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SAUL B. COHEN

## Jerusalem: A Geopolitical Imperative

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**MIDSTREAM**  
A MONTHLY JEWISH REVIEW

## Jerusalem: A Geopolitical Imperative

**N**O MATTER WHAT direction the immediate course of the Arab-Israeli conflict may take—limited Israeli territorial withdrawal in Sinai in exchange for an extended truce period; far-reaching withdrawals from Sinai and token territorial concessions in the Golan for formal non-belligerency; linked retreat from Sinai, alteration in the status of the Golan and return of much of the West Bank for a secure peace; or resumption of hostilities with, as one consequence, the extension of Israeli military control into "Fatahland" and other portions of Southern Lebanon—the long-range prospects are for a rollback of the Israeli presence from most of the territory gained from the June 1967 War. Israeli attitudes towards these additions to the 1967 Cease Fire borders have been ambivalent and ambiguous. Changing governmental policies reflect negotiation strategies and external pressures, as well as the political seesaw on which are balanced "minimalists" of various ideological hues, and "maximalists" who adhere to *Eretz Israel HaShelemah* (undivided Israel) for either ideological or security reasons.

In most of the Israeli discussions over the territorial future, however, a firm, "no negotiation" posture has been adopted on the issue of Jerusalem. Although Jerusalem is now on the diplomatic "back burner," the focus of attention being Sinai and the Golan, ultimately Jerusalem is likely to become

SAUL B. COHEN is the Director of the Graduate School of Geography at Clark University in Worcester, Mass.

the diplomatic focus. The Israeli policy of maintaining control over a united Jerusalem will be the greatest obstacle to Arab formal agreement on a permanent peace. Yet, paradoxically, a unified Israeli Jerusalem could, in the long run, help secure enduring peace, by serving to link Israel and a Palestinian state in geopolitically functional terms.

**T**HIS MAY BE better understood by viewing the Arab-Israeli conflict as taking place at two geographical levels: internal (Jews versus Arabs in former Palestine), and external (Israel versus the Arab states). The conflict within Palestine (and "Fatahland"), essentially guerrilla activity and small-scale military response, occurs in or near heavily populated Jewish areas. The scene of the external conflict, in which are arrayed massed armed forces, are border reaches removed from Jewish centers of population—along the Golan Heights, the Jordan River Valley and in Sinai. Prior to the War of 1967, the two forms of contention took place in the same geographical arenas; now they are spatially separated, even though linked politically and ideologically.

Most of the outside world, including Israel's Western friends, have, by espousing various United Nations resolutions calling for Israel's withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines, assumed that peace can be achieved despite a return to coterminous contention boundaries—the external and the internal. Israel's policy objectives, in contrast, seem to be to prevent a geographical relinking

of the military positions of the Arab states and the operational bases of the Palestinian guerrillas.

The various arguments over what territorial concessions Israel can afford to make, fail to distinguish clearly between the two different levels of contention. But the strategic implications to Israel of yielding territory in the Sinai and in the Golan are considerably different from the implications of abandoning military and settlement presences along the "Green Line" or in Gaza. With respect to its external, Arab state geographical relations, Israel may well be able to work out accommodations with Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and her viability as a state need not be threatened with such linked concessions. Such agreements might link territorial concessions to political declarations of recognition and non-belligerence; to limitations of armaments and disposition of armed forces; to establishment of demilitarized zones; to Great Power guarantees of the status quo.

With respect to internal (Palestinian) relations, Israel can scarcely make territorial concessions without undermining her viability as a state. This danger holds for the Gaza and Qualkilya-Latrun areas (adjoining Israel's Central regions), but it especially applies to the Jerusalem City-Region and Corridor, which is the strategic fulcrum for Israeli-Palestinian Arab relations. For outside powers that are trying to advance negotiations for a Middle Eastern peace, it is important to keep in mind that there is a lack of symmetry between the strategic significance to Israel of Sinai and the Golan, and the strategic significance of a united, expanded Jerusalem region. The purpose of what follows is to focus on the geopolitically-imperative quality of Jerusalem to Israel, and to suggest that the unity of an Israeli-governed Jeru-

salem advances rather than detracts from the prospects for ultimate peace between Israel and its neighbors.

**A** UNIFIED JERUSALEM is evolving as a system of two orders: one, a subsystem of the Israeli national geopolitical system, the other as a special-type system linking both Israel and the Palestinian Arab West Bank. This evolution casts the Jerusalem issue in a fundamentally different light, not merely from other territories, which prior to June 1967 were in Arab hands, but from what Jerusalem itself was prior to its formal reunification as part of Israel's national space.

The Jerusalem city-region has shown remarkable development as a region, a development which follows the organismic-developmental principles that characterize the growth and maturing of a general system. The system is highly complex, differentiated and integrated, both as a system unto itself and as a subsystem of Israel and of the West Bank. From two cities to one city; from a municipality to a city-region; from an area moderately open to outside influences to one that is highly open (flow of migrants, daily labor, tourists, capital, ideas)—the integrated system that is Jerusalem has acquired a life and status of its own. This makes its disposition far less amenable to the dictates of external mediators than it was in 1947 or in 1967.

What characterizes a developed system's ability to achieve integration above all is its feedback mechanisms. Prior to 1967, these were relatively weak. The Jordanians were fairly insensitive to the needs of Arab Jerusalem as a subsystem of the Jordanian Kingdom, and West Jerusalem was a weak appendage of the Jewish national state. Today, there are a variety of forces operating within Jerusalem that serve to influence Israel's national pol-

icy, rather than to accept it passively, chief among them being: the rise in a very powerful Jerusalemite "consciousness" among both traditional and non-observant Jews; the dependence of important sectors of the city's economy upon a large West Bank labor pool; and the increasingly interlocking nature of Jewish and Arab commerce and residence.

The attitudes and policies of the Jerusalem Jewish elite towards the development of the city are based on equalization of municipal services and employment and educational opportunities, and on maintenance of social and cultural pluralism. Nowhere else in Israel do Arabs and Jews face one another in such large numbers and so fully as equals, as in Jerusalem. That Jerusalem's municipal politics do not mirror Israeli national political trends and debates, but reflect wide-spread endorsement of the policy of Israeli-Arab living together, in spite of tensions and provocations that arise from the general pressures of the Arab-Israeli conflict, reflects the power of this commitment to Jerusalem's unity.

Jerusalem's Arabs, too, have a more direct role to play. Understandably they take an equivocal stand on the issue of the unity of the city. On the one hand, they strongly voice their Palestinian national aspirations for freedom from Israeli rule; on the other hand, they recognize and value the advantages of the city's unity. Because Jerusalem is so closely linked to Samaria and Judea, the Arabs of Jerusalem have a unique role to play in forging a special order of city-region system that seeks co-existence with Jerusalem's other order as a subsystem of Israel. If Jerusalem can remain an integrated arena for Arab-Israeli interaction, then it can continue to serve as a major feedback mechanism in forging policies be-

tween Israel and Palestinian Arabs on the future of the West Bank.

Finally, as a new geopolitical system evolves, the landscape takes on new political and cultural values. Jerusalem, the reflection of the past, mirrors the future. The Walled City remains, but its function has rapidly altered, decreasing in residential importance, increasing, relatively, in religious, commercial and tourist significance. The rest of the city has changed in rapid-fire fashion: suburbanization of former rural Arab villages; growth of modern, prosperous Arab suburbs; development of Israeli massive peripheral housing estates; expansion of national governmental, educational, hotel and commercial facilities; building of industrial zones, and enlargement of road and other communications and networks. These elements, like signs, lights, parks, and such cultural expressions as food, dress, language and social spirit, make for a "new" Jerusalem. It is this "new" Jerusalem that is a reality for Israel, the Arabs and the Christian world to contend with.

**J**ERUSALEM'S SPIRITUAL significance to Jews, Muslims and Christians is generally the starting point for discussions about its present role and future disposition. Indeed, up to the end of the nineteenth century, the city's growth and landscape characteristics were essentially stimulated by religion. For Jews not only of Israel but of the world, the division of Jerusalem from 1949 to 1967, attended by the denial to Jews of access to the Old City, and by the destruction or desecration of Arab-held Jewish holy sites and living quarters, became an unacceptable dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Arabs throughout the Middle East, the post-1967 unification and physical expansion of Jerusalem, attended by the loss of political sovereignty over

Arab holy sites and residential neighborhoods, has made the future of Jerusalem a central issue in the conflict. For many Christians, especially Roman Catholics represented by the Vatican, a national territorial status for Jerusalem, be this status Israeli/Jordanian or fully Israeli, has remained far less desirable than some form of internationalization. This is the logical consequence of a Christian view of Jerusalem as a place whose uniqueness for Christians can best be safeguarded, if no longer through the establishment of a Crusader-like Kingdom of the Middle Ages, then at least as an internationally-administered city, or as a city with extra-territorial status for its religious sites.

Religious feelings about Jerusalem are therefore deep, persistent, and tenaciously-held by all parties concerned, but an even more fundamental element is the geopolitical. To Israelis and Arabs the conflict over Jerusalem is a conflict for control of strategic space—a struggle that is not so much a consequence of broader issues in the conflict, as it is a mirror of this conflict. Jerusalem is the territorial imperative upon which Israel's *raison d'être* as a strategically-viable Eastern Mediterranean state is based. For the Arabs of the West Bank, Israel's security is their insecurity, as long as they persist in denying Israel's right to exist. No Palestinian state, West Bank or combined Jordanian-West Bank, will be defensible territorially without control or neutralization of Jerusalem.

In such a struggle, then, there is little opportunity for compromise. How can the contradictory needs of two competing national entities be met without diminishing one of the entities? In 1947, the United Nations' partition plan for Palestine proposed Arab and Jewish states, linked with internationalized Jerusalem, in an economic union. The

internationalized zone would have included Bethlehem in addition to Jerusalem, as well as the suburbs of the two cities, and been administered by a special international regime in relationship to the United Nation's Trusteeship Council. Described as the City of Jerusalem, the internationalized zone was to be a "corpus separatum," extending from Motza on the west to Shuafat on the north to Abu Dis on the east, to south of Bethlehem; this was an area considerably more extensive in the east and south than is a united Jerusalem today.

Had the Arabs accepted partition rather than war, and had either economic union or a federated state subsequently emerged, then a special status for Jerusalem would have been politically and operationally feasible, either under an international regime, or as a federal capital (with an international body to supervise the Holy places). Since 1948-49, and with each of the subsequent four wars, changes have come in the Israeli national territorial consciousness, with specific territories acquiring new values and sentiments. Today, a unified Jewish Jerusalem has become intrinsic to the Israeli perception of viability and territorial integrity. If we were to search for analogies, we could suggest that a united Jerusalem is as strong a geopolitical imperative to Israel as was Biafra to Nigeria; the Katanga to Zaire; Irian to Indonesia; the Baltic States, East Prussia and Eastern Poland to the Soviet Union; and Tibet to the People's Republic of China.

*The value that a people attach to territory as a result of bitter struggles that are conducted to assure their ties to this territory, especially struggles that are carried on with little external assistance, is a national value of the highest order.*

WHEN JEWS "ASCEND" to the mountain plateau of Jerusalem, that averages 750 meters above sea-level (lowest points are 600 meters and highest points are 835 meters), a variety of images are evoked, some religious, some historic-cultural and some physical-environmental. Careful analysis of the situation suggests that the "ascent" to Jerusalem is now far more than a matter of symbolism—it is an ascent to a modern day fortress region that safeguards much of the rest of the country. The steeply twisting modernized highway route that is 25 kilometers in length from its start at the head of Emek Ayyalon (Shaar HaGay) to the entrance to Jerusalem is the link between Israel the coastal plain enclave and the Israel of the mountains. Mountainous Palestine (Samaria, Judea, the Galilee) was the homeland of the Ancient Jews. At that time Jerusalem, on the crest of hills atop a mountain saddle that was 200 meters lower than the mountains of Beth El to the north and of Hebron to the south, was a junction of upland highways. The north-south road connected Beersheba with Schechem (Nablus) and Ginai (Jenin); the east-west road tied Jaffo to Jericho and Rabat Ammon (Amman). There were, of course, competitors perhaps even more favorably sited for this crossroads function, but the City of David acquired a religious significance that enabled it to maintain its primacy down through the ages. From its high accessibility site, protected by deep valleys and favored with an assured water supply, Jerusalem could dominate all of Judea, and was in a strong position to extend its influence throughout eastern Samaria. Jerusalem became in fact as well as in name the capital, the city up to which all Jews had an obligation to ascend.

It is an irony of history that the modern Jewish return to Palestine, starting

in 1882 and continuing to independence if not to 1967, should have taken place on the plains and not on the traditional mountain homeland. But the plains that had in Israelite times been inhabited by others were largely empty when the Zionist return began. The coastal plain, on occasions settled by Jews during their history of pre-modern settlement, and long since abandoned by Philistines, Phoenicians, Romans, Greeks and Crusaders had, with the coming of the Ottomans, fallen into decline and disuse. The Palestinian native stock, now largely Arab, remained or became an upland village peasantry. Of the relatively few Arabs whom modern Jewish settlers did encounter on the coast, many were nineteenth century immigrants, especially from Egypt. They had been attracted by railroad building and urbanization processes initiated by Europeans under the Ottoman rule. Later, with the onset of the British mandate after World War One and with heightened economic activities by Jews and the Mandatory government, conditions became even more favorable for immigration of non-indigenous Arabs into the coastal areas. By 1948-49, therefore, few of the Arabs with whom Jewish settlers interacted on the coastal plain were of native stock.

During this period of modern Jewish settlement, Jerusalem was the one upland area that attracted large-scale Jewish immigration to be added to the pre-existing Jewish population base that had been built up there during the Ottoman period. While Jewish settlement had retained a foothold in other upland areas for the four hundred years of Turkish rule (the holy cities of Safad and Tiberias in the Galilee, and the Judean city of Hebron), it was Jerusalem that was the largest Jewish center of settlement during this pre-modern period. Indeed, so pre-eminent

was Jerusalem that until World War One, more than half of all the Jews in Palestine continued to live there.

As residents of the only town in Palestine to have uninterrupted Jewish settlement (even during the ban of the late Crusader period), Jews were the dominant population for much of Jerusalem's history. They were the single largest group throughout the nineteenth century, consisting of 55% or more of the population for the last three quarters of a century. In 1896, the proportion of Jews to the total population was 62%; the corresponding figures for 1913, 1948, and 1967 were 64%, 61%, and 74%, and is 80% today.

An independent Israel was not, of course, physically restricted to the Coastal Plain, as it had not been to Zionist settlement previously. The interior valleys (Jezreel, Upper Jordan, the Arava) and the uplands of the Galilee and Negev were also part of the new state's territory. But rural Upland Galilee was already largely populated by Arabs who had remained after the establishment of the state, and the mountainous section of the Negev could support almost no population. In 1948-49, then, the Jerusalem Corridor and the City-Region, astride the routes to Samaria, Judea, and the Jordan Valley, provided the major focus for upland settlement, and thus for developing a more varied national landscape.

*A varied lowland-upland landscape is a basic national geopolitical objective. Jerusalem's city and corridor has links with historic Jewish settlement patterns and is the major focus for Israel's upland development.*

JERUSALEM'S RELATIVE LOCATION has shifted from peripheral to focal in the past eight years. If Jerusalem was

a primary objective for Israeli settlement efforts prior to 1967, it was also a problem region. It was on the periphery of the state, largely surrounded by hostile Arab forces, short of buildable land, and in danger of being pinched off from the coastal plain to which it was so tenuously tied. Israeli governmental policy was to develop Jerusalem as an administrative, educational and industrial center, linked to the lowlands by a chain of settlements that would be established in what up to then was a narrow, nearly empty corridor, only 10 to 15 kilometers wide and with only three Jewish and two Arab villages. This policy succeeded, despite serious obstacles, including investment capital shortages, the refusal of many foreign states to relocate their embassies in Jerusalem (which had been formally designated the capital of Israel in 1950), and the security problems along the Jordanian border. From 1948 to 1967, Jewish Jerusalem grew from 100,000 to 195,000. Moreover, nearly fifty settlements with 30,000 people were now to be found in the corridor, which was administratively divided into two districts, (one centering around Bet Shemesh and the other around Mevasseret Zion). In contrast to Israel's relatively successful efforts to develop its part of Jerusalem, the Jordanian-held section of the city evinced far less growth. Many Arabs had fled during 1948-49, and although some returned, and there was considerable internal growth, the outflow of population, attracted by employment opportunities in the Arab World and elsewhere, made for a net loss of population. Thus, for example, East Jerusalem's population declined from 76,000 to 68,000 between 1961 and 1967 (it had been 65,000 in 1948).

Despite the persistent and major efforts by the Israeli government to de-

velop Jerusalem as a frontier capital, the relative growth of Jerusalem did not keep pace with that of Israel as a whole. Jerusalem's share of the national population dropped from 9.6% in 1948 to 7.4% in 1966. (Prior to independence in 1946, Jerusalem's Jewish population had been 16% of the total Jewish population.) The city was no longer the upland junction that it had been from its founding through the first half of the twentieth century. It had become an outlier—a "dead end" at the eastern tip of a corridor *cul de sac*.

This temporary lowering of Jerusalem's locational status changed abruptly in 1967. Reunification of the city as a result of the Six Day War, with full access both to the coastal plain and to the West Bank, restored Jerusalem's focal location. What followed reunification was an unprecedented burst of economic activity and population growth. Jerusalem's share of the Israeli national population has nearly returned to the 1948 level. This growth has had two effects: (1) it has made Jerusalem an overwhelmingly Jewish city, more so than at any other point in modern times; (2) it has caused the old, Walled City to become dwarfed in population and area relative to the rest of Jerusalem. With a Jewish population of 250,000 and a non-Jewish population of 70,000, the population balance seems to have been irretrievably tipped, especially in view of the massive building projects now underway, and of the pull of Jerusalem for Jewish immigration. The geopolitical impact of Jerusalem's emergence as a largely Jewish city, and with a population not restricted to Western Jerusalem, but distributed in East Jerusalem and the Old City, is a new reality that has to be taken into account in addressing Arab demands for repatriation or for internationalization.

FOR THOSE ISRAELI Jews who desire a nearly all-Jewish state, a continued lessening of the proportion of Arab to Jewish population in Jerusalem is a desirable objective. The reality, however, is that just as Arabs cannot wish away the Jewish state, so Jews cannot wish away the Arab presence. If Jerusalem is to continue to serve as the unique locus for Arab-Jewish accommodation, measures ought to be taken to assure that the Arab population will not drop to such proportionate numerical inferiority as to lose its communal strength and integrity. For the current non-Jewish proportion of population (20%) to be maintained over the next quarter of a century, in the face of anticipated Jewish population growth, it would be necessary for this largely Arab population to increase by over 40,000, or by nearly 60%. While no absolute percentage can be fixed that would guarantee the Arab presence in Jerusalem as a viable community, there surely is need for the Israeli government to articulate and to promote Arab population growth goals.

In setting such goals, threshold requirements for supporting uniquely Arab educational, social and commercial services have to be articulated. A unified city whose population exceeds half a million would appear to require an Arab population of at least 100,000 to assure an adequate presence. Because the Arab internal growth rate is 4% per annum, the problem is not so much to find ways of attracting Arab migrants to Jerusalem, but rather to keep Jerusalemite Arabs from continuing to leave the city. The political climate of the Arab-Israeli conflict aside, employment, housing and educational training opportunities are the keys to promoting the growth of the Arab populace. The efforts that are now made to expand these opportunities reflect more of a municipal commitment than

a national Israeli commitment. From the standpoint of a strategy for peace, massive national investment for Jerusalem's Arabs in housing and in public service jobs at the middle and upper echelons may merit higher priority than an advanced defense line in Sinai, which is treated as much as a political or bargaining tactic as it is a military mechanism, and whose life is likely to be ephemeral.

The Old City, meanwhile, has become more and more of a "Treasure House" enclave. Its population relative to the total population of Jerusalem has declined from 20% at the end of 1946, to 9% in 1967, to about 7% today. Its land area, never large relative to the modern city that developed outside its walls in the nineteenth century, is about a square kilometer. In 1948, Old Jerusalem's area was 2.5% of the city's area, today it is only 1% (in 1922, in contrast, Old Jerusalem was about 5% of the municipal area). The decline of the Old City as living space, places greater emphasis on its role as a religious and commercial center. In this context, even though major planning and development efforts are underway to prevent the Walled City from becoming a "museum" by rebuilding some of its residential sections, it is not practical to conceive of a political fate for Old Jerusalem that is administratively separate from the city which surrounds it. On the other hand, international status for the Holy Places may be even more feasible, as the pressure of other activities, economic and residential, are decreased.


To speak of Jerusalem's growth potential now is to speak not only of a city, or even of a metropolitan area, but of a City-Region. During the first quarter of a century of Israeli independence, Jerusalem, the provincial outpost, was linked to the coastal plain by a string of rural settlements.

Today, a role may be forecast for Jerusalem as a focus for urbanization, the impact of which will be felt on upland and coastal areas thirty to forty kilometers distant. Not only are Jerusalem's suburbs extending northward and southward so that Ramallah and Bethlehem are in its orbit, but growth pressures both westward from Jerusalem and eastward from the Israeli Center (i.e., the area centering around Tel Aviv that extends from Netan Rehovot to Lod-Ramleh) may be expected to fill the Shefelah (Piedmont) and selected portions of the Upland Corridor. The western edges of the Shefelah around Bet Shemesh and Latrun are likely to attract major growth, especially as national pressures mount to protect the overcrowded coastal plain from additional residential, industrial and transportation uses. The final stretches of the modern highway from the Center to the capital are now under construction, and some of the Corridor's rural settlements are already beginning to convert to urban functions. By the end of the next quarter of a century, a Central Upland region to include the Shefelah (Latrun-Emek Ayyalon and Bet Shemesh-Nahal Soreq), the mountain passageway, and Metropolitan Jerusalem may well embrace a population of over one million and will be a continuous part of Israel's Central Region. The Jerusalem District Plan calls for a 1992 population of 565,000 for the city and 80,000 for the Corridor, without reference to what may transpire in Emek Ayyalon.

*The shift in relative location of Jerusalem from peripheral to focal has stimulated its growth in unprecedented fashion and enhanced its value as a City-Region to the country as a whole.*

WHAT ARE THE implications of the growth of Jerusalem City? For those who will live in this urbanized

# JERUSALEM: INDIVISIBLE CITY



upland, the environmental advantages are many: the natural beauty of mountains, trees, water and, to the east, desert; the brisk climate of sunny but cool summers and mild winters; forests for recreation; availability of building stone; amenities of national and international educational and cultural institutions; an ambience that is a unique blending of past, present and future. Jerusalem's planners have already profited from the negative experiences of the large-scale, unplanned growth of the Center. In Jerusalem physical and social planning is well advanced. This is not to gloss over the fact that the hectic building pace that has been generated out of security and political considerations has on more than one occasion permitted unaesthetic or poorly located development, or rationalized economic gain from excessively high-rise structures.

Major problems attend the growth and serve as challenges to the development of the city as a system. Unification of the city was accompanied by an outward extension of Jerusalem's boundaries to the north, south and east, into areas of both urban and rural Arab settlement. Unified Jerusalem today includes ten former Arab municipalities and West Jerusalem and, with an area of 100 square kilometers, is more than three times as large in area as was Jerusalem in 1947 (30 square kilometers). In the expanded city, large-scale, clustered apartment building has taken place to create new Jewish anchor points. In the first stage of growth, the Mount Scopus enclave was linked to Jewish Jerusalem by the construction of several thousands of housing units in Ramat Eshkol, in Givat HaMivtar and, adjoining Mount Scopus to the north, in Givat Shapira (Givah Zarfatit). Most recently, four large-scale developments have been sited at the new outer boundaries (north at Naveh

Yakov and Ramot [Nabi Samuil] on the road to Ramallah and Nablus; and, south, on the road to Bethlehem, at Natziv HaArmon looking eastward to the Judean desert, and at Giloh looking southwest to Beit Jalah). These massive apartment housing estates are designed on a sufficiently large-scale to provide the security of the majority.

**A**NOTHER ISSUE is that these residential areas are peripheral developments—if they are to be fully integrated with the core of the city, there will have to be radical changes in that core (e.g., the road system that runs through the center, adequate parking facilities, expanded commercial and other services). An option is to have the outlying housing estates develop independent service and employment structures. Such a development would mean loss of the efficiencies and amenities of a city's center, and the weakening of the quality of integrated city life. Jerusalem will have to choose: will these outlying northern and southern suburbs (and the western ones built in the 1950s and early 1960s) become isolated and semi-independent, as so often has occurred in American metropolitan growth, or will they be integrated, in form and function, with the central portions of the city?

Other problems that come with growth include: integration of the Old Walled City and the Jewish Commercial Center that adjoins it, a problem of increasing complexity as the modern commercial core in the Jewish sector expands away from Zion Square and thus away from the Walled City; the centripetal forces affecting university life, with the building of two separate major Hebrew University campuses (at Givat Ram and at Mount Scopus); the pressures to concentrate national government functions in one major area; and the competition for space between

commercial and residential areas on the one hand, and industrial areas on the other. Perhaps above all, there is the problem of how to maintain the quality of life of what was not so long ago a small city, in the face of pressures for growth. When does a city reach the point of not being "manageable" or "livable"? When does a city reach the point that its residents lose touch with the leadership and with one another? Some key benchmarks are when people become overwhelmed by the noise and fumes of traffic; when the individuality of neighborhoods is overwhelmed by the mass of the city; when population crowding and loss of open spaces become oppressive to the individual. While there is no precise population ceiling which, if exceeded, would rob Jerusalem of its unique qualities, there are, clearly, certain density danger points that must be carefully monitored if Jerusalem is to remain Jerusalem. Those guiding Jerusalem's growth are its guardians—they must answer to future as well as present generations, to Muslims and Christians as well as to Jews.

Part of what makes Jerusalem unique is that it is heterogeneous—a city of minorities, both of Jews and non-Jews. For Jews there are the observant (ultra-orthodox and orthodox) and the non-observant; the Ashkenazi and the Sepharadi; the Anglo-Saxons, the Germans and the East Europeans; the Yemenites, the Bokharians, the Kurds, the Iraqis and the Moroccans; the intellectuals and the workers. For the non-Jews there are the Christians—Armenians, Greeks, Western Europeans, Ethiopians and Russians; and the Muslims—urbanites, rural villagers and Bedouin; the Old City dwellers and the East Jerusalem suburbanites; the prosperous merchants and professionals, and the peddlars and street cleaners. How to maintain the richness of this ethnic

and religious tapestry, in the face not only of the normal social and economic tensions that characterize such a mixed urban area, and of the international political pressures that work to divide the Jerusalem scene, but also of the clear minority status into which non-Jews have been cast, is an unparalleled challenge. On the other hand, keen awareness of these problems, accentuated by the fact that "the entire world is looking on," creates a challenge-response situation that appears to be bringing about a faster development of the city-region.

*The uniqueness of each part of Jerusalem evokes very special responses to the challenge of integrating it as a system. With successive responses comes greater integration and greater dependence of the life of the whole on the parts.*

**E**XPANDED JERUSALEM, unified and under Israeli control, may find new political ways of integrating the needs of the Muslim and Christian populace. Municipal self-government for Arab Jerusalem (with its own mayor and elected council) in some sort of Borough Council System; dual citizenship for Arabs (in the Israeli state and in whatever Arab national government emerges in the West Bank); international supervision of Muslim and Christian Holy Places and guaranteed access through the country and the city to these Places—these are all possibilities for a city with unified services, communications, planning, economy, tax system, and security forces.

Whatever arrangements are ultimately made, few are likely to be seriously entertained by Israel if they should undermine the fundamental character of a unified City-Region controlled by Israel and open to Jewish

movement and settlement throughout its boundaries. The unfolding strategy of the Israeli development of Jerusalem is comprehensive. In the north the new housing estates of Ramot and Naveh Yakov, and the rebuilt international Atarot airport dominate Ramallah and its Muslim twin town Bira, by reaching to within three to five kilometers of these Arab centers and thereby dominating all of the Beth El Mountains region. From this point the Israeli presence has easy reach to Nablus, the center and main city of eastern Samaria. The Ramot development commands a number of Arab villages northwest of Jerusalem and adjoins the height of Ramot. This height overlooks a very ancient ridge road that presents an alternative route through the West Bank via Givon to the coastal plain at Latrun or Lod. The development also commands a Jerusalem by-pass route that leads southwestward to the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway via Abu Gosh. Naveh Yakov controls a by-pass route to the Jordan Valley northeast of Jerusalem, past Anata to the Jericho road. In this area too, the Anatot industrial zone has been set aside for development as a mixed industrial-trucking center.

To the south new Israeli suburbs dominate Bethlehem and the Hebron Mountains region, and thus the rest of Judea. The southeastern development at Armon HaNatziv overlooks the major Arab villages east of Jerusalem (Abu Dis, Sur Bahir), and dominates the eastern suburbs of Bethlehem. The southwestern development of Giloh is on the municipal boundary of Bethlehem and adjoins Beit Jala, the latter a commanding height from which Jordanian artillery once were trained on Jerusalem. In combination, these two developments serve as modern urbanized counterparts to the neighboring Beit Jala-Bethlehem-Beit Sahur district. Only twenty-five kilometers from

Hebron, they readily extend Jerusalem's reach to this center of Arab Judea.

These northern and southern suburban outgrowths of Jerusalem are major projections which impose the Israeli presence on the key Arab urban centers of Judea and Samaria. They also serve as "hinges" to Jewish agricultural settlements in Judea (Gush Etzion), to the Jewish urban quarter of Hebron, Kiryat Arba, and, potentially, to some of the settlements in the Jordan Valley. Finally, the four developments which lie along the north-south axis of the Mediterranean-Jordan Valley water divide are located at sites that command the deeply incised valleys that form the rim of the Jerusalem plateau. Ramot is at the head of southwestward-flowing Nahal Soreq and Giloh is at the head of northwestward-flowing Nahal Refaim. The latter stream joins the former which, fed by another major stream (Nahal Quesalon) flows westward to the Mediterranean south of Tel Aviv. On the slopes of this drainage basin are situated the major highway and railroad to the coast, the latter following the valley of Nahal Refaim from its entrance into Jerusalem. Naveh Yakov is at the head of eastward flowing Wadi Farah that becomes Wadi Kelt and flows into the Jordan River at Jericho, and Armon HaNatziv overlooks the southeastward-flowing Nahal Kidron. This stream cuts through Judean Desert Bedouin lands on its route to the Dead Sea. The four drainage basins cut by these water courses form a diamond-shaped protective moat (open on the east central side) around Jerusalem.

To complete the circle of the Jerusalem outreach, a major Israeli development has been planned east of the city. This is the industrial estate to be built at Maale Adummim, thirteen kilometers outside of Jerusalem's city limit.

Maale Adummim perches on the road to Jericho and the Dead Sea only another thirteen kilometers away and overlooks the drainage basin of Wadi Kelt. It is projected as a major site for Jerusalem's industrial expansion, and will build residential quarters (current proposals are for Jewish residential settlement near the site and a mixed Arab-Jewish labor pool). Even though Maale Adummim is not within Jerusalem's corporate limits, the decision of the Israeli government to build there reflects a firm commitment to the economic development of Jerusalem as a region, with links to West Bankers as well as Israelis. Ultimately, this industrial development may become the eastern terminus of a major circumferential highway linking the main Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road to the Jericho road via the northern part of the city near Ramot. When completed, Maale Adummim's development will represent a major strategic as well as economic Israeli presence, and will command Jericho and the lower Jordan Valley.

**F**ULFILLMENT OF ALL of Jerusalem's growth plans will have a greater strategic impact on the West Bank than small-scale, scattered Jewish agriculture settlements, be they near Hebron, in the Jordan Valley or, as desired by some Israelis, near Nablus. But this growth needs to be seen in economic-cultural, as well as strategic, terms. Jerusalem is rapidly becoming the modern, primary center for the most populous part of West Bank—from Nablus to Hebron to Jericho. The growth of Jerusalem means employment, daily commerce and a broad variety of services for the Arabs of the West Bank. It surely means a form of economic and social integration that is bringing the two peoples closer than single-dimensional schemes of political federalism

could or rural settlements by both peoples that are located side-by-side, but that have little interaction.

For Israel to become an Upland as well as a Coastal state could mean de facto integration with the Arabs of the Palestinian Upland. Such an integration was probably not anticipated by proponents of the original United Nations approved partition plan, or by many who espoused a bi-national state. These schemes were predicated on two separate peoples living in two separate parts of Palestine. Should the Palestinian Arabs continue to refuse to seek a political accommodation with Israel, a unified Jerusalem City-Region means strategic inferiority for them, without major compensating benefits. Should the Palestinian Arabs choose the path of political cooperation, however, this strategic element will one day lose its overriding significance. For at such a time, the fruits of economic unity and socio-cultural interrelationship will acquire greater saliency. This turn of events could bring Arabs and Jews into new and unforeseen dimensions of bi-national co-existence. It is in this context that the growth and development of a unified Jerusalem ought to be viewed—not as a hindrance to peace, but as a major element in the process of interaction that can stimulate the desire for peace. Open conflict, an option claimed by the Palestinians or other Arabs, is not likely to lead to the repartition favored by Arabs, given Israel's recognized military superiority over the Arab forces arrayed against it.

*Jerusalem has extended its strategic and economic reach over the most important parts of Arab Palestine, making for a set of links between Israel and the heart of the West Bank which are not to be easily broken.*

**T**HE GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES that have been discussed include: Jerusalem as a mythic territorial imperative of Israel; Israel's need to link her coastal and upland areas; Jerusalem's change in relative location from peripheral to focal; the response to the challenge of Jerusalem's growth by creation of a highly integrated system; and Jerusalem as a fulcrum for Israel's military and economic relations with the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank, establishing links that cannot be easily broken.

That Israel's attitude towards the disposition of Jerusalem has changed, is in keeping with geopolitical realities. For such realities are not fixed in space and in time. They change as the relationship between a people and its environment is altered. With variations in the role, status and values of a people, and the substance and value of the environment (including other people), new sets of transactions between a people and its environment emerge: out of these transactions are forged new geopolitical situations.

Israel's attitudes on the Jerusalem question should be viewed in the above context. Shifts in attitude reflect basic differences in Israel's geopolitical situation. Three stages may be discerned.

In the first stage, just before and during most of the War of Independence, Israel favored or was willing to accept some form of international status for Jerusalem. Then, Israel was militarily weak; in 1947 Israel hoped to achieve independence without war with the Arabs; it felt itself dependent upon outside powers, either to prevent the war from breaking out or to stop the war before it got out of hand. The old, Walled City, together with the newer, eastern Arab sections, was nearly as populous as was the western, Jewish sector. With over one-third of the total non-Jewish population, most of the

commerce of East Jerusalem, and its Holy Places, the Walled City was not merely the focus of international attention, but had prominence in the day-to-day life of the city. During this first stage, Israel was especially sensitive to international feelings. Had the outside world demonstrated the willingness and capacity to impose a peace, rather than simply cease-fire resolutions, Israel's attitude on the Jerusalem question would most probably have remained constant.

Then, for eighteen years, Jerusalem was partitioned between Jordan and Israel. Israel's initial acceptance of partition was based on the premise that some aspects of exchange across the boundary would be permitted. As the Jordanians denied Jews access to Jewish Holy Places, as they desecrated or destroyed certain sites, and as the outside world failed to take specific counter-measures (indeed, it seldom even protested), the Israeli attitude underwent a change. For the Christian world to continue to speak of internationalization as a means of safeguarding access to and control of Holy Places was viewed by many Israelis as self-serving. "Access" and "safeguarding" of Holy Places had, in the international arena, come to mean access and safeguarding for Christians and Muslims, but not for Jews. Israel nevertheless evinced a willingness to live with the status quo of partition, because it felt that accommodation with Jordan was the major route to peace and stability.

From June 1967 to the present, Israel has insisted on retaining control of a unified city. Jordan's entrance into the June 1967 War was not desired by Israel, which had demonstrated unequivocally its willingness to accept the status quo in Jerusalem and elsewhere along the Jordanian border. But with the Jordanian decision to join the other Arab forces, and the subsequent shattering defeat of its Legion, Israel no

longer had to accept partition of Jerusalem as part of its cease-fire arrangements with Jordan.

Instead, a new phase was entered—the present one. In this phase the issue of Jerusalem is viewed by Israel as one in which the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank are the major protagonists, not the Jordanians, nor the Christian world and not the Saudi Arabians. From an Israeli standpoint the arena of debate over Jerusalem has shifted from one which in the time of the Mandate included Palestinian Arabs, Jews and European powers, to the arena of 1967, in which the contenders were Israel and Arab national states (especially Jordan), to the present arena which is likely to center largely on Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. The debate now not merely reflects the general political and power relationships between the two peoples; it also reflects the characteristics of urban interaction at an expanded scale never previously experienced.

**T**HIS IS THE present geopolitical reality. Any basic changes in Israel's attitude on Jerusalem may be anticipated to flow from a change in the power relationships between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. If the outside world should seek to impose a solution, be this international-

ization or a new partition of the city, such attempts are much more likely to bear new seeds of conflict.

While dormant in recent years as an issue, the Jerusalem problem has resurfaced with the late King Faisal's decision to tie the future of the city to international oil politics. The U.S. effort to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict has thus far concentrated on the Egyptian and Syrian, or on the external, front. Whether Saudi Arabian threats of renewed oil boycotts will now direct the solo American effort or a reconvened Geneva Conference to press Israel to return East Jerusalem to the Arabs, as was so strongly demanded by Faisal, remains to be seen.

To American policy-makers in their efforts to bring about peace, the question of how far Israel can be pushed to make concessions is surely a critical dimension in the negotiations. It is therefore most important to keep three things in mind: that Jerusalem is a very different territorial imperative to Israel than are its distant borders; that there are advantages in continuing to treat Jerusalem as a separate issue of negotiation between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs; and that there is a likelihood that pressures to internationalize Jerusalem no longer carry the weight that they once did, given the radically different geopolitical role that the City-Region now plays.

**DATE DUE**

