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AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE THEORIES AND PRACTICES OF DIFFERENT JEWISH RELIGIOUS SERVICE STRUCTURES

BY

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DIGEST

As with all things in the Jewish historical continuum, many changes have taken place in the structure, contents, and theological bases of the various Jewish religious service systems. This paper is an inquiry into the nature of the different service systems, the similarities and differences between them, and the philosophical foundations upon which they are based. The stipulative definition of a religious service is: A religious service is a fixed structure of words and/or acts followed by a group of persons in community or by an individual alone, as a vehicle leading directly or indirectly to salvation.

In the sacrificial services of the canonized Pentateuch, we find a rigidly controlled formal occasion in which a priest-agent serves as the mediator between the deity and man. The essential act of the service is the sacrifice itself, and the efficacy of the service is that (to the believers), in return for the sacrifice, the deity will grant salvation in the form of this worldly prosperity. The deity is seen as a human-like person with super-natural powers. He exercises miraculous providence over those who adhere to His commandments.

The deity in the Pharisaic system is seen as a transcendent, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent person who is directly concerned with man. He expresses this concern by a providence that guides and controls the affairs

of man both through ordinary and extraordinary causation. One relates to this deity by means of words addressed to Him in prayer, in conversation. God is more personal than in the sacrificial cult system where he was removed to the extent that the priest-agent was necessary to relate to Him. Although He cannot be coerced, prayer is efficacious. The essential act in the service is talking to deity, and the salvation hoped for is a share in some form of an after-life.

The religious service based upon the philosophy of Maimonides serves two purposes. The literal meaning of the prayers gives direction to the uninformed so that they might lead better and happier lives. The esoteric meaning of the service provides the intellectual elite with truth and the means to achieve salvation. One cannot relate to God or know what he is. One can know only what he is not. The road to salvation is seen as the actualization of the intellect and in intercourse with the active intellect. For the intellectual elite, the service serves as a means and stimulus toward reaching salvation.

Cronbach takes the language of the prayerbook to be entirely ambiguous. Analyzing the functions of words, he shows that each individual means something different from every other individual when he engages in the activities of the religious service. The word, God, itself is ambiguous, and allows for various interpretations and uses. The aim of the service is to engender a feeling and attitude of

mutualism - of human friendship. That, says Cronbach, is salvation. Each person arrives at this mutualistic condition in his own way, depending on the meanings he gives to the various prayers in the service. Here, again, the essential act of the service is not a talking to the deity.

Kaplan's conception of God is that He is the Power that makes for salvation. Salvation is understood as deliverance from those evils, external and internal, which prevent man from realizing his maximum potentialities. The fact that the cosmos possesses the resources and man the abilities to enable him to overcome evil and frustration and thus, to fulfill his destiny as a human being, is the God-hood of the cosmos. Kaplan sees Judaism as a civilization, and the essential act of the service is the act of affirming loyalty to that civilization. In worship, Jews must express their self-identification with the Jewish people. The aim of the service, then, is to promote loyalty to the group, primarily a sociological act.

Religion, says Reines, is man's response to his finitude. The Reform Jewish community is a polydox community, one in which each Reform Jew has the freedom to develop his own response to his finitude. Given this freedom, no religious service whose language implies a particular God concept will be adequate to meet the diverse ideologies and needs within the polydox Reform Jewish community. What is needed is a new book of services, the literal value of whose

language will not subvert any proper participant's activity in the service. The only kind of service that would meet these qualifications is one whose language is totally equivocal. That is, the language of the service would be such that its literal meaning could accomodate any theological position and any response to finitude.

The common symbolism of Reform Judaism must be such that it is rooted in the nature of the real-life situations of the modern Reform Jew. It should take into consideration the secular calendar and its influence, and make the Shabbath such that it will have multiple significances. New symbols should be created to realize the spiritual possibilities of an industrial and scientific society. The Reform religious service, then, should be such that it enables each individual to make his own outhentic response to his most perplexing problem - his finitude.

To my wife

Renee

whose love, patience and understanding
have enabled us to realize our second dream

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INTRODUCTION

A common erroneous assumption that Jews make today is that the religious service structure as they know it (whether it is orthodox, conservative, or reform) is the Jewish religious service, and there is and has been no other. Their contact with only their own familiar form of religious service prevents them from realizing that, as with all things in the Jewish historical continuum, many changes have occurred. These changes are found both in the outward structures of the service, and in their theoretical foundations. Sometimes the differences are clear and obvious; more often, however, they are more subtle, and require close scrutiny and careful study to discern them. For example, the formal mode of relating to deity implicit in the sacrificial cult, where the priests act as agents of the people in the act of sacrificing, is quite different from the close person to person relationship implicit in the prayer service of the Pharisaic system. The idea of salvation in the sacrificial system (some form of this worldly prosperity) is substantially different from the idea of a portion in the world to come found in the Pharisaic system. And neither of these in the least resembles the idea of salvation as understood by Maimonides.

The purpose of this paper is to make an inquiry into the nature of the different service systems, the similari-

ties and differences between them, and the philosophical foundations upon which they are based. Further, as a result of this inquiry, we hope that it will be clear that new forms of religious services, and, in fact, new theological foundations for those services, are needed for the inquiring and demanding questions and needs of the twentieth century Reform Jew.

The first question that arises in our inquiry is just what is it that constitutes a service. The dictionary definition is an aid to us here. We learn that the word, service, is defined as "...a form or ritual of worship (as public worship) established for customary use, celebration or observance.... the performance of religious worship especially according to settled public forms or conventions."[1] Several elements are present in these definitions. We note that two stand out as being required: the public element involved, and the element of a fixed form of service. What is missing from these definitions is a notion of the purpose or purposes of the service. Toward what end does it lead? What is the desired result of a service? It is our contention that the desired result in every case of a religious service is some form of salvation.

For the purposes of this paper, then, we stipulate the following as a definition of the word, service. A service is a fixed structure of words and/or acts followed by a

group of persons in community or by an individual alone, as a vehicle leading directly or indirectly to salvation. With this definition in mind, we can proceed with our analysis of some of the different service structures.

CHAPTER I

THE SACRIFICIAL CULT

The sacrificial services that appear in the canonized Pentateuch present to us service structures that are coherent with our definition. An examination of some of the descriptions of those services reveals certain implicit ideas as to how the deity was understood, what was man's relation to the deity, and what was the hoped-for result and the efficacy of the particular sacrifice.[1]

In general, the deity is seen as an omnipotent person who is exacting in obedience to laws which He has given as guides for correct conduct and ritual procedure. He is the source of punishment and prosperity, and He can be influenced by man's attention to or neglect of proper conduct and ritual. It must be noted that, in the service itself, it is the proper mode of sacrifice that is essential. Ethical acts may be understood to be a necessary condition for a sacrifice to be efficacious. But it is correct ritual procedure, a fixed structure of acts, which is explicitly required.

Man is seen as subordinate to, and desiring to be on constant good terms with, the deity. Salvation is seen as this worldly prosperity,[2] and a proper relation with the deity is understood as a form of this salvation or as a necessary condition for salvation. The sacrifice itself is the essential act whereby that relation can be maintained or

restored.

The rigidly controlled formality of the sacrificial service introduces to us further elements of how the deity is understood and how man relates to him. One need only glance at the numerous regulations concerning sacrifices as they appear in the Pentateuch to realize their extent and importance. Little is left undirected. The role played by the priest is of prime importance. It is he who acts as the necessary agent of the individual and the community in the sacrificial act. Rather than making an offering to the deity oneself, the individual brings it to the priest who offers it for him. And the agent, himself, must follow correct procedures in order for the sacrifice to be efficacious. The ritual procedure and the role played by the priest are, in other words, as important as the sacrifice itself in effecting the desired result - a state of salvation.

The consequence of such rigidity and control is obvious and important. The role of the priest as a necessary mediating agent, and the great formality in the rites of the sacrificial service place significant limits on an individual's personal relation with the deity. Indeed, relating to deity is a formalistic community enterprise, rather than an informal, close, personal one. The priest-agent and the formal structure make the service non-humanly related. An individual simply cannot, and does not expect to, feel

close to the deity.

We have noted that salvation in the sacrificial service is understood as some form of this worldly prosperity. This kind of salvation is manifested in any number of ways. It may be the granting of good harvests, wealth, health, or forgiveness. It may mean escape from harm, punishment or destruction. Or it may mean a proper relation with the deity - a relation that is a conditio sine qua non for other forms of salvation. In all cases it means a desirable state of living in this world. That this is, indeed, the notion of salvation in the sacrificial system can be seen from the numerous attempts to bring about such states by means of a sacrifice, and by the conspicuous absence of a desire for any alternative forms of salvation. One would be hard-pressed to find, for example, a notion of or desire for some form of an after-life in the sacrificial system. Leviticus 25:18-19 gives an accurate notion of the idea of salvation in this system. "You must observe my statutes, and be careful to observe my ordinances, that you may live in security upon the earth; then shall the earth yield its fruitage, and you shall eat your fill, and live in security upon it."[3]

We turn now to four particular examples of the sacrificial act in order to demonstrate each of the elements mentioned above. Leviticus 7:11ff. informs us about the laws for the sacrifice of the thank-offering. In the midst of the discussion of this sacrifice we are given a particular

indication of the reason for the offering.

> This is the law for the thanksgiving sacrifice: if the one who offers it to the Lord would offer it as a praise-offering, he must offer, in addition to the sacrifice of the praise-offering, unleavened cakes mixed with oil, unleavened wafers smeared with oil, and cakes mixed with oil, of fine flour well mixed. In addition to his sacrifice in praise for prosperity he must present cakes of leavened bread along with his offering, and from each kind of offering he must present one cake as a contribution to the Lord, to go to the priest who dashes the blood of the thank-offering. The flesh of the victim sacrificed as his praise-offering for prosperity must be eaten on the day that it is offered; he must leave none of it over until morning.[4]

It is clear here that the individual offers the sacrifice as thanks for the "this worldly prosperity" he has received from the deity. Man is seen as the grateful recipient of divine favor, and to ensure continuance of that favor, he shows his gratitude by offering the deity part of his prosperity. In so doing, he fortifies his desirable relation with the deity, and strengthens his chances for continued prosperity (salvation).[5] The role of the priest-agent is not so clear here as it is in other places. The formalistic element is obvious, however, in the detailed directions one must follow in the process of sacrificing. And the idea of distance between the offerer and the deity is implicit in the fact that the offerer does not express his wishes or intentions to the deity in person to person terms.

The guilt-offering indicates another dimension of

man's relation to the deity. If an individual commits a misdeed, he must offer a sacrifice in order to receive the forgiveness of the deity for his sin. That is, the sacrifice is essential in order for the individual to escape the punishment of the deity and to re-establish a desirable relation with him. Leviticus 5:15-16 serves as an illustration.

> If any person commits fraud, sinning inadvertently in the matter of sacred gifts to the Lord, he must bring as his guilt offering to the Lord a perfect ram from the flock of the proper value in silver shekels, in terms of the sacred shekel; he must also make good the sacred gift concerning which he sinned, adding a fifth to it, and giving it to the priest, and the priest shall make atonement for him with the ram of the guilt-offering, and he shall be forgiven.

In this case, forgiveness by the deity (salvation) is dependent on restitution in the form of "making good the sacred gift" concerning which he sinned, and the offering of the guilt-offering. There is no indication that simply "making good the sacred gift" is sufficient. The guilt-offering is necessary, also, and efficacious in bringing about the desired forgiveness of the deity. Indeed, the offering of the sacrifice is the essential act in the restoration of a proper relation with the deity.

We see here, also, the importance of the role played by the priest. It is he, acting as the agent for the sinner, who offers the sacrifice. There is not the slightest hint of any person to person relation between the sinner and the deity. God is removed from the individual to the extent

that a surrogate (the priest) is necessary in any relation with him.

Leviticus 19:20-22 offers another example.

> If a man has sexual intercourse with a woman, who is a slave, betrothed to another man, but who has never been redeemed, nor given her freedom, there shall be an investigation; they shall not be put to death, because she was not free, but he must bring his guilt-offering to the Lord at the doorway of the tent of meeting, a ram as a guilt-offering, whereupon the priest shall make atonement for him with the guilt-offering ram before the Lord for the sin that he has committed, and he shall be forgiven for the sin that he committed.

Here the individual has committed a misdeed regarding sexual matters, and, again, there is the need to return to a right relation with the deity. The deity is seen as the source of forgiveness, and the sacrifice is seen as the effective means by which forgiveness is gained, the relationship restored, and a state of salvation reached.[6] The priest's pre-eminent role as the agent mediating between the deity and the offerer is obvious. It is he who makes atonement for the offerer by sacrificing the offering to the deity. Again, implicit in the need for the role played by the priest-agent is the idea that the deity is removed from the individual. No personal relation is possible between the deity and the offerer, and none is sought. If one wants to communicate with the deity, he must do so through the proper agent.

We have given examples of the thank-offering sacrifice

and the guilt-offering sacrifice. We turn now to the sin offering sacrifice. We must note that the theoretical differences between these sacrifices are not our concern in this paper. Rather, we are concerned with the means which the people used to make their offerings, the philosophical implications involved in those means, and the ends which they hoped the sacrifices would serve. Leviticus 4:22-26 describes the sacrifice of a sin-offering.

> When a ruler sins and inadvertently does any one of all the things which the Lord his God has forbidden, he shall incur guilt, provided that the sin which he has committed has been made known to him. So he must bring a perfect male goat as his offering. He must lay his hand on the head of the goat, and slaughter it at the place where the burnt-offering victims are slaughtered before the Lord; it is to be a sin-offering. The priest shall take some of the blood of the sin-offering with his finger, and put it on the horns of the altar for burnt-offerings, while the rest of the blood he shall pour out at the base of the altar for burnt-offerings, and burn all the fat on the altar, as in the case of the fat of the thanks-giving sacrifice. Thus shall the priest make atonement for him for his sins, and he shall be forgiven.

All of the elements mentioned above in regard to the thank-offering and the guilt-offering are present here, as well. Man sees the deity as the source of certain commands, and as possessing the power to inflict punishment for infractions of those commands. Thus, when a law has been broken, it is advisable to seek the forgiveness of the deity in order to avoid punishment and to restore the proper relation with him. In this particular case, it is the sacrifice of the

sin-offering that is the essential act in the restoration of that relation. By following prescribed formal directions when he offers the sacrifice, the sinner influences the deity in his favor. Here again, the formal directions require the priest-agent to bring the sacrifice to the deity for the offerer. The correct ritual procedure is most important, and the result of the formal rigidity is the negation of the possibility of any person to person relation between the offerer and the deity.

Several elements, therefore, are now clear with regard to the sacrificial service. That it is a rigidly controlled, formal occasion is made quite explicit by the numerous regulations governing the mode of sacrificing, and by the important function fulfilled by the priest-agent. Implicit in this formalism and in the role of the priest-agent is a separatedness that lies between the offerer and the deity. Man simply cannot feel close to his God. In this non-humanly related service, God is too formal and distant for an individual to communicate with him on a person to person basis. The sacrifice is the essential act in one's attempt to seek salvation - in one's attempt to seek some form of this worldly prosperity.

Implicit in the service, also, is the idea that there is a limit to what the deity can do for an individual. We have noted that salvation in the sacrificial system was not conceived of as some form of life after death. The

deity could not (or would not) save one from dying. We will see later how this notion differs radically with the idea of salvation in the Pharisaic system.

CHAPTER II

THE PHARISAIC SYSTEM

The Sadducees are the heirs of the sacrificial cult. As such, they consistently maintained that the ritual and sacrificial features of the sacrificial service should be carried out under their direction. Additions to the authoritative Torah, or innovations in the prescribed mode of relating to deity were anathema to them. Bright describes their position.

> These [Sadducees] drew their strength from the priestly aristocracy and the secular nobility associated with them.... In a certain sense they could claim to be conservatives, for they accorded authority only to the Torah.... It is probably that their foremost concern was that the Temple cult should be prosecuted and the law, especially its ritual and sacrificial features, carried out under the supervision of the constituted priesthood. Whatever they may have thought God's ultimate purpose for Israel to be, their aim in the present was to see to it that this status quo was maintained.... For them, in effect, the future of Judaism was to continue as a hierocratic cult community under the Pentateuchal law.[1]

We have noted above[2] several theological notions that are implicit in the sacrificial cult. That the Sadducees, as the heirs of the cult, held to different notions, we have no reason to believe. Indeed, the maintaining of their status was dependent on the notion that the sacrificing of an offering was the essential act in relating to a deity that was otherwise distant from man.

Along with the sacrificial worship led by the

Sadducaic priesthood at the second Temple, there developed the synagogue as the real seat of religious worship. The synagogue so completely satisfied the religious needs of the people, that the cessation of the sacrificial cultus at the destruction of the Temple in A.D. 70 was not even a serious crisis.[3] The Pharisees, as the religious party of the populous, inherited the synagogue movement,[4] and it is the liturgy of the Pharisaic synagogue which has come down to us in the form of the traditional siddurim and the Union Prayer Book. That liturgy is very informative. In the beginning of his chapter on prayer, Moore notes:

> The true nature of a religion is most clearly revealed by what men seek from God in it. The public and private prayers of the Jews thus show not only what they esteemed the best and most satisfying goods, but their beliefs about the character of God and his relation to them, and their responsive feelings toward him.[5]

We turn now to an examination of the Pharisaic service in order to determine the "true nature" of that religion of which we are the inheritors.

The Pharisaic service differs from the Sadducaic sacrificial cult on several very explicit points. The Pharisees held that there was an unwritten law, a code not written in the Law of Moses, but handed down orally from a continuous succession of fathers. This code was as binding as the Pentateuch itself. Along with holding to the divinity of this code, the Pharisees differed with the Sadducees in believing in the revival of the body, the

survival of the soul, life in the world to come, and a great day of judgment. The Sadducees rejected these, since they found no evidence for them in Scripture - the only source which they considered to be authoritative.

The concept of God implicit in the prayerbooks of the Pharisaic service is commonly called theistic absolutism. This is the concept wherein "...God is a transcendent, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent person who is directly concerned with the individual and collective welfare of men. This concern is expressed by a providence that guides and controls the affairs of man both through ordinary (natural) and extraordinary (miraculous) causation."[6] Individuals alone, and persons in community relate to this theistic absolutistic deity by means of words (prayers) addressed directly to him. Addressing words directly to the deity (not offering a sacrifice to him by means of an agent) is the essential act in the Pharisaic service.[7] There is a person to person relationship between God and the individual addressing him. In so making God more personal, he becomes also, more anthropomorphic. One not only can talk to him, but one can do so as a child talks to a parent. The relation is informal, and the deity responds to conversation. Although he cannot be coerced, prayer is efficacious. God not only is approachable, but he is near to each man who seeks a relation with him.[8]

One more element (perhaps the most important one) is

quite explicit in the Pharisaic service. Unlike the sacrificial cult, in the Pharisaic system there is no limit to what the deity can do for an individual. We noted above that, in the sacrificial cult, salvation was seen as some form of this worldly prosperity. The absence of any expressed hope on the part of the offerer that the deity might grant a form of eternal life leads one to the conclusion that the offerer believed the deity to be incapable of fulfilling such a request. In the Pharisaic service, on the other hand, a share in an after-life is a frequent request. Salvation in this system is understood as immortal life.

We turn now to some examples of the prayers in the Pharisaic service to demonstrate the elements mentioned above. The omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence of the deity, his concern for the welfare of man, and his natural and miraculous providence are explicit in the petitions expressed in the Shemoneh Esreh. In that prayer par excellance are found petitions for knowledge of God's law, repentence, forgiveness, and health. On a more national level, there are prayers for independence; the gathering of the dispersed to a land of their own; and the restoration of a national government. There are prayers also that God alone should be king over the people; that Jewish apostates may perish; that Jerusalem may soon be rebuilt to be God's lasting home; that the throne of David be set up; and that the Scion of David may speedily appear.[9]

Implicit in all of these petitions is the idea that God has the power to fulfill them. Even the most cursory examination of two of the introductory prayers in the Shemoneh Esreh reveals the power and providence of the deity, and the fact that he is concerned with the welfare of man.

> Blessed art thou, Lord our God and God of our fathers, God of Abraham, God of Isaac and God of Jacob; great, mighty and revered God, sublime God, who bestowest lovingkindness, and art Master of all things; who rememberest the good deeds of our fathers, and who wilt graciously bring a redeemer to the children's children for the sake of thy name.[10]

> Thou, O Lord, art mighty forever; thou revivest the dead; thou art powerful to save. Thou sustainest the living with kindness, and revivest the dead with great mercy; thou supportest all who fall, and healest the sick; thou settest the captives free, and keepest faith with those who sleep in the dust. Who is like thee, Lord of power? Who resembles thee, O King? Thou bringest death and restorest life, and causest salvation to flourish.[11]

The deity of these prayers clearly is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. He is close, as a father is to his children, and expresses his concern for his creature, man, by naturally and miraculously directing the course of man's affairs. Indeed, he even saves man from death. Man, on the other hand, is constantly aware of his dependence on the deity.

> We are insolent, but thou art gracious; we are obstinate, but thou art long-suffering; we are sinful, but thou art merciful. Our days are like a passing shadow, but thou art eternal and thy years are endless....
> Our God and God of our fathers, forgive and

> pardon our iniquities on this Day of Atonement. Blot out and remove our transgressions and sins from thy sight. Bend our will to submit to thee; subdue our stubborness that we may turn back to thee....
> ...What are we? What is our life? What is our goodness? What is our virtue? What our help? What our strength? What our might? What can we say to thee, Lord our God and God of our fathers....?
> O thou, who art ever forgiving transgression, heed our cry when we stand in prayer before thee. Pardon the transgression of the people who are turning from transgression; blot out our wrongs from before thy sight....
> Now may it be thy will, Lord our God and God of our fathers, to forgive all our sins, to pardon all our iniquities, and to grant atonement for all our transgressions.[12]

With these few examples alone, it becomes evident that man is dependent on an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent deity who is concerned with man's welfare. It is also evident that this concern is expressed by a providence that guides and controls the affairs of man. Nothing is beyond the power of the deity. And though man may petition his God for forms of this worldly prosperity, that is not understood as salvation. The ultimate blessing is that of eternal life. In the Pharisaic system, there is no limit to what God can do for man.

Implicit in all of the prayers of the Pharisaic service is the idea that they are efficacious. It is through them that one relates to the deity all of his fears and his desires, and it is through them that he attempts to influence the deity in his favor. Prayer - talking to deity - is the essential act in relating to God in this service. Moore

acknowledges that prayer was the essential act [although he doubts that this phenomenon was the best course for Judaism to take].

> The experience of all religions which have attained to the higher conception of prayer with which we have been dealing proves how difficult it is for the mass of men to expel from their minds the delusion that prayer is an efficacious means of moving God to do what the petitioner wants.... Judaism would have got far beyond Christianity, ancient or modern, if it had succeeded in overcoming human nature to this extent. [italics mine].[13]

The differences between the sacrificial cult service and the Pharisaic prayer service are now clear. The sacrificial service is more formal and rigid. Priests must act as mediating agents between the offerer and the deity. The sacrifice is the essential act in the service. The Pharisaic service offers the opportunity for a less formal relation. The individual relates to God by talking with him as one would talk with another person. As a result, the Pharisaic deity is more anthropomorphic than that of the sacrificial cult. The Pharisaic deity responds to conversation, much as a father would respond to his children. Prayer is the essential act in this service. The deity of the sacrificial service is removed, distant, apart. The God of the Pharisaic service is ever-present and near.

In the sacrificial system, there is a limit to what God will do for the individual. Man cannot escape death. Salvation is understood as this worldly prosperity. In the

Pharisaic prayer service, salvation is granted by the deity in the form of immortal life.

CHAPTER III

MOSES MAIMONIDES

The Judaism of Moses Maimonides was a radical departure from the Pharisaic system extant in his day. Aware that the more educated Jews of the twelfth century were troubled by the seeming contradictions between the beliefs of the Torah and the truths of philosophy, Maimonides set out to reconcile those contradictions. The result was recorded in his Moreh Nebukhim, a treatise written to "...vindicate the Judaism of the Torah and assure its survival."[1] Reines describes the problem:

> Maimonides' interest is with those whose doubts concerning the truth of Judaism arise from the seeming contradictions between the beliefs of the Torah and the truths of philosophy. ...The reader he seeks is the person who has been trained to believe that the Torah is true, who is morally upright, ritually observant, and competent in metaphysics and science. The problem confronting such a person is that the literal statements of the Torah conflict with the conclusions of philosophy on such fundamental subjects as the nature of God, providence, the after-life, and prophecy. Since the primary value of Judaism for the Jews historically (whatever the Jewish religious system of the time might be) was as a true religion, if the truth of Judaism should be refuted then it would be necessary to repudiate Judaism in all its aspects. In sum, the person to whom the Moreh Nebukhim is addressed is one whose life has become profoundly unauthentic owing to the conflict between his commitment to truth on the one hand, and his loyalty to the Jewish community on the other.[2]
>
> The procedure Maimonides adopts to resolve this conflict is to vindicate the truth of Judaism by reconciling the apparent contra-

> dictions between the Torah and philosophy. When properly understood, the differences between Scriptures and philosophy vanish.[3]

Maimonides does not contruct for his readers a religious service that would be coherent with his understanding of Judaism. Any description of such a service would have to be inferred from his writings on various other subjects in the Moreh. Before we attempt such a description, therefore, it is necessary to examine some of the fundamental ideas in the philosophy of Maimonides upon which our conception of a Maimonidean religious service is based.

God, says Maimonides, is an eternal, incorporeal, and perfectly simple substance.[4] By means of a process called emanation, He created the universe ex nihilo, and remains its sustaining ground. Emanation is understood as incorporeal causation,[5] and arises from the action of an incorporeal being. The direct effect of incorporeal action is itself incorporeal or form. God, since He is an absolutely incorporeal being, acts only through incorporeal causation or emanation.[6]

Emanation is further described as the action of a being that possesses a perfection to a superabundant degree.

> A thing perfect in a certain way is either perfect only in itself, without being able to communicate that perfection to another being, or it is so perfect that it is capable of imparting perfection to another being. A person may possess wealth sufficient for his own wants without being able to spare anything for another, or he may have wealth enough to benefit also other people, or even to enrich them to such an extent as would enable them to give

part of their property to others.[7]

God has more than sufficient power of being for his own existence, and it is out of the superabundance of this power that the universe was created.[8] Similarly, the universe is sustained by a continuous emanation from the godhead, its ground of being.[9]

The universe consists of three parts: the separate Intelligences; the bodies of the celestial spheres; and first matter, or the sub-lunar world.[10] There are ten Intelligences and nine spheres.[11] Out of the superabundance of God emanated the first Intelligence, the only creature created directly by God. The first Intelligence, also endowed with a superabundance of power for its own being, emanated the first sphere and the second Intelligence, which in turn emanated the second sphere and third Intelligence. This process continued and, with the emanation of the ninth sphere and tenth Intelligence, the creation of the heavens was completed. The creation of the universe was completed with the emanation of first matter or the sub-lunar world from the tenth Intelligence or Active Intellect.[12]

It is important to note again that, with the exception of the first Intelligence, nothing in the universe was created directly by God. Rather, the completed creation of the universe was a result of a series of emanations which began with the Godhead, the original source of all being and power. The sub-lunar world, of which man is a being, is a direct

creation of the Active Intellect.[13] Nor does God directly rule the sub-lunar world or any of its beings. Rather, it is ruled by the Active Intellect in partnership with the spheres, and this government consists of producing the causes that generate and preserve the existents of the sub-lunar world. The spheres produce corporeal change, and serve to prepare the substances on earth to receive their appropriate forms. The Active Intellect, the agent of incorporeal change, brings all things (including the human intellect) from a state of potentiality to actuality, thus endowing the existents with their forms. As the agent that realizes the human intellect, the Active Intellect provides the human species with its highest state of spiritual development. Man, however, must prepare himself to have this intercourse with the Active Intellect by engaging in intense metaphysical and scientific study. For, the Active Intellect can only realize the intellect of someone who has prepared himself to receive its emanation.[14] When man has realized his intellect, i.e., when he has prepared himself sufficiently to receive the emanation from the Active Intellect and enjoys intercourse with the Active Intellect, man has true knowledge of God and religion. He has reached the state of salvation.

> The constant intercourse between our intellect and the Active Intellect is the highest degree of perfection man can attain; and as the Active Intellect emanates from God, we are in communion with God.[15]

> Salvation, the optimum state of human existence, according to Maimonides, is the attainment of a

> fully developed acquired intellect. The act that directly produces salvation is the actualization of the intellect, which comes from metaphysical and scientific study.[16]

For Maimonides, then, the universe and the order within it are and continue to be results of natural causation. The universe is a "...hierarchical structure in which inferior beings are brought into existence and conserved by the beings immediately superior to them. These superior beings, possessing more than sufficient power of existence for themselves, emanate from their superabundance both the existence of the inferior beings and the providential care that sustains them."[17]

Providence is understood as "...the causation that produces and sustains existence, and its optimum state of well-being."[18] All sub-lunar creatures, with the exception of man, are subject to the blind providence of general natural law. Man, through his use of reason, can control and guide nature to his own purposes and, thus, bring himself under the influence of a special beneficent providence. Man, in other words, can influence his own existence and his state of well-being. The optimum state of man's well-being is found in the actualization of the intellect and intercourse with the Active Intellect. In other words, the optimum state of man's well-being is salvation.[19]

Given Maimonides' concept of God and His place in the universe as described above, the question arises as to how man is to relate to deity. The answer is simply that man

does not relate to deity directly, since the only entity with which He has "contact" is the first Intelligence which emanates directly from Him. Man, since he is far down the hierarchical scale described above, "relates" to deity only insofar as he actualizes his intellect and develops an intercourse between him and the Active Intellect. Further, this "distance" between the deity and man limits what man can know about God. Indeed, man cannot know what God is, but only what he is not. It is this latter point that is discussed by Maimonides in the Moreh in the section on the attributes of God.

Positive knowledge of God's essence, says Maimonides, transcends the capacity of the finite human intellect. Nevertheless, there are two kinds of knowledge man can have of God: knowledge of negative attributes and knowledge of action attributes. Knowledge of negative attributes consists of knowing what God is not, what, in other words, are the qualities that cannot be attributed to God. The more one negatives an inappropriate quality of God, the more he increases the quantity of his knowledge of God. Furthermore, the quality of one's knowledge of God increases with the excellence of the negation. An individual who negatives a quality of God on the basis of metaphysical demonstration has acquired a knowledge of the deity that is qualitatively superior to one who negatives a quality of God superficially and without thought.[20]

Action attributes are those qualities which one may judge God to have on the basis of the events that occur in the universe, all of which are ultimately attributable to the deity as the ultimate cause and ground of being. It must be understood that these qualities do not actually inhere in God, but they are anthropomorphic qualities, descriptive of human persons should the events of the universe be attributed to them. Action attributes predicated of God tell us only that events of a certain kind occur in a universe that has God as its first cause, but provide no information about the divine essence.[21] Action attributes, in other words, consist of the events of the universe and their causes. An understanding of these events and causes is an understanding of natural law.

Knowledge of God, then, can be attained by man only to a very limited degree. The highest degree of this knowledge would be achieved by developing an understanding of the action attributes or natural law, and by developing metaphysical demonstrations of the negative attributes. When one has acquired this kind of knowledge, he has actualized his intellect, enjoys intercourse with the Active Intellect, and has reached the state of salvation.

Should one make the observation that only very few persons have the ability to develop their intellects to such a high degree, he would be correct. And the question then arises as to what purpose this kind of Judaism would serve

for the masses of people in the Jewish community who do not possess this ability. The answer is found in Maimonides conception of Scripture as parable.

Maimonides was not unaware that his conception of the truth of Judaism (and Scripture) was not available to the masses. Nevertheless, the masses can benefit from a particular kind of knowledge of Scripture. Scripture, according to Maimonides, is written in parable form. A parable is composed of ambiguous images, each of which represents more than one idea or object, and equivocal language, whose words possess multiple significances. Within this parabolic structure of Scripture, two basic religious systems are contained: the exoteric mythological system and the esoteric rational system.[22] The exoteric mythological system is substantially the literal sense of Scripture, and the meaning taken traditionally to be the rabbinic interpretation. The relation of God to man as depicted on this level is anthropomorphic and supernatural. God is seen as a divine person with humanlike emotions. He intervenes frequently in history by performing miraculous acts of providential care. He is pleased and grants peace to His people when they obey; and when they disobey He brings punishment upon them. This meaning is primarily for the uninformed masses, providing them with a naive, imaginative religion. It is intrinsically valuable in that it provides the masses with that which best serves their religious and ethical needs.[23] From it man

learns how best to control excesses and how to live moral and ethical lives. In sum, it provides the masses with rules as to how they can live good and productive lives.

However valuable the exoteric mythological system is, it does not provide man with truth or the means by which he may reach salvation. These are found only within the esoteric rational system. Concealed within the ambiguous images and equivocal language of Scripture are metaphysical and moral truths, knowledge of which enables one to actualize his intellect and achieve salvation. Knowledge of this kind is available only to those who are capable of developing their intellects to a very high degree, i.e., to the intellectual elite. On this esoteric level (in which is contained truth) the deity is conceived of as the unconditioned transcendent ground of being. He does not relate to man, and His power to create and sustain being is extended to man only through the natural hierarchical intermediaries, the Intelligences and spheres.[24]

By means of the parable's imagerial ambiguity and verbal equivocality, Scripture is able to serve each individual according to his own qualifications. The literal meaning provides for the masses a naive imaginative religion which, though untrue, serves to elevate their religious lives. The esoteric or secret meaning of Scripture gives to the intellectual elite a sophisticated rational religion by communicating to them metaphysical and moral insights, an understanding

of which is necessary for the actualization of the intellect and salvation.[25]

From what has been explained above about the philosophy of Maimonides, we can make some observations by way of inference about the purposes and the efficacy of a religious service. It is clear that Maimonides sees within the Jewish community primarily two distinct classes of individuals: the uninformed masses and intellectual elite. Within each of these classes, individuals differ with regard to the levels of intellectual development they have reached and with regard to the abilities they have to develop their intellects. If a religious service is to have efficacy for persons with such varied levels of development and abilities, it must be such that it serves each individual according to his own qualifications. We have seen how Scripture accomplishes this end by virtue of its parabolic nature. We can infer, therefore, that the language of the religious service must be in the form of parables as well, and that during the service, each individual will engage in those activities that have meaning and significance for him. In short, what one does at the service will depend on the degree of intellectual development he has undergone.[26]

For the uninformed masses, the language of the various prayers in the service would be taken literally. The deity would be seen on the same anthropomorphic and supernatural level that He is seen in the literal interpretation of

Scripture. And, inasmuch as He is understood as a divine person with humanlike emotions, and as exercising extraordinary providence, prayer would be understood to be efficacious. For the uninformed masses, then, the traditional Pharisaic service would be most meaningful, and the essential act of the service would be prayer.

However, just as the literal interpretation of Scripture does not provide the individual with truth or the means by which he may achieve salvation, neither does the literal interpretation of the language of the religious service. Nevertheless, the literal meaning of the prayers does impart to the uninformed individual pacification and ethical values which enrich his existence, and laws which help him lead a good and moral life. In the last analysis, the service, taken in its literal sense, is a place wherein untrue beliefs are put forward in order to enrich the lives of uninformed individuals, and a place wherein ethical laws are put forward to control the masses.

The religious service serves a far different purpose for the intellectual elite. Though Maimonides does not state specifically what that purpose is, or what activities one should engage in during the service, we can infer these things from statements that he does make. Some of Maimonides' notions regarding the perfect worship of God are helpful in formulating a concept of a religious service for the intellectual elite.

> ...we will ... exhort those who have attained a knowledge of God, to concentrate all their thought in God. This is the worship peculiar to those who have acquired a knowledge of the highest truths; and the more they reflect on Him, and think of Him, the more are they engaged in His worship.[27]

> ...The true worship of God is only possible when correct notions of Him have previously been conceived. When you have arrived by way of intellectual research at a knowledge of God and His works, then commence to devote yourselves to Him, try to approach Him and strengthen the intellect, which is the link that joins you to Him..."[28]

It is clear from the above passages that Maimonides holds true worship of God to be impossible without first having developed the intellect to an actualized state. That is, one can worship the deity only after reaching a correct understanding of natural law and metaphysical demonstrations of God's existence. Once that understanding is attained, an individual should turn his mind toward contemplation of the deity. The more he devotes himself to such contemplation, the more he enjoys divine Providence or salvation.

> ...Providence watches over every rational being according to the amount of intellect which that being possesses. Those who are perfect in their perception of God, whose mind is never separated from Him, enjoy always the influence of Providence. But those who, perfect in their knowledge of God, turn their mind sometimes away from God, enjoy the presence of Divine Providence only when they meditate on God; when their thoughts are engaged in other matters, divine Providence departs from them.[29]

Maimonides notes that only Moses and the Patriarchs were able to enjoy salvation continuously, since only they were able to

actualize their intellects and concentrate on the deity constantly. All other men necessarily enjoy it to a lesser degree, inasmuch as they intermittently turn their minds away from contemplation of the divine and toward "other matters."[30]

Though it is now clear how one comes to worship the deity, and therefore, to enjoy salvation, the question still remains how the service is efficacious in bringing about this end. Maimonides' statement regarding the purposes of the Sabbath is helpful:

> Thus God commanded us to abstain from work on the Sabbath, and to rest, for two purposes; namely, (1) That we might confirm the true theory, that of the Creation, which at once and clearly leads to the theory of the existence of God. (2) That we might remember how kind God has been in freeing us from the burden of the Egyptians. The Sabbath is therefore a double blessing: it gives us correct notions, and also promotes the well-being of our bodies.[31]

The purpose of the Sabbath, then, is to enable man to develop "correct notions" about the theory of creation (natural law) which leads to a correct understanding (metaphysical demonstrations) of the existence of God. In other words, the purpose of the Sabbath is to provide man with a stimulus and with the means to educate and train himself to develop his intellect to such a degree that he may, indeed, actualize his intellect, enjoy intercourse with the Active Intellect, and achieve salvation.

This also, we suggest, is the purpose of the traditional prayers and the religious service for the intellectual

elite. Maimonides speaks of how one may attain the perfection of an individual who perfectly worships God:

> I will now commence to show you the way how to educate and train yourselves in order to attain that great perfection.
>
> The first thing you must do is this: Turn your thoughts away from everything while you read Shema' or during the Tefillah', and do not content yourself with being devout when you read the first verse of Shema, or the first paragraph of the prayer. When you have successfully practised this for many years, try in reading the Law of listening to it, to have all your heart and all your thought occupied with understanding what you read or hear. After some time when you have mastered this, accustom yourself to have your mind free from all other thoughts when you read any portion of the other books or the prophets, or when you say any blessing; and to have your attention directed exclusively to the perception and the understanding of what you utter.[32]

The perception and understanding of the Shema' and Tefillah' of which Maimonides speaks is clearly not of the literal sense of the prayers. Rather, just as Scripture has an esoteric meaning for the intellectual elite, a meaning that contains the truths of natural law and metaphysical demonstrations of the existence of God, so do these prayers and the rest of the prayers of the religious service. The purpose which they and the rest of the religious service serve is an educative one. Repetition of them, like observance of the Sabbath, provides man with a stimulus and a means towards developing his intellect, enjoying intercourse with the Active Intellect, and achieving salvation.

The essential act of the service for the intellectual

elite is not prayer (as it is with the uninfored), but the realization of the intellect. Given Maimonides' contention that the forces which govern man are really nature alone,[33] the service serves the purpose of stimulating man toward an understanding of that natural law, and as a means by which he may come to that understanding. The service, then, is not a place in which man relates to the deity (since that is impossible in any case) but, rather, a place in which he can come to understand all that can be known, wherein he can apprehend true ideas about the nature of the universe and God. As has been shown above, when man has developed an understanding of natural law (the action attributes of God) and the ability to give metaphysical demonstrations of the negative attributes, he has actualized his intellect, gained union with the Active Intellect, and has reached the state of salvation.

> The constant intercourse between our intellect and the Active Intellect is the highest degree of perfection man can attain; and as the Active Intellect emanates from God, we are in communion with God. According to Maimonides it is not by sacrifices or prayers that we truly approach God, but in this union with the Active Intellect.[34]

The religious service, then, is equivocal in meaning, enabling each individual to partake in it in the manner that is most appropriate to his own qualifications. For the uninformed masses it serves as a guide to a good and moral life. For the intellectual elite it serves as a stimulus and a means to truth and salvation.

CHAPTER IV

ABRAHAM CRONBACH

It now should be clear to the reader that within the Jewish historical continuum, several different religious systems have emerged. As each particular system came into prominence, a new and different idea about and approach to the deity was developed; the idea of salvation changed; and the structure, purpose, and efficacy of the religious service took on different interpretations. For those who believed in the sacrificial cult, the essential act of the service was the sacrifice itself. By sacrificing to the deity, one could influence Him to bestow divine providence upon His people, thereby providing them with salvation in the form of this worldly prosperity. For the Pharisees and their inheritors, the essential act of the service was prayer, conversation with the deity. By imploring God with words, the individual and the community could persuade Him to grant them providential care in this world and, ultimately, salvation in the form of a portion in the world to come. For Maimonides, the essential act of the religious service was the actualization of the intellect. In the process of actualizing the intellect, the individual came to apprehend true ideas about the nature of the universe and God, gained a union with the Active Intellect, and reached the state of salvation.

In short, as world views changed and new systems of

thought were introduced, Judaism adapted itself in an effort to remain a viable and meaningful influence on the lives of its adherents. Just as that process of adaptation was operative in the past, so is it operative today.

The very fact that a book like Abraham Cronbach's Realities of Religion could be written indicates the great adaptive process functioning today. In that book Cronbach shows how words purported to have particular religious meanings in fact have a variety of meanings, and that in order to speak intelligently about aspects of religion, one must be careful to realize the various functions of such words. In other words, Cronbach makes two important points: 1) There is today a multiplicity of ideas about particular elements within each religion. No longer does a single definition for a particular element suffice. 2) Words used in reference to those elements have a variety of functions, and we must realize the differences between those functions if we are to talk at all intelligently on the subject matter of religion. Cronbach describes the problem:

> Two persons may recite the same creed; yet the motive prompting the one may differ antipodally from the motive prompting the other. The language of two prayers may be the same. Yet, in spirit the two may stand worlds apart. One and the same religious organization may contain people who are abreast of twentieth century thought and also people who adhere to medieval points of view. How can we correctly assess religion if these distinctions are ignored?
>
> Religion asserts itself in rituals and in celebrations. It expresses itself in music,

> painting, sculpture, and architecture. It manifests itself in benevolences and sometimes in persecutions. But the problems of religion arise chiefly with its language. The disputes centering in religion pertain usually to religious beliefs, and beliefs are couched in words.
>
> We must accordingly familiarize ourselves with some characteristics of words.[1]

Language, says Cronbach, serves several functions. It can be informational, evaluative, dramatistic, impressional and indicational.[2] In the realm of religion problems arise when language is taken to be informational when, in fact, some religious utterances are not informational at all. And, even when used informationally, words often bear a multiplicity of meanings. A single word can refer to several different entities.

The designative function of language coincides with its informational function. That is, when language designates something, it supplies that something with a name. Sometimes the object named is imaginary ("ghost"), sometimes it is real ("automobile"). Verbs can be designative ("runs," "walks"), as can adjectives ("long," "short," "red," "yellow"). The relation between the designative and the informational functions of language is that of means and ends; designation being the means, information the end.

Sometimes statements convey misinformation as well as information. The difference lies in whether or not the expectations which the statement arouses are realized. If a statement arouses expectations which are realized, it is

correct and conveys information. If expectations are not realized, the statement is incorrect and conveys misinformation.[3]

We must make, also, a distinction between that which is reported and that which is perceived; for we can have expectations (and, therefore, apply a judgment of correct or incorrect) only about those things which are reported. That is, that which we know by perception, by immediate experience, dispenses with expectation.[4]

Another trait of designative language is its proclivity for a multiplicity of meanings. One word often has a great variety of meanings. Cronbach notes that Webster's Unabridged Dictionary lists eighteen definitions of the word "watch."[5] This tendency toward a multiplicity of meanings, we shall see, has a great impact in religion.

A second function of language is that of evaluation.[6] Language is evaluative when it reveals people's feelings, when it voices likes and dislikes, desires and aversions. Examples of such evaluative words are "good," "bad," "hero," "scoundrel," "saint," and "sinner." Sometimes these words are evaluative when used metaphorically, and designative when used literally. For example, the word "angel" can designate a Biblical figure, or evaluate an individual whose demeanor pleases us. Similarly, a yellow buttercup or a yellow newspaper.

Evaluations, of whatever kind, are individualistic in

nature. What one person considers good, another may think bad. What one person likes another may abhor, and their evaluations will differ accordingly.

Another non-informational function of language is dramatization.[7] Dramatization occurs when something easily pictured serves as a token of something abstruse, complicated, involved, far-reaching, and difficult to understand. Uncle Sam and Jack Frost dramatize respectively our federal government and a phase of the weather. Science is not void of dramatization. When we speak of water seeking its own level or a lump of coal storing up energy, we are using language to dramatize.

Another attribute of language is that of impressiveness.[8] Language used in this sense can entertain, bewilder, inspire, sadden or cheer. This use is often found conjoined with other linguistic functions. For example, words such as "communist," or "atheist" may designate the actual ideology of a particular individual, while, at the same time, impressing an individual with their cursed character in our society. When used in this sense they serve also an evaluative function. Some words are so impressive in the realm of religion that they are not to be uttered aloud, such as the Hebrew word for God.

It is apparent that one word may serve several functions simultaneously. That is, there may be a commingling of functions. One can see this readily in the example given

above, or with words such as "coward" or "villain." These words not only designate, but also evaluate and impress.

All of the functions of language described above are forms of communication. Language used in the function of indicator is other than communication.[9] Indeed, used in this way, language often indicates things which have not been communicated. An individual who speaks longingly about the oil resources in Texas indicates his admiration for material wealth. When one speaks of communism, he indicates his regard or disregard for a particular section of the world community. A vote for Eisenhower in 1952 very likely indicated one's admiration for military prowess.

Cronbach makes a distinction between what he calls mutualism and rivalism,[10] two antithetic human trends. By mutualism he means human helpfulness; by rivalism, human conflict. A mother's love for her child and the cruelty of war are extreme examples. When we treat people as ends in themselves, we have reverence for human personality and are exhibiting mutualism. When we treat them as means toward our own goals, ignoring them as individuals and as ends in themselves, we are acting rivalistically. Our Ego is distinctly rivalistic, since it is that part of our psychological make-up that causes us to like people who are similar to us and dislike those who are different from us.

Competitiveness is one of our outstanding rivalistic traits. It breeds mental turmoil, imposes strain, and

begets envy when we suffer reverses. Antithetic to competitiveness is the mutualistic trait of non-conpetitiveness. Non-competitiveness fosters peace of mind; it supplants the desire to compete with others with the desire to cooperate with others. In a non-competitive state, the individual is able to enjoy tranquility.

Cronbach is careful to point out that the distinction between mutualism and rivalism does not duplicate the distinction between right and wrong. Mutualistic acts are often deemed wrong, and rivalistic acts right. He notes that capital punishment, something distinctly rivalistic, is considered good by many, while social security, something distinctly mutualistic is considered bad by others. The relativity of right and wrong precludes their indentification with mutualism and rivalism.

Having equipped his readers with the necessary concepts of the functions of language, Cronbach proceeds to apply those concepts to the different manifestations of religion. He begins with the word "religion" itself, and demonstrates that divergencies exist not only between different religions, but within one and the same religion.[11] He notes for example, that the God, Jehovah, of the Bible is far different from the God of Maimonides; that the common contemporary belief in an after-life is all but absent in Old Testament literature; that both mutualism and rivalism have found their places in the realm of religion in the form

of the American Friends Service Committee and the Spanish Inquisition. He notes also that religions change their emphases as old ideas and traditions lose importance, and new ones gain importance. Today we religionize the idea of equality and de-religionize the idea of faith-healing.

> In brief, new objects of importance become integrated with old objects of importance. The word "religion" which labels the old gets, in this way, to label the new. That labeling constitutes religionizing. The reverse process, that of discarding and re-labeling constitutes de-religionizing.[12]

There are within religion, then some things which will attract, and some things which will repel. Some will apply to "religion" a designative sense. Others will use the word evaluatively.

> Every person is selective in matters of religion, accepting this, rejecting that; and the range from which to select is broad enough to satisfy what a variety of temperaments and preferences![13]

Cronbach notes in his discussion on the word, "God," that, when used designatively, it signifies "...the Creator of the world, the First Cause, the Determiner of destiny, the Dispenser of superhuman rewards and punishments. Such is the usage in theological discussions whether amateur or professional."[14] Designative usage underlies the traditional emphasis upon believing. To believe commonly denotes to regard a given proposition as informationally valid. Thus, to <u>believe</u> that God exists signifies the proposition "God exists" yields valid information. This designative use

of the word "God" belongs to that aspect of religion which brings religion into conflict with science. For, when religion purports to give information, it competes with scientific information. It is to this designative use of the word "God" to which the atheist points when he attempts to prove the statement "God exists" informationally misleading. And it is this designative use of the word "God" which prevails in the various theodices. If God is good, what is the explanation for the agonies and tragedies in the world? Some theodices explain suffering in terms of divine justice - justifiable punishment for sin. Some say it is a blessing in disguise, or that it contributes to spiritual discipline. Whenever it is used, the designative use of the word "God" invites controversy because it purports to give information that is valid, and that validity is inevitably challenged.

The informational usage of the word "God", says Cronbach, is the usage of theology.[15] It is not the usage predominant in worship, aspiration, and edification. In these contexts, the word functions evaluatively and dramatistically - evaluating and dramatizing the redemptive aspects of experience. Deliverance from life's afflictions constitutes the redemptive aspects of experience, including such elements as the good that is in the world, the healing of the sick, and most important, the change in human relationships from hostility to friendship.

These elements Cronbach would term "mutualistic." It follows, then, that the word "God", functioning in an evaluative and dramatistic way, would serve as a reminder of and a stimulus toward redemption, that state of being free from mental turmoil, strain, envy - from competitiveness. When we see the word "God" in prayer, we are reminded of life's afflictions and of the possibilities of deliverance from those afflictions. It is deliverance from those afflictions that constitutes redemption or salvation. Cronbach notes that:

> The outreach for redemption is exemplified by all the prayers ever written or spoken and by all the hymns ever composed or sung. With few exceptions - and those only seeming exceptions - any supplication ever uttered or set to music contains references to:
>
> 1. Life's afflictions
> 2. Deliverance from those afflictions.[16]

It must be reiterated that in its non-designative usage, the word "God" does not call to mind the question of whether or not such a being exists. Rather, in its devotional usage (e.g. in prayer and worship) the word takes on the meaning of redemption as it evaluates and dramatizes all of the redemptive aspects of experience. Thus, the other words applied to God (Helper, Protector, Savior, Deliverer, etc.) do not necessarily apply to a super-human individual endowed with these characteristics, but to those mutualistic aspects of experience which those names serve to represent (help, protection, salvation,

deliverance, etc.).

The indicational meanings of the word "God" are varied. It can indicate love or hate, magnanimity or shrewdness, sympathy or rage. Its use can result from the urge to help or the urge to harm - all according to the occasion and the intent of the user. Cronbach would have us use the word "God" as an indication of the redemptive experiences of the world, thus fostering non-competitiveness and its resulting peace of mind, "...qualities unsurpassed among the redemptive aspects of our lives."[17] In so indicating the general goal of mutualism, the word "God" can specifically indicate such things as reverence for deity and reverence for humanity; love; peace of mind; humility, and all human conditions that make for non-competitiveness. The word "God" in its designative sense can be ignored. And once the word "God" ceases to be understood as the supernatural cause of things, and is understood as the ideal goal, the question why God causes or permits all the evil in the world drops away. The need for a theodicy terminates. That is, once the word "God" ceases to be designated as the cause of all things in the universe (evil included), and begins to be understood as that which evaluates, dramatizes, and indicates all those things which are mutualistic in the world, the word serves as an agent for mutualism, and thus for redemption - salvation. In this non-informational sense, the word "God" refers to something

in the world which man knows by his own experience. No "belief" is required, and, thus, a conflict with a scientific understanding of the world is avoided. Outside of the informational realm there is no point to the question: Is God real or unreal, true or false, actual or illusory. Further, using the word "God" in this non-informational sense does not ignore the fact that there is suffering in the world, and that it falls sometime upon every man. Rather, recognizing that suffering, it points to the healing, to the mutualistic, to the redemptive aspects of life.

In his book Cronbach examines sundry other words,[18] showing how they, too, serve various functions in the realm of religion. Throughout he is careful to demonstrate not only that words (e.g. God, sin, immortality, sin, etc.) often have a variety of meanings, but, also, serve several functions. In fact, each word signifies and does something at least a little different for each individual who uses it. Further, phrases oftimes repeated in the course of a religious service are taken, not necessarily as belief, but as verbalization meant to impress. Few will doubt that prayers repeated daily often lose their intrinsic appeal. Nevertheless, their repetition itself is impressive because of their familiar sound, rather than anything to which the words refer. The use of Hebrew itself is an example. Few members of a congregation know the translations of Hebrew prayers. It is their sound that impresses the user in a

devotional formula. Though some may hold that prayers are not efficacious, they, nevertheless, can be effective. Their literary charm and their familiar sound evaluate, dramatize, impress upon, and indicate to the user the redemptive experiences of life that are available to him.

For those people who do not adhere to what Cronbach calls "Medieval beliefs", the language of the religious service would serve non-informational functions. Indeed, even for those who did hold to "Medieval beliefs", the language would serve those functions, at least in part. It is clear that for him, the essential act of the religious service would not be a talking to the deity. Rather, the several functions of the language would serve as a means to mutualism (which, for Cronbach, is salvation). Every prayer, and many individual words in prayers, would serve the functions of dramatizing, evaluating, impressing and indicating the redemptive aspects of experience. As those words and prayers (as well as symbolic and traditional acts) were seen as instruments of mutualism, they would aid an individual to become aware of and strive toward mutualism, and thus, salvation.

Cronbach, then, is like Maimonides in that he sees the language of the service doing different things. He would hold that there is no need to change the language of the service, since it is ambiguous enough to allow various meanings and to serve various functions. There is no reason to

hold to the literal interpretation of the prayers, and if one examines the truth of the Jewish situation, the words of the prayers (as well as the acts and symbols) actually perform the functions discussed above.

Cronbach's contention that the language serves more than an informational function is, we think, correct. However, we see no reason to continue to use language which (according to him) has no truth value in and of itself. Maimonides was legitimate in that he held that the language of the Pentateuch was written for two reasons, one which was to serve the uninformed masses, and one which contained the truth. Cronbach does not hold any part of the service to be true. What he is doing is taking the existing structure and accomodating unbelief. Though we agree with Cronbach that there are other values in the language of the service, we see no reason why these values could not be found in a new structure, a structure which, taken on face value, would not have to accomodate unbelief, nor contradict those things which we do believe. In short, we see no reason to retain either rituals or language which, when taken on their face value, require us to interpret away those principal meanings and accomodate our own more viable ones. We see no reason why a new service could not be written, a service using language whose literal meaning could accomodate any theological position without the necessity of interpreting away any principal meanings. In a later chapter we will

discuss further the need for and the philosophical basis of such a service.

CHAPTER V

MORDECAI KAPLAN

We have seen how both Maimonides and Cronbach offer alternatives to the idea that the essential act of a religous service is talking to the deity. Mordecai Kaplan, the founder of the Reconstructionist movement, offers yet another alternative. We turn now to a brief discussion of some of Kaplan's views, and a short critique of them.

At the outset we find fault with Kaplan's concept of Judaism as a civilization because he offers no compelling reason to be a Jew. That is, he gives us no criteria for following Judaism. He does not say that Judaism is the way to achieve the good, or that by following Judaism one may reach truth. Rather, the end of following Judaism is the belonging to a particular group. There is no intrinsic value to the Jewish people beyond a loyalty. Kaplan tries to make a case for belonging to the Jewish peoplehood by trying to demonstrate that such belonging satisfies certain basic human needs.

> We identify ourselves with a historic group to satisfy two needs of our nature: the need of belonging, and the need of orientation. The need of belonging is the need to feel ourselves part of a People that is dedicated to the consecration of life and our own self-fulfillment as human beings. The need of orientation is the need to achieve an intelligent understanding of our place in relation to nature and to society. To supply that orientation is one of the functions of a religious tradition.

Even if we were to assume that Kaplan is correct in

his contention that identification with a particular group satisfies the above "two needs of our nature", we still are unconvinced that he offers compelling reasons for a Jew to choose Judaism as that group which will satisfy those needs best. He attempts to show that a person born Jewish really has no choice but to engage himself in the Jewish community if he does not want to commit an unethical act. In speaking about an individual who, in general, leads a moral and decent life, but who feels no obligation to identify himself with the Jewish People or with Judaism he says:

> Even in such a case, we hold that, in failing to identify himself with the Jewish People and the Jewish civilization, such a person does not act ethically. We base this contention on the universal principle that <u>everyone has the responsibility to make the most of those conditions into which he has been born</u>. A person, who is born to Jewish parents, is identified by others as a Jew. His behavior affects their attitude to Jews in general. He, therefore, cannot morally escape his responsibility to the Jewish community. The very fact that he meets his other moral obligations, but takes no part in Jewish life, may well lead his non-Jewish friends and acquaintances to conclude that there is nothing in Jewish life to interest the ethically superior personalities among people of Jewish origin, who is of irreproachable character in all his other relations, but assumes no responsibility for identifying himself with Jewish life, thus not only weakens the Jewish People by withdrawing from it, but also does an injustice to his fellow Jews.[2]

We find the above reasons for adhering to Judaism exceedingly spurious. What does Kaplan mean by the

"universal principle" about which he speaks? Indeed, what makes that principle universal? And is it not patent nonsensense to assume that every individual born Jewish who does not pursue an active Jewish life contributes to the detriment of Judaism?

In the concept of Judaism as a civilization, then, belonging takes precedence. By belonging to that civilization, one contributes to it and, thereby, contributes to his own well-being as a member of the Jewish group. One who is born Jewish must take upon himself the responsibility of belonging if he is to avoid committing an unethical act. Loyalty to the group, then, is one's highest goal. It is the end toward which we, as Jews, should strive.

We noted above that we find Kaplan's reasoning about the necessity of a Jew engaging in the Jewish community spurious. In each of the systems we have examined previously, the proponents of those systems believed them to contain truth. It was because those systems were true that people adhered to them. Kaplan would have us believe that loyalty to a group is a sufficient and compelling reason for participating in it.

> What can we, who look upon Judaism as a civilization, say to the hypothetical ex-assimilationist, who is seeking a new adjustment to Jewish life? Here is how we would address him: "We hold open to you the door of the spiritual home in which you belong, but your entering must be an act of your own will. We can assure you of a hospitable welcome to our table, but we cannot promise that you will like our fare before

> you taste it, since we ourselves have found it good only by tasting it." If he rejects this invitation, if he chooses to stay forever in the No-Man's Land of the spiritually homeless, we sincerely deplore his fate, for we well imagine the agonizing experience he is living through. But we cannot force upon him, against his will, the only salvation that is available to him.[3]

In short, Kaplan says, one can find value in leading a Jewish life only after one has engaged in living it. He offers no compelling reasons, however, for attempting that engagement.

Kaplan's concept of God is also problematic. God, he says, is the Power that makes for salvation.[4] He means by "salvation" the following:

> Salvation means deliverance from those evils, external and internal, which prevent man from realizing his maximum potentialities. It is deliverance from frustration of which it is the antithesis. By identifying frustration - which should not be difficult, because there is so much of it around - we begin to understand what salvation consists in. Stated positively, it means the maximum fulfillment of those human capacities which entitle man to be described as "made in the image of God."[5]

> By faithfully participating as individuals in the activities that make for human salvation, we can at least have a foretaste of it. The resulting gain in virtue and significance will thus enable us not only to find life worthwhile but also help us render it worthwhile for the rest of the world. That much salvation it is within our power to achieve.[6]

God as the Power that makes for this salvation is explained in the following way. Once man has learned to control more and more of the forces in his own body and in

his environment, the need for a super-human deity is overcome. However, man still needs to overcome such traits as self-indulgence, arrogance, envy, exploitation and hatred, i.e. to bring under control the aggressive forces of his own nature. "That constitutes man's true destiny. Therein lies his salvation."[7]

In order to fulfill this destiny, one must assume that the universe is so constituted as to enable man to do so. And, says Kaplan, so it is. For, everytime an individual overcomes one of the above mentioned traits, he moves one step closer toward salvation. This "salvational behavior" on the part of man is our source of knowledge of God. The human person, then, is part of the salvation-making process, and is as much an object of faith as is God. Kaplan explains the concept in the following way:

> The fact that the cosmos possesses the resources and man the abilities - which are themselves part of those resources - to enable him to fulfill his destiny as a human being, or to achieve salvation - is the Godhood of the cosmos. That is the fact which we should have in mind when we worship God and glorify Him in inexhaustible variations on the motif of "Halleluyah." Even when we conceive God as Process, we do not pray to a what or to a fact. When we pray we affirm the what or the fact that spells salvation. Likewise, when we address ourselves to God in prayer of petition, we raise to the level of consciousness those desires, the fulfillment of which we regard as a prerequisite to the fulfillment of our human destiny.[8]

This concept of the deity is, we think, quite inadequate. In conceiving of God as the Power that makes for

salvation, Kaplan does not account for the existence of evil in the world. He attempts to show that evil exists for the purpose of challenging the fact that the cosmos can be depended on to further man's salvation. The awareness of Godhood, he says, thus necessarily implies the existence of evil. Kaplan has done nothing here but play the game of opposties. e.g. In order for there to be light, there must be darkness. He does not account for the source of evil. In the final analysis his God is responsible for only a part of the universe. Kaplan's conception is not one of a unified, coherent cosmos in the sense that the Godhead is responsible for everything (including evil) in the universe. Even the God of the Pharisaic system was coherent in this regard, considering evil a form of justifiable punishment for sin. Further, Kaplan makes a value judgment in holding that God is the Power that makes for salvation. Why is he not the Power that makes for evil? It is as logical to choose one as the other.

Given Kaplan's conceptions of Judaism as a civilization and God as the Power that makes for salvation, we turn now to a discussion of a religious service which would be coherent with those conceptions. For Kaplan, the worship service serves two functions: 1) As a place wherein we can commune with God, and 2) As a place wherein we can build loyalty to the civilization of Judaism. Prayer is the means by which we commune with God. In light of God being

understood as the Power (or Process) that makes for salvation, prayer

> ...aims at deriving, from the Process that constitutes God, the power that would strengthen the forces and relationships by which we fulfill ourselves as persons. We cannot help being aware of our dependence on the Process which we identify as God, namely, on all that makes for goodness, truth and beauty in the world, for our success in achieving a mature, effective and well adjusted personality, and we naturally articulate that need in prayer.[9]

Prayer, then, is an aid in strengthening those forces which enable us to overcome frustration and to fulfill those capacities which we, as individuals, are capable of fulfilling. In other words, prayer helps us to achieve the state of salvation.

The function of a worship service, however, is not only to commune with God. If that were the case, Kaplan notes, there would be no need for public worship.[10] The prime purpose of a worship service, of worshipping as a congregation, is to seek a sense of loyalty to the civilization of Judaism. The essential act of the service, then, would be the act of participating in the Jewish community. It would be primarily a sociological act.

> The function of worship is not only to commune with God. If that were its sole purpose, there would be no need for <u>public</u> worship. In worshipping as a congregation, we seek a sense of fellowship with those who share our religious tradition.... The interdependence of the elements of a civilization - peoplehood, culture, and religion - is as evident in respect to worship as in respect to all other aspects of

> Jewish life. In worship, the whole of us should be engaged. When we pray as Jews, therefore, our worship must express our self-identification with the Jewish People. That self-identification, which expands our spiritual horizon to embrace the whole history and destiny of our People, is as indispensable a part of our religious experience as the contemplation of Deity.[11]

Just as we found inadequate Kaplan's concepts of Judaism as a civilization and God as the Power that makes for salvation, so do we find his concepts of the functions of a religious service inadequate. First, since we cannot accept his concept of God (see above), his concept of the aim of prayer is equally unacceptable. Further, with all of Kaplan's emphasis on Judaism, he has failed to demonstrate what makes Judaism the only way one may reach salvation. That is, given Kaplan's God concept, an individual could concur that God is the Power that makes for salvation without adhering to Judaism or any particular religion. He could engage in prayer to that deity and reach Kaplan's idea of salvation without doing so as a Jew. There is, in other words, no intrinsic Jewish value in Kaplan's concepts of deity and prayer.

Kaplan's notion of the second function of a religious service is unacceptable because (as we have pointed out above) he fails to show that there is any intrinsic value in belonging to a particular people who are called Jewish. That is, his notion that the worship service serves as a place wherein loyalty to the civilization of Judaism is built

is inadequate because his concept of Judaism as a civilization is inadequate. If Kaplan gave some viable criteria for following Judaism, his concept of a worship service as a place wherein Jewish loyalty is built might be compelling. He does not provide that criteria, however, and that concept is, therefore, inadequate.

With all of the inadequacies of Kaplan's notions, it is interesting to note, nevertheless, that he does not hold that the essential act of a religious service is a talking to the deity. Further, it is clear from his notion of God that he rejects the literal interpretation of the language of the traditional prayerbook. Yet, like Cronbach, he takes the language of the prayerbook to be ambiguous enough to allow for his own meaning. And, like Cronbach, he keeps the existing language, without holding any part of it to be true, and, thereby, accomodates unbelief.

As we mentioned in the preceding chapter, we see no viable reason for retaining the language of the Union Prayer Book and having to interpret away its literal meaning. What is needed, we think, is a new book of services whose language could accomodate any theological position without the necessity of interpreting away any principal meanings. We turn now to a discussion of the theoretical foundations for such a book of services.

CHAPTER VI

ALVIN REINES, REFORM JUDAISM AND A COHERENT REFORM JEWISH RELIGIOUS SERVICE STRUCTURE

In this chapter we shall deal with the current Reform Jewish situation and with ideas about Reform Judaism as they have been developed by Alvin J. Reines. In doing so we shall discuss what Reines considers to be a viable philosophy of Reform Judaism, the religious services of the Union Prayer Book and their inadequacies, and a new philosophy of and structure for Reform religious services which are coherent with the essence of Reform Judaism.

In his article, "Authority in Reform Judaism,"[1] Reines notes that probably the most perplexing problem within Reform Judaism is that, though it *is*, no one has demonstrated satisfactorily *what* it is.[2] In his search for a proper definition, Reines first discusses the nature of authority in Reform Judaism. Authority, he says, is of two kinds: It may be the *power* to enforce obedience upon others to a set of commandments; or it may be the *right* to enforce obedience upon others to a set of commandments. Using authority in the second sense, Reines poses the question of whether or not Reform Judaism has the right to enforce obedience upon its adherents; if it does not have that right, he says, it should not seek the power of enforcement.[3] Reines takes it as self-evident that every person has the right to be free. That is, every person is

his own authority and, therefore, has the right to enforce obedience upon himself to commandments he himself issues.[4] An individual may wish to transfer that authority to an entity outside of himself, e.g. to an ecclesiastical group or person. The prime religious argument for such transfer of one's authority has been based upon the theological foundation of a creator God. This argument, says Reines, proceeds in the following way:

> 1. There is a God who has created the universe;
> 2. By the very act of creation, He has authority over everything He has created;
> 3. God therefore has authority over mankind;
> 4. Exercising His authority, God has issued commandments that mankind is to obey;
> 5. God has made known to X ecclesiastical body, through revelation or tradition or both, what these commandments are;
> 6. God has also, through revelation or tradition, delegated elements of his authority over mankind to X ecclesiastical body;
> 7. Therefore, inasmuch as X ecclesiastical body acts in the name of God, mankind is enjoined to surrender certain portions of self-authority to it and to obey the commandments that issue from it.[5]

Both the idea of a creator God and the idea of revelation are necessary to uphold the above argument. The kind of revelation needed for this argument, says Reines, is not subscribed to in Reform Judaism. His reasoning proceeds in the following way.

There are three categories of revelation: verbal revelation, dynamic revelation, and natural revelation.

> Verbal revelation is conceived to be a communication from the divine mind to certain human minds, a communication of ideas contained

> in words, in which equal sanctity attaches to the words as to the ideas. ...since revelation is the literal word of God, it must be considered entirely infallible and altogether insusceptible of change or alteration except through some subsequent verbal revelation. What this means -- if the Torah is taken as an example of verbal revelation -- is that not only the ideas expressed in the Torah are binding, but the very words (hence the name verbal) in which the ideas are expressed are equally binding.[6]

> Dynamic revelation is conceived to be either the product of a divine influence operating upon man's natural faculties -- such as reason and the imagination -- or the report of men, who, with human faculties, have witnessed some supernatural event. What this means -- if the Torah is now taken as an example of dynamic revelation -- is that part of the Torah was inspired by God or other superhuman agencies, while part was produced by man. Therefore, since only a portion of the Torah is conceived to be the work of superhuman agencies, subsequent generations may in principle discard those parts they consider to be historically conditioned, while retaining those parts they consider to be timeless and universal.[7]

> Natural revelation is conceived to be the response and creation of human minds in their search through history for values, purpose and divinity in life and existence. What this means -- if the Torah is now taken as an example of natural revelation -- is that one may accept and reject its ideas and words at will, for revelation is conceived to be the product of finite minds, and as such, is entirely fallible, its notions subject to change and development. This view differs from dynamic revelation in that it considers no part of revelation to be produced by superhuman agencies or inspired by supernatural events, and thereby, on the theoretical level, increases the element of fallibility present in revelation.[8]

If the documents of revelation as they present themselves to Reform Jews (the Pentateuch and the Prophets, and

to a lesser degree, the Hagiographa and the Talmud) were considered as products of verbal revelation, no abrogation or change in their contents would be possible. The fact is, however, that both implicitly in the changes it has made in ritual practice and its abrogation of some ritual practices, and explicitly in its various platforms, Reform has denied that the revelatory documents of its tradition are verbal revelation. What remains for Reform is to conceive its documents of tradition as products either of dynamic or natural revelation, and in either case, as consisting of documents that are fallible.[9]

Given the fact that its revelatory documents are considered fallible, Reform Judaism does not possess the right to enforce obedience upon others to a set of commandments. That is, since its revelatory documents are necessarily fallible, it has nothing upon which to base that kind of authority.

We noted above that an individual may wish to transfer a certain portion of the authority he has over himself to another entity outside of himself. So, for example, if an individual wishes to transfer certain authority over himself to his rabbi, he may do so. The Reform rabbi (and any of the Reform Jewish institutions) then, has authority over individuals only insofar as those individuals have granted him that authority. He has no basis upon which to ask for more. The essence of Reform Judaism, then, is that

each individual has the right to be his own authority. No ecclesiastical entity has the right to demand obedience to any set of commandments, since there is no basis upon which to claim that kind of authority. In Reform Judaism each individual is free, and may do with the authority he has over himself what he will.

Just as freedom is a conditio sine qua non of Reform Judaism, so, says Reines, is the theological position called polydoxy. Indeed, it is the most widespread principle of religious organization among Jews today, and owes its emergence and existence to rational commitment.[10] In the next few pages of this paper we shall explain what Reines understands as polydoxy, and attempt to show how this theological position concurs with the reality of the present Jewish situation outside of the realm of Orthodoxy.

The term Judaism has been understood commonly as a religious system that took the Jewish religious tradition (consisting of the Bible, primarily the Pentateuch, and the Talmud) as representing a single and homogeneous religious structure. Even though this tradition encompasses disparate writings authored over a span of at least two thousand years, Orthodoxy held to the notion that they were all the work of one God who, at various times in history, revealed His will in prophecy. The Pentateuch and Talmud were directly revealed by God, and made up the primary items of belief.[11]

The basis for this Orthodox Jewish position is the belief in the factuality of the revelatory experience of Moses at Sinai as recorded in Exodus. In this revelation God made known to Moses the commandments He wishes the Jews and all mankind to observe. The following are some of the characteristic beliefs derived from the revelatory experiences.

1) One God alone exists, who is omnipotent, eternal, omniscient and omnibenevolent.
2) God is the sole creator and conserver of the universe.
3) God in his omniscience is aware of man, and in his omnibenevolence exerts providence over human affairs.
4) The revelation of Pentateuch and Talmud to Moses is infallible. This revelation perfectly and forever expresses the will of God. No new revelation will occur or has occurred that alters this expression of God's will.
5) Inasmuch as this infallible revelation is the primary constituent of Orthodox Judaism, Orthodoxy is the only true religion.
6) The Creator is alone worthy of worship; and man, as creature, must obey his will.
7) God rewards those who observe his commandments, and punishes those who do not.
8) There is an ideal end to history, the Messianic era, which will be ushered in by a Messiah. At this time men will be judged by God for their good deeds and their sins.
9) There is an after-life, consisting in the resurrection of the body and the immortality of the soul.[12]

Reines turns to an examination of the word faith, and stipulates the definition that it is "...the act of assent that judges a belief or statement to be true."[13] If one follows the rational procedure, he will have faith

in or give assent to only those beliefs or statements for which there exists evidence of their truth. Evidence supporting faith may be loosely divided into two kinds, objective and subjective.[14] Objective evidence is that which is apprehended through reason and sensation. It is apprehended publicly by more than one person, and is either unique or repeatable. "Unique objective evidence is that which is witnessed by many observers, but which cannot be witnessed repeatedly at (human) will."[15] An example of this kind of evidence would be the cleaving of the Red Sea as reported in Exodus. "Repeatable objective evidence is that which is experienced by many observers, and which can be reproduced at will."[16] Science uses this kind of evidence today.

"Subjective evidence is that which is apprehended externally through sensation, or internally, as in a prophetic vision or the communion of prayer. Moreover, it is apprehended privately, by one person alone."[17] Moses' experience at the burning bush is an example of external, subjective evidence. Abraham's prophetic experience (Genesis 15. He received prophecy in a deep sleep - necessarily without witnesses.) is an example of internal, subjective evidence, as is the feeling of communion with a divine presence in prayer.

> In any case, the point of subjective evidence is that it is neither witnessed nor verified publicly. When accepted as evidence by anyone

> other than the person who apprehends it, subjective evidence must be accepted on the person's bare word or say-so.[18]

Subjective evidence is rejected by the scientific community because there simply is no way to verify it for others except by say-so. At least two problems emerge out of this lack of verifiability: 1) Why should any person believe another's say-so, and 2) How is one to make a choice of one person's say-so over another's when the two conflict?

Faith without evidence (another alternative) is open to the above criticism, and further, it leaves the individual entirely without criteria by which to judge even his own belief. Subjective evidence at least allows an individual some basis (private evidence) by which to judge a belief.

> Faith without evidence is wholly blind, given for no reason at all. How can a person, therefore, distinguish for himself between the various kinds of beliefs he might accept, enjoying, as he does, an equal lack of evidence for all of them? How can he even distinguish between the illusion of phantasy created by finite man out of need, and the reality of a true religion?[19]

Although Reines himself holds to the view that faith on the basis of objective evidence is the most reasonable, he acknowledges the fact that the evidence or lack of evidence a person will require for his religious beliefs must ultimately be left to his own personal choice.[20]

Until modern times, Reines points out, Judaism (Orthodoxy) insisted on having objective evidence as a condition of faith. Truth was claimed for beliefs because

objective evidence was present for them. This objective evidence manifested itself in three ways: 1) in miracles; 2) in a prophecy that was fulfilled; and 3) in a direct empirical experience of witnessing God reveal himself.[21] Miracles were understood as objective proof because they were perceived naturally by the senses in the presence of more than one witness. And the explanation of the miracles was that a theistic God must have performed them; i.e. that there must exist a being with the intelligence and power over the natural world which would enable him to cause a miracle.

It is reasonable to assume also that such a theistic God could make the prediction of an event come true - thus the cause of a prophecy fulfilled. And the Sinaitic theophany is an example of direct empirical evidence of God revealing himself.

There are two significant reasons for the requirement of objective evidence as the condition of faith for religious belief. First, a person must be convinced that his religion is true, or it cannot be his religion. Second, authority is granted to the person who knows the true religion and that person is, therefore, in a position to lay down dogma or true opinion. Consequently, it is only reasonable to assume that, before an individual gives up his right of freedom to that authority, he must be convinced that that authority is indeed, the holder of truth.[22]

In the course of the nineteenth century, the validity of the objective evidence which Orthodox Judaism claimed for its truth was called into question. The continuing success of science and the scientific method in combating the ills of nature earned for them tremendous influence, and, at the same time, discredited the traditional proofs of religion. When the method of science was introduced into the study of Bible and Talmud, it was soon established that the Jewish tradition was not a single and homogeneous religious structure. Rather, it was determined that the literature of the tradition was composed of various points of view significantly different from one another. It was determined, also, that they were the products of several authors, in many cases working several centuries apart from one another. Reines explains the consequences of this new knowledge.

> In view of these differences among the parts of the tradition, it was evident that the tradition was not the product of a one, enduring, theistic God, who consistently revealed Himself in history, but of fallible humans who, whatever the source of their inspiration, were not of one mind on the nature of God or principal beliefs of religion. Moreover, the many errors and inconsistencies revealed to critical study strongly reinforced the concept of the human authorship of Scripture. Once human authorship was determined, it was a small step to deny that the miracles and supernatural revelations as literally described in Scripture had ever occurred.... Hence the objective evidence of miracle and revelation upon which Pharisaic or Orthodox Judaism, and its authority were based was discredited. The term <u>discredited</u> is used

> advisedly; this evidence was not disproved, it simply was no longer believed....
> The upshot of the matter was that, by the end of the nineteenth century, an ever increasing number of Jews were satisfied that no objective evidence existed to verify or support the beliefs and authority of Orthodox Judaism.[23]

Since there existed no objective evidence to support or verify their religious beliefs, Jews began to search for a new kind of religious structure that would be consonant with the kind of evidence for religious belief that remained - subjective evidence. The answer given, perhaps more at the time by feeling than in awareness, was polydoxy.

Polydoxy differs antipodally from orthodoxy. In an orthodoxy, only one single religious belief (or a narrow variation from that belief) on any theme of religion is considered true. In a polydoxy, all opinions (with the exception of the orthodox position) regarding the great themes of religion are equally valid. For, since there is no objective evidence for one particular belief (Thus, orthodoxy is unacceptable.), the adherents of a polydox structure must be committed to the idea that each individual is free to choose his own beliefs, as well as his own methods for arriving at them.

> An orthodox religion is rationally possible where objective evidence exists to support the right of those who lay down the orthodox, the true opinion, and it is not so possible where subjective or say-so evidence alone exists. Unless objective evidence can be

> given for a religious belief, no special authority is granted anyone. No matter how convincing these private experiences are to him, the religionist's opinions are only personal ones. The rationalism of polydoxy lies here, in its judgment and evaluation of the evidence necessary for religious authority. It is intuitively understood as incoherent to endow someone with rights over oneself unless he can objectively establish those rights. No one is installed as the arbiter of religious truth on the basis of evidence that is in no wise publicly verifiable. In a polydox religious community, each is his own authority, for the appropriate relation among the members of the community is not that of hierarchy to laymen, but of equals in dialogue.[25]

If the idea of polydoxy seems a radical departure from the norm, one only need look at the situation within the Jewish community to see that it is, in fact, coherent with reality. Reformism, Reconstructionism, and Conservatism are in de facto if not necessarily de jure agreement on its validity. In any given synagogue or temple, one can find a variety of theological positions among its members. And, so long as no objective evidence exists for the position of orthodoxy, one would be hard-pressed to show why this polydox religious situation should not continue to exist as the only rational alternative to orthodoxy. In truth,

> The ultimate commitment of the modern Jew, as was the commitment of the Jew of the past, is to rationalism; the rationalism that requires objective evidence for the faith of orthodoxy, the rationalism that turns to polydoxy when the faith of orthodoxy has gone.[26]

The reader justifiably may raise the question: In a polydox situation such as Reform Judaism, what criteria

do we use to determine what or who is Reform Jewish. In Orthodoxy that question is, of course, less problematic, owing to its insistence on the authoritative nature of the tradition. Any idea that is consistent with that authoritative nature, and any person who adhered to its dogmas would be considered Jewish. Since, in Reform Judaism the authoritative nature of tradition is denied (because verbal revelation is denied), the only criteria that can be used to judge whether or not an individual is Reform Jewish is membership in a Reform Jewish institution. Thus, any person is to be considered a Reform Jew who is affiliated with one of Reform's formal institutions. And any religious thought or belief will be Reform Jewish so long as the one who professes it is a Reform Jew.[27] Reform Judaism is, then, the generic term referring to the religious systems of all Reform Jews, and includes the aggregate of religious systems subscribed to by them. Reines describes the great value of this definition by membership.

> The great value of the definition by membership for the preservation of the freedom of a liberal religion is apparent: it includes within its scope every member of the movement, and grants to the thought of every member a right that may be called the privilege of equal propriety. This privilege must be carefully understood. It does not mean that every system of Reform Jewish thought is equal in religious depth or intellectual value; it does mean that the religious thought of every Reform Jew is ipso facto a proper and rightful part of Reform Judaism. Hence, no member's thought can be censored as improper in Reform Judaism since, by definition, Reform Judaism is in part itself the member's thought.[28]

The term Reform Judaism, then, refers to a conglomerate of religiously radically free individuals. In denying verbal revelation, the Reform Jew denies also that any human being possesses an irrefutable claim to authority over his fellow man. Without this absolute authority and consequent right of dogmatization, Reform Jews will subscribe to different views as their belief, conscience, and reason dictate.

> Reform Judaism is a liberal religion, a diversity of opinions and persons in communication with one another, and the unity of the community in which this dialogue takes place is established by the affirmation of each peron's integrity in the principle of radical freedom.[29]

Given the ideology of Reform Judaism as described above, we turn now to an examination of the present Reform Jewish book of services (the Union Prayer Book), the present symbolism used in those services, and to what we consider to be more viable alternatives to both.

We have seen that Reform Judaism is a polydoxy, an open liberal religion allowing for diverse approaches to religious themes. One of those themes, of course, would be theology. It is a well-known fact that Reform Jews can and do hold to different meanings of the term God, and to various concepts of the essential religious act or act of salvation that the different meanings of God entail. It follows from this that any Reform religious service should strive to reflect and represent the diverse

ideologies of those who subscribe to Reform Judaism. The Union Prayer Book fails in this regard because it represents only one of the various theological alternatives - a form of theistic absolutism which may be termed conversations theism. Reines summarizes the basic characteristics of this God concept as found in the literal interpretation of the language of the Union Prayer Book.

> Anthropomorphism and anthropopathism give competent knowledge of the Godhead; positive attributes are unqualifiedly and properly affirmed of God. Accordingly, we know that God is a person, the absolute creator of the universe, omnipotent, omniscient (conscious of the world as well as Himself), and all-merciful. We know, too, that He relates directly to the individual, that He exercises complete providence over every person and thing, and that He reveals His will with certainty and clarity in a perfect revelation, the Torah. God arbitrarily has elected the Jews to be His chosen people, and He has charged them with the mission of informing all men that theistic absolutism as depicted in the Union Prayer Book is the only true concept of God. Since God is "the Father of all men," all men are brothers, and should live together in harmony. In this way, the Messianic Age will be realized, willed by God as the inevitable end of history. God has established an unconditional and irrevocable covenant with the Jews: they are His people and He exercises over them forever a special providence. This covenant holds forever no matter what the Jews may do. Man himself has no worth of his own; his rational capacity is of no value; his power is meaningless. God receives, is directly influenced by, and responds to the prayers of men much as a human person receives, is influenced by, and responds to conversation. Prayer is direct conversation with God. Such conversation is not only possible, but is the primary means of salvation. This distinguishes conversation theism from other concepts of theism, as the concept that man may engage in direct conversation with the Deity, and that

> such conversation brings special favor in this world and immortal expectation for the next.[30]

Just as the literal interpretation of the language of the Union Prayer Book is obviously inadequate to meet the needs of Reform Jews who hold to theologies other than conversation theism, so is the current Reform religious symbolism inadequate. Before we examine what Reines sees as the specific shortcomings of the present Reform symbolism, it is necessary to summarize his views on the necessity for some kind of symbolism.

Religion, says Reines is concerned generally with the whole man, but relates essentially and directly to the psyche. Traditional philosophic psychology describes the psyche as consisting of three parts: 1) reason (cognition or knowing), 2) will (conation or desire), and 3) feeling (emotion or attitude). Each of these parts of the psyche is served by one or more aspects of religion.[31]

> The creed of a religion provides reason with beliefs concerning reality, such as the meaning of the word God. The will is taught its limits and direction by a combination of the beliefs and ethical teachings of the religion. And the feelings a person should have regarding ultimate reality or particular events are also determined by the creedal and ethical commitments of his religion, as well as by the conative decision he has made.[32]

The expression of will and feeling in religion takes on both private and public forms. The private form of expression consists of the personal and subjective religious actions a person engages in. The public form

consists of the practices shared by the community. These shared practices may be called a common symbolism.[32] The purposes a common symbolism performs are many and varied. Reines enumerates some of them.

> The common symbolism serves:
> a) to bring a person, with full being, into relation with the divine aspects of existence;
> b) to evoke meaningful moods and positive attitudes;
> c) to enrich our sense of wonder and perception of reality by focusing our attention on cosmic events such as the solstices and equinoxes, or earthly processes such as growth and maturation;
> d) to quicken our sense of history and of a shared past by commemorating significant past events;
> e) to provide a productive celebration of significant life-cycle events;
> f) to provide a family, through home ceremonies, with enriched moments of shared experience;
> g) to enable a community to communicate to one another its joy on happy occasions and its compassion on sad ones;
> h) to provide, by its distinctive nature, a sense of common identity and shared purpose to those who participate in it;
> i) to provide children with an elementary knowledge of their religious community, since, at first, the true beliefs of religion are beyond their comprehension.[33]

The purposes of a common symbolism having been agreed upon, there remains the problem of constructing that symbolism. In doing so we must first arrive at a set of principles of Reform Jewish symbolism, and then create the actual symbolism itself. One theoretical principle of Reform Jewish symbolism has been established already. That is, that "...the same sanction as is applied to the observance of the common symbolism in a religious

system such as Orthodox Judaism is unqualifiedly inapplicable in Reform Judaism."[34] Orthodox Judaism takes its symbolism (as it does its theology) as part of an infallible revelation from God who commands its observance. Since, in Reform, no absolute revelation exists, no authority exists that can command observance to any particular symbolism. It follows that a determination of what constitutes Reform Jewish symbolism must be made subjectively, by human resources, and therefore, that no symbolism can be made obligatory upon any member of a community.

> Every Reform Jew, consequently, possesses the authority to determine for himself the nature of the symbolism in which he will participate. The right of the individual Reform Jew to serve as the final arbiter of his own symbolic practice may be termed the principle of free symbolism. Accordingly, the only justification in Reform Judaism for a common symbolism is that it enriches the religious life of the individual so that, for this productive purpose, he assents to its use.[35]

The common symbolism current in Reform, that represented primarily by the festival and ritual structure that is found in the Union Prayer Book and Rabbi's Manual, was produced on the basis of the principle which Reines calls traditional essentialism.[36] This principle takes the common symbolism of Orthodox Judaism as the paradigm for Reform. In creating the present common symbolism of Reform, early Reformers took Orthodox common symbolism, extracted from it what they considered to be its essence,

and gave it "modern dress." This "modified Orthodox" common symbolism has come under increasing criticism of late by those who see it as inadequate for today's needs. Reines divides the criticism into two kinds: that which comes from those who support halachah symbolism; and that which comes from those who support open symbolism.[37]

The advocates of halachah symbolism hold that the present Reform common symbolism has failed for three reasons: 1) When the early Reformers developed the Reform common symbolism, they omitted too many details of the traditional ritualism, leaving the symbolism with only a diluted version of its potential impact. 2) The Reform symbolism is too abstract and offers no detailed instructions regarding its observance. 3) The Central Conference of American Rabbis has never used the force of its prestige to insist that the Reform symbolism be kept. Thus, if there were more traditional observances, outlines of instructions for those observances, and if the CCAR used its influence to persuade Reform Jews to follow the observances, then Reform Jews would follow halachah symbolism as their way of life.[38]

The advocates of an open common symbolism, agreeing that the present common symbolism is inadequate, hold that it is not because there is not enough traditional ritualism in it, but rather, because it has adopted too much of the past. It thereby has become irrelevant to life as it is

really lived by the contemporary Reform Jew. For example, the present symbolism, because it is based upon the "Jewish calendar," is incoherent with the rhythms of the Reform Jew's life. Thus, the Shabbath falling on Saturday is incoherent with the real-life situation of Saturday being an important commercial day. Further, the present symbolism is incoherent with the economic and social structure of the life of the modern Reform Jew. Sukkoth, Pesach, and Shavuoth are basically pastoral and agricultural festivals. Yet, most Reform Jews are city-dwellers and such festivals have little relevance for them. Most important, the present symbolism is incoherent with the beliefs of many Reform Jews. That is, the language that is used in present Reform symbolism expresses the same beliefs as the theological position of conversation theism found in the Union Prayer Book. As we have seen above, no single theology is sufficient for a theologically pluralistic (polydox) community such as that found in Reform Judaism.[39]

The open-symbolist holds, then, that a common symbolism can flourish only when it is rooted "...in the authentic ground of man, the economic, social, and ideational matrix from which his existence emerges and in which his life lies embedded."[40]

Before we discuss the Reinesian solutions to the inadequacies of the Union Prayer Book and the present

Reform common symbolism, it is necessary to examine briefly what Reines considers to be the primary purpose of religion. Man, he says, is a problem existent. Stated simply, the problem man has is that he is a finite being with a will to be infinite.[41] Taking the word Jew an an ontal symbol, Reines notes the intensity of the problem, and that how a Reform Jew responds to it is his religion.

> The conflict between the finite being of the human person and the infinite strivings of his will is sharp, penetrating to the core of his personality and a threat to its unity and integrity. Finity entails aloneness and death, whereas finite being wills unlimited relation and eternity. Man's response to the conflict between what he essentially is and what he desires fundamentally to be, in other words, his response to finitude, is the definition I give to religion. An ontal symbol is a symbol that points to the problem structure of man's being (ontos) and summons him to respond to finitude with authenticity. The ontal symbol has the power of calling to being; it directs man to constitutive decision and genuine religion. As an ontal symbol, the word Jew turns the one whom it names to the essential demand of his being, but as an ontal symbol, it summons merely to authentic response, it does not call for any one particular response. In a religious situation such as Reform Judaism, where the evidence for response is admittedly fallible, and the autarchic individuality of each member is affirmed, response is determined as authentic not by its agreement with dogma, but by the competence of the response in resolving the individual finitude of the one who makes it.[42]

We have seen, then, that Reines holds that the Reform Jewish community is a polydox community - one in which each Reform Jew has the freedom to develop his own response to his finitude. In so doing he will attach to

the word God that meaning which best serves that response. It follows from this that, given the diversity of human nature, there will be various kinds of responses to finitude and various meanings attached to the word God among the participants in a Reform Jewish religious service. Consequently, no prayer book or book of services which has implicit in its language a particular theology (and thus, a particular response to finitude) will be adequate to meet the needs of a polydox religious community such as Reform Judaism. We have seen that the Union Prayer Book, owing to the particular theology (conversational theism) implicit in the literal interpretation of its language, is incoherent with the polydox nature of Reform Judaism and, therefore, inadequate to meet the disparate needs of Reform Jews.

What is needed, then, is a new book of services, the literal value of whose language will not subvert any proper participant's activity in the service. In other words, the only way to serve the individual differences one would find among the participants in a Reform Jewish service would be to provide them with a service which they can fashion according to their own needs, personalities, and levels of understanding. In effect, the service would be in the state of potentiality, and the congregant would engage in the creative process of actualizing that potentiality.

The only kind of service, says Reines, that would meet these qualifications is one whose language is totally

equivocal. That is, the language of the service would be such that its literal meaning could accomodate any theological position and any response to finitude. We have seen how both Cronbach and Kaplan have interpreted away the literal meaning of the language of the prayer books. Reines sees no value in keeping language whose literal meaning requires such reinterpretation. In an equivocal service, if a person believes in a God who is a person, he would address Him and understand himself to be in communion with Him, and come to terms with his finitude in that way. Or, if an individual felt that his response to his finitude lay in the mutualistic feeling engendered by realizing that he is not alone in his plight, he could gain strength and comfort in that way. The most important aspect of the equivocal service is that there is no unauthenticity involved in it because no individual is asked to believe anything he considers to be untrue. Each person is able to make his own authentic response to his own finitude.

Just as the equivocal service is rooted in the reality of the polydox nature of Reform Judaism, so should a Reform Jewish common symbolism be rooted in the economic, social, and ideational matrix in which the life of the Reform Jew is embedded. This means that those who develop a viable common symbolism for Reform Judaism will have to take into consideration such things as the secular calendar

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and its influence on the lives of Reform Jews; that the Shabbath will enjoy multiple meanings; and that new symbols will have to be created to realize the spiritual possibilities of an industrial and scientific society. Most important, the symbolism will be open to all Reform Jews.

> The language of the symbolism will preclude no Reform Jew from participation, whatever his personal creed. Such language will evoke moods of intrinsic meaningfulness without provoking theological dissent. Thus will the essential spirit of Reform Judaism as freedom be concretized in the symbolism that constitutes its body.[43]

The concept of an equivocal service is novel. As with most things novel, it also may be somewhat disquieting. Its strength lays in the fact that it provides each individual with a means by which he can make an authentic response to his most perplexing problem. There can hardly be any more justification for its need.

FOOTNOTES

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INTRODUCTION

[1]Webster's Third New International Dictionary

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

[1]The sacrificial cult underwent numerous changes in the long period of Biblical history. We are concerned only with the theological notions that are implicit in the canonized Bible. S. Mowinckel (The Psalms in Israel's Worship, p. 35.) points out that most of the cultic and ritual laws are found in the relatively late 'Priestly Document', and these are probably quite different in form from earlier sacrificial rites. He notes also, that we do not have a full picture of a ritual festival as a whole, and that we know practically nothing about what part was played by the congregations in the great festal processions, nor about the prayers that were prayed or the psalms that were sung. J. Bright (History of Ancient Israel, p. 197.) notes that the sacrificial ritual of the Solomonic Temple "...must have been in all essentials that preserved for us in the Priestly Code."

[2]See below, pp. 4f.

[3]For all translations of Biblical passages, the University of Chicago edition of the Old Testament, edited by J. M. Powis Smith, was used.

[4]Here, "praise-offering" is offered as a translation for a form of a תּוֹדָה , a thank-offering. Other translations use the words, "thank-offering."

[5]W. O. E. Oesterley (Sacrifices in Ancient Israel, p. 130) notes that there were two basic ideas behind the Israelite conception of gifts to the deity: 1) as a bribe to get the deity to grant a request; 2) as a tribute to the deity for the assurance of good times in the future. He notes further that, "In all cases of giving presents to Yahweh...something was expected in return...." (p. 132)

[6]H. H. Rowley ("The Meaning of Sacrifice in the Old Testament" in the Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 1950-51, vol. XXXIII) hold that another element was necessary to restore the relationship. "It is important here to realize that while sacrifice was thought to have potency, it was potent only when accompanied by genuine penitence and submission. On the other hand, penitence and submission alone were not sufficient for the cases where sacrifice was prescribed. They were primary as the condition of blessing, and it was always recognized in the true stream of Israel's religion that obedience was better than sacrifice; but it was not supposed that man could save himself from his sin either by his penitence or by his sacrifice. It was divine power that reached down to save him in the moment when he offered himself with his sacrifice. The animal of itself could do

nothing for him. But when its sacrifice was the organ of his approach in humble surrender and obedience to God, it became the organ of God's approach in power to bless him." (p. 95) "Hence sacrifice both expressed the spirit of the worshipper and did something for him." (p. 88) We do not find in the text that the 'spirit' is an essential part of the service, whereas the sacrifice certainly is.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

[1]Bright, John, A History of Israel, p. 449.

[2]Introduction, p. iii.

[3]For a fuller discussion of the development of the synagogue, see Moore, G. F., Judaism, vol. II, pp. 10-15, and Idelsohn, A. Z., Jewish Liturgy and Its Development, pp. 16-33.

[4]Moore, op. cit., vol. I, p. 287.

[5]Ibid., vol. II, p. 212.

[6]Ibid., vol. I, p. 68.

[7]Reines, A. J., Elements in a Philosophy of Reform Judaism, "God and Jewish Theology", p. 1.

[8]The development of this idea was natural in light of the destruction of the Temple, the location of the sacrificial cultus. See Idelsohn, op. cit., pp. 26, 78; and Moore, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 14, 15, 218.

[9]Moore, op. cit., vol. II, p. 213.

[10]Daily Prayer Book, edited and translated by Philip Birnbaum, pp. 82, 84.

[11]Ibid., p. 84.

[12]High Holy Day Prayer Book, edited and translated by Philip Birnbaum, pp. 676 ff.

[13]Moore, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 234, 235.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III

[1]Reines, A. J., Maimonides and Abrabanel on Prophecy, p. xvi.

[2]Ibid., pp. xvi f.

[3]Ibid., p. xvii.

[4]Maimonides, Guide For the Perplexed, translated and annotated by M. Friedlander, I, 51ff.

[5]Reines, op. cit., pp. xxiii f.

[6]Ibid., p. xxv.

[7]Maimonides, op. cit., II, 11f.

[8]Ibid., II, 12.

[9]Ibid., I, 69.

[10]Ibid., II, 10f., Also see ibid., I, 72 for a detailed epitome of Maimonides' cosmology.

[11]Ibid., II, 10.

[12]Reines, op. cit., p. xxvii.

[13]Maimonides, op. cit., II,4. Cf. Reines, op. cit., p. xxvii, n. 47.

[14]Reines, op. cit., pp. xxviii f.

[15]Maimonides, op. cit., III, 52, p. 294. n.1.

[16]Reines, op. cit., p. 1i.

[17]Ibid., p. 1.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid., p. 1i.

[20]Reines, A. J., "Maimonides' Concept of Mosaic Prophecy," Hebrew Union College Annual, vol. XL, Cincinnati, 1970

[21]Ibid.

[22]Reines, A. J., Maimonides and Abrabanel on Prophecy, p. xlix ff.

[23]Ibid., pp. 1v ff.

[24]Ibid., p. lvi.

[25]Ibid., p. lii.

[26]Maimonides, op. cit., I, 35, 36. Maimonides makes this point quite specific with regard to the understanding of Scripture. He points out that the truths of Scripture will have to be taught on the basis of the level of intellectual development an individual has undergone. To the uninformed individual, a more literal interpretation of Scripture will have to suffice. To the more informed, the "Secrets of the Law" may be revealed.

[27]Ibid., III, 51.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid., II, 31.

[32]Ibid., III, 51.

[33]This is in contradistinction to the literal interpretation of the language of the service, in which the universe is seen as governed by an anthropomorphic deity who governs the universe by means of natural and miraculous causation.

[34]Maimonides, op. cit., III, 52, p. 294, n. 1.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV

[1]Cronbach, Abraham, The Realities of Religion, p. 1.

[2]Ibid., See also following where these functions are discussed in detail.

[3]Ibid., p. 3.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid., p. 4.

[6]Ibid., pp. 5ff.

[7]Ibid., pp. 8ff.

[8]Ibid., pp. 10ff.

[9]Ibid., pp. 13f.

[10]Ibid., pp. 16ff.

[11]Ibid., pp. 22ff.

[12]Ibid., p. 29.

[13]Ibid., p. 30.

[14]Ibid., p. 31

[15]Ibid., pp. 32ff.

[16]Ibid., p. 33.

[17]Ibid., p. 43.

[18]Ibid., pp. 50ff.

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CHAPTER V

[1]Kaplan, M. M., Questions Jews Ask, Reconstructionist Answers, p. 16.

[2]Ibid., p. 25.

[3]Ibid., pp. 7f.

[4]Ibid., p. 85.

[5]Ibid., p. 126.

[6]Ibid., p. 127.

[7]Ibid., p. 83.

[8]Ibid., p. 85.

[9]Ibid., p. 103.

[10]Ibid., p. 241.

[11]Ibid.

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CHAPTER VI

[1]Reines, A. J., Elements in a Philosophy of Reform Judaism, "Authority in Reform Judaism."

[2]Ibid., p. 1.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid., p. 2.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid., pp. 2f.

[8]Ibid., p. 3.

[9]Ibid., p. 3f.

[10]Reines, op. cit., "Polydoxy and Modern Judaism," p. 1.

[11]Ibid., pp. 1f.

[12]Ibid., pp. 2f.

[13]Ibid., p. 3.

[14]Ibid., p. 4.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid., pp. 4f.

[19]Ibid., p. 5.

[20]Ibid., p. 6.

[21]Ibid., pp. 6f.

[22]Ibid., p. 7.

[23]Ibid., pp. 8f.

[24]Ibid., p. 9.

[25]Ibid., p. 10.

[26]Ibid., p. 11.

[27]Reines, op. cit., "Reform Judaism," p. 2.

[28]Ibid., p. 3.

[29]Ibid., p. 9.

[30]Reines, op cit., "Shabbath As a State of Being," pp. 3f.

[31]Reines, op. cit., "A Common Symbolism for Reform Judaism," p. 1.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Ibid., pp. 1f.

[34]Ibid., p. 2.

[35]Ibid., p. 3.

[36]Ibid., p. 3.

[37]Ibid., p. 4.

[38]Ibid., pp. 5f.

[39]Ibid., pp. 6f.

[40]Ibid., p. 7.

[41]Reines, A. J., op. cit., "God and Jewish Theology," p. 18.

[42]Ibid., pp. 18f.

[43]Reines, A. J., op. cit., "A Common Symbolism for Reform Judaism," p. 8.

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