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Judaism in Hermann Cohen's Thought

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Judaism in Hermann Cohen's Thought

by Terry R. Bard.

This study is directed toward gaining greater understanding of Hermann Cohen's conception of Judaism as it relates to his philosophical system. Although Cohen's philosophical system emerged from Kantianism, it is a subtle critique of Kant's thought. As for Kant, Reason provides the rational basis for Cohen's Marburg School of critical idealism. Ethics is concerned with deeds rather than with intentions as Kant had maintained. Ethics is the working out of this reason in the science of jurisprudence and moral law as it relates to ideas of fellow-man and society. Religion governs moral law; its essence thus develops from ethics. Aesthetics provides the functions of religion. The feeling of Mitleid, (social) pity, is an aesthetic response to human finitude and depravity. Religion, a Religion of Reason, unifies epistemology, ethics and aesthetics. Judaism is the prime example of such a religion of reason. Jewish monotheism is both universal and logical. God is a pure idea to which man "correlates" rationally and necessarily. This relationship becomes paradigmatic for man's relationship with the idea of his fellow-man. The trinitarian God of Christianity and the absolutism of Catholicism obfiscate this necessary relationship. Judaism has a mission, the achievement of an ethical humanity. The achievement of such an ethical society remains a continual possibility.

In order for Judaism to effect this mission, it must penetrate the world. A Jewish state or homeland counters the Jewish mission as Cohen conceived of it. Salvation becomes an ongoing, asymptotic task for the individual and society. Judaism provides the means for movement toward salvation. The matrix for salvation is human society. Thus, the future takes precedent over the past. For true rational religion, history is of tertiary importance. Communal worship and the observance of ceremonials and festivals, especially the Day of Atonement and the Sabbath, assist man in his religious endeavor; yet they are of secondary importance to ethical action.

Preface

This study is directed toward gaining greater understanding of Hermann Cohen's conception of Judaism as it relates to his philosophical system. For the most part, this study is descriptive and analytic. Interest in Hermann Cohen's thought has enjoyed fluctuating popularity among Jewish thinkers. Cohen has been praised and even epitomized during periods of individual or social rationalism. Today, when interests are more existential and romantic, less attention is paid to the Marburg School of critical idealism which Cohen developed.

I was first drawn to Cohen's critical idealism out of a personal, inner religious conflict between reason and feeling. Cohen's conception of God as idea was both rationally and emotionally stimulating for me. It removed religion from magic, miracles, and individual psychic yearnings. I have attempted to be as objective as possible in this study. My final evaluation of Cohen's conception of Judaism may indicate this personal interest. My own philosophical development has led me to find fault with some of Cohen's basic philosophical postulates. For me, his rejection of psychoanalytic theory is problematic. Whereas I accept Cohen's rational approach, I tend to incorporate the psychoanalytic and interpersonal dimensions of one's character with this rationalism. I have tried not to permit my bias to influence my description of Cohen's thinking.

Regardless of such 'inadequacies', the more I studied

Cohen's writings, and especially his Jewish Writings, his Begriff, and his Religion of Reason, I became aware of an inner tension. Cohen attempted to present Judaism and the God-idea as totally consistent with his philosophical system; they emerge from it. I think he succeeded. This study does not focus on Cohen's personal, psychological changes. At this stage of research it was not possible to note such alterations. Consequently, I have tentatively accepted the commonly held conclusions of other scholars concerning Cohen's personal development (See Chapter IX). Toward the end of his life, Cohen's own psyche seems to have altered; earlier religious forms and attitudes resurfaced. Cohen's feeling for Judaism and the Jewish people became evident. Certainly, Cohen loved his 'idea', but his need to love it and find security in it characterizes this change. Cohen's God-idea never changed; it remained idea. His personal relationship to it became altered. Franz Rosenzweig mis-interpreted this change (See Appendix A).

Although I have discussed Cohen's philosophical system as it relates to Judaism, and then his concerns for monotheism, the God-idea, the correlation, Judaism and ethics, the Jewish People, and Judaism and Christianity, these concerns are not necessarily separate in Cohen's thought or works. They are all integrated. I have singled out only five dimensions of Cohen's conception of Judaism, eventhough I have attempted to discuss most of the elements in Cohen's Judaism, such as his

conception of messianism (Chapter 9). Consequently, this study only partially represents all of Judaism in Hermann Cohen's thought. Nevertheless, I regard these five areas as the fundamental building blocks for Cohen's conception of Judaism. His discussion in Religion of Reason focuses on these areas.

I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Dr. Alfred Jospe whose understanding of Hermann Cohen's thought proved of much assistance and whose friendship, comforting. His translation of S. H. Bergman's Faith and Reason was my introduction to Hermann Cohen. Professor Steven S. Schwarzschild provided me with an initial understanding of the full dimensions of Hermann Cohen's work. I am indepted to him for his instruction and patient understanding.

Thanks are also due to Professor Uriel Tal whose comments, meticulous criticism, understanding, and personal warmth made this study enjoyable and meaningful. I am most appreciative for his willingness to supervise my work.

For me, Hermann Cohen's conception of religion and of Judaism is the fundamental building block for my present religious outlook. Hermann Cohen's Judaism was also the unarticulated base for my grandfather, Morris Terry's Judaism. My ordination as rabbi, toward which this study was directed, was among his greatest dreams. With deep admiration and devotion, I dedicate this work to his memory.

Above all, my wife Kay's critical assistance, unending love, patience and understanding made the realization of this study possible. I thank Kay and Michael Aaron for their love, encouragement, and for graciously sharing me with my work.

TRB

Cincinnati
25 Adar 5731

for

Morris Terry

zecher zaddik liv'racha

his silence is piercing

Table of Contents

Foward

Hermann Cohen was born in Coswig, a province of Anhalt, Germany, on July 4, 1842. He attended elementary and public schools in Coswig. During this time, Cohen received instruction from his father who taught in the Jewish school; his father also served as a cantor in a local synagogue. Cohen's father received his Jewish training in a Yeshiva; his general education was self-taught. He was a most pious man who wished to raise his son with the same piety.[1] The educational and emotional exchange between father and son had a lasting effect. Years later, Hermann Cohen's wife, Martha, comments in her foward to her late husband's summum opus:

> The father's love and enthusiam for Judaism which was combined with a basic scientific knowledge, accompained the son throughout his entire life...[2]

In 1853, at age eleven, Cohen entered the Gymnasium in Dessau. There he stayed for five years. During this time, Cohen's father visited him every Sunday; the two would study Jewish materials together.[3] Cohen's interest in Judaism was deep-seated. It was thus of little surprise when, in 1857 at the age of fifteen, Cohen set out for Breslau to enter the Rabbinical seminary, the first modern Jewish seminary in Germany. As was customary, in four years he matriculated in the University in Breslau. Here, in 1861, Cohen wrote a prize essay "Concerning the Psychology of Plato and Aristotle".

In 1864, however, after three years at the University, Cohen began to criticize his goals. He had become deeply immersed in philosophy, and, after serious introspection, withdrew all intentions of becoming a rabbi. He left the University of Breslau and transferred to the University of Berlin. At Berlin, Cohen focused his studies on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Nevertheless, he studied and achieved proficiency in philosophical developments up to and through Kant. Cohen's dissertation, which also happened to be his first philosophical work, was titled "Causes and Contingents in Aristotle". This thesis was submitted in 1864; Cohen was awarded his doctoral degree from both the Universities of Berlin and of Halle only one year later.

Even before Cohen received his PhD., he made his first appearance in Breslau in 1861. For some years a conflict had been developing between Zacharias Frankel, the president of the Breslau Seminary and representative of 'historical' (conservative) Judaism, and Samson Raphael Hirsch, the editor of the journal Jeshruran, an neo-orthodox rabbi who later turned secessionist, removing his congregation from the general Jewish community of Berlin. Hirsch had attacked Frankel on his interpretation of HALACHA L'MOSHE MI'SINAI (The Law of Moses From Sinai).[4] Cohen wrote a defense of Frankel's position, and, ironically, published it in Hirsch's journal, the Jeshruran. This controversy compelled Cohen to take a Reform position which subsequently is reasserted throughout his works (cf. below).

In addition to internal religious strife, external events

also affected Cohen's philosophy and Jewish concerns. Three major events in 1871 produced significant responses in Hermann Cohen's life and philosophy: the establishment of Germany, the convention of the first Vatican Council, and the appearance of Friedrich Lange's two volume History of Philosophical Materialism and the first installment of Hermann Cohen's interpretation of the Kantian system, Kant's Theory of Experience.

Cohen's conception of the German state was indicative of his general idealistic tendencies (cf. below). To him, the idea of state came to represent the pure form of ethical consciousness and action. In the state, the theory and idea of ethics find their pure culmination. Membership in the state is justifiable and commendable only so long as the state continues its ethical nature.[5] The establishment of Germany thus achieves Cohen's complete support. This support was partially the result of his idealistic philosophy and partly the result of the prevailing 'romantic spirit' which was mentioned before. Nevertheless, it was genuine and deep-seated.[6]

The convention of the first Vatican Council had only peripheral effect on Cohen's life and philosophy. Cohen's scrutinization focused primarily on the Council's institution of papal infallibility. Cohen was vehemently opposed to any kind of dogma; dogma opposes reason. And, as will be shown, anything which counters reason is not real and is thus invalid.

Most important to Cohen's career was the almost simultaneous publication of Friedrich Lange's History of Philosophical Materialism and Cohen's Kant's Theory of Experience. Lange, a

Liberal Christian, was Professor of Social Philosophy at Marburg. Though he, himself, was not a materialist, Lange's primary emphasis in his History was that the impulse for materialism arises out of moral concerns. Cohen, as an advocate of philosophical socialism and, to an extent, of social Marxism, felt constrained to write to Lange. Cohen included a copy of his newly published Kant's Theory of Experience with his letter. This book was an unconscious continuation of Lange's work. Cohen overrode Hegel and other absolutists such as Fichte. According to Cohen, these thinkers merely obscured materialism; they based their philosophies on Spinoza's misconceptions and Kant's mistakes (cf. below) Chapter I. Cohen claimed that Fichte and especially Hegel, whose dialectical appraisal of history, prevailed in Germany at that time,[7] were spinozists and as such untrue to their German heritage! Instead, Cohen asserts that Kant is Germany.

Lange immediately recognized the genius in Cohen's work, and the two became actively involved in philosophical correspondence. At Lange's invitation, Cohen moved to Marburg in 1873 to become private dozent, private lecturer, and assistant to Lange. Still, Cohen's Jewish interests did not lapse. During the same year, Cohen helped establish a rabbinical procurement committee for the Jewish community of Marburg.

Soon after Lange's death in 1876, Cohen became a Professor Ordinarius at Marburg. This was both an intellectual and ethnic accomplishment; Cohen was the first Jew in German history to achieve such a position. Cohen remained 'ordinary professor' at

Marburg for thirty-six years. In 1877 and 1889 respectively, he published his last two books on Kant's system, Kant's Bergründung der Ethik and Begründung der Aesthetik. Parenthetically, it be noted that while at Marburg, Cohen taught many Russian students. Since Jews were prohibited from attending Russian universities, many came to study in Germany. As a Jew and an ordinary professor teaching in the Haskallah spirit, Cohen became a particularly attractive teacher for these foreign students.[8]

By the late 1870's antisemitic tendencies had increased. As previously noted, much of this new antisemitism was 'racially' inspired. Yet, other justifications of antisemitism were proposed. One such justification was offered by Heinrich von Treitschke. For Treitschke, the Jewish threat was not grounded in racial differences. Rather a 'cultural' conflict existed between Christian Germans who lived in a Christian nation and the Jews. Jews could not participate totally in this Christian culture. Jews were divisive and thus a threat because they rejected Christianity, the very basis of German culture and Volksgeist. According to Treitschke, only a single culture, based upon a single religious tradition, could be integral and productive.[9] In about 1881, Treitschke wrote the essay "Ein Wort' Uber unser Judentum" in which he offered his justification for not accepting Jews as part of general German Kultur. Cohen responded to this essay with his Ein Bekenntniss in der Judenfrage.[10] This was Cohen's first book on a Jewish topic. In it Cohen advocates the gradual assimilation of

Jews into German culture.[11]

In 1878, Hermann Cohen and Martha Lewandowski were married. Martha was to prove a constant companion and critic of the philosopher. Cohen gained greater appreciation of aesthetic disciplines such as art, literature, and music. He became interested in German Impressionism, Shakespeare's works, and Heine's poetry, as representative of the idealistic spirit. All of these became incorporated into his own system of critical idealism as it developed between 1902 and 1912 and especially with the publication of the Aesthetic of Pure Feeling (1912).

In 1912, at age seventy and shortly after the publication of his Aesthetic of Pure Reason, Cohen resigned his position at Marburg and returned to Berlin. In Berlin, he lectured at the 'Hochschule fur die Wissenschaft des Judentums'. During the first world war, he returned to Marburg, 'despite his (advanced) age and ill health',[12] returning to Berlin only shortly before his death in 1918. Just before his death, Cohen had completed his summum opus, Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism.[13] The first edition of this book was published posthumously, in 1919. Nevertheless, Trude Weiss-Rosmarin notes that 'Cohen had the opportunity to correct some of the proofs for this book before his death'.[14]

In his seventy-second year, just prior to his death, and still suffering from an eye disease from twenty-six years earlier, Hermann Cohen remained the ambitious and contemplative person he was in 1873 when he began his philosophical career at University of Marburg. Hermann Cohen died on April 4,

1918, before the first world war had concluded. The inscription on his tombstone was written by Nehemiah Nobel, an orthodox rabbi in Berlin. Rabbi Nobel exhibited his intimate knowledge of Hermann Cohen as a human being and as a philopher when he wrote the words:

> Plato's shining world and Kant's darkening depths shone for you, o' great one as (into) one. Musically they resounded in you. The flaming torch was kindled in the prophetic fire. We here interred that which is mortal. Shine more brightly o' fire.

With these few words, Rabbi Nobel was able to capture the very essence of Hermann Cohen's life, so a man whose majestic manner, critical philosophy, and innovative religious beliefs blended harmonically in one being.

I

From 1871 to 1889, Cohen directed most of his intellectual efforts toward a re-interpretation of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant divided his system into three areas: epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Kant claimed that any sound system must be based upon a firm epistemological substructure. Thus Cohen's interpretation of Kant (1871-1889)[1] as well as his own system (1902-1912)[2] are similarly organized. With his interpretation of Kant, however, Cohen moves beyond Kant and develops new philosophical system called either the 'Marburg system' or the system of critical idealism. This system is characterized by a refusal of the existence of an autonomous world and of an autonomous God;[3] it removes the realistic elements from Kant's philosophy.[4]

Both Kant and Plato were philosophical idealists. The main distinction between these thinkers was that for Plato the pure Idea was always a metaphysical concept not found in and through history. It was an ontological precept which was not empirically produced or grounded. For Kant, pure idea has a dual dimension. Kant altered the Platonic system by differentiating the phenomena from the noumena.[5] Phenomena were those things which men perceive; noumena were those 'realities' behind the phenomena.[6] Noumena, as ideas or 'things-in-themselves' are unattainable. This dualism is the basis of Kant's transcendental method. Understanding arises from different forms of conceiving or relating percepts; these are the results of both sensual perception

(the matter of experience) and the perception of the categories of space and time (the a priori forms of experience). Both phenomena and noumena affect our understanding of reality.[7]

In agreement with Solomon Maimon, Cohen begins his criticism of Kant's epistemology by questioning the dichotomy between phenomena and noumena and by questioning the function of reason. Reason for Cohen is science, and science is historical. Consequently, reason too is historical. This removes reason from Platonic metaphysical concepts and places it as the cornerstone of a developmental process.[8] Cohen and Maimon assert that the Kantian noumena cannot possibly exist.[9] Reality is a process of becoming. As such, it is a limiting concept. Nevertheless, the Kantian conception of the noumena converts this process into an impossibility from its outset; the process does not exist. Only things in-themselves exist. For Cohen, however, reality is not static; it has no basis in a realistic epistemology, Achieving reality is an infinite and asymptotic task. The goal of this task is the achievement of freedom, the ability to live according to autonomous law.[10]

More importantly, Kant bases his system on a dualism between sensualism and science. The a-priori framework that makes cognition possible is the cornerstone for thought processes. For Cohen, however, thought is based on mathematics; it involves no sensualism. True being is identified with the processes of thought, will, and feeling, rather than with anything given in experience. Cohen's epistemology is based

upon the acceptance of Euclidean geometry and the Newtonian calculus. He contends that the mathematical formula for the derivative, $\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x}$,[11] is the beginning of all mathematics and the basis of all rational thought processes. Mathematics is a rational creation; the infinitesimal calculus, representated by the formula for the derivative, is representated of pure reason expressed in a scientific manner. Consequently, S. Hugo Bergman asserts, "the beginning of thought is itself shifting into non-being, reaching definiteness only asymptotically."[12]

In his introduction to Cohen's Jüdische Schriften, a collection of Cohen's Jewish writings, Franz Rosenzweig explains the distinction between Kant's concept of reason and Cohen's. Rosenzweig uses experience differently from Kant and Cohen, focusing more on the rational a priori categories of time and space rather than on sensations which both Kant and Cohen refer to in their formulations of pure reason:

> While Kant's pure reason is different from the reason derived from experience and thus becomes critical, Cohen's a priori is pure knowledge, derived from and described by experience... Or while Kant's pure, practical reason is removed from all things, both external and internal, to promulgate the law of moral practice, Cohen's pure will is the actual and realized moral will which becomes de-

> pendent upon and drawn by all moral strength of the soul.[13]

For Cohen, pure idea is not the indifferent creation of man; man cannot exist without it. Pure idea requires a necessary dual responsibility, a relationship, a correlation (cf. below). Because of this, man's experiences in fulfilling the tasks appointed by reason become of prime importance. (This is the point which Rosenzweig makes in the above statement.)

Due to Cohen's emphasis on relational experiences, he conceives of the relationship between subject (i.e. the thinking, acting and feeling man) and object (i.e. the idea or goal) in real, non-ontological, non-metaphysical terms. For Hermann Cohen, cognition is that process by which man extrapolates understanding from a conscious, objective analysis of the universe. As with Kant, cognition is a unity, a unitary development in the mind. The process of cognition is achieved most effectively through synthetic judgment. For Cohen, man, as an individual and social animal, exists only in relationship to the totality about him. This totality is reine Idee, pure idea. The term 'pure' indicates a dual quality: freedom from admixture and actual purity from something. This last quality of purity is more realistic than Kant's notion of 'purity from everything else', i.e. from all phenomena. Cohen contends that purity from something merely indicates a purity from all things which may tend to violate its directed purpose.[14] Pure idea is the beginning of all thought. From the initial recognition of pure ideas, thought proceeds to the stage of

development and of integration. Cohen uses this term integration of thought processes in the same way Kant used it, that is, the synthetic integration of a priori as opposed to a-posteriori concepts.[15] Yet Cohen maintains that a priori categories are unnecessary, for the process of thought itself is the ultimate form. Pure thought and pure being are one. The processes of thinking and becoming lead to this unity.

It is difficult if not impossible for man to have a physical sensation of a pure object or idea. Pure idea stands apart from and yet in direct relation to that which man perceives. Nevertheless, it has certain functions. It orders his conceptions, his thinking, actions, and feelings, while at the same time providing the goal toward which he must strive. This relationship between man and pure idea is solely the product of cognition. It is not sensual. For example, a man sees a tree. It may be any species of tree. Yet the idea of pure tree is automatically constructed to enable man to perceive any one specific species of tree. Such a pure idea of tree is a necessary prerequisite for the recognition of any one tree.

By a similar method of argument, Cohen attempts to disprove philosophical statements about the necessary existence of ontological and metaphysical realities. Idea provides an infinite task rather than an emphatic impossibility. 'Infinity' itself implies impossibility. Nevertheless, Cohen's use of the term infinite task is developmental.[16] It is historically inclined rather than temporally based. The very process of approximating an idea is developmental. It

is ongoing and culminates in the historical future and not in temporal relationships. Culmination is never achieved, for this process approaches pure idea only asymptotically, always coming closer and closer, but never quite achieving final union.

In his Logic of Pure Reason, Cohen postulates six basic philosophical relationships of the variety just discussed:

1. The idea produces reality.
2. The totality produces its parts.
3. The future produces the past and the present.
4. Hypothesis produces facts.
5. Being produces becoming.
6. God produces nature.

Basically, in these six relationships, Cohen has summarized his theory of cognition (i.e. his epistemology) and Kant's opinion of the antinomies. Whereas Kant postulates the antinomies as corresponding to noumenal-phenomenal conflicts, and suggests that the thinking individual will choose the noumenal position,[17] Cohen uses Kant's noumenal positions[18] and converts them into primary cognitive 'relationships'. S. Hugo Bergman has noted that Cohen's idea replaced Kant's noumenon. It is the ultimate element of objective reality; it is not a metaphysical reality.[19] If something is continually 'produced', it stands to reason that it does not stagnate. This continuous development or lack of stagnation is assumed for man, the world and the universe. Movement is necessary,

and the goal of this movement is toward approximation of the pure idea. As such, it has a theological orientation (cf. below). The task toward which cognition points is realized in ethics; its practical application occurs in religion.

II

Hermann Cohen's conception of religion emerges peripherally from his philosophical system. Religion first enters Cohen's system in his Ethik[1] and is given greater attention in his Aesthetik[2]., It is not autonomous but is related to ethics and aesthetics. Nevertheless, religion has its own prescribed tasks which pure philosophical speculation cannot perform.

i

It has been shown above that for Cohen the cognitive process is directed primarily toward establishing a relationship between the individual person and the totality of the universe. It is man's logical attempt to overcome his finitude, and to achieve an understanding of his existence. Cognition is goal oriented; it brings about the perception of a possible and (cf. above) but is not an end in itself. Cognition is the means by which man may achieve understanding. In his Ethik des Reinen Willen, Cohen notes that man does not live alone in the world; he stands in relation to others.[4] Within his philosophical system the relationships between men are independent of intention. This differs with the Kantian maxim 'duty for duty's sake' which implies that intention is paramount. For Cohen, ethics also deals with deeds and not only with intentions. Ethics is concerned with the deed itself and not only with the individual or with the result of the moral deeds he performs. Thus, ethics is pure. (The deed is only relevant as

it appears in the embodiment of the state. Cohen's conception of the state will be developed more completely later on.)

Whereas ethics is not concerned with the individual per se, it does originate in law which has jurisdiction over a community of individuals. Ethics is derived from the law throught the 'logic of jurisprudence'. The two are integrally related. Thus, the historical science of ethics is jurisprudence. Law and ethics both deal with deeds and not intentions. Their primary concern is with the future and not with the past. Thus, Trude Weiss-Rosmarin concludes, "whereas Kant separated morality from law, Cohen based his ethical system upon the logical science of jurisprudence."[5] Ethics is not the Gegeben or stated fact as Kant contends, but the Aufgeben, the setting of a task.[6] Ethics is the logical process of this task setting; reasoning and independent experiences produce the deeds. Here again Cohen finds problems with the Kantian system. Kant concieved of law and ethics as two distinct entities, the former leading to legal actions and the latter to moral actions. In Kant, law arises through a deductive process; generalizations are made from human sentiments. Cohen contends that Kant's concept of law is philosophically unsound. It is based on realism which Cohen finds unscientific. As previously mentioned, reason always is exemplified by science; it is never concerned with the individual human being. The same is true for ethics.

Kant's summum bonum was the idea of duty as it is universalized in his categorical imperative, that one should always act in such a way that his actions can be willed into

a universal maxim. Individual actions and their prior intentions are the primary foci for Kantian ethics. Cohen finds Kant's presentation as lacking practicality. Kant asserted that one should not treat others as 'means' but as 'ends'. Conversely, Cohen is more practical. He rephrased the Kantian categorical imperative to read, 'never treat another only as a means, but always also as an end in himself'.[7] As with Kant's imperative, this maxim is universal and applies to all mankind. Its implementation occurs through two kinds of law: jurisprudence and moral law. The former is governed by the state; the latter by religion, which itself is but an 'ideal subsidiary of the state', i.e. it embodies all those goals of the state but reigns over the individual as a member of a moral community. The categorical imperative is the only aspect of the noumenal reality which affects humanity; it is not sensual. Thus rational religion is based upon the noumenal categorical imperative. It is grounded in ethics and logic.

ii

Whereas the essence of religion develops from ethics, the function of religion stems from aesthetics. In his Aesthetik der Reinen Gefühls, Cohen discusses at length the nature of the arts. He attempts to show the basis of aesthetics in each of the areas of the arts, especially the graphic arts. Particularly vivid is Cohen's conception of aesthetics as shown in his discussion of painting. Cohen considers the graphic arts of painting and sculpture cognitively

rather than emotionally. In keeping with his evolutionary approach (see below), Cohen maintains that Impressionism, the prevalent art form when he wrote his Aesthetik, is the most advanced and meaningful mode of painting.[9]

For Cohen, art concerns the nature of Man and man in nature.[10] But art is not concerned with man as an individual. It is concerned with man as an ethical type:[11] pure love of art is productive only as it views man in the contex of external reality with all its pain and stress.[12] Art does not confront man outside reality in the manner that reason produces reality. As the result the feeling of pity, social sympathy, art is not equal to religious love, but merely its preparation.[13] Art takes the ugliness of human suffering and drudgery and sublimates it. Nevertheless, this process of sublimation overlaps the ethical. The initial appraisal of the world which the artist creates is an aesthetic act; his solution, however, finds its expression in ethics. The drudgery in man's life, as viewed by the aesthetic individual such as the artist, can only be admired by art. It must be subjected to the ethical use of religion to make it individual.[14] Religion discovers man as an individual through the artistic expression of human drudgery and suffering. This does not transform religion into ethics as Kant suggests. It emphasizes that religion is directly related to both ethics and aethetics but is autonomous from both. Moreover, it indicates that religion has only an indirect relationship to feeling. Religion and feeling are not synonymous as Freidrich Schliermacher suggested.[15]

For Cohen, aesthetics relates religion to ethics. Whereas art views the individual only as a representative member of a species, it transforms him into the universal by idealizing him. But art is not only a universalizing mechanism; it also makes possible individuation. When a person participates aesthetically in any act, for example, as one observes some piece of art or participates in any art-form such as music or poetry,[16] the individual separates himself from the universal. He becomes both subject and object, and individuation occurs. Consequently, while art is not selbständig, autonomous, it does have the special ability to link directly with religion.[17] The possibility of individuation does not exist in ethics; it becomes recognized through the intellect and sublimated by the aesthetic sense. The latter is the individuating element, the Eigenart found in religion.

iii

Cohen had originally planned to culminate his system by writing a psychology of culture. Instead, he wrote Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism.[18] This change is most significant. It marks Cohen's contention that religion is the culmination of the philosophical enterprise.[19] Religion is man's response to death; his response to his finitude. Religion becomes the focus and the unifying factor between epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Moreover, Cohen contends that Judaism is the prime example of a religion based upon the principles of reason as outlined in

his Logik. Judaism incorporates his ideals of ethics and aethetics.

Religion of reason is to be distinguished from mythology. Mythology is the result of uncritical, emotional faith. This faith arises out of a concern with destiny, fate, and is notably unconcerned with ethics and morality in any absolute sense.[20] Ethics which developed coincident with mythological structures, such as those of ancient Greece, evolved out of man's supposed personal relationship with the pantheonic gods. These gods were regarded as personalities, material beings. Different 'ethics' were adopted in relations with the various gods. For Cohen, mythological concern with fate and with the multiple ethics which that concern engendered, relegated mythology to the first stage in religious development. In fact, Cohen maintains that any religion which stresses mythological conceptions or doctrines of fate remains at the first stage of evolutionary development toward true religion, the religion of reason.[21] The God of the religion of reason is not personal or material; it is totally abstract, pure, and singular.[22] This God 'imparts what is good'[23] as in the prescription in Micah 6:8, namely, to act justly, love mercy, and walk with humility. Because the true God of rational religion is not a personality, he cannot demand belief or prescribe dogma. Man himself is the source and arbiter for his beliefs; his belief is scientific and based upon reason. All things which are unreasonable are not part of rational religion. Miracles, for example, are unreasonable, and as

such are not part of a religion of reason.

For Hermann Cohen, Judaism is the exemplary religion of reason. It stands above all others because it is based on empiricism, on logic.[24] Neither the premises of Christianity nor those of Greek mythology satisfy the criteria of reason. Both posit God as a personality; both stress dogmatic belief, and both demand abdication of reason in favor of 'faith'. For Cohen, faith without reason is incomprehensible. Cohen argues with Mendlessohn who, he claims, presented the view that the inner beliefs of Judaism are based only on a 'natural religion'. Cohen claims that this is somewhat of a concession to Spinoza's conception of Judaism.[25] Even the great Kant did not recognize the true spirit of prophetic Judaism:

> the prophets are only 'priests and soothsayers' who could predict the overthrow of the state... therefore he (Kant) saw Judaism only from the vantage point of political history, as statutory law...[26]

For Kant, Judaism was anathema to the state religion; it threatened the unity of the state and undermined its essential Christian origins and orientation. Cohen, however, maintains that Kant's knowledge of Judaism was insufficient. He achieved this knowledge only from his readings in Spinoza's Tractus theologicopoliticus[27] and Mendlessohn's Jerusalem, both of which are spurious sources for understanding the true nature of Judaism.[28] Although Cohen criticizes Kant,

maintaining that he, was not familiar enough with Judaism to criticize it, his attempt to justify Kant's attitude toward Judaism characterizes the hesitancy of a devoted disciple to reject some of his master's teachings.[29] Nevertheless, in the Kantian spirit, Cohen asserts that Judaism's fundamental goal is ethical, based upon cognitive principles. According to Cohen, there has been a string of Jewish thinkers who have attempted to articulate this ethical goal of Judaism beginning with Saadia Gaon. Maimonides, however, was the first modern thinker who consistently articulated the ethical task of Judaism over the historical, political, and spiritual background from which it emerged and in which it thrived. The very basic task of Judaism is that of ethical fulfillment. Whereas other religions remained at different evolutionary stages, Judaism quickly developed through such stages as polytheism, henotheism, and monism, with their corresponding mythological structures to a true, singular, and universal monotheism. with its basic and necessary rational structure.[30] Judaism is a paradigm for an ethical culture becuase of its universalism, humanism, ethics, and prophetism. These elements are grounded in reason and assist in bringing salvation to society and to the individual.[31]

III

Hermann Cohen maintained that Judaism is not merely the exemplar for rational religion; it is paradigmatic for a universal and rational theology. Judaism's emphatic monotheism represents the pinnacle of religious development. For Cohen, the term monotheism connotes several ideational concerns. As indicated above, monotheism represents the highest form of theistic evolution. Allusions to varying degrees of polytheism, henotheism, and monism, for example, are found in the pentateuch. The prophets, especially Isaiah and Jeremiah, represent the middle-point of Jewish religious development, the spiritual-political phase.[1] These prophets were true advocates of monotheism as it emerged out of the Jewish ethical system. Parenthetically, it may be noted that whereas prophetic monotheism was exemplary for Cohen, it did not constitute the sum and substance of the Jewish religious enterprise. In fact, prophetic monotheism is but one, albeit necessary, constituent of Judaism. Once, in about 1872, when Cohen was walking with Friedrich Lange, their conversation turned to religion. Lange is reported to have remarked that his preceeding comments might not be entirely acceptable to Cohen, for Lange was speaking from a Christian perspective. Cohen responded, 'Not at all. "What you call Christianity I call prophetic Judaism."[2]

In addition to the evolutionary dimension, monotheism connotes a theological dimension. It is more than the 'monism' of much of the pentateuchal material; that stage

implies the existence of one god among many. Moreover, monotheism contains a universalism which henotheism does not advocate; monotheism maintains the existence of one god for all peoples and for all times. The religion of reason cannot be the religion of a single people... nor of a single (historical) period; reason projects its unity among all kinds of men and peoples who have mastered science and philosophy.[3] All other conceptions of God are geographically or spiritually limiting. Cohen claims that even though this notion of monotheism emerged relatively late in Jewish historical development, its tardiness does not mean that the God about which it speaks emerged equally as late. Only man's critical perception of this universal God was achieved late. The universal God was intrinsic to the original Israelite religion. (cf. below).

Monotheism is not only universal; it is logical. Regardless of how the idea of God is posited, God and man have a necessary relationship. If religion is to be anything more than solipsim, any God-idea must relate to a group of like-minded individuals. It should be equivocally accepted by a religious community; otherwise one's religion has absolutely no relationship to another's. Consequently, according to Cohen it is illogical to say that like-minded individuals posit a God to which they can relate and which has power over them but to which <u>others</u> have no relationship. A totally personal God is limited, and a limited God is, as Maimonides pointed out, no real God at all.[4] Cohen recognized this problem. Therefore, he suggests that monotheism posits

an idea of God which is personal and yet universal and logical as well. It is a religion which is true for all men at all times because it is grounded in man's basic rationality. Cohen substantiates his conception of monotheism in Aristotelian and Maimonidean definitions.[5] Man is a rational animal. Any religion which is to be true for all men must therefore correlate with this rationality. Monotheism is the only religion which can satisfy this definition. According to Cohen, the prophets realized this very essence of monotheism, eventhough they did not know the real nature of God[6] (cf. below). Emotion has no role in monotheism; belief is purely rational eventhough it emerges from ethical and aesthetic considerations and has its primary influence in these two areas. True belief is not Schliermacher's 'feeling of absolute dependence' nor Kant's rational choice of the noumenal antinomies.[7] It is simply and purely rational. Cohen can be faulted here for not recognizing the complicated nature of a person's psyche, and thus the variety of roles which religion plays for any one individual. This refusal to consider the dynamic nature of the human psyche seems to have been intentional. Cohen had an ambivalence toward psychology,[8] but his distrust of psychoanalysis is apparent. Psychoanalysis, in its infancy at the turn of the century and not much more mature in 1918 when he wrote Religion of Reason, was not 'scientific". According to Cohen, it was not based upon reason, but upon unscientific speculation. Anything unscientific is questionable. Therefore, it is quite in keeping with Cohen's bias to distrust Freud's theories and to assert

that reason alone is the basis for a proper theistic belief. Reason is reproducible; psychic events are not necessarily so. Unfortunately, if Cohen had investigated the developing theories of psychoanalysis, he might have found some support for his conceptions of monotheism and of God.[9] Cohen's rejection of psychoanalytic theories parralleled his rejection of Freud's denial of religion and denunciation of Judaism.

For Cohen, monotheism represented a cognitive framework for all mankind. This framework maintains that man's essence is rational animal, and that any meaningful dimension of his being, whether private or public, must be consonant with his essence. This is the condition in which the religion of reason finds man. For Cohen, man's anxieties originate in rational confusion. Clear, scientific, honest reasoning will bring about a surcease of anxiety. Forgiveness of sin, salvation, is achieved through conscious effort.[10] Judaism is but one example, and for Cohen, the only true model of a monotheism based upon rational commitments.

It must be noted here that a reappraisal of the literature suggests that Cohen had a vested interest in Judaism which he was trying to protect, especially in his preservation of the monotheistic God. Cohen was not always objectively removed from his Judaism; he was subjectively immersed in re-interpreting it to meet his philosophical criteria, thus making that religion palatable to him. Cohen's critiques of Judaism are also his apologia for it.[11] In his Religion of Reason, Cohen speaks almost exhaustively about the nature of

God and his relationship to Judaism.[12] The remainder of his discussion shows evidence for the ethical and messianic nature of Judaism. The imposition of the correlation is arbitrary (see below), eventhough he considers it paramount. The idea of God becomes necessary for Cohen. This God-concept must be the source of ethical Judaism; any other God would not be the true universal god. Nevertheless, Cohen's system would have been consistent, and his ethical appraisal of Judaism as convincing, had he not considered the monotheistic elements of Judaism. Judaism, as a religion of ethics, could be as objectively viable and consistent without God: man could be regarded as the Focus of Judaism had Cohen wished to present it in this fashion. Cohen was radical enough to see through the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments for God and thus sought to posit another type of God, the guarantor of ethics (see below). He was not willing, however, to make the leap to no God, and thus propose simply an 'idea of religion'. Such a leap toward ethical culturalism would be a break with Judaism as he saw it, and Cohen held on to his Judaism tenaciously.[13]

True monotheism, in the guise of Judaism, is not merely personal and universal; it is communal. By communal, Cohen means that cohesive spirit which binds Jews together. It is not geographical. Jewish monotheism, by virtue of its history, is the basis for a community:

> Monotheism is not an individual concern. The total Jewish national spirit unfolds in the creation and

> development of monotheism, which (in turn) fulfills the rational needs of (the Jewish) people. One may condense the entire history of this people in a primal word "I am", modifying God, Gen.3 [14] to formulate the primal ethical motive arising from monotheism.[15]

Because this group is universalistic and not particularistic, monotheism becomes the source for feelings of personal identity with a group. Monotheism is important for group personal strivings for religious reconciliation, Versöhnung, with God. Monotheism is not merely a stage for religious growth; it is the summit of this process. According to Cohen, Judaism (as monotheism) has always stressed the importance of men as individuals and as members of a community. The community which monotheism offers is that of ethical responsibility. All Societies are capable of realizing their ethical task, but Judaism alone, through prophetic teachings and the wisdom of the sages, adopted ethical idealism as its cornerstone. Judaism recognizes man as both a social and ethical being.[16] The Greek mystery religions[17] failed because of their polytheistic doctrines, their vulgar rites, and their non-rational, non-ethical appraisal of the world. Socrates,[18] Aristotle and their disciples failed to provide a truly adequate practical religion. Contemplation was regarded as the highest good; through contemplation, salvation

could be achieved, a unification with the thought process itself or God. Christianity was based upon non-rational influences; its doctrines were grounded in prophetic ideals, but through the efforts of Saint Paul, faith was stressed over deeds; belief over action. Even marxism erred in treating the human being as an economic entity rather than an ethical being.[19] For Cohen, as for Kant, any separation of faith or belief from deeds is deleterious to the religious enterprise.[20] True rational religion treats deeds and faith simultaneously. For Cohen, the ethical goal of critical idealism and the belief in its truth are one and the same; the processes of ethical thinking and of true believing are parallel in time and in orientation. Judaism is based upon this relationship between belief and (ethical) action. Judaism is <u>ethical monotheism</u>.

IV

Cohen's conception of God's nature is at the very root of his conception of Judaism. Rational religion is a religion of ethics; God is the guarantor of those ethics. God is not a metaphysical reality. Rather, God is idea in its purest form; as such, he is not above or beyond man but a dimension of man's being.

The idea of God arises through rational processes (see ChapterII above). As man reasons, he approximates certain ideas. The existence of these ideas is not prior to man's thinking, nor are they solely of man's creation. The existence of an idea occurs simultaneously with the process of thought. Without thought, the idea cannot truly be said to exist. Man's thinking initiates the process whereby the idea is called into existence. Nevertheless, since man is not the creator of the idea, he is neither the cause for its being nor the sole determiner of its contents. The idea is independent of thinking man, although it stands in direct relation to him. Thus, Cohen's conception of God is totally removed from the phenomenal world.

A basic problem exists in Cohen's presentation of pure idea. If idea is not prior to thought and yet it comes into existence only during thought, both its source and its universal applicability to others come into question. Cohen recognizes this problem, thus he suggests that it is of no consequence. Certain arbitrary truths must be postulated for any sound philosophical (or mathematical) theory.

The truths which Cohen accepts are those of the infinitesimal calculus based upon Euclidean geometry. Mind itself is a source; mind is universal. There is a hint in the Religion of Reason[1] that religious love leads men to this God-idea through the correlation. Pure idea is thus the result of a logical postulate rather than the outcome of logical thinking.[2]

For Cohen, God represents pure idea. It is removed from metaphysical speculation, because as with Kant, Cohen reconized the cognitive difficulties regarding metaphysics. Consequently, the God postulated in the pentateuch, 'the one who created the world out of nothing', cannot exist except insofar as reason perceives him. Creation is not a one-time occurrence; it is ongoing. Cohen's conception of creation[3] coincides with the reform Jewish attitude of 'progressive revelation'. Revelation itself, the process by which the mind perceives true idea[4] , occurs ex nihilo to the extent that it does not exist until thought begins. Creation and revelation are logical rather than temporal postulates; they describe God's relationship with the world. For Cohen, the word revelation does not describe an event, but a logical relationship between human perception and absolute or pure reason; revelation is the creation of reason.[5] Revelation is also the process by which man achieves reason.[6] This concept of creation and revelation which Cohen offers in the Religion of Reason represents an extreme idealism.[7] Nevertheless, it is consistent with his discussion of the creative

processes of thought which appear earlier in his system.[8] Once initiated, creation continues infinitely. The process by which pure idea is realized is asymptotic and can never be achieved fully.

Creation occurs on two levels. The individual rational process of ideation is primary. This individual mode of creation is a universal possibility for all (thinking) men. Cohen postulates a second kind of creation which involves a special kind of community. Out of its concern for ethics, such a community perpetuates the creative process. The Jewish community is the prime example.[9] The monotheism of the Jewish community recognizes the individual in society through its stress on a universal ethic. This stress on ethics is the unique expression of the creative power of mankind. Therefore, Judaism has always maintained the corporateness of mankind; it recognizes the individual in himself and as a member of a religious community, a religious society. Monotheism is thus the historical mode by which the individual and the community become related. Creation is an individual and a communal endeavor; God is the impetus of the process. For example: the community of Jews voluntarily accepted those ethical and spiritual ideals of the decalogue thereby creating forever the bond between the monotheistic God and the Jewish community. Hence, salvation (as described above, chapter III) was a real and ongoing possibility for both the individual and the community. The individual is ephemeral; but the community created at

Sinai is eternal.[10] Both have a responsibility to search for salvation, fulfillment.

It may be noted that Cohen's conception of creation and salvation overcomes a major problem which Leo Strauss finds in Maimonides' works. Strauss suggests that the Rambam distinguished between esoteric and exoteric truth, the former pertaining to the elite and the latter to the masses.[11] Whereas Cohen's system is written for the elite, his notions of truth and salvation are universal. Through the medium of ethics and the enactment of the (Cohenian) categorical imperative, all mankind can work toward salvation. Judaism established the guidelines for such salvation seeking.[12] Salvation as an absolute and final state is not achievable.

If God is pure idea, how does man relate to it? How can he relate to God? In response to this problem, Cohen proposes the concept of the <u>correlation</u>. This concept is fundamental to Cohen's system and is found throughout his epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, as well as in his <u>Religion of Reason</u>.[13] Man is able to relate to the idea through the correlation. The correlation is simply a concept of origin and production. Since the God of the correlation is not a personality but an idea, it is not dialogical. The correlation is the facilitating mechanism by which idea is approximated; the mutuality which exists is that between mind and idea. Reason is part of both man and God, as Idea. Therefore, the correlation makes the possibility of truth a continual

reality. The God-idea, as man relates to it through the correlation, is the idea of truth; the process indicates the eternal correlation between ethics and nature. Man, as he relates to ethics, becomes the example of nature. Both elements of the correlation are primary.

Three basic types of correlation emerge from Cohen's epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics; the correlation of the reason, that of ethics and that produced by the 'social love of pity' which is found in aethetics.[14] These types of correlation are achieved either by the individual or by society.[15] Correlation arises through a reasoned process by which rational man and reason in some way share their rationality. Knowledge arises through this mutuality; the correlation indicates a logical relationship.[16]

Although the correlation exists throughout Cohen's system, it is only perceived and actualized through religion. The correlation implies a task which finds <u>man</u>, the individual, in both the fellow-man and the religious man.[17] The God of social love (ethics) and the God of the forgiveness of sin (religion) are equal. They represent the correlation between man and God. God as pure idea still remains the logical conclusion of the deductive process. This mutuality is the correlation of concepts, not of individuals; the concepts are concepts of purpose. (This purpose is to obliterate evil, thus the <u>primary</u> religious task is ethical.)

For Cohen it is impossible to have an idea or a concept without mental experience. The idea of humanity is

the essential world idea; it is expressed in Biblical religion, especially in the prophets.[18]

V

God and man exist simultaneously. The correlation between man and God is possible <u>because</u> God is pure idea, pure Being. God's existence is best characterized by his <u>Einzigkeit</u>, his uniqueness, rather than his mere <u>Einheit</u> or unity. This uniqueness arises out of the correlation. Yehuda Melber rightly points out that for Cohen the notion of unity is a negative, limiting attribute of God. It is asserted in refutation of polytheism; it indicates that God is not many but one.[1] However, the notion of God as the unique Being is positive; it posits God as the <u>only</u> true Being. All other gods are false. They are relegated to the class of non-Being.[2]

Uniqueness is God's essence.[3] It is the result of a (logical) deductive process[4] through which the God-idea emerges as the only true being. In contrast to Spinoza, Cohen maintains that God is pure Being. His Being "is completely different from every other type of existence (Dasein), (and) also from (every other kind of) life".[5] Cohen notes this equation of God and Being in Exodus 3:14 where God is quoted as defining himself (to Moses) as <u>Eheyeh ašer eheyeh</u>, which Cohen translates as God is he whose existence and essence are one.[6]

Cohen then asks if <u>any</u> attributes characterize God. Cohen felt compelled to consider this question to justify his radical notion of God as idea. Moreover, the doctrine

of the attributes was a central concern for earlier Jewish philosophers (such as Saadia, Maimonides, and Gersonides) as well as Christian philosophers and theologians (such as Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas). For Cohen, the notions of divine attributes suggested by Saadia and Maimonides were particularly instructive. Saadia defined God ontologically as 'he whose essence and existence are identical.' Since God's essence is to exist, and essence is simple and one, God is one. Consequently, unity, oneness, is the only (positive) attribute which can be claimed for God. All other attributes negate God's transcedent oneness; they limit him.[7]

Maimonides goes one step further than Saadia and distinguishes between attributes of relation and attributes of action. Attributes of relation cannot be ascribed to God because there is no way in which man can truly justify such attributes. Such attributes are [illegible] mental constructions and have no reflection in the deity. However, man <u>can</u> posit attributes of action. Such attributes are rational constructs which man creates as paradigms for ethical action. Attributes of action do not limit God; they are positive, but since attributes of action are only descriptive, they do not diminish God's essence. Only negative privative judgments about deity are possible.[8] For example, it is not possible to say that God is good, we have no idea what goodness in God could be like, nor could we justify such a statement.

But it is possible to say that God is not non-good. Cohen was familiar with Maimonides arguments for the negative attributes, and he reiterated Maimonides' position.[9] Parenthetically, it may be noted that Cohen understood and accepted many of the subtleties in Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed.[10] A primary reason for so-thinking is Cohen's view of God and of Revelation (see above). Maimonides maintained that revelation is an original and ongoing process of intellectual development. Moses was human and not divine;[11] he had prepared himself to such an extent that he became prophet par excellance.[12] Of course, Cohen was free of many of the thirteenth century prejudices to which Maimonides succumbed. Cohen lived in an age of biblical or "higher" criticism; thus he basically accepted Wellhausen's approach to scripture. He was able to question biblical claims to the literal occurence of the Sinaitic event. For Cohen, true revelation began with the burning bush. Nevertheless, Cohen's interpretation of the Sinaitic event seems the natural outgrowth of Maimonides' conception. Trude-Weiss Rosmarin notes that, for Cohen"...the revelation of Judaism is of an abstract and spiritual nature, being actually nothing else but reason, without any sensual admixtures whatever."[13] This thought is consonant with Maimonides' concept of the realization of the intellect, a process which approximates Cohen's process of revelation.

Only attributes of ethical action may be used to describe the idea of God. Cohen states this directly:

> Only ethical attributes may be

> posited of God, and within (these) only such as direct themselves toward occupations (i.e. daily doings) of man, and in which God and God alone, (and) neither man nor God-man, should become a model for mankind.[14]

God is the guarantor of ethics; he 'reveals' the idea of a universal behavioral model for all mankind: "God's existence is ethics and only ethics. It is God's nature; he has no other. ([This assertion is] in [sharp] contrast to Spinoza ['s pantheistic claims that] God created nature; he is not nature!)"[15]

Among the many attributes which the biblical authors suggested for God were those of goodness and holiness, from which the notions of love and justice emerge. Cohen equates goodness with holiness and asserts that the latter has a divine and a mundane dimension. Holiness, as a divine dimension, designates the very Being of the God-idea, whereas holiness as a mundane description describes man's being <u>in potentia</u>, that is, his becoming. Cohen singles-out holiness from Maimonides thirteen attributes because it bridges the gap between man and the God-idea. Holiness facilitates the correlation.[16] God's holiness consists of his ability to be that Being toward which man strives; such Being is approached only through (reasoned) ethics. Cohen, himself, states, "The existence of God is ethics and only such. He has no other nature,"[17] (see above).

Nevertheless, this God who is the guarantor of ethics and whose only attributes are those of ethical action has another role, that of renewer. As indicated earlier,[18] God is a partner in the creative process.[19] Such partnership is not possible in Christianity or Greek religions. Creation would be impossible without the idea of God, without pure idea. The process of approximation, which is intrinsic to man's existence, is the process of becoming. Becoming is possible only if it involves movement. God is that pure Being toward which man strives. His striving is an ethical striving; only through ethics can man approximate true Being. Consequently, God, as true Being, is the constant renewer of the immanent creative process.[20] Through the correlational process of renewal, God maintains and guarantees his own essence and existence as well as man's existence.[21]

VI

Religion, specifically Judaism, and ethics are integrally related. Whereas ethics has an existence independent of religion, religion does not have an existence independent of ethics. Ethics supplies the goal for religion, but not the content. The God of Judaism provides the ethical orientation for religion. It has been shown that God and man relate through a necessary correlation; this correlation is rational and its direction is non-ethical. In this aspect of the correlation, man stands apart from others. This separateness from man is only one dimension of Judaism, the emphasis on the individual. In Judaism, however, man stands in relation to other men as much as he stands in relation to God. Judaism provides the means by which man can relate with other men through the correlation with the idea of man. This correlation is ethical.

For Cohen, man's most meaningful relationships are rational, cognitive. They result from the correlation between the I of the individual and the idea of the other man. In the man-God correlation, the thou is the otherness of the God-idea, the not-I. In the man-man correlation, the thou is the fellow man. Cohen distinguishes between the Mitmensch, or fellow man, and the Nebenmensch, (Nachsten) or neighbor.[1] Man can correlate only with the Mitmensch; only the Mitmensch can be a thou.[2] The Nebenmensch is the other (person) treated as an object. No correlation is possible between objects. The neighbor thus becomes trans-

formed from the Nebenmensch to the Mitmensch through Mitleid, pity or social sympathy.[3] He is no longer separated from, but becomes one with the observer. Yet, the love of neighbor is also to be viewed as a consequence of the correlation. Both the man-God and man-man correlations are perceived and actualized in religion. The correlation represents a task[4]:

> The correlation between God and Man cannot be consumated otherwise than through the implied correlation between man and man. The correlation between God and Man is, in the first place, that of fellow-man with God. And the true significance of religion is primarily proven through the correlation, which gives rise to man as fellow-man.[5]

The God of social love (ethics) and the God of the forgiveness of sin (religion) are identical in Judaism. Both are this-worldly oriented. Both are rational.

Cohen maintained that the 'idea of humanity' is the goal toward which religion points.[6] This idea of humanity is expressed in biblical religion, especially among the prophets. The Bible defines and describes this united concept of mankind; its goal, and the true goal of Judaism, is this 'realization of a united humanity'.[7] Judaism's notion of messianic fulfillment is the achievement of a united

humanity; it is asymptotic. Messianic attainment depends upon the mutual dependency of God and man; 'without the one (and unique) God, the idea of humanity could not arise'.[8] Thus mutual dependency has been misinterpreted by many of Cohen's critics. They contend that, at this point, Cohen's God ceased being a concept, a logical postulate, and became a metaphysical reality exercising control of the world. This criticism is ill-founded.[9] God remained the logical postulate of Cohen's earlier system.

In Judaism, through its scriptures, man recognizes himself in the fellow man. This recognition is rational. Cohen cites the stories of Noah and Abraham as biblical examples in which man recognizes his fellow.[10] The golden mean, or its reversal, 'do not do unto others that which you would not have done unto yourself', is emotional; it employs self-interest. Consequently, Cohen maintains that the golden mean is unscientific and provides insufficient reason for its adherence. It presupposes that another person's likes and dislikes represent one's own. This assumption is not logical. Rather, Cohen maintains that the ethical, and thus universal, maxim which Judaism offers for mankind is found in Leviticus 19:18f. The Hebrew statement <u>v'ahavta l'reacha k'mocha</u> usually has been rendered as 'you shall love your neighbor as yourself'. For Cohen, this translation is wrong. First, it does not indicate the subtlety of the biblical text. Second, it is emotional rather than reasoned. And third, it obscures the universality of Judaism.[11]

Love is an emotion which develops out of relationships; it cannot be commanded nor is it reasonable to assume that man can love all other men. Consequently, Cohen maintains that the words 'should act lovingly' be substituted for 'shall love'. But other problems remain. To respect or act lovingly to a 'neighbor' implies to respect an object. Such respect is impossible, for man can have no meaningful relationship with an object. The word 'neighbor' implies an object which exists but to which man cannot 'correlate'; it is apart from man. The word neighbor also limits relationships to hearby physical objects. Rather, Cohen suggests that the use of fellow-man' which includes a universal subjectiveness to which all men may correlate. Finally, to say that you act lovingly toward your fellow man 'like yourself' is self-ish. It says nothing about the essence of humanity which one shares with his fellow. Therefore, Cohen translates Leviticus 19:18f as 'one should act lovingly toward his fellow man, <u>for he is like you</u>, I am the Lord'; he shares the human condition of finitude, just as you do, with other fellow men. Cohen notes that Akiba, the sage, made the same change.[12] Cohen says that the phrase 'I am the Lord' is essential. It makes the ethical imperative a divine commandment, and one loves his fellow man for <u>this</u> reason. Again, these initial distinctions are not based upon <u>kavannah</u>, or intentions, but on deeds,[13] for it is only deeds which law can legislate and history can order. Only when one acts ethically out of love of God, does one

approach the intentional aspect of the imperative.

Cohen's arguments for the re-translation of Leviticus 19:18f are paradigmatic for his conception of Judaism as the religion of (reason and) ethics. Judaism, from its very onset, recognized the universal principles of reason and ethics. Early Jewish systems, as are found in the Talmudic materials, perpetuated these ideals. According to Cohen, universal ethics originated with Judaism.[14] Like Maimonides, Cohen truly believed that Judaism had always had this claim to truth. He strave to prove this claim. Cohen is uncritical; his emotional bias to support his conception of rational religion upon earlier sources is questionable. This bias comes out most strongly in his conception of history (cf. below); it is a major stumbling block for the critic of Cohen's Judaism. Cohen imposes his system upon biblical and talmudic religion rather than stating that his interpretation of Judaism is his own and maintaining its legitimacy based upon his criteria for reason. One excuse for Cohen's lack of critical insight on this point was the continued conception of the Jewish religious enterprise as one of continuity. The synagogue liturgy and Jewish holiday celebrations perpetuate this notion. The Judaism of Cohen's day was considered as the gradual but completely continuous and legitimate development out of historic Judaism. It is ironic that Cohen should have accepted this theory, because he witnessed the intense struggle, almost revolution, of (emerging)

Reform Judaism on the German scene.[15] Nevertheless, it would have been threatening to him personally and to the Jewish community in general and Cohen maintained that his Judaism was a complete break with the past (cf. last chapter). Consequently, Cohen submitted to the prevailing theories. In passing, it may be noted that it is probably good that Cohen did not have the perception that he was creating a new Judaism, or at least that he did not articulate such a perception. Cohen's argument for the continuity of rational religion made his rebuttal against Treitschke in 1880 very effective. It is questionable whether he would have been as convincing and successful had he stressed the lack of Jewish continuity and the individuality of Jewish religious systems.

Ethics, for Cohen, has a social function; it considers man as a member of society and not only as an individual. Judaism, as a religion of ethics, prescribes an ethical society. This society is democratic. Those ethical maxims as found in the decalogue or in the Holiness Code of Leviticus 19 apply equally to all members of that society. Democracy is indemic to Cohen's Judaism. Cohen quotes from the midrash Seder Eliahu Rabba[16] in support of this claim:

> I call heaven and earth as witnesses, that whether it be an Israelite or a gentile, man or woman, servant or maid, the spirit of Holiness comes to everyone according to his actions.[17]

Judaism is the system which insures God as ethical guarantor. Judaism is thereby the system which preserves mankind.

VII

It may be recalled that once, when conversing with Friedrich Lange, Cohen had responded to his teacher, "What you call Christianity, I call prophetic Judaism." By this statement Cohen appeared to show a positive attitude toward Christianity. Germany was defined by many as a Christian state; its heroes such as Kant, Herder, and Goethe were also Cohen's heroes.[1] Nevertheless, Cohen's attitude toward Christianity is somewhat ambivalent. Cohen had tremendous admiration for Martin Luther.[2] Luther was a German hero, and Cohen was raised in this German tradition. Luther had taken a stand against the Catholic Church. As indicated earlier, Cohen was adamant in his rejection of Catholicism. Catholicism denied human freedom, established itself and its hierarchy as sole authorities, and damned the human being at birth. Cohen regarded Catholicism as irrational and threatening to reason and ethics. Consequently, Cohen regarded the Protestant Church as the Christian alternative to Catholicism. Cohen maintained that the Protestant Reformation and Luther's articles represent "the development of the freedom of Christian men."[3] Protestantism recognized human freedom. It denied the absolute authority of scripture and Church and advocated works as well as belief. Protestantism also helped produce the ethical culture manifested in the form of the German state.[4] This state, as an ethical and political entity warrants critical and yet complete support. Cohen was

aware of growing antisemitism. His defenses of Judaism show a praise of Christianity within a defense of Judaism. He praised both Christianity and the (German) state. Cohen even goes so far as to state that "Maimonides' (thought) is the true goal of Protestantism in medieval Jewry;[5] He subtly buried his idealism which also characterized the Protestant Reformation, in the overall scientific rationalism of his thought. Nevertheless, Cohen did assert that certain Christian truths were questionable; he questioned the belief in the literalness of Jesus as Christ, the attitude toward the neighbor, and the notion of salvation.[6]

Cohen questioned the reports of Jesus' life and death as related in the New Testament and as practiced by the Catholic Church. Deity was never nor could ever become a mundane person. To assert the contrary is to commit rational heresy.[7] Secondly, miracles do not occur in a rational world. Any claims to miraculous events are false![8] It might be said that Cohen along with many liberal theologians, necessarily 'demythologized' the New Testament before either Bultmann or Jaspers offered their critiques. This criticism of Christianity, however, did not constitute Cohen's entire attitude toward that religion. Regardless of its non-rational, even irrational, basis, Christianity expressed truths about man's nature.[9] It recognized the necessity for the love of mankind, and, in this recognition, it approximated the prophetic elements of Judaism. Eventhough it recognized the nature of mankind, the New Testament and thus Christianity frequently

misinterpreted the true ethical nature of man's relationship to his fellow.[10]

In Marburg in 1886, the Jewish community sued the state for a publication of a book on anti-semitism, Cohen was called to testify on behalf of the Jewish community.[11] Cohen defended Judaism against the Christian community and against Christian tradition. His defense was successful. It focused on the discussion of 'neighborly love' (Lev. 19:18) which has been discussed in the preceeding chapter. In his testimony, Cohen notes that the New Testament promotes a major misconception and misrepresentation of the biblical and thus Jewish attitude toward the neighbor. Christians have regarded the term neighbor in Jewish tradition as a reference to 'fellow Jew' implying a selfish, chauvanistic relationship. This negative attitude finds its logical expression in the New Testament account of the 'good Samaritan'. Cohen maintains (see chapter VII) that Judaism is not chauvanistic; it is universal. The word rea' (neighbor) in Jewish tradition always meant fellowman and not fellow Jew.[12] Cohen cites the example of Ruth. Rabbinic literature traces the lineage of this Moabite foward to King David himself; she is considered to be a 'full' Jewess.

For Cohen, Leviticus 19:18 becomes the forerunner for the categorical imperative: (1) honor mankind in your own as well as in everyone else's person; (2) never treat man only as a means, but always also as an end in himself;

and (3) always act in such a way as those principles which you set for yourself may be made into universal principles. Cohen maintains that Christianity recognized these principles eventhough it misread Jewish tradition. Christianity's logical basis rests in prophetic religion, prophetic Judaism.

Love and faith are primary in Christianity; they are precursors for a greater goal, the goal of salvation. Here, too, Cohen offers criticism. Christianity maintains that salvation is a miraculous, physical and real possibility. In Cohen's opinion, if the achievement of salvation is a real rather than an asymptotic possibility, man is defeated at outset. Original sin signifies such defeat in (Catholic) Christianity. The doctrine of original sin removes the possibility of salvation for all but a few elite, those lucky enough to be recipients of God's grace. Mankind is sinful, incapable of achieving 'rectitude!'[13] Such pessimism would not do for Cohen. It would give man a negative outlook on life and would provide him with no realizable goal. It would also deny man's fundamental freedom.[14]

Even liberal Protestant Christianity does not provide the proper means for achieving salvation.[15] because it stresses the notion of the salvation of the believers and not necessarily of the doers.[16] According to Cohen, only Judaism advocates the priesthood of all its members and the salvation of all those who perform (good) deeds. (Here, too, as with Cohen's notions of the neighbor, Cohen failed to accept rabbinic traditions contradictory to this salva-

tional schema. Although such traditions were not the prevailing current of Jewish theology, some recognition should have been given them.) Judaism does not prescribe the use of any intermediaries for the achievement of rectitude of sins and salvation. Total responsibility for sin and salvation is placed in man's power.

Christianity, due to its emphasis on faith and intermediaries, characterizes sin as offense against deity. Such offense is based more upon wrong belief than on wrong action, In Christianity, intermediaries, either in the form of priests or even in the mystical 'personhood' of Jesus, make forgiveness a possibility. The intermediary works on man's behalf to achieve forgiveness and salvation. Cohen finds such a conception unreasonable and dangerous. It is dangerous because it impinges upon man's radical freedom and his very personal relationship with his ida of God. No one else can possibly relate to his idea of God save himself. The penalty for sin is voluntarily accepted by man himself; his suffering arises out of a break in the correlation. No one else can call him a sinner as does Christianity. Sin is individual. According to Cohen, the prophet Ezekiel introduced the notion of religious sin as sin against God.[17] Only Ezekiel recognized the freedom of the individual in relation to man and to God.

Cohen maintains that Judaism focused on actions, deeds; sin emerges only in encounter with the idea of fellow man. Moral action arises out an acceptance of in the categorical

imperative. Both belief and action are primary, but man can be judged only by action. Consequently, Christianity represents only one dimension of Judaism; it is incomplete Judaism. Christianity termed 'prophetic Judaism' recognizes social ethics through the social prophets. In this context, sin is primarily any action which threatens societal welfare; sin against God remains in the background.[18] Christianity thus seeks to preserve the welfare of the state (i.e. German state in which Cohen lived), but it does not deal adequately with real, personal sin, which, itself, is the result of man's relationship with himself and with God.[19] Whereas prophetic (and Christian) ethics deal with society, the religion of reason is concerned with the individual in the context of an ethical society. Sin is the individuating mechanism; it forces man to repent.[20] Through sin and personal suffering, man recognizes the general suffering of mankind.[21] Suffering is thus transformed into an ethical necessity, but repentence is individual. In repentence, man extrapolates meaning from his suffering and from general human suffering and removes his sin from consciousness.[22] Forgiveness is thus achieved. For Cohen, only Judaism provides the mechanism for such a notion of forgiveness of sin. Christianity does not provide means by which man can effectively achieve forgiveness. In Christianity man can recognize societal ills and strive for their cure, but he cannot truly achieve forgiveness for his own sins.

Judaism does contain that mechanism whereby man can seek for forgiveness for his sins. The mechanism is characterized by the messianic process.[23] Messianic claims are irrational; no messiah can ever come or will ever come. Belief in the miraculous coming of a personal Messiah is irrational.[24] Rather, messianism is an ongoing process. It is infinite. The goal of messianism is the achievement of a united humanity;[25] the process is closely linked with the correlation. Such a goal can never be achieved; it can only be approximated. According to Cohen, this conception of messianism is original to Judaism.[26] (A more detailed discussion of messianism follows.)

VIII

Cohen contends that Judaism is an exceptional religion. Its notion of sin singles man out as an individual; its notion of ethics embraces man as a member of a group or community. The Jewish community itself is very special. It has the task or mission of transmitting ethical ideals to the other peoples of the world. The goal of the Jewish community is to effect the messianic age of a 'united humanity' (See Chapter VII). The social prophets were the originators of this goal.[1] They recognized that the Jewish people had a special mission to the nations of the world. The Jewish people, for Cohen, did not constitute a particular nation of individuals. Judaism is not a matter of national affiliation; it is a matter of religious conviction. In fact, no religion is justifiably the basis for chauvanistic nationalism.

Cohen's assertion that the Jewish community is a universal assemblage of believers contradicted emerging Zionism. A physical Jewish state is anathema to Judaism. Moreover, the concept of the chosen people is wrong. The very existence of the Jewish people is due to their adaptability which of necessity arose after the destruction of the second Temple. The dispersion made it possible for Jews to spread all over the world and thus try to effect their truly messianic aspirations of creating a united humanity.[2] The destruction of the Temple and of the sacrifical cult was seminal in creating a truly world

Jewry, a people united in purpose but characterized by its diversity.[3] The sages developed a system of prayerful service to replace the debunked sacrificial cult.[3] Personal prayer stresses man's individuality. Yet communal prayer is essential for Cohen. It ranks above individual prayer because communal prayer provide 'the original basis for the messianic kingdom..."[4] The return of the Jewish people to any 'zion', regardless of where it would be located, would mean the petrification of Judaism.[5] The Jewish people have the role of acting as the monitor and conscience for all mankind; they are the symbol of true suffering humanity. The very meaning of their existence derives from their place among the nations. The Jews are people among other peoples. Thus the Jew may also be a true German, Spaniard, American or whatever without jeopardizing his Jewishness or detracting from it.

Cohen's assertion that the Jewish people do not constitute a nation was a response to the growing trends of anti-semitism which began to emerge in Germany in the 1870's and which gained greater impetus from that time. In the first chapter it was noted that, for example, Heinrich von Treitschke's attack on the Jews was directed toward supposed 'Jewish nationalism.'[6] For Treitschke, religion and state were interwined. Any nation can tolerate only one religion. Germany is a Christian state; Judaism constituted a threat to that state. Similar criticisms of Judaism and the Jewish people emerged in the early 1900's.

Cohen's formal response to these criticisms appeared in his essay Deutschtum and Judentum, Germanism and Judaism.[7] In this essay, Cohen discusses the messianic orientation of the Jewish people, and the relationship of this people to Germany. Cohen's conception of history and messianism are implicit in his statement.

As has been suggested, messianism is the realization of a united humanity. For Cohen, "the biblical prophets invented history".[8] They recognized that God cannot destroy the world in the same manner that a court cannot execute a man. People can destroy the world; people can execute men. Nevertheless, the prophetic prediction of impending castastrophe has a cathartic effect on man; it leads mankind to action and thus to purification. Man's actions becomes historical events. Man's deeds become the purifying mechanism for achieving immortality, salvation. Immortality thus becomes the religious analog to ethical activity which is, itself, an infinite pursuit. Christianity and rabbinic Judaism focused their concepts of messianism on the past, a yearning for earlier times. Cohen transforms messianism from a yearning from a past paradise to a 'Golden Future'. Such a golden future is a goal toward which man strives,[9] at his own pace. The process of striving is endless; nevertheless it points to a final end. This end is an age where such searching will be transformed into a never achievable reality; it is an ideal.[10] Time is thus future oriented:

> For Plato, the ideal state is beyond time; the ideal state of the Bible is in the future.[11]

For Cohen (and Kant) reason and ethics are related to law.[12] Ethics is the philosophy of the science of law. In addition, law is coincidentally a necessary pre-requisite for the historical process, more prominently heilsgeschichte. Law permits progress along an historical continuum. The emphasis on the historical also coincides with the relationship between deeds and history. In the words of Rudolph Bultmann, deeds are not merely data, historisch; they are geschichtlich, that is, active, relevant and becoming. Cohen's conception of historical material parallels Bultmann's category of geschichtlich. Cohen maintains that such new categories must be developed continually to interpret history.[13]

Essentially, for Cohen, history is an ongoing process. History is not a collection of picayune facts, data; it is the recollection and continuing renewal of previous experiences. Its goal is not simply a reworking of past data, but a contemplation and creation of an ideal future.[14] There are two implications of this concern with the future. First, those geschichtliche experiences and events are only important if they are repeatable through a rational process. That is to say, those events which are not continually rediscovered in reality never existed! Second, history emphasizes a future goal.[15] Cohen feels that the future is asymptotic. Progress is not only an evolutionary development

resulting in perfection heretofor unachieved. Progress is a reinterpretation and reapplication of the historical (the geschichtliche) which results in new conclusions. They need not be based evolutionarily one upon another. These conclusions may not be appraised by value judgments. They may be judged only in relation to their approximation to the goal; whether it be a goal of pure idea of state, law, or whatever, is only of secondary importance. History is one vast ladder of progress; it is never a closed system. History begins anew with every moment, but it continues into the future; its messianic goal is freedom which culminates in community as opposed to society.[16] Steven S. Schwarzschild rightly maintains that for Cohen, 'community' meant society and 'society' meant state.[17] Consequently, the state is only the means by which messianism may be achieved. The state, by enforcing self-imposed law (see above) maintains the ethical direction of its citizens, but the (religious) community determines the final state. God is the guarantor of this process; the Jewish people is the community through which the idea of the individual becomes immortalized:

> ...immortality has the meaning of the historical immortality of the idea of the individual within the historical continuity of his people.[18]

Thus, the Jewish community serves a messianic purpose.

For Cohen, Germany was the ideal state which permitted

this process to go on undisturbed. Nevertheless, Cohen's conception of Germany was unrealistic. In his defense of Germany in Deutschtum and Judentum, Cohen relies heavily upon the aesthetic and artistic figures in Germany's past. Those figures who saw beauty and purpose in their lives provided ideals for Cohen and clouded his view of political and economic Germany. At the time Cohen wrote Deutschtum und Judentum, Germany was in the midst of World War I. Popular support for Germany's participation in the war was waning. In his pamphlet, Cohen rallied to the support of the German state. In addition, he stated that the goals of Judaism and those of Germany were identical. Judaism and Germanism had the same ethical goals. Despite Cohen's support of the state, he does stipulate that as long as the German state continued to be ethical it was incumbant upon him to remain a citizen and to support it. Yet, if the physical state began to overthrow its ethical purpose, he would withdraw his support and membership and immediately relinquish his affiliation with it.[19] It is interesting to note that Cohen never did relinquish his affiliation with Germany. It is also probable that Cohen was unable to remove himself from his idealization of the German state enough to recognize the increasing anti-semitism and political madness resulting from an increasingly falling economy in that country.

Much of the concern which contemporary scholars such as Jospe, Melber, Guttmann, et. al. have for Cohen's support of Germany is based upon their own feelings toward Germany.

They are aware of Nazism during World War II and the mass murder of one third of world Jewry. Many lost their families during this period. For them, there is a great deal of embarrasment and resentment in the fact that such a renowned Jewish intellectual figure apparently condoned the developments of World War II. Such a perspective is unfair to Cohen. Cohen truly believed that Germany's goals were ethical.

Thus, Cohen's conception of the state and of a people, a Volk, are integrally related. Judaism provides the ideal community which gives conscience to the state; both seek ethical goals. The state provides the legal means by which one strives for the ethical goals of true, rational, Jewish religion. Both the state and the rational religion are necessary for reconciliation.[20]

IX

Although Hermann Cohen's philosophical system emerged from Kantianism, it is a subtle critique of Kant's thought. Cohen's philosophy is strictly idealistic. His statements on man, the state, and the world are the results of his idealism. Cohen's thinking influenced the thinking and philosophy of his students and disciples among whom are Ernst Cassirer, Paul Natorp, Ernst Simon, and Franz Rosenzweig. His influence also extended to others who were not directly under his tutelege. Martin Buber, for example, may have found the guidlines for his dialogical thinking in Cohen's system, and especially in his Religion of Reason.[1]

Nevertheless, Cohen's philosophy became less 'enticing' to others toward the end of his life. At the turn of the century existentialism was becoming avant garde throughout Eurppe, especially in France. Idealism and rationalism were thought to separate the individual from phenomenological reality, eventhough these systems claims a reality for themselves. Psychoanalysis, with its discovery of non-rational depths of the personality, offers a sharp critique of strick rationalism. The economic and political make-up of Europe during, and subsequent to, World War I made for a heightened emotional state. Reason became replaced by passion. The capitalistic spirit which permitted the rapid rise of industry throughout the world stressed individual

advancement over community involvement. Emerging imperialism and nationalism, although radiating the guise of unity, were actually the results of groups of individuals who sought to increase their own interests and power. The notion of the ethical community was discredited; the person became interested in personal achievement. The community which Cohen idealized in expressionistic art became less of a possibility. Salvation in any group sense was regarded as impossible and unrealistic. Personal salvation was again sought, although salvation was now couched in mundane terms rather than in euphamistic metaphysical language. Such an eviroment was not congenial to Hermann Cohen's philosophical idealism. Even his notion of Judaism and Jewish nationalism which was consonant with the ideology of the Pittsburgh Platform of American Jewry (1885) was denounced in the Columbus Platform's affirmation of a Jewish state about fifty years later. The environment had changed.

Still, the perceptiveness of Cohen's thought remained. Cohen had criticized the traditional notions of man, God, the world, and salvation; he offered a live option for persons unable to accept the language of metaphysics. Cohen's God, as Idea, is not a metaphysical entity. It is a rational construction which the introspective, thinking man can derive for himself if he so desires. It is totally within the realm of his rational thought. Salvation is equally rational. Cohen offered the questioning man a

rational option; emotions, too, were explained rationally.

Within the context of Judaism, Cohen's thoughts generally were considered inadequate by Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox Jews. Cohen's conception of Jewish people and his disregard for a Jewish national homeland made his philosophy of Judaism unpalatable to many Jews. European Jewish youth movements thrived, and with them, the love and yearning for return to Zion. The increase in anti-semitism and the emotional return to more traditional Jewish theology contributed to this yearning. Consequently, whereas Cohen's defense of Judaism throughout his life[2] helped maintain a modicum of toleration for the Jews in Germany, his conception of Judaism proved inadequate for many early twentieth century Jews.

Apparently, of all Cohen's disciples, only Franz Rosenzweig made Cohen's system and conception of Judaism the basis of his own conception of Judaism.[3] Nevertheless, Rosenzweig finds the greatest value for his Judaism in the 'later Cohen', implying that with the Religion of Reason, Cohen's attitude toward Judaism and toward God underwent a radical alteration. S. Hugo Bergman, Jacob Agus, Alfred Jospe, Yehuda Melber, and Emil Fackenheim agree with Rosenzweig's implication that toward the end of his life, Cohen underwent a personal change which resulted in a commensurate and yet discontinuous alteration in his philosophical system. These men claim that Cohen's Religion of Reason represents a subjective rather than an objective evaluation of Judaism and of God. Alfred Jospe notes the change in the following manner:

> No matter how hard he (Cohen) tried to have his rationalistic system contain and embrace the totality of his thinking and concerns, somehow there always remained an excess. And he changed and enlarged his philosophical views constantly, as shown, for instance by Bergmann, in an attempt to express that to which he sought to capture in philosophic definition--albeit not very successfully... If you look only at what Cohen put into his system you will find no radical break. You must look at the concerns he was not able to put into his system or could not put into it successfully in order to understand the inner factors which drove him constantly to change his views in an attempt to express his ultimate loyalties.[4]

Although there is no documentation, it seems evident from the type of material which Cohen wrote toward the end of his life and his eventual move to the Judische Hochschule that Judaism became a primary focus for Cohen.[5] It is possible that as he grew older, changes occurred in his personality and his attitude toward finitude

which led him to have greater fervor for his religion. Concerning those elements 'which he was not able to put into his system', Jospe seems right. Cohen may very well have become more emotionally drawn to the religion of his fathers. Such an emotional attachment, however, does not necessitate relinquishing his rational system.. Jospe, Bergman, et al maintained that with the Religion of Reason, Cohen's conception of God changed from an ideal to a metaphysical being. God, it is claimed, became totally the creator, God rather than the mutually creator and the idea of God created by man. This conclusion is spurious. Even Franz Rosenzweig, as he was writing his introduction to Cohen's Judische Schriften in the fall of 1923 recognized that to interpret Cohen's God metaphysically was doing Cohen an injustice. Yet, Rosenzweig so interpreted Cohen's God in order that it would appear as the precursor to his own thoughts. On September 16, 1923, Rosenzweig wrote the following letter to his friend Martin Buber:

> The introduction to Cohen's book gives me tremendous difficulty. I hardly write a single sentence without a guilty conscience. For not only his disciples, but Cohen himself, would be unable to accept so much as a single sentence. Besides, I don't even manage to understand him. This isn't so serious, for I see that even (Prof. Paul)

> Natorp, in his rather impressive commemorative speech[6] confesses that he doesn't understand him. But is it proper for the biographer to depart so widely from the autobiography of his hero? I am reminded of a statement Cohen once made about me, I think to my mother: "He has an amazing way of patting and slapping a person in the same phrase." This proves that even then I behaved exactly the same way toward him, so now his shade needn't take offense. But I myself feel scruples about turning him over this way in his grave.[7]

Eventhough he denies it, Rosenzweig understands Cohen. Nevertheless, his willingly misrepresents Cohen as stated in his letter to Buber. The pre-emptory relationship between man and God which Cohen had established in the Logic of Pure Reason was the selfsame idea of God which forms the foundation of his Religion of Reason.[8] God remained an idea to which man stands in infinite correlation; without man there could be no God and vice verse. What changed was Cohen's attitude toward this God. Whereas in his early system, Cohen gives the impression that God is merely a rational construction, in his later years, Cohen becomes becomes emotionally attached to this Idea. Although

he disagrees with Cohen, Martin Buber recalls a statement made by Cohen very late in his life. This statement was in response to the question, can one love an idea? Cohen reportedly responded, "why should I not be able to love ideas? What is man but a social idea... How can I love anything but an idea?"[9] This change in Cohen's personality is most apparent. The fervor with which he defends Judaism in his Religion of Reason (as well as in many essays in his Judische Schriften) is symptomatic of this change. Yet, it must be recalled that Cohen did not entitle his book 'The Religion of Reason out of the sources of Judaism,' but simply 'Religion of Reason...' Judaism remained the exemplar, the religion, which, for Cohen, incorporated rational and ethical religion. But it was not the only religion.

It has also been shown that Cohen was very guarded concerning the relationship between Judaism and Christianity and between Judaism and the State. Cohen was hesitant to jeopardize his position of prominence, and he wisely couched his rebuttals against anti-semitism and Christianity in consoling, almost condescending terms. As long as a religion is ethically motivated, it is worthy of support.

Cohen uses Jewish tradition, theology, and practice for his own advantage. His desire to show that his conception of Judaism is consistent with past systems plays havoc with the material. Cohen's use of history is arbitrary and unscientific (See Chapter VIII). Granted, Cohen was not an historian. Nevertheless, his use of history casts doubts upon the credibility of the historical aspects of his enter-

prise.

Cohen maintains that Jewish communal worship and the observance of ceremonials and festivals, especially the Day of Atonement and the Sabbath, assist man in his religious endeavor. This contention is not a natural outgrowth either of Cohen's philosophical system or of his Religion of Reason. Rather, it appears that Cohen's feelings for Judaism prompted him to incorporate these concerns. Cohen's relationship to Judaism was deep-seated. Cohen's youth and early manhood were steeped in Judaism; it is questionable whether he ever gave this up.

Hermann Cohen's idealism converts the individual into a 'mental machine'. Reason is the true judge of existence; reason creates existence. Such a idealistic and monolithic conception of the human personality is suspect. Whereas idealism may have been emotionally, as well as intellectually satisfying for Cohen, especially early in his life, it is likely that very few people indeed would find such idealism emotionally satisfying, and emotions are a necessary aspect of human personality. Still, Cohen does offer a convincing in-depth conception of man's religious conflicts as one of man's own creation, although Cohen does not go as far as Freud and claim that this results from infantile experiences. For Cohen, God and man exist simultaneously. Idea and mind are co-existent, and depending upon the other, and each asserting the existence of the other.

Cohen's relationship between Judaism and ethics is

logical and satisfying for a very structured, essentially guilty society. Man asserts his own existence and the existence of the fellow man in ethics.

Appendix A

Judische Schriften, pages 31-33
(Franz Rosenzweig's introduction)

The idea of God, which as early as in his confession in 1880 (the Treitschke event), constituted the real power of his (Cohen's) statement. This idea stands at the center of all his Jewish writings, but where does it stand in his entire system? In his system, God does not constitute the center, for the center is occupied, as in all the great idealistic systems of the 17th century, by reason. Cohen is protected by his Kantian sense of truth against identifying God with reason as those systems did... Furthermore, against this identification of God with reason, Cohen is protected by his Jewish knowledge of God who, by definition, cannot be identified with anything else. If, then, God is not the center of the system nor its basis, what is it? The Kantian God whom the 30 year old Cohen discovered to his own amazement to be a requirement of all scientific ethics was, after all, not accepted by Cohen without serious thought. Kant postulated God in order to harmonize virtue and happiness which could not otherwise be brought out. Cohen certainly could not repeat this concession to the consensual eudaemonism of his time. Furthermore, this harmonization of virtue and happiness at most describes one small part of what trust in God means. Thus this postulate in Kant's ethics is only an adornment and not a necessary part of the construction of the system. In Cohen, it is

otherwise. His idea of God is the capstone without which the entire edifice of the system would topple; (it is) placed there by ethics... God guarantees the realization of reality and the moralization of nature. Without God morality might be merely a beautiful idea, a mere utopia. Without God, nature would be real but not true...

The idea of God (which was understood even by some people who considered themselves as disciples of his as if God were 'only an idea') (suggests) that what the prophets had said to and of their God was only 'a poetic expression' for Cohen's kind of thinking. No greater misunderstanding of the thought or of the thinker is possible. In the first place, for Cohen, an idea is never 'only an idea'. More importantly, God is as little a poetic expression for the idea of God as the fact of mathematical science is a poetic expression for the logic of pure cognition. Cohenian philosophy always avoids most carefully the identification of philosophy with its object, although it always is concerned with its objects. At most, one might interpret Hegel to have dissolved the object into a philosophical idea. With Cohen, one cannot do this. By using the word 'idea', a statement is made about the kind of scientific statement that can be made about God; the word idea implies that one cannot describe, calculate, or even comprehend God, for an idea is neither a thing nor a lawful connection, nor a concept. The word idea does mean that one can say what would not be without God...

Comment:

Cohen's conception of God as idea has been criticized by many thinkers. Such men argue that by developing philosophical ideas, Cohen posited a God which was a mere concept which could never be experienced. In his introduction, Rosenzweig takes exception to this criticism. He correctly maintains that for Cohen, the 'idea' is an hypothesis which makes scientific cognition an ethical understaking (i.e. all ethics implies principles). For Cohen, nothing is more real than an idea; ideals constitute reality. An idea is always something which is above the object, but related to it. Resenzweig's final point however is that an idea cannot be described, calculated, or comprehended, for an idea is not an object (i.e. all of these functions imply negative aspects of an idea), leads Rosenzweig maintain that for Cohen, 'an idea is never only an idea'. Here Rosenzweig is presenting Cohen's conception of God as the for-runner for the God which emerges in Rosenzweig's The Star of Redemption. See the concluding chapter for greater discussion of this point.

Notes

Foward:

1. Rosmarin, Trude Weiss-. Religion of Reason, pp. 2-4.

2. Cohen, Hermann. Religion der Vernunft (hereafter referred to as RV), the 'foward'.

3. Rosmarin. op cit. p. 3.

4. Zacharias Frankel was viciously attacked by many orthodox Jews with the publication of his 'Ways of the Mishnah' (originally in Hebrew). Frankel gave a new interpretation to the phrase Halacha l'moshe mi'sinai. In orthodox Judaism, this phrase was taken to refer to those laws which God revealed to Moses at Sinai, but were not written in the Torah. Instead, they were transmitted orally and could be found in the Talmud. Frankel disputed this and claimed that the phrase 'the law of Moses from Sinai' is post-Mosaic in origin and was considered by Talmudic scholars as having divine or Mosaic authority. Frankel thus threatened the very essence of orthodox Judaism; once the divine authority of the Talmud is questioned, the entire authority structure of past Jewish systems comes into question. It was not Frankel, however, but the German reformers such as Geiger who proposed a questioning of the basic authority structure of Judaism. In a sense, Cohen's RV is a response to this problem of authority.

5. See Cohen's Deutschtum und Judentum, pp. 45-46.

6. Many thinkers, such as Alfred Jospe, S. Hugo Bergmann, Jehudah Melber, and Alexander Altman have tried to justify or explain away Cohen's support of Germany. To my knowledge, only Emil Fackenheim, 'Hermann Cohen -- after fifty years', correctly understands and interprets Cohen's Germanism. Yet all of these thinkers as German refugees themselves may be tinged with memory of the holocoust and treat Cohen's Germanism in the light of this mid-20th century tragedy.

7. Cohen. Deutschtum und Judentum, pp. 13ff. See also his 'Spinoza uber Staat und Religion, Judentum und Christentum' Jüdische Schriften, Vol. III, especially pp. 369-372, as well as Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, pp. 3, 133-134.

8. Men like Isaac Steinberg and Gawornski were attracted to Cohen at Marburg. An interesting story is related concerning Gawornski. In 1911, Cohen requested that the University accept Garwornski as a privat dozent under Cohen. The university refused. Steven Schwarzs-

child has suggested that this refusal led Cohen to retire from the faculty at Marburg. More realistically, however, this refusal may have been the final impetus for Cohen's departure. He was now elderly and ailing. It is unlikely that the University's refusal to appoint Gawornski to its faculty was the only cause for Cohen's resignation.

9. In his 'Ein Wort uber unser Judentum' (Preussiche Jahrbucher, Vols. 44,45, 1879 and G. Reimer pub. Berlin, 1880) Treitschke wrote, "...We do not want an era of German-Jewish mixed culture. ...It is a sin against Germany to assert that Judaism is as German as Christianity." Treitschke, H. "A Word About Our Jewry," translated by Helen Lederer, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, 1958, p. 3.

10. Cohen tried to have this essay published by a Germann press, but he was refused. Nevertheless, he felt compelled to publish it and thus did so privately.

11. This theme is re-stated and re-exemplified in Cohen's Deutschtum und Judentum (cf. below) which was written twenty years later, in 1916.

12. Rosmarin. op cit. p. 8.

13. The first edition of this book was published under the title Die Religion der Vernunft aus dem Quellen des Judentums ('The' Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism), by Gustav Fock, Leipzig, whereas the second edition (published by J. Kaufmann, Frankfurt am Main) appeared with the title Religion Der Vernunft... The title of the first edition was probably a misprint which Cohen would not have permitted. The simple title of 'Religion of Reason...' is in keeping with Cohen!s system. It provides merely one way, albeit the way which Cohen thought best. Nevertheless, many critics of Cohen perpetuate this mistake, viz. Mordecai Kaplan and Jehuda Melber. In keeping with Cohen's philosophical system of critical idealism, it is interesting to note the motto which he ascribes to his Religion of Reason. It is taken from the Babylonian Talmud, tractate Yoma, page 85b which reads, ash're'chem yisrael, lifne me atem m'taharin, mi m'taher etchem, avichem shebashamayim ('Happy are you, Israel, before whom are you cleansed, (and) who cleanses you?(It is) your father in heaven.'). Cohen however translates this passage as follows: Heil Euch Israel. Wer reinigt Euch und vor wem reinigt ihr Selbst Euch? Es ist Euer Vater in Himmel." ('Hail, Israel. Who purifies you, and before whom do you purify yourselves? It is your father in heaven." Cohen's translation differs radically from R. Akiva's statement in b. Yoma 85b; it is intentional.

Self-purification and individual authority for religious beliefs and actions are the fundamental building blocks for Cohen's conceptions of sin, atonement, and the personal nature of religion.

14. Rosmarin, op cit. p. 8.

Chapter I

1. Kant's Theory of Experience, 1871; (F. Dümmler Pub., Berlin 1885) Kant's Foundations of Ethics, 1877; (F. Dümmler Pub., Berlin); and Kant's Foundation of Aesthetics, 1889. (F. Dummler, Pub., Berlin),

2. Logic of Pure Reason, 1902; Berlin, B. Cassirer Pub., (1914) Ethic of Pure Will; 1904; Berlin, (B. Cassirer), and Aesthetic of Pure Feeling, Berlin (B. Cassirer) 1912.

3. Bergmann, S. Hugo. Faith and Reason (ed. by Alfred Jospe). p. 41. See also the discussion below.

4. Emil Fackenheim criticizes Cohen's denial of realistic elements as 'a dreamlike lack of realism which is not present in Kant himself and which, by itself, suffices to explain why the eighteenth century master is today more philosophically alive than his nineteenth and early twentieth century disciple and expositor." (Hermann Cohen -- after fifty years, page 11). Later, in the same lecture Fackenheim terms Cohen's lack of realism his 'weakness' (ibid. p. 15). Indeed, Fackenheim is pointing to a 'problem' in Cohen's thought, but his critique of Cohen is a value judgment which is unfair to Cohen. Critical idealism is grounded in absolute idealism and is as valid a philosophical enterprise as is realism.

5. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft series), pp. 276-278.

6. Kant and Cohen, maintain that reality can only be what man's forms of thought permit it to be. For Kant, true reality is something quite different than for Cohen; it differs in specifics.

7. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason (WB series, Vol. 4) Transcendental Dialectic, pp. 310-311. Cf. also his Critique of Pure Reason (W.B. series, Vol. 3), pp. 45-48 and pp. 136-141, as well as Frank Thilly and Ledger Wood, A History of Philosophy, pp. 420-429.

8. Samuel Atlas, From Critical to Speculative Idealism, maintains that Solomon Maimon came to similar conclusions concern the nature and origin of reason. See Chapter V, pp. 62-108.

9. Recent attempts have been made to overcome this problem. For example, Bertrand Russell posits the notion of 'sensibles' which exist independent of the thinking mind. Russell creates a selective realism combining the most plausible elements of both realistic and idealistic systems.

10. This is the Kantian definition of freedom which Cohen adopts into his system, cf. for example Cohen's Aesthetic of Pure Feeling, pp. 34-36 for greater elaboration of this point.

11. Logik. p. 145f, 223.

12. Bergmann. op cit. pp. 36-37,

13. Cohen, Hermann. JS (Judische Schriften), Vol. I, pp. 18-19, Franz Rosenzweig's introduction. As with much of his 'introduction', Rosenzweig is paving the way for his own thoughts which become formalized in his The Star of Redemption.

14. Ibid. p. 19.

15. Thilly and Wood. op cit. pp. 426.429.

16. Cohen's concept of infinitesimals is similar to Leibniz's concept of infintesimals and monads; nevertheless he uses Maimon's concept of movement, task, toward infintesimals. While Maimon considers the monads as metaphysical realities, Cohen does not. See Atlas, op cit. pp. 33-37.

17. Kant. op cit. Transcendental Dialectic, pp. 412-413.

18. Namely, the creation of the universe ex nihilo, the world as infinitely divisible, the reality of individual freedom, and the existence of some sort of Absolute necessary being.

19. Bergmann. op cit. pp. 34-37.

Chapter II

1. See pages 61f. of Cohen's Ethik.

2. See pages 9, 34f, 56f, 186ff, and 331ff. of Cohen's

Aesthetik for greater elaboration of the relationship between religion and aesthetics.

3. Cohen, H. Der Begriff... op cit. pp. 6ff. See also Rosmarin, op cit., pages 17ff where she mentions that "Cohen never approaches religion as anything but a phase of philosophy... Philosophy seeks the 'well of truth' and religion seeks in that very same well 'about last things'." Alexander Altman, too, reiterates the same opinion in his "Hermann Cohen's Foundations and Formulations of the Correlation", see especially page 393.

4. Ethik. pp. 229ff.

5. Rosmarin, op cit. p. 7.

6. According to Cohen, 'God and his Law (i.e. Jewish ethical structures as posited by the prophets) stand in opposition to the egoism, self-investigation, and especially, to the heroism of the individual. (And this is where Judaism and Kant stand in opposition.) In the last analysis, the age-old thought of the equality of mankind before God is primary in Jewish Law.' Therefore, Cohen poists the translation of Leviticus 19:18 to read, ...love mankind, for he is like you... This translation also shows an emphasis on peoplehood and community (cf. below) for, as Cohen concludes, zeh sefer toldot adam, this is the book of the generations of mankind, a common midrashic phrase. (Cohen, 'Innere Beziehung...' p. 292.)

7. Cohen, H. Kants Begründung der Ethik. pp. 218-227, also pp. 279-280, 340-342. See especially p. 223 where Cohen quotes and offers a critique of Kant's eategorical imperative.

8. Der Begriff..., p. 16.

9. See Cohen's Aesthetik, pp. 337 and 326. Also note the last seven sections of part B of the 5th chapter of the Aesthetik, pp. 331-348. See also Der Begriff... pp. 86-107.

10. Ibid. p. 213. Many German impressionists were particularly obsessed with depicting man in his everyday tasks. They focused upon the human condition and tried to depict human suffering, thus evoking subjective impressions. The viewer responded to such graphic expressions with pity; for Cohen, the feeling of pity marks man's religious response of love for his fellowman.

11. Ibid. p. 166.

12. See Der Begriff..., op cit., p. 87 (and Cohen's Aesthetik, pp. 331-334.)

13. Ibid. p. 88. Cohen's conception of pity as arising from man's social condition is parallel to Arthur Schopenhauer's view that pity or sympathy forms the basis of morality and is thus the foundation for sound moral society. (See Shopenhauer's "The Basis of Morality." Translated by A. Bullock, 1903 and Thilly and Wood, op cit. p. 500).

14. Aesthetik, p. 222.

15. Ibid. p. 35.

16. Der Begriff... pp. 85-107.

17. Religion der Vernunft, pp. 19 and Begriff, pp. 95-96.

18. See Cohen's Begriff, pp. 14-15, where he gives his rationale for this change.

19. Cohen maintained that religion was an offshoot of philosophy. The immanence of philosophy [illegible] imbedded in Jewish sources was the basis of Christian scholasticism, although the scholastics borrowed more philosophy than Judaism for this theology. This borrowing led to two tendencies: (1) an Aristotelianism based on Platonism, and (2) a new-platonism (with the tendency toward pantheism, Spinoza's philosophy being a primary Jewish example). (Begriff, p. 14.).

20. Ethik des Reinen Willens, fourth edition, pp. 46ff. See also Trude Weiss-Rosmarin, pp. 11ff.

21. See Rosmarin's discussion, op cit, pp. 12, 14-15.

22. See the chapter below concerning the attributes of God.

23. Rosmarin, op cit. p. 26 and Ethik und Religionsphilosophie, by Cohen.

24. Begriff, p. 23.

25. Cohen, H. Innere Beziehungen der Kantischen Philosophie zum Judentum (JS) vol. I, p. 286.

26. Ibid. pp. 286f. See also: Cohen, Hermann, Innere Beziehungen der Kantischan Philosophie zum Judentum "Berlin Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judentums number 28, 1909, pp. 39-61; Friedlander, David, "Beitrag zur Geschichte der Verfolgung der Jüden in 19ten Jahrhundert durch Schiftsteller, Nicolai Pub. Berlin 1820. Groupe, Heinz Moshe, Kant und das Judentum." Zeitschrift Für Religions - und Geistes-geschichte, Köln 1961, vol. 13, pp. 308-333, Guttmann, Julius, "Kant und das Judentum, "Leipzig, G. Fock,

1968: Kellermann, B. Kantianismus und Judentum." Allg. Zeitung der Judentum, 1919, number 26; Neumark, David, "Historical and Systematic Relations of Judaism to Kant." CCAR Yearbook, Cincinnati, 1924. Vol. 34. pp. 203-221.

27. In this work Spinoza maintained that Judaism was merely a geographical and political entity.

28. Innere Beziehung. op; cit. pp. 284-285.

29. Cohen criticizes his master in a similar way in his Der Begriff... when speaking about the relation between religion and ethics. Here Cohen maintains that 'Kant's wisdom is strongly theoretical and, sadly, will not suffice for our 'scientific' culture.' (Begriff, pp. 3f.)

30. Cohen accepts the contentions of biblical critics and ethnologists concerning the nature and origin of Judaism and other religions. Darwin is largely responsible for originating these theories, (many of which do not have such wide acceptance today in the fields of biblical and ethnological research). Evolution itself is accepted; Cohen, too, accepts it and thus tries to justify the creation narratives found in the pentateuch on mythological premises, saying they are part of a primitive, emerging Judaism that had not yet achieved full fruition as a rational religion. This zenith was achieved with the emergence of prophetic faith.

31. Salvation, for Cohen, is never fully realizable, but it always must be posited as a goal to be approximated here on earth. Thus, Judaism is practical; it deals with man in his existential condition. (See the discussion below on Cohen's conception of messianism.)

Chapter III.

1. RV, p. 29.

2. Rosenzweig, Franz, op cit. page 14, introduction to JS. See also the discussion of Judaism and Christianity in Chapter VII below.

3. RV, p. 9.

4. Maimonides, Moses, Moreh Nevuchim, Chap. 54: see also Loves Jacobs "Principles of the Jewish Faith, pp. 118-148 and Jacob's, op cit., Chapter 4 (on Maimondes Mishneh Torāh).

5. Ibid. p. 72. Aristotle "Organon" on the "class" of man, "Metaphysics," (especially re: universality of God).

6. Ibid. p. 29.

7. Kant. Cf. Note 17, Chapter I.

8. It maybe recalled that Cohen wished to write a psychology of culture as the culmination of his system. This work was to be purely analytic. Cohen maintained that the goal of psychology was unifying consciousness, see Rosmarin, op cit. pp. 41ff. As such, psychology included religion as one mode of achieving such consciousness. On the other hand, Cohen mistrusted the scientific claims of psychology and psychoanalytic theory, although he found their theories useful. See for example, RV. pp. 1, 504-506.

9. I feel that the religion which Cohen advocates is consonant with some of the dynamic inter-phsychical relationships which Freud and his disciples advocated, especially concerning the 'roots' of man's religious dimension. This relationship remains a problem for further research.

10. See Chapter III above.

11. See for example, Cohen, RV. pp. 27ff. Der Begriff... pp. 179ff.

12. RV, See especially Chapter I-VII and Der Begriff Der Religion, Chapter II., pp. 295ff, Innge Bezihung... Deutschtum und Judentuim, pp. 11-25.

13. See the discussion of Cohen's personal relationship to Judaism in the concluding chapter below.

14. Cohen discusses at length the implications of the answer, ehiheh asher ehiheh, which Moses receives from God in Genesis 3. Cohen claims that this is the biblical statement of God's essence, see Chapter VI below.

15. RV. pp. 42-43.

16. Rosmarin, op cit., paraphrases Cohen, saying, ;'Jewish law' proves its universal and worldly character by regulating all human actions, even the most trivial ones. Thus human life, in all its aspects, is elevated to a sphere of holiness in which the distinction between holy and profane is negated (page. 142). Here, Rosmarin also points to a characteristic feature of Cohen's thought, i.e. to incorporate all aspects of

past Jewish systems. The prophets and the rabbis knew the truth. Maimonides accepted this too. He asserts that Moses knew the essence of God.

18. RV. p. 515 concerning prophetic religion and Sacrates.

19. Ethik, p. 315. See also Rosmarin, op cit., 105 for greater elaboration of Cohen's relationship to marxism. Cohen advocates a socialism which takes marxism very seriously. Nevertheless, marxism is inadequate; it does not recognize man's true essence.

20. Kant, I. Transzendentale Methoden Lehre "Des Kanons Der Reiren Vernuift" (W B edition, Vol. 4), p. 690. Cohen, Der Begriff Des Religion, pp. 104-106. RV. pp. 404-407.

Chapter IV.

1. RV, p. 174.

2. Ibid. p. 292.

3. Ibid. p. 68f, and especially p. 80f.

4. Ibid. pp. 82, 91, 96ff.

5. Ibid. p. 84.

6. Here it must be noted that Cohen has a very confusing sense of time. Time is relative; it begins only with the initiation of thought processes. Nevertheless, there are hints throughout Cohen's works that time is also prior to thought. The problem is unresolved.

7. RV, Chapters III, Iv, and V.

8. Logik, pp. 511-552.

9. RV, pp. 80-81, pp. 273-277.

10. Ibid. pp. 173-262-277-208-208.

11. See Leo Strauss' introduction to Shlomo Pines' translation of Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964, pp. 14-20.

12. RV, pp. 281-286.

13. Logik, p. 236, see also, RV, p. 110, 120-300.

14. Rosmarin, pp cit. p. 112., op cit. p. 112., RV. p 110, 120-30, 173, as well as other sources in previous footnote.

15. See above and Chapter III.

16. Rosmarin maintains, however, that, 'Despite his logical frame of mind, Cohen nevertheless admitted at times the superlogical religious experience of monotheism, and is especially evident from his pronouncement 'monotheism is a psychological mysterium. He who does not acknowledge this, does not know it in its depths' (From Jüdische Schriften, I, p. 237), Rosmarin, pages 81-82. Rosmarin's identification of psychological mysterium and superlogical is questionable. The mysterium which Cohen points to is that common, non-logical drive which man has toward religion; man is complacent in the mysterium of religion. In this way, the correlation too is mysterius. The truths of religion are believed irrespective of their logical basis.

17. RV, pp. 276ff.

18. See Chapter IV.

Chapter V.

1. See RV, p. 47 and Innere Beziehung, p. 295.

2. Melber, Jehuda. Hermann Cohen's Philosophy of Judaism, page 98.

3. RV, p. 41.

4. Innere Beziehung, pp. 295f.

5. Ibid. p. 295.

6. Jüdische Schriften, I. pp. 90f. This identification of God's essence and existence thus originates in Judaism. Again, Judaism is the model for true religion. See Chapter VII for Cohen's conception of Jewish originality.

7. Guttmann, Julius, Philosophies of Judaism, p. 68ff., and Husik, Isaac. A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy, pp. 24, 33, 35.

8. Maimonides, Moreh Nevuchin Chapter 52 Guttmann. op.cit. pp. 158-165, Husik, op. cit. pp. 260-266.

9. RV, pp. 71 and 73f.

10. Reines, Alvin. Maimonides and Abrabanel on Prophecy. pp. 66, 143ff, 230ff.

11. RV, p. 94. Cohen overstates Moses' humanity as a polemic against Christian claims for Jesus, the prophet who was both man and God.

12. Alvin Reines maintains that the nature of Mosaic prophecy is the greatest secret of the Moreh Nevuchim. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Moses was the prophet par excellance for Maimonides, see especially chapters 33 and 45 of the Moreh where in Maimonides discusses the nature of prophecy and its degrees.

13. Rosmarin, op cit. p. 56.

14. Innere Beziehung, p. 294. See pages 293 and following for one of Cohen's descriptions of the attributes, as well as in RV, Chapter III.

15. Ibid. p. 294.

16. RV. p. 111. Here Cohen describes this relation with respect to Leviticus 19:2.

17. Innere Beziehung, p. 294.

18. See Chapter V above.

19. JS, I. pp. 90ff.

20. RV, pp. 73f.

21. Begriff, pp. 50ff.

Chapter VI.

1. Cohen, "Die Nachstenliebe in Talmud" (JS), and also RV p. 276.

2. RV, pp. 15-19, 33. This idea corresponds to modern interactional theories of empathy.

3. RV, pp. 131-136, and "Nachstenliebe in Talmud", op cit. See, also Julius Guttmann's Philosophies of Judaism, p. 361. This notion is strickingly related to Schopenhauers notion of Mitleid and social sufferity. (of Chapter II, note 13.)

4. RV, pp. 276ff.

5. This quotation is Rosmarin's translation, p. 97. It is found in RV on pp. 133.

6. This act of transforming the Nebenmensch into the Mitmensch, however, must not be viewed apart from its position in the totality made explicit by the goal of ethics, namely the ideal state. This ideal state is, in actuality, merely an oversimplification of what Cohen, later in his system (RV) speaks of as messianism, the Messianic Age. (See below.)

7. RV. p. 284.

8. Ibid. p. 306.

9. See the concluding chapter of this essay.

10. RV, pp. 135-138.

11. Ibid., p. 138ff.

12. Ibid. P. 138.

13. Man freely chooses to do something prior to the action. The decision to perform the deed is completely autonomous.

14. The reader must remember that this is Cohen's assertion. It does not correspond to the results of biblical scholarship.

15. See above, the controversy between Frankel and Hirsch.

16. By this quote, Cohen also indicates his familiarity with rabbinic texts. He studied these texts throughout his life.

17. Italics are mine. See RV, p. 125, where Cohen quotes from Friedman's edition, Chapter 10, page 48.

Chapter VII.

1. Cohen, Hermann. Deutschtum und Judentum, pp. 1-6 and 42-44.

2. Ibid. pp. 9f.

3. Ibid. p. 25.

4. Ibid. pp. 28. also RV, pp. 404-406.

5. Ibid. p. 11.

6. RV, pp. 186, 282f, 375ff, 406.

7. Ibid, pp. 284f, 292f.

8. Ibid, p. 308, where Cohen comments on prophets and miracles.

9. D & J, pp. 6-9, 25-27.

10. See below, Cohen's discussion of "neighborly love".

11. This testimony, in extended form is found in Cohen's essay 'Die Nachstenliebe in Talmud", Judische Schriften, Vol. I, pages 145 following.

12. It may be noted that, as with most of rabbinic material, a variety of opinions may be found. In those rabbinic comments concerning Leviticus 19:18 which I have investigated, most do in fact translate rea' as fellow Jew. Perhaps Cohen's desire to defend the Jewish community before Christians ignorant in rabbinic law and commentaries and his prejudice for continuity and universalism led to this statement.

13. See St. Anselm's Proslogion (Chapter Ix) and Cur Deus Homo, (Book 1, Chapter XIII). A Scholastic Miscellany ed. and trans. by Eugene Fairweather, Library of Christian Classics, Volume X, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1956.

14. For Cohen, sin is any action which violates the correlation (see below). Since ethical laws are self-imposed, man takes the burden of the correlation upon himself. Sin is thus any unethical action which takes place in the context of the God-man correlation. Sin retains the individual whereas ethics destroys the individual in favor of humanity. Jacob Agus claims that for Cohen, sin is when a person who knows or regards himself as sinful feels isolated. Namely, he stands apart from the correlation. Sin becomes the sole responsibility of the individual; only he can call his action sinful. Agus is thus correct in analyzing Cohen's conception of sin in terms of radical individuality. Nevertheless, it is precisely from this individuality that personal freedom develops.

15. See the general discussions of Cohen's Begriff..., (pp. 67, 115) and Deutschtum und Judentum, (pp.9, 29f.) which stress Christian emphasis on faith for reconciliation and salvation rather than deeds.

16. The theology of the Social Gospel, as advocated by Hans Rauschenbusch and perpetuated by H. Richard Niebuhr, had not fully emerged during Cohen's lifetime. Cohen probably would have agreed with its goals. Cohen was influenced by such thinkers as Albrecht Ritchl who had used critical philosophy to scrutinize metaphysical questions (Der Begriff, p. 3).

17. RV, pp. 219ff, also 23, 212, 223, 235. Christianity borrowed this notion but mis-appropriated it. (cf. above).

18. Ibid. pp. 217, 257.

19. Ibid. p. 334-339.

20. See note 17, as well as RV, pages 223,241, 255.

21. Ibid. pp. 257, 355, 410.

22. Ibid. p. 256f.

23. Ibid. see chapters VIII and Ix, and especially p.345.

24. cf. note above concerning the nature of Christian claims for Jesus' divinity.

25. Ibid. p. 284.

26. Ibid. see especially, chapter 13 (theological) and chapter 14 (prophetic) dimensions of this messianism.

Chapter VIII.

1. RV. page 210, 215, 220.

2. Ibid. pages 296 and 304f.

3. Ibid. p. 286, 200-206, 230-236.

4. Ibid. p. 445, see also the preceeding note.

5. Ibid. p. 133.

6. See Chapter I, note 11.

7. Two different editions of this pamphlet appeared, separated by one years time. See Jüdische Schriften, Vol. II, pages 237ff. and 302ff., respectively.

8. RV. p. 288.

9. Ibid. p. 292.

10. Ibid. pp. 25 and 293.

11. Ibid. p. 340, Chapter 14.

12. Ibid. pp. 12-15, 399, 404-10; Kant (See Chapter 3, note 5).

13. Schwarzschild, Steven S. "The Philosophy of History of Hermann Cohen." pp. 28-30.

14. Schwarzschild, Steven S. "The Democratic Socialism of Hermann Cohen," pp. 426ff.

15. RV. pp. 338ff.

16. Cohen's historiography is sloppy at best, supporting contemporary institutions with archaic predecessors. His reconstructions and support for his theory of the relationship between Germany and Judaism are forced. Realizing his love for the German state, already on the road to immortality (according to Cohen), it is not surprising that Cohen was an arch anti-zionist. For Cohen, a Jewish state would negate the possibility for the salvation of mankind.

17. RV. pp. 231ff.

18. Ibid. P. 350.

19. Deutschtum und Judentum, pages 45-46.

20. RV. See Chapter XI, pp. 209-253.

Chapter X.

1. See RV, pp. 17ff. Ronald G. Smith, in his introduction to Buber's I and Thou (English Edition) does not list Cohen at all as an influence on Buber's I and Thou. Nevertheless, Buber was very well acquainted with Cohen's work (See Buber's Essay, "The Love of God and The Idea of Deity," found in Eclipse of God (pp. 53-62) where he quotes extensively from Cohen. Cohen's conception of I and Thou (Ich und Du) reflect the emerging existential concerns at the turn of the century. Buber may have altered this conception while accepting the idea of God which Cohen postulated--

although Buber is emotionally (and later mystically) drawn to his "Eternal Thou."

2. See Chapter I and the discussion in Chapter IX concerning Deutschtum and Judentum.

3. See Appendix A.

4. Jospe, Alfred, from personal correspondence, February 24, 1965.

5. See Chapter I above.

6. This was Natorp's address, Hermann Cohen's Leistung delivered in 1918.

7. Glatzer, N. Franz Rosenzweig. pp. 132-133.

8. See above, Chapter VI on the idea of God.

9. Buber, Martin. Eclipse of God. p. 58.

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