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JEWISH PARALLELS TO THE STOIC SAGE

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I.

Introduction.

"What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?
And the son of man, that Thou thinkest of him?
Yet Thou hast made him but little lower than the angels!"
--Psalm viii. 5-6.

When the curtain rose on the scene of ancient Hellenic philosophy, nature was the all-absorbing subject of inquiry. It might have been quite accidental; it might have been the natural expression of an intellect determined by geographic conditions; or influenced by a foreign civilization. Not that the Greek mind failed to turn to a more immediate realm of interest, to man, as the object of observation and comment. Practical human intercourse resulted in the outgrowth of codes, standards, types and models of character and conduct. Mythology and folk-lore fixed in the mind and in the heart of the people certain heroes and villains, certain object-lessons of the commendable and the objectionable. But in the field of purely theoretical pursuits, the Ionian thinkers centered all their inquisitive effort at the cosmos, the physical world. A marked revolution was inaugurated with the appearance of the Sophists in Athens. They selected Man and Man's faculties as the center of study. Socrates was little concerned with the elements of matter. He was untiring in his queries as to the elements of society. Instead of atoms and motion, we hear then of virtue and knowledge. As Cicero put it: "Socrates called philosophy down from the heavens to earth, and introduced it into the houses and cities of men,

compelling men to enquire concerning life and morals and things good and evil"[1]; And that interest in man, once aroused, continued to grow in depth and scope, until philosophy became immensely practical, speculation flamed with an intese fervor, systems as to the human place and duties and destiny in the world were advocated dogmatically and enthusiastically. The various philosophic isms assumed all the distinguishing earmarks of religious doctrine. Teachers and students and laymen sought and strove for the ideal type, the Sage, whose character and life would present both the goal of philosophic enquiry and the achievement of practical happiness. To be sure, the study of nature, of physics, and of kindred subjects, continued to draw the attention of the wise. But unquestionably the anthropocentric motive and view predominated; and science and theory were organized on the basis of the principles enunciated by the strict humanists of the Greek world.

Hebrew literature, on the other hand, at least the portion of ancient Hebrew literature which weathered the storms of time and survived to our day, was throughout the product of a passionate and uninterrupted interest in human values. Whatever thought and belief and science and tradition was transmitted through the ancient scrolls of Israel, breathes the spirit of morality, is taught from the point of view of social or individual human problems. Jewish philosophy clearly enthroned Man in the palace of its great Book. And the finest product of Judaism is not even a conception of God, certainly not a system of the world here or of the world hereafter, but the contribution of its ideal human type, the Jewish Sage, under whatever designations we may meet him in Jewish letters or in Jewish life.

What was the ideal type, the Sage, as the Greeks called him, or

the *Zaddik*, as he was first technically known among the Hebrews? By what standards was he guided; by what modes of action was he idealized? by what traits of personality was he characterized as the blessing and goal of humanity? Different peoples and different ages gave different answers to the above questions. The vicissitudes of fortune, the almost spasmodic and intermittent changes in historic circumstances, accounted for the variation of values in the Hellenic and Hebraic worlds, and in the various periods which those two worlds passed through. One must bear in mind also the influence of individual temperament and idiosyncracy, and the fact that even the varying moods of an individual are frequently responsible for many a note of discord in the song of his life. Yet, for technical purposes, if not for reasons of strict accuracy, we are justified in distinguishing a Stoic Sage in the realm of Greek moral philosophy, and in pointing out a number of salient features generally characteristic of the types held up as ethical models by successive generations of representative Jewish thinkers. It is a matter of speculative interest, and, so long as the ethical forces of the ancient world are still potent factors in our world of morals to-day, it is also a matter of practical value, to trace the currents of ethical ideals in the history of Jewish culture running parallel to those of Stoic culture; to compare the two, and observe the points of contact and of contrast, of similarity and of difference existing between the two. Many a beautiful Jewish thought was expressed most beautifully by a Stoic philosopher; many a noble Stoic principle was most eloquently lived by a Jewish sage. Or one looms most wise where the other failed in particular to satisfy the human soul. Whenever the Hebrew mind saw visions of moral ideals and busied itself with the study of man—and that flowed on in a con-

stant stream--we can find looking up parallels to the flower of Hellenic ethical achievement, to the Stoic Sage. That is the subject of our present thesis.

The extent of the natural influence actually exerted by Stoicism and Judaism on one another is a contested question. Some see in the general invasion of oriental cultures into the homeland of the Hellenes which followed in the wake of the Persian Empire, in the bodily contact into which the Macedonian invasion of Asia Minor brought the men and civilizations of the neighboring continents, in the reported travels of Greek and Semitic scholars in one another's lands, in the Eastern origin of many of the founders of Greek Schools, and particularly of Stoicism, in the spirit of cosmopolitanism which permeated the atmosphere of the Mediterranean basin during the period of the Roman Empire, in the proselytizing passion which dominated vast groups of religious zealots, in the numerous actual agreements in language and in thought between elements of parallel movements--some see in all these facts ample proof for the Semitic origin of Stoicism or for the Greek origin of many Jewish principles. Of course, history and anthropology have repeatedly proven the similarity in expression on the part of the human mind throughout the world, even where no direct physical relation between the societies that bear those similarities can be traced. The doctrines themselves, at least those which are truest to the general spirit of Jewish and Hellenic thought, are deeply rooted in the soil of their respective spheres.[2] Yet, there can be no doubt, judging on the basis of the historic facts which have come down to us, that the two worlds--the Jewish and the Stoic conceptions of man--did come in mutual contact. Certainly the two drew inspiration from the common sources of

the surrounding civilization and of the past; knew and influenced one another, especially when Macedonia became a highway for the exchange of Eastern and Western civilization; and, of course, the golden period of Jewish philosophy, the one in which we are particularly interested in our present study, the mediaeval period of Jewish literature, was based on a Judaism saturated with the spirit of Greece, modified as it was by Roman and Arabic and other influences. However, in our paper, we are not directly interested in this particular phase of the problem. In order to sift through the vast storehouses of Jewish and Stoic ideals and truths for comparison or for contrast, we may leave out of consideration altogether the question as to the origin of those ideas or the mutual influence of those two spheres.

II.

In Search For A Man.

It is told of the Cynic philosopher, Diogenes (4th Century), that he carried a lantern with him in the broad daylight. When asked to explain his queer practice, he replied that he was in search for a man. That anecdote characterizes the perennial quest of the ancient moralists and theoreticians, the quest for *the* man, the ideal type. Some thinkers thought that the ideal was to be found in a character, in a man's natural disposition, and they looked for the Sage. Others thought that what they were after was to be discovered in a mode of life, in achievement, and they asked what was *the good* in life, *the end* of man's existence? At bottom these were two aspects of the same question, and were frequently pronounced by the same scholars in almost the same breath. It was this problem, expressly raised or tacitly implied, which led the representative minds both among Jews and Stoics to propound their theories as to the conduct of life and the ideal man. Thus we meet with different points of attack and of view; the ideals were grouped and graded on the basis of different criteria; the highest figure was dubbed by different names. But under the surface of those intellectual and moral researches, we can distinguish two parallel currents of thought, the one Jewish, the other Graeco-Roman, both tending to the same goal, *the* man.

The Stoics looked for their Sages in the old annals and lists of primitive heroes. Hercules, Ulysses, and even Cyrus, were sufficiently remote from them to fit for the exalted position of an accomplished Sage. In the Roman period they found their ideal also in some men who were almost contemporary. The case was very similar with the Jewish

mind. Already the most ancient literary remnants of Israel bear accounts of the national ancestors, the Sages, if you will, of an heroic antiquity. They were held up for admiration and emulation by the unknown authors of those accounts. Successive generations of literary men turned to those primordial patriarchal figures as specimens of the finest realization of man. That was also the popular judgment of the masses. A good illustration of a later Jewish book of that kind, clearly the product of a mind influenced by Greek thought, is the Book of the Twelve Patriarchs. Here every son of Jacob is held up as the champion of a particular virtue, round which the patriarch's whole career is organized into one harmonious life. Philo, in the same spirit, looks back on Abraham as the "wise man," and is particularly untiring in his admiration of Isaac, the "self-instructed." So in Talmudic and in Mediaeval literature, these primitive Jewish heroes loomed up as men who approached God nearest. A Biblical Sage, highly cosmopolitan in nature and drawn from popular fiction rather than from national history is met with in the Book of Job. In the Talmud we find the concept of the Sage as the center of the world referred to a contemporary: "Said R. Judah in the name of Rav, each day a heavenly voice issues forth (from Mount Horeb) and proclaims: 'All humanity is sustained by merit of Haninah my son; and Haninah my son is satisfied with just a jug of carobs from Sabbath eve to Sabbath eve!'"[1] In another instance the Talmud bewails the loss of Jose the Small on the ground that with his demise there was left no *Hasid*---a term implying grace or kindness and corresponding to Saint or Sage.[2] That that Talmudic passage refers to *Hasid* as a type of character rather than as merely a disciple of an historical party, is born out by the continuation of that passage where is given an account of other great men, every one distinguished for some particular virtue, such as

holiness, modesty, the fear of sin, etc. At times the rabbis refer to the "former *Hasidim*," as the men who rose to a perfect relationship with God.

There are still clearer and more direct parallels in Jewish literature to the problem so prominent in Greek letters, namely, Who is the Sage? As already remarked, the question was raised in the forms, Who is wise, or Who is just, or Who is happy? corresponding to the Greek and Roman inquiries into the meaning of wisdom, or the real good, or ultimate happiness. The Book of Psalms is replete with assertions in that direction. "Happy the man" begins the first chapter, which continues to describe the person whose way "the Lord regardeth." "Who is the man that desireth life, and loveth days that he may see the good therein?" exclaims the author of another psalm.[3] "Whoso is wise, let him observe these things," tells us the singer of still another.[4] These are just typical of a great number of similar passages throughout the Psalms. To quote the language of Professor Neumark, "Deducting less than thirty special Psalms, it may be said that all the rest of the one hundred and fifty Psalms which make up our collection, have for their sole topic the *problem of justice*... Again and again it is the defense of the doctrine of the happiness of the just, in spite of all hard facts of real life seemingly pointing to the contrary, what the Psalmists in the pious outpourings of their deeply stirred souls are primarily concerned with...And the same is to be said of *Proverbs*."[5] Let us remark here parenthetically that the Just is a Hebrew equivalent for the Sage. Precisely as the Greek used the term Sage to denote a person who possessed all the virtues and not that of wisdom alone--there being no other term inclusive of all the

cardinal virtues—so the Hebrew term *Zaddik* implied all the virtues and not merely justice (*Zedek*). That all inclusive connotation was true also of the later terms *Haham* (Wise), or *Hasid* (Kind), although in many particular instances those words were expressly limited in their meaning. The early use of the names *Zaddik* and *Hasid*, and their opposite *Rasha*, is perhaps indicative of the greater prominence given to social relations in the Jewish moral consciousness.

We note in the other Books of the Bible the same conscious endeavor on the part of the Hebrew mind to find the real value of life, and the man who may be said to grasp that value. The injunction of holiness on the individual and on the community is a deliberate effort at a general standard set up by the Holiness Code to denote the human ideal.[6] The faithful observance of the Law is suggested in another code of the Pentateuch as a criterion for the truly wise nation.[7] The fact that here, as elsewhere in Jewish culture, we meet with the conception of the nation in terms of an individual, is again indicative of the keener social instinct of the Jew. In a still older code (JE) of the Bible, where divination is regarded as a distinguishing feature of the great man, Moses is reported to have wished the entire people to earn that distinction and to have proclaimed, "Would that the entire people of JHWH were diviners!"[8]

A favortie method employed in some of the later Books of Scripture is the discussion of the true fear of God—that quality being identified with wisdom, hence characteristic of the Sage. At the very opening of the Book of Proverbs, the compiler addresses himself to the Wise, and posits his identification of the two virtues. That Book is avowedly and primarily interested in the character of

the *Haham*, or Sage, and the depraved nature of his opposite, the *Kesil*, or Fool---the two terms corresponding to the Just and Unjust of other books. It gives many lengthy enumerations of the characteristics of the ideal man; and its description of the ideal woman[9] is one of the most brilliant literary gems in the whole of Scripture.

The thread of the same discussion is taken up by the author of Ecclesiastes. The latter, however, in his extreme pessimism, despairs even of the Sage. "What advantage has man in all his toil under ~~under~~ the sun?"[10] asks Koheleth in his characteristic mood. "For of the wise man, even as of the fool, there is no remembrance for ever; seeing that in the days to come all will long ago have been forgotten. And how must the wise man die even as the fool!"[11] How well might a faithful Stoic have been compelled by the logic of his belief in inexorable fate and in the coming Conflagration, to give utterance to these words! Indeed we ~~do~~ meet with this sentiment very often in the circles of the Epicureans. Koheleth, following on the Greek trail for the "good" and the "good-that-is-beautiful", tells us in true Epicurean wise: "There is no good for man but that he should eat and drink, and make his soul enjoy pleasure for his labour."[12] "I know they have no good but to rejoice and get pleasure so long as they live!"[13] At the conclusion of the chapter he remarks: "And I perceived that there is no greater good than that a man should rejoice in his works, for that is his portion; for who shall bring him to see what shall be after him?"[14] Again in a later chapter he adds: "Behold that which I have seen: the good which is comely is to eat and to drink, and to enjoy pleasure in all one's labour."[15] In a sense, that is also the problem of the Book of Job. The technique of that literary masterpiece carries the emphasis

on particular problems with which the Sage has to wrestle. Yet the soul of the hero of that immortal drama, the soul in its absolute nature and in its bearing under particular circumstances, is so pivotal a feature in the whole construction and progress of the work, that the poem may be properly called an enquiry concerning the heart of a Sage.

The search for the Sage continues in the Apocrypha, and in Hellenistic Jewish literature. We may select just one example of each to illustrate the way the problem is treated. The Book of the Wisdom of Solomon defines wisdom, the distinguishing virtue of the ideal man, as godliness, the effort at piety and justice, which is the supreme good, the source of all truth and virtue, and the surest means of leading those who lay hold of it to true happiness and immortality. We noted the attempt of Philo to draw a picture of the "wise man."[16] He describes the exact characteristics of the "good man,"[17] and takes special pains to define for us the exact meaning of the highest happiness,[18] the "end of the path of the wise and virtuous,"[19] the nature of a "perfect life."[20]

Similarly we find in the Talmud ever recurring observations on the character of the highest type of man. Of some of the leading men in that "ocean of learning" it is avowed that they studied Greek wisdom; of others that may be surmised. They all frequently asked themselves the question in which we are interested at present. To one of them, Ben Zoma, is attributed the direct statement: "Who is a wise man? He who learns from everybody!"[21]—almost as if that scholar had his eyes fixed not alone on the experience of life but likewise on that immortal sage of Athens, Socrates, whom all subsequent Hellenic schools regarded as their master, and who was forever seeking knowledge from everybody. The same thought is reiterated in the dictum of R. Joshua b. Levi, "He

who learns from his companion one chapter, or one law, or one verse, or even one letter is bound to do him honor" as he would to his master.[22] In the same tract R. Meir attempts to penetrate into the mystery of the *Zaddik-Hasid*, the type "for whose sake the entire world is worth while."[23] Even the note of happiness (eudaemonia) is struck in that book, when the "way of the Torah," the "only good,"[24] is defined for the benefit of the rabbinic student.[25] The end of life is sought and found by R. Johanan b. Zakkai when he maintains that one need not boast of having studied much Torah because "for that end were you created."[26] Eleazar Ha-Kappar expressed it as follows: "The living are here to recognize, to know and to make known...that He is God."[27] Our problem was in the mind of R. Hiyya b. Ami when he attributed superiority and greater happiness (in his conception of retribution) to the man who earns his livelihood by his labor over the man who is distinguished for mere "fear of heaven."[28] We can detect an appreciation of a "perfect life" in R. Johanan b. Zakkai's glowing tribute to the "happy" Eleazar b. Arach, whose life was distinguished for both speculation and good deeds.[29] It was as a protest against a distorted conception of the extreme pietist, that R. Joshua poured forth his invective against the "foolish *Hasid*" and placec him in the same category with the unjust and the unchaste;[30] or against the would-be saint whose only claim to virtue rested on his self-denial.[31] The same problem, as to who is truly wise, is found again in the literary heritage of the Amoraim, R. Johanan[32] and R. Issi b. Judah.[33] True, the term Sage did not always carry its full and distinctive philosophic connotation. It was used often merely as a generic name for scholars. That is clearly the sense of the term even in certain passages where ethical standards are defined.[34] But the evidence is sufficiently bulky to prove that Jewish thinkers looked for the Sage, for the end of lifem, and for happiness.

Lazarus, who builds his theory of Jewish ethics on the basis of absolute idealism, claiming that the Jewish Sage was never motivated by the hope or fear of retribution, of course maintains that Judaism is opposed to the entire idea of eudaemonism.[35] We disagree with that theory and fully indorse the contention of Professor Neumark who refuted the arguments of Professor Lazarus on that points.[36] But whether or not Judaism conceived of duty as autonomous, whether or not it held up the "fruit" for the present world and the "principal" for the world to come as a motive for right action, whether or not it thought that the highest happiness was identical with a virtuous life and maintained that true blessedness was achieved in the process of intending or acting the right and not in the consequences of the same, the fact remains that it prescribed the way of the wise and held up some kind of bliss, intrinsic or extrinsic or both with respect to the duty, which the wise would realize on his way through life.[37]

Furthermore, the exact meaning of the term 'eudaemonia', as it was understood by the Stoics, allows for an exact parallel between their motive and that of the Jewish Sage, even if we grant Professor Lazarus' contention that the genuinely Jewish spirit excluded the consideration of happiness as a reward. For the Stoic concept of eudaemonia embbdied the idea of 'sucess' rather than of material welfare. It conveyed the notion of the highest self-realization, of essential perfection, rather than of happiness in the sense as we ordinarily understand it. A Stoic would achieve eudaemonia when he would allow the highest possible development and play to his reason, which was his essence, in the same sense as an artist, working for art's sake (his essence), might attain the highest self-realization, or "success," in his work.[38] When, therefore, many

a Jew thought of practising, or perfecting himself in, his Jewishness, his essence, for its own sake (לשמה) or, which meant the same, for "the sake of heaven" (לשם שמים), he was attaining success, or happiness in that sense, or eudaemonia. It was precisely with that meaning of term that many a Rabbi used the word happiness—as, for instance, when Rav called R. Eleazar b. Shamua "the happiest of the sages" (מובינא דחכימי) because he had succeeded in having his opinion adopted as the binding law;[39] or when a later sage, Albo of Spain, speaks of "human success" (ההצלחה האנושית).[40] Taken in that sense, eudaemonia is not discarded from Jewish circles because pleasure, or happiness, or even life might be sacrificed for the moral ideal. And even the statement of R. Jacob in Aboth, "Better is one hour of repentance and good deeds in this world than all the life of the world to come, though one hour of bliss in the world to come is better than all the life (which includes happiness) in this world"[41]—even this statement does not disparage eudaemonism, when by the term is meant the highest self-realization of man, which, according to R. Jacob is implied in "repentance and good deeds". The Stoics generally looked askance at the idea of eschatological retribution, or even at reward and punishment in this world, as conceived by the crude worshipper. They would acquire virtue or harmony and consistency in the whole of conduct, or that natural disposition of soul which would co-operate cheerfully with nature, for its sake rather than for the sake of placating a deity who held out gifts in the one hand and whips in the other[42]. Yet, in a higher sense, the Stoics acted with a view at retribution, because their motive was to make the best of life and the best of one's self. In the same sense, the Jewish moralists who rose to the highest idealism considered the "reward of a good deed is a good deed"[43] and yet thought of retribution because they were

anxious to make the best of life and of their character.

If the discussion of the Sage is but fragmentary and casual, though the interest in it is evidently keen, in the literature of the rabbis, we meet with an altogether direct and complete exposition of it in the mediaeval literature. Saadia devotes the tenth chapter of his treatise "*Emunoth ve-Deoth*" to a discussion of the proper conduct of man, wherein he carefully and compactly draws the picture of the "Righteous Man" (אדם צדיק), the Sage, his duties, his reactions, his pleasures and accomplishments. He defines the category of the Sage, and takes it no longer as the common title for all scholars, but the distinction of the person whose reason or will controls his emotions and passions.[44] Judah Barzilai of Barcelona, too, determines the *Haham* by his disposition and character as well as by his scholarship and devotion to the Torah,[45] although he has not worked out as clear-cut a theory of the nature of the *Haham* as did Saadia. Solomon b. Gabirol spoke of the "ultimate aim" of man,[46] of "the purpose of the existence of the human soul;"[47] and he determined the "essence of happiness."[48] Similarly Bahya b. Pakkuda looks for the most fit worshipper of God, and finds him in the person of the prophet or philosopher who had acquired a certain degree of wisdom.[49] He feels the need for a certain harmony in the religious expression of man, a harmony between the man's body, intellect and heart, all employed together in the true service of God.[50] Certain conditions are found to be prerequisite for that ideal type, and Bahya enumerates them carefully. He gives an exposition and a criticism of the theories of the Sufis as to the character and conduct of the truly religious man, and thus builds up a Sage of his own. There are similar efforts on the part of almost all other Jewish authors of

that epoch. The finest examples are those of Jehudah Halevi and of Maimonides. We shall have occasion later on to examine the views of these two thinkers in detail. They discuss the highest type of man, the end of life, the true happiness of the soul. Albo considers the "perfect man" as the leader of humanity towards an ever-higher goal; for although man cannot raise other animals to his spritual standards, the "perfect man", who is perhaps above the ordinary man as the latter is above the brute, can nevertheless impart of his perfection to all mankind, because they all share in the same essential nature of man.[51] That corresponds to the concept of the Nation-Sage, which is to lead all other peoples to an ever higher appreciation of God's revealed Word.

The search for the ideal continued in Jewish life and letters. Spinoza described the Sage which he conceived as the highest type of human achievement, and the intellectual love of God which he regarded as the highest virtue or truest happiness. He admitted that there were not many actual examples of the wise man, for as he puts it, "all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare."[52] Other leaders of Jewish thought and founders of Jewish religious movements likewise interested themselves in that problem. In many a system the *Zaddik* assumed an all important and determining position in the cosmos. He became the support of the world, the blessing of mankind, the end and goal of creation. Like the Stoic Sage he was even endowed with divine powers, given the influence to annul even God's decrees, or rather to determine by his will the will of Providence. No Jewish writer, however, ever had the audacity to go the full length of Seneca, who raised the Sage even above the Creator.[53] Their never-abating religious humility

made them cling pretty steadily to the feeling that man has a dignity because he is subject to God; and they never went beyond the philosophy implied in the remark of the Psalmist:

> "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?
> And the son of man, that Thou thinkest of him?
> Yet Thou hast made him but a little lower than the angels."[54]

III.

The Virtues.

In the literatures of both the Greeks and the Jews, the virtues of man and the virtues or attributes of God, of which the former are copies, are so prominent a factor, that they reflect the philosophy, the genius, the soul of the people who dealt with them. The virtues are personified, are even apotheosized and deified; and in that process exert a tremendous influence on the development of religion as well as of practical ethics.

Like the Cynics and Stoics,[1] Jewish thinkers considered virtue as the supreme good, the end of life. Frequently expression is given in Hebraic letters also to the other Hellenic view, originally propounded by the Sophist Hippias of Elis,[2] that virtue is all-sufficient and self-sufficient for the highest happiness, irrespective of effects or retribution.[3] As a later Jewish thinker put it, for him who is truly wise, "Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself;"[4] or as he expressed it in another passage, that "virtue is to be desired for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to us, for the sake of which we should desire it."[5]

Maimonides assumes the same psychological basis for virtue as the Stoics did, and called a permanent disposition of the soul,[6] a *habitus* (διάθεσις), although the two differed in their final definition of disposition, the one interpreting it as body, since the Stoics held even the soul to be body, and the other regarding it as a non-material quality of a spiritual soul.

Because of their common element in their definitions of

virtue, Maimonides agrees with the Stoics in laying stress, so far as virtue is concerned, on the state of mind, on the habit of soul, on the intention (כוונה) rather than on the particular act. But that was also the prevailing Jewish attitude throughxout the ages, and did not by any means originate with the Stoics. The Pentateuchal codes enjoining sacrificial atonement for unintentional sins, did so primarily not because they held the offender responsible but because the ill effects of the deed had to be offset for social and religious reasons. The purpose is especially clear in the case of the Cities of Refuge, instituted for the purpose of protecting, rather than for the sake of punishing, the unintentional murderer. In the case of the sacrifices, furthermore the proper intention and frame of mind was a prerequisite in rendering the offering valid. The Psalmist praying to be released from the responsibility of "hiiden things"[7] similarly implies his innocence, and his conviction of that innocence, in matters in which he could not possibly intend anything improper. It was the social effect of a deed, and the fear of the community suffering as a consequence thereof, that led R. Johanan b. Beroka to affirm that in cases of the desecration of God's name (חילול השם), the law cannot afford to discriminate between the intentional and unintentional—for in such cases the safety of society is at stake; and in spite of his reason, his opinion was not accepted by his colleagues.[8] In fact, the sacrificial means of repentance was meant solely for the unintentional offender, according to a Talmudic statement; a sin wilfully committed could not be atoned for except by proper physical punishment.[9] Similarly, R. Johanan (b. Napaha) declares that one's vindication by God depends on one's effort to keep oneself just in the world.[10] It is only when the intention was evil, that the

rabbis took a lenient attitude and in their good-will to man allowed the belief to pass that "the Holy One, blessed be He, does not account it (the intention) an act."[11] That view is maintained by the School of Hillel also in cases of civil law; whereas the School of Shammai, known for its severity, insists on the guilt of a person for his evil intention even if he had not executed the crime.[12] It is in consideration of the value attached to intention, that we can understand fully the meaning of R. Nachman's dictum that a sin committed for its own sake is like a duty fulfilled with an ulterior motive.[13] So, in a later age, Bahya lays much stress on the will, for "no act is complete without the soul desiring it."[14] He stresses the importance of proper intention in the performance of our religious duties and in the functioning of our virtues, and brings proof for that contention from Scripture, from tradition, and from logical inference.[15] In fact, his entire work, *The Duties of the Heart*, is one grand attempt at convincing his people of the prime significance of a proper frame of mind, or a proper disposition of the soul, a religious heart; for withour a right intention of the heart, the duties performed by the limbs are meaningless and void. And it was not from the Mohammedan Sufis alone that Bahya inherited that great veneration for the heart.[16] He imbibed its meaning from the Jewish atmosphere, from the spirit of Jeremiah, from the Psalms, from the rabbinic *Aggadah* and *Halacha*, in which he grew up. Even Jehudah Halevi, who was so keenly interested in his nationalistic forms, in the ceremonialism *per se*, also speaks continually of the motive behind it and of the intention which should be the guiding principle of the act. When he tells us that one must reflect on the meaning of the laws, that fasts and feasts are equal means of getting nearer to God provided

one is inspired with the proper and pure motive of honoring God thereby, we certainly get an inkling into the value attached to intention on the part of that immortal poet. Albo, too, makes the right kind of intention indispensable to a perfect soul, when he identifies that with the spiritual understanding, which is the noblest part of man.[17] It is still more clearly expressed by Crescas when he maintains that in belief and in conduct one is not rewarded and punished for beliefs and deeds directly but for the intention and desire which accompany the same.[18] It is the same thought as expressed by Cleanthes the Stoic, when he tells us that good and evil are set in the intention and will and are not dependent on the action.[19] In fact, Stoics identified virtue with will as they identified it with reason.[20] That was the clue to their belief in the self-sufficiency of virtue, because virtue consisted wholly in the aiming at the mark (intention) and not at all in the hitting it (act); hence the truly virtuous cannot be disappointed even when outside conditions and happenings are not congenial[21].

Jewish literature is, on the whole, inspired by practical motives. The Prophets were champions of values and standards which they dreamed of seeing enthroned in the place of existing unjust conditions. The rabbis were above all practical legislators. It was, therefore, only natural that the virtues upheld in prophetic and rabbinic literature are more concrete than those espoused in Stoic and in later Jewish writings. Of course, even the Greek moralists and the Jewish philosophic writers, conceived of their pursuit as immensely practical, and actually believed that their suggestions should be taken as guides in daily and detailed duties. But these had a philosophic framework and view which, their authors admitted to be intelligible for

to the select few only, and which were entirely wanting in the early literature of the Hebrews. The virtues of the Bible and Talmud, are, therefore, as a rule, those simple moral principles recommended in every ethical system, with varying emphasis. Those early virtues are also highly social, hailing as they do from an age when the individual was dealt with largely because of his membership in the community. They possess a warmth of feeling and an emotional degree, which at least the Stoics never experienced in their virtues. For those early virtues were not as logically, not as abstactly, philosophic. They were rather products of the human heart.

There are numerous instances in the Bible in which lists of virtues are given. The method of selection and arrangement varies according to the temperament of the author and the crying need of the time. In later Scriptural works, as well as in extra-Biblical and post-Biblical writings, which come directly or indirectly under the influence of the Jewish contact with Hellenic culture, we begin to find the characteristic, although not absolutely blind, adherence to the formal Greek claxsification of the virtues. In the early Hebrew records it appears most prominently in the guise of divine attributes. In the later literature it is posited expressly as human qualities. But even throughout Mediaeval literature, we can observe the classic systematization of the virtues in the theories of divine attributes.

The Stoics adopted the four cardinal virtues, as elaborated by Plato, Wisdom, Courage, Soberness and Justice. There were slight modifications in definition by one philosopher or another, but on the whole the original meaning held good throughout the active development of Stoic thought. The Bible began, as we have already observed, with lists >

of simple duties, personal and social, which it regarded as the distinguishes virtues of its heroes. Thus, to illustrate from the life of Abraham, we have emphasis laid on his almost blind faith, sacrificial devotions, practical sagacity, loyalty, chastity, spirit of independence, geniality, valor, hospitality, justice, etc. The virtues are not analysed and classified. They are presented in biographical stories. As time passes and social problems begin to vex the heart of the people more and more, emphasis is laid on justice or love or mercy, the one or the other of the great moral qualities so passionately preached by the Prophets. Dr. Neumark distinguishes in the Maccabean Biblical writings the influence of the Platonic works, and sees a reflection of the Platonic treatment of the virtues.[22] He calles the Book of *Koheleth* the Jewish *Philebos*, the two works differing in the moral deductions, Plato choosing Wisdom *(Phronesis, Sophia)* as over against Pleasure (*Hedone*), whereas Ecclesiastes declares "vanity of vanities, all is vanity".[23]

In connection with the theory of the virtues, we may allude to the parallel thought so prominent in Prophetic and in Academic philosophy, namely, the thought of man's interest in God's attributes as models for human conduct. "To walk in His ways," "to cling to his virtues" (ללכת בדרכיו, להדבק במדותיו), "to resemble Him" (*homoiosis theo; imitatio dei*)[24] --are stock phrases in the ethical literatures of both nations. That will explain the intense zeal with which men of God sought His attributes and exerted themselves "to know Him." The Bible is replete with allusions of that nature; and the same is true of most works of the Apocrypha. In the anthropomorphisms of rabbinic writings, that purpose for applying human descriptions to God is fre-

quently stated in direct terms. Indeed, man was created in the image of God, and needs to maintain his moral resemblance to the Creator. We have it most clearly expressed by R. Hama b. Hanina[25] and by Abba Saul.[26] "As I am merciful, be thou merciful, etc."; and "As God buries the dead, so do thou bury the dead, etc." It is that resemblance to God, that kinship with Him, that, in mystic lore, becomes the agency whereby man rises to the heights of the *anima alta* and is ultimately united with God,[27] whereby man was led to believe that the soul came from God. Israeli claims that that is in fact the whole purpose of philosophy, to imitate God, to acquire the highest wisdom of the true reality, identical with His attributes, and thereby merge the human spirituality with the light of God.[28] "And man is obliged to accustom himself thereto, and to resemble Him according to his ability," posits Maimonides as an ethical law in his code.[29] That law is again expressed by him in his philosophic treatise, when he asserts that "the perfection of man whereof one may truly boast is... to imitate the acts of God."[30] Hence in many a Biblical and rabbinic discussion of the attributes of God, we may discern a discussion of the human virtues.

The enumeration and classification of the four cardinal virtues are, of course, met with throughout Hellenistic Jewish literature, including even the apocryphal and apocalyptic writings emanating from Hebraic Palestinean sources, which stood under direct Greek influence. Many of these ideas, however, may be traced back to a contact with Stoic channels rather than with Platonic sources. As an instance of that we may take the enumeration of the four cardinal virtues in the Book of the Wisdom of Solomon.[30]

The Talmud, too, echoes the Greek doctrine of the virtues,

although always in some modified form. "The Shechinah does not rest on one unless one is wise, courageous, wealthy, and of good stature;"[31] occurs in one instance, and in the absence of any qualifying definitions, we must assume that the terms were used here in their literal meaning. A similar statement occurs again in the name of R. Johanan: "The Holy One, blessed be He, causes His Shechinah to fall only on the brave, and the wealthy, and the wise, and the modest."[32] That Rabbi conceived of the Sage realized *in toto* in the person of Moses. Modesty, or humility, occurs later again as a cardinal virtue in the *Olam Katon* of Joseph ibn Zaddik. The author enumerates four principal qualities constituting goodness or virtue, namely, knowledge of God's attributes, justice or righteousness, hope, and humility. Dr. Husik recognizes in these qualities "modified descendants of the four Platonic virtues."[33] It is clear, however, that while ibn Zaddik feels still bound to four cardinal virtues, in Greek fashion, he is on thoroughly Jewish ground with respect to the kind of virtues which he adopts. His humility as his wisdom, are thoroughly religious qualities; his hope is exceedingly practical a virtue; his justice is no theoretic or esthetic harmony, but the hard, social kind of righteousness. Another characteristically Jewish version of the four virtues is found in the statement of R. Zutra b. Tobias where Rav is quoted to describe the ten instruments of creation. The number ten is, of course, mystical and mechanical. The qualities mentioned are readily reduceable to the four cardinal virtues, wisdom, justice, courage and kindness.[34] The unknown author of the *Toroth Hanefesh*, copies the Greek classification of the virtues in detail, even to the point of assigning each to its proper "faculty"--"The virtue of the vegetative soul is temperance; of the animal soul, courage; of the

rational sou, wisdom/. When these are harmoniously combined in the individual, and the two lower souls are controlled by the higher, there results the fourth virtue, which is justice, and which gives its possessor the privilige of being a leader and a teacher of his people."[35] Maimonides, in his description of the Sage, who has risen to the highest degree of human attainment, to prophecy, endows him with the three basic virtues, wisdom, temperance and courage. "When the spirit (of prophecy) rests on him, his soul roams on the stage of the angels called *Ishim*, and he is transformed into a different individual; he becomes conscious of being not the same, but raised over and above the stage of the other human sages."[36]

IV.

Wisdom.

The virtue which we are to consider first underwent a long and complicated history. Although the term was fairly fixed, the concept, for which it stood, changed frequently, and at times was taken to imply different ideas in the literary works of even the same authors. We must bear in mind that both among Graeco-Roman and Jewish philosophers, Wisdom (φρόνησις, *Prudentia*, חכמה) signified frequently a particular virtue, or the highest and the all-embracing virtue, or just virtue, as a generic moral abstraction. It is because of the latter meanings that the highest type of a virtuous person was called Sage, a term adopted by many Jewish thinkers.

Socrates taught the paradox that virtue is knowledge or wisdom. Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle---all the accounts, emphasize that proposition as characteristic of his point of view. "The supreme wisdom was to distinguish between good and evil."[1] "The virtues are mere forms of reason."[2] He, therefore, deduces the two corollary propositions, that no one sins knowingly and wittingly, and that virtue can be taught. Hence, the Sage alone, the man of knowledge, is truly virtuous and happy.[3]

The Cynics accepted the Socratic paradox. However, they interpreted wisdom as meaning instinctive and intuitive appreciation rather than intellectual insight or scientific investigation.[4] Conation assumed the all important position of cognition. Will-power rather than reason or knowledge determined virtue.

The early Stoics, too, adopted it. Even when they spoke of

the four virtues, they regarded wisdom as the dominant virtue. Panaetius of Rhodes, who is mostly responsible for the establishment of Stoicism in Rome, taught it in his School. Again his wisdom or knowledge is not the same as is generally understood by these terms. In one sense, his definitions are broader, and in another, they are narrower, than thei ordinary connotations. On the one hand, Panaetius maintained that the performance of "the simple and daily duties (καθήκοντα, *officia*) which come in the way of the good citizen" is a sure vehicle on the road to wisdom; on the other hand he taught that science (which we would certainly include in knowledge, and therefore should identify with virtue) is not an end of life, but merely a permissible recreation.[5] This attitude was generally accepted by the Stoics. Wisdom, the first and the ground-basis of all virtues, maintains its lofty position only when it shows practical results. But study, which is a means of leading men, especially children, to virtue, when indulged in for its own sake, or when carried to excess, is a vice.[6] The Stoics, too, involved will in wisdom. When they called virtue knowledge and identified it with good acts, they had in mind, and laid stress on, the practical choice, anologous to intellectual judgment or decision, which is involved in each act. Hence, virtue is wisdom; because when the decisive will is wise, when it is true to its natural self, when it is constituted with proper physical "tone," the decision or act is virtuous.[7] Hence, the truly wise never sins; the truly virtuous never errs; because when the will is colored by the proper intellect, right conduct follows. Virtue, in the strict sense, can, therefore, be possessed by the wise man only. Only reflections of virtue can be characteristic of the plain

man. The Socratic deduction was recognized by the Stoics: since virtue is knowledge, and knowledge can be imparted and acquired, virtue can be taught. From the moral stadpoint that was a highly significant deduction. It formed the basis of the whole theory of the "probationer," the man who by zealous learning and practice is daily nearing his goal of virtue, for that is acquired by training, not by birth.[8] With Seneca, the effort of the "probationer", the progress to virtue, becomes virtue itself.[9]

The Stoics entertained also the doctrine of the *Logos*. Wisdom or knowledge was personified, or rather deified, and looked upon as a cosmic principle. Reason was invested with theistic attributes and endowed with the gift of self-consciousness. There was a universal reason, a rational law in the cosmos. Heraclitus had already cherished it when he spoke of the Word.[10] When Socrates spoke of wisdom, he appealed to individual reason as the best guide to action; and he identified that with self-consistency, with being true to one's own nature which is rational. Zeno accepted this teaching, and maintained that to "follow nature" meant not to oppose tradition and fall a slave to license, as was implied in the theory of the Cynics, but to enthrone reason and be self-consistent; and that reason was cosmic.[11] He inherited his faith in the universal mind, in the active principle of creation called *Logos*, from his Academic teacher Polemo and from Heraclitus. *Logos* becomes for him the power which pervaeds, and gives shape to, the universe; it is identical with the deity, with primitive and creative fire; it is divine reason, the guide to right reasoning, the law which prescribes what is proper for the State and for the individual.[12]

The Stoics believed that body, which to them was the substratum of mind and matter alike, contains the "seed" which has an unchanging plan for creation, growth, purpose, and so forth. These seeds are spirits, or deities, fiery in their nature, spread throughout the universe, and working through "tension" (τόνος, *intentio*)—in its highest development—originally tension signified muscular activity; the Cynics understood by it the active condition of the soul, and later it became associated among the Stoics with "spirit" or "thrill." The seed's plan or purpose is called its "reason" or "word" (λόγος). Zeus the Creator is the One Spirit, or Word, or Seed-power (λόγος σπερματικός) of the universe, comprehending in himself all the individual seed-powers, of which they are begotten, and to which they shall in the end return.[13] That rational creative principle, God's *Logos*, is the basis of order and harmony in the universe (Cleanthes). Stoics identify *Logos* also with Fate, although Cleanthes would not attribute evil, the work of Fate, to be also a product of God or of *Logos*.[14] The term stands sometimes for God and sometimes for the reason emanating from God.[15] *Logos* is furthermore the most powerful social bond among the wise, the unwritten law of good-will which grows up among Sages by virtue of the fact that they all partake in the reason of the universe.[16] Individual liberty is implied in the concept, but not in Cynic sense, which would lead to anarchy, but in a sense consistent with the highest rational life and conducive to the deepest self-consistency.[17] Obedience to the *Logos*, harmony with nature, self-consistency, all practically meaning the same in Stoic doctrine, becomes the prime duty of man, the real virtue, true wisdom; and that becomes the guiding principle of Stoic philosophy. For the individual man the ethical problem is to bring himself, a part of

nature, into harmony with the whole. This harmony is virtue (ἀρετή, *virtus*) and it is an active and firmly established disposition of the soul.[18] It is consistency in life; its opposite is continuous restlessness and the indecision of the man in the crowd. The individual must feel his role in the universe, and subordinate his particular expressions to the general movement of the whole.[19] That is the virtue of wisdom, the dictates of the universal reason. That which we now consider as the meaning of the first virtue is in reality the definition of virtue in general, because wisdom is its basis.[20]

Jewish literature presents a similarly complex evolution of the concept of wisdom. Already in the Bible we find its application to good deeds even more characteristic than to intellectual acumen, which reminds us strongly of the Stoic parallel. The term *Hochma*, like its English equivalent, connotes, of course, practical sagacity and also manual skill. It occurs in that sense repeatedly in Scripture. Although such terms as the "spirit of God" appear in connection with it (as, for example, in the stories of Joseph, Bezalel, etc.), there is not religious piety necessarily involved, since even skill was a manifestation of God's spirit. It is in that sense, too, that Ecclesiastes condemns, in Stoic fashion, excessive wisdom meaning bookishness or science.[21] *Koheleth* fears evil emotions, physical pain, mental agony, and the neglect of material needs to result from over indulgence in studies *per se*.[22] It is in view of this belief of the author of that Book, that the exaltation of "human wisdom" in Chapter 8, whether it be an original ingredient or a later interpolation, does not contradict the former depreciation of wisdom on the part of the author. Here wisdom is parallel to "observer of the law" (שומר מצוה)

and whatever might have been his opinion of science, the writer of the Book certainly treasured the observance of law of the performance of duty. Still, even with respect to moral and religious duty, the composer of Ecclesiastes remains the pessimist that he is throughout. He voices, therefore, the generally accepted Jewish contention that man, being what he is, is always subject to a certain admixture of sin and weakness. "There is no *Zaadik* on earth who does not sin," he tells us.[23] In this respect he agrees with the general Jewish current of thought, and disagrees with the Stoics who claimed that the wise never errs, that the Sage never sins. Even Moses showed his human weaknesses. Even Abraham at one time faltered in hid faith. But whereas other Jewish thinkers would state fact as a past experience and not as a goal for the individual "probationer"; whereas authoritative Judaism knew of the means whereby sins, especially in the case of the less perfect among men, would be forgiven; whereas Jewish tradition recognized Moses and others as true ideals in spite of their sins, Ecclesiastes argues that there is no possibility of acquiring perfection, and therefore no need to aim at it. Since we are human, anyhow, we may as well forego the presumption of being too righteous or too wise. Above all, there is no incentive for that effort, because there is no retribution; one fate befalls the righteous and unrighteous; "all is vanity."

In other Biblical Books we find clear definitions of wisdom. It is the Torah, the Jewish Law, according to the author of Deuteronomy.[23] It is the fear of God—another expression for religious and moral piety—according to the Psalmist.[24] It is a synonym for righteousness in another Psalm, where is held up as one of the characteristics of the *Zaddik*.[25] The Book of Proverbs defines wisdom in

exactly the same way--it is the fear of God, it is an equivalent for justice and righteousness.[26] However, Proverbs makes of wisdom a central theme. It becomes with him the end of life, the goal of happiness, or to go back to a Greek parallel, it is virtue *par excellence*.[27] We find here a beautiful literary allegory, in which wisdom is called "Sister," a guardian angel protecting man from the snare of the other, the wicked woman.[28] Again, Wisdom is described as standing next to Folly on the parting of the ways, each calling for the passers by to join her.[29] The description of wisdom in Chapter 3 in one of the finest literary treasures in that great book which abounds in mnay masterful descriptions of the elements of happiness. When the author speaks of Wisdom as an instrument of creation, as the basis of the world,[30] we have one of the earliest instances of the doctrine of the *Logos* in Biblical literature.

It was the prophet Hosea who first gave special prominence to the attribute of wisdom as applied to God.[31] It was taken up with added stress by Isaiah, Jeremiah, and especially Ezekiel.[32] In the Priestly Code, the essence of God is identical with the spirit of wisdom.[33] But the compiler of the Priestly Code was an extremist in his conception of monotheism and in his rejection of angels. It was, therefore, later that the elaboration of the *Logos* theory of wisdom was adopted and developed in Jewish thought. The Apocryphal authors were decidedly influenced by it. Its appearance in Proverbs, we have already noted. In Philo it received its very highest development. Arnold sees in it the influence of the Stoics: "Through the Stoics the doctrine of the Word passed into the systems of Judaism and Christianity, to perform in each the like service by reconciling

doctrines apparently contradictory."[34] Again, "In physics and logic alike Posidonius upholds the doctrine of the Logos, and it appears that it passed directly from him to Philo of Alexandria, and so into Judaeo-Christian speculation."[35] The Wisdom of Solomon, which we have used for illustrations of the spirit of the Apocrypha because it is one of the Apocryphal books which stood most strongly under Stoic influence, gives us here another example of what wisdom became in some of the Jewish writings during the Hellenistic period. Let us quote what Emil Schuerer says on this point: "But while like the author of the Book of Proverbs and Jesus Sirach, he starts from the assertion, that this Wisdom is first of all present with God, it becomes in his conception almost an independent person besides God. His utterances indeed do not seem to really exceed what we already read in Proverbs viii-ix. But what is there more a poetic personification becomes with him a philosophic theory. Wisdom is according to him a breath (ἀτμίς) of God's power, a pure effluence (ἀπόῤῥοια) from the glory of the Almighty, the brightness (ἀπαύγασμα) of the everlasting light (vii. 25, 26). It is most intrinsically united with God (συμβίωσιν θεοῦ ἔχουσα), is initiated into the knowledge of God (μύστις τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιστήμης), is a chooser of His works (αἱρέτις τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ) viii. 3, 4 ... is assessor of God's throne (ix. 4: ἡ τῶν σῶν θρώνων πάρεδρος)." "Together therewith 'the almighty word of God' (ὁ παντο-δύναμός σου λόγος) is also personified in a manner which approaches hypostatic union (xviii. 15 sq.). Thus we have here already the elements, from which the Philonean doctrine of the λόγος (=reason and word of God) as a hypostasis mediating between God and the world is formed."[36] He continues, "*The influence of Greek Philosophy* is moreover shown in the details of execution. The formulae, with which the rule of wisdom in the world is described

(vii.24: διήκει, χωρεῖ; viii.1: διοικεῖ), recall the Stoic doctrine of the world-spirit of God as the wisdom of the world immanent in and pervading it."[37] In the first four chapters of the book, wisdom is interpreted as godliness and is held out as the means whereby the pious will attain to divine retribution. Solomon, who is supposed to be the author of the book, asserts in Chapters 6-9 that because he was attached to divine wisdom he attained to glory. It was wisdom, too, voluntarily accepted by Israel and rejected by Egypt, that assured blessedness (hence eudaemonia) to the former and proved to be a source of punishment for the latter. Hence "Divine wisdom is the supreme good, the source of all truth, virtue and happiness."[38] Like among the Stoics, it is the source of virtue, and the first and the basis of the virtues.

Philo sees the basis of universal harmony in the *Logos*, since the individual soul or mind is but a reflection of the cosmic Reason. All things are by nature opposite to one another, he tells us, except the reasoning power in us and the divine Word above us.[39] The same contradiction in expression, characteristic of the Graeco-Roman writers, is found also in Philo. In one instance, wisdom is almost akin to God, and takes His place in the universe; at another, it becomes a tool of creation or itself a creature. Thus in his treatise on the Migration of Abraham, the Word is the abode of God, the mind of the universe, the oldest of creatures, the means by which He created and rules the world.[40] As with the Stoics, so with Philo, virtue is wisdom, and wisdom is harmony with nature. "The goal of philosophy is to know how to live in accordance with nature, which is identical with a life of reason and v virtue or a life following the divine word or law. 'The words of God

are the actions of the wise man."[41] Like the Stoics, Philo included in the concept of wisdom intuitional as well as intellectual morals. To know God, through the faculty of prudence or the "sight of the mind", is to reach the summit of happiness.[42] In fact, the two are identified: wisdom is happiness; when you are absorbed in the one, you enjoy the other. "The man who gives up all passions and who departs from the opinions of the created being to those of the Cause and Creator, from the sensual to the intellectual, is promised happiness, i.e., a life of wisdom."[43] Like most Stoics, too, although unlike Seneca, he would not recognize as wisdom the state of a person engaged in a struggle against the passions, even though that person may master the passions. Like most Stoics, he would maintain that the moment of conversion to the state of true wisdom comes suddenly, not gradually, at the point of absolute release from evil, not during the performance of little virtues while in the struggle against evil. "Wisdom is possible not to a soul destitute of experience, not to one ruled by passions, but to one enjoying health of body and mind."[44] He regards wisdom as that quality, possessed in its highest degree of perfection, which gave the prophets the power to "see".[45] He also accepts the theory that since virtue is knowledge, it can be taught. "Some followers of the wise imitate and reach wisdom."[46] That being the case, Philo feels that if take the trouble of working for the sake of gain, they surely ought to exert themselves for the sake of that which is more valuable than wealth. "Surely my soul will travel for the sake of wisdom."[47]

Rabbinic writings reflect the same valuation of the virtue of wisdom as we witnessed in the other parts of Jewish literature. There are signs here and there, scattered throughout the book of a

thousand years, of the same theories and fancies having passed through here as elsewhere. After all, allowing for national differences and modifications, wisdom itself is cosmopolitan and its worship universal. Men in Judaea knew of intellectual currents in other coast-lands of their sea, and spoke of them in familiar terms, although later generations might attempted to weed them out, neglect them, misinterpret them. And so we find in the most prominent ethical treatise in the Talmud, in Aboth, wisdom applied to practical common-sense and to an elaborate conception of the Logos alike. The streams of Jewish and of Greek influence join and mingle here in one mighty river of traditional wisdom. Simeon b. Gamaliel was wont to consider silence as the most laudable characteristic of the wise; and he added, "not study, but practice is essential."[48] We find R. Akiba maintaining the same position, that the fence for wisdom is silence.[49] That practice counted more than theory, as was also held by the Stoics, may be gleaned from many other passages in that Mishna and throughout the Talmud. A statement attributed to R. Hanina b. Dosa declares that the only kind of wisdom which is lasting and substantial is the kind based on fear of sin, or the kind which is supported by a multitude of good acts.[50] Another Tanna, R. Eleazar b. Azaria, expressed it in more literary style: "Whoever has more wisdom than good deeds is like a tree of many branches and few roots; but whoever has more deeds than wisdom is like a tree which no wind can shake."[51] Wisdom, when taken in the restricted sense of formal knowledge or study, loses much of its charm and halo. It regains its prestige when it is defined as fear of God or proper conduct. It is in that sense that it became the basis of piety, of reverence, and of respect.[52] But, of course, study, especially study with a pure idealistic motive (which was looked on with utter disfavor by the Stoics),

remained a prominent virtue with the Sages of the Talmud. And so, although wisdom included practice, it did not by any means exclude formal theory and a formal exercise of the mind. R. Meir sees idealistic devotion to the Torah---in itself a *raison d'etre* for the universe---as a sure means of arming one with the practical assets of humility and fear, and thus preparing one for the exalted rank of the Sage.[53] That wisdom cannot go hand in hand with haughtiness is frequently declared in the Talmud. We have it also in a tradition of Rav handed down by R. Judah.[54] Frequently the concepts of wisdom and Torah are identified, and then we may detect even the Logos theory applied to wisdom (Torah) in rabbinic sources. R. Akiba considers a special mark of divine love for Israel that to them was vouchsafed that "treasure, instrument whereby the world was created."[55] R. Zutra b. Tobia implies the same when he quotes Rav that wisdom was one of the means whereby God created the world.[56] Almost a complete code of conduct for the Sage, and an exemplification of the broadness of the concept of wisdom, is found in the passage where the means are enumerated by which one may acquire the Torah.[57] "A gem" is transmitted also "from the mouth of Raba, The end of wisdom is repentance and good deeds."[58] By R. Ami Rami b. Abba it is directly called repentance and good deeds.[59] "Not he who just gives charity, but he who gives charity wisely, is to find happiness," implies R. Jonah.[60] Of course, frequently the term is used with the meaning of common-sense or practical experience,[61] scientific knowledge,[62] intellectual acumen,[63] or clever speech,[64] as well as moral aptness. When the Jew prayed for it three times a day, in the special benediction for wisdom in the *Shemone Esre*, he thought of wisdom in all its implications. And that

prayer was placed first in the series of week-day benedictions![65] The paradox of R.Johanan that God grants wisdom only to the wise, reminds us of Stoic paradoxes even in the terseness of style.[66] But in its meaning too, it finds its best interpretation with a view of Stoic philosophy. The oneness of virtue, the all-inclusiveness of wisdom, the sudden conversion of the righteous and patient "probationer" to the rank of the wise, makes R.Johanan's statement meaningful. It is also in exact parallel to the Stoic doctrine that virtue can be taught and that man should always endeavor to become proficient in it, that R.Ishmael b.Jose claims that wisdom grows with age,[67] or when for the same reason the term "elder" (זקן) is taken to designate only "one who acquires wisdom",[68] although in these and similar instances, wisdom is used in its restricted sense of scholarship. Almost Stoic sound two other paradoxes, which stand nevertheless on solid Jewish ground; the one is attributed to Abaye and asserts that one is poor only with reference to knowledge[69] (compare it with "The wise man is a king"[70]); the other goes back to Resh Lakish, "No man sins except through a spirit of folly!"[71]

In Mediaeval Jewish literature the term Wisdom is again used in various senses. Saadia recognizes in it purely intellectual endeavor, and he warns his ideal man from overdoing it. "It is folly to devote oneself exclusively to just one of the human interests: be it wisdom, pleasure or business!"[72] "The love of wisdom and the love of the world should be complementary to each other; one without the other is not good!"[73] Thus, whereas he cherishes his Jewish sense of respect for education and intellectual pursuit, he maintains that it is folly to be one-sided, to devote all energy to mere bookishness,

which is after all a means and not an end in life. Then, again, Saadia has another virtue which he designates by the same term, wisdom, and that is reason. One's life must be rationally guided. Humanity, and especially Israel, finds an invaluable aid in the Torah, wisdom revealed. Outside of that---Torah and tradition---individual reason or wisdom is the guiding principle of a moral life. Thus, the virtue of wisdom, including more than mere bookishness, is enthroned to a supreme position by Saadia, too.

Barzilai, standing under the influence of the mystic Book of Creation, begins his commentary on that work with an explanation of Wisdom, for it is, next to the Torah, the chief means of knowing God and attaining to the glories of the hereafter.[74] Reason is indeed a divine gift to man---but in order to possess it, one must earn it! Barzilai's thought here runs parallel to that of the Stoics which we observed before. But he admits that heredity, "the merit of the fathers", as well as one's personal piety, bear their influence in determining the depth and endurance of one's wisdom, or how quickly that virtue should be vouchsafed to one.[75] At any rate, saintliness and exertion constitute two prerequisites to the attainment of wisdom. In this mystic theory the elements of the Logos theory are taken up and discussed elaborately. "Wisdom is the foundation of heaven and earth;"[76] for the sake of wisdom and by means of it, or of the Torah which is identified with it, the world was created.[77] Wisdom was the first to be created, for it was to become the basis for the deeds of the righteous for whose sake God created the universe.[78] Thus wisdom becomes the basis of all virtue, precisely as in the scheme of many Stoics. Here it is, of course, identified with

the Torah. The motive for wisdom is not as pure and idealisitic with him as with Saadia. He compares it to good fellowship and states that just like the latter, it leads to prominence and should be cherished on that account.[79] The purity of motive, the self-sufficiency or autonomy of virtue, is not as prominent here as in Saadia or as in many another mystic book. Barzilai gives us a clear definition of the contents of wisdom. It is divided into knowledge and art; the former being subdivided in three classes: the first dealing with God and the Torah; the second, which is also next to the first in importance, includes the sciences of ethics, logic, politics, etc.; the third, and lowest of the branches of wisdom, embraces all the physical sciences.[80] The comparative value of these classes of wisdom differs, but together they constitute the one virtue of knowledge, understanding, wisdom. And practice is part of it. There is no wisdom without morality and no morality without wisdom---the two are mutually dependent and bound up.[81] This virtue becomes so prominent with Barzilai that, in Socratic form, he regards it as the only condition to, and characteristic of, virtue *par excellence*, the only essence of perfection. "When wisdom and understanding meet in a man, then that man is perfect."[82]

In the works of Gabirol, wisdom is raised to the summit of poetic-philosophic heights. In the Crown of Royalty he names it as an attribute of God and a source of creative power. "Thou art wise, and wisdom, which is the *fountain of life*, floweth from Thee;...From Thy wisdom Thou didst cause to emanate a ready *will*, an agent and artist as it were, to draw existence out of non-existence, as light proceeds from the eye."[83] Bahya opens his Duties of the Heart with an assertion that wisdom, which he regards as including the sciences'

and the wisdom of God, is the greatest gift of the Creator to man. In the *Toroth Hanefesh*, a book ascribed to Bahya, Wisdom, personified, Wisdom as a synonym of the Shechinah, is an emanation of God.[84] Wisdom is also the virtue of the rational soul.[85] Thus we have here the Platonic doctrine combined with the Logos theory, and a Stoic may well build on that the harmony of the world and the goo-will of the wise. In Bahya we have also the stress laid on the theory of the "unity of conduct". One must establish that harmony by a willing co-operation with God, a submission to His will, and a willing inner subordination to one's own reason as a guiding force in life.[86] Another parallel to the Stoic position of wisdom among the virtues is found in Joseph b. Zaddik's Microcosm. It comes first and forms the basis of all the virtues, for retribution is based on man's godliness, and godliness is based on knowledge.[87]

New concepts confront us in the philosophy of Jehudah Halevi. He sees the essence of all wisdom in the Torah, and those who possess the Torah are the true Sages.[88] Hence, faith becomes a primary element in the acquisition of wisdom.[89] Because of it, too, wisdom cannot be acquired by learning only. One must be born with the disposition for it. Hence, his theory that only the people who are the historical recipients of the Torah can attain to the highest manifestation of wisdom. With Abraham b. Ezra, that virtue assumes its Aristotelian definition of a form-principle of the soul. Hence, it is immortal, and receives a quasi-hypostatic aspect. To acquire wisdom means to attain to eternity. In fact, the soul was put in the body for just that purpose, to learn the wisdom of God, the meaning of his Torah and his world. Without the acquisition of that knowledge, the

soul cannot return to its source. It is man's highest purpose to fulfil that purpose; and he acquires wisdom through his soul. A preliminary knowledge of the sciences prepares man best for that function of his soul.[90] It is only when one has acquired wisdom that one can rise to the stage of the fear of God.[91] Thus, theoretical and practical wisdom become the aim of life, the criterion of virtue. The same is true of the ethics of Ibn Daud. Dr. Husik discovers a contradiction in the system of that philosopher between the varying expressions as to the end of life, believing it at one time to be conduct, and at another time to be wisdom.[92] But as a matter of fact, the two are the same, for wisdom includes practice as well as theory---virtue is knowledge, and the highest knowledge is the knowledge of God, which means a moral and religious life.

Maimonides makes wisdom the ideal even of the world to come. Reason is the highest factor in the system of that great rationalist. Even God, so far as we can know Him, is pure reason, and the means whereby we can know Him is again reason. Maimonides attempts to rationalize the revealed knowledge of God, too. The cosmos is one grand constellation of intellects, and man's highest ambition is to join his mind with those higher up. He quotes a Talmudic passage to prove on traditional grounds that the highest reward in the hereafter for the righteous, the *Zaddikim*, will be to enjoy the Shechinah, another name in his vocabulary, for the Active Intellect. He calls his Sage not *Zaddik* (Righteous), nor *Hasid* (Kind), but *Haham* (wise); and the prophet the real Sage, who rises above the *Hasid*, does so by virtue of a higher consciousness and a higher wisdom. Of course, since the prophet has all the characteristics of the Sage before he can rise to prophecy,

wisdom is an essential of the highest reach of the human being, even where there is no prophecy vouchsafed. Prophecy is defined as an intellectual achievement;[93] and Moses, "the choicest of the human kind...rose above the stage of man until he reached that of the angels...and he remained mere intellect."

According to Averroes, every human soul is absorbed by the Active Intellect at the death of the person, wise and fool alike; and that is the essence of human happiness. According to Jewish thinkers, wisdom is an attainment, free-will being a determining factor, and retribution is a goal toward which all are tending, but only the wise will find in it the spiritual or intellectual bliss of union with the Divine or Active Intellect. Spinoza came nearer than Maimonides to the truly Jewish appreciation of prophecy, when he stated that the "Hebrew prophets were distinguished by no superior wisdom, but by superior virtue".[94] Of course, wisdom is used here in its narrow intellectual sense. Spinoza cherished that conception of the prophets, however, not because he underrated their intellectual capacities, but because he had a higher estimation of the popular mind, and because he included in his concept of mind also the manifestations of our intuition. "He believed in the immortality of the mind, in so far as the adquate ideas are expressions of God who is eternal; and knowledge implies self-knowledge, self-consciousness. "Knowledge of the third or intuitive kind is the source of our highest perfection and blessedness; even as it forms part of the infinite mind of God, so also does the joy with which it is accompanied--the intellectual love of God--form part of the infinite intellectual love, wherewith God regards Himself".[95] Thus knowledge becomes even with him the highest

acquisition, the safest way to happiness. And because of it, too, Spinoza recognizes the postulate that wisdom or virtue may be taught. "And though the way thereto be steep, yet it may be found--all things excellent are as difficult, as they are rare."[96]

V.

Courage.

We shall now point out the salient features of the Stoic conception of the second virtue, of Courage (ἀνδρεία, *fortitudo*, גבורה, כח), as we trace the growth of that concept in Jewish thought.

The Biblical heroes, with few exceptions, are all men of valor. Their meekness, always recognized as a virtue, does not consist in shirking a duty, or in self-abasement, especially before enemies, or in inactivity. They were possessed of, what in Greek circles was known as, "Socratic strength and force," even if they could not always wield a triumphant sword or maintain a championship for a never subdued physical prowess. We must bear in mind that the ideal man in the earlier parts of the Bible, and the thought is maintained by the larger number of the prophets, was in the service of God, fighting his battles not alone but with God's help, and therefore could not otherwise but win. If one lost, one was not truly a Sage. That was the philosophy underlying their view of the sufferings of their people, or of the pain befalling an individual. There are instances of the display of strength and courage in the case of the patriarchal heroes, even of Jacob "the meek", when at the first impulse of love he rolls the stone off the mouth of the well, or when later he wrestles with an angel. The Life of Moses is, of course, replete with exploits of personal force and bravery. The watchword he passed on to his successor was "Be strong and of good courage!" Indeed to invest a man with the qualities of leadership, to prepare him as an ideal for the people, implied an inculcation of strength and courage.[1] "Do not fear nor fret" is passed

on as a national motto throughout the accounts of the early history of Israel.

In the Prophets, we observe the same principle of "doind for God" as we find, *mutatis mutandis*, in Socrates. A fire flaming within his breast, storming his will and his senses, breaking forth in the most passionate outbursts of eloquence, of teaching and of self-forgetfulness. The courage to denounce kings and princes in their very presence, to defy the obstacles of time and place, to remain unflinching in their devotion to ideal and to people in the face of death, is as characteristic of every one of the prophets as of the noblest of the Greek sages. Cicero's definition of courage as "virtue fighting in the fromt rank in defense of justice"[2] found no better realization than in the life of those immortal spiritual leaders of Israel's past. The Stoics saw in the virtue of courage two distinct aspects, or expressions of character: the one passive, which consisted in ignoring the onslaughts of fortune; the other active, which meant enthusiasm, broad vision, and a spirit of enterprise. The Jewish heroes showed the two aspects of nature; in the case of some—like in most Prophets—the former aspect was the dominating characteristic; in others, as in the popular ideal of David, the latter aspect was emphasized. A most striking example of a character combining the two, is afforded by the descriptions in Psalm 149 of the heroes in whom warlike valor was coupled with "God's exaltation in their mouth." In later Jewish history, when the sad experiences of a world demoralized taught the Jews the value of caution and the frequent futility of effort, the passive character of courage increased in prominence. It was then, too, that the tendency to lay stress on the training of the passive character increased

with the Stoics. Epictetus then gave the rule, "bear and forbear," *i.e.*, endure grief with heroic resignation, be sober and moderate.

When we glance at the attributes of God, we find that might was always considered an essential attribute of Providence. Courage appears also among the virtues of the God-fearing ruler described by Isaiah.[3] Jeremiah numbers it among the most prominent attributes of JHWH. With Maccabean history, valor of all kinds became a leading Jewish virtue. Under certain specified definitions, it then grows even into the leading and the basic virtue. Alongside of wisdom, it was that with the Cynics, and also with many Stoics.

Philo has nothing but contempt for cowardice, from which the good man flees. X "The virtuous was not only peaceful and just but also courageous and warlike."[4] In depicting the "wise man," Abraham, he considers boldness ~~of~~ as one of his "most admirable virtues."[5]

In the Talmud, courage appears among the essential qualifications of the *Zaddik*. It is one of the assets of the ideal man as described by R. Simeon b. Judah in the name of R. Simeon b. Johai.[6] It was Judah's courage at the Red Sea that won for his tribe the future royalty in the Promised Land.[7] Other rabbinic legends of the courage displayed at the Exodus point to the value of a strong heart. R. Zutra b. Tobias quotes Rav's statement that fortitude was of the instruments of creation, in other words, like wisdom, it is one of the f four virtues on the which the world is founded.[8] Like wisdom, too, courage was sometimes defined as designating one of the other virtues. "Who is a hero?" asks b. Zoma, and he answers: "He who subdues his passions."[9] It is what the Stoics called the passive aspect of courage; and un-

fortunately, the only aspect to be remembered by the thinkers of a subsequent epoch.

The Jews of the Middle Age know of courage, but not of the spirit of brave enterprise on a large scale. Their faith is unbroken; their endeavor to preserve Israel's ideals unremitting. But their sufferings in the dark centuries and the limitations set on their activities, trained their courage in only one direction---martyrdom. One is strongly tempted to parallel their concept of courage with Zeno's definition of it as "wisdom in suffering."[10] It is for that reason that, although we hear of courage as a cardinal virtue in the writings of the Mediaeval Jewish philosophers, it is but a faint echo af the courage as understood by former generations. Barzilai quotes a Talmudic passage[11] to the effect that the five men who were endowed with perfect physical strength or beauty---reflections of the Ideas in heaven---were all destroyed by the same qualities.[12] Gabirol speaks of courage in his *Tikkun Midoth Hanefesh* as a virtue emanating from the sense of touch.[13] Both Ibn Daud and Maimonides consider courage as a function of the emotional faculty of the soul. Maimonides sees in courage a prerequisite quality of the prophet, because prophecy comes only to a Sage, in other words, to one who is master of all the virtues, including courage.

VI.

Temperance.

There is quite an overlapping between the conceptions of courage, especially in its passive aspect, and that of the third of the cardinal virtues, namely, temperance or Soberness (σωφροσύνη, *temperantia*. פרישות). This virtue refers to the "lower appetites," and is frequently defined as a right disposition of the soul in relation to pleasure. Zeno defined it as wisdom in enjoyment; and Cicero, as the principle regulating our natural appetites so that they are neither in excess not in defect.[1] Wheras the Epicureans maintained that pleasure is the only good in life of which we are sure, all Stoics considered it as "indifferent," a thing not to be sought as an end in itself, as neither good nor bad. Some Stoics, however, such as Zeno, Chrysippus and others, subscribed to the Academic standpoint that pleasure may nevertheless be an advantage, and the seeking after it natural; while others, e.g. Cleanthes, maintained the Cynic standpoint that pleasure was not natural, and therefore worthless.[2] The general Jewish view took the stand of the former. True value, of course, cannot be acribed to physical pleasure. However, it is natural and should be indulged in to a reasonable, i.e., moderate degree. We have then active soberness, a healthy activity of the soul in matters such as eating, drinking and the relations of sex, recommended by the Jewish moralists. It is prominently treated in Jewish literature, but not so adequately dealt with by any Stoic writer.[3]

The early strata of the Bible contain the injunction of temperance in the form of taboos and other similar restrictions of

the primitive world. Necessity and experience forced sobriety on the man of that age. The wisdom of heroes established the restrictions in permanent codes, which were strengthened in authority by the basis of religious fear. Thus certain kinds of food, certain sexual relations, and so forth, were prohibited under all circumstances. Other prohibitions were partly qualified by considerations of season, place, and other circumstances. What was due to the poor, to the priest or th God, was taboo. Consumption in measures or mixtures similar to those prescribed for the ritual, was forbidden. Priests and Levites were under special injunctions. The prohibition of wine for them is expressly stated in Leviticus.[4] The denunciation of drunkenness is repeated time and again by Prophets and in Proverbs.[5] The author of Ecclesiastes is influenced by Epicurean dogmas in connection with that virtue. "The best philosophy of life, according to Koheleth, is not to hang after delusions, to enjoy everything within one's reach, but with temperance and judgment under the guidance of certain practical rules of life. His philosophy of life betrays the disposition of the Stoic Sage, with quite a perceptible woof of Epicureanism in between. There is nothing that can claim the title of absolute value, but man should bear it resignedly. This is the immutable course of things in which man may, as best he can, modestly fit in his own little existence, and make up his mind to do it cheerfully at that (Stoic). To enjoy life? Yes, as much as you can, but in a way guaranteeing your safety against self-destruction. (Epicurean)."[6]

It was the absence of that virtue of sobriety, which Philo ascribed as the cause for the destruction of Sodom.[7] Temperance is that kind of life which expresses religious idealism, looking upward to

God, Philo tells us in another essay of his.[8] Alongside with contemplation, temperance is the only condition of freedom and of naturalness in one's life, for there is no other slavery than that inflicted by one's passions.[9] It was Philo who pointed out the dualism in man's composite nature; the dualism of body and soul, in their technical ethical meaning. One must be very careful in not heeding too much the needs of the body at the expense of the soul. The pleasures of an idle and intemperate life spell the death of a man, according to Dosa b. Harcynas.[10] According to another rabbinic statement, the temperate is the beloved of God.[11] Bahya gives beautiful expression to the standard Jewish attitude of man's duty to participate in the joys of life, to attend to the needs of the body, to help in maintaining the world, but in all to be guided by the principle of sobriety. Asceticism as well as over-indulgence are equally harmful extremes, never recommeded by the Book of true revelation. If one needs must practise self-denial--and that is a good quality wherever legitimate--let one practise it in cases where it will promote one's personal and the general social welfare. Let one abstain from superfluities, let one keep one's hours of meditation and seclusion, but let one live in society and engage in the ordinary occupations which help the progress of civilization.[12] Abraham b. Daud speaks of temperance, which he derives from the appetitive faculty.[13]

We have noted before how courage was recognized by one Jewish thinker as nothing else than temperance when in its highest manifestation.[14] We must remember that temperance was upheld by all Jewish writers of the Middle Age as a guiding principle and a cardinal virtue in life. While Christian society presented (ow) prominent

extremes and was held in chains by brutes who demanded all and by mollycoddles who wanted nothing, Jewish life actually marched along to the even tune of temperance. Scientists to-day tell us that that was one of the chief cause for the survival of the Jewish race through the dark period of its exilic history. It was partly for that reason that the virtue was not absolutely defined and continually stressed to the same extent as in Stoic and in Christian literature. There was no need for it. In life, however, it was a leading virtue. Panaetius, among the Stoics, was the one to teach that soberness, which he defined as decorum, was by far the most important of the virtues.[15] His definition was generally upheld by the Stoics. The standard was a healthy state of soul, to be judged by the canon of symmetry, becoming (πρέπον, *decorum*). In the application of this principle, however, we may easily find an entirely new departure, that is if the criterion is made to depend on the artistic taste of the individual. Hence, Cicero's "decorum" is not characteristically Stoic.[16]

VII.

Justice.

More important than valor or moderation, more urgent than wisdom or temperance, is the virtue of justice (δικαιοσύνη, *iustitia*, צדק). Hesiod, one of the earliest Greek forerunners of the Stoics, had already given expression to that valuation.[1] For, in a sense, justice is each of these qualities; or is all of them combined. It certainly is the highest motive and most ideal spur to the the realization of those other virtues. It was a strict adherence to this trait of justice that raised Hercules to the rank of Sage. Zeno defined it briefly as "wisdom in distribution."[2] We may retain that as a workable definition for the general Stoic opinion.

In Israel it was more than a virtue; it was a passion. It was the leading *motif* of its internal history, of its spiritual achievement, of its literature. It gave the tone to the whole social philosophy of the Hebrews. Because we shall deal with the relation of the Sage to society in subsequent chapters, and because we are comparing the Jewish type with the Stoic which was deeply self-centered, we must confine our present review of justice to its individual application to the Sage. We must bear in mind at the same time that that mechanical segregation of the individual from the group is unnatural and certainly un-Jewish. Of course, aside from all other considerations, the social life of the Jew had its keen influence on every aspect of his individual character. So much so, that, as we have already observed, the Sage *par excellence*, the one who rose to excellence in personal conduct as well as in relation to

one's fellow-men, was known in Hebrew by the name of *Zaddik* (Just). This term has persisted in the people's vocabulary, so that even to-day it implies much more than mere righteousness. It is a title for one who is just, and pious, and godly, and temperate, and learned---in short, for whatever the people may hold up as an ideal.

Justice was always regarded as on e of the leading attributes of God. It is stated or implied in every book of Biblical and post-Biblical literature. God is called *Zaddik*; the coming of the godly period will be characterized by the prevalence of justice. It is even for His name that "He will lead me in the paths of righteousness."[3] He delights in it more than in sacrifice.[4] On the basis of that Biblical expression, a legend is woven in the Talmud to the effect that God took more delight in the justice practised by David than in the sacrifices offered by Solomon.[5] The virtue appears prominent in the Formula of Thirteen Attributes,[6] and in every subsequent definition of God's essence or works.

Justice is also defined as the only kind of fear of God, the only real wisdom, of which is characteristic of the ideal man.[7] It is for the righteous a veritable source of joy,[8] a sure means of attaining happiness.[9]

Philo reveals his Academic influence when he declares that justice comes after repentance, *i.e.*, after man exercised his other virtues.[10] At the same time, he stands on traditionally Jewish ground in that respect. He states that justice in a personal life is that condition which comes after one has subdued his passions and realized an inward moral victory.[11] The absolutely and ideally just is God alone.[12]

The world, which is based on His Word, is based on the quality of justice.[13]

It was as a consequence of the veneration of justice, that Israel developed the deepest respect for law. The legal and ethical parts of rabbinic literature are the greatest monument erected for that principle. And well might Israel be proud of that historic fact, for, all the superficial condemnation of a biased world nothwithstanding, the Jewish law and the Jewish instinct for law was one of the finest practical stepping stones toward the goal of the Sage. This is not the place to enter in apologetics of any kind, or to point out the redeeming features of the stress laid on law in Jewish history. Suffice it to say that justice was regarded by the Rabbis as a matter for this world, and as a basis for peace, love, and personal dignity. "Let not your passion persuade you that you have a refuge in the grave," tells us a rabbi when speaking of God's absolute justice---a statement which contrasts very favorably with the opposite Stoic teaching at the same time.[14] "One who increaseth justice, increaseth peace" is another of the curt rabbinic paradoxes reflecting their conception of that virtue.[15] Impartial judgment, tells us another rabbi, is like a good man with a good heart who will certainly live to have the wherewithall of doing good, "and to him applies the verse, "Blessed is the man who trusteth in God, etc! (Jerem. 17:7 f)."[16] To do justice means to create an atmosphere of kindness, according to R. Eleazar.[17] R. Joshua b. Karcha applies a Biblical injunction of fearlessness to the defense of justice,[18] which reminds us strongly of Cicero's definition of courage, mentioned before, as "virtue fighting in the front rank in defence of justice."[19] R. Eleazar and R. Hanina identify both courage and justice with temperance.[20] Justice is also almost

hypostasized in the statement, referred to before, in which it is considered as one of the tools whereby God created the world.[21]

In Mediaeval Jewish literature, the term of justice is applied to two distinct concepts---already appearing in the Talmud--- benevolence and legal justice. Frequently we read of justice also in the Greek sense of virtue, or of one of the cardinal virtues. Thus Ibn Daud defines justice as such conduct which allows everything its due, neither in excess nor in defect, which reminds us of Cicero's definition of soberness which we quoted above.[22] Ibn Daud considers justice as the leading virtue, and expressly states that it is not merely a social principle but also a virtue to guide an individual in the proper moral adjustment of his inner qualities and needs.[23] In his discussion of the virtues, he does not follow Plato. He defines justice as a distinct virtue, with its seat in the rational soul, thus taking the place of wisdom which he omits altogether.[24] On the other hand, Maimonides looks upon wisdom as the highest virtue, because that alone is truly and essentially intellectual. He considers justice as a distinct virtue, with its seat in the spirited soul, rather than as a harmony of the other virtues, thus adopting part of Ibn Daud's theory.[25] Justice will be one of the glorious conditions of the Messianic era for which every pious Jew is waiting most impatiently.[26] The performance of justice is natural with a soul trained and guided by wisdom, a soul that has reached real perfection.[27] Spinoza accepts that theory of Maimonides, and maintains that justice is based on reason.[28] Even social justice, peace, harmony, the spirit of communal life, are based on the rational experience of man that there is nothing more useful to him than his fellowmen.[29]

In fact, justice is one of the tests of reason and faith, for the latter are judged by Spinoza according to their influence and effects on the character and conduct of man.[30]

VIII.

The Emotions.

Before we may complete our review of Jewish parallels to Stoic conceptions of virtue, as realized in the ideal of the Sage, we must examine the place of emotion in the psychology and ethics of the Jewish thinkers. The popular opinion is that the Stoics were bent on suppressing all signs of impulse---those affording pleasure as well as those affording pain. However, that was not the philosophy nor the intent of the Stoics. With but few exceptions, they agreed that the emotions are to be considered natural; and because of their legitimate appearance they must be guided and controlled by some more reliable psychic force. Upon a careful study of the Hebrew classics, we shall discover that that was precisely the attitude assumed by Jewish thinkers, although the latter might differ in detail as to what was the best kind of rule or control of the emotions.[1]

Movement of the soul toward an object, which they called "appetite" (ὁρμή, Cicero---*appetitus*; Seneca---*impetus*), or away from an object, called "aversion" (ἀφορμή, *aliena*), is the general definition applied by the Stoics to all the conative and affectional states, which they crudely grouped together under the term "impulse."[2] They recognized several kinds of impulse or emotion: vicious emotion, *i.e.*, acting against nature, which kind is applicable only to rational beings, hence children, animals and the Sage are all free from it; rational emotion, which is also determined by the individual will, like vicious emotion, but which stands for a state in harmony with nature, and which is therefore shared by the Sage; in-

evitable emotion, not dependent on the human will, and which, natural and good, *e.g.*, love of nature or of friends, which is also shared by the Sage; and sensuous feeling, which is also involuntary, and therefore shared by the Sage, but over which the Sage should not show any mental elation.[3] We see thus that emotion was natural even with the Stoic Sage. Aristotle defined the emotions as diseases (παθήματα) which should be purged out of the soul (κάθαρσις).[4] But he, too, allowed for exceptions. He was never quite consistent and thorough in his treatment of that problem. The same was to a large extent true of the Stoics. Cleanthes saw the emotions come in whenever the "tension" of the soul was relaxed;[5] Epictetus thought that "the true philosopher is not a man devoid of natural feeling, but on the contrary affectionate and considerate in all the relations of life."[6]

In the Jewish writings we find no instance of condemning emotion as such. Certain impulses are to be checked; others are to be controlled and guided; others are to be encouraged and stimulated. The Bible condemns the impulse of anger, and yet holds it up in good light frequently, especially when it appears in the form of righteous indignation; just as the Peripatetics, who maintained that anger may serve useful ends, and should therefore be controlled rather than extirpated.[7] That emotion is condemned in the character of Joseph's brethren, and the absence of it is hailed as a mark of piety in the life of Joseph. It is cursed by Jacob on his deathbed, when he remembers how it dominated the heart of his sons.[8] In the Psalms, Proverbs, and other late Biblical writings, anger is associated with sin and evil, it is the characteristic of the fool, and the instruction is repeated frequently, "abstain from anger."[9] Patience is a sign of wisdom, and he

who controls his emotions and passions is superior to him who can conquer a city.[10] On the other hand, anger is one of the attributes of God, although He is also "slow to anger."[11] In the experience of the wilderness God's anger is kindled very often against His people; and that remains a prominent feature of Jewish history as conceived by Biblical and rabbinic literature. It becomes the basis for retribution and suffering, and consonant with justice and the spiritual conception of God.

Philo has nothing but contempt for those who are slaves to anger.[12] In rabbinic writings, we find both views represented, as in the Bible. "Do not be quick tempered" is Eliezer's dictum in *Aboth*.[13] By his wrath, a man is judged, and the one who is least susceptible to it is the *Hasid*.[14] The character of Hillel is so favorably contrasted with that of Shammai because of the sweet disposition of the former.[15] Passion is the bane of man, which shortens one's happiness and one's life.[16] It is sure to lead one to the fires of Gehenna.[17] Bliss in the world to come ~~is~~ consists in one's emancipation from all the petty emotions of hatred and jealousy and of all the lower appetites.[18] On the other hand, it is considered an essential characteristic of the scholar.[19] God Himself experiences anger each day at a certain moment, and Balaam's gift consisted in knowing how to strike just that particular moment at which to pronounce his curse.[20] God's anger is frequently alluded to by the Rabbis,[21] although they generally insisted that God is not pleased to see that quality in man.[22] To sum up, we may regard as the Jewish view of those days that anger is neither good nor bad in itself; it may spell the ruin of one or serve for religious and moral ends, depending on its quality, the person who experiences it, and other circumstances.

Precisely the same attitude is taken to the impulse of fear.

Aristotle regarded it as a disease.[23] According to the Stoics, it is the first of the sinful condition of man. It is defined (φόβος, *formido, metus*) as a case of a future disadvantage being mistaken for a future evil,[24] and is to be distinguished from caution which is a "good affection," almost a virtue, and is possessed only by a select number of wise men at changing intervals.[25] The Jewish thinkers recognized fear as a natural phenomenon; claimed that it had *raison d'etre* when one relied on God; and yet did not condemn the person who cherished fear. Fear became an important element in religion, and in time assumed all the earmarks of a virtue. In that sense, as religious fear, it was also upheld by the Stoics. The fear of God was indeed a duty, because it presupposed fearlessness of man, to a large extent. Those who fearlessly faced the most trying ordeals for the consecration of God's name were the most exalted saints. Already in Genesis, the fear of God is the basis of morality, and becomes the highest expression of faith.[26] It figures in the life of the patriarchs, in the story of the exodus, and in the moral codes.[27] To approach God with fear, and through that to have no fear of man, are stock phrases in the Psalms and Proverbs. The man who cherishes a sincere fear of God is truly wise and happy. It occurs even in a quaint paradox, "Happy the man who fears always."[28] Fear is morality. It is the glory of a woman. It is the distinguishing mark of Judaism.[29] But only when it is fear of sin, or fear of heaven. Philo, who combines the influence of the Hebraic and the Hellenic trends of thought, condemns fear when he contrasts it with hope, and then admits that the fear of God is to be considered a virtue rather than a vice.[30]

In the Talmud there are voices raised against fear, even

against the fear of religion; but the majority opinion is that the latter is to be encouraged and fostered. Thus we have the well-known statement of Antigonos in which he recommends the fear of heaven as the highest religious motive.[31] It must be based on education, on the Torah, just as the latter is founded on it.[32] When identified with religion and morality, it becomes the purpose of creation, the quintessence of the universe.[33] In another passage, it is described as the immediate antecedent to piety, the condition which renders one fit for the Holy Spirit.[34] Abba Hanan, quoting R. Eleazar, prefers the love of God to the fear of God, and although he recognizes the pedagogic value of the latter, he does not believe that it has any intrinsic value.[35] The contrast between the two affections, dealt with by R. Hanan, is further discussed by the rabbis in connection with Job; and varying opinions are adduced to prove that the two are the same, or that the one is superior to the other, or that although different both forces are equally fit to render one a perfect *Zaddik*.[36] The impulse of the fear of sin and the sense of modesty or of shame are usually classed together.[37] When fear is inspired purely by personal haughtiness, it is condmned as opposed to the fear of God and the dignity of man.[38]

Occasionally the Stoics found a redeeming feature also in the emotion of grief (λύπη, *aegritudo*), which they defined as a present disadvantage mistaken for a present evil. But as a rule, it was a psychic phenomenon to be avoided. In Biblical writings, sorrow and grief are condemned only when driven to excess. When indulged in moderately as a duty to the deceased, or as a state of mind struggling against temptation, or in contemplation of the wonders of God,

it is regarded as a pious and meritorious act. Philo, in the passage alluded to before, advises the wise man to flee from it,[39] but that is because he defined grief as extreme sorrow. He does not deny it the character of virtue, when it implies the Biblical restriction of moderation.[40] The same attitude is maintained also in rabbinic books. The shedding of tears on the departure of a pious man, or on the troubles of the community, is touchingly described as very meritorious.[41] Indeed, it is a duty to participate in the grief of society. The rabbis explain the troubles which befell the family of Naomi, in the Book of Ruth, to have been due to her husband's and sons' unwillingness to undergo the sorrow and suffering of their people during the famine which struck their land.[42] He who does not share in the sorrow of his people will not be blessed to see in the comfort of his people.[43]

The passion of hatred is akin to that of anger, and the Jewish view of it was the same as that of anger. As a rule it is inspired by an evil heart, and as such it must be avoided. It is especially reprehensible when the person against whom it is directed is innocent, or as the rabbis called it "hatred without cause" (שנאת חנם). The Pentateuchal codes prohibit it as well as the spirit of revenge.[44] The Psalmist frequently complains that he is hated for no cause, which is the height of injustice.[45] "Jealousy, passion and hatred lead to death" remarked R. Joshua.[46] It was because of hatred that the Second Temple, which was a center for the practice of all other virtues, was destroyed, which belief convinced the rabbis that that feeling must be as vicious as the three sins of idolatry, adultery and murder.[47] God rebuked the angels who gave vent to their feelings of vengeance at the downfall of the Egyptians on the banks of the Red Sea: "My

creatures are drowning, and your are singing?!" said the Almighty, even when the disaster was well earned by the victims.[48] The beautiful story depicting the superior wisdom and piety of Beruriah over her husband, R. Meir, because she prayed for the annihilation of sin instead of for the annihilation of sinners, is illustrative of the spirit of kindliness and love which permeated the atmosphere of the Talmud.[49]

Yet, there are times when such emotion may be justified and even admired. The rabbis sought to justify the hatred which the brothers bore to Joseph on the ground of the latter's improper conduct. Even the Bible hints at it in the remark put in the mouth of Joseph himself, that course of events was providentially ordained by God for the salvation of the world during the years of famine. Jealousy, hatred and revenge are all prominent motives and attributes of God, especially in the early records of the Jews. These are also motives of heroes, of the People of Israel; are stimuli to moral idealism; are characteristic, to a certain extent, of rabbinic scholars. A statement of Samuel the Small, preserved in *Aboth*, is characteristic of this attitude: "'When thy enemy falleth do not rejoice'...lest God will see and He will regret it and remove His anger from him."[50] One statement declares that David wrote his most beautiful songs when he witnessed the downfall of the wicked.[51] Especially a scholar may find absolutely necessary to resort to anger and fanatic persecution,[52] although if a scholar attains his end without recourse to harsh measures, he is all the more praiseworthy.[53]

In general, the same attitude is assumed by Stoics and Jews with regard to the passions and emotions which reflect the brighter side of human nature, but which are none the less dangerous to the

individual. Aristotle calls pity a disease; and others thought of love as madness. According to the prevailing Stoic conception, pity was a form of grief, and such must be be shunned.[54] Yet, Stoics looked on both as springs of action that may cause much good to humanity. Love, in a pure form, is to be the dominant principle throughout the ideal State, according to Zeno's conception of the Utopia;[55] and Epictetus described the philosopher as affectionate.[56] They spoke of "sober love" as the basis of happy marital relations and of friendship.[57] The Bible bears fond examples of extreme love among many favored heroes. It takes us even into the personal relations of happy wedlock, and extols true and pure love as a thing to be treasured and cherished. The commandment "and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" is considered as the basic principle of Judaism. Love, even more than fear, is commanded as the foundation of human relation to God. And God's relation to His people and His children is based on love, even in Prophetic writings. God chose Israel because of love.[58] The Almighty had special love for the downtrodden and the persecuted of the land. Although one rabbinic statement repudiates the notion of pity as a divine attribute,[59] yet another authority maintains that "whoever shows mercy to men will receive mercy from heaven.[60] It is admitted that pity renders life miserable.[61] The same emotion is one of the three characteristics of the Jewish race.[62] Boundless love for one's wife, is suggested as the surest foundation of a happy home.[63] For that reason a man must not betroth a woman unless he had seen her, lest he would not love.[64] Just as man is bound to thank God for every pleasure and enjoyment in life, so must one pronounce a benediction on love at a wedding.[65] One must love all the creatures of God; certainly one must pity even animals.[66]

The discussion of these few typical emotions will suffice to illustrate the Stoic and early Jewish attitudes to emotion in general. Let us now observe briefly how the Mediaeval Jewish philosophers reacted to that phase of human behavior. "There is a great difference between an idea expressed with personal emphasis, facial interpretation and joy and one uttered with anger and gloom" said Israeli in his Book of Elements.[67] That is not merely a pedagogic truth, but also one of immense psychologic value. The emotions as well as their physical expressions are not things "indifferent," but are either to be avoided or to be cherished, rather are to be guided. In the Middle Age as in previous epochs, "the ethical doctrine of Judaism demands that man's natural impulses shall be curbed not denied, purged not rooted out, chastened not suppressed."[68]

Man's soul has three forces, tells us Saadia.[69] One is desire (passion); another is anger (emotion); the third is counsciousness or reason. The moral principle is to establish the third force or faculty as the regent over the entire soul. "Every man who lets his reason dominate his desire and anger is in the category of the Sage." The emotions in themselves are neither good nor bad; they were planted in us each for a special purpose. Let us allow each to function just in the proper place, time, degree and measure, so that each will fulfil its purpose best. For example, greed for money should not be stifled, but encouraged to such an extent as will inspire us with ambition to accumulate enough for our material needs and for purposes of charity, but no more. It may become the source of oppression or of benevolence, of evil or of good; it is for our reason to decide. The same is true of love, or anger, or grief, or any other emotion--each has its time and place

and purpose and dangers. Our mental or psychic life is the product of God; hence there is nothing in it which should be against the spirit of God, provided we use these forces wisely.

It was God who ordered that we should fear Him, says Barzilai; and it was He who planted in our heart the love of the world.[70] Hence, our emotions are natural, are godly. Even impudence, which is a quality ordinarily disliked by God and man, is of value when used for a noble cause, according to Gabirol. He, too, regards the emotions as natural qualities of the senses.[71] Emotion becomes still more prominent in the system of Bahya, who lays so much stress on the heart, on one's consciousness and feelings in matters of religion and worship. One must shun flattery and cheap popularity, but fill one's heart with the fear of God. An unselfish love of God is the highest spiritual goal, which is attained by allowing reason full control over the other psychical forces of man. Similarly Jehudah Halevi, who was himself actuated by a passionate love and by fiery emotion which only the highest of poetic souls could experience, felt that the best service of God was the fulfilment and realization of every phase of man's life. He does not expresses his thirst for the "joy of life and the love of the world" in his *Kuzari*, which mean the fullest possible realization of the emotions.[72] The Sage which he builds up in his imagination, is, like himself, a volcano of religious and national enthusiasm, a prince who subdued every fiber of his being, including his emotions, to the service of the ideal.

Abraham Ibn Daud sees in the fear of God, based on wisdom, the truly valuable end in life.[73] Translated in different words, it means that reason and experience, the light of the intellect and of the Torah, must

determine the nature of one's highest experience in life--the religious feeling. He gives the exact definition of the fear of God, "Scripture commanded us to fear Him when it said: the Lord thy God shalt thou fear (Deut.10:4). It is reverence, awe, not fear of harm. There is a great difference between these two kinds of fear."[74] The emotion of reverence is to be fostered, for proper reverence is indeed love of God. One must learn to overcome anger and the other impulses which lead to hatred and harm.[75] When we arrive at this period in Jewish philosophy, we are right in the heart of the Aristotelian influence, and we encounter a new ethical criterion, that of the mean. The philosopher who gave it the best Jewish interpretation and development was Maimonides.

Maimonides interpreted the passage of Antigonos *in Aboth* as a rebuke against ulterior motives in religion, and he recommended a pure, idealistic love of God. That love of God was less of an emotion with him than with his predecessors. It was all rationalistic. It was an intellectual love of God. He was so dominated by the hegemony of intellect that he saw no value in the emotions at times. "He who subdues his desires by intellectual habits, his deed is commendable; but his soul is inferior to the soul of him who never yearned for such desires at all."[76] We can see him labor under a difficulty and employ a mechanical means of reconciliation, when he states that the Talmudic passage, "One who subdues one's desires is superior and destined for greater reward," refers only to when traditional laws are involved. Maimonides removes all traces of emotion from the formula defining God. A trait unworthy of man, he would, of course, not allude to the Creator. God is not subject to any of the bodily modifications, hence

cannot be said to be angry, or joyous, or full of remorse. Such anthropomorphistic allusions in Scripture must be taken figuratively.[77] Yet Maimonides did not believe in the absolute eradication of emotion from the sagacious man. "The right way is the middle course," he suggests as a guiding principke in conduct. "One should not be quick-tempered, nor should one be as feelingless as a dead body, but one should choose a middle course."[78] But Maimonides is not quite consistent with his principle of the mean. He admits that "there are cases in which a man must not adopt a middle course but go to the very extreme of the one or the other end, as for instance in the case of haughtiness...and anger."[79] Excessive humility and the complete absence of anger are the virtues, instead of the middle course in these qualities. Thus, Maimonides may be taken to agree with the general Jewish view, that emotions are in themselves neither good nor bad; but that certain emotions are good, others are bad; and most emotions should be judged by the criterion of the mean, determined by human reason. Hillel b. Samuel, who followed Maimonides, had a different psychology altogether. He ruled the emotions completely out of the soul, and attributed them to the changes and mixtures of the humours in the body.[80]

Crescas rebelled against the excessive rationalism of Maimonides. He came back to the more genuinely Jewish idea that the divine purpose in the world is best realized by man in his love and fear of God. He dfined the essence of soul as feeling and not as reason.[81] Love became still central a force with Jehuda Leo Abarbanel *(Dialoghi di Amore)*. Spinoza goes back again to the "intellectual love of God" which rises above the emotions.[82] It is shared by God and man, for God loves Himself, or love is the self-centered godly

process in the universe.[83] One's acts are to reveal the emotions of benevolence and kindness, even though these are nominally to flow from the mind instead of from the heart. Like the Stoics, Spinoza recognized inevitable emotions, coming as a result of man's role in the universe, of man being part of nature. But he maintained that an emotion can be conquered only by an emotion, and hence the reason, which is to rule or control all the faculties of the soul, must in itself be "touched with emotion."[84] Yielding up one's emotions, as well as yielding one's reason, means ceasing to be a man.[85] To study the nature of the emotions is a worthy occupation. For these "follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and possess certain properties as worth of being known as the properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight."[86] Spinoza gives us his rationalistic definition of emotion: "Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence, (*existendi vis*) greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another."[87] "An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof. There is no modification of the body (emotion), whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception, in other words, which we cannot destroy or control. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modffications of our body according to the intellectual order."[88] Spinoza believed that one must rule and check the emotions which are contrary to nature, and the failure to do that he called

bondage.[89] He differs from the Stoics in that he maintained that we do not possess absolute dominion over the modifications of the body. He misterpreted the Stoic view when he considered that the Stoics made all emotions depend absolutely on our will.[90] Yet Spinoza himself held that the mind may influence all the emotions to be referred to the idea of God.[91] Since emotion is a wrong form of knowledge, it is under the sway of the mental or rational faculties, especially of intuition (the third kind of knowledge); and if, in so far as it is passion, it cannot be absolutely destroyed by it, it can be made to occupy a very small part of the mind.[92] As one of his propositions states: "In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death."[93] Certain emotions, he believes, such as envy, hatred and pity can never be good.[94] Others, such as hope and fear, cannot be in themselves good.[95] In a world of true reason, humility and repentance would be nothing less than sin.[96]

In the moralist books of the age, of course, certain emotions were denounced. For example, in the Gates of Holiness of Chayim Vital we read: "Pride, anger, petulance, despair, hatred, jealousy, dissipation, covetousness, desire for power and self-assertion belong to the ugly qualities of men, making man's communion with God impossible, and hence are incompatible with saintliness."[97] But the good emotions were upheld with equal enthusiasm: "Let man love all creatures, including Gentiles, and let him envy none!"[98] The emotions, again, were not condemned as a class. They were divided into good feelings and bad ffelings.

The Stoics did find a purpose and useful meaning in the

emotions. They urged that impulse be guided and controlled, not suppressed. They admitted certain emotions to be natural to the Sage. They praised the love of God. Yet, on comparing the two literatures, one cannot help but feel the warmer, more human atmosphere of the Jewish attitude. Though slightly exaggerated, William James' judgment contains much truth: "If we compare Stoic with Christian ejaculations we see much more than a difference of doctrine; rather is it a difference of emotional mood that parts them. When Marcus Aurelius reflects on the eternal reason that has ordered things, there is a frosty chill about his words which you rarely find in a Jewish, and never in a Christian piece of religious writing. The universe is accepted by all these writers; but how devoid of passion or exultation the spirit of the Roman Emperor is! Compare his fine sentence: 'If gods care not for me or my children, here is a reason for it,' with Job's cry: 'Though he slay me, yet will I trust in Him!' and you immediately see the difference I mean. The *anima mundi*, to whose disposal of his own personal destiny the Stoic consents, is there to be respected and submitted to, but the Christian God is there to be loved and the difference between the emotional atmosphere is like that between an arctic climate and the tropics, though the outcome in the way of accepting actual conditions uncomplainingly may seem in abstract terms to be much the same."[99] Let us note that James quotes Jewish examples to illustrate the Christian mind. That is significant, for although the Christian imitated the Jew, rather than the Stoic, in his appreciation of the emotions, and in assuming an emotional view of the cosmos, he followed the Stoic rather than the Jew in his attitude to another class of psychic forces, namely the desires or appetites. We shall now turn to compare the Jewish and Stoic reactions to "externals."

IX.

The Desires.

The Stoics based their strength on their personal lack of interest in anything external to character or virtue. Their argument was that if your happiness is not made to depend on anything material, anything perishable, then your happiness is insured against material loss. They agreed with the Buddhists in holding that happiness is found only in the subordination of the individual desires to the Universal Reason. Hence, sensual pleasure, wealth, reputation, health, even life, in short, all things not dependent on your own reason or will, are things "indifferent." The doctrine goes back to an early Sophist, Prodicus of Ceos, who also argued away the dread of death on the ground that since it does not come into existence until after we are out of existence, it really should be of no concern to us.[1] Zeno, who adopted the Cynic view, as opposed to the Academic, that these external advantages are "indifferent", yet maintained that when these things are "natural" they are also valuable (προηγμένα); when they are not "natural" they are of "low value" (ἀποπροηγμένα). Since happiness or virtue consists in a harmony with nature, we can see how important some of these "things indifferent" actually become. For Zeno did not retain the restricted Cynic interpretation of "natural" as anything undetermined by custom or authority. There was many a Stoic who frankly rejected Zeno's "valuable" externals as inconsistent with the theory that advantages are indifferent. The great number of Stoic thinkers, however, accepted Zeno's modification as the authoritative opinion of their School. They agreed that all externals were dispensations of Providence; that some may be rationally used to good advantage; but

that one's happiness or virtue was ultimately independent of any of these externals. It is in view of this attitude that we appreciate the apparently contradictory teachings of Epictetus in regard to the Sage's duties to himself. Although he does not preach asceticism, he inculcates a passive attitude to the external goods of life. He teaches cleanliness, an appreciation of personal beauty, although he grimly jokes about his lame limb and shows no grave concern for his head. He has a keen sense of personal dignity, and yet he does not lay down any such rules about dress, or about diet, as Musonius did. He decried the extravagance and luxury of his day, and would have even no comforts of life; yet he permits servants, wine and art. He believes that where there is character there is morality, in pomp and splendor as well as in dire poverty. Hence wealth is not to be denounced, except where it is amassed at the sacrifice of a moral principle. Asceticism may be occasionally necessary as a disciplinary means to secure moral freedom.

The Jewish view in regard to these externals is entirely different, although it was not uniform throughout the ages. The Bible considers material prosperity as a "good" and even holds it out as an end for which to strive, a reward for obedience. The injunction in Deuteronomy[2] against multiplying horses, building large harems, and amassing wealth, is pronounced because of the danger of degeneracy, not because such pursuits, when indulged in wisely, are in themselves evil. Some of the most envied blessings in the Pentateuch given to favored sons and hankered after by others, consist of a promise of material prosperity.[3] Even in as late a book as Proverbs, wisdom is held up as an ideal because "it holds length of days, wealth and honor."[4] Of course, the material power must be used with discretion and piety.

"There are some who squander and gain thereby"; and "one who puts his faith in his wealth will fall."[5] "Better is a little accompanied by the fear of God than a great treasure full of confusion;...better a meal of vegetables and love therewith than of a fattened ox with hatred to it."[6] To sum up, then, while the Stoics looked on the objects of human desire as things to be avoided, unless there was no moral principle broken; the Biblical view was that such advantages enhanced the value and joy of life unless these were begotten at some religious or moral sacrifice.

The Bible has no trace of asceticism. The Levites and Priests who were not to share in the inheritance of the Land, were not hermits. Their lot was the Lord;[7] they were to be occupied solely with Him, and to have their minds free from worldly interests not because these were evil *per se* but because they were needed to devote all their time and energy on religious affairs. In fact, the Priests developed into the aristocracy of the land. The single fast instituted in the Pentateuch is proof of the Jews' opposition to self-denial rather than of the contrary. The value of this world and its externals is especially appreciated by the author of Ecclesiastes. "A man to whom God giveth riches, wealth and honor, so that he wanteth nothing for his soul of all that he desireth, yet God giveth him not power to eat thereof,...this is vanity and an evil disease."[8]

Scripture shows a much keener appreciation of beauty than what is generally supposed. The fact is that all heroes, and especially heroines, are described as excelling in physical stature

and "beauty of countenance." No Biblical writer imagined his ideal as anything but handsome. Beauty is a quality desired of God.[9] It was only when physical excellence became a source of vanity and rebelliousness that it was considered as the very weapon directed against its possessor.

The most significant distinction between Biblical and Stoic values remains in their respective attitudes to life itself. It was here that the genius of the Hebraic soul rose to its highest. Whatever eschatological and mystical notions filtered into the Jewish mind, life remained the most sacred, the most treasured asset. Virtues, happiness, aye, even God, must be found and experienced here. Their aims, ambitions and effort were directed at the attainment of purer and nobler and more valuable standards of life in this world. The Stoics considered nothing of true value, which was not dependent on one's own moral character. They recognized the struggle for self-preservation as the first natural law with each animal. But happiness was disjointed from temporal duration; hence, the continuation or cessation of life was of no grave concern, of no real value, and might rationally depend on one's free choice. Suicide became a "natural exit," which one might resort to whenever life was felt to be somewhat too burdensome. Heraclitus and Posidonius even exalted death--thus accepting the Persian rather than the Jewish view--because the soul was, in their teaching, at its lowest ebb while pent up in our body.[10] The earlier Stoics believed in the reuniting of the soul with the all-pervading cosmic spirit, and individually awaited death, the moment of that union, with joy. Their theory performed a great service in alleviating the human fear of death; but

at the same time it robbed men of their valuation of life. It was precisely that attitude which Christianity adopted, and which caused the world to drown in darkness and be set back a thousand years. But whereas Christianity made death a matter of personal concern, because the world to come was a continuation of the world here, Stoicism was more successful in robbing death of its sting but also of its glories.[11] The later Stoics attempted to discourage suicide. Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius were uncertain of the truth of immortality.[12] But even their valuation of life was not higher than that of the earlier leaders of their School. Compare with this the personal joy, the potentiality for heroic achievement, the hidden springs of a sanctifying morality which lay in the Jewish glorification of life. Scripture is even free to claim that "there is no mention of Thee in death; who will praise Thee in Sheol?"[13] There is no denial of the hereafter; but there is love of this world. Man weeps for the deceased, giving vent to the natural emotion; yet feels comfort in the protecting wing of the all-embracing Deity. The only exception again is the Book of Ecclesiastes, highly colored with the influence of the Greeks. "I prefer the dead that are already dead more than the living that are yet alive; but better than they both is he that hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil work that is done under the sun."[14] In fact, with his lack of comfort in life or in death, with his preference of non-being, he approaches the Stoics nearer than any other Jewish writer.

The Talmud inherited the world view of the Scriptures, and we may be prepared to find in it a continuation and a deepening of Biblical philosophy. But the history of the people had in the interval

given the rabbis a much sadder picture of reality, and thus, unconsciously they shaded their conceptions with many Stoic ideas. Their philosophy of the human attitude to desire is indicative not alone of the profound wisdom but also of the profound pathos that filled the life of Israel in the days of the Talmud. They cherished the same love of life and of beauty and of comfort as their predecessors had done; but life was not as lovable, beauty not as real, comfort not as extant as in previous days. Well might a rabbi say in the bloody days of Herod, that "he who increaseth possessions increaseth cares."[15] The pious treasure their wealth, frankly admits R. Eleazar, because they do not wish to resort to robbery.[16] In Usha, the authorities set a limit of twenty per cent to one's charity, so as not to impoverish the population any further.[17] Ben Zoma and R. Meir express a Stoic thought in their dicta that contentment is the only real wealth.[18] Indifference to pleasure is regarded as a condition for the acquisition of Torah.[19] But there is no bad feeling expressed against pleasure in itself. "Three things give a man comfort: a beautiful home, a beautiful wife, and beautiful clothes."[20] A prayer, recorded in the Mishna, implores God to send material prosperity to the people and the land.[21] In passages quoted before, wealth and physical attractions were considered as conditional to fitness for the Shechinah.[22] Indeed, one must possess wealth in order to observe the Law best; and for that matter, the poor are like the dead.[23] "Without bread there is no Torah" was a popular saying.[24] Rabba prayed for wealth as well as for wisdom and modesty, and he admitted that he received more of the first than of tha last virtue.[25] Even the recluse R. Simeon b. Jochai, who was forced to live in a cave, taught that beauty, strength, wealth and other advantages are

are proper for *Zaddikim*.[26] Poverty is condemned, although the poor are favored.[27] R. Alexandrai used to pray that God redeem Israel from poverty and from foreign political subjection, because those two conditions made it difficult for the people to do God's will.[28] When poverty was extolled, it was done as a psychological observation, that the poor are mor religious, rather than as a genuine love for it, as was the case in Christian circles.[29] On the whole, poverty was then so prevalent, that once R. Pappa said, if people bring you news of your friend's death believe it, but if they bring you news of your friend having grown rich, don't accept it hastily as a fact.[30] And the people were as a rule advised to enjoy their wealth or their possessions. "My son!" said Rav to R. Hamnuna, "If thou hast the wherewith to do thyself good, do so for in the grave there is no pleasure, and there is no fixed time for death. And if thou shouldst wish to say: 'I will leave my children sufficient to live on when I am in my grave,' who can assure thee that they will keep it. Men are like grass in the field—some spring up and have everything prepared for them while others fade and have nothing."[31] Even in the darkest days of Israles history, joy and pleasure was the rule on the Sabbath and festivals; and in connection with every religious or important family and communal affair, the Jew was commanded to enjoy the material gifts of God,[32] in spite of the opinion that the primary motive of the commandments was not pleasure.[33] One must use one's will and the help of the Torah to control the passions and desires of the body,[34] but if one feels absolutely conquered by one of the Bodily appetites, be it even the lowest, one is advised to

indulge in it, but in a way as not to call forth public scandal.[35] At least, that is the opinion of one rabbi. R. Akiba tells that the Torah provided ample means for one's inclination to self-denial in the institution of vows, and that therefore one must not indulge in any more.[36] The rabbis entertained a unanimous opinion of the question of the *Nazir*, and maintained that one who abstains from the pleasures of life is a sinner, although in certain cases that may be justified.[37] There were, of course, many rabbis who experienced an inclination toward a more rigorous and less pleasant view of life. We hear of one rabbi who was himself a Nazarite.[38] R. Meir implied in the title *Hasid* one who was somewhat ascetic and indifferent to pleasure, although he would not recommend fasting, flagellation or the breaking up of the home.[39] R. Eleazar looks on fasting as one of the virtues of a saint, and another rabbi regards it as a condition for being a *Hasid*, although there is a third authority quoted in the same passage, who calls one who fasts a sinner.[40] Especially in connection with students of the Torah a note of ascetic rigor is struck. The crushing of personal ambition, contentment with a "life of pain," self-habituation to hardships, the dulling of one's appetites or craving for comfort, are recommended to the scholar.[41] These suggestions might have arisen as pedagogic principles and as practical observations in days when the study of the Torah actually entailed much risk and sacrifice. One rabbi, who does not refer to abstention or self-denial, speaks in very vehement language against gluttonous students.[42] On the other hand, R. Jeremiah expressly states that a student must not fast, for it involves a loss of time and energy for the Torah; and there is no dissenting voice to

his judgment.[43] Frivolity, of course, is condemned in the Talmud as in the Bible.[44] The rabbis maintained an appreciation of beauty, and they prided themselves on the beauty of their people and their land. Jerusalem received nine tenths of all the physical charm granted to the cities of the world.[45] R. Ishmael declared with a broken heart that the "daughters of Israel are pretty, only the abject poverty renders them graceless;"[46] and two other Amoraim shed tears when they thought of beauty which was to perish.[47] Beauty is a quality desired of God.[48] One must be particularly careful in performing religious duties very gracefully.[49] The Rabbis frequently shows a fine poetic sense and an appreciation of nature.[50] They always advised the most extreme care of health. In fact, a man was forbidden to live in a twon without sanitary equipment.[51] Most rabbis looked on life as a gift of God, of which we must forever be glad. We find a statement that "it were better for man not to have been created at all," but which is not pronounced in the same spirit as the similar statement in Ecclesiastes. We can feel here that if it were not for the extreme misery of the people in that period, they would not have passed that judgment; and even under the circumstances in which they lived they did not despair but were determined to lead a moral and repentant life.[52] Even the idea of death the Rabbis utilized for the promotion of a better life, which was done by the Stoics in a similar manner. To think of death was one of the means suggested whereby to subdue one's evil passions and appetites. But death was not a thing indifferent.[53] Because God's delight was conceived to be in the living, life was to be treasured.[54] There was a man who applied the Stoic principle of "the open door" to his

own daughter, when he thought her life was a detriment to society, and he pronounced his effective curse on her, for which he was universally condemned by the rabbis.[55] In the world to come, however, men will not be troubled by the burden of appetite and desire, and thus will be appier, no matter how much one may indulge in one's pleasures in this world.[56]

Life became still darker and gloomier during the Middle Age, and thus we hear many a voice crying out from that wilderness against the "varities of this world." But the stronger spirits of even that epoch reecho the Jewish note of the joy and the sanctity of life, and of man's duty to develop all the faculties of soul and body. Israeli defines the aim of philosophy as the ideal of being like unto God, i.e., not to centralize all attention on the body in animal wise, not to devote oneself to desires and pleasures which are merely of the ~~body~~ flesh, but to attain the highest raionality and spirituality.[57] David al Mukammas recommends self-control here, so that infinite joy may be one's lot in the hereafter.[58] Saadia applies the same principle which he utilized with reference to the emotions. Man's soul is threefold; reason, guided by revelation and tradition, is to guide the other two faculties, desire and impulse, but the latter must not be suppressed. He condemns the ascetics who claim that the world is bad and for that reason "commit the error of deserting civilized society,"[59] or who maintain that the body is by its very nature the source of evil. A complete life involves both body and soul. Indeed, self-denial is a virtue; but it becomes a menace when overdone, or when it thwarts the progress of civilization.

Then there is plenty of opportunity to practise self-denial while in the course of performing our duties, without needing to resort to extreme means. Here we have an exact parallel to the actual realization of the Stoic Sage. He considers the advantages as really "indifferent" yet "valuable" in so far as these help to promote the welfare of society. A proper measure of food and recreation is necessary to maintain our health; a proper amount of wealth, to do charity and support oneself and one's dependents; of sexual intercourse, to continue the race; of love to insure the happiness of home. Saadia approaches almost the Stoic view when he does not look on life itself, the physical continuation of our existence, as an end; but like the Christian, rather than like the Stoic, he regards it as a means for another life. "And the love of it (life) has been put in the heart of manso that he would not commit suicide in time of trouble."[59] True worship is when we "fulfil our duty to all the interests of life, and not merely when we pray and fast."[60] "To sum up, man should acquire in this world as much as is proper for him, eat and drink whatever is permissible with a view at his needs, and conduct his life according to wisdom, labor and public opinion, partake of all the appetites, as we mentioned them, each one in its proper season."[61]

A Stoic phrase is found in Barzillai's book, when he says, "And therefore He created the world like a vestibule, so that man need not be forced in it and whoever wishes to depart, may do so."[62] He agrees with Saadia in holding that those who suffer and control their passions and desires in this world, will enjoy eternal and infinite bliss in the world to come, and vice versa.[63] The Sage der-

ives all the pleasures of life from one mere hint in the Torah.[64] Bahya shows the same attitude as Saadia. Neither asceticism, nor self-indulgence are the proper ways. However, since body tends constantly to satisfy its cravings, our will and reason must tend somewhat in the opposite direction in order to restore the equilibrium. The same is true of society in general, which needs a few ascetics in order to keep humanity in the middle course. The ideal way is the middle way, and not the ascetic. The best criterion is the Torah, which prescribes all that is best for both body and soul. "Trust in God is of advantage religiously in giving a person peace of mind, independence and freedom to devote himself to the service of God without being worried by the cares of the world... If he has money he can make good use of it in fulfilling his duties to God and man. If he has not, he is grateful for the freedom from care which this gives him. He is secure against material worries. He does not have to go to distant lands to look for support, or to engage in hard and fatiguing labor, or to exploit other people."[65] This way of philosophizing reminds us so much of the Stoics, and Dr. Husik's estimate here of the Sage's attitude to externals, as described by Bahya, which we have just quoted, sounds almost like an extract from Epictetus. A man's trust in God must not exempt him from doing his duty with reference to his own life, his health, his family, etc. He must satisfy all his inclinations, so far as they are in consonance with reason. The highest "love of God" is attained when reason is allowed to control the desires. The author of *Toroth Hanefesh*, too, maintains the doctrine of the mean expressed in Bahya. On the other hand, Abraham b. Hiyya believes that the man who is altogether free from any

of the desires is superior to the man who controls them, for as long as there are evil passions in a man, he may be guilty of evil thoughts although innocent of evil deeds.[66] Similarly Josph ibn Zaddik believes that the first principle in a truly religious and philosophic mind id to deaden the animal desires.[67] He denies any value at all to pleasure.

When we come to Jehudah Halevi, we reach again a more thoroughly Jewish philosophy. Not self-denial, but the joy of life and the love of the world are the true worship of God. A hermit's solitude was good for men like Enoch or Elijah who yearned for the company of angels, or for philosophers and prophets at the time whem all the conditions were favorable for the prevalence of the Holy Spirit. Those people found human society too burdensome, although even philsophers needed disciples, and prophets, too, were not in absolute seclusion. But the *Hasid*, namely, the simple worshipper of God, he must observe all the commandments, and must be careful to devote himself to all the interests of life.[68] "The *Hasid* is like a wise ruler who supplies all the men of his land with their nourishment and all their needs, to each one his due, no less and no more; so the *Hasid* allows each sense and each physical and psychical faculty whatever it requires. He feeds both his soul and his body."[69] God even recommended the indulgence of the desires as methods of worship; and when one's motive is pure, feasting is as proper a means of serving God as is fasting. He, too, maintains, of course, that the Torah is the best criterion of canon of conduct. When one observes the Torah faithfully, one does not neglect any of the functions, nor does one tax any of the senses to the point of

of dulling or wearying it. To do just what the Torah commanded, no more and no less, is the nearest way to God.[70] "What makes life especially pleasant are the benedictions over the enjoyments of this world, for here we combine physical and spiritual elation.[71] This poet-philosopher-patriot had no fear of death, either, so strong was his faith in God: "When I am far from thee my death is in my life; When I cleave to thee, my life is in my death."[72] When love is the guiding motive, even hardships evaporate into nothingness, nay, turn into pleasure: "My soul would delight to walk naked and barefoot on the desolate ruins which were thy palaces," he exclaimed in his patriotic enthusiasm to his beloved fatherland.[73]

In Moses Ibn Ezra we return to find a soul with ascetic inclinations. The aim of philosophy is to rise above the corporeal senses and worldly desires. The end of life is to acquire a true knowledge of the soul and of God, and that may be achieved by suppressing the desires of the body.[74] A moderate degree of asceticism is recommended also by Abraham Ibn Ezra. All the three faculties are to be given their due; but the reason must not only master the other two powers, it must even check and curb the passions, so as to insure the soul's freedom from the tyranny of the body.[75] Abraham Ibn Daud appreciates the appetites much more deeply. He finds that the Ten Commandments warned us against allowing free play to the desires. True piety, even for the greatest of the philosophers, is contentment in one's own possessions without coveting those of another.[76] Appetite is to be confined to its proper limits by means of the principle of the mean. Thus reason is to control the whole soul,

the middle course, determined by reason, constitutes for him, as it did for Aristotle and for Maimonides, the essence of virtue.

Maimonides believed that our appetites were legitimate so long as they were directed towards what was natural and good for the body.[77] He applied the Talmudic verdict of sinner to an ascetic.[78] In the world to come, when we shall be transformed into intellect, we shall neither appetites nor emotions. Similarly, in the ideal Messianic period, when reason will be the rule of the land, wisdom rather than prosperity will be its greatest glory.[79] At present, too, we must endeavor to rise to as high an intellectual degree as possible. Yet, while in this life, we are human and limited by body. Hence, we must not curb our inclinations, but use the middle course, as Aristotle recommends and as Ibn Daud suggests.[80] Liberality is a mean between niggardliness and wasteful squandering. Courage is a mean between rashness and cowardice. Dignity is the middle course between haughtiness and self-abasement; contentment between the love of money and idleness, etc.[81] In connection with the rule of the mean, Maimonides made use of the principle of the "contrary twist," which figures in the philosophy of the Stoics as well as of Bahya and Ibn Daud. Habit alone, acquired through training and practice, will insure for us the middle course. If our nature tends to one extreme, it is therefor of pedagogic value to realize that we must exert ourselves towards the opposite extreme for some time, until we are thus gradually habituated to the mean. "It was for that reason that the *Hasidim* would not allow their habits to be bound to the mean, but would for a precaution sake tend somewhat to the extreme."[82] The Torah is the best code devised in

accordance with that principle, "that man should be natural, should walk in the middle course...and you may reason a fortiore, since one who inflicted on oneself only the abstention from wine needed atonement, one who inflicts on oneself more radical self-denial will all the more be considered sinful."[83] The laws of the Torah point to an exact middle course, and one who follows their guidance need never tend to either extreme.[84] With all that, man must not forget that the proper intention and motive are important. While one must devote due attention to physical needs, one must not convert and well-being into an end of life. That would not be the act of a *Hasid*.[85] We must bear in mind that with all his Aristotelian materialism, Maimonides was a rationalist and a spiritualist, and that he believed the highest achievement of man to be his graduation into pure intellect.[86] We noticed with reference to the emotions, that Maimuni did not follow his principle of the mean throughout his discussions. So, in the case of the desires, he believes that the satisfaction of some of them, even when not allowing the extreme, is a necessary evil.[87] In another passage of his Guide, he claims that we cannot be proud of any perfection, be it in health, wealth or morals, except of the perfection in true wisdom, in the knowledge of God.[88] The appetites are a necessary evil; the truly godly man is stimulated by wisdom, by innate inclination to do the right; and such a man is superior to one who has desires with which to wage constant warfare.[89]

Hillel b. Samuel regarded desire along with sense perception as the two instruments of the rational soul, and a proper training of these as the basis for the influence of the Active Intellect on rea-

son and imagination.[90] Albo accepted the mean as the criterion of the good; and also established the quality and duration of pleasure as as a measure for the goodness of an act.[91] Nachmanides warns us that even the Torah is for purposes of detail insufficient as a guide for the appetites against excess indulgence. We must take the general principle of holiness as a precaution for keeping aloof from all animal desires.[92] Spinoza follows Albo in accepting pleasure as a criterion for good.[93] He calls the natural pursuit of one's own interest as virtue, but he does not identify it with selfishness.[94] The safest and most radical means of overcoming our passions is by gaining a clear and distinct idea of these, whereupon these cease to be passions.[95] Like Maimonides, he postulates as a rule that it is good "to indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they are necessary for preserving health"96 "Lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose."[97] He condemned suicides as weak-minded, and acting against nature.[98] He agreed with the Stoics in claiming virtue to be action in accordance with nature, and for that reason he called self-love and self-preservation a virtue.[99] "Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest."[100] Hence, he defined pleasure as a good and pain as evil. "As, therefore, those things are good which assist the various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid to man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body; it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good. But seeing that things do not work with

the object of giving us pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore, most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become excessive."[101] "Therefore, to make use of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible (not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is the part of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing plants, with dress, with music, withmany sports, with thatres and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to his neighbor."[102] "But they who know the true use of money, and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs, live content with little."[103] Of course, when Spinoza speaks of pleasures and appetites in a good strain, he does not refer to lusts; for these are not true pleasures. In fact, it is the characteristic of the ignorant man, as distinct from the Sage, that he is driven by lusts and has no acquiescence of spirit.[104] Spinoza tells us also that "a free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life."[105]

The Middle Age produced many ascetics among the Jews as well as among the Christians. The extrem cases were all the product of the ignorance and misrey of the time, and of the influence of the outside world. The ordinary Jew of that era was as moderate and sober as befitted the child of the genuine Jewish spirit.[106]

X.

Pain.

Closely akin to the Sages's indifference to externals is his bearing under physical suffering. The Stoics held that the end of man was a life conformable to nature. They recognized Fate as a force, even superior to the deity, which controls nature. It was the law of providence, the principle determining the universe. When the Cynics said "follow nature," they meant to break the shackles of tradition and authority, of human convention; it was a sort of anarchism.[1] The Stoics implied by that phrase subordination to reason, a cheerful acceptance of whatever nature of fate would mete out. Furthermore, the Stoics viewed the entire cosmos as a single organism, and providnece extends to the smallest details of life. Hence to follow nature in the daily duties was a veritable co-operation with the plan of the whole, and an acknowledgment of the voluntary subservience of the individual to the weal of the whole. "All that befalls the individual is for the good of the whole....On two grounds, then you should accept with acquiescence whatever befalls--first, because it happened to you, was ordered for you, affected you as part of the web issuing from the primal causation; secondly, because that which comes upon the individual contributed to the welfare, the consummation; yea, and the survival, of the power which disposes all things."[2] Thus spoke the Stoic emperor of Rome. We must bear in mind that the universe is permeated by a law of inner causality, which is both following reason and working for the best. Our personal reason is part of, and therefore harmonious with, the Universal Reason. Hence, it is rational for man,

,it is natural for him,and it is therefore virtuous,to resign to the course of destinyto submit to the universal order.That is rational freedom; that is the proper end of life. Now,pain and suffering come to every individual in the course of his life.They accompany all our endeavors and pursuits. The natural and rational attitude is to view pain as part of the cosmic system; to consider it as "indifferent" since it is not in our control,does not depend on our will,and since virtue or harmony with nature is in no way compromised by it. Since nature sends me pain,it is best for the cosmos as a whole that I have pain,a and it were futile,un-"natural",unco-operative,irrational,to rebel against the pain.Some Stoics did not stand the test. Dionysius of Heraclea deserted for the Cynrenaics after he had been inflicted with a painful eye-disease.[3] Panaetius of Rhodes (c.189-109 B.C.E.) hesitated to say that "pain is no evil;"[4] although in a determined, rational,harmonious cosmos,there should be no room for evil. Marcus Aurelius held up ~~supreme~~ firmness of character as the supreme good: "Be like the headland,on which the billows dash themselves continually; but it stands fast,till about its base the boiling brakers are lulled to rest.Say you,'How unfortunate for me that this should have happened'? Nay rather,'How fortunate that in spite of this,I own no pang,uncrushed by the present,unterrified at the future!' The thing might have happened to any one,but not every one could have endured it without a pang."[5] Yet,withal there is in him a melancholy strain of resignation to the cosmos. He fails to experience the joy of active co-operation with nature,characteristic of the earlier Stoics.[6] It was because of that indifference to pain and reliance on nature,that the Stoics looked with ease and no perturbation on death. "Death put

and his stable boy on a par. Either they were received into the seminal principles of the universe, or were alike dispersed into atoms."[7] When one faces pain, just as when one is confronted with any other situation involving choice, the will is called into play. But the will is colored by the intellect; and when it is warped to false judgment and weakened by slackness of tone, it errs and sins; when it has the proper tone and self-control, it rises to a true decision, determines a virtuous act.[8] The ethical problem of the individual is to bring himself, a part of nature, into harmony with the whole of nature. This harmony is virtue (ἀρετή, *virtus*).[9] Ulysses was considered a Sage largely because of his power of endurance and his vigor, thus never faltering in his duty of helping the plan of the universe, of showing true free-will. This philosophy explains the Stoic paradox that "the wise man is happy even on the rack."[10] We may recall that Zeno defined the virtue of courage as "wisdom in suffering." Indeed, one must endure pain on the same basis as one must control emotions and subdue desires.

"It makes a tremendous emotional and practical difference to one" says William James, "whether one accept the universe in the drab discolored way of stoic resignation to necessity, or with the passionate happiness of Christian saints. The difference is as great as that between passivity and activity, as that between the defensive and aggressive mood...."For when all is said and done, we are in the end absolutely dependent on the universe; and into sacrifices and surrenders of some sort, deliberately looked at and accepted, we are drawn and pressed as into our only permanent positions of repose. Now in those states of mind which fall short of religion, the surrender is

submitted to as an imposition of necessity, and the sacrifice is undergone at the very best without complaint. In the religious life, on the contrary, surrender and sacrifice are positively espoused, even unnecessary givings-up are added in order that the happiness may increase. *Religion thus makes easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary.* ...There is dignity in both these forms of resignation (Stoicism and Epicureanism). They represent distinct stages in the sobering process which man's primitive intoxication with sense-happiness is sure to undergo...(But) compared with the complex ecstasies which the supernaturally regenerated Christian may enjoy, or the oriental pantheist indulge in, their receipts for equanimity are expedients which seem almost crude in their simplicity."[11] The same may be said as to the difference between Stoicism and Judaism with respect to their respective reactions to pain. There are in the Bible traces of the feeling of complete helplessness and belief in fatalism. There is something of it even in the blind obedience of Abraham of the voice of God, even when against his will he is forced to expel Ishmael,[12] when even against his reason he is on the point of sacrificing Isaac; or in the characteristic remark of Laban, "The thing proceedeth from the Lord; we cannot speak unto thee bad or good."[13] There is resignation to a power revered and feared; there is co-operation with the plan of fate, so to speak. We find the same reaction in Aaron at the moment when the sudden catastrophe befell his two sons.[14] It is implied in the choice of Israel and in their duty to be holy, in order to conform with the plan of the Almighty.[15] Scripture indeed looks on pain as evil, but as an evil which must be received with gladness, for God punishes in the same spirit as a father.[16] The Bible, too, clearly expressed the belief

in human free-will,[17] but freedom is at its highest and best when in conformity with the godly laws of the universe. The Prophets looked on their own mission as well as on Israel place in the world as mere incidents in the divine plan of the cosmos.[18] The Psalmist prays continually ~~from~~ for exaltation and relief from pain; but no amount of suffering will bend his faith in God and his allegiance to the moral law. "Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for Thou art with me."[19] In fact, "the man whom God chastiseth is happy" for he learns in that manner of God's Torah.[20] The Psalmist prays, "Teach me, O God, to do Thy will" with the same conviction as the Stoic that a life conformable with the highest will is the true end of man.[21] The same spirit is prevalent in Proverbs: suffering is a token of God's love;[22] reliance on God, on the absolute goodness and wisdom of the cosmic force, in spite of what may happen to us individually, is the source of real happiness.[23] Koheleth is again the grand exception. In Epicurean style, he denounces pain and suffering, and since all is vanity, let us flee from it and embrace pleasure. Job, the great epic of suffering, is probably the finest product we have of the Stoic-like attitude to pain expressed by a Jewish author. Job refuses to blame himself for the evil that befell him; he regards it as a part of a divine plan which he admittedly does not comprehend; yet although he wriggles in pain and curses the day of his birth, he refuses to rebel against God. He is sufficiently human to feel the sting of Satan's blows; he is sufficiently frank to admit that he regards it as bad; but he is sufficiently faithful and courageous and wise to recognize that he may not understand the meaning and the good hidden in it and that, therefore, he must submit.

The books of the Apocrypha continue in the same strain: Pain is part of the divine plan--to punish, to try, to hold up good in bold relief thereby--and man must overcome it with profit. Philo, too, sums up that the "goal of philosophy is to know how to live in accordance with nature, which is identical with a life of reason and virtue or a life following the divine word or law."[24] But here again there is the difference as well as the resemblance with Stoic parallels. The wise course is to endure and to resign. But that did not imply rebellion; and was in no way incompatible with an aggressive attitude towards the avoidance of evil, the alleviation of pain, the co-operation with nature in such a manner as to call forth the advantages rather than the disadvantages of nature. At least the later Stoics did not show the same religious comfort, the same willingness to profit by evil. Philo tells us that both Moses and the Chaldeans conceived of the world as a symphony; but whereas with the latter it led to base materialism and fatalism, with the former it spelled active harmony and service and comfort.[25] The same is true with respect to the Jewish and Stoic teaching about pain. At bottom the same, yet because of the differing world-view, it led to different expressions which made all the difference imaginable.

The rabbis of the Talmudic literature continued the same view. "The Rabbinical notion is that misery and distress exist chiefly to be alleviated by the good among men.[26] The fates of human beings are not alike; they differ as to strength, possessions, and the events of their lives, 'so that love and beneficence may have the opportunity to translate themselves into acts!'"[27] Natha of Arbella advises us not to

advises us not to despair of punishment.[28] Gamaliel b.Judah gives the formula: "Make His will thy will,so that He will make thy will His will."[29] There is an echo of the Biblical teaching that pain is a token of God's love in R.Janai's observation that the pious suffer most.[30] The ordeals through which Abraham passed were indicative of God's love to him as well as of Abraham's love and devotion to God.[31] If a man can find no personal guilt to account for his suffering,let him consider it as "pain of love."[32] There is an express Amoraic statement that whomsoever the Almighty loves he punishes,and that the reward is great for those who accept such punishment with love.[33] Such suffering is called"pain of love" because it gives a man eternal freedom,and prepares him for the highest reward.[34] A *braitha* is quoted in the name of R.Simeon b.Jochai to the effect,that "the Holy One,blessed be He, presented Israel with three precious gifts,and all of these He gave with the accompaniment of pain,namely the Torah,Palestine and the world to come."[35] There is a note of Stoic pessimism in the passage that one's birth and death and moral responsibility areall determined for us against our will.[36] There is even the spirit of rebellion in a few passages: R.Johanan protests that he would have neither the reward nor the pain which precedes it.[37] A life in physical pain is no life at all.[38] But these instances are very rare,and they are most likely directed against the glorification of suffering and the self-infliction of pain which was prominent in the philosophy and practice of many a religious sect at the time. On the whole,resignation to the evil drops of life and a cheerful acceptance of whatever God metes out,is the accepted recognized religious attitude.[39] That is a condition for the acquisition of Torah.[40] "A man must recite a benediction

for evil as well as for good."[41] The recommendation that"a man should be in the habit of saying 'whatever the All Merciful doeth is for good'" is attributed to may rabbis.[42] We are told of R.Hanina and his School that they would cherish and welcome trouble.[43] Even R.Ami,who looked upon pain and death as the consequence of sin,would have us accept these cheerfully as an atonement for our sins.[44] Frequently the praise is repeated of "those who are insulted and do not insult, who hear themselves reviled and do not retort,who act out of love and rejoice in suffering."[45] R.Jose was even supposed to have prayed for kidney trouble,because most *Zaddikim* die of that ailment.[46] An extreme case of complacency undef the most excruciating pain is that of R.Nahum of Gimso. In the course of a visit,R.Akiba once remarked to him,"Alas! that I see you in this condition," to which R.Nahum replied,"Woe is me that I do not see you in the same condition." "Why do you curse me?" asked the guest in astonishment."Why do you object to suffering?" remarked the sick man in similar surprise.[47] The "Gamzo" legend was indeed a floating myth attributed to many a pukis hero,which is evidence that the philosophy of it was much admired. A bright aspect is discovered evn in the greatest of all catastrophes,keenly felt by all--that of the destruction of Jerusalem. It was the great opportunity given Israel to convert the world,said one rabbi.[48] Man should never protest against the decrees of heaven, remarked R.Eleazar.[49] Whoever takes delight in his pain brings salvation to the world,said R.Joshua b.Levi.[50] A keen psychological observation is recorded in Abba Hanan in the name of R.Eleazar: Proselytes nowadays suffer because they are motivated by fear rather than by love,for were the opposite the case,they would not regard their or-

deals as sources of suffering.[51] It becomes a joy to suffer for the great ideals of the Faith. It becomes a source of happiness to co-operate with the will and the plan of the Creator, and all incidental pain is ignored. Even God Himself prays "May it be my will that my children accompoish my will."[52] And in that plan and will of God, pain is an element, and must not therefore be repudiated.

In the Middle Ages, the same Jewish power of endurance and joy in suffering for the cause of the Most High, characteristic of the Biblical and Talmudical periods, is maintained, although the people show less courage in their reaction to personal, individual afflictions. The purpose of philosophy, the object of tradition, the only meaning of revelation is to teach man the essence of God's will and inspire man with the desire to do God's will. With all his opposition to asceticism, Saadia maintains that evil is not the fault of body alone; that pain may be due to the nature of the soul, may be a condition imposed by God for man's own good.[53] Barzilai posits free-will as a God-given gift, which implies that man is to use it so in a way to imitate the will of God.[54] God is the source of evil as well as of good; but it is man's privilige and duty to choose the latter by means of his free-will.[55] The greatest gift to man is wisdom, tells us Bahya, because that leads us to the will of God.[56] Humility, which he regards as one of the most important elements in right conduct, implies "the endurance of misfortune with resignation."[57] His own strength of soul and power of endurance is manifest in his prayer offered in the depths of the night: "My God, Thou hast brought upon me starvation and penury. Into the depths of darkness Thou hast driven me, and Thy might and strength hast Thou taught me.

But even if they burn me in fire, all the more will I love Thee and rejoice in Thee, for so said the Prophet, 'And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart!'"[58] Jehudah Halevi's *Hasid* thanks God even when he lacks all pleasure; and "he is always happy."[59] "But even during his struggles" says Schechter, in reference to Halevi, "the fear of the saint is not for punishment, for suffering is looked upon by him as another token of God's love, indeed, as a gift of heaven; nor is his hope connected with reward, which he would consider unworthy and mercenary. Death has no terrors for him."[60]

Maimonides' solution of the problem of free-will is akin in method to that of the Stoics. In the last of his Eight Chapters, he tells us that God established the harmony of nature, but man retained his freedom to do certain acts, which acts, when done, will bring the inevitable results in conformity with the laws of nature. Thus, man may or may not touch fire; but if he touches it, he will reap the inevitable consequence. It is similar to the Stoic harmonization of human free will with the theory of the cosmic Law of harmony. Man controls inward attitudes, and therefore outward acts or expressions of those attitudes, by his will. But man will reap the consequences of those acts which will follow the laws of nature. Moses b. Maimon quotes the Talmudic dictum, "all is determined in heaven, except the fear of heaven" (man's conscience, character and motive). Thus man has the choice even of his inward reaction to pain and will; as far as the consequence, that will follow proceed in harmony with the pre-established order. Man cannot determine his temperament, but he can determine his acts. Gersonides laid so much stress on God's free-will

(man's?)

that he sacrificed even God's foreknowledge for it. "A man's freedom may succeed in counteracting God's order...This is signified by the expression 'God repents'"[61] The Karaite Aaron b.Elijah of Nicomedia insists on the principle of "chastisement of love" and shows his sect's superiority over the Rabbanites who held the opinion that "there is no death without sin,nor suffering without guilt."[62] Of course,we had ample evidence of the Rabbanites' belief in the same g"grace"of pain. Albo sees nothing but evil in pain,and that should be shunned.[63] Of course,one is not to surrender ideals for the sake of avoiding pain; but one should avoid guilt or carelessness or whatever else may bring about suffering. Similarly Crescas who beliebed that the essence of the soul was love and desire,claimed that pain might destroy it.[64] Spinoza believed in the compact harmony of the cosmos--everything is determined by law. Man's chief good is to realize this harmony and his place and duty in it.[65] He taught that pain in itself was bad;[66] that superstition is false because "it seems to account as good all that brings pain."[67] But he did not define pain as inclusive of what we ordinarily term under it. By a clear understanding we are all able to lose sight of pain,and "the better part of ourselves will surely acquiesce in what befalls us,and in such acquiescence will endeavor to persist."[68] Spinoza's view,like the genral Jewish view,is based on the same philosphy as cherished by the Stoics, which we may briefly summarize in the words of Lazarus,that "the moral neither is,nor grows out of,opposition to nature."[69]

XI.

The Joy of Life.

In discussing the virtue of courage, we noted that with the Stoics it had both a positive and a negative implication. It meant a spirit of enterprise as well as a wise and brave reaction against the onslaughts of nature against our body and mind. Activity and energy, more than emotion and feeling, were the constituent elements of a natural and harmonious life.[1] "To keep quiet and enjoy was the maxim of the Epicureans. Sense was their guide. The Stoic taught that man was sent here to bestir himself and live."[2] The Epicurean God enjoyed rest; while with the Stoics, divine qualities implied activity.[3] The Sage was supposedly an optimist. Even Marcus Aurelius had faith in the goodness of the universal order.[4] And to do one's bit actively and forcefully was a way of expressing one's participation in nature. That spirit went back to the Socratic example of virility and strength of character. (ΣΩΚΡΑΤΙΚΗ ἰΣΧΥΣ). They even identified virtue with this will-power, and since virtue is self-sufficient, that became the all sufficient quality.[5] Virtue was, of course, a disposition rather than an act, but it was a disposition for activity. However, that spirit was not as prevalent with the later Stoics. They adopted the stress laid on contemplation by the Academicians and Peripatetics, and regarded that as the source of the highest satisfaction.[6] God himself contemplates creation. The change in emphasis led those Stoics to lay more stress on the self-restraint (ΚΡΑΤΟΣ) of the Socratic character than on its strength (ἰΣΧΥΣ); on the blamelessness more than on the accomplishments of life.[7] Seneca's Sage, for example, lacked all ambition and was distinguished for a "simple

life," for a spirit of quietism and resignation.[8] On the other hand, Epictetus returned to the older conception of strength of character.[9] Hand in hand with the spirit of activity, went the feeling of joy in life, which was experienced by the earlier Stoics. It was a joy in co-operating with nature, as joy in being a partner of God, as the Jews expressed it. The later Stoics missed that, as we have already had occasion to observe.[10] The earlier Stoics awaited even death with joy, for they realized that it was one of the big steps in one's personal harmony with the universe; they knew it meant the reuniting of the soul with the all-pervading cosmic spirit. The later Stoics awaited that, too, with resignation rather than with active joy.[11] "On the whole, Greeks and Romans looked on those as Sages who worked hard for good of the world, were untiring in their efforts, and led virtuous lives, shunning personal advantage."[12] This activity, which they expelled, should not be confused with restlessness, which they regarded as an expression of grief.[13] Calmness and rest are indeed qualities to be sought and used to good purpose by the Sage--but these are not incompatible with assiduous activity. Recognizing this trait in many Stoics, it is therefore wrong for James to generalize and claim that all Stoics looked on activity and service as a yoke,[14] or that they all lacked completely an enthusiasm for the world. Their joy, not as keen and not as lasting as that inspired by the religious impulse of the Hebrews, was a joy and an enthusiasm non the less.

Judaism was an optimistic world-view. The ancient elders telling the tales of creation, repeated the refrain that whatsoever God did "behold, it was good." Their hero was equally a man of strength

and activity. In a previous chapter we pointed out that they looked on Providence and fate to be working always for the best--always "God had planned it for good."[15] Both labor and rest, each in its proper time, were equally conditions of happiness. We remember that "with the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread" was a curse pronounced in punishment for an offence. But another Biblical account tells us that Adam was originally placed in the Garden "to till it and guard it." And the prevailing Scriptural spirit is respect for labor. At the same time, it recognizes the importance of rest, of leisure, of the calming influence of the Sabbath and festivals. It is most likely that the Jews derived their Sabbaths from the Chaldeans; but whereas with the latter those were days of taboo, with the Hebrew they became days of rest in our modern sense of material and spiritual recreation. It is also to the credit of the Jewish spirit, we may remark incidentally, as Professor Lazarus has already pointed out, that whereas Aristotle justified slavery on the ground of the importance of leisure, Israel invented the universal Sabbath.[16] Once in a while we hear the voice of the Psalmist or Prophet hankering after the ideal life of the desert. But that passion of the idealists was the result not of their hatred of the city and its requirements, but of their outraged conscience against the social injustice which pervaded the city. "Would that I had wings like a dove! Then would I fly away, and be at rest. Lo, then would I wander far off; I would lodge in the wilderness!... For I have seen violence and strife in the city."[17] And even in the desert, their ideal was not to be found in a hermit's cell, but in company of the whole nation, as in the days when God led his people out of Egypt. And the Prophets themselves, with few exceptions, were men of storm and

stress, men of true strength of character. Contemplation, as the day of rest, was extolled. Meditation of God and the universe was a virtue; but these were not exclusive of a vigrous, energetic participation in life. Joy was also the great quality of the Law: "Light is sown for the *Zaddik*, and joy for the upright in heart...Rejoice ye righteous in the Lord."[18] "It is a joy for the *Zaddik* to do justice."[19] "Worship the Lord with joy"[20] is an expression of the best religious spirit of Israel. "Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways and be wise" is a suggestion in Proverbs to those who lack in energy and ambition.[21] "Even one that is slack in his work is brother to him that is a destroyer."[22] The ideal woman is known for her strength and untiring zeal in the management of her household.[23] A joyful heart is a great asset.[24]

Philo said that the good man loves mankind and solitude.[25] He extolled contemplation and, therefore, retirement; "for what life can be better than that which is devoted to speculation."[26] But he advised at the same time to keep an interest in human affairs. Philo himself divided his career between solitary contemplation and public activity. He speaks of the joy of serving God. In his ecstasy, man attains the highest happiness of life. He even declares that excess of joy makes the mind greater.[27] He condemns the lazy, and places idleness in the same category with all the other evils.[28]

Strength of character and an enthusiastic joy in life are the dominating characteristic of the Rabbis. There were the moments of extreme suffering and despair, of hopes blasted and vitality sapped. But most frequently, it was the spirit of unconquerable courage and

joy that filled the heart of the Talmudic heroes. The spirit of energy and social co-operation breathes through the terse remark of Hillel: "If I am not for myself, who is for me? And if I am for myself alone, what am I? And if not now, when?"[29] Joy must be the possession of those who devote themselves to the Torah.[30] Contemplation is recommended, but first one must attend to the more active duty of study.[31] Without the joy which should accompany the performance of the religious duty, there can be no emanation of the Schechinah.[32] Said R. Judah b. Tema, Be fierce as a leopard, and light as an eagle, quick as a deer and strong as a lion, in the performance doing the will of thy Father in heaven."[33] This saying was incorporated in as the preamble in the codes of the Middle Age. The future world may be full of sad and serious conditions; but in the present world a Jew must engage in joy.[34] Activity is the first step on the way to a higher and better realization of the religious life, said R. Phinehas b. Jair.[35] Joy should distinguish the Jewish festivals, and for that purpose the pious observer receives an extra soul on the Sabbath.[36] The spirit of rest and joy made the Sabbath one of the most beloved features of the religion, and the day was described as the mate of Israel.[37] Those who help to cheer up the sad are assured of their share in the world to come, was a heavenly report brought by the prophet Elijah.[38] The statement of Rav, quoted by R. Hiyya b. Ashi, that "scholars of the Toarh will have no rest even in the world to come" is taken to mean that they will continue in an active pursuit of the Torah, continue to mark progress in their calling even after they will have passed through life.[39] Activities of a public nature and for the weal of the community may go on on the Sabbath day, is a statement in the literature derided for its pettiness and form-

alism in discussing the status of an egg laid on the Sabbath.[40] We have special benedictions for all kinds of joy. On weddings it would be recited, "Praised art Thou, O Lord our God, who created mirth and gladness, bridegroom and bride, joy and song and exultation and delight, love and fraternity and peace and friendship. O Lord, our God, may soon be heard in the ~~streets~~ cities of Judah and in the streets of Jerusalem the sound of mirth and the sound of gladness, the voice of the bridegroom and the voice of the bride, etc."[41]

Even in the dark and gloomy Middle Age, when all effort on the part of the Jew was stifled by restriction and all avenues of activity were cut off by discrimination, we hear the same voice of joy and sound of strength, which characterized the character of the Jew in preceeding centuries. Effort in well-doing remained a distinguishing mark of the religious consciousness of the time.[42] Philosophy involves also action--to do as God does--tells us Israeli.[43] Tranquility of soul and infinite joy is the reward of a virtuous life, tells us David al-Mukammas.[44] Saadia held up rest and joy as great ideals. Even the bliss of the hereafter consists of tranquility. But rest is only such "which comes after work and the attainment of the needs."[45] Barzilai expressed it very clearly in his Commentary on the Book of Creation: "Man's wisdom and knowledge and understanding emanate from God, but man must exert himself and work with these qualities in order to obtain the reward of possessing them...for thus decreed the Holy One, blessed be He, to grant his precious gifts to man through cause and endeavor."[46] The same erudite scholar, imbued with the spirit of his people, tells us that the Sabbath "is a double day, of double food, of double reward, and it is all rest and joy. The Sabbath is the Torah,

for he who observes it properly is as if he observed the whole Torah."[47] Somewhat later he adds, "And therefore this world contains effort. Everybody who exerts himself and practises the commandments, will received of the fruit of his deeds in the world to come."[48] After praising effort and energy so highly, he identifies the bliss of the hereafter with infinite tranquility and joy.[49] In his introduction to the Duties of the Heart, Bahya confesses that he almost committed the error of "choosing rest and dwelling in the abode of idleness." The Sage must must be quick and active in matters of the Torah as well as in all interests of life.[50] We notice before, during our discussion of his attitude to asceticism, that he disapproved of the life of the recluse. Participation in life and in all its activities is the end of man and the best means of attaining to true virtue. Joseph ibn Zaddik counted hope as one of the four cardinal virtues.[51] In Jehudah Halevi we find the finest and most pronounced exaltation of the joyous and active life of the Saint. He identifies the love of the world and the joy of life with true worship of God.[52] The Sabbath and the festivals are means by which we can acquire that joy and love.[53] His Sage is always joyous.[54] His ideal type of man is full of enthusiasm, full of vigor, is conscious of the immanence of God in every aspect of life and is most eager to give expression to every prompting of the soul. Abraham ibn Ezra and also Maimonides thought that the highest communion with God, as that of the prophet, was in solitude, in restive, calm contemplation. The latter prescribes joy as the mean between hilarity and sadness, and adopts the Talmudic view that it is a prerequisite to a truly religious atmosphere as well as to happiness.[55] But the joy which he prescribes is not necessarily social. Contemplation is experienced best in seclusion.

Therefore, "every *Hasid* seeks to separate and seclude himself more and more and not to associate with men except for absolute necessity."[56] The "divine pleasantness" concomitant to all godly deeds" is an ideal sought by Albo.[57] Contemplation becomes the source of virtue with Spinoza. "And while we contemplate the world as a necessary result of the perfect nature of God, a feeling of joy will arise in our hearts."[58] "Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good" he tells us in his Ethica.[59] "Thus will men be stirred not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to endeavor, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to reason."[60] That joy he identifies with mental acquiescence. He pities the ignorant man because he never realizes the true joy and mental acquiescence which he misses.[61] In this matter, then, too, Spinoza stood on solid Jewish ground, when he called for joy and endeavor as to characterize life. His joy and his endeavor were, however, less simple and less concrete than that prescribed by by the popular literature of the Jews in former generations.

XII.

The Sage To Himself.

We noted many characteristics of the Sage, as viewed by the Stoics and by the Jews. Let us now point out briefly additional traits which present a common appreciation or a striking contrast in the two philosophies. First as to the Sage in his duties to himself.

The Stoics had a high regard for the individual. The Sage was a king. That implied a dignified bearing of oneself in body and in spirit. True, it was immaterial what condition nature vouchsafed to our body. But we owe it all respect. That did not imply a pampering of mollifying of the body. It meant that in cleanliness, in neatness, and in austerity, we must assume a royal bearing. That was especially true of the soul or spirit, the real royal principle in us. The Sage was so dignified, that he would not bow to nature, in the sense that he would not consider himself defeated. The Jewish attitude to one's personality and person differed at different times, and was largely influenced by the two complementary views that man was in the image of God, and that humility was a religious duty. "Six things are unbecoming for a scholar" tells us an old tradition in the Talmud, "He should not walk out in public in perfumes, he should not walk alone at night, he should not appear in shoes covered with patches, he should not converse with a woman in the street, he should not join in the company of the ignorant, and he should not be the last to come to the house of study. Others added that he should not take long strides and that he should not with erect body."[1] A scholar who allows a spot of grease to remain on his coat is worthy of death, tells us R. Hiyya b. Abba.[2]

R.Eleazar tells us that a man should never humiliate himself, except when at the risk of his life is at stake.[3] Another rabbi allows one to wash his garment of the week day of a holiday, if he has no other means of procuring a clean garment.[4] "So great is the dignity of man that for its sake a Biblical prohibition may be waived."[5] R.Johanan b.Zakkai gives a humorous explanation for the Biblical specification of the fine imposed on a thief of cattle: "Come and see how important is human dignity, for an ox, that walked on foot he is fines with five pieces (of oxen), whereas for a sheep which he had to carry on his shoulder, he is fined with only four."[6] It was quite a problem as to when one might forego one's dignity in details of social etiquette.[7] Maimonides devotes much attention and many special paragraphs to a detailed discussion of the same question as well as to the problem of human dignity in general.[8]

It was because of human dignity that both Stoics and Jews condemned all manner of obscenity and nudity. The Stoics clearly admitted that it was purely a matter of convention, and that therefore, it dpended on our standards and on the taste of the individual, in the long run, whether it was semmly or unseemly for him. As a general principle, the Stoics were not opposed to convention, and upheld these standards of decency.[9] We have prohibitions against nudity and other obscene practices in the Bible.[10] We know that in the contact between Syrian and Jewish civilization, much blood was shed when the Jewish sense of propriety was frequently outraged by the Greek games which filled the Palestinean land. A Talmudic statement expresses "that there is nothing more ahnoxious and abominable before God than the sight of one who parades naked in the open."[11] Our ears and fingers are shaped

so as to allow us to give us the means of preventing our ears from hearing the improper remarks.[12] "Put the costly *on* thee, and the cheap *in* thee" reamrked a rabbi in comparing the value of good clothes and good food.[13] "By four signs a scholar reveals his character: by his money, his drink, his anger and his attire."[14] "Under all ordinary circumstances the underlying motives which inspired Jewish ideas on costume were a sense of personal dignity and a keen regard for decency. ...The mediaeval Jews were most sensitive on this subject. 'Accustom yourselves and wives, your sons and daughters, always to wear nice and clean clothes, that God and men may love and honor you'—is the advice of a Jewish parent to his parent children in the fourteenth century.[15] Two centuries earlier, the famous translator of Maimonides wrote to his son: 'Honour thyself, thy household and thy children, by providing proper clothing as far as thy means allow, for it is unbecoming in a man, when he is not at work, to go shabbily dressed. Withhold from thy belly and put it on thy back."[16]

It was also as a consequence of that spirit of dignity that standards of charity were set, that the duty of charity in a certain manner was prescribed as a protection to the life and dignity of the poor, and that the taking of charity was discouraged. We find in the biography of Abraham a recurrence of his spirit of absolute independence of other men in a material way. He does not wish Malkizedek to appear as having enriched him,[17] and he does not wish people to say that he received the Cave of Machpelah as a gift.[18] He who detests gifts will enjoy life, is a Proverb in Scripture.[19] We have already quoted that the needy who does not resort to charity will be blessed.[20] Similarly R. Akiba enjoined on his son R. Joshua that he should curtail his needs,

even when in connection with religious duties, rather than become a public charge.[21] The rabbis pitied the man who was materially dependent on his neighbors.[22] R. Nechunia tells R. Akiba with pride that he has never received any presents.[23] One must, however, protect the dignity of others who take charity. Good charity is when given in a manner compatible with the self-respect of giver and recipient; bad charity is when given without regard to the feelings of the people concerned.[24] Similarly Maimonides, who devotes so much space to the laws of alms and the duty of helping those in need, decides that whoever determines to devote himself exclusively to the Torah and thus depends on others to maintain him "has desecrated the name of God and heaped scorn on the Torah... It is a great virtue to live of one's own toil."[25] So Spinoza tells us that "the free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives as far as he can, to avoid receiving favors from others them."[26] And in spite of the strict application of this principle of independence and the checking of pauperism to one's self, it must not interfere with the duty of charity to others. "Deep-rooted in the Jewish heart lay the sentiment that poverty had rights as well as disabilities."[27]

Another corollary of man's dignity, and one of the most important of man's duty to himself, is that of education. Here we may point out a difference in emphasis on the part of Jews and Stoics. Both encouraged education; both considered it a duty. But while with the Greeks it was a means to a higher life, and therefore recommended, with the Jews it became almost an end, to which they devoted themselves passionately, and which they never tired of urging on all men. While the Stoic taught that virtue is knowledge, he stressed the larger

importance of practice over theory to such an extent that learning was almost neglected. Panaetius, the father of Stoicism in Rome, permitted the study of science as a recreation.[28] There were Stoics who advised youths to study logic and physics; and still more urged the study of the human soul. But none of them felt the ardor and enthusiasm for study, as was experienced in Judea. Zeno maintained that the training of the youth in grammar, music and gymnastics was worthless, for the true education was virtue,[29] and virtue was not a matter of theory but of practice. The first virtue they held to be wisdom, but we have already seen that that meant practical sagacity more than learning. In one respect they assumed a broad view. They recommended the same education for boys and girls. Both Musonius and Epictetus defended the right of women to education.[30] The Stoic commandment of transmitting a knowledge of the duties and virtues to posterity was repeated time and again in all parts of Jewish literature. But in addition we meet here with a direct expectation of study and knowledge. One of the king's duties, recorded in Deuteronomy, is to write a copy of the code.[31] Ignorance is one of Philo's worst horrors.[32] The first commandment in the Mishna of *Aboth* is to get pupils and establish Schools; and the rabbis well fulfilled that command; even when at the risk and the sacrifice of their life. The whole Talmudic era is one grand chapter of the firmest persistency and loyalty men have ever shown for a thousand years to an ideal of learning. Every tract of that "sea of learning" contains an exhortation to study, to learn, to spread the Torah, to remain loyal to it. We have seen before that merely studying was not sufficient; that the manner and motive of studying were always taken in consideration. There were also times when scholars

were not popular, and through their bad judgment called upon themselves the hatred of the people. But these were exceptional instances. On the whole, learning and the learned were held in the highest esteem. Bahya's remark that " he who refrains from from studying is despicable" was the commonly accepted view throughout the history of the people.[33] But whereas in Talmudic days, due to historic conditions and prejudices, study was frequently confined to the Torah exclusively, in the Mediaeval period the scope was frequently very much broader. The study of all sciences, and especially of God and of man, was made the basis of our knowledge of God and of the Torah by Joseph ibn Zaddik.[34] "Nature has put in us the agility as well as the desire to speculate withour reference to practical results...Theoretical studies must therefore have some value," so thought R. Levi b. Gerson, to use the language of Dr. Husik.[35] "A man Every religious man should investigate the principles of his religion and faith" tells us Albo.[36] Restrictions against the study of science and philosophy become more and more numerous as we advance in the Middle Ages towards the gloomier and darker centuries of persecution. But the zeal for learning *per se*, and particularly the fire of the Torah was kept up in spite of all hindrances and suffering. In one respect the Jewish view remained inferior throughout those ages—and that was the denial of the woman's ~~right~~ duty to learning and the Torah on a par with man. She was not denied the right to learn, however, and instances are not wanting of individual women who rose to a very high stage of scholarship.

Seneca tells us that the Sage must have a conscience.[37] In the Jewish consciousness throughout the ages, conscience formed an integral part of every man's moral equipment. Already the Priestly Code "prod-

uced that fear of sin and rigorisity of conscience which at all times have been the distinguishing marks of Judaism."[38] It was through their conscience that the Prophets became conscious of God.[39] The Psalmist describes ~~the~~ his pangs of remorse, when in the depths of night he would review his deeds.[40] A clear conscience is the basis for a clear record with God.[41] A fine conscience is included in Bahya's conception of humility.[42] Indeed, Judaism, like other religions which championed the cause of the poor and endavored to bring man with a pure heart nearer to God, is primarily an evolution of the standards and eontent of conscience. That was therefore a primary principle with the Jewish Sage.

Self-examination is an important duty of the Sage, especially in the conceptions of Seneca and Epictetus.[43] It may assume the form of prayer, particularly before sleep. But that quality or virtue or duty of prayer never meant with the Stoics what it meant with the Jews. We have already alluded to the Stoic arrogance as to the position and role of man. Seneca considered man even superior to the Gods, and Epictetus, although more conscious of Human failings, considered man not inferior to the deity.[44] Prayer or self-examination meant for the Stoics no remorse; implied no broken spirit. It was a cool, rational sort of calculation, to determine which was the act of the wise, what should be continued and should be halted. Self-examination in the Jewish sense implies atonement for past deeds, a frame of mind and heart which should prepare man for a new attitude in the future. The Psalmist was continually searching his heart and pouring it out before God with a broken spirit. Philo insisted on repentance.[45] Penitence is accounted a protection against punishment alongside with

good deeds, by R. Eliezer b. Jacob,[46] and another rabbi stated that "an hour of repentance and good deeds in this world is worth all the life of the world to come."[47] "When a man sees that suffering is coming to him, let him 'examine his deeds,' advised Raba (or R. Hisda)."[48] Raba was also attributed with the saying that "the end of wisdom is repentance and good deeds."[49] Some rabbis would even maintain that repentant souls are by far superior to those which had never sinned.[50] Self-examination is also recommended by the combined opinion of the Schools of Shammai and Hillel as the best thing for men.[51] R. Simeon b. Jochai said that one who was an absolutely unrighteous and then repented, all his former sin is obliterated.[52] Let man constantly examine himself whether he can pray with heartfelt devotion; if not, let him not pray.[53] Bahya tells us that because of his composite nature, containing conflicting principles, man is sinful and must continually repent. Self examination he recommends as conducive to repentance.[54] Self-examination is also recommended by Halevi. It is another name for man's progress to true wisdom and a perfect knowledge of God, according to Abraham b. Hiyya.[55] Maimuni devotes a whole tract of his code to the duty of repectance, which includes that of self-examination. Spinoza alone, of all Jewish thinkers, claims that "repentance is not a virtue or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm."[56] But he, too, adds the note that "As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good than harm; hence as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction."[57] Actually, "No pious Jew sought his couch without first seeking to survey the events of the past twenty-four hours, without first confessing

his sins, not to a priest, but in the silence of his room to his God.[58]

Sincerity and truthfulness are urged as personal assets by both Stoics and Jews. The former warned kings to allow people to speak the truth and not to encourage insincerity by repressive measures.[59] At the same time, some Stoics advised against speaking out one's mind without regard to persons or circumstances, that the wrath of tyrants ought not lightly to be provoked, and that it was a matter of self-control to use one's discretion in expressing freely and frankly one's opinion or reserving it. The Jewish sources are unanimous in their insistence on sincerity and candor, and likewise maintain that in certain cases of emergency one may act or speak with reserve in order to save one's life. We must remember the tyrannical conditions under which both Stoics and Jews were forced to live. The virtue of truthfulness is especially stressed in the Psalms. The chief complaint is against the lying tongue, the false witness, etc. The Prophets exemplified on many occasion the most extreme daring in speaking the truth even in the presence of kings, when that might have meant, or actually did mean, death. Philo considers "the most admirable virtues are boldness and freedom of speech at suitable times towards one's betters"; and he strongly strongly urges the same right be granted to slaves:

> "If a slave is always dumb,
> He is scarcely worth a crumb:
> Let him, freely told, boldly speak."[60]

"God bestows a blessing also on those who bless the wise man," he tells us, "but not on hypocrites, such as Balaam."[61] The rabbis extolled the virtue of truth, candor and sincerity, and called it the seal of God.[62]

Hypocrites are especially detested by God.[63] The Talmud quotes with approval the dying words of King Janaeus to his wife, "Fear not the Pharisees, and fear not the Saducees, but those hypocrites who pretend to be Pharisees, who do the deed of Zimri and demand the reward of Phinehas."[64] R. Simeon b. Lakish was in hiding for fear of the Patriarch whom he had told an unwelcome truth, and when freed, and on the point of reconciliation, he dared repeat the same truth. In a late Midrash we read, "The Messiah will come only when the world will have realized that to speak an untruth is as heinous a crime as adultery."[65] Barzilai insists that one must have freedom of belief in scientific theories, although he would not grant it in matters of religious tradition.[66] Sincerity is a prominent feature in Bahya's theology. The heart and the tongue must agree as to religious and moral principles.[67] The act and the intention must coincide in aiming to fulfil God's will.[68] The prohibition of flattery and lying is, of course, included in Maimuni's code.[69] Albo would not even grant the privilige of penitence to the hypocrite.[70] Spinoza's views on this matter are very interesting. In some respects they are as modern as if they had just been uttered. "The mind is not subject to State authority" he tells us. "Therefore in general language should not be. A man who disapproves of a law, submits his adverse opinion to the judgment of the authorities, while acting in accordance with the the law deserves well of the State."[71] He also says, "The most tyrannical governments are those which makes crimes of opinions, for everyone has an inalienable right over his thoughts--nay, such a state of things leads to the rule of popular passion."[72] Dr. Schechter quotes from the Little Book of the Righ Pious an opinion which illustrates th horror with which an untruth was regarded: "Be

careful not to utter an untruth, for against the most mighty sins we are warned in the Bible with only one prohibitive command, whilst the law forbidding the speaking of untruth is ever so many times repeated in the Scriptues."[73] Again, from the Ways of the Righteous, "The soul is extracted from the place of the Holy Spirit, hewn out from a place of purity...He who will meditate over these things, that his soul is extracted from the very source of truth, will do truth; never a lie an inlet into the place of the holiness of truth."[74] Indeed "truth is one of the specialties of the Jewish saint."[75]

XIII.

The Sage As A Neighbor.

"While in Greek ethics emphasis is laid upon the virtues and duties which tend to the perfection of individual life,"[1] in Jewish ethics the social relations of the individual receive by far the most prominence. Yet the Stoic Sage, as well as the Jewish *Zaddik*, was not a recluse. In both philosophies of life, the ideal man moved in society and came in continuous intercourse with men and women who endeavored to realize the same type of character in their own personality. Many of the topics treated before in this paper contain the implication of how the just individual is to react to his neighbors. We shall now point out some of his specifically social traits.

The Jewish *Zaddik* or *Hasid*—as the very terms indicate—was a social being. The finest part of his life was spent in company of his friends. The Jew's highest self-realization was through the community of which he was a member. The Prophets had their schools of disciples. The Psalmists and the writers of the Proverbs were in constant dread of evil company and longed for the right kind of companionship.[2] Jose b. Joezer said: "Let thy house be an assembly for the wise."[3] R. Joshua b. Perachia included in his will, "Obtain a friend,"[4] and Nitai of Arbela admonished, "Do not associate with the wicked."[5] When Abba Saul asked what was the most valuable human asset, no less than four out of the five answers given were of a social nature.[6] It was considered highly improper for a scholar to associate with the ignorant, considering that by ignorant they implied more than

the mere absence of information.[7] "Said Rabba b.R.Hana...Just as a fire does not burn at its best when alone,so the words of the Torah are not permanent when ~~alone~~ in a secluded person;"[8] and R.Nachman b.Isaac added in the same connection "Just as a little wood kindles the big one,so little scholars sharpen the mind of the big ones,and that was what R.Hanina referred to in his statement,Much have I learned from my teachers,and more than that from my colleagues,and most of all from my pupils." The rabbis warned us that care in the selection of friends will insure us against sin.[9] The same social consciousness is shared by most of the Mediaeval Jewish authors. Maimonides did not believe in wasting time in sociability; yet he believed in the importance of having good friends,of a strong community life,and certainly in one's duty to neighbors and society. His imagination was fired with enthusiasm at the picture of the "community of *Zaddikim*" in the world to come.[10] Since a man's character is formed largely through the influence of environment,a man must seek the company of the righteous in a good land.[11] Spinoza concurred in that belief,"for man in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of his rational life there is nothing more useful than his fellowman who is led by reason."[12] Lazarus sums up his appreciation of the Jewish social consciousness,thus: "Sympathetic intercourse with others,spiritual communion,in the normal,healthily organized human being is a need whose satisfaction is one of the most refined pleasures of life. The angels,say the Rabbis,are called 'companions' because neither envy nor malevolence divides them,and hence they are closely bound to one another. So should it be among

men.[13] Honi, the hero of Talmudic legend who slept for seventy years, on awaking found that he knew not a single person, and that none knew him. Then he wished that he might die, because he was beyond the pale of spiritual communion. And, therefore, it is said, the proverb runs: 'Either companionship or death!'"[14]

How far, then, should an individual go in adjusting his own self to the needs of others? It is well known that the Jewish founders of Christianity and others demanded absolute altruism as a basis for social life. The Golden Rule, in its positive form as it appears in the New Testament, is its classic example formula.[15] Authoritative Judaism never accepted that Judeo-Christian attitude, and in its philosophy of social relations inclined rather to the Stoic view. Hecato of Rhodes, one of the disciples of Panaetius, laid stress on the doctrine of "relations" (σχέσεις), i.e., simple duties to those avout us. In connection with that, he says: "In order to be in a position to perform these duties a man is entitled to care for his own life and property. He need not be too careful to provide for his slaves if provisions are dear; nor should he too hastily give up for another his chance of escape from a shipwreck."[16] The Jewish *Hasid* was much kinder to his slaves--and so was the Stoic, as a rule--than what was implied in that quotation from Hecato; but with respect to the last part of the passage, he was in total agreement with that Stoic. The Biblical command reads, "And thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."[17] Similarly the Mishnaic command runs: "Let thy neighbor's honor be as dear to you as your own," and "Let thy neighbor's property be as dear to you as your own."[18] It is the duty of the

Zaddik to rescue another's life or wealth as if he would his own. But when it is a question of saving another by losing one's own, then Judaism and Stoicism suggest that another's life is not more precious one's own life. There is a *braitha* which gives us a striking parallel to the statement of Hecato: "When two men are on a journey, and one of them has a pitcher of water; if both should drink of it they would both die, and if one should drink that one whould have enough strength to reach an inhabited place. Preached Ben Petura it is better that both should drink and die, rather than that one should the death of the other. Till R. Akiba came and interpreted the verse, 'And (thy brother) shall live *with* thee' (Lev. xxv. 35), thy life takes prededence to thy brother's life."[19] The same principle determines the Rabbinic decision as to finds and other legal and moral situations.[20] Yet that that principle was not generally meant to be lived up to strictly, and that selfishness even in that emergent circumstance was not to be legalized, R. Judah in the name of Rav added the remark, "Whoever lives up to it, will come to it (trouble and loss)."[21] Bahya had quite a utilitarian interpretaion of sociology. He believed that all cases of service and kindness between men were motivated by egoistic principles inherent in human nature.[22] However, he believed that with the aid of reason, we may attain to real disinterestedness. Maimuni believed in the possibility of absolute altruism, especially in the idealism of one's relation to God, because he had even more faith in the power of human reason that what Bahya had,[23] although he realized that it was exceedingly difficult for the great mass of people.[24] To quote the words of Lazarus again, "Egotism is necessary--not only as

necessary evil, but an integral element."[25] But that egotism of the individual is to be checked by the equally salutary egotism of other individuals, by considerations of justice and of the law.

Of course, both Stoics and Jews maintained that amiability and good will must be the basis of social intercourse. Both had the same philosophic foundation for it. The Stoics held that the spirit of friendship was *natural* among the wise, because of the common reason of the universe in which they partook. Hence, even if there were no States and constitutions, men would live happily together by virtue of the natural law, of the *Logos*.[26] They knew of men who worked hard for the good of the world, shunning personal advantage, even without any suggestion of being urged on to it by a mechanical law. Those men they called Sages.[27] That disinterested spirit of friendship and devotion to the cause of humanity was even rewarded with the highest possible gift—that of raising the heroes to the sky and giving them a seat among the Gods, which was an accepted Stoic belief.[28] The Jewish doctrine of brotherly love was founded on the same principle, of all men partaking in a common Power, in having one Father. Congeniality and amity are prominent features of the heroic tales of Scripture—e.g., in Abraham and Lot, David and Jonathan, etc. One must show a spirit of helpfulness even to an enemy.[29] The Bible, too, contains instances of good and godly men being raised to the sky—e.g., Enoch and Elijah—which were literally believed by successive generations. The ideal king, as described in Psalm 72, will be distinguished for his kind and genial spirit as well as for his righteousness and power. Mercy was one of God's attributes, and on that basis the rabbis ascribed

that quality to man and to Israel.[30] Receive every man with a pleasant countenance, was a suggestion of no less qustere a teacher than Shammai, and was repeated by many another authority.[31] Hillel said, "Do not judge your neighbor until you are in his poisition."[32] Indeed, one must alwasy seek to justify one's neighbor;[33] hence, a man may be acquitted in his absence, but not convicted.[34] The very word in Hebrew which we translate by the neighbor, *Haver*, really means companion, friend. For that reason, that every man must be looked upon as, at least potentially a friend, one's feelings must always be scrupulously respected, and he who puts his friends to the blush in public has no share in the world to come, even if he has Torah and good deeds to his credit.[35] Even a servant was not to be put to shame.[36] We have already observed how careful one should be in dealing with the poor, lest he offend their sensibilities. One must be very careful about the feelings and dignity of one's pupil, said R. Eleazar b. Shammua.[37] There was a report that R. Akiba lost twelve thousand disciples at one time, because they did not treat one another with due respect.[38] The School of Hillel merited that its decisions should be accepted as law, because it was permeated with the spirit of geniality and respect for others.[39] R. Janaiw was particularly fond of his pupil who would ask him questions every day, except when his master would lecture in public, in order not to embarass him.[40] Only he who respects others is himself to be respected, tells us Ben Zoma.[41] It was forbidden to visit a person at a time when that person might be embarassed.[42] Of course, there were men who were driven by the exigencies of their days to recommend intolerance and persecution against those whom they regarded as wicked,[43] but the higher and finer and more commonly accepted lesson was that one

should pray for the abolition of sins rather than for the destruction of sinners. R.Johanan gave the reason why prayers are to be recited in silence, in order not to offend the sinners.[44] R.Johanan: The Talmud never tires of telling those beautiful tales of bits of kindness shown by plain men and women, whose names are seldom remembered, whose reward was to be infinite.[45] R.Joseph's remark that the study of the Torah is more important than the rescuing of life,[46] was not generally accepted, for the Rabbis repeatedly put the latter above all other duties, and state that it is proper to interrupt the study of the Torah even for the purpose of participation in a wedding or funeral--two important social duties, according to the Rabbis.[47] Let us parenthetically remark, that with the Stoics, burial was a mere convention, and therefore not so significant;[48] whereas with the Jews, it was an act worthy of God Himself.[49] Rabba b.Idi said that there was such a character as a bad *Zaddik*, and that was a man who was punctilious in his duties to God, and negligent of his obligations to men (compare that with the "foolish *Hasid*").[50] "The love and merciful deeds of the heathen are elements of atonement and expiation, as the sin offering had previously been for Israel."[51] Abayi was in the habit of saying: "Man should be inventive in the ways of fearing God, should be gentle of speech, should control his wrath, and promote peaceable intercourse with his brethren, with his friends, with all men, even with the stranger in the market place, that he may be loved above and below, and be acceptable to all creatures."[52] Bahya saw kindness implied in each case of true humility, which quality was a condition to that harmony of soul and expression which a true worshipper of God must possess. Similarly Ibn Zaddik and Maimonides tell us that a man must in his conduct

imitate God's way which is based on kindness.[53] Maimonides had special laws for kindness, mutual respect, and other social duties.[54] Spinoza maintains the Stoic argument for love, on the ground of men's common participation in the universal reason.[55] It was that common devotion to the principle of love, as manifested in the works of God Himself, that taught the author of the *Little Sefer Hasidim* to say: "Refrain thy kindness and thy mercy from nothing which the Holy One, blessed be He, created in this world. Never beat or inflict pain on any animal, beast, bird or insect; nor throw stones at a dog or a cat; nor kill flies or wasps."[56] Because the Stoics despised pity, they never reached the depths of kindness fathomed by the Jewish soul, towards human beings or towards the dumb animals. The Stoic maintained an attitude of misanthropy, because of his reluctance to show grief and shed tears at the sufferings of others as well as of himself.[57] However, Stoics and Jews agreed on the mildness of punishment, wherever such was considered necessary. Cruelty was regarded by the Stoics as a form of greed, which was one of the four sinful conditions. The infliction of punishment must be just, speedy, and administered without any personal anger or malice, but as a matter of duty.

The Stoics and Jews had slightly different attitudes towards the question of social castes, which did not, however, affect much the social duties of the individual. Plato was an aristocrat in his social conceptions. Zeno, on the other hand, declared in his "Republic," that "the people will not be divided into classes, for all alike will be wise men."[58] Especially from the Stoic doctrine of the Cosmopolis, it follows that differences of caste, even of race were hardly perceived

by the founders of Stoicism. They held that the capacity for virtue was found in all, although in some to a greater degree than in others; and all alike needed philosophic instruction id that capacity was to be fully developed.[59] That was with respect to the ideal Sage. As for the actual generality of men they had nothing but contempt. The Jewish attitude to the democratic tendencies varied with the vicissitudes of their history. When the political interests dictated the spread of democracy, the religious forces followed or even led in the movement. In the days of the Bible there were castes in Israel; although a strongly democratic note is struck by the Prophets. The universalistic tendency of many of the Biblical accounts and books is very apparent. It is certain that the spirit of universalism was forever growing in the heart of the people, although they continued at the same time to remain loyal to the racial-religious group consciousness. Then the castes of the first born, priests and Levites retain only a spiritual meaning. Philo follows the Stoics in their spiritual division of castes, as well as he follows the Jewish traditions.[60] The Talmud frequently saw in ancestry and heredity the basis for distinguishing different grads of *Zaddikim*, even with respect to retribution.[61] One of the reasons given for the appointment of R. Eleazar b. Azaria in place of Rabban Gamaliel was his claim to be a descendent of Ezra.[62] "Said R. Isaac, the prayer of a *Zaddik*, the son of an unrighteous man, is not of the same effect as the prayer of a *Zaddik* the son of a *Zaddik*."[63] The Mishna transmits a list of the aristocracy that returned from the Babylonian exile under Ezra.[64] A barbaric custom called *Kezazah*, is described in the Talmud, whereby the offspring of an unfit marriage would be distinguished from the other members of

his family "for generations."[65] Yet the tendency in Biblical and Rabbinic law is not to discriminate between the Jew and the"stranger". Education gives a man the kind of nobility which is superior even to that of the high-priest, tells us the Talmud.[66] We know that the Pharisees were particularly opposed to the aristocracy of the Priests. Barzilai regards the "merit of fathers" as an element determining one's fitness for scholarship, and yet he insists on the supreme importance of personal effort.[67] Bahya recognizes only personal qualities as a basis for distinctions, and a man's standing depends on his morals and intellect.[68] Jehudah Halevi who lays so much stress on the aristocracy of the Jewish race, allows for little discrimination within the fold, except such as depends on one's personal caliber and God's choice. The popular witnessing of the spectacle of Revelation at Mt. Sinai, is the best argument for its veracity, a view repeated by Albo and many other later Jewish writers.[69] Similarly Maimonides grants distinction within the fold only on the basis of personal accomplishment, but maintains that few are by their nature ready to rise to the highest degree.[70] Again, the class of prophets itself is subdivided into various grades depending on their individual acumen and fitness.[71] In the Middle Ages common suffering fostered the spirit of democracy among the people,[72] although because of the strained relations with their neighbors, the Jews were less enthusiastic about the universal element of their religion. However, they still remembered that some of the greatest Jewish heroes were supposed to have descended from converts.

Both Stoics and Jews included gossip and idle talk among the things to be avoided. Epictetus discountenanced it on many

occasions.[73] The Rabbis sarcastically ascribed nine tenths of all the gossip in the world to have been appropriated by women, and considered it a source of frivolity and licentiousness.[74] Maimonides recommended silence as a trait for the wise.[75] A man should engage in a discourse of wisdom, or in words relating to his needs, but not in idle talk.[76] The will of an early Mediaeval Jew, quoted by Schechter, reads: "My daughters ought not to laugh and speak much with strangers, nor to dance. They ought always to be at home and not gadding about. They must not stand at the door (to watch what their neighbors are doing). Most strongly I beg, most strictly I command, that the daughters of my house be not, God forbid, without work to do, for idleness leads to sin, but they must spin, or cook, or sew, and be patient and modest in all their ways."[77]

One of the social virtues very much emphasized in Jewish literature, which does not figure as prominently in Graeco-Roman Stoic letters, is that of hospitality. It is of course a leading virtue in the Scriptures, where much of its oriental color and prominence is retained. It is one of the distinguishing marks of Abraham. It is repeated with much force in the Talmud, where authorities vie with one another in their praise of it.[78] The saintly extreme of that virtue is found in the *Sefer Hasidim*, where a man applies it even to a dog who sought shelter under his robes.[79]

The social duties of the Stoics and Jews involved, of course, a sense of honesty, justice in relations to laborers and the oppressed, peace, and other similar virtues which were indeed assets to one's personal self. An important item in the social

functions of the Sage, was his duty to influence others. Epictetus grants an exceptional position to the Cynic preacher because he attributes to personal example more influence than to all doctrine.[80] To exert an influence over others was almost a duty with the Jews. "He who causes other men to do the right will not himself fall subject to sin; and he who causes others to sin, should not be allowed to repent."[81] The duty of teaching is incorporated in the Bible, and is implied in the Mishna.[82] R. Johanan used a parable with reference to it: "Whoever studies the Torah and does not spread it is like a myrtle in the desert," and some people who thought that the implication might not be clear, changed it to read, "Whoever studies the Torah and spreads it in a place where there are no scholars is as beloved as a myrtle in the desert."[83] The advantage of virtue, tells us Pseudo-Bahya, is that it gives its possessor the opportunity to become a leader and a teacher of his people.[84] It is as much of a sin for a man fit to teach to refrain from doing his duty in that way, as it is for a man unfit for the privilige to assume the task.[85] In the same connection, Judaism considered a duty to reprove a sinner. "Do not reprove the scoffer, for he will hate you; reprove the *Zaddik* and he will love you."[86] Of course, the duty becomes paramount when it relates to a parent or teacher who is to be a vigilant supervisor of the child or pupil.[87] R. Amram claimed that because of the neglect of this duty, Jerusalem was destroyed.[88] The duty remains in force, even when repeated a hundred times, and devolves on the pupil as well as on the teacher.[89]

It was because of that regard for one's fellow-men, that both Jews and Stoics treasured reputation, and considered it as a

great advantage. Zeno included a good name among the *proegmena*, among the "natural things that are of high value." Seneca had much concern for it. It did not stand out important to Chrysippus and Diogenes.[90] Throughout the Biblical writings, a good name is held up as a precious possession for both individual and nation. The prophets are even zealous for the reputation of their God. A good name is more precious than wealth, not alone in Proverbs but even in Ecclesiastes.[91] Philo counts it as one of the five great gifts of God: "The fourth gift is a good name, since perfect happiness is when one combines the quality of goodness with the reputation for it."[92] R. Hanina b. Dosa said that "Whoever is pleasant to mankind is pleasant to God."[93] The crown of a good name is superior to that of the Torah, of priesthood and of royalty, was the maxim of Simeon.[94] To rise in reputation and die with a good name is a condition for happiness with R. Meir, according to a report handed down by R. Jochanan or R. Ami.[95] A man must satisfy public opinion as well as God, is the opinion of another statement in the Jerusalem Talmud.[96] A man's not perform even a righteous act in a manner which will compromise his own or some one else's reputation.[97] The stringent and impressive regulations bearing on the question of the "desecration of God's name" and its opposite are laregly called forth by the urgent need of keeping the name of Israel without blemish.[98] A good name is a goal toward which man should always strive.[99]

The Stoics and Jews also agreed in their common opposition to the institution of slavery. In theory they regarded it as contrary to nature; in practice, they were the mildest and most considerate masters.[100] Lecky regards Stoicism as more responsible than Christian-

ity for the change of slavery into serfdom. In the Bible, the enslavement of Jews is practically abolished, although heathen slaves are still maintained. Philo agreed with the theory that slavery was contrary to nature, and gives us the clearest expression of it.[101] The Talmud contains instances of the splendid treatment accorded to slaves in the Jewish household; and there is even the remark that "he who acquires a Hebrew slave, acquires a master for himself."[102] In those days, the heathen slaves were treated by Jews with the utmost consideration. The slave of a dentist might ask his master to extract his tooth, and that would be sufficient ground for him to obtain his freedom.[103] Whatever was the treatment expected of masters to slaves, the Jews had nothing but contempt for the man who would voluntarily choose slavery.[104] That was reason enough to inspire certain men with hatred against the entire class of slaves, although personal experiences might have influenced those private opinions which express enmity to slaves.[105] Many were the restrictions, placed on them in civil and moral life; and because of that we must conclude that the Stoics went much further in their liberal attitude to the slavery question, than their contemporary Jewish thinkers.

XIV.

The Sage At Home.

Both philosophies of life, under discussion, expressed their high regard for the individual's place in, and duties to, his family. Neither, even in the most extreme other-worldliness which any of their disciples preached, looked with favor on that type of seclusion which would undermine the highest moral duties and the very foundations of society. Chastity was preached by Epictetus as a duty one owes to oneself.[1] By the later Stoics, at any rate, the monogamic family was held as the family rule. Marriage and the rearing of children were encouraged as in strict conformity with nature. Marital fidelity was taken as a virtue which needed no proof to justify its value. While eroticism was condemned as madness, comradeship was commended, and love was to be the foundation of the entire institution of the home. The love of parents for their offspring was an ordinance of nature. Children were to give unlimited, yet "reasonable" obedience to their parents. The Stoics were known for the respect they paid to womanhood; their doctrine of equal education for boys and girls we have already pointed out. The equality of the sexes, although at the time seemingly paradoxical, was accepted by the Stoics in theory and practice.[2] Their attitude to slaves, who were then an integral part of the home, we have already observed, and it certainly did credit to the Stoic conception of the sacred social institution of the home. We may safely give this estimate of the Stoic attitude, in spite of the opinion that Epictetus looked coldly on one's duties to home,[3] and notwithstanding the statement of Zeno in his Republic that "women will

belong to the community only."[4] The Stoics suggested that the creation of the universe was repeated in miniature in the bringing into life of each individual organism. Hence, procreation is no humble or unclean function of the body. The principle of regeneration of a part of the soul,[5] it is the whole of man.[6] True, the institution of marriage is a convention and its law is mutable; but within proper limits it must not be transgressed.[7] Epictetus is the only Stoic who found an advantage in celibacy, as it affords an opportunity to devote oneself to one's own improvement and to that of society; but no other Stoics agreed with him; and he too recommended it to philosophers only.[8] Antipater of Tarsus said that marriage was both a personal and a social duty.[9] In Stobaeus we have a remark, met with frequently in Jewish writings: Sexual indulgence is a form of greed, and like gluttony and drunkenness, should be extirpated from one's nature; but that would be no reason for its complete extinction, any more than that we should not eat at all. "Men who do not wish to be licentious and bad should consider that sexual relations are only lawful in marriage, and for the begetting of children; such as aim at mere pleasure are lawless, even in marriage."[10] With the exception of Epictetus, Stoics advocated large families.[11]

In the early strata of the Bible, we find the more typically oriental attitude, although marked by characteristically Jewish kindliness, sobriety and broad-mindedness. Licentiousness is the sin for which the flood visited mankind in the days of Noah. Abraham and Isaac are models of marital fidelity and purity, yet they would stake the honor of their wife when in risk of their life.[12] Lot would sac-

rifice his daughters rather than violate the virtue of hospitality.[13] The action of Simon and Levi, in avenging the shame of their sister, is condemned by Jacob. In the life-stories of Judah and Joseph we have strong plead for chastity and for a single standard of morality.[14] Moses separated from his wife, when he entered upon his national career; and that act was approved by the Rabbis as well.[15] Modesty, chastity, and the rights of the woman, even of the woman-slave, are to be protected according to the injunctions of the Pentateuchal codes.[16] The Prophets never tire of railing at the moral offenders of their days, be they even kings; and some of them find no better analogy for their people's faithlessness to God, than that of a woman's infidelity to her husband. A man who has a houseful of children, who upon returning from work, sits with his wife and family at the table, who lives to see even grandchildren, that man is judged truly happy and blessed.[16] The crown of the old is grandchildren, and the glory of the children is their parents.[17] To enjoy life with one's wife, that is truly a gift of God, is true happiness.[18] The description of the "woman of valor" gives a splendid picture of the Hebrew's ideal of a wife in the days of the Proverbs.[19] Love between brothers, obedience to parents, and the other moral relations of the home, are continually enjoined on the individuals in all the books of the Bible. When Ecclesiastes speaks of woman, of course, he does not find one out of a thousand;[20] but, he suggests, "the good man" can escape her net. "A marriage free from injury" Philo calls the noblest reward.[21] Sarah is the ideal wife, because she shared all her husband's trials and remained for ever loyal.[22] "The virtuous desire children that to con-

tinue the practice of virtue."[23]

In the Talmud we have a number of references to the actual home-life of the Jew, and nowhere, not even with reference to the rich and the powerful, do we find an exception to the rule of monogamy. In their theoretical discussions, polygamy still figures, just as the sacrificial cult remained a live subject of study and dispute long after the Temple had been destroyed. In *Aboth* we have a direct warning against taking many wives, which may not at all be a reflection of the condition of the time;[24] and we are also told in the same tract that large children are becoming to the righteous.[25] Children are promised as a blessing to come in reward for aceepting pain with love.[26] A proper attitude at home is rewarded with happiness both in this world and in the world to come.[27] A Mishanic prayer, referred to before, specifies "And bless Thy people Israel with sons and daughters."[28] A man who found himself in the anomalous position of half-slave, which interfered with his opportunity for marriage, may force his master to free him completely, "because the world was created for generation."[29] The passages in the Talmud bearing on the sanctity of one's moral standing are legion. We may just mention here that chastity was one of the obligations which a person might not violate even at the penalty of losing life. For that reason, all kinds of laws were instituted, and also customs which were almost as binding as law, to decrease the opportunities for such violation, or for temptation.[30] Obedience to parents is absolute, only so far as it does not conflict with obedience to God.[31] The Jewish regard for woman is manifested in such statements as that of R. Tanhum, quoting R. Hanilai, which appear

frequently in Rabbinic writings: "A man without a wife lives without joy, without blessing, without good, etc."[32] R. Eleazar expressed it still more strikingly in his remark, "A man withou a wife is no man."[33] Another saying attributed to R. Eleazar is that a man gets the wife which he deserves.[34] Ben Azai was rebuked for having remained single, and in his feeble attempt to justify it, on the ground of his devotion to the Torah, we can read a tone of regret.[35] Marriage is a sacred and natural duty, for the sake of which man even interrupt his studies. To assist in marrying off a girl was considered an act of extreme piety. There is a *braitha* which specifies even the proper size of a family. One version reads that according to the opinion prevalent in the School of Shammai, it should consist of two sons and two daughters, whereas according to the opinion of the School of Hillel, it was one son and one daughter. Another version reads that the Shammaites considered a boy and a girl as sufficient for a family, whereas the Hillelites thought that a family should have a boy or a girl.[36] A father's minimum obligations to his son are specified as including the Abrahamitic rite, the ritual redemption if the son is the first-born child, the teaching of the Torah and a trade, and marrying him.[37] The teaching of the Torah was not imposed on the father as a duty toward his daughter, although Ben Azzai disagreed with that view and held that boys and girls were equally entitled to the privilige of an education.[38] The duty of marrying off a daughter is modified by a another Rabbi in a statement, that "a man may not betroth his daughter until she is sufficiently mature to express her choice."[39]

The duty of supporting one's family is identified with the virtue of

"continuous charity" ~~to which it~~ mentioned in Psalm 106.[40] In a statement of Ula, the minimum age limit of children dependent on the parents' support is set at six.[41] A man must make gentleness and not fear the spirit of his home and the reason for obedience.[42] R. Helbo stated that a husband must be very careful in his devotion and respect to his wife, for all the blessings of a home come for the sake of the wife;[43] and R. Eleazar asserted that when a man divorces his first wife, even the altar sheds tears over him.[44]

History tells us that throughout the Middle Age the devotion and loyalty of the individual to the home remained the same, within the fold of Israel. We must bear in mind, that the Jews ~~are~~ accepted the Talmud as their moral and legal guide. The injunctions of the individual's duties to family and to the moral code which ~~are~~ fill the pages of Mediaeval writings, are largely culled from the Talmudic sources. Saadia recognizes that marriage is a law of reason and of nature, and that without families, there would be no future for wisdom and for Torah.[45] Sexual love is considered a good, in so far as it promotes the interests of the race.[46] "Let man love the children with which God favored him; but there is no purpose in having too many children."[47] In spite of all the broad-mindedness and they displayed with reference to the position of the woman in the home, the Mediaeval writers continue the Talmudic tradition of denying women the duty of education, and of placing them in the same category with minors and feeble-minded for many legal purposes. Spinoza expressed the Jewish view in his observation, "As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony with reason, if the desire for

physical union be not engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and to train them up wisely."[48] To return to a general observation of the Jewish view of the relation between the sexes, we may say that whereas there was considerable progress marked in the development of Jewish life and thought towards the legal and mental status of the woman, that phase of her position did not rise to the height of the Stoic conception. On the other hand, in the moral duties of man, in his sanctification of home, in his accentuation of the duties to wife and husband and children and parents, the Jewish genius rose by far superior to that ever reached by the leaders of thought in the Greek and Roman world.

XV.

The Sage As A Citizen.

In our discussion of the individual's relations to his neighbors, we noticed the Social nature of both Stoic and Jewish ethical standards. Let us now briefly examine the Political sense of the Sage.

The demand for consistency in life, for the subordination of the will of the individual to that of the universe, helped to foster a sense of political loyalty in the heart of the Stoic Sage and Hebrew *Hasid*. Unlike the Christian saint, these were deeply conscious of their membership in the community and of their obligations to the social and political institutions. Arnold, in speaking of the Stoics, remarked: "It is not perhaps quite so clearly stated that the virtue of the individual is that disposition which will make him the best possible member of society, that is, the best possible citizen of the Cosmopolis. Yet this is everywhere implied."[1] Zeno taught that the wise man should participate in public life.[2] Solitude, of course, has its advantages, and so has society; both are to be used to good purpose by one who is leading a perfect life.[3] Patriotism was considered a duty. Epictetus held that it was a natural instinct to render faithful service while in public office. It was held that the State, no less than the individual must be guided by reason, and one's duty to the State rested on the latter's conformity with the rational principle. The ruler might be a tyrant; but a rational rule implied that all subjects of the State were free. War was condemned. The old discrimination against foreign races was

considered an anachronism. The entire universe follows one divine or cosmic plan, is part of it; and therefore, all lands and all nations are part of God. Stoicism flourished at the time when the Grekk city-State had been broken up, and when the Roman Empire was building its world-dominion. Its philosophy included a compact system, a cosmopolitan order, one city of gods and men. That did not preclude one's love to one's particular birthplace or fatherland. Many a Stoic dreaded the horrors of exile. But that was in the same relation to the spirit of cosmopolitanism, as one's love for one's own family is in conformity with the highest spirit of universalism.

Judaism as well as Stoicism chose their heroes from among men who performed faithfully and energetically their duty to their people and their country. King David and Marcus Aurelius were equally exemplary of the possibility of uniting political and intellectual pursuits. The Bible is replete with expressions of loyalty to nation, land, city and government. The Davidic family has enjoyed the devotion of the Jewish people to the present day, even though merely in ideal-- for a longer period than any other dynasty in the history of the world. "Do not segregate thyself from the community" was one of the wise dicta of Hillel.[4] "Do not segregate thyself from the community" was repeated again in the same tract by another rabbi, Zaddok,[5] and by all great leaders in Jewish affairs. The Shechinah rests on a society of Jews;[6] the Law is extolled because it fosters the community spirit.[7] Happiness is dependent on one's identification with the communal life of his environment.[8] The Court of each age has the same authority as that of Moses in its day.[9] "Pray for the welfare of the government;"

advised R.Hanina,"for were it not for fear of it,men would swallow one another up alive."[10] There were saints who made it their special business to take care of public places.[11] Jehudah Halevi makes communal life a condition for the highest manifestation of spiritual power and genuine morality. The right prayer is only public prayer, he tells us in the Kuzari,"for the Congregation does not pray for anything which would be of harm to an individual,whereas a single man in devotion may pray for something which would entail a loss to another individual."[12] The proper social life as well as bodily perfection are claimed as prerequisites for the perfection of soul even by Maimonides who had the highest appreciation of solitude as conducive to the growth of one's intellect. Albo devotes much attention to the political needs of the individual.[13] The moral standard and purpose of man is enhanced by proper political guarantees,in which all men must partake,for all men fall subject to them. Spinoza,too,taught that "the man who is guided by reason is more free in a State,where he lives under a general system of law,than in solitude,where he is independent."[14]

We have had occasion to refer to the universalistic tendencies in both Stoicism and Judaism. We may add here a few remarks on that subject. On the whole,the Stoics were world-citizens who frequently cherished a keen love for their own race or city; while the Jews were arient patriots who found it compatible with their group consciousness to cherish also a high regard for humanity as a whole. Stoic cosmopolitanism goes back to Heraclitus and the Cynics. In Eratosthenes we find a strong repudiation of Hellenic prejudices

against barbarians.[15] The root-principle of the Stoic State is that it is world-wide, a cosmopolis, based on the democratic principle that all human beings are capable of attaining virtue, and as such are natural born citizens of the cosmopolis.[16] In Jewish as in Hellenic literature, we find the literary echo of the deep anti-alien prejudice. We have thus the selection of Israel, the legal discrimination against gentiles, social and political barriers established between races. But throughout the literature there is an ever growing opposition to the chauvinistic element; and ever growing feeling of racial solidarity with the neighboring tribes, and with whole of mankind, of religious pride which is open to all who would embrace the truths of Judaism, and a high sense of hospitality and justice to the stranger. Most of the prophets reflect the same attitude, and become the leading champions of the universalistic ideas. Some of the Biblical Books--such as Jonah, Ruth, etc.--are written from a deep-rooted cosmopolitan interest. The vision of universalism to which some of those ancient Jewish prophets rose, has remained unsurpassed to the present day. Philo extolls Israel as the people that rose to the highest spiritual realization; but by means of the principle of the Fatherhood of God, he reconciles with it his broad cosmopolitanism.[17] The Rabbis gave frequent utterance to their universalistic tendencies, which never forced them to compromise their nationalism. Their love for their own people, on the other hand, never blinded them to the extent of not seeing Jewish faults or foreign virtues.[18] They believed, however, that all Jews had some merit even though it may not be evident to us.[19] The poor of the gentiles must be supported together with the Jewish poor.[20] The tendency of uni-

versalism weakened, of course, when the relations between Jews and non-Jews became for ever more bitter, which accounts for the many contradictory statements in Talmudic writings with reference to this subject. On the whole, however, whenever the Jews had the least respite from the oppressive hand of their neighbors there was a decided growth in the tendency towards a better theoretic appreciation of the non-Jew.[21] In one respect alone the Jews never gave up the prerogative of the Jewish race, and that with respect to prophecy. But again, every gentile adopting the faith of Israel, becomes part of the Jewish race. They never cherished a strictly physical conception of the notion of race. Saadia believed that in the days of the Messiah prophecy would be vouchsafed to the masses of the people—but only to those who will form part of the Jewish people.[22] An idea found in Rabbinic writings and repeated in Mediaeval books is that the whole world and all nations were created for the sake of Israel.[23] Israel is distinguished above all other nations, tells us Abraham b. Hiyya, but any gentile may through repentance be counted in Israel. Jehuda Halevi is the chief extemist in the matter of racial pride. "No nation can be compared to us;"[24] and the Sage, the *Hasid*, the ideal man, can be only a Jew. In fact, even Jewishness is not sufficient. The real *Zaddikim* must be of the Jewish race, inhabitants of Jerusalem, speaking the holy tongue, etc., bear all the characteristics of the absolute Jewishness.[25] It is no less just for God to make Israel superior to other people, than it is for Him to make man superior to all other creatures. Israel is the heart of the nations. Maimonides believed that the gentiles, too, may produce ideal men, which would have a share in the world to come.[26] Albo concurred in that belief, but while

he granted that gentiles may attain happiness, he reserved a special kind of happiness to Jews alone.[27] Spinoza declared that "the happiness of the Hebrews did not consist in the inferiority of the gentiles. Nor in philosophic knowledge or virtue. But in their conduct of affairs of state and escape from political dangers." "The divine law moreover is universal."[28] Let us remember that Spinoza regarded the prophets superior to other people only in virtue, which would contradict his appreciation of the Jewish people, if we would take the narrow view of confining prophets only to the Jewish people, as Spinoza's belief. The Stoics belonged to different peoples. Individually they had little prejudices. But on the whole, they were true cosmopolitans. The Jews were part of one race and religion only. They cherished the most beautiful dream of a unified world, of a unified humanity. But on the whole, they strict nationalists cherishing whatever was peculair to their own people.

XVI.

The Sage and the Cult.

We are not interested in our present discussion in the exact nature of the religious conceptions of Stoics or Hebrews. Let us describe the religious demands made on the Sage or *Zaddik*. Incidentally we shall thus gather some of the distinguishing principles of both religions. I said both religions---for in a sense, Stoicism, too, bears all the features implied in the definition of a religion.

The Stoic Sage was never to be mistaken, and for that reason never to form an opnion. In the absence of evidence, he was to suspend judgment. Were there no evidence for faith, the Sage would, therefore, have no faith. But the Stoic had evidence for it, the very best and more convincing proof, in the promptings of his own heart. Man is endowed with "innate notions"; and one of those primary, inborn conceptions is the idea of God. In addition, there are the rational proofs for the existence of God. It follows that the duty of the Sage is to believe in the Deity.

The Stoic conception of the deity may be characterized as teleological pantheism. The entire universe is God. Everything is part of Him; even matter, for in a sense God is also matter, or rather the substratum or "body" common to matter and spirit. The universal plan, or reason, or wisdom, the *Logos*, is also part of God, or is God. And this whole, this universal ensemble, is rational, is purposeful, is providential. Every little element in the cosmos works in accord with the plan of the Whole, with the decrees of

Providence. Thus the Stoics rose to an extremely monistic philosophy, far away from the popular theology of the Greeks. Yet they accepted the popular myths and concepts as the language for their own notions, ans they adjusted them to their own world-view. They accepted Zeus---which became primitive "body" possessed of the universal reason---as the eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient deity. When at the end of each cosmical epoch, when during the periodical "conflagration" of the universe, everything turns into fire, and nothing remains but the original substratum of all, Zeus remains, for he is that substratum.[1] Even Zeno, regarded as an atheist, because of his materialism, held that view.[2] It was in that kind of a God that the Sage believed. It was to that kind of a deity that Marcus Aurelius paid homage, although he had cruder conceptions of theology than other Stoics.[3] A number of Stoics rejected all faith in a deity, for they lacked the assurance of that evidence which most Stoics possessed. Such an agnostic was, for example, Aristo of Chios (c.250).[4] Panaetius, too, differed from the commonly accepted Stoic God-conception. On the other hand, such a Stoic as Cleanthes rose to the highest and deepest religious enthusiasm, as is manifested by his famous hymn. Cleanthes was the first to state the four rational proofs for the existence of God. He referred to heliocentric theory of the universe as an impiety. And his pious zeal was not without a touch of bigotry.[5]

In contrast to this expression of Stoic faith---about which, we may repeat the words of William James, "there is a frosty chill"--- stands the passionate and ardent devotion to God of the Hebrew. Throughout his literature we notice a steady evolution in the refinement and

subtlety of the theistic conception. The Sage is a believer, that is taken almost as a matter of course. In our discoussion of the virtue of wisdom, we observed that the end of life was thought to be the knowledge of God, and that implied always the faith in God. The pious reader is made to feel disappointed when Abraham and Sarah laugh and doubt the word of God, when a son is promised to a centennarian.[6] The Bible continues in one strain of firm reliance on God, characteristic of patriarch and prophet, and of priest and prince, of all who are truly wise. Providence takes a parental care of all nations and individuals. He leads His most beloved people, "even as a man carrieth his son."[7] Faith in him is the first of the Ten Words, uttered on Mount Sinai, and that becomes the basis and the burden of all teaching for centuries. God is also described as a burning fire, but not in the Stoic sense of materialism, rather in the Jewish sense of a zealous God, a Power that can punish.[8] He is near to his people;[9] He is merciful;[10] He is one.[11] He requires morality, the sanctification of life, as His truest worship.[12] He is a God of justice and of trustworthiness.[13] Faith in God is the chief virtue of the Psalmist, and the motive and foundation and very essence of his morality. "He who relies on God will prosper" is an oft repeated adage in the Book of Proverbs.[14] "The most perfect of the virtues is faith, for it is hard to believe in spirit when we live in body" tells us Philo.[15] "The Chaldeans believed in heaven, Abraham in the Ruler of heaven" he remarks, which may be taken as a valid differentiation of the Jewish and Stoic conceptions of God as well.[16] "We must be near God in order to be desirous of the good" he tells us in another passage.[17] The view of God's providence

and omniscience did not affect the parallel view of man's free-will and moral responsibility, in those early strata of Jewish literature, and did not annul those parallel principles of faith at any time of the development of Jewish theology. The Psalmist's confession that "I have set God before me always" is repeated in *Aboth* in the form of a command: "Observe three things, and you will not come to sin--there is an Eye that sees, an Ear that hears, all your deeds are recorded."[18] It is also repeated in the form, enjoining God-consciousness, "Know before whom you labor."[19] The struggle against idolatry practically ceased with the coming of the Parsees; yet in the consciousness of the Jew the horror of "strange worship" remained. It included any apostasy; and was one of the three sins which one was not to commit even at the cost of life.[20] It was the lack of faith which, according to R. Eleazar, was alone responsible for withholding the table of the hereafter from the *Zaddikim*.[21] "As often as Israel perceived the Holy One, blessed be He, they became saints" is stated in a Midrash.[22] It was to establish the proofs for faith, that Saadia wrote his philosophic treatise, *Emunoth ve-Deoth*. Faith in God's incorporeality and unity constitute for Barzilai the prime religious duty, which is the basis of all other religi duties.[23] Belief in the unity of God is the first root-principle in the religion of Bahya,[24] and his treatise, too, is the product of his anxiety to reconcile the beliefs with the practises of the religious man. Faith gives man that tranquility of soul, that independence of spirit and freedom from cares which render him fit for the truest and best service of God.[25] The wisdom of the *Hasid* is his faith, tells us Jehudah Halevi.[26] Prayer and ritual alone, Ibn Daud does not regard as suff

not regard as sufficient worship. "Every one of us must think continually of God and His Torah."[27] He calls faith one of the larger and the most important of the subdivisions of religious conduct.[28] His treatise is devoted to "the exalted faith." Maimuni calls faith the great dogma,[29] and he accepts the Talmudic view that sceptics and agnostics will have no share in the world to come.[30] He and Albo define an unbeliever as one who denies, not one who cannot prove, the dogmatic standpoints of Judaism, such for example as the incorporeality and unity of God.[31] Maimonides defines Providence as a spiritual influence, which leads him to conclude that only man, in the sublunar world, enjoys it, and among men, there are some who enjoy it more than others, for instance, prophets. All other animals are ruled by chance, as Aristotle taught.[32] R. Levi b. Gerson agreed that the nearness of a man to the Active Intellect determiness the amount of Providence he enjoys,[33] and he maintained that there is no opposition between reason and faith.[34] Albo wrote his philosophic treatise in order to determine which were the essentials of belief, and he arranges them in a manner which allows for three root principles: the existence of God, retribution and Revelation, which must be accepted by every one who is not an denier of Judaism.[35] One who denies other religious creeds may be a sinner, but not an agnostic;[36] for all practical purposes, however, sin and agnosticism are identical.[37] "Faith in God and in His Torah is what leads man to eternal happiness and to the adhesion of the soul to the "spiritual essence."[38] "The only test of faith" Spinoza tells us, are obedience and good works. As different men are disposed to obedience by different opinions, universal faith can contain only the

simplest doctrines. Philosophy has no end in view save truth: faith, as we have abundantly proved, looks for nothing but obedience and piety. Again, philosophy is based on axioms which must be sought from nature alone: faith is based on history and language, and must be sought for only in Scripture and revelation, as we showed in Chapter VII. Faith, therefore, allows the greatest latitude in philosophic speculation, allowing us without blame to think what we like about anything, and only condemning, as heretics and schismatics, those who teach opinions which tend to produce obstinacy, hatred, strife and anger; while, on the other hand, only considering as faithful those who persuade us, as far as their reason and faculties will permit, to follow justice and charity."[39]

Some Stoics believed in daemons and angels, with or without the allegorical metamorphosis. They had elaborate systems of spiritual hierarchies, deities and sub-deities graded in various classes, which included practically all the mythological figures of the pagan world, and added frequently unidentified powers and even the souls of men. None of the Stoics, believed in one spiritual incarnation of evil, like the Persian Druh or the Jewish Satan. Professor Neumark divides the whole of ancient Jewish speculation from the point of view of this question; those who followed the spirit of the Jeremian denial of angels (מעשה בראשית), and those who followed the trend of thought of Ezekiel who incorporated the elaborate Persian belief in angels (מעשה מרכבה) in his system of Jewish theology. However, authoritative Judaism, whether believing or disbelieving in angels, never looked upon that question as decisive with respect to the nature of

the ideal man, and in practical matters, such as the codes, the question of angels is seldom if ever raised.

The Stoics believed in a human soul, and based their conception of human conformity to nature (which is the end of life) on the divine nature and the perfection of the soul. The essence of the divine intelligence, as they called it, is precisely the same as of the universal reason, the life principle of the cosmos. The two are akin. After death, the soul will return and reunite with the cosmic soul, will be reabsorbed in the deity. Hence, we hear frequently the Stoic remark that there is a God in every man. Of course, the possible degradations of the soul, reveal its human aspects. The analogy is further drawn that just as the the heavenly bodies are maintained by exhalations from the ocean, so the soul is nourished by the body. The Stoic prayed for health of soul, if he prayed at all, as well as for health of body. Wheras the Stoics fairly agreed on the essence of the soul, they differed as to its destiny. Some believed that it was corporeal and destructible. Cleanthes maintained that all souls continue an existence after the body succumbed to death; but that they will last only until the Conflagration. Chrysippus believed that only those of the good would last till that cosmic catastrophe. Posidonius taught the pre-existence and the immortality of the soul.[40] Seneca wavered. The earlier Stoics awaited the reuniting of the soul with the cosmic spirit, and looked forward to it with joy. Aurelius followed Epictetus in regarding immortality as uncertain, as the great unknown, hence "indifferent."[41] On the whole, the Stoics seem fairly to agree to these few points, as summarized by Arnold: 1. The Substance

of the soul is imperishable; 2.the individual soul cannot survive the conflagration; 3.It does not of necessity perish with the body.[42]

The most ancient Jewish records reveal no interest in the nether world,and speak very little of the essence or destiny of the soul. With the spread of Persian influence,the ideas of immortality and *post mortem* retribution become more and more prominent. In the Wsidon of Solomon we find the pre-existence and immortality of the soul espoused as positive principles of belief.[43] Philo seems to combine the Jewish and Stoic beliefs when he tells us that the soul consits of blood and the breath of God;[44] and he believes in the immortality of the soul.[45] The Talmud speaks of the pre-existence of soul,[46] and frequently urges man to return it to God in its original purity.[47] Saadia identifies the soul with the life-force expressing itself in three psychic phases,desire,emotion and reason.[48] A similar division of the soul into faculties is elaborated by Pseudo-Bahya, Gabirol,and others.Bahya frequently identifies the soul with the heart, with the feelings;reason and psychic forces. The uniqueness of man consists in his immortality,made possible by his connection with soul, tells us Abraham Ibn Ezra.[49] Ibn Daud adopted the Aristotelian terminology,and spoke of the soul as the form of the body.Maimuni,too, speaks in the same language,and his "diseases" and "cures" of the soul are found in The Philosopher's writings.[50] He divided the functions of the soul into five classes: the nutritive,sensitive,imaginative, appetitive and rational.[51] Aaron b.Elijah granted immortality only to the souls which attained wisdom on earth.[52] Crescas substituted love and desire as the most prominent features of the soul'essence, in place

of reason, which Maimonides accentuated.[53] Spinoza believed in immortality of the adequate idea, in so far as it is an expression; and he makes the proposition, that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal."[54]

In connection with our previous discussion of the virtues, we touched on the question of retribution. Whatever the motive of the Sage is to be, we observed that the Jews expected reward and punishment for the acts of the individual, to come in this world or in the next. Epictetus denied post mortem retribution.[55] The other Stoics, too, expected no black darkness to await them when dead, no horrors, no judgment, no retribution. That was one of the reasons why death lost its terror with the Stoics. In Judaism, the belief in retribution after death was added to that in this world, after its contact with the Babylonian-Persian culture. The weakening of faith in vicarious retribution is synchronous with the rise of the belief in the other world; for if man's personal accounts are carried over to another existence, God's justice is established even if the righteous suffer and the wicked thrive in this world. The Psalmist expects the Sage to believe in retribution.[56] A sceptic voice is frequently heard in the Talmud, but that is drowned in the flood of faith of the great mass of rabbis.[57] The reason for the agnosticism of the famous Elisha b. Abuyah is given as his conviction of the absence of divine retribution.[58] Others rabbis struggled with the same problem as Elisha b. Abuyah, why men who are promised long life in the Bible for certain acts which they performed, should suddenly die in their prime youth,

but they do not reach the same conclusions as the apostate-rabbi; they infer from that that there must be retribution in the world to come, although the difficulty of the Biblical promise remains.[59] The Mishna which never mentions angels, believes in retribution after death.[60] David, held up as an ideal, expresses his faith in God's reward for the righteous, according to a Rabbinic legend.[61] Already the Talmud maintains a highly spiritual conception of the retrubtion awaiting the dead: "In the world to come there is no eating, drinking, procreation, etc.,...but the *Zaddikim* sit with crowns on their head, and enjoy the splendor of the Shechina."[62] The Mediaeval philosophers continue the suggestions contained in the Talmud with reference to the nature and history of the soul to retribution, and the world to come. Israeli demands belief in retribution of the pious.[63] Saadia repeats the assertion that there will be no bodily pleasures in the world to come.[64] Barzilai found other Talmudic passages to allow him the belief in material retribution after death.[65] Joseph al Basir believed in the eternity of retribution.[66] Pseudo-Bahya grades the souls according to their merit and destiny in the future life: Some will perish; other will find no rest; Still others will be rewarded or punished in sundry ways. Those of the truly righteous will return to the Garden of Eden and dwell among the angels.[67] Abraham b. Hiyya promises both material and spiritual retribution, depending on the nature of the soul in this world.[68] All the philosophers accepted retribution, and differed slightly in the kind of retribution they foresaw, or in the kinds of individuals destined to special degress of future favor. Maimuni believed in the purely

spiritual nature of the future world, and reserved the physical future to the reign of the Messiah on earth.[69] Gersonides, as Maimonides, looked forward to the union of the soul with the Active Intellect.[70] Albo insisted on the necessity of a pure motive in doing the right, but in addition he maintained that the right action is rewarded with physical reward in this world and with spiritual bliss in the next.[71] Later Jewish thinkers, and also Karaites, rebelled against the intellectual retribution of Maimonides and Gersonides, and substituted for it the truly spiritual reward, which has to do more with feeling.[72]

Let us now consider the relation of the Sage to the problem of sin. We know what an important role it played in the theology of the Christians. They taught that Man was originally created pure, but since Adam fell, sin has become ingrained in man, original with his very nature; and it required the mediation of God Himself, who appeared in the form of man and suffered execution as a sacrificial atonement for sin, to bring about the salvation of the race. Man is even now born in sin; but by accepting Christ, he earns his redemption. The Stoics believed in nothing of the kind. They would not recognize sin in their scheme of the world or of man. There are moments of weakness or error in the life of the individual, brought about by the improper tension of the soul. When one is truly oneself, one does not sin. When the will is natural, when it is wise, it cannot possibly be mistaken. All we need to do is to keep the soul, then, in good tone. There can be no sin in the world, because everything in the world is in a sense part of God. Fear, greed, grief and hilarity, with all their subdividions, are the sinful conditions in man, but they are all due

ignorance, and may be eradicated out of the body by education, by a proper adjustment of the soul-tone. This characterization of sin as error, or as a weak will, makes all sins equal and curable. We have, therefore, the saying, "He who has one vice hass, though he may not be equally inclined to all;"[73] and "He who is not wise is a fool and a madman."[74]

The Jewish mind was neither morbidly conscious of sin, as that of the Christian, nor haughtily aware of its independence, as was that of the Stoic. There were many Jews who read into the Biblical story of Adam all that the founders of Christianity incorporated in their theology. But authoritative Judaism never accepted it, and the Jewish consciousness was ever free of these obsessions. In the Jewish mind, let us remember, the greatest sin--and it believed that there was sin in man--was social rather than strictly religious. We hear of Adam being considered even as a *Zaddik*; the truly condemned sinner was Cain, who shed innocent blood. The general view was, of course, that Adam did sin--the Bible says so--and that God punished the human race, but sin was not part of the innate character of man coming as part of the punishment. Furthermore, sin, or rather crime, cannot be atoned for vicariously, according to the Jewish view. It cannot even be atoned for by the criminal or sinner himself, unless he makes up for his offence as much as is within his power, by actual reparation. The Jews, therefore, believed in sin; but not in original sin. They believed in atonement; but not in vicarious atonement. As against the Stoic view, we have the statement in Ecclesiastes, that "there is a righteous man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not."[75]

By sacrifice, ritual, reparation, confession, and a "broken spirit," the Jew would atone for his sins, and then again appear "clean before God." The fear of sin, as we had occasion to notice before, was a prominent feature of the Psalmist, and the *Zaddik* generally. And there was the belief that a truly righteous man goes down to the grave without a complicated account of detailed merits and demerits, but death itself clears his record and atones for sin.[76] R. Johanan b. Zakkai gives a Talmudic parallel to the Stoic doctrine of all sins being equal.[77] R. Simeon b. Lakish ives a parallel to the Stoic doctrine of sin being error, in his statement that "no man sins unless he is possessed of folly".[78] Sin does not discredit a man altogether, according to the accepted Talmudic view. "Why אתרוג is a scholar compared to a nut, because just as that fruit may have its shell bedaubed with mud and dirt without its kernel being affected, so a scholar even though he sinned, his wisdom need not be dispised... R. Meir found a pomegranate (Elisha b. Abuyah), he ate the inside, and discarded the shell, of it."[79] Saadia opposed the Neoplatonic and ascetic idea that the human body is the source of all evil and sin. The body is not unclean, and is not the cause of the soul's sufferings.[80] The injury of sin comes to the soul of its own free will. Bahya, Halevi, Maimuni and all the other subscribe to the doctrine of penitence, which is an essential duty of the Jewish religion. The last named thinker, however, believes that sin is the result of body rather than of soul, and for that reason he suggests that one should foster the intellect and have as little to do with the body as is harmonious with the plan of keeping it in good health.[81] We have already alluded to Spinoza's opposition

to repentance, and his note that "as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction."[82]

One of the great propelling forces in Jewish ethics, as well as in the political and religious history of Israel, one of the most potent influences in the life of the people and the *Zaddik*, was the belief in prophecy and in Revelation. That is practically wanting in Stoicism. The earlier Stoics who broke with the popular cult, lost faith in divination. Openly and confessedly they believed in it, as they believed in the Olympic gods. But practically it exerted no influence on their train of thought. Panaetius of Rhodes frankly suspended his judgment as to the value of it. Posidonius reintroduced it a generation later; and it became important again as one of the proofs for the existence of God and as link in the chain of causation as seen by the Stoics. The belief in it was then again weakened, and abandoned quietly in the days of the Empire.[83] But it at its best, the belief in divination did not by any means exert the influence which prophecy and revelation exerted in Israel. Here the grossly superstitious elements in it were fought from the earliest days. But the more spiritual and refined aspects of it grew in significance with the passing of the centuries. Israel itself, the whole people, became prophetic. That which in the heart of Moses was a fond wish, in the imagination of Halevi was an absolute reality. All Israel is a Prophet. The prophet, nation or individual, is preordained for that specific calling.[84] In the Psalms and Proverbs we hear nothing about it.[85] It reappears with renewed zeal in the apocalyptic literature. In Philo we have a description of the four kinds of trances, the highest of which, a vehement

sort of enthusiasm, is divinely inspired.[86] In his inspired moments, the prophet is possessed of another personality.[87] Sceptical words and the curtailment of the Prophet's power are met with in the Talmud. "The prophet was not allowed to introduce any innovation."[88] "R. Jose said that never did the Shechina come down, nor did Moses or Elijah ever go up."[89] But that feeling, although tolerated, was not generally shared by the Rabbis. They believed that with the demise of the last Prophets, the Holy Spirit, the source of prophecy, departed, but the "small voice" (קול דממה) remained.[90] Somewhat akin to the Holy Spirit, but not identical with it, was the Shechinah, a divine power, or influence, or atmosphere which could inspire, but not to the extent of prophecy. That the Shechina was found only in Israel, the central point in the philosophy of Halevi, is maintained in the Talmud.[91] According to R. Hama b. Hanina, it was found only in the aristocratic families of Israel, whereas according to R. Hisda, the Shechina was at one time part of the genius of every Jew.[92] The piety of the righteous will in time restore the Schechina, or the Holy Spirit, and the prevalence of prophecy of the highest order in Israel.[93] Israeli tells us that the people would never have grasped the will of God without the prophets' mediation. "The prophet is the Jew in whom the rational soul has separated itself from the other functions of the soul, and is in direct communion with the glory of God and the nature of the angels."[94] All the Mediaeval Jewish philosophers agree that revelation and the function of the Prophet was necessary to give man the highest kind of truth, which the intellect alone would probably never have discovered. The Shechina is identified

with the Active Intellect or *Logos*, by many a mediaeval writer.[95] Revelation gains in weight with Jehuda Halevi, for it is not only the means of letting us know the highest truth, it is also the proof of God's choice of Israel. True we cannot rise to the stage of prophecy nowadays, because there is lacking the genuine Jewish atmosphere, which is possible only in Palestine, etc., but we can approach the stage of the Prophet by endeavoring to realize in our life the ideal of the *Hasid*. After all, every Jew carries within him the divine element, potential of prophecy.[96] Maimuni considers the prophet as the highest type, but like Jehuda Halevi, he recommeds that we endeavor to rise to the degree of *Hasid*, for the power of prophecy comes directly by the choice of God, and does not depend on our effort. Anyhow, the character of *Hasid* leads to that of prophet.[97] He defines prophecy as a divine inspiration coming to the rational soul and to the power of the imagination through the mediation of the Active Intellect,[98] and classifies the prophets into eleven different grades.[99] Accordin to all the Mediaeval philosophers, Prophecy comes only to the man who realized first the other qualifications of the Jewish ideal man, of the Hebrew Sage. Even Spinoza concurs in the view that revelation is helpful, for it is more universally convincing and reliable than reason.[100]

Let us finally consider the duty of the Sage to ritual observance. Of course, all admitted that morality was essential to the attainment of the character of Sage. And so far, as religion is concerned, morality is "being like God" both in conception of Stoic and of Jew. The difference of view begins with reference to the

ceremonial aspect of religious piety. In the hymn of Cleanthes we have a Stoic prayer, which reminds us very much of the Psalms. He expressed his belief that through prayer and praise of God we rise to a communion with the deity which leads to right knowledge and right practice. But this hymn is one of the very few outpourings of a Stoic heart before God. On the whole, with the conception of the deity which they formed, and with the Cynic proclivities which they cherished, they naturally slighted and denounced trivial ritualism. A clear conscience and morality was all sufficient worship for some of the Stoics. Epictetus and his teacher Musonius, accepted the popular cult as well as the belief in divination, and they recommended prayer. But Epictetus was in this matter, one of the few exceptions among the Stoics. In Seneca we find a direct denial of the efficacy of prayer. Prayer might be observed by the Sage in the interests of civil law and order—just as Spinoza later held—and as a symbolical expression of a pious frame of mind.[101] Marcus Aurelius would rather that we do not pray at all; and if we do give vent to to prayer let it be for the will and the soul rather than for the body. There was no use in prayer since God himself was limited by fate; and we are part of God. Our duty is to believe in Him, but not to indulge in formal worship. We may praise Him, but not pray to Him. In Zeno's utopia there were to be no temples or images. That was the generally accepted Stoic view. We know the significance of formal worship in Jewish life and thought. Even the Prophets who denounced sacrifices which were brought without a repentant heart, and holidays on which the poor and oppressed would not be given respite, were en-

thusiastic believers in ceremonies when performed properly. To pray, to sacrifice, to "go up to the mountain of the Lord" or dwell "in His courts," to rest on the Sabbaths, to meditate on His teachings, these and the hundreds of details in the formalistic observance, were ever considered essential in the life of the one who was endeavoring to rise to the rank of the Righteous. Philo himself went as a pilgrim to the Temple of Jerusalem; and all his writings tell of the duty to obey God's commands. He even wrote down a compendium of Jewish law for practical purposes. The Mishna has the same purpose, and it too contains the ritual as well as the civil law, on which it lays equal stress. Indeed, the distinction between ritual and civil and moral law is often lost in the Talmud. Once in a while we hear even the voice of the extremist who would rank the ritual above the moral duties.[102] But we know that that was not the accepted view by the public opinion of the masses or the general consensus of the rabbis.[103] The Talmud contains many instances proving that it was the spirit rather than the letter of the law which counted most.[104] Similarly Saadia lays stress on the ritual, but not as a substitute for the moral duties.[105] Even in the world to come, he maintains, worship will be continued.[106] Barzilai recommends prayer in the same spirit.[107] Like Epictetus, Bahya believes that only "the prophet of the age or the expert philosopher" can truly worship God.[108] However, worship is not sufficient unless it be accompanied with sincerity of heart. The same principle is implied in the books of the other thinkers. Worship becomes all important with Halevi, because it is commanded in the revealed Law and because it helps to engender the proper atmosphere. Prayer is

"food for the soul"and all ceremonies are means whereby to cleanse the spiritual element of man of all the impurities which cling to it.[109] His ideal man must of course observe all the rational laws, but "more especially the divine ceremonies" which are the distinct possession of the divine people.[110] Halevi wanted enthusiasm,and that was best effected through worship. Ibn Daud clearly places ethical purity above ritual performance,but both are necessary to attain to the highest reward.[111] Maimonides and R.Levi b.Gershon established a rationalistic principle for every ritual ceremony,even for those which did not present an evident reason. Spinoza had no use for old Jewish ceremony,but he did not reject the ceremonial as such. He regarded the ceremonial law as partial and temporary,and not part of the universal law of God.[112] But he would have Israel subscribe to the ceremonials of the dominant peoples among whom they lived,as that would best serve the interests of public peace and order.[113] The general impression,so far as we may generalize impressions in our study,is that the Stoics practically found no significance in ceremonialism,whereas the Jews regarded as,next to the moral law, the most indispensable condition for the reaching of the goal,for attaining the ideal of the *Hasid*.

XVII.

The Path of the Sage.

The stage of the Sage was an ideal, a goal, an end in view. Very few ever attained to it, even according to Stoic opinion. We must, therefore, add in conclusion a few remarks on the path to the goal, the progress to it, and the several stations on the way.

Since virtue can be taught, life becomes one long lesson which, if properly conducted, may realize the ideal. The constant performance of the daily duties, and added to it a certain amount of theoretical learning conderning the virtues, will prepare a man, so that when he acquires a certain fixity, conviction and stability about his good habits he will pass into the ranks of the wise.[1] The conversion is sudden and complete, after a long preparation. Panaetius of Rhodes was mostly concerned with the "probationer", the man who is progressing towards the goal, rather than with the Sage himself. He too, saw simple acts of duty, rather than acts of perfect virtue, as the means whereby the probationer is led onward to his goal. Seneca declared in one passage, that progress to virtue was in itself virtue. The conception of progress dominates the writings of Epictetus, too. In the Jewish consciousness, there was never such a thing as a remote goal, except the goal of the future world. The Jewish man of piety was anxious to perform an act of piety or virtue whenever it presented itself, or even create opportunities for it. He was never aware of conversion, in the Stoic sense. He had the idea that "one may lose and gain the entire

world in one moment." But that was merely an expression to warn a person to be ever on guard, to always do the right. Jewish saints even saw in their childhood an ideal state of moral and religious life, and in old age would look back with the thought of happiness that their early life did not fall short in value to their old age.[2] On the whole, the Jewish ideal required maturity, intellectual and spiritual equipment, but when that was acquired any moral situation might make and unmake saints; whereas the Stoic conception was that one needed a long moral preparation, and then, once a Sage always a Sage.[3]

Seneca divided those on the road to virtue into three classes: 1. converts, 2. proficients, and 3. those whose education was complete. Then came the Sage.[4] We find similar divisions in the writings of Jewish philosophers. Philo accepted the Stoic classification of mankind into Sages (σοφοί), Probationers (προκόπτοντες), and the unripe (φαῦλοι).[5] In Israeli we find the classification on the basis of the prominence given to one or another of the soul faculties: those whose animal soul is predominant, those whose rational soul is predominant, and those in whom the rational soul is distinct and associates with the divine light which is a condition for prophecy.[6] The grades of piety and mankind in Bahya are based the nature of the motive which accompanies the religious acts of the individual.[7] He would also have a small class of individuals, devoted to a somewhat ascetic kind of life, for the purpose of maintaining the equilibrium of society. Halevi believes in the gradual progress of the individual

toward the stage of the prophet. Maimonides, as already observed elaborates a series of grades or stages of mankind ~~on the~~, below the class of the prophets. The Prophets themselves are ~~are~~ classified into eleven different grades.[8] With Maimonides, however, it was not so much a matter of progress, as the ~~the~~ goal of prophecy might never be reached by an individual who rose to the very highest degree of piety; nor might one prophet of his own effort attain to a higher stage of prophecy than the one he had attained. There is much more of the idea of progress, though less of the idea of grades, implied in the passage of the Jeruaslem Talmud, where it is said that one virtue leads to another until the attainment of the Messianic condition.[9]

The Stoics believed in the unity of virtue As Sphaerus defined it, "the separate virtues are but appearances of virtue or knowledge in different spheres of action."[10] What we noted before in connection with the unity or equality of sin, applies here with reference to the unity of virtue. That view finds its parallel in the Talmud in the frequent remark that he who fulfills a particular virtue or commandment is as if he fulfilled the whole Torah. Similarly Albo maintains that human perfection can bea ttained by observing properly any one single command of the Law of Moses, for otherwise the Law would be a hindrance rather than a help to man.[11] Barzilai speaks of man acquiring perfection by accepting one or two fundamental principles--because on the basis of these, he will accept all the others.[12] Of course, this doctrine of "either fool or wise," does not contradict the conception of progress toward the goal.

Notes and References.

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2. Cf. R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, pp. 21-22

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1. Ber. 17b. Hulin 86a. Taan. 24b.
2. Sota 49a.
3. Ps. 34:13
4. Ps. 107:43
5. D. Neumark, The Philosophy of the Bible, p. 230
6. Lev. 19:2
7. Deut. 4:6
8. Numb. 11:29
9. Prov. 31:10-31
10. Ecc. 1:3
11. ibid 2:16
12. ibid. 2:24
13. ibid. 3:12
14. ibid. 3:22
15. ibid. 5:17
16. Philo, The Unwritten Law, 36.
    Heir
    Heir of Divine Things, 22.
    Migration of Abraham, 19, 21, 22.
17. Un. Law 4. Neumark, Geschichte d. jued. Phil. B. II, S. 420
18. Un. Law, 12; Heir, 58. Mig. 16.
19. Mig. 26, 23.
20. Un. Law, 7.
21. Aboth iv 1
22. ibid. iv 3
23. ibid. vi 1
24. ibid. vi 3.
25. ibid. vi 4
26. ibid. ii 9
27. ibid. iv 29
28. Ber. 8a
29. Hag. 14b
30. Sota 20a
31. Ned. 10a, Nazir 3a. Cf. Nazir 4b and 66a.
32. Meg. 16a
33. Gittin 67a
34 Aboth v 10
35. Lazarus, The Ethics of Judaism, Eng. tr., #136-139
36. Haschiloach, vol. VI, Article Musar Hayahaduth.
37. See Lazarus, #76
38. See Hicks, p. 84
39. Gittin 26b, Kerith. 13b.
40. Albo, Sefer Ha-Ikarim, Petiha.
41. Lazarus, #139. Aboth iv 17
42. See Hicks, p. 85
43. Aboth iv 2
44. Emunoth Ve-Deoth, Pt. X, Ch. 2
45. Perush al Sefer Yezira, p. 158
46. Fons Vitae, I, 4, 24. See Husik, History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, p. 72
47. Fons Vitae, III, 204, 13ff. See Husik, p. 70
48. Husik, p. 70
49. Hobath Ha-Levovoth, Unity, Ch. 2.
50. ibid. Introduction.
51. Albo, Ikkarim, Pt. I, Ch. 6
52. Spinoza, Ethica, tr. Elwes, p. 271
53. See Arnold, #256. Elizabeth Carter, Introduction to Disc. of Epictetus, p. x.

Chapter III

1.See Arnold,#74,81,116,93.
2.T.Gomperz,Griechische Denker,I, p.438. See Arnold,#42
3.See Arnold,#82,117,321. Carter, Hicks,p.85
4.Spinoza,Ethica,Pt.V,Pr.42.
5.ibid.Pt.IV p.201
6.See Husik,p.288;Arnold,#184; Hicks,p.85
7.Ps.19:13
8.Aboth iv 5
9.Sabbath 4a,6b,102a.
10.Taan.8a.
11.Kidushin 39b,40a
12Kidd.42b; Bab.Mez.44a.
13.Nazir 23b.
14.Hobath Ha-Lev.,Introd.
15.ibid.
16.Husik,p.xxviii.
17.Ikkarim,Bk III,Ch.1-5
18.Or Adonai,Bk II Sec.5
19.Arnold,#98
20.ibid.#316
21.ibid.321
22.Neumark,Phil.Bible,p.227
23.See ibid.p.282
24.Ibid.p.227
25.Sota 14a;
26.Sabbath 138b
27.See Israeli,Sefer Ha-Yesodoth, Ed.S.Fried,Intr.p.38
28.See Husik,p.4
29.Yad,Deoth,I,6.
30.Zeller,Die Phil.d.Griechen,iii, 3rd ed.1881,p.271. Schuerer, Hist.of the Jewish People,tr. Taylor & Christie,2 Div.,vol.III p.288. Wisdom of Solomon,Ed. Charles,Ch.8,v.7.
31.Sab.92a.
32.Nedarim 38a.
33.See Husik,p.148
34.Hagiga 12a.
35.Toroth Ha-Nefesh,ch.2.Husik,111
36.Yad.Yesode,VII,1

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2.Nich.Ethics,vi 13
3.Paulsen,System of Ethics,tr. Thilly,pp.40-41
4.Arnold # 51
5.Ibid.#118
6.Cicero,De Officiis,Ed.Holden, 7th ed.i,6,18. Arnold,#336
7.Arnold,#285
8.Ibid.#324
9.See Hicks,p.118f.
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16.Ibid.#304
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19.Ibid.#318
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21 Ecc.I,17-18. See above p.28.
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31. Neumark, Phil of Bible, p.36
32. Ibid. pp.89,102,120
33. Ibid. p.186
34. Arnold, #20
35. Ibid. #118
36. Schuerer, Div.ii, vol.iii, p.232
37. Ibid. p.233
38. Ibid.
39. Heir, 48
40. Migration, 1
41. Ibid. 23
42. Un. Law, 12
43. Heir 58
44. Ibid. 59
45. Migration 8
46. Ibid. 30
47. Ibid. 39
48. Aboth 1 17
49. Ibid. iii 17
50. Ibid. iii 11-12
51. Ibid. iii, 22
52. Ibid. iii 21
53. Ibid. vi 1
54. Pesahim 66b
55. Aboth iii 18
56. Hag. 12a
57. Aboth vi 6
58. Ber. 17a
59. Ned. 32b.
60. Jer. Shek. v 15 (15a).
61. Ber. 63b. R. Ishmael
62. Sab. 75a, Joshua b. Levi.
63. Ber. 27b, Eleazar b. Azaria; Taan.
24. 23b, pupils of Isaac b. Elyashiv; Moed K. 28a, R. Huna.
64. Erub. 53b.
65. Ber. 33a.
66. Ber. 55a; Cf. Meg. 10b, where wisdom is granted to Mordeccai.
67. Sab. 152a.
68. Kidd. 32b.
69. Ned. 41a.
70. Xenophon, Memorab. iii, 9, 10. See Arnold, #328
71. Sota 3a.
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85. Ibid. p. 111
86. See Ibid. p. 101
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89. Ibid. v 16
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91. Commentary on Eccles., Intr. See Husik, p. 195
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93. Com. on Mishna, Helek, Ed. Holzer, p. 23
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70. Milhamoth, I 10-12; Husik p. 335
71. Ikkarim, I 10
72. Husik, p. 376
73. Seneca, Ben. iv, 27, 1. Arnold #393
74. Cicero, Tusc. Displ iii 5, 10. Arnold, #393
75. Ecc. 7:20
76. Mood K. 28a
77. Hag. 5a
78. Sot. 3a
79. Hag. 15b
80. Emunoth, VI, 4
81. Guide, III 8
82. Ethica, IV, Prop. 54
83. Arnold, #251
84. Kuzari, I 5-9; V 9; Deut. 18: 18; Neumark, Phil. Bible p. 103.
85. Neumark, Phil. Bible, p. 289
86. Heir 51
87. Ibid. 58

88.Sab.104a

89.Suk.5a

90.Joma 9b

91.Ibid. Cf.B.Mez.Ch.Lo Yachpor

92.Kidd.70b; Sota 3b

93.Shek.9b

94.Yesodoth,II p.57,59. Fried,
Intr.p.88f.

95.Husik,p.109

96.Kuzari V 22f. Husik,p.183

97.Shemone Per.Introd.

98.Guide,II; Husik p.277

99.Guide,II 32,45,etc.

100.Tr.Th.-Pol.Ch.15

101.Hicks,p.136

102.Bez.21a;Sab.118b,119a;Ned.10a,25a,etc.

103.Suk.49b; Shek.7b

104.Sot.37a,Jebom.6a

105.Emunoth,X 15

106.Husik,pp.45-46

107.Perush,p.7

108.Hob.Ha-Lev.Yihud,2

109.Kuzari,iii 5

110.Ibid.iii 7

111.Emun.Ram.p.100

112.Tr.Th.-Pol.Ch.5

113.Lazarus,#22-28

Chapter XVII.

1.Seneca,Dial.ix 2,2; Epict.Disc.iii 2,8; Arnold,#357

2.Suk.53a

3.Kidd.40b; Cf.Joma 38b

4.Hicks,p.120

5.Neumark,Geschichte,II,S.461

6.Yesodoth,II,p.58

7.Hob.Ha-Lev.,Yihud,2

8.Guide,II 37; Shem.Per.,Introd.;V,33; Yad,Jesod.vii 2

9.Shek.9b

10.Arnold,#91