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THE ZIONIST CAUSE IN AMERICA: 1919 - 1927

by

Neal Ivan Borovitz

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for Ordination

Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion

1975

Referee, Professor Stanley Chyet

To Joan, on our first wedding anniversary:

Your magic fingers at the typewriter and perceptive critical mind have been indispensable to me in the writing of this thesis.

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DIGEST

The years 1919-1927 mark the critical stage of development for the concept of Zionism in the American Jewish Community. Prior to the First World War, Zionism had made little impact in America and American Jewry had only minimal influence on the course of Zionist activity. Among the many political changes resulting from the War was the issuance of the Balfour Declaration and its subsequent approval by the League of Nations. Following the War, the Jewish communities of Europe, in which the Zionist idea had been born, were caught in the economic and political turmoil which dominated the continent. Thus, the Zionist leaders, most notably Dr. Chaim Weizmann, turned to America as the one Jewish community with the financial capability of developing a Jewish Home in Palestine.

This thesis traces the interaction of Dr. Weizmann with the three major groups of American Jews with whom he had contact. Two of these groups were opposing factions within the Zionist Organization of America. One, the Lipsky group was comprised of Jews of East European background who loyally supported Weizmann and his American lieutenant, Louis Lipsky. Within American Jewry, this group held a Zionist ideology most closely related to mainstream European Zionism. The other faction of American Zionists was known as the "Brandeis group" after their leader, Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Brandeis was the unchallenged leader of American Zionism from the outbreak of the War in Europe until his confrontation with Weizmann forced him from power in 1921. The first two chapters of this thesis deal with the Brandeis-Weizmann conflict: its causal factors and its ultimate effect in splintering the American Zionist movement.

The third identifiable group that played a central role in the Zionist cause was the so-called non-Zionists of whom Louis Marshall was the most

prominent. Like the Brandeis group these people were predominantly American Jews of West European background, who were on the whole both wealthy and native-born Americans. After the splintering of the Zionist movement in 1921, Weizmann spent a great deal of energy in enlisting non-Zionist support for the Zionist program of rebuilding Palestine.

These three groups of American Jews shared a general commitment to the upbuilding of Palestine as a Jewish National Home. However, due to clashes of personality and differing economic and political ideologies, these groups could not agree on the means by which American Jewry would participate in the Zionist cause. Both the Marshall and Brandeis groups favored a capitalistic form of development with minimal centralized control of the economy. Each demanded a separation of those donation funds used for charitable purposes and national land acquisition, and the capital funds to be invested in building an economic infra-structure for the Jewish National Home. Personality and differing positions in American partisan politics, rather than fundamental differences in approaches to Zionism separated the Brandeis group and the non-Zionists. Chapters Three and Five respectively deal with the Brandeis and Marshall programs for the economic development of Palestine.

The Lipsky faction supported the centralized economic program of the World Zionist Organization and the Keren Hayesod. They had a general mistrust of the other groups' commitments to Zionism. Thus, when the non-Zionists under the auspices of the Joint Distribution Committee (J.D.C.) began a fund raising campaign for the purpose of relief work in Russia, the Lipsky-led Zionist Organization of America countered with a large scale propaganda campaign against the J.D.C. program. The details of the bitter

in-fighting between Zionist and non-Zionist during 1925 and 1926 is detailed in Chapter Six.

As a result of these divisions in American Jewry, Weizmann had been unable to gain the political and financial support which the Zionist cause needed from American Jewry. In January of 1927 Weizmann and Marshall reached agreement on a program to unify American Jewish support for Palestine. The establishment of the Jewish Agency for Palestine comprised of an equal number of Zionists and non-Zionists was a result of this accord. As an indirect result of the events surrounding the Marshall-Weizmann compromise, the Lipsky group and its more nationalistic form of Zionism lost its influence in the American Jewish Community. Out of the factional conflicts of American Jewry between 1919 and 1927, the leading Jews of the United States -- together with a far visioned and pragmatic European leader like Chaim Weizmann -- developed a specifically American Jewish response to the call of Zionism.

PROLOGUE

The rise and development of the American Zionist movement from 1897 to 1914 involves special problems for the student of the Zionist idea. Modern Zionism in Europe grew out of the attempt of Jews seeking a solution to the perennial Jewish questions of survival for the group and the individual. Intellectual precursors of political Zionism like Leo Pinsker and Moses Hess came to the idea of the need for Jewish statehood from their personal experience of the failure of the European enlightenment to provide a place for the Jew. Similarly, the father of political Zionism and the founder of the modern Zionist movement, Theodore Herzl, was motivated by his own experience to reach the conclusion that a solution to the plight of the European Jew could be found only through the establishment of a Jewish state. Anti-semitism as exhibited in various forms in Europe, whether pogroms in Russia, forced social segregation, denial of full educational and occupational equality or the role of the Jew as eternal political scapegoat as personified in the famous Dreyfus case in France, made the Zionist dream of a reconstituted Jewish state in Palestine attractive to the European Jew. For the Jew living in America, the overt anti-semitism of Europe was more a memory than a reality. For the newly arrived immigrant to America, his new home was viewed as a "Goldene Medine" despite the personal hardships he might be presently suffering. For the American Jew of an earlier wave of immigration from Central and Western Europe, America at the beginning of this century, had already become a home with a future.

The Zionist movement in America was primarily composed of East European immigrants who were slowly becoming acculturated to America. However,

in the first two decades of Zionist history, the leadership elite of the Zionist movement in the United States was comprised of American-born Jews of Germanic or West European background. Neither group could snare the experiential motivation of their European counterparts to the Zionist idea. The East European immigrant had to confront the real gap between the theoretical preference for mass immigration to Palestine which their Zionism demanded and the existential reality of their own choice of immigration to America. For the American-born leaders of the Zionist movement in its early years, people like Stephen S. Wise and Richard Gottheil, their dual allegiance to the Zionist idea and American idealism made the question of personal aliyah moot.

Prior to World War I, the Zionist movement attracted very few adherents on the American scene. The United States was fulfilling the basic need of "klitah," the absorption of Jewish refugees from Europe, which Zionism claimed to be ultimately possible only in Palestine. The majority of new immigrants saw their future here in America. The already established American Jewish community of an earlier immigration had found fulfillment and freedom in America and viewed Zionism as at best a foolish dream and at worst a threat to their own position. Judaism was to most American Jews of German origin a religion, not a nationality. Their national allegiance was to the United States; their Judaism was a factor equatable only to the church affiliations of their gentile counterparts in America. Nevertheless, a feeling of concern and responsibility for their Jewish brethren in Europe continued. During this period, which predates the restrictive immigration quotas imposed in 1921 and 1924, the American Jewish community fulfilled its responsibility to the Jews of Europe through aiding the new immigrants in their

resettlement in America and by providing financial aid to those in need in Europe.

The Federation of American Zionists, the forerunner of the Zionist Organization of America, developed in this pre-World War I period a unique approach to Zionism tailored to the special circumstances of the American Jewish experience. Zionism in America adopted an "other" orientation to its program. Immigration to Palestine was for Russian and Polish Jews, not for American Jews. Personal aliyah was a concept to which only minimal lip service was offered by the American organization. Even to the most ardent of the American Zionist leaders Jewish life in America remained central while Palestine held the position in fact, if not in word, of a worthy philanthropic-political endeavor for American Jews.

In both the Zionist world of the pre-World War I period and the American Jewish community of that time, the Federation of American Zionists played a very minor role. The Americans, though in general backing the Herzlian political approach to Zionism, were never a major voice in the conflict between the Weizmann-led faction of "practical" Zionists who favored immediate mass aliyah and political Zionists like Max Nordau, Herzl's close associate, who demanded that political guarantees must precede investment of money and people in the land. On the American scene the leaders of the movement were not a part of the established elite of American Jewry. None were well known enough among the masses to draw popular support, nor did they include in their number the monied segments of American Judaism. Lacking both the charismatic leadership and the financial resources of their fellow American Jews of German origin who during this same pre-War period organized the powerful American Jewish Committee, the leadership of the Zionist movement had only

minimal impact on the Jewish community of America.

With the outbreak of World War I in Europe, the World Zionist Organization was physically divided by War. The opportunity now came about for Zionists in the still neutral United States to play a significant role in international Zionist activity. However, this opportunity could not have eventuated without the presence of a strong leader who had the ability to draw popular support from the American Jewish community. The man who assumed this role was Louis Dembitz Brandeis. A successful Boston lawyer, Brandeis had become a leading symbol of liberalism in America. However, prior to 1910, he had had little affiliation or association with the organized Jewish community. According to his later statements and those of his numerous biographers, Brandeis first became involved with the Jewish community during the garment workers strike in New York in 1910. At that point, his biographer Alpheus Mason says, Brandeis "became poignantly conscious of his people and of their plight This experience confronted him with a challenge which no self-respecting person, least of all a successful Jew, could shirk."

Louis Brandeis was born in Louisville, Kentucky, of immigrant parents in 1856. His early background was characterized by a tendency toward assimilation with the general culture rather than one which stressed a particularistic Jewish heritage. Several members of the Brandeis clan had intermarried with non-Jews. No mention is made in any biographical account of Brandeis having ever attended synagogue in Louisville or having received any formal Jewish education. The only member of his family who appears to have retained a strong Jewish identity was Brandeis' uncle Lewis Dembitz, a Jewish lawyer in Louisville, who had returned to a large measure of orthodoxy in his Judaism. Dembitz was also one of the

earliest of American Zionists. Dembitz and Brandeis were evidently quite close as illustrated by the fact that, in his uncle's honor, Brandeis changed his middle name from David to Dembitz. His uncle was also a major impetus in Brandeis' choice of law for his professional career. Jacob DeHaas, Brandeis's soi-disant mentor in Zionism, was to employ his own personal friendship with Uncle Lewis in first attracting the nephew's attention to the Zionist movement in 1912.²

Brandeis formally joined the Federation of American Zionists in 1912 after his initial encounters with DeHaas. His rise to leadership was rapid in the movement which desperately needed a dynamic and well-known personality. In the subsequent two years before World War I, Brandeis made numerous appearances speaking out for the merits of the Zionist cause. With the outbreak of the War and the decision to establish the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs, Brandeis was requested to assume the official leadership of the American Zionist movement as chairman of the new organization. Until his elevation to the Supreme Court in 1916, Brandeis spent a large portion of his time traveling across the country raising popular support and funds for the Zionist cause. After his assumption of the post of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Brandeis relinquished formal leadership of the Zionist provisional council, but retained the actual leadership through his associates Julian Mack, Stephen Wise and Jacob DeHaas, who themselves retained official leadership roles in the movement. Throughout the period of negotiations leading to the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent activity of the first American Jewish Congress and the peace conferences in Paris, Brandeis remained the leading figure in American Zionism. His control of the reorganized Zionist Organization of America after 1917 as Honorary President was as

total as his leadership as chairman of the provisional council had been prior to his assumption of a seat on the Supreme Court. During his tenure as leader, the American Zionist movement grew from a small inconsequential group into a mass movement of over 175,000 adherents in 1920. By the end of World War I, Louis Dembitz Brandeis, the assimilated Jew from Louisville, Kentucky, had become the as yet unchallenged leader of Jewish nationalism in America.

The scope of this paper on American Zionism will be limited to the years 1919-1927. During the initial three years of this period, Brandeis himself plays a central role in the major events of the Zionist cause. During the last five years, while he remained personally in the background, his ideological approach and his loyal followers continued to be prime factors in the course of Zionist history.

CHAPTER ONE: THE BRANDEIS-WEIZMANN CONFLICT: The Underlying Causes

At the twenty-fourth annual convention of the Zionist Organization of America, in Cleveland, June 5-8, 1921, the assembled delegates issued a vote of no confidence in the administration headed by Justice Louis Brandeis and Judge Julian Mack. Brandeis, Mack and thirty-seven of their associates, including all of the then prominent names connected with the Zionist movement in America, resigned from their positions in the organization. This marked a victory for the forces led by Louis Lipsky in support of the president of the World Zionist Executive, Dr. Chaim Weizmann. This vote was the culmination of a two year controversy between Brandeis and Weizmann over the direction of the Zionist movement.

The Brandeis-Weizmann split began in the wake of their greatest combined effort in the Zionist cause. Working together, they had successfully urged the adoption by the San Remo Peace Conference of the Balfour Declaration as the central concept of a British mandated Palestine. Because of this action, the opportunity for the development of a viable Jewish National Home in Palestine was for the first time a real possibility. The aftermath of this struggle for direction of the Zionist cause found the American organization in shambles. The divisive effects of the conflict were felt for the next decade. This chapter will retrace Brandeis' initial encounters in London and in Palestine with the leaders of European Zionism. In the process of reconstructing the historical events through the aid of a number of primary sources³, the sociological, ideological, and personality differences between Weizmann and Brandeis, which underlay this conflict will be analyzed.

Before reestablishing the confrontation proper, it is crucial

to understand a little of the basic ideological background of each man. Stuart Geller, in the preface to his study of Brandeis, states that:

the Zionism of Louis D. Brandeis was simply an extension of his own social philosophy that held dear the value of democracy.... He tended to be a moralist who saw "bigness" /monopolies and trusts/ as evil and the little man as good....⁴

He further states:

...even though Brandeis was a liberal and a progressive he was not an economic socialist. He was a thorough going capitalist even though he knew that the system could oppress the working class of America.⁵

Weizmann, on the other hand, was the product of Pinsk, the center of socialist-Zionism. His self-proclaimed mentor was Ahad Ha-Am, the great figure of the Hebrew Renaissance. Where Brandeis was the native-born product of Western culture and American ideals of liberty and democracy, Weizmann was the shtetl boy who migrated West. He undertook the transformation and transplantation from the yet largely medieval Jewish world of East Europe, to the modern world of the West. Where for Brandeis, Judaism may have been only a factor in his early development and a consideration in later life, to Weizmann his Jewishness was the crucial, central fact of his life. It was the shtetl Jew of the Yiddish world, Weizmann, who could and would communicate his position to the mass of American Jews.

Weizmann, in his autobiography, devotes some effort to explaining the circumstances of the conflict with Brandeis, and also gives his own estimate of the man Louis D. Brandeis. His account not only reveals his opponent but more importantly illustrates by its tone Weizmann's unfamiliarity with such a Jewish type. In comparing Brandeis to Abraham Lincoln, he says, "Brandeis too was a Puritan; upright, austere, of a scrupulous

honesty and implacable logic." ⁶ He further saw him as a high-principled theorist similar to his friend President Wilson. In the same vein Weizmann draws an analogy between the conflicts which Wilson had with his European opposites in this same post-war era and the internal Zionist conflict. The thrust of the Weizmann explanation is evident in the first introductory statements of their association. He implies that the naive, moralistic American just does not understand how Europeans handle politics.

Weizmann's account of the underlying problems which led to the split includes a bitter attack upon Jacob DeHaas. He claims that DeHaas, Brandeis' mentor in Zionism, had always shown hostility towards his personal leadership of the movement. Apologetically, he points out that since he has had little contact with DeHaas, the latter's opposition must assuredly have been based upon the old Herzlian divisions of political and practical Zionism. He then suggests that jealousy on the part of DeHaas that it was he, Weizmann the practical Zionist, who pulled off the political coup of the Balfour Declaration, was the basis for the antagonism. The irony of the reversal of sides on the political versus practical question is also indicated.

In describing the first Brandeis-Weizmann meeting in London preceding the Brandeis-DeHaas trip to Palestine, Weizmann expresses a somewhat placating and condescending attitude toward his two guests. Commenting upon their criticisms of the London Zionist office and its operations, he says that, "We knew how much would depend upon our American friends and were anxious not to hurt their susceptibilities." ⁷ He, nevertheless, ignored Brandeis' suggestions for efficiency.

DeHaas, in recounting this same initial meeting, gives a rather

different picture. He claims that:

Weizmann was impressed by Brandeis. He agreed with Dr. / Shmaryahu / Levin that there was something Messianic in the countenance and bearing of the American leader. Brandeis, for his part, freely admired Dr. Weizmann." 8

Here we begin to see the differences in explaining the fundamental causes of the eventual conflict. Weizmann describes it as a personality conflict based upon the differences of cultural backgrounds, while DeHaas is setting the stage for ideology rather than sociology and/or personality as the determining factor. The incompatible tone and nuance of recounting the events continue throughout the reports of the Palestinian trip and Brandeis' subsequent formulation of what Zionist action should be.

In the DeHaas account of his trip to Palestine with Brandeis, he speaks of the great impression Brandeis made upon the inhabitants and the impression the land made upon him. However, Brandeis was very upset by the swamps and the malaria spawned by them. He therefore made an immediate pledge on behalf of American Zionism to rid Palestine of malaria, before the onslaught of what he hoped would be mass immigration. A second disturbing factor that the Americans found on their trip was the inefficiency of the Zionist Organization's Palestine offices. DeHaas remarks that:

... the multiple-headed Zionist Commission with offices both in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv was too large and therefore inefficient. In part, he (Brandeis) remedied this while still in the country by forcing the transfer of all Zionist offices from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 9

DeHaas indicates that it was during this trip that Brandeis began to realize how important politics, both internal Zionist and external, were to remain for the Zionist cause. Externally, political intervention on

the highest level became apparent to Brandeis when the chief of the British military administration in Palestine, was less than responsive to his demands that the British in Palestine uphold the spirit and letter of the Balfour Declaration. Therefore, Brandeis personally took it upon himself to contact Lord Balfour upon his return to Europe. After this little excursion into private diplomacy by Brandeis, Balfour issued specific instructions affirming the British commitment to the Balfour Declaration.

Weizmann is quite critical of the entire trip. However, his stated reasons for dissatisfaction seem too petty and inconsequential for him to have reacted so harshly as to lay the foundation for the subsequent conflict. He indicates in his recounting that despite his prior warnings, Brandeis and DeHaas were overwhelmed by the poor physical conditions and were thus influenced to reach inaccurate conclusions. He states:

I think it may have been uncertainty that made Brandeis and DeHaas more trenchant in their criticisms than they otherwise might have been -- that and the fact that they did not make sufficient allowances for the difficult circumstances resulting from the war.... 10

Weizmann indicates that Brandeis was unfair in passing judgment after one short visit. He also apologetically points out that most of the settlements Brandeis saw were old pre-Zionist ones. In addition, before reaffirming the belief that only one who lives in the land can direct the movement's programs, he raises the old attack that Brandeis opposed political Zionism and was subsequently proven wrong by history. By emphasizing a paranoic view of Brandeis' concern with the malaria question, Weizmann completely contradicts the recorded accounts of DeHaas. Rather than paranoia, Brandeis appears in the DeHaas account to have reached a rational decision that economic growth and development could

not proceed before the swamp drainage problem was combatted.

It hardly seems possible that Weizmann risked the alienation of the foremost American Jew because of the issue of malaria control. Placation by promising that swamp drainage would be the top priority of practical work would have been the more expedient position. Weizmann above all was a keen political man and assuredly would have sensed this. Therefore, I believe that the unstated threat to Weizmann's position as the de facto, acknowledged leader of Zionism, and in a sense of World Jewry, was the issue here. Brandeis had done two things to challenge Weizmann's authority. First, he assumed the power to demand the reorganization of the Zionist offices and programming in Palestine. Occupying no official office in the world organization, he accomplished this through his two-fold power based upon money and prestige. Secondly, Brandeis had the "chutzpah" that no other Zionist had ever had, to go directly to Balfour himself. Much of Weizmann's power internally rested upon his position as being the communication link to the British. Brandeis' usurpation of this position could not go unchallenged. Therefore, in reality, Weizmann's argument with Brandeis is the converse of what he states. He desired that the Justice limit his concerns to the practical aspects of raising money and leave to him the political decisions, those internal to the Zionist Organization itself and especially those which involved dealings with the British.

In a recently published book, Isaiah Friedman presents a totally untraditional view of the motivations of the British in granting the Balfour Declaration.¹¹ Basing his approach upon recently declassified documents, Friedman minimizes the total effect which Weizmann, Brandeis, or any other Jewish leaders had upon the British decision to ~~issue the~~ Balfour Declaration. Rather than being a response to Jewish nationalism,

the decision was based upon British desires to enlarge their holdings in the Mideast. The role played by Weizmann and other Jewish leaders was not, therefore, in gaining any type of British concession for the Jews, but rather in giving an ethical support to British Imperialism which would pacify England's ally, the United States of Woodrow Wilson. Whether this hypothesis be correct or not, the fact that both Weizmann and Brandeis did perceive that their interventions with the British were effective remains unchanged. Likewise, Weizmann's apparent jealousy of Brandeis' intervention with the British authorities remains probable.

Brandeis formulated the experiences of his trip to Europe and Palestine into a definite plan of action for the Zionist Organization of America (Z.O.A.) . At the Chicago Convention of the Z.O.A. in 1919, Brandeis made the following five-point proposal for action within the context of reporting to the Convention about his trip:

- 1) A campaign against malaria to be waged vigorously in advance of any extensive immigration;
- 2) The purchase of land on an extensive scale;
- 3) Afforestation;
- 4) Strong financial support for the Hebrew University;
- 5) Considerable investigation and preparatory study of the land to facilitate agricultural, industrial and commercial development. 12

It is interesting to note that these proposals were all carried out by the Zionist Organization after Brandeis' ouster. The **proposal** was accompanied by a plea for labor and capital to forget their differences and join together in the practical work of building Palestine.

Before proceeding to the London Conference itself, it is worthwhile to reconsider some of the above statements and actions in the light of

ideology. Brandeis, as this observer sees it, remained true to form during his visits to London and Palestine and in his statement to the Chicago Convention. He clearly saw a line of separation between the role of community and individual development. The securing of the political rights necessary for colonization and the development of the land to a point where private capital would be attracted to it was the communal responsibility of World Jewry. This, however, was as far as his liberal capitalistic ideology would allow. As Geller points out in his thesis, Brandeis was not a socialist, but rather a man who valued the concept of individual initiative and competition in a capitalistic sphere.

Weizmann himself cannot be labelled a socialist. However, the record is clear that the Socialists were among his loyal constituents at that time within the World Organization. Moreover, he definitely favored firm central control over all Zionist activities. That control, of course, was to be centered around him. The piecing together of the implied underlying challenge which Weizmann felt personally from Brandeis, along with his natural political need to support the position of his socialist constituency, led him to be critical of Brandeis' proposals. Contrary to Weizmann, Brandeis continually appears as the politically naive figure acting out his typically American, direct approach to the issues. As the events in London and Cleveland will illustrate, the personal philosophies of these men and the varied types of dynamism each projected would all too often overshadow the basic ideological questions on the underlying economic base for development in Palestine.

LONDON CONFERENCE

The London Conference of 1920 was the first fully representative

meeting of the World Zionist movement since the outbreak of World War I. It was the first such international conference for Brandeis. As Weizmann indicates quite correctly, it was here that those differences between himself and Brandeis, heretofore only alluded to, were manifested and formulated into opposing stands. Each man came with his own conception of the roles the World Zionist Organization and the various national federations were to play. Each had a blueprint for the work in Palestine and his own notion as to how to induce more universal Jewish participation in the work. Each unfortunately also had his own interpretation of the other's position. One, Weizmann, had already rejected the basic points of his emerging adversary's position so that, in retrospect, the resulting open split between the two men by the meeting's end is more expected than surprising.

Due to the nature of such meetings that only formal, prepared speeches are publicly delivered, while the real debate goes on in private, there does not exist a reliable report of what happened in the numerous private caucuses of the American delegation privately or with Weizmann. Both DeHaas and Weizmann give their own accounts of the conflict as does Louis Lipsky, the American who a year later would be the organizer of the Brandeis defeat in Cleveland, and Julius Simon, later to be head of the Palestine Economic Corporation. Simon had been to this point a close associate and friend of Weizmann. After the London Conference, Simon becomes an integral part of the Brandeis Group. The reports in the London Jewish Chronicle, both in the selective coverage in the events and the tone of the editorials, indicate that the newspaper expressed the sentiment of the Weizmann Group.

Of these five major sources, the London Jewish Chronicle accounts are perhaps the most revealing in terms of the Weizmann strategy and

the overall atmosphere of the Conference. Written at the actual time, they give us the opportunity to see the Conference first hand, even if from a prejudicial view, that the four later authors could and did interpret and edit to fit their own positions, in the wake of the subsequent break. Before discussing the various articles from the London Jewish Chronicle, note needs to be taken of the obviously absent though normally expected ones. A search of the Chronicle reveals no article announcing the arrival in England of Justice Brandeis. This is notable in that the custom of Jewish newspapers, in particular, is to publicize widely the arrival of prominent Jewish figures. The New Palestine, while still under the control of the Brandeis Group, did publicize Weizmann's arrival in New York a year later. The Chronicle itself followed this pattern upon numerous occasions. One example of this is the series of articles about Albert Einstein's arrival in London in 1921 with Dr. Weizmann after their celebrated tour of the United States, at which time they successfully ended Brandeisian control of the Z.O.A. On an objective scale it is hard, I believe, to say that Albert Einstein was so much more of a celebrated figure in 1921 than Justice Brandeis, the American Supreme Court Justice, advisor and friend to the President, leader of American Zionism, had been in 1920. Was ignoring his arrival so blatantly not implying that Brandeis was almost a non-person?

Another point which illustrates the blatant playing down of the Brandeis role was the perfunctory mention of his election as President of the Conference. The bestowing of such an honor upon someone is usually considered newsworthy and is normally accompanied by a favorable article about the man. The only mention of the Brandeis election in the July 9, 1920, Jewish Chronicle was in the reprint of the official minutes

of the Conference. The entire comment read:

Dr. Bodenheimer proposed the election of Judge Brandeis as President of the Conference, Dr. Nordau as Hon. President, and Mr. Ussishkin as Deputy President. The Conference then adjourned for lunch. 13

At the afternoon session the Chair was taken by Judge Brandeis, the newly-elected President of the Conference, who delivered an address.... 14

Further evidence of the Chronicle slant and also revealing about the general attitude and atmosphere of the Conference as a whole are the editorial interjections in the reprinting of the Weizmann address of this same opening morning of the London Conference. Under the heading "Dr. Weizmann's Speech," the Chronicle reported: "Dr. Weizmann, who was received with loud cheers, said..."¹⁵ Throughout the speech, especially in the section where Weizmann enthusiastically offers the great thanks of the Jewish People to the government and leadership of Great Britain, the editor interjects the word "cheers" denoting the enthusiasm of the assembly. As seen above, there is no note denoting any emotional response to the election of Justice Brandeis or to his initial statement to the Conference, except a final applause.

In the speeches recorded in the Jewish Chronicle, Weizmann at length and Brandeis in brief reveal their basic positions publicly. Weizmann states:

The task is ours and nobody else's. The financial resources, the material and intellectual resources for the making of a Jewish Palestine must come from the Jewish People and the Jewish People only. Anybody who may harbour the idea of financial assistance for our specifically Jewish work in Palestine, whether in the form of a loan or otherwise from the British Government or any other government, must put that idea out of his head. 16

In describing the task of the Conference, he said:

Our tasks at this Conference are three-fold. First, we have to approve of a plan of our operations; secondly, to devise a means of securing the money our plans demand; thirdly, to adapt and reshape our organization for the accomplishment of its task. 17

In further elaboration of the role of public versus private funds in the achieving of the Zionist goal, Weizmann says:

We do desire a certain amount of private initiative, and we do wish the J.C.A. (Jewish Colonisation Association) to work to their full capacity in Palestine and we desire to work in harmonious cooperation with them. It ought to be practical to set up a single land purchasing organisation so as to prevent Jew bidding against Jew.... You will have submitted to you reports of public works and industrial development. We look to these to provide employment for a large number of Jews.... 18

Brandeis, in what amounts to a non-controversial plea for unity, states simply and without reference to ideology the task of Zionism,

It is the task of reconstruction. We must approve plans on which the reconstruction shall proceed. We must create the executive and administrative machinery adapted to the work before us. We must select men of the training, the experience and the character fitted to conduct that work. And, finally, we must devise ways and means to raise the huge sums which the undertaking demands. 19

Weizmann indicates that those differences he had alluded to above between himself and Brandeis became manifest at London. Weizmann's main political motive at London was to keep the World Zionist Organization ideologically pure and at the same time create a coalition of all non-Zionist and Zionist Jews for the practical development work in Palestine. He thus requested authorization to establish a Jewish Council and a United Palestine Appeal for the purpose of incorporating non-Zionist support.

The latter was immediately adopted but the former was not finally realized until 1929 with the establishment of the Jewish Agency. Brandeis opposed this plan. To the waste-conscious Justice, this duplicating of bureaucracy was similar to the inefficiencies over which he and Weizmann had previously disagreed, the prime, prior example being the duplicate offices in Palestine where the bureaucracy was badly mis-managed during Brandeis' trip the previous year.

Weizmann interpreted the Brandeis opposition as a misconception on his part of the role of the Zionist Organization. He claims that Brandeis saw the political role of Zionism finished; that the organization was hence to be merely an economic organ. Ergo, Weizmann concludes that Brandeis erroneously dispensed with Zionist ideology as a dividing force keeping non-adherents out of active participation. Weizmann desired to keep the organization itself ideologically pure. He claims in retrospect that this was due to his foreseeing of a continual political role which only the ideologically committed could undertake. He states the question before the Conference as being, "Whether a new organization should be formed for the accommodation of the non-Zionists or whether the World Zionist Organization should be completely reoriented, should in fact give up completely its political character."

20

DeHaas gives a somewhat different opinion of Brandeis' thoughts. Concerning the issues of local autonomy for the national foundations and cooperation on an international level, Brandeis went to London with the intention of full cooperation. He felt, however, that rather than creating a second inefficient super-structure on an international level, that the various local federations could more efficiently handle much of the responsibilities internally. DeHaas states that: "Moreover, he did not believe that the World Organization could render efficient and

useful aid to the various local foundations. They must and could solve their own problems. Their duty was to aid not seek support from the central authority."²¹

Brandeis felt therefore that internally each organ could and should solve its own ideological conflicts in such a way as to obtain the maximal support of its own Jewish community. He felt that the peculiar situations of each community, i.e., the vast differences in nature between the American Jewish community and the European, required different approaches. The pragmatic individualist felt that he and his followers could better deal with the American Jew through the Z.O.A. than could the world body.

The budget question marked the real irreversible point in the conflict. The Americans were to pay the bill and the Europeans were to run the show. It is vital to examine the compromise attempt made by Brandeis upon seeing the emergence of this attitude at the Conference. The failure of this attempt marked the point of no return in the exclusion of Brandeis from active Zionist work.

Brandeis had become rapidly disenchanted with the world body soon after the Conference convened. Meetings were disorganized and many of the delegates from Germany and Russia in particular were not representative of the Jewish masses there, but rather were old-time Zionists who, like their leader Weizmann, had been in self-exile in the West. Their natural concerns with the issue of minority rights in East Europe also frustrated Brandeis who saw these issues as of no relevance to the Zionist program. The absolute chutzpah of these people representing non-contributory factions to vote huge budgets to be subsidized by the American and British Jews, while retaining their control over spending greatly angered Brandeis.

The Justice therefore worked out privately with Weizmann, and three leading British Jews, Lord Reading, Sir Alfred Mond, and James de Rothschild a plan to take charge for a three-year period of economic development of Palestine. The American delegation wished Brandeis to direct this program which was to be based upon the platform of the Chicago Convention mentioned above. Brandeis declined. DeHaas points out in defence that there was no reason to believe that the European delegations would have allowed the American the top job in the organization. Further, according to DeHaas, acceptance would have necessitated resignation from the Supreme Court and thus have proved false Brandeis' claim that service and loyalty to Zionism and America were complementary and not mutually exclusive.

Weizmann, while supporting the Brandeis plan openly, secretly undercut him by privately discouraging Mond and Rothschild to whom he pointed out purported deficiencies in it. They backed out. Brandeis' refusal to accept active leadership because of his multiple reasons for remaining on the Supreme Court, resulted in an aura of discontent among the American delegation. He accepted the title of Honorary President. Weizmann, seizing upon the discontent of Louis Lipsky and others, laid the ground work in London for the repudiation of the Brandeis regime in Cleveland the following year.

Louis Lipsky emerges at the London Conference as the man to lead the fight to replace Brandeis as the head of American Zionism. Lipsky was a dedicated follower of Weizmann and was effectively used to eliminate Weizmann's chief competition for leadership of the movement. Since Lipsky is, after London, the active tool of the final defeat of Brandeis, it is crucial to study his accounts of the London meeting and after, as presented

in his memoirs Thirty Years of American Zionism.

Lipsky, in describing the setting of the London Conference, gives his own analysis of our two protagonists. He recounts of Weizmann that he was the head of the de facto Executive which had arisen during the War. It was he who had obtained the Balfour Declaration and the San Remo decision and was recognized by the British as the authorized spokesman of the Zionist Organization. Lipsky notes that it was to Weizmann that the Pioneers of Zionism turned after the War with the intent of establishing the old Zionist traditions, "The status, the methods of election, the same parliamentary methods."²²

Brandeis, whom Lipsky acknowledges as the dominant figure in America from 1914-1920, is not dealt with too kindly. Lipsky says that, "his ordinary interests and habits were based on realistic standards,²³ but his Zionist interests were primarily romantic and ideal." He further implies that the super-sophisticated Brandeis was unable to comprehend and relate to "a different stiff-necked people."²⁴ Lipsky emphasizes Brandeis' close association with Wilson and criticizes him for Wilsonian idealism. Like his friend, Brandeis could not, Lipsky implied, perceive the foreign European viewpoint. In regard to the triumvirate leadership proposal tied to the Brandeis economic plan mentioned above and the Justice's decision to decline the leadership, Lipsky issues his harshest attack. Lipsky says that "He [Brandeis] declined and the plans for this leadership proposal ended.... He had a number of reasons. They seemed to satisfy at the time but they were not related to the interests of the Jewish People. They bore a relationship to other interests and obligations."²⁵

Lipsky reports that the American delegation returned defeated in

that they had not played a significant role in the final outcome. Weizmann was in full control of the Executive. Brandeis, Lipsky felt, was responsible for this because of his hesitancy and ultimate refusal of active leadership. He accuses Brandeis of exhibiting less than full loyalty to the cause and describes the program of separate American action which Brandeis revealed in the Zeeland Memorandum (below) as being divisive. He and others warned Brandeis that his indirect personal leadership would no longer be acceptable.

Another view of the London Conference is found in the memoirs of Julius Simon. A German Jew by birth and rearing, though an American citizen by fact of his parents having lived in the United States prior to his birth and having maintained their U.S. citizenship, Simon was a long-time friend of Weizmann's through their Zionist activities in Europe. During World War I, his American passport allowed him to be the link between the English and German Zionists. He first met Brandeis on the latter's trip to London in 1919. Despite his long friendship with Weizmann, Simon sides with Brandeis regarding the issues of economic development and reorganization of the Zionist commission. In his autobiography, he details his recollections of the negotiations in London.

Simon's basic difference with both DeHaas and Lipsky is his firm belief that Brandeis was prepared in 1920 to assume Zionist leadership even if it meant leaving the court. Simon recalls that he and DeHaas both counselled Brandeis to assume active leadership while Felix Frankfurter advised against Brandeis leaving the court. In an exchange of correspondence with Evyatar Friesel, editor of his memoirs, Simon states:

When you ask me whether Mr. Brandeis was ready to step down from the Bench, I can only say that certainly only if Dr. Weizmann was ready to stand squarely uncompromisingly behind him. The Reading plan might have been the first step toward Brandeis' ultimate resignation from the Bench since Mr. Brandeis would have been one of the members of the committee of seven. 26

The Reading plan is the name of the proposal which DeHaas refers to above. Weizmann, according to both DeHaas and Simon, undercut this agreement convincing Mond and Rothschild to back out. Simon explains the basic point of the plan to be:

- 1) The Zionist Congresses be suspended for three or four years so as to give the new Executive a breathing spell and a chance to lay the new foundation of the National Home unhampered by political rivalry.
- 2) An Executive be formed of seven members, four Zionists, three of whom should be Weizmann, Sokolow, and Bernard Flexner, three Britishers: Sir Alfred Mond, James de Rothschild and Sir Robert Waley-Cohen; and Brandeis to be the seventh member. Lord Reading felt that he could not join because of his government position as Lord Chief Justice of England. He said to Brandeis: 'You are acquainted with conditions in Anglo-Saxon countries so we the British can agree that the Zionists on the Executive form the majority, if you will be the fourth Zionist member.' Brandeis was willing. 27

Simon later stated to Friesel in another exchange of letters, that even after Weizmann had destroyed the Reading plan, Brandeis would have assumed an active position on the Executive if and only if Dr. Weizmann had himself had offered it. He further expounds that he had been counselling his old friend Weizmann to do just that from the beginning of the conference.

When I arrived in London I went straight to Weizmann, who asked me, 'What message do you bring from America?' I said, 'Chaim, you have rendered an immortal service to

the cause of Zionism. Now I ask you to crown your work by offering leadership to Brandeis.' (Later I told the story to Felix Frankfurter who observed, 'You could not have said anything worse.') 28

Simon, perhaps due to his advance age of 90 at the time of the interview, appears rather naive in commenting to Friesel that had Weizmann taken his advice, given up the leadership and returned to his chemistry,

His image in history would be brighter today.... When the time was right a grateful nation would have recalled him for the presidency as the Romans had recalled Cincinnatus from his plow. 29

Weizmann mentions neither the Reading plan nor the triumverate which DeHaas, Simon, and Lipsky have detailed. Rather, in Trial and Error, he brushes over the London Conference quite rapidly making mention of Brandeis' objections to the budget proposal and his own plans for a Jewish Agency, which Brandeis thought to be unnecessarily redundant. Yet at the Cleveland Convention, Weizmann does take credit for opposing the Reading Plan and its economic proposals which Brandeis later formulated in the so-called Zeeland Memorandum. Weizmann stated in Cleveland after the vote of no confidence:

Possibly it was a good plan, possibly it was a bad plan.... But it was said that one of the members of the Executive wrecked this plan. The wrecker of this plan was myself... 30

Up to this point the entire conflict seems to be based more upon personality conflict than ideology. If the Brandeis group had resigned in London, Weizmann's theme describing the conflict as "Pinsk versus Washington" would be correct. However, this was not the

case. To the personality conflict was added a substantial conflict over the economic ideology which would govern the task of the upbuilding of Palestine. The issue itself was the rules governing the Keren Hayesod as resolved by the London Conference. Weizmann's desire for centralized control of all Zionist activities led him to make a coalition with the socialists in support of a single fund commingling donation and investments under the absolute control of a Keren Hayesod executive to be appointed by the World Zionist executive. Brandeis opposed this proposal on grounds that it was unworkable in the United States. His spokesmen stressed that such a plan would be in violation of the American tax laws, prohibiting contributors from claiming income tax deductions. The American counter-proposal was a request for national autonomy. They urged that each federation set up its own fund-raising mechanism which could thus best respond to the unique societal conditions of its home communities. The American Plan was defeated in London.

CHAPTER TWO: THE BRANDEIS-WEIZMANN CONFLICT: The Splintering of the Movement

Returning from London, Brandeis and his associates decided that they could not follow the letter of the London resolution. In the Zeeland Memorandum, formulated by the American delegation aboard the U.S.S. Zeeland, the ship upon which they were traveling back to America, Brandeis states his goal for the Zionist movement:

To populate Palestine with a body of mainly self-supporting Jews who will develop into a homogeneous people with high Jewish ideals; and will develop and apply these Jewish spiritual and intellectual ideals; and will ultimately become a self-governing commonwealth. 31

He goes on to assert that development of Palestine would require three types of funds for the support of different needed purposes:

A. Investments for support of:

- 1) Palestine Government Loan,
- 2) Jewish Colonial Trust, Anglo-Palestine Company, and a Land Mortgage Bank.

B. Quasi-investments:

- 3) Zion Commonwealth,
- 4) Stock of Hydro-Electric Power, Light, Irrigation, and Drainage Plant,
- 5) Dwelling Projects,
- 6) Certain agricultural undertakings.

C. Gifts:

- 7) Medical unit,
- 8) Research in aid of Palestine, Applied Science,
- 9) Afforestation,
- 10) University, Libraries, Museums, and the like,
- 11) Land Purchase,
- 12) Current Educational need. 32

This proposal is incorporated into the Keren Hayesod resolution of

the Z.O.A. conference at Buffalo, November 28, 1920. Both the London and Buffalo resolutions were published in the New Palestine prior to the Cleveland Convention in May, 1921.

The Zeeland Memorandum deals with the economic problems of developing a new state. Brandeis very carefully and exactly differentiates between the areas of social development in which public funds and private capital would be used. He speaks of the need for investments and quasi-investments as well as gifts. Brandeis was a liberal who still believed in the free enterprise capitalist system. The path of development which the Yishuv was destined to take was contrary to his own economic ideology. Communal ownership not only of the land but also of the major economic organs of the society did become the practical reality. The economic dominance of the public over the private sector -- with all its ramifications both positive and negative which still exist in Israel today -- stems from this basic decision. Thus, amidst what appeared to be superficially a conflict of personality, a crucial basic ideological decision concerning the economic system of the Jewish State was made. With the emergence of the dominant personality, Weizmann, there also arose the decision concerning the primary economic system.

Geller in dealing with this problem of conflicting economic systems, presents documented statements concerning the attempts made by various associates of our protagonists to reach a compromise on their ideological differences over an economic plan. Geller states that, "as late as February 4, 1921, L.J. Stein who was Weizmann's secretary ... submitted
33
a proposal marked 'STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.' "

Continuing, Geller further comments concerning this document that:

In that document he suggests a re-organization that would create an Executive including Justice Brandeis, Sir Alfred Mond, Mr. Sokolow, and Dr. Weizmann... though Brandeis would not be available for day to day administration.... And it is interesting to note that Dr. Simon would stand for efficiency, for a sound financial policy and for a business-like handling of the practical work of reconstruction. And the proposal even discusses the removal of Ussishkin. 34

Julius Simon was placed upon the Executive, as a watch-dog for the Brandeis group. He had already resigned at the time of the above-mentioned confidential memo. His resignation, along with that of his colleague, Nehamia de Lieme, of Denmark, was precipitated by Weizmann's failure to respond to their call for a reorganization of the World Zionist Organization. In their letter of resignation which accompanied their detailed report on the economic situation of the Organization, they called for a more efficient Executive in Palestine and the strengthening of the Executive by the fair sharing of responsibility by the Europeans with the American and English Jews. They accused Weizmann of ignoring their counsel and elevating his own East European friends and the Keren Hayesod which they managed and dominated to the level of the real decisions makers, rather than they, the members of the Executive.

Hope for resolution through cooperation seemed impossible. The Brandesians attack Weizmann for usurping power from the Executive. Weizmann's secretary, immediately after this accusation was made but prior to its being made public, offers a plan whereby Brandeis would have equal weight with Weizmann on the Executive. It is too late for this now. Simon and de Lieme are really saying nothing new in their letter. Rather, they only report the same inefficiencies and offer

the same critiques Brandeis had offered two years prior upon his own visit to Palestine. Therefore, assuming the integrity of the factual side of the report alone indicates that no change had occurred during this time. Those who in 1920 were directing the work in Palestine, who supported and in turn were supported by Weizmann, had ignored the Brandeis plea for efficiency based upon capitalistic economics and had continued to formulate policy on the ideological ideal rather than the practical need.

After the formulation of the Zeeland Memorandum the battle lines of the finale were irreversibly drawn. Brandeis had repeated the Weizmann method of placing his ideological position in a concrete formal statement. Any movement now on either side would require retreat. Paradoxically, while choosing to fix his stands firmly on the multiple areas of Zionist concerns and needs, Brandeis simultaneously retreated from public Zionist view, allowing his associates, Rabbis Stephen S. Wise and Abba Hillel Silver, and most prominently Judge Julian Mack, to defend his position and deal with the Weizmann group. DeHaas and others feel that the reluctance to counteract the great personal campaign Weizmann staged in America in early 1921 was the real cause of the results at Cleveland. Brandeis simply would not fight and thereby, in his view, lower the stature of a Supreme Court Justice. Weizmann fought on hard, attacking the American leadership collectively rather than the Justice personally. The strategy paid off in victory at Cleveland.

Lipsky, in his continuation of the narrative past London, states that, upon returning to the United States, Brandeis effectively ended

many of the basic organizational units of the Z.O.A. which had political-cultural overtones. Das Yiddishe Folk and the Maccabaeans were abandoned and closed, the educational department was given up, and Young Judea and the Intercollegiate Zionist Association were left to their own resources. Lipsky understood these actions to support his feelings that the Brandeis group did consider the political work finished, and further, that the needed economic development would be done on a capitalistic basis. Lipsky said:

Thus the way was being prepared for an open clash with the world Zionist leadership, for if America was to be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Zionist Executive, how could the obligations of the Zionist Organization in Palestine be met? 35

Lipsky, claiming that he had no other choice, tenders an invitation to Dr. Weizmann without the approval of the Z.O.A. Executive, to come to America for the purpose of intervening in American Zionist affairs. His justification was the failure of the Brandeis group to carry out the wish of the London Conference, to establish the Keren Hayesod in America. Brandeis had refused. Weizmann had the authority as chief executive to take just that step -- declare the Keren Hayesod in America.

Learning of Lipsky's invitation and Weizmann's planned trip, the Brandeis group refused to give a public reception for Weizmann. Angered by this slight, Lipsky and others of the then minority faction organized a general Jewish reception committee and mass meeting. Lipsky's critical tone at this refusal by Brandeis to publicly greet the man who was coming to undercut his leadership is unexplainable. Did he really think it proper for the American Supreme Court Justice, after

being publicly snubbed and ignored by Weizmann and the English Zionists a few months earlier when he was leading an official delegation, to now give this man the honor and respect of a formal public greeting? Lipsky was also aware that Brandeis had sent Judge Mack out to meet Weizmann on board his ship before disembarkation for the presentation of a compromise plan which hopefully would save the unity of Zionism. Nevertheless, Lipsky now openly and publicly sided with Weizmann and immediately began the well organized public campaign on the grass roots level that was to spell defeat for Brandeis at Cleveland.

Weizmann admits that the purpose of his trip was three-fold: 1) to establish the Keren Hayesod; 2) to awaken interest in the Hebrew University; and finally, 3) to form the base of a Jewish Agency. In other words, Weizmann by his own account came with no intention of compromise or negotiation with the American leadership. He had his "game plan" and would no longer accept any modifications. The Weizmann version of the Mack Memorandum was that it called for strong local federations at the expense of the world body. In explaining his rejection of the offer, Weizmann first explains that he lacked the power to accept it and then proceeded to knock the entire philosophy of the Brandeis group as being not only economically unfeasible but also less than fully loyal to Jewish nationalism. He said concerning the Mack Memorandum:

In this there was a reflection of the deeper and less conscious, therefore less overtly formulated feelings of the Brandeis group about the organic unity of World Jewry. ... My colleagues and I knew that 'private initiative' would not be feasible to any significant extent before the Jewish people in its corporate national capacity had made the financial effort which would create the foundations of the Homeland.

The Weizmann strategy was to appeal to the masses of the East European Jews in America over the heads of their Central European leaders. Therefore, this double strategy of appealing to the socialist ideological feelings which some of the new immigrants held dear along with the sometimes vocal and always latent hostility that the East European felt for his German cousin who dominated him, was guaranteed success. Weizmann the great politician had once again correctly analyzed his constituency and made the proper appeal that assured victory.

The basis of the Mack proposal was the two resolutions passed by the Z.O.A. executive on April 19, 1921, appended to this chapter. The hope evident in this proposal was that Weizmann would agree to at least a limited autonomy for the American Zionists in regard to the Keren Hayesod. In exchange for this they were willing to join the executive until the Zionist Congress later that year when the legal legislative body of the Zionist Organization could finally decide the issue. According to DeHaas the negotiations parallel the breakdown in London over the Reading plan. Weizmann first agrees and then violates his agreement. DeHaas' view of this final effort at compromise is supported by copies of the correspondence between Mack and Weizmann published in the New Palestine of April 21, 1921. By this time Weizmann is unwilling to negotiate in private, but chooses to conduct open, public negotiations through the publishing of his letter to Mack in the American Yiddish press. In an article in the London Jewish Chronicle, May 27, 1921, Weizmann publicly declares to the Jewish world that the clash had reached the point where compromise would not be the outcome. The strength of his attack further indicates his own confidence in

victory. In his bitterly worded article he very clearly calls for the repudiation of Brandeis and his group:

The American Zionist leaders have criticized rather severely the work of the Zionist Commission ... they were not offered in : spirit of friendship nor for the purpose of dreaming about an improvement However this may be, I would consider it proper for the American leaders to assume control and responsibility for the management of the World Zionist Organization through direct participation in our work in London and Palestine.... But unfortunately they ... refuse to participate in the leadership of the movement. They have no time.... They are not ready to make the necessary sacrifices.... 37

Weizmann is clearly preparing the British public for the following week's events in Cleveland announcing the resignation of Brandeis, Mack and their followers, when he says, "I am convinced that the possibilities for the Zionist movement in America are almost unlimited; but first 38 of all America must creat real Zionists...."

THE CLEVELAND CONVENTION

A reading of the transcript of the twenty-fourth annual convention of the Z.O.A. leaves one with the clear impression that the battle for control was lost before the pounding of the gavel. Lipsky, in the spirit of American politics, had diligently garnered grass-roots support during the six months between the Buffalo convention and the Cleveland meeting. He had succeeded in getting a majority of his supporters elected as delegates. Proof of the opposition's support came early when after Mack and Weizmann delivered opening addresses to the assembly, the first order of business was the election of a convention chairman. Stephen Wise nominates Mack. In a less volatile situation the election of the organization's president as convention chairman would have been accepted

without opposition. Morris Rothenberg, however, nominates Judge Henry Dannenbaum to oppose Mack. After a rather brief but angry debate Dannenbaum is elected chairman of the convention by a vote of 139-75. The strength of the Weizmann-Lipsky forces is evident.

Henry Dannenbaum proves to be a rather staunch and out-spoken adversary to the Brandeis forces. A Jew from Texas, he illustrates both here in Cleveland and later in the controversy between the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal a deep resentment and distrust for the East Coast German-Jewish establishment. At the end of this first session, Dannenbaum rejects totally the contention presented earlier by Mack, that the leadership had honestly sought compromise with the Weizmann forces. His statement amounts to a direct personal chastisement of Judge Mack himself.

The second session of the conference marks the final ouster of the Brandeis group preceded by an extremely vicious debate characterized by personal attacks upon the leading protagonists on both sides.

Bernard Rosenblatt, who was to play a central role in opposing the "economic Palestinianism" of the Marshall and Brandeis forces a few years later, was one of the chief attackers of Mack's presentation to the convention. Refuting Mack's insistence that Weizmann had first agreed and then backed out of a compromise resolution on the Keren Hayesod, Rosenblatt states that his role as mediator between Weizmann and Mack had been made impossible by Mack's refusal to accept the central authority of the World Zionist Organization. Mack rebuts that charge by emphasizing that his proposed compromise included a promise "that Dr. Weizmann would be guaranteed at the Congress my and Brandeis'

support and co-operation for complete re-organization of the World
Executive, names to be considered by both in conference." ³⁹ The
only condition for their support was Weizmann's support of the Keren
Hayesod to be constituted in America strictly as a donation fund. Each
side in this hot and disorderly debate accused the other side of dishonesty.
Each side claimed to represent not only the true will of the Jewish
People but to be the standard bearer for the principles of American
Democracy. Where Mack refers to the American principles of individual
and state autonomy, Rosenblatt counters with precedents from American
history regarding the conflict between Federalism and States' rights.
These two U.S. Judges thus interject into this debate on the future of
a Jewish homeland parallels from the then salient issue of American
politics, regarding state versus federal rights. Mack claims the state
level, in this case the national federation, has the ultimate right;
Rosenblatt, comparing the World Organization to the United States Federal
Government, asserts that the state, i.e., the Z.O.A., has no right to
interfere in the fund raising efforts of the Federal level, i.e., the
W.Z.O. From the response of the assembly as recorded by interjections
of applause in the text, Rosenblatt wins the argument.

Stephen Wise introduces a motion for a vote of confidence in the
Mack Administration. Morris Neuman counters with a resolution to
reject the Wise resolution and to disapprove of the actions of the
Executive of the Z.O.A. Wise in a rather long and detailed speech cites
the great accomplishments of the Brandeis group in the Zionist cause.
He states, among other things, that Brandeis and his American associates,
were the key to the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. He praises

Brandeis' accomplishments in securing a platform for Weizmann at the Peace Conference at Paris and the integral part that the Justice and his associates played in quieting the riots in Jerusalem and securing the mandate at San Remo. He then attacks the Europeans for excluding the Americans from decision-making positions. He asserts that Weizmann and his executive turn to the Americans only for money. Wise then affirms that the Brandeis group's only concern is for the safeguarding of the funds collected. Emphasizing that he, Silver and Mack had personally raised the majority of the funds, he states: "the objection is not to the safeguards but to the guardians." ⁴⁰ Knowing that despite his efforts the battle was already lost, Wise promises that he and his associates, if defeated, will relinquish their leadership, but will not leave the cause.

Following Wise's speech, a new attack upon the Brandeis group is leveled by the pro-Weizmann forces. It is the accusation of deliberate exclusion on the part of the Brandeis group of the non-Zionist elite of American Jewry from work for Palestine. This attack hits at the second major objection of Brandeis to Weizmann's position at London; the formation of a coalition Jewish Agency for Palestine to include Zionists and non-Zionists. Brandeis's position had been that if people wished to participate in the upbuilding of Palestine they should join the Zionist organization. His agreement to the Reading Plan, mentioned above, illustrated his understanding of how this could be facilitated. Weizmann, on the other hand, felt that the Zionist Organization should keep its ideological position of seeking a political state. Correctly surmising that the non-Zionist elite of America would not subscribe to this, he wanted to create a mechanism for their participation in the practical work of

building Palestine. In other words, regardless of their ideological position on the question of Zionism, Weizmann wanted their money. Brandeis and Mack did not. Their position was affected by more than ideology. Brandeis and Stephen Wise in particular had been in conflict with the American Jewish Committee for many years, over issues of major concern on both the American and Jewish scene. Both had made their mark in defence of the "little man" in opposition to the upper class of American society of which this group was so visibly a part. Zionism was the area of their dominance. They had no desire to share their position with the "uptown Jews" of the American Jewish Committee.

The issue reaches a climax when Louis Lipsky himself states:

I want to state clearly now that a vote of confidence is asked for all these acts of the administration. If we give that vote of confidence the Keren Hay'sod is voted away; the World Zionist Organization is repudiated; the separatist policy as expressed in the memorandum is approved. 41

Despite a final plea by Felix Frankfurter for support of the administration, the Brandeis group loses the vote of confidence 153-71.

Mack then reads a letter from Justice Brandeis who had not been present at the convention:

With the principles and policies adopted by the National Executive Committee under your leadership, I am in complete agreement. Strict adherence to those principles is demanded by the high Zionist ideals. Steadfast pursuit of these policies is essential to early and worthy development of Palestine as the Jewish Homeland. We who believe in these principles and policies cannot properly take part in any administration of Zionist affairs which repudiates

them. Upon the delegates in convention assembled rests the responsibility of deciding whether those principles and policies shall prevail in the immediate future. If their decision is adverse, you will, I assume resign and in that event, present also my resignation as honorary president. Our place will then be as humble soldiers in the ranks where we may hope to hasten by our struggling the coming of the day when the policies in which we believe will be recognized as the only ones through which our great ends may be achieved. 42

Mack then tendered his own resignation as President, ending his response to the vote by reading a list of thirty-seven members of the Executive who were likewise resigning their positions in protest to the vote. The convention recessed.

The following day, with the Brandeis group absenting itself from the proceedings, Weizmann issued what the New Palestine called
43
"Dr. Weizmann's Reply to his Critics." Weizmann's "reply" was an attack. He chastises the American leaders for not speaking Hebrew. He alludes to a paranoic attitude among them when he states:

Great emphasis has been laid by Rabbi Wise on the services which have been rendered by the American leaders to the Zionist cause. This statement reminds me very much of the constant emphasis which is laid upon the fact that you are good Americans, -- as though any attempt had ever been made either in public or private to depreciate their services. 44

He then continues by minimizing the American role in securing the Balfour Declaration. Weizmann asserts the heavy burden he is forced to carry as leader of the movement and the absolute impossibility for compromise with the Brandeis group, which he characterizes as being totally out of touch with the masses of the Jewish People. He states as if speaking directly to Brandeis and Mack:

I do not agree with a single item of your program. I do not agree with the philosophy of your Zionism, your conception of Jewishness. We are different -- absolutely different. There is no bridge between Washington and Pinsk. It is not the fault of Washington and not the fault of Pinsk, but we will try to build the bridge with our blood. If these people are ready to take the responsibility and go through the same hell through which I and my friends are going, we will give them all the powers and all the responsibility. 45

This composite picture of the conflict reveals to us the three levels of difference between Weizmann and Brandeis: the personal ego conflict, the sociological barriers and the ideological differences. The latter partly results from the first two but develops along its own course as the sequence of events progresses. Chaim Weizmann and Louis D. Brandeis each represent the finest of the two variant breeds of English-speaking Jews. The latter, the product of assimilation, has nevertheless retained a Jewish identity though acculturation to the West is the dominant force in his personality and ideology. The former is the newly arrive immigrant who, though physically living in the West, remains emotionally and intellectually a part of the all-encompassing Jewish milieu of the East European shtetl. Each is a pioneer; each a visionary; and each a stubborn and egocentric individual. Both men were of the strain that went searching for and found greatness. Each produced history rather than merely being a product of it.

The conflict between these two leaders was indeed tragic. It was perhaps also unavoidable because of their personalities. The morality, dignity, and idealism which made Louis D. Brandeis the great Justice he was, also narrowed any ground for ideological compromise. The total cultural assimilation of his background made him a foreigner in European

Jewish circles. The strong, shrewd Weizmann, while capable of great latitude in ideology, was a centralist at his core. He believed totally in the value of centralized control. He believed further that he was destined to be that control for the emerging Jewish national movement. He could not allow Brandeis a share of power or an ounce of independence, lest his entire power base melt away. Weizmann the statesman-politician recognized this and properly programmed against it. Their positions reflected not only the differences of the variant Jewish origins but also the economic-political ideology of their respective countries, the United States and Great Britain. The American Justice's economic policy was designed for the creation of an independent state, free economically as well as politically of foreign domination. Weizmann's whole program for development was centered around British colonial control. To Weizmann, the semi-autonomous position of being free within the British Empire was a sufficient, practical goal.

Following the Cleveland Convention, the Zionist cause in America was in shambles. Statistics in the American Jewish Yearbook show that between September, 1920, and September, 1921, the dues-paying members of the Z.O.A. drop from 176,658 to 24,320. The organization had literally collapsed with the resignation of its Executive. Not until the rise of Nazism in the 1930's would the membership in the Z.O.A. approach the mass numbers it had prior to this conflict.

Neither Weizmann nor Brandeis desert the Zionist cause in America following Cleveland. Rather they sought to vindicate their positions by proceeding forward with their respective programs. Brandeis and his associates organized the Palestine Development Council, while Weizmann

established the Keren Hayesod in America and proceeded forward with negotiations for an expanded Jewish Agency. In the process of each pursuit, both groups ultimately had to turn to the same third group for support. This group was the American Jewish economic elite who on the whole were the backbone of the Joint Distribution Committee and the American Jewish Committee. Their leading member, Louis Marshall, was to play a central role in the Zionist Cause from 1921 until his death in 1929.

The events of the following six years follow out of this conflict, and are described in the subsequent chapters of this paper. Weizmann had advocated separate organizations for political and practical work in order to facilitate^a coalition with Marshall and his followers for the practical work of settlement. Brandeis had totally rejected the seeking of a coalition with the Marshall group. Yet, in the six years subsequent to the Brandeis ouster, Weizmann was to observe a bitter conflict between his supporters in the Zionist Organization of America and the Marshall group. Brandeis, on the other hand, was to watch his associates reject his counsel and form a solid coalition with the Marshall led, non-Zionists in the creation of the Palestine Economic Corporation.

CHAPTER THREE: THE EXIT OF LOUIS BRANDEIS FROM THE ZIONIST CAUSE

Immediately following the Cleveland Convention a sub-committee of the defeated administration met in Washington with Justice Brandeis to discuss their future in the Zionist cause. This meeting on June 10, 1921, led to the calling of a conference of the Zionist supporters of their administration and certain non-Zionists whose interest in the economic development of Palestine was in concurrence with the ideology of the Brandeis group. The culmination of the larger meeting was the establishment of a new organizational structure designed to facilitate capital investment in Palestine. The Palestine Development Leagues and their coordinating body, the Palestine Development Council (P.D.C.), were organized on the basis of Brandeis' three point platform for the economic development of Palestine as outlined in the Zeeland Memorandum. (See Chapter One.)

The Palestine Development Council never succeeded in making a significant contribution of its own to the upbuilding of Palestine because of a lack of funds. The reasons for its failure to raise the needed capital rest basically upon the separatist approach taken by its organizers, and a lack of active involvement by Justice Brandeis himself. Only after some of his associates, most notably Bernard Flexner, Julius Simon and Judge Mack agree to join forces with Louis Marshall does the economic corporation plan meet with success. As a prelude to this chapter, I will describe the formation of the Palestine Development Council and its subsidiary organizations. Its limited successes and its ultimate failure will be discussed and analyzed. The successful realization of the Brandeis plan will be dealt with in a later chapter

devoted to the formation of the Palestine Economic Corporation under the guidance of Bernard Flexner and Louis Marshall.

At the original organizational meeting of June 10, 1921, Brandeis laid down the ground rules for his future role in the Zionist cause. He urged his associates, (Wise, Mack, DeHaas and Flexner, among others, were present) to retire completely from the political arena of Zionism. All of his supporters were to resign from any offices they held in local Zionist branches, while maintaining their membership in the Z.O.A. He rejected Mack's proposal that they make a fight on the issue at the Zionist Congress to be held later that year. Brandeis informed the assembled group that he had resigned as Honorary President of the World Zionist Organization and had no intention of either attending himself or of sending a representative to the upcoming Congress. By freeing themselves from the political entanglements of the movement, Brandeis argued, they could proceed to the more important task of developing the Jewish Homeland by providing for the economic needs of the new settlers and developing the land itself as a stimulus for further immigration of Jews.

Brandeis explained to his friends his ideas for the formation of an organization to facilitate investments in Palestine by various Jewish groups and individuals in the United States. The central organization would in his words: "Select through proper means the several things we want to do; to do these things and not talk about doing them; and to do nothing else."⁴⁶ His proposal for an initial practical project was the formation of a cooperative wholesale organization which could enable the people of Palestine to procure the basic commodities needed

at the lowest possible cost. He urged that his associates quickly raise an estimated \$250,000 (for initial capitalization) so they could proceed immediately.

In connection with his proposal Brandeis did not miss the opportunity to make an indirect attack upon Weizmann and the Zionist Organization program.

We are the Zionists who want to perform some practical work. The time when talking was the needed Zionist work ended quite a while ago. Our task is to approach Jews who feel as we do and afford them the opportunity of action on the lines indicated... all funds collected for a specific project should go there and will not be used for administering the collecting of funds.... 47

From the general tone of this statement and specific innuendoes such as these, it is evident that a motivating force behind the scheme to organize an economic corporation was Brandeis' personal desire to vindicate his position vis-a-vis Weizmann.

A conference was called for July 3, to discuss the possibility of creating the envisioned organizations. Brandeis, however, did not attend. The burden of selling the concept to members of the former administration and a small selected group of interested non-Zionists fell to DeHaas and Julian Mack. Therein lay one of the prime reasons why the Palestine Development Council and its affiliated Leagues never lived up to expectation. Brandeis was again retreating from public leadership of his cause. Mack and particularly DeHaas who assumed the principal roles of Chairman and Secretary, respectively, lacked the charisma, and in DeHaas' case the stature, needed to organize and carry through successfully such an ambitious program. The defeat at Cleveland, rather

than inspiring Brandeis to take the more active role needed to gain support for his program, caused him to retreat to a position of near total invisibility. His semi-public appearances were to become even less frequent than before.

The minutes of the Palestine Development Associates meeting of July 3 and 4, 1921, reveal a split in the previously solid forces of the Brandeis group. Mack presented a basic outline of Brandeis' position stated at the June meeting. He urged the adoption of three specific projects; the cooperative wholesale society, a credit union, and a trading company, to be carried out in an a-political atmosphere. Robert Szold, who was to take an active interest in both the P.D.C. and later the Palestine Economic Corporation (P.E.C.) supported unequivocally the anti-Weizmann approach of Brandeis. At the first session of the conference, he stated in support of Mack's proposal:

It seems to me that in the Zionist movement we have had what has happened in other movements, a conflict between the practical man who wants immediate accomplishments and the dreamer and visionary who sees the goal far ahead and is impatient of practical details ... whatever be your motive, if we are agreed on the one concrete thing, to rebuild the Jewish Homeland, you must go on with the steps and the steps necessitate economic foundation. 48

Mack then appoints a committee chaired by Judge Hugo Pam to formulate a specific proposal for the work of this group.

The Pam report, as expected, produces a formal resolution reflective of the Brandeis plan. It provides for five specific projects:

- 1) a cooperative wholesale company,
- 2) a construction company,
- 3) an Industrial Development Company (for long term loans),

- 4) a Building and Loan Association,
- 5) an agricultural Loan Company (to provide money for farming machinery for farmers. 49

The Pam Committee estimated that the Cooperative Company would need a starting capital of \$250,000 immediately, and a minimum of at least a million dollars soon afterward, if it was to succeed. The proposal was adopted and Mack urged the delegates to subscribe.

A second resolution passed by this conference supported the decision of Brandeis to retreat from the political arena of Zionism. It states that:

The Palestine Development Council does not regard it within the scope of its purpose to participate as a group in the internal affairs of the Zionist Organization of America, or the World Zionist Organization. Individuals, however, affiliated with the P.D.C. who are members of the Zionist organization may properly participate in the work of the local, national, or world organizations. 50

This proposal and the announcement of the decision by Mack that neither he nor Brandeis would attend the upcoming Congress met the violent opposition of Abba Hillel Silver. Silver had been one of Brandeis' strongest supporters and ablest fund raisers during the previous era of Zionist activity in America. He now demanded that the Brandeis group stay together and fight as a group from within the structure of the Zionist movement. He proposed that they either constitute themselves a minority faction within the Z.O.A. or, preferably, seek admittance to the World Zionist Organization as a separate organization similar to the Labor Zionists or Mizrahi. This is rejected by the group. Mack has support from the small number of non-Zionists who have agreed to join the P.D.C., but wish to stay completely clear of any involvement in Zionist politics. The former administration members wishing to

present their case to the Zionist Congress prepare a report to be distributed to delegates. This is their only response to Silver's plea. The rejection of this proposal resulted in less than full activity by Silver and others of the former administration who shared his view. Neither Silver nor Stephen Wise become members of the executive of the Palestine Development Council. They both did serve on the central committee of the Palestine Development Leagues. However, the organizational structure of the two organizations gave the power and work load to the "council." Silver and a year later Wise were also the first members of the Brandeis group to reenter active participation in the Z.O.A. and the Keren Hayesod. Their non-participation by choice in the active pursuits of the Palestine Development Council denied the new organization its most dynamic fund raisers. With Brandeis playing a continually more passive role, only DeHaas and Mack were left of the major figures in the former administration. The results of this splintering of forces was felt at the close of the conference in Pittsburgh. Mack and Brandeis had assumed that the initial \$250,000 for the cooperative company would be subscribed fully at this conference. The bitterness of the debate between Silver and Mack and the non-visibility of Brandeis contributed to the inability to raise even half this amount.

Nevertheless, Mack proceeded with the project. The Palestine Development Leagues were incorporated in 1922 with the Palestine Development Council as its executive coordinating arm. The preamble to the League's constitution read in part:

The Jewish homeland must become self sustaining. Effort and capital are the means with which we start. But, all enterprises must be so conducted that they can eventually

be purchased and controlled by the Palestinians. 51

Concerning the Palestine Development Council, the document stated:

In order for a local league to be represented on the P.D.C. it must have a minimum of twenty-five members and have raised a minimum of \$5,000 in subscriptions.... No part of the capital raised for the P.D.C. undertakings except taxes and business charges will be expended in the U.S. The organization expense of the P.D.C. is being provided from the administration funds of the central committee. This is a purely voluntary fund and the Leagues are looked to to first make some contribution to it and secondly to limit the need for it by undertaking all efforts locally. 52

The Palestine Cooperative Company was organized. It did begin operation in Palestine in 1923. In cooperation with Baron de Rothschild, initial financing was promised for the hydro-electric project of Pinchas Rutenberg. The Palestine Electric Company which finally resulted came into being, however, only after funds from the Marshall-Warburg group were ultimately invested. The other points of the initial resolution, a building and loan association, a construction company and an industrial bank were created, but lacked the capital needed to fulfill their goals. Mack, Bernard Flexner, and Julius Simon soon came to realize that without the financial backing of men like Louis Marshall, Felix Warburg, and the Lehmans, the practical work they wished to accomplish could not be undertaken.

Seeking the involvement of the wealthy "uptown" Jews of the American Jewish Committee and Joint Distribution Committee was the logical move for the Palestine Development Council. In Louis Marshall, the acknowledged leader of the "uptown" group, the P.D.C. had a sympathetic ear. Marshall had been extremely sympathetic to the development of Palestine as a place for Jewish settlement even before the Balfour

Declaration. In 1918, he managed to have the American Jewish Committee, with a membership including some of Zionism's most bitter opponents, issue a vote of support for the Balfour Declaration. As chairman of the American Jewish delegation to the Peace Conference he had supported Zionist efforts in securing the British mandate. Though avowedly non-Zionist, Marshall's ideological position on the methodology of developing Palestine for Jewish settlement was parallel to that of the P.D.C. He was active during 1922 and 1923 in political lobbying toward a congressional resolution by the United States Congress in support of a British Mandate based upon the Balfour Declaration.

Brandeis opposed joining forces with Marshall. In a letter to DeHaas and Mack regarding political pressure on the State Department toward obtaining American support for issuing the Mandate, Brandeis states:

As to the Mandate, I approve of J.W.M. [Mack] and S.S.W. [Wise] seeing Hughes [U.S. Secretary of State].... I don't think it advisable to have Marshall join you and there is no one of the Republican Jews whom I should advise as companion. 53

Julius Simon, who had become head of the Palestine Cooperative Company, relates a similar response to his first suggestion of the joining of forces with Marshall and his associates in the American Jewish Committee. Simon quotes Brandeis as saying:

Let the bankers assume their own responsibility for work in Palestine. You go on with your work... it may be small but it will set an example of how to build the country. 54

To understand Brandeis' opposition to the inclusion of Marshall and the "Jewish bankers," one must review the history of the previous ten years of the American Jewish community. Brandeis was never approached by,

nor did he seek membership in the American Jewish Committee. Prior to his entrance into the Zionist movement he was not involved in Jewish affairs. Interaction with the German-Jewish elite had been minimal,⁵⁵ as Geller points out in his thesis. The pressure of various big business elements -- including Jacob Schiff, who along with Marshall was one of the founders of the American Jewish Committee -- had kept Brandeis out of President Wilson's first cabinet. Schiff's later support of Brandeis for the Supreme Court aside, Brandeis, the Democrat and social reform lawyer, had little in common and little contact with his big business oriented Republican co-religionists. American partisan politics was a clear dividing line between the staunchly Democrat Brandeis and the Republicanism of the American Jewish Committee. Whether this had an effect upon his original decision to assume leadership of the Zionist cause which Schiff violently opposed is a matter for conjecture. There is no hard evidence to prove the case.

During World War I, Brandeis did come into direct conflict with the American Jewish Committee (A.J.C.) over the issue of convening a representative American Jewish Congress. When Brandeis assumed the chairmanship of the Provisional Committee in August, 1914, he wrote Marshall proposing the creation of a conference of Jewish organizations and individuals that would broadly represent the American Jewish community. Marshall's response came a year later at a meeting of the Committee-sponsored New York Kehillah. Speaking for the A.J.C.:

The American Jewish Committee has been unable to appreciate that any good can be wrought by the holding of a Congress, but on the contrary can only behold the possibility of infinite mischief. 56

Geller has detailed the struggle between Brandeis and the American Jewish Committee over the Jewish Congress issue. He analyzes the proposal as being perceived by the A.J.C. leaders as a struggle for power in the Jewish Community. Quoting an editorial attack in the New York Times reprimanding Brandeis, a Supreme Court Justice, for entering into public controversies regarding a Jewish Congress, Geller states that:

... a few days after the Times article appeared, Brandeis resigned from the Jewish Congress Organization and the Jewish Relief Organization. His ostensible reason was that the Supreme Court would be occupying most of his time. However, the Times editorial seems to have been decisive in prompting Brandeis to step down. 57

The publisher of the New York Times, Adolph Ochs, was, as Geller indicates, a powerful member of the American Jewish Committee inner circle. Geller accurately states that the editorial had the effect of "the A.J.C. personally telling Brandeis, 'You are not so far up that we cannot deal
58
with you.' "

During the controversy over the Jewish Congress, a number of bitter exchanges had taken place between Brandeis and Marshall. Neither man ever totally forgave the other for personal attacks made in the heat of the controversy. From that point, direct contact between Louis Marshall and Louis Brandeis was rare. Brandeis classified Marshall in the category of anti-Democratic Jewish leaders with whom he could not in conscience cooperate. No doubt the developing association and friendship between Marshall and Chaim Weizmann added to Brandeis' personal dislike of Marshall. Thus, Brandeis' refusal to include Marshall in the Palestine Development Council, while counter-productive to the Zionist cause, was in congruence with the Justice's approach.

Simon's insistence that success for the programs of the P.D.C. required the support of Marshall and other non-Zionists was echoed by Flexner and Mack. With their decision to participate in the non-partisan conference convened by Marshall in 1924, Brandeis withdraws totally from activity in the Zionist cause. After the successful dissolution of the P.D.C. and the P.D.L. assets by merger into the Palestine Economic Corporation (P.E.C.), Brandeis never again held an official position in any Zionist organization. Despite numerous pleas for him to reassume active public leadership, Brandeis confined his activity in the Zionist cause to paying his shekel to the Zionist Organization, making financial contributions to select projects in Palestine, and offering counsel to those of his former associates who came for advice. The steady stream of visits by Wise, Mack and Flexner continued over the next fifteen years. Through them his ideas and concerns retained an audience in the Zionist cause.

CHAPTER FOUR: LOUIS MARSHALL AND HIS NON-ZIONISM

Louis Marshall by his own self-definition was not a Zionist. In numerous private letters and public statements he stressed his non-affiliation and non-identification with the term "Zionist" and the organizations and movement to which the term applied. Yet, Louis Marshall emerges in the 1920's as the key figure in the Zionist cause in America. The leading representative of the "uptown" wealthy American-Jewish community, Marshall formulated an approach toward the issue of Palestine which has become, today, the essence of the American Jewish community's interrelationship with Israel. Louis Marshall's self-definition was that of Jew. He advocated the acceptance of the unifying aspect of the term by all Jews everywhere. His most concise and significant statement of this definition as it relates to the Zionist cause in America came in a speech at a fund-raising meeting for the Keren Hayesod, on March 13, 1923. He said in part:

As one who is not a Zionist, I regard it as a great privilege to have been asked to come here for the purpose of paying tribute to your great leader, to our great leader, Dr. Weizmann.... I told you what I am not. Somebody will probably say, tell us what you are. I can only answer in the ancient words which have resounded through the ages: "Ivri Anochi." I am a Jew. Nothing Jewish is alien to me. I therefore find it entirely consistent to have spoken in this room at the Golden Jubilee of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. I find it consistent to be chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Jewish Theological Seminary and I find it equally consistent to appear here among Zionists to speak for Palestine.... I know not an orthodox Jew or a conservative Jew or a reform Jew. They are all the same to me. We are bound to stand together as a brotherhood, to fight together, to suffer together, and to triumph together.... 59

Marshall attempted to formulate a non-partisan approach to the

upbuilding of Palestine. In fact, his non-partisan non-Zionism was in the broad sense of partisan politics a specific party approach to the Zionist cause. He and his friends among the uptown German-Jewish business elite of the American Jewish community formulated a specific platform for the upbuilding of Palestine. They viewed Palestine and the Zionist work being done there as one of many viable and essential Jewish causes. Marshall saw it as particularly noble. He found it worthy of an extraordinary amount of his time. However, it remained only one of many causes worthy of his philanthropic and emotional support and that of his friends and associates. To the hard-core Zionists, the building of the Jewish Homeland in Palestine was the Jewish cause. Zionism was the only solution to the Jewish problem and therefore the only cause worthy of massive effort by the Jewish People. This fundamental difference in approach to the Zionist cause was to lead to a bitter conflict between Marshall and the Zionist Organization, a conflict to be dealt with in a subsequent chapter. Let us first examine the "shidach" of Louis Marshall, the non-Zionist, to the Zionist cause.

As stated in chapter three, Marshall, unlike many of his fellow members of the German-Jewish elite, never actively opposed the Zionist cause. Neither did he undertake in the pre-War years a direct leadership position of the predominantly East European American Zionist movement, as did Brandeis, Mack Wise or Gottheil. Morton Rosenstock correctly describes Marshall's position in saying:

Marshall occupied a somewhat intermediary position between the two extremes. The vision of Theodore Herzl impressed him, but he did not care for the non-religious side of secular Zionism, and more fundamentally could not subscribe to the sovereign state idea explicit in Herzl's thought.... With the increasing certainty of legislation barring access

to the United States for Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, Marshall clearly saw Palestine as an alternative haven and refuge.... 60

Rosenstock further amplifies Marshall's concern for East European Jewry and the interconnection of that concern with Palestine by quoting from a letter Marshall wrote to Isaac Frank in June, 1921.

There is no other outlet for them. Where shall they go if they desire to better their condition? What objections can there be, therefore, to an effort to establish for them a home in the land of their fathers and enable them to build up the waste places of the Holy Land and to bring about a Renaissance. 61

Marshall, parallel to Zionist thinkers like Pinsker and Nordau, saw in Palestine a "miklat," a refuge for the Jewish people, and a solution to the Jewish problem of Eastern Europe. Echoing the dream of Achad HaAm, he saw in Palestine the potential for a Jewish spiritual renaissance. Political statehood was anathema to both Achad HaAm and Marshall. Unlike these European Zionist or proto-Zionist thinkers, Marshall held a firm belief in the American dream, and its promise for the American Jews. Like both the anti-Zionist and Zionist members of the American Jewish community of German origin, Marshall firmly identified himself as a member of the American nation. Like the vast majority of American Jews both within and outside the Zionist movement, he never seriously considered "aliyah" an option for himself. His non-Zionism was an "other" oriented ideology.

Marshall's approach to Palestine and the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration was congruent with that of most American Jews who proclaimed themselves as Zionists. Brandeis' statements concerning the harmonious interrelationship of being a good American and supporting the building of

a Jewish homeland were paralleled by Marshall's attacks upon anyone who accused American Jews of dual loyalty because of their support for the Cause in Palestine. Ironically, Marshall probably devoted a greater percentage of his social political efforts to strictly Jewish concerns than did either Brandeis or Wise, who loudly proclaimed their identity as Zionists. His approach to the practical task of the economic development of Palestine was totally congruent with the "Brandesian" approach. In essence his definition of non-Zionism as exemplified through his activity was in fact totally parallel with the "Zionism" of the Brandeis group. As stated in the previous chapter, a great tragedy for the Zionist cause in America was the inability of Brandeis and Wise to cooperate constructively with Marshall.

The Brandeis-Weizmann split was the crucial event in elevating Marshall to a position of centrality in the Zionist cause. To replace the support of the Brandeis group, Weizmann needed a new elite capable of raising the massive funds needed for the development of Palestine. Dealing with Marshall was in many ways easier for Weizmann. Since Marshall was outside of the Zionist organization, Weizmann had no reason to demand his loyalty to the ideological program of the movement. In his autobiography, Weizmann's later recollections of Marshall are presented in a more positive light than his recollections of Brandeis, noted above in Chapter One.

My acquaintance with Louis Marshall began in 1919 when he came to Paris as the Head of the American Jewish Delegation to the Peace Conference.... I was greatly impressed by Marshall's personality, his devotion to Jewish matters, and the great wisdom he brought to bear in the discussions. Although counted among the "assimilationists" ... he had a deep sympathy for the national endeavors of the Jewish

communities in Europe.... He had learned Yiddish and followed the Yiddish press closely....

It was a profound mistake to think, as some Zionists did at the time, that Marshall was not representative because he had not been elected; the most important Jewish groups in every city in America looked to him for the lead in communal matters and his attitude went a long way in determining theirs. And yet in one sense he was not representative of his following. He was much nearer to Jews and Judaism; nearer in fact than Brandeis, an ardent Zionist, ever was. For Brandeis, Zionism was an intellectual experiment based on solid foundations of logic and reason. Marshall was hot blooded, capable of generous enthusiasm as well as violent outbursts of anger. 62

Weizmann had achieved his first position of power in the Zionist movement as leader of the democratic faction which opposed Herzl's
63
"pursuit of princes and rulers." He had consolidated his strength in the American movement by appealing for mass support. The major thrust of the Lipsky-Weizmann strategy was the anti-democratic elitism of the Brandeis group. Here we see Weizmann following a parallel course to Herzl in completely negating his earlier position that Zionism must be a democratic mass movement whose leaders are responsive to the masses. From 1921 onward, the major thrust of Weizmann's efforts in America were the co-opting of the "princes" of the American Jewish community as benefactors and supporters of his leadership in the Zionist cause. During the years 1921 - 1929, Weizmann's own activity and the activity of his closest associates including Leonard Stein and Arthur Ruppin were directed toward winning the support of the Marshall-Warburg faction of American Jewry. In the many visits of Stein and Ruppin to America, a greater proportion of their time and energy was dedicated to discussions and receptions with this elite than to aiding the organization of mass support. Thus, as Rabinowicz accurately describes in his critique of Trial and Error, it was Weizmann in his years of power who in actuality

deserted the masses in favor of the pursuit of the "princes and rulers." ⁶⁴

Marshall was, as Weizmann correctly analyzed, the acknowledged leader of the American Jewish community. To recount his innumerable efforts on behalf of individual Jews and the Jewish community would be beyond the scope of this paper. In the years between 1921 and his death in 1929, he, the non-Zionist, represented the link between the warring factions of the Zionist movement. His belief that Jewish affairs must be conducted in an apolitical atmosphere was a motivating force in his effort to seek consolidated Jewish support for the practical work of developing Palestine. Convinced that the political phase of the work had ended with the securing of the Mandate, Marshall was intent upon bringing about a coalition of Jews free from partisan issues who would work together

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in developing a viable economy in Palestine. He chastises Mack for the overt political nature of the Palestine Development Council. He warned him that the political overtones of their program were pushing away the financial supporters whose investments were needed for the success of

⁶⁶
their projects. He also issues a warning to Weizmann that the Zionist Organization's intentions of seeking support through a competitive system of Jewish education in America would be counter-productive to their efforts of winning financial support from the "uptown" Jews ⁶⁷
in America.

Marshall's dedication to the Zionist cause and his perception of the role he had to play are expressed in a response to his son, James, dated March 19, 1923; Marshall explains here why he chose to make a speech at the Keren Hayesod meeting a week earlier. He delineates his attitude toward Zionism and the Keren Hayesod. The congruence of this private statement with the attitude expressed at the public gathering

quoted above illustrates the sincerity of Marshall's convictions and the centrality of Palestine to his Jewish interests.

I have never been a Zionist, am not now, and probably never will be. Nevertheless, I have always been greatly interested in the upbuilding of Palestine....

I have always avoided taking part in the factional politics which have existed in the Zionist Organization. Two years ago, when the division occurred which resulted in the retirement of what you call "the Mack group" I tried to prevent it, and ever since that time I have tried to act as a peace maker, in order to heal differences to the end that the constructive work so essential to the welfare of Palestine might be carried on by the Jews of this country as a united body....

I do not think the American Jew should pay the slightest consideration to the differences which have occurred in the organization but he should do whatever he can to help ... the Jews whose sentiments lead them back to Palestine to do so in safety.... There will be very few Jewish residents of the United States who will ever make Palestine their home, but there are thousands in Eastern Europe who yearn for the opportunity to do so. They should not be subjected to the shipwreck of their hopes merely because Mr. A and Mr. B have engaged in a political quarrel. 68

Marshall, perceiving the dual need of a spiritual center and place of refuge for the Jewish People, was now determined to use his influence and power in bringing about a coalition of Jews capable of guaranteeing the fulfillment of the promise inherent in the British mandate.

THE NON-PARTISAN CONFERENCE I.

By the winter of 1923-1924, Marshall had succeeded in gaining the support of both the Brandeis and Weizmann factions for a program of economic development to be carried out jointly by Zionists and non-Zionists. Weizmann had been urging such participation for three years. Brandeis had acquiesced to the pressure from his associates, as is noted in Chapter Three. Reluctantly the Justice had come to realize the

inevitable necessity of such a coalition. Agreement for cooperation between the Brandeis group and the Zionist Organization had come about only after bitter quarreling among Weizmann and Bernard Flexner, a long time associate of Brandeis and Mack, during an initial series of organizational meetings in the spring and summer of 1923. Marshall in issuing invitations to the private meeting had excluded Mack upon the latter's own request to avoid conflict. Inviting Flexner and Julius Simon as representative of the Palestine Development Council resulted in conflict which threatened to destroy Marshall's plan from the start. In a letter to Jacob Billikopf, he expresses his exasperation with the behaviour of both Zionist factions.

It is lamentable that the world is so full of busy bodies who never allow an opportunity to pass for attempting to do mischief and create bickering. I am glad to say that there is not the slightest misunderstanding between Judge Mack and myself on this or any other subject. 69

The continuing personal cooperation between Mack and Marshall and the determination of Weizmann to bring about a successful coalition with the non-Zionists led to the agreement that Marshall's call for a non-partisan conference would have the support and cooperation of both groups. Both groups realized the critical need for cooperating with Marshall. By 1923 the demands of Palestine had far exceeded the economic resources of the Zionist movement. Neither the Zionist Organization nor the Palestine Development Council could proceed further without the injection of massive funding which Marshall's support represented. Further, Weizmann had staked his position and reputation among the European Zionists on his ability to elicit support from the wealthy non-Zionist Jews of America. Similarly, vindication of the Brandeis-Mack position could come only through new capital for their projects.

Due to these conditions Marshall was able to evoke the promise from both sides that the proposed conference would be free from their ongoing partisan quarreling. Weizmann and Ruppin were cautioned to limit their remarks to the assembly to an explanation of the realities of Palestine. No interjection of ideology or partisan controversy would be tolerated. Likewise the Brandeis people would refrain from engaging in debate on partisan issues. Remarks by this group would be limited to support for the economic corporation. The P.D.C. agreed to negotiate a merger with the new economic corporation which Marshall hoped to form as a result of this conference.

Official Z.O.A. support was registered by Lipsky in an editorial in the New Palestine. Entitled, "An Historic Conference," the article praised the efforts of Weizmann and Marshall in calling the meeting. It welcomed the participation of non-Zionists and pledged the cooperation
70
of the Z.O.A. Marshall on his part dedicated an exorbitant amount of time to preparing the conference. He personally oversaw the issuance of invitations and wrote follow-up letters to those who failed to respond, urging their attendance. The invitations for the "Non-Partisan Conference to Consider Palestinian Problems" were sent out under the signatures of Louis Marshall, Cyrus Adler, Herbert Lehman, and Horace Stern. This in itself indicates the sincere dedication of Marshall to the cause. Obtaining the cooperation of these three prominent figures along with a firm financial commitment from Felix Warburg prior to the meeting was crucial to gaining the support of other prominent American Jews. An invitee could hardly reject such an invitation by classifying its sponsors as atypical nationalistic Jews or Zionists. Names like Adler, Lehman, Warburg, and Marshall gave the cause of upbuilding Palestine a new

legitimacy it had previously lacked on the American scene. In the letter of invitation Marshall clearly defined the purpose of the conference:

The time has arrived when we firmly believe that the duty rests upon the Jews of this country who are not members of the Zionist Organization to consider seriously their relations to the economic problems of Palestine, and to its cultural and industrial upbuilding. 71

The proposals for carrying out this obligation set forth in the letter and amplified again by Marshall at the opening of the conference, were participation with Zionists in the foundation of a non-partisan Jewish Agency; and the formation of an investment and finance corporation. The latter was to be organized not only on a basis of "unity and cooperation but also on firm and safe business foundations." 72 Neither idea originated with Marshall. The Jewish Agency proposal is the same principle formulated by Weizmann with which the Brandeis forces had disagreed three years earlier. The economic corporation proposal is parallel to the already existing Palestine Development Council which Weizmann and the American Zionists had been bitterly attacking since its inception. The prior agreement of each group to support Marshall and his ability "to sell" the most practical proposals of each group to his non-Zionist friends free of a "Zionist label" gave hope in 1924 that development of Palestine as a Jewish home would proceed forthwith.

The Conference itself was held on February 17, 1924. Louis Marshall retained total control of the meeting. In his opening remarks Marshall did more than lay before the meeting its tasks. He alleviated the fears of the assembled American Jews that affiliation with a movement for rebuilding the Jewish Homeland would adversely affect their position in America or their identity as Americans. He quoted from an April 28, 1918 statement of

the American Jewish Committee which he, of course, had drafted. The six major points of that statement were:

- 1) The American Jewish Committee's purpose was the securing of equal rights for Jews everywhere.
- 2) American Jews view the United States as their home.
- 3) The A.J.C. is mindful of Jews everywhere who through traditional sentiment yearn for a home in the Holy Land for the Jewish People.
- 4) Only a small percentage of Jews will ever live in Palestine.
- 5) The A.J.C. supports the Balfour Declaration and wishes to bring special note to the last sentence, "nothing shall be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
- 6) The A.J.C. is willing to aid all who wish to pursue this endeavor. 73

Marshall reminds the assemblage of the American Congressional approval of the Mandate, stressing that as Americans they must de facto accept the reality of Palestine and move to the issue of deciding upon action. As Jews, Marshall states they must confront three underlying facts, which urge the necessity for action now:

- 1) The right and the need of East European Jews, especially those in Russia, to emigrate.
- 2) The closed doors to immigration by the United States and other Western nations.
- 3) The obligation of the American Jewish Community to help our brethren throughout the world. 74

Regarding a choice of inaction Marshall affirmatively states: "I am afraid non-action of that kind, indifference of that character, can do us a thousand times more harm than all the Ku Klux Klans and Henry Fords you could crowd into this great city." 75

Marshall convinced this gathering, at least for the immediate moment, that their interests and obligations as Americans and their interests and obligations as Jews both demanded that they now assume responsibility for the financial needs of the upbuilding of Palestine. The argument first formulated here remains to this day the central theme of fund raising on behalf of Israel in the American Jewish community. Illustrative of the wide support he had garnered for these proposals prior to the opening of the conference itself were numerous letters from influential Jews in America and England, expressing support for the non-partisan proposals of Marshall. Among those expressing such support were Herbert Samuel, James Rothschild, Adolph Kraus of Chicago, president of B'nai B'rith, and Abram Simon, president of the C.C.A.R. The two most important letters came from Felix Warburg and Louis Brandeis. Warburg's absence was due to his being in transit to Palestine on an extensive visit for the purpose of analyzing the immediate relief needs of the populace. In his letter he pledges total support for the apolitical program. Since he was the leading Jewish philanthropist and head of one of the largest investment banking firms in America, such support was naturally helpful in eliciting support from others. Warburg's support assured the conferees that huge amounts of capital could and would be available for Palestine work. The Brandeis letter read by DeHaas and followed by a personal statement by Judge Mack assured the people in attendance of the support of this group for Marshall's proposals. The tone of a unified spirit towards action was set. The promise by Marshall that contributions and/or subscriptions for specific projects would not occur at the meeting, contributed further to the atmosphere of unity.

Weizmann's speech opened with a review of the success achieved by

the "Yishuv" since the end of the War. He gave an assessment as to the absorptive capacity of Palestine and then devoted the major portion of his remarks to describing the plan for the Jewish Agency. Ruppin, the agricultural expert and economist, gave a less optimistic assessment of the present conditions in Palestine. He then proceeded to outline a proposal for the future economic development which paralleled the tri-level funding proposal Brandeis had expressed four years earlier in the Zeeland Memorandum. His division of expenditures into national, risky investments, and safe investments was the exact program rejected by Weizmann twice before; once when Simon and DeLieme had presented their re-organization plan and again when Weizmann supported the Lipsky faction at Cleveland in negotiating the Buffalo platform. Ruppin, Weizmann's chief agricultural economist in presenting the essence of the Brandeis plan, was acknowledging the acquiescence of the Zionist Organization to the issue which had divided the Zionist cause for three years. Mack and DeHaas made no comment in the subsequent debate identifying the plan with their group. Neither is there any record of representatives of the two Zionist camps attempting to reunite now that agreement on the economic issue existed. The divisive personality issues and the build-up of animosity over the years were evidently too great to permit reunification, even after this acquiescence to the Brandeis plan. In its praise of Ruppin's speech, the New Palestine would later fail to mention any parallel it had to the old Brandeis plan.

True debate did not really occur. Those present expressed unanimity with the two central themes of the conference. The often lengthy speeches added little of substance to the ideas which Marshall had presented and Weizmann and Ruppin had amplified. The significance lay in that these

previously uninvolved Jews were now making personal commitments which Marshall and Flexner would later turn into subscriptions to the Palestine Economic Corporation. Two formal resolutions were presented and adopted. The first dealing with the investment corporation read:

Resolved that it be the sense of this assemblage that a committee of seven be appointed by the Chair for the Purpose of organizing an investment corporation with adequate capital for the purpose of upbuilding and developing the economic resources of Palestine on an economic basis, which shall enlist if possible the co-operation of all existing and operating corporations and groups which have the same end in view. 76

The second regarding the Jewish Agency, stated:

Whereas the Palestine Mandate of the League of Nations provides in Article III that the Zionist Organization shall secure the co-operation of all Jews in carrying out the terms of the Mandate;

And whereas the Zionist Organization has proposed that non-Zionists become members of the Jewish Agency;

Be it resolved that the Chair appoint a committee of seven to study the subject of the Jewish Agency and if practicable to formulate an appropriate plan whereby American Jews can associate themselves in such agency, and that such committee be empowered to confer with the Zionist Organization and other bodies to work out such plans for the effectualization of the object in view;

And be it further resolved that the committee report its conclusions to a reconvened session of this conference or by such other method as maybe deemed appropriate. 77

In the first issue of the New Palestine following the Non-Partisan Conference, Lipsky expresses the American Zionists' joy at the unity achieved.

The consummation of our dream of Jewish unity in the rebuilding of Palestine began in a happy setting. For the success

of the effort we have the guarantee of some of the foremost names in our American Jewish community. Names like Marshall, Lehman, Warburg, Adler, Stern, David Brown.... 78

Lipsky and the American Zionist movement are not, however, ready to surrender leadership to this new coalition. He warned in this same editorial that while avoiding division over minor points will be their statesman-like approach, the Zionists must "stand guard for the preservation of our principle.... It must surely be that this organization will win the recognition and admiration it merits." 79

Lipsky's editorial when viewed in retrospect said much more than an initial reading indicates. The unity of the American Jewish community behind the Marshall proposals was based upon a non-ideological approach toward Jewish relief. Marshall had stressed in his opening remarks that Palestine work was important for its value in alleviating the problems of East European Jewry. Weizmann had most cautiously avoided the issue of an autonomous Jewish State. He had avoided the issue of how best to proceed in development. Both he and Marshall totally neglected the possibility that any other solution outside / Palestine was viable for the rescue and rehabilitation of the oppressed Jews of Eastern Europe. The support of many of the conferees present was based upon the fact that Palestine was the only option open for European Jewry. Their commitment was totally one of aiding their oppressed and needy brethren. Lipsky in his editorial clearly states that this is not and will not become the approach of the Zionists in America. To them, Palestine is primary. Whether other options exist for the relief of the Jewish problem is of not interest to them.

At the conclusion of the conference the future looked bright for

American participation in the development of Palestine. The committees appointed by Marshall to carry forth the mandates of the two resolutions of the conference were composed of the most prominent names in American Judaism. Included were Judge Horace Stern, Samuel Untermyer, David H. Brown, Jacob Billikopf, Cyrus Adler, Paul Baerwald, Lewis Strauss and Herbert Lehman. Adding to this hope was the decision taken in the autumn of 1924 to begin the dissolution of the Joint Distribution Committee. The general feeling of the leaders of this massive philanthropic relief effort was that their work in Europe was near completion. No one envisioned further projects of massive relief in Europe. This action was expected to free a great deal of money for work in Palestine. The intention of Marshall and his fellow leaders of American Jewry in 1924 was to concentrate their efforts in Palestine. The committee charged with executing the resolution on the investment corporation began immediately to lay the ground work for the Palestine Economic Corporation. The consensus of the second committee regarding the Jewish Agency was to proceed with negotiations once the Zionist Congress gave formal approval to Weizmann's proposal.

The course of events in the subsequent two years was to alter this unity. Hesitancy on the part of the new friends of Palestine development and the distrustful impatience of the Z.O.A. leadership would lead to conflict. The continued crisis of Russian Jewry and a proposed solution by the Soviet government for the resettlement of Russian Jews in Crimea would divert money and effort from Palestine. As will be detailed in Chapter Six below, this issue would result in the outbreak of open hostility in the American Jewish community. Continuance of the effort toward an economic development program and a political coalition to govern

Jewish effort in Palestine was due basically to one man, Louis Marshall. Throughout the events to be described in the next two chapters, he never gave up his efforts at reaching a peace between the warring factions. While remaining the acknowledged leader of the non-Zionists who were being bitterly attacked in public by the Zionists, Marshall continued to search for compromise. Marshall's determination to fight for his principles rather than withdraw from the conflict was in direct opposition to Brandeis' strategy in the earlier conflict. The ultimate success of the Palestine Economic Corporation whose formative years will be detailed in the next chapter was due to Marshall's personal determination and powerful influence in the Jewish community. His personal example of a non-Zionist approach to Palestine was destined to become the archetype of American-Jewish support for the State of Israel for the last thirty years.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE NON-ZIONIST PROGRAM: The Palestine Economic Corporation

The first major activity of the non-Zionists following the 1924 Non-Partisan Conference was the formation of the Palestine Economic Corporation (P.E.C.) in congruence with the resolution passed by the conference. The announcement of its incorporation was made a year later by Louis Marshall at the second session of the Non-Partisan Conference reconvened on March 2, 1925. Announcement of the plans for the new economic group was overshadowed by the simultaneous announcement at the meeting that the non-Zionists would participate in an expanded Jewish Agency. Both projects received overwhelming support from the conferees including some known anti-Zionists. Response in the American-Jewish press was also extremely favorable. The Jewish Daily Bulletin joyously proclaimed:

A chapter of Jewish history begun in Basle in 1897... was brought to a successful conclusion last Sunday at the Hotel Astor, when American Jewry decided to join the Jewries of the various countries in Europe and in Asia in the forming of the Jewish Agency The conference, which removed the last obstacle for the long expected forming of the Jewish Agency by its enlisting of the cooperation of the non-Zionists in America, also healed the breach in the organization of American Zionists which occurred at a conference ... in Cleveland in 1921, resulting in the secession of the so-called Brandeis group. 80

This proclamation of peace in the Jewish ranks on a platform of unity for the Zionist cause was premature. The reporter was obviously unaware of the fragile nature of the unity exhibited at the conference. He, like some of the participants themselves, failed to see that the consensus of spirit was based upon a loose confederation of various factions, each preserving a separate interpretation of what the agreement

meant and what demands it placed upon them. Rather than constituting a beginning of unified action on behalf of Palestine colonization, this conference marked the end of consensus and the beginning of a bitter two-year struggle between the Zionists and non-Zionist forces in America.

The allusion to a healing of the wounds of "Cleveland" refers to Stephen Wise's support for the Jewish Agency plan. Wise expressed support for the Weizmann proposal and in the fall of 1925, did reassume public leadership in the Z.O.A. and Keren Hayesod. However, Wise's reaffiliation was strictly individual and tenuous. Like Abba Hillel Silver, two years earlier, Wise at this point chose to leave the disintegrating group once centered around Justice Brandeis. Brandeis himself was totally invisible at this conference, while Julian Mack had now become identified totally with Marshall's non-Zionists. The final vindication of the Brandeis group's ouster did not occur until 1930 when Mack and Wise finally ousted Lipsky from the leadership of the Z.O.A. In the interim, Wise had additional confrontations with Lipsky and Weizmann over the Keren Hayesod and the Jewish Agency. Creation of the Jewish Agency which seemed imminent to the Jewish Daily Bulletin and other American Jewish newspapers was destined to be delayed until August 1929 because of the underlying misconceptions covered over at this time by the conference.

Though euphoria over the Jewish Agency was premature, the conference was not a total failure. The second issue before the conference, the establishment of the Palestine Economic Corporation (P.E.C.), was destined to make this conference historic in a positive sense. The P.E.C. was destined to become a major source of capital in the colonization of Palestine and to remain a viable element in the economic development of Israel down to the present. Before dealing with the major controversy

of the years 1925-1927 which shattered the newfound unity of the Zionist cause in America, it is essential to examine the formation of the Palestine Economic Corporation.

The summary report of the 1925 Conference reveals that after an impressive opening statement Marshall, as chairman, called upon Bernard Flexner, the president of the newly incorporated Palestine Economic Corporation, to present a report. Flexner's report was brief. The concrete action which had occurred since the last conference had included a selection of provisional officers, acts of incorporation and preliminary negotiations with the Palestine Development Council, the American Palestine Company and the Joint Distribution Committee for merger of their Palestine investments into the new structure of the P.E.C. Flexner happily notes, "These agencies have met and have all agreed, in principle to become part
81
of this new corporation." In announcing the names of the officers and board members of the corporation, Flexner promised that as the corporation became active after the procuring of new subscriptions, additional people might be added to the decision-making body of the corporation. He concluded his report on a positive note:

I might say as to new money that will come into the Palestine Economic Corporation, that substantial sums have already been promised by a small group, sums which have not been solicited. We don't propose to announce the names of the persons or the amounts. We do not believe that this is the time for such an announcement. But the fact itself is indicative of the sort of response that we hope will be given when subscriptions are asked for. 82

In the preliminary stages both prior to this second session of the Non-Partisan Conference and immediately afterwards, the key figures in the P.E.C. were Flexner, Marshall, and Felix Warburg. Bernard Flexner

was a prominent attorney from Louisville, Kentucky, who had become involved in the Zionist movement during World War I. As a member of the "Brandeis group," he had resigned from the executive of the Z.O.A. after the vote of no-confidence at Cleveland in 1921. From 1919 on, Flexner lived in New York where he became involved in the Joint Distribution Committee. From this activity, he developed a positive association with Louis Marshall, Felix Warburg, and others of the prominent "uptown Jews." Maintaining close personal ties to Justice Brandeis, Flexner was a member of the executive of the Palestine Development Council from its inception in 1922 until 1924 when he resigned in order to be free to create the Palestine Economic Corporation. He thus was able to be a key intermediary between Brandeisian Zionists and Marshall's non-Zionists. Flexner, Julius Simon and Julian Mack share the credit for gaining Brandeis' approval of the cooperation with Marshall and his associates in the economic development of Palestine through the P.E.C.

Felix Warburg's Jewish affiliations and contributions are too numerous to list here. As a senior partner in Kuhn, Loeb and Company, Warburg represented one of the largest Jewish fortunes in America. His life was dedicated to serving the Jewish community. His personal papers indicate that a goodly proportion of his time was dedicated to the careful giving away of money rather than the interest expected of a great banker in acquiring more wealth. Julius Simon describes Warburg as:

...the grand seignor of American Jewry. Not because of his wealth or his exquisite home, or his artistic leanings, or his keen sense of public duty, his generosity, his proud consciousness of being a Jew, or his impatience with all sham -- but because all these endearing qualities were in one man. We all helped to found the P.E.C., but he was the real founder and its greatest mainstay. 83

Warburg's personal involvement in Palestine began in 1923 with his initial meetings with Arthur Ruppin, the great agricultural expert of the Zionist Organization. It continued through the establishment of the P.E.C. and the Jewish Agency, which from the death of Louis Marshall a month after its formation, he chaired as the leading non-Zionist member. While never in any official sense a Zionist, Warburg was deeply attached to the land and the upbuilding of the Yishuv; he can be categorized as a Chovev-Tzion -- a true lover of Zion.

The organizing of the P.E.C. was the result of the combined effort of these three individuals. The vast number of communications between the three during the years 1924 and 1927 on the subject of the P.E.C. clearly indicate their concern with all details of the organization and operation of the corporation. Warburg as the chairman of the Joint Distribution Committee and Flexner as representative of the Palestine Development Council from the beginning pledged full coordination of effort of the two groups' assets and interests in Palestine. Warburg further made the first large personal contribution of \$50,000 to the new corporation. In personal correspondence with other potential sources of funds, Marshall and Flexner often pointed to Warburg's financial involvement as a spur to others to subscribe.

Whenever Flexner ran into conflict concerning expenditures of the P.E.C. with either subscribers or benefactors, Warburg was always available for support. An example of this is the exchange of correspondence in August, 1926, between Flexner and Pinhas Rutenberg, the organizer of the Palestine Electric Corporation. Rutenberg in his impatience to get the project under way wished to grant concessions to General Electric in exchange for finance capital. Flexner voiced strong opposition to the

plan, threatening to withhold P.E.C. funds from the project if General Electric was involved. He felt that such participation necessitating the granting of the sale of concessions for equipment to General Electric
85
would result in vastly excessive costs. Both Marshall and Warburg sent supportive cables to Rutenburg and to Baron Rothschild who also
86
had a financial interest in the project.

Marshall in proposing the formation of an economic corporation at the 1924 conference stressed the need of establishing an organization on a purely business basis. The resolution quoted at the end of Chapter Four above reflects this desire. With this principle as an underlying factor, the process of organization was slow. Very few new commitments of capital were made during the first two years of the organization's existence. Effort was expended solely in the consolidation of those projects to which the P.D.C. and the J.D.C. had made prior commitments. The minutes of the executive meeting of the P.E.C. reveal that the organizers carefully weighed decisions on new investments with two major criteria in mind: first, what would its overall benefit be to the Yishuv, and two, what were the chances of its economic success? The first often out-weighed the second. A prime example of this policy was the decision of the P.E.C. executive in 1926 to postpone work on a hotel in favor of proceeding first with new finance capital for the Histadrut's new building company, Soleh Boneh, which was on the verge of
87
financial collapse. In support of aiding Soleh Boneh immediately, Flexner stated succinctly at that meeting the philosophy of the P.E.C:

But while the P.E.C. is not a philanthropic society, neither is it a money making concern. We have not conceived it as the task of the P.E.C. to seek the very safest investments or those likely to yield the highest monetary returns. 88

This action was not an isolated incident; on the contrary, it exemplified their approach to Palestine problems. It reflected the philosophy of the corporation as portrayed in its two basic documents, a "Statement of Plan and Purpose of the Palestine Economic Corporation" and the "Vriesland Report" prepared under the direct guidance of Flexner and Warburg. In the former document which was appended to the formal papers of incorporation, the objectives of the investment corporation are clearly delineated:

Object: the Palestine Economic Corporation has been formed to afford an instrument through which American Jews and others who are desirous of cooperating may be helpful in supplying capital and credit on a business basis to productive Palestine commercial, industrial, agricultural and other kindred enterprises and thereby further the economic development of the Holy Land and the settlement there of an increasing number of Jews. ...

Its purposes are not philanthropic. ... The Corporation believes that its shareholders, present and prospective, will expect its funds to be so employed as to stimulate a healthy growth of industry and commerce rather than to realize the largest or quickest financial returns. ... The Corporation makes no promises or representations, and gives no guarantees as to the outcome of its endeavors. It will, however, earnestly strive to make of itself a useful factor in promoting the welfare of Palestine. 89

The commitment to build solid economic structures in Palestine necessitated a consolidation of the existing projects being haphazardly conducted by the P.D.C., J.D.C., and the American Palestine Company at the time of the new corporation's formation. Aware of both this need and the additional factor that only a viable corporation which could insure safety for investors would attract new money, Flexner, Marshall and Warburg proceeded slowly with the new venture. Their first concern was effecting merger of the interests of the three earlier organizations into the consolidated structure of the P.E.C. The delay in absorbing the

American Palestine Company, which existed independently until 1927, was due to its failure to put its own economic house in order. On the other hand, the takeover of the J.D.C. interests which were financially solvent occurred immediately. This action was further facilitated by the fact that the J.D.C. executive was controlled in fact by Marshall and Warburg. They readily agreed to turn over the organization's Palestine interests to the new corporation. In the process of considering its own liquidation in late 1924, the J.D.C. further pledged financial support to the P.E.C., purchasing a small amount of stock in the new venture with its present capital surplus. After undertaking a massive new relief program in 1925, the commitment in principle to the P.E.C. was retained and the contributions greatly increased. Along with the initial personal subscriptions of Warburg, Marshall, and a select number of others who comprised the board of directors, the J.D.C. and its leaders formed the initial base for the corporation.

Merger of the P.D.C. interests was never in doubt. Flexner who had been integrally involved in the "Brandeis group" had firm commitments from his associates prior to the first conference. In fact, his involvement in the P.E.C. was the result of the pressure applied to Brandeis for full cooperation with non-Zionist forces, described at the conclusion of Chapter Three. Effective merger of the assets of the P.D.C. did not take place until mid-1926. This delay was due strictly to the technical problems of collecting prior subscriptions and the legal aspects of the merger agreement. A factor in the delay was the insistence by Flexner that because of his own personal involvement in the P.D.C. he not participate in the merger negotiations. The final merger was delayed until Marshall himself could find the necessary time to conduct the negotiations.

The Report of the P.D.C.'s major concern, the Palestine Cooperative Company, (P.C.C.) was submitted to Louis Marshall by Robert Szold and Julius Simon in April, 1925. The report indicated that the P.C.C. had⁹¹ been steadily improving its economic conditions. The enclosures in this statement revealed that the P.D.C. had become integrally involved with the Rothschild interests in Palestine. Both the Central Bank of Cooperative Institutions and the proposed hydro-electric project of Pinhas Rutenberg were being jointly financed by the P.C.C. and Rothschild's Jewish Colonization Association. It also showed that since speculation of a merger with this new expanded corporation had become public, a large percentage of delinquent pledges were being paid and new subscriptions of capital were being made to the P.C.C.

In consonance with their desire to see the venture properly capitalized, the directors sought to undertake a complete study of the economic situation in Palestine, before offering the sale of stock to the public or proceeding with new investments. Such a study was felt essential for convincing potential investors of the seriousness and solidity of the corporation. The P.E.C. commissioned S. A. Vriesland to undertake the study. The results of his study and the subsequent proposals for action closely parallel the original proposal of Brandeis in the Zeeland Memorandum. He, like Brandeis and later Ruppin in his speech to the first Non-Partisan Conference, delineates three separate types of funds : expenditure, quasi-investment, and investment. This report suggests that the P.E.C. should undertake projects which fall in both of the latter two categories. Stating that financial returns from quasi-investment projects will not be available for some time, he proposes that a proper mixture of safe investment⁹² and risky ventures be made. The report advocates that the P.E.C.

establish a revolving capital fund and refrain, as did the Palestine Development Council, from entering into the management of individual enterprises. The suggestion is made that such risky or national investments as the Rutenberg hydro-electric plant become joint ventures with the Keren Hayesod. In the area of agriculture, Vriesland's report delineates specific functions for the Palestine Economic Corporation separate from the role of the Keren Kayemet and the Keren Hayesod. The envisioned practical relationship would be that the Keren Kayemet purchase the land, turning it over to the Keren Hayesod for initial development and settlement. The Keren Hayesod would then be responsible for the initial reclamation work and the expense of settling the people on the land. All of this would be at community expense through these two national donation funds. The P.E.C. would then become liable for providing low interest long term loans to the settlers for additional development. In this system, the Keren Hayesod would be able to settle more people on the land. The present circumstance which the committee observed was one in which the Keren Hayesod had reached a saturation point as to the number of settlements
93
it could subsidize.

In summation the report stresses the objective of the P.E.C. is the development of a viable economy in Palestine. The shareholders do not expect large returns on their investment. Rather, in a direct polemic to the rising criticism from Zionist circles, the report states:

The Americans have been many times misunderstood as if their program of upbuilding Palestine on a business basis meant to take money out of Palestine. They meant that our work must be principally ruled by consideration of national economy and that the main principle of all our work must be to create as soon as possible such conditions as will give scope for normal economic activities so that the capital

which Palestine needs will more and more be acquired on the basis on which capital is generally invested. By accepting the above proposal the P.E.C. would contribute to the best ideals which American Jews have to offer to the common task of all Jews: the economic upbuilding of Palestine. 94

The stress placed upon the separate use of the philanthropic funds of the Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemet and the investment funds of the P.E.C. was in accord with the position Brandeis had presented six years earlier. It was a position which Marshall and Warburg subscribed to fully. Once the American Zionists finally agreed to set the Keren Hayesod apart, as a strictly donation fund, Marshall, Warburg, and Flexner gave their total support to its efforts. In fact, even in the midst of the bitter quarrel between American Zionists and Non-Zionists which erupted late in 1925, Marshall still gave his vocal and financial support to the Keren Hayesod and its successor in America, the United Palestine Appeal.

The application of this policy by the P.E.C. resulted in financial assistance to a number of critical economic enterprises in Palestine. As Simon points out, the P.E.C. accomplishments should be divided into two categories: "Strengthening the economic position of the small man and the creation of or participation in the development of the natural resources of the country, and the financing of public works and utilities." 96 In each category there were a number of institutions created to meet the needs of Palestine development. In the first category of providing cheap financing for settlers, the P.E.C. took over the interests of the Central Bank of Cooperative Institutions from the Palestine Cooperative Company. The also participated in the Palestine Mortgage and Credit Bank, an institution based upon the insistent idea of Brandeis that the key to colonization was the availability of cheap mortgage money so that settlers could build

and own their own homes. In the second category were projects such as the Palestine Electric Corporation, Palestine Water Company, Palestine Potash Ltd., and Bayside Land Corporation. In the majority of these endeavors, the Rothschild family and other European investors participated. In the case of the Palestine Electric Company, the Keren Hayesod was also a partner, in accordance with the Vriesland report's proposal.

As an example of the early activity of the P.E.C., its participation in the Palestine Electric Corporation mentioned above is worthy of a further detail. The Palestine Electric Corporation was founded by Pinhas Rutenberg under a concession granted him by the British Mandatory Government. Its purpose was to generate electrical power for both Palestine and the newly created emirate of Transjordan. Rutenberg was a Russian engineer who had been closely associated with the Kerensky government. After the Bolshevik coup, Rutenberg fled to the West. At the London Conference of 1920, he first presented his plan for the electrification of Palestine to the Zionist Organization.

From 1920 to 1926, Rutenberg's proposal lay dormant. Possessing little cash and rather flimsy commitments from Rothschild's Jewish Colonization Association (P.I.C.A.) and the P.D.C., he was able to do little more than prepare his plans and conduct limited experiments as to their feasibility. In 1926, Rutenberg's impatience with his Jewish investors led him to seek out General Electric for financing. As mentioned above, Flexner with support from Marshall, Warburg, and Rothschild, vetoed
96
the plan. The P.E.C. also pledged additional funds for the project and successfully urged Rothschild to do the same. Attached to the increased pledge was a stipulation that the P.E.C. and the P.I.C.A. be given a large

voice in developing and operating the Palestine Electric Corporation. In this same cable Flexner proposed that Rutenberg's salary be set by the directors on an equitable basis. Rutenberg had proposed that, if General Electric were involved, he would desire a percentage of the profits. Flexner totally rejected this request along with the proposal for the outside money. Flexner's anger with Rutenberg had reached the point where he felt that Rutenberg should be replaced as head of the project. His reference to setting a specific wage for heading the project was the result of a toning down of the original draft by Warburg.⁹⁷ Flexner's total mistrust of Rutenberg as compared to Warburg's willingness to give him the benefit of the doubt can be traced back to Flexner's involvement with the "Brandeis group." Brandeis and Simon's experiences with the Zionist Commission in 1919 and 1920 were undoubtedly behind Flexner's mistrust. The intent of the Americans was to keep a firm control over the project. Rutenberg, who was closely involved with the Zionist Commission, was suspect by these men of being equally inefficient and wasteful as the other Zionists had proved to be. As good businessmen, they did not wish to see the misappropriation of their funds in the manner which they had critically observed Zionist funds used.

Through the intervention of Rothschild and Sir Herbert Samuel, the Palestine Electric Corporation was able to acquire the needed additional capital funds from the Mandatory Government under the Trade Facilities Act. With this guarantee, Flexner and Rothschild released their funds and the Rutenberg project was successfully undertaken. After the establishment of the State of Israel, the P.E.C. and the P.I.C.A. turned over their interests in the Palestine Electric Corporation to the State of Israel which also had inherited from the Mandatory Power its interest in

the power company.

PROBLEMS OF SUBSCRIPTION

The major problem which confronted the P.E.C. in its initial years was an inadequate capitalization. The initial reason for its formation was the expectation that a united front would avoid the subscription problems faced by the Palestine Development Council and the American-Palestine Company. Initially, when first proposed in 1924, the corporation was to be capitalized at five million dollars. This was trimmed to three million dollars by the time of its formal announcement of incorporation at the second meeting of the Non-Partisan Conference in 1925. By June, 1925, the high hopes of Flexner, Warburg, and Marshall for quick capitalization of the corporation were deflated. In a memo to Marshall, Lehman, and Warburg, Flexner is distraught.⁹⁸ The proposed public sale of subscriptions appeared to be impossible because of the proposed J.D.C. campaign in the fall of 1925 and the unexpected appearance of a public drive for Palestine Securities, Inc., by the Z.O.A. Flexner posed the question to his colleagues as to whether they should one, forget the whole thing, or two, add to existing capital by seeking new subscriptions from a limited number of people and receiving a percentage of the upcoming J.D.C. campaign.

Prior to the surprising public announcement by the New Palestine of a campaign for subscription to Palestine Securities, plans had been made for a low key public offering of stock in the P.E.C. Flexner had had David Brown and David Bressler prepare a detailed memo outlining proposed options⁹⁹ for the fund raising. The proposal called for a four-pronged approach: one, small personalized gatherings at individuals' homes for the purpose of reaching out privately for subscriptions; two, personalized letters to be

sent to specific groups of potential contributors by Flexner, Marshall, Warburg, and Lehman (four separate lists of names were compiled, and letters signed personally by these men were sent); three, bring Lord Balfour for a testimonial dinner; four, use the then dormant J.D.C. card file of contributors as a list for potential subscribers. With the announcement of the Palestine Securities drive, and the proposal for a new J.D.C. campaign to be conducted in the autumn, the P.E.C. was left without a date on the calendar to stage a public campaign.

The ultimate decision was to postpone any public subscription campaigns and to request operating funds for the corporation from the J.D.C. Since David Brown, the chairman elect of the proposed United Jewish Campaign, was also a board member of the P.E.C., while Marshall and Warburg held the real power of appropriating J.D.C. funds, such a request was assured of positive response. However, hope of reaching the original goal of five million dollars which these financial experts had determined necessary for expansion of the P.E.C. investments into areas where the P.D.C. and J.D.C. had not been involved was now shelved. The surprising announcement by the Z.O.A. was seen by the executive members of the P.E.C. as an absolute breach of faith by the Zionists. Marshall's initial reaction when first notified of the advertisement which appeared in the New Palestine of April 24, 1925, was one of anger and disbelief. The P.E.C. leadership was in total agreement that this campaign, launched by the Z.O.A., was in violation of the understanding reached between Weizmann and Marshall which had made the Non-Partisan Conferences and their subsequent actions regarding the P.E.C. and the Jewish Agency possible. The unity of Zionists and non-Zionists in the American Jewish community was breached. In reviewing the events, we find herein the seeds of the open "warfare" which erupted in

the autumn of 1925, with the competitive fund raising efforts of the J.D.C's United Jewish Campaign and the Zionists' United Palestine Appeal.

The first public mention of an organization called Palestine Securities, Inc., is in the April 24, 1925, edition of the New Palestine. Here we find two full-page advertisements announcing the formation of the Palestine Securities, Inc., and the calling of "A Conference for the Promotion of the Economic Development of Palestine." The stated purpose was "to take practical steps in the direction of economic effort in Palestine..." and to direct private investment into channels that shall aid in the effort to lay permanent foundations for the resettlement of the Jewish
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Homeland.

In this same edition we find two editorials and two additional articles by Emanuel Newmann and Bernard Rosenblatt, the president of Palestine Securities, Inc., dealing with the positive aspects of this endeavor for Palestine and the investor. In the first editorial, entitled,
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"Palestine Investments: A Warning," Lipsky repeats an important public service message in warning the Zionist public against unscrupulous stock salesmen who had been promoting fraudulent land purchases in Palestine. The editorial continues:

Any person who desires to purchase land in Palestine under conditions that are guaranteed to be impartial and non-profit making, should do so through the accredited agency of the Zionist Organization of America, the American Zion Commonwealth. 102

In the second editorial dealing specifically with the Palestine Securities, Inc., the above message that the Z.O.A. sponsored investments are the only safe way for Zionists in Palestine is amplified.

Any number of investments projects are being placed on the American market. Their success in gathering capital depends on the ability of the promotor to inspire confidence But the investor has no safeguard. The Palestine Securities, Inc., will be a profitless service to the public. It will deal only in such securities that represent public service. ... Important in connection with the establishment of this agency is the further announcement that a conference is being called for May 3rd., to which only businessmen are to be invited, for the purpose of considering the whole question of ... investment of individual capital in Palestine. 103

The question which these editorials and the idea itself of a Palestine Securities Corporation beg is, What of the Palestine Economic Corporation? Had not the Zionists given their approval to it as a legitimate organ for capital investment in Palestine? In the editorial of March 6, quoted above, had not the New Palestine expressed a hope that the P.E.C. would successfully undertake a program that it now proclaimed should be the sole territory of Palestine Securities? Did Lipsky, Rosenblatt, and their fellow collaborators really expect success in raising a massive amount of capital? The Z.O.A. in promoting this program was risking the alienation of the non-Zionist support for Palestine which had taken years of nurturing to obtain. Thus, it is most difficult to give Lipsky the benefit of the doubt and state that he did not perceive this project to be a counter to the Palestine Economic Organization. His editorial statement in the May 8, 1925, New Palestine does not appear credible. He states there:

The Palestine Securities does not in any way interfere with the activities of the Palestine Investment Corporation, of which Mr. Bernard Flexner is the Chairman, nor is it a rival corporation.... The Palestine Investment Corporation, as we understand it, is to be a corporation that will sell its stock on the American market and make investments in such enterprises as in its judgement may be financially remunerative or important from the point of view of upbuilding Palestine.... As a matter of fact, the Palestine Securities may become the feeder organization for

the Palestine Investment Corporation. Only in case the Palestine Investment Corporation, once its capital is secured, will decline to invest in any enterprise submitted for its consideration, will the Palestine Securities find it necessary to offer its securities for sale to the general public.

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If this was truly the intent of the Z.O.A., why would they not have contacted Flexner or Marshall before going public with their program? The correspondence between Flexner and Marshall indicates total surprise at the announcement. Lipsky's action could have been motivated by one of two desires. First, Palestine Securities could have been aimed originally at destroying the "Brandeis group's " Palestine Development Leagues. The Z.O.A. in 1925 was still fighting the battle of Cleveland, and the New Palestine was its weapon. Continually through the years 1921-1927, there are periodic reference to the misguided efforts of the Brandeis group. In the same April 24th edition in which the original Palestine Securities announcement appeared, there is an editorial welcoming Stephen Wise back into active participation in the Z.O.A. Lipsky takes the opportunity not merely to praise Wise for his Zionist efforts but to condemn further the rest of the old "Brandeis group" for not doing the same. The Z.O.A. leadership undoubtedly saw the defection of Wise and the merging of the assets of the P.D.C. into the new P.E.C. as a weakening of the Brandeis faction's strength. The organizing of the Palestine Securities and its offering of immediate investments could have been initially designed to strike a final blow at the Brandeis group and thereby gain vindication for their walkout after the Cleveland Convention.

The other plausible explanation is a desire to temper the influence of the non-Zionists. Lipsky and Rosenblatt were well aware of the rising position Marshall was assuming in the Zionist cause. Weizmann was staking

his power on an effective compromise in the Jewish Agency with Marshall, which would supply the Zionist cause with the needed financial support in exchange for tempering its ideological position by sharing power with the non-Zionists. Perhaps the editorial on May 8, quoted above, should be understood as saying to Flexner and Marshall that the Z.O.A. was not to be circumvented; that they could operate their investment corporation here, but the connecting link to Palestine itself would and should remain under the Z.O.A. auspices.

Regardless of motivation, the effect of the Palestine Securities offer was to create an atmosphere of distrust among the non-Zionists towards the American Zionists. In response to Marshall's invitation as conveyed to him through Leonard Stein, who was in New York at the time, Weizmann sent a telegram dated May 20, 1925, to Stein to be conveyed to Marshall.

Had no prior knowledge scope purpose of organization --
During last stay America Rosenblatt once mentioned informally
his undertaking municipal loan with consent Palestine
authorities -- This project being old I naturally approved
nevertheless strongly advising his consulting Marshall
order avoid misunderstanding or overlapping. 106

In the letter Weizmann wrote to Rosenblatt alluded to in the telegram, he commended him for his proposal. There was no mention of consulting with Marshall before proceeding. Weizmann's approval of the embryonic idea is dated two years prior to the New Palestine announcement. Thus, we must look with suspicion on the motivation of the American Zionists in reviving a two-year old idea at precisely the moment it would conflict with the proposed program of the Palestine Economic Corporation.

The American Zionists were well aware of Marshall's attitude toward the Palestine Securities prior to their publication of the May 8th editorial

and subsequently published claims of support for the Palestine Economic Corporation. In an extremely blunt letter to Rosenblatt, Marshall condemns not only the organizers of the project, but also the project itself as self-defeating. He stated to Rosenblatt:

Don't you think that it is about time to put on the brakes in respect to the creation of new Palestinian corporations? ... This is becoming absolutely ridiculous and the result will be that every man who has an interest in Palestine will make up his mind to do nothing, acting on the scientific theory of proceeding along the path of least resistance.

I feel very much aggrieved at the use of my name in connection with your latest fledgling, and I desire to protest against any intimation that I do not look upon the Palestine Securities Inc., as engaged in rivalry with the Palestine Economic Corporation. What it purposes to do comes directly within the scope of the Economic Corporation. ... Either you will have pre-empted the field or by a failure will have destroyed a market. You should at least have asked whether we saw any inconsistency between your efforts and ours...but that you have not done.... I have had great difficulty in interesting various gentlemen in our corporation and it only needs such a movement as that which you are now launching to sour them entirely and to destroy what I have regarded as one of the most hopeful efforts to render genuine help in the upbuilding of Palestine. 107

The response of the Z.O.A. was to endorse the Palestine Securities project at its annual convention in June, 1925. Lipsky in presenting a defense of the project claimed that misunderstandings with the P.E.C. had been settled. He repeated the assertion he had made in the New Palestine that the Palestine Securities would be beneficial to the Marshall group's proposed activity. He added that the urgent need of the Zionist Organization-sponsored projects such as the General Mortgage Bank demanded that the American Zionists take immediate action to raise capital. No mention is made of Marshall's letter to Rosenblatt. The delegates, under the impression that unity with the non-Zionists was unharmed by the venture, passed the

resolution endorsing the project by acclamation.

In the two other areas of potential conflict with the non-Zionists, the convention was careful to avoid controversy. No resolution was passed concerning the Russian Colonization plan of the J.D.C. The outlined proposal of the Jewish Agency as agreed to by Marshall and Weizmann was unanimously endorsed. However, the action of the Z.O.A. leadership in carrying through the Palestine Securities plan continued to irritate the non-Zionist leadership. Brown and Flexner especially were developing a contemptuous mistrust of the American Zionist leaders. Their alienation along with Marshall's personal disgust with the failure of Rosenblatt or Lipsky to reply positively to his letter of May 4th resulted in a more cautious approach by Marshall in dealing with them in the future.

In a long detailed letter to Weizmann on July 2, 1925, Marshall 108 expresses the frustration of the non-Zionists with the American Zionists. He turns to Weizmann for assistance in controlling the actions of his American followers. Marshall informs Weizmann of the actions of Rosenblatt and Lipsky, expressing strong objection to the use of the New Palestine as a tool to interfere with the establishment of the P.E.C. He quotes for Weizmann the advertisements and editorials supporting the Palestine Securities. He delineates for him how they are interfering in his efforts on behalf of the P.E.C. Marshall cites specifically the irresponsibility of the Palestine Securities in claiming that their securities are totally guaranteed, as a hindrance to attracting investors to the P.E.C. In their prospectus, the Palestine Economic Corporation had in honesty stated that the possibility of the failure of one or another investment was always possible. In the closing of the letter, he reemphasizes the problem which the Zionist cause faced, due to the Palestine Securities plan.

The plan of selling securities is the very plan on which we have dealt in our prospectus. While it is quite possible that the Palestine Securities Inc., may exercise a useful function in cooperation with the Palestine Economic Corporation, the competition which it creates in a market which is as yet limited, is in every sense of the word unfair. We have just had a meeting of our Board in which the opinion was expressed that we were being seriously hampered in our efforts to secure capital by the action of the Zionist Organization in fathering the Palestine Securities, Inc., and advertising in the manner described. This is a critical period in the life of the Palestine Economic Corporation and there are some of our members who are very much disturbed by the occurrence. 109

The reverberations of this mistrust extended beyond the issue of the P.E.C. In the opening of this same letter, Weizmann is informed by Marshall that the next move regarding the Jewish Agency is up to the Zionists. If the Congress accepts the resolution with its provision for representation as adopted by the second session of the Non-Partisan Conference, Marshall will fulfill his commitments to secure broad non-Zionist participation. The unstated but quite apparent threat is that a less than total endorsement of the proposal would kill the Agency idea. He expresses the attitude that the non-Zionists did not see any necessity for further negotiations on the issue of Zionist - Non-Zionist representation on a Jewish Agency Council. In fact, this is what occurred. The Congress, which was the scene of numerous volatile debates between Labor, the emerging right wing led by Ze'ev Jabotinsky, and the Weizmann-led General Zionists, did not grant a carte blanche to Weizmann in establishing the Agency. In approving the resolution the Congress amended the proposal in order to delay effective implementation of the Agency for two years until a proposed constitution could be studied and finally approved by the Congress itself. Weizmann's opposition to this amendment was of no avail. Marshall, who was in Europe at the time, left with the issue of the Agency more in doubt than before. The Congress's conditional approval

meant that the negotiating stage would of necessity be extended at least two years, until the next Congress.

The frustrations of the American non-Zionists with the Zionist Organization were growing. The failure of Weizmann to deliver the Congress's unconditional approval of the Jewish Agency formula was added to the anger over the interference caused by the Palestine Securities. Together they effectively dampered the enthusiasm for Palestine work among the non-Zionists. The activity of the Palestine Economic Corporation was slowed. The solicitation of leading American Jews for representation on the Jewish Agency Council was postponed. With the start of a three-year United Jewish Campaign by the J.D.C. for relief and reconstruction work in Eastern Europe, the attention of non-Zionists toward Palestine was diverted. The P.E.C. with funds provided by the United Jewish Campaign did begin in the years of 1925-1927 to expand and develop its program. However, the diversion of spirit and capital toward Europe resulted in a much slower pace of development than had been anticipated. It was not until 1931 that the P.E.C. finally reached its initial goal of a \$5,000,000 capitalization.

Twelve years passed from Brandeis' initial proposal in 1919 for a massive effort of private capital investment in Palestine until the work of the P.E.C. warranted the supervision of a full-time president residing in Palestine -- twelve years in which the economic prosperity of the American Jewish Community could have channeled a larged amount of investment capital into Palestine. Julius Simon's assumption of residence in Palestine in 1931 marks the turning point for the P.E.C. as a major factor in the economic development of Palestine. Brandeis' proposal in the Zeeland Memorandum which formed the basis of the Palestine Economic Corporation's program was proved valid.

By the autumn of 1925, the unity of American Judaism proclaimed six months earlier at the Non-Partisan Conference was shattering. The J.D.C. was launching the United Jewish Campaign to deal with the relief needs of Eastern Europe. This relief agency had been organized as a temporary agency during the World War to meet the needs of European Jewry. The intention of its organizers to liquidate the assets and cease the functioning of its many activities was nullified by the continued economic hardships of Russian Jewry during the early years of Bolshevik rule in Russia. The opportunity for relief work inside Russia to be financed by American Jewry was made possible by a proposal from the Soviets in 1925. The affects of of this proposal which became known as the Crimea Plan will be discussed in the next chapter. Interest in Palestine work among the non-Zionists to whom Marshall wished to appeal was waning. Influential persons like David Brown, chairman of the United Jewish Campaign were being drawn toward the negation of Palestine as a viable alternative to the Jewish problems of Eastern Europe. The anti-Zionist position of Julius Rosenwald and others was enhanced by bitter attacks by the Z.O.A. on the J.D.C. and its leaders. As will be described in the next chapter, virtual war raged between the partisans of Zionism and the supporters of the United Jewish Campaign. The ultimate losers in this conflict between the segments of the American Jewish community were the Palestinian Jewish communities, and those Jews in Europe who would seek a Palestinian refuge in the immediate future.

CHAPTER SIX: THE CRIMEA CONTROVERSY

In the spring and summer of 1925, concern for the Jews of Soviet Russia was widespread throughout the Jewish world. The socio-economic condition of Russian Jewry had deteriorated drastically in post-Revolutionary Russia. Massive financial aid for relief in Russia, like financial support for Palestine, was available only from American Jewry. Both the desperate situation of millions of Russian Jews and the obligation to take action on their behalf was sensed ^{by} / Zionist and non-Zionist alike. For the Zionist leaders, the solution to the Jewish problem of Russia was mass immigration to Palestine. For the non-Zionists, Palestine was not seen as the end-all solution for the millions of Russian Jews. With the passage of restrictive immigration laws by the United States in 1924, the role of America as a refuge for the persecuted non-Jew as well as Jew had ended. Up until this time, immigration to America had been a major factor in Jewish life. Millions of Jews, primarily from Eastern Europe, had immigrated to America in the first two decades of this century. A major activity of the American Jewish community during these years was aiding the resettlement and acculturation of immigrants in this country. With America's doors virtually locked against the Russian Jew, an alternate solution to the plight of these people was needed.

The leadership of the American Jewish community could have opted for the Zionist alternative of immigration to Palestine. In 1925, there were no legal restrictions inhibiting such a choice as was to be the case a decade later. According to David Brown, chairman of the United Jewish Campaign, 80 percent of Russian Jewry saw immigration to Palestine as the best solution to their present problems. The actions of the two non-

partisan conferences indicate that the major non-Zionist leaders recognized the legitimacy of developing Palestine as a refuge for oppressed Jewry. The decision to disband the J.D.C. was indicative of the feeling in 1924 that direct aid to European Jewry had reached the saturation point of its effectiveness. The active support by Marshall and Warburg for the development of Palestine under the terms of the British Mandate as a Jewish National Home should have served as an additional impetus to choose the Zionist alternative for relief of Russian Jewry. Bitter anti-Communist feeling in America was an additional factor which weighed against direct aid to Russia.

Yet, the non-Zionist political and economic elite of American Jewry chose not to opt for immigration to Palestine as a solution for Russian Jewry. For those sympathetic to the Zionist cause, opposition to a program of mass immigration was based upon their perception of Palestine's limited capacity for absorption of new settlers. The necessary economic base for absorbing more than 20,000 to 30,000 Jews a year did not yet exist. The projected program of the P.E.C. was to solve the economic problems impeding larger immigration. But, until these problems were solved, even those most sympathetic to the Zionist cause among the non-Zionists could not see Palestine as a viable solution. Those within American Jewry who held to a staunchly anti-Zionist position were in 1925 eager for any alternative which excluded Palestine from a program of relief for East European Jewry. Therefore, when the Soviet government itself offered American Jewry an opportunity for aiding Russian Jews through resettlement in the Crimea, the leadership of the J.D.C. (consisting of both anti-Zionists and sympathetic non-Zionists) reversed the decision to dismember the J.D.C. In the spring of 1925 the J.D.C. decided to respond

to the offer of the Soviet government.

The most anti-Zionist supporter of the Crimea program was Julius Rosenwald. The Chicago millionaire, head of Sears Roebuck, was the largest single contributor to the United Jewish Campaign drive of 1925-1927, whose primary purpose was the funding of the Agro-Joint work within the Soviet Union. Rosenwald's motivation for financing this project appears to have been a fervent desire to block Palestine development. His views regarding Palestine were well known and often well articulated.

I shall not lift a finger to advance the immigration of Jews to Palestine, for Palestine has nothing to offer them. The soil is too poor to support them. Nor is Palestine a field for manufacturing or industry. The Jews never went to Palestine of their own choice. They were simply lured to go there by all sorts of promises; and when the bait is withdrawn they will certainly refuse to settle there. 111

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As Melvin Urofsky accurately records, through the creation of the American Society for Jewish Farm Settlement in Russia, in 1928 with a personal donation of five million dollars, Julius Rosenwald did all he could to lure Jews away from Palestine.

In 1925, the Soviets were in desperate need of foreign capital. They were also desirous of solving their Jewish problem. A proposal intended to meet both these needs was submitted by Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin. It called for the establishment of Jewish agricultural communes in the Crimea. Later, this area in the southern Ukraine was abandoned by the Soviets as a place for Jewish settlement in favor of the more remote Biro-Bidzhan project in Siberia. A number of settlements were established throughout Russia after 1925. Jewish national districts were recognized in Kherson and Dnepropetrovsk as well as the Crimea. By the mid-1930's, about 225,000 Jews who had in pre-Revolutionary days been small

shop keepers or artisans were engaged in agricultural work in the Soviet Union.¹¹³ However, the promises of religious and cultural autonomy for these Jews resettled in their own autonomous regions never materialized. The vast majority of those settled in the Ukraine were literally handed over to the Nazis after the invasion of Russia in World War II.

With the Russian offer as a stimulus the J.D.C. began plans for a new philanthropic campaign. A separate and distinct chapter of J.D.C. activity began with the decision not to liquidate the J.D.C. in the spring of 1925. One year earlier on July 21, 1924, the J.D.C. had fathered the American Joint Agricultural Corporation (Agro-Joint) to operate its programs in Russia. The J.D.C. made an initial investment of \$400,000. This fund was to be used for vocational training and loans to small businessmen and artisans displaced from their shops and workshops by the turmoil of the Russian Revolution. Money was also used for the settling of Russian Jews on the land. The Russian offer to aid in the Jewish resettlement program stimulated a massive relief campaign on behalf of Eastern European Jewry. About 25 percent of the \$25,000,000 raised in the United Jewish Campaign of 1925-1927 was appropriated to the Agro-Joint for its colonization work. After 1928, a private philanthropic organization backed by Julius Rosenwald, called the American Society for Jewish Farm Settlement in Russia, continued to finance Russian colonization.

Marshall, Warburg, and Flexner, the J.D.C. executives most committed to the upbuilding of Palestine, participated with an enthusiasm equal to those like Julius Rosenwald who saw "Crimea" as an alternative to Zionism and Palestine. Under Warburg and Marshall's leadership, the J.D.C. ultimately allocated a portion of the funds raised for capitalization of the P.E.C., as mentioned in the Flexner memo quoted in Chapter Five.

Nevertheless, "Crimea" became the identifying project of the J.D.C.-sponsored United Jewish Campaign of 1925-1927. It became the issue which shattered the unity of the Zionist and non-Zionist factions of the American Jewish community, laboriously constructed by Marshall and Weizmann through the Non-Partisan Conferences on Palestine of 1924 and 1925. Eighteen months of bitter conflict ensued between the American Zionists and the non-Zionists who supported the United Jewish Campaign. The Zionist cause in America suffered greatly from the autumn of 1925 until a new peace was established in January, 1927. Parallel to the period of the Weizmann-Brandeis conflict at the beginning of the decade, the ultimate loser in this battle was Palestine. The economic situation in Palestine during the mid-1920's was bleak. Unemployment was high, credit and investment capital low. The splintering in the Zionist Cause in America delayed the efforts of the P.E.C. and cut sharply into the funds raised in America for Palestine work. More people emigrated from Palestine than immigrated to the Jewish homeland during this period. In reviewing the critical events of this eighteen-month period, the intent will be to examine both sides of the tragic conflict which impeded the work of the upbuilding of Palestine.

The conflict proper began in the aftermath of the proclamation of the United Jewish Campaign at a J.D.C. conference convened in Philadelphia, on September 13, 1925. Prior to the meeting itself, the Z.O.A. leadership had already expressed its opposition to the proposal for Jewish colonization in Russia. Likewise, David Brown, the general chairman and chief spokesman for the United Jewish Campaign, and Felix Warburg, chairman of the J.D.C., had made known the decision to proceed with the plans. In the Jewish Daily Bulletin of May 17, 1925, the lead article informs the public

of David Brown's cabled report to Warburg, which exudes with optimism for the Jewish colonization effort in Russia. The article notes that the J.D.C. executive had met the evening before to discuss what action it should take as a follow-up to the \$400,000 it had previously allotted Jewish agricultural settlement in Russia. In the subsequent issue of the Bulletin, a statement was released by the J.D.C. announcing its intentions ¹¹⁴ to launch a massive fund-raising effort. This statement was followed by numerous publicity releases throughout the summer describing the aim of the J.D.C.'s \$25,000,000 drive. David Brown, who ¹¹⁵ accepted the chairmanship of the campaign on May 20, 1925, announced immediately that \$250,000 was being advanced to Dr. Joseph Rosen, director of colonization for the J.D.C. so that the colonization work could continue unimpeded by a delay in raising new funds.

The reaction of the American Jewish Press was divided. While the Anglo-Jewish papers reported unqualified support, the Yiddish press was apprehensive about the cooperation of American Jewry with the Communist ¹¹⁶ government of Russia. Outside of the Zionist organization and the Zionist journals, there was a general atmosphere of support by most major Jewish organizations for the proposed United Jewish Campaign. The Union of Orthodox Rabbis and a number of Jewish labor organizations pledged ¹¹⁷ their support for the J.D.C. campaign during the summer of 1925. Brown himself spent the major portion of the summer soliciting support for the relief and resettlement of Russian Jews in agricultural settlements in Crimea. The J.D.C. leaders did a quite thorough job of eliciting popular, broadly based support for their proposed projects. Both Brown and Warburg, however, avoided any mention of Palestine in the presentation of their proposals. This had the effect of neither promising specific aid out of

the relief drive for Palestine nor excluding outright, any aid to Palestine from their work. During this time, the summer of 1925, Marshall was personally engaged in planning the Jewish Agency which he and Weizmann had hoped would be established that year. Perhaps the silence regarding Palestine reflected a "wait and see" attitude toward Marshall's interaction with the Zionist Congress.

As was noted in the last chapter the Congress deferred action on the final Jewish Agency until its next session in 1927. Lipsky and his associates were well aware of the frustrated anger of the P.E.C. executive, of which Brown was a member, over the perceived interference of the Palestine Securities Inc., in their efforts. The New Palestine editorials and the statements at the Z.O.A. convention had, as noted in the last chapter, angered the non-Zionists. From the perspective of the Z.O.A., the delay in capitalizing the P.E.C. coupled with the proposal of the J.D.C. for a new relief campaign, lacking assurance of aid to Palestine, was seen as a threat to the Zionist cause. The non-Zionists appeared to be reneging on the promise of support made at the March, 1925 session of the Non-Partisan Conference. Further, Russian colonization offered an alternative focal point for American Jewish concern regarding relief for the Jews of Russia. However, the Z.O.A. in the summer of 1925 was totally committed to the coalition of Zionists and non-Zionists in the proposed Jewish Agency. In light of the tensions created by the Palestine Securities, the leadership under Lipsky was hesitant to take any action which would totally alienate the non-Zionists. Thus, when the issue of the Crimea plan arose at the Z.O.A. convention in July, 1925, Lipsky encouraged a lively debate on the issue, but had a resolution opposing the plan referred back to committee. He

thereby retained leverage with Marshall over non-Zionist participation in Palestine work while holding the potential of Zionist opposition to the J.D.C. drive as a constant threat.

Illustrative of Lipsky's cautious opposition to the J.D.C. proposal is a New Palestine editorial of May 29, 1925.¹¹⁹ The Zionists offer official praise to Warburg and the J.D.C. executive for reactivating their relief program. The body of the editorial, however, deals critically with the proposal of Crimean colonization. Claiming that the Jewish section of the Communist party is the source of this idea, the editorial warns against cooperating with these known enemies of the Jewish masses in Russia. Attributing the plan to Communists was undoubtedly intended to project the image that the plan was "traif" from an American as well as a Jewish perspective. In a second editorial in this same issue, the New Palestine editor stresses the theme of the futility of revitalizing Jewish life in Russia.¹²⁰ Following the theme of an article by Dr. S. M. Melamed¹²¹ in the previous week's issue, the New Palestine asserts that the intent of the Communists is not to help Jews but to hurt the Zionist cause in Russia. Both the Melamed article and the Lipsky editorial claim that Anti-Semitism is so deeply embedded in the East European societal structure that emigration is the only solution for the Russian Jew. Melamed sees the danger of an outbreak of pogroms in the Crimea by the native Mujik population who will rightly see colonization by Jews as an intrusion on their land. The thrust of all three articles is evident. The Zionists are warning American Jewry against being used by the Communists to finance the assimilation into Communism of Russian Jewry.

There is a very careful avoidance in these articles of the fear of losing needed capital for Palestine development. The tone of these early

attacks on the Crimea plan project a mood of conciliatory advice to the non-Zionist American Jew. The intention of wishing to sabotage the Zionist program in Palestine is attributed only to the Jewish Communists, not the American Jews. The moderation exhibited in these critiques parallel Lipsky's purposeful control of the Crimea debate at the Z.O.A. convention. By refraining from direct criticism of the J.D.C. leaders and by personally preventing the Convention from taking a positive stand against the J.D.C. plan, Lipsky was able to forestall open conflict with the non-Zionists.

Support for an open conflict with the non-Zionists over the Crimea plan was present at the Z.O.A. convention of 1925. The transcripts of the debate at the June convention of the Z.O.A. reveal bitter opposition to the proposal and to the American Jews supporting it. The debate on the "Crimea plan" occupied a significant part of the convention. A vast number of speakers advocated a formal condemnation of the J.D.C. intention of cooperating with the Soviet Government. Without Lipsky's interference the resolution opposing the United Jewish Campaign would have been adopted by the convention. Prominent and influential leaders such as Maurice Samuel, Emanuel Neumann and Stephen Wise issued warnings against a reliance on the good faith of the non-Zionists. Neumann, who agreed to Lipsky's call for a tabling of the resolution and referral to committee, nevertheless expressed the general sentiment of the assembly's distrust in stating:

Crimea is a mere symbol. If it isn't Crimea, it's Mexico. And if it isn't Mexico it's Argentina. The point is it is a substitute. It is an "ersatz." (Applause.) And I say it is a subconscious thing on the part of a great many well-meaning Jews, non-Zionists, who somehow can't square it with themselves as yet that their principle Jewish activity in the future shall be centered upon Palestine. 122

The factional differences between the old "Brandeisists" and the Lipsky leadership were not in evidence at this convention. With the official return of Stephen Wise to participation in Z.O.A. activity and the warmth of welcome afforded him as illustrated by his election as a delegate to the upcoming World Zionist Congress, the Z.O.A. for the first time in four years could project a picture of unity. Wise had made peace with Weizmann as well as the latter's American supporters as was manifest in the warm invitation he extended to the Zionist leader to speak at the Jewish Institute of Religion during his next trip to the United States.¹²³ The unity in Zionist ranks is significant. Without the support of the extraordinary fund-raising talents of Silver and Wise, the Z.O.A. might not have dared organize the United Palestine Appeal in the winter of 1925 in competition with the United Jewish Campaign.

Similar to the outcries of the established Z.O.A. leaders at the 1925 convention was the protest registered by Ludwig Lewisohn, American Jewish novelist, and contributor to the politically liberal, secular magazine, The Nation. An admitted Zionist by personal commitment, Lewisohn was not, however, politically active in the Z.O.A. Therefore, his outcry at the proposed J.D.C.-sponsored Crimea project is not tainted by any accusation that his opposition was due to a jealousy that he personally would be denied a position of leadership in the immediate activity of American Jewry. Such an accusation could be made against a Wise or Neumann whose partisan Zionism was well established. Lewisohn's protest against the J.D.C. plan emerged from his sincere belief that Europe offered no future for the Jewish People. Prophetically predicting the horrors soon to befall European Jewry, Lewisohn wrote in the October 7, 1925 edition of The Nation: "To spend one penny on keeping Jews in Eastern or

Central Europe is to subsidize murder. Palestine ... is the only hope, the only duty, the only salvation." ¹²⁴ Unfortunately, the J.D.C. supporters to whom the warning was directed, ignored the advice of this non-political Zionist just as they paid no heed to the statements made by the delegates to the Z.O.A. convention, earlier that same year.

The tension over the silence by Brown and Warburg regarding Palestine was increasing among American Zionists during the summer of 1925. Stephen Wise became the chief spokesman among the American Zionists in opposition to the Crimea project. Therefore, upon their return from the Zionist Congress, Marshall sought out Wise in an attempt to reestablish the disintegrating unity of American Jewry. Wise had the authorization of Lipsky and Weizmann to negotiate with Marshall. He had earned their confidence by his bitter attacks upon the Crimea plan. In a newspaper interview a week before meeting with Marshall, Wise had warned that there was great danger in providing the "Bolshevicks" with American Jewish money. Rather, he urged, American Jewry ¹²⁵ should direct the receipts of a new fund-raising campaign to Palestine. The Zionist choice of Wise as their spokesman culminated the "rapprochement" between Weizmann and Wise. In an exchange of letters prior to the Philadelphia conference initiating the United Jewish Campaign, Weizmann and Wise exhibited total agreement in strategy toward defeating the Crimea program. The bitter insults which had characterized their exchanges a few years earlier were ¹²⁶ replaced by words of friendship and cooperation. Weizmann himself never raised the issue of the United Jewish Campaign with Marshall in 1925. By refraining from personal involvement in the controversy, Weizmann avoided damaging his cordial links to Marshall during the ensuing controversy. Weizmann's silence, while crucial to the subsequent accord which ended the

public controversy in 1927, did result in a new breach in his relationship with Wise.¹²⁷ Wise was among the last holdouts in 1929 in maintaining his opposition to the Jewish Agency coalition. Distrust of Weizmann and Marshall appears to have been the primary reason for his wariness regarding the Agency.

Marshall's willingness to negotiate with Stephen Wise was in itself a measure of the earnest desire he had to preserve Jewish unity. A long-standing personal animosity between these men had existed since Wise's formation of the Free Synagogue in response to his being denied the job of rabbi at Temple Emanu-El after a bitter public controversy with Marshall, then president of the congregation, over freedom of the pulpit. Marshall's personal influence with his fellow organizers of the United Jewish Campaign and his personal sympathy for the Zionist cause made him the ideal choice to negotiate with the Zionists. The fact that these two men had the confidence of their respective constituencies and that their personal relationship precluded the chance of either one giving in to the other caused their resultant compromise to meet with universal praise from the various segments of American Jewry.

In its final form the resolution calling for the United Jewish Campaign as worked out by Wise and Marshall consisted of five major points: one, it called upon American Jewry to raise fifteen million dollars over three years; two, it authorized the J.D.C. to continue and expand its agricultural and industrial resettlement program; three, it urged the J.D.C. to expand relief work especially in the areas of industrial aid to artisans, medical sanitation, and war orphan care; four, "American Israel" would not undertake any new untried tasks in areas of reconstruction or social amelioration; and five, the following statement regarding Palestine:

The conference regards it as self evident that American Jewry whenever called upon is prepared generously to support the work of Jewish resettlement in Palestine. It is persuaded that through the Jewish Agency and other instruments the Jews of America will always give adequately and generously of their strength and substance to the performance of this great and historic task. 128

There is no specific mention of Crimea nor does the term "colonization" appear in the resolution in respect to efforts in Russia. Again, Marshall had at least temporarily achieved unanimity at a public conference through compromise. The implicit commitments to Russian colonization satisfied the "Rosenwalds and the Browns," while removal of the words "Crimea" and "colonization" and the explicit pledge of support for Palestine, gained the concurrence of the Zionists for a unified campaign. However, Marshall was not merely "playing politics." This resolution expressed his own firm belief that American Jews could and should support both the development of Palestine as a Jewish home and the relief needs of East European Jewry.

Marshall vehemently defended the principle of supporting both causes in a public statement in the Jewish Daily Bulletin of July 19, 1925, and in a private letter dated September 10, 1925, to Elihu Stone, president of the New England Z.O.A. In the letter, Marshall expresses great anger at Stone and others of his fellow Zionists for having falsely exaggerated the Crimea proposals and viciously slandered the J.D.C. leadership. He calls Stone's attention to the fact that he and the other members of the J.D.C. executive had proven their concern for and commitment to Palestine by their financial contributions. He warns Stone that:

to say colonization on the soil by Jewish People can only be permitted in Palestine is an act of impertinence, brutality and fanaticism. I know that Dr. Weizmann who thoroughly understands the situation, does not entertain such views and I can also say that the only thing which will prevent

the Keren Hayesod from increasing its collections in this country will be the adoption of such resolutions expressing this sentiment. 129

The Zionists, while being granted the compromise paragraph in support of Palestine, were thereby put on notice as to the point where pressure against J.D.C. activity would endanger their own cause. The non-Zionists, even the most sympathetic, i.e., Marshall, would withdraw support from the Keren Hayesod if the Zionists opposed the relief work for East European Jewry. Similarly, in agreeing to support the compromise he had worked out with Marshall, Wise put himself and the Zionists on record as to the limitations of their agreement. Noting that the assurance of Marshall, Warburg, Lehman and Brown had been given that the Russian colonization plan was being pursued in the context of relief work only, Wise urged support of the compromise proposal and the United Jewish Campaign. However, he also issued a warning to the J.D.C. leadership that Zionist support was conditional on their continuing active support for Palestine.¹³⁰ The threat that the Zionists would remove support from the J.D.C. program and conduct a competing campaign for funds was implicit in Wise's statement. The United Jewish Campaign, if it wished to be truly united, would have to exhibit supportive action for Palestine colonization and refrain from activity which would hinder the Zionist cause. Despite the implicit dangers expressed by both sides, the Philadelphia Conference was concluded on a note of Jewish unity.

This unity was to be short-lived. At the close of the Philadelphia conference both sides felt they had achieved victory. The Zionists saw the recognition of Palestine reconstruction by the acknowledged leadership of American Jewry as a vindication of their efforts for the last twenty-eight

years. In an editorial entitled "The Triumph at Philadelphia" Lipsky explained to the rank and file Zionists the significance of the wording of the resolution. In his view the danger that Russian Colonization would become another "Uganda" was averted:

The Joint Distribution Committee will continue its work to relieve the Jews of Russia side by side with the Jews of Poland, the Jews of Bessarabia, side by side with general relief work. But there is no mention of Russian relief as a sort of new aspect of Jewish history. The resolution is NOT simply a matter of words. It is a distinct declaration of faith and principle on the part of American Jewry.... The Conference will perhaps be regarded as a turning point in the history of Jewish thought and action. 131

Dos Yiddishe Folk, the Yiddish language American Zionist publication, echoed a similar note of victory: "What the Zionists wanted at Philadelphia was that the desire of 80% of the Russian Jews to settle in Palestine would be given due consideration. This has been achieved in the fullest measure." 132

Thus, we see that a commitment in principle to Palestine as the Jewish homeland by the American Jewish community was the extent of the Zionist goal at Philadelphia. There was no demand for a share of the money to be raised. The Marshall-Wise compromise met their demands. On the J.D.C. side, their program for action had won approval as submitted. Their only concession was a recognition in principle of the legitimacy of the Zionist movement. If the leadership of the United Jewish Campaign had continued to pay verbal tribute to the Zionist cause in addition to the financial investment made in Palestine from the campaign through the P.E.C., the subsequent conflict would have been avoidable. The commitment of the Z.O.A. leadership to the Weizmann program of alliance with the non-Zionists was strong enough to resist pressure from the more purist elements opposing the coalition. Stephen Wise's role as spokesman for the Zionists in negotiating the compromise

with Marshall is evidence of the strength of this position. The legitimacy of Zionism which the resolution offered was victory enough for the American Zionist leaders.

Tragically, the United Jewish Campaign under David Brown did not preceive the importance which the Zion'ists placed on this official pledge of commitment. In the initial launching of the public campaign through newspaper advertisements and letters to potential contributors, the paragraph regarding Palestine was deleted from the Philadelphia resolution. The Zionist "Triumph at Philadelphia" had been totally composed of a formal written commitment to Palestine by the leadership of American Jewry. They now felt betrayed. Response and counter-response on both sides became bitter and personal. Whether the deletion had been intentional or, as Brown later claimed, an oversight, open warfare between the Zionist and non-Zionist segments of American Jewry now followed. Having been denied the long sought official recognition of the legitimacy of their cause by the American Jewish establishment, the Zionist forces retrenched into a hard-line opposition to the total program of the United Jewish Campaign.

The conflict between the Zionists and the United Jewish Campaign (U.J.C.) developed a momentum of its own after October, 1925. The following fifteen months were characterized by attacks and counterattacks of a personalized nature. Attempts at compromise continually failed due to the deep personal animosity and mistrust which developed through the inter-action of the leaders of the two groups following the publication of David Brown's announcement of the U.J.C. program. The strategy adopted by the Zionists to counter the U.J.C. included the organization of a united fund-raising campaign of their own and a concerted public relations effort to discredit the U.J.C. and its leaders in the hope of winning popular support from the American Jewish

community for support of Palestine development in opposition to the colonization work to be undertaken by the "Agro-Joint" in the Crimea.

The public relations approach adopted by the Zionists in an attempt to discredit the non-Zionists is reminiscent of the organized campaign used to defeat Brandeis forces within the Z.O.A. five years earlier. By accumulating popular support for their position the Zionists hoped to defeat the Crimea project and thus channel the funds into Palestine work. Like Brandeis, the J.D.C. leaders had a disdain for public confrontations on Jewish issues. Undoubtedly, the Zionists hoped to win a similar victory against another opponent unwilling to enter a public fight.

The initial response to David Brown's omission of the Palestine paragraph of the Marshall-Wise compromise resolution was made by Stephen Wise. Choosing the podium of the American Jewish Congress (A.J.C.) of which he was president, rather than an official Zionist platform, Wise chided the "real leaders of the Joint Distribution Committee to give public and solemn affirmation that they will not tolerate a violation of a compact into which they have entered; that they will not violate a covenant of honor they concluded with American Israel." ¹³³ By "real leaders," Wise undoubtedly meant Marshall and Warburg with whom Wise had drafted the compromise resolution. Wise's total disgust with and mistrust of David Brown were indicated further on in this speech when Wise told of his "amazement and mortification as a Jew" ¹³⁴ in learning of the manner in which Brown had disregarded the intent and the letter of the agreement. Wise did not at this point demand a total repudiation of the U.J.C. by the Congress. Rather, he initiated two resolutions intended to warn the J.D.C. leadership that the Zionists were prepared to go public in their effort to pressure them to support the upbuilding of Palestine. The first resolution was a unanimous endorsement of the soon

to be launched United Palestine Appeal and its goal of raising five
million dollars in 1926.¹³⁵ The second resolution was a warning to
the J.D.C. executive that if they allowed Brown's omission of the Palestine
paragraph to stand as the policy of the U.J.C., "the Executive Committee
of the American Jewish Congress is empowered to reconvene this Congress
or take such action as it deems advisable in the circumstance." The
A.J.C. continued to call upon the J.D.C. to:

explicitly guarantee to American Jewry that the United
Jewish Campaign will be throughout conducted on the exact
terms of the Philadelphia agreement, that is to say, in
conformity to the letter and spirit of the Philadelphia
Resolution.

and

to issue a budgetary statement making clear the amount it
intends to expend for the continuation and reasonable
extension of land settlement in Russia, together with the
other proposed allocation of the funds to be raised. 136

If the J.D.C. would meet these demands, the American Jewish Congress promised
its full support for the United Jewish Campaign.

Response to the A.J.C. resolution was quick. Louis Marshall on
behalf of the J.D.C. issued a statement in the Jewish Daily Bulletin of
October 29, 1925. In this statement he sought to minimize the differences
between the pro-Zionist American Jewish Congress and his colleagues on the
J.D.C. executive. Marshall notes that the Congress in its resolution had
expressed concern for the plight of Eastern European Jewry. He stressed
that the scope of the United Jewish Campaign was limited to the aiding of
the Jews of Eastern Europe, and that the intention of devoting the funds
collected by the campaign to Eastern Europe exclusively had been clearly
expressed in the Philadelphia resolution. In dealing specifically with the

A.J.C. demand for a detailed budget, he pointed out the impracticality of allocating funds not yet collected. Marshall also contended that Brown's letter was "in no way intended to disavow the force of the Palestine paragraph. His letter had sole reference to the United Jewish Campaign." 137

In amplifying the position of the J.D.C. regarding Palestine, Marshall enumerated the extensive funding of Palestine projects which the J.D.C. had undertaken and the continued commitment of the J.D.C. leaders to developing Palestine. He declared that "they regard it as the duty of American Jewry to generously support the work of Jewish resettlement in Palestine. Personally many of us are doing it, and have done it, and intend to continue 138 in that course unless we are prevented."

Marshall's public posture of playing down dissention between the factions of the organized Jewish Community did not reflect the personal anger and frustration with the Zionists he expressed privately. In a letter to 139 Abba Hillel Silver written immediately prior to issuing this public statement, he emphasized the three major points of his later public statement that: one, financial aid to Palestine was outside of the scope of the U.J.C.; two, he and his fellow J.D.C. executive members, including David Brown, had proven their commitment to Palestine development through financial support of the Keren Hayesod and their efforts on behalf of the formation of the Jewish Agency; and three, the J.D.C. itself as an organization had continually and actively participated in a number of relief and development projects in Palestine. However, unlike the public announcement, in his letter to Silver, Marshall warned that though he himself felt American Jewry was capable of providing aid for both Eastern European Jewry and Palestine, if the Zionists wished to create a conflict, Marshall and his associates would thus be prevented from carrying out their intention of aiding in the development

of Palestine.

Marshall forwarded to David Brown a copy of this letter along with a personal letter advising Brown "not to indulge in any controversy" with any of the Zionists. He added the suggestion that Brown play down the Russian colonization work in his public pronouncements as chairman of the United Jewish Campaign. Marshall offered Brown his analysis of the situation within the Jewish community. In sharing his wisdom with his younger colleague, Marshall obviously hoped to avoid further conflict with fellow Jews. Marshall wrote:

Those who would never help us anyway are trying to create a schism by talking about Russian Colonization and misrepresenting us as being opposed to Palestine. Let us saw wood and go forward and not permit ourselves to be diverted into by-paths which though alluring will only find us barbed and mired. Nobody knows better than I do how inviting it is to engage in Polemics. Nobody relishes a pretty fight more than I do. Yet as I grow old, I find that if one has to fight there are sufficient opportunities in other fields and more dangerous foes to deal with than those who are members of our own household. The latter may be safely ignored. The former cannot be disregarded. 140

These letters are accurate reflections of Marshall's approach to the schism in American Jewry in 1925 and 1926. By urging moderation on both sides and by threatening to withdraw his financial and political support of Palestine, he hoped to recreate the broad coalition of American Jewry which he had constructed through the Non-Partisan conferences. Marshall in his deep commitment to Klal Yisrael saw legitimacy in both causes. His belief in the overriding unity of purpose of the Jewish People blinded him to the deep personal resentments and ideological difference which underlay the public name-calling and counter-productive propaganda being disseminated by both the Zionists and anti-Zionists within American Jewry. The unanimity

of purpose exhibited at both the non-Partisan conferences and at the Philadelphia Conference was the result of broadly based, loosely worded principles which allowed everyone to interpret the results in his own way. At the end of 1925, following the active beginning of United Jewish fund raising efforts by both the U.J.C. and the United Palestine Appeal, both the J.D.C. and the Z.O.A. viewed their opposing programs for the resettlement of Russian Jews as the most practical solution to the compelling "Jewish Question." Each saw the other's position as untenable. Each side lacked respect for the other and viewed the other's actions and statements with suspicion. Both sides found themselves in direct competition for public financial support for their respective causes. Though a Marshall and a Weizmann could find satisfaction with two separate fund-raising campaigns oriented toward two separate programs for aiding the plight of Russian Jews, their followers could not. Weizmann's statement of October 26, 1925, that "The Zionists do not consider the Crimea project in any way a rival to Zionism,"¹⁴¹ does not accurately reflect the editorial opinion of the New Palestine editorial, "Our Course of Action," in its October 23rd edition, where it calls upon Zionists to refrain from cooperating with the J.D.C. campaign.¹⁴²

Likewise, Marshall's admonition to David Brown quoted above fell on deaf ears. As Yonaton Shapiro correctly states, "The bureaucrats of the J.D.C. were unhappy with these arrangements. Apparently they were beginning to feel uneasy about the increased attention given to Palestine as compared with the general relief work that was their main responsibility."¹⁴³ Marshall attempted to reunite American Jewry by gaining a firm commitment from the J.D.C. to allocate \$1.5 million of the United Jewish Campaign's budget to the Palestine Economic Corporation.¹⁴⁴ In addressing the

"Extraordinary Conference on Palestine" which was the launching effort of the United Palestine Appeal (U.P.A.), Marshall further emphasized his desire for unity through his call for a single united campaign to be jointly conducted by the Zionist organizations and the J.D.C.¹⁴⁵ The conditions mentioned above which divided the Zionists and the J.D.C. people, were however, too strong in the winter of 1925 to be neutralized by Marshall's efforts. The Crimea controversy remained an active and divisive issue until the beginning of 1927 when Marshall and Weizmann were finally able to work out a compromise solution which each was able to compel his followers to observe. The interim year of 1926 was characterized by continued personal attacks on both sides and by extensive competition between the U.J.C. and the U.P.A. for money. While the J.D.C. felt that the Zionist attacks were hindering their campaign efforts, the fact remains that the original \$15 million goal was pledged in the first year of the three-year campaign. The U.J.C. ultimately raised more than \$25 million. However the image of the J.D.C. leaders was damaged by the public accusations and misinformation used by the Zionists in their propaganda campaign against the U.J.C.

Probably the most brutal example of the Zionist attacks against the J.D.C. people and the Crimea project was the advertisement printed in a Houston, Texas, newspaper entitled, "Jews of Texas Beware."¹⁴⁶ Judge Henry Dannenbaum was the author and subscriber of this advertisement which alluded to Marshall, Warburg, et. at., as profit-seeking capitalists who had no real concern with the Jewish masses of Russia or with the development of Palestine. Dannenbaum, of course, did not use any names in this attack, nor did he refer directly to Crimea or to the United Jewish Campaign, or the J.D.C. But Dannenbaum, who had played a leading role in the ouster

of Brandeis at Cleveland five years earlier, was clearly challenging Marshall, alluded to in the advertisement as "a communal leader whose promises to Palestine are unperformed," to enter into public, open debate. Marshall's response, like that of Brandeis in the earlier schism, was though blunt and challenging, also private.¹⁴⁷ Despite the continued public attacks, the J.D.C. leaders refused to make a public defense. They concentrated their efforts on raising larger sums of money from their own small but affluent circle. Throughout 1926, Warburg and Marshall were in agreement that a counter-propaganda campaign would prove futile. Shapiro, in commenting upon a Warburg letter to Marshall opposing a J.D.C. counter-attack in August, 1926, states:

More was involved than a desire to guard his good name and reputation in the proper circles of American Society. It was a realization that once having admitted mud-throwing, militant and aggressive elements would have the advantage over restraint. Accommodating leaders would never, therefore, be able to compete effectively. The A.J.C. could not fight such a battle in 1926 for the same reason Jacob Schiff had refused to fight the Zionists in the newspapers in 1916.¹⁴⁸

Warburg's proposal to Marshall as to how they could combat "the Lipsky-Neumann gang" was, "let us join the more respectable and moderate elements in the hope that together we will hold in check the militant and aggressive."¹⁴⁹ This desire to end the public quarrelling within the American Jewish community was a prime motive in 1926 behind the desire of Warburg and Marshall to join together with Weizmann toward finalizing the Jewish Agency. Similar to Schiff's final acquiescence to the Jewish Congress movement of 1916-1917, they saw the Agency as a vehicle through which they could silence the Zionist attacks and quietly reassert their position as the unchallenged leaders of American Jewry.

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE EMERGENCE OF UNITY

The bitter struggle between the J.D.C. and the American Zionists had effectively tabled action regarding the proposed Jewish Agency. By the winter of 1926-1927, the non-Zionists had not yet responded to the resolution passed by the Fourteenth Zionist Congress, held at Vienna in August, 1925. Establishment of a Jewish Agency on which the wealthy non-Zionist Jews of America and Western Europe would be represented was a cornerstone of Weizmann's program from the time he first proposed non-Zionist involvement in the upbuilding of Palestine at the London Conference of 1920. (See Chapter One.) The role of non-Zionists had been a central issue of disagreement between Brandeis and Weizmann during their struggle for control of the movement in 1920-1921. Weizmann believed that massive amounts of capital could best be obtained from American Jewry through a coalition with the Marshall-Warburg faction of American Jewry, outside of the Z.O.A. structure. Brandeis and Mack insisted that all Americans wishing to participate in the Zionist cause join the organization which they, at that time, controlled. The issue of non-Zionist involvement in the upbuilding of Palestine was a major factor in Weizmann's decision to facilitate the ouster of Brandeis from power in 1921. By the autumn of 1926, however, Weizmann's program for obtaining massive amounts of capital for Palestine was faltering. The public controversy raging between the Z.O.A. and the J.D.C. over the Crimea program had inflicted extensive financial injury on an already weak organization.

Weizmann arrived in New York in November, 1926, the troubled leader of an economically weak movement. The current deficit of the W.Z.O. was over £ 30,000. The Keren Hayesod, when first launched by Weizmann in 1921, had

set a five year goal of £ 25 million. By the winter of 1926-1927, a mere
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£ 3 million had been collected. At the Vienna Congress Weizmann's
leadership had been attacked by the socialists on the left and by Zev
Jabotinsky, the founder of Revisionist Zionism, on the right. Passage of
the Jewish Agency resolution by the Congress was accompanied by grave
reservations among many of the delegates. "They did not want to have the
rich Jews of America, the so-called assimilationists, in an Agency which
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would have a controlling voice in the affairs of the Jewish Homeland."
Rather than give Weizmann and his executive the power to finalize a coalition-
based Jewish Agency, the Congress instructed Weizmann to reopen negotiations
with Marshall and the Non-Partisan Conference executive committee and to
report back to the Congress two years hence. With the biennial meeting of
the Zionist Congress due to convene in Basel the following summer, Chaim
Weizmann needed a concrete accomplishment in 1926, if he was to maintain
his leadership of the Zionist movement.

As noted at the end of Chapter Six, Warburg and Marshall viewed the
establishment of the Jewish Agency as the solution to the scandalous public
warfare being waged against the J.D.C. and its leadership in the American
Jewish community. The personal animosity existing between the J.D.C. leaders
and the leaders of American Zionism made negotiations between the rival
groups impractical if not impossible. Weizmann's personal silence regarding
the Crimea controversy left him the one Zionist with whom Marshall could
negotiate without the stigma of having acquiesced to the opposition. Weizmann's
trip to America, though planned well in advance, was preceded by an ultimatum
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from Marshall in the form of a long detailed letter. Refraining from any
hint of the damage he and his fellow J.D.C. executives had suffered at the
hands of American Zionists, Marshall warned that the continuing opposition of

Weizmann's American followers to the J.D.C. would lead to a total end to non-Zionist support for the cause of building a Jewish Homeland in Palestine. Specific mention was made in the letter to the impending suspension of non-Zionist support for the Jewish Agency and the dissolution of the Palestine Economic Corporation.

Negotiations between Weizmann and Marshall began immediately upon the arrival of the former in New York in November, 1926. In a series of meetings which included a number of people, but notably excluded the leadership of the Z.O.A., Weizmann and Marshall reached an accord which successfully ended the in-fighting within American Jewry. The agreement firmly committed Zionist and non-Zionist alike to the establishment of a Jewish Agency composed of a coalition of the leading non-Zionist Jews of Europe and America and an equal number of Zionist delegates. The agreement was announced at a U.P.A. rally in New York City on January 17, 1927. Though the Agency was not officially constituted until August 14, 1929, with the signing of the Jewish Agency constitution in Zurich, Switzerland, the Weizmann-Marshall accord signalled the beginning of this new unity. The new Jewish Agency replaced the W.Z.O. as the recognized organization dealing with the Mandatory Power. The Weizmann-Marshall accord called for a Palestine commission empowered to present a definitive report on Jewish colonization in Palestine. The subsequent problems regarding the composition of this commission did not have the damaging effect which the Crimea and Palestine Securities Ltd., issues had caused in the past. The personal commitments of Weizmann and Marshall were strong enough to keep their respective constituents from sabotaging their plans for a jointly-controlled Jewish Agency.

Weizmann's gains from this agreement are clear. The great wealth

of American Jewry would now be made available for the colonization and economic development of Palestine. Marshall would now actively resume his fund raising efforts on behalf of the U.P.A. and the P.E.C. A letter from Marshall to Julius Rosenwald¹⁵³ immediately after the public announcements of the peace agreement is indicative of Marshall's renewed efforts to enlist financial support for the Zionist cause. After explaining the accord which had ended the Zionist-J.D.C. war, Marshall urges Rosenwald to contribute to the Chicago U.P.A. drive. Rosenwald, it must be noted, had been the staunchest opponent to the Zionist cause in the American Jewish Committee and the J.D.C. In fact, his massive contributions to the United Jewish Campaign are traceable to his bitter distaste for Zionism.

Establishment of the expanded Jewish Agency was a great personal triumph for Weizmann. Calling it "the hour of our triumph,"¹⁵⁴ Weizmann later described in glowing terms what the Zurich meeting, made possible by his accord with Marshall twenty months earlier, meant to him and the movement.

Zionist opposition had been overcome, external opposition had been soothed; a genuine assembly of Jewish leaders in the non-Zionist world declared its intention to stand side by side with the Zionists in the practical work in Palestine. All sections of the Jewish people were represented and every community of any size.¹⁵⁵

Weizmann's stature as a leader of world Jewry was enhanced by the pledge of the social-economic elite of American Jewry to join forces with him. If not for Marshall's death immediately following the Zurich meeting, and the Great Depression precipitated by the stock market crash of October, 1929, the assurance of Marshall and Warburg that Weizmann's financial troubles were over would most likely have assured his continued uninterrupted leadership of a

financially solvent Zionist cause.

The Marshall-Weizmann accord resulted in a number of significant concessions by the Zionists in exchange for the desired support of the J.D.C. elite. A look at the exchange of letters between the presidents of the American Jewish Committee and the World Zionist Organization reveals that Weizmann in effect repudiated the Z.O.A. and the U.P.A. leadership. Marshall, on the other hand, in his January 17th reply, graciously accepted the apology without any admission of foul play or error on the part of his comrades in the J.D.C. Weizmann in his letter to Marshall, dated January 13, 1927, places the blame for the conflict upon the understandable apprehension of the American Zionists toward "any movement which might interfere with
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the work of upbuilding Palestine." In addition, Weizmann made a special effort to praise the J.D.C. for its continual support of Palestine development. He noted that the J.D.C. had invested over seven million dollars in Palestine prior to the U.J.C. drive of 1925-1927. He also offered his thanks for the estimated two million dollars the U.J.C. had pledged to the P.E.C. to
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capitalize the latter's proposed investment program in Palestine.

Marshall's reply and his subsequent statement at the U.P.A. rally notably excluded reference to the anxiety he and Warburg had exhibited in their exchange of letters the previous August, as quoted at the end of Chapter Six. Weizmann, the master politician of the Zionist movement, had been outmaneuvered by Marshall. Desperately desiring the success of the Jewish Agency, Weizmann failed to perceive the political leverage he actually had. Marshall was able to get his desired peace in the American Jewish community without compromising the J.D.C. aid program in Soviet Russia. The Agro-Joint continued its work in Crimea. In the following decade it would pour millions of additional dollars into the Biro-Bidjan project initiated by Stalin.

Marshall also won the additional concession from Weizmann that a joint Zionist-non-Zionist Palestine commission would investigate the economic conditions of Palestine prior to Marshall's reconvening of the Non-Partisan conference, for the purpose of officially approving American non-Zionist participation in the Jewish Agency. This last condition to the agreement delayed final approval of the Jewish Agency until 1929.

Yet, one cannot be too critical of Weizmann. He had no way to know the extent of irritation caused Warburg and Marshall by the public attacks made by the Zionists during the previous year and a half. Marshall's correspondence with Weizmann reflected a waning interest in future participation in the Zionist effort. To lose the support of Marshall and his friends totally would have meant disaster to the Zionist cause. By compromising, Weizmann through Louis Marshall, was able to draw an entire segment of influential and wealthy American Jews into the expanded Jewish Agency. The importance of this action became clear in the subsequent decades. Had Weizmann lost the support of Marshall, a "true Hovev Zion" the possibility seems slight that he could have constructed such an organization at a later time with less committed American Jews. Perhaps Weizmann, who often admitted that he held a pessimistic attitude toward the future of European Jewry felt that the price he paid for American Jewish support was a necessary one. Since he had absolutely no influence over the "Rosenwalds," any attempt to fight the continued existence of an Agro-Joint would have proven futile. By adopting a less ambitious and more humble approach, Weizmann gave the J.D.C. the victory in their battle with the Zionists which they desperately desired. However it must be clearly recognized that Weizmann did succeed in involving the non-Zionist American Jews with their vast financial resources within the expanded Jewish Agency and the Keren Hayesod.

An indirect result of the Marshall-Weizmann peace agreement was the defeat of Louis Lipsky and his pro-Weizmann forces within the Z.O.A. With the easing of tensions between Zionist and non-Zionist the unity of American Zionism which had emerged in 1925 at the outset of the conflict began to dissipate. Without repeating the details of the leadership crisis of 1927-1930, which Yonatan Shapiro reconstructs in detail,¹⁵⁸ the major underlying causes can be summarized here. Shapiro notes that "the immediate cause was the impending creation of the Jewish Agency, which had been designed to take over the Z.O.A.'s fund-raising activities and to become the single organization to which the economic development of Palestine would be entrusted."¹⁵⁹ The changing socio-economic status of the evolving Jewish community in America was also a factor. The "nouveau-riche" Jew of East European origin wanted association with the socially accepted German-Jewish elite. With agreement that American Jewry was to play a united role in fund raising for the Zionist cause, the Z.O.A. members desired a more American style of leadership for their movement. In 1928, Lipsky and his associates were accused of misusing Zionist funds by loaning \$500,000 in U.P.A. funds to the floundering American Zion Commonwealth, without the authorization of the directors of the U.P.A. Coupled with the continued outcry by the Brandeisists that the Z.O.A. executive was inefficiently wasting money in their bureaucratic structure, pressure for a new leadership for American Zionism increased.

Weizmann, firmly committed to his partnership with Marshall, stayed out of the Z.O.A. crisis of 1927-1930. Unlike the 1919-1921 period during which he had played an active role, Weizmann, in effect, deserted his trusted lieutenant, Louis Lipsky, in this struggle for control. In fact, through his agreement to transfer control of the Keren Hayesod to the

Jewish Agency, Weizmann effectively disarmed his American loyalists. With control of the U.P.A. in America now in the hands of the future Jewish Agency members, including Julian Mack, the inevitability of Lipsky's defeat was clear by the summer of 1928.

Lipsky's abrasive approach, once a vital aid to Weizmann in his battle with the Brandeis group, was now a liability. With the formation of the Jewish Agency, Weizmann envisioned a new era for American Zionism. However, the personal hatred between the Lipsky faction of the Z.O.A. and both the J.D.C. leadership and the Brandeis group was a continual threat to the peace in American Jewry. A return to office of the Brandeis people would solve two potential problems for Weizmann. First, men like Szold, Wise, and Mack had proven themselves to be more effective fund raisers than Lipsky and his associates. Their ultimate return to office in 1930 gave the Z.O.A. a stature within American Jewry which Lipsky could never have achieved. More important for both Weizmann personally, and for the Zionist cause in America, was Lipsky's inability to deal with the non-Zionists. The presence of Julian Mack as Honorary Chairman of the Z.O.A. after 1930 proved to be important in the maintenance of peace between Zionists and non-Zionists during the subsequent decade. By quietly withdrawing support for Lipsky, Weizmann was following his familiar pattern of changing his position as the necessities of the Zionist cause required.

By the end of the decade the Zionist cause in America bore a striking resemblance to the pre-1921 Z.O.A. ¹⁶⁰ While remaining publicly invisible, Brandeis through Robert Szold, Julian Mack, and Stephen Wise regained control of the Z.O.A. in 1930. The more nationalistic approach to Zionism of a Louis Lipsky was replaced by the Americanized style of a Brandeis, Warburg, and Wise. Lipsky's Zionism, like Weizmann's and that of many of the

other European leaders, was steeped in the Yiddish culture of Eastern Europe. As the Jewish immigrant began leaving the "ghetto" of New York's Lower East Side, with its strong Yiddish culture, he desired a more Americanized approach to expressing his Jewish identity. The emerging middle class of American Jewry in the late 1920's saw Felix Warburg, not the "Hälutz" of Palestine, as the role model he wished to emulate. Like the German Jews of an earlier wave of immigration, these people were sympathetic to and willing to aid philanthropically their less fortunate Jewish brethren in Europe and Palestine. But, like both the original leaders of American Zionism before the World War and the American Jewish Committee leaders who had now agreed to participate in the Jewish Agency, the bulk of American Jews, while sympathetic to Zionism, automatically excluded from their consideration personal aliyah and a nationalistic ideology. Palestine was their cause, but America was (and for most would remain) their home.

With the fall from power of the Lipsky group, the cultural and ideological elements of Zionism which separated the Z.O.A. from the non-Zionist sympathizer melt away. From 1921-1927 the terms Zionist, non-Zionist, and anti-Zionist were meaningful classifications for differentiating segments of the American Jewish community. Subsequent to the creation of the Jewish Agency the differentiation between Zionist and non-Zionist ceases to have significant meaning. A case in point is the self-identification of Judge Julian Mack. Mack served as President of the Z.O.A. from its reorganization in 1918 until 1921, when the vote of no-confidence by the Z.O.A. convention forced him and the entire Brandeis group to resign. Following the failure of the Palestine Development League (P.D.L.) in 1923 to make any significant impact on the Zionist cause, Mack became involved with the non-Zionist sponsored Palestine Economic Corporation (P.E.C.). Unlike many of his

Zionist colleagues, including those in the so-called Brandeis group, Mack was also involved in the Joint Distribution Committee. His long time membership in and association with the Z.O.A. disqualified him personally from receiving a non-Zionist seat on the Jewish Agency council. However, Mack's close friend and associate in Jewish affairs, Bernard Flexner, did receive a non-Zionist seat on the Jewish Agency council. Like Mack, Flexner had been a part of the Brandeis faction of the Z.O.A. prior to 1921. He too had been involved in the P.D.L. As noted in Chapter Five, Flexner was the first president of the P.E.C. Together, these two Brandeis men, both of whom maintained close personal relationships with Louis Marshall, kept the Justice informed of activities within the non-Zionist group. After Marshall's death and the assumption by Felix Warburg of the American direction of the Jewish Agency, Flexner and Mack played a significant role¹⁶¹ as liaisons between Warburg and Brandeis. Through their efforts, Warburg and Brandeis reached an accord on the future of Zionist activity in America -- an accord which effectively eliminated the Lipsky group from any influence they still retained.

Mack's intense desire to gain American Jewry's support for Palestine and his close personal ties to the non-Zionists led him to adopt a very pragmatic approach to Zionist appeals. In a recently published biography, Mack is quoted as early as 1923, as having stated: "I am not now endeavoring to make converts to Zionism. I used to do that, up to 1919, the end of the war. I have ceased doing that because, if I make converts to an interest¹⁶² in Palestine, the rest is apt to come." The P.D.L. and the subsequent P.E.C. within which Mack played a central role were based upon this same philosophy. Whether one paid his "shekel" dues to the Zionist Organization or not, interest in Palestine demonstrated through financial support was the

major need of the Zionist cause in the mid 1920's.

Mack's approach to Zionism was in fact congruent with the non-Zionism of Marshall and Warburg. Aliyah by American Jews was as foreign a concept to Mack and his major associates, Wise and Brandeis, as it was to Marshall and Warburg. Both the Marshall-led non-Zionists and the Brandeis Zionists saw the role of American Jewry in the Zionist cause in terms of providing both money and solid economic concepts to the Yishuv. All of these men shared a dedication to America which competed with their Zionism for both their time and energy. This stands in opposition to the total commitment to Zionism of men like Lipsky and Weizmann. In fact, what prevented Marshall and Brandeis from working together in the Zionist cause were factors related to American politics as previously discussed. It is a credit to the personality and character of Julian Mack that he was able to be a successful liaison between these two men.

Where, therefore, does one classify Mack and Flexner or, for that matter, Brandeis himself? To call them Zionists and thereby group them together with ardent Jewish nationalists like Lipsky, who advocated eventual statehood and encouraged aliyah by American Jews, seems odd. Both Mack's and Flexner's personal involvement during the 1921-1930 period in the Zionist cause is completely within the various non-Zionist structures which were created. Their actions and their statements are much more congruent with the positions of Marshall and Warburg whom we have called non-Zionists. Yet, Mack and Brandeis along with Robert Szold and Stephen Wise each of whom would serve as President of the Z.O.A. in the following decade, continued throughout their lives to identify themselves as Zionists. On the other hand, Marshall, Warburg, and Flexner, after 1921, with whom the above mentioned shared a common approach to Zionism, were quite adamant in retaining their identity

as non-Zionists. It is quite obvious that after the defeat of the strongly ideological Lipsky faction of the Z.O.A. the terms "Zionist" and "non-Zionist" became a semantic means of differentiation referring merely to which group of people an individual American Jew who supported Jewish settlement in Palestine wished to identify himself.

The present Jewish Agency executive which controls the distribution within Israel of U.J.A. collections retains the differentiation between Zionist and non-Zionist seats. American Jews occupy seats of both categories. The division of seats on the executive today is closely parallel to that prescribed in the original Weizmann-Marshall agreements. Yet, in fact, the American Jew who sits on the Agency executive as a non-Zionist does not really differ in his attitude toward the basic tenets of Zionism from the present day leaders of the Z.O.A. Neither the Z.O.A. nor the non-Zionists occupying positions of leadership in the U.J.A. or Jewish Agency today oppose statehood for Israel. Neither group of American Jewish leaders would feel very comfortable in a strongly ideological group like the Z.O.A. of Louis Lipsky. For the most part, neither our non-Zionists on the Jewish Agency nor our Z.O.A. leaders honestly contemplate personal aliyah. In the euphoria over the establishment of the State of Israel, it is of interest to note that Rabbi Israel Goldstein stands out among the American Zionist leaders of the 1940's for having personally made aliyah. Likewise, the non-Zionists of today would not accept Jewish resettlement in Soviet Russia as an alternative to the present aliyah of Russian Jews into Israel. Today's non-Zionist would probably see such a suggestion as the work of anti-Zionists.

The pro-Israel sentiment of present day American Jewry has evolved over the course of this century. The Holocaust, the subsequent United Nations

action establishing the State of Israel, and the four tragic and bitter Arab-Israel wars have solidified American Jewish support for the existence of Israel as the Jewish Homeland. Yet, the basic attitude and approach to Zionism which characterizes American Jewish activity on behalf of Israel predates the tragedies and the victories of the past thirty-five years. That attitude is apparent in the aftermath of the Weizmann-Marshall agreement of January, 1927. Out of the factional conflicts of American Jewry between 1919 and 1927, the leading Jews of the United States -- together with a far-visioned and pragmatic European leader like Weizmann -- developed for themselves and the generations of American Jews who have followed them a specifically American Jewish response to the call of Zionism.

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