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FREUD AND HIS MOSES

Judith A. Chessin

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of the requirements for Ordination

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DIGEST

The topic of Freud and his Moses has generated controversy since its inception. Artists, Biographers, Critics, Psychoanalysts and Religionists alike have produced a voluminous literature regarding Freud's treatment of the Moses figure. This study will not attempt to add to these diverse theories on Freud's Moses concept, but rather to collect and critically assess the diffuse literature on the topic.

The procedure will entail a systematic examination of Freud's documented Moses concepts; an exploration of Freud's sources for his hypotheses and of his divergence from these sources; and a review of the critiques and theories emanating from study of Freud's writings on Moses. In considering the various reviews and analyses, this study does not presume to be exhaustive. Rather it seeks to present the representative thematic and methodological critiques of Freud's work and the major theories about the motivations behind Freud's treatment of Moses, theories which in turn are critically assessed both thematically and methodologically.

The major criticisms leveled against Freud's Moses treatment apply equally to the various treatments of the psychoanalyst as well. Especially within the speculative area of "psychobiography," theorists must proceed with the scientific caution of a tolerance for the ambiguity resulting from conflicting and inaccessible data, and with a rigid intellectually honest employment of empirical facts and objective interpretation, lest they merely produce "historical novels" on Freud and his Moses.

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THE WRITINGS: FREUD'S WORKS ON MOSES

There can be no doubt that the legendary figure of Moses occupied a significant place in the mind of Sigmund Freud. Freud, who knew the Bible well, saw in the figure of Moses the embodiment of paternal law and referred to this theme in many of his writings. Not only did Freud, in the latter half of his life, mention Moses often in his personal correspondence, but he also addressed two complete works to the subject of Moses the lawgiver. By examining his writings about Moses, we begin to grasp the important role the prophet played in Freud's thinking.

Freud's attraction to Moses may be first noted in his fascination with Michelangelo's statue of Moses in Rome. Freud visited the statue of Moses on the fourth day of his very first visit to Rome in 1901. He revisited it with the same exaltation every time he returned to the city. In his essay, The Moses of Michelangelo, he described the intense feelings the statue aroused in him:

It always delights me to read an appreciative sentence about this statue.... For no piece of statuary has ever made a stronger impression on me than this. How often I have mounted the steep steps from the unlovely Corso Cavour to the lonely piazza where the deserted church stands, and have essayed to support the angry scorn of the hero's glance! Sometimes I have crept cautiously out of the half gloom of the interior as though I myself belonged to the mob upon which his eye is turned -- the mob which can hold fast no conviction, which has neither faith nor patience, and which rejoices when it has regained its illusory idols.¹

When Freud returned to Rome in September of 1912, he was already planning to write his essay, The Moses of Michelangelo. He went to visit the statue daily in order to study it, measure it, and sketch it, until he could attain the fullest possible comprehension of the masterpiece. Yet the paper was not written until the fall of 1913. Ernest Jones says Freud doubted the correctness of his interpretation, and was reluctant to publish it at all.² Finally, he consented to publish the article in Imago anonymously. The paper appeared in Imago as "by ***." Attached to the essay was a further disguise, a footnote drafted by Freud:

Although this paper does not, strictly speaking, conform to the conditions under which contributions are accepted for publication in this Journal, the editors have decided to print it, since the author, who is personally known to them, moves in psychoanalytic circles, and since his mode of thought has in point of fact a certain resemblance to the methodology of psychoanalysis.³

When his insistence of anonymity was challenged, Freud wrote to Jones, "Why disgrace Moses by putting my name to it? It is a joke, but perhaps not a bad one."⁴ To Karl Abraham, his student, Freud wrote:

The "Moses" is anonymous partly as a pleasantry, partly out of shame at the obvious amateurishness which it is hard to avoid in papers for Imago, and finally because my doubts about the findings are stronger than usual, and I published it only as a result of editorial pressure.⁵

Only in 1924 would Freud agree to withdraw his anonymity when the first edition of his complete works was published.

It was the statue's imposing power that prompted Freud to concentrate on Michelangelo's Moses. Why was this figure, which rests

upon the tomb of Pope Julius II, so enigmatic, he asked. What did it represent?

Freud described the statue as:

seated; his body faces forward, his head with its mighty beard looks to the left, his right foot rests on the ground and his left leg is raised so that only the toes touch the ground. His right arm links the Tables of the law with a portion of his beard.⁶

Yet, aside from these few unambiguous features, writers are not agreed on the statue's interpretation or significance. Freud summarized the main differences of opinion, refuting many critics' observations by his close attention to detail.

On some points, however, Freud did agree with most interpreters. He concurred that the statue portrays Moses at a particular moment in his life. Freud also agreed that the statue's expression reveals mingled anger, pain, and scorn. Yet most writers had associated these emotions with the moment when Moses, descending Mt. Sinai with the Tables of the law under his arm, caught sight of the backsliding Israelites dancing around the Golden Calf. Here Freud's interpretation diverged. It is generally said that Moses' hand is plunged into or playing with his long flowing beard and that, with his right arm, he is holding the Tables -- which are beginning to slip from his grasp. Yet Freud, focusing on the fact that the Tables are turned upside down and on the details of the right hand clutching the beard, came to a different conclusion.

Freud denied that "Moses" was about to start up to punish the disobedient people below, as so many commentators had assumed. On the

contrary, Freud thought, Moses' position reflected not the inception of a violent act but rather the end of a movement which had already commenced. Moses had indeed been about to start up and denounce the faithless Israelites. Yet as he began to spring up, take vengeance and forget the Tables, he observed that those precious tables were about to slip from his grasp and he contained himself -- overcoming the temptation. Thus the Moses sits frozen in his "wrath and his pain mingled with contempt. Nor," said Freud, "will he throw away the Tables so that they will break on the stones, for it is on their special account that he has controlled his anger; it was to preserve them that he kept his passion in check."⁷ To Freud, Michelangelo's Moses represented the highest mental achievement -- mastery of emotions. Moses' desire to preserve the Tables, to carry out his mission, triumphed over his anger.

Freud was aware that his interpretation did not match the Biblical text where Moses did in fact break the Tables. His defense:

Michelangelo has placed a different Moses on the tomb of the Pope, one superior to the historical or traditional Moses. He has modified the theme of the broken Tables; he does not let Moses break them in his wrath, but makes him be influenced by the danger that they will be broken and makes him calm that wrath, or at any rate prevent it from becoming an act. In this way he has added something new and more than human to the figure of Moses; so that the giant frame with its tremendous physical power becomes only a concrete expression of the highest mental achievement that is possible in a man, that of struggling successfully against an inward passion for the sake of a cause to which he has devoted himself.⁸

Freud experienced some doubt as to whether Michelangelo truly intended to portray Moses in this way. He closed his essay wondering if he may have seen in "Moses" things which the artist had not intended. Such doubt helps explain Freud's reluctance to publish and sign his Moses

piece. In 1921, however, Jones sent Freud an article by H.P. Mitchell which reinforced Freud's thesis. This contribution heightened for Freud the plausibility of his interpretation and, in 1927, he added both a postscript and his name to the previous publication of 1914.

That Michelangelo actually intended to depict Moses in the way that Freud described has been considered doubtful by most art critics. That Freud saw such discipline in the famous lawgiver is perhaps reflective of the circumstances in which Freud found himself as he wrote his essay. Jones reported that the Moses was written in the same month as Freud's long essays announcing the seriousness of the divergences between his views and those of his closest student, Carl Jung.⁹ To Freud, Jung was to be the Joshua destined to explore the promised land of psychiatry. As Freud himself put it in a letter to Jung, "If I am Moses, then you are Joshua and will take possession of the promised land of psychiatry, which I shall be able to glimpse only from afar."¹⁰ (This identification by Freud with Moses will be explored in greater detail in a later chapter.)

Freud's preoccupation, then, with the Moses statue coincided with the time when he himself was striving to suppress his own indignation with the way his Swiss followers, particularly Jung, had suddenly repudiated his work. Under the stress of his own personal struggle, it is possible that Freud projected onto the statue "Moses" the very same victory over passions which Freud himself was striving to achieve. Indeed, Freud expressed this very thought to S. Ferenczi after the defection of one of his students, W. Stekel: "At the moment the situation in Vienna makes me feel more like the historical Moses

than the Michelangelo one."¹¹

Freud continued to feel attached to his "Moses." Twenty years after the essay was first published, he wrote to its Italian translator, "My feeling for this piece is rather like that towards a love-child."¹² For although all references and allusions to Moses disappeared from his letters for a long period, Freud resumed his captivating Moses story twenty years later in his last work, Moses and Monotheism.

Before discussing this major work, it is relevant to note that the year Freud visited the statue daily also saw the publication of Totem and Taboo (1912-1913). The fundamental tenets of this work played a major role in Freud's later thinking about Moses. Freud suggested in Totem and Taboo that civilization began with the killing and eating of the primeval father which was followed by the establishment of the incest taboo and the totem feast. The first gods, therefore, were totem animals, which later developed into human forms. However, what the gods were in totemistic times was relegated to a holy animal or a constant companion to the newly-evolved human god.

As the mythology developed, it celebrated the original slaying of the primeval father in the many myths in which the hero slays the monster. It also celebrated the Oedipal victory in the portrayal of the youthful gods, like Attis and Adonis, who committed incest with their mother, usually Mother Earth, and were in turn torn asunder by a wild animal before the year was over. This wild animal represents the primeval Father. Freud suggested that Christianity added a new variation to this repetitive myth. Christ, too, was considered a son

god, but he neither killed the father nor committed incest. He sacrificed his own life to redeem the brothers from "original sin." To Freud, the original sin was the killing of the primeval father.¹³

Although there is no mention of Moses or the religion he founded in Totem and Taboo, the work proves relevant with regard to Freud's thinking about the prophet. For in his next work about Moses, Moses and Monotheism, Freud applied the general principles of religious mythology of Totem and Taboo specifically to the Mosaic religion.

It was the year 1934 when Freud conceived of and, for the most part, wrote his ideas on Moses and religion. Although Freud mentioned his plans to Jones and M. Eitingon in August, the first full account of Freud's ideas appears in a letter to Arnold Zweig of September 30, 1934. Freud explained, "Not knowing what to do with my leisure time, I have been writing something, and contrary to my original intention, it took up so much of my time that everything was neglected."¹⁴ Freud went on to explain that the subject was Moses, and the point of departure was anti-Semitism:

Faced with the new persecutions, one asks oneself again how the Jews have come to be what they are and why they have attracted this undying hatred. I soon discovered the formula: Moses created the Jews. So my essay got the title: The Man Moses, an historical novel. The material fits into three sections. The first part is like an interesting novel; the second is laborious and boring; the third is full of content and makes exciting reading.¹⁵

Freud continued that he would not publish what he had written because it involved a theory of religion: "...Certainly nothing new for me after Totem and Taboo, but something new and fundamental for the uninitiated. It is the thought of uninitiated readers that makes

me hold over the finished work."¹⁶ Freud explained that, in the light of having aroused such controversy with his Totem-theory, and in the atmosphere of Catholic orthodoxy which pervaded Vienna at the time, he feared that publication of his work might lead to a ban on psychoanalysis and cessation of all psychoanalytic publications in Vienna. Further, Freud added, "...there is the fact that this work does not seem to me sufficiently substantiated, nor does it altogether please me. It is, therefore, not the occasion for a martyrdom. Finis for the time being."¹⁷

Eitingon, who heard of this from Zweig, is reported to have asked Freud if the new book contained anything stronger than his previous work (Future of an Illusion [1927]), which had not occasioned objections. Freud replied that it differed only in that it admitted that religion was not based entirely on illusion but also had an historical kernel of truth, to which it owed its great effectiveness. He added that he would not be afraid of the outer danger if only he were surer about his thesis concerning Moses, for, Freud said, "experts would find it easy to discredit me as an outsider."¹⁸ Freud had also expressed the reservation that the Jews would be offended to hear that their great Moses was really an Egyptian.¹⁹

Freud wrote to his followers those days in late 1934 as though he were debating with himself, justifying his decision not to publish, expressing his doubts about his thesis. To Eitingon he wrote, "I am no good at historical romances. Let us leave it to Thomas Mann." To Zweig, he reiterated, "It won't stand up to my own criticism. I need more certainty and I should not like to endanger the final formula

of the whole book, which I regard as valuable, by appearing to found the motivation on a basis of clay. So we will put it aside."²⁰ But put it aside Freud could not do.

Between 1934 and 1936, statements such as the above appeared frequently in Freud's letters to his closest friends. He could not seem to let go of his Moses. To Zweig he confided, "Moses will not let go of my imagination [Moses giebt meine Phantasie nicht frei]."²¹ And a month later:

As far as my productivity goes, it is like what happens in analysis. If a particular subject has been suppressed, nothing takes its place and the field of vision remains empty. So do I now remain fixated on the Moses, which has been laid aside and on which I can do no more.²²

The first two chapters of the book, "Moses, an Egyptian" and "If Moses Was an Egyptian...", formed a book in themselves, and were published in the review Imago in 1937. Yet, the whole project continued to torment Freud "like a ghost not laid." Freud wondered if he would ever complete the third part of his book in the face of all his inner doubts and political obstacles.²³

Finally, in 1938, having left Nazi-occupied Vienna for England and thus no longer inhibited by political obstacles, Freud published his work of three parts. Part III, entitled "Moses and His People," was revised many times before assuming its final form.

The book itself, because of the circumstances under which it was compiled, is neither clear nor concise as were most of Freud's works. Instead Moses and Monotheism is a compilation of three essays of greatly differing length, two prefaces situated at the beginning

of the third essay, and a third preface found half-way through the same essay. The book is burdened with constant repetitions, recapitulations, and apologies from Freud who was painfully aware of its shortcomings. Freud attributed these difficulties to the length of time which went into the book's construction, its constant revisions, and the disruption caused by his own migration to England after the Nazi occupation of Vienna. Despite these irregularities, however, the content of the book and the cogency of the argument are quite remarkable.

The book's first major thesis is that Moses was an Egyptian. Contrary to the Biblical myth which asserts the existence of a Hebrew child, raised in Pharaoh's court, who defected in order to lead his own people from Egypt, Freud considered Moses' name to be evidence that he was an Egyptian. Freud dismissed the Biblical explanation that Pharaoh's daughter gave the baby the name "Mosheh" saying "I drew him out of the water" (Exodus 2:10) on the basis of three objections: 1) that the name "Mosheh" is the active form of the verb "to draw out" (which would mean "he who draws out"); 2) that it is absurd to attribute to an Egyptian princess a derivation of a name in Hebrew; and 3) that the water out of which the child was drawn was probably not the Nile. It is perhaps more plausible, said Freud, that Moses' name was derived from the Egyptian word "mose," meaning "child," as an abridgment of the fuller form of such names as Ra-mose (child of Ra), Ah-mose and Toth-mose.

Freud never questioned the historicity of the Moses figure. Yet, using the techniques of psychoanalysis, he concluded that the extant Biblical account of the Moses story is the transcription of a myth commonly disseminated in antiquity, which O. Rank analyzed as "the myth of the birth of the hero," common to all ancient peoples.²⁴ Freud

related that Rank found, in his study of the early lives of kings, princes, and religious leaders, a number of fantastic features which different peoples, even though widely separated and entirely independent of each other, present with an amazing similarity and literal conformity. A myth surprisingly similar to the story of Moses attached itself to such widely disparate historical figures as Sargon of Agade, Cyrus, Romulus, Oedipus, Perseus, Gilgamesh, and others.

From the psychoanalytic point of view, Freud explained that the rescuing of a baby out of water is a symbolic representation of the birth process. The basket in which the baby is protected from the Nile River is the womb; the river is the amniotic fluid. From Rank, Freud pointed out the uniform elements of the myth in which the life of the newborn is played out between two families: the first, royal and aristocratic, abandons the child; the second, humble and poor, takes him in and raises him. The social contrast between the two families is designed to underline the heroism of the great man.

Of course, the story of Moses is quite different from the typical myth, as the Bible tells us that it is the modest family which abandons the child to be raised in a noble home -- the royal house of Pharaoh. To Freud, this discrepancy is explained by E. Meyer and others after him, who suggested that the original form of the Moses myth was different:

Pharaoh had been warned by a prophetic dream that his daughter's son would be a danger to him and his Kingdom. This is why he has the child delivered to the waters of the Nile shortly after his birth. But the child is saved by Jewish people and brought up as their own. "National motives," in Rank's terminology, had transformed the myth into the form now known by us.²⁵

In other words, Jewish nationalism caused the Moses legend to be recast along the Biblical lines in order to make a Jewish national hero out of Moses. Whereas the Egyptians had no reason to glorify Moses, the Hebrews did in fact have reason to create such a legend: to give their leader a glorious role.

Freud, then, developed his own hypothesis along the lines of psychoanalytic insight. Since one of the two families was fictional and invented as a function of the myth, it is probable that, according to Freud, Moses did indeed come from an aristocratic Egyptian family. Freud reached this conclusion on the basis of a universal truth of all such heroic exposure myths: i.e., that the first family, the one from which the child is exposed, is generally the invented family and the second family, into which the child is received, is the real family. The legend of Moses deviates from the others in that, whereas other heroes rise in social position in the course of their lives, Moses reduces himself to the level of the children of Israel who are slaves of the Egyptians.

Freud conceded that there is an insufficiency of documentation for establishing Moses' identity as a Egyptian aristocrat. But starting with this hypothesis, Freud sensed its far-reaching import for explaining the special features of the laws and religion which Moses gave the Jews and for understanding the origin of the monotheistic religion in general.

Freud introduced his second major thesis with the question: why would an Egyptian of noble birth become a leader of a strange immigrant tribe and leave his country with them? And furthermore, how explain that the religion he founded among them, Mosaic monotheism,

contrasts so sharply with the unrestricted polytheism of his own people, the Egyptians? Freud found the explanation to these questions in a remarkable event in the history of the Egyptian religion. In the fourteenth century, B.C.E., during the reign of the Eighteenth Dynasty, there arose a Pharaoh Amenhotep IV who undertook to impose upon his subjects a new religion, fundamentally different from that of his ancestors, which demanded a rigorous belief in a single god and intolerance of any other "god or goddess."

Basing himself on J.H. Breasted's works on Egypt, Freud described the shortlived Egyptian monotheistic movement. The new religion developed slowly among the priesthood of the sun temple of On (Heliopolis), who began to conceive of the idea of a universal god whose essence was an ethical character. It was this sun god -- Aton -- whom Amenhotep IV accepted as the focus of his new religion. Aton was worshipped not merely as the material visible sun but also as a sun symbol of a divine being whose energy was manifested in its rays. Hymns of praise to this sun god were preserved on gravestones, extolling Aton as the creator and preserver of all living things both inside and outside Egypt. These hymns bear a remarkable resemblance to Hebrew Psalms of a few centuries later, devoted to the Hebrew god, Yahweh.

Amenhotep's reform engendered opposition among the priests of the old religion, whose privileges were threatened. Amenhotep therefore changed his name to Ikhnaton and expunged the name of the previous major god, Amon, wherever it appeared. Even the name of the Pharaoh's father, Amenhotep III, was obliterated from every inscription. Ikhnaton established a new capital, which he named Akhetaten, abandoning the

the royal city of Thebes. He closed the old temples of other gods and confiscated their property, to the serious discontent not only of the priesthood but also of the Egyptian people who were unwilling to put aside their many gods in favor of the single abstract deity. Upon the Pharaoh's early death, his extreme measures were now visited against his new religion. The new Pharaoh, Ikhnaton's son-in-law, moved back to Thebes and reinstituted the cult of Amon.

To Freud, then, if Moses was Egyptian, then the religion which he gave the Hebrews was the religion of the sun god Aton. Freud pointed out several similarities between the religions. In the first place, there is the congruence between the name of the Egyptian Aton and the Hebrew name of god, Adonai. Further, the strict Jewish monotheism of the early days portrayed no after-life as was the case as well in the religion of Aton, which rejected the elaborate after-life of the cult of Osiris. Both religions forbade pictorial representation of any kind. Finally, Freud argued that the rite of circumcision, which in the Bible purports to be the mark of covenant between God and Abraham, was a later invention. In reality, to Freud, Moses introduced the rite of circumcision to the Hebrews from the custom which had long been indigenous to Egypt.

Freud's theory was that Moses had been a committed follower of Ikhnaton's new religion. After the Pharaoh's death, Moses saw all hopes for his future collapse, so he fled his homeland and emigrated with several Semitic tribes to found a new empire based on the religion which the Egyptians had spurned. Freud continued that Moses, "slow of speech"

for he did not know their language, became the leader of the Semitic tribes which he had led toward Canaan.

Freud continued his hypothesis by questioning the unity of the Biblical narrative of the Hebrew tribes' journey through the desert and of the revelation at Sinai. Following Meyer, Freud proposed that the tradition had fused into one entity two quite differing leadership figures bearing the name Moses. Like some other Biblical scholars, Freud asserted that the Hebrew tribes, who later formed the Israelites, adopted a new religion when they came into contact with the Midianites, an Arab tribe south of Palestine. The Midianites worshipped their god, Yahweh, a volcano god, a demon who resided in a mountain and was angry and bloodthirsty. The mediator between Yahweh and his people was named Moses, the humble shepherd son-in-law of Jethro, who while tending his flocks received summons from his God. The humble Biblical Moses, then, introduced the Midianite religion to the Hebrews, and is distinct from the mighty Biblical figure, also named Moses, who led the Hebrews from Egypt. The two Moseses, for Freud, were as distinct as were the universal Egyptian god Aton and the intolerant demon Yahweh, who resided in the mountain.

Freud explained the union of the two figures by quoting another scholar, E. Sellin, who suggested that Moses was actually killed by the Hebrews who could not tolerate the stringency of the monotheistic religion. In this radical opinion, Freud found the confirmation of his earlier theory of religion -- that it reflected the symbolic representation of the murder of the father by his sons.

Freud's hypothesis is this: The tribes which experienced the

Exodus from Egypt under the leadership of an Egyptian, Moses, eventually joined with related tribes, long since settled south of Canaan. The fusion of the two groups, under a compromised-upon, common religion derived mainly from the Midianite god Yahweh, constituted the new Jewish nation. The fusion, however, proved unstable. There was an eventual split into two kingdoms, Judah and Israel, because the tribes from Egypt had a more advanced culture than did the primitive desert-dwelling tribes.

Observing the Egyptian names distinctive to the Levitical tribe, Freud concluded that the clerical Levites were also Egyptian. The Levites, who occupied the highest positions in the social hierarchy of the Jewish nation, were, according to Freud, originally supporters, functionaries or scribes of the religion of Aton, who joined Moses in exile, and who, as educated Egyptian activists, were notably culturally superior to the rest of the Jewish nation.

It was the offspring of these Levites alone, Neo-Egyptians as Freud called them, who upheld the few standards of the Egyptian religion (such as circumcision) which persevered their way into the compromise which now constituted the ancient Jewish religion. For it seems that, according to Freud, the Egyptian leader never reached the east banks of the Jordan with the tribes whose leadership he assumed. The tribes who followed Moses to freedom could not bear his harsh despotism. Just as with Ikhnaton, the people who had been dominated and suppressed by stringent laws, rose and threw off the burden of the religion that had been imposed upon them. The Biblical text's only clue to such an end is the account of "wandering in the wilderness," which describes a succession of serious revolts against Moses' authority, which were suppressed by bloody punishment. To Freud, any one of the rebellions

might in reality have ended differently:

It is easy to imagine that one such rebellion ended in a way different from what the text suggests. The people's defection from the new religion is also described in the text -- only as an episode, it is true; namely in the story of the golden calf. In this, by an ingenious turn, the breaking of the tables of the law (which is to be understood symbolically: "he has broken the law") is transposed on to Moses himself, and his furious indignation is his motive (Exodus 32:19).²⁶

The Biblical text disguised the hypothesized murder of Moses by merging the later Moses, source of the Midianite religion of volcano-god Yahweh in Judaism with the Egyptian Moses, to form a single national hero.

The final difficulty with which Freud needed to grapple in order to render his reinterpretation of the Biblical narrative convincing was the account of the pre-Mosaic Patriarchal relationship with Yahweh. Freud overcame this difficulty by suggesting that the patriarchs were Canaanite, either real individuals or local divinities, whom the immigrant Hebrew tribes appropriated retroactively into their national history in order to transform their settlement on the land of Canaan into a legitimate return to the territory of their ancestors.

The third part of Moses and Monotheism deals with monotheism and religious phenomena in general. Freud contended that, as the Jewish religion developed, the god Yahweh shed primitive characteristics and grew more and more to resemble the old god of Moses, Aton. To Freud, the hallmarks of the ethical monotheism which typified the later Biblical prophets -- i.e., the idea of a single god; the rejection of magically effective ceremonies; and the stress upon ethical demands --

were in fact Mosaic doctrines, to which no attention was paid to begin with, but which after a long period of time emerged as operative. Freud found analogy for this series of events in mental life -- hypothesizing a phenomenon of latency in the history of the religion of the Jewish people.

To Freud, the events which made up the history of the Jewish people found "identity" with the events leading to individual human neurosis. After laying down and expounding the formula, "early trauma / defense / latency / outbreak of neurotic illness / partial return of the repressed," as the steps contributing to psychopathology of individuals, Freud applied the same sequence to the group psychology of the Jews.

His interpretation of the early trauma experienced by the "infant" society began with the assertion, made in Totem and Taboo, that originally primitive people settled in hordes, each dominated by a powerful male who was unrestricted in power and to whom all females were property. The first decisive step which changed this enduring social structure occurred when the sons united to overpower their father and then devoured him raw.

Freud suggested that, as with children today, each son hated and feared his father, but also honored him as a model -- desiring to take his place. Freud supposed that, shortly after the trauma of parricide, the brothers struggled for dominance, but finally set up a social contract which brought about laws of renunciation of instinct (having of all power), recognition of mutual obligations and the renunciation of inviolable (having all women).

Analogously, Freud argued that the establishment of Jewish

monotheism and its continuation into Christianity was a clear-cut example of a neurotic response to the trauma of this primal event. For, if the insistence on one god restores the father figure to his ancient tribal role, it also reminds the believers of their repressed guilt of having long ago killed the father in order to occupy his place.

In founding Christianity, said Freud, Paul rid himself of this threatening guilt, for the holy communion became the harmless totemic reenactment of the murder of the father figure, and Christianity became the religion of the son, whereas monotheistic Judaism remained the angry religion of the father. Moreover, with the concept of redemption, Paul removed the spectre of guilt which remained inherent in Judaism. And further still, Paul's abandonment of the ritual of circumcision -- symbolizing the chosen people -- cleared the way for a universal Christianity -- open to all.

However, the Jews maintained their own monotheism tenaciously, and therefore also their sense of guilt over parricide(s). Freud argued that the Jewish people had renewed the primitive parricide in the murder of Moses. This murder of Moses constituted an important link between the repressed event in primitive times and its subsequent reappearance in the form of monotheistic religion. It was repentance for the murder of Moses which provoked the Jewish fanatical desire for the Messiah.

On the basis then of the accusation, "you killed our God," Freud commented, Jews are persecuted by anti-Semitism. Freud reinterpreted this comment as true, for in its statement is implied: "You will not admit that you murdered God (the primal picture of God, the primal

father, and his later reincarnations)." Freud continued: "There should be an addition declaring: 'We did the same thing, to be sure, but we have admitted it and since then we have been absolved.'"²⁷

But beyond this, Freud ascribed anti-Semitism to conscious fear of Jewish difference and defiance to oppression; to unconscious jealousy of the "first-born" religious status; and to the fear of castration evoked by circumcision.

Freud also felt that Moses imprinted upon Jews special character traits which held them together over their troubled and persecuted history. He suggested that Moses impressed this character in them by giving them a religion which increased their self-esteem as "chosen" so much that they thought of themselves as superior to all others:

Thereafter they survived by keeping apart from others. Mixture of blood interfered little with this, since what held them together was an ideal factor, the possession in common of certain intellectual and emotional wealth. The religion of Moses led to this result because (1) it allowed the people to take a share in the grandeur of a new idea of God, (2) it asserted that the people had been chosen by this great God and were destined to receive evidences of his special favour and (3) it forced upon the people an advance in intellectuality which, important enough in itself, opened the way to the appreciation of intellectual work and to further renunciation of instincts.²⁸

This concludes the major theses put forth in Freud's final work, Moses and Monotheism, with which he struggled for years. At the close of his life, Freud, in dealing with the Moses figure and his people, perhaps was struggling with his own issues of personal identity and affiliation as a Jew.

However, it seems unlikely that Freud was motivated by a

sense of Jewish self-hate to write this work -- as has been suggested by many critics. Despite the dramatic and criminal character he ascribed to Biblical events, Freud was fascinated by what Moses achieved. Freud admired Moses, not only from the point of view of a psychologist but also from that of a moralist and humanist who admired reason and truth. As he wrote:

I was astonished to find that already the first so to speak embryonic experience of the race, the influence of the man Moses and the exodus from Egypt, conditioned the entire further development up to the present day.... To begin with, there is the temporal conception of life, and the conquest of magic thought, the rejection of mysticism, both of which can be traced back to Moses himself and, although not with all the historical certainty that could be desired, perhaps a little further.²⁹

Yet Freud received many warnings from Jewish sources not to publish his study. The Jewish community, at the rise of Nazi persecution, felt that Freud's work would deprive them of their one sense of consolation -- the laws of Moses, of Moses himself. Freud felt that such a sentiment was an overestimation, that his work would not disturb any belief, and that Jews should feel pride at preserving their tradition and at giving rise to its spokespeople -- even though the initiative to the tradition came from the outside. To Freud, truth was sacred and he could not renounce his rights as a scientist to pronounce it. He wrote: "We Jews have always known how to respect spiritual values. We preserved our unity through ideas and because of them we have survived to this day."³⁰

And so, in his unending search for universal truth and his own personal truth, did Sigmund Freud contribute his Moses and Monotheism. Against the backdrop of anti-Semitic persecution, the upheaval of exile,

and the pain of a deteriorating cancer, Freud concluded his works and his life, once again expressing his fascination with Moses, in a work he considered to be "a worthy leavetaking."

NOTES: CHAPTER 1

1. S. Freud, The Moses of Michelangelo. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XIII, trans. J. Strachey, p. 213.
2. E. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. II, p. 365.
3. Freud., op. cit., p. 211.
4. Letter of January 16, 1914, in Jones, op. cit., II, p. 366.
5. Letter of June 4, 1914, in H.C. Abraham and E.L. Freud, eds., A Psychoanalytic Dialogue: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, p. 171.
6. Freud, op. cit., p. 214.
7. Ibid., pp. 229-230.
8. Ibid., p. 233.
9. Jones, op. cit., II, p. 366.
10. Letter of February 28, 1908, in W. McGuire, ed., Freud to Jung Letters, trans. R. Manheim and R.F.L. Hull, pp. 196-197.
11. Letter of October 17, 1912, in Jones, op. cit., II, p. 367.
12. Letter to Edoardo Weiss, April 4, 1933, in Jones, op. cit., II, p. 367.
13. As discussed in M.S. Bergmann, "Moses and the Evolution of Freud's Jewish Identity," The Israel Annals of Psychiatry and Related Disciplines 14 (1976), p. 18.
14. E. Freud, ed., The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Arnold Zweig, trans. E. & W. Robson-Scott, p. 91.
15. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
16. Ibid., p. 92.
17. Ibid.
18. Letter of October 17, 1934, in Jones, op. cit., III, p. 194.
19. Jones, op. cit., III., p. 194.

20. Ibid.
21. Letter of May 2, 1935, E. Freud, op. cit., p. 106.
22. Letter of June 13, 1935, in ibid., p. 107.
23. Jones, op. cit., III, p. 225.
24. O. Rank, "The Myth of the Birth of the Hero," in The Myth of the Birth of the Hero and Other Writings, ed. Ph. Freund (1914).
25. S. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, SE, Vol. XXIII, p. 11.
26. Ibid., p. 48.
27. Ibid., p. 90.
28. Ibid., p. 123.
29. Letter of December 14, 1937, in Letters of Sigmund Freud, ed. E. Freud, p. 439. Cited in M. Robert, The Psychoanalytic Revolution: Sigmund Freud's Life and Achievement, p. 383.
30. Jones, op. cit., III, p. 237.

THE SOURCES: FREUD'S SOURCES FOR
MOSES AND MONOTHEISM

To track down the sources Freud utilized in any given one of his works is no easy task. For one of Freud's dominant traits was his fierce independence of mind. In the opinion of one writer:

Freud was a challengingly, provocatively, scrupulously honest intellect; but his apparent need to stand alone, his need to rid himself of any suspicion of intellectual dependence on others...seems to have driven him frequently into a rigid, almost solipsistic intellectual attitude.¹

In other words, as one of Freud's disciples put it, "Freud had a remarkable capacity for forgetting some sources of his ideas."²

Freud saw himself as a pioneer or a "conquistador," whose calling it was to explore the uncharted regions of the psyche. He often ignored such "niceties as footnotes or scholarly disputation." Freud had admitted that he experienced difficulties assimilating ideas which had no connection with his own thoughts. Jones remarked that the ideas of others wearied him, for Freud was more interested in soaring off in his own pattern of thought than in reading works by someone else whose thought processes he found inhibiting. He once wrote to Fliess, "Reading is a terrible infliction imposed upon all who write. In the process everything of one's own drains away."³ With such an attitude, it is no wonder that the sources or catalysts for Freud's ideas are so difficult to uncover.

A second factor which complicates the picture of Freud's source

material is the arbitrary selection of ideas with which he supported his own theses. For example, despite the fact that W. Robertson Smith's theory of sacrifice, upon which Freud relied in Totem and Taboo, was criticized sharply by anthropologists, Freud refused to abandon the theory. It became the basis for his later work, Moses and Monotheism.

In Moses, he explained:

Above all, however, I am not an ethnologist but a psychoanalyst. I had a right to take out of ethnological literature what I might need for the work of analysis. The writings of Robertson Smith -- a man of genius -- have given me valuable points of contact with the psychological material of analysis and indications for its employment. I have never found myself on common grounds with its opponents.⁴

Similarly, Jones recounted that, when Freud was told that Selin himself had retracted his statement that Moses had been murdered by the Hebrews, Freud shrugged his shoulders and said, "It might be true all the same."⁵

A final remark about Freud's use of scholarship is that he often ignored, in his publications, the studies of his distinguished contemporaries in the field of religion. Not once in any of Freud's studies did he mention colleagues in the field of religion such as R. Otto and W. James, whose works in the phenomenology of religion were well known in Europe in Freud's time.⁶

Despite these difficulties, Freud acknowledged many of his references on which he relied for the writing of Moses and Monotheism. While almost every point of Freud's grand thesis about Moses was either suggested first or confirmed by some primary source, it was the radical way in which Freud compiled the information which raised such controversy. Freud's source material for Moses and Monotheism may be divided into two categories: acknowledged sources and

unacknowledged sources.

Of Freud's acknowledged sources, the primary work on which he depended was, of course, the Bible. Although controversy has been raised over Freud's religious education and affiliation, his interest in the Bible and Biblical stories is not questioned. An inscription found in the Freud family's Philipppson Bible from Jakob Freud to his son implied that Sigmund began to study the Bible at the age of seven. In his autobiography, Freud recalled those early lessons:

My deep engrossment in the Bible story (almost as soon as I had learned the art of reading) had, as I recognized much later, an enduring effect upon the direction of my interest.⁷

Throughout his life, Freud retained this interest in the Bible. He kept abreast of the Biblical scholarship of his day and often referred to Biblical characters and themes in his writings.

Freud's hypothesis, then, that Moses was killed during a desert rebellion may have originated with his reading the Biblical text even before the hypothesis was suggested by Sellin. For any reader with his sensitivity for the Oedipal (father/son) conflict might have seen such a dynamic played out in the Biblical narratives. To Freud:

...the account of the "wandering in the wilderness" -- which might stand for the time of Moses' rule -- describes a series of grave revolts against his authority which, by Yahweh's command, were suppressed with savage chastisement. It is easy to imagine that one of these revolts came to another end than the text admits.⁸

To Freud, the accounts of the desert wanderings suggested that the overbearing choleric father figure, Moses, was reminiscent of the primal father. Moses' fate, therefore, was conceivably the same -- death at the hands of the rebellious overburdened sons, the children

of Israel.

To Freud, the Bible recounted and camouflaged yet another story of the death of the father figure: The military leader, Moses, brought the Israelites out of Egypt after protracted sufferings and struggles with Pharaoh's army (Exodus 1-15). After Moses successfully led the "murmuring" Israelites (Exodus 16:2; Numbers 11-14) through a series of dangerous campaigns, dissension occurred led by Korah, who resented the growing political strength of Moses and Aaron. The rebellion was crushed by the execution of 250 of the ringleaders; yet disaffection spread amongst many of the people who resented the death of Korah and held Moses responsible. Trouble arose again at Zin, when water was scarce. Moses broke the law of Yahweh by striking twice the rock which was to give water (Numbers 20:1-13). For this sin, Aaron died (was executed) on Mt. Hor (Numbers 20:23-29). And shortly thereafter Moses prepared to die for the same sin (Numbers 27:12-14; Deuteronomy 1:37; 3:23-27; 4:22; 31:2). Moses was punished for his impatience by death (Deuteronomy 32:49-51).

From this plot, it was later suggested that Moses' violent demise, of which Freud spoke, stemmed from the rebellion at Zin in the first month in which the people lived at Kadesh. This account intimated that the striking of the rock to obtain water was in fact a sacrificial rite. Moses, given permission by Yahweh, took up his rod to strike the rock, i.e., to kill the leader of the rebels, who instigated the rebellion at Zin (Numbers 20:2) for which the waters were called "the waters of Meribah" ("waters of strife/rebellion"). However Moses, in his anger, struck the rock twice, i.e., illegitimately putting to death an additional man. In so doing, Moses, by

misusing the political power Yahweh had bestowed, saw the balance of opinion swing against him. Moses was put to death by the people.⁹

Whether Freud saw this scenario or another rebellion as the cause of Moses' murder is unknown. It may have been a moot point to Freud when Moses died, for according to Freud the text has camouflaged the murder. As Freud put it, the people began to regret the murder of Moses and to seek to forget it. At the union of the two tribes (at Kadesh), the Moseses were blended. The account of the Exodus made its way into the compromise, but the murder was disavowed. Moses was fused with the figure of the later religious leader, the son-in-law of the Midianite Jethro -- and lent his name, Moses. And thus, to Freud, the guilt of the murder was repressed and Moses lived on.

Freud suggested that evidence of the soldering of the two figures may be seen in the conflicting Biblical accounts of Moses' personality:

He is often pictured as domineering, hot-tempered and even violent, yet he is also described as the mildest and most patient of men [see, e.g., Exodus 32:19 and Numbers 12:3]. These last qualities would evidently have fitted badly with the Egyptian Moses, who had to deal with his people in such great and difficult matters; they may have belonged to the character of the other Moses, the Midianite.¹⁰

Freud doubted, however, that the Egyptian Moses ever made it to Kadesh (where the "waters of Meribah" episode was said to have occurred) or heard of the name Yahweh, just as the Midianite Moses had never been to Egypt or heard of the god, Aton.

Whether Freud read the Bible and came up with his hypothesis of Moses' murder and its obscuration, or whether he took it from another source, is irretrievable. Even without Sellin's hypothesis about the

murder, Freud could have found older sources of the murder theory in Jewish folklore. Jones, for example, cited: M. Abraham, La Morte de Moïse, Legendes juives apocryphes sur la vie de Moïse (1925); L. Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews (1947); M. Rosenfeld, Der Midrasch über den Tod des Moses (1899).¹¹ Whether Freud used these sources or classical texts themselves is likewise indeterminable. That he had access to some classical works is evident; he quoted anecdotes from Josephus' The Jewish Antiquities, and referred to the books of Herodotus.

Regardless of which sources led him to his hypothesis, on the point of Moses' murder Freud felt the need for further validation.

He wrote:

I should not feel secure in giving this account, if I could not appeal to the judgement of other enquirers with a specialist knowledge who see the significance of Moses for the Jewish religion in the same light as I do, even though they do not recognize his Egyptian origin.¹²

Freud found this confirmation in the work of Sellin, Mose und seine Bedeutung für die israelitisch-jüdische Religionsgeschichte (Leipzig, 1922). In this book, Sellin, a Hebrew/Aramaic scholar, startled the theological world by announcing that, through reinterpretation of some passages in Hosea, he had found evidence of the murder of Moses by his people. To Sellin, it can be read in Hosea 13:1 that the people of Ephraim martyred Moses because of his stand against the worship of Baal. In the passage the word in question is vayyāmōt, which is usually translated "and he died," but which Sellin read to mean "and killed him" or "and he was killed," referring to Moses. The passage in question refers to Ephraim's guilt of Baal worship. Most

interpretations of the text assume that it was this idolatry which incriminated Ephraim and "he died," for indeed the tribe of Ephraim disappeared subsequently from reference. But Sellin upheld his interpretation in the first and other editions of his later book, Geschichte der israelitisch-jüdisches Volkes, Volume I (Leipzig, 1924). He further discovered many allusions to a violent death of Moses in the later prophets. To Sellin, the information of the murder had always been in the hands of the priestly circles who had suppressed it, but it eventually surfaced and was alluded to in the later writings.

Sellin also believed, as did Freud after him, that at the time of the murder the religion which Moses founded was disavowed. Yet the people's guilt over the murder emerged as the basis for their later Messianic expectations:

At the end of the Babylonian captivity a hope grew up among the Jewish people that the man who had been so shamefully murdered would return from the dead and would lead his remorseful people, and perhaps not them alone, into the kingdom of ever lasting bliss.¹³

Further, Freud applauded Sellin's conjecture that the monotheistic tenets of the Egyptian Moses were blended in with another more primitive religion (the Midian Yahweh cult) and almost subsumed thereto. Sellin wrote:

Consequently we must picture the true religion of Moses -- his belief in the one moral God whom he preaches -- as thenceforward necessarily the property of a small circle of the people. We must necessarily not expect to meet with it in the official cult, in the religion of the priests or in the beliefs of the people. We can necessarily only reckon to find an occasional spark emerging, now here and now there, from the spiritual torch which he once kindled, to find that his ideas have not entirely perished but have been silently

at work here and there upon beliefs and customs, till sooner or later, through the effect of special experiences or of persons specially moved by his spirit, it has broken out more strongly once more and gained influence on wider masses of the population. It is from this point of view that the history of the ancient religion of Israel is necessarily to be regarded. Anyone who sought to construct the Mosaic religion on the lines of the religion we meet with, according to the Chronicles, in the life of the people during their first five hundred years in Canaan, would be committing the gravest methodological error.¹⁴

But even Freud was unwilling to commit himself fully to Sellin's work. Freud wrote that he was in no position to judge if Sellin had interpreted the passages from the Prophets correctly. "But if he is right," Freud continued, "we may attribute historical credibility to the tradition he has recognized, for such things are not readily invented. There is no tangible motive for doing so; but if they have really happened, it is easy to understand that people will be anxious to forget them." But again, having followed him this far, Freud rejected Sellin's conjecture that Moses was murdered in Shittim, the country east of the Jordan.¹⁵

To Freud, it did not make much of a difference if Sellin's conjecture were necessarily accurate or not. It was enough that Sellin had written the work, for, according to Jones, it was Sellin's hypothesis which induced Freud to write his book on Moses -- since it fit so well with Freud's own views on the psychological and historical importance of parricide. As was mentioned earlier (p. 21), when A. Yehuda, another Biblical scholar, begged Freud not to publish his work in view of the offense it would occasion within the Jewish world, the professor argued that Sellin had abandoned his belief that Moses was murdered. Freud was not phased by this -- only remarking,

"What a pity....It might be true all the same."¹⁶

An interesting footnote to the Sellin controversy was added by Jones, Freud's faithful student and biographer. Since so many of Freud's critics, who rejected the hypothesis about Moses' murder, played up Sellin's disclaimer, Jones tried to confirm the matter. Some said the retraction was made seven years after the publication of Sellin's book, others said ten. Jones found it difficult to confirm the disclaimer at all. After reviewing many erroneous leads, he finally heard from a Professor Rost of Berlin that a few Biblical scholars had "tackled him [Sellin] in a personal conversation and had heckled him so badly that he was compelled to withdraw the suggestion that he made." Jones presumed that Sellin was a man of peace yet also one of obstinacy, for, "in a subsequent edition of one of his books, written thirteen years later, he [Sellin] not only repeated his suggestion that Moses had been murdered, but added that since first making it he had found much further evidence in its support." And so, Jones concludes, "Freud's confidence in his interpretation had not after all been misplaced."¹⁷

Freud also relied on other less controversial Biblical scholars to confirm his own hypotheses. Interestingly, some of the other tenets of Moses and Monotheism which raised such controversy when brought up by Freud, had already been given voice by the Biblical scholar E. Meyer. As was mentioned earlier (p.11), Freud found the legitimacy to reinterpret the Biblical exposure myth of Moses psychoanalytically in Meyer's contention that the legend had been modified. To Meyer, the original legend was more in conformity with other exposure tales. It was Pharaoh, threatened by his grandson, who exposed

Moses to the Nile from which the baby was rescued and raised by humble Hebrews.¹⁸ Meyer had also noted the Egyptian etymology of the name, Moses. He had written in a 1905 resume of his 1906 work, Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbärstamme: "The name 'Moses' is probably Egyptian, and the name 'Pinchas' in the priestly family of Shiloh...is undoubtedly Egyptian. Of course this does not prove that these families were of Egyptian origin, but, no doubt, that they had connections with Egypt."¹⁹ Reacting to this statement, Freud wondered what connections could be conjured up other than Egyptian familial origin.

Freud also quoted Meyer at length with regard to the notion that there were two Moseses and two religions which were fused together to form a single tradition. To Meyer, the Hebrew tribes assumed the religion of the Midianites and other local tribes at Meribah-Kadesh. There they adopted Yahweh, the volcano god. Since volcanoes are not found either in Egypt or Sinai, scholars such as Meyer placed Meribah-Kadesh as well as Sinai-Horeb -- the home of Yahweh -- along the western border of Arabia. The original god Yahweh was, according to Meyer, "...an uncanny bloodthirsty demon who went about by night and shunned the light of day."²⁰

Although Meyer acknowledged some historical kernel in the story of the sojourn in Egypt and the catastrophe which befell the Egyptians, Freud complained that Meyer could attribute nothing more to Egyptian influence than the rite of circumcision. Meyer reinforced this contention while not going so far as to conclude that Moses was an Egyptian:

The Moses we know is the ancestor of the priests of Kadesh -- that is, a figure from a genealogical legend, standing in relation to a cult, and not a historic personality. Thus (apart from those who accept tradition root and branch as historical

truth) no one who treats him as a historical figure has been able to give any content to him, to represent him as a concrete individual or to point out what he may have done and what his historical work may have been.²¹

Meyer's theory was intended to link Moses up with the figure at Kadesh, not -- as did Freud's theory -- with an Egyptian Moses. To Meyer, the Exodus and story of Moses' youth were secondary features which were interpolated to achieve a connected legend. For these Egyptian stories of Moses' youth were dropped once the text reached the narrative at Kadesh:

Moses in Midian is no longer an Egyptian grandson of Pharaoh, but a shepherd to whom Yahweh revealed himself. In telling of the plagues there is no longer any talk of his former connection, though effective use might easily have been made of them, and the command to kill the [new born] sons of the Israelites [Exodus 1:16,21] is completely forgotten. In the Exodus and the destruction of the Egyptians, Moses plays no part whatever: he is not even mentioned. The heroic character which the legend of his childhood presupposes is totally absent from the later Moses; he is only the man of God, a miracle worker equipped by Yahweh with supernatural powers.²²

Although Freud went further in his hypotheses than did Meyer, this Biblical scholar's works went a long way in validating Freud's Moses. To Freud, then, the legitimacy of his endeavor, to separate and explore the destinies of the two Moseses, was confirmed not only by the contradictions in the Biblical text itself but by the ideas of Biblical scholars such as Sellin and Meyer. Freud found support for his methodology in the techniques of the documentary hypothesis and in the comparison of his work with the endeavors of Biblical critics such as Auerbach (1932), Gressman (1913), Volz (1907), and Yahudah (1929), each of whom had seen more in Moses than the literal Biblical text suggests.

Despite the variety of sources on Egyptian history with which Freud was familiar, he relied almost exclusively on the works of J.H. Breasted for confirmation of his Moses. Although Breasted did not go as far as did Freud in his theory of Egyptian influence on the Hebrew religion, Breasted's standard works, History of Egypt (1906) and The Dawn of Conscience (1934) were very supportive of many of Freud's hypotheses. For instance, in his introduction to The Dawn of Conscience, Breasted found great significance in the fact that

...civilised development in the countries surrounding Palestine was several thousand years earlier than that of the Hebrews. It is now quite evident that the ripe social and moral development of mankind in the Nile Valley, which was three thousand years older than that of the Hebrews, contributed essentially to the formation of the Hebrew literature which we call the Old Testament. Our moral heritage therefore derives from a wider human past enormously older than the Hebrews, and it has come to us rather through the Hebrews than from them.²³

Freud, who hoped to prove the Egyptian origins of Mosaic monotheism, must have been particularly approving of this interpretation of Egyptian history.

It is interesting to note Breasted's protest that, by universalizing the tenets of "ethical monotheism," he meant in no way to discredit the "Hebrews or their nation":

... There are reasons why the author would like to call attention to the fact of his life-long interest in Hebrew Studies. For years he taught Hebrew in university classes, and had among his students many future rabbis.... The opinions regarding this book are based solely on judicially minded study of the ancient documents; but in a world in which anti-Semitic prejudice is still regrettably evident it seems appropriate to state that the book was not written with the slightest anti-Semitic bias. On the contrary...the ancient civilization of the Hebrews was a great demonstration of developing human life -- of the advance

of man toward new visions of character and of social idealism. It is for us now to recognize the larger human process transcending racial boundaries -- a process in which the Hebrews occupied an intermediate stage -- and to catch the full significance of the fact that man arose to high moral vision two thousand years before the Hebrew nation was born.²⁴

How ironic that Breasted thus anticipated the angry reactions of critics who later attributed to Freud anti-Semitic motives (and therefore self-hate) for suggesting that ethical monotheism may not have originated with the Jews. Breasted himself was left unscathed for suggesting the theory. Yet Freud's account of the notion "evoked a storm of indignation and even anger among the Jewish community, especially among Biblical scholars...[who] vehemently accused [him] of having been animated by a secret anti-Semitism."²⁵ Breasted's introduction is almost reminiscent of Freud's protest that Jews should not feel deprived of greatness, even though the initiative of their tradition came from the outside (see p. 21).

Freud quoted Breasted to support his first tenet of Moses and Monotheism that "Moses" is an Egyptian name:

It is important to notice that his name Moses was Egyptian. It is simply the Egyptian word "mose" meaning "child," and is an abridgement of a fuller form of such names as "Amen-mose" meaning "Amon-a-child" or "Ptah-mose" meaning "Ptah-a-child," these forms themselves being likewise abbreviations for the complete form "Amon-(has-given)-a-child" or "Ptah-(has-given)-a-child." The abbreviation "child" early became a convenient rapid form for the cumbersome full name, and the name Mose, "child," is not uncommon on the Egyptian monuments. The father of Moses without doubt prefixed to his son's name that of an Egyptian god like Amon or Ptah, and this divine name was gradually lost in current usage, till the boy was called "Mose." (The final s is an addition drawn from the Greek translation of the Old Testament. It is not in the Hebrew which has "Mosheh").²⁶

Yet, despite the fact that Breasted confirmed the Eryp-

tian etymology of the name Moses, he did not go so far as to question Moses' Hebrew heritage. Breasted contended:

It is evident that some of the Hebrew nomads, after having taken refuge in Egypt in time of famine, were subjected to slavery. from which a Hebrew of statesman-like gifts and notable powers of leadership, who placed himself at their head, delivered them and thus became the first great Hebrew leader whose name has come down to us.²⁷

To Freud, Moses' bearing an Egyptian name was reliable if not unimpeachable evidence of his nationality. Yet Freud pointed out that even Breasted, who acknowledged the origin of the name, would go no further than to suggest that "Moses was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians (Acts vii,22)."²⁸

Freud's presumption that Moses was an Egyptian occasioned the conclusion that the religion Moses gave the Hebrews must have been Egyptian also. Since the Hebrew and Egyptian religions contrasted so radically in areas such as magic and afterlife, etc., Freud looked elsewhere for the origins of what was later Mosaic monotheism. And Freud found, in the annals of Egyptian history, the figure Amenhotep IV who, for his brief reign, instigated a religious reform of monotheism and universalism. The Pharaoh Amenhotep IV, whom Breasted called "the first individual in human history,"²⁹ forced a new religion on his Egyptian subjects which ran contrary to all of their thousand-year-old traditions. As Freud put it:

It was a strict monotheism, the first attempt of the kind, so far as we know, in the history of the world, and along with the belief in a single god religious intolerance was inevitably born, which had previously been alien to the ancient world and remained so long afterwards.³⁰

Basing himself on accounts given by Breasted (1906 and 1934)

and somewhat on the Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. II (1924), Freud gave an account of the shortlived Egyptian monotheistic movement (see pp. 13-14). To Freud, the similarities of the characteristics of the Aton religion and the Mosaic religion were too striking to ignore. Both religions excluded notions of magic, graven images and afterlife, which for the Egyptians was a radical departure from their thousand-year-old tradition.

To Freud, then, "if Moses was an Egyptian and if he communicated his own religion to the Jews, it must have been Ikhnaton's [Amen-hotep IV], the Aton religion."³¹ Breasted, however, was more conservative in his associating the two religions. To Breasted, Moses' Egyptian background only influenced aspects of the Hebrew religion such as their adoption of the practice of circumcision, for Moses "was no slavish imitator of Egyptian practices...."³² Furthermore, to Breasted there were few similarities between the religion of Ikhnaton and the religion which Moses first founded. Breasted contended that the ideals of ethical monotheism came to the Hebrews after centuries of settlement in Canaan (long after Moses): "The old Midianite nature god of the desert, who also led the Israelites into Palestine and had found savage pleasure in the slaughter of the Canaanites, was gradually transformed in the Hebrew conception of him, till he became a God of righteousness...."³³ Breasted thus argued that the ideals of monotheism and universalism, which first found expression in the religion of Ikhnaton, over centuries spread from Egypt to surrounding areas. In reaching Palestine, the movement gradually gained influence and the Hebrew people eventually evolved into a similar ethical social structure. Freud, on the other hand, assumed that the hallmarks of

the Aton religion were imposed upon the early Hebrews by Moses, but only became expressed after a long period of latency. Thus, while Freud relied heavily on the historical data Breasted provided in his great works on Egyptian history, the author of Moses went much further in interpreting the significance of these data as they applied to Moses and the religion he founded.

As mentioned earlier (pp. 6 - 7), Freud based Moses and Monotheism on many of the fundamental underpinnings of his general theory of religion espoused in Totem and Taboo. In Totem and Taboo, Freud borrowed more from Frazer's Golden Bough (1890) than any other source. Yet in Moses his reliance on the work was noted only in one footnote. Freud did, however, note in Moses the role of three anthropological sources on the development of his own theses: "I made use of some theoretical ideas put forward by Darwin, Atkinson and particularly by Robertson Smith, and combined them with the findings and indications derived from psychoanalysis."³⁴

From C. Darwin, The Descent of Man (1871), Freud had adopted the hypothesis that human beings originally lived in small hordes, each of which was ruled by a despotic older male who appropriated all the females for himself and castigated or disposed of the younger males -- even his sons. The sons were allowed none of the women to themselves and lived together in forced celibacy. Freud added to this a theory of J.J. Atkinson (Primal Law, 1903) that this patriarchal hegemony typically ended in rebellion by the sons who, in banding together, overthrew their father and together devoured him. The brothers then enjoyed brief communistic enjoyment of sexual freedom, but

in turn became segregated anew by the fierce fire of sexual jealousy, "...each survivor of the slaughter relapsing into lonely sovereignty, the head of the typical group with its characteristic feature of a single adult male member in antagonism with every other adult male."³⁵

The continuation of this theory (in common with Atkinson) Freud attributed to W. Robertson Smith's totem theory: i.e., the father-horde finally had to give rise to a totemic brother-clan. In order to live in peace with one another, the brother-clan had to learn to renounce the women on whose account they had, in fact, murdered their father. They instituted exogamy and, with the power of the father abated, the families reorganized in the form of matriarchies. In Freud's psycho-analytic account of Smith's theory:

The ambivalent emotional attitude of the sons to their father remained in force during the whole of later development. A particular animal was set up in the father's place as a totem. It was regarded as ancestor and protective spirit and might not be injured or killed. But once a year the whole male community came together to a ceremonial meal at which the totem animal (worshipped at all other times) was torn to pieces and devoured in common. No one might absent himself from this meal: it was the ceremonial repetition of the killing of the father, with which social order, moral laws and religion had taken their start.³⁶

The link between these ancient anthropological events and the murder of Moses and institution of monotheism could be explained in part by a mechanism within humans which Freud called "archaic heritage." To Freud, there are memory-traces within individuals which, like animal instincts, are transmitted generationally without having to be taught. That is, humans are equipped with preserved memories of certain experiences of their ancestors. It was these memory traces which Freud referred to as "archaic heritage."³⁷

The primary experiences suggested by Atkinson and Smith were preserved through archaic heritage. Freud believed that "men have always known (in this special way) that they once possessed a primal father and killed him."³⁸ Further, the repetition of an event actively entered a memory into archaic heritage. Thus,

fate had brought the great deed and misdeed of primeval days, the killing of the father, closer to the Jewish people by causing them to repeat it on the person of Moses, an outstanding father-figure. It was a case of "acting out" instead of remembering....³⁹

The killing of Moses also constituted an indispensable link between the forgotten event of primeval times and its later emergence in the form of the monotheistic religion. The murder of the primeval father had been traumatic, the memory had been repressed. But the repressed material "returned" slowly over the course of human history. A patriarchy once again emerged, but the male leaders never achieved absolute power as had the father of the primal horde. The totem animal was replaced by a god in a series of transitions. Over time the idea of a supreme deity developed and, as tribes and people began to unite, the gods too became organized into families and hierarchies. One was, at a certain point, elevated into being supreme lord over gods and humanity. After this, a further step was hesitatingly undertaken of paying respect to only one god. Finally, the decision was made to give all power to a single god and to tolerate no other gods beside him:

Only thus was it that the supremacy of the father of the primal horde was re-established and that the emotions of relating to him could be repeated. The first effect of meeting the being who had so long been missed and longed for was overwhelming and was like the traditional description of the lawgiving from Mount Sinai. Admiration, awe and thankfulness for having found grace

in his eyes -- the religion of Moses knew none but these positive feelings toward the father-god. The conviction of his irresistibility, the submission to his will, could not have been more unquestioning in the helpless and intimidated sons of the father of the horde -- indeed those feelings only become fully intelligible when they are transposed into the primitive and infantile setting. A child's emotional impulses are intensely and inexhaustibly deep to a degree quite other than those of an adult; only religious ecstasy can bring them back. A rapture of devotion to God was thus the first reaction to the return of the great father.⁴⁰

Thus according to Freud was the monotheistic religion tenaciously maintained by the Jews through their perpetual and archaic need to experience the authority of the primal father. The murder of Moses only reinforced the entire process by imprinting the primeval experience even more permanently on the minds of all Jews who followed.

In conclusion, Freud suggested that, because the father-religion (Jewish monotheism) leaves no room for the ambivalence toward the father (which was the lot of the sons), the hostile impulses against the father (God) are turned inward -- resulting in the perpetual sense of inherited Jewish-guilt. To overcome the guilt, Jews have evolved a strict set of commandments and ethical doctrines to which they must constantly adhere. Freud concluded his work with the thought that Jews "in a certain sense...have in [this]...way taken a tragic load of guilt on themselves; they have been made to pay heavy penance for it."⁴¹

The above psychoanalytic theory of "archaic heritage" served as a bridge which linked Freud's ideas about Moses and monotheism to his historical and anthropological sources. It was also this hypothetical structure ("archaic heritage") which linked the psychology

of the individual with the psychology of the group (a presupposition of Freud's). Although he was highly criticized for adhering to this idea, Freud relied on a notion of Lamarckianism: i.e., he believed that "what was acquired by our ancestors is certainly an important part of what we inherit."⁴² Despite the lack of acceptance of these beliefs in scientific circles, Freud could not imagine social or biological science without a Lamarckian hypothesis. He could not abide with the notion of conscious transmission. The deepest instinctual secrets could not have been rationally disseminated (i.e., taught) but were rather remembered by the mass psyche. Yet it was not a linear transmission of attitude to Freud; rather the primal act was necessarily denied and forgotten in order to persist in the unconscious.⁴³

Thus was Freud at odds with the greater scientific community of his time because of his belief in the Lamarckian idea of genetic transmission of cultural characteristics. When he was challenged that these notions were inconsistent with what most biologists believed, Freud answered, "But we can't bother with biologists. We have our own science." And then he added, "We must go our own way."⁴⁴

Once again in this matter, Freud's iconoclastic disposition becomes apparent. Freud was disinterested in the objections of his critics, and seemed unconcerned as well with the need to prove the correctness of his suppositions. In Moses and Monotheism, not only did Freud assume the hypothetical construct of "archaic heritage" but he never validated this assumption by documentation of its sources. The unaware reader of Moses would assume that the concept of inherited memories came from Freud himself. Just as Freud did not

document his sources for the notion of archaic heritage, as he left unacknowledged other sources which he was aware may have influenced his thinking about Moses.

In searching for works contemporaneous with Freud about Moses and the origins of monotheism, one is surprised to discover two studies dealing with related subjects by Freud's students: Th. Reik and K. Abraham. Yet neither of these works received mention in Freud's Moses and Monotheism.

That Freud disregarded the work of his own students was not the case, as he went to great lengths to credit Otto Rank's theory of the birth of the hero (see pp. 10-11). In fact, there is reason to believe that Freud himself influenced the development of Rank's book. Yet Freud quoted from The Myth of the Birth of the Hero (1909) extensively, giving credit to its author for the theories therein and for the examination of Moses' exposure story.

In 1919, Th. Reik published a work on Ritual: Psycho-Analytic Studies, to which Freud himself wrote the preface. In the preface, Freud reiterated the fundamentals of Totem and Taboo and concluded:

This hypothesis, founded on the views of Robertson Smith, and developed by me in my Totem and Taboo in 1912, has been taken by Th. Reik as the basis for his studies on the problems of the psychology of religion, of which this is the first volume. In accordance with psychoanalytic technique he begins by considering details of religious life that have not been previously understood, and in elucidating them throws light upon the fundamental pre-suppositions and ultimate aims of religion. He keeps steadily in view the relationship between prehistoric man and primitive man of today, as well as the connection between cultural activities and neurotic substitutive formations.⁴⁵

In many ways, Freud's Moses is similar to Reik's work with regard

to methodology, sources, and conclusions, and yet there is no reference to Ritual by Freud in Moses and Monotheism.

Particularly relevant to Freud's studies was the last chapter of Reik's study on the Shofar entitled, "The Moses of Michelangelo and the Events on Sinai." Since Freud, at the time of publication, had not yet acknowledged his authorship of his essay on Michelangelo's statue, Reik referred to him as, merely, "the gifted author of the study of the Moses by Michelangelo."⁴⁶

The horns on the Moses statue, which play no part in Freud's analysis, become the point of departure for Reik. Quoting the same sources as did Freud, Reik stressed the fact that the statue evokes a mixture of admiration as well as horror; it attracts as well as repels. Reik, citing observers who have noted the bovine nature of Moses' head, believed that the horns were not a mere mistranslation in the Vulgate but rather an intuitive understanding of the totemistic nature of the Sinai event.

Although the theme is disguised, Reik believed that the events on Mount Sinai recapitulated the kernel of the Mediterranean myth of the struggle of the hero against the monster (see p. 6). The Israelites originally worshipped a bull or a ram. Moses was victorious over the totem animal, burned it and gave its remains to the Israelites to drink, a reenactment of the totem feast.

Reik believed that Moses ascended Mt. Sinai not to receive the Ten Commandments, as the traditional account had it, but to fight Yahweh, the Bull God. Moses returned victorious and therefore horned. This Bull God was worshipped through a stone holy to him. The destruction of the Tables alluded to the destruction of the holy stone.

Therefore, when Moses forbade the worship of graven images, this can only be interpreted as a parricidal act.

Yet, in a secondary revision of these historical events, victory was returned to the father. To reflect the revision of the facts, the bull was changed into a calf -- a symbol connoting a son. Similarly, Reik pointed out, the name Moses means "child" in Egyptian. In this way Moses became a son to Yahweh, and it was indeed the figure of Moses whom the Jews worshipped. The golden calf was a totemistic image of Yahweh's son. In the secondary revision, however, the son of Yahweh, Moses, failed in his rebellion and was reduced to the rank of mediator between the people and Yahweh. The sense of guilt over the unsuccessful rebellion remained with the people and was resumed once again in the struggle between God and Christ. Unlike Judaism, Christianity became a successful Son religion.

At the very least, Reik's study forms a bridge linking Totem and Taboo with Moses and Monotheism. At the most, Reik's theses, such as the notion of Father/Son religions, or of residual guilt over rebellion from the father, influenced ideas Freud presented in Moses and Monotheism. It is curious that Freud made no reference to Reik's work.

M. Bergmann, in his study of Freud's Jewish identity, implied that Reik's ideas may have truly originated with Freud, but that Freud later renounced these theories in favor of the interpretations which appeared in Moses. Thus did Freud ignore his earlier Moses -- the Moses presented by Reik. As Bergmann pointed out, on one occasion Freud had allowed Reik to sign his name to a publication of Freud's.

Furthermore, the two psycho-analysts were in close personal contact. Bergmann suggested that Freud, in this case as well, published some of his early ideas about Moses under Reik's own name. In any case, Bergmann continued, it is not probable that Reik would have published ideas at variance with Freud's. "We may assume therefore that before the twenties Freud too saw Moses as a son figure. In Moses and Monotheism he is clearly a father figure...."⁴⁷

If Freud neglected mention of Reik as a source for Moses because he no longer upheld his student's theses, we are left wondering why Freud avoided mention of the work of K. Abraham. In 1912, Abraham published a study of Amenhotep IV, in which he interpreted the behavior of the radical pharaoh in the light of psychoanalysis. To Abraham:

Those who are accustomed to study the mind in the light of Freudian theory must feel the life of Amenhotep IV almost as a challenge for psychoanalytic investigation. It shows us with singular clarity how a man of that remote cultural era was dominated by the same complexes and motivated by the same psychic mechanism as the study of neuroses by Freud and his school has revealed in contemporary man.⁴⁸

On the basis of the extant information concerning Amenhotep IV, Abraham diagnosed the pharaoh's behavior as indicative of a neurotic personality with Oedipal conflicts. The pharaoh was, throughout his life, attached to his beautiful dominant foreign mother. He, unlike all other Egyptian rulers, restricted himself to a monogamous relationship with another Asiatic woman, whom along with his mother was always depicted at his side.

To Abraham, the behavior of Amenhotep IV could be interpreted as rebellion against a father from whom the boy sought independence

even after Amenhotep III's death. At age fifteen, the boy took over the throne and his rebellion against paternal power was sublimated into idealistic aspirations. Yet at the same time these aspirations were directed decisively against the tradition which his father had handed down. Examples of this process in Amenhotep IV's reign are not difficult to find. After he took the throne, Amenhotep IV immediately broke with the religious tradition of his father, and instituted instead the cult of his mother's favorite god -- Aton. Amenhotep IV changed the form and style of art in favor of art forms of ancient Lower Egypt. From then on, the connection was established pictorially of the young pharaoh not with his father but with the earliest of kings.

Without reviewing again the famous monotheistic revolt of Amenhotep IV who changed his name to Ikhnaton, it is important to reiterate one point highlighted by Abraham. In his enthusiasm for Aton, Ikhnaton sought to obliterate all traces of the god after whom his father and he himself had been named. He therefore had the name Amon, and therefore his father's name, expunged from all inscriptions and memorials. Ikhnaton went so far as to have his mother's embalmed body interred not beside her consort, but in a new mausoleum near the city of Aton, where Ikhnaton himself one day wished to rest. In the epitaph, she was described as the consort of "Nebmaara," the personal name of Amenhotep III -- a name he did not use officially once he became king.

Abraham drew the obvious Freudian conclusion:

Ikhnaton wanted to be in death next to his mother, whom he had separated from her consort. His rivalry with his father

for the possession of his mother was to extend beyond the grave. So he realised with the dead what he had been unable to achieve with the living.⁴⁹

In his essay, Abraham observed relationship between Ikhnaton's monotheistic movement and the later Hebrew monotheism. He suggested that "Ikhnaton's teachings not only contain essential elements of the Jewish monotheism of the Old Testament, but are in many ways in advance of it,"⁵⁰ and that "Aton knows nothing of the hatred, the jealousy, and the punishment of the God of the Old Testament."⁵¹ He further asserted that:

Ikhnaton...created a new religion according to his own personal needs, with a paternal god at its center. He ascribed to him unlimited power, that omnipotence which every child originally ascribes to his father. He made him the one and only god, in transparent imitation of the uniqueness of the father. He thereby became the precursor of Moses and his monotheism, in which the one and only god unmistakably bears the features of the patriarch, the sole ruler of the family.⁵²

One can just imagine Freud's intrigue with such an account of the pharaoh, an account which many say first aroused Freud's interest in Egyptian monotheism.⁵³ Yet no mention of Abraham's work appeared in Freud's Moses. Shengold believed that this omission was a parapraxis on the part of Freud traced back to the rivalry between Abraham and Jung, and further back to Fliess.⁵⁴

The preceding two essays were certainly familiar to Freud and may have influenced the great thinker's ideas about Moses and his monotheism. Yet another essay, closer to Freud's notions than any other, may have also influenced him. However it remains unclear whether Freud indeed knew of it. In 1789, Friedrich Schiller published a lecture: The Mission of Moses (Die Sendung Moses). In that essay, Schiller postulated that Moses, the Hebrew child, was raised as a

foster-child by the Egyptian Princess and had access to the mystery religions of Egypt. The concept of monotheism had first been discovered by Egyptian priests who did not dare to give it wide currency as it would have undermined the Egyptian theocratic, political structure which was based on polytheism. The priests, however, sought out talented trusted disciples to whom the precious new insight of one God could be entrusted. The insight, bequeathed for many generations from one thinker to another, finally became the underground property of a small coterie of priests who were able to grasp its significance and develop it further. Moses, having been raised an Egyptian, belonged to that select group from whom no priestly secrets were withheld.

Schiller's lecture, a century before the hieroglyphic inscriptions of Ikhnaton's religious reformation were deciphered, credited the Egyptian priests with religious innovations such as monotheism, specific priestly rituals, circumcision, the ark of God, and the name of one supreme deity. The doctrines were impressed upon Moses in his formative years but he, like his teachers, was unable to espouse them publicly. When Moses was forced to flee Egypt, for having killed an Egyptian taskmaster who mistreated a Hebrew slave, he had a great deal of desert leisure to reflect upon his fellow Hebrews' lot and the religious mysteries to which he had been exposed.

In the silence of the desert, there arose in Moses the desire to return to Egypt and liberate his enslaved people -- the Hebrews. But first he needed to awaken within them a sense of hope, courage and self-confidence. Moses went about the task by imbuing them with

a sense that a supernatural, heavenly power was interested in them. Because the lowly Hebrew slaves were unable to comprehend the universal abstract deity of the Egyptian mystics, Moses linked his philosophical God with the national God of the Hebrews' ancestors -- Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Moses convinced the Hebrews that their Patriarchs' God had at long last achieved supremacy and had succeeded in annihilating all other gods, thus becoming the sole and omnipotent Ruler of the Universe. Equipped with this belief, the Hebrews, reinforced by the magic they saw Moses perform, willingly followed the great statesman out of Egypt.

Moses, having implanted within his people a sense of hope and enthusiasm, prepared the Hebrews for conquest and settlement of the territory beyond the wilderness of Sinai. Such a settlement could only be achieved by a united people who would not disintegrate into tribes but would be governed by a common will, embodied in a constitution or code of laws that would be accepted. To Moses, unanimous approval would only be achieved if the ordinances were presented as commandments emanating from God, and so he grounded the constitution on Divine sanction. Although the purity of his monotheism was diluted, Moses disclosed to an entire people the Unity of Deity on which was based the Hebrew theocratic state.

To Schiller, the achievement was meant in no way to glorify the Hebrews, for in his opinion they were a depraved national group both in ancient times and in his own day. Yet, so strange were the ways of God that an impure vessel could contain a precious ingredient of truth, which it could dispense to others before it (the Hebrew

people) was deservedly scattered and dispersed. Schiller, however, conceded the greatness of Moses, one Hebrew who duped all other Hebrews into following the universal truth.

Despite Schiller's anti-Semitic leanings, his many works were widely read by Jewish youth who were under the spell of enlightenment. He was, in their eyes, a supreme dramatist and poet, preaching individual freedom and national emancipation. His hymn to joy, which Beethoven incorporated into the Ninth Symphony, stirred the hearts of the Maskilim with its call for universal love for all children of the one God. Schiller's influence was felt on the literature from the neo-Hebrew works of the Maskilim to the popular Yiddish literature of the common masses. "Yet, few, if indeed any, of his Jewish readers and admirers were aware of his personal antipathy toward Jews...."⁵⁵

E. Blum has pointed out how unlikely it is that Freud was unfamiliar with this essay in his adolescence.⁵⁶ And the ideas put forward in Schiller's work bear a remarkable similarity to many of the ideas that Freud put forward a century and a half later. Perhaps, the kernel of ideas contained in Freud's last book had an origin much earlier than Freud either remembered or at least admitted.

This, as well as other influences on Freud's thinking about Moses, may never be clear. Although many, in fact most, of the more radical theories Freud propounded in Moses and Monotheism can be traced back to earlier sources, many of his references are lost to us. Freud, with his independence of mind, did not always consider the need of documenting ideas which were not his own. Although many of his sources for ideas are documented in Moses, there is reason to believe that

some unacknowledged sources also played a role in this great thinker's ideas on Moses. In this regard, this study on Freud's sources may well be concluded with Freud's final words in Moses and Monotheism:

...Exhaustive answers to such riddles cannot in fairness be either demanded or expected. A contribution, in view of the limitations which I mentioned at the start, is all that I can offer.⁵⁷

NOTES: CHAPTER 2

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36. Freud, Moses, p. 131.
37. Ibid., p. 100.
38. Ibid., p. 101.
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THE CRITICS: REVIEWS AND CRITIQUES
OF FREUD'S WORKS ON MOSES

As could be expected, Freud's works on Moses evoked a varied response. When the great founder of psychoanalysis probed into the realm of religion, emotional controversy was bound to ensue. Many religious thinkers of Freud's day (and of today) may have felt threatened by the assertions of Moses, which dispossessed the Jews of their founder and reduced religion to the sphere of neurosis. It is with this perspective that we may best understand the critical reactions to Freud's works on Moses.

In examining the critiques of Freud's interpretation of Michelangelo's Moses, we find that some of his followers were impressed with Freud's speculation that the statue portrays a superior and self-contained Moses. In the opinion of H. Segal, for example, Freud clearly demonstrated not only that the latent meaning of the work is the overcoming of wrath but that the artist's achievement in general was in "giving the fullest expression to the conflict and union between the life-and-death instinct."¹ Aside, however, from the many reviewers who criticized the speculative nature of the essay, only a few have pinpointed any serious fallacies in Freud's analysis of The Moses of Michelangelo.

J. Spector felt that Freud erred in presupposing the artist's intent because Freud failed to consult the original designs Michelangelo intended for the statues on Pope Julius II's tomb. In Michelangelo's

earliest sketches of the tomb (1513), "three other figures on a level with Moses were set diagonally to each other at the corners of the square platform and Moses sits solidly with one tablet in each hand, horns on his head, and with a long beard that falls straight down."² This earliest conception of the statue reflects none of the subtleties about which Freud speculated -- e.g., regarding the position of the Tablets, the hands, and the beard. Spector suggested that, if anything, these original sketches imply that Michelangelo intended nothing more than to evoke the image of a great lawgiver. The changes from the original sketches to the final product, Spector believed, related to the implementation of a major revision in the tomb's overall design, including especially the placing of the figures (six, instead of four) in right angles on the platform instead of diagonally:

In the final version of 1513, Michelangelo solved the problem -- analogous to the one faced in the Sistine ceiling, the immediately preceding project -- of linking the front and side figures. It was to this end that he broke the symmetry of the form, placed the tablets in one hand, rotated the head and arms, and used the beard as a "streaming" motif to unite the head to the right hand holding the tablets. Contrary to Freud..., Moses does not grasp his beard, but touches it exactly as the figure of the Louvre Slave, carved along with the Moses for the same façade of the Julius tomb, touches the line of drapery on his chest, which serves to link the right hand to the upraised left arm.³

The changes in Michelangelo's Moses were, according to Spector, stylistic and not, as Freud had it, pregnant with meaning. Freud knew of the two versions of the layout of the Papal tomb, for he spoke of the Moses as "...together with five other statues (or according to a later sketch, with three)."⁴ To Spector, then, Freud's decision to minimize the formal consequences of the changes in the two projects

reflected a flaw in the Freudian interpretation -- albeit a more dramatic interpretation, "with its series of imagined stages, and with its potential for his [Freud's] own identification."⁵

Another critic, R. Bremer, contended that Freud's whole interpretation of the Moses statue was based on several fundamental misconceptions. To Bremer,

his use of irrelevant passages from the Bible leads him into finding numerous problems in the statue that have no basis in reality; they are, in fact, problems created by Freud himself. He then proceeds to solve these problems...with arguments of utmost ingenuity; but in the course of these arguments, he is forced to misrepresent the statue to such an extent that his final interpretation bears hardly any relevance to the work of art he is discussing.⁶

Bremer asserted that Freud fundamentally misconstrued the moment reflected in the statue when he presumed that it reflected Moses' holding the Ten Commandments. Instead, Bremer suggested that the statue portrayed Moses' subsequent second ascent of Mt. Sinai, with two blank stones to replace the first set of tables which he had broken. Bremer contended that Michelangelo had in mind not Exodus 32:15-19 (in which Moses descended the mountain and, upon seeing the Israelites dancing around the golden calf, dashed the Ten Commandments to the rocks) but rather Exodus 34:4-8 (wherein Moses, seated upon the mountain with two blank tables, waited to behold the glory of God and receive the law for a second time). Viewing Michelangelo's Moses in the light of the second Biblical passage resolves many of the discrepancies between the statue and the text which Freud was unable to harmonize. To Bremer, Moses' careless grasp of the blank tables, his seated posture, his impression of imminent movement and his ambiguous emotion-laden facial expression are all readily associated with the supreme

moment of Moses' second receipt of revelation on Mt. Sinai.

Freud, unable to explain the cited incongruities, assumed instead that Michelangelo designed the Moses statue in direct convention of the Bible. But as Bremer stated, "Michelangelo's Moses is only contradictory to the Bible texts quoted by Freud, but wholly in accordance with the Bible texts...concerning Moses' second ascent of Mount Sinai." ⁷

Bremer did find Freud's work interesting, however, because [of] what it reveals about the state of mind of its author. Apparently Freud was incapable of breaking free from his identification with that Moses who came bearing God's word, and who then found his position threatened by apostates. In his attempt not to "dash the Tables to the earth and let loose his rage upon his faithless people" [Moses of Michelangelo, p. 216], Freud projects these feelings, and the tension caused by suppressing such feelings, onto the statue of Moses. In order to justify the projection, he ascribes the desire to express such feelings of anger, and this victory over such anger, to Michelangelo. He chooses a Bible text and shows that this text is inconsistent with the statue; therefore, Freud contends, Michelangelo must have consciously rejected this text and must have created a non-Biblical Moses. And thus Freud proves incapable of turning one page of his Bible and reading, one chapter further on, the beginning of the relevant passage -- truly a revealing course of events and of the utmost significance to those concerned with the interpretation of works of art.⁸

It becomes quite evident, through examination of even these two quite straightforward reviews, that the subject of Freud's treatment of Moses opened up a new realm of speculation. For most critics, no matter how sober and scientific, seemed to feel constrained to probe for Freud's motivation for treating the Moses figure as he did. The very reviewers who denounced Freud for attempting to exact Michel-

angelo's intent from his art often partook of the same subjectivity: i.e., inferring Freud's intent from his essay on Moses. While such speculation is often interesting, we might question its validity (a subject discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 5).

H. Puner's discussion of Freud's treatment of Michelangelo's Moses exemplifies this type of subjectivity. She pointed to the fact that, although Freud referred to the Moses with the head of Pan [p. 213], he neglected to explain or even question Michelangelo's equipping the great statue with the pagan accoutrement of horns. Puner suggested that horns are indicative of the animal ancestry to which even the most noble of humans owe debt. But to Freud, Puner continued, the horns on the Moses statue did not fit with his conception of his great hero, for they symbolize the baser passions, the primitive nature of humaiity. Thus, without substantive confirmation, Puner conjectured:

Moses, cried Freud, was not caught on the horns of his passions. Moses was so much the master of himself that he could shut his eyes to the fact that his head was horned. And Freud, in the image of Moses, carried his conviction to such a pitch that he acted as if he saw no horns at all on the head of his hero.⁹

We see, then, that even the seemingly most forthright of critiques, a critique of art interpretation, can become conjectural and emotionally charged when it involves Freud and/or Moses. Thus it is not surprising that even more intense emotional controversy ensued from Freud's Moses and Monotheism.

When the book was first published, it was met with the immediate acclaim of many of Freud's loyal followers. The review in

the London Times Literary Supplement of May 27, 1939 stated: "...The book is impressive. In a sense it is beyond criticism. Thus it is really immaterial whether or not we accept the novel hypothesis."¹⁰ After receiving a copy of the book from Freud, A. Einstein responded: "Your idea that Moses was a distinguished Egyptian and a member of the priestly caste has much to say for it...."¹¹ A.A. Roback, who considered himself a follower of Freud, anticipated the criticisms of Moses:

The reaction to Freud's Moses and Monotheism will be four-fold against the four characters of the Haggada. The cynical smart Aleck will dismiss it as "tommyrot." The moron will of course not have the occasion to react, for he will not know the book. The simpleton, in his bewilderment, will say, "What's all this about?" Finally the scientist will suspend judgement until he has read the volume -- and one might add, a good many volumes on that subject, to boot.¹²

In a sense even Freud's greatest critics were compelled to acknowledge the psychoanalyst's ingenious ideas, systematic presentation, and prosaic literary style. L. Köhler, a biblical scholar, rejected the contentions of Moses and Monotheism but conceded that Freud possessed the rare talent of making the most implausible theory appear not only plausible but true.¹³

As could be expected, however, it was the Jewish scholars who were quickest to reject Freud's conclusions and dismiss the book as "tommyrot." One such critic, T. Weiss-Rosmarin, wrote a review characterized by Jones as filled with "vituperative indignation."¹⁴ Her first contention was that Freud was reckless and impudent to express opinions on Biblical topics without knowledge of Hebrew, Egyp-

tian and neighboring languages of the Near East. Weiss-Rosmarin accused Freud of being "only a little better posted on ancient Near East history and the Bible than the average educated lay-person."¹⁵ She also charged that Freud was animated in his writing by bitter hatred of the Jews, a hatred which motivated him to strike a blow against them by depriving Jews of their famous hero.

Another critic and Biblical scholar, A.S. Yahuda, concluded his review with the words: "It seems to me that in these words we hear the voice of one of the most fanatical Christians in his hatred of Israel and not the voice of Freud who hated and despised such fanaticism with all his heart and strength."¹⁶

M.R. Cohen, the Talmudist, wrote in a scathing review of Moses and Monotheism: "If anyone else had written this book, we should have been justified in dismissing it as the work of an opinionated crank who is more interested in his tortuous speculation than in getting at the verifiable facts."¹⁷ Cohen, who disagreed with the conclusions drawn by Freud, felt that no careful student could be misled by the work with such a weak scientific conclusion. Cohen's concern was that the general public might erroneously assume that Moses was a contribution to the psychoanalytic understanding of Jewish history.

But these criticisms, which emanated from Jewish scholarly circles, are in a way as suspect as Freud's work itself. For while Freud's credentials for the study of religion have been challenged by some, others have praised his erudition in the same area. And while some condemned Freud as an anti-Semite malevolently aiming to strip the Jews of their beloved Moses, so too have others praised him for his

loyalty to and pride in his Jewish people whom he saw as singularly fit to attain the truth and accept the teachings which elevated them to the heights of spirituality. These divergencies of opinion will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 5. Here, however, it is important to note that the critiques and reviews of Moses and Monotheism often betray more the emotional attitudes of the reviewers toward Freud and/or Moses than objective evaluation of the quality of Freud's work on Moses itself. Therefore, in assessing the critical responses to Moses and Monotheism, we must view them against the backdrop of thematic and methodological concerns.

In order conveniently to address the criticisms leveled against Moses and Monotheism, E. Jones compartmentalized the key elements under four major thematic rubrics. The first theme coming under scrutiny was the notion that Moses was an Egyptian.¹⁸ To Freud, the weight of "evidence" rendered the conjecture probable enough. The mythological birth story, the Egyptian adoption and naming, the classical legends and the Biblical critical speculations all contributed to the plausibility that Moses was a highly placed Egyptian who only later cast his lot with a body of Israelites and inspired them. This evidence was not convincing, however, to most of the critics reviewing the book. The details enumerated by Freud were to them at best circumstantial conjectures which proved little about Moses. Thus, M.R. Cohen asked:

What evidence does Freud present that Moses was an Egyptian? That the Egyptian origin of the Hebrew word for Moses, suggested by Breasted (who was not a Semitic scholar) is dubious can be seen by considering the somewhat similar name of the King of Moab, mentioned in the Book of Kings, and whose inscription we have on the Moabite Stone. Besides, even if

the questionable etymology be admitted, it doesn't follow that Moses was an Egyptian, any more than Thomas Mann must be a native of England or of the Isle of Man, though future historians may discover his name in records of notable gatherings of English-speaking Americans. The only other evidence offered for the Egyptian ancestry of Moses is a quite arbitrary manipulation of legends that does not deserve serious attention.¹⁹

Because the question of Moses' lineage is conjectural at best, there existing no clear factual evidence in either direction, many of the criticisms against the Freudian notion of an Egyptian Moses were likewise speculative, i.e., based on little evidence and arbitrary use of "fact." Illustrative of such speculation is the unpublished thesis of D. Motet. Motet collected arguments (some more compelling than others) which he and others have marshalled against the notion that Moses was an Egyptian. Motet propounded not only that Moses' name by itself indicates little about his nationality, but that the Egyptian Princess who named him probably herself had knowledge of or access to Semitic languages. With such knowledge, she may have intentionally given the baby an ambiguous name to hide his (Hebrew) lineage. With regard to the question of language, Motet also found implausible Freud's explanation of Moses' "slowness of speech" as his inability to speak the Hebrew language. For if Moses spoke Egyptian, and used Aaron as his Hebrew translator, then why would Moses have depended upon Aaron as a spokesperson in confronting the Egyptian Pharaoh?

A further question arises from the divergence between the Biblical birth story of Moses and the prototypical birth of the hero legend. To Motet, the difference between the two is so great that the Moses story does not qualify as even an emended hero-exposure

story. Furthermore, Motet asked, were the priestly writers to have tampered with the text in order to conceal Moses' Egyptian origins, and embellish the hero, "would they not go all the way?"²⁰ Had the priests in fact edited the story to claim Moses as their own, could they not have also edited out their hero's flaws such as his own language difficulties, and his murderous inability to control his temper? Motet (as others) also questioned the notion that the Hebrews would have followed a stranger in race and tradition out into the wilderness. Motet went so far as to see evidence of Moses' Hebrew origins in his joining the Midianites and becoming a shepherd. Since Genesis 46:34 states, "...every shepherd is an abomination to the Egyptians," Motet conjectured that Moses would never have voluntarily become a shepherd unless, as a Hebrew, he hoped to regain his earliest of identities by choosing to return to his people and their line of work.²¹

A second theme in Moses and Monotheism arousing critique, albeit more scientific, was the hypothesis that Moses acquired a belief in monotheism in Egypt and converted the Hebrews to it.²² This theory opened up the complicated question of the origin of monotheism, a problem on which much has been written. Jones stated that, even before Freud, the idea that Jewish monotheism had rootage in Egypt had been suggested by Brugsch in the 1870's, intimated by Breasted, and supported by Petrie who saw in Ikhnaton the prototype of Moses.²³

M. Cohen believed that Freud's whole purpose in suggesting Moses' Egyptian ancestry was to connect the Mosaic legislation with

Egypt and especially with the monotheistic reform of Ikhnaton. But, to Cohen, an individual mediator was unnecessary for conveying the beliefs of Egypt to the Hebrews, since Egyptian, as well as Babylonian, influence prevailed not only in Palestine but throughout neighboring countries.

While the language and early modes of writing of the Phoenician or Canaanite cities were akin to those of Assyria and Babylonia, Egypt ruled these cities (including Jerusalem) before the date of the supposed exodus. Semitic Beduin [sic] tribes were moving in and out of Egypt centuries before the Hebrew invasion of Canaan. Egyptian influence in Palestine does not need, therefore, the intervention of any single person in the manner of Freud's elaborate invention.²⁴

Cohen and many critics like him believed that Hebrew monotheism was no more necessarily dependent upon Egypt than was the philosophic monotheism of Xenophanes. Cohen followed the more mainstream notion of his day that Hebrew monotheism had evolved slowly out of primitive polytheism. A major criticism leveled against Freud's suggestion that Moses derived his monotheism from the religion of Ikhnaton was that the two religions were quite different. The Pharaoh's reform was not nearly the pure monotheism of the Mosaic doctrine. Ikhnaton, for example, considered himself to be divine, either as the son of Aton or even part of the universal godhead. Ikhnaton was the emissary of the god to the masses who could reach Aton through worshipping the Pharaoh. As one Egyptian history emphasized:

...it may be stated flatly that the mechanism of transmission from the faith of Ikhnaton to the monotheism of Moses is not apparent. This was the personal religion of a pharaoh who later became a heretic within one generation. It was not accessible to Egyptians at large. Their subsequent reaction in a fervent return to the older forms, particularly the Osirian faith and the cherishing care of little personal gods, shows how little penetration Atonism had below

the royal family....Atonism taught that the Pharaoh of Egypt was essential as the only intermediary between god and people.²⁵

Another discontinuity between Atonism and Hebrew monotheism has been noted in the marked absence from the former of ethical teachings. The religion of Ikhнатon was intellectual rather than ethical; its emotional content flowed from the fervor of the convert, who rejected past forms and preached new forms. The conviction of right and wrong was not ethical, but a passionate testimony that the new was right and the old was wrong. The hymns of praise to Aton expressed gratitude to the god for the creation and sustenance of life. Yet, no text called upon worshippers to dedicate themselves to the god through ethically correct lives or upright hearts. The universalism of Aton may have implied the need to treat all people equally, since they were all created by one god, but this conclusion is strikingly absent from the texts.²⁶

Another criticism arising in response to Freud's associating Moses with Ikhнатon was chronological. While the date of the Exodus is disputed, few scholars would place it nearer to Ikhнатon's reign than a century or two. As Petrie (upon whom, Jones intimated, Freud relied) wrote, in response to the critique of Moses appearing in the London Times Literary Supplement: "The new hypothesis which you quote of a connection between Ikhнатon and Moses is too shaky historically. The Aton worship was over and destroyed in Egypt more than a century before Moses and the Exodus. It is like fathering Hitler on the Revolution of 1790."²⁷ (To Petrie, the Mosaic religion followed Arabian worship. Jethro, the priest of Midian, trained Moses to shake off Egyptian influence in favor of an Arabian religion.)

Freud's third theory, difficult to prove or disprove, was the supposition that Moses was slain in a tumult.²⁸ That Freud used Sellin's questionable hypothesis about Moses' murder to confirm his own view has already been discussed (pp. 30-32). Many reviewers sharply criticized Sellin's theory as well as Freud's apparent reliance upon it.

S. Baron referred to the notion of the violent death of Moses as a "farfetched hypothesis, largely given up by its author and shared by no other biblical scholar."²⁹ J. Mozley wrote that the theory had "not a scrap of real historical evidence to back it."³⁰ We might think that L. Vogel was more generous for he concluded that,

even if one were to accept the notion that Moses was subsequently killed by the Hebrews, it is more probable, surely, that Moses was simply the victim of a coup d'etat occurring among those closest to him, rather than the victim of the whole Hebrew nation, most of whom would have had no knowledge of the circumstances of his death.³¹

Vogel concluded his review, however, with the thought that, just as every hallucinatory idea has at its base a forgotten or deformed truth, so "in...Freud's interpretation of the history of Moses, perhaps we might say that the kernel of truth is the existence of Moses, and all the rest is the hallucinatory product of Freud's personal psychosis."³² Yet despite these scathing scholarly refutations and Sellin's alleged retraction of the murder theory, Freud remained adamant in his adherence to the notion of Moses' murder.

Those disciples of the theory of Moses' murder sought support for Freud's hypothesis in other than Sellin's dubious interpretation of the Hosea passage. In Jones' review of Moses, he pointed to the

Biblical mystery surrounding the death and burial of Moses, and to the midrashic speculation about Moses' violent end.³³ Roback contended that there exist "hundreds of stories woven around the figure of Moses through the archaic storehouse" which would have helped support Freud's case.³⁴ Roback also bemoaned the fact that Freud did not refer to Ahad Ha-Am's essay on Moses, which had already created a furor by its assertion that Moses never existed. "And," Roback added, "no one who knows anything about Hebrew literature would question the loyalty or sincerity of Ahad Ha-Am, even if we should regard his opinion as ill-advised."³⁵

The fourth and final motif by which to explore the thematic criticisms of Moses is Freud's theory that the tradition of the murder of Moses implanted a lasting unconscious sense of guilt among the Jewish people.³⁶ To Freud, as discussed earlier (pp. 18-20), the murder of Moses reinforced the universal inherited sense of guilt dating from the murder of the primal father, a guilt which is constantly reanimated in the individual infantile experience. To Jones, "it is from its very nature the most hypothetical and least demonstrable part of Freud's whole Moses theory."³⁷ Accordingly, Cohen called the theory "an instance of credo quia absurdum."³⁸ Yet the notion of inherited disposition was necessary to sustain Freud's far-reaching inferences concerning the respective enduring reactions to the primitive parricide among Jews and Gentiles, such as guilt and anti-Semitism.

The fundamental presupposition for the notion of inherited guilt was that group psychology followed the patterns of individual psychology. Freud, influenced by his experience of analysis with in-

dividuals, superimposed the development of certain events in the individual human psyche onto the unfolding historical development of group processes (i.e., trauma / defense / latency / outbreak of neurotic illness / partial return of the repressed). The validity of the Freudian parallelism between individual and mass psychology has been questioned by critics such as S.W. Baron, who could not accept the notion of a period of latency within groups.³⁹ Particularly difficult to accept was the thought of a group latency period spanning the time from the hypothetical murder of the primeval father to the alleged murder of Moses. Such a time span presupposed a hereditary construct for the transmission of memories (i.e., the archaic heritage), a notion which was rejected by most scientists of Freud's time. In other words, the presupposition of the parallelism between individual and group psychology was based on a still earlier presupposition of Lamarckianism, a theory which had been discredited for more than half a century.

Even Jones, Freud's most loyal disciple, disagreed with Freud's adherence to the notion of inheritance of acquired characters:

How immovable he was on the matter I discovered during a talk I had with him in the last year of his life over a sentence I wished him to alter in the Moses book in which he expressed the Lamarckian view in unusual terms. I told him he had of course the right to hold any opinion he liked in his own field of psychology, even if it ran counter to all biological principles, but begged him to omit the passage where he applied it to the whole field of biological evolution, since no responsible biologist regarded it as tenable any longer. All he would say was that they were all wrong and the passage must stay.... 40

Although Jones disagreed with his mentor's Lamarckian orientation, he approved of Freud's general notion of inherited guilt. Thus did

Jones excuse Freud his obstinance with a quotation from a "recent" work on science:

It is never wise to deny to men of genius the use of methods to which their intuition may guide them; they can usually be relied upon to do the right thing, even though through the unfamiliarity of the procedure they may give the wrong reason for doing so.⁴¹

Similarly, P. Rieff, in discussing the propositions of Freud's Moses, wrote: "Although Freud's 'scientific myth' remains more myth than science, its merits lie in judgements of value that it conceals ...and, perhaps, to borrow Freud's own borrowing from Polonius, 'his bait of falsehood snared a carp of truth.'"⁴²

Many critics, however, found the methodological concerns which arose out of Freud's reconstruction of the Moses legend less excusable. As was discussed earlier (p. 26), Freud's arbitrary selection of facts and source materials by which to confirm his own hypotheses frequently constituted the jumping off point in methodological critiques of Moses and Monotheism. To Baron, the work is open to the most crucial objections due to "the extreme liberties admittedly taken by Freud with available biblical material...[and] the findings of modern anthropological and historical research."⁴³

Baron wrote:

This limitless arbitrariness in the selection and use of the little existing evidence renders the entire factual basis of Freud's reconstruction more than questionable. The primeval-father horde and the murder of the primeval father are considered by almost all contemporary anthropologists as a figment of imagination. The explanation of the subsequent rise of totemism, based upon a suggestion once made by W. Robertson Smith, is here upheld by Freud even though he knows "more recent ethnologists have without exception discarded" Smith's theories (p. 207). For the career of the historic Moses, he

quotes outstanding modern scholars -- Meyer, Gressman, Sellin, Breasted -- of whom he speaks with greater awe than of the original biblical sources and ancient monuments. But he selects from these writers some of their most fantastic views, often timidly advanced and sometimes later revoked by the authors themselves, drags them out of their context, and combines them into a new artificial entity.⁴⁴

Putting it more concisely, W.F. Albright stated that Freud's "...new book is totally devoid of serious historical method and deals with historical data...cavalierly."⁴⁵

M. Cohen criticized Freud's arbitrary and autocratic use of the Biblical text, especially with regard to the question of Moses' existence. While many scholars questioned if Moses were indeed more than a legendary figure, Freud "proceeds not only as if the actual existence of Moses had been proved, but as if certain arbitrarily selected statements about him in the Bible have an ascertainable basis."⁴⁶ If Moses can only be accepted as a composite of legends originating over many centuries amongst different tribes, then there is no reason to build a history upon the stories. And since there is no indisputable data to determine the historicity of the Moses figure, then Freud's entire work becomes conjectural.

Rieff criticized Freud's arbitrary selection of data for what was ignored. For in the Freudian reconstruction of the origin of political society, the myth of the murder of the primal father was the link between social and individual history. Yet in Moses and Monotheism (as well as Totem and Taboo), Freud ignored the important fratricide themes which to Rieff are equally as important:

If the images of the parricide theme -- Oedipus and the other regicide characters of the drama -- stride so movingly across the universal stage, the images of the fratricide theme -- the sons of Oedipus, Joseph and his brothers, Cain and Abel...

-- indeed all the brothers and sisters who have been so fatal to one another, stride across the same stage, equally moving in the myth mind.⁴⁷

Neither did Freud address the Abraham myth of the father who killed the son:

And...the propitiatory sacrifice of the Son of God (Moses, Christ), on behalf of his sinful people, must be viewed as much a Son-killing as a Father-killing. That the killing of the Son of Man by his own brothers, the masses, may be viewed as commanded by a more primary Father, God, appears only as a sublimated solution of the scapegoat mechanism as a fratricide.⁴⁸

Since these additional myths have bearing not only on the development of political society but also on the Freudian reconstruction of the Moses legend, Freud's exclusive treatment of only the parri-icide theme is inadequate, to Rieff.

M. Robert, in her thorough methodological critique of Moses, stated that, had Freud stuck with his original idea of publishing the work as a novel, he could have avoided many of the aforementioned "acrimonious criticisms." However, once he modified his projected novel into a scientific work, "he staked his good name as a scientist on a dubious undertaking, which instead of serving science and history, exploited them unscrupulously."⁴⁹ To Robert, Freud faulted the disciplines of philology, archaeology, epigraphy, anthropology and genetics. Yet for various reasons, most likely the publication date (1939), most of the specialists in these areas, best equipped to answer Freud, refrained from doing so. Thus, Moses was reviewed, according to Robert, by the most prejudiced of critics, Christian theologians and orthodox Jews.⁵⁰

Robert, like many other critics, questioned Freud's utiliza-

tion of the Biblical text. Although Freud cited many Biblical scholars, Robert, too, contended that Freud was mainly interested in findings which squared with his own ideas. We will be reminded that Freud was unconcerned with the arbitrariness of his procedure. As he put it, "...this is the only way in which one can treat material of which one knows that its trustworthiness has been severely impaired by the distorting influence of tendentious purposes."⁵¹ Although Freud understood that the Biblical text had been distorted and that it was the product of many differing sources, Robert felt that Freud disregarded this knowledge when it came to constructing his Moses theory. Freud, like orthodox theologians, persisted in confusing the time when the events of the Exodus took place with the very much more recent period when they were committed to writing. Like Cohen, Robert criticized Freud's treating Moses as though there was direct evidence of his existence as a single historical figure. While elsewhere Freud expressed sympathy for the principle of evolution of the Biblical text, here he implicitly denied the very notion by "thinking away the eight-hundred-odd years required for the biblical image [of Moses] to take form."⁵² Robert contended that the "anachronism" served Freud's purpose as it provided him with an immediate hero without which an attempt at psychological analysis would lose all justification.

Modern scholarship, however, shows that it is impossible to know Moses as an individual. We are "curtained" off from the character by the several centuries of thought and culture which elapsed before the Moses story was recorded. Thus stated Robert:

Under these conditions Moses, the human individual, cannot possibly be subjected to psychological analysis; at the very most

one might analyze the editors, who successively compiled the ancient chronicles relating his life, for Moses has no existence except in their narratives; he is made in the image of their ethical, social and spiritual needs, and apart from a few faintly intimated character traits reflects only the psychology of the intellectual elite of various epochs.⁵³

Robert concluded that Freud was not interested in the chronicles of the eighth or sixth century B.C.E., who provided him with the subject, but with the "original Moses." To this end, Freud rewrote the life and death of Moses as though deliberately forgetting a dense layer of time which must have obscured the prophet's true face forever.

To the many critics of Freud's Moses, the great psychoanalyst intruded clumsily in both the areas of religion and science. To religionists, Freud illegitimately rewrote the Biblical myth. To scientists, Freud arbitrarily collected "data" with little scientific verification. And of these short-comings Freud himself was aware. But more than thematic or methodological concerns, critics were plagued with one question: Can the science of psychoanalysis shed light on the development of mythology? And, reciprocally, can the development of human mythology reflect the very truths found in the science of psychoanalysis? To Freud, science and mythology were inseparable. He once asked A. Einstein: "Does not every science come in the end to a kind of mythology?"⁵⁴ In Freud's mind, as demonstrated in Moses, the answer was yes.

NOTES: CHAPTER 3

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THE MOTIVATION: THEORIES ABOUT
FREUD'S TREATMENT OF MOSES

A multiplicity of theories has emerged in response to the question of Freud's motivation for his unique treatment of the Moses figure. The theories range from substantial and serious documentation to wild and speculative rumination. Although it is hardly feasible to superimpose order upon such a diffuse range of material, the theories may best be organized on the levels of "evidence" on which they are based. We will therefore examine these theories on the basis of the three levels of Freud's consciousness from which they derive: i.e., interpretations based on available material from Freud's a) conscious level; b) preconscious level; and c) unconscious level.¹ Thus do we examine, in turn, theories based on: a) assumptions derived from documented and factual evidence about Freud's motivation for working with the Moses figure; b) inferences drawn from dream-work and autobiographical data which may have contributed to Freud's understanding of Moses; and c) speculations based on analytical interpretations of Freud's unconscious motives behind his treatment of Moses.

A number of facts in Freud's biography led Jones to the "obvious conclusion" that "the grand figure of Moses himself, from Freud's early Biblical studies to the last book he ever wrote, was one of tremendous significance to him."² Supportive of this suggestion for Jones was, first, Freud's long and relentless interest in the Moses

statue of Michelangelo. It was during his first visit to Rome, in 1901, that Freud flinched under the statue's angry glare. To Jones, this reaction was indicative of the fact that the Moses statue represented an angry father figure to Freud. Consistent with this interpretation was the fact that 1901 was also the year in which Fliess, Freud's father substitute, "angrily discarded him in spite of Freud's attempts at reconciliation."³ Yet the statue represented more than a formidable father-image to Freud, for certain facts imply that Freud concurrently identified himself with Moses: his frequent visits to the statue over the years; his persistent hesitation to publish his radical hypotheses about Moses; and his suffering under the defection of his own students the very year in which he formulated his notions of the statue. To Jones:

One cannot avoid the pretty obvious conclusion that at this time and probably before, Freud had identified himself with Moses and was striving to emulate the victory over passions that Michelangelo had depicted in his stupendous achievement. The backsliding mob were the many former supporters who had deserted him, and gone back on his work, in the last four years -- Adler and his friends, Stekel, and now the Swiss [Jung]. Indeed, he had expressed this very thought himself in a letter to Ferenczi written at the same time of the separation from Stekel. "At the moment the situation in Vienna makes me feel more like the historical Moses than the Michelangelo one" [see above, pp. 5-6]. But above all emotions was the overriding need to save something of his life's work, psychoanalysis, just as Moses had bent all his strength of will to preserve the precious Tables. Some of the doubt about his interpretation that kept disturbing Freud in what seems to us a really unnecessary degree may be attributed to his uncertainty about whether he would now succeed in self-mastery as Michelangelo's Moses did.⁴

Beyond the obvious fascination and identification with the lawgiver, Jones felt that the figure Moses answered more existential questions of identity and meaning for Freud. Especially as he

neared the end of his life did Freud reexamine not only the earliest riddles which had perplexed him, i.e., the concern of personal identity and the problem of his birth, but also the later enigmas with which he wrestled, i.e., the origin and nature of humanity in general. Jones stated that, for Freud, this final search for understanding humanity led to the more restricted problem of his own identity as a Jew and the more general issue of Jewish identity at large. And the riddle was solved, said Jones, with the figure of Moses:

The leader who kindled his imagination above all others was inevitably Moses, the great man who did more than anyone to build the Jewish nation, to create the religion that has ever since borne his name, and, in Freud's opinion, even to stamp on the Jewish people some of their most prominent and valuable character traits.⁵

It was not only Freud's existential search which brought Moses to the forefront of the great thinker's mind in the last years of his life. Jones contended that the political events of 1933-1938, the rise of the Nazi party, with its vehement persecution of the Jews, led Freud to question what it was in his people which aroused such hatred, and how they had become what they were. "Such reflections, together with his knowledge of their sojourn in Egypt and the origin of monotheism in that land, inevitably led to the founder of his nation and the creator of its religion" --- Moses.⁶

Moses further attracted Freud, according to Jones, because of the analyst's life-long fascination for characters who might not be what they seem. It is, to Jones, no coincidence that the three great men in whose personalities Freud seemed most interested, and with whom he partially identified himself, were Leonardo da Vinci,

Shakespeare and, of course, Moses. Jones pointed to the interest Freud took in the questions of identity which shrouded each of these figures. Leonardo was separated from his mother in early life and was raised by a step-mother. According to Freud, Leonardo's confusion between the two women found its way into his masterpieces (as, e.g., in his depiction of the infant Jesus with the Virgin Mary and Saint Anne). Similarly was Freud "obsessed" with the notion that Shakespeare may not have authored all the works attributed to him. Freud was even skeptical that Bacon, who is often credited with the works' authorship, singularly wrote the "Shakespearian" plays. With this predilection, Jones was not surprised that Freud "discovered" in Moses traces that the famous lawgiver was not as he is believed to be -- a Hebrew.⁷ This fascination with heroes who were not as they seemed (i.e., Moses) was suggestive of Freud's own "family romance."⁸

To Freud's loyal follower and biographer, the later "guesses" circulating concerning Freud's motives for viewing the Moses figure as he did were "wild" and "foreign" to Freud's nature. Freud's motivation for publishing his Moses was simply "a desire to get at the simple truth as best he might.... Then, the coming to certain conclusions always expressed itself in their being written down and, whenever possible, published for the consideration of whoever might be interested."⁹

The biographical data Jones cited on his mentor's fascination and identification with the Moses figure are surely at the base of

all subsequent theories on Freud's motivation for writing about Moses. However, most theories go much further than attributing the work simply to Freud's search for the truth, as did Jones. Many theorists have linked the biographical data to other facets of Freud's life which may have contributed to his treatment of Moses and the publication of his ideas. These theorists have taken into consideration indirect, preconscious evidence, namely, Freud's dreams, fantasies and ambitions as presented in the few autobiographical testimonies available.

H. Sachs, for instance, linked Freud's later Moses concept with some of the early predominant autobiographical themes emerging from the personal dreams as revealed by Freud in his The Interpretation of Dreams. Here Freud disclosed that his boyhood hero was Hannibal:

Hannibal had been the favorite hero of my years from eleven to fifteen...; like many others at the same age I had given my sympathies during the Punic wars not to the Romans, but to the Carthaginians. When later, in the higher classes, the understanding for the consequences of belonging to an alien stock began to dawn on me and the anti-semitic tendencies of my classmates warned that it was necessary to consider my attitude, then the figure of the Semitic leader stood even more imposingly before my eyes. Hannibal and Rome symbolized to the young man the contrast between the tenacity of the Jew and the organization of the Catholic Church. The importance which the anti-semitic movement gained from then on for my affects contributed to the fixation of the thoughts and emotions belonging to these early times.¹⁰

To Sachs, the young Freud's choice of hero was consistent with his adolescent desire to become a fighter, a leader in the war against injustice and oppression. It is no wonder then that the boy was disappointed when his father failed to exhibit heroic behavior under confrontation:

I may have been ten or twelve years old, when my father began to take me with him on his walks and reveal to me in his talk

his view about things in the world we live in. Thus it was, on one such occasion, that he told me a story to show me how much better things were now than they had been in his days. "When I was a young man," he said, "I went for a walk one Saturday in the streets of your birthplace; I was well dressed, and had a new fur cap on my head. A Christian came up to me and with a single blow knocked off my cap into the mud and shouted: 'Jew! Get off the pavement!'" "And what did you do?" I asked. "I went into the roadway and picked up my cap," was his quiet reply. This struck me as unheroic conduct on the part of the big, strong man who was holding the little boy by the hand. I contrasted the situation with another which fitted my feelings better: the scene in which Hannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca, made his boy swear before the household altar to take vengeance on the Romans. Ever since that time Hannibal had had a place in my fantasies.¹¹

In his commentary on his own dream material, Freud remarked that his resentment against oppression had an early infantile root, for his first playmate, somewhat older than he, occasionally capitalized on the greater strength which age afforded him. Similarly, Freud recalled how, in his adolescence, he had led a class revolt against a tyrannical "ignorant and unpopular teacher." And another dream reminded Freud of an earlier "period of hope and happiness" during his school days: when Austria was under the rule of the "Bürger" Ministry -- a party inclusive of Jews. "So henceforth," remarked Freud, "every industrious Jewish schoolboy carried a [cabinet-] minister's portfolio in his school bag."¹²

In his later adolescence, Freud appropriately realized that his victory over oppression would not be achieved through violence. Thus, the reminiscence of his early struggles against oppression now fired his ambition in a different direction. To Sachs, his daydream was now translated into that of his becoming a great statesman who would remove the injustices done the minority to which he belonged.

It was only upon entering the university that Freud decided upon which line of study to pursue. A lecture where Goethe's essay, "Nature," was recited swayed Freud to the area of natural science and medicine. Thus the conflict of career was resolved since Freud felt that "for the medical men the carrier of a minister is out of the question."¹³

Sachs referred to this decision as the turning point in Freud's life, for

he dropped definitely and for all time the aim of entering the arena, of becoming a fighter who tries to crush the opposing forces and eventually emerges as a victorious political leader. The new ideal was to be a scientist, a searcher after truth, a discoverer of the unknown who goes his own way and does not care about converting others by more or less forceful method.¹⁴

And as Freud put it:

My destiny I imagined to be...that science during my lifetime would take no notice, but that some decades afterward someone else would without fail be brought face to face with the same facts, which then, being more in harmony with the trends of his time, would find recognition. Thus I, as his precursor who by necessity had to be unsuccessful, would be vindicated and get my share of the honor. In the meantime I, as a sort of Robinson Crusoe, did my best to make my lonely island a comfortable dwelling place.... The "splendid isolation" was not without advantages and attractions.¹⁵

With this decision, Freud turned his back on his boyhood ambitions, and devoted himself wholeheartedly to what he considered to be the life of an obscure and lonely scientist. Sachs considered this attitude to be an overcompensation, for henceforth "Freud shunned all occasion for public discussions and avoided scrupulously to enter into polemics with his critics." Not once did Freud "take up arms in self defense" against his critics; and he advised his followers not to

spend their time and energy in sterile polemics but to answer criticisms with positive work."¹⁶ Despite this attitude, however, during the years 1910-1914, when the criticisms and revolts came from within (from former followers and disciples), Freud was forced to face the dissensions and draw a sharp and clear line demarking the confines of psychoanalysis and rejecting those followers who crossed over it. This task Freud undertook in On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement, which was published at the same time as his anonymous The Moses of Michelangelo.

To Sachs it was not merely the parallelism in actual situation which drew Freud to the Moses figure (i.e., the necessity of the leader's subduing anger in the face of a rebellious people). Freud was also drawn to Moses in response to his psychical situation:

...a repetition of the infantile affects when the friend and playmate became an enemy and oppressor. Here was the danger of a regression to the warrior-ideal of adolescence, to the identification with Hannibal. But instead of regressing, Freud found for himself a new -- or perhaps it was a still older -- ideal in the man Moses, who overcame his affects and went on with his work. The former friends could deflect him from his fixed purposes not more than the old enemies.¹⁷

Sachs concluded that Freud's interest in Moses, which started at this critical stage of his life and which was fueled by his interest in early Egyptian history, required one more step to achieve the detachment from the figure evident in Moses and Monotheism:

We have heard that the warrior-daydreams of adolescence clustered round Hannibal because he was the Semitic hero. Now, Moses is universally considered not only as a Semitic, but as the Jewish hero and leader. The identification with a great man of his own race or nationality which was a source of narcissistic satisfaction to the boy could be enjoyed still more intensively when Moses became the hero in place of Hannibal. This was the spot where an old fixation could be easily renewed, a narcissistic

satisfaction could be obtained with the best possible rationalization. Here Freud showed that he had freed himself from the fetters of the past and from the pleasures of finding one's own self mirrored in the figure of a hero. His approach to the Man Moses was to prove that he was an Egyptian and not a man of his own race and blood.¹⁸

To Sachs, the only persistence of Freud's identification with Moses was slight and not narcissistic in nature. The appeal of the theory of Moses' murder, and further of the murder of the primal father, was in its confirmation of Freud's belief that every great leader and teacher of a new truth or of a new way of living had to be sacrificed in order to gain the ascendancy of his/her ideas by resurrection. (Moses' resurrection, the spiritual rebirth of his teaching, was the "ethical monotheism" reintroduced by the prophets.) Freud believed that something of this sort would happen to him as well. Years after his death, a prophet would come to proclaim the truth that was rejected in Freud's own time. Yet, according to Sachs, Freud had not begun his career anticipating martyrdom. At the end, however, Freud wrote his Moses with new understanding:

He knew now that no great teacher can avoid suffering and persecution, not even by the sacrifice of all personal ambition and vanity. He did not flinch and did not complain but reacted to it...with perfect indifference to the question if it was welcome or unwelcome. He accepted it quietly as being in the nature of things, a necessary part of his destiny.¹⁹

Capitalizing on many of the same themes of the autobiographical subplot Sachs discerned in The Interpretation of Dreams, M. Bergmann drew much farther reaching conclusions as to Freud's deeper motivation for his treatment of Moses. To Bergmann, the greater issue was Freud's life-long ambivalence as a Jew. Although Freud never com-

pletely overcame the conflict, his attitude toward Judaism over the years grew increasingly positive. Bergmann documented this evolution by exploring Freud's dream work as well as his treatment of Moses.

Like Sachs, Bergmann considered ambition to be a major motivating force in the young Freud's life. One of the persistent day residues of Freud's dreams was his concern with academic advancement. Yet under the Hapsburg Monarchy, academic achievement was made easier for Jews through conversion. Bergmann implied that the conflict, then, between ambition and religion might have been especially acute for a "marginal Jew" such as Freud, who had no strong religious or national conviction. At this time in his life, Freud had considered an expedient conversion to avoid a Jewish marriage ceremony, but he was dissuaded by his mentor and friend Breuer, who felt that conversion was "too complicated."²⁰

Bergmann believed that Freud's ambivalence as a Jew and his desire for advancement led to a persistent and overwhelming wish to convert. Despite Jones' vehement denial, Bergmann and others saw evidence for the conversion theme in Freud's dreams. Bergmann cited Velikovsky, for example, who

interpreted all Freud's dreams to contain the wish to convert. He could demonstrate this thesis by usurping the dreamer's right to free association. To take only one example in the "Dream of the Botanical Monograph" (Freud 1900, p. 1169) Velikovsky finds that "herbarium" conceals the word "Hebrew," the genus crucifers refers to crucifix, and to turn over colored plates alludes to conversion.²¹

Although Bergmann questioned the validity of this particular interpretation, he supported attempts to interpret the preconscious material in terms of the unconscious wish it revealed. For instance,

although Bergmann conceded that there is no evidence that Freud consciously entertained the idea of converting for the sake of academic advancement, the option appeared in a dream. After Freud learned that "denominational considerations" stood in the way of his promotion, he had the dream, "My Uncle with the Yellow Beard."²² In this dream Freud turned the tables on anti-Semitic ministers, identified with the aggressors, mishandled eminent colleagues because they were Jews, and in so doing denied in the dream his worry that anti-Semitism would stand in the way of his promotion.²³

Bergmann, following the techniques of dream interpretation and free association, linked the above disclosure with the next paragraph in The Interpretation of Dreams -- which described a series of dreams based upon Freud's longing to visit Rome. In these dreams Rome was, for Freud, ever elusive. Freud saw Rome but it was shrouded in mist, or he was unable to set foot in the city. Freud had, in reality, developed an inhibition which has been labeled as his "Rome neurosis." Between 1895 and 1898, Freud traveled to Italy five times without reaching Rome. At times Freud came as close to Rome as Orvieto or Assisi, yet he never ventured into the city.

Bergmann reported that, upon one of these visits to Italy, the following sentence came unbidden to Freud's mind: "Which of the two it may be debated, walked up and down his study with the greater impatience after he had formed his plan of going to Rome -- Winckelmann, the vice principal, or Hannibal, the commander in chief?"²⁴ Bergmann followed C. Schorske's interpretation of the dynamic meaning of the enigmatic sentence:

Hannibal wanted to conquer Rome, Winckelmann, the noted art historian, converted to Catholicism in order to make Rome his home....Unconsciously Freud may well have been struggling with two attitudes toward Catholicism represented by Rome, to "conquer it," as he ultimately did in exposing religion as a collective neurosis, or to convert with the chances of academic advancement that conversion offered in Austria.²⁵

To Bergmann, the series of Rome dreams reveals not only other instances of Freud's ambivalence towards Judaism but also an unsuccessful attempt on Freud's part to displace the original Promised Land of Israel to Rome. In the dreams Freud was only able to see his Promised Land, Rome, from afar. The metaphor of the Promised Land was a favorite of Freud's. What the Land signified, however, varied. "At times it is the solution of the riddle of the dream, at other times it is the key to the cause of the neurosis. Finally, at the end of his life Freud experienced the publication of Moses and Monotheism as the Promised Land."²⁶ The future success of psychoanalysis was also the Promised Land for Freud. The analyst compared his student Jung to Joshua who seemed destined to enter the Promised Land, while Freud himself, like Moses, would only view it from afar.

For Bergmann, this analogy drawn by Freud in a letter to Jung (dated February 8, 1908) documented Freud's first conscious identification with Moses. Up until his publication of The Moses of Michelangelo, the identification with Moses may only be inferred from the symptoms of Freud's "Rome neurosis" and from the prominence of the metaphor of the promised but forbidden land. However, the reluctant publication of Freud's revisionary thoughts about the granite Biblical figure led Bergmann to assume that Freud wished "both to elevate Moses and to obliterate his outstanding human characteristics, namely, the

wrath of Moses."²⁷

Bergmann attributed Freud's hesitation to publish and sign this essay to its author's dim awareness that he may have projected his own ideas onto Michelangelo. As to why Freud wrote the essay at all, Bergmann cited Sachs' suggestion that, by shifting identification from Hannibal to Moses, Freud was able to overcome the temptation of fighting his backsliding disciples and perhaps overcome and sublimate the pain of his disappointment. However, Bergmann offered the deeper interpretation based on M. Ostow's suggestion that the Moses statue appeared angry to Freud because Freud had broken the "Rome Taboo." If this was the case, then Bergmann hypothesized a further step:

that the wrath-conquering Moses connotes an intrasystematic change within Freud's own superego, a less destructive father figure is created of Freud. The new Moses who is not violent is a shade closer to Jakob Freud who also conquered his wrath in the fur cap incident. When this paper was translated into Italian, Freud wrote to Edwardo Weiss, "My feeling for this piece of work is like that towards a loved child" (Jones, Vol. II, p. 367). If this interpretation is correct, then the love for the essay itself would suggest that it did in fact accomplish the intrapsychic purpose for which it was written."²⁸

If Freud intended to elevate Moses and to obliterate his outstanding human characteristic of wrath in his essay The Moses of Michelangelo, then he repeated the effort in his last work, Moses and Monotheism. Bergmann saw Freud's final book as a similar attempt to purify the dean of the Hebrew prophets by creating a dichotomy between the two Moseses. Just as Freud was conflicted over the Christian symbol of Rome in his desire both to conquer and convert, so with the Jewish symbol of Moses did Freud desire not only to disassociate but also to identify.

Freud believed that the Jews were held together by the trauma which occurred at the beginning of their history (parricide). Therefore Bergmann concluded that Freud's motivation for making the trauma conscious was to loosen the cohesive power which held this group together. To Bergmann, Freud's belief that Christianity has surpassed Judaism (by its admission of having murdered God) depends on the questionable assumption that the acknowledgment of guilt, however indirect, is superior to the repression of the parricidal act. Bergmann questioned the hypothesis and was therefore led "to believe that the old wish to convert that...[Bergmann] assumed operated in some of the dreams dreamt forty years before the publication of the book broke through to be sure in a much larger historical context, once more at the end of Freud's life."²⁹ To Bergmann, the inner motives that led a man of eighty, gravely ill and on the threshold of death, to write a book which broke with the continuity of his earlier books, were the unconscious conflicts between Freud's political ambition and the ambivalent identification with Moses. Just as an autobiographical subplot was scattered throughout Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams, so did Bergmann see Freud's personal struggle and ambivalence revealed in The Moses of Michelangelo through to Moses and Monotheism.

Like Bergmann, many writers have attempted to understand the unconscious motives behind Freud's treatment of Moses. They have not limited themselves, however, to Freud's conscious biographical material, or to his preconscious autobiographical and dream material. Instead they have applied analytical interpretations to Freud based on the tenor and consequences of his works on Moses. Since these analy-

ses of Freud do not always depend on documented evidence and cannot be validated, they have run the risk of being conjectural and oftentimes conflicting. However, "turning Freudian psychology on Freud" is a popular theme and therefore has become a topic of prolific concern.

A favorite focus of the analyses of Freud has been his strong Oedipus complex. It is true that Freud discovered this theory during his own self-analysis and would not have claimed its universality if he himself had not experienced the conflict. On this basis, various conjectures have identified Freud's Oedipus complex as the motivating force behind many of his thoughts and actions (e.g., his Moses concept).

D. Motet went to great lengths to document symptomatic instances of Freud's complex. For instance, Motet "demonstrated" Freud's "fixation" on his mother with the "evidence" that the adult Freud saw Amalie every Sunday morning and then evening until her death. Furthermore, Freud frequently forgot to bring his wife flowers but never his mother.³⁰

Perhaps more indicative of Freud's Oedipus complex were the symptoms the analyst himself revealed in The Interpretation of Dreams, such as the "sexual craving" for his mother and the embarrassing and usurping of his father played out in his dreams.³¹ Another incident shedding light on Freud's feelings towards his father is the fact that he was late for Jakob's funeral. Although Freud felt justified in that he had been delayed at the barber, he later had a dream which he himself interpreted as a self-reproach left by his father's death.³²

To many interpreters, these Oedipal experiences help explain why Freud sought out idealized father-figures who invariably disappointed him and whom he later rejected. To Motet, Freud likewise projected his Oedipal complex onto Moses, and overextended it to the phylogenetic experience of the Jewish people (the killing of Moses) and even to the whole of humanity (all killed the primal father).³³ Motet was not alone in this speculation. J. Spector went even further in interpreting Freud's writings and fantasies with regard to his ambivalence toward his parents. He concluded:

The crucial conflict between his desire to lose himself in his mother and to separate from her in order to achieve individuality gave rise to Freud's Faustian restlessness, and his never quite satisfied attempt to find a father-figure with whom to identify. This problem of identification may help explain how Freud came to deny the Jewishness of one of his chief heroes, Moses, through making him an Egyptian. Freud alluded to Moses throughout his adult life, and may have begun to reflect on the prophet already as a boy of seven, when his father showed him the Philipppson Bible. Freud's quite secular but profound interest in Moses accounts for his fascination with the famous statue of the prophet by Michelangelo....³⁴

To Spector, Jones' discussion of the Freudian identification with Moses was simplistic and not wholly satisfying. For Freud regarded Michelangelo's Moses not only as an admired hero with whom he could identify, but also as a wrathful lawgiver whom he feared. In Spector's interpretation, Freud's ambivalence toward Moses, on the one hand identifying with the lawgiver and on the other dreading his dangerous power, fits the pattern which Freud himself diagnosed as the Oedipus complex: "in which a son identifies with his own father as his mother's husband, and at the same time wishes to remove his father as a rival for his mother's love."³⁵

According to Spector, Freud's ambivalence towards his father (and father-figure, Moses) also manifested itself in his mixed feelings about his Judaism. Thus, the twelve year-old may have felt both sympathy and distress as well as secret satisfaction upon seeing his much admired father humiliated when the anti-Semite knocked off his hat. Furthermore, his choice of Semitic hero, in Hannibal, and public stance of pride in Judaism may have been offset by private wishes of becoming a non-Jew as a solution to his shame and anger at his father.³⁶

To Spector, the question of Freud's Jewishness may be linked to even deeper levels of emotional involvement. In his old age, Freud was still wrestling with his own guilt for wishing the death of his long-since-deceased father, a guilt he analyzed in depth in terms of the Oedipus complex. Freud sought relief both from his internal self-oppression and from the external social and political oppression he was experiencing with increasing intensity in Vienna:

The psychoanalyst's complex mind explored solutions in more than one direction: becoming with old age more and more like his father, the powerful and rebellious son becoming the oppressed and defeated father, Freud released some of his guilt on one level by making Moses a non-Jew in Moses and Monotheism of 1939, thereby opening the way to assimilation; moreover, if Moses is Egyptian, then he's not the Jewish father Freud displaced (that is, killed in fantasy). It must be remembered that in the Vienna of Freud's youth, assimilation was a commonly proposed solution advanced in the liberal Jewish circles Freud's family frequented.³⁷

The theory of Freud's Oedipal complex as a contributing factor in some of his later works and ideas is both compelling and relevant. However, some theorists, carried away with their "psychoanalytic insight," have made subjective blanket statements and unsupportable claims

based on the same notions, leaving no room for doubt and making no allowance for conflicting motivations. For example, H. Puner went so far in her analysis of Freud's Oedipus complex as to claim that without a doubt:

...Freud, at eighty-two, was at last saying, as directly as he could, that he hated his father. He had said that the idea of God is a sublimated idea of the father. He had then, in Totem and Taboo, made the primordial father into as hateful a figure as any son ever encountered. He had gone on to link the need for religion with man's most primitive and horrible savagery. He would in later works call religion an illusion. But despite all the denial of religion which he had affected, the coup de grace was lacking. He had not attacked the religion of his father specifically and by name. In Moses and Monotheism he did just that. He took from the Jews two great things which had traditionally characterized them: a great national hero, and a world wide cultural achievement. These he gave to the Gentiles.³⁸

The malicious intent which Puner hereby imputed to Freud has also been echoed by theorists who have accused Freud of having been additionally motivated to write Moses by a secret hatred of the Jews. We have already seen that Weiss-Rosmarin and Yahuda had labeled this "self-hatred" as Freud's overriding impetus in making Moses Egyptian (pp.63-64). To P. Roazen, Freud's whole interpretation of Moses' Egyptian origins, which robbed the Jewish people of their leader, was based on an anti-Semitic bias. Freud, who in Roazen's estimation resented his Jewish affiliation, took "revenge" by taking away the Jewish identity of the greatest of Jews.

The reliability of such simplistic over-generalizations becomes questionable in the light of conflicting hypotheses (based on the same evidence) concerning Freud's motivation for his Moses concept. D. Bakan, for instance, conjectured that Freud, who attributed anti-Semitism to a rebellious reaction against the repressive forces of the Mosaic code,

sought to ward off anti-Semitism by separating the Mosaic characteristics from the image of the Jew. By making Moses Egyptian, Freud hoped to free the Jews of the blame for the impositions of the superego -- "the Mosaic yoke" -- on society.³⁹ E. Grollman wrote that with the Egyptianization of Moses Freud hoped to lessen prevalent anti-Semitism by transposing "the noxious and hurtful characteristics of circumcision and 'chosen people' concepts to non-Jewish origins."⁴⁰

Perhaps the least substantiated theory of Freud's Oedipus complex and anti-Semitic bias in relation to his treatment of Moses has been advanced by I. Maybaum who emotionally contended:

There was hatred in everything Freud felt and said concerning the religion of his father and also concerning Christianity. He could not even enjoy the paintings of the great masters, because they so often dealt with religion.... Had Freud submitted himself to psychoanalysis, he might have been told that he hated his father. Subconsciously he did. He hated his father when he made Kiddush. As a child Freud must have seen this ceremony in which the eve of Sabbath and festival is sanctified at the family table of a Jewish home. Freud hated his father when he said grace and perhaps mumbled it in the manner of a Jew who still observes the custom of saying this long prayer after the meal, but no longer with the respect of the convinced adherent. Freud hated his father when he observed the Sabbath rest and he hated him when he presided at the Seder table on the Passover nights.⁴¹

On the basis of such fantastic presumption, Maybaum proceeded in "proving" that Freud's hatred of his father and his religion motivated the psychoanalyst in "making a contribution to the anti-Jewish Nazi literature" with his Moses.⁴²

Thus do theories based entirely on incomplete and conjectural aspects of Freud's psychological make-up lead only to subjective speculation and baseless accusation. Certainly Freud's ambivalence toward his parents and their religion impacted upon his theories, but only

investigations which have considered this ambivalence as a part of the greater whole have any valid basis.

With regard to the complex nature of Freud's Moses concept, more soundly based theories have arisen in response to the question of Freud's "family romance" (see p.114n.8). Many readers of Freud have noted the psychoanalyst's conviction that he was unique -- a self-conception grounded not only in his fantasy but also in the realities of his life.

The evidence that Freud's life followed the classic hero path, consciously or unconsciously, is so apparent as to occasion the statement: "There can be little doubt that Freud felt himself heroically predestined and convinced that it was up to him to even-tuate this heroic destiny."⁴³ As is typical of heroes, both in myth and actuality, the reasons for Freud's high self-expectations stemmed from events connected with his birth. Freud was born with a caul, considered throughout the centuries a portent of later fame. Upon his birth, Freud's mother was informed by a peasant woman that this first-born would become an important man to the world.⁴⁴ These prophecies were evidently repeated to the young Sigmund regularly. At age eleven or twelve, Freud's fantasies were sparked when a poet in part of Vienna predicted that the young boy would grow up to be a cabinet minister. It was this prophecy which may have led to the young Freud's original intentions to study law. Freud, the favored and special son of Amalie, acknowledged that "people who know that they are preferred or favored by their mother give evidence in their lives of a peculiar self-reliance and an unshakable optimism which often seems [sic] like heroic attributes and bring actual success to their possessors."⁴⁵

Freud, throughout his life, lived out heroic identifications with great warriors and leaders of the down-trodden. Not only did he identify with Moses, but it has been pointed out that as a child Freud identified strongly with the biblical Joseph (also a first-born favorite of his mother but with older siblings from his father's previous marriages). K. Eissler suggested that, when Freud later became famous as a dream-interpreter like Joseph, it was merely the self-fulfillment of his childhood identification with this biblical hero.⁴⁶

F. Sulloway revealed further tendencies in Freud's biography which indicate a conscious enacting of the hero-myth. First was Freud's repeated references to his isolation. Sulloway suggested that Freud thrived on opposition and the feelings of isolation such opposition engendered. Encouraged by Fliess, who possessed a similar sense of heroic destiny, Freud actively isolated and withdrew himself from the public arena, all the while complaining of his loneliness. Even after Freud achieved world-wide acclaim, he continued to feel isolated and persecuted:

Freud was, in sum, an archetypical example of what Bruce Mazlish (1976) has called the "revolutionary ascetic" -- that breed of dedicated fanatics who willingly shun all mundane pleasures, including the need for group contact and group reinforcement, in order to fulfill their revolutionary mission in life.⁴⁷

Another Freudian tendency also indicative of the psychoanalyst's hero-complex was his ambivalent attitude toward any autobiographical disclosure. Not only did Freud feel doubt and unease about publishing self-revelatory material, but he even twice destroyed his personal papers in order to keep his hero's past shrouded in mystery.

After the first destruction of his personal documents, the young Freud wrote to his fiancée:

...I couldn't have matured or died without worrying about who would get hold of these papers.... As for the biographers, let them worry; we have no desire to make it too easy for them. Each one of them will be right in his opinion of "The Development of the Hero," and I am already looking forward to seeing them go astray.⁴⁸

Thus, according to Sulloway, Freud's suppression of historical record was a prerequisite for being and remaining a hero in the eyes of posterity. By destroying his past, Freud sought to cultivate the mystery about himself and thereby set himself apart from the "more transparent non-heroes of humanity."⁴⁹

Given such conclusive evidence attesting to Freud's self-concept as the mythical hero, it is highly probable as well that the psychoanalyst additionally contemplated his birth and "family romance." It is commonly conjectured that Freud, in comparing his intellect and "hero"ism with the talents of his family, indulged himself in the private "family romance" fantasy that he was self-created, since he soared so far beyond his natural family. Like his heroes, Oedipus, Leonardo, Shakespeare, and Moses (all of whom Freud contended were raised apart from their natural fathers), Freud had fantasies that his high rank in the intellectual world derived from within -- that he was self-begotten. Therefore, in rewriting the birth-myths of the heroes with whom he identified, Freud vicariously rewrote his own biography and indulged his "family romance" fantasy.

M. Robert went to great lengths to develop the "family novel" theme in response to the question of Freud's motivation for making

Moses an Egyptian. To Robert, Moses and Monotheism was Freud's final attempt to write the true novel of his own life. This desire to refashion his biography led to Freud's life-long interest not only in everything connected with the mystery of birth and origins but also in "shadowy" individuals whose established identity could in any way be questioned. The obsession Freud nurtured about Moses he had also about Shakespeare whom Freud refused to believe was a commoner of English extraction. Freud was quite taken by the suggestion that Shakespeare's name might have been a corruption of the French Jacques Pierre. Later in life, Freud became convinced that Shakespeare was in fact Edward de Vere, the seventeenth Earl of Oxford. This theory eliminated both the playwright's English extraction and his status as a commoner, which, to Robert, "conflicted with the tendencies of his [Freud's] own 'family novel' and his profound need for aristocratic origins."⁵⁰

To Robert, this obsession with Shakespeare shed much light on Freud's treatment of Moses, another figure whose status and origin Freud doubted. For "in both cases he deprived a people of its greatest genius, but the example of Shakespeare shows that he did so for compelling unconscious reasons and not at all out of resentment and animosity."⁵¹ Since England was a favorite country of Freud's, no one could possibly assume that he wished, with his myth of Shakespeare's birth, to injure or deprive the poet's native land. Despite the closer proximity of Moses to Freud's identity, Robert claimed:

Freud's two biographical fictions had this in common: they owed nothing to outward circumstances. Just as Freud supported...[an] extravagant thesis on Shakespeare for reasons

that had nothing to do with love or hatred for one country or another, so his Moses did not result directly, or primarily, or consciously from the hatred of the Jews that some critics have read between the lines of his book. It is only the last episode in the novel of origins on which Freud worked all his life and which toward the end took on the force of truth.⁵²

Robert contended that neither the tragic events of the day nor the conflicting emotions Judaism aroused in Freud led to the writing of Moses. But, at the end of his life, Freud needed to reconsider the facts of his birth, and to change them, at least in his imagination, to become master of his fate. For Robert suggested that, in Freud's advanced age, he began to see in himself a marked resemblance to Jakob Freud. "In his old age," Freud wrote in Moses and Monotheism, "even the great Goethe, who in his years of storm and stress had undoubtedly looked down upon his unbending and pedantic father, developed traits that had formed part of his father's character."⁵³ To Robert, Freud, who had always identified himself with Goethe, was here alluding to the painful loss of individuality that he himself was experiencing. At the approach of his death, he was becoming more like Jakob, and as a function in delaying this "return of the repressed," Freud rewrote the story of Moses. Robert concluded:

And so, in order not to die, Freud declared in the book that may be regarded as his authentic testament, that he was not Solomon son of Jakob, nor yet Sigmund the turncoat son, whose very name gave promise of the highest destinies, that he was no more a Jew than Moses had been, although the Jewish people had been born of this foreign leader and guide. But just as Moses had broken with his native Egypt and its rulers, who persecuted him for his advanced ideas, so Freud severed all inner ties with the Germany of his time, and not only with the Germany of the Nazis but with everything within him that was still German. So that when it came time for him to leave the stage where he had filled his role so valiantly, he could say that he was neither a Jew, nor a German, nor anything

that still bore a name; for he wished to be the son not of any man or country, but like the murdered prophet only of his life work.⁵⁴

A rather obvious conclusion has been shared by many a theorist: that Freud's identification with Moses was his inspiration for writing about the figure. The metaphoric interpretation that Freud saw himself as a new Moses delivering a new law of psychoanalysis has been a supporting element in numerous theories concerning Freud and Moses. Vogel, for instance, represented this view as follows:

Freud felt compelled to prove that the Jewish religion was a sclerotic and decadent concept. He needed to destroy the Biblical tradition, to wipe the slate clean, in order to permit a new departure for mankind, according to laws handed down from a Freudian Sinai by a new Moses.... Freud was to act out...[the] drama symbolically: he kills the father figure (the monotheistic Moses), pushes aside his brothers (the Jews), isolates himself and takes the father's place, exiling from his presence those who attack his authority.⁵⁵

This theme of Freud as a "new Moses" led a variety of theorists to infer that Freud, with a Messianic fervor, hoped to replace the Jewish/Christian religions with a new religion of psychoanalysis. Freud had at one point defined the psychoanalyst as "a secular spiritual guide."⁵⁶ Furthermore, in a letter to Fliess, he once wrote "...how slight must be the influence of the religion of science which is supposed to have replaced the old religion...."⁵⁷ Freud's point was that, where the religion of science failed, the religion of psychoanalysis should take over.

Motet proposed that Freud's Egyptianization of Moses unconsciously relieved his torment over the defection of his Christian "heir," Jung. For when Freud wrote, "...if I am Moses then you are

Joshua and will take possession of the promised land of psychiatry...,⁵⁸ he meant that Jung would be the bridge to the Gentile world. After Jung deserted him, Freud realized that, if Moses as an Egyptian could bring his religion to the Jews, then he, Freud, as a Jew, would also be able to bring psychoanalysis to the Gentiles.

To Puner, Freud's role as a quasi-religious leader was confirmed by the worshipful attitude of many of his disciples. For instance, A. Brill contended that his mentor's identification with Moses was valid since Freud was a passionate leader of humanity, conscious of his mission as a teacher and as an expositor of the dark recesses of the mind. Similarly, M. Graf, a student who could not adhere to Freud's authoritarian orthodoxy, saw Freud as "...a Moses full of wrath and unmoved by prayers -- a Moses like the one Michelangelo made of stone...." Graf, however, suggested that Freud's authoritarianism might have been legitimate since his followers "do consider him as a founder of a religion."⁵⁹ Fromm similarly observed the religious fervor of Freud's followers. H. Sachs, for instance, after reading The Interpretation of Dreams, wrote, "I had found the one thing worthwhile for me to live for; many years later I discover that it was also the only thing I could live by."⁶⁰ As Fromm observed, to live by a book dealing with the interpretation of dreams would be understandable only in religious terms: the author was considered a new Moses and his system a new religion.⁶¹

D. Bakan perhaps went furthest not only in attempting to prove that Freud was the founder of a new religion but also in specifying

the kind of religion. It was Bakan's contention that Freud was a secularized Jewish mystic and that psychoanalysis can only be understood in the light of these Jewish mystical origins. To Bakan, Freud was not explicit about the mystical origins of psychoanalysis because he feared that this would further inhibit the chances of his movement gaining general acceptance.

Bakan's theory, as was mentioned earlier, is based on his supposition that Freud identified normative Judaism and its God with the rigid and repressive aspects of the superego. Freud, therefore, saw anti-Semitism stemming mainly from Gentile resentment of the strict Jewish morality. Freud's goal was to loosen the superego (the Mosaic law) from Judaism in hopes of facilitating inner liberation and diminishing a source of the resentment of the Gentile world against the Jews.

Central to Freud's attitude was his identification with Moses. To Bakan, Freud saw himself as a new Moses who sought to overcome the old Moses. Bakan interpreted the essay, The Moses of Michelangelo, as Freud's declaration that he no longer feared a dreaded punishment from Moses the law-giver. By concluding that the statue's gaze would remain forever frozen, and that Moses would not jump up and punish the backsliding masses, Freud effectively declared liberation from his own superego. In Moses and Monotheism, Bakan suggested, we see another such liberation. Moses and Monotheism is not a description of what took place at the beginning of Judaism but rather Freud's attempt to murder Moses (the symbol of Jewish Orthodoxy), projected back

into archaic times. As Bakan put it:

...It is necessary for Freud to kill Moses. Not that the real Moses has not been dead for several thousands of years, and not that the real Moses would not have been dead whether killed or not. But the Moses of Freud's murder is the Moses each person carries about with him.⁶²

Thus, by imputing the strong repressive superego aspects of Judaism to an Egyptian, Moses, and then killing him, Freud hoped to liberate Jews from Mosaic law (as did other leaders such as Shabbatai Zvi, Jacob Frank, and Paul) and to lessen the impact of anti-Semitism by removing the stigma of Judaism's strict morality.

Yet, to Bakan, Freud was not merely a destroyer. His self-image as the new Moses encompassed as well the concept of Messiah:

Moses and Monotheism is an attack upon the Moses figure as embodying the stern wrath and harsh judgment and restrictions of personal liberty in our culture. But an Oedipal attack on Moses must be a preemption, in Freud's own terms, of the Messianic role. One of the critical features of Messianism is its goal of leading people out of slavery and oppression. Thus Freud's whole effort at the creation of psychoanalysis may be viewed as Messianic in this respect. The aim of psychoanalytic thought is the production of greater freedom for the individual, releasing him from the tyranny of the unconscious, which is, in Freud's view, the result of social oppression.⁶³

Thus, according to Bakan, Freud -- the new Moses -- hoped to offer his people and the world a new non-repressive Torah of psychoanalytic insight. Or as a critique of Bakan described Freud: "Underneath the pose of scientific rationality...this bearded Jew was a twentieth-century Rebbe intent on giving his people and the world a new Torah."⁶⁴

Yet the notion of Freud's desire to be the new Moses was not accepted by everyone. G. Zilboorg, for instance, was not convinced

that Freud's strong reaction to Moses could be called an identification:

It is doubtful really whether Freud himself, even unconsciously, tended to consider himself the twentieth century giver of the New Law, the august transmitter of some new scientific Ten Commandments.⁶⁵

Rather than psychoanalysis improving upon religion, it was Zilboorg's contention that Freud felt his theories set religion totally aside and thoroughly refuted it. Although Freud viewed modern religion as "nothing other than psychological processes projected into the outer world,"⁶⁶ it was not enough for him. Having already demonstrated the meaning of the psychological reality of religion in The Future of an Illusion, Freud sought as well the demonstrable historical truth on which the religious reaction was based. (Just as in the human individual, neurotic illness is based upon some traumatic historical reality, so must group religious behavior [which Freud saw as neurosis] be based on an equally historical traumatic event.) Zilboorg concluded that this was the purpose of Moses and Monotheism, to demonstrate the historical basis for the psychological reality of religion:

For a period of over two decades, the idea germinated in Freud's meditations on the subject that just as man in his prehistory rose to the level of societal unity by way of parricide and through totemism, so did the religion of the Jews go through the same phase of parricide. Moses, Freud thought, was not a Jew; he was an Egyptian priest who gave the Jews their monotheistic religion, and later on Moses was murdered by the Jews. Freud, in making the hypothesis that Moses was murdered, at once felt that (1) the very existence of Moses, an Egyptian priest who did not even speak Hebrew, lent historical basis to the religion of the Hebrews, and (2) the actual murder of Moses lent historical basis to Freud's theory of parricide and its role in the formation or glorification of God the Father.⁶⁷

Thus did Freud, at the end of his life, finally "round out" into one system of thought the origin of neurosis in the human individual and the origin of the belief in God in the human race.⁶⁸

Incidentally, Zilboorg speculated that Freud bore life-long guilt over his death-wish for his little brother Julius (whose Hebrew name Jones guessed might have been Mosheh), who died as an infant. To rid himself of this guilt, Freud yearned for the resurrection about which the young Sigmund's Catholic nanny had taught him. To Zilboorg, the disappointment and betrayal Freud experienced when his brother was not resurrected as the nanny had promised and when the nurse herself disappeared (after having been caught stealing) embittered Freud against religion. This bitterness elicited Freud's "attacks" on religion -- a phenomenon he hardly would have wanted to promote or to replace.

There is one remaining category of theory about Freud and his motivation which does not necessarily arise from conscious, preconscious or unconscious data of the analyst's thoughts. These theories, based solely on scraps of evidence and creative interpretation of the "facts," make for intriguing popular reading as they are usually based on scandal and treachery. Reading more like mystery novels, the genre of which Freud was accused of writing, such theories have no scientific validity as they are impossible to test or corroborate. The genius of these theories resides in their intrigue and masterful development of plot. Therefore, such books might, like Freud's Moses, be typified as historical novels.

M. Balmary, the French academician, provides perhaps the best example of this type of theory. Her entire book is based on a newly revealed piece of "evidence" -- that Freud's father Jakob had a secret second wife (Rebecca) before Amalie, a second wife who mysteriously disappeared. To Balmary, Sigmund knew of Rebecca's existence and knew as well that some mystery regarding her implicated his father. Yet Freud repressed the information and sought always to protect his father and himself from Jakob's "hidden fault." Thus did Freud cast aside his "seduction theory" in favor of the Oedipus complex (which shifted blame from the actions of the patient's father to the fantasies of the patient him/herself), all in hope of further repressing his knowledge of his own father's possible seductiveness. The relevance of Balmary's hypothesis here is her fascinating description of Freud's reaction to Moses in the light of this self-protection.

To Balmary, it was not simply the statue of Moses in Rome that both compelled and repulsed Freud, but rather the entire tomb and what it represented to Freud. For at San Pietro Freud encountered the tomb of the Pope (il papa or father) Julius II (the name of Amalie's second child who died after Sigmund's death wish for him) flanked by the two statues of Leah and Rachel (the two wives of the Biblical Jacob, son of Rebecca -- implying to Freud both polygamy and incest) and topped by Moses, the angry judge of lies and deceit. To Balmary,

the tomb of Julius II, in which the Moses of Michelangelo is located enigmatically puts Freud in the grips of the hidden fault concerning his father's second wife and perhaps his brother's death. A fear had long kept Freud far from Rome, far from the tomb and from what it represents.⁶⁹

Though the mighty lawgiver did not jump up to punish Sigmund or

Jakob, Sigmund nevertheless perpetually expiated for his father's unnamed sin in his own home. For at his dinner table (the same word for tablet) did Freud reconstitute the scene at San Pietro. At meal times Freud would bring, from his collection, his newest statuette to stand by his dinner plate. And before him sat not only the statue on the table but two sisters, his wife Martha and his sister Minna (Leah and Rachel), as well as six children whose names spelled out the name MOSHE (Mathilde, Martin, Oliver, Ernst, Sophie and Anna [Hebrew Hannah]). To Balmary:

With what amazing exactitude Freud reproduces the tomb of Julius II in his daily life, at the exact moment when his father dies! It is probably only through the unconscious or in the sacred that one can reunite contradictions in this way. For Freud manages to be both the Biblical Jacob and Jakob Freud at the same time, in the same scene....⁷⁰

Like the patriarch Jacob, Freud lived with two sisters, one, Martha, the mother of his many children, the other, Minna, the more contemplative one who shared Freud's research and ideas. Yet to Balmary (quoting Freud from a letter of October 31, 1897 -- "sexual excitation is of no more use to a person like me"), Freud perpetually and ritually atoned for the apparent promiscuity of his progenitor and, in a situation where infidelity was possible, remained chaste with both women (in the "presence" of Moses).

The "plot" of Balmary's book weaves in and out like a fascinating mystery novel. It is both compelling and titillating. Yet as to the validity of its methodology we must remain skeptical at best. As Balmary put it:

Only one method presents itself to us, the most difficult one: starting from the interior of Freud's life to try to discover what was no doubt incomprehensible to Freud himself. If Freud failed to see, if he repressed something concerning a blameworthy father, then these repressed elements must have returned in some disguised way in his life, and perhaps even in his work. We should find some trace of them in his biography, not, of course, in those things presented most clearly, not in broad strokes, but in the small details, in the margins, or in what was presented to us as marginal....⁷¹

We see here that, even with her fantastic conclusions, Balmary purported to use the same methodology employed by all theorists on Freud. By looking not only at the conscious documented evidence of Freud's life, but also at the preconscious details and the unconscious motivations he may have implied, theorists have created any number of compelling and conflicting hypotheses about the great master. The danger is clear. The conclusion that the critics drew from Freud's Moses and Monotheism applies to theorists of Freud's psychological make-up as well: When a writer does not remain strictly with the objective scientific facts, s/he runs the risk of writing novels. Or as Freud once warned his future biographers, "reverence before the greatness of a genius is certainly a great thing, but our reverence before facts should exceed it."⁷²

NOTES: CHAPTER 4

1. General psychology texts describe the Freudian topographical model of the mind as consisting of three systems: conscious, preconscious, and unconscious. The conscious level of the mind consists of the individual's current thoughts and experiences. Beneath this level, the preconscious includes information that is available following some direct effort at recall. The contents of the unconscious are repressed and not readily accessible. In this system, all preconscious material is descriptively part of the unconscious. Yet, it can become conscious. One outlet for this preconscious material is dreams. However, to be released by means of a dream, the material must first link up with unconscious wishes: "Every dream exhibits some link to thought 'residues' of the previous day (SE 5:562). These day residues may be unsolved problems, worries, reflections, intentions, fears,...suppressed thoughts.... The day residues belong topographically to the preconscious." It is the preconscious material which provides the raw material of dreams. But for the production of a dream such residues (preconscious wishes) must link up with corresponding unconscious wishes (F.J. Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind p. 339).
2. E. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. II, p. 364.
3. Ibid., p. 365.
4. Ibid., pp. 366-367.
5. Ibid., III, p. 367.
6. Ibid., p. 368.
7. Ibid., p. 428.
8. Ibid., p. 368. Freud coined the term "family romance" to describe the fantasies of small children (and/or all neurotics) who often contend that an exalted figure is one of their parents, usually instead of the real father, or that they are the adopted (or found) child of a king or a hero (cf. pp.100-05; M. Schur, Freud: Living and Dying, p. 150n.).
9. Jones, III, p. 369.
10. S. Freud, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. II, pp. 196-197; as cited in H. Sachs, "'The Man Moses' and the Man Freud," The Psychoanalytic Review 28 (1941), p. 156. (Cf. Freud, SE, Vol. IV, pp. 196-197.)
11. Freud, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. II, pp. 197-198. (Cf. SE, Vol. IV, p. 197.)

12. Freud, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. II, p. 193; as cited in Sachs, p. 157.
(Cf. Freud, SE, Vol. IV, p. 193.)
13. Freud, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. II, p. 193; as cited in Sachs, p. 158.
(Cf. Freud, SE, Vol. IV, p. 193.)
14. Sachs, ibid., p. 158.
15. Freud, Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung, Vol. IV, p. 427; as cited in Sachs, p. 158. (Cf. Freud, On the History of the Psycho Analytic Movement, SE, Vol. XIV, pp. 3-66.)
16. Sachs, ibid., p. 159.
17. Ibid., p. 161.
18. Ibid., pp. 161-162.
19. Ibid., p. 162.
20. Jones, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 167; as cited in M.S. Bergmann, "Moses and the Evolution of Freud's Jewish Identity," The Israel Annals of Psychiatry and Related Disciplines 14 (1976), p. 9.
21. E. Velikovsky, "The Dreams Freud Dreamt," The Psychoanalytic Review 30 (1943), p. 492; as cited in Bergmann, ibid., p. 9.
22. Freud, SE, Vol. IV, p. 137; as cited in Bergmann, ibid.
23. Freud, SE, Vol. IV, p. 193; as cited in Bergmann, ibid., p. 10.
24. Freud, SE, Vol. IV, p. 196; as cited in Bergmann, ibid.
25. Bergmann, p. 11.
26. Ibid., p. 13.
27. Ibid., p. 15.
28. Ibid., p. 18.
29. Ibid., p. 23.
30. D. Motet, Moses and Freud: a Psychological Analysis, p. 151.
31. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, SE, pp. 237-241, 250, 623; as cited in Motet, p. 152.
32. M. Bonaparte, et al., The Origins of Psychoanalysis (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1951), quoting Letter 70 (October 3, 1897); as cited in Motet, p. 152.

33. Motet, pp. 153-154.
34. J.J. Spector, The Aesthetics of Freud: a Study on Psychoanalysis and Art, p. 64.
35. Ibid., p. 66.
36. Ibid., pp. 66-67.
37. Ibid., p. 67.
38. H.W. Puner, Freud: His Life and His Mind, p. 256.
39. D. Bakan, Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition, p. 158.
40. E.A. Grollman, Judaism in Sigmund Freud's World, p. 155.
41. I. Maybaum, Creation and Guilt: A Theological Assessment of Freud's Father-Son Conflict, p. 41.
42. Ibid., p. 84.
43. I. Goldston, "Freud and Romantic Medicine," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 30 (1956), p. 492; as cited in F.J. Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind, p. 476.
44. Freud, SE, Vol. IV, p. 192; as cited in Sulloway, p. 476.
45. Freud, ibid., p. 193; as cited in Sulloway, p. 477.
46. Sulloway, p. 478. Cf. K.R. Eissler, Talent and Genius: the Fictitious Case of Tausk contra Freud, pp. 253-255.
47. Sulloway, p. 479.
48. Letters, p. 141; as cited in Sulloway, p. 479.
49. Sulloway, p. 479.
50. M. Robert, From Oedipus to Moses: Freud's Jewish Identity, p. 157.
51. Ibid., p. 158.
52. Ibid.
53. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, SE, Vol. XXIII, p. 125, (translation slightly modified) in Robert, op. cit., p. 166.
54. Robert, p. 167.
55. L. Vogel, "Freud and Judaism: An Analysis in the Light of His Correspondence," trans. by H. Sachs, Judaism 24 (1975), pp. 191-192.

56. G. Costigan, Sigmund Freud, A Short Biography (New York: Collier Books, 1968), p. 239; as cited in Motet, op. cit., p. 167.
57. Bonaparte, op. cit., citing Letter 104 (February 6, 1899); in Motet, op. cit., p. 167.
58. Letter of February 25, 1908, in W. McGuire, ed., Freud to Jung Letters, trans. by R. Manheim and R.F.L. Hull, pp. 196-197.
59. M. Graf, "Reminiscences of Freud," Psychoanalytic Quarterly (1942), cited in Puner, op. cit., p. 150.
60. Sachs, Freud, Master and Friend (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946), pp. 3-4; as cited in E. Fromm, Sigmund Freud's Mission: an Analysis of His Personality and Influence, p. 67.
61. Fromm, ibid., p. 67.
62. Bakan, op. cit., p. 167.
63. Ibid., p. 170.
64. R. Rubenstein, "Freud and Judaism: a Review Article," The Journal of Religion 47 (1967), p. 44.
65. G. Zilboorg, Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 198.
66. Jones, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 353; as cited in Zilboorg, ibid., p. 206.
67. Zilboorg, p. 223.
68. Ibid.
69. M. Balmory, Psychoanalysing Psychoanalysis: Freud and the Hidden Fault of the Father, trans. by N. Lukachen, p. 58.
70. Ibid., p. 61.
71. Ibid., p. 28.
72. Freud, Über Forel: der Hypnotismus, seine Bedeutung und seine Handhabung, Wiener medizinische Wochenschrift, 1889, 34, 1098; as cited in V. Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism (New York: Clarion, 1967), p. 7; as cited, in turn, by Motet, op. cit., p. 170.

THE CONCLUSION: ASSESSING THE THEORIES
ABOUT FREUD'S TREATMENT OF MOSES

Just as Freud's concepts of Moses have been subjected to extensive critical scrutiny, so must the theories about Freud's treatment of the Biblical figure undergo similar critique. Therefore do we, once again, examine both thematic and methodological concerns with regard to the many theories presented in Chapter 4.

As we have seen, the subject of Freud and his work has evoked emotional reaction and controversy. Theorists from every discipline have attempted to "analyze" Freud in the hopes of understanding his works. Thus we have viewed a rather unsystematic collection of analyses of Freud written from the perspectives of artists, writers, religionists and psychoanalysts. The reality for Freud, however, was that his method of interpretation was strictly scientific and should "be subject to scientific procedures and methods that can lead to valid theoretical, objective scientific knowledge of the psyche."¹ Although the notion of psychoanalysis as science is controversial in and of itself, to Freud the validity of psychoanalytic interpretation resided in its adherence to the scientific procedure and method. Thus must we examine the thematic and methodological aspects of the theories about Freud's treatment of Moses in terms of their scientific validity.

All theories, scientific or otherwise, require by definition a tolerance for ambiguity. Very few data lead to incontrovertible conclusions. Furthermore, there often exist conflicting data which cannot always be harmonized into one simple hypothesis. Such is the case with the available information theorists have employed to understand Freud's motivations for his Moses treatment.

One of the most common themes which has been treated in this regard is religion. As we have seen, some critics have attributed to Freud the most virulent anti-Semitism and religious self-hatred, while his defenders have presented only Freud's most proud and self-laudatory expressions of his Jewish identity. As we recall, I. Maybaum stated flatly: "there was hatred in everything Freud felt and said concerning the religion of his father and also concerning Christianity"²; and A.S. Yahuda heard in Freud's words "the voice of one of the most fanatical Christians in his hatred of Israel...."³ Yet E. Jones countered that, "in his laudation of Jewish spirituality, Freud was manifestly proud of the religious and ethical genius of his own people who were able to accept that teaching and rise to sublime heights far transcending the endeavors of the Egyptians or anyone else."⁴ Even while such statements are drawn, in part, from Freud's own remarks with regard to his Jewish identity, they are inadequate in that they do not present the whole picture. The question of Freud's feelings about his religion is far more complicated than the aforementioned theorists have implied. Taking Freud's own statements as a whole, there appears to be a persistent ambivalence toward Judaism, both sides of which must be examined before yielding any sober scientific

theory.

That Freud read and enjoyed the Bible at an early age is confirmed by the dedication that Jakob wrote to his son (in Hebrew, a language which its recipient could neither read nor understand):

To my Dear Son, Solomon

It was in the seventh year of your life that the Spirit of God began to stir you and spake to you [thus]: "Go thou and pore over the book which I wrote and there will burst open for thee springs of understanding, knowledge, and reason. It is indeed the book of books. Sages have delved into it and legislators have derived [from it] knowledge and law."

Thou hast seen the vision of the Almighty. Thou hast listened and ventured and achieved soaring on the wings of the wind [Ruah, translated elsewhere as Spirit of God]. For long the book has been lying about like broken tablets in a closet of mine. And as you were completing your thirty-fifth year, I put on it a new leather cover and I called out: "Spring up, O well; sing ye unto it." And I am presenting it to you as a keepsake and a token of love."⁵

To some, the Hebrew document is relevant not only in its content but also in its style and form. Bergmann, for instance, concluded that the dedication indicates that Jakob Freud was neither a religious nor a nationalistic Jew, but a member of the Haskala (Enlightenment):

No orthodox Jew would speak lightly about the Spirit [ruah] of God speaking to a seven-year-old. Nor would any religious Jew see the Bible as belonging to mankind as a whole. Biblical flowery language (Melizot in Hebrew) also marks Jacob Freud as a member of the Haskala.⁶

To Bergmann, Jakob's association with the Haskala movement would help explain the source of Sigmund's propensity for equating the freedom to use the intellect with the Jewish heritage.

Freud's great admiration for the nineteenth-century journalist, Ludwig Börne, might also have played a role in his life-long commitment to the liberalism of the Enlightenment. When Freud was fourteen, he was presented the collected works of Börne, the only books Freud kept

from his adolescent years. When he was studying in Paris, he paid a visit to Börne's grave. R. Rainey believed that Freud may have modeled his Jewish identity, in part, upon that of Börne.⁷

Börne, of a well-to-do Orthodox Jewish family in the Frankfurt ghetto, became familiar with the ideas of the Reform Jewish movement and German Enlightenment, and left the religion of his father. He (like Freud) disdained the ritual observances of Orthodox Judaism and converted to Protestantism, motivated primarily by his ambition to become an effective political journalist. Crediting his instruction in Reform Judaism as the catalyst for his interest in social problems, Börne felt that belonging to the dominant religion would facilitate achieving his life-long goal of emancipating all oppressed peoples, including the Jews.

Börne defended the Jews against political persecution, which he saw as a sign of the universal perversion of human rights. To Börne, the emancipation of the Jews was a necessary first step in the political emancipation of all the oppressed peoples of Germany. To Rainey:

Börne presents an image of a Jew sharply critical of Orthodoxy but deeply imbued with the spirit of the prophetic ethic of justice and freedom sublimated into a commitment to the liberalism of the Enlightenment. He was particularly concerned with German culture and with the political improvement of his homeland.⁸

To Rainey, the young Freud presented a similar image. Not only did he likewise disdain religious Orthodoxy, but Freud, an ardent believer in liberalism, was contemptuous of the aristocratic biases of the Hapsburg monarchy. He consistently favored democratic

political systems and admired Lessing and Hammerschlag, proponents of ethics-based religious systems. Freud, like Börne, also considered conversion, perhaps not only to avoid a religious wedding ceremony but also to promote his own academic achievement.⁹ Yet Freud did not actually convert to Protestantism, as did Börne. Freud, however, probably always felt attracted to the journalist's image of "the Jew freed from the confines of Orthodoxy and deeply immersed in the mainstream of German culture -- a man who was sharply critical of that culture but at the same time seeking to improve it."¹⁰

That Freud chose not to convert before his wedding ceremony was in no way a decision made out of respect for his bride's religious devotion. Martha Bernays, Freud's fiancée, was an observant Jewess in her youth. During her betrothal, she wrote to Freud daily, except on the Sabbath. Eventually, however, Martha overlooked the prohibition of writing on the Sabbath, although she would do so only in secret and with a pencil.¹¹ Over the years, Freud sought to emancipate his bride from the domination of her religion. The writing on the Sabbath was one of the many tokens of love he demanded from her. Yet on the issue of the Jewish wedding ceremony, there could be no compromise, for the Austro-Hungarian Empire required a religious ceremony for a legal marriage. Thus Freud was forced to submit to the "ordeal."

On the other hand, Freud at times expressed to his fiancée feelings of affirmation for elements of his Jewish heritage. In July of 1882, four years before his wedding, Freud wrote to Martha after meeting an old Jewish engraver in Hamburg who was one of "a number

of men from the old school all of whom adhere to [their] religion without cutting themselves off from life."¹² To Freud, the old engraver was indebted to the school of thought which taught that:

[when] religion was no longer treated as a rigid dogma, it became an object of reflection for the satisfaction of cultivated artistic taste and of intensified logical efforts, and the teacher of Hamburg recommended it finally not because it happened to exist and had been declared holy, but because he was pleased by the deeper meaning he found in it or which he projected into it.¹³

Freud concluded:

And as for us, this is what I believe: even if the form wherein the old Jews were happy no longer offers us any shelter, something of the core, of the essence of this meaningful and life-affirming Judaism will not be absent from our home.¹⁴

This affirmation contains the essence of Freud's understanding of his Judaism, an essence he valued throughout his life. He sought to preserve the "core" of his Jewishness while casting off its outer form, which for him was its theology and ritual observance.

The "core" of Freud's Judaism is sometimes unclear and inconsistent. In the above letter it was primarily the life-affirming joy of Judaism. In his later Preface to the Hebrew edition of Totem and Taboo, Freud asked himself in the second person: "What is left to you that is Jewish?" He answered: "...A very great deal and probably its very essence." Freud "...could not now express that essence clearly in words; but someday no doubt it will become accessible to the scientific mind."¹⁵ Three years before his own death, Freud wrote of his relationship with a deceased colleague: "We both were Jews and knew of each other that we carried that miraculous thing in common,

which -- inaccessible to any analysis so far -- makes the Jew."¹⁶

For Freud certain elements of the Jewish essence were captured in a specific Jewish "psychological structure" and Jewish "character traits." In a letter to the B'nai Brith (1926), Freud wrote:

That you are Jews could only be welcome to me, for I was myself a Jew, and it has always appeared to me not only undignified but outright foolish to deny it. What tied me to Jewry was -- I have to admit it -- not the faith, not even the national pride, for I was always an unbeliever, have been brought up without religion, but not without respect for the so-called "ethical" demands of human civilization. Whenever I have experienced feelings of national exaltation I have tried to suppress them as disastrous and unfair, frightened by the warning example of those nations among which we Jews live. But there remained enough to make the attraction of Judaism and the Jews irresistible, many dark emotional powers all the stronger the less they could be expressed in words, as well as the clear consciousness of an inner identity, the familiarity of the same psychological structure. And before long there followed the realization that it was only to my Jewish nature that I owed the two qualities that have become indispensable to me throughout my difficult life. Because I was a Jew, I found myself free of many prejudices which restrict others in the use of the intellect; as a Jew I was prepared to be in the opposition and to renounce agreement with the "compact majority."¹⁷

Time and time again, Freud expressed appreciation for the character traits bestowed upon him because of his Jewishness, especially independence of thought and intellectual courage. Freud also felt that Jews have a special respect for spiritual values. He wrote:

"We preserved our unity through ideas, and because of this we have survived to this day."¹⁸ However, this spirituality did not include mysticism. To Abraham, Freud, analyzing some of the roots of the resistance to psychoanalysis on the part of Jung and his associates, wrote: "On the whole it is easier for us Jews, as we lack the mystical element" (contrary to Bakan's assertion).¹⁹ Although it is un-

clear what Freud meant by "mysticism," Rainey concluded that, in context, he was referring to a "Gentile propensity for formulating abstract, non-empirical theories about human nature...."²⁰

Freud sometimes referred to the common character traits which made up the Jewish psychological structure as though they were racial traits. Freud felt that he related to K. Abraham because of their shared "racial kinship" and intellectual constitution.²¹ Freud applauded some of these inherited Jewish traits. He saw Jews as "superior," "sensitive," more "critical of themselves" and "less sadistic than Gentiles."²² Yet he also disdained some aspects of the "structure" such as the Jewish tendency toward "fanaticism" and "self-hatred."

Freud therefore was surely not a Jewish chauvinist. In fact, he had great reservations about Jewish "nationalism." Towards Zionism, Freud had sympathy. Yet he was skeptical about the movement's success. Furthermore, Freud had no qualms about mixed marriage or assimilation. He did not feel, however, that Jews should convert to Christianity since "...the Christian religion is every bit as bad as the Jewish. Jews and Christians ought to meet on the common ground of irreligion and humanity."²³ Rather than a love or hatred of Judaism, Freud seems to have ultimately "believed in" a philosophy of humanism transcending "national" or "racial" bounds. In fact, he expressed his two-fold credo as the "brotherhood of man and the alleviation of human suffering."²⁴

Despite Freud's rejection of religious ritual and theology, Jewish historical figures always held appeal to the psychoanalyst. Not only did he openly identify with Moses, but in his later life Freud

compared himself to the Biblical Jacob. Shortly before leaving Vienna for London to escape Nazi persecution, he wrote: "I sometimes compare myself with the old Jacob who, when a very old man, was taken by his children to Egypt.... Let us hope that it won't also be followed by an exodus from Egypt. It is high time Ahasuerus came to rest somewhere."²⁵ Freud also revealed that Joseph (Jacob's son), the Biblical interpreter of dreams, was a common disguise for himself in his own dream life.²⁶ And at one of the final meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, disbanding under the pressure of the Nazi occupation in Vienna, Freud stated:

After the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem by Titus, Rabbi Jochanan ben Sakkai [sic] asked for permission to open a school at Jabneh for the study of the Torah. We are going to do the same. We are, after all, used to persecution by our history, tradition, and some of us by personal experience.²⁷

The above is in no way intended to represent a complete or thorough-going study of Freud's Jewish identity. Such an analysis requires a complete study in and of itself. What is intended here is to indicate the complexity of the phenomenon of Freud's understanding of his Jewishness. To Rainey:

Its intricate antinomies are perhaps best summed up in Freud's succinct characterization of himself as an "infidel Jew" [SE, Vol. XVI, p. 170] -- "infidel" because he rejects Judaism as a "confessor" and is reserved toward Jewish nationalism; yet nevertheless a "Jew," bound to his people by "dark emotional powers," sharing with them a common "intellectual constitution" and character traits of inestimable value, such as joyousness in life and independence of thought."²⁸

The complexity of Freud's ambivalence towards his Jewishness has often been ignored by many theorists. In analyzing Freud, theorists have often considered only one side of Freud's conflicting at-

titudes towards religion and have based their hypotheses accordingly. For instance, supported by only Freud's negative religious feelings, writers such as Velikovsky, Puner, and Roazen have suggested that Freud resented his Judaism, wanted himself to convert, and "avenged" his Jewishness by "converting" Moses. (Bergmann, in a more sober study, considered Freud's mixed feelings toward religion before proposing the conversion hypothesis.) On the other hand, Jones, ever defensive of his mentor, would acknowledge none of Freud's more hostile disposition toward religion. Rejecting the plausibility of any theory regarding Freud's treatment of Moses in specific and religion in general, Jones proclaimed that "a desire to get at the simple truth as best he might dominated all [of Freud's] ... motives."²⁹ Similarly Bakan, defending his hypothesis with a chapter on Freud's positive Jewish identification, suggested that Freud hoped to free his people from the oppressive yoke of the Mosaic superego (Law) with his secularized Jewish mysticism, i.e., psychoanalysis.

The present intention is not to assess the cogency of the aforementioned theories but rather to examine their "scientific" validity. Without a sober treatment of all extant data on Freud's feelings about religion, the validity of theories on religion's relation to his Moses treatment is called into question. As these data are conflicting, a tolerance for ambiguity becomes necessary.

A further theme explored by critics, biographers and theorists alike has been Freud's qualifications for the study of religion. This issue has shared a common fate with the question of Freud's Jewish identity, for the available information on Freud's knowledge in this

area is inconclusive.

Freud's qualifications have been highly praised as well as questioned. Jones stated that "Freud possessed an unusually comprehensive knowledge of various religious beliefs."³⁰ S. Baron, despite his disagreement with Freud's hypotheses, complimented the author of Moses and Monotheism for his "erudition and dialectical powers."³¹ However, T. Weiss-Rosmarin suggested that Freud "was only a little better posted in ancient Near East history and Bible than the average educated layperson" and was "reckless" and "impudent" for entering into the field without a better grounding in ancient Near Eastern languages and culture.³² In reviewing Moses and Monotheism, M.R. Cohen stated of Freud:

The author of this attempt to explain the origin of Hebrew monotheism does not profess to be an historian. He is not interested in, and shows no familiarity with, the actual conditions of life among the ancient Israelites and their neighbors. Nor does he pretend to any command or knowledge of the Hebrew text of the Bible which is practically our only source of information for the history of the Hebrew religion. These limitations of knowledge prove in fact fatal.³³

Freud was not by any means a professional scholar of religion. His formal university training was in medicine, and his field of expertise was the discipline of psychoanalysis which he himself originated. In areas of Jewish life, Freud often pleaded ignorance. He was unable to read the Hebrew of his father's inscription in the family Bible, and had to be tutored privately in order to learn (by rote) the Hebrew wedding vows required for his religious wedding ceremony. In a letter of response (and correction) to A.A. Roback's Jewish Influence in Modern Thought (1929), Freud wrote: "I had such a non-Jewish upbringing

that today I am not even able to read your dedication which is evidently in Hebrew characters. In later years I have often regretted this gap in my education."³⁴ When Freud visited the catacombs in Rome, he wrote to his wife that the Jewish graves could be distinguished from the Christian ones by the relief of the candelabrum, but he found it difficult to remember the name -- menorah.³⁵ Jones dismissed this lapse of memory as related to Freud's unfamiliarity with the synagogue, but other writers have indicated that Freud's inability to identify such an important Jewish symbol is highly significant.³⁶

However, Freud's assessment of his "non-Jewish upbringing" has been considered an exaggeration by those who have studied Freud's childhood and early education. Rainey suggested, on the basis of Freud's description of his own religious background, that the analyst meant merely that he had not been raised in an Orthodox household. In piecing together the fragments of Freud's religious self-portrait, Rainey contended that, although the boy was an agnostic, he was raised in a moderate Reform Jewish home with emphasis of the Haskala teachings of the "ethical demands of human civilization."³⁷

Similarly, Freud's Jewish education was not as minimal as he implied. During his school years, religious education was compulsory in the schools of Austria, both public and private. During the hours of religious instruction, children who, like Freud, attended private Jewish elementary schools, were taught mainly Bible supplemented by lessons in Jewish history and Hebrew. School authorities insisted on the study of Hebrew as the pupils would thereby gain a better under-

standing of the Scriptures, would be able to understand Jewish liturgy, and would "retain familiarity with the language which binds Jews of all nations together."³⁸ Yet, the time allocated to religious study in the overall school curricula rendered it nearly impossible to allot a sufficient amount of time to Hebrew study. Therefore, little emphasis was placed on the study of the Hebrew language, and it is no wonder that Freud forgot his Hebrew in later life.

Freud was greatly influenced by his instructor in religion, S. Hammerschlag. Of his teacher Freud wrote: "He has been touchingly fond of me for years; there is such a secret sympathy between us that we can talk intimately together. He always regards me as his son."³⁹ Hammerschlag was a source of both emotional and financial support for Freud throughout the young man's medical student years. Freud named his youngest daughter after a daughter of his great teacher and another after a niece.⁴⁰ When Hammerschlag died in 1904, Freud wrote an obituary:

S. Hammerschlag, who relinquished his activity as a Jewish religious teacher about 30 years ago, was one of the personalities who possess the gift of leaving ineradicable impressions on the development of their pupils. A spark from the same fire which animated the spirit of the great Jewish seers and prophets burned in him and was not extinguished until old age weakened his powers. But the passionate side of his nature was happily tempered by the ideal of humanism of our German classical period which governed him and his method of education and was based on the foundation of philological and classical studies to which he had devoted his own youth. Religious instruction seemed to him a way of educating towards love of the humanities, and from the material of Jewish history he was able to find means of tapping the sources of enthusiasm hidden in the hearts of young people and making it flow out beyond the limitations of nationalism or dogma....⁴¹

Whereas Freud may have thought of Hammerschlag as another source for his own humanistic universalism, Rainey pointed out that for Hammerschlag the "ethical" demands of humanity were "to be fulfilled by a full realization of one's particularity as a Jew."⁴² Freud chose to ignore, or perhaps forgot, the particularism of his much admired teacher.

It is difficult to assess exactly how much of his Jewish instruction Freud retained in later years. Despite his lack of recall of things Jewish, Freud retained considerable knowledge of the Bible, from which he quoted frequently. When Martha wrote to him of her lack of beauty, Freud responded with a quotation from Proverbs (31:30): "Charm is deceitful, and beauty is vain," omitting the conclusion of the verse: "but a woman who fears the Lord is to be praised."⁴³ When Freud first retracted his seduction theory, considering it to be erroneous, he wrote to Fliess that he was not at all ashamed. Modifying David's lament for Saul (II Samuel 1:20), he wrote: "[Certainly I shall] tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Oskalon, in the land of the Philistines, but between you and me I have the feeling of a victory rather than of defeat."⁴⁴

Freud was introduced to several other religious traditions in the Gymnasium. He was required to take course work in the history and culture of the "Phoenicians, Babylonians, Medes, Assyrians, Indians, Persians and Egyptians."⁴⁵ Two-fifths of Freud's total course load was spent in study of the Classical Greek and Roman cultures including language, history and literature. Not only did he read authors such as Cicero, Tacitus, Virgil, Horace, Xenophon, Homer, Sophocles, and Plato

in their original languages but Freud studied the mythology of their cultures in great detail as well.⁴⁶

Freud, first in his class for six out of the eight years of his Gymnasium studies, developed his interest in antiquity in these early years, an interest which remained with him throughout his life. Even if the rudimentary nature of these early academic studies was insufficient to be considered "scholarship," his studies laid a firm academic foundation for his further interest and study of religion. His knowledge of Greek and Latin proved to be a valuable linguistic tool in his later life.⁴⁷ Despite his lack of ability in Hebrew and Near Eastern languages, Freud was a gifted linguist, mastering English, French, Italian, and Spanish, in addition to Greek, Latin, and his native tongue.⁴⁸

Although Freud's academic work at the university was devoted almost entirely to natural sciences, he briefly studied philosophy with Brentano (an ex-priest who wrote several works on the philosophy of religion).⁴⁹ Freud also, at this time, belonged to a fraternity at the University of Vienna (Leseverein der deutschen Studenten) which sponsored lectures on topics such as art history, philosophy and the history of religion. Two lectures sponsored by the group and published in the fraternity's own press were entitled: "Concerning the Elements of a Renewal of Religious Ideas in the Present" (by S. Lipiner, 1878), and "The History of the Origin and Development of the Egyptian Hierarchy and the Development of the Teaching of the Oneness of God (Monotheism)" (by L. Reinisch, 1878).⁵⁰

Freud remained interested in the study of religion and anti-

quities throughout his life. He read much in the field of archaeology and ancient history. To his friend, S. Zweig, he confided that he had "actually read more archaeology than psychology."⁵¹ Jones claimed that Freud's readings included the subjects of Roman, Greek, Egyptian, and ancient Near Eastern religions.

Freud's enthusiasm for archaeology also extended to the acquisition of a personal collection of antiquities, which contained many Egyptian, Greek, and ancient Near Eastern statuettes and cultic objects. Freud studied each statuette to such great lengths that he often had his newest acquisition placed beside his plate at meal-time so that he could further scrutinize it while he had his dinner with his family. An enthusiastic traveler, Freud enlarged his collection of artifacts on almost every trip by visiting famous archaeological sites and museums.

Freud also furthered his knowledge of religion in dialogue with his friends and acquaintances in the field of religion. His life-long friendship with the Swiss pastor, Oskar Pfister, and Professor Emanuel Löwy afforded Freud many opportunities for lively discussions in areas of religion and religious history. Later in his life, Freud received many visits from scholars in religion. Freud's students likewise kept him informed in the area, as many of his pupils and colleagues engaged in the study of religion. Jung, Rank, Reik, Abraham, and Jones all contributed to the field under Freud's influence.

A final, and unique, source of Freud's knowledge of religion was his observation of religious behavior in his analysands. Although,

when published, his case studies were well-disguised, extended discussion of his patients' religion occurs in at least four of his major cases: Emmy von N., Little Hans, "the man with the rats," and the Wolfman.⁵² Many of Freud's case studies clearly influenced his views on religion. For example, Rainey pointed out that:

the Little Hans case was crucial to the development of his theory of the relationship between totemism and animal phobias, which provided one of the keystones of his discussion of the origin of totemism in Totem and Taboo [SE XIII, pp. 128ff.]. The Wolfman case furnished valuable data on the interrelationship between an individual's image of God and his experience with his father -- specifically as related to the theory that childhood religious concepts are a channel for the "sublimation" of libido [SE XVII, pp. 64-65, 114-117]. The "ritualistic" behavior of many of his obsessional neurotic patients drew his attention to the parallels between their "private rituals" and the corporate ritual expressions of various religious traditions [SE IX, pp. 117ff.].⁵³

Freud's case material, of course, only provided him with the one-sided view of religious behavior symptomatic of pathology. However Freud's friendship with Hammerschlag and Pfister, men deeply committed to their religions and highly admired by Freud, balanced out his exposure to religious behavior. Therefore, Freud's observation of various modes of religious commitment extended beyond the confines of his analytical couch.

While some critics of Freud have been quick to point to the gaps in his religious education and background, others have rallied in defense of his expertise in the area of religion. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. Freud's life-long interest in ancient history, his extensive reading in related fields and gift for languages, his collection of antiquities, his acquaintances with

scholars in the field of religion, the work of his colleagues and his observation of his patients were all sources Freud drew upon for the study of religion. Whether or not Freud made good use of these resources is not here the question.

Technically speaking, Freud, whose field of expertise was psychoanalysis, was a layperson since anthropology, biblical studies, political theory and sociology were outside the realm of his immediate field. Yet the "layperson" clearly had at his command substantial resources in these areas. And as Rainey cautioned: "In viewing Freud from this perspective, we are employing categories of judgement determined in large part by the norms of American university education, with its marked stress on 'departments' and fields of special inquiry."⁵⁴ Rainey warned that "one should not be misled by American notions of academic specialization to underestimate Freud's qualification for dealing with the topic [of religion]."⁵⁵

Except for Rainey's work, Freud's instruction in Judaism and its influences on his works on religion in general and Moses in specific have only been cursorily examined.⁵⁶ Therefore statements about Freud on these themes (prior to Rainey's work) have been based on an absence of data and are hence inadequate. As in the theme of Freud's Jewish identity, the topic of Freud's qualifications in the area of religion yields ambiguous data. Until more definitive resources become available, a tolerance for ambiguity is here again in order.

This ambiguity in certain facets of Freud's life becomes perhaps more tolerable with the realization that, with regard to human motivation, many things can be true simultaneously. For example,

Freud's mixed feelings for religion -- both his respect and his disdain -- might have provided for the analyst a situation of "creative tension," i.e., "a tension which sharpens one's sensibilities to certain problems and constrains one to come to terms with certain issues."⁵⁷ The tension created by Freud's own agnosticism over against his father's Jewish piety was perhaps another important catalyst in Freud's life-long struggle to resolve the question of religion. Even in his final years did Freud seek to answer the question of "what makes the Jew?" with his Moses. The same type of creative tension might have been operative around Freud's attitude toward his early Jewish education, lessons which went all but forgotten, yet which were influential upon the direction of his future writings. Furthermore, Freud's admiration for his teacher of religion, Hammerschlag, despite his inability to accept the latter's views, might similarly have constituted an area of creative tension.

The notion of the tension between two opposing feelings existing simultaneously brings into consonance elements of the conflicting theories (presented in Chapter 4) with regard to Freud's response towards Moses. Just as Freud may have identified with the "Moses" at Corso Cavour and the lawgiver's suppressed rage at his faithless backsliding followers (cf. Jones, Rieff, Puner, Sachs), at the same time Freud could have identified with the faithless impatient "mob" who had rejected the teachings of Moses (i.e., the theological affirmations of the Judaism of Freud's father and teacher) (cf. Rainey, Robert, Spector). Similarly, just as, on one level, Freud may have Egyptianized Moses out of a desire to universalize and assimilate

the founder of Judaism into a non-Jewish culture (cf. Spector, Roazen, Puner), so too on another level may he have been trying to disengage hated qualities from the Jews (Bakan, Grollman).

Obviously, it was more than mere scholarly curiosity which drew Freud to a study of religion and Moses. There were deep existential conflicts in areas of his relationships (with his father and his teacher of religion), his environment (his membership in the Jewish minority of Vienna and his experiences with anti-Semitism), and his identity (his agnosticism and his strong Jewish identification) which led Freud to his conclusions.

The intention here is not to judge the accuracy of the aforementioned treatments of these themes but rather to question the reliability and validity of theories which ignore the conflicting thematic data. Simplistic and one-sided theories are unacceptable since both sides of Freud's ambivalence contributed to the creative tension which served as catalyst for his treatment of religion and Moses.

Not only do theories of scientific validity require a tolerance for ambiguity and thus a consideration of all available data, but also a methodology guided strictly by facts. In the light of all of the conflicting data regarding the theme of Freud and his Moses, it is mandatory that theorists adhere to rigid intellectual honesty. This requires, methodologically speaking, that theories be based on empirical evidence and that this evidence be objectively interpreted.

Unfortunately, there is a paucity of primary documentary evidence (beyond what we have already discussed) concerning Freud and his religious development. Freud was reticent about divulging details of

his own life and destroyed most of his personal correspondence dating prior to 1908. Also lacking is available secondary material. After the Second World War, it became apparent that many documents relevant to Freud's life had been destroyed by the Nazis. Furthermore, a large number of Freud's letters had been lost as a result of the ravages of the war. The need to collect the surviving documentation of Freud's life history was recognized by a small group of psychoanalysts who opened the Sigmund Freud Archives. However, the documents collected, because of their sensitivity, will only be released at pre-arranged dates -- some even as late as the year 2102.⁵⁸ According to Rainey, too little material is available on Freud to create a reliable psychobiography, regardless of one's psychoanalytic expertise. For instance, too little is known about Freud's early childhood, his parents' religious commitments and his response to them, and his attitude toward his own Jewishness during his childhood and adolescence (not to mention the details of his personal life and correspondence, etc., all currently withheld by the Archives).⁵⁹

Thus, the empirical data with which to support theories about Freud's attitudes are minimal and incomplete. Theories which have sought to designate Moses as the outlet for Freud's self-hatred, his anti-Semitism, his enduring desire to convert, his overpowering Oedipus complex, or his messianic complex are simply not of sound enough basis to be considered scientific. Although vague documentation might exist supportive of elements of any of these themes, the theories are not firmly enough based in empirical data. Nor do we know what type of refutation or confirmation might lie behind the sealed doors of the Freud

Archives.

Another methodological concern with regard to theories about Freud's treatment of Moses is the obvious subjectivity of many of the theorists. Scientifically valid theory requires dispassionate inquiry. Those religionists who have accused Freud of "impudently" "robbing" the Jews of their Moses; those critics who have dismissed Freud as an "opinionated crank"; those theorists who have discredited Freud's Moses concept as the "hallucinatory product of Freud's personal psychosis" -- all reflect the degree of emotionality and subjectivity with which Freud's treatment of Moses has been approached. Many of the critiques and theories herein examined betray more the emotional attitudes of the writers themselves toward Freud and/or Moses than objective evaluation of Freud's treatment of Moses. This subjectivity in evaluation of data is methodologically suspect.

Yet the bias does not reside with Freud's detractors alone. For Freud's defenders, especially his followers-turned-biographers, only referred to their mentor and his ideas in the most glowing and deferential of terms. That Freud's followers viewed him as a sort of religious leader / father-figure / ego-ideal has been previously discussed. Like members of a religious sect did Freud's immediate students, with exaggerated reverence for their "founder," seek to safeguard the future of psychoanalysis by replying to Freud's critics, determining the direction of the ever-widening psychoanalytic movement (by controlling the International Psychoanalytic Association and its publishing house), and, in Freud's own words, by "defend[ing] the cause against personalities and accidents when I am no more."⁶⁰

It was with emotional fervor that Freudian followers like Jones, Sachs, and Eissler sought to defend their mentor against any criticisms, assuring the world of Freud's genius and his pure motivations, suppressing any information to the contrary. F. Sulloway perceived in the works of Freud's biographers a trend subtly (and unconsciously) to recast Freud's personal history into the mold of a modern day hero legend. Citing J. Campbell's survey of the archetypal hero (The Hero with a Thousand Faces, 1968), Sulloway examined the archetypal hero motifs of isolation, initiation, and return, prominent in the Freudian legend. To Sulloway, despite kernels of biographical historicity, the classical hero themes have been largely superimposed onto Freud by means of historical censorship, distortion, embellishment, and propaganda.⁶¹ Thus, like all heroes, did the "legendary" Freud withstand symbolic "rites of passage" with: a) a call to adventure (the case of Anna O., which only Freud was "brave" enough to publish); b) a succession of difficult trials (Freud's "blunder" of the seduction theory which diverted him from discovering infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex); c) a secret helper (Fliess in his supposed role of "transference" figure during Freud's self-analysis); d) a perilous journey (Freud's self-analysis); e) a return from the journey to face opposition in the hopes of benefiting humanity (Freud's period of "splendid isolation"); and finally, after the struggle, f) a world-wide acceptance of the hero's teachings, culminating in reward and fame (Freud's "emergence from isolation" into international recognition).⁶²

That elements of the Freud "legend" may be constituted more by

fiction than fact was convincingly documented by Sulloway. The relevance of Sulloway's findings to this study is that they reveal the bias in Freud's biographers. Zilboorg likewise observed that, in confronting Freud's opposition, "scientists" such as Jones:

betray that emotional attitude which they seem to avoid so successfully in their own scientific work. They readily agree that being emotional means not being guided by reason, but they deny the emotional nature of their own attitude and frequently fall into the trap of their own unreasoning, the existence of which they deny repetitiously and with a perseverance that gives one the impression that they do protest too much....⁶³

A compelling example of Jones' subjective perception of Freud was apparent in the biographer's "undiminished virulence toward all the old opponents of Freud and psychoanalysis."⁶⁴ When writing Freud's biography, a colleague of Jones recalled:

Jones carefully checked whether (and how many) of these bug-bears were still alive. I had expressed doubts about the death of one individual, and in a letter to me dated December 13, 1954, Jones could scarcely conceal his pique when he wrote: "I don't care when he died so long as I can be sure he is thoroughly dead now, since I am libelling him severely."⁶⁵

Jones' three volume biography of Freud is not to be dismissed entirely. It revealed a wealth of hitherto unpublished material and reflected, if not the "objective reality" of Freud and his cause, the "subjective reality" of the psychoanalytic revolution from the perspective of Freud and his immediate followers. Yet it is the work's "scientific" validity that is here in doubt. For just as the bias and subjectivity of Freud's critics is methodologically suspect, so too is the rigid intellectual honesty of these passionate treatments

of Freud by his biographers questionable. Zilboorg observed:

The time has not yet come for a thorough and definitive psychological evaluation of Freud as a personality and as an historico-sociological phenomenon. The passions that clustered about his name alone are still running high and regardless of the best individual intentions and wills, the psychoanalytic groupings are still too prone to defend this or that aspect of Freudian tenets against attack from without. It is impossible to proceed with the necessary calm and to study Freud as he was rather than as he appears to be or might have been, or ought to have been. Even the whole body of Freud's writings, and his correspondence with Fliess, and the volumes by Jones do not seem sufficient for a fully adequate assessment of the phenomenon known under the name of Freud....⁶⁶

In spite of all the aforementioned cautions, treatment of Freud and his Moses is not fruitless. Freud himself understood that his "obsession" with the figure was symbolic and meaningful. Yet theories emanating from Freud's works on Moses must be thematically reliable (tolerating the ambiguity of conflicting and incomplete data) and methodologically valid (employing intellectually honest investigation based on empirical data and objective interpretation). Whether Freud himself adhered to these standards in his works on Moses can only be determined by the "scientifically sober" critic. Those theories on Freud and his Moses which have overstepped boundaries of "scientific method and procedure" have left us only with the very type of "novels" which they accused Freud himself of having written. It was Freud himself, perhaps envisioning the vast complex of theories which would one day surround his name, who warned of the need for sober investigation in his Moses and Monotheism: "It is a good rule ... to be content to explain what is actually before one and not to seek to explain what has not happened."⁶⁷

NOTES: CHAPTER 5

1. S.A. Handleman, The Slayers of Moses: the Emergence of Rabbinic Interpretation in Modern Literary Theory, p. 131.
2. I. Maybaum, Creation and Guilt: a Theological Assessment of Freud's Father-Son Conflict, p. 41.
3. A.S. Yahuda, "Sigmund Freud on Moses and His Torah," Aver V' Arav. Memorabilia and Impressions (1946); as cited in E. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Volume III, p. 370.
4. Ibid.
5. A.A. Roback, Freudiana, Including Unpublished Letters from Freud, Havelock Ellis, Pavlov, Bernard Shaw, Romain Rolland, et alii, p. 92 (brackets included).
6. M.S. Bergmann, "Moses and the Evolution of Freud's Jewish Identity," The Israel Annals of Psychiatry and Related Disciplines 14 (1976), p. 4.
7. R. Rainey, Freud as a Student of Religion: Perspectives on the Background and Development of His Thought, p. 61.
8. Ibid., p. 62.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 63.
11. Jones, op. cit., I, p. 116.
12. Letters of Sigmund Freud, edited by E.L. Freud, pp. 18-19 (brackets included).
13. Ibid., p. 21.
14. Ibid., p. 22.
15. S. Freud, Preface to the Hebrew Translation of Totem and Taboo, SE, Volume XIII, p. xv.
16. Letter of April 19, 1936, to Barbara Low, in Letters of Sigmund Freud, p. 428; as cited in Rainey, op. cit., p. 66.
17. Letter of May 6, 1926, to members of the B'nai B'rith Lodge, in Letters of Sigmund Freud, p. 367. Rainey suggested that the first line, "...I was myself a Jew," was written in the past tense because Freud was reiterating the factors which led to his joining

the B'nai B'rith. The tense should not be misconstrued to mean that Freud had since renounced his Judaism (Rainey, op. cit., p. 81, n. 29). Bergmann, however, felt that the word "was" constituted a mistranslation of the German word sei. The passage should instead read: "What I now am" (Bergmann, art. cit., p. 6, n. 2).

18. Jones, op. cit., III, p. 254; as cited in Rainey, op. cit., p. 67.
19. Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, p. 46; as cited in Rainey, op. cit., p. 67. Elsewhere, Freud mentioned the "specifically Jewish nature" of his mysticism, referring to his belief in the meaning behind certain numbers of relevance to him (i.e., Gematria) (Letter to Jung, April 16, 1909, in M. Schur, Freud: Living and Dying, p. 232). D. Bakan relied heavily on Freud's superstition with regard to numbers as supportive of Freud's kabbalistic mystical leanings. However Freud strongly denied being a mystic (cf. Rainey, op. cit., p. 96).
20. Rainey, ibid., p. 67.
21. Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, p. 34; as cited in Rainey, ibid., pp. 67-68.
22. J. Wortis, Fragments of an Analysis with Freud (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 145 and 158; as cited in Rainey, op. cit., p. 68. "During the fall of 1934 and the winter of 1935 Wortis underwent psychoanalysis with Freud. After each session he recorded in a diary the course of the dialogue. Thus these statements of Freud represent what Wortis remembers him to have said. They are not necessarily Freud's exact words" (Rainey, p. 82, n. 38).
23. Wortis, ibid., p. 144; as cited in Rainey, op. cit., p. 69.
24. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, SE XXI, p. 53; as cited in Rainey, op. cit., p. 69.
25. Letter of May 12, 1938, to Ernst Freud, in Letters of Sigmund Freud, pp. 442-443. "Ahasuerus was a legendary shoemaker of Jerusalem who taunted Jesus on the way to crucifixion. As punishment, he was condemned by Jesus to wander throughout the earth until the Day of Judgment" (Rainey, op. cit., p. 85, n. 91).
26. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, SE V, p. 484, n. 2.
27. Jones, op. cit., III, p. 236.
28. Rainey, op. cit., p. 76.
29. Jones, op. cit., III, p. 369.
30. Ibid., p. 376.

31. S.W. Baron, Review of Moses and Monotheism, by S. Freud. In The American Journal of Sociology 45 (1939-1940), p. 477.
32. T. Weiss-Rosmarin, The Hebrew Moses: an Answer to Sigmund Freud, p. 37.
33. M.R. Cohen, Review of Moses and Monotheism, by Sigmund Freud. In Jewish Social Studies 1 (1939), p. 469.
34. S. Freud, Letter of February 20, 1930, to A.A. Roback; in Roback, op. cit., p. 26.
35. Letter of September 21, 1907, to Martha Freud, in Letters of Sigmund Freud, edited by E.L. Freud, p. 261.
36. Jones, op. cit., II, p. 36 (cf. Bergmann, art. cit., p. 5; E.A. Grollman, Judaism in Sigmund Freud's World, p. 52; and Rainey, op. cit., p. 108).
37. Rainey, op. cit., p. 24, citing letter to B'nai B'rith (see n. 17).
38. S. Hammerschlag, "Das Programm der israel. Religionsschule in Wien," p. 7; as cited in Rainey, op. cit., p. 38.
39. Letter of November 15, 1883 to Martha Bernays, in Letters of Sigmund Freud, edited by E.L. Freud, p. 75.
40. Jones, op. cit., I, p. 179.
41. Freud, "Obituary of Professor S. Hammerschlag," SE IX, pp. 255-256.
42. Rainey, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
43. E. Simon, "Sigmund Freud, the Jew," Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, II (1957), pp. 280-281. As cited in Rainey, op. cit., p. 108.
44. Jones, op. cit., I, p. 260. The quotation is similarly cited in Rainey, op. cit., p. 109, who in turn cites E. Simon. Bergmann, however, recorded Freud's quotation as: "Of course I would not tell it to Dan and talk about it in Askelon..." (emphasis mine), a slip which Bergmann suggested "confuse[s] friend and foe" (art. cit., p. 5).
45. As cited in Rainey, op. cit., p. 109.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 110.
48. Jones, op. cit., I, p. 24.
49. Rainey, op. cit., p. 110.

50. Ibid., p. 111.
51. Letter to S. Zweig of February 7, 1931; as cited in M. Robert, The Psychoanalytic Revolution: Sigmund Freud's Life and Achievement, pp. 372-373.
52. Rainey, op. cit., p. 115.
53. Ibid., p. 116.
54. Ibid., p. 107.
55. Ibid., p. 158.
56. Rainey's dissertation was the first contribution to this hitherto unexplored region of Freud's biography. To Rainey:
 E. Jones provides little information about Freud's instruction in Judaism. He observes that Freud began to read the Bible at an early age, was "of course obliged to attend occasional lessons in the synagogue during his school days," and was taught Hebrew.... Other biographers of Freud, specifically H. Puner, F. Wittels, and O. Mannoni, have not made any substantial additions to Jones' observations.
Ibid., p. 53, n. 1.
57. Ibid., p. 25.
58. J. Malcom, "Annals of Scholarship: Trouble in the Archives," The New Yorker (December 5, 1983), p. 60.
59. Rainey, op. cit., pp. 78, 86-87 n. 95.
60. Jones, op. cit., p. 153; as cited in F.J. Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind, p. 483.
61. Sulloway, ibid., p. 446.
62. Ibid., pp. 447-448.
63. G. Zilboorg, Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 202.
64. Sulloway, op. cit., p. 484.
65. L. Veszy-Wagner, "Ernest Jones (1879-1958)," in Psychoanalytic Pioneers (1966), p. 119, edited by Franz Alexander, et al. (New York: Basic Books). As cited in Sulloway, op. cit., p. 484.
66. Zilboorg, op. cit., p. 224.
67. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, SE XXIII, p. 93.

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