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TWO MODERN JEWISH PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORY:

NACHMAN KROCHMAL and HERMANN COHEN

Steven S. Schwarzschild

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Hebrew Letters degree.

Hebrew Union College-Jewish
Institute of Religion
Cincinnati, Ohio
February 1955

Referee:
Professor Dr. Samuel Atlas

To the Beloved Memory of

My Mother

Rahel Schwarzschild, b. Sissle

1896-1949

She lived for her family and instilled in her sons Jewish devotion and Jewish steadfastness in times of personal and Jewish anxieties and troubles.

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INTRODUCTION

It may be only or partly a self-centered illusion on the part of contemporary modern men that we are living in a particularly "historic age." Our forefathers, in all their respective generations, may be presumed to have labored under the impression, even as do we, that their eras were all distinguished by the multiplicity, weightiness and significance of the events which transpired in their time. Illusion or not, however, it is a fact that in our age men are particularly conscious of the impact and speed of grave events in the area of the social life of mankind, and one of the results of that consciousness must inevitably be an increased amount of attention paid to the facts, causes, results and principles - if any - of history.

Even if it be true that also preceding eras were aware of the importance of history in general and their own histories in particular, the fact cannot be gainsaid that history as a concentrated, systematic and scientific discipline has come to the fore only within the last few centuries of our civilization. The Renaissance gave some impetus to the study of history by its interest in classic antiquity, - but that was, generally speaking, not yet a historic interest but rather an antiquarian one; that is to say, Renaissance-man as such was more concerned with the facts of Greece and Rome than with the dynamic relationship between these and earlier as well as later facts of history. In the 17th and 18th centuries historical studies increased. In the 19th century history finally blossomed forth as the all-encompassing, all-consuming and all-important pre-occupation of literary, social, political, religious, philosophical and scientific faculties, - and so it has essentially remained to this day.

So far as the philosophers are concerned, it is not too difficult to point to the basic reasons for the comparative indifference to history in previous epochs. European culture, up to modern times, was shaped overpoweringly by the religious orientation of Christianity, - and in the view of Christianity the primary focus of importance resided within the human individual, not the human collectivity. To be sure, no less disturbing and provocative questions were asked by men in those days than is the case today; human beings have presumably asked themselves at all times what the causes of their condition are, what meaning they may attribute to their existence, and what the outcome of it all is likely to be. But all these questions were asked, and the answers to them given, in terms of the individual. The relations which this individual maintained were regarded as pertinent to these problems only insofar as they were relations to his God, his religious community and his terrestrial community of the time. That his individual fate might be profoundly connected with the fate of previous and coming ages was hardly ever entertained, even as a possibility. Obviously, from such a point of view history would be a rather useless business.

In the second place, the world-picture that pre-modern men carried around with them in their minds was that of an essentially closed universe. That is to say, it was held that the world and all that is therein was as it is and will be as it was. Whatever changes may occur affect only details of no consequence; the basic principles, species, conditions and purposes always remain the same. Again, therefore, there could be no conception of history as such under these circumstances. History, after all, must always work on the premises that not only are

there changes but also that these changes matter sufficiently to be investigated.

As part of this second reason for the indifference to history may be classified the underlying philosophic premise for an almost total disregard of the sequence of social and, for that matter, natural events: since its earliest Greek beginning philosophy had been conceived of as the search for truth and true reality. Plato stamped his imprint on that search when he declared what all of the Middle-Ages came to believe an incontrovertible fact that truth and reality can only be unchanging, static, and therefore different from the sensual world. If that were not so then the truth and reality of one moment would not be the truth and reality of another moment, and that, of course, would presumably contradict the very definition of truth and reality. The consequence of such a basic mental orientation for history is clear: history deals with terrestrial objects and, consequently, with effervescent phenomena. If terrestrial objects and effervescent phenomena are by definition excluded from the substance of truth and reality, then to concern oneself with them more than absolutely necessary for immediate, practical purposes is an unforgivable waste of time. History is thus a profoundly unphilosophical subject-matter, and no philosopher would bother with it.

Taken all together, these three reasons were sufficient to expel history into the outer circle of intellectual oblivion. Thus it came about that even when men in the ages prior to modern times felt as we do, that they were being swamped by a virtual flood of social and natural events of no little import, they spent relatively little time or mental effort on exploring the implications of their earthly experiences. But

this attitude, of course, changed fundamentally with the more positivistic, earth-bound, geocentric orientation of the last half-millenium of western civilization. Once men start being more interested with their experiences on earth than their eventual fate in heaven, once they start defining truth in terms of its direct applicability to human activities, once they direct their eyes more to the inter-relationship between themselves and nature than their ties with the unseen world, - they will also begin to take interest in the possible laws which govern events here beneath. Once they discover that nature and society do not always remain essentially the same they will also commence to wonder exactly in what manner and for what reasons these changes come about. And it follows only logically, in the third place, that the individual will be replaced by the collectivity in the center of attention, for the longevity of the individual limits the scope of the changes which he himself may experience, whereas the group endures for rather longer periods of time during which more room will be given for the observation of fluctuations and possible improvements.

The Bible, whatever else it was, was, of course, also a book of history. History looms large in it from the openings words about the beginning of life to the last word of the Book of Chronicles. Also in the view of the writers of the Bible, to be sure, final truth was above and beyond the sensuous world, with God. But, on the other hand, the philosphical sophistication, and perhaps sophistry, of the Greeks is conspicuously absent in it which assumed that genuine reality and the most profound concerns of man are not of this world. The God of the Bible, the relationship with whom was the most important concern of the

people of the Bible, acted in this world. What is more, He acted not primarily in nature or through individuals but with the social entity of the peopleoof Israel. The changes that occurred throughout the life of Israel were, therefore, of immediate and crucial significance not only to the bored gatherer of earthly trivia but to the fate of the world itself. And history thus held a very considerable position in the earliest tradition of Jewish thinking.

Add to this factor the long drawn-out history of Israel since the Bible, and it cannot come as a surprise that, tthough also Jews during the Middle-Ages lost much of their sense of history in an environment which neglected it, the question about the meaning of the course of human events never quite ceased in their midst. It was a fruitful coincidence that the Jews left the European ghettos and entered increasingly into Western culture just at that point, the beginning of the 19th century, when their own consciousness of history would encounter the new-found consciousness of history of the outside world. It was to be expected that the merger of these two different conceptions of history would produce painful but also creative conflicts, the conception of history of an age-old people which revolved around the providence of God and the special function in it of Israel on the one hand and the conception of history which approached the facts of past, present and future with the methods of scientific investigation.

The following study scrutinizes the philosophies of history of two Jewish thinkers of the 19th century, both of whom tried hard, and no doubt with different degrees of success, to employ both canons of work, that of Judaism and that of European culture, to frame valid interpreta-

tions of the course of human events which would possess universal truth and yet accord with the special character of Judaism and of the Jewish people. Nachman Krochmal lived in Eastern Europe during the first half of the century, Hermann Cohen in Central Europe during the second half. The former still lived in a rather homogeneous Jewish community, the latter was at least as much a part of German culture as he was of Jewish culture. Thus the difference of their languages, Krochmal writing in Hebrew and Cohen in German, represents more than an accidental linguistic fact: it indicates simultaneously the amount of Europeanization of the two respective men and their Jewish readers. Krochmal never became more than an elevated Melamed, without position or reputation, and his direct influence was limited to his personal students and the few friends he made by correspondence in the West; to this day he is almost completely unknown to the general philosophic public because none of his writings have ever been translated. Cohen, on the other hand, was professor of philosophy at one of the oldest and most respected German universities, head of the most influential school of philosophy in Europe at his time, and intellectual leader for wide circles of non-Jews as much as Jews. They thus differed in their personal careers as well as their systems of thought, for, as we shall see, they would assuredly have disagreed with one another as much as any two philosophers could disagree who were both intellectually open-minded, eager for truth from wherever it might come, and who adhered determinedly to their Jewish faith - as they understood that faith. The circumstance that brings them together - unbeknownst to one another, for Cohen nowhere so much as mentions the name of Krochmal - is the 19th century: Krochmal opened it chronologically as well as in-

tellectually, and Cohen closed it; there are only two years between the death of the Russian Jew and the birth of the German, but when the former was born the 19th century had not yet dawned, and when the latter died it had long since set. What they can teach the generations after them individually and together must be left until after their doctrines have been studied.

II. The Philosophy of History of Nachman Krochmal

1. Introduction

Krochmal was a philosopher, but it takes some doing to shed the coat of non-philosophical husk before one can reach the philosophical pea in his writings. His extant writings comprise no more than his magnum opus "Guide for the Perplexed of the Time" and a few fragmentary essays, letters and aphorisms. (1) Even from among these Krochmal himself never saw the published version of the major work, but it was published post-humously as edited by M. L. Zunz from uncompleted notes and studies. (2) Due to this technical circumstance alone the reader can never be quite sure that he is getting the author's thought correctly, entirely and with all its necessary detail.

Furthermore, there are substantative difficulties in trying to crystalize Krochmal's system of philosophy. For one thing, he was not only a philosopher but also a student of history for its own, factual sake. As a result there are entire chapters in the "Guide" and lengthy passages in other chapters which deal exclusively in technical, philological and literary investigations of no immediate philosophical value, - such as chapters XI, XVII and others. Quite apart from the fact that Krochmal obviously had a personal academic bent which was intrigued by the search for the establishment of precise historical data, - an orientation which he shared with the men of the German-Jewish enlightenment and of the Wissenschaft des Judentums in the first half of the 19th century by which he was so greatly impressed -, it may be presumed that he pursued a pedagogical aim in wishing to incorporate such historical investigations in his book: the attainment of philosophical truth and of a "purified faith" to which he aspired required, so he be-

lieved, that educated Jews leave behind them the scientific ignorance, mediaeval superstitions and cultural narrowness of the immediate past and learn to study not only their traditional disciplines of Talmud and Halachah but also literary criticism and positive history. In order to accustom them to such ways he would confront them with some actual examples of his own and of his Jewish and gentile contemporaries. (3) For our purposes, however, when endeavoring to formulate his philosophy of history, it will be necessary to leave aside the details of his historical investigations and the question of their validity or lack of validity.

For another thing, and connected with the previous difficulty, it is not always quite clear exactly where Krochmal's exposition of another man's philosophy ends and his own begins. Chapter XII, for example, delineates a general outline of Alexandrian, Jewish-Hellenistic philosophy which he on the whole rejects, to be sure, but which also contains, as we shall see, sufficient similarities to the Kabbalah and some aspects of his own thought to create some confusion. This same lack of clear distinctions becomes bothersome again in chapter XV which deals with Kabbalistic concepts. The highly controversial question regarding Krochmal's dependence on Hegel might in turn have been considerably assuaged if it were fully clear in chapter XVI where he is expressing his own views and where he is merely summarizing the then modern Hegelian metaphysics. And certainly in chapter XVII, which is a detailed study of the philosophical system of Abraham ibn Ezra, as conscientious a reader as J. L. Landau (4) presents his interpretation largely as if it were Krochmal's own thought, though Krochmal explicitly states that

"when we give the references (to Ibn Ezra) at the end of the chapter it will be seen that we have not deviated from Ibn Ezra's intention by adding anything that he did not mean." (5)

The last significant difficulty is that in the accepted, western sense of the word the "Guide" is not really primarily meant to be a book of philosophy. Its main title, "Guide of the Perplexed of the Time", by its allusion to Maimonides' "Guide of the Perplexed" which certainly is a strictly philosophical work, refers to those of its aspects which are primarily philosophical; its sub-title, however, "Teacher of a Purified Faith and Instructor in the Wisdom of Israel" refers to two other types of interest which are represented in it: the "wisdom of Israel" is, of course, what the Germans called the Wissenschaft des Judentums, - and this philological type of learning has already been mentioned (6) -, while the "purified faith" refers to the pedagogical trend of the book which we shall notice very frequently throughout it,- which, indeed, pervades it from beginning to end, and which pursues essentially a religiously reformist tendency. (7) Krochmal was interested in advocating a doctrinal and practical purification of the Judaism that was maintained by almost all of his contemporaries in Eastern Europe on the basis of philosophy and a better knowledge of history. This very practical aim of his, which he set for himself perhaps partly as a result of the attacks which he underwent at the hands of some of the ultra-orthodox elements whom he liked to call "self-declared pietists", mitchasdim, (מתחסדים) often conflicts with the objective and non-partisan nature of philosophical speculation and exposition. The cool-headed reader cannot fail to feel that the "purified faith" -

aspect overshadows the "Guide of the Perplexed"-aspect of the book; indeed, the latter should be the sub-title rather than the former. All these factors, then, must be kept in mind and taken due account of when the strictly philosophical sequence of thoughts is to be traced.

2. Philosophical Basis

The pedagogical purpose of his study of history is clearly formulated by Krochmal in the very preface. He justifies it in terms of the historical conditionedness of the study of history itself, for, he says, the study and interpretation of historical documents differs in each age in accordance with the conditions of that age. The requirement of his own age, then, is "positive history", - i. e. above all the type of accurate factual research which will elucidate correct dates, authorship, textual interpretation, etc., and of which he gives abundant examples in his own work of history, in short: "to interpret and to investigate and to establish each matter in its proper time of composition." If a psalm, for example, stems from the exilic period, then its traditional Davidic origin must be shown to be erroneous, for otherwise the skeptics will mock Judaism for its scientific untrustworthiness and the orthodox will be ignorant of the truth and the full impact of the psalm's significance. Therefore, "such holy work, meaningful to the ears and to the heart of the present generation, will evoke in it every yearning, good, wisdom and righteousness, according to the needs of the times. This is something that cannot be accomplished by assigning the psalm to David at the rise of the morning-sun of the nation and of the

state..." (8) This, indeed, will be the refrain of the "Guide" in every chapter: in this era Jews themselves wish to get at the historical truth, and their desire must be sated if necessary at the expense of some traditional prejudices. But even if that were not so, it is still necessary to bring the historical truth to Jews, for the non-Jewish nations are producing scholars who are acquiring and publicizing the truth; living in their midst as we are such truth will reach our ears. Unless we come to terms with it in a positive manner our educated young men will learn to scorn Judaism, and our orthodox old men will be stranded in a world which has left them far behind. Hear it they will anyway; the only question is whether they will hear the historical truth in an antagonistic manner or as the result of their own positively oriented studies. Therefore, "it is much more dangerous to try to keep covered the known than to reveal the unknown." (9)

The study of history is thus commanded primarily in the interest of the welfare and protection of Judaism and the Jewish people. It is conceived of as a shield against the attacks of secular science and as a fence against the exodus of emancipated intellectuals. It has the earmarks of its time; the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah) (השכלה) is spilling over from Central Europe to Eastern Europe, Emancipation beckons from the West and is decoying many out of the rooms of Jewish learning into the universities (Solomon Maimon being the contemporary prototype), and the optimistic pedagogical temper of a Lessing is combined with the positive historical "spirit of the age" of the first half of the 19th century. (10)

In further pursuit of a definition of Jewish existence that would

be compatible with modern historical science and yet accord with Jewish historical continuity, Krochmal delineates three types of religion that are innately fallacious and that produce dangerous counter-reactions. Not uncharacteristically he gives each of them a German name, and when taken together they represent an exhaustive list of the pet-peeves of the age of enlightenment and rationalism: Schwaermerei, Aberglauben and Werkheiligkeit, - i.e. 1. "enthusiasm" which begins rationally enough with a rejection of the value of the senses but goes on to denigrate even reason, while it puts its faith solely in "soul states"; from there it proceeds to a belief in bodyless beings, angels, and strives to bring about a union between them and men; a holy book is endowed with secret meaning in each letter, and these secrets are regarded as the only and esoteric truth; finally, union with God Himself is aspired to, and in the process all concern for human and social needs, as normalized in ethics, is shed. (11) 2. "Superstition" in turn begins rationally enough with a recognition of human smallness and unworthiness but goes on to seek refuge with imaginary spirits and departed ancestors. 3. "The doctrine of the holiness of deeds alone" also begins properly by rejecting the emotionalism of the two first types of religion, but in despair of being able to arrive at a meaningful and acceptable system of doctrines it falls back on the practical obligations of hetoronomously given divine laws, concentrates on their fulfillment at the expense of an understanding of their spirit, and in its intellectual pessimism even goes so far as to surrender all belief in rational laws while boasting of those chukkoth (חוקות) of God "which Satan uses to trap people and at which the gentile nations laugh", - a legal credo quia absurdum. (12)

Obviously, these three types of religion will incite opposition, and not their least injurious effect is that the opposition to them tends to be as extreme and irrational as they themselves. "Enthusiasm" repells by its emotionalism and induces cynicism, a denial of the reality of all spirit; - "superstition" repells by its credulity and by way of reaction produces skepticism which will deny God Himself and the divinity of revelation; - and the exclusive stress on deeds is answered by extreme theoreticians who foreswear all action, content themselves with intellectual speculations and become moral passivists and quietists indifferent to the fate of the world and mankind. From each of these extremes, "let the man who seeks life save himself!" (13)

Having posed the problem of rational Jewish existence as confronted by modern historical science in German, Philosophic, Hellenic terms, Krochmal, who always assumes a complete equivalence, translates them into traditional Jewish terms. He subdivides Maimonides' theology (chochmat hatorah)(חכמת התורה) into three sections: 1. The study of the nature of spirit and of reason and their occurrence in reality (ma'aseh merkavah), (מעשה מרכבה) metaphysics, 2. the study of the nature of the world (ma'aseh bereshit) (מעשה בראשית) i.e. cosmogony, and cosmology and natural science, and 3. the study of the nature of Revelation and of man (ta'ame demizvoth), (טעמי המצות) i.e. theology, psychology and ethics. The three aberrations of religion and their antitheses previously formulated are each respectively distortions of these three philosophic orientations. (14)

At this point in his argument Krochmal suddenly changes his position. Hitherto he has pursued what may be called a taxology of religious aberrations. Suddenly, in the middle of this pursuit and in the

middle of a chapter initially devoted to that purpose, he begins a lengthy, though not too profound or detailed, epistemological argument. Only at the end of that argument will we see its relevance to the original problem and the relevance of that problem itself to his first main object: an outline of a philosophy of history.

The basic fact to be considered, he begins, is this: "Know you that the very principle of reason is that man's work, unlike that of animals, consists of taking sensual images that are transmitted to him from outside of the soul or from the soul itself and to make of them concepts, i.e. images that are generalized, unified and which unite with others." (15) All human beings engage in this process of conceptualization. The more educated a man is the more will he generalize even his initial concepts, while the less educated a man is the more will he be limited to "images of the beginnings of thought." (Tziyure techillat hamachashavah)(ציורי תחלת המחשבה) "The principle is that it is of the very nature of the spirit of reason to build its edifice in a world which is entirely rational, takes the material for the edifice from the sensual world and gives it its own form." The ladder of conceptualization begins on the lowest rung with concepts just barely stripped of their material content, "images of the beginning of thought" or Vorstellungen (and Krochmal uses this and the following German termini technici); these concepts when further generalized are called Begriffe, and these in turn lead up to "ideas" (Ideen) which are, as he explains in another place (16), combinations of concepts which in their totality do not refer to any sensual images, such as goodness, justice, etc. (17) However sketchy this epistemology is, its essentially Kantian character

is obvious on the face of it. (18) In another connection Krochmal reads the same epistemology into Abraham Ibn Ezra's philosophy: the principle of knowledge resides in the reason, not in the senses. The reason acts to abstract from its first impression the form and the attributes which are peculiar to it, e.g., a house which it has seen and holds on only to that which is needed for the idea of a house in general, which thus becomes a rational possession to which it has attained. Abstraction and rationalization of existent things are processes that have for their purpose the knowing of the essences of these things, of the relation of their order, of the laws of their development and of the ways of their activities. Since these concepts and laws appertain exclusively to the reason they do not fall under the category of time but are essentially eternal. Vulgar people may claim that they are not real but rather creations of the human mind, but all philosophers know ("and in this all philosophical systems agree and differ only in the extent of its conscious realization and of its introduction into all parts of the system") that the "realities" of the empirical world, constantly in flux, are not at all real, cannot claim the real attributes of being or of existence when compared with the stability and unchangeability of concepts. (19)

Having again, through the philosophies of Kant and the Platonic-Aristotelian Ibn Ezra, dealt in the terminology of Hellenistic Europe, as in the previous instance (20) Krochmal once more switches to Jewish terminology in order to prove its validity in the area of Jewish traditional thought. (21) After all, he declares, this process of conceptualization and generalization is exactly what the Talmud used in the explanation and elaboration of Biblical laws. By means of the hermen-

eutic rules it discovered the underlying principles of Biblical institutions, disrobed them of their temporally and spatially conditioned details and then applied these principles to the new times and to new places. Examples of this type of interpretation can be given abundantly from each of the six orders of the Talmud. And if the ancient rabbis considered it necessary to handle in such a manner the laws of Judaism, which are concerned only with concrete actions and are well defined, how much more is it necessary to treat the problems of faith, attitudes and morals similarly, for they are, when all is said and done, the spirit and purpose and justification of these laws! Thus it is false to claim that Judaism is only concerned with legal studies. These philosophic, conceptualizing activities are "the glory of the essence of spirituality and of its true life." (22)

To be sure, this is a process which is not only very difficult and demanding because of its philosophic abstractness but it is also subject to many pitfalls, mistakes and errors. All sorts of extraneous factors are liable to spoil the purity of the chain of conceptualization: "lust, hate, desire for honor or for office, excessive self-love which does not take regard for others" etc. may mar the workings of the intellect. These sensual and worldly intrusions into the functions of reason Krochmal interestingly ascribes to the progress of history in what is the first observation in the "Guide" that can be called a concept of philosophical history: "Only in the beginning of recorded time, when human needs were still few, easily satisfied and clearly known to men, when men did not yet demand many accountings (i.e. intellectual explanations) and forsook the permitted without recognizing it, - then the heart was

perfect and thought was pure of all the psychological evils which accompany the permitted." Only with the progress and differentiation of civilization did the latter come about and distort rational processes. (23) But despite these dangers, conceptualization is still the only road of progress in history and toward the truth.

It was believed at one point that (and here the two strains of thought, the taxology of false religions and epistemology merge) the path of virtue was the golden medium between the two extremes. With few changes Maimonides accepted that view from Aristotle. In accordance with that view true religion would have to lie midway between the extremes of enthusiasm and cynicism, superstition and skepticism, Werkheiligkeit and quietism. But later philosophers of ethics soon pointed out that, in the first place, the maxim of the medium road gives little, if any, aid in determing where exactly this middle is located and that, in the second place, it is an empty formula which defines virtue only negatively and, as it were, geometrically rather than assigning to it some definite content. These philosophers proposed instead to define virtue in terms of maxims, true or false rational principles of action. But this, too, turned out to be an empty formula, for it is easier to say that morals must be determined by the reason than actually to determine by the reason how men should specifically act. "As for us, we wish to chose for our investigation an higher and better road so that we may come to the fundamental source and the beginnings of things in such a manner that these problematic, false religions will be explained and their opposite dangers automatically avoided..... This better road is the one which in fact combines the two extremes"

rather than avoiding them half-way. (24)

With this statement Krochmal ends chapter IV of the "Guide," and it is natural to ask that he specify what this road is. As the read progresses in the book he has to wait, however, until he comes to chapter VI to find the direct continuation of the thought and the answer to this question. This writer, therefore, suggests that chapter V is an interpolation put in the wrong place, or at least in an illogical place, by the editor Zunz. This suggestion gains plausibility in view of Zunz' own statement (25) that he "found chapters V and XII only in the form of first drafts, and furthermore only a few of the chapters were numbered in the author's manuscript." Nonetheless, if only in order to preserve the continuity of the presentation of the system as presented in the printed versions of the "Guide", as well as for the innate interest of the chapter, we shall summarize it here shortly simply by way of a separate philosophic fragment:

Chapter V is, in effect, a discussion of purpose and teleology. Krochmal uses it in order, by way of introduction, to introduce to his Jewish readers some "general historical cultural knowledge", as he might have called it. He recites that the Greek philosopher-doctor Galen had argued against the Biblical concepts of purpose and intention in a book on "The Usefulness of the Limbs of Living Beings." Maimonides, the Jewish philosopher-doctor, had refuted Galen's arguments, but he did so in a technical medical book which was never translated from its arabic original and never published. Krochmal takes it upon himself, therefore, if only to rescue this work of Maimonides' from the obscurity of history, to state its views: it is assumed, in the first place, that every natural

object has a cause. This assumption is not by any means sufficient, however, to prove the existence of God on the basis that He is presumably the necessary cause of the physical universe, since the universe could also have a "mechanical", unintentional, unconscious cause. For a cause to be intentional it must, in the first place, be outside of the object which it causes - outside and beyond it. It must, in the second place, be a real cause and not only an intentional cause projected by the mind of the observer, through the logical fallacy of anthropomorphism, to the object. In the third place, in order to be intentional it must be rational, because intention is a rational calculation as to the relationship between cause and effect. Finally, before one can ascribe the existence of an object to a rational, intentional cause, one must be able to prove that the existence of a mechanical cause would not be sufficient to explain the existence of that object. Now, it is only things which possess limbs and parts which serve other parts of those things that satisfy all these requirements for the stipulation of an intentional causality. Such organic things can, in fact, be explained in no other way, for each constituent part within them, if it were placed in a slightly altered position or given a slightly different function, would disrupt the whole. For that reason alone, therefore, a conscious, rational and purposive cause must be believed to have constructed them. Furthermore, the fact that they are living and that they perpetuate themselves species-wise are evidence to the same effect. In a Kantian sense it is interesting to note that Krochmal describes this entire function of rational purpose in its relationship to differentiated organisms as one of "uniting" or "unifying" them. From the purposive-

ness of organic individuals we conclude to the purposiveness of the organic universe, for it, too, is unified, living and composite, and in it lower forms always serve their respective higher forms of being.

Now philosophers are wont to ascribe purpose to matter; so Aristotle will speak of the soul of growing or the soul of living within matter. But, of course, matter can neither think nor will. And Judaism, therefore, speaks of the "God of the spirits of all flesh." "The short of it is that due to all these considerations we must arrive at the conclusion that there is a rational, spiritual beginning which is above matter and the sensual." (26)

It is not too hard to see why Zunz felt that he should put this chapter immediately ahead of that chapter which would first deal with genuine religion, for, as we have now seen, it, in fact, constitutes Krochmal's proof for the existence of God, - surely an argument that one could expect prior to a discussion of religion.

Before we proceed, it is still worth noting, however, that at this point in the argument Krochmal implies an argument against Maimonides as being too rationalistic! Maimonides had stated, so he says, that according to Galen the Bible teaches that God can also do the rationally impossible, whereas he, the Greek philosopher, would claim that also God can only act within the limits of reason, and that His only alternative is to chose that rational possibility which is appropriate to the purpose for which it is intended. Maimonides answers that Galen has misrepresented the Bible: also the Bible agrees that God can only chose one of many rational possibilities. The only difference which Maimonides grants to exist between the Greek philosopher and the Bible refers to the range

of rational possibilities: for one who believes in the eternity of matter creation and annihilation of the world are impossible as well as miracles, for they would contradict the rational potentialities of pre-existent matter; for one, however, who rejects the doctrines of the eternity of matter and of creation by emanation these three things are perfectly possible and rational. (27) - Krochmal implies that Maimonides conceded too much to Galen by granting that God cannot do the impossible. This anti-Maimonidean objection of his, which surely brings him closer to anti-philosophic Jewish orthodoxy, should haunt him, - but apparently does not-, when he comes later (28) to defend Ibn Ezra's emanationalist theory of creation.

We can now return to the straight line of Krochmal's argument. (Chapter VI) Last he had claimed that there was a better way than the classic middle-road to transcend false religion and its dangers. He must now specify what that way is. (29)

His answer begins by stipulating that all religion, true and false, past and present, means to address itself to Spirit. Another way of saying the same thing would be to say that all religion intends God, whether it succeeds in its intention or not. The spiritual intention expresses itself in one way even in idolatry which, after all, does not really mean to worship an object but the spirit which manifests itself through that object; it expresses itself in another way when, for example, Jewish sages used to say that all Biblical laws are obligatory not because of any rationality that may be inherent in them but only because of their divine origin, - which was, Krochmal explains, their way of stating that their value derives from their directedness to God.

(30) In this worship of Spirit, however they may define it, religionists of all persuasions, scientists and philosophers then agree. (31) From this initial definition Krochmal can go on to give a basic definition of religion in its theoretical as well as practical aspects which is as broadly liberal as it is fundamentally incontrovertible: "The recognition of the believer that everything is meaningless and senseless except it be founded on God, this is the knowledge of God; and the believer's recognition that he himself, in his essence and spirituality, is dear to God, can draw near to Him, and that by drawing near to Him he can establish himself, this is the service of God."

The broad, general nature of this definition, whatever its practical value may be for Krochmal, is of crucial importance to his philosophic argument, for it is the penultimate step in his epistemological answer to the question how true religion can be found in a way other than that of the Aristotelian middle between two extremes: this definition is obviously a generalized, conceptualized description of all positive religions. He can, thus, draw the conclusion to which he has long and circuitously worked up: even as sensual perceptions, in order to gain rational validity, must be increasingly conceptualized - in accordance with the Kantian epistemology which we have already laid down (32) -, so also positive religion must be conceptualized, spiritualized, purified, in order to become increasingly valid and true. Religion, too, like perceptions, must be raised on the epistemological ladder from the rung of the sensual (Empfindung), over the rung of understanding (Verstand) to the height of reason (Vernunft). At this point Krochmal lays down this doctrine without any explicit reference to the problem

he raised so many pages ago (33), but clearly this is his answer: by generalizing, conceptualizing positive religion with all its aberrations he will be able to do what he promised to do, namely to establish true religion not by measuring whether it is equi-distant from the two extremes of false religion but by stripping these two extremes of their errors in details and combining the "true beginnings" which he has pointed out to exist in both. Thus from "enthusiasm", for example, he would, no doubt, abstract the error of emotionalism and the transcendence over terrestrial existence,-from its opposite danger of "cynicism" he would abstract the denial of spirit, - and from each respectively he would preserve as their essence the revulsion against the sensual and the denial of dogmatic spiritual hypostases.

This is one of the most important junctures in Krochmal's system, and we must, therefore, stop to explore the implications of this result. In the first place, and because of its immediately practical aspect perhaps the least important facet of this view, we notice the historical "toleration" which espresses itself here,-very much in the spirit of Vico who looked at all historical religions as steps in the progress of the human mind (34), of a Hegel who followed in Vico's footsteps (35), of the end-of-18th-century rationalism and 19th century romanticism which, like Herder, detected the spark of divinity in all positive religions and rejected the exclusiveness of dogmatic religions in their claim to sole revealed authority. In this definition of Krochmal we have the Jewish translation of 19th-century-Enlightenment-tolerance. In the second place, and systematically much more important, we face here Krochmal's definition of the "purified faith" of the title of his

book and of his essentially reformist tendency. The purified faith is the conceptualized faith, and reform meant for him conceptualization. In view of this result it is not too hard to understand why orthodox religious authorities in his age as well as in other ages have always looked askance at the philosophizing of even the most orthodox.

We have already noticed that due to his somewhat circumstantial and circuitous reasoning it is sometimes hard to predict to exactly what result a certain train of thought will lead in Nachman Krochmal. In this case, for example, the combination of Kantian epistemology with a taxology of false religion led to a definition of the "reformed" faith which is not too different from other forms of 19th century intellectualized religion, the "higher religion" of a Hegel and even of a Comte. Here, too, obscure as it may yet appear to be, the definition of conceptualized religion is the last step before Krochmal can logically begin his philosophy of history in earnest. But before we take that next step with him we must still state two more implications of this definition which he himself adumbrates.

Conceptualization of religion means a fuller, philosophic understanding of all aspects of religion, including the knowledge of God. To use his own words, "intellectualization is the perfecting of the internal substance of the matter (36), i.e. the spiritual becoming known to itself." (37) The blatantly Hegelian formulation of this dictum is further elaborated when Krochmal goes on to state (38) that in the case of God Himself this process of gaining self-knowledge, through the three steps of existing essence, self-knowledge and self-revelation, are not three different entities but one and unified. This is obviously a ver-

sion of Hegel's Beziehungsloses Sein, Fuer-Andere-Sein and Fuer-Sich-Sein (Unrelated Being, Being-for-others and Being-for-oneself), the three steps in the dialectic of ontology which Krochmal himself will attempt to expound in his chapter on Hegel. (39) But the Jewish philosopher immediately stresses the unity of these three aspects as if to proclaim that, whatever else he may accept from the non-Jewish philosopher, he certainly will not accept the clearly Christian, trinitarian overtones of this doctrine. (40)

He is less immune to possible objections of Christianizing when he seeks positively for Jewish terms for this doctine of "spiritualization." Kodesh ("holy") (קדש) means permanent and therefore spiritual, he declares, - chol ("secular") (חול) means physical, bodily and therefore transitory, - while tame ("impure") (טמא) means "crudely, crassly sensate", - and tahor ("pure") (טהור) means "spiritualized, enlightened body", i.e. matter suffused with spirit or "dark body which refines itself into spiritual clarity." (41) One can see how, by means of such a subtle re-definition of traditional Biblical and Jewish terms, all the laws of holiness and purity can be interpreted as idealistic, anti-materialistic injunction, but one may also wonder whether this is not carrying Hellenistic Paulinianism pretty far within the realm of Judaism.

Finally, it must be stressed that Krochmal tries hard to identify this doctrine of the "purified (conceptualized) faith" with the tradition of historical Judaism, - as innovators in and outside of Judaism have always done. He does this by strongly implying that his interpretation is identical with the Sod, (סוד) the secret, esoteric strain of the faith.

At this point in the argument chapter VI ends. Chapter VII begins in medias re and plunges directly into history and its philosophy. As before, the transitional step in the argument is left out, intentionally or otherwise. (Krochmal's method does, indeed, often approach the method of half-implied, half-expressed esoteric teachings.) But this transitional argument is clearly implied, and it constitutes the second crucial juncture is his system: conceptualized religion, the "purified faith", requires an understanding of the history of the faith and its people which in turn is freed of traditional prejudices and biases, which is itself intellectualized, which is philosophized. Otherwise the people will continue to be stuck in the swamp of ignorant, unscientific superstitions. Since the "Guide for the Perplexed of the Time" is primarily a philosophical history, it may thus rightly be said that the first six chapters of the book, the "philosophical chapters", are an apologia for the philosophical history which is to follow them. Krochmal has now established his philosophical right and the religious need for a philosophy of history. They are both required by the necessities of the "purified faith", and the philosophy of history, therefore, basically serves this pedagogical purpose. All this has been preface; what is to follow, the chapters dealing systematically with the presentation of the structure and the content of the philosophy of history, are the heart of the matter.

3. The Course of History

"To the animals, Krochmal begins, loneliness is natural and sociability only accidental," but "Providence" has made man different. Man is, to use the famous Aristotelian term which best characterizes Kroch-

mal's thought, (42) the "social animal" who naturally bands himself together in social units, beginning with the family all the way up to the entity of the nation. These social organizations of mankind make possible a division and consequent specialization of labor among human individuals, and this division and specialization in turn makes possible the gradual development of higher qualities like love, mercy, honor, and humility as well as of such activities as go beyond the primitive accumulation of food and shelter: thought, the pursuit of beauty, religion, education, and law. Such achievements are attained gradually either by individuals who then transmit them to their social groups, by specially developed groups, or sometimes even by strangers to the community to which they transmit it such "as Abraham and Melchizedek." The speed of the development of such traits will, of course, differ among different nations and even within the same nation among themselves. (43)

Nonetheless, however different and differently developed these various higher traits may be within one nation, they all derive from one basic source; they are all the manifestations of one single force. "They have one principle and one root, and that is the spirituality (ruchaniuth)(רוחניות) of the nation which emerges from potentiality into actuality." It is this "spirit (ruach)(רוח)of the nation" (we would perhaps say: the genius, the soul of the nation) which determines the nature of its individual characteristics, as the "personality" of an individual is said to determine its traits. (44) It expresses itself in all the activities of the nation, law, education, religion, war and peace, and in its very history. Though sometimes it may be difficult to decide exactly which is the basic "national spirit", there can be no

doubt that it is the fundamental cause of all the multifold material and spiritual activities of the nation. It is, as it were, the national noumenon to the national phenomena. (45)

This national spirit is comparable to the "soul" of an individual not only in that it constitutes the core of its personality but also in that it has a life-cycle like that of the individual. "Even as the spirit of a nation will perfect itself and grow in the manner which we have explained (i.e. through its process of specialization and individuation) in its morning-period, so it will also deteriorate and shrink when the shadows of evening fall, until it dies completely and the fine qualities of the nation will perish one after the other. "This is so because, as luxury and favoritism increase in the nation, also the love of pleasure will increase; thought will become subservient to the senses and their enjoyment; - pride, ambition, quarrels, violence, bribery and contempt for the law will flourish." "As the hearts divide, so the minds divide." Superstition and false religion will gain sway, and "the knowledge and service of God will be darkened and confused." "Thus it is that only the spirituality, and it alone, brings into existence and maintains the ties (of the nation) while it is a nation, and, therefore, in truth, the essence of a nation, that which makes it a nation, is only the spirituality within it." (46)

It is, of course, true that spirit as such is not subject to the effects of time, growth and decay, but the people and the people's physical forms in which the spirit dwells are perishable. When the people dies, its spirit is invariably transferred to another people adjacent to it in space or time. In the case of small nations this trans-

fer of a spirituality is either not noticeable at all or almost imperceptible, but in the case of great nations their spiritualities in this wise become "the inheritance of the entire human race and a general, human spirituality." These national spirits are in the Bible called "gods of the nations" or "princes of the nation". As a king unites and unifies a people externally, so its spirit unites and unifies its people internally. These spirits, or basic characters, may be belligerence, ingenousness, thought, grace, law, wilyness, knowledge etc. And they have been traditionally associated with one of the stars in an astrological manner. (47)

As for Israel, its spirituality, god, prince or principle is no such fragmentary and therefore relative deity. It is possessed by "the absolute spirituality, besides which there is no other, the source of all spiritual reality and the universal prince." Other spiritualities exist only by virtue of their participation in the universal and absolute one. It, in turn, has chosen Israel as a "kingdom of priests, i.e. teachers to the entire human race of the absolute, Biblical faith." And Israel is, therefore, not subject to any stellar influences (ayn masal leyisrael) (עין משל לישראל) but only to those of the Lord of the stars. Philosophically speaking, "absolute spirituality" "is a concept of the pure reason alone" (hu musag habeenah hatehorah levad) (הוא משג הבינה הטהורה לבד) and "the greatest concept." (48) "If you wish to realize simultaneously how difficult this thought is and how easy, notice that even Israel which stood on Sinai and heard it did not, as a whole and in general, understand it in its pure truth until approximately the time of the return from the Babylonian exile, i.e. until 1000 years had passed

since the giving of the Torah." (49)

This, summarized in chapter VII of the "Guide of the Perplexed of the Time," is in effect a statement of Krochmal's complete philosophy of history. It is the only place where he sketches his view of the history of mankind as a whole and of Israel in particular. The rest of his major work will from now on be taken up with a detailed elucidation of the principle of Jewish history here laid down in broad strokes. Except for details of historiography an evaluation and criticism of his views can be made on the basis of this statement alone. We shall, however, delay such an evaluation and criticism until all the facts, even the details, have been presented. Nonetheless, a number of points must even now be emphasized, a number of connections and historical relations illuminated, so that the further course of Krochmal's thinking can be followed with a full realization of its implications.

In the first place, the basic kinship between this philosophy of human and Jewish history and that of Yehudah HaLevy cannot possibly be mistaken. (50) The latter also taught that the fate of the nations of the world was bound up with the determination of the stellar, sub-lunar world (51) to which all normal earthly existence was subject, except for Israel which differed from the other nations as do men from animals and animals from plants by virtue of their possession of the "divine substance" (inyan haeloki). (ענין האלקי) This substance was part of the Godhead Himself and connected Israel directly to Him while exempting it from what is otherwise "natural law." (52) The "divine substance" inhering in the Jewish people is really only a more concretized form of Krochmal's "absolute spirit", and what Heinemann says of the one is e-

qually true of the other: "Jehuda Halevi's nationalism is nurtured in the soil of Greek biology." (53)

It is this biologism, consisting of the basic thought that nations are analogous to human individuals and that their histories are like the latter's lives, which constitutes a bridge between Halevy, Vico and Krochmal. Vico, too, taught that societies grow like biological organisms. (54) "Through this science (history) we can answer the practical question how a nation in its rise may come to a state of perfection and how in its decadence it may be stimulated to new life." (55) And apart from this cyclical theory of history which seems, wherever it occurs, to be the specific form of a general biological bias, whether one think of the three philosophers just mentioned or contemporary figures like Spengler and Toynbee, it is interesting to notice that, at least in the case of these three classic writers, they also share the common belief that Israel alone is in one way or another exempt from the laws of history which govern all other nations. Also the Christian Vico explicity espouses this doctrine. (56)

In regard to the concept of absolute spirit, as it enters into Krochmal's definition of Israel's unique place in the scheme of history, a clear,though rarely if ever noticed, further connection with mediaeval Jewish and general philosophic concepts can be observed. Is not the doctrine that Israel survives the periodicity of historical developments from birth to death due to its possession by the Absolute Spirit exactly the same as the scholastic, Aristotelian doctrine of the "conjunction" according to which immortality is attained by attaching oneself to the Active Intellect? The only difference between the two doctrines is that

the mediaeval counterpart thinks in terms of other-worldly survival while Krochmal thinks in terms of historical survival and that the former usually thinks in terms of human individuals while the latter thinks in terms of social units. This latter difference, however, is really not additional to but a part of the first, since obviously this-worldly, historical survival would have to transpire in historical, not individual categories. Furthermore, Yehudah HaLevy actually does claim, even as does Krochmal, that the peculiarity of Israel is due to its attachment to the Absolute Spirit (57), so that even collective conjunctio is not without historical precedent. (58)

What should finally be noticed is again the profound intellectual affinity between Krochmal's substantative definition of Israel's historical role and that of his contemporary German-Jewish reformers. He says: Israel is to be "a kingdom of priests, i.e. teachers to the human race of the absolute Biblical faith." (59) This differs little, if at all, from the typical, enlightened and liberal conception of Israel's task in the world as it was propounded at the time in leading Jewish circles in Germany, and it fits in very well with the general pedagogical tenor of Krochmal's entire orientation: he wishes to teach Israel, so that Israel may teach the world.

It is, in any case, the biological life-cycle of nations from which Israel alone is exempt which Krochmal pursues further. Each nation, so he proclaims, goes through a cycle of three periods: 1. "the time of its beginning, blossoming-forth and when its spirit is born. This is called "the period of blossoming-forth and of growth into a nation." " 2. "After all the good orders and spiritual gifts have come into perfect actuality,

been perfected and raised, the nation has grown in all respects to the point of glory and magnificence for a longer or shorter time; this is called "the period of strength and accomplishment."" 3. "However, as in the being of every natural living organism is contained the cause of its own annihilation and death, so still during the second period the causes of the downfall and perdition of the nation are created..." This is called "the period of disintegration and destruction". (60) "Thus it is with all the nations whose spirituality is particularistic and, therefore, finite and destined for destruction. But in regard to our nation, although insofar as it is tied down to materiality and sensual externality we, too, are subject to the natural orders, ...the general spirituality which is in our midst protects us and saves us from the law governing all changeable things." (61) Israel's exemption from the laws of growth and decay is not to be understood as complete in the sense that it does not run the same course of rises and falls. It, too, after all, is "subject to the natural orders" and, therefore, goes through the cycle of three periods. The exemption consists of the circumstance that, due to the indwelling of the Absolute Spirit in it, at the end of the cycle, at the point at which other nations disappear into oblivion, it re-commences a new such cycle. "We intend to chronicle the times that have passed over us from the period of the blossoming-forth of the nation to this day in order to show clearly how the cycle of three periods was duplicated and tripled for us and how, when the time was ripe for our disintegration, annihilation and destruction, a new spirit and forgiveness were always renewed in us, and when we fell how we always arose again and were fortified, and the Lord our God did not forsake us." (62) Israel's eternity is thus not an eternity beyond

time but within it and, therefore, within history.

This doctrine, that Israel survives the point in time at which it conveys its one great idea to mankind as whole, directly contradicts Hegel's famous principle that "when, thus, the peculiarity of a people has been lifted by an idea,-when the idea has developed so far that the peculiar principle of a people is no longer essential,-then this people can no longer exist.....World-history then moves to another people." (63) As Franz Rosenzweig correctly pointed out, however: (64) "With such a view of the relationship between peoplehood and humanity no Jewish science, for which Judaism is an eternal factor, could compromise."

Anticipating the details of this historical structure we can state Krochmal's periodization of Jewish history in accordance with this scheme as follows: I. First cycle: 1. first period of blossoming-forth: from Abraham to the death of Moses, c. 465 years; (65) 2. second period, of full maturity and magnificence: from the entry into Canaan to the death of Solomon, c. 477 years; (66) 3. third period, of decline and degeneration: from the death of Solomon to the murder of Gedalyah, c. 375 years, and therewith the end of the first cycle. (67) II. Second cycle: 1. first period of second cycle, of growth: from the destruction of the first temple (68) to the rise of Greece, c. 280 years; (69) 2. second period of second cycle, of maturity and magnificence: from Alexander the Great to the fall of the Hasmonean dynasty, c. 260 years; (70) 3. third period of second cycle, of decline and degeneration: from the death of queen Alexandra to the fall of Betar in the Bar-Kochba revolt, c. 210 years, and therewith the end of the second cycle. (71) The rest of the story Krochmal merely summarizes in a couple of sen-

tences rather than detailing the events of the individual cycles and periods as he had done up to now, and he says: "We cannot now finish the story and the interpretation of the following generations, although also future events transpire according to the pattern of our thought, - the only difference being that the periods are longer in extent, different in character, and a different spirit prevails in them substantatively." He does, however, give some details as to the periodization of the third cycle: 1. first period of third cycle, of growth: from Antoninus to the beginning of the Gaonic period; 2. second period of third cycle, of maturity and magnificence: the Gaonic period, c. 740 C.E. through the Golden Age of Spain; 3. third period of third cycle, of decline and degeneration: from the death of Maimonides until shortly after 1640, the period of the European expulsions and the Chmelnitzky pogroms, and therewith the end of the third cycle. Krochmal adds: "The interpretation of all these is important and valuable, so that from them we can learn regarding our end. (be'acharitenu) (באחריתנו) There is still much room for interpreters to work in." (72)

The most important question that must be asked about this periodization is what Krochmal intended to do with the history which followed the end of his third cycle. It would, off-hand, certainly appear as if he had intended to integrate it somehow into his system, for he spoke of wishing to chronicle the history of Israel "to this day". (73) And though he nowhere makes any reference whatsoever to the ensuing history in philosophical terms (although, of course, he does mention historical figures of more recent times), one might easily enough deduce from his philosophical premises that he must have believed himself to live in one

of the cycles which would follow the third one. After all, it is the Absolute Spirit, itself not subject to the vissicitudes of time, which again and again elevates Israel above the inroads of natural degeneration. Indeed, Rawidowicz believes that such is the case: "It is impossible, according to Krochmal's theory, to exclude the coming of new "cycles" from the incessant current of Jewish existence. . . It is given to Krochmal's followers to divide the years 1700-1940 (the time of Rawidowicz's writing) into one cycle or two." (74) Rawidowicz, the outstanding student of Krochmal's writings, certainly deserves serious consideration. On the other hand, equally good reasons can be brought forward which would make one believe that the sequence of cycles may have, in Krochmal's mind, ended with the third. For one thing, and as a matter of cold, documented fact, Krochmal nowhere mentions anything resembling a fourth cycle. Now it might be argued that, even as he never got around to detailing the third cycle, so he did not have the chance even to mention the fourth one. But, although it must, of course, be remembered that the "Guide" remained unfinished at his death and thus remained a torso, an "unfinished symphony", it would still be very extraordinary that nowhere in his notes should he even so much as have made mention of the occurrence of a fourth and possibly even a fifth cycle; it would have taken only a single phrase to do so. In the second place, however, the word "our end" (75), if taken, as it might be taken, in a technical sense, might make the student hesitate: in Biblical terminology "the end" means "the end of history". Could Krochmal, who was always exceedingly careful in the use of words, have meant it in the same significance? This possibility gains in likelihood when one considers

the temper of Krochmal's time: however much or little Hegel may have influenced him, the 16th chapter of the "Guide" proves beyond all doubt that he was quite well-known to him. Hegel, it is known, regarded himself as the apotheosis of the species of philosophers, his philosophy as the apotheosis of philosophy, the Prussian State of his time as the apotheosis of history and thus his own time as the "time of the end." Hegel's third cycle in the development of religion, for example, he regarded as the last and a final consummation. (76) This was the peculiar, secularized version of 19th-century pseudo-messianism. The French Revolution, the increasing political emancipation of men in Europe, the tearing-down of the ghettowalls around the Jewish people, widening education, and the rising tide of romantic, universalistically inclined, liberal-minded nationalisms throughout the continent, convinced many people, particularly Western-European Jews with whom Krochmal was intellectually so closely connected, that the final era of universal peace and brotherhood had dawned. It is, therefore, not at all inconceivable that also Krochmal might have regarded his own time as the end of time. Add to this the fact that, as we have already seen, the Hegelian predilection for triads also characterizes Krochmal's thought,- and it cannot be gainsaid that a good case could also be made out for the proposition that Krochmal may have thought of the fourth cycle, in which he himself lived, as not so much a continuation of the previous three as rather their consummation. Certainly Rawidowicz' alternative that he might have believed himself to live already in the fifth cycle (77) is completely excluded by his own statement that as time went on the periods and cycles grew longer in extent, and, therefore, the fourth

cycle, if indeed there was to be one at all, must have been longer than its predecessor which lasted from early Roman times to c. 1700 C.E. The writer does not believe that this question, on the basis of the available evidence, can be decided. But certainly no dogmatic, definite statements about it ought to be made one way or the other. It ought to be recognized that both answers are possible. Surely, the mere possibility of such sober, semi-scientific millenarianism on the part of our thinker open all sorts of intriguing vistas!

The second most important question regarding the interpretation of Krochmal's periodization refers to the relationship of the three established periods to one another. It is certain that as they follow one after the other Krochmal also believed them to progress beyond their predecessor. "Here it is proper that we take cognizance of an notice the mighty difference between the spiritual quality of the nation in the times of the first cycle and its quality now (during the second cycle), and how gradually it revealed itself and strengthened itself in these (latter) days." (78) Indeed, all the descriptions of the second cycle are couched in much more glowing and admiring language than those of the first, - which is the more noteworthy as they deal, after all, mostly with post-Biblical events. And again: "Israel experienced no more precious era than this (the second cycle) from the time that it became a nation to this time." (79) This implied belief in progress harmonizes well with our author's general and previously noted biological bias, though it goes too far to claim, as does Katsh (80), that Krochmal held to an unambiguous view of history as progress, for, when all is said and done, the Absolute Spirit would, presumably, continue to be the

exclusive possession of Israel and could not be transferred to other nations, - and thus "progress" would have to transpire within very definite limits. Katsh is right, on the other hand, in recognizing that some process of increasing self-consciousness is involved in the course of historical progress as Krochmal perceives it, though he,too, does not locate the crucial phrase which occurs in the "Guide": (81) "This is the great principle, that the existence of a certain spirituality in any nation is not sufficient; the nation must also be clearly aware of its existence." (82) The German idealist tinge, even the Hegelian category of self-consciousness is unmistakable at this point. The stage at which Being becomes Being-for-itself in Hegel's metaphysics is delineated by Krochmal himself (83) and is the stage of Being's self-consciousness. A closer analogy yet than the Hegelian one is the similarity of this concept of the self-consciousness of a nation's spirit with the second rung on the ladder of the Philonic, Alexandrian and later mediaeval, Platonizing hirarchy of logoi, that rung, towit, on which Absolute Being "looks at itself", becomes aware of itself and thus creates the first subsidiary form of Being. Krochmal goes to considerable length in expounding the doctrines of the original Hellenistic as well as of the later scholastic Platonizers, (84) and we shall demonstrate later (85) that he must have done so out of a feeling for the essential kinship of his own thought with theirs, - however unlikely this combination of 19th century critical historicist and ancient mystical Platonizers may at first glance seem.

The question that must be asked, however, in this connection is: if each of the three cycles is somewhat higher that its predecessor,

what is the relationship of their individual sub-periods? Is, for example, the first period of the second cycle higher only than the first period of the first cycle? Is it higher also than the second period of the first cycle? Or, for that matter, is the third period of each cycle higher or lower than or on the same level as its respective first period? These may appear to be trivial question, and, in fact, Krochmal nowhere enters into a discussion of them. They are, however, of some relevance to our first question, whether there were to be other cycles after the third one. In line with Krochmal's organic, biological trend of thought, it can be taken for granted that, as the commentators point out in unison (86), neither the periods nor the cycles are related to one another in a dialectical manner. There is nothing antithetical about the second periods and cycles and nothing synthetical about the third ones. Rather, as the original simile clearly indicates, they grow out of one another continuously as maturity follows youth and senility follows maturity. If, on the other hand, the third periods revert back to the level of the first periods, as there is nothing before birth and nothing after death, then one might also assume that by the same token the third cycle reverts back to the level of the first. This is not impossible, in view of the fact that Krochmal indicates the superiority of the second cycle over the first but not of the third over the second. In that case, not only is Katsh's thesis of Krochmal's doctrine of uninterrupted progress even further demolished but also additional testimony is adduced to make the possibility of a regular fourth cycle more unlikely. The two possibilities can be visualized diagrammatically:



As in the case of the first question, this writer does not believe that the available evidence enables us to come to any definite decision as to which of these possibilities Krochmal himself actually adhered to. And even the striking similarity between Krochmal and Vico on this point does not help us any further, for also with regard to Vico, whom, according to Buber (87), Krochmal "follows", this question has been asked and only speculatively answered by Croce: Croce describes the problem of the Vico-interpretation in these words: (88) "nor is decadence inevitable if statesmen and philosophers working in harmony can preserve the perfection that has been reached and check the threatened destruction... (89) And Croce asks: can this process of recurring rhythms go beyond Christianity, as Vico sees it? He answers: "On the whole (90) it is probable that the difficulty of determining Vico's opinion as to the fate of contemporary society is due to the fact that he had really no settled

conviction on the subject and was led hither and thither in various and contrary directions by the influence of hopes and fears...But since the nature of the mind which underlies these cycles is outside time and therefore exists in every moment of time, we must not exaggerate the difference of the periods...The reflux of history, the eternal cycle of the mind, can and must be conceived, even if Vico does not so express it, as not merely diverse in its uniform movements but as perpetually increasing in richness and outgrowing itself, so that the new period (of sense) is really enriched by all the intellect and all the development that preceded it, and the same is true of the new period (of imagination or of the developed mind.).....His philosophy, while it attains the lofty vision of the process of mind in obedience to its own laws, nevertheless retains by reason of this failure to apprehend the progressive enrichment of reality an element of sadness and desolation." (1)

We have quoted Krochmal to the effect that as time went by the periods and cycles grew in length. (91) In this connection it is interesting to note that his chapters in the "Guide" also grow longer as they go forward in history, and his analyses become more detailed as he proceeds from the Bible to Hellenism, the Talmud and the mediaeval Abraham ibn Ezra. One suspects that not only the length of the historical eras account for this circumstance but also these additional considerations: 1. the Bible, as the talmudic Midrash has it, is the property by now of almost all mankind and not specific to Judaism; it is post-Biblical Judaism which characterizes the faith best and with which, therefore, the student of Judaism and of Jewish history will most be concerned; 2. it is exactly the post-Biblical eras that least is known about by

Jew and non-Jew alike, which most require scientific study for that reason. Lastly, from the point of view of Krochmal's intellectual orientation it deserves notice that, by happenstance or intent, his periodization always seems to work out in such a manner that the periods of "maturity and magnificence", of cultural affluence and intellectual purity, coincide with periods that are conventionally accused of "assimilationism": when Jews lived in a foreign cultural environment, absorbed great parts of it and intermingled them with their own cultural tradition:

The very beginning of Jewish history is described in terms favorable to the idea of cultural inter-relationships: the Arabs also are progeny of Abraham, and for that reason they always retained at least part of their and our forefather's monotheism which is exemplified in their iconoclasm; Edom is referred to as "our brother"; the person of Job came from their midst to find a place in our Bible; and in later times some of them (no doubt Krochmal here has in mind the Idumaeans) even joined Israel's faith. (92) Later on in history at least one of the reasons why God drove the patriarchs into Egypt was to have Israel there learn the civilized arts, above all architecture, which were highly developed in that country. (93) In the Babylonian exile and due to its dispersion Israel reached a height of religion never before attained: though it was there deprived of a state and prophecy ceased, - or perhaps just because of these conditions -, hitherto hidden qualities came to the fore; henotheism was overcome by the experience of exile, monotheism takes hold of the people once and for all, and in general religion flourishes in a new spiritual, unmaterial setting, without miracles, "not with might and not with power, but with My spirit, sayeth the Lord." (94) The almost unbounded

admiration which Krochmal expresses for Hellenistic Judaism sometimes goes beyond all proper limits; we have already referred to the fact that he describes the period when Jews in Hellenistic Egypt founded communities throughout their diaspora, spoke Greek and tried to harmonize the Bible with Greek philosophy as one "more precious than any since the beginning of the nation." (95) He seems to put more credence in the records of "wisdom according to the Jews of Alexandria" than those even of the Talmud. (96) And in connection with the restrictive legislation of the Pharisees over against an un-Jewish environment he makes this most illuminating observation: some such quarantining laws may have been salutary in stemming the tide of dangerous Roman assimilation, but they also led to an increasing cleavage between observant and less observant Jews, and this separatism induced the belief on the part of the Romans that we despise all non-Jews, odium generis humani. "Thus the amazing thing is that, whereas in the time of the first temple excessive assimilation to the cult and laws of the neighboring nations was the cause of the downfall of our kingdom, now, toward the end of the days of the second temple, one of the contributing causes to the decline was the excessive separation from the ruling and powerful nation." (97) Also in the case of his scholastic hero Abraham ibn Ezra the element of Greek and Spanish adjustment must have played a part in his mind,-at least unconsciously.

All this was no mere fluke and not simply due to an ideological bias in favor of periods of Jewish acculturation. It was, in fact, a matter of historical principle with Krochmal which he actually formulates explicitly and which, not even necessarily in philosophical but

certainly in historical-methodological terminology, indicates the thoroughness of his historical frame of references. He notes the fact that Alexandrian Jewry used a "Hellenistic language" (which he describes somewhat like an ancient Yiddish) in its Jewish literature; he adds warningly that the neglect of Hebrew resulted in the loss of that literature to the body of Jewish literature (an interesting comment in the light of his own Hebraistic enlightenment); and then states: "Know that this is a great and important principle which we need and find proper: that we shall continue to investigate and analyze the beliefs, morals and traits that were manifest in our people in the course of time,-how the events which befell us bound us together in connections and relations with others more than is true of any other nation or tongue, though still in a limited measure and not more, - how we were affected and changed by their beliefs, morals and traits and how we affected them from generation to generation, - even those who were distant from us but came close to us in some degree and accepted some of our ways, like the Greeks in the time of the later Platonists Plotinus and Priclus or, in another way, Mohammed, and those who had been near us but removed themselves from us like the Christians or Spinoza and his followers. It is the duty of wise and great men among us to study and to understand them in their principles and roots so that we may approach, through study, clear impressions and eventually clear understanding of our own essence and quality, towit the general soul of Israel, how it is revealed in the sphere of our historical events and words, in the trends and changes of the times to this day. From this we can then draw conclusions regarding the future." (98) Surely no more lucid description can be given of the importance of cul-

tural and historical inter-relationships for a correct assessment of any individual national culture. And yet this did not, of course, mislead Krochmal, the Hebraist and philosopher of the Jewish national spirit, to mistake the dangers of false assimilation: he excoriates the Biblical kings who did not understand that Israel's survival was premised on the pure doctrine of the One God and His unity, not on assimilation to the surrounding idolatrous nations; (99) he heartily approves of Nehemiah's expulsion from the reconstituted commonwealth of foreign wives, proselytes and alien influences because of their injurious effects on the religion of Judaism. (100)

Indeed, historiographical methodology is constantly re-emphasized by the philosopher as one of the most important contributions to "the purified faith." But for Krochmal such methodology meant more than it does for the factual historian; for him historical methodology was basically a philosophical concern. To be sure, he stresses the same desiderata which also the conventional modern historian stresses: economic and social causes are recognized as one of the important strains in the dynamics of history; taxes and geography are given their due weight.(101) The changes which come about in social and even religious institutions due to the passage of time and the alteration of conditions are appreciated, even ascribed to classic religious figures. (102) The instruments of comparative critical philology are employed. (103) Krochmal reiterates often that by rational canons literary documents must be interpreted in the light of their authors' intentions, not by way of exegetical re-interpretations, in order to yield valid historical conclusions: "Was this in truth the intent and desire of the book? This is the question

which the ancient generations never asked, but along its lines interpretation in our time must move..." (104) He condemns Philo for "adducing from the text more than its simple meaning."( ) (105) And the dangers of the Aggadah, talmudic homilies, consist largely in that it is too often taken literally when it had been intended poetically; in exasperation at the stupidity of his orthodox opponents Krochmal exclaims: "There are times when things (such as these) which are as clear as the sun need to be explained 100 times and more." To the contrary, also Aggadah must be dealt with "so as not to contradict the foundations of the purified faith, right reason and pure morals." (106) The importance for valid history of accurate chronology is pointed out again and again, for without it confusion and lack of causal consistency cannot be avoided. (107) Thus much of the chapter dealing with the Talmud is concerned with the establishment of an at least tentative chronology for entire tractates as well as individual sugyoth, ( )(108) although, at the same time, both in order to defend himself against super-orthodox attacks as well as in order to focus on the actual philosophical tangentiality of temporal considerations, Krochmal adds: whether they be earlier or later, the laws are equally significant, for "honor, usefulness and spiritual good" have nothing to do with time. (109) But having stated this proviso he can go on to anticipate the great discussion which flared up around Fraenkel's Darche HaMishnah ( ) by interpreting the term "Mosaic laws from Sinai" ( ) in a broad and metaphoric sense. (110) In formulating new historical hypotheses Krochmal is always excessively cautious, both because he wishes to reduce the possible offensiveness of his theories

to the orthodox as much as at all possible as well as in order to maintain proper scientific reserve. (111)

But all these are the mere paraphernalia of positive, historical research. To Krochmal, however important they may be for research, they are of subsidiary rank. They find their proper place only when integrated into a complete system of historiographical methodology which in turn is fundamentally of a philosophical nature. We have already pointed out that the basic, philosophical reason why Krochmal engages in historical research in the first place is that he regards it as a prerequisite for what he calls "the purified faith". (112) In order to be raised to a higher level of intellectuality and spiritual truth religion must be conceptualized and investigated as to its correct historical development. For history to make this contribution to "conceptualized religion", however, it must first be conceptualized itself. Obviously, the factual details of historical events have a bearing on intellectualized religion only insofar as they constitute the raw material of history, even as perception deals legitimately with the details of sensual experience. But as the latter, to become genuine knowledge, must go through the process of abstraction, (113) so also the former, in order to become genuine historical knowledge, must go through the same process. "Conceptualized history," the principles of history, rather than the mere accumulation of random facts, therefore, are the supreme goal of the real historian. They are also the goal of Krochmal's historical methodology. (114) He states this view of the proper function of the historian most succinctly in the form of a criticism of Josephus Flavius: "Joseph the priest, the only historian to have dealt with this period, already took notice of

its various events, but only in the field of politics, and even with political events he did not deal according to the causes which brought them about nor according to the connection of their essential dynamic out of which they were born, - and when he instructs us in the materiality of these events he does not speak at all of the moving spirit which brings them into actuality." (115) Here the main stress is clearly on the importance of the underlying "spirit" of historical events rather than on their causal connection and on the significance of cultural history alongside of political history, though these too are designated as important enough. (116)

Briefness and the selection of salient features in historical developments appear to be the manner in which Krochmal proposes to conceptualize history. This is presumably the historiographical equivalent of the epistemological process of abstraction in which, too, uncharacteristic details are stripped off the object of sensual perception so that its essence, its generality, may appear. Indeed, this is Krochmal's typical procedure throughout the lengthy passages dealing in historical research. Above all, however, it must be assumed that the fitting of the historical facts into the philosophical scheme of periods and cycles of growth and decay which we have previously outlined (117) constitutes this conceptualization.

Croce, in summarizing the philosophy of Giambattista Vico, with whom we have previously had occasion to compare Krochmal, says: "He demanded the construction of a typical history of human society (cogitare) which was then to be discovered in the facts (videre).... The ideal history of the eternal laws which govern the course of all nations'

deeds in their rise, progress, points of rest, decline and fall...Thus each of the tendencies shown by his interpreters is partially justified: one group of whom maintain that Vico laid down and employed the speculative method; another, that his procedure was both in intention and in effect empirical, inductive and psychological.....The philosophy of man undertakes to determine the forms, categories or ideal moments of mind in their necessary succession, and in this aspect it well deserves the title or definition of "eternal ideal history," according to which particular histories in time proceed; while no fragment however small of actual history can be conceived in which this ideal history is not present. But, since ideal history is also for Vico the empirical determination of the order in which the forms of civilization, states, languages, styles and kinds of poetry succeed one another, it comes about that he conceives the empirical series as identical with the ideal series and as deriving validity from it...And this very treatment of the empirical course of events as absolute threw a shadow of empiricism over their ideal course; since the latter once identified with the former took over its empirical and temporal character instead of the eternal and extra-temporal character which it had as originally conceived." (118) This statement about Vico can be applied almost literally also to Krochmal. He, too, constructed the ideal history of cycles, and he, too, engaged in research in empirical history. The relationship of the two is here at issue. Croce submits that Vico was never quite able to synchronize completely his ideal with his empirical historiography, that he swerved from one to the other to the detriment of both, and that, therefore, those interpreters are partly right who proclaim him an empiricist as well as those who would make of his an i-

dealist philosopher of history in the absolute sense of this term. Croce concludes: "This unity of philosophy and philology, a unity with Vico sometimes confused and impure in method, recurred in its faulty aspects also in the Hegelian school; so that this mental tendency might with justice be entitled "Vicianism." (119)...Vico was the 19th century in germ." (120)

This is not the place for a critial evaluation of Krochmal's philosophical and historical work, but, without anticipating that task, the question must at least be asked whether this conflict of ideal, cyclical history with empirical historical research does not also occur in his system. Rawidowicz believes that he was essentially an empiricist: "To blossom, flower and decay are not the passing phases of reason which develop over and above all empiric experience but are rather very natural phases which hold true for every being subordinated to the law of growth and decay." He considers Hegel, on the other hand, an a priori philosopher. (121) Katsh, on the other hand and more rightly, replies: "The question of whether Hegel's dialectics are of an a priori or an a posteriori character can scarcely be answered conclusively...As one cannot brand Hegel's method as exclusively a priori, so one cannot classify Krochmal's as exclusively a posteriori, for it is certainly true that he applies to history an evolutionary conception borrowed from the world of nature." (122) Thus we are again in the middle of the controversy between the interpreters, of whom Croce says that both of them are partially right because he whom they wish to interpret never quite decided the question entirely in his own mind. Atlas points out that the problem with which Rawidowicz and Katsh grapple had lost its significance for

both Hegel and Krochmal when the former's identification of thought and being destoyed the distinction of a priori and a posteriori. Unlike the pre-Hegelian Vico, therefore, the identity of the ideal with the empirical series may be regarded as justified by the system in the case of Krochmal. The fact of the matter is that, as happens to all philosophers of history, a case could be made out without too much trouble that one could take exactly the same facts which Krochmal handles but arrange them in a different series. Thus it would be hard to decide whether it was the empirical facts which determined the ideal series or whether the ideal series determined the facts. One might even go so far as to venture the suspicion that Krochmal did not get around to specifying the events of the periods of the third cycle and that he did not even outline the principles of history after the end of the third cycle not only because time and energy did not permit but also because, had he tried to do so, he might have found the plethora of facts too unwieldy for his cyclical treatment, for, of course, the closer one comes to modern history the greater is the availability of extant and documented knowledge. This is not in itself a criticism of Krochmal's method, because, as we have said, the same criticism could be leveled at just about every philosopher of history: whatever systematization might be proposed could be, and is, attacked on such empirical grounds. The empirical evidence is in this problem by far not the only judge of the validity of the system; primarily also its unity with a valid logical and ethical system would have to sit in judgment, and that is a question which we postpone till later. (123) Merely the possibility of the doubt is here established for possible later use.

Apart from this philosophical reason for conceptualizing and thus "purifying" history, however, Krochmal also has a practical, indeed an apologetic reason. He is still concerned with the "purified faith" of Judaism and wants to protect it from the attacks of Jewish cynics as well as of non-Jewish scientists. And the scientific study of Judaism alone will make possible this objective. Scientific study now, means essentially two things to him: 1. the acceptance of established scientific conclusions from whatever source they may stem, be it his own or other Jewish scholars' conclusions or those of general European higher learning, - for to try to cover up that which is revealed is much more dangerous to the orthodoxy of the faith than to reveal that which has hitherto been covered up, and 2. the collection of whatever scientific knowledge is already deposited, though often half-forgotten, in classic Jewish scholarship. "We are compelled to accept the verdict of modern scholars and their proofs...Only for our vindication will we say that these scholars have more proofs which show that also our own ancient teachers knew about this." (124) At the same time that he repeatedly and eloquently defends the right of free scholarship, in terms of the primacy of truth and of its practical modern usefulness, he always guards the reserve of tradition and handles it most gingerly. (125) Very much in the spirit of Maimonides, whom he actually invokes, he declares his supreme goal to be "to make peace between reason and the two Torahs, written and oral" (126) The locus classicus of the expression of this scientific view of his deserves verbatim quotation: "Know, my friend, (I am compelled to repeat this three times and more) that our intention in this chapter and in the whole book is to purify and explain the aspects of our faith in a rational manner, by definitions of thoughtful

investigation, and by searching for truthful evidence, - and by means of these three methods to defend the right against the doubters, attackers and deniers and against all those who stray from the right path of truth in any direction. This is the great need in our time. We have also stated previously that our goal in truth resembles the goal of Maimonides in the "Guide" for the people of his time (here, of course, is the origin of Krochmal's title) and that we always follow in his footsteps in matters of research, there being no difference between the people of his generation, their perplexity and its necessary cure, and the present generation and its condition." (127)

4. The Mystical Tradition

Now, it neither can be nor is the purpose of this study to review the details of Krochmal's philological, historical and literary studies. Many of them have since his time become the common property of historical scholarship; others undoubtedly have been rejected by later researchers; a not inconsiderable number are of innate interest because they show the author's scientific perspicacity, thoroughness and flair for imaginative, yet sober combination; by far the majority of them have served, either in detail or in principle, as stimuli to the further development of historical and literary investigation. But despite this interest we forego the pleasure of tracing them for they fall within the province of history, not of philosophy or even the philosophy of history.

We must concern ourselves, on the other hand, with those remaining chapters of the "Guide of the Perplexed of the Time" which deal with philosophies or philosophers, primarily because by virtue of their

subject-matter they are very close to, if not actually part of, our area of study, but secondarily also because in view of their subject-matter it is always possible that they may have a direct bearing on Krochmal's philosophy of history. We believe that they will in fact turn out to have such a bearing.

The main such chapter is, of course, the famous chapter 16 which bears the tile "Definitions and Prolegomena to the Wisdom of Faith (philosophy of religion) taken from Theoretical Philosophy." This is the chapter which expounds in brief a summary of Hegel's metaphysics, though Hegel's name does not occur in it. Outside of this chapter there would have been preciously little in the "Guide" to make possible the claim that Krochmal was in fact a Hegelian. Such things as the concepts of national spirits and the absolute spirit, the triadic divisions of historic cycles etc. would easily have been traced to traditional Jewish and general philosophic influences (128) rather than to the specific and overpowering influence of Hegel, had it not been for this passage. It is this chapter which has released the torrent of controversy between, on the one hand, people like Landau (129) who see Krochmal as a Hegelian pure and simple and others like Rawidowicz who deny it.

The literary and philosophic problem resulting from this chapter is not so simple, however, as to permit the student simply to state that he does not believe that the Hegelian philosophizing of chapter 16 is characteristic also of the rest of the book and that, therefore, Krochmal may not legitimately be called a Hegelian. The problem is not even adequately solved when one gives good and convincing reasons for this conclusion. For this additional, even fundamental question must first be

satisfactorily answered: that chapter 16 is an exposition, though brief and partly even superficial, of Hegel's metaphysics is not denied by anyone, including those who oppose the Hegelian view; it must then be explained by them why Krochmal included such an exposition in his work on the philosophy of Jewish history. We can never proceed in philosophy on the gratuitous and unsystematic assumption that something has crept into the thought of a philosopher by accident or mistake; this would reduce the work of a serious man into a haphazard conglomeration of reading-notes, and it leads to the kind of violent exegesis which changes every text in the image of its reader. Even if it be granted that the "Guide" came to its editor Zunz only in the form of unfinished drafts, the existence of a chapter on Hegel must have had its cause in the mind of Krochmal. Interpreters like Landau have little difficulty with that problem: they simply deduce from it that Krochmal was a Hegelian, and that is the end of that, - although they then run into the insuperable problem of having to prove the Hegelian character of the rest of the system, - which cannot be done, and which they commonly also avoid trying to do. Landau, for example, only deals with chapter 16 and the beginning of chapter 17 and forgets, in effect, about the rest. It is the others who must face the question: surely chapter 16 must have some relationship to the rest of the book; if the logic, epistemology and philosophy of history of the "Guide" do not exemplify the basic philosophic concepts taught in this chapter, what then is this relationship?

Guttmann answers this question as follows: "Only in the chapter about the bases of the philosophy of religion which are derived from logic, which was apparently written in the last years of Krochmal's life,

and which comprises essentially the upshot of Hegel's logic, only here does Krochmal develop Hegel's concepts in their dialectical form,- and according to some stray remarks in the chapter it is possible that during the last period of his affliction he was ready to accept the Hegelian dialectic. Yet this chapter stands completely separate and by itself in Krochmal's book, - and apart from or outside of it we do not find the dialectical method, the conceptual development or the dialectical formulation of the course by which the world comes forth out of God." (130) Thus, to the extent to which he not only admits his essential bafflement but actually tries, however cautiously, to suggest a theory which would reconcile the Hegelian chapter with the rest of Krochmal's writings, Guttmann proposes a chronological answer: toward the end of his life Krochmal was veering toward Hegelianism whereas previously he had not so much been under its influence. Although there is no proof for this hypothesis, for all we know it may be true. But even then it does not answer our question. A systematic question cannot be answered in terms of the passage of time. Furthermore, this proposed answer only leads the question one step backwards, for if it is true we must then go on to ask why Krochmal, in view of his later Hegelian frame of references, did not go back to recast the entire system in its terms. Rawidowicz and Katsh, on the other hand, together with practically all other commentators, do not really try to answer the question at all. They content themselves with pointing out that the "Guide" as such is not especially a Hegelian work of philosophy, that at most it shows the influence of German idealism in general, and that the Hegelian chapter strikes the reader as being quite out of philosophic context.

We are going to propose a solution to this question. It can be shown, this hypothesis will claim, that chapter 16 stands in close and integral relationship with and is the continuation of one of the architectonic strains in the book. For this purpose, however, we must broaden our question. We will not only ask what the chapter on Hegel has to do with Krochmal's philosophic work as a whole and with his philosophy of history but also what role the chapters on Philo of Alexandria (chapter 12), Kabbalah and gnosticism (chapter 15) and Abraham ibn Ezra (chapter 17) play in this connection.

That Krochmal spends an unproportionately great deal of time on these subjects, though it has not previously been particularly noted by the commentators, seems beyond doubt. Chapters 12 and 15, though purportedly dealing with different subjects, the first with Philo and the second with the Kabbalah, in fact deal with the same theme: by way of explaining the history of the basic ideas of the Kabbalah Krochmal traces them back to Alexandrian philosophy and therewith to Philo. Now Philo may have been of some importance in Jewish history and in the history of Jewish philosophy. His and others' neo-Platonism showed its minor effects in the Talmud, major effects in the rise of Christianity, gnosticism, scholasticism and Jewish mysticism, but, as Krochmal himself points out, fundamentally it was a road leading away from Judaism; with Christianity itself Krochmal does not concern himself at all. To devote two entire chapters to Philo is, therefore, completely out of proportion and philosophically unnecessary. Ibn Ezra, on the other hand, belongs in the third cycle of Jewish history which the historian merely periodizes but does not specify. Literally the only fact or figure out of that

cycle with which he deals at all is Ibn Ezra, and then he deals with him in a chapter longer than any other in the book. How can one, then, help but ask: how do Philo, Ibn Ezra and Hegel get into the "Guide for the Perplexed of the Time?"

One could, presumably, offer all sorts of technical, trivializing answers to this question. It might be said that these philosophers were largely unknown to Jewish students, and in pursuit of his goal of bringing the world of general culture, insofar as it had any bearing on Judaism, to the attention of Jewish scholars, Krochmal himself wished to make a beginning and, therefore, engaged in some research into them himself and included them, in form of a short anthology, in his book. One might even go so far as to say that their inclusion was practically accidental, that Krochmal had happened to have done some work in them, that he possessed notes on them, and just simply included this material because it happened to be handy. (131) But these, and similar solutions, are philosophically unsystematic, in the first place, - they are of a trivializing nature, in the second, and they merely bring the question back by one step again where one would have to ask: why did Krochmal "happen" to be interested in Philo, Ibn Ezra and Hegel and not in other, equally or more important philosophers in history?

In order to arrive at a satisfactory answer to our question, it will be necessary to review Krochmal's summaries of the philosophies of these men in greater detail with due, systematic emphasis on those aspects which are of particular relevance to the conclusion which we shall propose.

In the case of Philo of Alexandria Krochmal tentatively proposes

a thesis which David Neumarck was later to work out more elaborately, that the Platonizing tendency is noticeable in many talmudic passages, - a fact which Krochmal connects with Philo's Jewish reverberations. It may be thought that some of the passages which Krochmal analyzes in this light lend themselves to such an interpretation only by means of rather forced exegeses (132), but the three fundamental points out of Philo's writings which commend themselves particularly to the historian are unaffected by this difficulty: in the first place, he interprets Philo as having primarily taught the subservience of the senses to the intellect and the epistemological as well as moral usefulness of the former only when properly used by the latter. (133) In the second place, like the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, he is particularly entranced, though at the same time repelled, by the doctrine of the hyle, the Platonic primordial matter which, co-existent with and as eternal as God, constituted the substance out of which the world was to come into being. (134) Wherever the doctrine of the Hyle was accepted creation ex nihilo had, of course, to be denied, and the best that was conceivable, the closest that one could come to the Biblical view of cosmogony, was, as HaLevy showed, (135) a theory of emanationalist, eternal creation according to which the world was the necessary, not voluntary, and timeless, not instantaneous, product of the meeting of eternal spirit with eternal matter. And the third point in Philo's system that especially interested Krochmal is formulated by him in these words: "The choice and most elevated stage of the faith and knowledge of God is seen and opened and indicated in the people of Israel, the people sacred to the Tetragrammaton, the Reality, who are priests and prophets to the High God

for the whole human race. For the sake of humanity the family which is part of God (i.e. Israel) is given over to the unmediated guidance of God, while the other nations are handed over to the guidance of celestial princes, high spirits, God's angels appointed over them." (136) In Philo these "princes" are, of course, identical with the emanationalist logoi. Though the nations of the world are thus divided from one another not only by virtue of their natural, biological discreetness but also by virtue of the different genii which dominate them in heaven, in messianic times mankind will be united and unified, again not only in the terrestrial sense but also in the sense that God alone will resume His direct providence over them all together as He now does only with regard to Israel. (137)

As we have already pointed out, in chapter 15 Krochmal proposes to study Jewish mysticism, but, except for a few introductory remarks, he never really gets to his subject. He traces the philosophic orientation of the Kabbalah back to Alexandrian gnosticism which, in turn, had its fountain-head in Philo. Having thus returned to the Alexandrian period, he never gets back to the Kabbalah anymore but states in some detail the views of three minor thinkers. Their ideas are then by implication also presumed to be expressed in many different ways in Jewish mystical literature. What are these ideas? They are essentially only variants of ideas we have already encountered in Philo. The world came to be through a process of emanations from God which eventually reached down to the very hyle, the sub-lunar world being an intermixture of the last logos with primordial matter. The purpose of history and religion is, accordingly, to separate these two elements from one another again and thus to

re-establish spirit in its pristine purity. (138) (And it was obviously not very hard for Krochmal to bring out the similarity of this doctrine with the Kabbalistic one of "the collection of the fragments of the vessels.") Again, each nation possesses its own deity, each of these deities being a lower emanation from the deus absconditus: "all this happens through the mediation of the ruler ('arxon) of the world and his princes who are appointed to every people." (139) It is possible, on the other hand, for men to establish contact with the supreme deity in a manner more direct than by means of the various and manifold intermediaries on the emanationalist ladder, for men of piety and high intellectual development can skip this arduous process with the help of a Savior who constitutes a direct link between the lowest forms of existence and the highest. (140) This last reservation gives an opening to a possible doctrine that, for example, Israel may not be involved in the complexity of the world of logoi but may be subject directly to the Absolute Spirit himself. (141)

Much of this mystery-religion and mystery-philosophy Krochmal, of course, rejected, for he was fully conscious of its historical and philosophical relations with gnosticism, Christianity, and heretical Kabbalah. Thus he indicates, for example, that early modern Sabbatianism again taught very similar notions, and he remarks in historical wonderment: "One must marvel at the changes in the course of time while yet its events so resemble one another!" (The Hebrew of: plus ça change plus c'est la même chose.) But he is far from denying it all validity. Even as he characterized the three double-dangers of false religion at the very beginning of his studies as having begun with reason but ended

in unreason (142), so he says also here: "All this began with reason but ended in (excessive, undisciplined) imagination." (143)

Ign Ezra's theory of creation does not differ fundamentally, is in fact derived from that of the Alexandrian Platonizers. For him, too, the coming-into-being of the world is essentially the coming-together of the two pre-existent existents, God who is absolute spirit and the hyle which is unconditioned matter. God must necessarily think true thoughts, and these thoughts are the derived logoi which, taken together, build the ladder that leads from Him down to matter. In fact, these necessary thoughts of God are several things at the same time: they are, in the first place, God's thoughts; they are, in the second, the emanations which eventually cause the existence of the sensual world; and they are, finally, the Platonic ideas, arch-types of all the changing and multitudinous objects of the perceptual universe. (144) In each such capacity, as emanations, ideas and essences, they are, of course, unperishable. But what is even more important, this series of unfoldings out of God is a necessary, not a volitional process on the part of God. The very beginning of creation is, therefore, quite in the Aristotelian sense of the word, a law of nature rather than an act of the ethical will. And Ibn Ezra is repeatedly represented by Krochmal as following this Aristotelian line of thinking: to be sure, the essences come about in the just described manner, simply as the unconditioned activity of Absolute Spirit. But unformed as they are as yet and bare of all delimitations and definitions, they are also imperceptible, unknowable for human beings. These essences constitute the second of three worlds: the first, absolute, undifferentiated spirit, is innaccessible to material human beings and, in a manner of speaking, even non-existent since it is undifferentiated; the second, that of the bodyless spirits or thoughts

emanated from God, is divided among itself, consists of separate and discreet individuals, but it, too, is as yet unknowable and, therefore, non-existent, as it were. (145) Only in the third world, that of material existents, is spirit given form by entering into matter, - thus completely individuated and defined. If, then, pre-material existence is, in a manner of speaking, unknowable and nothing, materialization is creation ex nihilo. (146)

By this play on words Krochmal's Ibn Ezra has saved his orthodoxy and proclaimed his belief in Creatio ex nihilo. Despite this somewhat artificial show of orthodoxy, on the other hand, no secret is made of the fact that this is not creation in time but emanationalist, necessary and, therefore, eternal creation. (It will, of course, be remembered that HaLevy stated explicitly that though he himself did not adhere to this doctrine of creation, he also did not regard it as fundamentally irreconcilable with the Biblical faith if it could philosophically be proved to be true.) "Ibn Ezra believed in creation, but not in creation in time." (147) And Krochmal adds puckishly: only Jews believe that the world was created approximately 5000 years ago, but that should not deceive anyone into not understanding that also the philosophers believe in creation, though not in creation in time: and it may, then, be concluded that according to Jewish tradition what happened c. 5000 years ago is not the coming-into-being of any and of the first type of existence but only of the first materialization, i.e. the occurrence of the third sphere, "and let us rather not ask whether even this creation was from something." (148)

Man, as the proto-type of all individuation, is, of course, prim-

arily the product of materialization and thus the typical representative of the third world. On the other hand, he is also bestowed with more spirit, even self-conscious spirit, than all other forms of existence. He stands, therefore, right on the border between the second and the third world. Despite his materiality and earth-boundness he is thus raised to a higher level of existence; he is, in fact, "aufgehoben". (Krochmal uses and defines the Hegelian term.) (149) He is "the secret of the worlds, and his soul is bound together with the celestial souls." (150) If man as such is the highest form of terrestrial existence, if his soul is bound up with the souls of the higher spirits, - then Israel is the highest form of human existence and his soul is bound up with the Absolute Spirit Himself. "The most honored being on earth is man, and the most honored being among men is Israel...He is the perfect, intellectual man who clings to Reality." (151) Somehow this is again very reminiscent of the HaLevyan doctrine (152) that as man is to the animal world, the animal to the world of vegetation and this to inorganic reality, so is Israel to humanity, - a completely different level of existence. (153) And if it should be asked how the universal God, upon whom all reality is dependent, can be concentrated more in one form of reality than in another, in man more than in the rest of the earth and in Israel more than in the rest of mankind, Ibn Ezra answers - so Krochmal declares: even as the human spirit pervades the entire human individual and yet is most manifest in some parts of it, such as thought, the emotions etc., so also God inhabits all reality and yet is more visible in some places than in others. (154)

The last point out of Krochmal's summary of Ibn Ezra's system that

needs to be stressed in this connection concerns the eventual outcome of the vissicitudes of human history. Ibn Ezra defends the at least partial knowability of God against those who would establish an unqualified doctrine of Sancta ignorantia. These latter (- and the wide-spread ramifications of their views into the theory of negative divine attributes and even complete, mystical, religious agnosticism throughout ancient, mediaeval and modern philosophy need not here be traced -) pronounce God unknowable not only on the ground that He is, by definition, beyond human ken but also on the ground that "if I knew Him I would be He." (155) Over against this view Krochmal's Ibn Ezra insists that some aspects of God can be known. If this were not so man would be even worse off than the animals, for the latter do not know Him, but at least they also do not feel the need of knowing Him, whereas in the case of humans not only would a constitutive need remain unfulfilled but even a conscious constitutive need would remain unfulfilled. (156) If men ever lack the feeling of this need they do so only temporarily and only due to external, social, political, economic and historic circumstances of special strain and stress. (157) Eventually, however, - and this eventual point is clearly to be understood in logical, not in temporal terms - all these variations of the fate of God among men, the object of greater or lesser searches, separated from His creatures by the intermediation of His own emanations, will come to a final consummation. All the many ways in which God has in history subdivided His oneness will be overcome when His oneness will be restored. Everything will return to the One, (158) - and this presumably means not only that all the nations which have historically been under the suzerainty of subsidiary

spirits will return to the direct Providence of God Himself (159) but also that the ladder of emanations by which the Spirit descended from His high place to lowly matter will be re-ascended, and the world will return to the state of spiritual purity out of which it originated. In his introduction to the chapter on Hegel Krochmal repeats this view regarding the eventual re-unification of God and the world's humanity: "It is a principle of the Biblical faith that the entire human race will join in the knowledge of God eventhough only in the end-of-days, as is plentifully demonstrated in the testimonies and in the prayers." (160) Thus, in a manner of speaking, the great cycle of cycles of which history consists returns to its point of departure, a point which is as little temporal in the beginning as it will be at the end but which is rather logical - as would be requisite in a doctrine of infinite creation. This is, indeed, an extraordinary spectacle, - the student must exclaim-, how a philosopher of history super-imposes his philosophy of history, his philosophy of temporal events, upon a backdrop of a metaphysical philosophy which operates outside of time! And we are again forcibly reminded of what Croce had to say about Vico's ardent attempts to reconcile his ideal historical series with his empirical historical series. (161)

Rotenstreich, in fact, endeavors very astringently to destroy all semblance of rationality in Krochmal's system by contrasting this extra-temporal aspect of his philosophy with the historical aspect. If, so he rightly points out, Krochmal's "Absolute Spirit" is God it is not a personal God, a God rather who is very close to a pantheistic deity, and

one who himself has no will and leaves no room for a human will. This last, the deprivation of God's volition, is manifest most clearly, as we have just had occasion to see (162), in Krochmal's logical necessity to think of creation in terms of emanation. For that reason alone it would already appear impossible to construct a view of history on this basis, for how can there be history without will? Furthermore, if the world is ruled by such an Absolute Spirit there can be no history, for Absoluteness implies staticness, perfection, and perfection can have no history. Finally, Rotenstreich censures Krochmal for proclaiming on his premises the eternity of Israel's history. "Krochmal showed only the extension of Israel's historic course, not its absoluteness." (163) In short, accepting Krochmal's non-temporal, philosophical bases for what they claim to be, the critic demonstrates their irreconcilability with a philosophy of temporal events. Basically this criticism is justified, though Rotenstreich fails to notice the qualifications which Krochmal imposes on his concept of the Absolute Spirit: the Absolute Spirit fragmentized itself in permitting individual, non-Jewish nations to be taken possession of by parts of itself. An absolute but fragmentized Spirit is not really completely absolute anymore; it will become absolute again only when it is completely re-unified. And history, then, is the course of the re-unification of the Absolute Spirit. When formulated in this manner the underlying kinship between Krochmal's view of history and the philosophies of the Alexandrians and the Kabbalah is striking!

In our endeavor to arrive at a point where we can perceive the logical place of his Philonic, Ezraic and Hegelian studies in his philosophy of history, we have now reached Krochmal's chapter on Hegel in the

"Guide". In the book itself, however, the chapter on Hegel precedes the one on Ibn Ezra, not vice versa. One may well wonder whether Krochmal, if he had come to any definite ideas about the sequence of chapters, intended this particular order, for it blatantly defies chronology - if nothing else. If the present chapter 12 on Philo were to precede the present chapter 15 on the Kabbalah, and if the chapter on Hegel were to follow instead of precede the one on Ibn Ezra, then the correct chronology upon which Krochmal laid so much stress (164) and, incidentally, also the progression of our hypothetical thesis, would be enhanced. We venture to submit that this might, in fact, be the proper arrangement of the book. Zunz' admission that chapter 12, like chapter 5, was found extant only in the form of a first draft and that only a few of the chapters were numbered (165) lends some additional credibility to our suggestion, - at least insofar as chapter 12 is concerned.

It is not our purpose to study Krochmal's understanding of Hegel's metaphysics. We do, however, have to summarize briefly how, according to it, reality comes into being. The primary reality is Being. Being, of course, comprises everything, since nothing can "be" without Being. Being even includes Nothing, though in another way Nothing is the negation of Being, since we also have to say that, for example, darkness, i. e. the absence of light, "is". Though Being is thus the first and most basic of all realities, it is also so highly abstract a concept and so far removed from empirical reality that it is described as "abstraction of the reason which does not exist...naked of all utility or reality... only the beginning of thought and the first grasp on the rational spirit." (166) In their original state these two constituents of Being, Being and

Nothing, are at rest. When they come into movement, when they start dynamically to relate themselves to one another, then the change from Being into Nothing and vice versa produces Becoming. (167)

The second basic concept is "existence" (Dasein). It comes to be when Becoming is defined, - that is to say, when it is delimited within itself. By such internal definition of one "existence" not only is this one part of Becoming brought about but also the rest of Becoming is defined as not being that which has been defined. The dynamic or dialectic relationship between the defined parts of Becoming to one another constitutes change, and since, obviously, this relationship goes on from the first two to an unlimited number of similar relationships we also arrive at the concept of infinity. And automatically also the concommitant of infinity, namely finiteness, is produced. (168) This infinity is not true infinity, however, since it is only the unending addition to one another of parts of Becoming which are themselves limited, i.e. finite, - and no summation of finites can attain to infinity. Genuine infinity is brought about in this manner: when we define a "whatness" or quality we are in effect negating all other qualities; when we then go on to define a second quality beyond the first we are negating the first which in turn was a negation. It is, then, the negation of negation which constitutes genuine infinity and which is identical with existence. (169) In this negation of a negation Being, originally at rest and unmediated, having gone out to become Being-for-others through Becoming, has returned unto itself. (170) And in this return the original One is re-constituted even while all other ones are repelled from itself and thus Many is created. Spirit, as it were, has gone out of itself, diversified itself

into subsidiary forms, and now returned into itself.

We need not pursue the dialectic course of the unfolding of Being, or Absolute Spirit, any further in detail. In the manner in which these first steps are described to be taken by it, and thus gradually all component factors of reality evolved out of it, even so this process continues through repulsion and attraction, separation and composition, (171) atoms, (172) discreet and continuous quantities, (173) space, time and matter, (174) quanta and numbers. (175) The point cannot have been lost to any reader: this Hegelian ontology is actually a new version of the Alexandrian series of emanations out of the deus absconditus, here called Being, and represents a German-idealist variation on the ancient attempt to evolve reality and the world out of one original fountainhead without the intercession of a divine volition. That it, too, goes through the process of the self-diversification of the One, only eventually to return to the One, makes the analogy, even the basic identity, only the more inescapable. And it should be freely admitted that if Alexandrian Platonism was mystical, so is Hegel's ontology.

We can now pull together the threads which by now have become visible as winding through Philonic Platonism, Alexandrian gnosticism, scholastic Platonic Aristotelianism as represented in Abraham Ibn Ezra, and Hegel. They are clearly these: 1. the world has come into being not through any act of divine volition in time but through the eternal and necessary effusions which emanate out of the Absolute Spirit by virtue of its inherent nature; 2. the nations of mankind all stand under the jurisdiction of various lower forms of spirits and are thus connected with one or another inferior rung on the ladder of emanations; 3. there is

at least the possibility, if not the actual philosophical necessity, of one such nation, towit Israel, being exempt from such inferior jurisdictions in order to be directly in communication with the Absolute Spirit Himself; 4. it is in the nature of this emanationalist process that eventually it returns to its source, and at such a time, of course, also the jurisdictions of the lower spirits will be anulled in order to be re-assumed over all nations by God Himself. The last three points, now, are identical with the premises of Krochmal's philosophy of Jewish history: all the nations are possessed by lower spiritual princes because of whose effervescent character also the nations themselves are subject to the law of growth and decay, while Israel, attached as it is to the Absolute Spirit Himself, is accordingly exempt from this law and has an eternal history. Does it not then stand to reason that Krochmal's entire laborious effort to bring these philosophic strains out of history into the body of his philosophy of Jewish history, despite the fact that he seems originally to be working with fundamentally different philosophic premises, has for its purpose the philosophic justification of the dogmatic assumptions of his philosophy of history?

And without anticipating our own critical observations on this philosophy, it can hardly be denied that they are dogmatic assumptions - even if it should be granted that they are true. Nowhere does Krochmal offer any form of derivation for these national spirits (Biblical texts are not philosophic proofs), nor does he even try to prove their existence in any fashion. It can, therefore, take little wonder that such or similar conclusions, when arrived at by significant classic philosophers, preferably non-Jewish, would be God-sends for him. Our

suggestion is thus in short that Philo, gnosticism, Ibn Ezra and Hegel are incorporated in the "Guide of the Perplexed of the Time" not for any exclusive scholarly reasons, not because of their importance in the course of Jewish history, not even because they are inherently of great philosophic significance, but simply and primarily because they tend to support the basic premise of Krochmal's philosophy of Jewish history with argumentations that are respectable in the history of philosophy.

This theory of the place of what the writer is calling "the mystical tradition" in Krochmal's philosophy of history, the only consistent attempt to explain how Philo, Kabbalah, Ibn Ezra and Hegel got into Krochmal's system, has until now nowhere been stated fully. But it has a short pre-history. Guttmann had intimations that Ibn Ezra is in fact a spokesman for Krochmal himself (176) and that there is a historic continuity between neo-Platonism and Hegel. (177) But the first and hitherto only student of Krochmal who recognized this fact was P. Lachover. His essay, The Revealed and the Hidden in Krochmal's System, ought for this reason to be better known. His conclusions are essentially identical with those of this study: Krochmal uses neo-Platonism, gnosticism, Kabbalah, Ibn Ezra and Hegel primarily to buttress his theory of the special status of Israel in history. (178) And he rightly points out that thus, though somewhat wary of its dangers of which he was aware, Krochmal fundamentally embraces an irrationalist orientation. Lachover quotes: "Hegel was without a doubt the most irrationalist of philosophers known in the history of philosophy," and he adds: "How much more so is Krochmal's Absolute Spirit and all that is connected with and dependent

on it." (179)

5. Conclusion

Thus we have returned to the beginning of Krochmal's philosophy of general and Jewish history. It consisted basically of two premises: 1. Israel is totally different from the other nations of the world by virtue of its adherence to the Absolute Spirit, and 2. history proceeds according to the law of cycles of growth and decay to which all nations are absolutely subject, while Israel is subject to it only relatively inasmuch as it always again overcomes the decay in order to begin a new growth. We cannot help but ask about the philosophical and historical validity of these premises, especially since, as we have just seen, Krochmal himself seems to have wondered about their strength.

The similarity between Krochmal's theory of Israel's Absolute Spirit and Yehudah HaLevy's "divine substance" has been pointed out. (180) It has also been pointed out that in the case of both biologistic patterns of thought dominate. (181) One might even go so far as to say that these two are the only ones in the line of classic Jewish philosophers who chose the categories of biological thinking in preference to those of rational thinking, thinking in form of logical abstractions rather than of organic life, which otherwise heavily predominates in the history of Jewish philosophy. Now this has certain advantages, but it also entails serious disadvantages. The advantage is primarily that it enables them to begin with what they regard as facts of Jewish history and to spread out from there into general philosophy, to extract from Jewish realities the general validities which also apply to the rest

of reality. The more numerous rationalists in Jewish history always had to proceed in the opposite direction: a rationalist must, due to his commitment to rational principles, begin with general, rational concepts which will, in their nature, be of universal applicability, and only at the end of the construction of their systems may they get around to pinning these general concepts down to their possibly special application to Israel. In this second alternative Israel is thus at best a special case of a general principle, and sometimes it is even difficult to reach the point where the special application to Israel can be made at all; universal principles often find it hard to get down to the facts of life. Rationalism tends to formulate philosophies of history, then, which are philosophic but not, in their character, Jewish; Judaism can only be one of the many subjects with which it deals. In the biological vein of thought, on the other hand, a certain "existentialism", better yet: a certain phenomenologism manifests itself. It does not begin with general conceptual principles but with certain real or believed facts. The principles may eventually be evolved out of the observed facts. In the case of Jewish philosophers of that type it is, therefore, perfectly possible to begin with Jewish facts, facts not only taken out of Jewish history but which are Jewish in their very nature. The basic fact of that class would, of course, be, and for HaLevy as well as Krochmal was, the Sinaitic covenant which made of Israel a "special people" due to its special relationship to God. This status of "special people" will then naturally manifest itself in a special history. (182) Only in relationship and contrast to this special status of Israel will the rest of mankind and its history find their proper place in the philosophy of history.

Their's is, therefore, not only a philosophy of Jewish history but actually a Jewish philosophy of history. (183)

This might appear to be only a matter of semantic pride. Why should it be so important to have not only a philosophy of Jewish history but also a Jewish philosophy of history - apart from the egotistical desire for special status? But in actual fact two important factors are involved in this question. Philosophically speaking, religionists have always felt, and will no doubt continue to feel, that the claim of philosophy to define with the tools of human reason the categories of thought and of historical reality even in the case of Revelation and Jewish history is an arrogant self-elevation of human categories over God. For them (and if one could only persuade oneself that their method is not only logically preferable but also intelligently acceptable-also for us) to let the facts of history - and of Revelation - define the categories of thought and of history is immensely truer. Empirically speaking, in the second place, Jews and many non-Jews are inclined to believe that this biological pattern of thought just simply accords better with what they intuitively feel to be a reality: ayn masal leyisra'el, (אין משל לישראל) Israel is not subject to the natural or rational laws, - Jews are by far not the only ones, as the example of Vico alone suffices to show (184), who sense this to be a profound and primary truth. But facts which transcend natural and rational law cannot be understood by natural or rationalist principles. They must, in the first place, be accepted as undeniable facts, - and only then can men try as best they can to grapple with them intelligently. (185)

The dangers of this philosophical orientation outweigh its poten-

tial advantages, however. As a matter of simple fact it proceeds, in the first place, in an unashamedly dogmatic manner. Anything not deducible from human reason is, in its nature, only asserted dogmatically. Neither HaLevy nor Krochmal make even a show of deducing the "divine substance" or proving the indwelling of the Absolute Spirit. Also the neo-Platonic and ontological mystifications of Hegel cannot hide this fact. What is proposed is the acknowledgment of the existence of a special type of reality, the homo Judaicus, and the only prooof offered is the special character of Jewish history. But it is a basic canon of logical thinking that new laws may not be stipulated so long as old laws can satisfactorily explain the set of facts at issue. Krochmal may not wish to admit the cogency of their reasoning, but the fact is that there have been more than one rational theory to explain Jewish history. We shall encounter one proposed by Hermann Cohen; other schools of philosophy have proposed others. It would be necessary to refute their claims in detail before one would be entitled to resort to other explanations, but that has neither been done, nor has it even been suggested that it be done.

The ambivalent value of the biologicist approach to Jewish history is nicely brought out in Horwitz' laudation of it. Horwitz praised Krochmal to the sky because he fitted in marvelously with his own ideology of Jewish nationalism and Hebraic renaissance. He would have heartily endorsed Guttmann's words that Yehuda HaLevy and Krochmal were the only ones who not only wrote philosophies of Judaism but also philosophies of the Jewish people. (186) He, therefore, makes this not invalid analogy: Krochmal's concept of the Jewish people comprises within

it all segments of Israel and is, thus, not only nationalistic but also democratic; contrast that with Maimonides' oft-mentioned intellectualistic aristocratism; this democratic-aristocratic contrast is in line, Horwitz says, with the equivalent and famous conflict between Maimonides' philosophic and abstract concept of God on the one hand and the Rabad's defense of an anthropomorphic and popular, democratic concept of God.(!) (187) Here one has all the advantages and all the dangers of the biologicist approach bunched together in one small and neat package: its realism, Jewishness and demoracy and its crudeness, chauvinism and demagogy. The student will probably have to make his choice, whether the appeal to the people overrides its demagogic horror, whether in, to use a contemporary analogy, national socialism the nationalism outweighs the socialism or vice versa.

In the second place, a pluralism is involved in this HaLevyan strain which is dangerous theoretically as well as practically. HaLevy is quite outspoken in dividing Israel from the rest of humanity as rigorously as organic is differentiated from inorganic reality, and Krochmal in effect says the same thing. Few would deny that such a fundamental fragmentization of the human species, such a destruction of human monism, is inconsonant with Biblical and Jewish teaching and threatens the unity of mankind. It should not be necessary anymore at this point to refute the accusation that the Jewish doctrine of the chosen people has nothing to do with the odium generis humani or with modern racism. But it is, indeed, difficult to refute the accusation with the arguments of HaLevy and his philosophical progeny. There is a moral difference in detailed definition, to be sure, - but is there also a logical

difference between the doctrines of the "master race" and of the special Jewish genus?

At first glance it may offend Jewish self-consciousness with regard to the actual, extraordinary history of Israel, - but the demand cannot be gainsaid, for philosophical, historical and moral reasons, that Jewish history must be treated with the same categories and laws with which all human history is treated. This is so because, in the first place, we have only reason with which to work. To begin with facts is dangerous because, for one thing, different men perceive different facts, and it is ironical to think that the basic fact on which HaLevy erected his system, the Sinaitic covenant, which appeared to him to be so indubitable, is questioned by many in modern times. It is perfectly true that the rationalistic procedure may encounter difficulties in attempting to rationalize the facts and the goals of Jewish history. But to the extent to which this is so the answer cannot be to devise a special law for Israel but to improve, perhaps even to change the formulations of the laws governing all of human history until they satisfy this requirement, too.

The difficulties which arise in connection with some of the specific details of Krochmal's philosophy of history fade into insignificance compared to this basic problem. But the detailed objections, too, do arise. It has already been noticed that the cyclical classification of the facts of history can be disputed without too much trouble. Many other classifications have been proposed which seem to possess no less validity. That Krochmal would propound it makes sense in terms of his general biologistic outlook, for it is only consistent that the def-

inition of Israel as a biologically different entity should be accompanied by a definition of history derived from the biological analogy of growth and decay and the eternal re-birth of nature. (It would be interesting to speculate whether we are not here faced with a parallel to the conflict between the religion of the Bible, the religion of God who is above nature and even contrasted with nature, on the one hand, and Canaanite nature cults, on the other, in which the same biological analogies determine theology as well as ethics. The short of it seems to be that nature is an alluring but also a deceptive mirror in which to look for the image of God or of man.) Furthermore, what has been recognized by the students of the history of ideas as the essentially Greek notion of cyclical history casts its pessimistic shadow also over the Jewish thinker's scheme of history. As our diagram (188) indicated, it is almost inevitable that the cyclical rises and falls should be reflected on the larger scale of history so that here, too, a fall to the depth from which man's fate began must be expected. In our generation, when the unbounded optimism of the 19th century is meeting its opposite reaction, this may be an attractive feature of Krochmal's philosophy of history. It remain to be seen, however, whether it is also an ethically and therefore historically creative view. We shall suggest in our final conclusion that the criterion of the validity of a philosophy of history is its ethical and historical creativity. (189)

Due to its originally dogmatic, merely assertive character there are a number of points at which the details of Krochmal's historical scheme are left unspecified, - although it would appear that only a detailed analysis could make it comprehensible. Certainly one of the cruxes of

his theory of Jewish history is the doctrine that Israel always overcomes its periods of degeneration and begins a new period of growth. For a thinker who wishes to be more than an ideologist and rather a technical philosopher it would, then, be imperative to demonstrate what the mechanics of this transcendence over degeneration are. Merely to say that it happens without explaining how it happens leaves this theory as a dogmatic assertion. But the only explanation which Krochmal gives, if, indeed, it is an explanation, is that it pleases "Providence" to bring about this re-birth. (190) This is, of course, not enough. The one great advantage of Hegel's "dialectic" of history is, after all, that it establishes dynamic connections between the various periods of history, lets them gradually flow into one another. Krochmal, on the other hand, by merely placing the periods adjacent to one another without even attempting to show how one grows out of its predecessor makes out of history more of a jig-saw puzzle than a continuous process. And it cannot even be said that Krochmal does not seem to have had a feeling for the necessity of such transitions. It is a striking, though not entirely comprehensible, detail in the "Guide" that wherever a transition between the second and third periods of cycles is described, wherever, thus, cultural affluence is said to begin to decline, such a dialectic relationship is established. "Still during the second period the causes of the downfall and perdition of the nation are created." (191) And what he says here first as a general, theoretical statement he actually tries to illustrate in concrete history, too: for example, he observes that the strife among Pharisees and Saducees caused a great deal of deterioration "toward the end of the second and the beginning of the third period" of the second

cycle. (192) Unfortunately, however, he does not endeavor to build the bridge at those points in history which according to his own statements show the greatest gaps, - the miraculous renaissance after the cyclical proximity to death.

It would be tempting to formulate our own theories about the periodic rebirths of the spirit of the Jewish people, - for that there is something of this intermittent rejuvenation in the history of Israel can hardly be denied. Leo Baeck speaks of the "eternal youth" of Israel. Disregarding the problematic cyclicality of Jewish history, thinking only of the view of Schopenhauer which Thomas Mann has popularized in our time, namely that spiritual creativity is the concommitant of physical degeneration, one might be inclined to speak of the miracle of Jewish history which has kept the Jewish people in a permanent state of degeneracy. Thus spiritual productivity has been maintained at all times without the consequence of it, physical death resulting from this degeneracy, having been induced. This would, perhaps, correspond to the early stage of the third periods of Krochmal's scheme. But all this is mere speculation and has no warrant whatever in the words of Krochmal himself.

Finally this summation of Krochmal's place in the history of philosophy cannot be avoided: to be sure, he tried to formulate a philosophy of Jewish history - a subject which had been sorely neglected before his time and which has still not been dealt with in an approximately adequate manner in ours. But in terms of philosophy as such it is hard to avoid the impression that he was more a university-teacher than a philosophical systematizer or innovator. There is no clear and distinct line in his

thinking. The precipitation of Maimonides, of Vico, Hegel, Kant and many others can be recognized in his mind, but we have seen how difficult it is to forge a genuine unity out of this eclecticism. Perhaps, indeed, it would be better to speak of Krochmal's not so much as a philosophy of history and rather as a philosophical history. Compared, for example, with what we shall encounter in Hermann Cohen his basic principles are much too simple and much too arbitrary, the wealth of concrete historical data much too great to receive the title of a philosophy of history; that, on the other hand, his history-book does not simply aim to accumulate facts but rather to demonstrate certain underlying historical principles, and that it, within limits, succeeds in doing so, can also not be denied. The "Guide for the Perplexed of the Time" gains in stature when looked upon as a philosophical history; it rather tends to lose in stature when regarded as a philosophy of history.

III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY OF HERMANN COHEN

1. Science and History

Immanuel Kant's crucial philosophic feat had been to trace back all forms of human cognition to the structure of the human reason. The principal concept on which this feat is based is really quite simple: man obtains knowledge exclusively through the "spectacles" of his intellect and senses; like the thickness and tincture of actual eyeglasses, so also the "spectacles" of his senses and intellect determine what and how man can see through them, - the major difference being that he can never take off these particular glasses and is, therefore, entirely dependent upon them for all his vision. Consequently, Kant reasoned, the human intellect decides the form of what man can know and how he can know it. Insofar as form determines content, - and in the area of knowledge this is a wide field, - reason also decides what it is that man knows. In distinction from orthodox Kantians who would limit the basic proposition to just this degree, neo-Kantians go even one step further to argue that also all substance of knowledge is produced by the human reason, - i.e. that the "spectacles" not only transmit knowledge in their particular manner but that they simultaneously create the objects of the vision - in this case the content of all knowledge. For our purposes and at this point it is not necessary to follow the arguments of the two wings within the Kantian school or to try to assess their respective merits. The point is that according to either interpretation Kant conceived of the structure of reason - which determines the form and the substance of knowledge either largely or completely - as super-historical, immutable and universal in time as well as extent. In other words, the

"spectacles" were eternal and unchanging, though what was seen through them might be in constant flux. The comparison of the structure of the human reason with a set of spectacles expresses the manner in which Kant's fundamental concept is generally understood and usually interpreted by orthodox Kantians. This is essentially a psychologicist interpretation basing itself on psychological subjectivity, however it may be generalized into an assumed universal principle. Neo-Kantians differ from this interpretation not only by treating not only the form but also the content of human knowledge but also by deriving the laws of thought not from the human reason and thus subjectivity but from the factual tested knowledge of science and thus objectivity. They reason: science does in fact argue in such-and-such a manner; such-and-such a manner is, therefore, the law of thought. In either case, however, what thus Kant called "the super-historical validity of the formal laws" (1) seems to imply, and does in fact imply, an unhistoricality of the fundamental philosophic premise which fits well into the essentially unhistorical temper of the age of enlightenment of which he was the last and greatest representative. Perhaps nowhere did he give expression to this unhistorical mood more clearly than when he made the famous statement that the categories - the specific forms in which our metaphoric "spectacles" are cast or the laws by which science operates - are part of a logic "which has not been able to make a step of progress since Aristotle." (2) Thus reason as well as the science which deals with it, namely philosophy, are essentially unhistorical.

It is at this point of hard unhistoricity in Kant that his great

disciple and renewer Hermann Cohen begins his neo-Kantian re-formulation. This, of course, is not yet a problem of the philosophy of history but rather of the historical character of philosophy. Nonetheless, if the prime factor of philosophy is made part of the stream of history as will be seen to be the case in the system of the "sage of Marburg," it is clear that a philosophy of history will not be simply an ideological, applied outgrowth of certain basic theoretical principles but will actually be part and parcel of these principles themselves, however it may then proceed to express itself in specific historiographical canons.

Cohen first of all analyzes what Kant actually meant when he spoke of "reason." Reason, as a fact of the human consciousness, is, after all, no more than a subjective and psychological fact which we are not entitled to hypostatize into an eternal, unchanging given reality. Kant himself had pointed out, in one of those superbly oratorical passages which intermittently liven up his lengthy pages of technical, dry jargon, in the last chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, (3) that to think of reason as what is called "common sense" is to engage in "naturalism of the pure reason", - that this is "pure misology reduced to principles," - and that it is tantamount to claiming that it is better to determine the size and distance of the moon with the naked eye than by means of mathematical calculations. In other words, "reason" is the reason of science. In fact, Cohen points out, (4) the reason whose structure Kant analyzed was not just a reason per se but a very specific and historically formed reason, towit the reason manifested in the science of Newton. This recognition leads directly to

the fundamental point involved in this discussion: philosophy does not analyze the formal structure of reason as a psychological fact of the human consciousness but rather reason as used in the systematic, objective and disciplined form of science. The transcendental method does not seek the principles of reason but the principles of science. (5) What philosophy, therefore, does is to crystallize the rational methods which science actually uses in its exploration of reality, to make them conscious to itself and to science, to study their validity or the lack thereof, and to use those that are found to stand the test of logic for the attainment of additional knowledge. But science itself, on which reason thus depends, is clearly a factor subject to history: it changes, grows and progresses. With it then also reason must change, grow and progress. "My scientific philosophy has always proclaimed its own historical character. This historical character I understand to reside and establish in the history of scientific reason which traverses the history of the sciences within the history of nations in the form of constant progress." (6) Also the very categories of thought which in Kant appear to be so beyond the reach of times and seasons, as the forms of reason, are then historically determined, for they manifest themselves in the modifications of which the progress of science consists, and this progress is obviously a datum of history. One may perhaps lay down the non-historical rule that science, and therefore the human reason, must always take form in some categories or other, but one may neither assume that any given categories of the past or present are immutably and universally human nor can one necessarily predict exactly what the rational, scientific categories

of the future will turn out to be. (7) The result of this "historization" of reason is that, so far as an understanding of the past is concerned, new avenues are opened for the interpretation of previous stages of science, culture and with them of the human reason, - avenues which a disciple of Cohen, Ernst Cassierer, was to explore magnificently. And so far as the future is concerned, the way is left open for new, better and more effective forms of the categories of thought which present at least the potentiality of the attainment of greater truth and goodness. In short, "history is the concept which embraces both philosophy and science." (8)

From this historical nature of philosophy two immediate conclusions for a later philosophy of history are derived. The first is that as a result of the dependency of the progress of philosophy on the pregress of science which places both of them within the realm of history, the contingent character of history is raised to a rational and necessary level. Without this concept the facts of history appear to express no rational purpose but to succeed one another in an unpredictable and altogether accidental manner. Now, however, the scheme of history can be said to consist of the plethora of historical events whose function it is to create the conditions for progressively better science, and the function of this progressively better science is to constitute the conditions for progressively better philosophy; finally, the function of this progressively better philosophy is, of course, to create the conditions of a progressively better social life in the future. Thus the events of history are not pure accidents but are rationally necessary for the fulfillment of an historical pur-

pose. (9)

It is unmistakable, of course, that in this conclusion, apart from the already stated mutual intertwining of philosophy and science, is also involved the prior assumption of progress in history. The formulation of the conclusion makes it clear that the rationality and necessity of history - which lift it above the level of contingent accidentality - would be invalidated if there were no progress in science and, therefore, in philosophy itself. The belief in historical progress had already been posited by Kant. He had spoken, in the self-assured tones of the age of enlightenment and of the dawning period of unprecedented technological advance, of "the constant, certain course of the sciences;" (10) he had believed to be able to perceive in the success of the glorious French Revolution and in the acceptance of its republican principles by ever widening circles of people in the world the "signa rememorativa, demonstrativa et prognostica" of historical progress in his own time. (11) But more basically he had admitted that the belief in historical progress was not justified by any theory or accumulation of facts but that it was a necessary and useful "postulate" demanded by practical reason so that man can act with a view toward future betterment. (12) Hermann Cohen shares this belief. As Kaplan describes it very well, (13) "animated by an unlimited optimism, Cohen does not doubt for a moment that men's labor in all fields of culture must bring an abundant harvest and that, despite the apparently discouraging past of mankind and despite its still sad present, history does not transpire "without inner progress."" (14) Like Kant, also Cohen feels that he sees some "signa rememorativa" in his own environment which justify

him in his belief: the advance of socialism (15), the increasing emancipation of Jewry (16), etc., - though such factual progress is always small, often undetectable and gradual. (17) But again like Kant, this doctrine is for him more basically a postulate demanded by practical reason for the sake of its rationality and usefulness: the necessary concept of the progress of science is the necessary premise for the necessary concept of the progress of pure cognition, (18) for without it men will forego all constructive activities in despair of their final effectiveness.

Now at first sight this identification of history with "constant and certain progress" appears to be a moralistic optimism neither justified by the philosophic facts of Cohen's thought nor easily bearable by a generation in which the "signa rememorativa" are not French revolutions, socialist advances or Jewish emancipation but world-wars, genocide and the threat of atomic destruction. The undeniable danger of this optimistic doctrine is only overcome, but overcome it is, by the open, infinite and asymptotic character of Cohen's concept of progress. Already Kant had described the progressive human attainment of the moral ideal as "an approximation of this idea." (19) For Cohen too, the attainment of a progressive, higher stage in history, science, culture and philosophy is always only the preparation for further tasks, the challenge of new problems created by the solution of old ones, and the questions raised by the answer to their predecessors. A concept comes to solve a problem, but the concept itself raises new problems which await a solution in the future. And as this is true of logic so is it true of history: "Further questions, such as history will

always ask again, will cause new answers; not an eternal grave but eternal birth, and not a re-birth but always a new birth," - this is history. (20) Furthermore, this historical process of problems being solved and the solutions creating new problems on a higher plane must necessarily continue ad infinitum, since, as we shall further see, it is a process which has for its purpose a rationally defined ideal; and this ideal, being absolute and perfect, can be approached and approximated within the imperfections of human history but not actually attained. (21) Thus progress is, to be sure, an integral and indispensable part of Cohen's concept of history as well as of his germinal concept of the inter-relationship between history and philosophy, but it is a view of progress which, in the first place, positively insures the "openness" and creativeness of history and which, in the second, by its stress on the infinity and consequent unattainability of absolute morality is safeguarded against an easy moralism in which historical processes would be simply identified with moral improvement. It is an optimistic doctrine insofar as one may look at the constant, "asymptotic" nearing of the curve of human history to the axis of ethical norms, but it may with equal justification be called a pessimistic doctrine insofar as one may look at the eternally unbridgeable gulf between that curve and the axis. (22)

The second implication of immediate relevancy to a philosophy of history in Cohen's philosophic dependency on science is the profoundly and exclusively rational character of history. This, of course, is self-evident for a "philosophy" by virtue of its very name alone, and the more so for the philosophy of history of a transcendental idealist.

But quite apart from the fact that a rationalist does not know of any other method than that of reason for the understanding of history or of anything else, the inter-relationship between science and philosophy presents the rationale for this rationality. Science is the human attempt systematically to interpret the world of nature and the world of man by the use of the human reason, and if philosophy is the crystallization and analysis of the methods of science then it, too, must put its unqualified trust in the human reason. To refer the events of history back to some divine fiat and thus to expel them from the jurisdiction of reason is either simply an admission of at least temporary scientific bafflement or a malicious attempt to justify good and evil equally as God-given institutions and thus to remove them from ethical criticism. (23) By making of God a "real", ontological factor in human history this is also a violation of the Second Commandment in that it introduces Him into the realm of sensual nature and historic experience. (24)

Even as the reason which treats history was itself super-historical for Kant, so also the constitutive objects of nature were, in his view, basically beyond the grasp of history - at least, in his view as interpreted by orthodox Kantians. To be sure, the phenomena of nature were in a constant state of flux and thus may be said to have their own history, but underlying these phenomena were unknowable noumena, the substances, as it were, which reason cannot reach because they are inaccessible to the senses -and the senses, of course, are the only suppliers of facts to man's reason - but which must be assumed to exist as the unchangeable sources of sensual appearances. The concept of the

noumenon had to be a scandal and a stumbling-block to the radical rationalism as well as to the radical idealism of Cohen: from the rationalist point of view noumena were objectionable because their existence is dogmatically asserted without, in their very nature, being succeptible either to proof or to argumentation; and from the idealist point of view they were objectionable because they present a metaphysical reality which is neither created by, related to, nor dependent on reason. Integrating these noumena into a system of transcendental rationalism was, together with his "historization" of reason itself, perhaps the philosophic magnum opus of Cohen. He re-defines them simply as the problem. Noumenality is essentially a transitory, historical stage of being, though, like everything that is a problem and historical, this transitoriness may extend into infinity. The noumenon simply designates that about an object which is not yet known and, therefore, constitutes the question, the challenge to the human reason. But since, as we have already seen, the problematic in human existence is asymptotically infinite, the noumenon, too, must participate in this character, though, in this case, it is the challenging asymptotic infinity of the cognitional task. (25)

Now the "given facts" of history are to history itself what the noumenon is to the cognition. As the noumenon is the unknown - as yet unknown - and irrational material which cognition must rationalize, so the "data" of history are the irrational facts which it is the task of history to reduce to their origin in the human consciousness. Historical facts, ~~what positivists call "objective reality~~", are thus quite literally the transcendental problem of history of which the question

must be asked: how do they come about? (26) Of course, even these noumenal raw materials of history in fact never occur in their stark harshness, completely untouched by the light of human reason. Current history consists, after all, of human experiences and has, therefore, already gone through the processes of perception and rationalization. Past history has gone through even more steps of phenomenalization in that it has been written down in one form or another and thus interpreted. In endeavoring to understand history "as it really was" one must, therefore, to be sure, attempt to get as close to the sources as possible in order to avoid false ordering of the raw materials. (27) But fundamentally all history is already categorized in one way or another and, therefore, human, not "objective", history. (28)

2. Teleology

History thus being rational it is not merely a matter of accumulating the facts of history. The work of reason, as men have known ever since Plato, is to unify the manifoldness of sensual experience into an ever greater unity of meaning and of purpose. Rational history must, therefore, be systematic and tend toward unity. This implies that all the manifold historical facts must and can be ordered according to some principles of direction in which their succession moves and some goal toward which they move. (29) Otherwise it would be neither science nor philosophy. (30) Now such unifying principles are obviously not given by the facts of history themselves; to the contrary, it is these facts that require and need them. Unity is not experienced but imposed by the

human reason, "purely", i.e. underived from the senses, upon experience. Thus philosophy, and reason through philosophy, in actual fact creates history. (31) Reason must and does create out of itself the principles which organize human experience into history. What and how these principles are we shall see shortly. But whatever they turn out to be, they may be compared to a gigantic magnet which straightens out and places in a purposeful direction all the millions of pieces of iron, experiences as the raw material of history, which have hitherto lain about in a meaningless chaos. This analysis, however, must be taken yet one step further, for as its stands now it still retains a spot of metaphysical dogmatism inasmuch as the formulation at which we have arrived up to now would imply that, though the principles of history have their origin in reason, the "facts" of history come from some other, non-human source, and we would, therefore, still be captured by an unphilosophic dualism. The point is that historical facts would not be historical if they were not subsumed to rational historical principles, and it is, consequently, correct to say that reason produces the principles of history, and the principles of history produce the facts of history. Thus the latter, too, are products of reason, (32) though even then, integrated into the whole of history, they still remain individual facts. (33) Just as individual perceptions do not lose their characteristic individuality by being made parts of a conceptual order, so also individual historical facts do not lose their individuality in an amorphous sea of vague, general historical ideas. Finally, it must be clear from all this that for Cohen the unintelligent and unsystematic gathering of trivia which so frequently goes under the name of history is not history at all, but that

only those facts deserve the dignity of that name which are consciously ordered with an eye toward a rational, i.e. ideal end, - and in other words, those which are made to be part of a philosophy of history. (34)

A rational principle or goal, then, brings order and system into human experiences in order to make them history. The order into which it brings them is one of development toward the goal, and development means continuity to Cohen. This continuity is to be understood as a continuity of substance, not necessarily one of chronology. Thus, for example, in his chapter on freedom in the Ethics of the Pure Will (35) the continuity of the concept of freedom may skip the centuries from Plato to Kant and from scholasticism to sociology, but continuity it is. This stands in direct contradiction to the Greek belief that war, conflict rather than progress, is the source of development. Rather it is the Biblical and Jewish doctrine that peace, and God as the God of peace, creates reality. (36) More contemporaneously it stands in contradiction to all forms of Hegelian dialectics, be it in Hegel's own formulation or the socialist dialectics of Marx. Both are merely modern adaptations of the Greek belief in war as the dynamic of change. If, Cohen exclaims, Hegel is right in claiming that the occurrence of pain proves contradiction to be the principle of reality, then by the same token the occurrence of pleasure should prove that continuity and harmony is such a principle. In fact, one motif or a very few motives wind through history as its unifying principle, no class-war or conflict of thesis and antithesis. If the theory of dialectics has, it is true, enriched, deepened and made more flexible modern historiography, it has also endangered the very foundation of all rationality by shaking the judgment of identity, the

promise of social progress by inducing social conflict; and its possible merits are plentifully replaced by the harmony and creativity of the principle of continuity. (37)

Before we can proceed to define in greater detail the "aim" which history has been shown to require for its very existence, we must first study two more factors which enter into the make-up of history: the role of nature in it and the nature of time within which it takes place.

Obviously all of history takes place on the stage of nature. We have already noted that the course of history is infinite inasmuch as it is essentially ethical, and the historical as well as ethical goal toward which it tends is ideal, absolute and therefore unreachable in time. Reached it must be, however, Cohen argues, and it can then be reached only in infinity. This is not an infinity understood as a timeless duration in some other sphere but rather the endless challenge of ever greater human, active approximation of the end. Now this infinite progress can only take place, as we have stated, in nature, and nature must, therefore, also be infinite and endless in order to permit the ethical tasks of history to be carried out. Nature, of course, does not continue endlessly by itself, - naturally, as it were. How the necessary persistence of nature is then to be garanteed we shall see at a future point. (38)

As for the nature of time, it is no more sequence than continuity is chronology. If it were sequence time would be primarily concerned with the past and would, in fact, be born out of it, for sequence can only exist for occurrences which have already taken place. To the contrary, time is a series and like every series thus an act of serial-

ization. This means that it is, in the first place, not an ontological reality, as Kant made eternally clear, but a human action. It means in the second place that it is primarily concerned with the future, for serialization is an act of "stringing together" individuals in a certain direction, toward a certain aim, and aims are matters of the future. Time is then born out of an anticipation of the future, and the past as well as the present are only subsequently divided off from this future. (39) This aimfulness brings the nature of time into harmony with the aimfulness of history which we have already established, and both history as well as time are seen to be futuristic in character. "In the ethical judgment this anticipation becomes faith in the future as the inexhaustible womb of historic possibilities." (40)

We return to the necessity of a purpose for history. We have seen that in order to have history we must have a unifying principle which will bring system into the chaotic manifoldness of human experiences that constitute the raw material of history. This principle must yield a vision of the progressive development of history. Now development cannot be stipulated unless the aim of the development is known. One cannot, for example, know the destination of a road unless one has actually seen that destination, for to depend on the general direction of a stretch of the road which one has trod but which is distant from the destination in order to gauge its final point would be possibly misleading but certainly unreliable a method, since the road might at some further point deviate from that direction. Therefore, past history and all empirical evidence cannot produce the aim of historical development. Only a non-empirical or pure idea of the reason can sat-

isfy this requirement. Such an idea may also be called a hypothesis. This hypothesis or idea produced purely by the reason will then serve the function of, in the first place, serving the historian as the principle by means of which he will order the data of history; in the second place, it will make it possible to detect the direction in which the movement of historic events goes; and, in the last place, it has the normative function of challenging men to mould present and future history so that it will most expeditiously approach that end. (41) Such an idea is not to be derogated as a mere will-o'-the-wisp or castle in Spain: it is the actual power which, itself beyond history and infinite, creates history, its principles, direction and facts, (42) and skepticism of its effectiveness in the name of some sort of realism merely testifies to the degeneration of an idealistic culture. (43)

It has already been seen that the formulation of this history-shaping idea cannot be in empirical terms. It is not a "reality" in the empirical sense but an ideal or ethical one whose reality lies in the future. This doctrine elaborates further Cohen's arch-enmity to Hegel in whose system the pantheism of his other arch-enemy Spinoza is brought up to date, since for both the idea is identified with history, works in history and is imminent to history. Cohen exclaims: "Perhaps nothing has contributed so much toward making philosophy contemptible in the pre-revolutionary age than the reactionary motto of Hegel: the real is rational and the rational is real," (44) for it in effect justifies the existence of everything at the time that it exists, be it bad or worse. It necessarily leads to a form of historical quietism, and that socialism should have followed in the foot-steps of this great protagonist o

the existing Prussian state is the height of historical anachronism. Ethically this dangerous mistake is the direct result of the identification of rationality with reality, for once the ideal goal of history is believed to be already incorporated in present reality there is not a way of distinguishing between the "reality" of truth and the "reality" of a hallucination: both are real and, therefore, rational. (45) And logically it is due to the fact that once one believes the motivating power of history to reside within rather than beyond history, to be the product rather than the producer of history, one is compelled to find some ideal absolute in a given reality, for an absolute is required either way. As we have already stated, development cannot be stipulated without knowing the goal of the development; Hegel assumed development; he cannot let himself conceive of a goal outside of history, and it must, therefore, be inside of it. (46) And with this "realistic devil on his shoulder" (47) Hegel finds the Prussian state to be this ideal entelechy of development; others will find it in some other absolute purpose within history. (48)

On the same grounds, as well as on an even more fundamental one which we will have occasion to analyze more thoroughly right away, not only empiricism but also materialism is incapable of offering a useful framework for the construction of a philosophy of history. It, too, must rely exclusively on empirical data and cannot, therefore, formulate a purpose for history different in nature from history and located in the future. Yet Cohen perceives an at least unconscious ethical and thus ideal stimulus at work within modern materialism which redeems it partly and refutes its own explicit ideological formulations. Partic-

ularly in the materialism which socialism has chosen as its contemporaneous philosophical undergirdings a nausea with hypocritical idealism expresses itself which revolts against the smug opposition against social progress in the name of loftier, idealistic and intangible values on the part of those who possess material wealth. In the second place, this socialist employment of materialistic terminology and even methods has for its sometimes unavowed purpose the aim of showing social and moral inequity in the present, the occurrence of improvement in the past and, therefore, the possibility of improvement in the future. Thus even the presumably materialistic argumentation of a Marx for social change in terms of his theory of surplus-value actually rests on a basically moral consideration, namely that it is "wrong" for one person to expropriate the product of another. (49) Indeed, the very outcry of socialism against social injustices is obviously premised on a distinction between the "is" and the "ought" and thus refutes its own Hegelian identification of the two with one another. (50)

One may, thus, find ameliorating factors in the practical materialism of the philosophy of history preached by so many moderns. But this is possible only because they in fact act on assumptions which contradict their verbal professions. Were they to act in accordance with their avowed principles, however, they would not only drive themselves into a corner where they would have to approve of any given reality, however morally abhorrent it might be to them, on the grounds that, after all, "what is is rational, and what is rational is," - but they would also, and even more disastrously, destroy the very possibility of any kind of rational, human philosophy of history. In materialistic terms develop-

ment means evolution, the inevitable production of certain effects from certain causes which themselves were inevitably caused by previous causes - and so ad infinitum backwards and forwards in time. This, however, is not history but nature. (51) In such a system men would not be actors but puppets; the course of human events would not have a purpose but merely causes; it would not be concerned with values but with a super-human compulsion. This is "historical naturalism." (52)

This easy and optimistic identification of the "natural course of events" with the progress of goodness was destroyed by Rousseau who denied that nature and history were synonymous by establishing history as the anti-natural force in reality. (53) Kant took the severance of history from nature one further and decisive step through his antinomy of freedom. By proving the rational validity of causality as well as that of human freedom he insured the possibility of the latter within the system of scientific rationalism. And since history as the course of humanly determined events is dependent on the existence of human freedom, this antinomy is positively called "the historical antinomy" by Cohen. (54)

Actually Cohen cannot as yet rest satisfied with the possibility of freedom as it is provided by Kant. In the first place, this freedom must be established as more than a mere possibility in logic or postulate in ethics in order to lay the basis for history; but, in the second place, its nature must also be defined less dogmatically and more historically than was the case with Kant. For the latter, as well as for most moral philosophers, human freedom is a question of the origin of human actions, whether they are determined by heteronomous or autono-

mous causes, whether they spring from unconditioned volitions of man or not. In each of these two respects the philosophic problem has thus been concerned with the "past" of human actions and with problematically assumed innate capabilities of man. Instead of asking such psychological questions Cohen proposes to regard human freedom not as a human possession, psychological trait or logical possibility but as a methodic idea: human freedom designates the idea that men do act and must increasingly act according to laws which they themselves, their own reason, legislate rather than impelled by any non-human, imposed forces. (55) It is then more a normative idea than anything else, concerned with the future rather than the past of human actions, historical in nature itself in that it must yet increasingly be created by man in history.

And the content of the idea of human freedom was, of course, already expressed by Kant in that formulation of the categorical imperative which Cohen calls the motto of the socialist society, namely that men are never mere means but always at least also ends-in-themselves. This is only another way of saying that men must be allowed to act according to a self-imposed law rather than according to one imposed on them from an outside source. This is the aim, ~~of socialism, and this is also the~~ final goal of history: a society of free men, of men as ends-in-themselves, of ethical persons. (56) Thus history is fundamentally connected with ethics and has for its purpose the fulfillment of the ethical tasks.

In a way this result of Cohen's preliminary considerations on the general nature and course of history was already foreshadowed by the manner in which he posed the problem. When discussing the nature of the "raw material" of history, the "facts" with which history concerns itself,

he asserted that nothing less than the experiences of all humanity taken together could constitute the stuff of history. There is only, he proclaims, world-history or no history at all. (57) Fragmentary history is not history but either chronology or nature. History as the history of one people, for example, is sure to come into conflict with the history of other peoples, to produce disunity and thus to run counter to ethics. As we have already seen, however, to run counter to ethics is synonymous with running counter to history and, therefore, with being unhistorical. (58) It can, therefore, also not be surprising that starting out with the actions and experiences of all of mankind as the material of history the end-product of history must again comprise and be meaningful for all of mankind. In any case, however, the result is that history is concerned with ethics, and ethics is concerned with the totality of mankind. At each stage of history morality is involved, though in an "immature and crippled" manner. (59) And the methodological conclusion of this circumstance for historiography itself is well stated by Kaplan when he says: (60) not the uniqueness of events in history but the systematic rationality of ethics constitutes the fundamental problem in the philosophy of history. In an age in which philosophy harps constantly on the undoubted uniqueness of events and human beings and logically arrives at historical pessimism and the "suspension of the ethical" this is Cohen's rationalistic and idealistic answer. It is also a criticism of Windelband's and Rickert's conception of history as the discipline which deals with the individual and the unique.

We began our analysis of Cohen's philosophy of history by noting that his entire philosophic system is, in the first place, a search for the

principles of science. That, after all, is the "transcendental method," to ask what the pre-suppositions of a certain established reality are and then to proceed to investigate the ramifications of these pre-suppositions. A philosophic logic of reason accordingly turned out to be the logic in fact employed by the natural sciences in their progressive explorations of man's natural environment. When, in the second step of constructing the system, the philosopher asks not so much for the theoretical bases of the cognition of reality but rather what the right principles are according to which man ought to act, he is, as it were, looking for "the logic of ethics." The major difficulty in constructing such a scientific ethic always has been that there did not seem to be a reliable "Vorwurf", working model or facts of experience, which might be dissected for its ethical principles as the natural sciences can be dissected for their logical principles.

3. Ethics and History

In the course of our considerations up to this point we have, however, discovered what this working model of the principles of ethics is. For two reasons history proves to be this needed pattern. In the first place, it is now seen to be an ideal construction, and ideas are, of course, products of the human reason and have a normative function. And normative functions are, as their very name indicates, ethical in nature. This, however, might also be said of the natural sciences, for they, too, must work with hypotheses, ideal constructions toward which the scientist aspires, - if only the last and most general of these

"hypotheses", the idea of unity and of a unified cosmos or universe. If history is to be the specific laboratory experiment for ethics, it must have a more peculiar relevancy to ethics. But this specific relevancy, too, we have unearthed by noting that history, if it is to be history at all must be human, as distinguished from natural, not subject to the laws of natural causality, and, therefore, dependent for its very possibility on the condition of human freedom. We remember that Cohen called Kant's antinomy of freedom, the basis of the possibility of ethics and the transition from the Critique of Pure Reason to the Critique of Practical Reason, "the historical antinomy." Thus history is the empirical reality of the ideal system which stems from the possibility of human freedom. Clearly, therefore, the transcendental question concerning ethics may be asked of history: what are the principles that make it possible? Equally clearly, therefore, as the natural sciences are to logic so history is the "Vorwurf" of ethics.

In this analysis of the relationship between ethics and history one more step must be taken. If history is to be regarded from the perspective of ethics, if, indeed, ethics is to be studied in terms of history, then a yet more specific form of history must be found than we have hitherto been able to determine. As it is history is still a vast, inchoate conglomerate of contradictory facts and tendencies from which presumably almost any ethic at all might be derived. As the natural sciences, in which logic is to be discerned, have a strict, rigorous and scientific basis, the basis of mathematics, so also history must be boiled down further to an objective, factual pattern before its underlying ethical premises can be culled from it. This objective skeleton

of history, around which the millions of historical data are bunched, Cohen sees in law. Law is the rational, systematic and concrete form in which each stage of history objectifies itself. It may, therefore, be said that what mathematics are to the physical sciences law is to ethics, and what the sciences are to logic history is to ethics. (61)

In this manner, too, one of the possible pit-falls still contained in Kant is overcome. When discussing Kant's understanding of the term "reason" we noted that it could lead to two opposite mis-calculations: either reason might be regarded simply as a psychological attribute of the human personality, and in that case we would be dealing not with an objective, scientific factor; or, to counteract that possibility, it would have to be dogmatically assumed that the psychological trait of reason is also a universal and immutable power in which all human beings in all places and at all times partake, and then we would be setting up a metaphysical hypostasis of reason which neither method nor facts warrant. It has rightly been pointed out (62), for example, that, in line with the psychological use of the term "reason", it would be perfectly possible for a criminal, too, to claim that he is acting in accordance with the categorical imperative and that it is not due to him if other people will not act according to the principles of his actions, though he is quite willing to have them do so! Such a psychological and individualistic interpretation of Kant's rationalism as well as of his ethics is overcome by Cohen's insistence that "reason", properly understood, means an ethic of law, and that this "law" in turn is not the product of individual, psychological personalities but of objective, historical sources, towit the state. The state is not a product of nature

but of the rational, free and historical contract between human beings, and whereas in the state of nature there can be and are no ethical persons but rather creatures acting according to the principles of natural survival and jungle-strength, it is precisely in the rational context of the state that man as an ethical individual, relating himself to others according to ethical criteria, is born. The state is, therefore, "the objectivization of ethical man"; more than that, it is the ethical form of historical man par excellence which produces the individual. (63) It is "the pinnacle of ethical and theoretical culture." (64) Thus even as the principles of history produce history so the state produces the citizens.

This is a basic distinction which Cohen makes as the deepest historical value: peoples are facts of nature and biology, not of history; the state is the quantity with which history deals. (65) The most that can be said for the concept of the people is that it is the natural precondition upon which the historical concept of the state is based: "the state is the ethical factor in the blood-concept of the people." (66) But by itself, unsublimated into the state, the people cannot treat lawfully, i.e. ethically, equally, all human individuals since it makes pernicious distinctions between members of different clans, and a historical mentality which thinks in terms of peoples, therefore, leads inevitably to the "poison of nationalism and racial chauvinism." (67) Cohen opposes for this reason the historical school of the philosophy of law whose god-father was Savigny and which believes that law arises from folk-customs rather than from juridical decisions in early courts of law as well as that the state is an expansion of more primitive forms of bio-

logical organization, such as families, clans etc., rather than a social contract. "The school of historical philosophy of law is rooted in a naturalism which disguises and presents itself as a form of spiritualism in the manner in which naturalism usually does this. Only in appearance does the "national spirit" become something different in the form of Hegel's "general spirit."... This is the basis and the root of materalism in which the materialistic philosophy of history originates - which latter dominates the thinking of socialist circles to the profound detriment of the cause." (6 8) Clearly, this controversy between Savigny's and Krochmal's historicism in the philosophy of law with Rousseau's and Kant's rationalism, in which Cohen, of course, stands on the latter side, is merely an application of the same controversy with regard to the philosophy of history as such, evolutionism on one side and idealistic rationalism on the other. And Cohen is entirely right when he connects the historicism of Savigny with the materialism of Marx, as Engel's famous study of the origin of the family demonstrates.

It must be remembered, however, - so that Cohen may not be misunderstood, though even correctly understood this doctrine may be subject to criticism -, that when he speaks of "the state" in this ideal, ethical form Cohen is not exclusively or primarily thinking of the empirical state which we encounter in history. He explicitly admits that the actual state has been and still is "the state of the estates and of the ruling classes, not the state of the law". (69) The state he is talking about is the ideal state of the future, the pure concept of the state, which is a task to be accomplished rather than a reality of experience. (70) The hypothetical character of his state is further

evidenced by the fact that he argues against Savigny by claiming not so much that the state is factually derived from a social contract but rather that it must be so regarded for philosophical and ethical reasons. (71) Nevertheless, he does, state that even this empirical and imperfect state represents a rung on the ladder toward the ideal which cannot and must not be skipped or sawn off if the highest level is eventually to be reached. The empirical state is the transitional form toward the ideal state which in turn is the fulfillment of ethics. (72) Society, or in religious terminology "the kingdom of God", is the name of the concept of the ideal state through comparison with which the actual state is held in a constant state of flux toward the final goal. (73) But even this ideal eventuality will still have to be in the form of states. The universal establishment of the reign of ethics will consist not of a federation of peoples, mere natural formations, but of the federation of states as ethical constructions. (74) And, therefore, also the national socialism of Lasalle who wanted to work toward socialism through the state rather than the internationalistic socialism of Marx who advocated the same pursuit but apart from and even in opposition to the state is more correct. (75)

It might, finally, be asked why Cohen perceives so much ethical and historical value not only in the ideal state and in the ideal law but even in the empirical stages of these two concepts, rather than in, say, religion and religious law as the unifying and rational final hypotheses of human history. His answer to this question is that, though positive law and the positive state have indeed often assumed injurious forms in history, at least in their ideal forms they can be believed to affect the

unification of mankind, - whereas religion, on the other hand, though it, to the contrary, has often in actual history brought about desirable results, is inherently incapable of producing the final and required consummation. This is true, he asserts, because, unlike the state, religion makes a claim to "truth", and in their very nature varying formulations of truth cannot be compromised. Therefore, religions must necessarily have a divisive effect, - unless, he adds caustically, they relinquish their claim to truth and resort to the "concept of tolerance and similar bromides." (76)

In any event, not only is the state, and eventually the federation of states, the highest form of history but it also, as we have already stated, actually "creates" the individual as citizen which is equivalent with the ethical person. This is an example of the methodological canon which we can watch Cohen apply almost everywhere, that the part is a product of the whole, not the reverse. Thus, even as the unifying principle of the goal and consummation of history has already been seen to be the "cause" of individual historical facts, so also here humanity is not the sum-total of individual men but individual men are the products of humanity, and the state is not the summation of all its citizens but the citizens are the creatures of the state. All these propositions are true for the same reason: a fact would not be a historical fact if there were no history to make it so; men would not be human if it were not for humanity from which they derive their status; and citizens would not be what they are if there were no state of which to be citizens. The abstract is the condition for the existence of the concrete. (77)
For this reason also the ethical person is not the same thing by far as

the empirical man, and neither is the historical person. [Empirical man comes to be through the mediation of ethics and history, and since both ethics and history are essentially ideas, empirical man in turn becomes ethical and historical only insofar as he partakes of the abstract ethical and historical man. Of these the state and the labor union are prototypes: in each of these two social forms, many men freely, rationally and concertedly pool their wills and thereby establish law; although not every individual will necessarily consent to the specific laws thus brought about, nonetheless, due to his participation in the social entity, the law produced by it is regarded as also his will. (78) Furthermore, it is only in the course of acting according to such self-legislated laws that man literally creates himself: in the state of empirical nature man is a complicated and ununified assembly of desires, lusts, ambitions, reactions and fears which, to the scientific observer, would rather give the impression of many different and mutually conflicting persons; it is only by unifying all these tendencies, by subjecting them all to a unifying, ethical will, the will of man's autonomous law, that a single person is brought about. "Oh Lord, unify our hearts," Cohen quotes from the Jewish liturgy. Again, therefore, the abstract creates the concrete. (79)

4. God

We have, up to this point, traced Cohen's philosophy of history in the following sequence: we studied his view of the relationship between philosophy and history in general; we analyzed what he regarded as the principles of history as they are dictated by a historically oriented

philosophy of historical reason; and lastly we considered with him what the material is with which history deals and what basic forms it assumes. We can now, by re-tracing our steps and taking the principles of a philosophical, rational and scientific history already laid down to their logical conclusions, proceed to the next and last stage of the construction of Cohen's philosophy of history, the general and, in fact, theological results of his system.

Throughout his entire system of thought winds one thread across which we, too, have run several times up to this point in some crucial connections, a thread which is also central to the fabric of Cohen's philosophy of history, towit the distinction between nature and ethics. Another way of saying the same thing is that cognition, man's capacity by means of which he copes with the reality of nature, is entirely separate and different from the will, his capacity for determing the direction of his actions. This, indeed, is Cohen's ever repeated accusation against all forms of pantheism, Spinozistic, Hegelian, pietistic etc., that they identify the ideal with the real, the moral with the natural, and the perceptible with the volitional. Whenever history is conceived of in such pantheistic terms, confusing the natural with the historical, ethics lose their distinguishing mark of human, rational purity and become instead some form of naturalistic determinism. On the other hand, this type of dichotomy, if carried out to an unqualified and radical degree, could obviously lead to some deeply dangerous conclusions: it might be argued, for example, on such grounds that ethics have absolutely nothing to do with the actual life of man, since this is undeniably a life which, in the first place, partakes of the processes of

nature itself and, in the second place, transpires in an environment of nature; there is no human or historical life which is not itself natural and which does not take place within nature; therefore, it might be proposed, an ethic which is qualitatively and uncompromisingly different from nature, is so "pure" that it cannot be practiced by living human beings. And this, of course, is an objection often raised against all forms of abolutistic, idealistic ethics, whether they be religious or philosophical.

But this would be a complete distortion of what Cohen has to say on the subject. In line with what is traditionally and rightly asserted about Jewish ethics, his point, too, is that nature and ethics are not irreconcilable but rather that the former must be subjected by the latter, somewhat as is the natural force of the tiger by the human force of his trainer. Nature is the clay which man must mold; ethics is pure, to be sure, but it must be and is applicable to empirical reality in order "to embrace it, subject it, master and transform it." (80)

In the second place, however, and more fundamentally, we have already run across the other problem which is involved in this train of thought: ethics is, due to its ideal character, infinite in its essence, - i.e. its tasks are absolute and can, therefore, never be completely fulfilled in historical time by empirical man. Fulfilled, however, it must be, - that is its challenge. (81) Since, as Cohen hastens to admit to the questioner, human ethics cannot be practiced except on the stage of nature in which man lives, nature must exist infinitely in order for the infinite progress of ethics to be able to take place within it. But, again as we have already had occasion to state, nature does not

continue to exist into infinity by itself: according to the laws of birth, growth, decay and death - which are the characteristic laws of nature -, it will come to an end. If it does not happen naturally that nature exists into infinity, but since it must do so on demand of the ethical reason, there must be a non-natural garantee of its infinity. The name of this garantee is the idea of God. "The idea of God constitutes this unity of a unique sort which consists of the independent task of unifying nature and morality as the basic law of truth demands and permits it."(82) "Nature cannot deprive the ideal of the perfectibility of development. Truth demands it. God garantees it." (83) Even into the teeth of his admired predecessor at the University of Marburg whose idealistic history of philosophic materialism he esteemed so highly but who, for reasons of social idealism, flirted a bit too much with socialist dialecticism to please Cohen, he throws these words: "Ethics seeks to assure itself of the reality of its concepts within the reality of history." (84) And this divine garantee of the eventual triumph of the good within nature and history, though it be delayed into infinity, - and that is really all that the idea of God means to Cohen, though it may well be exclaimed that this "all" is quite a bit -, is also the idealistic philosopher's answer to the Marxist defamation of "bourgeois utopianism": this is not an unrealizable utopia, but, to the contrary, this dream is garanteed by God. (85)

By virtue of the logical canon which we have already formulated and defended in terms of Cohen's system of thought, that the whole is the condition and, therefore, the cause of its part, this enthronement

of the idea of God at the highest peak of his philosophy of history, this completion of the philosophical structure through the insertion of the concept of God at its highest pinnacle, in effect means that God - or, at any rate, the idea of God - is the "creator" of history. For again it is true that that which leads up to the entelechy would not have come into the realm of rational cognition, and thus of historical existence, if it were not for the entelechy; i.e. history would not exist but for the existence of the idea of God. It is, consequently, perfectly true for Cohen, and valid in terms of his terminology, that God is the basis of history: God is the God of history. (86)

More than that, indeed, follows from all the considerations which have led us to this point. Truth is the name which Cohen reserves for that idea which brings about the last, final and complete unification of the universe. Since the idea of God is that idea which in infinity establishes the accord of the two basic orientations of reason, thought and will, logic and ethics, nature and man, this is then truth. And, again quite literally and truly, God is Truth. (87) So far as the grand ethical adventure of mankind in history is concerned, an adventure which to the thinker of Marburg goes simply by the name of socialism, since, as we have seen, God is the garantor of the realization of the goals of socialism, Cohen can reach this magnificent formulation: "Because of its atheism socialism loses its pinnacle, its roof, and because of its materialism it loses its basis, its foundation." (88) But back in the field of traditional theological language, even as the idea of God thus attained justifies the names of "the God of history" and "the God of Truth"

so also does it retain the transcendence and uniqueness ascribed to Him. Transcendent He is in that He is neither part of thought or Himself thought - as idealists tend to think - nor nature or in nature - as pantheists tend to think -, nor is He in both, as Spinoza proclaimed, but rather He is transcendent to thought, which is rational and human, as He is transcendent to ethics, which is rational and human, and unifies them both as subsumptions, as it were, underneath Him. (89) Unique He is in that this unifying function, which has been seen to make possible the very existence of nature and ethics, is, of course, reserved to this idea alone. This is the genuine and significant meaning of monotheism, not that there is only one rather than many gods - which would be a merely historical assertion directed against pagan polytheism -, but that He is unique, unlike anything else, in the world of man or nature. (90)

If we study the implications of this concept of God a little further in its relevancy to Cohen's philosophy of history, we also find that a vindication of some of the more orthodox notions of the role of God in history results, though these notions may in the process undergo a certain metamorphosis. In the sense, for example, in which God as the creator of the world would thereby also be laying the foundations of the occurrence of human history, it may now be said that the "beginning" of history is simultaneous with the deployment of the creative activity of God. However, this is not to be understood in any temporal or historical sense. To do that would imply a derogation of the uniqueness of the idea of God in that it would personify and actualize Him. Creation rather means, as we already have had occasion to note, that God is the logical

premise, the condition of the existence of nature. This is a logical, not a temporal relationship. Being, an absolute idea, is the prerequisite of Becoming, for if this were not so the only alternative would be that Becoming is its own origin, and that in turn would again be equivalent to the pantheism of Hegel which identifies history with God. Creation then not being a historical or temporal but rather a logical relationship, it follows that it continues to characterize the connection between the idea of God and the idea of nature at all times. Cohen, therefore, understandably prefers the term Hiddush used for creation by the scholastics of the Jewish Middle-Ages rather than the term B'riah employed in the Bible, for it permits him to interpret it in the sense of "daily renewal" rather than in the sense of temporal, instantaneous creation. (91) This may be a doctrine not completely in accord with normative Jewish belief, but, on the other hand, it will be remembered that it coincides substantially with what was taught as the Platonic theory of creation in scholasticism and that Halevy declared it to be perfectly compatible with basic Jewish faith.

Exactly the same line of reasoning is employed with regard to the traditional religious concept of revelation. As creation means to Cohen the coming-into-being of nature as the scene upon which ethics and history unroll, so revelation means the coming-into-being of man as a rational creature, made rational by the Deity. Now again, just as the creation of nature does not mean the formation and shaping of matter in the manner in which a magician produces an object out of thin air, since such a conception would be a personalization of the idea of the unique

God, so also revelation does not mean that God either literally implants the rational capacity in man or conveys to him specific rational formulae. Rather, even as God is the creator of the world inasmuch as Being is the logical condition of Becoming, so revelation is the logical condition for the human activity of reason. In this context, then, revelation means the assurance of the relevancy of reason to reality, - and that, of course, is not a matter of experienced validity but of an aspired consummation in the infinite future. Both these statements, the one with regard to the creation of nature as well as the one with regard to revelation, are true by the canon of the primacy of the whole over its parts. In this sense created nature and revealed reason, both emanating from God, come together to lay the foundations of the occurrence of history. Lastly, it is obvious that as it must be said of this understanding of creation that it is not a temporal or instantaneous occurrence, in fact that it is not an occurrence at all but a logical relationship, so also revelation in this interpretation is not a historical event at all but again a logical relationship, the relationship between the historically employed reason of man and the fulfilled and realized reason as an ideal concept. (92) Such an interpretation of the term revelation, unlike Cohen's signification of the term "creation", could, of course, not find any historical precedent in classic Jewish philosophy, since the historical occurrence of revelation was a basic premise of even the otherwise most emancipated, untraditional and philosophical thinkers of the Jewish past. It does, however, find its counterpart in the doctrine of continous revelation as it was propounded by Jewish reformers and liberals in 19th century Germany.

That "Sinai is in the heart of man" (93) is a sentiment frequently enunciated by them. Cohen merely gave this concept a more philosophical foundation and formulation.

The most important of the religio-theological implications of his philosophy or history, which Cohen fully spells out, is, however, the identity of the Biblical messianic age with his concept of the consummation of history in infinity. The Biblical prophets are actually the true creators of history in that they turned it from what it had been and continued to be in most cultures, a record of the past with a nostalgic, atavistic longing for an idealized golden age of the past, into an anticipation of an ideal future and the assurance of its eventuality which, quite literally, casts its shadows before it into the present and past. The "end-of-days" is their name for Cohen's philosophical infinity of history, and both serve the normative function of directing every present toward them. And, to complete the parallelism, what in philosophy we have called "society" goes under the name of "the kingdom of God" in religion, that ideal state which, by its always comparatively superior character, stimulates human action toward the improvement of the given state of affairs at any historical time.

Here, too, Cohen deals with a traditional religious terminology which he, or at any rate his liberal Jewish predecessors, re-interpreted. Though he emphasizes over and over again the centrality and supreme importance of the messianic doctrine as it was taught by the prophets for the history of mankind he rejects the notion of a personal Messiah. The belief in such a person represents to him the same type of personalization and concretizing mythology to which he objects in the notion of

a personal God: God as well as the Messiah are ideas and ideals but not persons. This, to him, is not a lower but a far superior and more powerful type of reality. On the other hand, of course, the transformation of the Messiah from a person to an "age" is quite a conventional process in the period of the German- Jewish emancipation.

If the terms "society" and "the kingdom of God" denote the same idea in Cohen's system, a third term can still be added as a name for this reality. We have already noted several times that "socialism" means both the endeavor for and the eventual reality of the perfect society to the philosopher. He has no doubt at all that the prophets were socialists in a quite technical sense and not merely in the sense of homiletic generalities. When they identified the person of the Messiah with the "suffering servant", when they rebelled against social injustice and inequity, when they identified human evil not with death - an identification which in religion and philosophy leads to theosophic speculation and mytholohy - but with poverty, a condition that can be and must be remedied by ethical, social human action, when they went so far as in effect to make "piety" and "poverty" synonymous names, - they evolved a religious system of socialist thought and action which stands in direct historic connection with the socialism of modern times. (94)

5. History and Judaism

Of Cohen, who was not only a Kantian philosopher but also a Jewish thinker, we must ask one last but crucial question with regard to his

philosophy of history: what, if anything, is the role of Judaism and Israel in this system?

In answer to this question the first point which must be clarified is that indisputably Cohen arrives at Judaism from philosophy; he does not come to philosophy from Judaism. This is basic, for there can be little doubt that wherever this has been the procedure of a Jewish thinker - and Cohen is by far not the only one who took this course -, the result has been, and has had to be necessarily, that at best Judaism can turn out to be for them an exemplar, or even the exemplar, of general truths which they arrived at independently of Judaism. When you begin with a universal, as the philosopher invariably must do, the only way of ending with a particular is to try to prove that the particular is an illustration of the general, - and usually also there will be many different illustrations of the general, not just one. In this manner it would appear to be impossible to discover a peculiar or unique value in the specificity of the particular. Thus, in the case of the relationship between philosophic truth and Judaism, the philosopher, because he is a philosopher and has a primary commitment to philosophy, will inevitably attempt to establish certain general philosophic truths and then proceed to inquire whether these general truths are contained in Judaism; to the extent to which they are he will accept Judaism, and to the extent to which he does not find them to be there contained he will also feel free, indeed constrained, to discard Judaism. The Jew, on the other hand, because he is a Jew and has a primary commitment to Judaism, will begin by analyzing Judaism for the truths which it contains and may, nay usually will find that these truths also have a more general, philosophic bearing outside the theological and communal boundaries of Judaism. In

his case, however, he will find general truths in the particular, and since he has found them only and originally in this particular he will ascribe indispensable value to the existence of the peculiarity of the particular.

The validity of this observation is also exemplified in the thinking of Hermann Cohen. We have traced his philosophy of history and have easily been able to do so exclusively in terms of his rational philosophy. He begins with general considerations relating to reason, and this is the standard to which he will adhere through the end. It is true that at several points it was possible, and even cogent, to note parallels and substantiations in Judaism. But none can labor under any doubt that it would have been perfectly and easily possible to construct the same philosophic system without any such references. Furthermore, where they were made they were only convenient comparisons and illustrations. But without them or with other comparisons and illustrations the philosopher could have continued his work undisturbedly.

Thus, at best we may expect Cohen to find Judaism a good, possibly even the best embodiment of the general truths at which he has arrived through the methods of general, non-Jewish philosophy, - even as is true of most other men who followed the same course. And this is exactly what happens. Judaism is the embodiment in historic, concrete and lived as well as believed form of the truths which he has arrived at in an independent manner. "The sources of Judaism shall be shown and proved to be the material in whose historical self-production the problematic reason, the problematic religion of reason is to produce and verify itself." (95) The operative words here are "verify itself." If the

philosophic truths are verified in Judaism, so much the better for Judaism; if not, then so much the worse for Judaism, -- not so much the worse for philosophy. Philosophy is the standard of measurement, not Judaism. To give only two examples of this method: religion must, for philosophic reasons, ideally and basically be ethics. If a religion can be shown to be in accord with this criterion then it is true religion. It is not that if a religion which is initially accepted proves to contradict this conclusion that then the conclusion must be rejected. Fortunately for Judaism the latter alternative does not happen to be applicable. "Through the identity of religion and ethics Judaism is also subjectively proved to be the religion of reason." (96) And, incidentally, however much he advocates the principle of the separation of state and church for practical and social reasons, fundamentally Cohen accepts the validity of the theocratic concept just for this reason, that in it the religious, i.e. ethical values are conceded primacy in the establishment of the human society. (97) Or, to give yet another example, history is the progressive realization of ethical ideals. Jewish history then will be history only insofar as it can be said of it that it fulfills this requirement. And that is exactly what Cohen explicitly states: "Jewish history, as history, that is to say insofar as it consists of ethical ideas ..." (98)

Now it must be asked whether, even once it is admitted that Judaism and its history are such an illustration of the general truth of the philosophy of history, they are the only ones to deserve that designation. The answer is in the negative. Cohen made a special point of entitling his

book about the sources of Judaism Religion of Reason, i.e. a, one religion of reason, not "the, the one and only religion of reason", and when by mistake the article "the" crept onto the title-page of the book in the first edition it was quickly omitted in the second edition. (99) Furthermore, he explicitly states that there is no such things as an "absolute religion" but that other religions, too, apart from Judaism, have a right to the name of "religion of reason", though all of them, no doubt, have earned it to a different degree.)(100) The only quantitative difference between all such religions of reason, a quantative difference which turns into a qualitative one for a reason which we shall recognize shortly and which is peculiar to Cohen's philosophic method, is a difference of aboriginality. In Judaism the idea of the unique God and His ethical law originated. Here these were, therefore, historically first and presumably most pure because least adulterated with external, contrary influences. (101) "This originality of Judaism (as the religion of reason) constitutes the advantage of Judaism." (102) While this "advantage" may at first appear to be rather trivial, in that, after all, certainly for a rationalist like Cohen, the truth of an idea would be unaffected by its appearance in time, it is actually a much graver factor than that. Cohen's entire philosophic system has also been called "the philosophy of origin." The origin of reality, the reality of ideas, out of the nothingness of an unconditioned reason, which he exemplifies in the creation of the increment of the infinitesimal calculus, determines the purity of all "pure thought" Without such a pure origin it is despoiled by sensuality. (103) The question of origin is, therefore, not a question of temporal priority but of logical purity, of pure rationalism. And this is what Cohen means when he speaks of the originality of Judaism.

The identity of religion with philosophical ethics is, however, to be understood in a strictly historical, temporal, transitory and limited sense. It is true that the prophets first taught the doctrine of messianism which is identical with the concept of the garantee of the fulfillment of the ethical tasks; it is equally true that religion first taught the ethical laws which spring fundamentally from the rational character of man; and it is certainly true that Judaism was the first to proclaim the idea of the one and unique God who is the source as well as the guarantee of the realization of truth. But this relationship between religion, specifically Judaism, and the truths of reason is not a logical but merely a historical one. All these truths, as his own system and the general progress of philosophy demonstrate, have historically risen to the level of human consciousness through the instrument of religion; basically, however, they are truths produced and arrived at by the independent human reason. This is their genuine and enduring locus. Therefore, "the connection between rational truth and religion is to be maintained only historically." (104) There are certain dangers in the perpetuation ad infinitum of this relationship. The progress of reason demands that these doctrines be rid of certain and significant impurities which necessarily are attached to them by their religious context. Religion, even when it propounds partial truths, so Cohen declares, distorts to a certain degree and assuredly mythologizes these truths: for example, we have already seen that the ideas of God and of the Messiah are personnified rather than kept in their ideal pristineness, that creation and revelation are almost invariably interpreted in naturalistic

ways, etc. More important even than these faults, we have also seen that religions are necessarily denominational and, therefore, divisive. In all these ways religion, although it gave birth to the basic historical and ethical truths, is, in the course of time, a hindrance to the development of its children. "Therefore, for ethics as a science the motto must be: the dissolution of religion into ethics." (105) Only in that way can the rational truths attain to their complete and necessary clarity as well as historical effectiveness.

This entire argumentation sounds, and theoretically is, very much like the rationalism of the Enlightenment, much of which sneaked into 19th century German-Jewish liberalism, - namely that "natural religion" is the highest stage of the intellectual development of man for the sake of which the inherited theology and pomp of the historical religions must be scrapped. But Cohen is somewhat more careful and restrained than his rationalistic predecessors. He recognizes and severely castigates the shallow positivism and "cultural ethicism" which results when the specific and rooted theological and religious foundations are abandoned in favor of a "religion of common sense." This warning harks back to the analysis of reason with which we began our study. "Common sense" is not only much worse than scientific reason but also than the historically developed formulations of ethical religions. The spread and eventual dominance of the scientific reason which alone surpasses the rationality of the historic religions is a vast, immensely difficult, demanding and greatly time-consuming task. / Until such a time is reached the religious constellations of Judaism and Christianity must be continued.

This "historical piety" is our "responsibility to the ethical future." (106)

It is in this intervening period, the period between our present stage and the eventual triumph of scientific reason, that Israel and Judaism still have their world-wide and profound historical tasks to perform. Judaism, through its practice as well as teaching, must progressively purify not only itself but also all other religions of the slacks of mythology which they still retain. Through the maintenance and administration of the idea of the one God they perform this task in the first place. Until this idea is accepted by all mankind its mission is not fulfilled. And Cohen makes it quite clear in many places, including his central Ethik, that the doctrine of the trinity and of the divinity of Jesus for him falls within the class of harmful mythological survivals. And, in the second place, the statelessness, geographical homelessness of the Jewish people, its diaspora life, is a divinely and providentially imposed favor, for by means of it Israel has been enabled to further the fulfillment of this task by direct and intimate contact with all the peoples of the world even while it was deprived of the opportunity to engage in the national chauvinism which has usually characterized national states in history. In short, "the unique God has deprived us of our fatherland and has returned it to us in the form of all mankind...To bring about the recognition of this unique God in the world, this is our task in world-history." (107)

It might be objected, as indeed it was by Achad Ha'am in his famous essay Slavery in the Midst of Freedom, that the continued historical existence of the Jewish people is neither sufficiently justified nor

adequately rationalized by the formulation of such an ideal task. In the first place, it is claimed, no people exists for such philosophical and abstract reasons, and, in the second place, such ideal aims do not require the existence of Israel as a specific historical unit. This objection Cohen answers as follows: it is true that at first sight it would appear that even as for the universal logic of mathematics no one special social unit is required but it applies to all nations without distinction, so also the universal God would not need one particular nation for the teaching of His idea. But in fact the idea of God is different from the rational sciences. In order to bequeath it in its full purity to all mankind the historical process of instruction requires a cultural, i.e. historical continuity of a spiritual people. This people is still needed even after the Bible has become the common property of enlightened humanity. The fundamental ideas of truth could not survive the vicissitudes of history "among the nations which did not produce them." The unity and continuity of this one people is a telling, historical symbol of the eventual unity of all mankind in the recognition of the one God. "One mankind could come to be only under one God. This one God arose only in one people. Therefore this one people must continue." (108) In this sense, then, Jewish history will continue as it has ever since its inception: "Jewish history, as history, i.e. insofar as it consists of ethical ideas, is an unbroken chain of human, national misery. ...The messianic people suffers vicariously for the suffering of mankind ...Thus the misery of the Jews has leveled a harsh accusation at other nations at all times. From this messianic

point of view a theodical light is shed over this enigma of world-history. Eudaemonistically the suffering of the Jews is a misfortune. But another interpretation is placed on Israel's history by its messianic vocation. As Israel suffers for the sake of the idolaters in the view of the prophetic poet, so it suffers to this day as representative of the inadequacies and faults which are still obstructing the realization of monotheism." (109)

6. Conclusion

Is this then a Jewish philosophy of history? By the same token by which Julius Guttmann refused to speak of a "Jewish philosophy" but rather insisted on a "philosophy of Judaism" it would seem to be necessary to speak of Hermann Cohen's philosophy of history as at most a philosophy of Jewish history, not a Jewish philosophy of history. At least methodologically he makes no pretense at constructing the latter. It even seems likely that had the suggestion been made to him that he do so he would have refused it vehemently. For, as we have seen, to construct a Jewish philosophy of history would mean to construct a philosophy of history whose methods, whose categories and whose terminology as well as final aims are Jewish in principle. Such a philosophical history would not even necessarily have to deal with the history of the Jewish people; conceivably it could deal with the role of the Chinese people without any particular reference either to Israel or to Judaism, and yet it would be Jewish in its manner of dealing with the problem that

it has chosen for itself. Such a notion, however, would have been and was profoundly distasteful to Cohen. To him the methods, categories, terminology and aims of history appeared to spring not from any particular religious, national, cultural or revealed context but out of the universality of the logic of scientific reason. It is true that he will sometimes speak of the rise of monotheism or of prophetic messianism as a "miracle" which cannot be explained in terms of general history. (110) But in view of the total character of his philosophical orientation and the explicit canons of historical thinking that he laid down for himself it must be believed that these were rather metaphoric expressions of admiration and wonderment than technical philosophical concepts. On the other hand, that his philosophy of history not only included but even reached its systematic climax in a philosophy of Jewish history and that he regarded Jewish history as the prototype, universal red thread and approximation of ideal world-history cannot be doubted. No less doubtful would seem to be the truth of the statement that throughout his general philosophy of history, at just about every crucial turn of the road, reminiscences appear, references are made, illustrations are given and concepts are introduced which point to Cohen's grounding in the heritage of classical Jewish experience and thought. But, as we have said, these strike the student not as integral constructive parts of the system but rather as the personal element, however genuine and deep they may be, introduced into the system by the personality of the author. Our first conclusion would, therefore, unavoidably be that Cohen's philosophy of history is also a philosophy of Jewish history, but it is not, nor does it claim to be,

nor would it have wanted to be, a Jewish philosophy of history. Nowhere is there any indication that the role of the Jewish people is to be judged by any other standards than the ones which are also applied to all other peoples; nowhere is there any justification offered for possibly thinking of Jewish history as qualitatively different from all other particular histories; everywhere the logical rationalism that characterizes his entire thinking is also unmitigatedly and unqualifiedly used in terms of Jewish history.

On the other hand, this question can also be approached from another perspective. It is possible for a philosophic system to be couched explicitly in one terminology and yet in fact to express certain underlying tendencies of the mind which point to another set of terms. It could be argued, for example, that whereas Cohen thought of his methods and wanted to think of them exclusively in rationalistic, logical and scientific terms, abjuring all specialized theological or cultural or historical premises, he in fact illustrates in his entire mental mode a specifically Jewish coloration of thought which also affected the conceptual results at which he arrived. This would appear to be involved in a statement made by Jakob Klatzkin: (111) "Even some neo-Kantians who possess in Cohen the most dignified interpreter and reformer used to circumvent their master cleverly, and the more so, of course, academic philosophers of other schools. The reason for such behavior can easily be guessed. The world-view of Cohen is in its fundamental principles the world-view of Judaism. The ethics of Cohen employ the principles of Jewish morality in a strictly methodical manner. And it is understandable that one could not forgive an academic philosopher for this

Judaization of ethics. What one can detect in the words of Kuno Fischer sounds like an unintentional confession when he thought he could refute the thought of Cohen with the phrase: more race than philosophy." It would lead too far to try to substantiate the thought presumably contained, or at least suspected by Klatzkin, in Fischer's statement, however one may evaluate its moral intentions, because this might involve a phenomenology of the historic Jewish spirit and a close analysis of the possible relationship between the classic categories of Jewish philosophies and those of Cohen's. But that there is some initial probability of validity in the observation seems clear: quite apart from the use of such substantively Jewish terms as God, creation, revelation, the kingdom of God, messianism, man, the unity of God, the world and man, reason, law, ethics, etc., a number of deep-seated methodological canons are implicit in Cohen's philosophy of history which might possibly entitle it to be called Jewish. Among them would have to be counted first of all the basic conception of neo-Kantianism, the striving for unity in perception, will, the human individual, and history; Cohen's radical monism is surely in direct line with the underlying motif of Judaism through the ages not by mere accident. The thoroughly historical orientation with which he approaches problems of logic, ethics, art and theology again is his inheritance from the spirit of the "religion of the God of history" par excellence. That his complete confidence in the power of reason is rooted in the rationalism of the Talmud, in which also the historical model of his ethic of law must be recognized, he repeatedly stresses by calling upon the name of Maimonides. And his

ethicism which dominates not only that aspect of his system which specifically deals with ethics but which even pervades his logic and esthetics undeniably perpetuates the fundamental emphasis of Judaism. In short, however one may have to differ on individual historical and religious conceptions, a good case could be made out for the "Judaized" character of his philosophy. In this sense, too, Cohen himself would not have denied the Jewish character of his thinking, for he was profoundly convinced that he was merely bringing up to philosophical date the best in the culture of the West, and as his book on Germanism and Judaism testifies, however startling it may otherwise be, he perceived the best of the culture of the West in the tradition of Jerusalem together with the purified tradition of Athens.

This is not to say that at, at least, one decisive point, and possibly at some other minor ones, in the system it is not necessary for us to ask critical questions. Guttmann has already asked the most decisive one (112): basic to the rounding-out of the entire system as well as of the philosophy of history is the concept of the idea of God as the guarantee of the infinity of nature for the sake of the eventual unification of nature and ethics. Not only is it basic in this respect, but so far as the concept of God itself is concerned, to which Cohen ascribes such supreme significance, this is its entire and exhaustive meaning. But can an "idea", however potent one may believe it to be in respect of its normative function, really be credited with such ontological, historical effectiveness? Can the God who is a rational idea fulfill the task so expected of Him, or is it not understood that this is the function

of personality? True, Guttmann himself states that this question can be answered consistent with Cohen's system only after his concept of reality has been completely clarified. Cohen ofttimes condemns those who speak of ideas as being "only ideas", who have an insufficient belief in the reality and potency of ideas. He regards them as partly influenced by the mythologically inclined need of Christianity to prove the personal, historical and ontological existence of a divine Jesus and partly as victims of the materialistic, naturalistic skepticism of a time in which idealistic and ethical culture is rapidly degenerating. But even when the validity of these accusations is granted our problem still remains: at this particular and decisive point we are not dealing with the historical effectiveness or the human relevancy of ideas we are asked to believe in the power of an idea over the fundamental laws of nature and beyond the duration of history.

It is at this point, rather than at the point of the concept of the "correlation" which Rosenzweig exaggerated in his re-interpretation of Cohen and which, if not kept within proper boundaries, is likely to lead to a distortion of the entire system, that a possible extension of neo-Kantianism must be begun from the point of view of religion and Judaism. Cohen who himself was rightly proud of having learned from Kant and then having gone beyond him would have been the last to deny that this would also become necessary for his students. (112a) And that here his own logic leads him beyond the limits of his system to the concept of the personal and even ontological God was rightly and cogently recognized by Guttmann.

But once one has, at least tentatively, taken this step, the logic of the step leads beyond itself in turn. We have noted how, in the specific application of his categories to traditional religious ideas, a de-personalization, idealization and therewith also a generalization took place. Not only God was transformed from a person into an idea; also the Messiah suffered the same fate; and creation as well as revelation lost their particularistic character and became universal ideas; even the Jewish people itself was turned from a concrete historical entity into more of an embodiment of an idea and therefore deprived of its concrete historical peoplehood. That all these transformations, consistent as they may be and are with the tenor of the system, also are carbon-copies of the often shallow liberalism and rationalism and scientism of the 19th century should make us a bit suspicious. None of these propositions are new with Cohen; they are without exception the common intellectual property of German Reform. Klatzkin may not have been so wrong when he exclaimed in admiration and sadness at the same time: "A spiritual giant was the watchman over the inheritance of a spiritually dwarfed generation." (113)

Now, if the logic of Cohen's concept of God may demand a "re-personalization" of the idea of God, the same act becomes possible, though not necessary, for his concept of the Messiah. "Messiah" denoted to Cohen the power of the idea of God to harmonize nature with ethics in infinity. If, as we have seen, this power can be exercised only by a person, what we are saying is that this function which the system must postulate is not a natural but a miraculous, irrational one. The point is that the curve of an asymptote never does reach the axis, and if it

does it can do so only in contravention of the laws of mathematics. And nevertheless this is what is postulated. Finally, once a miracle is postulated, whether in infinity or today, there is no more warrant to say: the miracle can only happen this way and no other; the Messiah is an idea and an age, not a person! Actually this conclusion would also seem to be required by the exigencies of Cohen's practical ethics: to say that the sure promise of progress is required by mankind so that it will continue to strive for improvement and to give this promise by saying that it consists of the guaranteed approximation of reality to the ideal into infinity, though the approximation will never in history reach the point of co-incidence, - this is a dubious promise. And how one can approach infinity is a logical question all by itself. The point of infinity is that, having gone toward it a certain distance, one is still as far away from it as one was to begin with - it being infinitely away! Here again, therefore, the promise can only be the promise of a miracle. Orthodox Marxists may scorn that this is not only utopian socialism but positively miraculous socialism. But if it is not that it is not socialism at all.

The only alternative would be to dispense with the promise all together. That would mean also to dispense with the idea of God in the system. It would in fact seem that, if one does not wish to take the ontological steps which have just been outlined, - if one wishes to remain strictly within the framework of Cohen's own rationalistic limits, - that this would be the preferable and even necessary attitude. From the point of view of a transcendental monist, a logician who rejects

the method of psychology and eudaemonism, what, after all, is the need for a promise of success? Is not the logical and ethical requirement for goodness sufficiently compelling? Is not the assurance of eventual triumph a form of eudaemonism? And exactly why is it true that logic demands the reality of ethical ideas within the reality of nature? The much more rigorously ethical answer, and very possibly the true one in terms of philosophy, is the statement in the Sayings of the Fathers: "You cannot finish the work, but you are not free to leave it undone." It may well be that we ought to answer the historical cock-sureness of "scientific socialists" as well as the messianic optimism of Cohen by saying: we are socialists because we wish to be socialists, not because we are sure that socialism is going to win! On the other hand, the suspicion raises itself that this added super-abundance of hopefulness which Cohen adds to the system was due more to the desire for a concept of God and for the lastly Jewish legitimacy of the system than to the logical requirements of the system itself. (114)

About this optimism one more and last word needs to be said. But first of all a further implication of the possibility of a "re-personalization" of the concepts of God and the Messiah must be indicated. If the God of the system must be a personal God after all equivalent alterations would ensue in the interpretations of the concepts of creation and revelation. The creation and revelation of a personal God would be different from the creation and revelation of the idea of God. Without entering into the details, it may very well turn out that under such auspices the two would re-gain some of the historicity and temporal particularity which they had lost. And finally it must be said that all

these strictures, however radical they are in terms of specific, substantive concepts, would not otherwise interfere with the consistency, validity and grandeur of Cohen's system.

As to the historical optimism itself, it is not as optimistic as some of its detractors claim. The accusation of "fatuous millenarianism" which is so universally leveled at 19th century thinkers nowadays is unjustified in the case of Cohen, and, as we have already stated, the much abused anecdote told by Franz Rosenzweig, that Cohen may not have expected the messianic age within fifty but surely within a hundred years, is not really a serious argument. To be sure, it is optimism to believe in constant and certain progress. But, from another perspective, it can be claimed with equal validity that it is a particularly profound form of skepticism to declare that this progress will never, never reach its destination or even come perceptibly closer to it. And, of course, both propositions are enunciated by Cohen with one breath. Surely one modifies the other and moderates it. Although it must be admitted that Kant's reliance on the signa rememorativa, demonstrativa et prognostica of the essential goodness of man in the French Revolution and the spread of republican principles as well as Cohen's reliance on the progress of socialism in his time does as much honor to their ethical greatness as it was both perhaps over-confident and a dangerous precedent for less auspicious times, such as ours.

But it would seem that the really objectionable aspect of Cohen's optimism is his faith in the positive state and positive law. Understandably he was afraid, for philosophical as well as social reasons, of the overwheening demands for primacy on the part of the people's blood and of the denomination's truth. In contrast he saw ethical

value in the state and in the law even while regarding them as transitory stages through which one had to pass on the way toward the kingdom of God. But, practically speaking, the positive law and the positive state seem to have done everything they could to frustrate such confidence in our time. It is no longer true that "man's metabolism functions through the organs of the state"; if anything the contrary is true. Cohen himself said in the moment of his greatest patriotic loyalty and in that most assimilationist of his writings, Germanism and Judaism, (115) that, contrary to the logic of his philosophy and theology, he would be a Zionist if German peoplehood ever demanded the sacrifice of his Jewish faith and adherence! But possibly he might answer that this is only an empirical argument drawn from a passing historical situation. Is it, however, legitimate to point to the historical divisiveness of religions and, disregarding their ideal unity and their practical proselytism, to raise this historical feature to the level of an innate anti-messianic trait, even while disregarding the historical divisiveness of national states and, instead, to use their philosophical indifferentism as an index of their messianic usefulness? Is it not, to the contrary, much more true to the canon of historical continuity and philosophical monism to regard religion and religious law as the historical, empirical Vorwuerfe out of which reason extracts the road-signs to the future? Much more reason, and certainly much more morality, has been discovered in Judaism and the Halachah in our time than in the state and its laws!

IV. A CONTRAST

In terms of philosophical method it is not incorrect to observe that Nachman Krochmal and Hermann Cohen begin in the same way and end in the same way. We have noticed that both of them build the foundations of their respective philosophies of history on the corner-stone of epistemology. And this is, of course, only reasonable. History is a form of human knowledge, and before the characteristics can be specified which distinguish it from other such forms what they all have in common, namely the substance and structure of human knowledge as such, must be defined. But the similarity, in fact the identity of Krochmal's and Cohen's starting-out points goes further than this mere formal approach. They both not only recognize in theory that epistemology must precede all other activities of the human intellect, but they also in practice follow in the epistemological foot-steps of that path-finder of modern, scientific cognition, Immanuel Kant. It has been demonstrated (1) that Krochmal's theory of knowledge is not only derived but at least in the sketchy form in which he presents it even taken bodily from the work of Kant, and he uses this theory of knowledge to apply it to his chief desideratum, the spiritualization, what he calls the "purification", of religion. (2) And the third and last step which he takes in his employment of Kantian epistemology is to declare that the purification of religion can be brought about only in the manner in which all intellectual purification takes place, towit by means of an ever increasing conceptualization of history. (3) From this point onward he plunges into his own theory of history, having laid the foundation for it in Kant's philosophical premises. - Cohen, on the other hand, also begins with Kant, - and this,

of course, is self-evident for the great restorer of the philosopher of Koenigsberg. He does not so much apply his teacher's epistemology by way of analogy, as does Krochmal, but rather analyzes its own inherent principles and then proceeds to extend these principles into new areas. For him epistemology itself is a historical phenomenon due to its intertwining with the historical progress of scientific knowledge. (4) This having once been established, historical knowledge is conceived of by Cohen in exact analogy with scientific knowledge: it begins with a hypothesis or telos, it has its "data", and it ends in certain ethical conclusions. - Thus, despite certain differences in utilization which direct the two thinkers at a small angle away from one another - and the two lines that form this angle of divergence between them at the outset will, like all non-parallel lines, put ever more distance between them as they get further away from their point of convergence -, Krochmal and Cohen both begin with Kant. Actually, this is not a very surprising discovery: where else can rational thinkers begin since 1800?

In a manner of speaking, it may also be said that the two end at the same point. God is the climax of the system of each. To be sure, in Krochmal's language He turns up usually under the designation of the Absolute Spirit, - and this designation carries its implications for the vast differences which separate their respective conceptions of God. Nonetheless, when one considers the specific function, or definition, attributed to the idea of God by the two men the similarity is really quite striking: in Krochmal's system God, or the Absolute Spirit, is He who guarantees the eternity of Israel; in Cohen's system God is He who guarantees the eternity of nature for the sake of the eternity of the

ethical task. Thus the traditionally prime aspect of the nature of God in religion is preserved by both, His eternity, unchangeability, supermundaneness, and His promise of man's eventual triumph.

Connected with this basic similarity of their conceptions of the function of God is the similarity of their interpretations of His creative relationship to the natural universe. We have come to the conclusion (5) that Krochmal accepted in all its essential aspects the neo-platonic definition of creation as not an instantaneous act in time but rather as a constant and, as it were, logical relationship between necessary being and contingent being. This is also what Cohen says about God's creativity, that it is the necessary condition for reality, not its mechanical cause. (6) The reason for which these two philosophers arrive at this same conclusion is formally the same but substantatively different. For neither of them is God a person; for Krochmal He is the Absolute Spirit, who, we have reason to suspect, is immanent to the historical process very much in the pan-historical way of Hegel; and for Cohen He is an idea, transcendent to the historical process. In either case, however, the result is the same insofar as the problem of creation is concerned: a God who is not a person cannot act in specific ways within time; He can only have a non-personal, i.e. logical relationship to existents outside of Himself.

Thus it happens that we may state that Krochmal and Cohen both begin and end their philosophies of history at the same points.

But these are, of course, very formal and even superficial similarities. In the first place, even these similarities differ as much as

they resemble one another, - as we have already initially noted: Krochmal's Kantian epistemology is quite sketchy and enters into his philosophy of history only by way of analogy, while Cohen's is technical and all-embracing; Krochmal's God is a Hegelian dogma, within history and yet ruling it, while Cohen's is a Kantian idea beyond history as well as nature. More significantly, the epistemology and God are the extreme ends of the systems, one at the beginning, the other at the end, - and they are related to the historical systems perhaps in the manner in which birth and death are related to life. Life itself consists of what happens between them, even as history consists of the intellectual structures suspended between the premises of knowledge and the last attainment of knowledge. And insofar as their conceptions of history proper are concerned, Krochmal and Cohen could not possibly differ more than they do.

Their basic difference has already been extensively noted in the conclusions of the two chapters dealing with them. (7) For Krochmal the foremost problem is Israel; from it he starts out, to it he returns, for the sake of a definition of its nature he undertakes to study history as a whole, and he derives his fundamental principles as well as facts from its experiences. For Cohen the fundamental problem is knowledge as such; he begins by analyzing it, and only at the end of his considerations he also weighs the role of Israel in the scheme of history as he has constructed it previously. It has also been noted that this basic difference is essentially the difference between a philosophical, rational approach on the one hand and what may be called a "phenomenological" approach on the other, and the respective advantages and disadvantages of each have been estimated. The former accords more with the demands

of logical, scientific thinking but consequently lacks a certain amount of "life-like" vitality and must perforce deviate from hitherto accepted notions of Jewish self-assessment. The latter possesses the traits whose absence is felt in the former, but with their possession also goes the terrible danger of naturalism.

In addition to the detailed consideration of the merits of each approach that we have presented in the preceding chapters, one more example may here serve to illustrate the abyss that opens between Cohen's fundamental philosophic outlook and that of Krochmal. We concluded that Krochmal's orientation may rightly be called a biologicist one as over against Cohen's rationalism. This is another way of saying that, whereas for Krochmal the arch-type of thinking seems to be embodied in the biological science, for Cohen this arch-type is to be found in mathematics. It is no happenstance that Krochmal's typical analogy for history is a biological metaphor: historical nations grow and die like human individuals, - i.e. like biological organisms. (8) Cohen's fundamental analogy, to the contrary, is the analogy between the relationship of mathematics and logic on the one hand and ethics and the state on the other. (9)

It is for this very reason that literally what Cohen attacks is propounded by Krochmal, - although it was, of course, not Krochmal that Cohen was thinking of but rather Hegel. The people is not yet a historic datum for Cohen; it is a biological, natural one. With the glorification of the people as the operative unit of history go - so he declares and warns - go plutocracy, chauvinism and racialism. Only the state is the

objective form in which a people can enter into history, - the state as the non-natural, volitional and therefore ethical creation of man. This doctrine of Cohen's can be brought into a short but entirely accurate formula: history is the history of states. Now for Krochmal the exact opposite is true, so much so that he does not even bother to state it in so many words but rather proceeds to construct his historical scheme on its presumably self-evident assumption: history is the history of peoples. The units whose life-cycles he describes are invariably peoples. And, quite in accordance with Cohen's own reasoning, it is obvious that this difference in their evaluation of the data of history is based on their difference in the fundamental philosophic orientation: peoples are the units of biology; states are the units of human creation. - This is no mere speculative game. The respective philosophical positions of the two men manifested themselves immediately in questions of practical politics: as Horwitz' epitaph on Krochmal proves (Tziyun lenephesh Rabbenu Nachman Hakohen), and as contemporary essays still proclaim, Krochmal became the early hero of Jewish nationalism and Zionism, - due to his emphasis on the "national spirit." Cohen, on the contrary, was in his time the outstanding German-Jewish exponent of anti-Zionism and is so remembered to this day.

Thus the difference between people and state may be taken as a symbol of everything that divides the two men. It is a symbol, for example, of the difference between Krochmal's cyclical scheme of history as over against Cohen's insistence on the essentially uni-lineal character of history. (10) And again, of course, this is the difference between

biology and mathematics: the life-cycle is a biological concept, progress an algebraic one.

Even the difference in their conceptions of God must, in the last analysis, be ascribed to the named principal divergency of fundamental orientation between them. In Cohen the idea of God enters into the system at the very end. He is the product of the system. The system is first constructed without resort to Him, but by means of the reason alone. And when He does enter it, or rather: when He comes to "round out" the system, God is not in any manner or shape a substance; He is a rational idea exclusively. As for Krochmal, on the other hand, the idea of God is not derived at all. He is quite dogmatically stipulated at the beginning of the historical chapter VII, and Krochmal "operates" with Him as if His function had been proved for the purposes of history. (This is so unless one is ready to concede that the piece of historical reporting on the dispute between Maimonides and Galen in Chapter V (11) constitutes Krochmal's deduction of the concept of God.) Furthermore, it must be conceded that, although in some respects Rotenstreich's strictures on Krochmal may be too radical, he is unquestionably right in asserting that Krochmal's God, or "Absolute Spirit," has some of the biological substance which seems to adhere to all of his basic concepts. (12) Or as Guttmann puts it: Krochmal did not quite avoid the pantheistic dangers of an identification of God with the world. (13) And this is, of course, the philosopher's original sin in the eyes of Cohen.

In this writer's view the fundamental question thus resolves itself to this: there are, for an attempt at a philosophic construction of Jewish history in particular and, connected with it, of universal history

in general, two alternatives one of which any philosopher must initially chose: he may, like Cohen, begin with the fundamental assumption of all rationalism that all forms of human knowledge, and therefore, all experienced reality, cannot but be rational in nature; if this is so, then also Jewish existence must be subsumed to the universal laws of rationality, - though it may, in the process, lose some of what it has hitherto regarded as its peculiarity. Or he may begin with the equally fundamental assumption that the Revelation which has made Israel and its history the special and unique factors that they are is not subject to the human laws of reason but only to the divine laws of God, - that these laws cannot necessarily be cast into the limits of rationality, - and that he must, therefore, begin by studying the cold, hard and perhaps irrational facts pertaining to Israel, draw his conclusions from them and endeavor to test their applicability as widely as possible. This is a mutually exclusive alternative; you cannot have the one and the other. It is also a closed alternative in the sense that no third choice is possible. Around this issue most of Jewish speculation has revolved throughout the centuries: this may be regarded as the basic problem over which rationalists and dogmatists quarreled in the Talmud in the matter of the "reasons for the commandments;" this is the basic contention between the rationalists of mediaeval Jewish scholasticism on the one hand and their orthodox opponents on the other; this is the dividing line between men like Yehuda HaLevy, Krochmal and contemporary existentialists on the one hand and Maimonides, Cohen and modern rationalists on the other. This issue separates the parties not only with regard to their philosophies of

history but also in the much wider field of religious philosophy in general. This is a choice which faces us today as much as it did Krochmal and Cohen.

It would clearly appear that no inescapably compulsive reasons can be put forward which would prove that either initial assumption is valid and the other demonstrably false. Revelation is a rationally unproved basic assumption, - but then, so is the rationality of the universe, or even the succeptibility to reason of the universe. But, though no definitive argumentation may be possible for either side, it would still seem that some sound reasoning can be followed which will strongly weigh the evidence in favor of one as over against the other:

This much of Cohen's train of thought can hardly be denied: if there is anything like history at all, it consists of the free actions of men. If history were anything but that, either the actions of unfree men or no actions at all or not the actions of men, it would not be history but either biology or fate. Free actions of men, however, are the field of ethics. History is thus indubitably the arena of ethics. It follows then that any philosophy of history must validate itself in terms of ethics. Cohen is therefore right beyond all quibbling that the philosophy of history is really a sub-division of moral philosophy.

The question for the philosopher, as to which of the two initial alternatives to choose, must consequently also be considered in terms of their respective ethical results. And once the question has been framed in this manner, also the answer would appear to be quite clear. We have had occasion to note (14) that the raw-materials of historical facts

can, as the many differing schemes of history prove that have been proposed in the course of philosophical speculation about history, be arranged in many different series: they can be arranged in a line of unilinear, uninterrupted progress, or in cycles, in other systematic orders or their orderliness may be denied altogether. This depends exclusively on the hypothesis with which the historical facts are approached in the first place and accordingly chosen from among their colleagues. That they can be so differently arranged in itself proves nothing against either their "arrangeability" as such or against any specific arrangement. Cohen makes it abundantly clear that the validity of any such arrangement must be measured in terms of the ethical cogency of the hypothesis according to which they arranged. Ethics is thus not only the judge of history but also the judge of the philosophy of history.

And what must its judgment be? In answer to this question, can Cohen's fundamental criticisms of all forms of naturalistic philosophies of history be refuted? Once either Yehuda HaLevy's or Krochmal's definition of the selection of Israel in terms of an innate, substantial and initial differentiation between it and the rest of humanity is accepted, there can never be a unification between these two types of human existence. Vegetables cannot become animals and have, in fact, little in common with them. This describes the situation quite correctly for the Kusari. And in the Guide everything tends to show that the choice of the "Absolute Spirit" in coming to attach itself to Israel is an irrational, irrevocable and unbridgeable fact. On such grounds, how can the accusation which

Cohen levels at naturalism be invalidated, that it invariably ends in chauvinism?! Or, to cite another illustration, if the cycles of history are as automatic as Krochmal presents them, if they come and go without any essential relationship to human deeds, what is there to stop men from throwing up their hands in quietistic fatalism and abandon their ethical tasks? Is Rotenstreich then not entirely correct when he declares (15) that the Absolute Spirit leaves no room for the human will? And, still as a result of the theory of the cyclicality of history, it would surely appear that the historical pessimism of Ecclesiastes, the Greek philosophers who thought in terms of ever-recurring aeons, and of a Spengler is unavoidable: if the waters return to the sea, why bother, if you can help it, to leave the sea in the first place?

On the positive side, Cohen's rationalism certainly, for one thing, seems to pass the test of practical life, as does the rationalistic history of Kant himself: the dangerous dead-end alley of Jewish chauvinism in Israel is recognized today even by some of the earliest Zionist proponents, and Spengler predicted the "decline of the Occident;" Kant, on the other hand, greeted the dawn of the French Revolution no less enthusiastically than, for example, its Jewish beneficiaries, and Cohen, despite his bourgeois background and environment, came forward as a philosophical teacher of ethical socialism. (16) And theoretically, too, much commends the ethical consequences of Cohen's rationalistic philosophy of history: freedom as well as progress become under his hands neither sure and smug possessions of man nor illusions of incurable optimists; rather they are

ideals which must be and can be acquired by working for them. Thus conceived of history is not the record of the dead past or a hopeless present but the challenge of a possible and finer future. Can higher ethical recommendations be given to a philosophical choice?

If, then, of the two alternatives the rationalistic one must be chosen, from the point of view of a philosophy of Jewish history the one great problem is left, how to define, if at all, the election of Israel. The modern liberals are not missing, of course, who are perfectly willing to discard that doctrine and its historical documentation completely. But Krochmal as well as Cohen are sufficiently conscious of Jewish facts as well as Jewish theories never even to entertain that extreme possibility. Between them they seem to have exhausted the possibilities of interpreting that doctrine philosophically without scrapping it: the election is either, as Krochmal would have it, an- as it were - physical fact from which everything else issues forth. But this interpretation we have been forced to reject. The only other choice then is the one which Cohen makes: Israel is elected in the sense not that it is substantively at all different from the rest of humanity but in that it is an exemplar of religious and ethical truths for the sake of which it lives and which it must teach to all other men, - these truths in turn being rational truths. (17)

Against this interpretation very valid objections have been raised by Jewish theologians of the existentialist type: 1) it is fatuous to assume that Israel is either capable or in a position to "teach" mankind;

this is a rather condescending, didactic form of superiority not in consonance either with the facts of Jewish life or the possibilities of social life in general. 2) The dissemination of ideas, or even the disseminatibility of ideas, does not constitute election; it may be attributed to many other cultural forces in human history, for one thing, and it does not represent a correct expression of Jewish self-consciousness of election, for another. Thus this interpretation which has found much favor among Jewish liberals in the last two centuries cannot be endorsed.

We venture to suggest an interpretation which does justice, on the one hand, to the ethical demand of humility and rationalistic universalism and, on the other, to the facts of Jewish history as well as to traditional Jewish doctrine. That there is something special not only to the ideas of Judaism but also to the nature of Israel the facts of Jewish history would seem to substantiate sufficiently. But why must this special character be explained in terms of either human superiority or the unfathomable decree of God who acts through biological differentiation or idealistic emanations? Does it not stand to reason much more that history itself is the agent of election? If that were so, then, history having been shown to be both rational and divine (in the Cohennian sense), the election would in turn be a rational fact and yet a God-given reality. Israel's ideas as well as its character would have been shaped by the historical forces which have been at work on it, and these forces would be the same forces that work on all other peoples but, of

course, not through the same events. Let it not be objected that such an explanation of the occurrence of ideas denies the spontaneity of human thought and is, therefore, naturalistic, for, after all, history itself has been demonstrated to be a human and ideal creation.

What this would mean specifically may be illustrated by means of a well-known and generally accepted fact of history: the universality of the Jewish spirit has frequently, and rightly, been attributed to Israel's experience of homelessness since it first arose on the human scene, from Abraham, through Moses, Babylonian and modern exiles; surely this experience has shaped the unnaturalistic character of the Jewish people, its complete indifference to "hearth and home" and to "blood and soil;" this has caused the recognition of the immorality and uselessness of military institutions and heroism. If this, for example, is true, then the immense emphasis which the biologicist Yehuda HaLevy places on the holiness of Palestine as over against the rationalist Maimonides' relaxation of the ban against living outside of Israel is no accidental contrast.

In short, Cohen's rationalistic history may be employed not only to explain the facts of Judaism but also the facts of the Jewish people. And thus his ethical universalism can be brought to terms with Jewish self-consciousness. No more could be asked; perhaps also no less should be accepted.

VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CONSULTED AND / OR QUOTED.

V. Footnotes

1. Footnotes to Chapter II

1. Cf. Simon Rawidowicz, Kitve R. Nachman Krochmal, Berlin 1924.
2. Cf. Zunz, Introduction, Guide of the Perplexed of the Time, Warsaw 1894, pp. III, V.
3. For Krochmal's wider pedagogical intentions, cf. pp. 10-12.
4. Nachman Krochmal - Ein Hegelianer, Berlin 1904, pp. 68f.
5. p. 285. All references to the Guide are according to the Rawidowicz edition; cf. footnote 1. Cf. ib., p.209, about the danger of such confusions.
6. Cf. aboue, p. 8.
7. On the disputed title cf. Rawidowicz, Zunz' Notes on the Guide of the Perplexed of the Time, p. 368, n. 1, and G. Kresel, On the Name of The Guide of the Perplexed of the Time.
8. pp. 5f.
9. pp. 143f.
10. About Krochmal's pedagogical bias cf. Rawidowicz, op. cit., pp. 100, 107f., War Krochmal Hegelianer?, pp. 569f.
11. p. 7.
12. p. 8.
13. p. 9. - In view of the disputed Hegelian influence on Krochmal, one must notice here the Hegelian predilection for triads as well as the relationship between theses and antitheses. As we shall see, however, Krochmal's resolution is not so much in terms of a dialectic synthesis as rather the removal of the problem to an entirely different level which is unconnected with the level of both thesis as well as antithesis. Nonetheless, Landau connects these distortions with Hegel, op. cit., pp. 20f., whereas Rawidowicz ascribes them to Kant, cf. War Krochmal Hegelianer?, p. 581.
14. pp. 10f.
15. p. 11.
16. p. 289.
17. p. 12.
18. Cf. Kant-Lexikon, R. Eisler, Berlin 1930, article Vorstellung, p. 588: "a conscious perception is cognition. Cognition is either an Anschauung or a concept. A concept is either empirical or pure (" from outside of the soul or from the soul itself"). A pure concept, insofar as it has its origin only in reason, is a notion. A concept of notions which transcends the possibility of experience is an idea..." "A concept is a reflected Vorstellung."
19. pp. 285-287; cf. Landau, op. cit., pp. 64-69. In order to accomplish this identification of Kant's with Ibn Ezra's epistemologies Krochmal must, of course, disregard the vast difference between Ibn Ezra's Aristotelian-Platonic, scholastic realism and the rationalism of Kant's epistemology. Cf. also the doctrine of noumena p. 296 and another outline of Kantian epistemology in one of his letters, p. 421.
20. Cf. p. 14.
21. Little wonder that, believing in the full equivalence of philosophic and Jewish terminologies, Krochmal hotly defends the Jewish authenticity of mediaeval scholastics like Maimonides and Ibn Ezra who espoused the same view when these were attacked by Luzatto's anti-Hellenistic dia-

tribes. Cf. in his letters p. 435. Cf. also Guttmann, Haphilosophia shel haYahadut, Jerusalem 1951, pp. 291f.: "There can be no doubt that Krochmal sees the whole truth in the metaphysics of German idealism. While Formstecher and Hirsch adopt the system of Schelling and Hegel only within definite limits, and endeavor to contrast the conception of the personal God of Judaism with their pantheism, Krochmal sees no opposition between idealistic philosophy and Judaism but rather stresses time and again that the teachings of "the new philosophers" agree completely with Judaism.....Indeed, there is kernel of historic truth in this view: Ibn Ezra, the Rambam etc. derived from the same Aristotelian-neo-Platonic, emotionalist pantheism from which also German idealism derives."

22. pp. 13, 15.
23. pp. 14f. It is hard not to recognize a Paulinian as well as a Rousseauesque strain in this remark: lust and the desire for the forbidden are the product of permission, i.e. law, and "the human heart was perfect" in its pre-civilizational state.
24. pp. 16f. Katsh, Krochmal and the German Idealists, p. 89, n. 14, is wrong in asserting that Krochmal advocated the mean between extremes as the right path.
25. op. cit., p. V.
26. pp. 18-24, 26f.
27. pp. 25-27.
28. cf. pp. 64ff. One might also ask whether Krochmal correctly represents Maimonides' position, for the latter, after all, in accordance with several classic Talmudic Midrashim (cf. Gen. R. VIII, 5 and B. Erub. 13b.) argued that in the last analysis no purpose can be ascribed to man's existence; it just has to be accepted as a fact. Cf. Guide of the Perplexed, III, ch. 28.
29. cf. pp. 18f.
30. By this ingenious explanation Krochmal kills two flies with one stroke: 1. he eliminates the traditional stumbling-block to Jewish philosophy of the anti-rationality of the Talmudic dictum he quotes, and 2. he uses a classic, even orthodox Jewish doctrine to support his somewhat daring proposition.
31. p. 29.
32. cf. pp. 15f.
33. pp. 30f.
34. cf. Benedetto Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, N.Y. 1913, p. 92.
35. cf. Kuno Fischer, Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre, Heidelberg 1901, pp. 972-996.
36. No doubt dibur (דבור) ought to be emended to davar (דבר) in the text.
37. p. 31.
38. ib.
39. pp. 274-277.
40. Unrelated Being - God the father, Being-for-others - God the son, Being-for-oneself - God the spirit. Landau, op. cit., p. 40 recognizes this Christianizing factor.
41. p. 32.

42. Man as the social animal also occurs in Vico; cf. Rawidowicz, War Krochmal Hegelianer?, pp. 543f.
43. pp. 34f.
44. Guttmann, Foundations of Krochmal's Thought, p. 279 suggests plausibly that ruach is the national fragment of the universal ruchaniyuth.
45. p. 35.
46. pp. 35f.
47. p. 37.
48. A literal translation of the Kantian term.
49. pp. 37-39. It is worth noticing here the first statement of the transcendent religious significance of the Babylonian exile, - a view which Krochmal will often reiterate and which accords with that of later Biblical criticism.
50. Cf. Horwitz, Memorial to Krochmal, pp. 39, 43f.
51. A view which Krochmal will later, cf. p. 66, state in the name of Ibn Ezra.
52. Kusari, I, 95, etc. About the "physical","terrestrial" character of Krochmal's "national spirit" cf. Rawidowicz, Introduction, p. 106.
53. Jehuda HaLevy, Oxford 1947, p. 23. Rawidowicz on the biologism of Krochmal, cf. Nachman Krochmal als Historiker, p. 60, War Krochmal Hegelianer?, pp. 546, 561.
54. Croce, op. cit., p. 104.
55. ib., p. 109.
56. ib., p. 92. Cf. also Martin Buber, The Gods of the Nations and God, in Israel and the World, N.Y. 1948, p. 197.
57. Heinemann, op. cit., p. 37: "God made manifest to the people that He is in connection with them."
58. One is almost constrained to ask whether "the spirit of a nation" has anything in common with that spirit which, in Krochmal's Kantian epistemology, is the organ of conceptualization. The answer to that question, however, would seem to have to be in the negative: the former is an almost physical cause of objective, historical events, the latter of intellectual abstraction alone. The homonymity of the term must, therefore, not lead to any confusion of concepts: Krochmal's Kantian epistemology is quite unintegrated with his HaLevyan metaphysics of history. - A related question is whether the Absolute Spirit in Jewish history can really be said to be identical with God, or whether it is not rather a pantheistic God who pervades history. Cf. Guttmann, Haphilosophia, op. cit., p. 295.
59. p. 38. Cf. also Buber, op. cit., p.200.
60. The last phrase states its own biological premise clearly: the nation is the biological macrocosm of the human individual.
61. p. 40.
62. ib. Notice the clear statement that history will be told only for philosophical and pedagogical purposes, not for its own sake.
63. Vorlesungen, I, 18; cf. Rawidowicz, War Krochmal Hegelianer?, p. 555.
64. Atheistische Theologie, in Kleinere Schriften, p. 282.
65. p. 44.
66. p. 47.
67. p. 49.
68. There is a slight discrepancy here between the date of the end of the first cycle and the date of the beginning of the second.

69. p. 59.
70. p. 82.
71. pp. 82, 112.
72. p. 112. Again notice the pedagogical import of history: "so that we can learn....."
73. cf. p. 34.
74. 100th Anniversary of N. Krochmal, in The New Judaea, London Sept. 1940, p. 198. Also, op. cit., Introduction, p. 124.
75. Cf. p. 36. Also on p. 255 he refers to his own time as "the depth of the end of days, i.e. our own time." (!)
76. Cf. Fischer, Hegel, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 784.
77. Cf. p. 37.
78. pp. 50f.
79. p. 60.
80. Krochmal and the German Idealists, op. cit., pp. 91f.
81. ib.
82. p. 44.
83. p. 277.
84. Chapters XII, XV, XVIII.
85. Cf. p. 73.
86. e.g. Katsh, op. cit., p. 91.
87. Cf. op. cit., p. 197.
88. op. cit., pp. 126-132.
89. Compare this to Krochmal's divine supercession of the laws of growth and decline in the case of Israel.!
90. Notice the indecisiveness of Croce's interpretation!
91. cf. pp. 25, 27.
92. pp. 41f.
93. ib.
94. pp. 51, 56.
95. p. 60.
96. p. 73.
97. pp. 91-93.
98. p. 167.
99. p. 49.
100. p. 57.
101. pp. 47, 91, 147.
102. pp. 58, 71.
103. Use of LXX, pp. 125, 175; linguistics, cf. p. 141; occurrence of the hypothetical figure of a "redactor" ("R"), "the last scribe", p. 136; Samuel is ascribed to later writers and this ascription is substantiated, p. 46; attitudes toward proselytism are explained in terms of political and cultural developments, p. 57; Deutero-Isaiah is crystalized, pp. 114-117; Daniel is dated in the Hasmonean era, pp. 61, 133-135; close analytical attention is given to Talmudic criticism, cf. e.g. p. 72.
104. p. 142.
105. p. 174.
106. pp. 240, 242.
107. pp. 149f.
108. Cf. e.g. pp. 207, 209.

109. p. 210.
110. p. 213.
111. Cf. pp. 152, 158, 202ff.
112. Cf. p. 27.
113. Cf. p. 15.
114. As before, in places where crucial transitional steps are taken in the construction of his continuous philosophic system (cf. p. 27), they are taken by implication. In fact the comparison between conceptualization in general epistemology and conceptualization in historical knowledge is nowhere explicitly stated by him.
115. p. 88; cf. also pp. 41, 59, 191, 202 etc. He did not think too highly of Josephus anyway and calls him "a writer of pleasant fiction, not an historian," p. 116.
116. For another remark on the importance of cultural history cf. p. 71 and the philosophical interpretation of the issues between Pharisaism and Saduceeism cf. pp. 74f.
117. Cf. pp. 35f.
118. op. cit., pp. 33-40.
119. ib., p. 238.
120. ib., p. 243.
121. War N. Krochmal Hegelianer?, pp. 548, 561, 569f. Rawidowicz does not seem to notice that his own description assumes an ideal co-incidence between individual life and collective life.
122. op cit., p. 95. But is an "evolutionary conception" not a posteriori?
123. Cf. pp. 150-153
124. p. 114. He is talking about the existence of a second Isaiah.
125. Cf. e.g. pp. 140, 143f., 200, 246ff.
126. p. 202.
127. p. 209.
128. As indeed we have done and is done further by Katsh, op. cit., who rightly prefers to speak of the general influence of German idealism.
129. op cit.
130. op cit., p. 291.
131. Cf. e.g. Horwitz, Memorial to Krochmal, p. 38. Against that N. Rotenstreich, Absolute and History in Krochmal's Thought, p. 333.
132. pp. 170, 172 etc.
133. ib., p. 170.
134. ib., p. 172.
135. Cf. Kusari, I, 67.
136. p. 186. Rawidowicz (ib.) points out that Krochmal's summary of Philo is a verbatim Hebrew translation from the German book by Neander. On the other hand, in view of the reformist, world-missionary, pedagogical function in history which, together with his German-Jewish contemporaries, Krochmal ascribes to the Jewish people, it is worth noting that in the above excerpt from Neander the phrase "for the sake of all humanity" is not to be found in the original but was inserted by the translator.
137. p. 187.
138. pp. 259-263, 265, 269.
139. p. 262.
140. ib.

141. When we have pointed out that there is a great resemblance between the scholastic theory of the "conjunction" of the human spirit with the Active Intellect on the one hand and Krochmal's theory of the Absolute Spirit in Israel on the other, then we find an historical justification for this parallelism at this point, for it was, of course, from this neo-Platonic theory of a direct contact between men and the Absolute that the scholastic theory of conjunction arose.
142. Cf. p. 13.
143. p. 271.
144. p. 287. Though this is here presented as Ibn Ezra's, not Krochmal's belief, Krochmal himself draws an interesting and Maimonidean conclusion from it: the eternity of species is garanteed by their essential, ideal nature; the eternity, i.e. immortality, of the individual is not so garanteed, since individuation is a result of materiality. Individual immortality is, therefore, a doctrine of faith, not of logic, and it is promised by God only as a symbol of the unperishability of the spirit which also inheres in the human individual. Cf. p. 433.
145. p. 305.
146. p. 306. Re this, cf. Neumarck, Toldoth HaPhilosophia beYisrael, vol. 2, pp. 280f.
147. ib.
148. pp. 327f.
149. p. 290.
150. p. 313.
151. p.322.
152. Cf. p. 31.
153. pp. 289, 322.
154. p. 299.
155. pp. 314f.
156. p. 314.
157. p. 315.
158. p. 320.
159. Cf. p. 73
160. p. 273.
161. Cf. p. 51.
162. Cf. p. 65.
163. op. cit., pp. 339ff., 342, 344.
164. Cf. p. 48.
165. Cf. p. 19.
166. pp. 274f.
167. ib., p. 275f.; cf. also Landau, op. cit., pp. 39-45.
168. Ib., p.276; Landau, pp.45-47.
169. This is, of course, the beginning of later idealistic developments to which Landau correctly alludes by speaking of this as Identitaetseinheit, Idealitaet der Unterschiedenen. And Maimonides arrived in the same way at divine infinity, by the negation of negations.
170. ib., p. 277; Landau, pp. 47-50.
171. Landau, pp. 50-52.
172. ib., pp. 52-54.
173. Guide, p. 279.
174. ib., p. 280; Landau, pp. 54-58.
175. p. 281; ib., pp. 59-62.

176. Only Guttmann, op cit., pp. 295, 298 and Krochmal's Fundamental Thoughts, p. 269 intimates, in connection with Ibn Ezra's emanationalism, that it is really Krochmal who speaks through these ancients.
177. ib., p. 270.
178. op. cit., pp. 301, 303, 315, 317, 320, 323.
179. ib., pp. 321, 332.
180. Cf. p. 31.
181. ib.
182. It is, therefore, characteristic that HaLevy was more conscious of the importance of history than any other mediaeval Jewish philosopher. Cf. also Guttmann, op. cit., p. 303.
183. This problem is part of the general problem raised by Guttmann in the preface to his DiePhilosophie des Judentums, whether there can be a Jewish philosophy or only a philosophy of Judaism.
184. Cf. op. cit., p. 92.
185. My teacher Samuel Atlas, too, though otherwise an uncompromising neo-Kantian, at this point finds his rationalism overpowered by the facts of Jewish history and stipulates the "miraculous" nature of Jewish history and its unsuccessibility to lawful treatment.
186. Krochmal's Fundamental Thoughts, p. 281.
187. op. cit., p. 50.
188. Cf. p. 42.
189. Cf. pp. 150-153
190. Cf. Rawidowicz, Introduction, p. 99.
191. ib.
192. p. 72.

Footnotes to Chapter III

1. cf. Simon Kaplan, Das Geschichtsproblem in der Philosophie Hermann Cohens, Berlin 1930, p. 7.
2. ib., p. 14; Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, p. 12.
3. ed. by Albert Goerland, Berlin 1922, vol. 3, p. 570.
4. cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 14f.; Cohen, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, p. 406.
5. F. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart, 7th ed., Biographisches Vorwort und Einleitung mit kritischem Nachtrag by H. Cohen, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1902, p. X.
6. Cohen, Deutschtum und Judentum, Giessen 1916, p. 53; cf. also Lange, op. cit., pp. 443, 450.
7. cf. Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 14-18; Cohen, Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis, p. Xf.
8. ib., p. 21; Kants Theorie, op. cit., p. 9.
9. Cohen, Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums, 2nd ed., Frankfurt a/M 1929, p. 7; cf. also Kaplan, op. cit., p. 22.
10. Kaplan, op cit., p. 12.
11. Streit der Fakultaeten, 2, 3-7.
12. Rezension von Herders "Ideen", Pt. 2, VI, 46; Fortschritt der Metaphysik, II; cf. also Atlas, Zur Erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlegung der Geschichte, in Archiv fuer systematische Philosophie und Soziologie, vol. XXXI, nos. 3f., pp. 169, 172.
13. op. cit., p. 34.
14. cf. Ethik des Reinen Willens, p. 508.
15. cf. my monograph The Social Philosophy of H. Cohen.
16. Deutschtum, op. cit.,
17. Cohen, Ethik des Teinen Willens, Berlin 1904, p. 480; Lange, op. cit., p. XIII.
18. Logik, op. cit., p. 396; cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 13.
19. Geschichte in weltbuergerlicher Absicht, VI, p. 5f.; cf. also, Altas, loc. cit.
20. Cohen, Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis, 2nd ed., Berling 1914, p. 387.
21. cf. Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 43, 45, 77.
22. In line with this understanding of Cohen's concept of progress, the anecdote which Franz Rosenzweig made famous, that Cohen expected the advent of the Messiah if not in fifty so at least within a hundred ye years, if to be believed literally, must be taken simply as an exaggerated, paradoxical apperçu. For Cohen the Messiah would, in fact, only come in infinity - however optimistic he may otherwise have been!
23. Cohen, Juedische Schriften, ed. by Franz Rosenzweig, Berling 1924, vol. II, p. 48.
24. ib., vol. III, p. 202.
25. cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 14.
26. ib., pp. 23f., 27.
27. ib., p. 36; cf. Religion der Vernunft, op. cit., p. 272.
28. ib., pp. 27f., 37.
29. Religion der Vernunft, op cit., p. 292
30. Logik, op. cit., p. 586; cf. also Kant, Geschichte, op. cit., p. 187.

31. Kants Theorie, op. cit., p. 8f.; cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 37.
32. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 38.
33. ib., p. 42.
34. Religion der Vernunft, op. cit., p. 4; cf. also Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 38, 100.
35. ch. 6.
36. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 100.
37. Logik, op. cit., pp. 113f., 117.
38. cf. Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 45, 72-78.
39. Logik, op. cit., p. 154.
40. ib., p. 454.
41. cf. Religion der Vernunft, op. cit., p. 9; Kaplan, op. cit., p. 48f.; Atlas, op. cit., p. 226; Ethik, op. cit., p. 26.
42. Logik, op. cit., p. 6.
43. Juedische Schriften, op. cit., vol. III, p. 197f.
44. Lange, op. cit., p. 463.
45. Logik, op. cit., p. 495.
46. Ethik, op. cit., pp. 40ff.
47. Logik, op. cit., p. 416.
48. Lange, op. cit., p. 516; Logik, op. cit., p. 388; cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 53.
49. cf. Atlas, op. cit., p. 232; Walter Kinkel, H. Cohen * Eine Einfuehrung in sein Werk, Stuttgart 1924, p. 241.
50. Ethik, op. cit., pp. 37, 274-276, 279, 294-296; Lange, op. cit., p. IX; cf. also Kinkel, op. cit., p. 168.
51. Ethik, op. cit., pp. 39, 43; cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 52.
52. ib., p. 312.
53. ib.
54. cf. Kaplan, op. cit. p. 26.
55. Ethik, op. cit., pp. 297-305.
56. cf. Kaplan, op cit., p. 54; Lange, op. cit., pp. 532f.
57. ib., pp. 24, 29.
58. cf. Benzion Kellermann, Die Philosophische Begruendung des Judentums, in Judaica, Festschrift zu H. Cohens 70. Geburtstage, Berlin 1912, p. 78f.
59. Ethik, op. cit., p. 36.
60. op. cit., p. 55.
61. Ethik, op. cit., p. 63; Logik, op. cit., p. 495.
62. Kellermann, op. cit., p. 90f.
63. Religion der Vernunft, op. cit., pp. 12-15.
64. Ethik, op. cit., p. 257; cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 31.
65. Ethik, op. cit., p. 34; Kaplan, op. cit., p. 30.
66. Ethik, op. cit., pp. 32, 241.
67. ib; this is the philosophical root of Cohen's anti-Zionism (cf. Religion und Zionismus, Antwort an Dr. Buber, in Juedische Schriften, op. cit., vol. II) which he regarded as the nationalism of Jewish peoplehood, although he also opposed Jewish statehood for other reasons; cf. below.
68. Ethik, op. cit., pp. 238f.; here appears the fundamental and insurmountable chasm between Krochmal's and Cohen's philosophic orientations of history. That nationalism in the philosophy of history

ends in folkism in the philosophy of law, or possibly the reverse, is still testified to by Rav Tzair, The History of Jewish Law, (Hebrew), N. Y. 1944, cf. particularly vol. I, pp. 124-136.

69. ib., p. 615; cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 85.
70. cf. Kinkel, op. cit., p. 197.
71. ib., p. 198.
72. Lange, op. cit., p. 529f.
73. ib.; Logik , op. cit., pp. 202-204.
74. cf. Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 61-64.
75. Kinkel, loc. cit.
76. Ethik, op. cit., pp. 54-58.
77. Religion der Vernunft, op. cit., p. 15; Aesthetik des Reinen Gefuehls, Berlin 1912, pp. 33f., 49; Ethik, op. cit., p. 5; etc.
78. Ethik, op. cit., pp. 69-74.
79. Logik, op. cit., p. 300; Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 58f.
80. Ethik, op. cit., p. 391.
81. This point will be gone into further in the critical postlude to this presentation. But even here the question imperiously raises itself; why? What philosophical or historical or ethical compulsion is there for a "garantee" of the realization of the norm? Is not, to the contrary, the point of a norm that it is not realized, in time or eternity?
82. Ethik, op. cit., p. 462; cf. Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 69-78.
83. Ethik, op. cit., pp. 426-428.
84. Lange, op. cit., p. 520.
85. cf. my monograph op. cit., - When I wrote that study I had not seen the reference which Chayim Greenberg, The Inner Eye, p. 264 makes to an actual personal encounter on the field of socialist controversy between Hermann Cohen and Lenin. I have seen no other proof of its veracity, but the character of Greenberg as well as the internal verisimilitude of the story commend it: Lenin wrote that Cohen's demand for the teaching of higher mathematics in the last years of German high-schools was a bourgeois attempt to befuddle and divert the minds of young adults just when they are ready to become associated with revolutionary activities. (!)
86. cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 82.
87. Religion der Vernunft., op. cit., p. 490; cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 80. It will be remembered that also Cohen's dissident disciple Rosenzweig reserved the name of truth for God at the highest point of his system, only in that case He unifies the knowledge of truth as it is undertaken by Judaism and Christianity separately in history.
88. cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 527.
89. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 79; Religion der Vernunft, op. cit., p. 41.
90. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 88; Religion der Vernunft, op. cit., ib.
91. Religion der Vernunft, op cit., pp. 74-78.
92. ib., pp. 82-98.
93. ib., p. 98.
94. Juedische Schriften, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 313-315; vol. II, pp. 171-175; Religion der Vernunft, op. cit., p. 305.
95. Religion der Vernunft, op. cit., p. 5; cf. Kaplan, op. cit., p. 99
96. Religion der Vernunft, op. cit., p. 38.

97. ib., p. 300
98. ib., p. 312
99. ib., p. 625
100. ib., p. 39
101. ib., p. 12
102. cf. Kinkel, op. cit., p. 253.
103. cf. Logik, op. cit., pp. 31-38
104. Lange, op. cit., p. 513
105. ib., pp. 514-516. - It is true, although this was vastly exaggerated by Rosenzweig in his Introduction to the Juedische Schriften, that in his latest and particularly in his posthumous work, the Religion der Vernunft, Cohen ascribed a more independent role to religion, namely the granting of salvation to the individual outside and beyond the process of history. (Cf. especially op. cit., pp. 23-25) But this is by definition outside the scope of our considerations.
106. Julius Guttmann, Die Philosophie des Judentums, Munich 1933, p. 353.
107. cf. Kinkel, op. cit., pp. 255, 264.
108. Religion der Vernunft, op. cit., pp. 294ff.
109. ib., p. 312f.
110. ib., p. 284
111. Hermann Cohen, Berling 1921, p. 12
112. op. cit., p. 351; cf. also my monograph, op. cit.
112a. cf. Atlas' paper: "Maimonides - and Beyond Maimonides"
113. op. cit., p. 11
114. Atlas points out creatively that if, in terms of philosophy, the divine unification of nature and ethics is a dogmatic assumption, then also the noumenon at the end of thought, rather than behind the phenomena, is one and should be eliminated.
115. op. cit., p. 58

Footnotes to Chapter IV

1. cf. p. 16
2. cf. p. 24
3. cf. p. 25
4. cf. p. 88
5. cf. pp. 63-65
6. cf. p. 119
7. cf. pp. 75-80, 131-135
8. cf. p. 32
9. cf. p. 107
10. cf. pp. 97f.
11. cf. pp. 19-21
12. op. cit., pp. 339f.
13. The Fundamental Thoughts of N. Krochmal, p. 283
14. cf. p. 53
15. op. cit., p. 339
16. cf. my monograph The Social Philosophy of H. Cohen
17. cf. p. 128

1. To Chapter II.

A. Works by Krochmal

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