INSTRUCTIONS FROM AUTHOR TO LIBRARY FOR THESES AND PRIZE ESSAYS

AUTHOR L. David Feder

TITLE The Congress Controversy: A Critical History of the American Jewish Congress 1916-1920

TYPE OF THESIS: Ph.D. [ ] D.H.L. [ ] Rabbinic [✓]

Master's [ ] Prize Essay [ ]

1. May circulate [✓]) Not necessary
2. Is restricted [ ] for ___ years.) for Ph.D.) thesis

Note: The Library shall respect restrictions placed on theses or prize essays for a period of no more than ten years.

I understand that the Library may make a photocopy of my thesis for security purposes.

3. The Library may sell photocopies of my thesis. ✓ yes ___ no

3-7-89
Date

David Feder
Signature of Author

Library Record

Microfilmed July 12, 1989
Date

Marilyn Kriden
Signature of Library Staff Member

THE CONGRESS CONTROVERSY:
A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
1916-1920

BY L. DAVID FEDER

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for Ordination

Hebrew Union College-
Jewish Institute of Religion
March, 1989

Referee:
Professor Jacob Rader Marcus

DIGEST

In the fall of 1914, after the outbreak of the First World War, some Eastern European Jews in the United States called for a democratically elected Jewish Congress in the United States, which would be better able to provide both political and economic relief to the Jews of the war zone of Eastern Europe during and after the war. The American Jewish Committee, composed largely of well-to-do and well-established German-Jewish leaders in the United States, opposed the plan to call a Congress. The Committee, established to protect the civil rights of Jews everywhere, preferred either to conduct private negotiations with American and foreign leaders itself after the war or to call a conference of major Jewish organizations consisting of tried and tested Jewish leaders and allow this group to approach the American and foreign leaders.

When Louis D. Brandeis assumed the leadership of the Zionist organization, the Zionists became the leading proponents of a Jewish Congress. They saw the Congress as a means of increasing the size and support of their following. The controversy surrounding a Congress became a struggle between the Zionists led by Brandeis and the American Jewish Committee, led by Louis Marshall, Jacob Schiff, and Cyrus Adler. Although other issues were invoked, such as democratic representation of the desires of American Jewry and what type of rights the Jews of Eastern Europe should

receive, the real dispute was over who would control American Jewry.

After months of dispute, debate, and rancor, a compromise was finally reached. The Congress was to be only a temporary organization and would not endorse any particular Jewish ideology and would have a limited agenda. There would be democratic elections, but there would also be delegates that were appointed by Jewish organizations as well. After continued debate, even after the Congress had been agreed upon, it was decided not to hold the Congress until after the cessation of hostilities in Europe.

The Congress was held in December, 1918. It agreed to send a delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris to ask for the guarantee of rights for the Jews of Eastern Europe, as well as, the rights of the Jews to a national homeland in Palestine, as promised in the Balfour Declaration. The delegation from the American Jewish Congress, in conjunction with other Jewish delegations in Paris, worked to agree on a common formula for Jewish rights. While these public discussions were continuing, Louis Marshall and Julian Mack of the Congress delegation, privately met with Western officials and these private negotiations are what actually led to the protection of Jewish rights in the minorities treaties. The international Zionists, under the direction of Nahum Sokolow, were responsible for the adoption of the Jewish rights to Palestine by the Peace Conference.

The Congress concluded according to its agreement,

within one year of the signing of the Peace Treaty, but not without the attempts made by some delegates to continue it. The Congress failed as a means of gaining power for the Zionists and the results achieved in Paris, were achieved by Louis Marshall, of the Committee, and by means of private negotiations, not public debate. Although the rights the Congress had demanded had for the most part been granted, the Congress movement was by and large a failure.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Any history of American Jewry must take into account the relationship between American Jewry and European Jewry. The period surrounding the First World War is no exception. In fact, the relationship between European and American Jewry was at no time more central than during this period. Almost all of the energies of the American Jewish community were channeled toward protecting, defending, and supporting the Jews of Eastern Europe, both politically and economically. There were many different avenues of support and within each of these avenues, there was always more than one option. In raising funds for war relief in Eastern Europe, for example, there were four different groups collecting money; the American Jewish Relief Committee, the Central Relief Committee(Orthodox), the People's Relief Committee(Socialist) and the Zionists. This study, however, will concentrate on the political response by American Jewry to the plight of the Jews in war-torn Eastern Europe.

In order to study the response of American Jewry, a brief view of the historic difficulty in acquiring full and equal civil, political, religious and economic rights by the Jews of Eastern Europe is necessary. The abuse of the rights or lack of rights of the Jews was most obvious and most extreme in Roumania, Russia, and Russian Poland. Jews had been in Roumania for centuries. Generation after generation of some families had lived in a town or village,

but were never citizens. This was true before there was an actual state of Roumania and the situation actually declined once Roumania became an independent state. At the Congress of Berlin of 1878, the European powers(Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Turkey, and Russia) recognized the existence of an independent Roumania. Among the preconditions for independence they declared that religion could not be used to exclude people from the enjoyment of civil and political rights, public employment , and the exercise of various professions. Furthermore, freedom of religion and religious practice was also guaranteed.[1]

The problem was that Roumania never abided by these conditions and there were no means of enforcing the Treaty of Berlin. The Roumanians claimed that the articles of the Treaty of Berlin applied only to citizens of Roumania, not foreigners. Jews, who had been living there for generations, were still said to be a foreign element within Roumania and therefore, had to be denied rights in order to protect the rights of native Roumanians. Even when pressure was placed on the Roumanian government by the government of the United States and other Western governments, it continued to refuse to naturalize its Jewish residents in practice, although in theory, they continued to claim that rights would be given to everyone in Roumania.

Citizenship meant more than just an abstract principle of belonging or fitting in to the fabric of Roumanian

national life. Roumanian citizenship was the only means, outside of emigration, of economic survival for Roumanian Jews. Jews, under their status as resident aliens, were denied the right to live in certain areas, including all rural areas, the right to engage in certain occupations and were excluded from almost every profession. Furthermore, employers were required to hire workers in a proportion of two Roumanians for every alien. Roumanian Jews were also taxed excessively for the privilege of residing in Roumania. These conditions reduced the community to a state of abject poverty with little or no hope of rising out of it.[2]

The conditions under which the Jews of Russia lived were no better, in fact they were probably worse. Not only was there discriminatory legislation against the Jews, there were also frequent acts of violence directed against the Jewish population. This discrimination had existed for centuries, but the force and frequency of violence and discrimination increased following the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881. The May Laws of 1882, restricted the economic and educational opportunity of Jews within Russia, and more importantly, restricted where they could live. All Jews in Russia were forced to live in the cities and towns of the Pale of Settlement. Jews were uprooted from areas outside of the Pale and forced to resettle there and Jews already living within the Pale were often forced to leave the villages in which they had resided for generations and move into the cities and towns.

A new wave of pogroms broke out in 1903 with the massacre in Kishinev. The brutality of this massacre attracted international attention, Jewish and non-Jewish. The fact that the Russian authorities had done nothing to intervene and protect the forty-seven Jews who were killed and the over four hundred who were injured incensed individuals and governments throughout the world. Protest meetings occurred throughout the United States totaling seventy-seven meeting in fifty cities. The largest of these was one which packed Carnegie Hall and included among its speakers former President Grover Cleveland. After pressure from American Jews and Gentiles, President Roosevelt also condemned the massacres.[3]

Between 1903 and 1906 more than 300 pogroms occurred in Russia resulting in untold losses of life and property by the Jews of Russia. In response to this widespread discrimination against the Jews, as well as, discrimination against American Jews in Russia, the United States government eventually denounced its treaty with Russia. The agitators in the battle to abrogate this treaty were the leaders of American Jewry, especially the leaders of the American Jewish Committee. More information will be provided on the role of the American Jewish Committee in this instance in succeeding pages.

A very large part of the Russian Pale of Settlement would become Poland at the conclusion of the First World War. The attitude of most Poles toward the Jews was no

better than that of most Russians. Prior to the outbreak of the war, an economic boycott of everything Jewish was started by Polish nationalists, and it was observed by the vast majority of the population of the country. This led to an even greater impoverishment of an already poor and distressed Jewish community.

American Jews wanted to see that the Jews throughout Eastern Europe had the opportunity to rise out of their poverty and to actually have the same rights of citizenship that were enjoyed by the Jews of the United States. This desire to ameliorate the conditions of Eastern European Jewish life arose from several different quarters. The first to effectively organize was the American Jewish Committee. The Committee was organized in 1906. The idea for a permanent Jewish committee along the lines of the French Alliance Israélite Universelle, the British Anglo-Jewish Association and the German Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden, was broached at a meeting of the Wanderers, a group of prominent New York Jews who met monthly for social and discussion purposes in 1905. One of the members of this group, Louis Marshall, reported that "'although we all felt the danger of such a movement,' the consensus was that someone would doubtless form an organization and that 'in order to avoid mischief it was desirable that we should take the initiative'."[4]

After a series of meetings and discussions a conference was called for February to which fifty-nine prominent Jews

were invited. The consensus of this conference was that an American committee whose primary function would be to safeguard Jewish rights abroad, and which would also coordinate appeals to the American government, unite Jews in different parts of the country and prevent undesirable and immoderate declarations on behalf of American Jewry, should be established. There was some disagreement on how members would be chosen for this representative committee, by election or appointment, but eventually it was decided that an Executive Committee of 15 would be created, which would have the power to increase the size of the committee to 50(later 60). Provisions were made to have district advisory councils elect members to the committee, but this system never functioned effectively and for all practical purposes, the members were appointed. On November 11, 1906, at a meeting at the Hotel Savoy in New York, the American Jewish Committee came into existence.[5]

The leaders of the American Jewish Committee were prominent, well-to-do, German Jews. There was probably more than a grain of truth in the characterization by opponents of the Committee that its leaders treated "the Jewish masses as if they were forever to be in a state of tutelage and incapable of having anything to say with respect to the management of their own affairs."[6] This view by members of the Committee is reflective, to at least some degree, in the fear of mischief by other groups. Of the leaders of the American Jewish Committee, Jacob Schiff, who provided money

and prestige, probably had the most patronizing view toward the Eastern European masses. The other important leaders of the Committee were Mayer Sulzberger, Cyrus Sulzberger, Cyrus Adler and Louis Marshall. Mayer Sulzberger, a judge in Philadelphia, was the first president of the Committee. Because he was in Philadelphia and the Committee was based in New York, the daily administration of the Committee fell largely into the hands of Sulzberger's cousin, Cyrus Adler. Another cousin, Cyrus Sulzberger, a prominent businessman, was the expert on the social ramifications of immigration to the United States, while Louis Marshall, a prominent attorney, was a legal expert adept in formulating statements for presentation to Congress.

The first and most important issue in which the American Jewish Committee took the lead in American Jewry was the case of attempts to reform immigration law, thereby limiting Jewish immigration to the United States. The Committee successfully prevented the implementation of such changes. The next case, was that of the Russian Passport Question. Russia refused to give full rights to American Jews who possessed American passports, equating their status with that of Russian Jews. The leaders of American Jewry were outraged. The trade agreement with Russia that had been concluded in 1832 would be up for renewal in 1912. In January 1911, Louis Marshall began the public campaign to abrogate the treaty with Russia. He appealed to the American public, Congress, the State Department, and

President Taft and his advisors to abrogate the trade agreement with Russia over the passport question. The passport question, it was argued was not just a Jewish issue, but was an American issue, because the rights of American citizens were being violated. After a year's pressure, Taft allowed the treaty to lapse. This was a tremendous accomplishment by the Committee, and with it, it established itself as a spokesman for American Jewry.[8]

Not only had the Committee assumed leadership within American Jewry, Louis Marshall, had become the President of the Committee and one of the most prominent Jews in the United States. The Committee under Marshall's leadership grew in power and prestige. Marshall, born in Syracuse, New York, was involved in almost every prominent Jewish organization of the day. He was president of Temple Emanu-El in New York and chairman of the Board of Directors of the Jewish Theological Seminary, a member of the board of the Jewish Agricultural Experiment Station and many other organizations and at the same time maintained a very successful legal practice.

Although Marshall and the American Jewish Committee enjoyed prominence, other Jewish groups made their presence felt. The American Zionists were a relatively small group prior to the outbreak of the First World War. The war had trapped the leaders of international Zionism in the hostile countries of Europe. In the interim, the Zionists of the United States would have to assume the mantle of leadership.

American Zionists were therefore expected to speak, as well as act, on behalf of the Zionist masses of Eastern Europe.

The entrance of Louis D. Brandeis onto the scene changed American Zionism dramatically. Brandeis, who had had little or no Jewish interest, was approached to serve as chairman of the soon-to-be organized Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs. It was assumed that Brandeis would be merely a figurehead and lend his name(by this time he was a prominent attorney) to the fledgling Zionist organization. Brandeis surprised everyone by taking an active interest in Zionism. Although Brandeis credited Jacob deHaas with being his tutor in Zionism, it is not clear why Brandeis took such a great interest in Zionism. It is clear that his interest was great and was passionate. Brandeis set out to increase the membership of American Zionism and build up its financial support as well.

Although Brandeis' Jewish background was limited, he was a devoted adherent of American democracy and wanted to see American Jewry organized along more democratic lines. He was uncomfortable with the back room diplomacy and <u>shtadlanut</u> that had characterized American Jewry and the American Jewish Committee. When calls for a democratically elected Jewish Congress in the United States began to emerge, this captured Brandeis' imagination. A congress like this would be true to his cherished principles of democratism and Americanism, as well as being a potential source of manpower and support for the Zionist organization.

Brandeis' prominence would provide the counter-weight in the Congress movement to the prestige of Marshall and the Committee.

The Eastern European Jews, specifically those living in New York, provided the impetus for the call for an American Jewish Congress. The Eastern European masses, led by the Yiddish press, wanted some kind of leadership role in aiding their relatives who were still in Eastern Europe. Many felt that this goal could best be accomplished through democratic means and therefore set out to call for a Congress. The groups active in calling for a Congress included Zionists, Nationalists, Socialist-Zionists, Socialists, and labor leaders. With this many different groups within the immigrant community, it is not very surprising that they were not unified in their demands. Nevertheless, all shared the desire to do something to protect the Jews in Eastern Europe, both during and after the war.

These were the groups and the factors that were in place at the beginning of the World War I. American Jewry had many options before it, but these options really boiled down to two. Either Jewish groups could compete or they could collaborate. The remainder of this work will concentrate on which of these options did emerge as victorious.

CHAPTER ONE

The call for an American Jewish Congress went out just one month after the beginning of the war. On August 30, 1914, the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs was created at a meeting of the Federation of American Zionists. The Provisional Executive Committee was created because the vast majority of the leaders of international Zionism were trapped in the belligerent countries of Europe. Louis Dembitz Brandeis, a newcomer to both Zionist and Jewish affairs, was selected as its chairman. At this meeting, Nahum Syrkin, Baruch Zuckerman, and Bernard G. Richards proposed the following resolution:

"The Zionist Extraordinary Conference assembled empowers its Provisional Committee to take the initiative, within the shortest time possible, to call a convention of Jewish organizations and Jewish committees for the following purposes:

1. For the creation of a relief fund to alleviate the sufferings of the Jewish population in war districts and of Jewish refugees.

2. The maintenance of Jewish institutions in Palestine and the Orient.

3. The discussion of the entire Jewish situation in regard to the changed condition of the world after the war."[1]

This resolution led to Louis D. Brandeis writing a

letter to Louis Marshall, president of the American Jewish Committee, the very next day, August 31, in which Brandeis informed Marshall of the creation of the Provisional Executive Committee (or the Provisional Committee for International Zionist Affairs as it was then referred to) and went on to say,

"The Committee regards it also as its function to emphasize the importance of Palestine for the Jews of the world in any negotiations that may be entered upon by the Powers before or upon the conclusion of the war.

That any diplomatic negotiations on behalf of the Jews shall have due effect, the Committee believes that action should be taken by a united American Jewry.

To this end, the Committee invites you to cooperate with it in calling a conference of representatives of all the important Jewish organizations and groups in the country."[2]

That same day, after a meeting of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee, Marshall responded. He invited the Zionists to join with the American Jewish Committee in considering the condition of world Jewry as a result of the war and to take appropriate action. Sub-committees of both groups met and were unable to reach agreement. Therefore, the American Jewish Committee alone called for a conference of Jewish organizations to be held at Temple Emanu-El on October 25, 1914. At this meeting, the American Jewish Relief Committee

was founded to direct war relief on behalf of the Jews in Europe and in Palestine. The agenda of this meeting was confined to war relief, much to the dismay of the Zionists and the question of a congress was not even raised. Furthermore, the American Jewish Committee dominated the American Jewish Relief Committee, with seventeen of the twenty-five members of the executive board belonging to the American Jewish Committee as well. After this temporary setback, the Zionists abandoned their discussion of the congress, due to a lack of interest and support within the overall Jewish community.

The agitation for a congress then moved to the Lower East Side and the immigrant Jewish community. Here, it found almost instant support. The effort to create a congress was tied to the effort to raise funds for their brethren in war-torn Europe. Both actions had the same goal, aiding the Jews of Eastern Europe: the funds were for their immediate relief and the congress was for a permanent solution.[3] The Yiddish press became the vehicle for this agitation. Their program was two-pronged, to encourage the formation of a congress and to attack those uptown Jews who opposed the congress. Louis Marshall, in a letter to Solomon Schechter, claimed that the Yiddish press regarded themselves as the leaders of public opinion and expressed only contempt for the uptown German Jews who they described as Jehudim. "Where unity and harmony should prevail, they sow seeds of discord. Where calmness and self-control are

required, they froth at the mouth. Where secret councils are indispensable, they demand mass meetings, Jewish congresses, and loud vociferation. Men who know better are carried by this insanity. The result is confusion worse confounded."[4]

On the Lower East Side the agitation resulted in meetings held in small back rooms debating the issue until eventually the Jewish Congress Organization Committee was formed on March 21, 1915, with Gedalia Bublick as its Chairman and Dr. Max Girsdansky as its Secretary.[5] This group became the primary group agitating for a congress. Soon, the Zionists warily began to express an interest in this group. The Jewish Congress Organization Committee in the words of Louis Lipsky, was "without prestige, or funds, or ability."[6] Nevertheless, the Zionists remained interested because they were already looking toward the end of the war. They felt that the Jewish question would appear on the agenda of the post-war peace conference and were unsure who would speak for American Jewry. If the Zionists were unable to rally a majority of American Jews to the Zionist cause, then the leadership of American Jewry might remain opposed to or indifferent to the Zionist program. According to Lipsky it was of the utmost importance to bring a congress into existence in order to ensure three things: first, the creation of an authentic body to speak for American Jewry; second, to form this group into a likeness satisfactory to Zionist hopes; and third, to have a forum toward which Zionist propaganda might be directed."[7]

The entrance of the Zionists into the Congress movement at this juncture was purely opportunistic as evidenced by the words of Louis Lipsky, one of the leading Zionists of the era. The Zionists set out to use the Congress movement to their own advantage and were extremely successful. One of the first things which they did was to move the offices of the Congress Organization Committee from the Lower East Side to Madison Square, directly across from the Zionist offices. The East European Jews did not at first greet with open arms this move by the Congress Organization Committee. In fact, the move was met with physical resistance, by Dr. Girsdansky, Secretary of the Committee.

The East European Jews accused the Zionists of attempting to get rid of the masses and make the Congress merely an auxiliary of the Zionist Organization.[8] It appears that this is at least partially true. There is no doubt that the Zionists wanted to control the Congress movement and make it auxiliary to their own organization, they admit this in their own words. What is less clear is the attitude of the Zionists toward the masses. They needed the support of the masses, but they did not appear to have a great deal of interest in placing the Eastern Europeans in leadership positions once the Committee was re-organized in August, 1915. In any case, they were able to continue to manipulate the East European Congress advocates to serve the goals of the Zionist movement for at least several months.

While this conflict was going on, another group of East

European Jews emerged and entered into the fray. The National Workmen's Committee on Jewish Rights was formed in the early part of 1915, by representatives of the Workmen's Circle (Arbeiter Ring), the United Hebrew Trades, the Jewish Socialist Federation of America, and the Forward Association and held its first convention on April 18, 1915. Its program called for the achievement of civil, political, and national rights for the Jews of Eastern Europe and its constituency was composed of the labor and radical organizations throughout the country.[9] Their motivation was no different from the group that formed the Jewish Congress Organization Committee: They wanted to help their brethren who were still in Europe and who were still without rights.

Meanwhile, the American Jewish Committee was struggling with the issues brought by the agitation for a Congress. The leadership and of the American Jewish Committee was firmly opposed to the creation of a Congress at this point in time. At the annual convention of the Kehillah of New York, April 24-25, 1915, though, a resolution to "issue a call for a Jewish Congress to consider the Jewish question and to devise ways and means how to place the same on the agenda of the peace conference" was introduced. This resolution received a great deal of popular support and had it been put to a vote, it probably would have passed. Luckily for the Committee leadership, the resolution was tabled for one month in order to give the delegates and

especially the American Jewish Committee the opportunity to study the proposal in greater depth. This also bought the Committee more time to plan alternative strategies to cope with the desires of the Kehillah.[10]

The Kehillah was the New York district of the American Jewish Committee and deferred to it in all national and international matters, while maintaining autonomy over local issues. In turn, the Kehillah selected over one third of the membership of the American Jewish Committee.[11] A decision by the Kehillah in favor of a congress would either force the American Jewish Committee into the Congress camp or would cause an internal rift within the Committee. To add more fuel to the fire, the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs publicly came out in favor of a Congress on May 9,1915.[12] This was their first public statement on the Congress issue since the initial call for one in the fall. Although they had continued to discuss it, they had not felt that the time was ripe for a public statement until this moment.[13]

This was a very busy period of time for the members of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee. In a flurry of letters that went between its members, a great deal of dissatisfaction was expressed with the idea of any sort of large conference or congress. Cyrus Adler made no secret of his opposition to it. In a letter to Louis Marshall he suggested that the Executive Committee call a conference of national Jewish organizations and if this is

not sufficient for the agitators in the Kehillah, a meeting of the entire American Jewish Committee should be called before proceeding. Adler then went on to address the claims that the Committee was unrepresentative. He believed that all other national organizations had been given the opportunity to participate in the founding of the American Jewish Committee and afterward had had an ample opportunity to cooperate with it. In fact, Adler was willing to see the American Jewish Committee dissolved if a better organization came along, but until a superior organization was established he felt bound to uphold the Committee.[14]

Within a few days, Adler's opposition increased. In letters to Marshall and Jacob Schiff he characterized any plan for a large gathering as dangerous for the Jewish people and that in order to act responsibly, the American Jewish Committee should decline to participate in it altogether.[15] Jacob Schiff shared Adler's fears about the holding of a congress. Schiff believed that this would result in misunderstandings both within the Jewish community and the general American community. The holding of a Jewish congress would lead many to conclude that Jews were indeed members of a separate entity and not true Americans. What Schiff believed was needed was a conference "composed of conservative and thoroughly tried men and leaders."[16] Louis Marshall also shared in this distrust of a large public meeting that could create a permanent or at the very least a short-term organization that was empowered to speak

for American Jewry and stated that the American Jewish Committee simply would not participate in this organization and would continue to act on its own according to what they believed to be in the best interests of the Jewish people.[17]

One member of the Executive Committee was not opposed to the convoking of such a convention or congress, Judah L. Magnes. Magnes believed, as many of the critics of the American Jewish Committee believed, that the Committee was not a representative organization that could speak on behalf of American Jewry. Magnes reasoned that the Committee could not claim to represent the Jews in America either during or after the war because it was out of touch with the views of the Jewish masses in America and the desires of the Jews in belligerent lands in Europe, as well as, lacking the united support of large numbers of American Jews. Magnes asked how the American Jewish Committee could aid the Jews of Europe without knowing what the Jews of Europe wanted and needed? Similarly, how could they speak for the Jews of America without knowing their views? Even though dealing with governments was a delicate business and must of necessity be done in private, the support of the entire Jewish community would be necessary for successful negotiations. Magnes therefore stated that "it is necessary that a plan be devised whereby all the Jews of the country will be given the opportunity, through their chosen representatives, of expressing their views and sentiments, and of sharing that

responsibility that rests upon all of us."[18] Magnes however, remained a minority voice within the American Jewish Committee.

On May 23, the Kehillah reconvened and a compromise was reached. The motion that passed called for the Kehillah to recommend to the American Jewish Committee to call a special general meeting to consider holding a Conference made up of delegates chosen by Jewish organizations from across the country to consider the Jewish question as it affects Jews in belligerent lands.[19] This compromise was important because it found the middle ground between the strong anti-congress sentiment of the leaders of the American Jewish Committee and the agitation for a congress by the Eastern European and Zionist elements of the Kehillah. The resolution called for a conference as desired by the Committee, not a congress, but it gave the organizations across the country the opportunity to determine who would represent them, not just the president or appointed representatives, as the Committee had hoped. Also, this resolution bound the Kehillah delegates to the American Jewish Committee to support the Kehillah plan and thereby almost insured its passage. Still, over all, this was a victory by the American Jewish Committee. It remained in control of the organization of this conference and there was no reference to the formation of an executive committee to share in the planning of this conference. In the eyes of its leaders, the position of the American Jewish Committee,

as the spokesman for American Jewry on all questions of civil and religious rights of Jews throughout the world had been affirmed.

The agitation for a congress did not abate with this temporary advantage in favor of the American Jewish Committee. If anything, the attacks increased. In a letter to Solomon Schechter, Cyrus Adler claimed that Marshall, Judge Sulzberger, and himself had become the principal objects of attack in the Yiddish papers. The purpose of these attacks according to Adler was to overthrow the American Jewish Committee. Adler also claimed that the majority of the members of this movement were pro-German and their actions could lead to mistrust of Jews by most Americans.[20] This same claim of pro-German sentiment was made by the Zionist leadership against the leaders of the American Jewish Committee, especially against Jacob Schiff. The East European Jews were accused of being pro-German because they supported any power that would defeat Czarist Russia, while Schiff and others were accused of being pro-German because of their German origins, as well as their desire to see the defeat of the Czar. More importantly, the money collected by the American Jewish Relief Committee was channeled into Europe through the German Hilfsverein, which could legitimately be construed as pro-German. This question concerning the distribution of funds in Eastern Europe remained an issue within the American Jewish Relief Committee and the Joint Distribution Committee until the

American entry into the war. Officially, both the Provisional Committee and the American Jewish Committee had declared themselves to be neutral until the entry of the United states into the war. In the months leading up to the American entry though, both groups began to show some favoritism toward the Allies, yet continued to criticize each other for not maintaining strict neutrality.

Resistance to the congress remained strong within the American Jewish Committee. In a letter to Adolf Kraus, president of the Independent Order of B'nai B'rith, Louis Marshall reiterated his objections to the congress and its dangers to American and European Jewry. Marshall told Kraus that that it had been his purpose "all along, when the proper time came, to have the American Jewish Committee act in cooperation with your organization, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and other representative American Jewish leaders. I would be willing to cooperate also with Mr. Brandeis, but I greatly fear that, whatever we do, the firebrands and political agitators will not be content with our action." Marshall then went on to accuse the agitators of being more concerned with the headlines that they could capture than with the effect of their actions on the Jews of Eastern Europe. He sincerely believed that any large public gathering could result in publicity that would be detrimental to the welfare of the Jews in Eastern Europe; Jews in Europe could die as a result of the publicity hunters in the United States.[21]

Marshall's sentiment was shared by many members of the American Jewish Committee. Nevertheless, during the special meeting of the American Jewish Committee on June 20, 1915, that was mandated by the Kehillah resolution, the Committee agreed to call a conference. The conference though, was on the Committee's own terms. It was to be held in Washington, on October 24, 1915, composed of no more than 150 delegates representing national Jewish organizations. At least one concession was made to the congress proponents by recommending that each organization invited make some effort to allow the members of that organization to express a preference for delegates to be sent. The influence of Judah Magnes is also evident in the resolution that was passed. The last clause of the resolution instructed the President of the Committee to learn from representative Jewish leaders in belligerent lands, what the needs of Jews in those lands are and how the American Jews can best promote their interests and help them to achieve equal rights. Without this information, there was to be no conference.[22] This clause expresses the the same thoughts as the memorandum authored by Magnes that was prepared for the Executive Committee meeting in May. This resolution also provided for a special committee of seven individuals to take charge of the organization of the conference and gave the Executive Committee the power to delay the convening of the conference.

The committee of seven apportioned delegates among the

major and the not so major national Jewish organizations, determining representation based on the number of members in each organization, its geographic distribution and probably to some degree, how compatible the committee felt the organization was with the goals and methods of the American Jewish Committee. The number of delegates per organization ranged from a maximum of seven for organizations such as the American Jewish Committee, the Federation of American Zionists, the Independent Order B'nai B'rith, and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations to a single delegate for the Hebrew Union College and the Federation of Roumanian Jews.[23].

The annual meeting of the Federation of American Zionists was to be held just one week after the special meeting of the American Jewish Committee and because of their centrality in the debate over the congress, they were the first group to be informed of the decisions reached by the Committee. The Federation of American Zionists then referred this correspondence to the Provisional Executive Committe for General Zionist Affairs, which was meeting simultaneously. They rejected this resolution of the American Jewish Committee, at least officially, because it did not extend an invitation to any other group to assume responsibility for calling and planning the Conference. In reality, they were afraid that their influence at this conference would be very limited and that the conference would be in the hands of people who were opposed to or at

least not favorable toward Zionism. This led the Provisional Committee to revive its declaration of May 9, and call for the convening of an American Jewish Congress and to seek to cooperation of other national Jewish groups in establishing this congress.[24]

There were now two proposals before American Jewry, the Conference and the Congress, and two groups attempting to lead American Jewry into one of these camps, the American Jewish Committee and the Zionists. Unity was in the best interests of both the American Jewish Committee and the Provisional Executive Committee and both organizations believed that unity was in the best interests of and critical to the successful functioning of both the American and the European Jewish communities. To further achieve those ends, a meeting between Louis D. Brandeis, representing the Provisional Executive Committee, and Cyrus Adler, representing the American Jewish Committee was arranged. Felix Frankfurter, a member of both organizations also attended.

These three met on July 12, 1915, at the Hotel Astor in New York. The decision to have Cyrus Adler, instead of Louis Marshall, as the representative of the American Jewish Committee was a critical one. Marshall, president of the American Jewish Committee was unable to be involved in negotiations at this point in time due to other personal obligations and Adler, the chairman of the Executive Committee replaced him. There was no one within the

leadership of the Committee who was as strongly opposed to the entire concept of a congress as was Adler. Even before this first meeting, it was clear that compromise was not near the top of Adler's agenda. This is not to say that his opinion was radically different from other members of the Committee, but other members, especially Marshall, might have been more open to the spirit of compromise. Even so, the themes that emerged at this meeting remained constant in the subsequent correspondence between these two organizations.

Adler favored a small select group of tried and tested leaders under the direction of the American Jewish Committee, which deserved its position of leadership for two reasons: the prominence and prestige of its members, as well as, its historic precedent represented by its constitution, by-laws and involvement in assisting Jews in foreign lands. Brandeis believed that democracy represented the true spirit of both Americanism and Judaism and without democratic participation, an organization or movement lacks legitimacy. Adler began with a discussion of the number of delegates at the conference, while Brandeis was more concerned with the methods used to select these delegates. Brandeis wanted more organizations involved in the calling of the conference or congress and the determination of its plan and scope. A compromise was suggested in which a large selecting committee would meet to invite representatives for a preliminary conference to formulate all of the questions for

the final Conference or Congress. This suggestion was to be taken back to each of their respective groups.[25]

Adler and the American Jewish Committeee were the first to respond. The Executive Committee voted that **"the plan, purpose and scope of the Conference heretofore decided upon by the General Committee at a special meeting held on June 20,1915, be adhered to."** The only modifications that the Committee was willing to entertain was that eight other organizations be invited to join in calling the Conference and allowing the Chairman (Adler) to modify immaterial details. In his letter to Brandeis, Adler went on to say that the Executive Committee favored Brandeis' suggestion of having the Committee and the Provisional Executive Committee agree on the organizations to be invited and the number of representatives each should be assigned, but felt that Adler's suggestion of having more groups participate in calling the Conference had a greater possibility of achieving results. More important, were the reasons given for refusing to modify the plan, purpose and scope of the Conference. Adler said that no modification was possible because this was a decision reached by the General Committee, which the Executive Committee did not have the authority to adjust. Furthermore, the reason for the limitation of scope was that this limitation was representative of the dominant issue before American and world Jewry and expansion of the scope would only cloud the issues.[26]

Brandeis acknowledged Adler's letter one week later, on July 28. He stated that Adler and the Committee had not really modified their initial suggestion at all and suggested that a special meeting of the General Committee be called and convened prior to the next meeting between himself and Adler. Brandeis listed four different objections that he had to the Committee's Conference plan. First, he claimed that it was undemocratic because it gave the delegates no control over the plan and scope of the Conference and all national organizations should have a voice in what affects all of American Jewry. He then reiterated his call for a preliminary conference composed of twelve to twenty four organizations selected by both The American Jewish Committee and the Provisional Executive Committee which would then determine the plan and scope of the Conference or Congress. Second, he accused the Committee of being uncooperative because according to their plan only they had the opportunity and the responsibility for planning the Conference, sharing these with no other organization. Third, this plan limited the scope and determinaton of what could and could not be discussed, and fourth, the distribution of delegates was disproportionate and unfair.[27]

While Brandeis was composing this letter to Adler, Adler was already writing another letter to Brandeis. Adler had discovered that Louis Lipsky, Chairman of the Federation of American Zionists, had issued a call to all Zionists to

agitate in favor of a Congress due to the status of negotiations with the American Jewish Committee. Adler, to fhis credit, did not accuse Brandeis of engineering this maneuver, but he did ask Brandeis to disavow this action which gave the impression that the negotiations that had been entered in to, were going on in bad faith.[28]

Within a few days, Adler received Brandeis' letter and responded to it, answering the objections that Brandeis raised. Adler first made the point that the initial resolution adopted by the American Jewish Committee and its subsequent modification were not entered into lightly, but only after great consideration. Adler was greatly offended by Brandeis' claim that the Committee arrogated certain powers to itself. The purpose for which the Committee was formed was exactly the type of situation which currently existed. The American Jewish Committee was formed to protect civil and religious rights of Jews throughout the world, just as the Federation of American Zionists was formed to promote Jewish life in Palestine, and the Committee intended to fulfill its responsibilities.

Adler also objected to Brandeis' characterization of the Committee as undemocratic. He recounted the history of the formation of the Committee and the invitation of all Jewish groups to its founding, as well as, representation within the Committee. In response to the claim that the American Jewish Committee was uncooperative, Adler claimed that the very fact that the American Jewish Committee was

willing to call a Conference was proof that they were willing to work with other Jewish groups. The claim that the distribution of delegates was unfair was countered by claims that the special committee assigned to consider representation did so using the proofs of the forthcoming American Jewish Year Book and were prompted by three guiding principles: the number of members of each organization, the diversified interests of American Jewry, and the geographic distribution of the Jews in the United States. Adler reminded Brandeis that thirty spaces had been left open to allow the inclusion of other organizations or increase the representation of organizations already invited and that the Committee was willing to reapportion delegates if necessary.

Finally, Adler was very concerned over the criticism that the plan and scope of the Conference was too limited. Adler expressed concern that a conference to discuss all of the problems of the Jewish people would not only be futile, but could endanger Jewish communities in Europe and Palestine. From a purely pragmatic point of view, Adler doubted whether many national organizations would be willing to participate in a conference of unlimited scope. If the American Jewish Committee had really made up its mind in advance, then there would be no reason for it to even bother to call such a conference, but the Committee wanted to determine the consensus of Jewish opinion in the United States as to what could and should be done for the Jews in Eastern Europe. Adler concluded by stating that he did not

see the will of the Jews of America demanding a Congress, for if there were really such a mass movement, why would the Jewish Congress Organization Committee and the Federation of American Zionists instruct their members to agitate for a such a Congress? Due to these differences and Brandeis' unwillingness to reenter into negotiations with him, Adler said that he felt the need to proceed with the call for a Conference and to issue invitations to all of the national organizations. He hoped that Brandeis and the Zionists would be willing to cooperate in this venture.[29]

Before responding to this letter,Brandeis first wrote to Jacob deHaas, secretary of the Provisional Executive Committee, instructing him not to publicly reveal that negotiations had broken off, but to allow other organizations to make this known first and to allow them to criticize the Committee.[30] On a practical level, Brandeis realized that further negotiations would not succeed, but on a political level, he realized that it was much more valuable to make it appear as if the Provisional Committee was willing to continue to compromise, while the American Jewish Committee continued to remain intractable.

Shortly after the letter to deHaas, Brandeis wrote to Adler accusing him of many of the same things of which Adler had accused Brandeis. He admitted that he had not known about Lipsky's decision to send the letter about agitation for the Congress, but felt that this action was no worse, than Adler acquiring the support of the United Synagogue for

the Conference on the day before he and Adler first met. Brandeis said that Lipsky was merely responding to the situation in the same manner as Adler did himself. Brandeis once again complained about Adler's refusal to take his suggestion to the full Committee and accused him of standing in opposition to Jewish unity, when unity was so very important within the American Jewish community. Brandeis then remarked that he considered the Conference to be both futile and dangerous and could not support it. While Adler believed that a public Congress would be dangerous because it might result in public statements that would hurt the position of Jews in Eastern Europe, Brandeis said that a Conference conducted in secrecy would only lead to suspicions about what the Jews were planning. Only through public democratic sessions could both Jewish and non-Jewish help be secured. Brandeis went on to restate his belief that the American Jewish Committee was not a democratic body, but was merely a self-selecting and self-perpetuating group. Finally, he once again requested that Adler call a full meeting of the Committee to discuss the idea of a Congress.[31]

What is most interesting are the shared accusations. Both accuse each other of negotiating in bad faith, of planning meetings that would be to the detriment of the Jewish people and of not representing either the majority or the will of the Jewish people. To some degree both were right on all three of these charges. Neither group really

trusted the other and both wanted to control the eventual Congress or Conference to their own advantage. Each felt that their methodology was the best for the protection of the Jewish people. Adler trusted secrecy because negotiations in the past had always been conducted in secret and these had generally been successful, while Brandeis believed that democracy was the very backbone of Americanism as well as Judaism. Abandoning the democratic ideal was inconceivable in his eyes. Finally, at this point in time, neither group represented the majority of America's Jews. The majority at this point in time was undecided and both groups desperately wanted to sway the undecided majority to their solution to the Jewish problem in Eastern Europe in both platform and method.

Within a few days of the break-up of negotiations between the American Jewish Committee and the Provisional Executive Committee, the fears of the Eastern European Jews were realized. The leaders of the Zionist movement abandoned the pretext of a separate Congress movement, re-organized the Jewish Congress Organization Committee and placed Brandeis as its chairman. For the next several months, Brandeis directed both the Zionist movement and the Congress movement, thereby using the Congress movement to support the aims of the Zionists. Brandeis had to juggle these two separate agendas, agitation for a Congress and the building of the Zionist movement, at the same time.

Brandeis' primary concern was increasing the

membership and the coffers of the Zionist organization, and the cause of the Congress was definitely secondary. This was first made evident in the letter written to deHaas on August 8. In this letter, Brandeis told deHaas that the Zionist organization could not afford to underwrite the budget of the Congress; "we need at this time Zionists--not **stimmung**[favorable public sentiment]."[32] As far as Brandeis was concerned, there was no need to rush the Congress, time would be better spent in first building up the Zionist movement and using this membership as leverage in Congress negotiations.

The months of August and September were busy ones in this controversy. The American Jewish Committee continued in its call for the Conference on October 24, the Zionists agitated for a Congress and against the Conference, the Independent Order of B'nai B'rith attempted to mediate between the Zionists and the Committee, and the National Workmen's Committee held a convention to determine where American Jewish labor stood on the question. While these issues were being fought out by these heavyweights, every Jewish organization in the United States was being asked to choose sides. Some chose the Congress, some the Committee and some simply abstained for the time being.

Brandeis and the Zionists were perhaps the most active of the groups during this period of time because they were trying to keep as many options open as possible. This is most apparent in a letter from Brandeis to Stephen S. Wise

on August 25. Brandeis wanted to keep communication with the American Jewish Committeee open and continue to try to persuade them to reconsider their decision and join the Congress movement. At the same time, propaganda in favor of a Congress should continue and increase. The suggested reconciliation meeting suggested by B'nai B'rith should be fully explored, but a level of wariness should be maintained. If these efforts to influence the American Jewish Committee to re-enter negotiations failed, then all efforts should be directed to preventing the Conference from being organized. If the Committee decided to go ahead and hold it, then an effort should be made to discourage organizations from participating and to declare that the organizations which actually do participate do not accurately reflect the views of their membership. What Brandeis makes most clear in this letter is his commitment to democratic principles. He believed that at this point in time, the Congress proponents were not representative enough of American Jewry and therefore, the time was not yet ripe for a Congress. Furthermore, because the Organization Committee was not yet representative, he would permit it only the power to study the plan and scope of a Congress, but forbad this committee to take any action except calling for such a Congress.[33] Some of the members of the Congress movement might have seen the call for democracy as merely a gimmick to attract the support of American Jewry. Brandeis though, was very sincere in his commitment to the

will of the people. This did not preclude him from attempting to convince American Jewry what their will should be or from doing his best to wreck the plans of the American Jewish Committee, which he considered to be anathema to democracy

This absolute commitment to democracy he stressed in many of his public addresses. Some of these were published and Brandeis often sent copies of these to people who expressed an interest in the Congress movement. The best of these lectures was delivered in Baltimore on September 27 and was entitled "Jewish Unity and the Congress." In this lecture he hammered away on the same themes that he had enunciated in his letters to Adler. He stressed the importance of unity of action by American Jewry in support of the Jews of Europe, while admitting that disunity of opinion could even be helpful. This unity of action could only be accomplished by listening to the voice of all American Jews, not just some of America's Jews. Through these arguments he railed against the Conference plan as dangerous because it was undemocratic and unrepresentative of American Jewry.[34]

Brandeis was not the only Zionist leader to publicly speak in favor of a Congress. Louis Lipsky spent perhaps even a greater amount of time propagandizing for both the Zionist movement and the Congress. A good deal of his speeches involved attacks on the American Jewish Committee in general and Adler in specific. Many of his statements

were half-truths and some were out and out untruths. He blamed Adler personally for the collapse of negotiations between the two groups and mentioned no guilt on his own part or on the part of the Zionist movement. Adler considered Lipsky to at fault for the lack of unity within the Jewish community and responsible for the failure to achieve any compromise, for he believed Brandeis to be sincere in his efforts, but controlled by Lipsky and deHaas.[35]

The National Workmen's Committee held a convention in New York, September 4-6. This organization had grown from its initial April conference to include more organizations and ran the spectrum from labor unions to radicals, and from Zionists to anti-nationalists. The purpose of this convention was to achieve full rights for Jews. The Executive Committee was instructed to participate in the organization of an American Jewish Congress, but only under certain conditions, namely that the organization be organized on a democratic basis and that it be only a temporary organization.[36] This placed the National Workmen's Committee squarely between the Congress and the Conference camp. They wanted democracy as did the Congress proponents, but they also feared a permanent Congress as did the Conference advocates.

This led to intense negotiations between all of the groups involved. According to Louis Lipsky, The National Workmen's Committee held the balance of power and both

groups vied for its support.[37] The attempted reconciliation by Adolf Kraus of B'nai B'rith was a failure, but representatives of the American Jewish Committee, the Jewish Congress Organization Committee, and the National Workmen's Committee continued to meet. During this period of time, poor response had forced the American Jewish Committee to at least postpone its planned Conference until after its general meeting in November.[38] For a moment it appeared as if the Congress Organization Committee and the National Workmen's Committee had reached an agreement to call a conference of Jewish organizations to take action to acquire civil, political, and where recognized, national rights for the Jews in belligerent lands. The Congress Organization Committee, feeling that this was merely an attempt to sidetrack the plans for a Congress, called off the agreement.[39] Negotiations continued and on November 12, sub-committees of all three groups met. Judah L. Magnes, representing the American Jewish Committee, suggested: "That a Conference of national Jewish organizations be held for the purpose of considering the rights of Jews in belligerent countries and in Roumania, and that it call a Congress on a democratic basis at such time, in such place, and in such manner as it may deem best to secure such rights."[40] The conferees agreed to make no decision until Magnes' proposal had been discussed by each of the three organizations.

The American Jewish Committee met two days later on

November 14 and discussed the Magnes proposal. The other two members of the sub-committee, Colonel Harry Cutler and Cyrus Sulzberger, objected to the resolution both at the meeting of the three sub-committees and before the general meeting of the American Jewish Committee. A compromise was suggested and adopted which called for the participation of the American Jewish Committee in calling for a Conference to discuss the rights of Jews in Eastern Europe, which would then call a Congress at the termination of hostilities.[41]

Why did the American Jewish Committee cave in to its longstanding objection to a Congress elected on a democratic basis? According to Naomi Cohen, the Committee yielded to public opinion, placing greater importance on deferring the Congress until after the war than on the basis of the composition of the Congress.[42] Cyrus Adler in a letter to Jacob Schiff felt that the Committee was attempting to prevent American Jewry from falling completely under the influence of undesirable leaders, but also felt that its entrance into the Congress had only resulted in it trailing behind these undesirable leaders.[43] This author believes that both are correct. The Committee realized that it was losing the public relations war and knew that if it did not agree to participate in the Congress, then there would be no possibility of its voice being heard, that it could have no influence whatsoever. The clause providing that the Congress not be held until the cessation of hostilities also bought time for the Committee. It gave them the chance to

keep their options and the options of American Jewry open, as well as expressing a legitimate concern over the effect of public declarations while hostilities were still ongoing on the fate of Jews in Eastern Europe.

One would imagine that this major concession made by the American Jewish Committee would have been greeted with great enthusiasm by the Congress Organization Committee. Instead it was rejected almost immediately. In a letter to Bernard G. Richards, on November 14, Brandeis told him to publicize the absurdity of the position of the American Jewish Committee, without of course, linking these words back to Brandeis. Brandeis objected to their compromise because he felt that a Congress after the termination of hostilities might be too late for the Jews to actually accomplish something. He also felt that the Committee's decision invalidated the Conference that would precede the Congress because it placed preconditions on this Congress, namely, that it not be held until after the war. In short, this new compromise was actually a restatement of the Committee's call for a Conference in June and therefore, the Congress Organization Committee should continue with its own plans.[44] A similar letter was written on the next day to Harry Friedenwald in which Brandeis once again stressed that the Committee had not in fact compromised at all.[45]

On November 26, at a meeting of the Administrative Committee and the sub-committee of the Congress Organization Committee that had met with the sub-committees of the

American Jewish Committee and the National Workmen's Committee, it was decided to reject the offer made by the American Jewish Committee, on the grounds that this resolution would be fatal to the Congress movement. Therefore, they decided that a draft for the calling of a preliminary Conference of the American Jewish Congress should be issued as soon as possible. Louis Lipsky prepared such a draft and then Brandeis revised this draft. Both versions had as their first order of business the question proposed by the American Jewish Committee, could a Congress be held prior to the conclusion of the war?[46] This issue was then referred to the Congress Organization Committee.

The sub-committees of the American Jewish Committee and the National Workmen's Committee both continued to support the resolution offered by the American Jewish Committee in the succeeding negotiations with the sub-committee of the Congress Organization Committee. On December 23, the Congress Organization Committee adopted a resolution that called for immediately convening a Preliminary Conference and delivered an ultimatum to both the American Jewish Committee and the National Workmen's Committee to respond by January 15, or else the Congress Organization Committee would proceed on its own.[47] Did Brandeis from the start intend to call a conference regardless of the reaction of the other organizations? It does not appear to be so. Brandeis continued to hope for a broad-based leadership to support a democratically elected Congress. He in fact

complained that the preponderance of Zionist leaders within the Congress movement was actually draining manpower, money, and energy from the Zionist movement.[48] Throughout the preceding year Brandeis had constantly stressed the concept of democracy. Louis Lipsky, on the other hand, had been much more inclined to independently call a preliminary conference, in fact he had even done so on October 5.[49] Also Lipsky had consistently agitated for a Congress throughout all of the negotiations. The apparent unwillingness of the American Jewish Committee to agree to the Congress demands or the slowness of their response, the centrality of democracy to Brandeis, the strength of the agitation for the Congress, and perhaps the desire for the power to lead American Jewry led to the issuance of the ultimatum which would eventually lead to the Preliminary Conference.

CHAPTER TWO

The decision by the Jewish Congress Organization Committee to call for a Preliminary Conference with or without the support of the American Jewish Committee and the National Workmen's Committee, resulted in a reaction of shock and surprise by the other two organizations. On January 9, the American Jewish Committee rejected the offer to participate in calling the Preliminary Conference immediately. The National Workmen's Committee also rejected this proposal. What is most interesting is the fact that negotiations between the three sub-committees did not cease with the declaration of December 23. On January 16, a meeting was scheduled, but was postponed until January 23.[1] There were no new developments as a result of this meeting, although the American Jewish Committee did assume that by maintaining negotiations, it was still at least possible to avert or at least delay the Congress. The Zionists wanted to maintain negotiations in the hopes that they would not actually be forced to call the Congress by themselves, but would receive assistance from these other organizations. Brandeis and others still were not sure if the Zionists had enough support to successfully convene a representative Congress and without the support of the American Jewish Committee and the National Workmen's Committee, very strong arguments could be made that the Congress was indeed not representative of American Jewry.

The January 15 deadline passed and the Congress Organization Committee did nothing immediately. Greater support for the Congress began to emerge and give the committee the confidence it needed. Greater support did begin to emerge in favor of the Congress. On January 17, a meeting in San Francisco of two hundred delegates representing more than sixty organizations endorsed the Congress.[2] On January 23, the Jewish Congress Association of Chicago held a regional conference for the Midwest which voted overwhelmingly in favor of a Congress.[3] The next day, a massive rally was held at Carnegie Hall, in which Brandeis addressed those assembled on "Jewish Rights and the Congress". Brandeis addressed the crowd on the misery of the Jews in Eastern Europe and their need for rights. He argued that the Congress was the only way of achieving such rights and that democracy was the essence of such a Congress. He went on to say that the Congress would create a body by which the Jews of America may authoritatively address other governments, guarantee rights for Jews in Eastern Europe and create unity within the American Jewish community.[4]

The greatest boost to the Congress movement was to come a few days after these events. On January 28, President Wilson placed the name of Louis Dembitz Brandeis in nomination for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. This gave the Congress movement the respect it needed. According to Bernard G.

Richards, "We may not have gone against the power, the influence and the wealth that surrounded Mr. Marshall, ... were it not for the balancing influence and prestige of Brandeis."[5] Encouraged by the show of popular support, including the formation of seventy two Congress committees in as many cities, the Jewish Congress Organization Committee, acting on its resolution of December 23, voted to convene a Preliminary Conference in Philadelphia on March 26, 1916.[6]

The nomination of Brandeis did not end the opposition to the Congress. Many members of the American Jewish Committee remained very strongly opposed to the Congress. Jacob Schiff continued to believe that the Congress would result in the isolation of Jews within the United States into a separate group and perceived to have interests which differed from those of the average American.[7] In response to these views, Bernard G. Richards wrote to Schiff and told him that these fears were unfounded and that this fear of the reaction of American Gentiles was just what Zionism was trying to eliminate.[8] Schiff's opposition to Brandeis' Congress policies did not prevent him from not only sending Brandeis a telegram of congratulations, but also making a public statement praising Wilson's nomination of Brandeis, which was published in the New York newspapers.[9]

In subsequent correspondence with Brandeis, Schiff continued to express his opposition to the Congress movement. Schiff believed that the Congress agitation had

also hardened the position of the Ottoman Empire against Jewish migration and thereby actually did harm to the cause for which the movement had been formed. He stressed his fear that the Congress agitation would lead to an outbreak of anti-Semitism and his belief that the only Congress for which there was room in the United States was the United States Congress. Finally, Schiff pleaded with Brandeis that before he ascended the Supreme Court Bench, he put an end to the Congress agitation and take steps to heal the rift that had developed within American Jewry between Zionists and non-Zionists.[10]

This ambivalence was not unique to Schiff. Louis Marshall also continued to disagree with Brandeis on the Congress, but nonetheless sent him a telegram of congratulations.[11] After Brandeis informed him that the Congress Organization Committee had decided to go ahead with the plans for the Preliminary session of the Congress, this opposition was quite apparent. Marshall implied that the congress group had been carrying on negotiations in bad faith because it was or at least should have been obvious that the American Jewish Committee was serious about the negotiations. In fact, he claimed that the differences between the Committee and the Congress were minor. The Committee had already made concessions of allowing the Executive Committee to be chosen by the conference and that all of the details of the Congress including the democratic selection of delegates should be arranged by the Executive

Committee. Marshall was even willing to concede that the delegates could be chosen prior to the cessation of hostilities. The only point on which the American Jewish Committee was unwilling to give any ground at all was that no Congress be held prior to the end of the war. What shocked Marshall even more was the fact that all of the members of the sub-committees believed that there had not been a time since the outbreak of the war when a Congress could have been held and only one person believed that there would be any time before the end when it would be prudent to hold a conference.[12]

This bitter disagreement over the Congress issue did not prevent cooperation in other areas. In October, Brandeis arranged for a meeting between Judge Julian Mack and Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston to discuss American aid in the shipment of petroleum to Palestinian Jewish orange growers. When it became known that Judge Mack could not attend the meeting, Brandeis arranged to have either Marshall or Adler attend this meeting.[13] The Provisional Zionist Committee and the American Jewish Committee also cooperated in establishing a Russian Bureau to disseminate accurate information about the conditions of Jews there. This bureau, under the general direction of members of both groups, would also be financially supported equally by both groups.[14] Both groups agreed that Jews in Europe and Palestine needed American aid; they continued to disagree as to how to provide this aid in the best possible

way. What is important is that they did cooperate in other ventures, even during the time when they were bitterly divided on Congress negotiations.

On February 27, the Jewish Congress Organization Committee issued its formal call for the Congress to be held in Philadelphia on March 26. This call was signed by the presidents of twenty national organizations and was addressed to all national Jewish groups and local Congress Organization Committees. This Preliminary Conference was to determine the date, program and means of representation for the Congress, as well as elect an Executive Committee to take over the duties of the present Jewish Congress Organization Committee.[15]

Rather than conceding defeat, the Congress opponents chose to continue to fight. Jacob Schiff continued to voice his objections to the Congress movement with his claims that this was the cause of disunity within American Jewry, that it was unpatriotic and that it would lead to anti-Semitism. Schiff now began to voice these reservations publicly. At annual meetings of both the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society and the Educational Alliance, he condemned the Congress in addresses to these groups.[16] Then he granted an interview to Isaac Gonickman of the New York Warheit, which was also picked up by the New York Sun and the New York Times. Schiff said very little in this interview that he had not said earlier in private correspondence and at public meetings. The important distinctions here were that

this appeared in print and that it appeared in the American press, not just the Jewish press. The authenticity of Schiff's statements could not be doubted because the article stated that the interview was read, revised, approved and authorized for publication by Schiff. To make matters even more heated, an introductory paragraph by the newspaper concluded that it was Schiff's view that any Jewish policy that did not have as its aim the development of American national life "would almost be treason to the principle of American citizenship."[17] This charge of treason sparked the most immediate reactions. The editor of the Jewish Daily News cabled Schiff and asked him if he had indeed accused the supporters of the Congress and Zionists with treason. In his response, Schiff stated, "I am not aware that I have charged participants in the Congress movement and Zionists with treason to the United States."[18] This lukewarm response seems to indicate that although Schiff might not have publicly charged them with treason, he did not necessarily disagree with these charges.

In any case, Zionist and Congress leaders were incensed and many wanted Schiff's head. Richard Gottheil and others asked for an immediate response by Brandeis to this attack by Schiff which could be regarded as no different from one delivered by an anti-Semite. Brandeis in conjunction with Jacob deHaas and Stephen S. Wise decided that the response should be in action, not words. The best means of answering Schiff's charges would be in the conduct of the Preliminary

Conference which therefore had to be as dignified as possible. Brandeis now saw the Conference as a test of the Jewish people which they would have to pass. Brandeis also did not want to make this decision public because he felt that there was nothing to gain in publicly answering Schiff's charges and there was even a strong possibility of losing ground. Furthermore, opponents of the Congress, if informed of its plans would be in a position to cause even greater disruption.[19]

Brandeis and his associates could only assume that Schiff's attacks were part of a plan or conspiracy to disrupt the Congress. It is far more likely that Schiff was acting alone on his own beliefs. It is important to remember that Schiff himself was an immigrant to the United States, unlike other Committee leaders such as Marshall and Adler or Congress leaders such as Brandeis and Lipsky who were American born. Schiff had the patriotism of an immigrant, of one who had chosen to live in the United States(Schiff came to this country at the age of eighteen and five years later became a naturalized citizen.). For this reason he was perhaps more sensitive to any charge which had even the remote hint of un-Americanism. As an observant Jew, he was also very troubled by any movement which called itself Jewish, but which was not centered around Judaism as a religion which became more clear when at a later date he entertained the notion of becoming a member of the Zionist organization. Schiff's American and Jewish

identity was threatened by the Congress movement and he responded as best he could to stop what he must have sincerely felt was a grave danger to the status of Jews in the United States, not just an attempt through propaganda to protect the hegemony of the American Jewish Committee within the American Jewish community as some have claimed.

Meanwhile, Louis Marshall speaking officially for the American Jewish Committee formally declined the invitation to attend the American Jewish Congress. In this letter to Bernard G. Richards, Secretary of the Congress Organization Committee, Marshall claimed that the Congress was an infringement on the declared functions of the American Jewish Committee, namely, to prevent the infraction of civil and religious rights of Jews anywhere in the world. Even so, the Committee was willing to enter into negotiations with the Congress Organization Committee and the National Workmen's Committee, which were broken off in a breach of faith by the Congress Organization Committee. Once again Marshall argued that a Congress held during the war would be injurious to European Jewry based on information the Committee had received from responsible organizations. Marshall then leveled one new charge, the Conference was not true to it own purpose because it was not really democratic. Marshall argued that because of the inclusion of local groups at the discretion of the organizers, the Conference would actually be weighted in the favor of the Zionists who would be given national representation, as well as, local

representation. This he claimed was actually a packed convention, which by definition could not possibly perform the functions of a conference.[20] Marshall took the very same arguments raised by the Congress proponents against the Conference plan and turned them against their Congress. The argument could accurately be applied to both instances because both groups wanted a favorable audience which would agree to whatever plan they suggested.

The Congress opponents made one last effort to prevent its holding. Henry Morgenthau, the U. S. ambassador to Turkey, returned to this country immediately prior to the Preliminary Conference and both groups attempted to get a statement from him. Judah Magnes approached him first and Morgenthau said that he would make no statement without first speaking to both sides. Stephen S. Wise then convinced Morgenthau somehow that the Congress was not a Zionist idea, but a spontaneous democratic movement. Morgenthau, then met with Brandeis who further attempted to convince him of the validity of the Congress movement. After this meeting, Morgenthau agreed to make no public statement.[21]

Having weathered all of the potential conflicts, the Preliminary Conference was called to order on Sunday, March 26, 1916 at 2:30 P.M. in Philadelphia with 367 delegates representing 30 national organizations and 83 different cities.[22] The opening addresses were directed as much to those who were not present as to those who were within the

hall. The three opening speakers, Leon Sanders, the Temporary Chairman, Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, the keynote speaker, and Judge Hugo Pam, the permanent Chairman of the Conference, all addressed issues raised by the Congress foes. Sanders began his speech by stating that they met as patriotic Americans and loyal Jews. Wise and Pam both echoed this sentiment. Sanders claimed that the purpose of this gathering was to secure equal rights for Jews in all lands in which they live, not to cause a revolution or to advance the cause of any particular group(i.e., this was not a Zionist sponsored convention). Judge Pam said that the Congress must not be dominated by any single group, while Rabbi Wise said that this group had no program other than organizing a democratic organ through which the Jewish people could express their views. Both Sanders and Pam stressed that the door must remain open to those who chose not to participate in this Conference. Sanders admitted that they were just as zealous to serve the Jewish people as those who had assembled in Philadelphia, while Pam credited them for having been in the vanguard battling for the rights of world Jewry and giving of their thought, power and influence in Jewish causes. He said that they honestly believed themselves to be right, just as much as the Congress proponents believed themselves to be right. Both he and Sanders told the delegates that their support was necessary and that the only way to regain their support was through a patient, calm and dignified conference and

rational arguments. Denunciation would gain absolutely nothing.

Wise differed from them radically on this point. He denounced the Committee in no uncertain terms, stating that opponents of the Congress were benevolent tyrants who abhorred democracy. While Pam had admitted the value of the leadership that the Conference supporters had shown in the past, Wise claimed that "we reject no leadership for we have known no leadership." He went on to characterize their policies as ones of inaction, aimlessness and timidity. Their rejection of the this Conference he claimed was evidence of the aimlessness of their so-called leadership. While the other two speakers had attempted to pacify the division within the Jewish community and do what they could to heal the rift, Wise tried to widen this rift and rub salt into the wound. Why Wise chose to do this is unclear. Perhaps he still harbored a grudge because Marshall and his associates refused to allow Wise to have the Temple Emanu-El pulpit on his own terms when Marshall was the president of the congregation and it is possible that this was his revenge. It is also probable that Wise was playing to the crowd and felt that these attacks would generate a sizable of reaction. Finally, it is possible that Wise sincerely believed that the American Jewish Committee had not been negotiating in good faith and deserved this abuse.

Elsewhere in his address, Wise defended the use of the term "Congress" and responded to the charge that support for

the Congress was treasonous. Wise was also the only one of the introductory speakers to address the question of Zionism and Palestine and he saw this Congress as a fulfillment of Herzl's belief that Jews must take their fate into their own hands. [23]

The first official order of business in the Preliminary Conference was the election of an Honorary Chairman and a Permanent Chairman. Brandeis, who was not present at the Conference due to his nomination to the Supreme Court and the fear that an appearance here could damage his chances of approval, was elected Honorary Chairman by acclamation. Judge Hugo Pam of Chicago was then elected Permanent Chairman.[24] The Conference then proceeded to appoint committees and committee chairmen.

Most of the committee reports were routinely delivered and accepted, but there were a few that created a great deal of discussion. The Committee on Resolutions Relating to the Program of the Congress began its report by stating that the subjects suggested for discussion by the Congress were just that, suggestions. The Congress would have the power to widen the agenda to any subject relating to the Jewish problem. The first item was the one that generated the greatest amount of discussion, namely the rights of Jews in lands where rights are denied to them. The controversial phrase was the inclusion of national rights alongside civil, political and religious rights in the rights to be secured by the Congress for Jews in those lands where these rights

are denied. A compromise resolution was offered by Stephen S. Wise, which separated the rights into two different categories; civil, political and religious rights in all lands and national rights in those lands where national rights are or ought to be recognized. Debate on this continued and discussion of it had to be brought back to a special committee. This special committee, of which Wise was a member, returned with a slightly different wording of his original compromise, which was adopted by the Conference. Other issues placed on the program of the Congress were the problems of Jewish development in Palestine, cooperation with Jews in other lands in furtherance of the Congress program, creating a commission to represent the Congress at the Peace Conference, establishing the Congress as a permanent institution, consideration of reconstructive work in lands affected by war and Jewish migration after the war, financial responsibility for the Congress, and appointing commissions to study the condition of Jews in foreign lands.[25]

The real areas of major controversy were the methods of electing delegates and the date for actually holding the Congress. The Committee on Resolutions relating to Methods of Election was unable to reach a decision and presented a majority and minority report. The majority report favored the election of delegates by existing organizations, while the minority report wanted universal suffrage with elections within every Jewish community. Debate on the floor of the

conference was inconclusive, so that the committee went into conference again. Wise joined this committee and helped it to reach a compromise. The decision adopted was that the principle of universal suffrage would be applied and membership in any local Jewish organization qualified an individual as a registered voter.[26]

The Committee on Resolutions Bearing on the Date of the Congress also came out with a majority and minority report. The majority report gave a great deal of discretion to the Executive Committee, instructing them to complete preparations for the Congress by September 17,1916, to meet by that date to determine a date for the Congress, and if they were unable to set a date for the Congress prior to January 1,1917, they must order a referendum of the delegates to the Preliminary Conference for future instruction. The minority report viewed the situation as very critical and felt that the Congress should be held as soon as possible, on or before September 10, 1916. All negotiations with other Jewish organizations concerning the Congres should be concluded by May 15, 1916 and that delegates to the Congress should be elected by June 15. A compromise was reached which still gave wide-ranging powers to the Executive Committee, while stressing the urgency of the situation. The Executive Committee was instructed to have completed the preparations for the Congress by September 3, 1916 and convene the Congress between September 3 and December 31, 1916. The Congress could not be held

after December 31, without a vote by three-quarters of the Executive Committee. No mention was made in this compromise resolution of negotiations with other organizations.[27]

The Committee on Nominations recommended that an Executive Committee of seventy persons be elected exclusive of an honorary chairman and a secretary. Only American citizens would be eligible for membership on the Executive Committee. Also, the Executive Committee would elect an Administrative Committee and officers out of its own midst. Also, Louis D. Brandeis would be the Honorary Chairman. These resolutions were all adopted by the Conference. There was debate however, on the make-up of the Executive Committee. Many delegates to the Conference felt that their region or organization had been slighted. Some suggested that the size of the committee be increased to one hundred and others, including Wise, Pam and deHaas, volunteered to withdraw their names to make room for others. The eventual compromise, suggested once again by Wise, was that the recommendation of the Nominations Committee be accepted, but that the Executive Committee have the right to increase its membership to one hundred members taking the additional nominations collected at the Congress as recommendations for inclusion in the Executive Committee. This was approved unanimously by the Conference.[28]

The issues on which there was debate at this Preliminary Conference seem to have involved disagreements between radical separatists and those more willing to

Brandeis' first choice to serve as the permanent Chairman of the Conference, but Wise believed that he ought not serve as Chairman. In a letter to his brother prior to the Conference he expressed the reasons why. "In the first place, I am clerical; in the second place, I am an ultra-Liberal, and in the third place I am a New Yorker. Even assuming that I possess all the other needed capacities for chairmanship, I believe we ought to have a non-New Yorker and if possible one who is not a pronouncedly, though as really, Zionistic, as I am."[29] Pam fit these requirements beautifully, but Wise was still the individual who emerged as the star of the Conference.

Enthusiastic reports of Wise's work came back to Brandeis who wrote to Wise praising the work that he had done and expressing "delight that the Jews from the whole country should have come to know you as they do now."[30] Brandeis also expressed delight in the proceedings in letters to Lipsky and Richards. To Lipsky, he remarked that the success of the Preliminary Conference could be used to the advantage of the Zionist movement in increasing its membership.[31] In his letter to Richards, Brandeis suggested the date of April 9, for the first meeting of the Committee of Seventy to begin planning the Congress.[32] At this meeting, temporary officers were chosen, with Brandeis as Chairman, Jacob Carlinger as Treasurer and Bernard G. Richards as Secretary.[33]

While the Preliminary Conference appeared to be an

overwhelming success and the Congress supporters were basking in its glow, the Congress' opponents, not immediately won over as many of the speakers at the Conference had predicted, were not sitting still. On the same day that the Conference convened in Philadelphia, The National Workmen's Committee of the Eastern States met in New York and ratified the decision of the Executive Committee to refrain from participation in the Preliminary Conference of the American Jewish Congress. Two weeks later, the National Workmen's Committee of the Western States met in Chicago and also concurred.[34]

The National Workmen's Committee invited the Congress group to resume negotiations with the sub-committees of their organization and the American Jewish Committee, as if the holding of the Preliminary Conference had no real impact on the negotiations. The Executive Organization Committee, believing this merely to be an attempt to hamper the the Congress movement and believing that the actions of the National Workmen's Committee were dependent on those of the American Jewish Committee, informed them that a committee would confer with them about the possibility of representation on the Executive Organization Committee. The National Workmen's Committee either misunderstood or chose to misunderstand and responded by acknowledging the acceptance of the Philadelphia Conference Congress to enter into conference with the American Jewish Committee and themselves. When this misunderstanding was corrected, the

National Workmen's Committee declined to join the Executive Organization Committee.[35]

There was very little interest expressed by other groups in joining the Congress. Opponents to it still remained vocal in their opposition. Schiff, for example, wrote to a Congress proponent stating that, "if you think that the Jews of the United States were crowned with Unity at the recent conference...; far from this, only an inconsiderable percentage of our people were, as I am assured, represented."[35] Schiff also condemned the Congress at the annual meeting of the Jewish Publication Society of America, characterizing its leaders as men "whose interest in true Judaism is not very far-reaching, and who are Jews only for questionable nationalistic machinations." Schiff went on to praise the Philadelphia Jewish community for paying no heed to the Preliminary Conference while it was assembled there. Later, in the same speech, Schiff made a number of disparaging remarks about Yiddish, characterizing it as a jargon and claiming that it "is not a modern language, if a real language at all."[37] This caused a major controversy within the Yiddish press with once again intense criticism of Schiff. Schiff was even told by Sholom Ash, the Yiddish writer, that he was attacking Schiff because Schiff was interfering with the desire of the Jewish people for a Congress.[38]

The Yiddish press might have still been supporting the Congress movement, but the warmth of the support of others

was beginning to cool. The delegates from the Midwest felt that the Congress had been dominated by New Yorkers to the detriment of the Congress.[39] The Orthodox also were less enamored with the Congress movement and felt themselves to be underrepresented within the movement. Brandeis had to try to allay the fears of Rabbi Meyer Berlin, leader of Mizrachi, that the Orthodox were being given second class status and denied positions on important committees as well as not being sufficiently represented in general.[39] Even Horace Kallen, a long-time Congress supporter, felt that Congress activity was very disappointing and that without fresh interest and discussion the movement would lose vitality. He feared that the Congress would then come to represent only a small clique, not the entire population of American Jewry.[41]

In order to determine its own response to the success of the Preliminary Conference the American Jewish Committee called a special meeting on May 14, 1916. The Committee believed that there were three choices before it:

"1. To abandon the three main specifications of the action taken at the annual meeting;

(a) The time for the convening of the congress.

(b) That the organizations represented be national organizations.

(c) That the discussion be limited to the rights of Jews in belligerent lands and in Roumania.

2. That immediate steps be taken by the American Jewish

Committee to convene the Conference of National Organizations upon the basis originally proposed by it;

3. That the American Jewish Committee continue to act as a separate and independent body, and endeavor to secure rights for Jews in belligerent lands and Roumania."[42]

The Committee adopted the middle course and called for a conference of national Jewish organizations to be held in June 1916, "to secure full rights for the Jews of all lands and the abrogation of all laws discriminating against them, it being understood that the phrase 'full' rights is to be deemed to include civil, religious, and political rights, and in addition, wherever separate group rights are recognized in any land, the conferring upon the Jews thereof of such rights, if desired by them."[43] The Committee dealt with the question of national rights by using the phrase separate group rights and they further qualified this by stating that they would work to secure these rights only if the Jews of that land desired separate group rights. This differed from the resolution adopted by the Congress group which called for national rights in those lands in which national rights are or ought to be recognized.

Both Congress and Conference were attempting to generate support. Jacob Schiff continued to speak out against the Congress. The ire of the Yiddish press increased after a speech Schiff made at the dedication of the Central Jewish Institute on May 21, after which he was misquoted as saying that the Jews of Russia and Poland were

responsible for their own persecutions, rather than the discriminatory laws imposed upon them which kept them as a separate people were responsible for the persecution. Even after a correction was printed in the New York Times as well as in the Yiddish and Jewish papers, the abuse continued. Schiff even considered resigning from the American Jewish Committee in order to lessen the attack upon it.[44] Adler dissuaded Schiff from resigning from the Committee by telling him that this would be interpreted by the opponents of the Committee as dissatisfaction with the policies of the Committee and thus strengthen their position. Adler attributed the increased abuse heaped upon the American Jewish Committee, including himself and Marshall, as a reaction to the calling of the Conference and an attempt to prevent as many organizations as possible from associating with the Conference.[45]

At the annual meeting of the New York Kehillah, Schiff addressed his detractors as well as his supporters. He publicly corrected the error reported by the newspapers by reading from a stenographic report of his comments. He went on to say that the Yiddish press had ignored the truth because they wanted to destroy opposition to the Congress movement and he was the most conspicuous member of the American Jewish Committee. Schiff went on the record as saying that Jewish politics in any form from this time onward would be a sealed book to him. He would continue to work for the uplift of the Jewish people, would continue to

cooperate in relief work and procuring full rights for Jews in the war zone, but this would be all.[46]

While this controversy was raging and the American Jewish Committee was preparing for the Conference, Brandeis was placing the Congress in a state of greater readiness. Brandeis instructed Richards in late May to have the committees on electoral system, plan and scope and affiliation with other bodies, increase their activity in order to prepare themselves to report to the Executive Committee at the earliest possible date. [47] Brandeis realized that the Congress would have to be prepared to compete with the Conference and that speed was of the essence. If the Congress were better prepared at an earlier date, then this might be the advantage the Congress needed. The earlier advantage that the Congress had held after the Preliminary Conference had now disappeared. This loss of ground had also caused Brandeis to lose flexibility and become more rigid in his interpretation of the Congress program. This became most clear at an informal gathering at the home of Eugene Meyer, attended by Bernard Semel, active in the Kehillah; Judge Irving Lehman, loosely associated with the American Jewish Committee, although not a member; and Dr. Henry Moskowitz, of the National Workmen's Committee. It was suggested that Brandeis sit down and negotiate with Marshall and Israel Goldfarb of the National Workmen's Committee with the possibility of undoing all that had been done at the Preliminary Conference and take up

where negotiations had broken off in the fall. Brandeis responded that he did not have the power to enter into negotiations such as these, but even if he did, he would not, because the Congress organization now had a process by which individuals and organizations could affiliate with the Congress. Brandeis expressed reservations about the motives and methods of both the American Jewish Committee and the National Workmen's Committee and their lack of confidence in the democratic process. Brandeis made it clear that he was willing to negotiate in order to achieve unity, but he was willing to negotiate on his terms alone.[47] Brandeis and the other members of the Congress movement were preparing for the rapidly approaching showdown with the American Jewish Committee.

Tensions between the groups increased throughout the month of June. Dr. Harry Friedenwald, a founding member of the American Jewish Committee, and Felix Frankfurter, both resigned from the Committee in protest against the undemocratic actions of the Committee and their disregard of the masses of American Jewry.[48] An attempt was made by Louis Lipsky and others to separate the Kehillah from the American Jewish Committee at the Kehillah's annual meeting. They called for termination of the connection between the Kehillah and the Committee, the endorsement by the Kehillah of the Congress and the resignation of Kehillah board members from the Committee.[49] Had this been brought a year earlier, it probably would have passed, but now people

were tired of the conflict and after Schiff's moving defense of himself and the American Jewish Committee, this resolution failed. At the annual meeting of the Federation of American Zionists, Dr. Frank Schechter and Dr. Solomon Solis-Cohen, introduced a resolution to suspend Zionist involvement in the Congress movement pending the attempts at a reconciliation.[50] This was overwhelmingly defeated, but now gaping holes were beginning to appear in the Congress movement with doubts expressed in what had previously been their strongest bases of support, the Zionists and the Kehillah. Also, the Provisional Executive Committee very strongly considered resigning from the American Jewish Relief Committee over the distribution of funds through the German Hilfsverein.[51] Eventually, this conflict was resolved and the Provisional Executive Committee remained within the relief organization, but this added to the tension within the Jewish community.

On June 16, the American Jewish Committee officially issued invitations to its conference of national Jewish organizations to be held at the Hotel Astor in New York on Sunday, July 16, to discuss the organization of a Jewish Congress to secure full rights for the Jews in all lands. The following organizations joined in the call of the conference: the Central Conference of American Rabbis, the Council of Jewish Women, the Independent Order Free Sons of Israel, the National Workmen's Committee, the Order B'rith Abraham, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and the

United Synagogue of America. Fifty four organizations were invited to send 145 delegates to the Conference.[52] Among the first organizations to decline the Conference invitation was the Executive Organization Committee for an American Jewish Congress which also advised all other organizations associated with the Congress movement to do likewise. The Executive Committee of the Independent Order of B'nai B'rith voted to participate in neither the Congress nor the Conference.[53]

Objection to a Congress or Conference continued within some circles of the American Jewish Committee, notably Schiff and Adler. Both grudgingly accepted the idea. Schiff believed that it was better to allow a Congress to come into existence than to publicly divide American Jewry; maintenance of unity was simply too important. Adler was willing to abide by the decision of a proper Conference, but still reserved the right not to attend himself.[54] Adler also disagreed with Marshall's decision to invite representatives from the Congress Organization Committee to address the Conference, agreeing with Samuel Dorf that these people would merely come and lecture those present and tell them what bad boys they were. Adler continued to state his view that the entire Congress agitation had been planned by an inner circle of Zionists, even before the war, to destroy the American Jewish Committee, overthrow American Jewish institutions and replace the current leaders with a new regime. Adler believed that even Brandeis and Friedenwald

were controlled by a political oligarchy, including Schmarya Levin, Lipsky and deHaas, which he said put Tammany Hall to shame. Adler was convinced that the Zionists simply could not be trusted to negotiate in good faith.[55]

In this atmosphere of extreme tension from both within and without, the American Jewish Committee did convene the Conference on July 16, with Louis Marshall as chairman and ninety delegates representing twenty-seven different organizations in attendance. Marshall's charge that the Preliminary Conference was a packed convention could just as easily be applied to his own gathering. A substantial number of delegates representing other organizations also happened to be members of the American Jewish Committee. This shared point of view helped the Conference to adopt the same call for full rights embodied in the resolution adopted by the American Jewish Committee, but added that it desired to bring about united action first by Jews in the United States and then by the Jews of the world. It also passed a resolution calling for a Congress, solely to discuss the securing of these rights. It then established an Executive Committee of twenty-five individuals to which it gave wide-ranging powers; to confer and cooperate with all other national Jewish organizations in all actions involved in the calling of a Congress, such as its time, place, and method of electing delegates. They insisted that none of these measures affected the autonomy of any Jewish group. In addition it was recommended that the Conference

take steps to aid Jews in lands of oppression and consider the question of establishing an institution for the rehabilitation of Jewish life in the war zone and in Palestine. The name this Conference gave itself was the Conference of American National Jewish Organizations.[56]

A committee consisting of Brandeis, Pam, and Leon Sanders, representing the Executive Organization Committee of the American Jewish Congress, addressed this Conference. They had come merely to explain the purpose of the Congress movement, express a welcome to the delegates and hope that they might be persuaded to join the Congress movement. Brandeis said that he felt the Congress was essential to unify American Jewry and provide a body to represent them and that all organizations were still welcome to join.[57] This committee was then invited to remain during the deliberations. Magnes, who had resigned from the Provisional Executive Committee during the previous year, read the resolutions which had been adopted. After this Brandeis, who had been approved by the Senate and been sworn in as a justice on the Supreme Court on June 4, and the other Congress representatives were pulled into a debate which got out of hand.

Oscar Straus, the first to speak, began in a very conciliatory tone, praising Brandeis and the Congress and stating that everyone was in agreement that unity within American Jewry in order to aid the Jews of Eastern Europe was very important. Straus was even willing to concede

democratic election of delegates, but wanted to know if it had been decided whether the Congress would be held before or after the war?

The trouble began when Brandeis responded. He embarked upon a long discourse on the structure of the Congress organization and the limited powers granted to the Executive Committee. He commented on how the resolutions adopted here were far more limiting than those adopted at the Preliminary Conference and stressed that there was nothing that the Executive Organization Committee for an American Jewish Congress could do with these resolutions but note that they had been passed. Because of the structure of the Congress organization it could not enter into negotiations with another group, but was willing and wanted to bring as many groups as possible into the Congress.

Straus still had not received a definite answer to his question, so he posed it again. Brandeis answered that the Congress must be convened between September 1 and December 31, war or no war, unless an extension is voted by three-quarters of the Executive Committee or by a majority of delegates through a referendum. Straus remarked that although other issues had been left open to the consideration of the entire Congress, it appeared that the question of time was only one-fourth open. Straus then went on to emphasize that it would be suicidal to convene a Congress prior to the cessation of hostilities, especially without knowing who would be victorious in the war.

Straus had used sarcasm and facetiousness in dealing with Brandeis. Judah Magnes, who spoke next was much less subtle. Magnes said that the real point that Brandeis was making was that either those assembled at this Conference join the Congress Organization or we will not cooperate at all. He further claimed that no one had the right to lay down these conditions to an old and established Jewish organization as Brandeis had done and predicted that the American Jewish community would renounce his leadership if this attitude persisted. When one delegate objected to the tone that Magnes had used, Magnes apologized if he had offended Brandeis with his tone. Twice again later he offered apologies for the possibility of unwittingly offending Brandeis either in word or in tone.

Once Magnes had concluded, other speakers rose to take issue with Brandeis. Eventually, about six o'clock, after three hours of debate, Brandeis and his committee left.[58]

Brandeis was very shaken by this experience. He felt that nothing that he had said or done could have possibly led to these attacks upon him and for that reason felt that perhaps the attack was premeditated.[59] Others have said that Brandeis walked into an ambush, but it is more likely that the tensions of the preceding weeks simply exploded at the Astor Hotel. The anger expressed was not anger directed exclusively toward Louis D. Brandeis, but also frustration over the inability to unify American Jewry and establish that unity on the their own terms. Recriminations had flown

back and forth between the two groups; neither trusted the other and some individuals in each group regarded the status of relations between the two groups to be a state of war. Brandeis' long involved discourses rather than simple straightforward answers to question and his lack of flexibility made matters even worse and merely added fuel to the fire. His unfamiliarity with Jewish groups, other than those meetings which he personally had chaired, also contributed greatly to the shock of this experience. The collision of two different styles of debate might have been what finally broke Brandeis. Brandeis was much more familiar with civil and sophisticated discourse, not the rough and tumble debate that characterized the Jewish masses, especially those of the Kehillah. Judah Magnes, after seven years of trying to control Kehillah discussions, had adopted many of the same tactics of debate himself. As proof of the lack of premeditation on his part, during the course of his remarks, he thrice stressed that his remarks were not calculated to harm and apologized for any impression that he might have given that he was not desirous of compromise and cooperation. As further evidence of his lack of premeditation, Magnes did not realize how hurt Brandeis was until Julian Mack informed him; after which, he promptly wrote a letter of apology.[60]

Marshall also wrote Brandeis a letter of apology both on behalf of himself and the Conference.[61] In a letter to Cyrus Sulzberger, Marshall blamed the altercation on

Brandeis and his group. He claimed that by stating that it was impossible to modify the Congress program, Brandeis and his group had displayed deplorable tactics and the indignant reaction was inevitable. Marshall then characterized Magnes as the worst offender in his inability to restrain himself.[62]

According to the opinion of Cyrus Adler, Magnes' words were more directed at deHaas and Lipsky, who were merely spectators and Magnes got carried away with his rhetoric as he was wont to do, for which Adler had often faulted Magnes in the past.[63] There is no doubt that Magnes' remarks, as well as those which followed, caused Brandeis a great deal of personal pain. It is not clear and in fact it is unlikely that these remarks were intended to cause pain or destroy any possibility of compromise.

The blame in actuality rested on both camps. Neither displayed a real willingness to compromise because neither felt that it was in their own best interests. Compromise meant the very real possibility that a subsequent congress or conference would take a stand that was an anathema to everything for which either organization stood. The head-on collision that resulted at the Hotel Astor was the inevitable result of the months of bitter denunciations carried on by extremists in both camps.

Despite this inevitability, Brandeis was so upset that he resigned from his position as Chairman of the Executive Organization Committee for an American Jewish Congress, as

well as Honorary President of the Provisional Executive Committee. In addition he also resigned from the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Relief Committee and the Joint Distribution Committee[62] Within days of the Hotel Astor Conference Brandeis had severed all official ties to Jewish organizations. With Brandeis removed, at least officially, from the movement and a rival organization calling for a congress, the time was ripe for compromise by moderates in both camps.

CHAPTER THREE

The day after the Hotel Astor Conference, the Conference of National Jewish Organizations sent a committee to a meeting of the Executive Organization Committee for an American Jewish Congress. This committee, consisting of Harry Cutler, chairman; Julian Mack, Samuel Schulman, Jacob Massel and Frank F. Rosenblatt, presented the resolutions adopted by the Conference and expressed the hope that negotiations could be undertaken and a compromise arrived at. The Conference committee departed and left the Executive Committee to debate their proposal. There were many who opposed the resumption of negotiations, especially Louis Lipsky, who rued the fact that "there were too many elements on our side eager for compromise."[1] In spite of his opposition the views of the moderates prevailed, including such an unlikely individual as Gedalia Bublick, the original chairman and founder of the Congress Organization Committee.[2]

What led the Congress group to agree to negotiations when only the day before Brandeis had been so adamant that no negotiations were possible except concerning the admission of the Conference group into the Congress? The strong and vocal reaction to Brandeis and his committee on the previous day had to have weighed heavily on their minds. They had gone to the Conference confident that there was at least a strong possibility of convincing those assembled at

the Conference to join with them in the Congress movement. The strength and uniformity with which this proposal had been rejected must have come as a shock to the optimists in the Congress movement who believed that they were negotiating from a position of strength and had the Conference over a barrel. Some had felt that the Conference would be coming to them in a position of weakness, asking them for peace, and therefore they would be a superior position to ask for peace on their terms. Others might have approached this from the complete opposite perspective. The Congress had been losing strength or at least not gaining support for a number of months and now after a successful Conference, Congress members felt that if they did not negotiate now, they would eventually be forced to accept the terms of the Conference. Also, there were members of the Congress group who had favored making peace from the start; now their voices began to gain greater weight.

For whatever reason, the Congress did consent to enter into negotiations and the Executive Organization Committee appointed a committee of seven, chaired by Hugo Pam, and including Leon Sanders, Abraham Schomer, Joseph Barondess, Maurice Katz, Louis Lipsky, and Jacob G. Grossberg, to confer with the Conference committee on the following day.[3] It is interesting to note that both Barondess, a Lower East Side labor organizer, and Sanders, a former judge and President of the Independent Order B'rith Abraham, which had accepted invitations to both the Philadelphia

Conference and the Hotel Astor Conference, were members of the American Jewish Committee. On the committee from the Conference, Jacob Massel had attended the Philadelphia Conference, Julian Mack was a Zionist and President of the Kinights of Zion and Harry Cutler was a Zionist who later served as an a member of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America. Samuel Schulman, on the other hand, was the most committed anti-Zionist on the Conference committee, while Lipsky and Schomer were the two extremists on the Congress committee.

The meeting on the following day was a long one, beginning in the morning and concluding late at night. The first and greatest issue to be hurdled was the issue of rights to be campaigned for at the Peace Conference. Samuel Schulman spoke in support of the Hotel Astor Conference resolution. First, this resolution called for group rights for Jews in countries where such rights were recognized, but only if they wanted them. Second, although "group rights" and "national rights" were almost the same thing, the distinction was very important in the eyes of the American public. He believed that the use of the word national implied that American Jews felt themselves to be a separate nation and hence this would lead to an outbreak of anti-Semitism. Schulman also preferred the use of the term peoples to the word nation because this involved no theory of Jewish life.

Lipsky pointed out that the resolution of the

Conference of National Jewish Organizations did not apply to Poland and if an independent Poland were created, the Jews would be unable to secure group or national rights.

Mack countered with his opinion that there really was not much of a difference between group and national rights and Massel agreed with him. Rosenblatt stated that the National Workmen's Committee preferred the term national rights, but since the American Jewish Committee believed that this would be unacceptable to American officials who were not familiar with the European usage of the word national, he was willing to go along with the American Jewish Committee. Rosenblatt also came out in favor of the usage of the term peoples over nation.

Mack then suggested a compromise to take into account the Polish situation, which involved a modification of the Congress resolution. Barondess also proposed a compromise, but Schulman objected because the word national still appeared. Cutler, then proposed what turned out to be the needed compromise. He argued that since everyone agreed on the intention, but merely disagreed on the wording, this issue could best be worked out by a sub-committee.[4]

The other issues on which compromise was necessary were concluded with less difficulty. The Conference forces were willing to concede the democratic elections of delegates, but the Congress proponents also were willing to grant some representation to organizations. The Congress committee also conceded that the Congress would be only a temporary

organization and its program would be limited in that there could be no motions which bound them to any theory or philosophy of Jewish life, as well as providing for the guarantee of the autonomy of every organization participating in the Congress. They also agreed to create a new Executive Committee of 120 people, later 140, composed equally of members selected by the Congress and the Conference; hence, the Congress was not absorbing the Conference, they were merging. The Conference group did agree to the use of the term Congress, as well as one major concession. The Conference group agreed that the Congress could be held prior to the cessation of hostilities. Ostensibly this was their primary objection to the entire Congress movement, for they felt that this would endanger Jewish lives in the war zone. The entire conflict with Brandeis at the Hotel Astor Conference was about this very issue. Either they hoped that they would be able to persuade the Executive Committee to delay the Congress once the Executive Committee had been formed or they had been using this only as a pretext to avoid a situation in which they were at a disadvantage. Later developments make the former suggestion the more plausible, but there is no definitive proof.[5]

The report of this meeting was drawn up by Rosenblatt and Lipsky and distributed to the members of both sub-committees. There was great disagreement on the definition of full rights for Jews in Europe. The initial

draft defined these as "civil, religious and political rights, and, in addition thereto, group rights in such lands where group rights are, or were, or upon the demand of the Jews of the land affected (democratically ascertained) should be recognized."[6]

Mack had difficulty with this version. "Should be" did not seem to adequately deal with the situation in Poland because it was not explicit enough and "democratically ascertained" appeared as if it committed American Jewry to work for democracy in Russia. Mack revised this to read "...group rights in such lands where group rights are or should be recognized, upon the demand of the Jews of the land affected..." Mack further interpreted demand as "to be ascertained in as democratic manner as is feasible."[7]

Schulman still was not happy. He insisted that they had not even discussed how the desires of the Jews in Europe should be ascertained and preferred the original resolution proposed by Mack on July 18, which used the phrase, "group rights in such lands where group rights are customarily granted and where Jews desire them."[8] Lipsky attempted to assure Schulman that he was the only delegate who had such a problem, but Schulman held his ground and refused to yield on his anti-nationalist stance. The two sub-committees had to be reconvened.

At this point in time Louis Marshall actively entered the conflict. Marshall sent a letter to Massel in which he rewrote the contoversial clause which stated that the Congress would meet:

"exclusively for the purpose of defining the methods whereby in cooperation with the Jews of the world, full rights may be secured for the Jews of all lands, and all laws discriminating against them may be abrogated. It being understood that the phrase 'full rights' is deemed to include:

1. Civil, religious and political rights, and in addition thereto
2. Wherever the various peoples of any land are or may be recognized as having separate group rights, the conferring upon the Jews of the lands affected, of such rights, if desired by them, and
3. The securing and protection of Jewish rights in Palestine."[9]

This version was the one ultimately adopted by the two sub-committees on August 9, 1916. When the entire package was brought before the Executive Organization Committee for an American Jewish Congress, many felt that this sub-committee had sold the Congress out by conceding too much to the Conference. With a few reservations, only one of which was accepted by the Conference, the Executive Committee accepted the agreement. They had wanted some mention made of consideration of post-war rehabilitation in Palestine and Eastern Europe, and had objected to some representation by national organizations instead of popular

elections, but the Conference refused to accept these. The Conference did accept one change requested in the resolution on group rights qualifying the phrase "if desired by them" with the words "as determined and ascertained by the Congress."[10] The conference also accepted this compromise and now it was merely up to the delegates of the Philadelphia Conference to ratify the agreement.

A referendum was sent out on August 27, 1916. Attached to the referendum was a memorandum signed by the members of the sub-committee stating the reasons why they deviated from the Philadelphia program. It urged the delegates to accept these changes even though they regretted the changes they were forced to make. The first regret they expressed was that the Congress would have to be limited in scope and would not be able to take up discussion of every aspect of the Jewish problem. Instead, the Congress would meet exclusively to define the methods by which it, in cooperation with other Jewish bodies, would work to secure full rights for the Jews in all lands. The committee also regretted that the Congress would be limited in duration and would be forced to dissolve one year after the adoption of a Peace Treaty in Europe. They also apologized for the fact that constructive relief and migration could not appear on the agenda of the Congress. The last disputed issue was the concessions made regarding the principle of democracy. The committee regretfully informed the delegates that at least some of the delegates were to be chosen by organizations,

not by a democratic vote. In conclusion, they stated that certain concession were made by the forces of democracy to the forces of peace and they hoped that in the victory of the policies of peace the principles of democracy would triumph. The referendum followed the compromises worked out between the two sub-committees. It permitted the delegates to vote on four separate issues: program (the limitations previously discussed), method of elections, date and executive committee (its expansion).[11]

Two hundred and forty three out of three hundred and sixty seven delegates responded. Marshall complained that the Executive Committee of the Congress Organization Committee had sent the memorandum expressing their regrets about the changes that had been made. He also complained to Israel Zangwill that the Zionists were attempting to defeat the settlement. Marshall's fears turned out to be well founded. The most important change, the adoption of the new compromise program, lost by only eleven votes and the proposal to allow some direct election by organizations lost by sixteen votes. The other two resolutions passed. What is amazing is that with all of the propaganda generated to defeat this measure, the margin of defeat was so small.[12]

Two options lay before both of these groups, they could either return to the negotiating table or attempt to continue alone. Both groups were too tired of fighting to proceed alone, so they returned once again to negotiations. On October 2, 1916, the two sub-committees met once again.

On this day, Louis Marshall replaced Julian Mack on the Conference Committee, while about half of the Congress Committee had been replaced. This committee consisted of Barondess, Schomer, and Lipsky, who were joined by Jacob Carlinger, Abraham Goldberg, Aaron Levy, Louis Rubinsohn and Leo Wolfson.[13]

The issue which dominated this meeting was the same one which had dominated all of the previous meetings, how to express national or group rights in a way acceptable to everyone involved. The Conference committee rejected the use of the term "national" and the Congress committee rejected "group rights." A similar argument was made regarding the use of the terms "nations" and "peoples." Louis Marshall was eventually able to engineer a compromise acceptable to all parties. This article now read: "Wherever the various peoples of any land are or may be recognized as having rights as such, the conferring upon the Jewish people of the land affected, of like rights, if desired by them, as determined and ascertained by the Congress."[14]

Another concession made by the Congress parties was that one quarter of the delegates would be selected by national organizations. The Conference committee conceded the resolution that "the Executive Committee shall consider the advisability of placing on the agenda of the Congress the subject of the economic reconstruction of the Jewish communities in the war zone."[15] Both the Executive

Committee of the Conference of National Jewish Organizations and the Executive Organization Committee for an American Jewish Congress accepted this agreement and once again it was referred to the delegates of the Philadelphia Conference. The referendum was issued on October 15,1916 and this time, the referendum passed by a huge margin, 217 votes to 4.[16]

Cooperation did not assure trust. The two leading anti-Congress proponents within the American Jewish Committee, Schiff and Adler, continued to oppose the Congress and even Marshall maintained a healthy distrust of the Zionists. Schiff felt that the agreement that neither Zionism, nor Nationalism, nor a permanent Congress would be discussed by the Congress would not last past the opening gavel at the Congress. Either the men who made the agreement will break it themselves, or even if they are men of honor, they will not have the wherewithal to control the delegates. Nevertheless, Schiff concluded that the Congress was now inevitable so the best had to be made of the situation.[17]

Marshall attempted to allay these fears. In a letter to Schiff, on July 22, Marshall admitted that the Congress agitators had gone so far that the holding of one was inevitable. To prevent too much harm from being done, Marshall felt that the American Jewish Committee had to enter into the Congress and attempt to assert some leadership. By this point in time Marshall felt that the

leaders of the Congress movement had lost control of their movement, which made it an ideal time for the Committee to enter the picture. The mass of Congress support he felt was for a democratic Congress and many of the other issues were negotiable. The Committee had been willing to concede that for almost a year, but was unwilling to make any concessions on broadening the program to include Zionism, Nationalism or any sense of permanency. Furthermore, Schiff should have no cause for alarm because the elimination of these topics was not just a "gentleman's agreement" but a predetermined fact that would be put into the written agreement. By carefully crafting the frameworks of the Congress, all danger could be eliminated.[18]

Adler continued to refuse to have anything to do with the Congress. He helped Marshall choose delegates for the Executive Committee for the Conference of National Jewish Organizations, but refused to be one himself, even when this was offered because he believed that he was not well suited to help create unity. Adler did agree though to take on a greater role within the American Jewish Committee, allowing Marshall more time to deal with Congress matters.[19]

Even after the second referendum, Schiff continued to insist that the old tried and true approach of quiet diplomacy would accomplish more than any of the Congress agitation. He suggested that after the current Presidential election, the President and the Secretary of State should be approached informally and Marshall should express the desire

that the United States government support the claims for full and equal rights for Jews in all those lands in which these are denied. Too much time had been lost in all of the Congress battles in the attempt to secure rights for the Jews of Eastern Europe and action was needed, Congress or not.[20]

Politicians in all parties were well aware of the struggle for equal rights for Jews and all others in Eastern Europe by this point in time because all three political parties, Republican, Democratic and Progressive, had adopted planks supporting these rights and the action taken against the Russian government in the Passport Question of 1911. The author of all three of these planks was none other than Louis Marshall. Marshall wrote a different version of the same plank for each party, phrasing it in such a way to agree with the general outlook and goals of the party. Each of the parties adopted Marshall's version without changing so much as a syllable.[21]

On November 2, the Executive Organization Committee for an American Jewish Congress announced the results of the referendum. On November 14, the Executive Committee of the Conference of National Jewish Organizations selected their seventy delegates for the Executive Commmittee of the Congress. On December 3, sub-committees from both groups met for the last time in order to plan the work out the details of the first meeting of the newly appointed Executive Committee of the American Jewish Congress. They

determined that the meeting would take place on December 25, 1916, at the Hotel Savoy in New York. Harry Cutler was chosen to open the session.[22]

The first issue faced at this session was the selection of a temporary chairman. For the original Congress group this selection was very important. It had to be demonstrated that the merger was a real merger not a capitulation to the American Jewish Committee. For that reason it was important to them that a neutral figure be chosen. The Conference group preferred Louis Marshall and therefore Julian Mack nominated him, stating that his years of distinguished service and special qualifications made Marshall best suited to chair this body. Jacob Panken, of the National Workmen's Committee, seconded this nomination. The Congress group preferred Adolf Kraus, president of B'nai B'rith, whose neutrality was unquestionable (B'nai B'rith had agreed to join neither the Congress nor the Conference). Horace Kallen nominated Kraus and Hugo Pam seconded this nomination. In a roll call vote Kraus won by a margin of 4 votes, 49 to 45. Marshall, the loser, in a very noble gesture, moved that the election be declared unanimous, and so it was.[23]

Four committees were then appointed to report back to the general assembly at the afternoon session: a nomination committee of fifteen for the election of a permanent officers and an administrative committee; a committee of seven on the time and place of the Congress; a committee of

eleven on the number of delegates and the methods of election; and a committee of seven on constructive relief.

At four o'clock the afternoon session convened. The first committee to report was the one on time and place. The committee reported that in its unanimous opinion the Congress should be held in Washington, D.C., by May 1, 1917, leaving the exact date up to the Administrative Committee. The question with which the committee had grappled and which they brought to the floor was whether to fix the date or leave it elastic. The committee had decided that although good arguments could be presented from either perspective, people were anxious to hold a Congress as soon as possible, no matter when the actual opportunity for presenting demands to the peace conference came. Oscar Straus noted that important reasons could arise to delay the convening of the Congress after May 1, and the Administrative Committee should be given the power to extend the deadline if necessary. Stephen S. Wise then argued that it was important to have a fixed date and that the Congress meet as soon as possible. Julian Mack then suggested a compromise. The Congress should be held by May 1, unless the Administrative Committee decide by a two-thirds majority that it would be unwise to hold the Congress at that point in time. In that case, the Executive Committee of 140 would convene on the first Sunday in April to determine a new date. This compromise was accepted.

The next committee to report was the one on

constructive relief. Marshall reported that it was the unanimous opinion of the committee that constructive relief appear on the agenda. There was disagreement about how this should be worded. Some believed that relief should be "in conjunction with" existing groups and others felt that it should be "through" existing groups. Marshall personally favored "through" because the existing three organizations (American Jewish, Central, and People's Relief Committees) already had the necessary machinery and were functioning. "In conjunction with" implied the creation of a fourth group which would further replicate the job currently being done by the existing groups. Harry Friedenwald suggested that this was an issue best left up to the Congress, while Morris Hillquit believed that relief should be struck from the Congress program because it had nothing to do with full and equal rights. Samuel Schulman agreed with Hillquit and further stated that reconstruction was a permanent task, while the Congress would be only temporary. Wise disagreed, stating that the the Congress should relegate to itself the power of reconstruction. Sholem Asch then agreed with Wise. Finally, by a vote of 60 to 29, Friedenwald's position, of delaying any decision until the Congress, was adopted.

Next to report was the committee for the election of permanent officers and the administrative committee. Once again there was controversy surrounding the report of a committee. This committee issued two reports, majority and minority. The majority favored the election of Kraus and

the minority, Marshall. Kraus left the chair and after some debate he addressed Marshall and suggested that both of them step aside. Marshall agreed and then Wise nominated Nathan Straus. This was seconded by Kallen and Simon Wolf and Straus' nomination was then unanimously accepted. Bernard G. Richards was elected Executive Secretary and Adolph Lewisohn, Treasurer.

AT the evening session, the chief issue was the composition of the Administrative Committee. There was a good deal of controversy surrounding labor representation, especially the omission of Congressman Meyer London after controversy surrounding remarks he had made at a Boston relief rally. After seemingly endless discussion, Magnes said that the time had come to be frank and if the opposition was to London, let him speak. London explained his remarks at the relief rally and was then elected to the Administrative Committee by acclamation. Following this discussion, the meeting adjourned.[24]

The following day, the Administrative Committee met for the first time. Its members elected Harry Cutler as chairman and Louis Kirstein and Morris Hillquit as first and second vice-chairmen. Adolph Lewisohn was elected chairman of the finance committee, Max Goldfarb, Joel Enteen and Bernard Semel were appointed to the committee to report on the conditions of the Jews in Europe. What would turn out to be the most complex assignment, the chairman of the committee on methods of election, was given to Isaac Hourwich.[25]

The most laborious work to be done during this period was that of the Committee on Elections. The first report brought by this committee to the Administrative Committee on January 14, was not accepted because of the inability to resolve a conflict on voting methods and so the report was returned to committee. For the next month, the committee continued to try to work out all of the details. It was relatively easy to determine that there would be four hundred delegates, one hundred of which would be chosen by national organizations (defined as an organization having branches in two or more states meeting regularly and being in existence prior to January 1,1916), and three hundred of which would be chosen by popular election. There was heated discussion about representation by national organization, especially by the early Congress supporters who favored only universal suffrage, but eventually it was determined that fifty four groups would be represented by one hundred delegates with representation ranging from 6 delegates to one delegate. It was also relatively easy to determine that every man or woman, twenty one years of age or older, who was a member of a Jewish organization was entitled to vote. However, it was much more difficult to divide the United States into districts and precints. At the meeting of the Administrative Committee on February 25, the aforementioned system was adopted as well as establishing a general board of elections to govern elections.[26]

The logistics of apportioning the three hundred

delegates among the various Jewish communities of the United States turned out to be even more of a technical nightmare than previously imagined. It was not until the Administrative Committee meeting of March 11, that all of the details of the electoral system were finally worked out. The Administrative Committee discussed the postponement of the Congress and decided to recommend that the entire Executive Committee of 140 meet on April 1, to determine the date for the Congress.[27]

On April 1, the Executive Committee met and determined that the new date for the Congress would be September 2, 1917. They also gave the Administrative Committee the power to postpone or anticipate the date of the Congress if necessary by a two-thirds vote, without the necessity of reconvening the entire Executive Committee. This was not achieved without considerable debate. Hourwich felt that June 17, would be an acceptable date because the revolution in Russia should help the Jews to achieve rights in other lands, while Louis Marshall felt that it was impossible to set a date at this point in time and the Administrative Committee should be given the power to determine the date. Stephen S. Wise suggested the date of September 2, and this was the one ultimately adopted, with the understanding that the Administrative Committee would have the power to adjust the date. Also at this meeting, the date of the election was set for June 10, 1917 and a General Board of Elections was appointed.[28]

It appeared that preparations were proceeding smoothly for the Congress. This was to change very quickly. At the same meeting that the Executive Committee chose to move the date of the Congress, they also chose to send a telegram to the new Russian government congratulating them on the establishment of democracy in Russia and wishing them good luck. This was signed by the officers and a number of prominent members.[29] The real significance of the Russian Revolution (both First and Second) for the Congress was its effect on the labor movement. Once the czar was overthrown and all discriminations and restrictions against the Jews in Russia were abolished, the National Workmen's Committee withdrew from the Congress on May 18, 1917, because they now failed to see a need for the Congress.[30]

The entry of the United States into the war on April 6, 1917 was to cause additional problems. Mobilization for war and support of the war effort were given higher priorities than the Congress. Also, fear of anti-American accusations led many groups to question their involvement in the Congress and some chose to leave it. The Union of American Hebrew Congegations withdrew from the Congress on June 3, and the Central Conference of American Rabbis on July 3.[31]

There were some members of the Reform movement who had been opposed to the Congress from the start. When the Conference and Congress forces finally coalesced, they remained opposed to the Congress and wanted to begin an anti-Congress movement. Marshall tried to convince David

Philipson to send delegates to the Congress and was very concerned that Philipson not create a disruption in the Congress movement. Although both the UAHC and the CCAR droppped out of the Congress, at this point in time they made no serious effort to disrupt it.[32]

Despite some uneasiness, elections went ahead as scheduled and on June 10, 1917, over 330,000 American Jews cast their ballots or at least over 330,000 ballots were cast. There were allegations of widespread voter fraud on the part of the Zionists. They were charged with ballot box stuffing, pre-marked ballots, lack of supervision in polling places, voting by unregistered voters, the disappearance of ballots and people voting in more than one district.[33]

In ten weeks, the Congress had suffered major setbacks. The Reform movement and the labor movement had defected, the Zionists had been accused of trying to rig the elections and as the United States became more involved in the war effort, some feared that the Jewish Congress might be seen as unpatriotic. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee on June 20, Jacob Schiff suggested that the American Jewish Committee recommend a suspension of the date of the Congress at the next meeting of the Administrative Committee of the Congress. Both Harry Cutler and Julian Mack opposed this because they felt that just because it came from the American Jewish Committee, it would not be well received by the Congress Committee.[34] In any case, Cutler sounded out the idea without mentioning any

group by name, at the meeting of the Administrative Committee on the following day. It was almost universally rejected. Cutler was, however, able to postpone the date by which organizations must report their delegates to the Executive Committee from July 3 to July 31.[35]

In order to ascertain what the United States governmnet really felt about the Congress, Stephen S. Wise was dispatched to meet with Wilson and discover his views. Simon Wolf, representative of B'nai B'rith in Washington, on his own, had led the President to believe that a Congress would obstruct American interests. Rumors were flying about Washington that Wilson was opposed to the Congress. Wise met with Wilson on June 29, 1917, explained the actual situation to the President and was authorized to make the following statement:

"While it may seem necessary to the gentlemen who have called the Congress to postpone it some little time from the date fixed because of the urgency of public business, the President is persuaded that the American Jewish Congress will wisely and prudently serve Jewish interests, and that its deliberations and policies will be in accord with and helpful to the aims of the American government."[36]

This statement contained two very separate and important pieces of information. One, the President was in favor of a Jewish Congress, and two, the President was opposed to the Congress being held at this point in time. The support and approval of the President was a major

victory at this point in time when so many were abandoning the Congress movement. For these reasons, Wise wrote to Harry Cutler, requesting that an Administrative Committee meeting be called as soon as possible.[37]

On July 3, Cutler called for a special meeting of the Administrative Committee on July 7. At this meeting, the committee voted for a limited postponement of the Congress from September 2 to November 18.[38] At this meeting the Socialists strongly objected to postponing the Congress. They felt that the only reason why the President wanted postponement was so that there would be nothing on the public mind except the Conscription Bill. They tried to push Wise into revealing why the President wanted the Congress postponed, but he refused citing that conversations with the President were confidential. Mack supported him on this issue and the majority of the committee was persuaded to vote for postponement.[39]

This led to an odd alliance. Both the Zionist leaders and the American Jewish Committee now thought it best to postpone the Congress until the end of the war. Stephen S. Wise was in favor of postponing the Congress, as was Brandeis. Both of them felt that despite the large numbers who voted for delegates, American Jewry and especially its leaders were not yet firmly behind the Congress. Wise was even prepared to call a meeting of the Zionists on the Administrative Committee and demand party discipline in the vote to postpone the Congress. There is no evidence of such

a meeting, but a meeting of the entire Administrative Committee was called for October 4, 1917.[40]

There was a great deal of disagreement in the Administrative Committee meeting. Nathan Straus proposed that due to war conditions, the Congress should be postponed until a time when peace negotiations are in sight. Even the combined Zionist and American Jewish Committee leadership was not sufficient to gain the majority needed to pass this resolution. The vote was 14 in favor and 16 opposed. Marshall then proposed that the entire Executive Committee convene within ten days to discuss the issue more completely. This resolution was accepted and a meeting was called for on October 14, at Temple Emanu-El.[41]

Both sides on this issue had the time now to marshall their votes as the showdown approached. Discussion was heated once again with Nahum Syrkin and Magnes leading the fight against postponement. The arguments and numbers of those favoring postponement were greater and by a vote of 72 to 31 the Congress was postponed until peace negotiations were in sight and the Administrative Committee was authorized to fix its date.[42]

By mid-October 1917, the American Jewish Committee had left its imprint clearly on the Congress that they had originally opposed. The Congress had been successfully postponed until after the war, representation by national Jewish organizations had been assured, the program of the Congress had been limited in its scope and it was agreed

that it would be only a temporary body. Louis Marshall had set out to restore peace to the American Jewish community by creating a Congress which was harmless because its framework was so well-defined. Through compromise and fortunate circumstance it appeared that just such a Congress would be created.

While these negotiations on the date of the Congress were occurring, the Zionist leadership also had other issues with which to deal. The Balfour Declaration would not be released until November 2, 1917, but American Zionists began to lobby Washington in January, 1917, for its support. On January 29, Stephen Wise sent a proposed text of what would eventually become the Balfour Declaration to Colonel Edward House- a very close advisor to President Wilson- that he, Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter had emended.[1] Two months later, Wise met with House and discussed the situation of Palestine and the possibility of the imminent announcement by the British of their support for some sort of Jewish home in Palestine. Wise was overjoyed when he learned that this had House's interest and support. When House expressed the possibility of United States' involvement in persuading the British to make such concessions that would acquire the support of France and Russia, Wise was even more grateful.[2]

Even greater interest was generated in the proposal once Lord Balfour came to the United States as a special ambassador of Great Britain. One of the first Americans who Balfour met with was Brandeis. During the time that Balfour was in this country, Brandeis would meet with him or his secretary, Eric Drummond, many times. At a meeting with Drummond on the afternoon before meeting Balfour, they had

enthusiastically discussed a British or perhaps even an American mandate for Palestine. The word "State" struck a note of discomfort, but "homeland in Palestine" met with approval by all concerned.[3]

At this same time, British Zionists were beginning to urge American Zionists to support the proposal for a British protectorate in Palestine, rather than a "Jewish Republic", which they believed the Wilson administration would support. In a flurry of letters and cables in late April and early May, it was made clear that the only acceptable solution from the perspective of British Zionists and their supporters was a Jewish Palestine under a British protectorate. They also made clear that the support of American Jewry and especially the American government was critical to the acceptance of this by the British government. Weizmann, Sokolow and their associates in Britain had now assumed direction of the Zionist movement on the subject of Palestine and were demanding adherence to their policy by all Zionists. This pressure by the British Zionists would increase as the Balfour Declaration moved closer to publication.[4]

Brandeis refused to respond to any of these cables until he had met with both Wilson and Balfour. On May 6, he met with Wilson for about an hour, discussing general Zionist policy and the future of Palestine. Wilson assured Brandeis that he was entirely sympathetic to the aims of the Zionist movement and approved of a "publicly assured,

legally secured homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine" under a British protectorate. Wilson though made clear that this was not an opportune time to make any public announcements of these views.[5]

The next day Brandeis met with Balfour and Drummond and discussed the future of Palestine. Brandeis found that he and Balfour were in agreement and that Balfour would do all he could to advance the cause of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Balfour explained to Brandeis that the British at present could not make a public announcement because of opposition by the French and to some degree, the Italians. Brandeis explained that the United States also could not make any sort of public declaration at present because it was at variance with American public policy. Balfour then urged Brandeis to try and secure support from the American government. The support of the American government would provide the British with leverage to use against the French in the division of the Ottoman Empire under the Sykes-Picot agreement, whose conditions remained unknown to Zionist leaders.[6]

Brandeis cabled the British Zionists that he was in complete agreement with their proposal, had met with Wilson and Balfour, but at the present could not make or secure any public statement. Very little happened over the next few months in the activities of the American Zionist leaders with regard to the Balfour Declaration. In late June when Wise met with Wilson to discuss the Congress, the subject of

Zionism also arose and once again Wilson promised that whenever Wise and Brandeis felt that the time was ripe for the President to publicly declare his support, he would.[8]

In September, the British government and the British Zionists began to feel that the time was ripe. Unfortunately, Wilson did not and almost wrecked the Balfoour Declaration. David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, and the War Cabinet believed that the time had come to actively court Jewish public opinion in the United States and in Russia. The Jews in Russian and Poland had in his opinion aided the Germans in order to overthrow the czar and helped to make possible the German victory in the East. He believed that in the United States powerful Jewish leaders had retarded Wilson's natural impulse to join the Allies. Furthermore, the Germans were beginning to pressure the Ottoman Empire to accede to the Zionist demands. A declaration by Great Britain might shift world-wide Jewish opinion to the Allied cause. With food and raw materials running low in England, due to the German blockade and a need for reinforcement by American troops, favorable public opinion was necessary both in the United States and Russia to supply this needed relief. Lloyd George believed that the degree of support exhibited by Jews might be crucial to gaining the support of the United States and Russia, as well as freeing up Jewish capital for the Allied effort.[9]

On September 3, the British War Cabinet decided to discern Wilson's views on a declaration. The following day,

Lord Robert Cecil cabled Colonel House to see if he would unofficially ascertain if this had the support of the President. The response was not what the British had expected. Wilson was willing to make only a general statement of sympathy without any real commitment, because he felt that the time was still not opportune, House feared that there were dangers lurking in the Zionist question and Secretary of State Lansing pointed out that the United States was not at war with Turkey and had enough problems of its own without becoming involved in its Allies' problems. Without the expected support of Wilson there was greater reluctance by the British government to release the declaration because they felt that they needed the support of their ally.[10]

Weizmann then cabled Brandeis and urged him to contact Wilson and gain his support. He also enclosed a draft of the Balfour Declaration. On September 23, Brandeis and Wise met with Colonel House and apparently received assurances of the President's support because he cabled Weizmann and assured him that the President was entirely sympathetic with the declaration. Why Wilson apparently reversed his decision within two weeks is unclear. Some have credited Brandeis' influence with changing Wilson's mind. Others have said that Wilson never actually changed his mind. This can be seen from two different angles. On the one hand, Brandeis' cable to Weizmann did not commit Wilson to any public statement on the declaration, so Wilson himself was

not forced to publicly support the aims of the British. On the other hand, Wilson might not have realized the seriousness of the original request and only now was making the sincere statement of his actual beliefs. Others have blamed Colonel House for the entire problem. House was said to publicly praise the Zionists, while privately cursing them. House advised Wilson not to make any statements in support of the British declaration and at the same time assured the Zionists of the President's support. Brandeis and other American Zionists were only privy to the public views of House and therefore never quite saw the entire picture. Regardless of what actually happened, the British Zionists now believed that they had the support of the United States and were able to continue to work for the acceptance of the declaration.[11]

On October 14, after continuing debate in the British cabinet and considerable objections by anti-Zionist Jews led by Edwin Montagu, Weizmann cabled Brandeis another draft of the Balfour Declaration that had been approved by the British government. He instructed Brandeis to get the approval of the President for this text as well as his recommendation that it be granted without delay. Wilson had received a draft a week earlier on October 6, and October 13 he remembered that he had forgotten to tell Colonel House that he approved of the draft. House then sent word back to the British that Wilson approved, but did not want his name mentioned publicly when the declaration was issued.[12]

With Wilson's approval, even before Brandeis' request, Brandeis notified Weizmann and then sent a copy of the original cable to deHaas. He told deHaas that he was not inclined to change any of the phraseology because Weizmann was doing the best that he could, but that deHaas, Wise and others would be better judges of that than himself.[13]

A few Zionist leaders, most notably Wise, Mack and deHaas, assembled to examine the text and make suggestions and emendations if necessary. The text Weizmann sent read as follows: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish race and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object; it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed in any other country by Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship."[14]

A few of the features of this draft did not meet with the approval of the American Zionists. The first was the use of the phrase "Jewish race" to which they preferred "Jewish people." The other phrase was the very last, which was to safeguard the rights of Jews outside of Palestine. The expression "Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship," was felt by Mack to place "Zionism on a principle of discontent which is most undesirable." It was suggested that the text merely end

with the words "or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country". Weizmann was notified of these suggestions and both of these changes were reflected in the final draft of the Balfour Declaration when it was released on November 2.[15]

The announcement of the Balfour Declaration was a cause for celebration by American Zionists. Their leaders had worked hard alongside the British Zionists to assure its passage. In the post-Balfour era, the American Zionists, under Brandeis' unofficial leadership, continued to do what they did best. They accelerated their rate of growth and their fund raising for Palestine. The publication of the Balfour Declaration led to tremendous growth in their recruitment drive with the campaign to have all American Jews as shekel payers in the Zionist organization. The familiar refrain in Brandeis' letters to deHaas remained "Members, Money, Discipline" and the remainder of the war era was spent expanding and strengthening the American Zionist organization. Brandeis had helped to assure Wilson's support and had responded favorably on behalf of American Zionists; the third thing which Weizmann had requested was to acquire statements of support from prominent non-Zionists as well.

This turned out to be much easier than many would have thought. Many of the leaders of the American Jewish Committee, had long been accused of being anti-Zionists. In reality, many of them were opposed only to Jewish

nationalism and actually supported the restoration of Palestine and the right of other Jews to seek refuge there. When one examines the founders and boards of directors for the American Federation of the Jewish Territorial Organization and the Jewish Agricultural Experiment Station, founded in 1906 and 1910 respectively, one might as well be reading the roster of the American Jewish Committee: Mayer Sulzberger, Cyrus Sulzberger, Daniel Guggenheim, Cyrus Adler, Louis Marshall and Julius Rosenwald, just to name a few. Schiff, unquestionably, was not considered to be a Zionist, yet he was a generous contributor to the Technicum (later Technion) and later even offered to buy its buildings and donate them to the Zionist organization of America.[16]

The position of Louis Marshall was typical of many members of the American Jewish Committee. Marshall admitted that he was "not a Zionist, certainly not a Nationalist", but as he grew older "the feelings of love and reverence for the cradle of our race increase in intensity". By 1914, Marshall already supported the work of Rothschild in establishing colonies in Palestine for the oppressed Jews of Europe. He also stated his belief that immigration to the United States would soon be greatly limited. Therefore he felt that it was the duty of every Jew with the financial wherewithal "to concentrate their efforts toward the development of that land." Marshall believed that large tracts of land should be secured in Palestine for the establishment of colonies for agriculture, forestry, and

industry and "for the creation of a permanent home for those of us who have no secure abiding place."[17]

The basis for this anti-nationalist position was their firm belief that Judaism was first and foremost a religion, not the expression of a nation. Their nation was the United States, their religion was Judaism. While there is no question of their devotion to their people and their desire to ameliorate the condition of those Jews who were oppressed, they could not support any view which emphasized nation at the expense of religion. A number would agree with Adler's comment that "settlement in Palestine on an anti- or non-religious basis was the greatest misfortune that has happened to the Jews in modern times." At the time Schiff fully concurred.[18]

But even Jacob Schiff began to show signs of change. Within only a few months his opposition to Zionism began to mellow. He continued to be opposed to that stream of the Zionist movement that favored an independent Jewish nation because "no one can be entirely loyal to two nations." Schiff did believe that it would be possible to establish Jewish autonomy in Palestine once there was a sufficient Jewish population in the country. In due time he believed it would become part of the British Empire, in the same way that the Transvaal was part of the British Empire. When he discovered that this was all that many of the Zionist leaders in the United States wanted, his opposition mellowed even more. Had it not been for his demand that Zionism

recognize the Jewish religion as its basis and the belief in God as central to the definition of a Jew, Schiff would have become an official member of the Zionist Organization, rather than just a financial supporter.[19]

Schiff came to this realization while he was being courted by the Zionist leaders. These same leaders also courted Louis Marshall who was already known to express a moderate opinion on Zionism and Palestine. In the fall of 1917 Mack, Elisha Friedman, Eugene Meyer and Brandeis remained in contact with Marshall and with Schiff. Mack and Meyer met with Marshall for his advice in drafting their statement with respect to the Balfour Declaration. Marshall found "that there is very little difference between their point of view and ours." The chief stumbling block was the use of the word "national" which Marshall understood, as did these Zionists, to be used in its broadest possible sense, as relating to a people, not political sovereignty. The established American Zionist leadership, consisting of Brandeis and his circle of American and Western European Jews, such as Frankfurter, Mack, Meyer, Friedman, and deHaas began to find itself closer to the position of the moderates within the American Jewish Committee, than to the Eastern European masses and leaders who had a much more nationalistic bent. In fact, Brandeis' inner circle was composed largely of members or former members of the American Jewish Committee, Mack, Meyer and Frankfurter. This was very evident in the decision to postpone the

American Jewish Congress, with the alliance of Marshall and Wise against the socialists and Eastern European Zionists. The Yiddish press took note of this decision to postpone and accused the the Brandeis circle of selling out. Despite these objections, this understanding between these two groups of leaders was very significant in the functioning of the American Jewish Congress.[20]

Within the American Jewish Committee, there still existed a major division with regard to Palestine and the Balfour Declaration. And it was not until April 1918, that it finally issued a statement on the Balfour Declaration. Confirmed anti-Zionists such as David Philipson wanted absolutely nothing to do with Zionism. Some, like Mack and Cutler were Zionists and others, like Schiff, Marshall and Oscar Straus supported restoration of the land of Palestine. Adler, wanted a conference of national Jewish organizations to determine the fate of Palestine, believing that all Jews, not just the Zionists had a stake in the restoration of the Holy Land, but this failed to materialize.

The Committee needed to fashion a statement which would offend as few people as possible. Marshall prepared such a text, with suggestions offered from various members of the Committee. Before holding a special meeting of the American Jewish Committee to discuss his statement, Marshall sent a copy to Secretary of State Lansing for his approval. There was no objection from the State Department and after discussion, the American Jewish Committee accepted this as

well. The initial paragraph of the document described the purpose of the American Jewish Committee. It went on to emphasize that Jews of the United States had acquired a permanent home here and stated their unqualified allegiance to this country. The statement went on to recognize that not all Jews in the world were fortunate enough to live in a country which provided as much freedom as the United States, but a majority of Jews will continue to live in the lands in which they currently reside. A minority will desire to go to Palestine, to which all Jews have a historic and religious attachment. The Committee received with profound appreciation the declaration of the British and especially noted the clauses which declared that nothing will be done to prejudice the rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine or Jewish communities outside of Palestine. Furthermore, the document closed with the pledge to cooperate with others to establish a center for Judaism in Palestine.[21] This statement expressed the classic stance of the Committee. It was unquestionably a statement of devotion to the United States and the principles of freedom and democracy. The definition of Judaism expressed was a religious one and the tie to Palestine was equally part of this religious framework. Finally, their support for the Balfour Declaration saw the Declaration as merely an extension of the purpose of their own organization, to promote and defend the rights of Jews throughout the world.

As broad-based and inclusive as this statement

attempted to be, there were still those who found room for objection. David Philipson objected immediately and Marshall attempted to explain to Philipson that the Committee had adopted this statement after the Declaration had become fact not theory and enjoyed the support of America's allies. Without a careful statement it was felt that some Americans would attempt to charge Jews with dual loyalty and this was to be avoided with as much effort as possible. Philipson remained unconvinced and in the fall began to organize with Max Senior and Henry Berkowitz an anti-Zionist movement, that was also an anti-Congress movement. Marshall cautioned them not to continue because the entire free world now supported the Balfour Declaration and the only thing that they would accomplish would be to cause trouble and disunity for the Jewish people. Marshall's words were disregarded, but the anti-Zionist group caused only minor damage to the Congress forces and the negotiations at the Peace Conference.[22]

Throughout most of 1918, both the members of the American Jewish Committee and what was now the Zionist Organization of America devoted a good deal of their energy to the war effort. Many of these leaders enjoyed prominent positions in the Jewish Welfare Board, the Joint Distribution Committee and war-related positions associated with the government. The Zionists continued to grow and increase their membership and their coffers. Most of their attention was focused on internal membership issues and on

Palestine. Within the American Jewish Committee, the emphasis was on the status of Jews in the war zone in Europe and the acquisition of rights for them in the post-war period. The Congress fight had been placed on hold and the rancor which had earlier dominated relations between the two groups had dissolved, or at least been dissipated, as both concentrated on the American war effort and the needs of the world Jewry.

CHAPTER FIVE

In the fall of 1918, the American Jewish Committee, particularly Louis Marshall, became very involved in the defense of the Jews in Poland and Roumania. During the month of September, Marshall entered into correspondence with Polish leaders and in October, he met with Roman Dmowski, president of the Polish National Committee. Marshall confronted Dmowski with the anti-Jewish sentiment within Poland, especially that held by the Polish National Committee and its leaders, including Dmowski. Dmowski admitted that he was hostile to the Jews and gave his reasons. He resented the fact that there were Jews who immigrated from Russia and remained separate from the general Polish population. Dmowski blamed them for boycotting Polish doctors and lawyers and turning exclusively to Jewish ones. Dmowski also blamed the Jews for electing a Jew rather than a Pole to represent Warsaw in the Russian Duma. Poles and Jews now also found themselves competing for the same jobs in the fields of commerce and industry in a very poor country. In response to these factors, Dmowski admitted that he had helped to organize the economic boycott against the Jews of Poland and took great pride in his role in the boycott. Furthermore, he claimed that the use of Yiddish rather than Polish made it appear that the Jews were pro-German rather than patriotic Poles. Jews who had fled Russian persecution were suspected of

actually being Russian sympathizers. Against such ludicrous arguments, Marshall was unable to exact a promise by Dmowski to bring an end to the boycott of Jewish merchants and professionals which had been going on for the past six years. He attempted to convince Dmowski of the absurdity of the arguments which Dmowski had articulated, but was unsuccessful. The most he could get Dmowski to agree to was that economic prosperity in Poland would bring an end to the boycott and prejudice against the Jews.[1]

Marshall and the American Jewish Committee also joined with various groups of Roumanian Jews in the United States in trying to lobby the United States government to protect the rights of Jews in Roumania. Marshall remained in contact with President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing throughout the summer and fall, informing them of the history of the Jews in Roumania and the futile attempts to force Roumania to abide by the Treaty of Berlin which explicitly provided for the recognition of Roumanian citizenship for the Jewish population of Roumania. On November 21, Marshall and a committee representing the American Union of Roumanian Jews met with Lansing. Marshall detailed the ineffectual nature of the Treaty of Berlin and the problems suffered by the Jews of Roumania and the further problem that would result if Roumania were given even more territory at the Peace Conference. Marshall proposed that the rights of the Jews be guaranteed by treaty. Unlike the Treaty of Berlin, the United States

would be a signatory to this new treaty and would be able to insure its observance. Marshall further proposed that the resolutions that he drew up to guarantee the rights of the Jews of Roumania should also be included in all the treaties for all of the new states that would be created after the war.

Marshall's six resolutions would become the basis for the resolutions adopted by the American Jewish Congress and ultimately embodied in the minorities treaties of the new states at the peace conference. The first clause provided that all inhabitants of the territory of a given state be considered citizens of that state, unless they desired to retain allegiance to another state in which they had previously resided. The second clause provided for equal civil, political and religious rights for all citizens regardless of origin, race or creed. The third clause dealt with minority representation in all elections, providing that no individual may vote for more than two-thirds of any legislative body. The fourth clause permitted the establishment of an official state language, but prohibited any restiction of the usage of other languages. These first four broadly applied to all minorities. The final two clauses dealt exclusively with Jewish issues. One demanded autonomous control of religious, educational, charitable and cultural institutions by the Jews, while the other claimed the right for those who observed the seventh day as their Sabbath (the Jews) to pursue their secular affairs on any

other day of the week so long as they did not disturb the worship of others. Marshall hoped that Lansing would support the adoption of these resolutions at the peace conference.[2]

It is important to note that this proposal contained no reference to group or national rights. The struggle over the definition of full rights would continue for the next several months. Also by the fall of 1918, there appeared to be a division of areas of interest and responsibility within the American Jewish community. The American Jewish Committee assumed the responsibility for protecting the rights of the Jews of Europe, the Joint Distribution Committee dealt with the issues of economic reconstruction and aid of the European Jewish communities, and the Zionists concentrated on the political and economic status of Palestine. The leadership of American Jewry seemed for the first time in a very long time to be in agreement or at least were not at war on the means by which the Jewish problems could best be solved.

This unity was soon to be tested. Shortly after the armistice was signed on November 11, the Administrative Committee of the Congress called for the Congress to actually convene on December 15, 1918, in Philadelphia. Prior to this, both the Zionists and the American Jewish Committee prepared individually for the peace negotiations in Europe. Stephen S. Wise left for Europe in late November as the representative of the Zionist Organization of America

and as Brandeis' personal representative. His official duty was to act as a liaison between the American Peace Commission and the Zionist Organization under Weizmann. Weizmann and Sokolow were given the responsibility of negotiating on behalf of international Zionists for the future of Palestine. Wise felt that his ties to Wilson, Colonel House, and Lansing, would prove to be valuable to the Zionist cause.[3]

Meanwhile, the American Jewish Committee remained in contact with British and French Jewry. In November, Professor Sylvain Levi of the Alliance Israélite Universelle contacted Adler and urged him to be sure that the American Jewish Committee was represented at the Peace Conference.[4] Before the Congress had even met, both the Zionists and the American Jewish Committee were already either dealing or preparing to deal with the peace negotiations taking place in Europe.

Some of the Jews in the United States no longer viewed the Congress with the same urgency. The two issues that precipitated the call for a Congress, the fate of the Jews in Europe, especially in Poland and Roumania, and the fate of Palestine as a Jewish state. According to an article in the American Hebrew, the Polish and Roumanian situations had resolved themselves or soon would. Roumania, the author felt, would do whatever the Peace Conference told it and the situation in Russian Poland would be resolved internally within Russia. The British had already spoken on what they

believed should be Palestine's future and most of the major powers were in agreement with them. Also, President Wilson was thought to understand the gravity of the situation and support the interests of the Jews.[5]

Others were less certain of the good intentions of the nations of Europe, among them Jacob Schiff. Schiff believed that the great powers of Europe had done little or nothing to protect the rights of the Jews in Poland and Roumania, and had done nothing to put an end to the economic boycott and pogroms in Poland. He felt that if the Jews were not successful in gaining the guarantee of full rights at the Peace Conference, then the new smaller nations would then increase the oppression to which the Jews were subjected.[6]

Jewish opinion within the United States fell between these two extremes, although most of those associated with the Congress were in agreement with Schiff. These were the prevailing moods when the Congress was called to order on December 15, 1918 at 2:30 P.M. at the Metropolitan Opera House in Philadelphia.

The opening addresses by Harry Cutler, David W. Amram, and Nathan Straus stressed the unity which the Jews of the United States had been able to achieve despite the wide variety of different points of view from which they came. The achievement of full rights for Jews in Europe was said by all of these men to be the first priority of any American action. Amram spoke of Jewish rights in Palestine in terms of full rights for all peoples, Jews, Christians, and Arabs

in Palestine and in Europe. Straus spoke of Palestine and its importance not only to Jews but to humanity in general. When he spoke of a Jewish Palestine though, he spoke of it as a foregone conclusion, the Balfour Declaration having been endorsed by the Allied Powers and even the pope. The spirit encountered on this afternoon was a far cry from the rancor of the Philadelphia Preliminary Conference in March 1916. On this day everyone spoke of peace and unity, of the differences that had been overcome in the intervening years and of the task that lay ahead.[7]

This spirit of cooperation was well expressed in the election of a President of the American Jewish Congress. Julian Mack, the first to be nominated, was nominated by Louis Lipsky. A number of people seconded this nomination and then Jacob Pfeffer placed the name of Louis Marshall into nomination. Marshall, as at the first meeting of the Executive Committee two years earlier, declined the nomination and then also seconded the nomination of Mack. The Yiddish poet Yehoash (Solomon Bloomgarten) was then nominated and seconded. In the election that followed, Mack won by an overwhelming margin of 232 to 61. Immediately following this vote, William Edlin, who had nominated Yehoash, moved that Mack's election by made unanimous and this easily passed. Following Mack's election, Nathan Straus was unanimously elected Honorary President.[8]

The decision to chose Judge Julian W. Mack as the President of the American Jewish Congress was the most

important decisions reached that day and one of the most important that the Congress reached in any of its sessions. Mack's qualifications made him uniquely suited to be president of this diverse body. First, Mack was a founding member of the American Jewish Committee and until the previous summer had sat on the Executive Board. Mack had represented the Conference of National Jewish Organizations on the sub-committee that negotiated with the Executive Organization Committee for an American Jewish Congress to establish the American Jewish Congress. Mack was a close associate of Marshall who had nominated Marshall for the position of Chairman of the Executive Committee two years earlier.

Not only were Mack's credentials spotless from the perspective of the American Jewish Committee, he was also unquestionably a Zionist and a confidant of Brandeis. On June 27, Mack had been elected the first President of the Zionist Organization of America, Brandeis' dream of having one single centralized Zionist organization. Mack felt that he was merely a stand-in for Brandeis at this post and thought that Wise or deHaas would have been better choices. As stand-in for Brandeis, Mack certainly enjoyed Brandeis' confidence. During the earlier stage of negotiations between the Zionists and the American Jewish Committee, Mack had urged Brandeis to compromise because the Committee had also yielded a great deal. Eventually Brandeis did yield, but it is uncertain what role Mack's advice played in this

decision. On the other hand, Mack's advice, in the case of the Balfour Declaration and revisions of it, was accepted. Once he had been elected President of the Zionist Organization of America, Brandeis suggested that he resign from the American Jewish Committee in order to avoid the interlocking directorates which up until now had characterized the American Jewish community. In any case, Mack accepted Brandeis' advice and resigned from the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee, but not from the Committee proper.[9] The choice of Mack as President was seen as a victory by the Zionists, who controlled the vast majority of delegates present, but at the same time, this was not a threat to the American Jewish Committee who also saw Mack as one of their own. This was most evident in a simple silent gesture directed by Harry Cutler. Louis Marshall and Louis Lipsky both escorted Judge Mack to the podium, a physical symbol of the spirit of compromise. This decision to compromise at the very outset was to prove to be an omen of compromise to come.

Mack's inaugural address stressed this theme of compromise and reflected the conditions and concerns of the various groups represented at the congress. He first admitted that there were many there who were equally qualified and capable of serving as President, and referred to one man who was not present, but who had served the American Jewish community with his leadership in political matters with great devotion for many years. He never

mentioned Brandeis by name, but there is no doubt as to whom he was referring. This was intended to remind the Zionists that Mack spoke for Brandeis.

Mack next reminded the delegates that they were American by citizenship and Jews by race and faith and that their decisions and actions would be guided by both of these factors, the American interest in democracy and the particular Jewish concern with the fate of Jews in Eastern Europe and Palestine. Now, Mack claimed, was the ideal time to hold the Congress because now American Jewry was finally unified in the desire to guarantee full and equal rights to Jews everywhere.

Mack then turned his attention to Palestine. He pointed to the support that the Balfour Declaration had gathered from nations around the world. He also stressed that the misconceptions about Zionist goals had finally been dispelled and that now most people realized that the Zionists neither expected nor desired that all or most Jews move to Palestine. No more than a representative nucleus of the Jewish people was expected to settle in Palestine. Mack saw the role of the American Jewish Congress as cooperating with the Zionist world organizations in this area because the primary responsibility for Palestine l;ay in the hands of the Zionists. Mack then concluded his speech with a call for careful deliberation of these problems by the Congress. The remainder of the Congress can be seen as adding all of the details to the outline that Mack provided in this speech.[10]

After some discussion on the appointment of committees and basic bureaucratic measures, the Congress then adopted three resolutions in rapid succession. The first, addressed to President Wilson and the Allied leaders expressed the gratitude of the Jews of the United States for the Allied victory and their hopes for a just and lasting peace. The second resolution was a greeting to the Jewish soldiers in the American and Allied armies and the third expressed appreciation on behalf of the American Jewish Congress to the government of Great Britain for the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration. The Congress then recessed.[11]

The second session of the Congress, held later that evening, was taken up largely by Louis Marshall's report on Jewish rights in Eastern Europe. Marshall's speech began though, with a discussion of Palestine, not Eastern Europe. He declare that "the future of Palestine is no longer a mooted question. It has become a settled question." Marshall went on to say that the nations of the world, including the United States, had expressed their support for the Balfour Declaration and that there was no doubt that the Declaration would receive the sanction of all of the nations of the world at the Peace Conference. Furthermore, Marshall attempted to correct the public perception that he and others were anti-Zionists and pointed to a long-time involvement in the rehabilitation of the land of Israel. This statement served to allay the fears of the mass of Zionist delegates at the convention, who feared that the

members of the American Jewish Committee would try and remove Palestine from the agenda of the Congress.

After this initial apologia, Marshall turned his attention to the condition of Jews in Eastern Europe. Marshall made very brief references to the problems in Russia and the newly created states before coming to the two greatest problems, Roumania and Poland. With the addition of territory to Roumania, the Jewish population would double, which meant that an even greater number of Jews would potentially be denied basic rights. Marshall reviewed the Roumanian problem and the treachery and trickery by which the Roumanian government had successfully evaded the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 and denied citizenship to its Jewish inhabitants. Not only had only 300 Jews out of a population of 300,000 been granted citizenship over the past forty years, but 220 restrictive laws against the Jews had been adopted during the same time period.

Even worse than the abuses within Roumania, was the condition of Jewish life in Poland. The Jewish population of Poland would prabably be about four million, depending on where the boundaries for Poland were drawn. The economic boycott against the Jews was continuing and in addition, pogroms resulting in the loss of Jewish life and the destruction of Jewish property were beginning to increase. Correspondence and conferences between Polish leaders and American Jewish leaders over the previous eight months had

failed to produce any concrete guarantees, although the Polish National Committee in Paris did propose that all citizens of Poland would be entitled to equal civil, political and relgious rights, but it did not define what constituted citizenship. The only bright point in the negotiations with Polish leaders was the suggestion that a joint commission composed of two American Jews and two American Poles and two Americans of neither Jewish nor Polish descent be assigned to go to Poland and investigate the claims of the economic boycott and pogroms. It was also suggested that Jews in Poland be guaranteed the same rights as all others in Poland. At this point in time, Marshall only mentioned that provisions for the protection of rights to be inserted into the treaties establishing Poland and other states had been prepared, details of this were to be presented at a later session.[12]

After Marshall concluded his remarks, a very different perspective was offered by Dr. Chaim Zhitlowsky. Zhitlowsky, representing the Nationalist Socialists, favored a secular democratic national Jewish state in Palestine in which church and state would be separated as in the United States. Furthermore, he favored rights for the jews of Eastern Europe on a national, not a religious basis. Finally, He resolved that a permanent American Jewish Congress and world Jewish Congress be created.[13]

Needless to say, Zhitlowsky's remarks caused a furor. The Mizrahi delegates were incensed by the deletion of the

religious character of the Jewish homeland in Palestine and of the significance of religious rights in Eastern Europe. In this respect they were joined by members of the American Jewish Committee and moderate Zionists who still saw religion, not nationality, as the basis of Judaism. Although Zhitlowsky was allowed to complete his speech, over the protests of many, the issue of nationality and national rights was to prove to be the central issue upon which Congress would conduct hours of debate over the next several days.[14]

The next two sessions were relatively uneventful, dealing with bureaucratic and administrative matters. Real debate on concrete issues began with the fifth session and the report of the Committee on Roumania. Although initially there was some debate on the preamble of the proposed resolution which suggested that the Jews deserved equal rights because they had contributed so much to the economic, social and cultural life of the country, the debate soon turned to the question of national rights. The question was hotly debated. Some felt that the Jews of Roumania should not be singled out for special rights, but that they be guaranteed the same rights as all inhabitants of the country. Others felt that only by guaranteeing the Jews national rights would these rights actually be assured because the Roumanians themselves considered the Jews to be a separate nationality. Still others were willing to compromise by saying that if other minorities wanted and

were granted national rights, then the Jews also should request national rights. Eventually the resolution on Roumania was redrawn and in the final draft it was noted that "the Jews of Roumania are deprived of political, civil, religious and national rights" and that "Jews in Roumania are subjected to exceptional laws and considered and treated as aliens." The resolution went on to instruct the Executive Agency of the American Jewish Congress "to use its best efforts and give its full support to the Jews of Roumania, in order that they may obtain full rights as demanded by them." "Full rights" was clarified to include the removal of "all direct and implied anti-Jewish restrictions in Roumania", the granting of "the fullest political, civil, religious and national rights" and the application of the laws of naturalization to the Jews of Roumania. This resolution passed unanimously, as did a second resolution which called for the granting of relief and reconstructive aid to to the Jews of Roumania.[14] This vote made it clear that the group which favored national rights had a clear majority within the Congress.

The sixth session adopted a number of resolutions of importance which directed the work of the delegation it would send to Europe. First, the Congress resolved to send a delegation of seven to Europe, to meet with representatives of Jews of other lands and work for the realization of the objectives of the Congress. Furthermore, this delegation would be required to report back to the

Congress after its work in Europe was concluded and the President of the Congress would be empowered to call the Congress back into session within one year of the signing of the Peace Treaty. It was also resolved that if the delegation required further instruction, then the President would have the power to reconvene the Congress. Another resolution was adopted which stated that the delegation representing the American Jewish Congress would call on the American Peace Commission at Versailles and do everything in its power to insure that no new country be granted freedom, autonomy or independence without first granting equal national, civil, political, and religious rights to every individual and group within the country. In addition the Congress resolved that once peace was declared in Europe, the delegates of the American Jewish Congress should cooperate with the delegations of other representative Jewish organizations in convening a world Jewish Congress. The last resolution of significance to be adopted at this session instructed the delegation at the Peace Conference to cooperate with representatives of other Jewish organizations, specifically, the world Zionist Organization, "to the end that the Peace Conference may recognize the aspirations and historic claims of the Jewish people with regard to Palestine." This resolution went on to favor the trusteeship of Great Britain for Palestine with the understanding that the rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine and Jewish communities outside of Palestine would not be prejudiced.[16]

By the afternoon of December 17, the Congress had already determined the purpose and methods of its representation. The actual representatives would be determined later, as well as the specific demands for all of the lands of Eastern Europe except Roumania. Specifically it had been determined that a delegation of seven be sent to the Peace Conference to confer with representatives of other Jewish groups to protect the rights of Jews in Eastern Europe and work for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This delegation furthermore, was to work with the American Peace Commissioners to insure that any new state established by Peace Treaty must guarantee the full rights of all of its citizens. By this point in time, all of the Zionist demands had been met; support for Palestine was assured, as was cooperation with the world Zionist organization and the creation of a world Jewish Congress. The inclusion of the demand for national rights for the Jews of Roumania was contrary to the wishes of the American Jewish Committee, as was the establishment of a world Jewish Congress. However, there was little that affected the position of the American Jewish Committee within the American Jewish community. They had yet to lose on any issue which they considered to be absolutely critical. The discussion of Jewish rights in Poland and the remainder of Eastern Europe was still to come.

The next two sessions of the Congress were merely killing time to allow the Committee on Poland, which had

merged with the committees on Russia, Ukrainia, Finland, Lithuania, Galicia and the New Slavic States, have more time in which to prepare its report. It took the 52 members of this super committee over thirty hours to arrive at a decision that was acceptable to a majority of the committee. In the meantime, the delegates assembled discussed the importance of Palestine, the importance of the congress movement and the importance of freedom. The Congress even assembled at Independence Hall and discussed the importance of liberty.

The Committee on Poland, chaired by Marshall, finally concluded its deliberations and was ready to present its report. Then the unexpected happened. Louis Marshall, the alleged enemy of the Jews of the Lower East Side, became their champion. Marshall emerged as the peacemaker of the committee and the hero of the entire Congress. He first reported on replies that were to be sent to the Ukrainian Congress and the National Polish Department acknowledging correspondence from both groups and stating the hope that the Peace Congress would create a new world order of democracy and self-determination. Marshall then went on to reveal the "Jewish Bill of Rights". This was a modification of the Bill of Rights that Marshall had sent to Secretary of State Lansing a few weeks earlier.

The differences between these two texts were minor. The first clause of both dealt with definitions of citizenship, with the Congress version serving to clarify

the Lansing draft. All inhabitants of the territory shall be considered citizens (including those who left or were expelled after August 1, 1914), unless the inhabitants desire to retain allegiance to another state and declare so within a given period. Furthermore, the Congress draft added the condition that for a period of ten years after the adoption of this provision no law shall be passed which restricts the return of former inhabitants to the territory.

The important addition to the clause defining the rights to be enjoyed by citizens of a territory was that of national rights to the civil, political and religious rights that were included in the Lansing draft. This was considered to be a major victory by the Zionists, the Nationalists and the Eastern European masses. This clause alone was greeted with a tremendous round of applause by the delegates assembled. After years of haggling, the principle of national rights had finally been agreed to by all factions and that agreement was engineered by Louis Marshall, the early opponent of national rights. The leader of the American Jewish Committee, the so-called enemy of the people, was actually the one to introduce national rights to the Congress. Marshall compromised when he realized that victory on his terms, using the language preferred by the American Jewish Committee, was impossible. Marshall, however, maintained something more important, control of the committee and a tremendous amount of influence over the Congress as a whole. By giving in on the word "national",

Marshall was better able to safeguard the position of the American Jewish Committee on more important issues, such as the temporary nature of the Congress. So long as there was no permanent organization to challenge the American Jewish Committee, the supremacy of the Committee was secure. Marshall admitted in a letter to Rabbi Isaac Landman, immediately following the Congress, that the phrase "national rights" was to be understood differently in Eastern Europe, than in the United States because conditions in Eastern Europe were different. Groups had remained separate and distinct within Eastern European territories for centuries, unlike the United States which had formed its own homogeneous "American" nationality or Western Europe which had more naturally homogeneous communities. In Eastern Europe, national rights meant what would be called in the United States cultural or communal rights and explained that the populations of Eastern Europe, specifically the Jews, believed that the welfare of the state would be best served by the promotion of several different cultures. Marshall stressed that it was not up to the Jews of the United States to determine the relative merit or wisdom of this conception by the standards of Fifth Avenue, but had to rely on the fact that the Jews of Eastern Europe would act in their own best interests. The right of the East European Jews to control their own destiny, whether Marshall agreed or disagreed with them, was the cornerstone of his personal policy regarding the rights of Jewish

minorities and this policy won for him the respect and admiration of the Eastern European Jewish community.

The remaining resolutions did not differ from the Lansing draft in content: the principle of minority representation in all elected bodies; autonomous management over religious, educational, charitable and other communal institutions; the prohibition of any restriction of the usage of any language; and the protection of the rights of those who observe any day other than the first as their Sabbath.[17]

This "Bill of Rights" was adopted unanimously and Marshall received the greatest ovation received by any of the delegates present at the convention. The Congress then withdrew the earlier resolution instructing the delegation representing the Congress to influence the American Peace Commisssion to demand full rights as a precondition for the formation of the new states of post-war Europe because that demand was included within the "Bill of Rights". The Congress further stipulated that should new states emerge in Russia, they come within the scope of the Roumanian resolution and the "Bill of Rights".

The Congress then immediately proceeded to increase the number of delegates it was sending to Europe from seven to nine and selected these delegates. These nine included Julian W. Mack, Stephen S. Wise, Louis Marshall, Harry Cutler, Jacob de Haas, B. L. Levinthal, Joseph Barondess, Nahum Syrkin, Leopold Benedict (Morris Winchevsky), and

Bernard G. Richards, as Secretary of the Commission. This committee was adopted unanimously. At the time of its appointment, Wise was already in Europe, negotiating with the Zionists on behalf of American Zionism. His appointment as a delegate also made him a representative of the Congress at the same time and therefore in his subsequent negotiations with the Zionists on behalf of Jewish interests in Palestine before the Peace Commission he was speaking for the American Jewish Congress as well as American Zionists. Marshall, it should be noted, was the only non-Zionist on the entire commission.[18]

The last issue on which there was a conflict at the Congress was the permanent or temporary nature of this Congress. Even at this last session of the Congress, some delegates were still attempting to have the American Jewish Congress declared a permanent institution. Mack kept reminding the delegates from the chair that it had been previously agreed that the Congress would be only temporary and that this was one of the agreements that formed the very basis of the Congress. The merely temporary nature of the Congress would come under attack again and again in future debates concerning the Congress. Mack's leadership allowed the Congress to weather the storm in this case, as well as in future disputes.

Was this first session of the Congress a victory for the forces of democracy within the American Jewish community? Did it give the average American Jew a voice in

determining the policy that would represent American Jewry at the Peace Conference? The answer appears to be no. The events leading up to the Congress involved a power struggle between American Zionists and the American Jewish Committee. In the period immediately before the convention of the Congress and while the Congress was in session, moderates within both the Committee and the Zionist organization worked to reach compromises, to prevent the Congress from falling into the hands of radicals. The principal work on the major accomplishment of the Congress, the "Bill of Rights", was done by Marshall before the Congress ever assembled. The resolution on Palestine had been drawn up by the Zionists prior to the Congress as well. In reality, the Congress merely fleshed out the details of what had been prepared by the Executive Committee and the Administrative Committee of the Congress, which were composed of selected, not elected individuals. Granted, these elected delegates did deliberate these issues in long and drawn out debates both in committee and on the floor of the Congress, but the real power remained in the hands of the acknowledged leadership, not the masses. What is significant is that the leadership was able to find room to compromise in order to present the impression of a unified American Jewry to any outside onlooker. The scandal of a divided American Jewish community had been successfully avoided.

Among the first official acts of the Congress was the announcement of the resolution of the Congress to the

British government. The resolution was cabled to Wise, who reported to Lord Balfour that it was the desire of the American Jewish Congress that the British government act as trustee over the Jewish Commonwealth of Palestine. In the course of his conversation with Balfour, Wise asked for a further definition of "a national home for the Jewish people." Balfour responded, "This means that Jews who either wish or require, now or in the future, to go to Palestine shall have the right to do so."[19] The understanding of moderate American Zionists, of non-Zionists, such as Marshall, and of the British government was essentially the same. All were in favor merely of Jewish settlement in Palestine at this point in time, not a Jewish state. By this early date, the question of Palestine was virtually settled; all that was needed was the consent of the other nations at the Peace Conference.

Meanwhile, back in the United States, the other delegates to the Peace Conference were making their plans to go to Europe. Marshall, for one was not looking forward to travelling to Europe. For one thing, Marshall suffered terribly from seasickness and for that reason alone he had not been abroad for twenty-two years. Marshall also did not feel that he had the time to spend at the Peace Congress. He decided to go because he felt that it was his duty, as the only non-Zionist member of the delegation , to make sure that the Zionist program did not overshadow what he considered to be the essential question, Jewish rights in

Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Marshall's friends, both in this country and in Europe encouraged him to attend. At the first meeting of the delegation to the Peace Conference on December 30, the committee had insisted that Marshall precede the remainder of the delegation to Europe in order to bring about agreement among the American, British, and French delegations. Marshall was specifically selected for this duty because of his position on the American Jewish Committee and his contacts with British and French Jewry over the past several years. Marshall was to take charge of the problem of Eastern Europe, while Mack would deal with the issue of Palestine. As soon as he would be able to place a few personal matters in order, Marshall would be prepared to leave.[20]

As Marshall was putting his affairs in order, pressure was being placed on another member of the American Jewish Committee to attend the Peace Conference. At its Executive Committee meeting on December 9, 1918, the American Jewish Committee voted to send its own delegation to the Peace Conference. The Executive Committee decided that Cyrus Adler and Oscar Straus should accompany Marshall as representatives of the American Jewish Committee. Like, Wise, Marshall also represented two groups, the American Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Committee. Straus was very willing to go, but Adler had to be persuaded. After pressure from Marshall, Schiff and other members of the Committee and their insistence that Adler could indeed

be of great service in securing full and equal rights for the Jews of Eastern Europe, Adler consented.[21]

While the American Jewish Committee was pursuing its own agenda, the Zionists were also doing the same. Brandeis remained in communication with Weizmann and Wise in London. Brandeis also dispatched deHaas in early January as his personal representative to Weizmann to speak for Brandeis on all matters. Even though he had been elected as a delegate from the American Jewish Congress, deHaas went to Europe as Brandeis' personal delegate, not under the auspices of the Congress. Still, when speaking for Brandeis and American Zionists, deHaas could also claim to be speaking on behalf of all of American Jewry. Brandeis also instructed Wise to remain in Europe in order to meet with and brief deHaas and to make no definite plans for returning to the United States. The first two, and for a long time, the only, Congress delegates in Europe were personal representatives of Brandeis answering to him.[22]

On January 14, 1919, Wise arranged a meeting between Weizmann and Wilson. Wise met with Wilson for about forty-five minutes, then Wilson and Weizmann had a private meeting. Wise was very encouraged by both his and Weizmann's meetings with Wilson and wrote to Max Heller that "the most hopeful thing of all is the attitude of our President..He is our friend and he will stand by us to the end." In the same letter, Wise remarked that a Jewish Palestine was taken for granted by the Allies.[23]

One of the results of these meetings with Wilson, was the decision to delay the departure of the remainder of the Congress delegation for Europe. Wilson said that he preferred to meet with the delegates in Washington, rather than in Paris, and so the delegation would have to remain in the United States until Wilson returned from Europe in late February or early March.[23]

Another result of these meetings with Wilson and the very presence of deHaas and Wise in Europe, was a growing discomfort with and distrust of the Zionists by the American Jewish Committee. This distrust was led by Adler, who believed that the Nationalists had gone to Europe in order to confer as often as they wished with the President and other world leaders in order to present their own views to the exclusion of more moderate views. For that reason he felt that Marshall and others had been asked to remain at home.[25]

During the month of February, word began to filter back to American Jewry of the international support for a Jewish Palestine. Even Jacob Schiff came out publicly in favor of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, citing the Russian Revolution as a reason for this change of heart on his part. The Russian Jewish masses were now able to leave Russia en masse and needed a publicly secured homeland in which to establish themselves.[26] Meanwhile, the members of the American Jewish Congress delegation waited for Wilson's return and the opportunity to meet with him.

On March 2, a delegation composed of Wise, Mack, Marshall, and Richards met with Wilson. By all accounts, this was a very successful meeting. Wise met privately with Wilson for about twenty minutes and then the other members of the delegation were invited to join them. The delegation submitted memorials to the President on the subjects of Jewish rights in Eastern Europe and Palestine, including the Bill of Rights and correspondence with Polish representatives. The delegation explained the history of Jews in Eastern Europe and the problems which they had suffered throughout the centuries, as well as the special problems brought about by the end of the war and the creation of new states, placing special emphasis on Poland and Roumania. The delegation proposed the Bill of Rights as a solution to these problems and went on to explain all of its clauses. They also emphasized that now was an especially propitious time to achieve justice and equal rights for all persons, not just the Jews, in each of these new states because these nations which were seeking rights, had to be prepared to grant them before their independence or territorial gains could be recognized. For further background to these problems, Marshall reproduced all of the correspondence between himself and Polish leaders on the subjects of Jewish rights in Poland, the economic boycott and pogroms, including the report of his conversation with Roman Dmowski. Finally, the memorial on Palestine recounted the historic relationship between the Jews and Palestine and

the fact that only a minority of the Jewish population of the world would even consider moving to Palestine. The land, they claimed, was in need of rehabilitation and the Jews were willing to take on the challenge. The memorial continued with an explanation of why a British trusteeship over Palestine was preferable, citing the Balfour Declaration and the historic relationship between England and Zion. The terms of trusteeship presented in the memorial were very similar to the terms presented within the Bill of Rights: the declarations of the peace conference would form an integral part of the constitution of Palestine; the Jewish people would be guaranteed fair representation in executive, legislative and administrative positions; proper standards of administration would be observed in matters of communal autonomy; public assistance for education would be offered without distinction of race or creed, although Hebrew would be one of the recognized languages; the Jewish Sabbath and Holy Days would be legal days of rest; the rights of the present population would be safeguarded; and all inhabitants who desire to be citizens would be citizens. All present remarked that Wilson was very receptive to these memorials and Wilson made the following statement: "I have before expressed my personal approval of the Declaration of the British Government regarding the aspirations and historic claims of the Jewish people in regard to Palestine. I am, moreover, persuaded that the Allied nations with the fullest concurrence of our

Government and people are agreed that in Palestine there shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth." After the others had departed, Wilson also privately assured Wise that Palestine would be given to the Jews.[27]

Wilson also expressed support for minority rights, but was much less concrete on this issue than on Palestine. Wilson claimed that he was the only disinterested friend of the smaller nations and that he was concerned that these smaller nationalities be protected. Wilson had tried to protect the nationalities through the covenant of the League of Nations, but Japanese demands that racial discrimination be outlawed as well as religious discrimination, led to the abandonment of the entire issue. Wilson then shared his own personal program with the delegates. He told the delegates that every one of the groups that was intolerant of the Jews was an applicant for some type of favor from the United States. The President insisted that protection of minority rights would be written into any agreement entered into with these nations. When Mack mentioned minority rights in Poland specifically, Wilson responded, "Racial minorities will be taken care of everywhere, not only Poland. There will be hell to pay if they are not." Wilson's last piece of advice was not to lobby any one group in particular, but to distribute the pressure and influence among all the groups at the Peace Conference.[28]

After this meeting with the President and its favorable outcome, the delegation was ready to proceed to Europe.

Some of the delegates had already left around the same time that the sub-committee met with Wilson, namely, Barondess, Benedict, Syrkin and Cutler. Wise and deHaas had already been to Europe and returned to the United States. The real work for which the Congress had been formed, the presentation of Jewish proposals concerning Eastern Europe and Palestine before the Peace Conference, was now underway.

CHAPTER SIX

While the leaders of the American Jewish Congress were waiting to meet with Wilson, events in Europe did not stand still. Felix Frankfurter arrived to replace both Wise and deHaas as the representative of the Zionist Organization of America and Brandeis. Throughout the remainder of the negotiations in Europe, Frankfurter continued to serve as the representative of American Zionist interests.

The absence of American representation did not prevent European groups from petitioning the Peace Conference On February 3, the Zionist Organization submitted its proposals to the Congress. The Peace Conference asked the Zionists to make a presentation on Palestine on February 27, before most of the members of the American Jewish Congress had arrived. Wise had already returned to the United States, Levinthal was in London, representing American Mizrahi at the Zionist Conference there and although deHaas was in London, he was unable to make the trip to Paris due to illness. American involvement in the presentation of Zionist requests to the Peace Conference was therefore limited, due to forces beyond their control.[1]

During the next few weeks, the Anglo-Jewish Association, represented by Lucien Wolf, submitted its own resolution on the rights of Jews in Eastern Europe and the Alliance Israélite Universelle submitted a resolution in its own behalf dealing with the status of the Jews in Roumania.

Both the British and French delegations were opposed to the phrase "national rights". Both believed, as did the American Jewish Committee, that Judaism was a religion, not a nation. The British were a little more flexible than the French and were at least willing to consider the expression "minority rights", while the French insisted purely on religious protection for all people.[2]

Relations between the Eastern European Jews and these two Western delegations were very poor. The Easterners felt, deservedly, that the Westerners believed themselves to be superior to them and acted in a very patronizing manner. The Eastern European Jews were also approaching this situation from a completely different perspective. Western European Jews were protecting the rights of their brethren, but at the same did not want to suffer any loss of status themselves in their own native lands. The Eastern European Jews, on the other hand, were talking about their own lives and their own fate. They had been the ones to suffer during the war and in the pre-war era and for many, this was the first opportunity they had experienced in which they could take responsibility for themselves. The East European delegations, even those from the same country, were greatly divided. For example, William Filderman of Roumania, representing the Union of Roumanian Jews, was opposed to national rights, while representatives of Roumanian Zionists in Paris, demanded national rights. In fact, the vast majority of Eastern European Jews supported national rights.

This call for national rights was shared by Zionists, Socialist-Zionists, Bundists and almost every other Jewish group in Poland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Galicia, Russia and even Greece. The Eastern Europeans also were accustomed to loud and noisy debate, giving each person the opportunity to speak, not the well-mannered and orderly discussion to which the British and the French were accustomed. Finally, the East Europeans had no powerful friends on which to call. All the real power was in the hands of the Western Powers. Because of these differences in attitude, in basic ideology and in methodology the East European delegations in Paris, had yet to find a common position with the British and the French and remained locked in conflict.[3]

These were the conditions that Mack and Richards faced when they arrived in Paris on March 16, 1919. Mack then went about attempting to effect united action among the disparate elements of the international Jewish community assembled in Paris. This would prove to be many times more difficult than the efforts to unify American Jewry. Within ten days he had organized the Eastern European delegations and the delegation of the American Jewish Congress into the Committee of Jewish Delegations (or Comité des Délégations Juives Auprés de la Conference de la Paix). Mack was elected its chairman, and Cutler, its treasurer. Mack, however, was unable to acquire the cooperation of the French and British delegations in this effort. This new alliance of the Americans and East Europeans gave the demands of

Eastern European Jewry status and made it possible for their views to be communicated to the Allied Powers.[4]

By the time Marshall and Adler arrived in Paris the Committee of Jewish Delegations had already been organized. They had left New York about one week after Mack and Richards and in a statement made upon leaving for Europe, Marshall claimed, "My sole purpose in going abroad at this time is to present to the Peace Conference as one of the representatives of American Jewry...the cause of our brethren in Eastern Europe, whose unhappy status has become intolerable and whose shackles must now, if ever, be broken." No mention is made anywhere in this statement of Palestine and the Jewish claim to it. Instead, Marshall concentrated on the historic persecution against the Jews in Eastern Europe and the need to protect not only Jewish rights, but equal rights for everyone.[5]

Although it might not be significant, Marshall referred to himself as a representative of American Jewry, not of the American Jewish Congress. His dual position, as delegate of the American Jewish Committee, as well as the American Jewish Congress, makes it very difficult to discern to which of these groups Marshall felt primarily responsible in Paris. Marshall remained committed to the program adopted by the Congress, but this was not all that different from the one adopted by the Committee. In any case, Marshall authored both the position of the Congress and the Committee on Jewish rights in Eastern Europe. Moreover, Marshall

believed the American Jewish Committee to be just as valid a representative of American Jewry, as the Congress. The Congress was in many ways fulfilling what Marshall and other members of the Committee believed to be the legitimate role of the American Jewish Committee and they had compromised merely for the sake of presenting a unified front within American Jewry.

If there appeared to be no conflict of interest between representing both the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress in Marshall's eyes, the same cannot be said for every American Jew, especially Marshall's old foe, the Jewish press. Marshall was attacked by a reporter from the Jewish Morning Journal at the time that he sailed for Europe. The article asked how Marshall could represent the Congress, which demanded special rights; national, cultural, and minority rights, and the Committee which desired only full civil, political, and religious rights. The article went on to praise Marshall, but asked him to publicly declare his real goals. The author of the article, B. Sheloin, ignored, probably purposely, the fact that there was no contradiction between the goals of the Congress and the Committee, and wrote the piece merely to keep the pressure on the Committee. Public reaction to the article is uncertain, but it did cause Harry Schneiderman of the Committee to ask Jacob Schiff to ask Mack to issue a statement expressing the consonance of the goals of both organizations.[6]

While negotiating with the leaders of the world, Marshall would use these resolutions on behalf of American Jewry as guidelines and do what he felt was best for the Jews affected by the decisions of the Peace Conference. Marshall did not bind himself to the particular text of any draft of these resolutions on the rights of Eastern European Jewry, but instead, followed the underlying themes of the resolutions. The actual wording was unimportant to Marshall, the rights resulting from that wording were everything.

Before their arrival in Paris, Marshall and Adler first stopped in London to meet with representatives of British Jewry. They met with members of the Conjoint Committee including, C. G. Montefiore, Sir Stuart Samuel, and Major Lionel de Rothschild. Rothschild and Samuel were persuaded to agree with Marshall and Adler that the Jews needed some form of minority rights, whether they were called national or group rights, but Montefiore continued to insist that Jews should be treated solely as a religious body with absolutely no political aspects. Even Montefiore, though, wanted emancipation and rights for the Jews of Eastern Europe. Marshall and Adler were also able to persuade these leaders of the Conjoint Committee to travel to Paris to join with Lucien Wolf, who was representing the Board of Jewish Deputies.

While in England, Adler and Marshall also met with Herbert Samuel, Sir Stuart's brother and a leading British

Zionist. Samuel advised them to separate the issues of the conditions of the Jews of Eastern Europe from Palestine. Both Palestine and minority rights were two approaches to the "Jewish problem", but he felt that both should not be advocated by the same individuals. This is perhaps another reason why the question of Palestine was left completely up to the Zionists and the Congress representatives never really became involved with it.[7]

Marshall arrived to conditions very different from those he had expected. Originally, he had believed that the only Jewish delegations in Paris would be those representing the Western powers, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the Anglo-Jewish Committee and the American delegation. He reasoned that these were the only permanent organizations working for Jewish rights, and that these were also the only groups capable of exerting any influence on the great powers. Marshall had not even seriously considered the possibility of Eastern European Jewish representation and therefore, conflict over what was best for the Jews of Eastern Europe. His perception of the situation changed rapidly.[8]

Marshall went about solving this conflict in his usual way, he sought to effect a compromise. The conflict between the Jews of Eastern Europe and the Jews of Western Europe appeared to be one of ideology. Marshall attempted to transform it merely into a conflict over language, just as he had done within the United States. Marshall tried to

point out two things to all of the Jewish delegates in Paris. First, that all of them wanted to see an end to the discrimination and oppression which the Jews had suffered in Europe and second, that without a single unified Jewish position, the Allied leaders would pay them no heed. Therefore, Marshall, immediately upon arrival picked up where Mack had left off at trying to effect a unification of the Eastern and Western delegations, the job for which originally he was to leave early to accomplish. By credentials alone, he was best qualified for the job of establishing unity. His status as a member of the delegation of the American Jewish Congress and therefore part of the Committee of Jewish Delegations made him acceptable to the East Europeans and his role as president of the American Jewish Committee, made him acceptable to the non-nationalists of both France and Great Britain. Marshall was able to convince both sides to meet together once more and see if they could at least find common goals on which they could agree.[9]

On March 30, Grand Rabbin Israel Levi called a conference of all the Jewish delegations assembled in Paris, of both those affiliated with the Committee of Jewish Delegations and those which were not. This meeting, chaired by Marshall, was said to be the most important conference held by the Jewish delegations, according to Cyrus Adler. No agreement resulted from this conference, but there was a greater amount of understanding as an outcome of it. Once

again, the conflict between national and religious, racial, and linguistic minorities was played out. The nationalists were led by Sokolow, those defining Judaism as a religion, by C. G. Montefiore and Marshall remained in the center, seeking some common ground on which all could agree. He tried to convince all assembled that unity was possible by pointing to the successful resolution of the conflicts and the unanimous decisions reached by the American Jewish Congress. To the Easterners, he pointed to the devotion of the French and British Jews over the years in defending the rights of the Jews of Eastern Europe. He also pointed out the cool judgement and the political connections of the Western Jews. He reminded the Western Jews that these issues effected the Eastern Jews more directly than those in the West and that they possessed greater and more direct knowledge of their own problems. Marshall pled with both sides to come to an understanding because, although the Western delegations could not accept the demands of the extremists, at the same time, they could not remain aloof, oppose, or even withhold from the Peace Conference the views of those who were most directly affected. Similar are the words of Julian Mack to the British and French Jews, "even if you cannot agree with East European Jews it is still your duty to leave them alone; even if you believe they are mad and headed for self-destruction. It is <u>their</u> fate." Marshall and other knew that the submission of more than one resolution concerning rights in Eastern Europe, would make

all of the resolutions meaningless. Jewish unity was crucial to the adoption of rights for Eastern European Jews.[10]

The next evening, this conference reconvened and attempted to find a concrete plan of cooperation. This was fraught with difficulties. The questions of the feasibility of union, the methods of achieving it, and the basis of representing it all had to be answered. The first issue on which there was disagreement was even the use of the term fusion, which Marshall had used. The British preferred the term union to fusion because fusion implied a chemical combination and union, a mechanical one. This distinction was acceptable to everyone. What still continued to make negotiations difficult was the word "national". The French especially could not conceive of national rights without national sovereignty and the only place where they saw even a possibility of Jewish national sovereignty was in Palestine. The term national rights used in a European Jewish context was a contradiction or a meaningless term as far as they were concerned.

Terminology was not the only problem. When discussing some type of organization which would unite all of the Jewish organizations at Paris, the question was raised as to whether this would be an organization for the exchange of points of view or one at which votes would be taken. If it were one at which votes would be taken, then the French and British had problems with its potential construction. If

all of the delegations were given equal representation, then the Western organizations would be easily voted down in any dispute. Representatives of the Alliance were opposed to any majority vote in which their voice might be stifled due to the importance of their organization in the past and present. The British also felt that a majority vote of an organization in which the delegates had not been carefully scrutinized was dangerous and in any case they were unwilling to sacrifice the independence of the Conjoint Committee. The French also believed that large numbers of Eastern European delegates would be embarrassing.

A number of different models for a conference or union were proposed, but each was rejected by at least one party. Marshall believed in the principle that all of the delegates had the right to be represented and to express their views. Mack concurred with his views, but the French and British were unwilling to commit to this plan for equal representation and still wanted some way of either limiting the number of Eastern European delegates or leaving themselves the option of being free to differ from the decision of the group. Herbert Bentwich, representing B'nai B'rith, reminded the British and the French that they were the minority, not the majority, of the delegates assembled and believed that unity of action was more important than what words were used to describe the rights. This position was shared by Marshall and probably the British representatives, Lucien Wolf and C. G. Montefiore, would

have been willing to agree if it had not been for the intransigence of the Alliance and the deference of the British to the French group. When it became obvious that unity was not immediately possible, the Conference adjourned until the following weekend.[11]

During the intervening week, the American Jewish Congress delegation met with Secretary of State Lansing, General Tasker H. Bliss and Henry White of the American Peace Commission. Mack and Marshall presented the case of the American Jewish Congress, including the Memorials submitted to President Wilson, to these American Peace Commissioners. The Peace Commissioners assured the Congress delegation of the justice of their claims, but remained skeptical of granting special rights for minority groups, fearing that these rights would increase resentment. Mack countered by stating that without these rights, the Jews of Roumania and Poland would remain second class citizens. Lansing was still unconvinced. He felt that the Jews of Roumania and Poland would come close to constituting a national political party and further alienate themselves. When Mack assured Lansing that the Jews merely wanted what other minority groups enjoyed, Lansing finally consented. These resolutions were later forwarded to Colonel House.[12]

The weekend arrived, and on April 5 and 6, the last full meeting of delegates representing all of the Jewish groups at the Peace Conference assembled. At these meetings, a final decision would be reached regarding how

the Jewish position on Jewish and minority rights would be presented to the Peace Conference. Once again, Marshall chaired the meetings. Marshall announced at the outset, that a committee to investigate minority rights or the rights of the Jews had not yet been appointed by the Peace Conference, but that the next meeting of the plenary session and the next opportunity to suggest the appointment of such a committee would be on Monday, April 7, and therefore speedy action was crucial to success. Marshall proposed that the order of speeches would begin with Sokolow, who would lay down the nationalist position. He would be followed by other nationalists who would look at the problems from slightly different angles. The nationalist speakers would then be followed by non-nationalists. The first and most important issue brought out by Sokolow was that the Jewish population of Eastern Europe, independent of the ideology of the nationalists, had declared itself to be a nationality, largely to save its lives. Caught between warring nationalities in many regions, and unable to declare themselves to belong to one nationality without completely alienating another, Jews declared themselves to be a nationality. The Jews differed so much from the surrounding population that they needed political rights, as well as the continuing control of their educational, social and charitable institutions in order to survive as Jews. It was not that important whether the word national was used as far as Sokolow was concerned, but it was important that the

content of these rights be the same as national rights. This last point was a very important compromise on language which should have made cooperation between the Western delegations and the Eastern delegations easier.

Following Sokolow, Dr. Thon of Cracow and Ussishkin of the Ukraine spoke. Thon pointed out that in the recent elections in Poland, the vast majority of Jews voted for one of the nationalist groups and almost no one voted for the assimilationist candidates. The Jews, according to Thon, were a nation, not just a religious sect and should other groups be given group rights of some sort, but not the Jews, then the Poles would never give the Jews national rights on the grounds that the Jews denied their own nationality. Ussishkin added that the Jews of the Ukraine had also organized themselves as a national community and believed that the Jews as a nation should be admitted to the League of Nations.

The first of the non-nationalists to respond was See of the Alliance. See said that Ussishkin's views on Jewish nationalism were unacceptable to Western Jews. He then went on to praise the actions of the Napoleonic Sanhedrin, which he claimed was responsible for the freedom enjoyed by the Jews of the West. See supported the granting of similar rights to the Jews of Eastern Europe, including complete freedom of religion and control of education and charitable institutions. In other words, the French wanted to recreate French Jewish life in Eastern Europe. Montefiore, on the

other hand, came much closer to Sokolow's position than did See. Since Sokolow did not care what terminology was used, so long as the rights were granted, the Joint Foreign Committee was already committed to religious and cultural rights and could be persuaded to support educational autonomy as well. Anything else, such as the suggestions by Ussishkin, he considered to be dangerous.

Debate continued, but three broad positions emerged. The first was the centrist position, championed by Marshall and the American delegation. Sokolow and some of the Eastern Europeans, on the one hand, and the British delegation, on the other, were drawn toward the center. The French delegation remained extreme anti-nationalists, while Ussishkin and other East Europeans remained extreme nationalists, demanding the retention of the word national. It began to appear to be a replay of the situation in the United States, with the extremists on both sides losing strength to the moderates of the center. Also, similar to the United States, the moderates did not place a great deal of emphasis on the actual words used, but relied upon the results, namely, the protection of the rights of the Jews of Eastern Europe. After extended debate, with no resolution in sight, the delegates decided to adjourn until the next day.[13]

The arguments continued the next day, with what appeared to be growing strength in the center position. Herbert Bentwich, representing B'nai B'rith, called for

compromise, but asked the non-nationalists to accept the term national rights because everyone except the Jews refers to the Jews as a nation, only the Jews refuse to call themselves as such. Cyrus Adler, even struck a remarkable note of compromise. Adler, preferred a formula which did not use the phrase "national rights" and in which the Jews did not receive any special rights, but nevertheless felt that it was crucial that a unified position be reached and was willing to compromise. He felt that the submission of more than one memorial would certainly result in failure. Adler further noted that one of the problems with the usage of the term nation was that it implied foreign and that those designated as such were not a real part of the population. Syrkin condemned the other Western delegations for fearing that granting national rights would endanger their own positions. He praised the Eastern Europeans for desiring the moral values of Jewish nationality, even if they lost something in citizenship because of this. He went on to condemn the actions of the Napoleonic Sanhedrin a century earlier for looking only at the situation of its time and the desire for commerce and industry, while ignoring Jewish aspirations for the future. Now, he felt that it was possible for a country to contain many nationalities and that loss of one's particular national or group identity was no longer necessary or even desirable to become a good citizen.

Barondess praised the Alliance for its work in the

past, but did not add much to the actual debate. Mack pointed out that although American Jews did not desire national rights, conditions in the United States were different than Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, the states were largely homogeneous and therefore, no national rights are necessary. In the United States, where the society was so heterogeneous, minority rights were unnecessary because there was no majority to oppress the minorities. Only in Eastern Europe, in which there were several different distinct groups within each state were national rights feasible and necessary. If the Western Jews believe national rights to be destructive, then they can withdraw, if they believe them to merely a disadvantage, then they must unite with their Eastern brethren to secure them. Mack did not place a great deal of emphasis on usage or non-usage of the term national. Harry Cutler also supported a pragmatic position and felt that a common cause on a common platform was what was most important. The presence or lack of the phrase "national rights" was not so great a tragedy. Cutler also agreed with the earlier motion that a committee of seven be appointed to try to bridge the gap between the differing parties. Except for Syrkin, the entire American delegation favored the centrist or pragmatic position of compromise, which was not overly concerned with the actual language used. Although Sokolow later repudiated his earlier position and demanded the inclusion of the word national, all parties agreed to the suggestion that a

committee of seven be appointed. This committee included Marshall, Sokolow, Wolf, Bigart, Thon, Ussishkin, and Adler.[14]

Within weeks of arriving in Paris, the actual language of the resolutions adopted by the American Jewish Congress had been abandoned in favor of the general principle of guaranteeing rights for the Jews of Eastern Europe. The spirit of compromise which had so characterized the American Jewish Congress itself, was transferred by its delegates to the resolutions which they had brought with them to Paris. Once again, the importance of the moderates within the Congress movement cannot be given too much emphasis.

After a number of meetings, this committee of seven was still not able to bridge the difference between the nationalists and the non-nationalists. Marshall, specifically, was credited with tireless devotion toward working out a compromise, but even he was not skilled enough. It was agreed however, that the Committee of Jewish Delegations would be permitted to submit resolutions to the Peace Conference favoring national rights, but that the non-nationalists would abstain from openly displaying any hostility toward these resolutions. Although there were some exceptions, this agreement was by and large honored throughout the course of the peace negotiations.[15]

Most people gave Marshall primary credit for the successes of the Jewish delegations at the Peace Conference. Credit was also given to Mack, Adler, and Lucien Wolf of the

British delegation. The other members of the American delegation had very little to do with the successful presentation of Jewish needs to the Peace Commission and the inclusion of minority rights in the peace treaties signed in Paris. What is important to note is that Marshall and company followed the course of action that was originally suggested and advocated by the American Jewish Committee, namely, quiet diplomacy. The public debates, discussions and resolutions of the Committee of Jewish Delegations, ultimately had very little impact. Delicate matters were withheld from the Committee on purpose. Personal contact and private interviews with leading Allied figures was what insured the passage of minority rights. Still, Marshall's association with the American Jewish Congress, made his negotiations substantively different from what would have been demanded had he merely followed the desires of the American Jewish Committee. The influence of the Congress showed in his willingness to work for national rights, even though he had opposed national rights when he was in the United States. The methodology might have been the best of old-fashioned shtadlanut, but the vocabulary came from the American Jewish Congress.[16]

The Committee of Jewish Delegations continued to work on drafting articles for inclusion in the Peace Treaty which would provide for Jewish rights. This, however, was a slow and arduous task, involving almost infinite discussion. Meanwhile, time was running out. On April 19, 1919, Henry

White, one of the American Peace Commissioners, informed Marshall and Adler that the Peace Treaty was nearing completion and almost nothing had been done for minority rights. The Americans then turned to informal channels of obtaining the passage of these resolutions. On April 20, Marshall and Mack submitted a draft for a treaty to David Hunter Miller, legal advisor to the American delegation. Both Marshall and Mack had known Miller in the United States and Miller had the respect and confidence of both Colonel House and President Wilson.[17]

This treaty draft was very similar to the "Bill of Rights" adopted at the American Jewish Congress. The first article stated that as a condition for receiving territorial rights and other rights, the aforementioned state must adopt the following clauses as an integral part of its constitution. The first clause established the qualifications for citizenship, namely, that all those born in the territory and those who had been living in the territory prior to July 1, 1914. Exceptions were made for those who had acquired citizenship or who wished to acquire citizenship of another country. The second clause granted to all citizens without distinction as to race, nationality, or religion, equal civil, religious, political, and national rights. This draft did feature the controversial phrase, national rights, but the debate was far from over.

The third clause was a new feature, determining the basis of national autonomy. Each national minority which

composed at least one percent of the population had the right to establish and manage its national, religious, educational, charitable, and social institutions. This clause also established proportional representation on all levels from local to national. Proportional funding for the exercise of governmental functions was also provided for as was the right to waive one's membership in such a minority. Finally, the Jewish minority of the state would be recognized as such a minority and would be eligible for all of the rights contained within the clause. This clause probably shows more influence by the Eastern Europeans than any of the others.

The fourth clause permitted the usage of any language of any national minority in public meetings, in schools, in the press and in any transaction or public document. The fifth clause guaranteed that those who observe a day other than Sunday as their holy day, the right to observe that day without fear of being forced to desecrate their Sabbath or holy days. Furthermore, these people also would not be prohibited from working on Sunday.

The second and final article was concerned with the enforcement of this treaty. It gave any signatory or any group affected by a violation of the treaty, the right to submit their complaint to the League of Nations for ajudication.[18]

Two days later, Mack, Marshall, and Miller revised this draft. The revised draft applied exclusively to Poland.

Some of the revisions were minor, but others were substantive. The changes in the definition of citizenship were minor, it expanded the definition of Polish citizenship by stating that any person who was born in Poland, who has lived in Poland at any time since August 1, 1909, or who was living in Poland on August 1, 1914, who has not been naturalized into another country, shall be considered a Polish citizen.

The second clause, defining the rights of Polish citizens, was changed once again. This draft promised equal civil, religious, and political rights, omitting, national rights. At this point in time, it was assumed that the absence of national rights would make its passage easier.

The third clause was completely new. It was a listing of various basic rights that Poland promised to uphold, including protection of life, liberty and property; freedom of religion and the free exercise thereof; free usage of any language; and no discrimination against any inhabitant of Poland on account of birth, race nationality, language, or religion.

The fourth and fifth clauses were basically a restatement of the third clause of the original draft with no substantive changes, providing for national autonomy with select areas of autonomous control and proportional funding. of these national minorities. The sixth clause established proportional representation, while the seventh clause recognized the previous six as a bill of rights which was an

integral part of the Polish Constitution and could not be altered without the consent of the League of Nations. This draft denied some of the specifically Jewish rights of the earlier draft, including the Sabbath observance clause. Also omitted was the guarantee of protection by the League of Nations.[19] The lack of these specific safeguards was a major loss of protection by the Jewish minorities. The Sabbath clause was the major recognition of the Jews as a religious, not a national minority. More importantly, the guarantee of the right to work on Sunday was crucial to the economic protection of the Jews. The lack of protection by the League of Nations meant first, that there was no real teeth in the enforcement of these resolutions and, therefore, the clauses would be as meaningless as the rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Berlin, and second, that Eastern European Jews would still be dependent on the Jews of the West for their protection and would be unable to defend themselves.

One week later, a draft which differed in no significant way from this one was forwarded to Colonel House by Miller, Mack, and Marshall.[20] The draft submitted to House still bore a great deal of resemblence to the memorial submitted to President Wilson a mere six weeks earlier. The wording had changed, in some cases it had changed a great deal. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the latter drafts are descendants of the earlier Marshall draft.

Miller arranged for Mack and Marshall to meet with Colonel House on April 30. At this meeting they learned that House strongly approved of these clauses and that he was submitting them to the Council of Four, which would be meeting on the next day. Adler, meeting with Henry White at this same time, received White's assurance that the new nations would be restrained and that he would support the Jewish claims. Mack and Marshall spent a very nervous day waiting to be sure that these clauses would indeed be taken up by the Council of Four. It was feared that if the Council did not demonstrate some form of movement on these proposals that next day, then the work for Jewish rights might all be for naught.[21]

Even if the specifically Jewish claim was weakened by this draft, the Council of Four at the Peace Conference was suitably impressed by it. They decided to insert into the treaty with Germany a clause binding both Poland and Czechoslovakia to separate minorities treaties. They also created a new committee, the Committee on New States and For the Protection of Minorities on May 1. Miller was appointed the American representative on this committee, while James Headlam-Morley and Phillipe Berthelot, represented England and France.[22]

While these private negotiations were continuing between Marshall, Mack, Miller, and other representatives of the Allied Powers, the Committee of Jewish Delegations continued to meet. The Committee was not a very efficient

organization and remained locked in endless debate over the necessity of the use of the term national, the need for Jewish representation at the League of Nations, the need for the Committee to become a permanent organization, and other issues. Because of this, the drafting of recommendations to be delivered to the Peace Conference was a painstakingly slow and tedious process. The committee, charged with the responsibility of drafting the resolutions, was chaired by the Russian Zionist Leo Motzkin, while Marshall and Mack were also members of this commission and served as moderating elements. Eventually, a sub-committee was appointed to actually write the clauses after the full commission had finally agreed on the points to be discussed. This sub-committee was composed of Marshall, Mack, Motzkin, Filderman of Roumania, and Braude of Austria. The final draft of the memorandum of the Committee was not completed until May 15, 1919, and it was not submitted to the Peace Conference until June 10, 1919. Because it was not completed and submitted until this late date, the actual text of the Committee's memorandum was of no real importance. The real work of negotiating for rights for the Jews and other minorities in Eastern Europe had been performed in private by Marshall, Mack, Sokolow, and Adler. The Committee gave the Jewish representatives the status and official rank to enable them to speak with the various representatives of the powers represented at the Peace Conference.[23] Once again, democratic and open discussion

had yielded to private shtadlanut. Effective negotiation came in the form of personal contact and private meetings, not the decisions reached by large, open assemblies and the documents they generated. Democracy was simply too slow and cumbersome a process to be used effectively when flexibility and speed were necessities.

The process of private metings with Miller, Miller's assistant, Manley O. Hudson, Colonel House, and other members of the Allied Peace Commissions continued over the next two months until the signing of the treaty with Germany, which was immediately followed by the signing of the treaty with Poland. Realizing that the first treaty would be the most crucial, the attention of Mack and Marshall was concentrated on the situation in Poland. To make matters even more critical, pogroms continued and even increased in Poland. The immediacy of the need to protect Jewish rights was keenly felt.

By mid-May, the Allied Powers were prepared to include in the treaty with Germany, special provisions to protect the racial, linguistic, or religious minorities that would be laid down in a subsequent treaty between the Allied Powers and Poland. Although the Eastern European nationalists would have preferred that these rights include national rights, nevertheless, the fact that these rights would be granted was cause for joy. Adler, who by this point in time was willing to accept national rights, was still very pleased that the official draft of the Committee on New States did not use the word national in its

draft.[24]

In mid-May, Mack also returned to the United States. He was replaced as President of the Committee of Jewish Delegations by Marshall, but not without a good deal of conflict. Many of the members of this Committee were uncomfortable with the thought that their President might be a non-nationalist. This was a fear with no basis in reality. Even though Marshall himself was a non-nationalist, in all of his negotiations on behalf of the American Jewish Congress and the Committee of Jewish Delegations, he had supported national rights.[25]

The pogroms in Europe provoked rallies and mass meetings in the United States. Former President Taft cabled Wilson in Paris, informing him how disturbed the Jews of the United States were over the news about these pogroms. Taft asked that maintenance of religious freedom be made a precondition for the recognition of Poland, Roumania and the new Slav States. Taft's cable was followed by one from Stephen S. Wise who also requested that the rights of minorities in these new or expanded states be safeguarded. Wilson responded to Wise's cable by stating that safeguards against religious discrimination will be embodied in the treaties by which these new states would be established.[26]

Word of these demonstrations also reached the delegations in Paris, including a cablegram of over two thousand words from Schiff to Marshall. Both Marshall and Adler felt that it was very important to bring this

information to the attention of the President. The only question was how? Adler came up with a rather unique solution that worked. He called President Wilson at his Paris residence and made an appointment. Often the easiest solutions are the most simple. Adler called on May 27, and the next afternoon Marshall and Adler met with Wilson. They gave him a copy of the telegram and went into some detail about the pogroms in Pinsk and Vilna. This led to a discussion of minority rights in order to insure that pogroms no longer occur. Wilson said that he supported racial, religious and linguistic rights, but felt that separate national rights would only tend to lead to continued outbreaks of violence because of jealousy between groups. Wilson did support, however, the guarantee of Sabbath observance. What Wilson continued to oppose was the right of minorities to appeal directly to the League of Nations in cases of violation of their treaty rights. Wilson once again felt that this would lead to resentment and disharmony within the state. He felt that the Eastern European Jews could be best protected by the Jews of America and England. American and British Jews could monitor the affairs of their East European brethren, report infractions to the American and British governments and then these governments could then bring the infractions to the attention of the League of Nations. Although Adler remarked that the Jews of Eastern Europe did not desire to have to continue to rely on the help and protection of Western

Jewry, but would prefer to stand on their own, the President refused to budge from his position. This meeting helped to reassure both Adler and Marshall that Wilson, the chief proponent of minority rights among the Big Four, remained a supporter of the Jewish position and was adequately informed on both the generalities and specifics of the situation.[27]

The month of June was a battle between Poland and the other new and enlarged states and those who demanded minority rights. The Polish delegation received a draft of the treaty it would be expected to sign on May 22. It continued to fight against being bound by this treaty until the bitter end, when its representatives actually signed it. While Poland and Roumania and other states fought against these treaties as an unfair imposition on their sovereignty, Wilson remained the champion of minority rights. He reminded the opponents of minority rights that it was the victory of the Allies which had won for them independence or gained additional territory for them and that therefore the Allies had the right to set certain conditions before they turned over this territory.

Marshall continued to help with the revision of the minorities clauses of the Polish treaty and remained in contant contact with Wilson, House, and Hudson. Until almost the very last moment it was not certain whether the Polish representatives could be persuaded to sign the treaty. Finally, on June 28, 1919, the German treaty was signed in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles, and in a small

adjacent room, Paderewski and Dmowski signed the Polish Minorities Treaty. The Polish Treaty then formed the basis for the subsequent treaties with Roumania, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, Marshall and Adler, the two remaining American Jews in Paris, were unable to witness the signing of the treaty because it was signed on a Saturday afternoon and they did not travel on the Sabbath. The real architect of the treaty, Marshall, had to be satisfied with a second hand account of the signing.[28]

The Polish Minorities Treaty was composed of twelve articles. The first article merely stated that articles two through eight would be considered fundamental laws and nothing could interfere with or override these. The second clause insured the full protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland "without distinction of birth nationality, language race or religion." Furthermore this clause guaranteed free exercise of any creed, religion or belief.

Articles three through six defined Polish citizenship. Nothing in these four clauses was inconsistent with any of the previous Jewish memoranda on minority rights, these clauses simply went into much greater detail. Article seven declared that all Polish citizens would be equal before the law and would enjoy the same civil and political rights regardless of race language or religion. Also differences in religion would not be grounds for discrimination in any situation. This clause further guaranteed the freedom to

use any language in public or private situations, including the courtroom.

The eighth clause gave Polish nationals who belonged to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities the right to manage at their own expense, their own charitable, religious, social and educational institutions, as well as the freedom to use any language within them. The ninth clause was also concerned with the educational system. This required the Polish government to provide for instruction in the native language of the majority of students in the school, especially if the majority were a non-Polish speaking minority. Clause number ten, applied exclusively to the Jewish schools. These schools would be under the supervision of Educational Committees which would be subject to the general control of the state and would be in charge of distributing all state funds to the Jewish Schools.

The eleventh clause protected Jews from being compelled to work on the Sabbath, except in those cases in which the obligation applied to all Poles, such as military service. The twelfth clause declared that the preceding clauses involving minority rights could not be modified without the consent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. Furthermore, Poland agreed that any member of the League of nations would have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction of the preceding rights. The Polish government also agreed that the International Court of Justice was the ultimate arbiter of any dispute involving these rights.[29]

The rights provided for by this treaty were very similar to the rights initially demanded by the American Jewish Congress. The most obvious shortcoming was the elimination of any reference to national rights. Although national rights were not explicitly mentioned, the rights that were given corresponded to Marshall's original understanding of full rights. Jews were given the freedom to observe their Sabbath and holidays, use their languages and maintain control over their charities, religious and social institutions, and schools. They were also promised that they would not be discriminated against on the basis of religion, language, or race. Overall, they had acquired many more rights than they held previously. Most importantly, these rights were guaranteed by an international body and there was a system of recourse to this body if necessary. The only right which they wanted but did not achieve was the second half of the Sabbath clause. Their observance of the Sabbath was guaranteed, but their right to work on Sunday was not.

With the successful resolution of the Polish Treaty, Marshall and Adler were prepared to return to the United States. After the passage of the Polish Treaty, it was assumed that the other treaties would easily follow in rapid succession. The situation with the other treaties turned out to be a little more complex than previously imagined, but eventually the treaties were signed and the Jews were assured their rights Preparations were made to give

Marshall a hero's welcome at the dock and then a banquet and a reception a few days later. This welcome would be equal only to that of returning troops and its planning involved more than one thousand Jews from across the country from every class and interest within the Jewish community. On July 25, Marshall and Adler arrived in the New York and Marshall's arrival in particular was the occasion of one of the greatest demonstrations ever given a private citizen.[30]

The speakers at the banquet in Marshall's honor, in addition to praising the work that Marshall had done, praised the work of the entire American delegation and the cooperation by all of the Jewish delegations in Paris. Mack emphasized that the American delegation had gone to the Peace Conference as Jews, but had worked for the rights of all of humanity. Adler stressed the role of the United States and remarked that while other nations had other things on their agenda, the sole goal of the United States was justice. Marshall saw the events in Europe in almost messianic proportions. He remarked that the Peace Conference had been a tool of Divine Providence and that now the yoke of oppression that had been upon the Jews and other peoples had been broken. The rights gained by the Jews were not gained because they were Jews , but because they were minorities and therefore had the right to participate in the liberty that all had acquired. Characteristic of his modesty, Marshall accepted no credit himself for all that

had been achieved in Europe, even though his tireless efforts, more than those of any other individual, had led to the passage of the Polish Treaty.[31]

The successful resolution of the Polish Treaty was almost the end of the activities of the American Jewish Congress. A memorial concerning Jewish rights in Palestine, which was not drafted until immediately prior to Marshall's departure, was held until Sokolow needed to use it at the San Remo Conference. Marshall and Mack remained in contact with Wilson and others at the Peace Conference to insure the protection of Jewish minorities in the remaining Eastern European Jewish states. Most of the delegates to the Congress redirected their energy to raising money for reconstruction work in Europe and protesting against the continuing pogroms in Eastern Europe. With the goals of the Congress, the securing of rights for Jews in Eastern Europe and Palestine, achieved, there remained nothing to do except call the concluding session to order.

CONCLUSION

Although some members of the American Jewish Congress had pushed Mack to reconvene the Congress at a early date, in order to extend the life of the Congress, better cope with post-war relief, and take greater steps in securing the establishment of a world Jewish congress; Mack delayed the final session of the Congress until May 1920.[1] On May 12, Mack sent a letter to all of the delegates to the Congress, stating that in accordance with the resolutions adopted at its first session, the official report of the delegation to the Peace Conference and a full report by the Secretary on the work carried on by the Congress Organization would be presented at a second session of the Congress. The date for this session was fixed as May 30, and the site was Philadelphia.[2]

When the Congress reconvened it was assumed that the session would be very brief. The only business on the agenda was the presentation of reports. By prior agreement, the Congress would immediately disband following the reading of these reports. In his opening address, Mack left no doubt that this was what he intended to do. Mack reminded the delegates that they were gathered together "pursuant to the terms on which this limited Congress became a reality." Mack went on to say that the delegation was present "primarily to report to you the results of the mission upon which we were sent by you. That mission, so far as the

delegation is concerned, has been accomplished. The delegation is therefore ready to ask from you its discharge. We are gathered together for any other business that may properly, within the terms of agreement under which the Congress was constituted, be considered at this meeting, and then pursuant to those terms, to adjourn without day(sic)." He then spoke of the successful efforts by the Congress delegation in accomplishing both the letter and spirit of the goals assigned to it by the Congress. After the formalities of greeting some of the foreign visitors and reading telegrams from those who were unable to attend. Mack was ready to ask Marshall to read the report of the delegation to the Peace Conference. The first of many objections to the rapid resolution of the duties of the Congress occurred here.

Dr. Gustave Hartman proposed that the Congress be made a permanent organization. Mack refused to recognize the resolution on two grounds. First, he had already called for the report of the delegation to the Peace Conference and therefore, it was out of place. Second, it violated the principles upon which the Congress had been organized. When Hartman appealed the decision of the chair, Mack stepped aside and Wise assumed the chair. In the debate that followed, Hartman claimed that there was still a great deal of work for the Congress to do on behalf of the Jewish people and therefore a permanent Congress was necessary.

Mack responded by saying that the question before the

delegates was one of honor. When the Congress had been called into being through a series of compromises, one of those compromises was that the Congress would be merely a temporary organization. The delegates were honor bound to adjourn. If the delegates did not agree with Mack, Mack was willing to abide by their decision, but he felt it would then be necessary for him to resign as President.

After continued discussion, the assembly voted 142 in favor and 66 against sustaining the chair. Mack resumed his position as chairman and the session continued with an address by the representative of the mayor of Philadelphia. After his speech, Marshall delivered the report of the delegation to the Peace Conference, the content of which has already been discussed in detail in the preceding pages. Following this address, the Congress adjourned until the evening.

The evening session commenced with the reading of the Secretary's report by Richards. Once again, an attempt was made to extend the life of the Congress. This time, Abraham Schomer introduced a resolution that the Congress should have a new election of officers and Executive Committee, which could then reconvene the congress when it was necessary. The basis for this resolution was the fact that the aims for which the congress had been called had not yet been achieved. Once again, Mack refused to recognize the motion, Schomer appealed, Mack stepped down and Wise replaced him. Once more, the issue was debated and once more, Mack was sustained.

The last bit of controversy at this session was an attack by Baruch Zuckerman on the work done by the delegation at the Peace Conference. This attack, however, was expunged from the minutes of the meeting. Mack's defense of the delegation was included and many of the charges can be derived from his defense. Zuckerman must have charged the delegation with delaying their departure for Europe and using the meeting with President Wilson as only an excuse; failing to take part in the presentation of Jewish claims to Palestine; failure to work for national rights for the Jews of Europe; and failure to take steps to convene a world Jewish congress. Mack answered all of these claims and defended the actions and the successes of the Congress delegation at the Conference. Following this last bit of controversy, Louis Lipsky moved that the Congress adjourn sine die. This was seconded, the motion carried and with the last rap of Mack's gavel, the American Jewish Congress passed out of existence.[3]

It came as a shock to no one when several delegates remained behind after the dissolution of the Congress to reconstitute a permanent American Jewish Congress. Among those involved in this action were Stephen S. Wise, Louis Lipsky, Gedaliah Bublick, Gustave Hartman, Abraham Schomer, Baruch Zuckerman, Leon Sanders, Joseph Barondess, and Bernard G. Richards. What is most significant is that this action occurred after the dissolution of the Congress. The Congress proper adjourned according to its pre-arranged

agreement. It had done what it set out to do and breach of faith by any of the parties involved in the creation of the Congress had been successfully avoided.

Was the Congress a success? The answer to this question must take into account a number of factors, especially, from whose perspective and by what standards. On the most basic level, had the Congress achieved those goals which, once constituted, it had set out to achieve? The goals of the Congress were to insure that the Jews of Eastern Europe acquire the rights which had been denied them for generations and that a Jewish homeland be created in Palestine. Furthermore, the delegation of the American Jewish Congress was instructed to cooperate with other Jewish organizations in the achievement of these goals. There is no doubt that the Congress through its delegation in Paris had achieved these goals. The rights of the Jews in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland and Roumania where the guarantee of protection had been thought to be most necessary had been achieved through the minorities treaties. Granted, the rights granted were not quite everything the Congress had requested, but the majority of the requests were filled. Specifically, the guarantees of national rights, political recognition of minority groups, and the right of Jews to work on Sunday were not achieved. The important guarantees of citizenship and of full and equal civil, religious, and linguistic rights had been achieved, as well as the retention of a good deal of autonomy within

the Jewish community. Furthermore, Sokolow, Weizmann, and the world Zionist organization had, with the cooperation of the delegation of the American Jewish Congress, insured that Great Britain would receive the mandate for Palestine and that Palestine would be a Jewish national homeland. This was made official at the San Remo Conference, which was held immediately prior to the concluding session of the Congress.

Related to this successful suing for the rights of European Jewry was a second area of success for the American Jewish Congress that had been totally unanticipated. The events at the Peace Conference led to the emergence of American Jewry as a leader in world Jewry. It was the American delegation, more than any other which had toiled for the passage of the minorities treaties and it was the delegation of the American Jewish Congress which united with the various committees of Eastern European Jews and agreed to speak on their behalf. More than the other Western Jewish communities, American Jewry had accepted the responsibility for its Eastern European brethren. Because of this, the leadership of world Jewry was now beginning to move to the other side of the Atlantic. If not yet leaders, America's Jews were now at least partners in leading the international Jewish community. With the end of the First World War, American Jewry had came into its own.

As far as changes within the structure of the American Jewish community, no long term changes were brought about. Many of the leaders of the Congress movement, both Zionists

and the Eastern Europeans of the Lower East Side, such as Kallen, Asch, Lipsky, and others, had set out to dethrone the American Jewish Committee and replace it with the Zionist organization or some Eastern European Jewish group. This effort failed completely. Most of the compromises that were necessary to establish the Congress favored the position of the Committee. The Congress proponents eventually yielded to the Committee on the date of the Congress, the composition of the Executive Committee, the election of delegates by organizations and the limitation of the Congress on matters of ideology or philosophy of Judaism. Most important was the fact that the Congress would be merely a temporary organization. Because it was not permanent, it posed no threat to the American Jewish Committee.

The American Jewish Committee was not completely unaffected by the Congress movement either. It caused the Committee to realize that its word would no longer be automatically accepted within the American Jewish community. The Committee also realized that it would have to cooperate with newly emerging groups within American Jewry and not just with its traditional allies. The American Jewish Committee no longer held hegemony over the protection of civil rights of Jews in all lands. One must also remember that the Committee was forced to compromise as well. They had to accept the concept and existence of a Jewish congress. They also had to accept the fact that some people

saw Jews as part of a nationality and therefore Jews deserved national rights and some of its members, Marshall and Adler in particular, worked to see that those rights were achieved. The Congress movement forced the American Jewish Committee to deal with Eastern European Jewry in a different way. No longer could they pretend that they knew what was best for the Jews of Eastern Europe, but from this time forward they would have to listen to what Eastern European Jews felt was best for themselves. In other words, the Committee would have to start to deal with them as equals. Also, the Committee, which was well-known for its non-nationalistic stance, came out in favor of the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

The most important of these changes was the fact that the American Jewish Committee was not completely invincible. It could be challenged. In this instance, the challenge was not completely successful, but nonetheless, the Committee did have to compromise. After the American Jewish Congress, and partially as a result of the American Jewish Congress, we begin to see the proliferation of Jewish organizations with very similar purposes. The purpose of the organization began to matter less and less, while the composition of the group began to take on greater and greater significance. Multi-purpose organizations emerged, many of whom replicated the same work as other organizations. The differences between these organizations lay exclusively in their constituencies. For example, the newly formed permanent

American Jewish Congress wanted to serve a very similar role to that of the American Jewish Committee. Where the constituency of the American Jewish Committee was largely, but not exclusively, the established, well-to-do, religious German-American Jewish community, the Congress wanted to protect the civil rights of world Jewry primarily on behalf of secular, nationalist, and Zionist East European Jews.

The success or failure of the Congress was heavily dependent on the leadership that emerged. Because of those leaders who were pragmatists, not ideologues, the Congress was first able to meet and second, able to achieve the goals it set out to accomplish. Those who advocated extreme positions, such as anti-nationalists like Philipson and Senior or nationalists like Schomer or Zuckerman, in the long run, had very little influence. Those who advocated negotiating from a position of power and trying to bully opponents into submission also lost their influence, as did those who tried to ignore opposition and speak only for themselves or their organization. Intransigence on the part of Brandeis, Wise and others accounted for the limitation of their roles as leaders. The leaders who emerged over the course of the Congress were all moderates and pragmatists, such as Mack, Cutler, Marshall, and others, who placed greater emphasis on action than on the vocabulary used. The belief that compromise was always possible lay at the very core of their beliefs and actions. Also, the interlocking directorate of American Jewish organizations facilitated

compromise. Figures like Julian Mack and Harry Cutler, who were officers of the American Jewish Committee and the Zionist organization as well, were able to find the grounds for unity between both of the worlds to which they belonged.

The ability to compromise permitted American Jewry to speak with one voice on the problems of European Jewry. Had several different positions emerged,then it would have been much more difficult and perhaps impossible to influence the President on what direction the American government should take and what position it should support. The disagreements remained by and large within the Jewish community and did not spill out into the secular community. Keeping the dispute an internal matter had been important to all of the Jewish groups and on this issue they had a great deal of success.

This was also a transitional period for leadership within American Jewry. Old and established leaders like Marshall, gradually gave way to younger bureaucrats like Lipsky and younger personality figures like Stephen S. Wise. In less than a decade from the conclusion of the Congress, a number of prominent Jewish leaders were either dead or had been removed from their position of leadership. Cutler, Schiff, and Marshall were all dead by 1930, while Brandeis and Mack lost their leadership roles within American Zionism at the Cleveland Conference in 1921. Although this generation of leadership would soon be gone, the giants of American Jewry still dominated the scene during the Congress controversy.

The individual leader still made a tremendous difference. Even with all of the influence of the organizations involved and their ideologies and agendas and the support of the masses of American Jewry, nothing would have been possible without these very gifted individual leaders. The success of the Congress can be traced directly back to the efforts of a few select individuals, who, in addition to serving as advocates of their own individual organizations and doing everything that they could to increase and sustain the power and influence of these organizations, also were attracted by a higher goal, serving the Jewish people. The actions of men like Schiff, Adler, Mack, Cutler, Wise, Brandeis, and especially Marshall cannot be given enough emphasis. These were the men whose actions made the Congress and its success possible. Brandeis almost single-handedly directed both the Zionist and Congress movements until his appointment to the Supreme Court bench and remained the real power within American Zionism until he was deposed at the Cleveland Conference in 1921. Wise was perhaps the most charismatic speaker in the American Jewish community and attracted support with his words. Mack, with his gentle demeanor and patience, was able to persuade bitter foes to at least listen to each other. Cutler, more colorful than Mack, was also equally at home with Zionists and non-Zionists. Both Schiff and Adler were highly opinionated individuals and were often found embroiled in disputes with one group or another, but their devotion to

the Jewish people was never doubted, even by their enemies. Finally, the undisputed leader of all of American Jewry and the man who singlehandedly did more to insure the passage of the minorities treaties and guarantee the rights of Eastern European Jewry was Louis Marshall. Marshall's role within American Jewry can be best summed up in the words of Chaim Weizmann: "It was a profound mistake to think...that Marshall was not 'representative' because he had not been elected , like the members of the Zionist Executive. As one traveled up and down the States one could not but be impressed by the extent and power of his influence. The most important Jewish groups in every city in America looked to him for the lead in communal matters, and his attitude went a long way, in fact was often decisive in determining theirs...He was much nearer to Jews and Judaism...than Brandeis, an ardent Zionist, ever was."[4]

NOTES

Introduction

[1]L. P. Mair, The Protection of Minorities(London: Christophers, 1928), pp.30-34.
Cyrus Adler and Aaron M. Margolith, With Firmness to the Right: American Diplomatic Action Affecting the Jews, 1840-1945(New York: American Jewish Committee, 1946), pp.113-15.

[2]Adler and Margolith, pp.120-26.

[3]Ibid., pp.261-64.
Gary Dean Best, To Free A People(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp.64-82.

[4]Naomi W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1972), p.8.

[5]Ibid., pp.9-16.

[6]Carl Herman Voss, ed., Stephen S. Wise: Servant of the People(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969), p.72.

[7]Cohen, pp.26-27.

[8]Ibid., pp.54-80.
Best, pp.166-201.

Chapter One

[1]Jewish Congress Organization Committee, To the Jews of America, New York, 1915, p.6.

[2]Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy, eds., Letters of Louis D. Brandeis(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1973), 3:293-4.

[3]Yonathan Shapiro, Leadership of the American Zionist Organization 1897-1930(Urbana,IL: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 80.

[4]Charles Reznikoff, ed., Louis Marshall Champion of Liberty(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America), 1957, p.506.

[5]Frank F. Rosenblatt, "The National Workmen's

Committee on Jewish Rights", The Jewish Communal Register of New York, 1917-1918(New York: Kehillah, 1918), p.1431.

[6]Louis Lipsky, Selected Works. Volume One: Thirty Years of American Zionism(New York: Nesher Publishing Company for the Louis Lipsky Jubilee Committee, 1927), p. 52.

[7]Ibid., p.51.

[8]Ibid., p.52.

[9]Rosenblatt, pp.1446-7.

[10]Alvin S. Roth, "Backgrounds and Origins of the American Jewish Congress"(Rabbinic thesis:Hebrew Union College, 1953), p 138
Oscar I. Janowsky, The Jews and Minority Rights 1898-1919(New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), p.168.

[11]Arthur A. Goren, New York Jews and the Quest for Community(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p.44.

[12]Roth, p.134.

[13]Urofsky, 3:408.

[14]Ira Robinson,ed., Cyrus Adler, Selected Letters(Philadelphia:Jewish Publication Society of America; New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1985), pp.267-269.

[15]Ibid., pp.271-2.

[16]Cyrus Adler, Jacob H. Schiff, His LIfe and Letters (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc.,1928), pp.291-8.

[17]Reznikoff, pp.507-9.

[18]Arthur A. Goren, ed., Dissenter in Zion(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 139-43.

[19]"Ninth Annual Report of the American Jewish Committee" in the American Jewish Year Book 5677, Cyrus Adler, ed.(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1916), p.357.

[20]Robinson, pp.272-4.

[21]Reznikoff, II, pp.509-10.

[22]"Ninth Annual Report of the American Jewish Committee", p313.

[23]Ibid., pp.314-15.

[24]To the Jews of America, pp.10-11.

[25]Ibid., pp.11-12.

[26]Ibid., p.12.

[27]Ibid., pp.12-14.

[28]Ibid., pp14-15.

[29]Ibid., pp.15-20.

[30]Urofsky and Levy, 3:564.

[31]To the Jews of America, pp.21-2.

[32]Urofsky and Levy, 3:564.

[33]Ibid., 3:571-3.

[34]Louis D. Brandeis, "The American Jewish Congress and Jewish Democracy"(New York: American Jewish Congress, 1935), pp.8-11.

[35]Robinson, pp.286-7, 289-90, and Cyrus Adler, I Have Considered the Days(Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1941), p.306.

[36]Rosenblatt, pp.1448-9.

[37]Lipsky, p.54.

[38]"Ninth Annual Report of the American Jewish Committee", pp.322-3.

[39]Janowsky, p.172.

[40]"Ninth Annual Report", p.353.

[41]Ibid., p.354.

[42]Naomi W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1972), pp.96-7.

[43]Robinson, p.296.

[44]Urofsky and Levy, 3:634-5.

[45]Ibid., 3:635-6.

[46]Ibid., 3:651-3.

[47]Ibid., 3:681-2.

[48]Ibid., 3:655-6.

[49]Janowsky, p.174.

Chapter Two

[1]Urofsky and Levy, 4:10.

[2]American Jewish Year Book, 1916-1917, p. 89.

[3]Roth, p. 273.

[4]Brandeis, pp.12-15.

[5]Shapiro, p.83.

[6]Roth, p.274.

[7]Shapiro, p.82.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Urofsky and Levy, 4:34.

[10]Urofsky and Levy, 4:103.
Shapiro, p.82.

[11]Urofsky and Levy, p.56.

[12]Reznikoff, II,pp. 513-14.

[13]Urofsy and Levy, 4:619.

[14]Ibid., 4:108-09.

[15]Roth, p.303.

[16]American Hebrew, March 3, 1916, pp.471-72,
American Hebrew, March 10. 1916, p.504 in Roth, pp.315, 317.

[17]New York Times, March 11, 1916, p.7:4 in Roth, pp.318-20.

[18]Jewish Advocate, March 16, 1916, p.1 in Roth, pp.320-21.

[19]Urofsky and Levy, 4:116-17.

[20]Reznikoff, II, pp.514-17.

[21]Urofsky and Levy, 4:133.

[22]American Jewish Historical Society, Preliminary Conference of the American Jewish Congress, Report of Proceedings, March 27-28,1916, p.13.

[23]Ibid., pp.4-12.

[24]Ibid., p.10.

[25]Ibid., pp.20-22.

[26]Ibid., pp.23-27, pp.30-31.

[27]Ibid., pp. 32-33,35.

[28]Ibid., pp.33-35.

[29]Carl Herman Voss, ed., Stephen S. Wise: Servant of the People(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America), 1969, p.60.

[30]Urofsky and Levy, 4:137-38.

[31]Ibid., 4:134-35.

[32]Ibid., 4:137.

[33]Bernard G. Richards, "The American Jewish Congress", The Jewish Communal Register of New York, 1917-1918(New York: Kehillah, 1918), p.1436.

[34]Rosenblatt, p.1450.

[35]Janowsky, p.177,n.23.

[36]Morris Frommer, "The American Jewish Congress: A History, 1914-1950"(Ph.D. diss.: Ohio State University, 1960), p.88.

[37]"Report of the Twenty-Eighth Year of the Jewish Publication Society of America, 1915-16" in the American Jewish Year Book, 1916-1917, pp.423-25.

[38]Adler, pp.300-01.

[39]Frommer, p.88.

[40]Urofsky and Levy, 4:174-5.
Frommer, p.89.

[41]Frommer, p.90.

[42]"The American Jewish Committee, Tenth Annual Report", p.11.

[43]Ibid., p.12.

[44]Adler, pp.300-01.

[45]Robinson, p.304.

[46]Adler, pp.301-04.

[47]Urofsky and Levy, 4:200-04.

[48]Ibid., 4:220-21,n.1; 4:237,n.3.

[49]American Jewish Year Book, 1916-1917, p.95.

[50]Roth, pp.353-4.

[51]Urofsky and Levy, 4:205-06, 211, 233-36.

[52]"The American Jewish Committee, Tenth Annual Report", pp.12-14.

[53]American Jewish Year Book, 1917-1918, p.245.

[54]Adler, p.304.
Shapiro, pp.85-6.

[55]Robinson, pp.307, 312-13.

[56]"The American Jewish Committee, Tenth Annual Report", pp.16-18.

[57]Urofsky and Levy, 4:250-51.

[58]New York Times, July 17, 1916, p.4:2 in Roth, pp.403-07.
American Hebrew, July 21, 1916, pp.334-37,343.

[59]Urofsky and Levy, 4:250-51.

[60]Goren, Dissenter in Zion, pp.154-55.

[61]Reznikoff, II, p.517.

[62]Ibid., II, p.518.

[63]Robinson, pp.315-16.

[64]Urofsky and Levy, 4:250-53.

Chapter Three

[1]Lipsky, p.55.

[2]Janowsky, pp.179-80.

[3]Richards, p.1437.

[4]Janowsky, pp.180-82.

[5]Ibid., p.182.
Frommer, pp.91-2.
Lipsky, pp.55-6.
Shapiro, p.97.
American Jewish Archives, Schiff Collection, Adler to Schiff, July 21, 1916; Marshall to Schiff, August 21, 1916.

[6]Janowsky, p.183.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid., p.184.

[9]Ibid., p.185.

[10]Ibid., pp.185-86.

[11]American Hebrew, August 25, 1916, p.495, September 1, 1916, p.523.

[12]Schiff, Marshall to Schiff, August 21,1916.
American Hebrew, September 5, 1916, p.583.
Frommer, p.94.
Reznikoff, II, pp.519-20.

[13]Janowsky, p.188.

[14]American Jewish Historical Society, "Referendum submitted by Executive Organization Committee for an American Jewish Congress to the Delegates to the Preliminary Conference."

[15]Ibid.

[16]Frommer, p.96.

[17]Schiff, Schiff to Adler, July 23, 1916.

[18]Schiff, Marshall to Schiff, July 22, 1916

[19]Schiff, Adler to Schiff, July 21, 1916

[20]Robinson, p.323.

[21]Reznikoff, II, pp.520-21.
Schiff, Adler to Schiff, June 10, 1916.

[22]Janowsky, pp.188-89.
American Jewish Year Book, 1917-1918, p.245.

[23]Lipsky, p.56.
Frommer, p. 97.
American Hebrew, December 29, 1916, p.266.

[24]Frommer, pp.97-8.
Janowsky, p.189.
Richards, pp.1439-1440.
American Hebrew, December 29, 1916, pp.266-67,269.

[25]American Hebrew, December 29, 1916. p.266.

[26]Schiff, "Minutes of the Administrative Committee of the Executive Committee for an American Jewish Congress, February 25, 1917.
American Hebrew, March 2, 1916, p.526.

[27]American Hebrew, March 16, 1917, p.585.

[28]Schiff, "Letter to Members of the Executive Committee for an American Jewish Congress, April 1, 1917."
American Hebrew, April 16, 1917, pp.746-47.

[29]Schiff, letter from Executive Secretary of the Congress.
American Hebrew April 16,1917, p.747.

[30]Rosenblatt, pp. 1452-53
American Jewish Year Book, 1916-1917, p.246.

[31]American Jewish Year Book, 1917-1918, p.157.

[32]Reznikoff, II, pp.524-25.

[33]Frommer, pp.103-4.

[34]Schiff, Schiff to Adler, July 11, 1916, Adler to Schiff, July 13, 1916.

[35]Schiff, Schneiderman to Schiff, June 21, 1917.

[36]Stephen S. Wise, Challenging Years: The Autobiography of Stephen S. Wise(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), p.206.

[37]Voss, pp.81-2.

[38]Schiff, Letter to the Administrative Committee, July 3, 1917.
Richards, p.1441.

[39]Schiff, Adler to Schiff, July 13, 1917.

[40]Urofsky and Levy, 4:312-13.

[41]Schiff, Letter from Executive Committee for an American Jewish Congress, October 5, 1917

[42]Frommer, p.107.

Chapter Four

[1]Voss, p.74.

[2]Ibid., p.76.
Wise, pp.188-9.

[3]Urofsky and Levy, 4:283.

[4]Ibid., 4:284-45, 287.
Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration(London: Vallentine, Mitchell & Co., 1961), pp.424-26.

[5]Urofsky and Levy, 4:286.

[6]Ibid., 4:288-90.
Melvin I. Urofsky, American Zionism From Herzl to the Holocaust(Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1975), pp.207-08.

[7]Urofsky and Levy, 4:288,294.

[8]Wise, p.189.

[9]David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), pp.722-26.

[10]Stein, pp.504-5,597-8.
Urofsky, American Zionism, pp.211-12.
Stein, pp.505-510.

[12]Urofsky and Levy, 4:316-17.
Stein, pp. 514-30.

[13]Urofsky and Levy, 4:318.

[14]Ibid., 4:316-17.

[15]Harry Barnard, The Forging of an American Jew: The Life and Times of Judge Julian W. Mack(New York: Herzl Press, 1974), p.221.
Wise, p.189.
Urofsky and Levy, 4:319.

[16]Adler, pp.169-176.

[17]Reznikoff, II, pp.708-710.

[18]Schiff, Adler to Schiff, July 13, 1917, Schiff to Adler, July 16, 1917.

[19]Adler, pp.309-17.

[20]Reznikoff, II, pp.710-713.
Shapiro, pp.113-17.
Urofsky, American Zionism, pp.213-14.

[21]Reznikoff, II, pp.714-16.

[22]Ibid., II, pp.716-18, 720-23.

Chapter Five

[1]"Report of a Conversation between Messrs. Roman Dmowski and Louis Marshall at the Plaza Hotel, New York City, on October 6, 1918."

[2]Reznikoff, II, pp.640-5.
American Hebrew, November 29, 1918, p.69.

[3]Urofsy and Levy, 4:360.
Voss, p.84.

[4]Adler, I Have Considered, p.306.

[5]American Hebrew, December 13, 1918, p.145.

[6]Adler, pp.305-06.

[7]American Jewish Congress, "Report of Proceedings of the American Jewish Congress, December, 1918", pp.2-14.

[8]Ibid., pp.14-15

[9]Barnard, pp.205, 213-14.
Urofsky and Levy, 4:351,354.

[10]"Proceedings of the American Jewish Congress", pp.15-19.

[11]Ibid., pp.19-21.

[12]Ibid., pp.23-31.

[13]Ibid., pp.31-33.

[14]Ibid., pp.33-35.

[15]Ibid., pp.43-48.

[16]Ibid., pp.49-52.

[17]Ibid., pp.53-67.
Reznikoff, II, pp.536, 642-3.
American Hebrew, December 27, 1918, p.186.

[18]"Proceedings of the American Jewish Congress", pp.67-8.

[19]Wise, p.195.

[20]Reznikoff, II, pp.538-39.
Schiff, Marshall to Schiff, December 31, 1918, Schiff to Marshall, January 2, 1919.
American Jewish Archives, Julian W. Mack Papers, Report to National Executive Committee Meeting, June 1, 1919.

[21]Robinson, pp.357-60.
Schiff, Schiff to Adler, January 20, 1919.

[22]Urofsky and Levy, 4:374.

[23]Wise, p.196.
Voss, p.85.

[24]American Hebrew, January 31, 1919, p.296.

[25]Robinson, pp.358-9.

[26]American Hebrew, February 7, 1919, p.328; February 14, 1919, pp. 342, 355.

[27]Wise, p.197,
Voss, p.pp.86-7.
Barnard, pp.230-31.
Reznikoff, II, pp.723-24.
American Hebrew, March 7, 1919, p.405.

[28]Cohen, pp.113-14.

Chapter Six

[1]Mack, "Report to National Executive Committee".
American Jewish Historical Society, "Proceedings of Adjourned Session of American Jewish Congress including

Report of Commission to Peace Conference, May 30, 1920", pp.24, 30-31.

[2]Janowsky, pp.268-72.
"Adjourned Session of American Jewish Congress", p.31.

[3]Sister Margaret Regina Thompson, SC, "The Jews and Minorities Treaties, 1918-1929"(Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of America, 1966),35-36.

[4]Janowsky, p.287.
Mack, "Report to National Executive Committee".

[5]Reznikoff, II, pp.540-41.

[6]Schiff, Schneiderman to Schiff, March 16,1919

[7]Adler, I Have Considered, pp.308-9.

[8]Reznikoff, II, pp553-34.

[9]Mack, "Report to National Executive Committee".
Barnard, p.520.
Adler, I Have Considered, p.309.
Reznikoff, II, p.554.
Janowsky, pp.290-92.
Schiff, Richards to Schiff, April 3, 1919.
"Adjourned Session of the American Jewish Congress", pp.24-25.

[10]Adler, I Have Considered, p.310.
Janowsky, pp.294-96.
Barnard, p.251.

[11]American Jewish Committee, "Memorandum of the Proceedings of Representatives of Jewish Organizations of Various Countries, Held at the Hotel Continental, Paris, Monday, March 31, 1919".
Janowsky, pp.267-99.

[12]Frommer, pp.149-51.
Schiff, Richards to Schiff, April 3, 1919.

[13]American Jewish Committee, "Memorandum of the Proceedings of Representatives of Jewish Organizations of Various Countries, Held at the Salle Du Consistoire Israelite, Rue de la Victoire, Saturday, April 5th, 1919".

[14]American Jewish Congress, "Meeting Sunday, April 6th, at the Salle du Consistoire Israelite, Paris".

[15]"Adjourned Session of the American Jewish Congress", pp.31-2.
Mack, "Report to National Executive Committee".

Janowsky, pp.305-07

[16]Barnard, p.250.
Adler, I Have Considered, p.310.
Cohen, p.103.

[17]Janowsky, pp.333-34.

[18]Ibid., pp.335-36.
Thompson, pp.240-41.

[19]Thompson, pp.244-45.
Janowsky, pp.338-39.

[20]Thompson, pp.246-47.
Janowsky, p.339.

[21]Janowsky, pp.340-41.

[22]Ibid., pp.341-42.

[23]Ibid., pp.309-16.

[24]Schiff, Marshall/Adler to Schiff, May 12, 1919.
Robinson, p.369.

[25]Janowsky, pp.316-18.

[26]Wise, pp.179-80.

[27]Adler, I Have Considered, pp313-16.

[28]Ibid., pp. 323-24.
Schiff, Adler to Schiff, June 20,1919.
Janowsky. pp.352-60.

[29]"Adjourned Session of the American Jewish Congress", pp.62-5.

[30]American Hebrew, July 4, 1919. p.182., July 18, 1919, p.238, July 25, 1919, p.258.

[31]Ibid., August 1, 1919, pp.263-64.
Reznikoff, II, pp.545-48.

Conclusion

[1]Schiff, Committee of New York Delegates to the American Jewish Congress to New York Delegates, December 23, 1919.

[2]American Jewish Historical Society, Letter to American Jewish Congress Delegates, May 12, 1920.

[3]"Adjourned Session of the American Jewish Congress", pp21-8.

[4]Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp.308-09.

Bibliography

Archival Material

American Jewish Archives. Cyrus Adler Manuscripts.

_____. Felix Frankfurter Papers. Microfilm.

_____. Julian W. Mack Papers.

_____. Jacob Schiff Collection.

American Jewish Committee. Memoranda of the Proceedings of Meetings of Representatives of Jewish Organizations of Various Countries Held At the Hotel Continental, Paris, March 31, 1919, and at the Salle du Consistoire Israélite, April 5-6, 1919.

American Jewish Historical Society. Preliminary Conference of the American Jewish Congress. Report of Proceedings. March 27-28, 1916.

_____. Proceedings of the Adjourned Session of American Jewish Congress including Report of Commission to Peace Conference. May 20, 1920.

_____. Referendum.

Theses.

Frommer, Morris. "The American Jewish Congress: A History, 1914-1950." Ph.D. diss. Ohio State University, 1960.

Roth, Alvin S. "Backgrounds and Originis of the American Jewish Congress." Rabbinic thesis. Hebrew Union College, 1953.

Thompson, Sister Margaret Regina, SC. "The Jews and Minorities Treatis, 1918-1929." Ph.D. diss. Catholic University of America, 1966.

Books and Published Materials.

Adler, Cyrus. I Have Considered the Days. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1941.

Adler, Cyrus. Jacob H. Schiff, His LIfe and Letters, 2 vols. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1928.

Adler, Cyrus and Margolith, Aaron M. With Firmness to the Right: American Diplomatic Action affecting the Jews, 1840-1945. New York: American Jewish Committee, 1946.

American Hebrew. New York.

The American Jewish Committee. Annual Report. vols.9-14, 1916-1921.

The American Jewish Congress. The American Jewish Congress and Jewish Democracy. New York, 1935.

The American Jewish Congress. Proceedings of the Adjourned Session of American Jewish Congress. New York, 1920.

The American Jewish Congress. To the Jews of America. The Jewish Congress vs. the American Jewish Committee. A Complete Statement with the correspondence between Louis D. Brandeis and Cyrus Adler. New York, 1915.

American Jewish Year Book. 1915/1916-1918/1919. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1916-1919.

Baker, Roy Stannard. Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters. 8 vols.
New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1927-1939.

Barnard, Harry. The Forging of an American Jew: The Life and Times of Judge Julian w. Mack. New York: Herzl Press, 1974.

Best, Gary Dean. To Free A People. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982.

Bonsal, Stephen. Suitors and Supplicants: The Little Nations at Versailles. New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1946.

Cohen, Naomi W. Not Free to Desist. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1972.

DeHaas, Jacob. Louis Dembitz Brandeis. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1929.

Dillon, E. J. The Inside Story of the Peace Conference. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1920.

Goren, Arthur A. Dissenter in Zion. From the Writings of Judah L. Magnes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Goren, Arthur A. New York Jews and the Quest for Community: The Kehillah Experiment, 1908-1922. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.

House, Edward Mandell and Seymour, Charles, eds. What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1920. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921.

Janowsky, Oscar I. The Jews and Minority Rights 1898-1919. New York: Columbia University Press, 1933.

Janowsky, Oscar I. Nationalities and National Minorities. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1945.

Lipsky, Louis. Selected Works. Volume One: Thirty Years of American Zionism. n.p.: The Nesher Publishing Co., 1927.

Lloyd George, David. Memoirs of the Peace Conference. 2 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.

Macartney, C. A. National States and National Minorities. London: Oxford University Press, 1934.

Mack, Julian W. Memorials Submitted to President Wilson Concerning the Status of the Jews of Eastern Europe and in Palestine by Representatives of the American Jewish Congress on March 2, 1919. New York: American Jewish Congress, 1919.

Mair, L. P. The Protection of Minorities: The Working and Scope of the Minorities Treaties Under the League of Nations. London: Christophers, 1928.

Newman, Abraham A. Cyrus Adler: A Biographical Sketch. New York: American Jewish Committee, 1942.

"Report of a Conversation Between Messrs. Roman Dmowski and Louis Marshall." n.p.

Reznikoff, Charles, ed. Louis Marshall: Champion of Liberty, Selected Papers and Addresses. 2 vols. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1957.

Richards, Bernard G. "The American Jewish Congress." in The Jewish Communal Register of New York City 1917-1918. pp.1429-1444. New York: Kehillah of New York City, 1918.

Robinson, Ira, ed. Cyrus Adler, Selected Letters. 2 vols. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1985.

Rosenblatt, Frank F. "National Workmen's Committee on Jewish Rights." in The Jewish Communal Register of New York City. pp.1445-1454. New York: Kehillah of New York City, 1918.

Shapiro, Yonathan, Leadership of the American Zionist Organization, 1897-1930. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971.

Stein, Leonard. The Balfour Declaration. London: Vallentine, Mitchell & Co., 1961.

Urofsky, Melvin I. American Zionism from Herzl to the Holocaust. Garden City, New York: Anchor Press, 1975.

Urofsky, Melvin I. A Voice that Spoke for Justice. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1982.

Urofsky, Melvin I, and Levy, David W. Letters of Louis D. Brandeis. 4 vols. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975.

Voss, Carl Herman, ed. Stephen S. Wise: Servant of the People. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969.

Weizmann, Chaim. Trial and Error. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1949.

Wise, Stephen S. Challenging Years. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949.