

TRANSLATION OF THE SEFER TAGMULE HA NEFESH

o f

ben Samuel ben Eliezer of Verona
Hillel [of Verona]

with a summary of the religious ideas of the Book

A T H E S I S

submitted by

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DEDICATED

to

MY PARENTS

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PREFACE

Hillel B. Samuel, author of the Tagmule Ha Nefesh, Italian physician, philosopher and Talmudist, was born about 1220 and died in 1295. He was the grandson of the Talmudic scholar, Eliezer B. Samuel of Verona. Hillel spent his youth at Barcelona where he studied Talmud and Natural Sciences, his teacher in Talmud being the famous Josiah Gerondi. He became acquainted with the work of Maimonides and soon was one of his most fervent admirers. He studied Medicine at Montpellier and practiced successively at Rome; at Capua where, having attained fame both as a physician and philosopher, he lectured on philosophy; and at Ferrara. In old age he retired to Forli where he lived out his days in straightened circumstances. According to Graetz, he was the founder and promulgator of the scientific method among Italian Jews. He avoided Talmudic one-sidedness by turning his attention to general studies. He was thoroughly acquainted with the Latin language and even translated a Latin work on Surgery into Hebrew. In addition to the Tagmule Ha Nefesh, he was the author of a three chapter Appendix to the Tagmule Ha Nefesh; a Commentary to the Twenty-Five Hakkamot of Maimonides; a revision of the "Liber de Causis"; the Sefer Ha Ezer; a Philosophical Explanation of Canticles; Chirurgia Summi ex Latina in Hebraea Translata.

It is to be regretted that the limitations of this thesis permit only of the translation of the Tagmule Ha Nefesh and a brief synthesis of the religious

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ideas of the book. It is an interesting work and Hillel is an interesting personality. The thought of the book is saturated with Aristotelianism, quite naturally, and profoundly influenced by Maimonides. In addition, for purposes of both proof and disproof, Hillel draws upon his wide knowledge of general Philosophy and Science. He quotes copiously from contemporary and older writers, both Christian and Jewish, Ibn Roshd, Galeus, Alexander, Themistius, Isaac Israeli, and others. A comprehensive study of the Tagmule Ha Nefesh with a view toward evaluating its thought and consequently Hillel's place in Jewish Philosophy would necessitate tracing his ideas back to their original sources and discovering just what is fresh and original in Hillel's own thought. This would be particularly interesting in the matter of his difference with Ibn Roshd as to whether the intellect is part of soul or not. Both of them claim correctness on the basis of Aristotle. An examination of Aristotle on this point in the light of some more modern study would reveal which of them was actually right. The writer found enough interest and stimulus in this work to make him desirous of pursuing the investigation further.

The translation, the major portion of this work, is based on the edition of *S. J. Hallerstein* of Moses Steinschneider, published in Lyck, 1874, whose notes and textual corrections proved of such invaluable assistance that the translation could never have

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been made without them. From his limited knowledge of medieval Hebrew style and construction, the writer can only say that he found the style and sentence structure quite complicated, peculiar and cumbersome. Throughout the book an attempt has been made to preserve closely the literal meaning of the text and at the same time to render the translation into English sentences which will be shorter and less complicated. In places the impossibility of turning the Hebrew idiom into exact English will make the thought seem vague and obscure, but this could not be avoided. Another difficulty in this work is that at times it has been impossible to determine whether Hillel is quoting or paraphrasing the thought of some one else or whether he is presenting his own thought. Whether the translation in all instances brings out the proper division of thought is largely a matter of chance. There are a few cases of misquotation. Either Hillel quoted from memory and erred, or some of them may be mistakes in printing.

In conclusion, it may be stated that the work of this translation, to paraphrase Hillel, has been a rather wearying one, because it involved a great deal of back labor. But it has been profitable work. It has given the writer somewhat of a mastery of the terminology of medieval Jewish Philosophy. It has given him an insight into the methodology of medieval Jewish thinkers, and thus has furnished the foundation for possible future work in this field.

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A word of acknowledgement is due here to Mr. Lauterbach for his aid in tracing some of the Rabbinic references, and to Prof. Cohon for his revisions of the translation.

NOTE: Biographical material obtained from Jewish Encyclopædia article on Hillel b. Samuel and from the German Edition of Graetz, Vol. 7, pp. 161-163.

Book of the Compensations of the Soul

Chapter I

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Said the author Hillel, son of the Chasid Rabbi Samuel, son of the Gaon Eliezer of Verona, of Blessed memory. Although it is known to all scientists that the distinctive possession found in the human species is the soul and its well-being, and that it is the ultimate end of man's existence, despite all this the number of those who do not care to know what it is, what its origin and destiny, exceeds the number of those who do care, so that they number less than one out of a hundred because of their paucity. Furthermore, those who are interested have been unable to arrive at the truth of this difficult problem except to agree that it is profound in itself; and that the length of the preparatory works and the preliminaries essential to lead up to it, together with indolence in study and the many sequences of temporal accidents and the brevity of life, that all those are powerful causes in lessening the attainment of scientific knowledge in any human generation. These circumstances stimulated me to assume the task, in God's name, of making one small, complete work, briefly employing indispensable language in order to furnish illuminating knowledge of the soul to everyone to whom God is near. The work of this treatise, even though it be small in size, has been great for me, because of the weakness of my apprehension and its great importance. I turned to gather these scattered things from the books of those philosophers which are large and spacious, and I arranged them and explained them

briefly with lucidity so that the speculation of them might not be so difficult for those who seek wisdom that they will neglect them. I sought no other profit by this than to attain this purpose of existence, the knowledge of the truth alone, for there is no other single purpose in knowing the truth than to know that it is the truth. This is somewhat similar to what the Rabbis said, "The reward of a commandment is a commandment." Although the explanation of this is that God bestows upon him another commandment, and the two of them are pleasant, yet the entire thing becomes one consideration to the person who understands that explanation. Therefore I intend by this treatise to demonstrate the existence of the soul, its meaning and its compensations, until we shall have arrived at its truth. Then this purpose of existence shall truly be fulfilled for us through a species of wisdom which we know to be true. This is because of the fact that the soul is that thing by which man becomes man, and that it is found in human existence. If so it is not proper that we should forget what it is that produces us, namely, our own existence. Furthermore, it is not proper that we should despair of comprehending that which itself makes us intelligent beings because if we do so we shall not be intelligent beings, not even men, but we shall come into the animal category and that of other creatures. Therefore the prophet warns us, "Do not be like the horse etc." There is yet another great benefit in this speculation. That is, that it is

possible that when a man begins to entertain evil and destructive thoughts on the subject of the rational or intellectual soul (Rationale in the vernacular) he may arrive on account of them at another idea even more evil, as I shall now show you. Suppose there be one of the mass of Israel who, comparing himself with a Chasid, imagines that the soul after being separated from the body attains physical conditions in the species of its compensations and awards, as we see from the cases of allegorical confusion as to the literal meaning of the Biblical verses and the interpretations of the stories in the Talmud. He may also imagine with this notion another and he may think that the soul is physical and he may assert this: Since everything which is subject to physical effects is necessarily physical; and since the soul after its separation is subject to physical effects, namely, physical punishments, therefore it is physical. This inference, although it is possible that all this may not of itself cause great damage, will cause great damage in the way of making it possible to draw from it other false, destructive beliefs. For example, if one seizes upon the conception that the soul, in his rational comprehension, is a body, being what one ordinarily conceives of as that or else very fine or a light or illuminating like the sun, this will immediately force him to conceive that there are material bodies and limited spaces above in the superlunar world. With all this, since it is accepted by all men that the

soul is given from above, on account of his conception that there are material bodies in the superlunar world, he will immediately be forced to the conception that the angels are physical. If he believes that the angels are physical and it has already been proved true to the majority that the angels are emanated from the Glory of God, as the Rabbis explain the verse, "Who coverest thyself with light as with a garment"; and since it is known that that which emanates first emanates only that which is like it; from this he will conclude that God himself is a material body. As soon as he arrives at this point, he arrives at the destructibility of the soul, the perishability of matter and the denial of the existence of God. Behold what happens to him! Therefore I have endeavored to demonstrate in this treatise of mine what is sufficient for one who seeks the truth, as you shall see. I have divided it into two chapters. In the first chapter, I shall demonstrate seven matters concerning the soul, and throughout this entire section there will enter an important definition for the purpose of strengthening the Holy Faith. Therefore, because of its importance, I have set apart a division for it. In the first chapter I shall also explain briefly three types of intellect and the matter of identification of the soul with the Active Intellect. In the second chapter I shall explain the truth of the compensations of the soul which are destined for it by way of reward and punishment after its separation from the body. Then I shall strengthen my arguments with passages from the Bible and the

Talmud and I shall explain many things that appear at first glance to one who does not understand as contradicting the subject that I aim at. When my intention has been carried out in this book I shall entitle it, *Compensations of the Soul*. I abjure every intelligent person who reads it not to pass over it cursorily but to understand it deliberately, in a spirit free from lust and jealousy, to be zealous of it and then if he sees any errors in it, let him examine them carefully and teach me the truth in God's name. Then I shall accept the superiority of his wisdom as one receives instruction from his master and God shall aid me.

The divisions of the first chapter are seven. (1) I shall demonstrate that the soul exists. (2) I shall demonstrate that it is of itself non-physical, non-material, that it has no distinctive property, that it is non-accidental. (3) I shall demonstrate that it is without movement in the sense of any of the kinds of movements, that it is indivisible, that it is unchangeable in the sense of any of the varieties of change. (4) I shall demonstrate what it is by solving the problem of its definition and I shall give its definition. (5) I shall demonstrate whether it is one or many in its number, and I shall prove at any rate that it is one. (6) The degrees of intellect I said are three and I shall prove their existence by proofs, and I shall show how the intellect which is one part

of the soul finally attains unity with the Cosmic Intellect. This point I shall stress a great deal. (7) I shall demonstrate how our intellect is distinguished from the human soul, and I shall refute the arguments of those who say that ~~it~~ is not soul and that it is not a part of soul.

The divisions of the second chapter are three. In the first I shall give proof for the types of the rewards of the soul and its punishments, whether or not they are material and I shall prove that it is impossible for them to be material. This I shall show from the viewpoint of Divine Justice and from the viewpoint of Natural Science. Secondly, I shall demonstrate what the rewards and punishments really are. Into this will enter many differences that I hold in regard to the words of the Rabbis since it appears on the surface of their arguments that the compensations of the soul are material. However, this is not so. The explanation is as I shall present there.

Chapter I we begin the first division of the first chapter, which is to prove and to demonstrate the existence of the soul. That is, that it exists in the human body and that because of its power, it (the body) lives, obtains nutrition, feels, moves, thinks. We say this because we see that among all natural bodies there are some that obtain nutrition, grow and reproduce, and there are others that do not obtain nutrition, nor grow, nor reproduce, as for example stones. From this

it clearly appears that those that possess these qualities do not have them because of their corporeality, that is, only because they have a body because even stones have bodies yet do not obtain nutrition, nor grow, nor reproduce. Therefore it follows that they possess within themselves another principle which produces a perfection outside of corporeality or materiality. This thing which produces this perfection must of necessity be called the soul. That is, it is the principle which leads to perfection of itself, being additional to perfections which are not of another matter but are voluntary. We shall further prove the truth of this matter in another way, through its accidental qualities. Through them we may know its existence in truth, for this is one of the ways in which the existence of a thing may be confirmed. That is, we may arrive at its existence by knowing its accidental qualities. This is one proof in the manner of those proofs which demonstrate the cause of a thing outside of the thing itself. They are different from the proofs which demonstrate the cause of a thing from two aspects which may be subsumed under one knowledge. The first of these, and this is the real proof, is the assumption of beginninglessness as it differs from intermediary causes, because of all of them the intermediary spaces are things caused and affected from the major end, that is, they are subsequent in their existence, and they are better known to us through the things which precede them.

It is these secondary things that we take as being intermediary spaces, also for two reasons. The first is that they are the things that equal the major end which is the cause of the thing and which also turns upon it. The second is that they are those which the major end includes more of them and the first class, that is, those are of the things which are effects and changing. This is the proposition before us now. There is an analogy to it in the example of one who says that the planets are nearer to us than the fixed stars because their light does not seem to sparkle forward and backward. This is like saying that the planets do not sparkle and those things which do not sparkle are nearer to us. Therefore the planets are nearer to us. Since proximity may be accepted for knowing its existence--which is the object of our investigation--we know by the appearance of the planets that they do not shine. Since the sparkling which is the intermediary space is caused by the nearness, now that the nearness is more perceptible to us, therefore we know that the thing exists because of its accidental qualities. We do likewise in knowing the existence of the soul. We say that although it appears from bodies that they perform voluntary movement and that they feel, this does not come from the two aspects that we spoke of above. Nor is this found in them because of their being bodies or not. If you say that this exists in them because they are bodies, then all bodies would be equal in this respect. Although it is evident that every body must have a form and a specific value attached to

that form. So it is found whenever there is corporeality. Since the sense denies this, therefore it is not so because of their being corporeal, as we said above. Yet another proof is that certainly no manner of body acts upon any manner of thing simply because there is corporeality in it. Because if it were so, the stone would burn the tree as if it were fire. Every activity of a material body needs an efficient cause by which it is acted upon because it is a material body. These two proofs constitute one matter and are dependent upon each other. Another proof similar to these is that a thing which moves must move either of itself or by a motive power outside of itself. If you say that it moves of itself then that which is moved and the mover are one thing. This is impossible because in order to be that which is moved the thing must be a receiver in potentiality, and to move it must be a thing in activity. If any manner of thing moves of itself this thing must be mover and moved in one with one completely balanced movement. Because of this you will find one movement by itself both in potentiality and in activity, in one thing, at one time, with potentiality and activity combined at one time, according to one manner and according to one arrangement. All this is entirely impossible. Therefore, since there is no manner of thing which moves of itself and the body does move, it follows of necessity that something exists outside of it which moves it. It is impossible that this thing be material

as I have proven. Therefore we say that it is an imaterial thing and that it is the soul. Yet another proof is that we see bodies sustaining life and feeling; and anything which sustains life has within it an existible tendency in potentiality to sustain life before it sustains life in actuality; if not it would be unable to sustain life and no manner of power goes from potentiality to actuality except from something that is in actuality because whenever there is nothing in actuality it is unable to give to itself, how much the more is it unable to give to anything outside of itself any manner of existence in actuality. Therefore everything which is moved in actuality is moved by the power of a thing in actuality outside of itself, and everything which sustains life in actuality sustains it by a thing in actuality outside of itself. That thing you call soul or anything else that you wish. But this is the name of the power relative to that which is called soul and because the soul is that by which life is sustained and everything which sustains life does so because of the soul. For this reason it is fitting that that thing by which bodies are life-sustained should be called soul. This name is not given to it because of its formation nor because of its essence but because of its government of bodies and its relation to them. Therefore the soul is that which bestows life upon bodies and gives them feeling and voluntary movement. This is the subject of Avicenna's inquiry in the beginning of his Sixth

Book on Physics. And in the first part of his book on Medicine at the end of the chapter, "Psychic Faculties", he says that the soul is the cause of all the faculties, that from it come the movements and the various bodily activities, and that it is also the cause of rational conceptions. This is like a definition of the soul. Furthermore he says in his Sixth Book that it must be said of the soul that it is a part from the compositeness of a living thing which is composed of two aspects. The first is that it is a part of what the thing is when it is in actuality. Secondly, that it is a part of that which is in relation of subject to the other. If the soul be of the second alternative, namely, something which the compound is in potentiality, then the body would be either of the class of that alternative or not. And if it be of that class then the compound of psychic and vegetative would be neither of body nor of soul for the reason that this class is neither soul nor body because of the proofs which I advanced above. Therefore it is perforce necessary that this treatise refer to the first alternative. It must be inferred from this that the soul is that thing which sustains life and gives life because in actuality it gives and sustains life. The formation of the human form exists because of the formation of this form principle which is its form principle in actuality. And the material body is distinct from the human composition, not because it is a body, but because it is a primary difference

in actuality. And the material body is distinct from the human composition, not because it is a body, but because it is a primary difference coming from the psychic and the vegetative soul, namely, from that thing upon which it depends as a form principle. But it is possible to say of the soul that it is a product or a possession or a force in relation to the products which come from it. Then it would be called actual from one point of view of its being conceived in relation to perceiving and intellectual forms which it receives. Because of this it is said of it that it has two species of activity, the activity of acquisition which manifests itself in wisdom, and the activity of faculties. This second is divided into many part, into the activity of psychic and physical faculties and the activity of habit faculties. And the writers say also a simple faculty which is intellect alone and an activity compounded both of faculties and activities. Some say that the soul has two functions in activity, namely, a primary and secondary function. The primary is that by which it distinguished man from beasts, that is to say, the human form principle, which is that by which man becomes man in actuality. The secondary is that which gives faculties and activities. But all these things go into one disposition through different modes of expression. Thus far I have clearly proved that the soul exists.

Second Division. I shall here demonstrate that it is something which is incorporeal

without peculiarity, without accident. From this we shall prove that it is an essence. We must say that the soul from any point of view is one of two things. Either it is an essence or it is an accident for all of existence is included in these. That it is an accident is impossible because accident is, according to Aristotle, that which can be conceived of as existing or as non-existing or as decaying and yet its subject remaining permanent. That is to say, that for its substratum to exist it is not necessary that it should exist, and if it be destroyed the destruction of its substratum does not necessarily follow. Now, it cannot be imagined under any circumstance the existence of the body apart from the soul after the departure of the soul. Nor can we imagine the existence of the body from the soul without the existence of the soul in it. Therefore it is not an accident. There is yet another proof. That is, that the accident, even the accident without incorporeal being, is not a thing which remains permanent in a species but travels from species to species like color, smell and similar things which travel from species to species. But the soul never travels from the species of that which contains life to the species of that which does not contain life, namely, to the species of stones or minerals. If you say that it is possible for the peculiarity to be of that kind which is found in every species and always permanent in it without traveling from it to another species, as for example

laughter and writing in man, even though the individual may be destroyed, e. g., Every man laughs and everything which laughs is man. This it is impossible to say of the soul from two aspects. First, that though the peculiarity is found in every species, it is not found in it constantly in activity but it is very often in potentiality for no man actually laughs all the time and yet he is always actually a man. The same applies to all peculiarities without distinction. But about the soul such an existence is inconceivable because it is impossible for a man to exist without actually containing life and still actually remain a man, because the body of a dead person is not called a man just as a pierced or blind eye is not called an eye. If you find any manner of peculiarity which is constantly actually in a species, like the two legs of a man, it passes from it to another species, for he is on a par in this respect with the birds, something which is not true of the soul. The same fact holds true of many accidents without distinction for they are like peculiarity in that they also pass from species to species, all the more since they do not make known suggestions of their substance (or what is like them.) Also they are not turned from subject to object because we do not call every black thing a raven nor every black person a Cushite, although it may be possible to produce their likenesses in artificial forms. But all this cannot be applied to the soul. Secondly, there is no manner of peculiarity or distinguishable

accident in man except it be one of two kinds, as Isaac Israeli says in his Sefer Ha Yesodoth. First, that there are some natural activities from the faculties of the soul, as for example laughter. Second, there are some natural acts of the body coming from the very nature of the body. For example, the jaundice manifests itself in the face because the green gall has become powerful in the body. Third, there are some natural activities from the sense faculties. For example, a man perceives himself to be a worker of a certain type or a designer of a certain type. When a long time has passed in perceiving it, it becomes fixed in his soul until it becomes for him the foremost attribute. And since the senses are among the activities of the soul, therefore everything comes back to it since it is the form principle. Therefore it is not a peculiarity but it is the cause of peculiarities. Furthermore, the accidental and peculiar matters received by the body alone without agents offer of themselves some kind of activity, but the soul is the activity of all the activities of the body without acting itself for behold there is no manner of change in its essence as we proved before. Therefore, since it is not an accident nor anything like an accident, it necessarily follows that it is a substance, a substance related to accident, for among existing things there is nothing outside of substance and accident or something connected with accident. Further, since it has already been proved under the subject of substance according

to Plato that anything which is one in number and undergoes many changes is a substance; and that anything, which by the fact of its existence a thing becomes what it is and by its non-existence is not what it is or decays, is a substance. The soul is both of these. It is one in number undergoing changing states and by its existence in the body the body contains life as it is and by its non-existence the body does not contain life. Therefore it is a substance. After I have proved that it is a substance it is necessary that we examine further what kind of a substance it is, whether it is a form substance or whether it is a material bodily substance. We say that it is not a material, bodily substance. That is to say, it is not a material body. This we must prove. It is possible that the reader will be astonished and say that this proof is superfluous and unnecessary because we have already seen above in the proof of the existence of the soul that it is not a body. We reply to this that the inquiries concerning the truth of a matter are four according to the philosophers. If it is? What it is? How it is? Why it is? Each one of these four has a separate and distinct evidence for itself by which it is verified. But many times there befalls an accident in proving the first as in proving the others. Just as an accident is possible in the case of demonstrating if the thing is, how much the more in demonstrating what it is. Because of all this we need not be restrained from repetition in demonstrating what it is, in order to make clear by proof distinct for it that it is an evidence essential to it. So the matter stands with this in which we are now

engaged. That is to say, although in the first inquiry--if the soul exists--the demonstration of the proof (inferred by us from accident) that it exists, the proof of what it is we need not regard similar because we wish to show that the human body has a soul for the purpose of governing it. That is, that it does not govern itself nor does the body receive its nature of itself without something else outside it. In this proof we must infer that this thing is outside of the body, not that we wish to show by this any essential proof about what the soul itself is until we come to the place of the proof necessary for the problem of substance, to the second question, which is, what it is. If you say, let the proof come from any source and the proof that comes to us from everywhere is sufficient, we reply that by this additional affirmation the second of the inquiries will be analyzed, you will grasp the evidence and you will be more convinced that the question of substance and not of accident is the essential point to guide us.

Now we return to the subject and say that it is impossible for the soul to be a material substance. This we shall prove by many proofs essential to it. First, that every body has parts, that every body possesses motion and that every body changes. If every body is subject to these accidental qualities and does not escape them either potentially or actually and the soul escapes all of them as we shall prove; that is, it neither moves by itself nor is it divided nor does it change in substance and nothing escapes these except that which is not a material

body; therefore the soul is not a material body. Secondly, if you say that the soul is a material body, it cannot escape being a material body for one of two reasons, namely, it is either a body containing life or it is a body without containing life. If you say that it is a body containing life and that it moves our body, this being felt by us, it is known that it would not be able to move it except if it were also moved with it, as has already been shown by Aristotle. In an introduction to the Book on Physics, he says that every body that moves a body must necessarily be moved along with it in moving it, from the beginning of the movement until the end. If not it would not be able to move it. This is because anything which is in any way a body would be unable to move a body with which it is not constantly in contact. If it is in contact with it, it is necessary, from any point of view, that it be moved along with it. Since it is necessary that it be moved with it in some manner of being moved and not moving itself, as has been demonstrated for us in another introduction, it follows from this of necessity that there exists yet another soul which you call a body in order that it may move this one in order that it may move our body; and you must tack on also another to be composed of another soul, and another to another, and this is already false. Furthermore, is it not true that we have never seen that other body which gives life to it which you say moves our body and man has never felt it. Therefore these are foolish words. If you say that the soul is a body which does

not contain life, this is more clearly foolish than the first argument and it is unnecessary to discuss it. Thus I have clearly proven by demonstrable proofs that the soul is without body, without accident, without peculiarity. It remains for us to conclude because of the force of these negative proofs that it is only a form substance. There are still other proofs for this but these are enough for you now because I like brevity. If you doubt this and say, have we not seen that the soul goes down into the body when it becomes attached to it and goes up from it when it departs; and that these two are clearly movements in it, for they are motions in space which is more truly a species of motion than any other motion; and since it moves in space and everything that moves in space is a body, therefore it is a body. I reply that this descent and ascent are only applied to it by way of figure of speech or by way of metaphor. Because, if it were possessed of movement by descent and ascent in space, that movement could not escape being one of three natural movements, namely, toward the middle, away from the middle and around the middle with a motion which circumscribes the middle. It is not necessary to say that you do not think that it encircles but you only thought that it descends and ascends. Even so, according to your words, it has two motions, toward the middle and away from the middle. It is impossible for it to have these two natural motions because of its very nature. For it is impossible for one thing by itself to have two opposite motions that are natural to it like these. The movement toward

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the middle is descent and away from the middle is ascent, and it is impossible for any manner of body by its very nature to both ascend and descend, for if so it would be heavy and light at the same time. If it be true that the cause of descent is heaviness and the cause of ascent is lightness, then both of them would be found in one body. This is false. If so, it is left for you to say that if one is natural to it, the other must be due to external force. If you say that the descent is natural to it, then the ascent must be due to external force. It is known in Science that everything by its very nature descends and ascends due to external force. If any moving force causes it to move upward, it must of necessity return to its position and natural center in a short time, and not remain, just as in the case of the forced ascent of a stone upward. So it is with the soul. This is false. If you say, thus God decreed that it be left above thus departing from the natural way which you started; and further, because of this, the descent of the soul to the body, to this destructible matter, is a movement natural to her and the ascent to the world of pure light is an accident and a coerced movement, these words are foolish and not worthy of mention. If you say on the other hand that the movement of descent is the one which is forced upon it, and the ascent is the one which is natural to it like the ascent of the elemental fire which comes down from above by a compulsion which brings it down according to the causes of its elevation and that it ascends naturally to return to its element. Even this cannot

be established because if the ascent were more fitting to it because of its nature and belonged to it naturally, then the ascent of the soul of the righteous man upward when it departs from the body and returns to its source would not be accounted to it as a happiness or a recompense or a reward from God, but it would be a natural matter incumbent upon it because of its very nature, like the ascent of the elemental fire upward. It would follow because of this that the punishment of the soul of the wicked is compulsory in the descent of his soul to Sheol and the ascent of the soul of the righteous is natural and not according to the law of reward. All these ways are false. Therefore it is left for you to say of necessity that there is not in its substance any of the species of motion; and when we say ascent and descent of it this is only metaphorically for purposes of clarity. The attachment of the soul to the body is no descent from space nor is its detachment from it an ascent into space, for we already know that there is no space ascribed to that degree whence it comes and where it returns, for above the sphere there is no body nor anything bounded by space nor even space, and if there is no space there, then it cannot descend from space nor can it ascend to space. Even when it comes into the body it cannot be said of it that it comes into space for it is in the body like a form with matter, and not like an object in space or an object in a vessel. These are of the nine things which Aristotle speaks about in the "Cosmology", which he mentions in order.

But it is attached to the body by a form attachment giving perfection to the matter just as Aristotle says in the "De anima", that it is not posterior to the body like a pilot to a ship as Plato thought, but it is posterior to it like form to matter. He says of it that it is the primary part which makes the human body a rational creature. In its departure its ascent is the return of an emanated thing to the spiritual degree from which it was emanated, or the preservation of that emanation for the degree of pure spirit, and this is its glory and honor. At times it is possible to make the return if you are worthy. Thus far I have stripped from it the movement of ascent and descent when it comes into the body and when it departs from it. There still remains to strip from it the movement in substance while it is attached to the body, for it seems that it is moved with the motion of the body. Therefore it is necessary to remove this difficulty and to say.

Third Division. Since it is true that everything which moves something outside of itself either is a mover without being moved or is moved of itself when the other moves, it is necessary that we posit in the soul one of these. If you say that the soul is moved of itself when it moves the body, it is impossible for it to be moved by any of six motions which come in the four definitions of the ten categories, i.e., substance, quantity, quality, space. In substance come two complementary motions which are existence and destructibility. In quantity come growth and decay.

In quality comes one motion and this is the change from one state to another, from heat to cold, from white to black and similarly. The change is when it becomes something after changing that which is found in it in essence; whether the substratum remains permanent in it or not. Yet another species of movement enters and under it there are yet other species. This is the species of movement which is primary in Nature to all other motions, that is, the movement by which heavenly bodies are moved. Now we shall prove that it is impossible for the soul to be in motion when the body is in motion in the manner of any of these motions. If it is not moved in any of these ways, it is not moved at all in essence because there exists no other species of motion besides these. We shall begin with the motion of substance and say that it does not move with the motion of substance because the motion of substance is either in production or in destruction. If you say that the soul moves in order to come into being, then it is only a matter of becoming and becoming is nothing but entering into the process of becoming substance. Therefore, when the soul moves for the purpose of coming into being, then it decays in the process of becoming, every movement and every hour that it moves, and when it grows old it has entered into the substance of soul and has come into being. As many times as it enters into substance it is made another substance different from the substance that it previously had. Or you may have to say that it was an accident before it was made a substance, being daily created out of nothing and existing

here in the form of substances without end, from changing activities and designs without end, and this is clearly false. If so, it is impossible for it to be moved in order to come into being, when it moves the body, and that it should be moved for the purpose of destruction is likewise impossible from the force of a proven analogy to the analogy which we used in connection with coming into being. Nor is it moved by the motion of quantity because that motion is made toward growth and decay. Toward growth it is impossible that it be moved when it moves it, for if so that soul which is moved a greater length of time would be considered greater. Because of this it would be greater and larger in quantity in elders than in youths and in youths more than in children. This is false and delusory because the soul does not undergo increase in its quantity according to the increase in years. Increase and decrease apply only to a coming into being, destructible, material substance. Increase is caused by the material body coming in from its coming into being and entering into dimensions of the material body, length, breadth and depth. All these are certainly impossible for the soul. That it should be moved toward decrease is also impossible by the force of the proven analogy to the one we used in connection with increase. Nor does it move in the direction of spacial motion because spacial motion is from space to space, either like from the middle or toward the middle; or it is in a space like around the middle and especially in connection with circular bodies where space is interior. No one of these can be established of the soul for behold we see that it moves the body toward every direction in the

world, and if it is not moved by a natural nor by an artificial movement, how much the more is it not by a coerced movement. For if it were by a coerced movement then no living thing would possess any voluntary motion at any time, and we constantly see voluntary motions in the living body like sitting down and walking and so forth. Toward the motion of quality or active state it does not move either even though it would appear at first consideration that it ought to be moved by this species of motion more than by others, when we see that it changes to joy and misery and anger and tranquillity, and so forth--and change is the principle of motion as has been explained. It is necessary to say that it does not move by this species in substance because the transformation is a change in quality, and the end of the change, after the change has been effected, is when the changed thing is not left with the form of the quality which it had in advance. But it strips this off and dons another more accidental form. For example, you say that the white garment changes itself in quality when it strips off the form of whiteness and dons the form of blackness and there is no whiteness left. If the soul were to change itself in this manner it would have to change in substance from quality to quality at all times, and it would not remain as it is in substance but become something else while it is moving. It would follow because of this that while it is in motion it should be changed and yet not changed at the same time. This is false. Furthermore, if it changes in quality while moving the body,

it follows from this that with everything that it moves it should be in motion toward psychic dispositions. That is to say, toward joy or toward grief, toward anger or toward calm, toward fear or toward confidence and toward all the rest of the accidental qualities of the soul. And it could be constantly changing in its voluntary acts and dispositions toward more good or more evil. So that in the end the state of the living body would not be left with any one disposition even for an instant. Certainly we see that apparently during a majority of the times it stops moving toward any disposition and is not in grief and does not rejoice and is not angry and does not laugh. Therefore it is not moved by the motion of quality. If you say: So we not constantly see that it gives us all the accidental qualities of the soul. Therefore it is surely moved by quality and undergoes changes and changes are the principle of motion as has been explained. To this we reply that it does not have these by virtue of its own essence but by virtue of the mixed material forces which it receives because of its unity with the body, for we already know that the faculties of the soul are produced after its admixture with the body as Galen maintains in all his books. These material faculties come from the union of the soul with the body and are varied and changing. Certainly it does not possess them because of that by which it is a soul as Aristotle says in the first section of his discussion of the soul that to understand, to love and to hate are not the sort of activity which comes from the soul but one of those

which a man has because of that which he is; that upon the destruction of this you do not remember and you do not love etc. It follows from this that it does not have them just because it is a soul but by virtue of being joined with the body. They use the phrase "to understand" perhaps to mean what Ibn Rosha thought, that the intellect is not soul nor a part of soul but it is distinct from soul, and he calls it soul by association as will be presently pointed out in the Seventh section. Therefore it has been clearly proven that it is not moved in substance with the motion of the body. But that motion is a motion of that part which is of the species of accident, as Our Master Moses said in his Sixth Hakdamah and he compared it to the motion of the nail with the corner. He says that when the parts of an aggregate move with the whole, it must be said that they move because of the accident that affects the aggregate, namely, as a part. And since the soul is that part which gives and sustains life, that because of it the thing becomes what it is in actuality--and that which gives and sustains life moves--it must be said of it that it moves with it when it moves. But he says this in a round-about manner and not exactly. After I have proven that it is without movement it remains to prove also that it is without division either potentially or actually, even though I ascribed the phrase "part" to it above. This was not said from the viewpoint of dependence but because it is like a part of a living thing, in the sense of a formal or efficient cause. Not that it is possessed of divisible quantity like a nail is

part of its double. We begin to affirm this by the use of the analogy that everything which is a composition may be divided and everything which is without composition is indivisible. Since that which is without material body is without composition, therefore that which is without material body is without division. Further it may be deduced that since the soul is without material body as I have amply proven, therefore the soul is indivisible, because there is no material body imagined in it nor the possibility of any that it should undergo division and not motion. This proof alone is sufficient. But on top of this I shall prove similarly through natural science. I shall say that it is impossible to discover any divisibility in anything, unless it be in essence possessed of division, composed of parts and divisible into parts. This is nothing but the law of division and composition, namely, the distinction between each part of a thing and the thing itself and their union into something outside of it. If you say that the parts of the soul are in this manner you cannot escape its being divisible either potentially or actually. If you say that by its very nature it must be divisible in potentiality, then it follows perforce that it should be divisible in actuality, any soul at any time. If not, this potential existence within it would be worthless. So Aristotle maintains in every one of his books in every thing that he says about potentiality. If you say that it is true that it actually divides while in the body you cannot escape one of two alternatives. Either every part of the aggregate of the parts is

what the whole thing is in its entirety or it is something else. If you say that in the smallest part of it it is what it is in its entirety, then it grows, lives, feels, moves, perceives. If these are the things by which the soul is defined, according to Aristotle in the "De Anima", then every single one of these parts set off by itself would produce all these faculties. It would result because of this that these faculties would be multiplied many times without any semblance of need, in accordance with the number of parts, for according to your argument it would actually be divided into parts. This is excessively false and there is no proof in it which needs refutation. If you say that it is possessed of all these faculties in wholeness, the entire whole being composed of parts constantly joined together, and that since the faculties are dependent upon this unity and combination, therefore it cannot be divided in actuality. I say that that which is at first divisible in potentiality is so later in actuality. If this is so, we are back where we were in the first place, namely, that the divisibility can go into actuality at any time. Therefore, if the divisibility goes into actuality, we are back at the point of folly from which we fled. Now you see that these two ways are both false. I summon to witness for me another great witness who is trustworthy in everything that he says, Rabenu Moshe, who says in his Eleventh Maqamat that some things whose existence depends upon the body are divided according to the division of the body and they divide by accident

like colors etc.; and there are some faculties that give the body its existence which do not divide in any manner, like the soul and the intellect. See that he strips divisibility from the soul entirely. If there be any who doubts the statement of Aristotle which we quoted above, namely, that anything which possesses the potentiality of anything must pass to actuality at some time and in some individual etc.; and he says: Do we not see many things and bodies which possess the potentiality of something and yet never pass to actuality. For indeed it is believed by the majority that the sphere is a material body and thus it is called in scientific works. Since it is a material body it possesses parts and yet it is never actually divided. The answer to their argument has already been furnished by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*. It is only natural that a body be called eternal which comes into being and perishes, only by use of language. Heaven, even though it be said of it that it is a material body, this is not by way of fact but by way of metaphor. Thus it is understood from the second part of the "Cosmology", where Aristotle says that when we speak of Heaven we simply understand a form without matter, as you say a circle or a square which is purely form without matter. But when we say, "this Heaven", matter with form is understood since the Heaven is one of the parts of the world. It seems to me that he means by this that Heaven (in the abstract) means form without matter like anything which is incorporeal, but "this Heaven" means, according to the method of expression, matter and form,

like anything which is composed. It is like saying "whiteness" and "white". There are books that present another version about Heaven and the World. But from both versions it is literally clear that the substance of Heaven is not a material substance but that it is called so by association (equivocations in the vernacular). Nor is it possessed of matter in reality but by association, as it is understood from the "Cosmology", for there it is explained that the sphere has no possibility. If it has no possibility it is not matter as has already been explained in the Physics and in the Metaphysics, that possibility is always joined to potentiality and to matter. So Rabenu Moses explained in the twenty-fourth Haguamah that everything which is in potentiality is of necessity possessed of matter, for possibility is always in matter. If so, it (the sphere) is not possessed of material body nor of matter. If it is not possessed of matter it has no change in substance for matter is the cause of all changes. Furthermore it has no potentiality. And if it has no potentiality it is all the more true that it has no possibility for the reason that possibility is something which is anterior to potentiality and is the only disposition which is found in matter, as I have explained. It follows for us from all this that (the sphere) has no divisibility in potentiality and therefore it cannot be said of it that it is potentially divisible. If so, it is unnecessary that there be produced for us any instance in the world that it is divisible in actuality. So Ibn Rosha explains in the first part of Physics, in the section on

the distinction between sublunar matter in potentiality and non-being. These are his words: From here it appears that everything which is possessed of sublunar matter is subject to becoming and to decaying; until the place where he says: And from here it is clear that the heavenly substances have no matter at all, for if so they would be subject to coming into existence and to ceasing to exist like everything which is possessed of matter. But their nature is not like the nature of things that are here. Furthermore he proves in his book which is called the "Book of the Substance of Heaven" that they are not possessed of matter at all but they are like a substratum only. Here you have the proof that the sphere is possessed neither of matter nor of material body. But he speaks of it in this way just as the name "Dog" is applied to Mercury and to the Pisces. Since it is not possessed of matter it has nothing in potentiality for nothing is found in potentiality except matter. Do not be led astray by what he explains on the proposition of Aristotle which begins, "but whatever has a nature, it is that which it has like its form principle etc." Ibn Rosha says: It appears from this that matter is substance in potentiality and that the form principle is that because of which matter is form in potentiality etc. but he means by this that matter is in substance one of the existing objects of the world in actuality because of the form principle, for were it not for the form principle it would be non-being and it would be without existence in actuality. He speaks there by way of general necessary

explanations for an object which is of itself an object alone, not that it is an object because it is an object compounded of matter and form. To this he really applies the term Nature. It is possible to say from this point of view that it is possible to discover potentiality and actuality in one object together at the same time, and that this is the thing by which that compounded thing exists, and not from something else. This is partly Creationism. It is also possible to say that the matter is in actuality, that is, in the actuality of matter. This is also Creationism. This is the proposition which says that every material body is compounded of matter and form and that this is the cause of its being a material body. Ibn Rosha says that they are not of the First Principles, on this he took issue with Aristotle's Metaphysics. He also is in doubt there whether or not the sphere has any sort of possibility since it is known that it receives its form from another form without any sublunar matter. But in the end he is satisfied that it has no possibility. Even Moses appears to favor that about which Ibn Rosha is in doubt when he says in his Nineteenth Hakhamah: Everything that is a cause for existence is a possibility for existence from the standpoint of its substance etc. And he removes this doubt, as I explained, by the distinction which there is between possibility and potentiality. You must guard against the fact that even if it has any possibility, it is not essential that it be possessed of actuality. Even that which is in potentiality need not pass to actuality in every respect and only

Whatever is not in it now is like them. That is to say, the possibility of divisibility is actually in all bodies because they are possessed of parts divisible in potentiality. For example, patterns and measures, for all such are accidents or frequent occurrences concerning which it must be said that they are in the thing in possibility only. It does not necessarily follow because of their existence in the thing in possibility that they will always come to actuality even in any individual at any time, just as it does not necessarily follow that any wine must turn sour, because the sourness is not in it in potentiality but in possibility. In this way of the possible it may be said that every potentiality is a possibility even though every possibility is not a potentiality, and it may be said that possibility exists even in individuals. But potentiality cannot be said to necessarily pass into actuality except in the case of species, that is to say, in some individual of the individuals of the entire species and at some time. As you say, philosophy exists in the potentiality of the human species. Therefore it would follow that it pass to actuality at any time in any man like Reuben or Simeon or anybody else in the human species at any time like an Aristotle. But with possibility which is only the predisposition toward potentiality, it is possible that philosophy be found in very many individuals. But it would not necessarily follow from this that they would be philosophers because they would in actuality only be predisposed toward this. Possibility is a little like a distant

power. Behold I have reached the place where I can explain the difficulty which has occurred among the philosophers concerning the distinction between potentiality and possibility. Although it is true that it appears at first glance that the two matters are one, it is not so. Rabenu Moses sent a communication to Rabbi Samuel ibn Tibn saying that this matter was very hard and very difficult to arrive at its truth, and that even the most skilled philosophers were confused by it. But behold, I shall explain it to you. Pay attention to it and you shall understand. I say that we find in the Book on Rhetoric in the section on Essentials that possibility is spoken of in connection with that which is in potentiality. But I say that these two titles are derived from two points of view. The logician derives them by way of appearance only. That is, a certain thing means so and so by nominal attribute or word, from the viewpoint of analogy or by way of metaphor or association. The physicist derives them by way of the meaning of existence, that is, from the viewpoint of definition. Therefore we must say that in the Rhetoric he (Aristotle) does not mean what he says from every point of view, but only according to the meaning of the name or attribute or word. That is, the name means so and so. By this he means something else, an analogy to what is in potentiality. Therefore we say that it is established that he says from one point of view that every potentiality is possibility like a word meaning the name of an attribute, as we said. But it is not established that he says that every possibility

is potentiality by definition or by existence. The proof for this is that the Philosopher, when he says in the Rhetoric that possibility is meant for that which is in potentiality, he meant something else, by way of the meaning of an attribute or by way of association. For behold he says that there is no intention in words which are possessed of many phases describing the quality of the subject to the object but their meaning should be attached to the object. And the object certainly has two divisions, whether it is in potentiality or whether it is in actuality. And it is known that the possible does not mean of itself any kind of necessary existence. But it is the reverse of the necessary which also has two divisions, that is, necessary of existence which is called essential, and necessary of non-existence which is called impossibility. Behold, the possible is the opposite of the universal necessity and the medium for particular necessities. That is to say, it is placed between that which is necessary of existence and that which is necessary of non-existence. It becomes then a matter of possibility of existence or possibility of non-existence. This function it is not necessary of existence. But from the point of view that there are essentials running parallel but not connected to the meaning of the truth of one particular thing, it is clear that it is not justified. Because they are not negative we say that it is possible of existence, for the reason that the word negative is denoting those things possessed of alternatives, it is not fitting that it should be posited with an expression of existence with which it connects with the object. For then, the relation of

form to matter, that is, quality to substratum, becomes a relation by negation. Therefore these two parallel expressions distinguishing truth from falsehood become a matter of negation. But when we say that something is possible that it will exist or something is possible that it will not exist, both of these are not negations. But one of them is without negation and the second is that which presents a possibility. If it were also negating the presentation of possibility it would be rendering existence impossible. Thus you see that possibility can be considered the medium for individual essentials only under one assumption, that is, by that which is not by way of an absolute essential by positing the necessity of the parallel, and that is when we say that something is possible of existence or possible that it will exist. This way of possibility is not considered a perfect medium between the necessary and the impossible, for behold, one of its alternatives is in itself necessarily non-existent. For example, that about which it is said that it is impossible that it should exist is one thing of itself with incontrovertible non-being and the exact opposite of incontrovertible existence. I have dwelt a bit lengthily on the explanation of possibility in order to show you that that possibility about which the philosopher said that it is ascribed to that which is in potentiality, he only meant by it that which was in judgement upon that which was in potentiality, according to the proposition which I mentioned to you before. Not that possibility in a thing and potentiality in a thing were one matter. Behold,

do you not see furthermore that from the possible there may be that which is possible toward that in which there is possibility in itself. This is called a future known possibility. And there may be from it that which is possible only to us and not of itself. This is called an inner past possibility. An example of the first, that it is possible in the future, is when you say that it is possible that Reuben will go to a certain place or it is possible that he will not go. For these two are possibilities in themselves about Reuben, and one is not more natural to him than the other. It is called a known possibility because in the future the possibility may turn to completion from every point of view when it becomes actualized. That is to say, whether he will go or whether he will not go at first has no existence. And now it changes from nothingness to existence and that possibility turns to completion from the point of view of itself and from the point of view of our knowledge. From the point of view of itself, for it is already an existence and has become an existence from nothingness. And also from the point of view of ourselves, since for us the possibility of it has already turned to certainty of it. An illustration of the second, that it is possible in the past, is when you say that it is possible that he went to a certain place or that it is possible that he did not go. They are not now possibilities in themselves in any form for that which is done is done. But they are only possibilities to our knowledge. It is called a vanished possibility because, although that which is a

possibility to us may become our knowledge, that is, it may become known to us that he went or that he did not go, yet it has not changed in itself from that which it was at first. Therefore it is not a possibility from any point of view for even if he did go whatever took place in this matter was what it was. But it is yet within possibility that he will go. And if he did not go and remained in his place, it is yet possible that he will go and that he still remains without having gone, and the question of possibility has changed and turned only from us, that is, from our knowledge. This is what the proposition of Galen contradicts when he says that whatever is possible of itself is like that which is possible in our knowledge. These words are logical and I wrote this book only for him who has used the science of Logic, for some time and is versed in Natural Science. It comes to us in general from what has been said about this, that when it is said of a thing that it possesses possibility, it is not the same thing as when it is said of a thing that it is in potentiality. For whatever is in possibility is something related to the knower by way of meaning alone, as I have said. And whatever is in potentiality is something related to the knower by its existence, even though that existence be deficient. Therefore it is necessary that you place five kinds of distinction between potentiality and possibility. The first is that which I have explained at length. The second is that the possibility is only the pre-disposition which is found in the subject that there is something in it in potentiality, and the

possibility is prior to the potentiality in time and in space, as I said above. An example of this is the sword which is in the piece of iron in potentiality. Yet it is necessary that it should have possibility, so that through it it can pass into actuality, and this is like the power for melting, the stamping out, the whetting, the sharpening until it be a sword in actuality. This is only one pre-disposition of its composition into this material substance, something which is not so of a piece of wood or stone. If so, this material substance needs three things by which it becomes the substance of a form principle in actuality. Two of them are in it. The third is outside of it. The first is the thing as it is in potentiality. The second is the attainment of the possibility which is in pre-disposition to that thing, in order that it should be able to pass to actuality. The third is the efficient cause which brings it from potentiality to actuality. These three are comprised in the category of three known causes, i.e., matter, form, efficient cause. The explanation of this second type will be more enlightening to you, and the illustration for it you will find in another section in which I shall explain the twenty-five categories for the inquiry of anyone who is chosen, desirable, wise--may his soul be with him--who seeks from me that I shall explain to him. The third type is that possibility spoken of concerning the existence of accidents and attributes in a thing which is not in actuality, without having to go into actuality ever for any essential purpose, activity or perfection.

And potentiality may be applied to the existence of active faculties which are in a thing not in actuality, but it is essential that they should pass to actuality at some time, for some essential purpose, activity or perfection. The fourth type is that possibility which can be ascribed even to individuals as I spoke of it above as being something without necessity to pass to actuality. But potentiality, being higher and being necessary to pass to actuality, must be ascribed only to a species. That is to say, that the necessity that it do not pass to actuality is only in the whole species. That is to say, in every species it is impossible that there should not be found a single individual in whom there is not found in actuality what exists in the species in potentiality. But it is not necessary that that potentiality should pass to actuality in every individual of the species.

The fifth is that the thing is something in potentiality from the point of view that there is a certain thing in it in potentiality not conceived by it. Also, there may be said of it only affirmation and not negation. As you say, there is in the seed the form of the man in potentiality, but it is not conceived. But it is not said that the form of the man is in the seed in potentiality but that it is not like the seed in potentiality, because if so, it would justify in the same thing affirmation and negation at the same time. This is false. But it is of the peculiarity of the possible that affirmation and negation may be said of it and conceived in it together, when you say it is possible that it will rain in a few

days with all the potentiality of water, and it is possible that it will not rain. This is from the potentiality of the possible in itself. It follows for us from this that the accident rests beneath the possible which tends toward the object in potentiality. Ibn Roshd says in the Physics, in the section on Accident and Chance: Possibility is applied to three phases, possible under equal conditions, somewhat possible and very possible. We also say that the object in potentiality is not an accident in itself, that is from the point of view of its existing in potentiality. but when it passes to actuality, that passing is related to the accident. That is to say, an accident befell it. When a piece of wood has been made into a box, for a box has been made of it and not a basket; although it is true that at first there existed in it the potentiality of the form of a box and the form of a basket, for it was in the piece of wood to be made of it a box or to be made of it a basket; we say that it is joined to it by possibility, not that it itself is the possible because the possible of which we speak is the predisposition in matter. This predisposition is more material, for you say that there is a predisposition in this piece of wood that it be made either into a box or a basket, which is not true of a piece of iron. but this predisposition which is thus formed into a box or into a basket is formal or special. There is yet another difference between them, but this is enough. And know that you will not find these things in any book known to us. Even the Christian philosophers did not perceive them until I made them clear to them. When they heard them they were very happy and translated them from this book. Praise

be to the Blessed who is great of knowledge! Behold, until now I have tried to prove concerning the soul that it is without division. In this category it has been proved and also made clear that it does not change in substance in any manner of change, and this was sufficient for us by what it appeared. But because this contradiction is more apparent to us than the others, when it is seen that when there befalls a man the accident of joy or glory, it reacts to this and exalts and rejoices and expands all its faculties; and when the opposite befalls him it reacts also to the opposite completely and all its faculties are troubled and its understanding confused; so it appears that it is always changing to voluntary motions and toward artificial dispositions and toward all the activities, from work to work and from thing to thing. We clearly have all these changes from it because it changes us to all of them, and it is known that they come to us only from the soul. If so, it appears that it always changes. And if it changes we have come back to all the difficulties that it was necessary for us to solve above. Therefore the matter before us now is once again to repeat the solution concerning this difficulty and to explain it more clearly so that it may enter the understanding of every deaf and dumb person. I say: Know that there are some substances whose foundation and permanence is completely within themselves without needing anything outside. They are the incorporeal faculties which we call angels, and they are called forms only by way of metaphor. There are forms which are also without

coming into being or destruction and they are generic forms. There are some forms whose foundation is not in themselves. But they need something outside of themselves. They are the faculties which are called material forms, and their existence possesses the possibility to receive matter or to appear in manner and not possibility alone. But this phase is somewhat essential to them from one point of view. That is, they are in the subject of something, and this is the matter, in order that they may become known. These forms are those which are first principles to corporeal substances in order to give them some sort of perfection. They are called material forms and they do not complete themselves. They are in actuality whether or not there exists for them a substratum, this being the material substance, and they come into being and perish. But certainly the existence of this substance is an essential disposition for the existence of the form in actuality. But the rank of this form about which we are speaking, the soul, belongs to it by the grace of God, and the nature of existence makes it essential for it to be attached to the matter of the human body to give it perfection. Some think that it, by its rank and through itself, actually thinks concepts above it in rank. But concepts below her are concepts only in potentiality and not in actuality. Therefore it needs the substratum of something in order that these concepts should also be concepts in actuality. Some say that it does not think of itself and is not intellect but a spiritual substance existing to give the body

bodily perfection. But according to the view of those who say that it of itself
 things in actuality of the root of its existence, it is really no form. But it
 is the degree of divine emanation and it is the primary activity, which does not
 need a body, as Aristotle says. What I say now tends somewhat toward those who
 say that the intellect is indivisible from the soul (and concerning this I shall
 5-x explain at length in the seventh section by the help of God). This you cannot
 imagine, the existence of potentiality and actuality in one thing together from
 one point of view, because whatever it possesses in actuality is only for the
 perfection of its existence and it possesses it from the aspect of its existence,
 and this is its first perfection and ultimate cause. The faculty which it has of
 comprehending these concepts is only from the aspect of the appearance of active
 faculties. That is, it is within its potentiality to have them in actuality.
 From this point of view it needs a substratum like every form. And from this
 point of view only is it related somewhat to the other forms which we mentioned
 above. From every other point of view it is completely different from them.
 These are the two types of actuality which I mentioned previously at the beginning
 of the book. It is necessary for you to know that the sentient faculty is its
 first requisite for receiving all the concepts, as it appears from Aristotle in
 the *De Anima* and in the section on the sensations. There are positive five steps
 in intellectual comprehension. The first is corporeal and this is the appearance

which is perceived outside of the soul. The second is when that appearance is formed in the associative sense. The third is when it is impressed on the imaginative faculty. This is called Phantasy in the vernacular. or on the faculty of apprehension which is called (stimulativo). This is more reliable in comprehension than the first. The fourth is the impression in potentiality on the rational faculty. The fifth is the impression on the faculty of the Retentive Power. Note that in the case of all these psychic concepts, the beginning of their comprehension is the sense. By it all the details are comprehended, and the comprehension of the details brings us to the comprehension of the whole until we comprehend all the elements and we comprehend them stripped of matter. It is known that the soul does not pass to actuality to comprehend these concepts, but by its very existence in the subject. This is one of the peculiarities which the soul has which Aristotle posits for its being of necessity in a body. Galen says in the Book on Chemistry: The sense and the voluntary movement are peculiarities of the soul and natural activities. Therefore the human body is the most precious and important division which exists in this lowly matter, associated by the will of God to be the substratum of the soul. While it is in it, it is one of the active and formal causes. When it ascends and returns it is the active Intellect existing by itself as an ultimate only. Therefore you who entertain the doubt about the soul, when there appear activities by which it acts upon our bodies,

that perhaps it too changes, it is necessary for you to understand what I have explained to you in this Hakdamah, i.e., that the root of this change and its origin is in the category which is outside of the soul. From this aspect, all these changes appear to be from the soul, in the body because they are in the soul and in the soul because they are in the body. But they do not belong to it because of itself at all. That is, because there is in the piece of wood that it be changed to a box because there is wood in it, something which is impossible of a piece of iron; or because there is in the piece of iron to become a sword, something which is impossible of wood or straw. These things do not exist in the soul in this way. They can only be ascribed to it from this point of view, that it is only the form principle in it. That is to say, it needs the subject just as I have explained. And this appears in it according to what is necessarily so from the nature of the thing which is its subject. But from the point of view of its essence, that is, from the point of view that it is a rational soul or a sort of exalted effluence or an ineffable emanation, from this point of view, it certainly does not change at all according to any manner of change outside of the fact that it thinks these concepts and moves these concepts in actuality, in such a way that the intellect and the thinking and the concept become one just as I shall soon explain with the help of God. This is not ascribed to it as a change at all. It is only a method of receiving without change, just as it appears that

the sense changes when it receives the perception of matter. For if it receives a percept, after retaining it, it should become weak on account of this perception. Like the eye which looks at the eye of the sun, the faculty of its vision becomes weak. This is not so with regard to the faculty of the intellect, for when it thinks a concept, after it has taken hold of the concept, it does not become weaker because of this. But the speculation on it by the intellect increases afterwards more than in the beginning. The reason for this is that which I mentioned before, because the sense faculty is mixed with the material subject and therefore it undergoes the change and the activities, since it is a fact that matter is the essential cause for undergoing changes. But the rational faculty is not mixed with a material subject, for behold you see that it does not receive or comprehend any sort of concept unless it is stripped of its matter, and this is so because the thing conceived exists outside the soul as matter and in the soul as form. For example, the soul perceives the species of the thing and therefore you see that the intellect perceives at one time two opposing concepts, just as we see that it perceives the time in which the thing exists in the past and in the future together. Also it perceives the diagonal and the square with the apothem, and it perceives that it is different as to its side. Also the soul perceives fire and is not made fire. It is impossible for all of these to be perceived unless they are forms stripped of matter. Therefore, the soul does not

change at all in receiving them. Those changes, concerning which we doubt, that appear to us in the soul are only because of one temporary disposition in this attachment, that is, of the design that joins soul and body together just as I said above. Ibn Rosha says something similar to this in his commentary. Concerning the matter of the material intellect he says that one aggregate of a concept has a substratum composed of aggregates. The first is that by which it is true of itself, from the point of view of its existence. The second is that by which it is one of the objects of the world. He calls it an aggregate from the point of view that it is one part in one way because the thing of which it is an aggregate is not known to the soul as being true or false. By this method the composite substratum would be an aggregate in potentiality because it is confused in parts. It would be like any one of the percepts which are in potentiality. By this method the aggregate is not one of the external objects, that which is called an aggregate, because the aggregate, because of the fact that it is an external object, is divided into what corresponds to the parts. He says: Since it is true that the aggregate has such a compounded substratum, despite all this it cannot be changed or acted upon from the point of view of the substratum, that because of which it is true and on account of which it passes from potentiality to actuality. Therefore it is necessary for it to be so at all time and in any way. On account of this the task comes continually to the soul. Therefore from the point of view of the substratum in which there are external objects, it has no kind of change,

but it only receives in it without any changes or changing states just as it lights and distinguishes the thing from that which is limited and distinguished. Note that the words of Rosha follow my thought. And he furthermore informs us why it becomes wearied with toil.

Know, thou who looks in to this book, that this doubt, concerning which we are troubled, aroused my spirit to reveal the secrets of very important interpretations about the soul, and things which you will not find explained in philosophical books. You would not even be able to understand them clearly after great difficulty and close speculation. I placed them before you illuminated as the sun at noon-day. With the help of God I shall continue the explanation about the intellect and in what sphere it rests and I shall explain this very clearly. Now, my brother, see with your eyes and understand with your mind how truly true, lucid and profit I have shown you about the soul concerning its being immaterial, without motion, without transformation, without change and how much we have avoided attributing to it even one of these accidents. If we are thus careful in reflecting about the soul and in getting the truth of its essence, then we shall have a firm hold and grasp its truth according to everything which has been said, that it is only an emanation emanated from the emanation of an emanator. If so, what shall you say concerning the One who emanated it from His majesty and produced it from His glory. May His name be blessed and His memory exalted, just as it is

said, "The candle of the Lord is the soul of man." And how it can be imagined or made similar to Him so that for even one of these accidents may be attributed to it is forbidden so to think to any one who is of the sect of Moses our Master, peace be to him! After I have proven that it is a form substance, by this I have completed three of the problems which are "if", "how", and "what". It remains now to explain the fourth division, and that is to give its definition briefly and in it I shall include the "why", that is, the fourth problem.

FOURTH DIVISION. The soul is one degree of emanation. It is a form substance constituting its own essence, standing by itself in the fourth degree of creatures, after the degree of the Active Intellect, giving the primary perfection to the natural body, emanating from the true, good, perfect man, in final cause God through the medium of transcendent powers which are above it in a higher degree. This is the definition. Aristotle defines it in a similar manner in the second section of the Soul and says that it is the first cause in a natural, organic body etc. But this definition which I have written here is like the definition of the emanation, so I shall explain briefly the cause of the "why", that is, why it exists and for what purpose it exists. Furthermore, He sheds upon it the light of the Active Intellect in order to reduce all of its faculties from potentiality to activity, and in order that the perceived thing may turn from it into the activity of the Active Intellect. and then from the union of this matter the

intellect and the perceiver and the percept will be one thing from every point of view just as Rabbi Moses has explained to us in the first chapter of the "Moreh Nebuchim". He says that a man, before he perceives a thing here, perceives it in potentiality, and when he perceives a thing with its form pure of its matter, and forms its image in his intellect besides that which is found there, this is the image which is the Active Intellect, and that percept he establishes from this Active Intellect and it remains in the intellect. And this man, in whom this intellectual image has fastened itself, in him are found these three things in actuality, because the intellect by itself is nothing without the concept. In this connection he produces the example of the tree and he elaborates upon it a great deal. Also Al Farabi the philosopher in the book "Postulates of Existing Things" explains the matter and he connects this matter of the Active Intellect with the rational power in man just as the sun is related to the vision. That is to say, the sun gives light to the vision. And the vision of the light which it gets from the sun becomes seeing in actuality after it is seeing in potentiality, and the powers of the light itself see the sun itself because it is the cause why seeing in potentiality becomes seeing in actuality. Of light, also, the powers seen in potentiality become seen in actuality. So the latter is with the Active Intellect because it gives to the soul that thing which is impressed on the rational faculty. Just as that thing which is impressed is connected with

the rational soul as light is connected with vision. By that thing itself the rational soul perceives the Active Intellect and through it brings things perceived in potentiality to percepts in actuality. Because of this the man who is reflective in capacity becomes reflective in actuality. He becomes intellect and thinker in his essence after not being so and he comes to it since he is incorporeal. This it is which is the activity of intellect in man and therefore it is called Active. This activity of the Active Intellect in the soul is first in the material intellect, that is to say, the possibility which is called rational. For just as the darkness is illumined from the light so the potential intellect is illumined from the radiance of the faculty of the Active Intellect. Because of this activity which the Active Intellect exerts upon it, it comes to be speculative intellect. After that it ascends from this sphere and becomes Active Intellect according to the way which we have said. The Active Intellect is one of the ten incorporeal degrees as has been explained in his books by Al Farabi. And this intellect which is perceived in us is the comprehension of pure principles without intermediary. There is a difference between the intellect and wisdom for wisdom is the comprehension of principles through an intermediary, that is, through the medium of the intellect. Furthermore, wisdom is speculation after proofs in aggregate by means of recognizing the particulars. But it is evident that the faculty of the intellect is related to the aggregates or to that by

which aggregates act upon particulars. It is further my desire to explain the essence of the three kinds of intellect. But it seems to me that it is proper to precede with the fifth division about the soul, and to examine it to see whether all the souls which are in human beings are one soul in genus just as the light of the sun is all from one body, that is to say, the species of the sun, although it sheds splendour and light without limit upon the inhabitants of the earth. Or like the heat which produces many heats according to its subjects and objects and despite all this is only one heat. Or whether the souls of mundane creatures are many in number according to the bodies which are found here. And whether every day new souls are created, poured into bodies which are coming into being. In this speculation there is a dispute between schools. One school says that all of it is one in number, just as I have said, and this is Ibn Rosnd and all those who follow his understanding. Also concerning the material intellect it is said that it is one for all mundane creatures, and it is said that it is not soul nor a part of soul but it is merely called soul by association or by way of metaphor and not that it is so in reality. Another school says that the souls poured into the bodies of earthly men are many according to the number of the bodies which are found here. and that they are created new every day when the bodies are born. and that the intellect also is created new just as they, and that it is a part of the soul. but even according to their words it does not perish with the death of

the rest of the soul like feeling and the rest, but it remains forever after death. The Christian philosophers follow this view and say that to believe that the souls of all men are one is an heretical belief. They say that according to this, of all the souls of men only one would be saved when all of them return to being one. Also that only one would be punished. Therefore, according to this, punishment and reward would fall on the one soul itself at one time and that all this is false and a perjurious thing unconstructive of all religions and faiths. I say that their words and proofs in this respect are very correct and seemingly acceptable to every believer. But for the philosophers of Israel I have not found to this very day that they have examined this matter. Even from the words of the written Torah it is impossible to arrive at the truth of this matter because there are some verses which indicate that the souls are many and some which indicate that it is all one. From some of the words of our Rabbis we can infer that the souls are created from one to many, and if they are so created they are certainly many. From some we can infer that it is all of it a primal creation remaining in one place and not created over time. Therefore I desire to set aside for this matter the fifth section by itself, for this is an important matter and the investigation of it is fitting and necessary. I shall review in it some of the ideas of the schools and their proofs, and afterwards I shall show to him who would understand verses from the Scriptures and from the words of the Rabbis. Although it would be seeming to begin with the latter, I shall begin with the others because they are demonstrable proofs.

FIFTH DIVISION. Ibn Roshd' says in his explanations to the *De Anima* in showing that the soul is one in number in all the men of the world even if we see from it plurality in accidents. He says: These souls which all worldly creatures have are either many in number in the substance of their creations--and they cannot avoid one of two alternatives--or they are a creation all of it at one time in actuality, or they are created anew from day to day and created with the coming into being of the body and each one poured into the body set aside for it. Both of these alternatives are void and impossible of being. That all of it is a creation together in actuality constantly is a false thing, because since the soul is a form as we have proven and as has been clearly demonstrated, then there would exist in actuality, at one time forms without end. This is false, because it is a form brought to the matter of the human body to be its perfecting form. With the existence of forms brought to matter without limit would follow perforce the existence with them of matters in actuality also without limit, because it is impossible for a form to exist without matter or matter without form in actuality, of the forms set aside for bodies. Because if they are forms set aside for bodies they would be existing thus constantly from the beginning without body. Their existence would thus be useless for what use or what need would they serve existing thus, since there would not yet have existed a body for them and the body and the form are in the category of unity. And if there would actually exist bodies without limit, it would perforce necessitate the existence of spaces without limit. This

is as false as the first and more so, for behold because of this it would be necessary that there be from the beginning of the world bodies existing according to the number of the souls remaining constantly for such creation, and there would not come into being any more bodies from that time to this day. Therefore the first consideration is null and void.

The second consideration, that is, that they are constantly created anew from day to day and created as the bodies come into existence into which they are to be poured, this also is false because if they are created anew constantly, then they are not so in actuality because everything which is created, the possibility of its creation must precede it in time and it must exist in potentiality. It has already been set down in proven propositions that they are forms. All of the forms exists in actuality from the point of view of its own existence. Although you may see that a certain form is like matter in potentiality, this potentiality is not from the point of view of itself but from the point of view of the matter which is prepared to receive different forms one after another. It may be said of matter that a certain matter is in it in potentiality. All the more is this true of natural generic forms which cleave, of course, with their bodies and they exist in them in actuality because they are the perfection for their bodies just as the human form with the man and the vegetable with the vegetables. And so with the individuals of any species just as the form of the palm tree with the palm tree and the cabbage with the cabbage. But in the case of divine forms the matter

is not so. Everywhere the divine forms like the soul are constantly in actuality, therefore it is impossible that their existence should be left according to this way, since it is one degree of the psychic species in essence, in number, many in the accident of subjects just as the example which I used above. Furthermore, if you say that they are created continually every day, this cannot escape one of two alternatives. Either they are produced from nothing, or they are produced from something that exists. The first is void, that is, their existing from nothing because for an object to come into existence without existing is an impossible thing. If not from the angle of creation, then it is a miracle and we do not believe in impossibilities except for the area of a faith that compels it. The second is also void because the existent state out of which they come must of necessity be either form or matter because as yet no principle exists outside of these. Creation has no place here since we have already disproven existence out of nothing. If you say that these existences out of which they come are matter, this is more null than the first because, if it were so, according to this the form would come into being out of the matter, from which we must infer that that which was in actuality came out of that which was in potentiality, and that which is perfect in itself would exist and come into being out of the wanting. All this is a false and accidental thing. And if you say that that state of existence out of which they are produced is a form, this also is null like the first and is possible, because if it were so the form would come into being from a form, and not only one

from another, but forms from forms without limit. It would follow from this that the forms are existent in potentiality and come into being and perish, one into the other continually. But in fact the contrary has been proven, namely, that matter is the cause for coming into being and perishing, and that the form is without coming into being and without perishing of itself from the point of view that it is a form. This is a true proposition. Therefore all these distinctions are false, and it remains that all the souls are one in essence and in number, many in the accident of substratum, and that it is one degree of emanation poured into the substratums which are proper for its reception just as in the case of the sun and its radiance, which I used above, or like a point which is one and there come from it the beginnings of many lines. These are the two proofs of Ibn Rushd that all souls are one in species and in number. He has yet another proof when he says that if the souls are created the intellects are also created with them, and then the intellects would also be distinct and created, and everything which is created is something which comes into being and everything that comes into being perishes, if so then the active intellects which belong to them perish and are not eternal. But Aristotle said that the intellect is deathless, imperishable and eternal and everybody believes this. He has yet other proofs but this is sufficient for any intelligent person.

Now I desire to begin by mentioning a few verses which indicate likewise and a few which indicate the opposite. Scripture says, "And he breathed into his

nostrils the spirit of life and man became a living soul." Since it says that man became a living soul, the literal meaning is that he put in him one spirit and a soul in which there was the power to give life to others. That is, one spirit in number emanates the power of many spirits and that is why he might have said simply "spirit" and it would have been sufficient. But he goes on and says "spirit of life" on account of the spirit itself because it is impossible to find a spirit which does not give life. For this purpose it was created and for no other reason. Furthermore he goes back and explains, "And man became a living soul." That is to say, a soul which possessed enough life for something outside of itself. Do not be astonished at this explanation and let it not appear far-fetched to you because it is not my own but I found it written literally thus in the words of our teachers in the Midrash which is called Sefer ha Chof. Our Rabbis say, the righteous could create a world, for it is written, ⁴ "Your sins shall make a distinction between you and your God," and it is written, "let Thou hast made him but little lower than God." The Midrash wonders about this and says, Has a man a soul to bring it into him, and it answers, Yes, for is it not written, "And he breathed into his nostrils the breath of life," that is to say, the breath in which there is power to give life to the body. Thus far the Midrash letter by letter. How it is possible to produce spirit from spirit and in what way I shall show later. Furthermore the prophet says, "He gives soul concerning it to the ⁵ God" and spirit to go in it," the literal meaning being one soul for all the

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inhabitants of the world. Furthermore Ezekiah says, "As God liveth who made for us this soul." He says "lonu" and he says "zoth" but he does not say "nefosheth elen". Furthermore he says, "Who fashions their heart one to understand their uses?" That is to say, although he says "yachad", the literal meaning of which is that there is some sort of divisibility like the word "yachadov" and "yachad" implies a collection of parts, he goes back and explains that there is no sort of division. He says "libom" in the singular but he does not say "libosom" or "levavchen". And the explanation of "halev" is either a soul in many places or it is a word referring to a faculty of the soul. Further, there is that which says, "And the soul of the Almighty will give them understanding," the literal meaning being that it is one soul prepared for all humane creatures. Further, there is what Solomon says, "Who knows the spirit of men, whether it ascends up-ward." He says "ruach" in the singular and he also says "haolam" in the singular but he says "anoshim". That is, that it is one for all of them. Furthermore, "And the spirit returns to God who gave it." We find many verses which imply that they are many just as "all these souls are mine etc." Or, "He purifies the souls of his saints," "He atones for your souls," and many like these. I say that one verse that implies that they are one outweighs all the verses which imply that they are many because the verses that imply plurality do not deny that they are one. Hence, it is possible that it be called one or many figuratively for I

* Ezekiah

have shown above that they are both true and that it is one in species, in essence, many in number and in the accident of the bodies which are caused from its faculties just as the command of a king which is spread among many men. Furthermore, the verses which imply that it is one are very clearly with regard to the existence of the essence of the soul, particularly, just as, "Who made for us this soul," and, "Who gives soul to the people for it." And the verses which imply that they are many refer to the activities, to the qualities and to the faculties and not to the existence of its essence particularly. Therefore, do you not see that even blood is called soul by way of metaphor. Even the blood of a dead person is called soul just as they interpret, "To all the souls of the dead he may not come." But we find one verse which more implies the plural number in the essence of its creation than all the rest of the verses. This is, "For the spirit shall be wrapped about me and the souls I have made." This implies their being many in number and in substance and that they are all a creation from the beginning because it says "Qisim". The Rabbis explain it that the Son of David will not come until all the souls which are in bodies shall perish, its explanation being one treasure whose name is Qisim. I found in commentaries to the Se Anima that there is a school of great philosophers who believe that the soul has another body which does not perish or it is never separated from it and that it endows the faculties of souls to all men. When I saw this, lest God permit this philosopher or, or also to go away after that sort of knowledge and call it a treasury--and this is a very

foolish belief--it is therefore necessary to circumvent the words of that philosopher in another way in order that they may not have any sort of basis upon which to stand. I am going to present this explanation with the help of God and I shall make known that the words are not according to their literal meaning but they are spoken with a more important and truer intent. But it is necessary to understand the literal meaning of the verse thus. "A spirit will go forth from Me." This hints at the emanation which is called psychic emanation and therefore he put it in the singular. "And I have made souls," refers to the species of faculties which are predicated in the bodies. This means that the emanation is a psychic species for all the souls when it produces itself "from before Me", meaning that it comes forth "from Me". "And they are emanated from My Glory immediately," and "I have made souls," mean that there emanate from that spirit many faculties in number according to the individuals of the world. This is a marvelous virtue in the power of God, Blessed be He. Therefore He is glorified for it. The "wrapping up" is used by way of metaphor. It is like obtaining permission from before a Lord. At first one stands before him with bared head and without garment, as it is written in Perek Shabbas: "With head bared and hands folded and praying like a servant stands before his master." Thus is the custom of the world before kings and rulers and after receiving the petition one wraps himself in his garment and goes out. It is necessary to know that the word "ruach" is very common as a homonym for soul in a general sense, as for example, "And the spirit returns to

God who gave it." Also for the vital faculty, as for example, "Everything in whose nostril is the breath of the spirit of life." Also for the will, as for example, "My spirit shall not judge man,"¹⁸ "Whatever there is a spirit to go."¹⁹ Also for anger and passion, as for example, "Better is he who conquers his spirit that he who captures a city."²⁰ Also for the restraint of spirit and the breathing of spirit as for example, "His spirit was at ease, the waters were scattered by clouds and winds."²¹ Therefore the phrase, "My spirit is wrapped up within me" may be interpreted either as will or as soul. The word "neshamah" is also a homonym for the rational soul, as for example, "And the soul of the Almighty shall give them understanding." Also for the breath of life which is breathed into man, as for example, "Everything in whose nostril there is the soul of a living spirit." See that the verse implies rather that they are many as I have already explained to you and I have connected it with things similar to it. See how the Rabbis explained it Chagigah when they speak of the Heaven in which are righteousness and justice, the treasures of life, the treasures of peace, the treasures of blessing and the soul of the righteous and the souls and the spirits which are destined for creation etc. Note that they say "nismoson" in the singular and they do not say "nismosehen" as they say later, "and the souls and spirits which are destined for creation." They mean by this that the species of the souls is only one and by "souls and spirits" they mean the faculties which are later emanated from that one, and they are called souls and spirits because they are many according to their

subjects from day to day. There were some who explain "the soul of the righteous" to mean those who are already dead. But this is not seeming for behold it exists beneath the Throne of Glory, for it is a more exalted degree than the Sphere and even before the Schechinah in reality. "With the righteous shall I behold Thy Presence." Likewise, "May the soul of my Lord be bound up as the binding up of life with the Lord thy God." ²² Therefore it is necessary to explain "the soul of the righteous" as those destined to be born into the world, as the souls and spirits which are destined for creation. They say "righteous" because the species of the "neshamah" is all of it perfect and righteous and there is no flaw in it in all of its essence. You are not to understand from this that there is another spirit which is not of the righteous--God forbid! This would be heresy. Even those who explain the "righteous" as those who are already dead, there is no proof in this that the souls are many, but one, because it is written "nishmoson". Furthermore it is true that Rabenu Moses said in the seventy-eighth chapter of the Moreh Nebuchim that when one examines their words that they meant when they said souls and spirits those which are destined to be created, the souls which come into existence with man when he comes into existence, that they are only a design; and when they said "soul of the righteous" it must not be understood by this the soul of the righteous who are already dead, but it means the part of the soul which survives after death, the spirit which remains after death, that is, the rational part. The rest of the faculties like feeling and stimulation and movement are

all destroyed with the perishing of the body when it dies and returns to nothing. In this respect all the philosophers are agreed that nothing is left after death of the soul except the rational part alone. I am going to show that even feeling and stimulation are left. It is necessary to wonder a bit about the words of Rabenu Moses when he says that they are only a design because from the words of Aristotle it appears that the existible intellect is the design existing for the soul as I shall show with the help of God, and that the soul is not only a design for the body but a perfection of form, and his words need explanation. It is possible that we can arrive at an explanation of him from that which they say, "And the souls and spirits which are destined for creation." For this saying is astonishing and very ambiguous from its context. That is, if they are destined for creation, then they have not yet been created, and they are in a state of non-being, for they do not exist in any of the species of creations and they are not in any place in the world. If so, how is it that they are in Heaven which is a figure of speech for something which exists in essence. Therefore it is possible that this destiny which they bespeak for them is the design which Rabenu Moses talks about. That is, for example, the state of non-being which is called the first natural cause in accident from the point of view of its becoming attached to something and preparing itself to receive different forms one after another as has been explained in the Physics. We can explain the words of our teacher yet in other clearer ways, that is, that they are the design of the body for receiving the psychic faculties

according to the statement of the Philosopher who said in the definition of the soul that it is the first cause in the body, meaning that by it the living body comes into life, and afterward are produced in it the rest of the rational powers. Everything that I have explained in these matters of the verses and of what follows from them is very fitting and sufficient for the verses which I have produced in this connection. I have explained that they imply thus and thus and I have set them forth according to that which is more plausible. It remains to show that even with its being one in essence, in species and in number, nevertheless it is possible that from that one are emanated many individual souls in the manner of the emanating of the emanation of one sphere after another; that every soul is unique by itself; that it is produced day by day for each individual body. We are not hindered from believing this by saying, how is it possible that a form should be produced from a form without coming into being and perishing as Ibn Roshd wanted to prove, for we shall return to him and say that every activity of coming into existence and perishing is perforce done by corporeal substances, through the method of actual contact of one with the other, but the activity of spiritual, form substances which is a distinct activity, to it cannot be ascribed actual contact at all, because it is not confined by limit of time, distance or place which makes it necessary for it to do thus. So that it is clear that in the case of existing objects and the intellects which are in the objects, the one necessitates the existence of the other by way of emanation. From this point of view you may ascribe to them

some sort of compositeness, so that it may be said that from the point of view that the first of the intellects perceives itself, it produces from it an intellect outside of itself, and from the point of view that it perceives its cause it necessitates the existence of a sphere. In this way itself you can conceive of the soul. That is, from one degree of soul there follows necessarily the existence of many degrees of souls since all of them are perfecting forms and so are constantly created anew each day. After death there is left of every soul the rational part, that is, that which the soul received from the Active Intellect by means of the existible intellect, until that part returns to the degree of the incorporeal activity just as I shall show below. That is the part which is prepared to receive the recompense of rewards and punishments in each man. That degree from which they are divided is the degree of Divine Emanation. In it there is nothing appertaining to any sort of recompense except concerning those which are emanated from it day by day. Note that by this reflection we have arrived at the truth of the possibility of all the souls being one and we have explained all the verses which imply their being many, and some of the commentaries which imply likewise. We have established the salvation of the soul and the rewards and punishments as religious principles, and there is peace for Israel.

I endeavored to establish the possibility of the opinion of those who say that all of it is one because that opinion can be proven by clear, demonstrable proofs necessitating their reception by the rational processes and agreeing in the

main with the verses of the Torah. If any sort of doubt is born from it concerning the salvation of souls I shall warn against it. So you will be aware of it and this will be the peace between Reason and Faith when both of them are established. But the other knowledge, that is, that they are many in number, each one distinct and created from day to day, has no sort of clear basis. But it is faith alone without reason and judgement. That faith neither strengthens the one who believes in that type of knowledge nor does it weaken the one who believes in it. But it is more strengthened if we add to it the modes of reason which is the foundation of the world and therefore it is fitting for every intelligent person to choose it. Know that this section is very essential in this treatise for important matters are discussed in it and all of them are necessary. If you do not find these things explained and proved in any book in the world, I shall explain them briefly here.

The reason why Reuben is a righteous man and Bilhom a wicked fellow, although it is true that all souls are one and derived from one source all of which is righteous and pure, I shall explain presently in a separate chapter, with the help of God. After I have finished making known my intention I shall return to the place from which I departed, and that is to explain the three degrees of intellect according to the philosophy of Roshd and Alexander and Themistius, the commentators on the books of Aristotle, for these things are made clearer for us from the writings of these men that the explanation which we get from Aristotle's formulation. For, according to my way of thinking, they arranged them and developed

them minutely and arrived at the meaning of his words. Since it appears so to me, it is sufficient to write their words like this letter by letter as one translates from book to book. So I shall do. And when it seems to me that it does not suffice for this book to write their words verbatim I shall add whatever is necessary so that they may become more and more clear to the student and they shall stand out perfectly clear. But what I shall add I have taken from the books of Aristotle or from what we understand from him because it is not my own and I do not desire a garment that does not belong to me.

I shall begin in the beginning by making known that there are in the intellect three species or degrees of intellect, that is, the existible intellect applied in the books of Roshd to the corporeal, and this is the rational faculty; and the acquired intellect which is the speculative; and the Active Intellect. These exist necessarily. This I shall show by clear proofs from the words of Aristotle. Afterwards I shall show how it is possible and necessary to have the union of the existible intellect with the Active intellect by its comprehension of the Incorporeal, Active Intellect and its subsequent becoming what it is. This is the sixth section and I shall begin with what Roshd says in his book about the intellect in the name of Alexander.

SIXTH SECTION. Says Ibn Roshd in the name of Alexander by whom was explained the way which appeared necessary to us to obtain the examination of the Intellect according to that which we understood of the words of Aristotle. This because it

has already been explained in the *De Anima* that the speculation concerning the soul is like the speculation concerning the sense. Just as, in order to complete the activity of the sense, three essential things are necessary, so it is necessary to say of the soul. The three things by which are completed the activities of the sense are these. The first is the receptive faculty, that is, the faculty of sense (*sentier* or *sentitiva* in the vernacular). The second is the thing which is outside, that is, the perceived form and it is the demonstrable thing, that which is the thing perceived and apprehended. The third is the thing which brings the percept to the sense, that is, the space which being intermediary transfers the percept to the sense. So the intellect has these three, the receptive faculty which is the faculty of the rational intellect which is like the faculty of the perceiver combined with the percept; the faculty of contact which brings the concept to the intellect which is like that which brings the percept to the sense. This is the reflective intellect called the acquired intellect or that which is by acquisition (*acquisto* in the vernacular). The third faculty of perception is the active which is outside in actuality, which is like the thing perceived and apprehended. It is that whose degree becomes by that apprehension the corporeal degree of the percept to the sense, just as the activity of the sense faculty is not complete except when it receives the percept, so the material intellect is not completed except by receiving the concept and it becomes the Active Intellect. After

it receives it, this material intellect is conceived by it and it is completed and established. Then the thinker becomes concept and the concept thinker, all one. But the material intellect conceives the efficient cause lacking in its reflective element, that is, by means of the intellect which is by acquisition which thinks all the material forms. For it is like a medium between material and incorporeal forms in the categories of reflection and perception. And it is from the point of view of its perceiving that the material forms become more important than matter. By relation to it the Active Intellect is more imperfect. But afterward it comes to conceive in the end its efficient cause with a perfect comprehension and becomes one with it. Its degree is exalted by this for it exists by conceiving itself just as do the incorporeal intellects, and all the potential concepts near it become concepts in actuality. It has no manner of potential concept left. Because of this it appears that matter has then no manner of permanence in activity, but it exists in the class of perishables. Thus far Alexander. Ibn Rosha adds that the reflective intellect comes into being and perishes and is without eternity and he discusses it a great deal. But Aristotle does not speak of it. But when he speaks of the Active Intellect he speaks of the intellect which is by acquisition and it seems that this is the reflective and that they are one, and that there is nothing else except the existible intellect, produced and complete (activora or activo in the vernacular). For example, any one of the concepts in potentiality of the intellect which it receives from the doer and then receives the concepts

stripped of matter, that is, it perceives the generic species of the things stripped of matter and limited, is called the acquired intellect. That is, it has then acquisition by nature and the perception stripped and defined. It has also the power to come to the doer and this is a power already perfected in it by its nature. But when the perception is complete in actuality so that it perceives actually completely, then it is called Active Intellect. Since he shows well the existence of these intellects briefly and arranges them without any sort of proof, it is necessary now to recount the proofs which they have for them and to show logically how the material intellect becomes one with the Active Intellect, and to warn concerning all the difficulties which attach themselves to this union, that is, on account of those who would like to say that this union is without the existible intellect.

First I shall propose three propositions drawn from the meaning of Aristotle's formulation according to the commentators on his books. The first is that it is necessary that there exist an intellect whose relation to the material intellect is the relation of the percept to the sense. The second is that since it is true that there exists an intellect whose relation to the material intellect is the relation of the percept to the sense, and the material sense is able to perceive the percept as a relation of the percept to the sense. The third is, that it has already been demonstrated in the *De Anima* that anything which has power over a thing in potentiality, it follows necessarily that its existence be in that thing

in actuality at the end in order to become one of the individuals of the species. If not, this existence would be for nothing and Nature does nothing wastefully. If so, since it remains that the material intellect has power in potentiality over the intellect which exists above in actuality, it follows from every point of view that in the end it goes to it in actuality. The last two of these propositions are true, known in themselves. But the first which says that there is an intellect existing outside in actuality whose relation to the senses is the relation of the percept which is in actuality to the sense which is in potentiality has not yet been very clearly explained. It is necessary to ponder over it and to say that perhaps it is not so because it is not incumbent upon us to say that that which we conceive is like that which we perceive. Because if it were so there would exist an intellect which would move the material intellect just as there is a percept outside of the soul in actuality moving the sense. But the relations are not alike for behold the concept, whose relation to the material intellect is the relation of the percept to the sense, is in the soul and the percept is outside of the soul. Just as Aristotle said that we comprehend the species from the thing. That is, the form of the thing is in the intellect and its matter we comprehend in the sense. Thus the comprehension of the form by the intellect is like the comprehension of the straight line and the comprehension of matter by sense is like the comprehension of an approximate line. Therefore we may fall into error. Plato thought that there are aggregate forms stripped of matter in actuality and that

they were the cause of the knowledge of all the individuals that exist as well as the species, called Ideas. That is, imaginative things (similitudine in the vernacular). God, Blessed be He, established them and created all the particulars like seeing (speculi in the vernacular). It is like all the forms which are in the soul of the artisan. The artisan knows them although he does not know how to make them out of nothing. But God, Blessed be He, knows them and makes them according to his will. Augustine explains and says that the species (ideas) are not another thing but universals coming after the existence of God as he arranges them. His words in this respect are very far-fetched. The thought of Plato is that every individual has a species (Idea) which belongs to it above and that is the cause of the existence of the individuals. These species (Ideas) are universals. Furthermore, we said that the relations were not alike. That is, the relation of the concepts to the intellect is not like the relation of the percepts to the sense. This is so from every point of view for, behold, the rational soul assumes the species of the reflective concepts but the sensible soul does not assume the species of the percepts. The sense when it perceives in actuality does not become the percept itself, for if it were so, when we perceive fire the sense would become fire, but the intellect when it conceives in actuality becomes the concept itself from every point of view. Therefore it is left to explain in this introduction how the comprehension by which the material intellect comprehends the incorporeal is related to the comprehension of the percept by the sense. After

that I shall show by what the relations are held together and by what they are separated. We say that it is self-evident knowledge that we are possessed of intellect in potentiality, that is, that there exists in us the disposition to receive intellect. Were it not for this we would be like ordinary wild animals (*animali bruti*). Since we are possessed of intellect we also know that the intellect does not exist in us actually but potentially. This is known to us from the point of view of reflecting upon all existing objects, natural or divine. We do not comprehend them until after some time and after long, constant reflection and investigation of natural matters, by comprehending the universals from the particulars through syllogism and also by comprehending those things which go contrary to the natural order, through psychic faculties, one after the other, just as we perceive. After that we shall imagine and after that we shall comprehend that we are not intelligent beings until there be perfected in us the comprehension of natural existences. From this we shall rise to the comprehension of divinity. If our intellect were all of it in actuality it would not come to us thus. Therefore these accidents clearly teach us that we have intellect in potentiality. Since we find our essences becoming strong in the reflection of concepts of which at first we were ignorant, and when all of them become known and there is left no manner of thing hidden from us, then we shall know of a certainty that although we were intelligent beings first in potentiality, now we have become intelligent in

actuality. This first concept even dialecticians will sense if they put their minds to it. After we know clearly that our intellect goes from potentiality to actuality, it is further known clearly that our intellect which we possessed in potentiality does not move to this perfection of itself and that our own essence does not actualize itself. But we know further clearly that there is an actualizer outside of it which performs this actualization and this activity, since we know from the first concept that no product may act upon itself. Since we know this from a first concept without any sort of proof, immediately it is further known to us that this actualizer is intellect itself in activity because everything which performs an act is intellect or intelligent being perforce. It is necessary that this actualizer be of the species of the actualized potentiality because whatever gives anything to something outside of itself gives from its species necessarily that which is of its form. Just as the craftsman when he makes a box does not make it only because he is a craftsman but he makes it from whatever form of the box there is in his intellect in actuality. He is the actualizer of the form of the box into actuality from the piece of wood which was there in potentiality, since we already know that everything which gives form is form in actuality; and everything which gives an efficient cause it is perforce necessary that it be also in activity just as the fire gives heat in actuality because it is itself in actuality. So is the matter of the Active Intellect in connection with our intellect point for point. This is what Aristotle meant in the *De Anima* that it is necessary that there exist an intellect conceiving everything and an intellect making everything a concept as

in the case of light with vision etc. From all these we are obliged to know clearly from first concepts, one thing after another, each following from one outside of it that there is an intellect which exists in actuality which actualizes our intellect from potentiality into actuality. This is what Rabenu Moses meant when he spoke of the Tenth Intellect, that is, the Active, because the proof for its existence is the transition of our intellect from potentiality to actuality. Behold I have clearly proven how the first explanation becomes necessarily true, that is, that it is necessary that there should exist an Active Intellect which reaches the material intellect, the relationship between them being the relation of the percept to the sense. This explanation is more necessary to clear proof than the others and by its becoming true the others become true.

Now I shall return to prove by what relations they are joined and by what they are separated. I shall say concerning this that the intellect which conceives the concepts is the receptive faculty alone and not the active faculty, like the sense which receives the percept. By this it is connected with it partly, that is, by the receptivity alone, by that which is the receptacle. But it is necessary to examine this, that is, if the receptivity of the intellect which is in potentiality toward the concepts which are in actuality and its being affected by them is like the receptivity of the sense for the percept and its being affected by it, or whether it is in another category. The truth of this distinction has been pointed out by Aristotle who says that it is necessary that the nature of the receptivity

of the intellect be in this respect different and distinct from the nature of the sense and that the term receptivity is applied to both of them by homonym. Because it is known that the intellect comprehends all the errors, it follows from this that it is not a faculty in the body unfolded in it and divided whenever it becomes divided as we see in the case of the sense faculties which are unfolded in the body and part of them divide with it. This we shall prove with many proofs. The first is, that if it were a receptive faculty in the body like the receptivity of the senses, it would only comprehend a specific form from among the forms, because specific subjects receive only specific forms. Just as every sense only receives the sense which is peculiar to it for the sense of sight does not comprehend the sense of taste. Secondly, if it were a faculty in the body possessed of a specific form it would not comprehend the form specifically designed for its comprehension. If the eye were colored the faculty of sight would not be able to receive colors. And so with the rest as has been said in the second part of the *De Anima*. Thirdly, if it were a receptive faculty in the body like the sense, it would be acted upon and perishable because of taking hold of the concepts just as the sense is acted upon through taking hold of the percepts. Therefore Aristotle says similarly by way of example, if it is for reflecting like it is for feeling and for sustaining any sort of thing, it will have a similar effect from the concept. Fourthly, if the receptive faculty of the sense in the body is like the receptivity of that which possesses distinct form, it would not comprehend itself

because the sense faculties do not comprehend themselves. Their ultimate purpose is the comprehension of something outside. According to my words it may appear somewhat that the faculty of the sense will feel that it is feeling and this requires reflection of itself. This we will postpone to another place. Fifthly, if it were a specific faculty in the body for receiving like the sense receptivity there would happen to it what happens to the sense. When it perceives one percept it does not perceive another percept which is contrary to it, at the same time that it perceives the other. If it does receive them it receives it in a manner which is anomalous and the mastery is like the faculty of a disturbed force. Therefore Aristotle says that the intellect is not mingled with matter for if it were it would not receive changes and if it receives them it receives them anomalously. Therefore he says that it may be said of the intellect that it is like the sense in one way, that is, in the way that it receives only by the generic method. By this method it may be said that it is established to receive the conceptual species, namely, the material forms, and it belongs to them potentially by its nature just as the sense which potentially belongs to the percepts. Just as the sense has percepts in potentiality before it senses, and the sense itself is not one with the sense faculty by this method for the sense faculty, that is the feeling capacity, is in actuality and the sense is in potentiality, according to the knowledge of Aristotle. In this he refutes the thought of Empedocles and the other ancients who said that we recognize earth because it is earth and water because it is water,

by which they meant to say that the sense is itself in actuality. There is yet a great difference between the intellect and the sense for the intellect recognizes the whole thing because it comprehends the universals, and the sense not so because it comprehends only particulars. The intellect recognizes the whole thing because it is not mixed with matter. The ancients erred in this respect for they thought that the soul needs to be compounded of all matters in actuality in order that it may recognize all matters. This is a great mistake because exactly the opposite is necessary. I shall speak further about this presently, with the help of God.

Now we shall return to our point and say that after it has been explained of the material intellect what we have said, it appears to some of the commentators from his (Aristotle's) own words that he meant that that portion of the perfection which the soul has is called material intellect or existible or rational faculty; that it has no sort of nature distinct in itself but another nature, that of possibility or disposition alone. And this possibility is not like the rest of the possibilities because they exist in the material substratum. Because of this we would have to say that this possibility is forever in matter. This possibility is not. Therefore Aristotle says that the intellect is not something which exists before it thinks but it is by its very nature in potentiality toward the concepts, and it is made into actuality when it actually thinks them just as the sense is actualized when it actually senses. Therefore Aristotle says that

the intellect is not something which exists before it thinks but it is by its very nature in potentiality toward the concepts and is actualized when it actually thinks them just as the sense is actualized when it actually feels. Therefore Aristotle says that it is because of it and with it that one reflects and it is that by which the soul conceives and it is not something in actuality. Themistius comments that it is not one of those things which exist in actuality and that it is an essence in potentiality receiving the material forms and the possibility exists in its essence. It is potentially related to the species which it receives and it understands its nature by relation just as it understands the nature of the materia prima. That is, he says that the relation of this intellect to that which it thinks is the relation of the materia prima to the form principle. Because of this relation some of the expositors called it material intellect, that is, that it needs to receive perfection from the form principle, so the Active Intellect becomes its perfecting form. Also, because it has the receptivity of material forms it is necessary to name it further the existible intellect on account of its possibility. Since we have demonstrated it to be an essence existing in potentiality alone, it cannot be understood that it comes into being or perishes, because whatever is in potentiality does not come into being and does not perish, as has been explained in the case of the materia prima. But Alexander believes that this nature of the intellect is only a disposition, that is, one faculty of the soul and he says this because Aristotle compared it to a

disposition which changes like the board of a stripped tree which is a disposition to receive all writing, and it is not mixed with the board nor is it divorced from it. And Alexander says that the substratum for this disposition is nothing else but the soul and argues from this that this disposition comes when the soul is poured into the body just as in the case of all dispositions which come with their substratums. If it is so, according to his words it is something created and this is the weak point in his argument. The existible intellect is one form or disposition in the soul and especially in the soul which is in a body. It is composed according to a mixture of real causes and perfect for preparing its substratum to receive all concepts just as it is the disposition of the cut tablet to receive all writing. ^{Ibn} Roshd says by way of definition that this disposition is something which revolves upon this incorporeal substance from the point of view that there is attached to it a substratum. It is not completely divorced from it nor mixed with it. This is because the material intellect comes to this disposition stripped of forms at the time of perception. In order for it to perceive the substance stripped of forms it must be possible for it to perceive non-being. According to the idea of Ibn Roshd, the material intellect is a substance distinct according to its formation, separated from the body, without posteriority to it at all like the soul has posteriority to the body. And it is not one of the parts of the soul. It is almost a compound of potential and Active Intellect. From the

point of view of this composition it is possible that it does not conceive itself when it conceives something that is present, especially if there be attached to it imaginary things (Fantasia in the vernacular). Because of this attachment there happen errors to its concepts and it forgets, because the complexity of things is the cause for fallacious reasoning. Thus Aristotle says in the second section that the intellect is always right when it perceives things. That perception is called apprehension. But when it perceives compositions at one time it may be right and at another time it may be wrong. Some say that it certainly appears from the words of Aristotle that the material intellect is only a disposition in the soul and not a potential essence. Because of this reflection is necessary, for if it were a potential essence receiving existing forms in itself, according to the thought of Themistius, then these concepts which it receives remaining in their essences would be sensed forms and they would not in truth know their essences. That is, they would not be concepts to it in the way that the conception of them would become thinking and afterwards conceives the concepts. Whether this intellect is completely divorced in that it is not soul nor part of soul has not yet been explained. Note that the text of Aristotle implies one thing or the other and this requires a separate investigation for itself and it is possible that I shall write something satisfactory about it. The general principle of my words in this matter is that none of the ideas mentioned prevents this existible intellect from attaining to the comprehension of the Active, Incorporeal Intellect and from being joined with it so that both of them can become one thing in essence.

This is true because, if the existible intellect is an eternal essence existing in potentiality and its nature is the nature of possibility and a disposition which can be likened to the natural existence of primary matter, it is not impossible for it to comprehend the eternal and become united with it. As you might say, it is not an actual thing until after it comprehends concepts but when it comprehends them it is an actualized substance and is then made something created by the very fact of receiving concepts. But if it is only a disposition existing in the soul, does not this disposition nevertheless also require creation into substance just as Al Farabi thought when he said: This intellect about which they say that it is in potentiality is created by its activity in receiving the forms of concepts. If so when they say about it that it can still return and receive the form of the Active Intellect and become joined with it until it becomes it, then if this be so, it would become an eternally created thing. Therefore whoever says that we are joined in unity with the incorporeal intellect pronounces an ancient folly.

We reply to this and we say that since it is clear to us that the material forms are those which cause this intellect which is in potentiality to pass to actuality just as the sensation is actualized by the sense. It is impossible for this disposition which the forms have to be like those which are in matter, but they are like intellectual forms separated from matter. This is so because it is impossible for that which is in matter to be acted upon by that which is not in

matter except by a form which is stripped of its matter. Therefore the material, pure forms certainly will be acted upon by this intellect in this way, that at the beginning they move the sense faculty and afterwards this perception will reach the imaginative faculty which is a faculty for receiving the impressions of the sensations and keeping them after receiving them from the sense. It combines some of them with others in waking and in sleep by a combination and separation, at one time true and at another false and it has with this the perception of power and utility. This faculty also is almost incorporeal, divorced from matter, because it receives the forms stripped of matter. Nevertheless it is not free of subject or of some rational basis, for behold it would not be able to imagine its nature except by a surface substratum or rational basis. It is possible that it be said that this is one of the differences that there are between matter and substratum that the substratum understands even all matter in the sensation, while it is possible to say that in secondary materials there is no great distinction between matter and substratum. But when you relate the materials to primary matter there is a great difference between matter and substratum, because primary matter is pure of any form in actuality while it is in potentiality, and the substratum is a thing compounded of matter and form while it is in actuality. Matter from the point of view of its substance is not in actuality for it has no completeness without the form but the substratum is always in actuality from the point of view of the form. When ^{Dr} Roshd said that the Heaven is a substratum he meant its compositeness

of form and existence, that is, existence devoid of the existence of intellects, and that its existence is very distant from the existence of intellects.

We return to where we were and we say that this imaginative faculty which we mentioned later deposits that which it receives in the rational faculty, the material intellect. Thus this perception will be incorporeal and stripped of matter. It will be more formal than what was in the imagination because now it will be stripped of substratum even, and it will be rational, coming from the material forms which are stripped of matter. They are generic forms through the medium of the imaginative faculty. Therefore this intellect receives from them forms or intellectual forms through which it becomes a thinker and in this way we say that the material forms, that is, the generic, do the work of intellect. It is known that anything which comes externally to do the work of intellect is considered intellect. Therefore they are called concepts in potentiality. So they are in the faculty of this material intellect until there comes to it the incorporeal agent and makes them become concepts in actuality, like the thing perceived by seeing which becomes seen in actuality on account of the light as we have said many times and just as all these matters have been explained on account of which it is fitting that we say that this intellect is fitted and able to be joined with the Incorporeal Intellect. We say to Al Farabi that it does not follow from this union that because of it, it should be said to be eternally created, because that reception of concepts and of intellect are not changes in the essence of its being like the changes of

coming into being and destruction. But it is according to the way which I showed before. Behold, it is not the activity of some change in essence, because the Incorporeal Intellect does not move it as an efficient or material cause alone like in the case of material contacts where that which is moved is acted upon in essence by the power of that which moves it when it actualizes it. If the matter were so that with a new change of anything its being is changed in the form of its essence as Al Farabi thought, then this idea certainly brings him to the error of denying this unity. The matter is not so for it certainly moves it by way of form and purpose, that is, when it gives it its ultimate perfection, it becomes perfecting Active Intellect. And being moved by its power is not a movement which changes the receiver in essence, but it is the natural influence of intellect, only that it receives the material form from the incorporeal, a reception which is one of the natural species of reception which is in incorporeal intellects which is an emanation of its essence or the reception of emanation and perfection, and not the material reception of coming into being. This reception is that unity. That is, the cause and the effect become one essence and one species in essence, and the material becomes the incorporeal when it thinks itself. This is perfection and it becomes then the power of movement. By way of analogy, it is as if you said of a thing that its essence returns to its essence, that is, that the concept and the thinker become one from every point of view. This is the peculiarity of incorporeal beings that they perceive their

own essences, and the distinguishing properties just as they are distinguishing properties become the opposite in the substratum. That is, we say thus: Every incorporeal intellect perceives its own essence and everything which perceives its own essence is an incorporeal intellect. You may say that the intellect, while it is separated from the Active Intellect that this is a defect or change in the essence of the Active, and when it comes to be joined with it, it appears that it assumes by this union some sort of perfection which did not formerly exist in it and this acquisition is a new change in it and that it was formerly defective in essence. Know that this separation that happened at some time accidentally is not a defect in its essence. Also when it becomes joined to it this does not add any perfection to it, also when it was separated from it that separation was not for naught. Certainly it is the will of God in this respect that the forms which are all one in category should be joined with one form in number because every existence has the disposition within it to approach anything that there is in its nature to receive of perfection and there is not kept from it the reward due it. Thus even one of these existing intellects that has a natural existence particularly peculiar to it, if it was possible for it from the beginning of its existence to ascend later to a primary perfection, Divine Justice will not keep it from this. This you see even in the existence of primary matter and primary form. Although they are perpetually in potentiality, their existence is not a futile existence, since it appears that their reward of

love is through the medium of the existence of the material forms that are constantly coming into being until they ascend to the degree where they are conceived through the medium of intellect and come to be concepts. Later they ascend from being material concepts to being incorporeal concepts. All this is on account of the great Divine Justice which decrees that perfection must be bestowed upon all things which potentially have the possibility of attaining it. So that now you have arrived at the truth of the second investigation, namely, that the material intellect has the power of being joined to the Active Intellect.

Now it remains for us to establish the third, which is, that since it is capable of this and since this ability is in it in potentiality, it is perforce necessary that it come to be that thing actually at the end of any individual of the human species. If not, the potential existence is for nothing. This matter we shall be able to prove from things that are self-evident. It is known to every intelligent person that anything which is seen or felt in Nature, although it may be hidden to one species of living things on account of its weakness, it is not hidden from another species. Therefore it cannot be said that perhaps the nature of the matter of the human species is the thing which prevents this unity, because it is not true from any point of view that it is an obstacle to any happiness. It may appear from the nature of the eyes of the bat that he is prevented from seeing the light of the sun although the light of the sun is fitted by its nature to be seen by all living creatures. So it is possible in the case of this

intellect with the Incorporeal Being. We answer that, although the bat does not see it, it is not withheld from the vision of the rest of living creatures, birds of prey who see the body of the planet of the sun in itself. They see and recognize it from afar for a long time. So the matter is in the case of the material intellect with the Incorporeal Intellect. Although it is possible that any group of men may be unable to reflect upon the Incorporeal, it does not follow from this that this reflection and this unity are impossible for the whole species. For since there is this disposition in the Incorporeal to join with the existible and the existible with the Incorporeal, if it did not pass into actuality at some time and in some individual of the species, it would exist for nothing. I reply further and say that this disposition by which the reflective intellect perceives incorporeal things is something which is created in the reflective intellect toward perfection. Just as I said before, until this disposition is related to the acquired intellect, that is, that which is by acquisition perfect, the disposition which is called material intellect is related to the soul. The proof for this is that every form created, being material, comprehends the possibility of receiving another form and after it another, if the matter is to come to what it will receive at the end of the development, form without materiality. Another proof for this is that the concepts of intellect which are acquired are knowledges in potentiality because they are knowledges of things which are in potentiality, because of this principle that that which has no purpose in potentiality

is useless as I explained in ^{the} Metaphysics. In this respect there is a greater doubt when they say, how can the universals be true if they do not exist outside the soul. This is the reason why Plato found necessary the existence of incorporeal forms, that is, that those concepts must be incorporeal. The answer to this is that universals are knowledges in potentiality of those things which exist outside the soul in potentiality and of primary concepts, for every class in which there is found a thing in potentiality, that must pass to actuality in that class or in the species. If the concepts are knowledge in potentiality and when they find a mover which will move them from potentiality to actuality they are of necessity moved to knowledges which are in actuality. But this is all distant to the believer, to the one who has not reached this degree. Just as it is difficult for one, on account of his number of years, to comprehend one who has reached years beyond his own. That is, for the youth to comprehend the disposition of the old man since attainment to this perfection generally does not come to pass except at the time of old age and after intense, constant reflection and rejection of luxury just as we see many perfections not reaching their ultimate purpose except after there happens to them many steps, like the receiving of youth after childhood, manhood after youth and old age after manhood. This is a natural cause. There is yet a cause for receiving the dispositions and acquired characteristics from the point of view of conduct just as we see of many things that they do not receive the perfections which they possess in their nature except after much continual habit toward that perfection and by accumulating

many things, growing one after the other, which strengthen the dispositions and give fixed characteristics. These matters are all formulated in the existence of this unity in the end and especially at the time near the separation of the soul from the body, because this perfection is the opposite of bodily perfection. All the philosophers agree that the end for the prosperity of the soul and its happiness is the comprehension of the incorporeal intellects and its unity with the Active Intellect. Alexander makes this an introduction in his book as if it were to him one of those things which are self-evident from a first concept. So does Themistius and he adds one very small essay to it in which he says that if the intellect which is in us succeeds with that which is not in its essence, how much the more that it should comprehend that which is of its species, namely, that which is itself intellect. After he has established this he says that since the sun is something which is seen and more fitting to be seen than anything which is seen, how is it that the bat does not see it and it is its peculiarity to see in darkness and to see things less worthy of being seen than the sun. This doubt has already been refuted above, that this happens because of the weakness of the seer and is not necessarily the case in all species of things that see. It is probable that Al Farabi, when he came to the end of his days and did not comprehend this, he concluded that it was one of the impossibilities. May God keep him from those who do comprehend, Amen. Whether the soul has any material activities after death is comprehensible from the matter of the existible intellect

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for no material faculty nor any of the material objects is necessary after its unity with the Incorporeal. If it has no need for such, certainly it is free of them for if not they would be useless existences. There have also been said in this respect things which are somewhat essential for the completeness of this book. Of them I shall make a distinct seventh division as I said above.

SEVENTH DIVISION. I shall begin the reflection upon the existible intellect by making known whether it is soul or a part of soul for in this respect there happens to be a great dispute between the authors who are commentators on the works of Aristotle. Ibn Roshd and his school, who are called Averroists, want to prove that it is not soul nor a part of soul. He says that the intellect is one in all men just like the soul, according to his thought, yet it is not united with the soul for the reason that it is a sort of form principle to the body just like the soul, but it is a single, unique essence free from body in its own existence. The others, who are the sages of the generations, want to prove that it is a part of the soul. These two parties fortify themselves with proof for their reasoning from the words of Aristotle in his book about the soul and from analyses of the rest of his books. ¹⁰ Roshd demonstrates his idea about it from the literal analysis of Aristotle and from simple proofs. The others want to prove the opposite in another way, that is, by making a commentary to his explanations which will indicate the opposite of Ibn Roshd's idea. If they are unable to show that Aristotle completely makes the intellect necessarily a part of soul, it is enough for them only to show that Aristotle did not deny that it was part of soul and

that he did not divorce it from soul, and that this matter he simply left in the realm of possibility. The root of this proof, according to my understanding, to use an analogy, is like one who says that the definition of lordship is the basis for men of a province and their guardianship. It is necessary to preface this definition with one introduction and this is it. The guidance of provinces and their establishment and guarding is a matter which rests on wisdom, on power and on will. If so, the man who is fit to be ruler, must possess in himself all these three after he has been appointed. A certain person has all these three. Therefore he is fit to be a ruler. Thus it is said according to the understanding of the one who says that the intellect is part of the soul for they say by way of principle: The human body needs to be guided and perfected by the intellect and power. The soul is that which guides and perfects. Therefore there must be found in it these two, intellect and power, and also will. But those who say that it is not part of soul answer this analogy and they say: Certainly it is true that that which guides must possess these two or three, yet they are certainly not part of it but they are faculties acquired by it externally. This is the case of the intellect with the soul. Even though the soul be rational, the intellect is not part of it or of its essence, but it is an emanation which is an incorporeal essence emanated upon it and is something outside of it. But those who say that it is part of soul answer again and say that the ruler does not guide the provinces, because he is a certain individual but because he is wise and possessed of power.

Therefore wisdom and power and will are certainly part of his lordship--not only a part but they are the entire essence of his lordship by which he is ruler of the province. So the matter is with the soul. It does not guide the body except by being in its essence rational and possessed of power and will. I have presented this analogy in somewhat popular language in order that it may open the way for you, and you will comprehend more easily the words of the proofs of the two schools and you will choose the knowledge which is more harmonious with Reason and Faith. Understand that when I say throughout my book "part" or "parts" of soul, according to the usage of IbnRoshd and Aristotle, by this is not meant part in the sense of a thing which may undergo divisibility like the matter of quantity where the half is part of the whole or like the form which is part of the compound. Nor does it mean anything which is divisible either potentially or actually. "Part" is used analogously and it means a faculty or power of soul. Thus you will understand it in any place where you find "part" or "parts" used in connections with soul or intellect. It is necessary that we begin to settle this debate by the definition by which Aristotle defines the soul in his book. From this definition we will go to the rest of the arguments that support it. Aristotle says in the second part of his book on the soul that the soul is the primary agent in the natural body, organic potentially to living creatures, lending a primary perfection to the natural body, being explicitly the human form or the form of other living creatures, that is a primary perfection and a primary form. The other form is

a produced form (formato e corpo naturale organico). And that perfection comes little by little according to the importance of the body. Some say that when he says that the soul is the first agent of the body he means that it is a first agent in relation to the second agent just as wisdom is a first agent in relation to attention, for first we are wise and then we pay attention. So the soul is a first agent by analogy to the second. Some say that wisdom is a first agent of the soul in the body, but this is wrong for we are not originally wise and there are many who never become wise. There is another snare ⁱⁿ that explanation. When it says that the soul gives life to the natural, organic body, this is analagous to wisdom. Life is the essential form by which it is body absolutely and wisdom is also an essential form. Therefore the body would have two essential forms from one aspect and this is impossible. Although it is possible to say that the one is a form of the body, that by which it is a living body possessed of soul and the other is the human form by which it is a righteous, living thing. According to this they are not two essential forms from one aspect. We return to the meaning of the definition which Aristotle gave the soul and we shall say now: Ibn Roshd says that the intellect is not to be sealed and included in this definition at all and it is not to be understood from it that the intellect is soul nor that it is a part of soul. This is because Aristotle says immediately afterward that this is that which gives life to this natural organic body. He means by this that we say that the soul is an agent of the body because we see that the incorporeal

soul is not the life of the body nor is it living body. Therefore the intellect is not included in this because it is not the life of the body. Furthermore, the soul is like an organ (organo in the vernacular) and the intellect is not an agent in the body and it is not like an organ. Therefore it is not included in this definition. Furthermore Aristotle says later that from the conceiving and reflection of a certain thing it has not yet been revealed, therefore he shows by this that the definition of the soul does not include the rational, that is, the intellect nor the receptive faculty. Furthermore Aristotle says in the second part that we certainly see that there is another genus of soul and this alone is fitted to be incorporeal just as the infinite (perpetuo in the vernacular) is distinguished from the finite. Therefore he means by this that the intellect is a thing divorced from soul. It has already been mentioned what this distinction is. Although he says that it is another genus of soul, it is not to be understood because of this that it is soul but that it is called soul broadly and by homonymity alone, not that it is soul. This is because the intellect is an infinite thing but the parts of the soul are finite. Therefore, since we see that the infinite and the finite are not comparable in essence, anything that is called soul by association is completely distinct from soul, and that is the intellect. Therefore he says that this alone is fit to be distinguished etc. Furthermore Aristotle says that from the reflective intellect there is another criterion of judgement, from which it is obvious that the intellect is not limited nor included in the definition of the

soul and that it is not soul nor part of soul. Furthermore we may infer from the words of Aristotle that the intellect is not soul from what he says after the difficulty that he shows from the analogy that there appears to be between the intellect and the sense. He says that if it is true that to think is like feeling or carrying something, therefore it will be so of the concept and the intellect. That is, the intellect will be diminished by the power of the concept just as the sense is diminished by the power of the sensation. Or it will not be so. Afterwards he answers and says that they are like each other from one point of view and unlike from another point of view. That is, they are unlike from the point of view of this form of activity for we say that the intellect does not diminish from the power of the concept like the sense diminishes from the power of the sensation. Although it seems that there is in the intellect something similar to modification, it is not a change but only a state of receptivity and of the receptive state it is said by association that it feels. Certainly they are similar from the viewpoint that this genus of intellect is prepared to receive the genus of the concept, that is, the material forms, and that it is potentially in relation to this genus which is received by it, but it is not in it in actuality because of its nature. In this thing the intellect is like the sense for the sense is also potentially in relation to the sensations. We infer from the statement of Aristotle first that the modification may take place in two ways. First, modification which changes the thing acted upon either in quality or in essence. Secondly, that it does not

change but that it gives it greater perfection than it had at first. This is the activity of receptivity alone. The conclusion of Aristotle's statement leads to this, that the cause for the intellect's being without the influence of a complete modification by the concept as the sense is by the sensation is because the sense or sense faculty is mixed with matter but the intellect is without mixture. Thus he says: The soul is mixed with the bodily material but the intellect is not mixed. Therefore the intellect is not soul but distinct from soul. Therefore he says that the intellect, before it thinks in actuality, is not a thing in actuality, on account of the existing objects. Therefore we know further from this that it is not a part of soul for the soul is something in actuality. Furthermore he says that if the intellect were mixed with body it would have, from the point of view of the matter, some characteristic of corporeal natures and it would have some organ distinct for it is the body. And everything which has some organ in the body has some bodily nature like heat or cold. Therefore Aristotle says after this that everything which is hot or cold and has some organ like the sense, it is fixed to that organ and according to the changes of the organ the activity changes. Therefore Aristotle meant that if it is mixed with body it has some sort of bodily organ and it becomes then either hot or cold. I think that from this the physicians understood that when any limb of the body becomes ill, although it is necessary to pay attention in healing that limb to the association which it has with a limb outside of it because of its having been produced from it or because of the tie by

79-2 which it is connected with it, nevertheless the healing of the sick limb consists in concentrating upon itself because the natural composition that this sick limb has is its organic and composite form by which it performs its peculiar function, from the point of view that it is a certain organ of the soul to act or a certain activity in its shape and position. This is what Galen meant in his book called "The Small Work" where he deduces the causes of medicine partly from the sick body but mostly from the sick limb in it. This he meant likewise in the "Methods of Healing". Likewise the statement of Archigenes in the "Healing of the Brain" where he commands the healing of the heart. Don't be entrapped by this because the two meanings invalidate each other but this which I shall write is the essential.

Let us return to our point and mention another decided proof. Since the soul is the form of the body as Aristotle meant in all this, if we say that the intellect is part of it and it is already known that the intellect is eternal and without destruction, as he says in the second part on the soul when he says, "This alone is distinct like the distinction of eternity from perisability." And in the first part he said that it appears that the intellect is an imperishable essence; and in the third place he says; "In truth this alone is without mortality and is eternal." From all these versions it is a spiritual essence which is imperishable. This distinction comes either from the faculties of the soul which are corporeal or it is from the body. If it is from the body and the soul is posterior to it, therefore the body is not soul nor part of soul. If it be of the faculties then

they perish with the body. Furthermore may be inferred from this that the breath of a perishable thing is a form for a perishable thing and that it perishes with the body to which it is a form, for with the destruction of the body its form perishes or passes to another body. All these are impossible. Therefore it remains that the intellect is not soul nor part of soul nor the form of the body. Furthermore says Aristotle that to think, to love and to hate are not activities in the soul but of that which becomes attached to it, because with the destruction of this you do not remember and you do not love and they are not of it but they are universals as has been said. Therefore it clearly appears from this that the intellect is not soul. Yet another proof comes from the words of Aristotle. He says in the "Book on Animals": "The intellect necessarily comes from the outside and it alone is divine etc." Behold we know that there is no form which is an agent of matter coming from the outside but it comes from the energy of matter. Therefore the intellect is not the form of the body and if it is not the form of the body and the soul is the form of the body, then it is not soul nor a part of soul. Furthermore his (Ibn Roshd's) school says by way of evidence and make this inference: Every form of a body is mixed with matter and is composed of the elements. Therefore if the intellect is the form of the body it is composed of elements and it does not come from the outside. But Aristotle has already said that it does come from the outside, and it is known that it is not composed of the elements. He mentions yet another proof. If the intellect is soul or a part of soul, and the parts of

the soul are vegetative like feeling and thinking, therefore the vegetative and the sensory are also from the outside because the entire soul is of one essence or one in its faculties. And since it is obvious that they are not from the outside but that they are inherent in matter, therefore the intellect is not part of soul but it originally comes from the outside and it is in addition a divine essence. Therefore Aristotle says in addition that the intellect is not related to corporeal activity. From these proofs it appears that the intellect is not soul nor a part of soul but some divine faculty emanated into the human soul which is the form of the human body, being that which Aristotle calls the foundation of divine things in order that there should be a distinction between the higher and the lower soul. These are the proofs of Ibn Roshd and his school that the intellect is not soul nor part of soul, some of them taken from literal arguments of Aristotle, some of them taken from clearly demonstrated inferences. From here on I shall begin to prove the opposite, to demonstrate that the existible intellect is part of soul. This I shall say according to the method of knowledge of the philosophers who believe in religion, because this knowledge of the intellect, whether it is soul or part of soul or not, is included with the knowledge mentioned above concerning the soul, namely, if the soul is one or many. That is, if the soul is one then the intellect is also only one in the entire world, and if it is many according to the words of others, then intellects are also many like the souls, since the intellect is part of soul. If you say that Ibn Roshd will say to them that even according to

their words the souls are not one but many, despite all this it is possible that the intellect be one for all, and that it be like an emanation of one of the faculties among many receivers like the Active Intellect which is one even according to your words. We answer to Ibn Roshd that they would refute him with this argument, that it is evident that even some of the parts of the soul survive after death, namely the sense and stimulative faculty, for they receive the judgements of God by way of reward and punishment according to the activity of the Divine Will. Even if they do not take into consideration whether the intellect is one or many, if he denies the survival of parts of the soul and the intellect is one in his opinion and is not soul nor part of soul, then he annuls all compensations for the soul completely. Because if the soul is a facultative essence in an organic body and
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 from it come all the natural and psychic activities of the human body for evil or good, because there would not be nothing left of it after death, according to his knowledge. All the more does he not admit to us of the intellect that it receives any sort of activity in this world which would make compensation incumbent upon it. But if it be fit for them concerning the intellect that it receives some compensation by some marvelous way because it is that which guides and perfects the soul, then this knowledge is balanced and it is possible that we could accept it. There might be some who would wish to quibble about it and to say that it is unnecessary according to any of the ideas for the intellect to receive any compensation and especially the compensation of punishment because when the psychic faculties

like feeling and stimulating are inclined toward the sinners and the wicked ones, then the intellect does nothing there for the intellect makes straight and guides only towards the end of service and good action. We shall leave this investigation to another place.

Now I shall begin to refute the proofs of Ibn Roshad and his school and to show that Aristotle did not mean by his words what they say. This I shall do because he is the great head after whom follow all the camps of the philosophers and the strong fortress upon whom all depend for strength who rely on natural and Divine wisdom. Since his words there has been nothing new and no man has been found since his time who disputed him. After that great support has been removed from them, behold they are left even with us in alignment, and we have the additional help of faith over them in the matter of the compensations of the soul which is one of the primary concepts. It is the rock of help and the chief of all principles, so that there is more with us than with them. Now it is up to them to produce new proofs for their ideas but they have no more since the shadow of Aristotle has turned from them and is with us. Concerning that which Ibn Roshd says that the existible intellect is not included in the definition of the soul and he wishes to prove this from what appears from Aristotle that its definition is that it is that which furnishes being to the natural, organic body and therefore he calls it the efficient cause of the body etc. as quoted above; the answer is that these words certainly indicate that Aristotle acknowledged and meant that the intellect

should be included in the definition of the soul. This is so because he says after this: "Truly it may now be said in the definition of what the soul is that it is an essence, that it is according to the criterion of judgement and that it is the being of this natural body." Therefore by this statement that he says what the soul may be said to be in the wide sense, he meant to show that everything which enters into this essence and into this being is soul. If he says that the intellect is not in this category he denies what he says afterward in the first part on the soul: "If the soul has no sort of activity and no activities peculiar to her, then the soul is not distinct from the body except like one separate part. It is a part born to it." It certainly appears that this distinct part is the intellect. This is just what he says: "Although I have said to you that the soul is without separation because it is the perfection of the body, nevertheless it has a part to which the term 'separate' may be applied from a certain point of view, because it is not known to the body like the rest of the parts but like another thing." This is the existible intellect, that which improves it when it comes into the body by making it rational. And he says, born to it, by which he means to its existence. Although it is an efficient cause of the body not all the parts are an efficient cause but only some of them. If there is any part of it that is not an efficient cause of the body and it is separate because it has no organ in the body, being separate, this is only the rational part. But with all this, this does not prevent their (the other parts) from being an efficient cause for the body because when we say

that Aristotle said that it is an efficient cause for the body he meant that some of the parts are an efficient cause for the body. Further, if there is any part which is not clearly an efficient cause of the body, it does not follow that all of them must be an efficient cause for the body, for when we say that the soul is an efficient cause for the body, it is not as if we said that the parts of the soul are an efficient cause for the parts of the body for the latter includes the efficient cause more because it is more detailed. Therefore in this section itself he says in explanation of what he says that it is the efficient cause of the body because some of its parts are in efficient cause of the body, that it is necessary to apply to the parts what is said of the whole; namely, what I say in the definition that it is literally so in its wholeness must be understood only of its parts, and when I say that that part is not an efficient cause of the body I do not mean that it is completely distinct from the body that that it is not an efficient cause of the body without the medium of the soul because it is not completely distinct from the body. But it is a form principle for it through the medium of the soul as I shall presently show with the help of God and it is distinct from the rest of the parts of the soul. Furthermore Aristotle showed more clearly that the intellect is included in this definition through what may be deduced from his words later when he showed that it is an efficient cause of the body from that which appears that the soul, when it is separated from the body, then the body is not alive in actuality. He says something that approximates what I shall say. This is because

it is possible to be said of a thing that it is such in actuality only in relation to another thing. Not that it is a form principle but that it is like a species of mover just as in the case of a burner which may be called of the species of burners in actuality in relation to that which is burned even if it is not burning at the time. So anything which is possessed of movement in its species, it may be said of it that it is a mover in species in actuality in relation to that which causes the movement even if it is not being moved at the time. Or like matter which is matter in actuality in its species in relation to the form. The meaning of this is that it may be said of a thing that it is in actuality so and so even if it is not possessed of a form principle and it is not an efficient cause for something outside of it but that it is in its species in actuality so and so. An analogy for this is that it may be said that this stone is heavy in actuality, that is, on account of that efficient cause which it has in its nature; and although it does not burden any man and is not heavy as an actual burden. So it may be said that something burns wood in actuality, even if it is not burning at the time at all, because it is of the species of burners in actuality. Therefore it is in actuality from the point of view of the species, and in potentiality in relation to the individuals to be burned in actuality. This is a very good explanation. Therefore he says that matter is matter in actuality in its species in relation to the form in order that there be no room to doubt this and to think as Plato thought in a matter similar to this when he explained that the soul is not united to the body

like a form but like a motive power, and so said the Greek philosophers. Therefore Aristotle goes on to remove this doubt and he says that the soul is an efficient cause for the body not only like a pilot for a ship who only directs its course but like form to matter. And he makes known what the soul is according to its essence and according to the data of judgement. He shows this through things which are less real according to their essence but more known to us. That is, from the point of view of activities and ends which appear to us in actuality, for many times we know the truth of the thing through its accidental qualities. Therefore he adopts this method of distinction by distinguishing its activities when he says that that which is possessed of soul is distinguished from that which is not possessed of soul by life. Of that which pertains to life we infer every rest and spatial movement and movement of nourishment and growth and every thing in which there is one of these it may be said that it is living. It may be inferred from this that if it is necessary that the soul have its origin of these things, that the soul be bounded by its parts, namely, by the vegetative, the apperceptive, the stimulative, the rational, that all these are in one thing in its essence, like in the case of the human. All these things are proven from the words of Aristotle, some of them proven by interpretations of his words, some of them proven from what may be clearly understood from his words. Thus you may know that up to this point may not be understood from the words of Aristotle the stripping of the intellect from the definition of the soul, but the very opposite should be understood, namely,

that it is included in it, just as I have explained what Aristotle says that from the conceptual and the reflective a thing is not yet revealed. Ibn Roshd wished to show from this that the definition of the soul does not include the conceptual and the reflective, therefore the intellect is not soul nor part of soul. The refutation of what he says in this respect is that when Aristotle says that the thing is not yet revealed, this does not refer to his definition of the soul but it refers to the doctrines of Plato concerning the soul when he says that there are in the human species various souls assigned for it according to the various activities of the body. Aristotle doubts this by way of interrogation. Namely, if each one of these souls that Plato speaks about is a unique soul by itself according to his words. Or if they are parts of one complete soul. If you find that they are parts of one complete soul, is there a distinction of one from the other only according to the data of judgement or spatially, that is, according to the existence of a separate organ for each one. He goes on to say that some of these words are not weighty enough to be accepted and some of them are subject to doubt. The precise definition of these questions he does not give here but he leaves the definition of this until the third part of his book. And although even the intellect he does not completely define as I shall show presently with the help of God, he begins to speak of these things somewhat by way of definition. He says that it is necessary that there be parts of the soul because of what we see of the faculties of the soul, the apprehensive and the vegetative. For behold we see of vegetables and of some

of the living creatures that they are certainly living and in every part of them we see activities which their souls have in entirety. Therefore it appears from this that all those souls of which Plato speaks are parts of one soul. This is what he means when he says that some of these things are not acceptable. And when he says that some are to be doubted he means the rest of the parts of the soul, that is, the conceptual and the rational. Concerning this he says "a thing is not yet revealed", namely, that the conceptual and the rational according to Plato is a part of soul, just like the apperceptive and the vegetative and the rest. If you find him to say that they are parts of soul, how is it that they are separated spatially, or is it only according to the demands of judgement or is it according to faculties. In this matter he goes on to elaborate and to explain in the third part. So that when Aristotle says that "it is not yet revealed" he does not mean to strip the intellect from the definition of the soul as Ibn Roshd thought but he says it as a matter of doubt concerning the words of Plato as to how they are to be understood. In the third part he comes back to them to define them and to investigate whether the intellect is divorced from soul etc., just as I have written above and he discusses the matter. He seems to me to say that it is a separate thing more as a matter of importance than spatially, that is, that it has no distinct organ in the body. This is where the reasoning of Ibn Roshd against what Aristotle said is removed. But it appears that there is another category of soul and this alone is fit to be distinguished etc. Ibn Roshd says that from here it is clear that we

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see that Aristotle meant that the intellect is a thing divorced from soul and that it is not a part of it. As mentioned above he turns from what he said in this matter because for purposes of judgement Aristotle adds to the words of Plato for your knowledge, for he says "it is not yet revealed" and he says "that there is another category of soul etc." He begins to speak about the doubt precisely which he explained above, whether these souls are parts of a soul or not, and if they are divided according to the demands of judgement only or spatially. And he says: "Only this one is fitting." But the rest of the parts of soul it is known that they are not separated from the essence of the soul which guides the body. It is they and they are it. And that one that he says it is fitting that it should be separated, he does not mean that it should be divided from the body, meaning that it will not be part of the soul as Ibn Roshd thought, but he means that it is divided from the rest of the parts of the soul on account of its perfection and its purpose. He means by it a separation of faculties for to feel is another thing from to think and to reflect, but all of them are parts of the soul even if the faculties are divided. If you say that the rest of the parts are also divided one from the other, for the vegetative is another thing from the apperceptive and the motor is yet another thing, the answer to this is that all of them are in the class of natural, organic, corporeal activities but the intellect is not so because its separation is more pronounced. Therefore the clear explanation of the words of Plato is that the souls of which he speaks are parts of the soul, some of them separated from others by the type of separation which has been mentioned and some of them not.

The separated ones are the conceptual and the reflective and concerning them he says: This only is fit to be separated etc. So you see that through these minute examinations has been revealed and made known what was formerly not known and it has been explained here by Aristotle that the soul is defined by the vegetative, the sensory, the motor and the rational. Therefore he shows logically that it is attached to the body with all these parts, not like the attachment of the pilot to the boat but like form to matter. This is the truth of what the soul is in principle (or in entirety) just as he says in the second part, for after he defines it he begins to distinguish its faculties when he says that they are vital, sensory, passionate, motor (spatially), intellectual etc. That the intellectual are the intellect is known from what he says afterwards in his explanation of the distinction. He says the intellectual and the intellect is in men. Therefore he means here that the intellect is a faculty of the soul, that which he says in the definition is an efficient cause of the body since he says that it is in men. But there is a further doubt here as to the thought that the intellect is part of soul. This is, that if the intellect is this soul, how can it be said of it that it is a first cause. Is it not true that the intellect is not in actuality in the beginning of the soul's existence in the body, that then the body has not yet any reflective intellect and that the intellect before it thinks is not a thing in actuality. Therefore it is not a first cause. But of the vital and vegetative faculties it is possible to say that they are the first causes. What we shall say now destroys

the proof of Ibn Roshd which he deduced from his explanation to Aristotle who said that there is another category of soul and this is fit to be separate. I have shown that it must be understood from there that the intellect is part of soul as I have explained. Furthermore we can show that the definition of soul is inclusive of everything, even of the intellect, by what Aristotle says afterwards. He says: "And by that method itself it is truly one judgement of the soul and of the form etc." The form here is not an organ divided into three faculties, the vital, the sentient and the intellectual which are organic and the soul here is not another thing. But for those things spoken of it is not necessary to seek another soul but an entity for these things mentioned, those which are included in the definition of the soul. Aristotle makes no more mention of the intellect in the second part except what he says later in the end, and it is not a lack of judgement or comprehension. Concerning what Aristotle says that certainly of the reflective intellect there is one criterion of judgement, Ibn Roshd wants to show from this that the intellect is not included in the definition of soul. There is an answer that because there is a difference between the intellect and the apprehension he goes on to say of the reflective intellect that there is one criterion of judgement, and he delays this path of investigation until the end of the third part of his book in the place where he returns to speak of the intellect. He says that we wish to speak of a part of the soul which recognizes and knows. Here he clearly says that the intellect is part of soul. In order that there should be no doubt concerning what he

says that the reflective has one criterion of judgement, he means that this difference is only in the method of activity of the intellect. That is, from it come reflection and action, just as has been explained in another place. Furthermore he goes on to define in the third part this difference that there is between the intellect and the rest of the parts of the soul for he says of it that it has one criterion of judgement. We see upon examining closely there in the third part that he says that we must pay attention to this difference which it has. This difference needs reflection as to how it is known to us what he understands. So far it has not yet been proven that he understands that it is able to stand with each one of those things which have been mentioned, that is, that it is divided from them either according to space because it has no organ in the body or that it is divided from them according to a criterion of judgement. Nevertheless it is known that he does not want to prove this difference to be of the kind which is completely separated from the body. That is, that it only has some sort of dependence on the body according to its being like the soul. If it is unable to stand with each one of the things mentioned, that is, if it is completely divorced, it would be divorced also from the vital while the body is still alive and this is impossible. But he means to show the difference that it has from them, namely, that it is separated from them only according to the method of performing intellectual activity. Therefore he goes on to say: Therefore after it is made to think etc. The words of Aristotle follow logically with this statement. Therefore it must be understood

from the literal meaning of the explanations of Aristotle that the intellect is part of the soul. Concerning what Aristotle investigates about the differences that there are between the intellect and the sense, upon which he expatiates, Ibn Roshd wants to show that the intellect is not soul from these words with which Aristotle concludes when he says that the intellect is not acted upon by the concept like the sense is acted upon by the percept, because the sense faculty is mixed with matter and the intellect is not mixed with matter. Ibn Roshd says from this, therefore the intellect is not soul for the soul is mixed with matter. Furthermore Aristotle says that "the intellect is not a thing in actuality until it thinks etc.," as quoted above, up to "either hot or cold", by which he refutes the statement of Ibn Roshd. When Aristotle speaks here he answers concerning that which he doubted and not as a statement of his own logical thought. That is, he still intends in this place to make known whether the intellect is soul or not, for he had spoken of this formerly as a doubt but he is determined to refute the doubt with which he started and to refute the idea of the ancients because they explained that recognition comes from the nature of the thing recognized. They used as an analogy for this that we recognize the earth because it is earth and water because it is water, the recognition receiving its nature from the thing recognized. Therefore they said that it is necessary for the soul to be composed of the elements of all things in order that it may recognize all things. If not, it would be unable to recognize anything. .

Now Aristotle comes to show the opposite of their words. He says that it is necessary that just because the intellect recognizes all things that it be not compounded of all things, that if it were composed of them it would be unable to recognize them. Furthermore, that the intellect is not in actuality but in potentiality is the opposite of what they say concerning the thing that recognizes and the things that are recognized. This he wishes to show from the analogy that there is between the sense and the intellect from one point of view. And that is that just as the sense is in potentiality toward the percepts so the existible intellect is potentially toward the concepts and not in actuality as those thought who said that the thing that recognizes is in actuality just as the thing recognized is in actuality. Although the sensory faculty is in actuality, the sense is not so for it is in potentiality and not in actuality. Furthermore he wants to prove that the intellect is not composed of the matter of natural things because of that which we see from the organs of the senses. He produces proof from the sense of sight whose organ, the apple of the eye, has no color in it for if it had any internally, it would be unable to perceive any color beside this and the eye would be rendered ineffectual for seeing other things. The same holds true of tastes. So the matter is with the intellect. Because it recognizes all things it is not seeming that it should possess any nature of the things perceived and conceived that it recognizes. But the only nature that it has is that it is existible. That is, it is in potentiality toward the conceived things from the point of view of its

own nature but it is actualized when it recognizes in actuality, just as the sense is actualized when it perceives in actuality, as has been said in the second part. We infer from this that the intellect before it thinks is not in actuality on account of the existing objects. This is opposite to the ancients who meant that all things are in actuality, that is, that it recognizes all of them. Therefore he brings the statement of Anaxagoras concerning the intellect, that it is that which commands all things by moving and by separating. In order that it be not believed that he agrees with this he says later: "I say that the intellect is that because of which and with which one thinks and that because of which the soul thinks and it is not a thing in actuality. He shows by this further that the intellect has no nature of matter bounded by actuality, and that it is not a faculty in the body because it is not mixed with the body. The proof comes in this way. Since it has none of the nature of perceptible things, therefore it is not mixed with the body and it is not a faculty in the body, because if it were mixed with the body it would have some of the matter of corporeal natures and it would have everything like the sense. He goes on to say that everything like that which is hot or cold has some organ just as the percept or the sense is set in its organ etc. Therefore, because he has already shown what it is necessary to say of the intellect from the analogy with the sense, it would be possible to say from this that it changes or is destructible, since they are like one another because the sense is destructible etc. as quoted above. Although some say that the soul is the place of species, this

place is inferred broadly, just as every thing which receives, according to the style of Plato's words. That the soul is the place of the species does not refer to the entire soul but to the rational alone. If the sensory part receives species it does not receive them in its essence but in its organ, but the rational does not receive in an organ but in its essence. With all this it is not entirely the place of the species because it has them not in actuality but in potentiality as we said above. Thus far I have proven that it is not to be understood from the words of Aristotle that anything which he says here denies that the intellect is soul or a part of soul. On the contrary the opposite is to be understood for he takes the intellect in the place of soul when he answers the arguments of the ancients, as you have seen, and he means that the intellect is part of soul, that which is the efficient cause of the body, even though the intellect has no organ in the body like the rest of the faculties.

If a man should say, how is it possible for the soul in its entirety to be the form principle of the body and with all this that there should be another faculty of soul which is not a faculty in the body nor a form principle of body. To this we would answer that we see the same in the other objects of existence, for we may see a form principle which is an efficient cause of the body, composed of the elements, and yet it has another faculty which is not in it from the power of any element, hot or cold, moist or dry. Just as the magnetic stone has the power

to attract iron and a certain stone to congeal the blood. These powers come from some other transcendental, heavenly source, perhaps from heavenly bodies. So we can say of that which we are discussing. That is, just as they are important form principles, so they have important faculties transcending the degree of matter. Therefore, the ultimate form principle, that which is the human soul, even though it possesses in its entirety the possibility of being the form principle of the body and the efficient cause of the body, yet it is not impossible for there to exist in it some distinct faculty which is transcendent (*sopragrade* in the vernacular) which is not a bodily faculty nor a bodily efficient cause and performs a distinct activity. This is the intellect which is incorporeal because it is not a faculty in the body even though it is a faculty in the soul and the soul is the efficient cause of the body. We can know that the soul is the efficient cause of the body from the point of view of two kinds of faculties. The first is that which gives to the body (*spetialita* in the vernacular) one species of form principle unique to it by which a man becomes a man. This is the faculty which the soul has from the point of view of its entire essence, namely, from the point of view that it is soul alone. The second is that which gives to the body the form principle of human activities by which man lives. Some of the faculties of the soul are an efficient cause of the body which gives perfection to the bodily activities and for these faculties are prepared organs fitting for those activities. These faculties are different according to parallels (*oggetti* in the vernacular). That is, when the

faculty finds the parallel of sight it will be the faculty of the sense of sight. Likewise for all the bodily activities which come from the faculty of soul. This is a change from judgement according to the change of parallel comprehensions and not a change from the essence of the soul. But there are some of its faculties which are distinct from being an efficient cause of the body. Because of this they have no organs and none of their activities are performed in organs. These are the intellectual faculties which are in the soul like the existible, the reflective or the acquired. I have already shown how it is possible for these species of faculties to be ~~a~~ one in essence in the soul. Furthermore, it must be known that it is not impossible for there to exist for man a form of which it may be said that it is in matter yet divorced from matter. That is, by one method it is in matter and by another method divorced. In this matter we find that Aristotle makes known the limit of natural reflection in matter and form in the 19th chapter of the second part of the Physics. He says that sublunar matter with form is a proved proposition, for the reflections which change in the form change in the matter. That is, they change in the reflection of the matter, as he says in connection with his analogy of the reflection of a doctor and the reflection of a shipmaster. When he speaks of matter here he means the substratum of reflection and not the matter of the existence of objects, which is really composed of matter and form. All things that come into being are fit from the point of view of their opposite in form to be spoken of as coming into being and perishing. A short

summary of these words is that Aristotle meant by this a change in reflection and not a change in existence. Or it is possible to put the two propositions into one meaning and to say that what he said of coming into being and perishing he meant of primary matter only whose existence is in potentiality, and in it they are certainly associated because there is no dimensional change (dimensional in the vernacular.) That is, because it is not bodily. But in secondary matters in which there is a dimensional plan in percept, in these they change with the change of the forms for the forms are received by the matters according to the disposition of the matters ^{to} receive them. So Aristotle meant when he said that the matter is the individual origin, that is the dimensional, for the dimensions are not known except by matter. This is harmonious and an excellent statement.

Now we return to our statement about the words of Aristotle, and say that Aristotle said by way of interrogation on this question of limit that the physicist must arrive at the knowledge of form and matter. Afterwards he says, just as the doctor arrives from the knowledge of tempers and pains at the cause, and from a knowledge of salt ^{to} navigation in the knowledge of ship pilots; that from these each will arrive at the limits on account of which exists the quiddity of their works. So the physicist will do for he needs to know the attached form so that he may know the incorporeal form. Certainly this is true of sublunar matter. Just as in the case of man who is born of

woman and of the sun. He meant by this that the physicist should reflect upon the form from the point of view of his reflection on matter, that is, because it is a form to matter; and upon matter from the point of his reflection on form.

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The reflections are different according to the difference in their subject as we said before. When he says that man is born etc., he meant by this that the reflection of the physicist on forms is on forms which are with their matters, that is, when they are with matter. But at times even on forms which are in matter from one viewpoint and from another not. Such forms are the medium between the incorporeal forms and the material forms, just as the form of man which is of man and sun. Therefore it is called distinct from matter in another way, that is, from the point of view of the human form which comes from the sun and is in matter from the point of view of the material reproduction which comes from man. This it may be said of the soul that it is the form of the body and the faculty of the body from one point of view, and from another point of view it is distinct from it, namely, on account of the power of that thing which is peculiar to man by which he is man, namely, the intellect. Furthermore, of those parts themselves which are the form and being of the body he says that they are separate and not separate. Separate from the point of view of its substance, for the substance of the body and the substance of the soul are not one, as I have proven at the beginning of the book at length that it is not a bodily substance. Without separateness from the viewpoint of the perfection which it gives the body, for in this way of looking at it it is joined with it completely like form to matter, and it is part of the human aggregate as I have proven from the proof that Ibn

Roshd used clearly when he said that since the soul is the form of the body etc. as quoted above in connection with his proofs as to whether or not it is the form of the body. Before I begin to answer this proof, I shall say that it appears from the words of Ibn Roshd that he wants to prove two things here, even if he does not even explain one. One of the two clearly is as I have written above, that he infers the following. The soul is the form principle of the body. If the intellect is soul or a faculty of soul, then the intellect is also a form principle of the body. Since the intellect is termed the form principle of the body, and the body is perishable; since every material form perishes with its matter therefore its form principle perishes with it. From this may be deduced that the eternal is the form for the perishable and perishes with the body. This is false for it is certainly known that the intellect survives and is eternal. Therefore since it is clear that it survives the body, it is not its form for according to natural laws when matter perishes its unique form perishes with it. But this does not perish. The second matter which appears from his words is that he wants to prove, although he does not state it clearly, that since the intellect is eternal and survives the body, therefore it is not its form and therefore does not co-exist with it but is prior or posterior to it and survives living and survives complete. This proof follows his idea that the intellect is one in all men as I mentioned previously. I shall begin the refutation of these arguments and say: In truth, the intellect is an eternal form principle without perishability as

we said above in the name of Aristotle. It also appears more emphatically in the eleventh part of the Metaphysics in the place where he says that the form principles are not prior to their matters. But it is from this that Ibn Roshd inferred and said that if it is the form principle of the body, therefore it perishes with it etc. The answer to this is in two ways. The first is that we have already said before this that some of the parts of the soul are an efficient cause of the body and some of them are not. I proved this from my understanding of the interpretation of Aristotle and from other sufficient proofs. If some of the parts of it are not an efficient cause of the body and these are the intellectual faculties, therefore it is possible for the intellect to be a faculty of the soul and the form principle of the soul. Parts of the soul will perish but it will survive because it is not in itself an efficient cause of the body nor a faculty of the body as I proved above. Therefore because of what I proved from the words of Aristotle it must be said that the form principle which is the soul survives the body, but not all of it. That which survives is the intellectual faculty. When I speak of it as a part and not as a whole, do not understand from this that the soul is possessed of divisible parts, but the meaning is as I explained to you previously at the beginning of the third division and in the seventh. The second is that even if it be insisted upon that the intellect is the form principle of the body like the soul, nevertheless it survives the body and will not perish with the body like the rest of the formal faculties which perish with their matter.

This I shall prove from my understanding of the words of Aristotle and other convincing proof. First this must be understood from the words of Aristotle when he says that certainly this alone is eternal and does not die and he shows us the judgement in this, that it is fitting that it should be eternal and not die because it is an incorporeal unity, something which is not true of the rest of the parts of the soul and of the rest of the form principles with their matter. The proof why the intellect with the matter of the body is different from the rest of the forms with their matter is this. First we shall explain and say that anything which is potential to perform any facultative activity, the performance of that activity must be because it has an efficient cause in it. Then we shall say that the forms which have no causal faculty without being joined to their matter are not an efficient cause without that unity. Therefore they are not the efficient cause, but the composition of them and their matter is the efficient cause and it is that which produces them. It may be inferred from this that those forms are not existent of themselves in truth, but that it may be said that some
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 existence comes to them. The analogy for this is that warmth is not that which heats because it is only a form or a quality not in substratum, needing of itself the substratum of something. And it is not a corporeal substance. But that which is warm is that which heats in that it is a thing existing in a compound, corporeal substance. Therefore for a particular thing, warmth is not the efficient cause but on account of warmth. And of this cause Aristotle says in the eleventh part

of the Metaphysics that it cannot be said of accidents that they exist of themselves in truth but they are either from the object or toward the object. It is similarly true that the material forms have no efficient cause without their being joined to matter. But those which have an efficient cause of themselves without union of matter, they are in truth the origin of being in essence. Now we have arrived at the point of the proof and we shall say that therefore the form principle which has the faculty within itself to act on account of its own power without relation with matter is that which truly has existence because it does not owe its existence to a compound like the rest of the form principles. But the compound has its existence on account of it, not it on account of the other. Therefore the rest of the form principles which exist on account of their compound perish with the matter which is part of their composition and which is related to their being, but that form on account of which the compound has its existence entirely, not it because of the other from any point of view, the matter which is part of its composition may perish but it survives. This is a true, irrefutable statement.

Now we shall say: The intellect is this and it is this form. Therefore even if it be said loosely that it is the form principle of the body as I am going to show presently with the help of God, it is necessary to say that it does not perish with the perishing of the body, but it will remain alive before God. If you find some difficulty in what Aristotle said in the first part on the soul

that to think, to love and to hate certainly are activities (passions) of the soul, of those that are secondary to it. Because of this, when this destruction occurs, you will not think, you will not remember, you will not live. But they are not of those, but they are universals as has been said etc. It is possible, lest there be some doubt about this saying of Aristotle, to say that if it is so then the intellect is not soul nor a faculty of soul nor an incorporeal essence unique in itself. This proposition is without agreement with any of the types of knowledge mentioned, neither with Ibn Roshd and his school nor with the others. Because whoever says that to think is not from the soul but from the composition and when composition perishes the intellect will perish, therefore it is not soul nor a faculty of soul nor an incorporeal essence existing by itself, but it is another faculty produced from the compound and when the compound perishes it will perish, this is against all the opinions and all the explanations and all the interpretations for all agree that the intellect is eternal and imperishable. To such a one I answer that this statement by Aristotle does not go according to his knowledge and his own truth but it goes according to the knowledge of the ancients who wrote before him. This I said in my youth in the house of study when I was studying in Spain with ^{the} teacher who taught me natural science. The students of the school argued with me for a long time. Even my master did not agree with my word. There was much discussion on this point for the explanation of Ibn Roshd did not produce any solution for this difficulty. But God was favorable and behold our teacher found a certain old document of ancient writing from the

commentary of Themistius who commented on all the books of Aristotle. It was found written that Themistius explained that this statement of Aristotle goes according to the knowledge of Plato and his disciples and is not his own thought. The aforementioned says that when Aristotle says this in this chapter of the first part of his book on the soul, he was still meditating on the thought of the ancients, and he had not yet refuted the thought of those who said that there is no difference between the intellect and the sense. Therefore throughout that entire part he speaks of the intellect just as he does of the soul. This is obvious when he says that it does not perish in time of old age. Therefore throughout that division he speaks of the intellect as of the soul. Thus our teacher found in the commentaries of Themistius. So his spirit was set at rest and he acknowledged my words. My heart rejoiced and I thanked God that he made my knowledge agree with the opinion of the aforementioned philosopher for he is one of the greatest of the commentators on the books of Aristotle, and all the teachers agree with his explanations as they do with those of Ibn Roshd. Even more. Thus you see from this statement that there is no difficulty over what I explained above.

Now it is necessary for me to say that even if Aristotle made that statement according to his own knowledge this would cause no difficulty with my words, because when we say 'thinking' it is not like when we say intellect because the word 'thinking' indicates the activity of a thing which is compounded (passione in the vernacular.) For thinking is not a separate thing standing of itself like

intellect but it is thinking through the accident of its attachment to something else outside of it. That is, that thing which is its parallel (objecti in the vernacular) like color to sight. This parallel to the intellect, because of which it is called thinking, is called the imagination. The scientists call it ⁷⁷⁻²fantasia. It is acquired after the sense faculty and especially in the sense of sight for man thinks and understands the form principle of the thing after he has perceived its matter with the sense perception. The activity of this faculty is completed organically and it is the medium between the intellect and the sense, and the activity of the intellect is not complete through it until it comes to the intellect. But it may not be said because of this that the intellect works in an organ. Therefore, when we say 'to think' it is an activity in the compound coming from the incorporeal through the fantasia. To say 'to think' is like saying 'to make hot' or 'to make white' or 'to see' but not like saying redness or whiteness or heat or cold or sight, for the one is incorporeal and the other is inherent. The incorporeal remains in thinking and the inherent in perception. The incorporeal remains in thinking and the inherent in perception. The incorporeal here is the formal cause through which the inherent is given complete attention. Witness in this respect that Aristotle means by this statement the activities of the compound which is connected with thinking, loving and hating, which are activities of the compound, namely, of the human soul which has bodily acquisitions. Although thinking is nothing else but intellect as we have said many times, even Aristotle saying that the intellect is that thing because of which we think and reflect,

it must be said that the intellect and thinking become one when the existible intellect becomes Active Intellect. But while it yet remains in potentiality it is not yet intellect itself but it is thinking, that is, in the process of becoming intellect. But before it becomes so it is certainly an activity of the compound. Therefore we say that wisdom is an accident, that is, the knowledge of particulars. That species of wisdom is in the category of quality which is one of the accidents. This is a refutation of the mistake of Ibn Roshd in one of the two things that I said he wanted to prove from the words of Aristotle. Concerning the second matter where it appears from his words that he precedes the existence of the soul to that of the body and upon what the matter hinges I have already made known my meaning in this respect.

But I shall go on to make another brief statement from which comes a sort of analogy for this, although it is not very essential. We have it from Aristotle in the eleventh section of the Metaphysics when he wants to examine whether the forms precede matter. He says that the natural forms do not precede matter. The example for this is like when we see that man when he was created, then that creation is that which is one of the forms produced in the body of man and one does not precede the other - the ball of brass is with the brass - and the form principle of man does not precede man. Furthermore he says there that the motive causes are those which precede and not the form principle etc. He does not examine there whether any form precedes matter but he does examine whether any form survives matter. This was explained above. The other arguments of Ibn Roshd

after this which I quoted here was included in the refutation as you saw, and it is unnecessary to repeat it again. Here it seems to me fitting to join with these words one short investigation in the matter of the perception of the intellect. That is that we must minutely examine questioningly and say that since it is known that the intellect does not conceive concepts except through the medium of the imagination (fantasia), as mentioned above, therefore the intellect has no sort of rational activity after its separation from the body. To this we answer that this question does not belong to the realm of Physics but to the realm of Metaphysics. However, we shall speak of it ~~as~~ a bit and we shall say that the compounded soul comprehends in one way and the incorporeal in another. Their comprehension is not alike. Therefore Aristotle asks in the third part on the soul whether the intellect which is not free of the imagination thinks (conceives of) any corporeal thing. He says that certainly it comprehends that incorporeal thing which the incorporeal cannot comprehend. It is possible to ask and say, why does Aristotle here call it 'incorporeal' when he said that the existible and the active is incorporeal. We answer because it is not a cause agent of the organs of the body and it is non-incorporeal from the point of view that it is a point or faculty of the soul which is the efficient cause of the body as mentioned above. I say that even while it is in us it is fitted to be able to comprehend the incorporeal essences when its being becomes actualized, as I showed above. When we see that it does not comprehend them, this is not an impossibility for it from the point

of view of its essence but from the point of view of the matter to which it is attached, that cause substance which separates it from them. Similar to this we see in the case of natural matters that that which is light ascends by its nature and despite all this it is possible that it come down through the coercion of something which compells it to come down or which prevents it from ascending. So it is possible to say of the intellect which is in the soul. We shall return to the order of our words concerning the proof which Ibn Roshd produces from what Aristotle says in the Book on Animals that it is necessary that the intellect should come from without and that it should be only a divine matter etc. Behold it is known that there is a sort of form principle which is an efficient cause of matter which comes from without but it comes from the energy of matter. Therefore the intellect which is from without is not an efficient cause of matter and is not a form principle of the body, and if it is not a form principle of the body and the soul is the form principle of the body, therefore the intellect is not soul nor part of soul. The answer is that my refutation of this syllogism has already been given as I said previously that not of every form principle may it be said that it comes from the energy of matter and that it exists because of matter, but only of those forms which have no definite arrangement of existence.

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Either they are of an organic relation to the matter for of those it is truly necessary that they should be so in actuality for those things which are composed of them because they do not exist alone. Or they are of the organs of that

attachment to the matter. Therefore it must be said of those that they come from the energy and from the power of the matter. But the intellect, since it is true that it has existence of itself without matter, its existence is not because of the attachment to matter and it does not come from the power of matter but from an external, incorporeal source just as Aristotle said: Therefore it is possible for it to be the form principle of the body and an efficient cause in the body at any rate even though its entire existence comes from the outside and its being is only divine. This statement of Ibn Roshd's does not prevent it from being an efficient cause in the body. That is, because it is an efficient cause of the body that it should be necessary because of this for its existence to come from the power of matter. If you say, what forces me to say that it is an efficient cause of the body from any point of view, I shall answer that since I have proved that it is a faculty in the soul and the soul has an efficient cause of the body, then it is that efficient cause of the body from this point of view, namely, through the medium of the soul. It is furthermore true that Aristotle says in the Book of Animals and in many places in his books that every faculty of an animal belongs to and is dependent upon some particular body, that which is called the foundation of divine things and that is the human body in order that it should be between the higher and lower soul and these faculties come from an incorporeal source through the medium of heavenly faculties. Behold the refutation of Ibn Roshd's argument in this matter, and concerning what he argued further when

he said that if the rational soul is the form principle of the compounded body, then it is composed of the elements. We answer that the refutation of this argument depends also on the refutation of the preceding ones, because I said previous to this that it does not follow because of this that it is composed of the elements as I proved above. Further, behold we see of things that their nature exists because of the seed of that which causes them to grow. Because the seed is called hot, nevertheless it is not the real elemental heat, but that heat is received by the seed with some spirit (spirits in the vernacular) which brings it there (Schiuma or ~~confiagione~~ in the vernacular). In that spirit there is an incorporeal nature coming from the stars. Therefore in the arrangement of that which is compounded of elements there is a faculty which is not compounded of elements but which is through many, distinct mediums. Not only the intellectual faculty comes from above and externally but even the vegetative faculty comes externally according to that which I said and it is so in truth. There was one who thought to refute this argument of theirs by quoting the proposition which they used that every form principle of a body, being mixed with matter is compounded of the elements. For example, the natural earthly parts of the soul like the vegetative, the sensory, the motor and therefore those parts perish with the body after death. But this certainly is poured into the body from divine, heavenly faculties, therefore the intellect is not compounded of the elements and does not perish. The thought of Ibn Rosha in this respect is heretical and destructive and necessary to put far away. If it is difficult for you to

harmonize the statements of Aristotle, that is, what he says in one place that every faculty of the soul is dependent upon some particular body etc., to what he says in many places that the rational soul is not related with any bodily activity. He meant by this without any medium, for this is true that it is not related with bodily activities by itself without the medium of the rest of the bodily faculties, something which is not so of them for they are related to the body without any sort of medium. It is further possible to say that Aristotle meant by this after death and this is established. Concerning that which ~~he~~ (Ibn Rosha) argues that if the intellect is a faculty of the soul and the parts of the soul are vegetative, sensory and rational, then also the vegetative and the sensory come from the outside because the entire soul is one essence of faculties, and this is not true for we see that they are with matter. In this we reply what I said immediately above that the vegetative also comes from the outside by the natural way of the seed which produces it. But if this idea is not acceptable we will answer him in another way and we will say that it does not follow from our statement that the intellect is a faculty of the soul or part of the soul and the intellect is from the outside, that because of this also the vegetative and the sensory come from the outside even though the entire soul is one essence of faculties. This does not necessarily follow from the words of Aristotle because he leaves the matter without definition. That is, whether the intellect is separated from the rest of the parts of the soul as a substratum,

that is spatially, as Plato said or according to a criterion of judgement only. If we say that they are according to substratum as he appears to say more truly even if it has no organ, despite all this there may not be deduced from here anything, which is inharmonious with my thought because Aristotle says in the third part on the Soul something similar to this, that is, according to the method of appearances (*figuramenti* in the vernacular) these faculties are related to that which is common to all of them and to the faculty of that which is first in accidental appearances and things possessed of souls. Just as in a square is a picture of the triangle so the vegetative is the sensory. And if the intellect is with the soul one according to the substratum of that thing which Aristotle has not yet completely defined, so similarly we may say that the vegetative and the sensory are like the rational just as he says that the triangle is in the square and the square is in the pentagonal. And if it is true that different forms (*diverse* in the vernacular) come from different activities, then the triangle from the square by being reversed has another cause different from the square just as it has another species. So it is that the vegetative by existing below the sensory is another species of soul and it has another cause; but if the triangle which is in the square has one cause in itself, then it has one cause also coming from the vegetative and the sensory but that which is in the sensory. Therefore if it be said that the vegetative and the sensory is that which is in the rational, that which is in its essence rational being from an external cause,

from this may not be deduced anything inharmonious to my thought, for it is not unseemingly that a purpose from a higher thing should have a faculty which is toward a lower purpose. Therefore the rational soul, although it comes from an external cause, yet has faculties which the vegetative and sensory have, those which come from lower activities. Therefore it may be inferred that Aristotle was satisfied that it was so that the human soul is an efficient cause of the body and that a part or a faculty of it was the existible intellect and that it was also a form principle of the natural body through the medium of the soul. I shall prove this further through the proof of the activity of the soul in another way similar to what we have said and it is this. It is known that the thing through which some other thing is caused is the form principle of that which it causes. For example, you say that we know through the soul and through wisdom. But we know better through wisdom than we do through the soul because through the soul we are not wise except from the point of view that it has wisdom. Furthermore, when you say that we shall gain health at first through the body and for the sake of health we must get healthy, so we shall say in this for it is known that wisdom is the form principle of the soul just as health is the form principle of the body. From this may be deduced that the soul is that thing because of which we are alive and we say that we are alive through the vital faculty and we feel through the sentient faculty and we are moved through the motor faculty and we think through the intellectual faculty which is that

thing because of which the whole thing becomes one judgement and one species. Since the intellect is the form principle of the soul for all of them in entirety as I showed and the thing is not caused except by its form principle as I said, therefore the soul performs all its activities through the intellect which is its form principle. We have already said concerning the soul that it is known to be the existence of the natural body. Therefore the intellect is the form principle by which the soul is caused to be this existence of the natural body, not only an existence which it has from the vital, the sentient, the motor faculties but also the intellectual. It may be inferred from this that the intellect gives all the faculties, even the vital, the vegetative and the sentient like the form principle from which come all the faculties. Thus the intellect is the form principle of the body through the medium of the soul. Because of this there exist two form principles, the soul being the form principle of the body and the intellect being the form principle of the soul and the two forms are like one thing. This is Creationism. This latter proof is clear and very powerful after we know all the principles which have been mentioned. But it is possible to argue them and to seek demonstration for them and not yet to be well convinced of them. It seems to me further necessary to prove that the intellect is part of soul when we see that the intellect is troubled, and not only troubled but actually destroyed, when the soul undergoes psychic activities

like anger and grief. If it is an essence completely divorced from soul it would not change at all with the accident of the soul. Perchance a man may argue and say therefore that it has some of the material faculties of the soul and that it has an organ in the body, although Aristotle says that it is distinct by the essential distinctions of eternity from perishability. It is furthermore possible to argue, if the intellect is the form principle of the body in the way mentioned and the intellect is eternal, therefore it too is eternal and does not die, for it (the intellect) is that which gives the body its complete existence according to this thought. Reflection is needed for these are very difficult matters. Thus Ibn Roshd is answered according to all his arguments one by one in order, and we have arrived at the limit which we set for ourselves and scholars will bear me out that I have briefly made known the existence of the soul and its intellectual faculties, how they are and what they are. I have made known the opinions of the philosophers in these matters and I have shown which of their opinions is acceptable. I have proven everything by clear, lucid proofs. But the matter of the rest of the bodily faculties of the soul like sustenance, growth and reproduction have no place in this book of mine and so I leave them to the science of Medicine, because the primary, fundamental purpose of this book was only to demonstrate the existence of the soul and its essence and intellectual faculties and its

immortality. This purpose was to lead to the other purpose which was to make known the degrees of compensation through reward and punishment, for this is the ultimate end for which men hope who serve God, Blessed be His Name. By this matter I have completed the first chapter of this book. The second chapter follows.

Chapter Two

2-x First Section. After I have demonstrated with sufficient proof the existence of the soul and its intellectual faculties according to the philosophers, it is now necessary that we take yet a second path in its investigation for another purpose, that is, the compensations with which God will compensate it after its separation from the body for its conduct, that is, according to the manner in which it has guided and led the body which was given it to guide by being in it, and according to the habits which it acquired by the union of part of its faculties with the body. This compensation comes to it either as a reward of good for good action or as punishments for acts which it has committed in this world. Concerning these compensations there has been great dispute in the thought of men. The majority of them think that they are all bodily. Whether in the form of compensations for good action called reward or compensation for evil action called punishment, all of them come in the category of corporeal effects, the one of a species of corporeal pleasure, the other of the species of corporeal pain. They also lay great stress upon the matter of pain and they think that it is much greater and more intense than all the rest of pains and punishments. Some of them think that the reward will be spiritually immaterial and that the punishment will be corporeal in feeling, a literal sensation. Each one of these schools produces proofs for its ideas according to its thought and according to what it understands of the

literal meaning of the Scriptures, the Mishnah, the Talmud and the Aggadoth. There is yet another small sect of men who think that there are two kinds of compensation, both of them spiritual forms separated from all matter and corporeal material. But they are a very small group. Therefore I have fortified myself in the name of God and I shall explain here the truths of these two species of compensation. First I shall present proof for them scientifically and from ideas which are demonstrative to the intellect. Afterward I shall give general principles to refute the doubts which may possibly disturb the thought of the believer and which grow out of the literal meaning of the Biblical verses and the Haggadoth. I shall reconcile these Biblical verses with the scientific truths until they are completely known according to my words and thus become known to every intelligent person.

The first step in this investigation is that we shall ask what compensation is given the soul after its ascent, whether it is corporeally material or spiritually immaterial. That is, if it merits pleasure, is that pleasure material or immaterial; and if it suffers punishments, are those punishments the burning of real, material fire from the cardinal principle of fire or a fiery flame or the rest of the material punishments by which the soul may then be grieved and affected just as it may be grieved and affected in this world by material fire and material punishments. Or whether the matter is not so. The root of the answer to this question may be found from the force of what I have already proven about the soul, namely, that it is without body, without matter and that it is a

psychic substance. Now we may say: Since it is not body and anything which is without body may not be affected by a body, therefore the soul is not affected nor will it be compensated by material compensation. This is true because the exudations of the body are not acted upon by the body for the reason that every corporeal agent moves and is moved by that thing on account of which and because of whose power it is acted upon. And the agent will be an efficient cause upon that which is passive in the working out of the activity which comes from it in all the parts of the efficient cause from part to part, and that which is passive will be influenced during this activity in its change and will receive it from the power of the efficient cause in all its parts. Since the form essence which is without body is not composed of parts at all, it will not be affected by the power of a material agent. There are yet many proofs for this but this is sufficient from the point of view of natural science. Now should that believer question and say that the compensations of the soul will be material and that it will feel those compensations just as man feels them in his life-time, we say to him: If so, according to your word, the soul of the righteous man will surely enjoy material pleasures and he shall receive through them his good reward for good actions and experience a corporeal sensation through them. If he answers you that it will be so, it will follow from this according to his words that the Garden of Eden, The Light of Life, The Land of the Living, Great Good that is Stuffed Up, that all these things appointed by God for the souls of the righteous after death

are corporeal states, namely, gardens and paradises, beautiful, abounding in fruits, rich, green and precious, flowers of precious odour and very brilliant forms. There the righteous will lie down and enjoy themselves with all these kinds of beauty and pleasure, every man according to the manner in which he has been favored. And that this is the true Garden of Eden and that all the good promises which God designated for the righteous if they keep the Torah and commandments are nothing else. If the matter be so, according to his thought, say to him further, was not the Garden of Eden in which are these pleasures created only in order to reward the righteous who served the Creator, Blessed be He, in this world and to pay their reward and to satisfy their desires. If so, why did He take them from this world and separate their souls from their bodies. It would have been better if he had left them living with their bodies and given them all this pleasure after a definite time and in a definite place, for many of the righteous would prefer the remainder of themselves to be alive in their bodies forever in this world. They would be reconciled with this aforementioned life of pleasure on the condition that it be eternal. And what would be the difference between this world and that since then they would enjoy the very same pleasure. The same could be done also with the compensation of the wicked and with their Gehenna, and this state of affairs would be very much more useful to every kind of man to love and to serve God, since the compensations of the souls would be visible and recognizable to the eyes, for the wicked would see with their eyes the exaltation of the

righteous and the punishment of the sinners and they would repent of their evil and improve their ways. If you say that if it were so this would be an action for the sake of receiving reward, is it not true that men even now serve for the sake of receiving a reward, should the explanation of the Torah be that this Garden of Eden is according to your words. Therefore it perforce remains for that believer to say that the compensation of good and the Garden of Eden promised the righteous is not corporeal nor material but that it is only spiritual. That is, the soul of the righteous mounts ever upward into eternal degrees to behold the presence of the Lord God of Hosts, blessed be His Name, and there it remains forever satisfying itself from that Radiance and Eternal Illumination, according to the word of the prophet, "I will behold Thy presence in righteousness, I will satisfy myself by the light of Thy countenance." ²³ He says, on awaking, because that world is a world of good awakening when the soul is actually in it but this world is a world of deep sleep and darkness. It is also written, "And the soul of my master shall be bound up by the cord of life with the Lord thy God." ²⁴ It is also written, "And ye who cling to the Lord your God are all living this day." ²⁵ All this is the Garden of Eden for righteous souls. Since it is clear to you that the compensation of good is incorporeal but enjoys spirituality eternal, you should also say to him that it is necessary that punishment be the opposite in the soul, that it is by that method in the self-same category albeit the opposite in species. That is,

that the punishment and the reward are alike in category and different in kind and the knowledge concerning opposites is the same. There is an analogy when you say that white and black are alike in category because both are in the category of color which is one of the kinds of quality, and different in species. For we may say of whiteness and blackness that they are different species as to color which is their category and therefore they are truly opposites. For it may not be said that white is in the category of quality and black in the category of rule and measure which is quantitative, because they could not be opposites if one came into the class of quality and the other in the class of something acquired or in the class of something related. Since one opposite is of quality and it is righteousness, the other must also be of quality and it is wickedness. They are different in species for one is good and the other evil but both of these are under one category. It is necessary for you to form a clear idea of this matter of punishment and reward in your mind for they are truly opposite in essence but they are alike in the category of existence which is a spiritual existence for both of them. In the category of compensation it is also true that it is one matter for both of them and a difference in species, that is, in the kinds of compensation and in the kinds of existence, because the punishment is by way of existence of spiritual compensation for evil, and the reward will be the existence of spiritual compensation for goodness. If you say that it is possible for one compensation to be spiritual and the other material and they would still be opposites, I will

answer that they are not opposites but they would come in the category of related for matter is related to form but it is not opposite to it in the manner of true oppositeness. But those things which are subsumed under oppositeness are like evil and good, white and black and similar things. Whoever desires to know these distinctions must read Aristotle's Book of Categories. Hence it remains that if the compensation of reward is spiritual, then the compensation of punishment is also ~~justitia~~ ^{spiritual} without corporeality, without matter. If he does not grant this and insists that punishment is corporeal even though reward may be spiritual, we shall begin to multiply distinctions for him and we shall say to him as follows: The sensation of punishment which you say that the soul experiences after its separation from the body can only be in one of two ways. Either it is like the sensation which is felt at the time of its attachment with the body or it is different from it. If you say that it is like it, it is impossible that the sensation after death is similar to the sensation at the time of attachment, because the separation has already taken place. If the attachment was the cause for the soul's feeling as is known axiomatically, now that it has been separated it follows from every point of view that with the separation there departed from it that species of sensation which it had at the time of attachment, just as it follows that the effect leaves when the cause departs, since its nature is an inner essence and the body is no longer with it but is in the grave. If so, it is impossible from any point of view that the sensation be at all similar. If you answer me that so God decreed, I will ask you why He kills man and separates his soul from

his body. Let Him leave it thus with the body for a stated period, say seventy or eighty years. Then let Him judge it eternally with the body in this world by fire and water and the rest of the punishments. Thus the wicked will see and be
 X 5 - *
 afraid and will return to God, and this will be a great means for making the human species righteous and not one in a myriad will perish. For what is the use of this great change since you make the sensation after the separation equal with that as the time of attachment. If you say further that thus God decreed on account of the sin of the first man, then you may further answer the question by saying: Why did He decree that the man should die because of the sin since the sensations are the same. If you still say that so God willed, you do not attribute to that will any sort of intelligence or justifying reason. Therefore you make the ways of God to be by way of accident, without order, but by chance. God forbid! Not so did the prophet testify concerning it when he said, "For His commandment is
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 a faithful testimony making wise the simple." Therefore this lends meaning to his words for the simple do not become wise except when the teacher gives them some sort of meaning for what he teaches them and gives reasons for his words. The commandment is called "clear" and "just ordinance" and "wisdom dwelling lucidly" and "righteous are the ways of the Lord". That is to say, they go in the middle way without inclining to either extreme for the inclination to their extreme may be called inharmonious and not straight. If it is straight it is impossible for anything to exist but an intelligent purpose and a viewpoint tending toward

the methods of justification. Do not think that it suffices to answer these questions by saying that so God willed and so did His wisdom decree and that just as we are unable to comprehend His essence so are we unable to comprehend His desire. This is not a sufficient answer for, behold, we find in the case of Abraham our father that he was astonished about the decree of the Creator when He told him that He was going to put an end to Sodom. He said before Him, God forbid, God forbid, while he examined thoroughly whether the decree was just or not. And God favored this and gave him a satisfactory answer until he was appeased and agreed with the decree and returned to his place. Even Moses our Master, peace be to him, was astonished and said, "The one man shall sin etc."²⁷ So he asked God to make known His ways, as it is written, "Make me known Thy ways."²⁸ That is, why it is evil with him who is righteous and good with him who is wicked. As it is recorded in the first Perek of Berachot that God answered him, according to the opinion of Rabbi Jochanan who says: Three things Moses our Master, peace be to him, asked God and he granted his request that the Shechinah should rest etc.--until the disagreement concerning the interpretation of Rabbi Meir, who said that only two of the three things were granted him for it is said, I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious. But the thing is not so, for surely all three were given to him as it says, "He pays His enemy to his face to destroy him." That means that he does not delay for his enemy but pays him to his face. We learn in the first chapter of Erubin. R. Iala has said, to his

enemy only he does not delay. That means, the righteous who is not perfect but he does not delay to a perfectly righteous. Therefore did Rabenu Tam interpret, The second part of the verse deals with the perfectly righteous and the first part applies to the righteous who is not perfect. Although it is difficult on account of the word "to destroy him" yet nevertheless it is permitted to interpret in the work of the Creation and to turn it toward Truth and Justice. So said our Rabbis: There is no death without sin and no punishment without transgression. You see that they did not mean that it is accidental without any sort of justifying cause. Although there is room for the question that if there is no death without sin, why was death decreed against the perfectly righteous for the sin of the first man. But in order not to interrupt our discussion of this we will leave this idea to another place, and we will combine this with other very useful ideas and we will make one small chapter of them with the help of God. There I shall show that there can be death without sin in another way, also that the generations do not die for the sin of the first man. Now then from what I have proven it can certainly be seen that the sensation after the separation is not equal in any way with the sensation at the time of attachment but is different from it. Since the matter is so, it is necessary that we return to the refutation and continue once again to pile up distinctions, for that is the road that leads to the truth of mooted subjects. We shall say that since the sensation is not equal it cannot escape from being one of two things. Either the sensation is stronger and finer

than that ~~of~~ the time of attachment or it is weaker and coarser. If it be said that it is stronger and finer the man who is the possessor of the soul to be judged cannot escape in this lifetime from being either a righteous man or an average wicked person who deserves no remembrance. Now if he be a righteous person and you say that the sensation of eternal pleasure after death is more powerful than the sensation of perishable pleasure at the time of attachment, this distinction is valid and I grant you that it is only seeming that the eternal God, the merciful, good Lord should be liberal and increase for a servant the receiving of eternal good over the receiving of transient good. But if the possessor of this soul be wicked in his lifetime and his soul enjoys itself when it feels with temporal vanities and in superabundance, is it possible because of this that his soul be punished after death with psychic punishments which are felt with a more powerful and finer sensation, a sensation much more afflicting than the measure of the sensation which is felt in the pleasures with which it enjoyed itself in its life, with temporal pleasures. This is not according to religion, God forbid! It is not possible that there should be perversity in the nature of God for behold He is called Merciful and gracious, great in love, inclining toward love and mercy and great in love. It follows from His graciousness and the great number of His mercies that He should make the measure of the punishment less than the measure of the sin in order that He should not cause it to grow. Since we know the number of His mercies and kindnesses, therefore it is

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totally impossible to ascribe this part to God, Blessed be He. Therefore it perforce remains to say that the sensation after separation is weaker and denser than at the time of attachment. If you say this, then the second part becomes impossible. That is, if the possessor of this soul is wicked, then the measure of the sensation of the punishments becomes less than the sensation which he felt in his life in the pleasure of sins. This would certainly be called love and mercy in the ways of God, Blessed be He. But then the first part, that is, if he was righteous in his life, would not be possible, namely, that He should lessen the measure of the sensation of pleasure than the measure of the pleasure which he would have felt in his life if he had permitted himself to be enticed and had occupied himself in the pleasure of sins, instead of conquering his inclination and afflicting himself a great deal in order to honor his Creator and spending his time in fasts and afflictions. If, because of this, the sensation which he feels in the eternal pleasure which is given him as a compensation were to be less than the measure of pleasure he might have enjoyed in his life and less than the amount of affliction which he underwent for the honor of the Creator, Blessed be His Name, then this would be a perversity in the nature of God just like the other part which was mentioned in the first part of the discussion. If in the first discussion, the second part was impossible and in the second discussion the first part is impossible--that is, if he is wicked it is not possible that the sensation after separation should be more powerful and if he is righteous, it is not possible that it should be weaker. If you say that it is this way, that for the righteous

it is more powerful and for the wicked ~~waker~~, then there comes back to you the question of why He causes death, just as I stated above. These are things which could happen if there were no order in the nature of God. All these impossibilities occur when you say ~~that~~ the compensations are physically material and non-spiritual. From this point on it is necessary to begin to make known briefly what they are and how they are. But before I make known the compensation of punishment, I shall make known the compensation of good which is called the Garden of Eden and afterward I shall make known its opposite.

Second Division. Know that the Garden of Eden which God promised the righteous and which the prophets mention by implication in the Scripture, is also mentioned by the sages of the Talmud in a thousand places in the Babylonian Gemmarah, in the Jerusalmi and in the Aggadoth. The degree of the approach to it is through a way which I shall make known to you now. That is, that God, Blessed be He, magnified his love for the human species until He made it the subject for this distinguished form, the soul. When the soul and body became joined and unified, he graced this union by His favor with the possibility of attaining to the eternal prosperity which is the Intellect. In order that this attachment might endure, visible forms similar to it were made and from them were to ascend into the Path of Life the part of this attachment which is fitted to ascend. For this favor He established three degrees through which it will ascend to the Mountain of God. They are the three kinds of intellect which I explained previously.

Although in the first chapter I have already clearly written about their existence and content, I shall again repeat here a very brief review including whatever I need to lead me to the point intended for later. I shall say that ^{the} material intellect, that is, the existible (possible) is the faculty in the soul for receiving the concepts, which receptivity is a defective one until there follows it in order the second intellect, which is that by acquisition, that which brings a man by reflection and contemplation to the comprehension of the matters which are to be conceived. This receptivity is also defective in relation to the first and that which comes after it which is the Active Intellect (Agent), which is the intellect existing in actuality. It is the final form for those which have been mentioned and perfects them in the way that I previously explained in the first chapter. From the acquired intellect, that is, that which is by acquisition, comes the practical (Practive). The speculative is that which thinks and comprehends all conceivable objects which have been stripped of matter. In that comprehension there is nothing connected with action, but it is only a knowledge of the objects and of the primary cause for existence as is. This knowledge is called scientific truth and is a division more important than philosophy. The practical is also divided into two phases, for from it come the subjective (cogitative) or problem- atical derived from estimate (Stimative). From it also comes the artificial ^{by} (artificial), ~~that~~ which there may be pondering over a matter whether it must be done or not, and distinguishing between the seeming and the unseeming in

human activities and attributes. It has a great bearing upon the prosperity of the soul for it leads and guides the motivating faculty in matters of the will and directs it to see the good and shun the evil. The artificial is that by which man comprehends the arts and crafts. Because of these two phases it is called practical, because from the point of view of them it is related to the comprehension of matters which lead to activities and arts, that, to that whose way it is to lead to activity. Especially is this true of the second method that comes from it, the artificial. But in spite of all this it is also reflective from one point of view, namely, from the reflection and thinking that it has to do between the necessary and the unnecessary, the useful and the injurious in all matters which lead to action. Therefore is derived the art which is good imagination produced from righteousness. It is also because of this that the difference between the reflective and the practical is only on account of the proofs (objecti.) There is no difference between them in essence but in the accident of proofs, for the reflective proofs are truth and falsehood and the practical proofs are good and evil. These two are the ultimate causes for these two kinds of intellect, and in this they are different but in essence they are one. They also define art and they say that it is a faculty by nature an activity, that on account of the faculty it does its work systematically through some subject in order that it may attain some intended purpose formulated by the soul. Behold, since it is the acquired intellect which gives the soul these concepts through the faculty of the

material intellect which it has established for the purpose of this receptivity, and it is its medium between the material and the active, which is that which gives Divine perfection in actuality and which is a degree of the incorporeal faculties standing above the degree of the soul and its activity. It is the providence in rational life bringing it to the prosperity which it is possible for it by its nature to approach. There are forms of men different from each other according to the changes of chemical and component compositeness and the human behavior which is theirs. According to this they are different from each other in the degrees of their comprehension of wisdom and in this receptivity which their souls receive from the faculty of the Active Intellect according to system. This is what Rabenu Moses said in his important work. He said that when the faculty of the Active Intellect is diffused among the intellectual faculties of the soul, that is, among the rational faculty and the imaginative faculty, and they receive it with complete receptivity, then all of them pass into actuality, and by this the thinker, the concept and the intellect become one thing. Our master says that by this degree it is possible for a man to attain to the virtue of prophecy with the the best of the conditions which I shall arrange presently. Our master says that prophecy is an honor emanating from God, Blessed be He, through the medium of the Active Intellect first upon the rational faculty and then upon the imaginative in such a way that it appears to man as if that thing is something outside the soul and he posits three things necessary for the acquisition of prophecy. The first is the perfection of the rational faculty in study and in minute

reflection. The second is the perfection of the imaginative faculty in its nature. The third is the perfection of the ethical faculty. He says that sometimes prophecy will depart from him who is fitted for it on account of psychic conditions such as anger and grief and similar things. Or it may depart through the will of God by means of a miracle or because the generation of a man or his station is unsuited for it, although he himself is fitted for it and has practiced a great deal in order to attain it. Furthermore he says that when the faculty of the Active Intellect becomes diffused upon one of the faculties of the soul, that is, upon the rational and the imaginative is deficient in receiving it on account of some defect existing in it because of the deficiency of the soul for some internal or external material cause, then its degree of intellect becomes less and it will be below the degree of the prophets and that person will then be of the group of reflective and investigating scientists. If it is diffused upon the imaginative and the rational is deficient because of a great deal of slothfulness in study and comprehension, then he will be of the group of those who are skilled in laws and customs which govern provinces and of the group of diviners whose proficiency is their human wisdom. This is a knowledge upon which they concentrate for a long time to comprehend. Through the sense faculties they find the thing to be so through many tests, and it becomes fixed in the imaginative faculty. This is the intent of ideas taken from the purpose which we find in the words of our master in the Moreh. Do not think that ^{it} ~~that~~/is enough for a man to obtain the virtue of the

righteous only for the emanation of the faculty of the Active Intellect into the two rational faculties of the soul without understanding also the other faculties of the soul for many of the goods of Divine matters and righteous deeds. Do not believe thus for behold our sages, may their memory be for blessing, say that the purpose of wisdom is repentance and good deeds etc. They say the Torah will be a deadly poison to him who does not become meritorious through deeds and it will be to him like a ring of gold in the nostril of a pig. Furthermore they explain in Yebamoth the verse, "He that hateth suretyship is secure." He who says, I have nothing but Torah, he has not even the reward of the Torah, because it is written, "Ye shall learn and ye shall do." Because of this they say, "Everyone whose fear of sin etc." There are many like these in the Talmud. The principle of the statements is that the fear of the Lord is a man's most treasured possession. Therefore it is necessary that man shall establish for himself first those two faculties of the soul for upon them depend all the fulfillment of commandments and the transgressing of transgressions, and they direct them to everything toward which they ought to be directed until they are all for the purpose of elevation. These two faculties are the sentient and the stimulative faculties which are vessels to the rational faculty. Our master says in his Shmoneh Perakim that into these faculties come all the performance of commandments and transgressions and good and bad characteristics. It is known that the psychic disposition, namely, the characteristics are the root cause for the fulfillment of the Torah and the Commandments as well as for sin and rebellion. Therefore the emanation of the Active Intellect into the intellectual faculties of the soul are to no

purpose alone, without first preparing and arousing these two to the service of God, Blessed be He. They are the first fundamentals. If not, the emanation would merely add deficiencies, great and damaging without purpose, just as we see that

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bad food is more injurious to the one who recognizes that it is injurious than to the one who does not recognize it. We shall begin with the sentient faculty and we shall say that first it is necessary that a man should incline all five of the senses for one purpose which is the service of God, to do through them that which is good and righteous in His eyes. The sense of sight should incline toward seeing all the commandments whose seeing the Torah commands like, "When thou seest the ³²naked that thou cover him," and, "You shall see it and you shall remember etc." ³³And everything which is similar to this that comes in the Torah and Talmud to prevent one from turning to idols or to the sight of any one of things whose sight the Torah forbids, as it is written, "And you shall not turn astray after their ³⁴hearts and after their eyes, etc." One should strengthen his eyes against seeing evil according to the way which the Rabbis, be their memory a blessing, explained, And everything similar to this.

The auditory sense should incline toward hearing the voice of the sages of the Torah who lead us to service in the name of Heaven for they say that one should not glorify himself through the disgrace of his fellow or to receive dominion over the congregation, that one should listen to the cry of the poor, that one should not listen to slander or words of ill report. And everything

similar to this.

The sense of smell should incline to the commandments of God, Blessed be He, not to take pleasure in the odour of a forbidden thing. Whether it is possible for you to flee from it or whether it is not possible, it should not delight itself with that which the Torah prohibits for it says, "A man who doeth thus ³⁵ to smell of it; let him be warned against the curse of sweet-smelling things and let him be very careful with the blessing of sweet-smelling things of the Habdolah of the outgoing of the Sabbath.

The sense of taste should incline to take pleasure in the eating of a commanded thing like the eating of Passover, the Matzah, the Moror and the Sholosh Seudoth of the Sabbath and the Seudah of a Holy Day and everything similar to this which is of commanded food, like the Seudah of Circumcision and of the groom and bride and the Seudah of Peace and the Seudah of mourners. His whole intent at the time of eating should be that he should eat in order to sustain life in this world so that he should be able to spend his days in the service of the Creator in order to merit the life in the world to come. He should not be bent upon enjoying himself with the various species of delicacies. Thus he will reflect and this will prevent him from enjoying forbidden food and thus establish what is written, "He who guards his mouth and his tongue guards himself against the troubles of the soul ³⁶ by the guarding of the mouth," which means that he should guard against the eating of forbidden things, and by guarding his tongue that he should keep himself from evil and from a deceitful thing and bad language and slander against the lawful

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things, just as it is written, "Guard thy tongue from evil."

The tactual sense, which means the sense of touch, is an aggregate sense spread over the whole body. But its faculty in the body is more particularized in two limbs, the hands and the sexual organs. We find that touch and contact are associated with these two. For of the hands it is said, "Peradventure my father will feel me,"³⁶ and "Although thou hast felt about all my stuff."³⁷ And in the matter of the sexual organs it is said, "He will not hold innocent anyone who comes into contact with them."⁴⁰ And likewise, "You shall not draw nigh to uncover nakedness."⁴¹ This 'drawing nigh' can only mean contact. So it is essential that a man should incline all of this sense to the service of God, Blessed be He, by the touch of the hand to take the Lulab and the Ethrog, to put on Tefillin, to wrap oneself in fringes, and all the commandments which concern the action of the hand. But he should restrain himself from causing his hand to strike his poor brother and from raising his hand haughtily and from everything like this. In the contact of the sexual organs he should act only to fulfill the commandment of, "Be fruitful and multiply", in the name of Heaven. He should keep himself from all forbidden intercourse, according to the words of the Torah and the words of the Scribes, for⁴² it is written, "And you shall sanctify yourselves and be holy." Thus you see by this that it is necessary for the righteous man that he unify and incline all the sentient faculties of his soul to the service of the Creator. It remains to be said that he must also unify along with them the stimulative faculty of the soul which is the second of the two upon which depend the species of good and evil actions. This is the faculty by which man comes to busy himself with that which

he loves and to shun that which he hates. Its dwelling place is in the heart. Furthermore there come from it the qualities of strength and trust, of anger and pleasantness, of joy and grief, of humility and pride. They are found in men to a greater or less extent according to what they receive from this faculty, either through the cause of their diversified dispositions or because they constantly train themselves or because of the company that they keep, and the soul learns to walk in the footsteps of these guidances which they receive from Society. It is essential that a man should incline even this to the service of God, Blessed be He, because he may use the stimulative faculty for love and hatred to love God and His servants and to hate the wicked, as it is written, "Those who love the Lord hate evil." ⁴³ With the stimulative faculty for strength he may overcome his inclination and submerge it and then he will be called a mighty man in truth and he will exalt his heart to go in the ways of the Lord. That is, the service of the Creator will become light for him and he will not consider it a heavy burden which he should spare, but he will reflect in his heart, I am fitten for this and triumphant over this and who can stay me. With the stimulative faculty for trust his heart will find support in trust in God, as it is written, "Trust in Him at all times." ⁴⁴ And it is written, "Trust in God and do good." ⁴⁵ This trust will even cause him to hand himself over to martyrdom in the name of God, and remove his hand from robbery and theivery and all fraudulent obtaining of money, for he will say: Wealth and honor belong to God alone, His are silver and gold and He will provide

me with my needs in this world, and so why should I be spurring myself on to obtain a wealth which is not legal. He will use the stimulative faculty for anger against the wicked and evil-doers who do not accept but reject the yoke of Heaven from themselves, as it is written, "And I shall break the burden of the yoke." ⁴⁶ Even the prophet prayed against the crafty, "Shall I not hate those that hate Thee, Lord etc." ⁴⁷ All this he shall do in the name of Heaven and not to receive the crown of a prominent man or in order to avenge himself upon his enemies. He shall use the stimulative faculty for pleasantness to be forbearing and to forgive him who sins against him, just as the Rabbis, Blessed be their memory, explained: To whom does God forgive sin, to him who overlooks transgression. He shall use the stimulative faculty for joy and grief on account of the diminution of the living Torah and to mourn over the destruction of Jerusalem and to rejoice in its joy, as it is written, "Be merry over it, rejoice all the mourners etc." ⁴⁸ and to rejoice with a bridegroom and bride and to rejoice in the joy of the Sabbath and a Holy Day, as it is written, "And you shall rejoice in your festivals." ⁴⁹ He shall use the stimulative faculty for humility and pride in the middle path in order that he shall not hold light the honor of his house and he shall not disgrace its glory by an overemphasis upon humility, nor should he exalt his heart in such a way that there will appear in him the signs of haughtiness. Everything should be in the name of Heaven, just as our sages, blessed be their memory, say, "Excommunicate a person who has humility and excommunicate him who has no humility," and, "A

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thing in its season, now good it is." In connection with the qualities of free-will offerings, he should go in the middle path so that he should not be called a scatterer or a destroyer. So with all the rest of the qualities not mentioned here he should conduct himself in them by the middle path since it is the proper one. Then his soul will be healthy just as our Master Moses explains in his commentary to Aboth concerning the man who has these, who turns and inclines all his psychic, that is, his intellectual, sentient and stimulative faculties to one point and directs them to only one purpose, which is the service of God, until there is perfected in him all the ethical and intellectual virtues which I mentioned above, and he sets all his desires to know the secret of God, the secret of this existence in its entirety, in order that through this the honor and glory and power of the Creator may be evident to him. And if he suppresses all his natural desires, behold he will come even in his lifetime to be among the degrees of the individuals who are like the Ishim and even more than them. In this degree into which he shall come he shall do all the wonders which we find in connection with the prophets and the sages of the Talmud who resurrected the dead by their prayers over them, and slew the living suddenly by inflicting punishments upon them, and created men and living creatures and brought down rain and restrained it, and things similar to these. They did all these great wonders suddenly in their lifetime by their will alone, without any sort of oath in God's name, simply by attaining to this degree which is the angels' degree, this establishing what is written, "He will do the will of those who fear Him." ⁵¹ Whoever attains this, happy is he, for the angels and the

Host of Heaven are obeyed by him immediately without any sort of oath in the Holy Name, and behold all of him is included in the Heavens and there remains no separating division between him and God, Blessed be He, except the inherence which the soul has with matter on account of which it was said of Moses our Master, Peace be to him, "Thou shalt not be able to see my face etc." Similarlay it is said, "Thou hast made him a little less than God." This of which I have spoken is the path which raises the soul to that station which I have shown you at the beginning of these words. But after death there is added to the soul a greater degree, from one point of view, than the degree before it came into the body, therefore all the more greater than that which it possessed while being in the body, for then the Eternal Light illumines it and it ascends constantly from one degree to another in the Light of Life. When its journeys have been completed, then it is in the Lands of the Living and in the sight of the Presence. Concerning this time the Sages, Blessed be their memory, says: The righteous are greater in their death than in their life, and greater are the righteous than the ministering angels; and they say that the righteous are destined to say "Holy" before them. This is the Garden of Eden which God promised to the righteous. Happy is he who merits this! I say that the imaginative faculty is fitted to remain after death as a part of the intellect by the will of God through the medium of the Active Intellect, and that it should become one with the intellectual faculty and be one to receive the compensations of reward and punishment. This is a faith worthy of being accepted by everyone

who holds to the religion of Moses our Master, peace be to his soul, but the rest of the corporeal faculties like eating, growth and reproduction and similar ones are not worthy of survival.

If the reader be astonished and say, how is it possible that the soul should ascend after its having been joined with a body, even with the body of a righteous man, to a degree which it previously had when it was pure from all the accidents of matter and all the impurities of body. We shall answer him in two ways, from two premises, in order to remove this doubt. The first is that we already know that a good God for an ultimate good purpose will not withhold from any creature the destiny fitted for him, as I have shown above in the matter of the primal matter and the primal form. Secondly, it is known further that everyone who prepares himself more for good and for the acceptance of perfection, it is fitting that there be increased for him further perfection than that which he possessed at first. Furthermore, accordingly as he adds to himself virtuous qualities and worthy attributes, so it is fitting that you add to him a further perfection up to the perfection which will enable him to reach an ultimate purpose. Thus he will be repayed by the praise and glory of Him who causes the original perfection, who bestows this order and measure of grace by being gracious to those who are worthy in proportion to their relation to themselves and in proportion to their relation to others. These two premises are things well known of themselves but I shall present an example for you so that you may be able to understand it.

Suppose there be in the court of a certain king a certain nobleman who is the greatest among his noblemen and servants. This nobleman is a man distinguished by the attributes of nobility and habituated to abstinence, set off by the characteristics of strength and the possessor of worthy human qualities, that is, of generosity and exalting humility, seemingly by all species of appearance a man who has the ability to stand in the palace of the king. But he has not yet been submitted to any test. That is, he exists in a place and time which happen to restrain him from the exercise of his faculties and attributes, and they stimulate him to the opposite in the way that he recognizes himself and his merit truly in actuality, and this is known to others beside himself. But he remains in this station and with this strength perfect in its arrangement and faculties in his own eyes and in the eyes of others, a perfection of strength and opinion only, not a perfection actually tested. By his being in this state of perfection he is very honored and distinguished in the eyes of the king and the noblemen, and he has special favor in the king's presence among those who are so favored, who are also of the degree of virtues which are found in him.

Behold this king has a certain province in his kingdom which is a rebellious province and powerful men accustomed to rebellion, men of blood and wickedness. It seems to the king and his counsellors that the province must have to rule over it a strong man, wise-minded, firm in quality and possessed of certain attributes, and through him it is possible that they will come under the yoke of the

kingdom. Furthermore it seems to him that the aforementioned nobleman would be fitted for that rule since there is really found in him the degree of the qualities necessary for the government of that province. Therefore they send him to rule over them. He who has been appointed goes there and begins to concentrate his attention upon the characteristics of the men of the province until he understands and comprehends all of them. He begins with them gently, little by little, with great caution and removes them from their evil natures, degree by degree so that they should not be frightened or worried about the removal and the change suddenly and thus rebel against him. He does not lord it over them but very wisely tones down their ways little by little without their feeling the diminution. Thus he does for a long time until he has made himself strong through the power of the king who has sent an army and horsemen there. With this and with the goodness of his faculties, a goodness which has made his own mind lofty, and with the best of his attributes he brings them under the dominion of the king and puts them in the category of the rest of those who are his subjects. He turns them from force and perversio to peace and humility, from rebelliousness to service, from falsehood and violence to the ways of truth and righteousness, and he rules over them for a long time by his power and wisdom until he completely wins over this province for the king. Now this appointed person has arrived at the test of his faculties since they are now found in him to be destined and insistent. He, with all this, remains perfect in his faculties and adds to himself strength and great perfection. Only now he is perfect with an actual tested perfection, and thus a province and all its

inhabitants belong to the king. After a time the king sends for him to return to his court and he returns by his command to the king.

Now I shall ask you whether it was in keeping with the law of the rank of the king and his righteousness that he should have left this nobleman in the degree of his first station without addition, or whether it was fitting that he should add to him and elevate his honor above that of the other nobleman. Behold, do you not know that if he had left him only in his first station, this would have been a great defect in the law of the king and in his righteousness, because it was necessary that he should increase his honor so that he might add to himself some good and actually tested importance for the service of the king. If he would not have done this, there would have been no difference between the one who serves the king and the one who does not serve him or the one who has importance alone. That is, in respect to a strength which, without having been observed in him while his merit was being actually tested, would put him on a par with that man whose merit had not been actually tested. This would be a great perversity in the nature of the king. Therefore it is perforce left for you to say that it was fitting of the nature of the king that he should increase his station above that which he formerly held so that he might add for himself some of the merit that might become his, just as every good master does not withhold goodness from his servants whether that goodness be original or whether it be acquired. So the matter is completely with respect to the soul which was given by God to man which is everything that it was

while it was yet above. In its degree it was an honored, trusted station, remaining without purpose or stimulation according to that which was in it. God sent it into the body of man that it might lead and rule over it, it being that which is the cause of all the changes, the animal desires, the evil passions, the perversities, the rebelliousness. It is the city or the rebellious province. There follows necessarily the violence of the natural arrangements of the deficient human being that this inherence which inheres in the body should lead only to bad action leading to evil characteristics which follow necessarily from its deficiencies, and binds it until it becomes gradually a necessity of this matter that even it itself destroys by this inherence all virtues which it originally had. But this which is appointed does not do so, but it overcomes the violence of that evil disposition and prevails upon it to see its appointed destinies. It puts strength into the faculty of the intellect to fortify itself with the service of God and causes it to face the wars of the passions. But it is not sufficient for it that it guard itself from the destruction, a destruction which is on account of those evil dispositions that follow from the association and thus emerge in its goodness. But it must further add
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 strength and turn those evil dispositions and evil designs, all of them, to good and honorable action and thus emerge strong with the help of God. It will conquer over the body which is the province or rebellious city until it brings that province under the dominion of its king. It will make of him a man who fears God. It will direct all his faculties to the way which I pointed out above through the faculty of the five senses. Thus it will be perfected, actually tested of itself, into a self performing the service of the Holy One.

Now I shall ask you whether it would be fitting that after its separation from this body and its ascent to the House of God, that it should remain only in the first degree where it was before it performed all the good things and successes which elevated it almost to perfection, that it should be left in its position without being tried by an actual test, and if He should not add to it honor and great esteem more and more. God forbid, for this would be a great perversity in that which is good and makes for good in the nature of God, Blessed be He.

But it is fitting that he should add to it a thousand times more up to the very end that it is possible for her to receive of the perfection which is the end of all perfections and the final purpose. Scripture testifies concerning this when it says, "And the light of the righteous is like a light constantly shining ⁵⁴ and a light while it is just day," which refers to the degree after which there is no other degree. This is what our Rabbis meant in Leviticus Rabbah to the verse, ⁵⁵ "And you shall sanctify yourselves and be holy." They use the analogy of a cellar in which He puts the drunkards and abstainers to guard in the next world. He doubles the reward of the drunkards who guard the wine and do not drink of it, for they have compelled their evil inclination to turn to the nature of abstinence. An example of such a restraint are Israel and the angels. Israel, because there is habitual among them the Evil Inclination, for to them is ascribed two types of holiness, "And you shall sanctify yourselves and be holy." The angels, with whom the Evil Inclination is not habitual, to them one type of holiness is ascribed in

their being called "Holy Ones". That is what the Scriptures meant when it said, "The mighty ones are those who do his word." Our Rabbis, be their memory blessed, explained this: The righteous are those who conquer their inclination. They say that they are greater than the ministering angels. See that my words are like the words of our Rabbis almost literally. There is yet another proof for this, for after we have learned above in the first chapter from many proofs the unity of the soul with the Active Intellect even while it is yet in the body in the way that I have shown--and all the philosophers agree with this--you may now deduce this: Since even while the intellect exists in matter which is a thick composition and a dense partition between it and the Eternal Light it is attached with the Active Intellect, how much the more, a thousand times, after its separation from the body and from matter, a more prominent station is fitted for it, even though there be very little relation between it and the first. This is certainly an axiom whose explanation it is unnecessary to elaborate. This is sufficient of what I have made known to you of the secret of the soul and the Garden of Eden which God promised to the righteous and I have shown you that all of it is divinely spiritual, elevated and exalted by the Divine Glory in which there is no material stamp whatever. I shall show you that just as the Garden of Eden which is the reward of the righteous is all spiritual, so the Gehenna which is the punishment of the wicked is all immaterial.

Now it remains for me to show you what it is, and I shall present to you

the example which I used previously of the nobleman who was sent to the province. But this will be the opposite of what was said about him above. Suppose he did not govern the province well, but badly, woe unto him for then he could not return to the palace of the king who had sent him. He would no longer know his late place or his former station before the king had sent him to the province. But he would find his end and he would languish there in his exile and perish with those rebellious despoilers. He would perish with all of them because he had drawn them only to evil and not to good as he was obliged to do. Because of this he too perishes with them. Pray, who can imagine punishment and great vengeance and harsh afflictions for that nobleman because of his rebellion worse than being forced from his station of glory and honor, cast down to the station of disgrace and shame in the densest sort of darkness and thrust away by a decree which has no repeal. So will the result be with the wicked soul which destroys all the glory and preciousness and the honors which are assigned to it and which the soul of the righteous enjoys. The destruction of these promising things is not sufficient for it, but it is shaken out and stripped even of those which it originally possessed to every evil. This is the "hollow of the sling" which God has promised to the soul of the enemies of righteousness just as they explain the verse, "And the spirit returns to God who gave it." They produce an analogy for it in the case of the king who distributed garments among his servants. He commanded that the wicked ones who soiled them should languish in the dungeon. So with the wicked. Concerning their bodies he

says, "There is no peace etc." Concerning their souls he says, "And the souls of
 thine enemies shall He sling out as from the hollow of a sling." This is the ex-
 planation. See that He ascribes to the souls of the wicked throwing down and
 casting to destruction and He does not say that they will be burned. Although it
 is true that in many places He does ascribe to it an expression of burning, it is
 not the burning of actual material fire, but it is simply a suggestion of the de-
 struction and perishing, just as fire which destroys the things that are put into
 it and is the best example for the destruction of good things as I shall explain at
 length. Of "the hollow of the sling", the explanation is that it will be cast out
 of the land of the living, and it will be left weighted down by its darkness, and
 it will not return to its original form. It will recognize its own destruction and
 it will not return to non-being for a long time but it will remain in dense darkness.
 It will seem to it as if it were remaining perpetually surrounded by consuming coals.
 Its entire time will be spent in trouble and grief, in fear and trepidation. Dark-
 ness will fall upon it and it will constantly feel this great trouble through the
 faculty of the imagination which has been left of it, as I shall presently show.
 But it will not be burned in fire, that is, in literal, material fire. By the
 rational faculty it will reflect upon all the goods and prosperities which it might
 have received had it been meritorious and righteous. By this faculty it will also
 comprehend the pleasure of the righteous soul, whereupon its own sorrow and grief
 will be greatly magnified. This casting out and putting to shame is also what He

meant when He said, "And those cast out in the earth will be written down." God, ⁶⁰ blessed be His Name, also says, "Whoever sins against Me I shall erase him from my book." ⁶¹ But He does not say, "I shall burn him." So the prophet says, "They shall be blotted out from the Book of Life and they will not be recorded with the righteous." ⁶² Who can imagine or measure for the wicked soul chastisements and punishments and exactions greater than these which God, in His mercy, will exact from them.

But it is said of the soul of the righteous, "Thy righteousness will go before thee and the Glory of God will be thy ^{upward} ~~reward~~, ⁶³" and his soul will cleave to the path of life. It will return to God and in righteousness it will behold His countenance. Amen? So you will find in one verse that the sage explained something of the nature of the Garden of Eden and of Gehenna briefly when he said that the path of life is upward for the intelligent person, so that he may turn away from Sheol below. By this he meant that the real Garden of Eden is the path of life ascending upward. Therefore the intelligent righteous person will choose it in order to turn away from Gehenna which is its opposite, for the Garden of Eden is an ascent upward and Gehenna is a descent downward, namely, forsakenness and casting out, just as I have said. He does not say "in order to keep away from fire below" but he says that it is the opposite of the Garden of Eden, namely, the opposite of the path of life which is upwards.

The average soul will approach the ascent and will keep away from the casting down and the descent, and it will have station and existence according to

its relation. This is also in accordance with the explanation of the verse, "When
 64 man goes to his house of the world." We infer from this that every person has a
 world according to his glory. The average person is called righteous from one point
 of view, as they explain the verse, "They will be erased from the Book of Life,"
 as referring to the totally wicked. "And with the righteous they will not be in-
 scribed" refers to the average persons. But of material punishment there is none
 at all, only spiritual punishment. They say what is important concerning the
 65 verse, "He shall call to the Heavens above and to the earth to judge with Him."
 They make use of the example of the lame and the blind person, and they say that in
 the future to come--which they explain here to mean resurrection of the dead--He
 will put the spirit back into the body and judge them as one. The literal inference
 from this explanation must therefore be that he effects once a while a second union in
 order that, cleaving together, they may get the sensation of the punishments in the
 same way that they perceived the pleasure of the union at the time of the first
 union, which was a bodily, material sensation. Before this union is affected there
 does not exist any sort of sensation like this material sensation, but the types
 of punishment which precede this aforementioned time are all incorporeal. If it
 is true that the punishment which is called Gehenna which takes place immediately
 after death is a bodily punishment, what would be the farther need for this union.
 Has not the soul been already judged for a long time by corporeal judgment. It is
 not necessary for me to apologize for it since I am not the sinner.

Now I must enter into the refutation of him who desires to refute these words of mine through the use of Aggadic statements and Midrash which appear on their surface to agree with the literal meanings of some of the Scriptural verses which are found in the Torah, which also seem at first glance to teach that there is a burning in material fire. It so happens that there has befallen such a one an intellectual confusion to take these verses according to their literal meaning without diminution or addition and without any sort of hidden meaning, and he does not attribute to them any form of wisdom and he does not formulate them intellectually but he selects a handful and then scatters bits. If he finds ten Aggadoth or ten verses teaching or suggesting the opposite of the thought which he has in mind, and one verse or one Aggadah which seems to go according to the method of his thought, he will lay hold of this one alone and throw away the ten, as if the law does not go according to a majority instead of according to an individual. He will depart from the truth on account of a desire which forces him to incline toward his own thought. Of such a person it is said, "He that separateth himself seeketh his own desire." ⁶⁶ That is, the man who departs from that which is true and proper is one who seeks corporeal things and cites matters which teach only according to his desire to interpret and to find only that which hides the truth and which agrees with his thought alone.

Before I begin to cite proof from the words of the Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, and the words of the Biblical Verses concerning the way of truth

and righteousness as I shall explain, I shall present one short proposition from which you may comprehend two purposes. The first is that you must comprehend from it the truth of these two important matters, if you have the inclination for understanding stripped of jealousy and evil desire. The second is that you will judge in the scale of merit if you are wise and righteous and you will receive my words with good spirit and you will formulate them in your mind. Only be careful that you be not of the sect of those who dispute over the truth with an evil intent, that is, in order to be considered a wise person in the sight of others and to make another appear wrong. If you do so, God, Blessed be He, will be a witness and a judge against you and I shall have saved my soul. But if you see any sort of error in them after you have examined them carefully and you will correct them according to the truth in deliberation and in calm, this will be the work of Heaven. I have already said at the beginning of my book that I will be your disciple in this, and I will accept your words as refreshing waters to a parched soul, and your reward will be very great.

Know that all the words of the Rabbis may be divided into six parts. The first part consists of words in their literal meaning without subtraction or addition. The second is the matter of allegory or proverb teaching some exalted purpose. The third is a collection of sayings like prophecy which comes in a dream or waking state from God, Blessed be He, through the medium of the Active Intellect. These are the prophetic words spoken by means of allegory as in the case of Daniel and the other prophets. The fourth are words of Aggadah and popular explanations

which are presented on the Sabbaths and Holy Days to the masses of men, women and children in order to draw their hearts to the Torah and Mitzvot and to strengthen them for the service of God, Blessed be He, and this part is very good and useful for Israel. The fifth is the collection of words of amusement intended to rejoice and expand the heart after the sage has become wearied with fine speculation and the study of difficult laws and profound principles. The sixth is the narration of miracles which God performed in the world in honor of the righteous in the generation of the sages of the Talmud, and the great wonders which he shows in their time just as he did in the days of the prophets, and for whose sake he changed the natural order.

An analogy for the first division of words according to their literal meaning includes everything which we find of their words in the Mishnah, the Talmud, the laws of the Sifra and Sifre, commandments and their explanation, hermeneutical rules by which the Torah is to be interpreted, the conclusions *a minori ad majus*, standard rules, identic categories and all similar things, because they are the explanations of the Torah and the Books of the Soferim in which there are commandments. All these are according to their literal meaning and it is incumbent upon every Jew to accept them just as they are spoken and in the language in which they spoke them, without subtraction or addition. We are not to add to them nor to subtract from them nor to be skeptical of them nor to doubt them nor to give them any allegory nor to draw them out of the parable clearly expressed in them in order to

turn them about to other meanings, because all of them were spoken by Moses our Master, Peace be to him, from the mouth of God. Our Rabbis said concerning them that the Torah was acquired by the faith of the sages, and everyone who approaches them skeptically in order to understand them against their literal meaning or the explanations which the Rabbis placed upon them is a complete heretic and a skeptic and "hears down the plants". He has no place in the world to come for behold Moses our Master has written from the mouth of God, "That through these words I made a covenant with you and with Israel".⁶⁷ The Rabbis explained this to mean that God made a covenant with Israel over the Mishnah, that is, the oral law. The sage says: "Through the Holy Spirit and more than these, be careful!" Its explanation is: Be more careful with the words of the scribes than with the words of the Torah etc.

Furthermore, they explain, "Better is this love than precious wine", as meaning that the words of the scribes are more than the wine of the Torah. All this is so because they are the explanations of the Torah, they are its glory and crown, they testify to its excellence, without them its excellence would be unknown and man would not know its arrangement. Therefore, they are not to be understood allegorically so that a man may free himself from the literal meanings clearly expressed in the commandments and say: A certain commandment has a certain purpose, and it is enough for me to understand the force of the purpose alone but it is unnecessary to fulfill it as it is written. Anyone who says thus is not of the religion of Israel nor of the sect of Moses our Master. It is forbidden to speak to him and God will remove him from us. This is what Solomon the Sage intended when he said

that one must understand allegory and fine writing in the words and proverbialism of the Sages. That is, it is necessary to understand the words of the Torah through its fine method of expression as it is written, and it is not sufficient merely to understand them through allegory. It is necessary to do likewise with the words of the Sages, to perform them according to their words, and then to attach to them an allegory or a proverb. But the allegory and the proverb without the method of expression itself and without the words themselves are not enough except to give a proper and fitting reason for the commandment. That is, God commanded a certain commandment for a certain reason. This is said in order to lend glory to the commandment so that it will not be considered a futile thing. Thus the matter becomes the work of Heaven and the glory of Israel and the glory of God, blessed be His Name, and is conditional upon constant performance according to the way that it is written so that it may not be considered merely an allegory. So we find in the case of the Rabbis that they presented numerous reasons for the Torah and the commandment of the Aroah Minim and the commandment of the Fringes. This is simply a matter of good not of evil. They also explained the cause for the seven days impurity for those who give birth to the male child and why fourteen days for a female child because in the case of a male child, they all are rejoicing, she repents after seven days. But in the case of the female child when they do not all rejoice, she repents only after fourteen days. They also explained the reason for circumcision on the eighth day as being that the father and mother should not be sorrowing and

the whole world rejoicing. So we find with many other commandments. The commandments whose reason we are unable to comprehend we leave until Elijah comes and he will reveal the reason. Even Moses our Master presented a reason for the eating of Matzah and the dwelling in booths.

הכ-ב

The second part consists of a large number of explanations which appear to be words provoking astonishment, or explanations of Biblical verses which seem very far-fetched and no sort of commandment is dependent upon them. For example, the ox which the first man brought, its horns preceding its hoofs, which they explained thus, first showing the horns, then the cloven hoofs. Certainly the matter is not according to its literal meaning nor is any matter similar to this. For they are strange and far-fetched words according to the explanations which are given them. They are certainly to be understood allegorically. They are golden apples in silver baskets. According to the way that our teacher Moses explained, they said these things in strange language in order that that which was clear of them might serve as an explanation to the mass of the people, while that which was mysterious, which a really what was intended by them, would be a precious treasure for chosen men, the remnant of the sages whom God calls. The strangeness of the matter which appears from their literal meanings would serve to hide the secret from the mass which has no power to comprehend them, too weak to understand, as it is written, "Lamb for thy garments". A certain sage ^{said} that the words of God are profound and given to men that they may be performed, and they are made hidden and impenetrable in order

that they may become difficult, and then revealed that they may become our life and foundation. This section of their words is very lengthy. I will be unable to give you its details but I give you one short statement which may be a guiding principle. When you find among their statements words tending in this direction, take them allegorically and not literally. Everyone who understands them literally is in my opinion a pious fool.

The third division consists of words like prophecy. These are the majority of words spoken by way of a narrative of something that took place. That is, the narration of very astounding stories that you find among their words like a certain story about a certain Rabbi: One time it was so and so. There are marvelous stories like this, difficult to believe that they were really as they are written. And it is impossible for them to have been so in any way or manner except through a miracle which annulled the natural order, and a miracle for which there was no necessity either on account of reason, place or the individual. It is known that no miracle is performed which annuls the natural order of creation except for some very, very great need. It is not performed for the amusement of men. These sayings are like: the Jozmoth of R. Bar bar Chuman introduced by "I have seen" in Perek Ha Acher, and similar things whose meaning is like: "I see a staff blossoming". So also when it says, "I have seen Elijah which was so and so." All these matters which came to them in the vision of prophecy and emanated by the Holy Spirit in a dream or waking state, and they are matters teaching concerning the future and

concerning things in a category similar to the category of the prophets. This is my faith in all these matters and similar things from every point of view and it is an important faith. Our sages accord it much more honor than the faith of pious fools among the mass of our people who take these matters literally and thus attribute foolish words and uselessly impossible sayings to the sages of the Talmud.

The fourth division consists of certain special aggadoth. They are the sayings which were presented as homilies to the mass of the people, the women and the children on the Sabbaths, the New Moons and the Holy Days in order to draw their hearts to the Torah and the Commandments. They sometimes presented these explanations to them in the language of threat and exaggeration in order to instill fear into them so that they might guard themselves against sinning; sometimes in the language of good tidings and gracious promises in order to strengthen the hearts of the students who study the Torah in poverty and pressing need so that the study would not be a burden to them and they would forsake it. This portion we may divide into sections. Many of them were promises to the righteous concerning the future to come. For example, Israel was destined to have it so and so. The Land of Israel is destined to produce such and such. The walls of Jerusalem are destined to be so and so. Likewise they say of one who is accustomed to come to the Synagogue and to the House of Study, if he does not come for one day God asks for him, as it is written, "Who among you fears the Lord, hearkening to the voice of His servant etc." Likewise they say, everyone who recites, "May His name be exalted" with all

his might, even if there be some idolatry in him we overlook it. So they say in another place, Great is idolatry, for the reason that anyone who denies it, it is as if he had acknowledged the entire Torah, and the reverse. So they say that if Israel would keep one Sabbath according to the law, they would immediately be redeemed, for it is written, "For the eunuchs who keep my Sabbaths etc." All these are sayings which are exaggerated quite a bit, for it is obvious that whoever serves idolatry will not be keeping the Sabbath. Therefore these sayings about keeping one Sabbath, even worshipping idolatry would not be true literally, except if you translate "servant" and not "to serve". Likewise they clearly say that the trust of God in women was greater than in man, for it is written, "Trustful women, ~~be~~ ⁷¹ ~~arise,~~ etc." Furthermore, there are in this section rules of human conduct by which a man should guide himself with the members of his household and with the rest of men. They find clearly expressed Biblical verses which agree with those sayings. For example, they say: bad education in the household of a man is worse than the wars of God and man, for it is written, "O Lord, how many are my enemies etc." ⁷² Likewise they say: A man should always be careful with grain for there is no quarrel in the household of a man except over grain, for it is written, "He who puts peace in your territory (73) in that he satiates you." ⁷⁴ They also say, when the barley is exhausted from the pot then quarrel ~~knocks~~ on the door and enters the house. Likewise they say: A man should never appear at an administrator in his own household. Whence do we know? From the case of Joseph. Likewise they say: A man should never increase evils in the midst of his house. These and similar things

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are words of ethical instruction and guidance and present human arrangements fitting for the human species. And they use Biblical verses as if they corresponded, even though they do not correspond to the particular case and were not intended for it. But they quoted them thus in order that their words should be acceptable to those who hear them and that they should be accepted voluntarily. Some of them are words of warning concerning things which it is forbidden to do. Also, if they agreed clearly with a few of the verses they applied the verses to them, even if the verse might not have been particularly intended for this. As they say: You shall not make of bundles bundles. Likewise they say: Whoever does not practice civilization, they put him into a compartment into which even the ministering angels may not enter, for it is written, "For there was no sorcery in Jacob and no divination in Israel at the time when he told Jacob and Israel what God would do." ⁷⁵ Similar is the interpretation of the robbery of the poor person in your houses on Sabbath, the greeting of a man for his neighbor, and very many similar things. Some of them are stories which told what happened of good to pious people. For example, the story concerning a certain pious man that he performed a certain commandment and God compensated him in such a wise. These are numerous in the Talmud and it is good to understand them just as they are written if the thing be not of the class of total impossibilities. This fourth section is a very good one and useful to Israel to draw them high to the service of God, so that from performance which is not in the name of Heaven there should come performance which is in its name. The

entire purpose of our Rabbis was to produce service in the name of Heaven.

The fifth division includes words partly in fun like: Make the coal look like orange and thin the parts that are red and prepare for me two (roosters) that tell the time in the darkness. And like others things when it says so and so was talking in a clever language like, The laule knocks at the bottom of the barrel so let the birds fly to their nests. And everything similar to this of which there are many in the Talmud. Do not think that it is a useless matter, but it is a useful thing, because their purpose in this respect was to rejoice the heart and to cause it to expand, so that it might not become confused and so that the intellect might not be weakened by an overabundance of great labor in the study of the Torah and difficult Halacoth expended to bring the zealous searcher to its truth. When they became weak from their studies, they would appease themselves with foam and relax themselves with words of amusement, so that the strength of the intellect might be renewed, for their brains become wearied when they sit constantly at the work and they need this, just as they say: The Schechinah does not dwell in the midst of melancholy and in the midst of sloth but in the midst of joy and study requires prayer as in the day of illness because we ~~were~~⁷⁶ "Take for me a player." because they did not wish to satisfy their joy with futile words, they spoke in the language of the Torah by way of digression. All this was done in the name of Heaven to magnify their Torah and to beautify it or to stimulate the heart of the students and to make them zealous for tradition, like that sage who was interpreting

for the congregation, and they feel asleep and he wanted to wake them up so he said, "What did Esther see that she should rule over one hundred and twenty-seven provinces," as it is written in Berasith Rabbah. In this fifth division some matters of health, some of which concern the life of a person, even though most of them are for old men and old women. Also words of hyperbole are included in this section just like that sage who buried a dead person and found a skull of a dead person which went into the eyeball up to his nose. Or like the one who ran after a goat which went into the marrow-bone of a dead person; or he ran after the goat three miles and the marrowbone did not enclose it. Likewise, the egg of the bird etc. And everything like this which is an exaggeration, of which there is no need and for which it is unnecessary to assign a special section.

The sixth section includes the recounting of miracles and wonders which God does through the righteous sages. This is like what we find of some of the Rabbis, the Sages of the Talmud, who punished and slew and resurrected the dead, and brought down rain and produced a mountain within an hour or made it seem as if a mountain had been produced there. Likewise the stories about Nahshon of Gamzu and of Shoni the Circlemaker and all the stories similar to these which are so numerous that we cannot include all of them in a book. They are the wonder works performed by the power of God to the glory of the righteous. All of these we must believe literally and as they are written for they are exactly as they are written. He does this in order to establish the will of those who fear Him, because the righteous are greater than the ministering angels as I previously pointed out. Everyone

who denies these things or makes sport of them is a skeptic for they are all true, provided that the particular miracle which annulled the natural order was necessary to be done at the time in which it was done or for the need of saving the generation or to spread awe of the righteous among the people of their generation ~~so~~ that they should not rebel against them. Or in order to avenge a righteous man upon a wicked person or in order to establish a suitable memorial for the righteous. But to believe that these wonders were vain and futile, that they occurred accidentally without any of the purposes or needs which I mentioned or things similar, this sort of faith is not obligatory but it is foolish, and concerning such believers it is written, "A fool believes everything." ⁷⁷ For stories which are not according to these conditions which I have set down are foolish stories and worthless things, and it is not seeming either to worry about them or to believe them, even if they are written in a book and with ink. I am unable to mention them in detail but I will quote only a few examples. Of these things I have expatiated at great length in a book which I wrote which is called Maamar Ha Carbon, and here I have given you an introduction for the two purposes which I mentioned at the beginning. Now do not be astonished at me when I allegorize for you every explanation and verse which seems to teach that the rewards of the soul are corporeal, both for reward and for punishment, because everything that you find in their words of this matter which teaches corporeality comes under three of the five divisions, namely, the second, the third or the fourth, and is not to be understood literally from any

point of view. Behold I shall begin to mention in brief outline form some of these things from which a thinker might find ground to argue against us from the words of our Rabbis, in order to strengthen his own argument, and what is necessary to answer him and how to explain these words of the Rabbis from which he thinks to strengthen his own position. You, like an understanding person, will in the same way take everything which they have said in this respect, even that which I have not written here, in the way that I shall explain everything that is written here, because I shall not be able to give all their words in detail. But these shall serve you as general illustrations exemplifying the particular things.

Third Division. If your opponent should say: Behold we find that our Rabbis say in many places in the Talmud that Gehenna is of material fire, and that the soul of the wicked person is burned in that fire after his death; and that there is even found in the Midrash an aggadah telling of the compartments that there are in Gehenna and the angels appointed over them and the laws by which the soul of the wicked man is to be judged in fire and in hail and in thunder, and similar things at which the understanding of man revolts merely upon hearing the mention of them. Furthermore it is found in the Gemara that a smoke rises over the graves of the wicked immediately after death, and we find also that the soul of the righteous person enjoys itself in rivers of pure balsam wood and tables with silver legs and in gardens in which there are various trees, until even upon their person the odours can be distinguished. We even find of one of the Chasidim

that he absorbed some of those leaves into his own garment and his garment retained some of that good odour and in this way it became very valuable in price. They also speak of three classes on the Day of Judgement, the completely righteous, the completely wicked and the average ones. The completely wicked are immediately assigned to Gehenna etc. The average ones flutter about and then ascend, for it is written, "And I shall put that third into fire."⁷⁸ But the sinners of Israel shall go down bodily to Gehenna and be judged therefor twelve months. Their body will be destroyed and their soul burned and the spirit scattered under the soles of the righteous, for it is written, "And they shall grind the wicked for they shall be dust beneath their feet."⁷⁹ Furthermore they say that the light will not come into contact with the wicked of Israel, since, from the altar in which there are only beams of gold denars and the fire could not come into contact with it all the days of the Temple, the sinners of Israel who are as little filled with commandments as a pomegranate, how much the more that the light of Gehenna will not come into contact with them. Its literal meaning is that there is there a real fire in which the souls of the wicked are judged. Furthermore, they say in the matter of the three classes, in connection with the verse, "And they went forth and they saw the corpses of the men who sinned against Me, that their worm did not die and their fire was not extinguished,"⁸⁰ that Gehenna is consumed but they are not consumed, meaning literally that there is a material fire in which the soul is judged. There are many sayings like this in the Talmud. One would not be able to include them in

a large book, all of them clearly seeming to teach that there is a punishment for the soul of the wicked in Genenna of real, material fire. Thus far it is possible for my opponent to have arguments against me, and he may even multiply them from what he may find of statements to support him.

To this I reply that one may answer such an opponent that all the statements that we find from our Rabbis concerning the subject of Genenna^{which} indicate at surface glance the existence of a completely material fire are all of them of one of three of the five sections. Either they spoke them allegorically or prophetically, which is something like allegory, or by way of popular explanation. But most of them are only from two sections, that of allegory and of popular explanation and a few of them from the third section. In everything that they said in this teaching the promise of a perceivable, material pleasure and the threat of a perceivable, material punishment, the basis of their intention was only that which I shall now tell you. That is, they described these matters in dreadful, terrifying terms and in very fearful language in order to instill fear into the mass of the people who are fools, because it is known that they would not accept the yoke of the commandments and the instructions of the Torah except through the threat of a punishment or a reward of a corporeal nature, that is, through a bodily sensation. This is because they only fear and worry about accidents which happen to them on account of their materiality, like animals who are afraid only when a hand is waved over them with a stick or with a stone or when one shouts at them or stings

them with reins, but they do not fear about their future because they do not know and they do not understand anything but the blow itself when it strikes. This happens because they are entirely corporeal without any sort of rational principle and they have only that species of form principle which makes them completely what they are. That is, the ox form principle to the ox is what makes it an ox and the bird form principle to the bird is what makes it a bird. They comprehend of things only that which is perceptible to them. They do not comprehend the species of a thing, that is, to know sweet from sweetness and bitter from the species of bitterness, but they comprehend of a thing that it is pleasant to them and of another thing that it is hateful. This happens because there is no rational principle.

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Also there is nothing left after death of their composition that they should fear during their life time for its destruction or for accidents that may happen to it. Therefore they do not fear and are not worried except for their flesh and their limbs which convey sensations to them. This is because they have no perfecting part left in them outside of that which is found in them now. Even their love for their owners and masters and their recognition of them does not occur to them except when they receive fodder and wheat at their hands daily, and on account of the hope which clings to them through the imaginative faculty, by which God leads them to hope for the happiness of eating which comes to them from the hand of their masters when they fill their mangers. Therefore they follow them and recognize them, but not by way of an intellectual, generic recognition. Such recognition is similar to

that by which the plant through its own natural faculty recognizes the sweet roots and draws them to itself and forsakes the salty roots and those which are sulphurous. This is called natural perception as Galen and Isaac Israeli wrote in the book of Elements. So the matter is likewise with the mass of the people who are guests in the form of man, for they do not serve the Creator and they do not love Him and they do not revere Him except on account of the hope through which they expect from Him a sufficient quantity of food and drink and wealth together with longevity, in wealth and in honor, in this world all the time that they live in it; and after death that He bring them up with their bodies or that their souls should enjoy themselves in gardens and pleasant Paradises at streams of rivers of honey and butter and pure balsam, and there they should rejoice and regale themselves with corporeal joy like the joy and the pleasure that they have here. If possibly they believe that there they will not eat food like this which it is necessary for them to expell from their bowels, it may possibly be to them like the food of Manna which is called Lechem Abirim because it is food completely absorbed by the limbs. If they rebel against Him, He will also punish them with the punishment of corporeal, material fire as mentioned above. I have heard of a certain sage who has written that the Garden of Eden into which the soul of the righteous comes after death is a delightful place on the earth existing in a state of peace which is very pleasant, with good atmosphere, with pleasant surroundings and with a beauty of arrangement. There there are forms and glorious images, very majestic, in which the soul may

tace pleasure. After beholding them at great length they become like living creatures and Seraphim and Ofanim and the hosts of Heaven and like transcendent forms. There it rests and learns about the higher perceptions which are like these in the Garden of Eden. It reflects upon them until it ascends after some time into that higher world, for now it can comprehend and understand its own essence without any sort of imagination. That perception will be a perception without confusion, not a sudden transition from a thing to its opposite, but a perception which comes easily and pleasantly from one degree to the other because it has already comprehended their likenesses in the earthly Garden of Eden. This sage compares this Garden of Eden to the work of the Tabernacle and the Beth Olamim. He expatiates upon these matters with great clarity. By my life, these words are more fitting and suitable for acceptance than the words of any author of our time, or those of whom I have heard. Even to our Master Moses they appear good and they agree with what the Rabbis said: Up in Eden the eye shall never rest. If you say, in what garden was the first man and if you say that that Garden was Eden, is it not written,"

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"And a river went out of Eden to water the garden." This means literally that there is a certain very glorious place whose name is Eden where the righteous soul is glorified upon its separation from the body. After that it enters with the upper world through the medium of this glorious garden. This attachment and entrance into that world is something like its attachment with the body through the medium of the spirit, that which is its nature, like the medium between matter and form through

an arranged plan between the upper world and the world of bodies. Its location is unknown. According to the words of that sage, it is necessary that there exist punishment in another place as the opposite of this. Perhaps it is a transmission to something similar. Perhaps it is fitting to say that there is no need for it to exist for purpose of punishment. This may be so because it is not necessary to worry whether the soul of the wicked is punished immediately, or whether it is not, according to the law of love and mercy. At any rate, the Garden of Eden of that sage is not the real Garden of Eden which is the ultimate happiness of our souls, but it is a place of some average pleasure. Whether it is so or whether it is not so, the fundamental principle is that the souls of humankind need these words very much in order that they may not attribute to themselves any sort of compensation, good or evil, if they imagine it to be according to the way they have it while they are in this world, namely, a bodily thing. This does happen to them because they are unable to formulate in their weak intellect any sort of existence without its being bodily. They even think their soul is a body. They do not comprehend any very beautiful allegory which the philosophers use in this respect to establish the truth of existence separated from body and of its being more real in existence than the corporeal. They (the philosophers) say. Let us suppose that there be a certain man complete in all his limbs who is born in the atmosphere. His face and his eyes are covered with something so that he cannot see anything outside of himself. All his sensory limbs like hands, arms, knees, shoulders, legs and digits

are distinct and separated from one another. They exist in such a way that they do not touch each other at all, and none of them perceives the other. It does not know and it does not sense by the faculty of any of its senses or by an explicit tactual sensation that it is possessed of limbs. Further, it is not aware by any kind of awareness that it is possessed of body, nor that it is possessed of soul. It never sees any body. Despite all this it is aware of itself and certain in its soul that it is surely some sort of existence and that it is the existence of something. Afterwards, if it comes after some time to formulate its thinking or to sense any one of its limbs, it nevertheless does not think to itself that this limb which it imagines is part of its existence or essential to its existence from the angle of actual truth, because it has already been made certain of the existence of its limbs. But it thinks that its being and its fundamental existence is that of which it was truly aware at first, that is, that which was neither limb nor body nor perceptible thing, but only concept. What it senses now as being body or a part of body, it considers something else outside of its fundamental existence, something accidentally to its essential existence. Therefore, that which is not body nor a part of body is more true and certain to it than that which is created for it now which is a bodily thing because that which was true for it of its existence is the being peculiarly essential to it. That is its self by which it is a part of existence and therefore it is primarily true for it. This is the example which the philosophers use to maintain that that existence which is incorporeal

is truer and more real than corporeal existence, for behold this man was more aware of the truth of his own existence and being through the existence which was not body than he was aware of the existence of himself through the existence which was body. Therefore existence without corporeality is more true and more real. From this we may infer that the existible intelligence has no need of knowing the truth of the existence of itself for the self which it thinks even if it be body. How much the less is it necessary for it to be in truth body for the purpose of certain existence, except for the purpose of human existence alone. Therefore after its separation from human existence, it exists then in an existence much truer, namely, the soul which is left after death. It is unnecessary to suppose any sort of bodily existence there, for that which is left is not body but is the root of its existence. Thus all things which exist spiritually, which means that they are without body, stripped of matter, are the props of existence, more real in their essence than things which are bodily. There is almost no relation between them on account of the great ascendancy of the one over the other.

But behold, the mass of the people who have not studied real science and are not practiced in speculation are unable to arrive at the fundamentals of these matters, and they cannot imagine their being true in any way. Anyone who claims that the future compensations will be incorporeal, they will not believe him and they will not listen to him but he will simply embitter their heart against the performance of good action in the hope of receiving that reward which he tells them,

for they will consider it futile. Concerning them the Scripture says, "Who knows. the spirit of man whether it ascends upward". They will go in this way when they are afraid of punishments, for they are afraid that the worm will eat them, that their flesh will become hard like a needle in living flesh, that fire will consume their bones and eat their bodies, that they will fall from exalted places into sunken depths, that they will be boiled in cauldrons and bowls. Afterwards, forks will be attached to them and snath them up and draw them out of the cauldrons and cut them into pieces with edged swords. Some of them will be hung by their rights and by their breasts while the hinges of doors are being pierced into their ears. They will be smitten by rods of fire and hail bound together, while the demons turn them suddenly, from fire to snow and from snow to fire. They will be cast into the throats of crocodiles. and similar material punishment is which afflict the flesh of man in his life. Whoever threatens them with the destruction of their soul, that it will be cut off from its majestic form, and whoever tries to take them fear that it will be left in darkness and obscurity without ascent or return to its source, to the illumination of the eternal light and that it will be finally consumed, they will mock at him and they will consider this a very good settlement. All this happens to them because of the coarseness of their matter and the confusion of their brains, so that they are unable to formulate any sort of rational principle. But they incline all their faculties and activities to a material destiny and toward this they incline in everything they believe or do. They do not understand the knowledge

of the true form which is fitting should be left of their composition after death, until this intelligence brings them to rejoice in the comprehension of the eternal, spiritual degree and to fear its destruction. This bad idea which has been widespread among the mass of Israel from of old and ancient times is the reason that Moses our Master did not clearly explain the reward of the true Garden of Eden for the righteous and the punishment of souls after death, because in that generation Israel were new in faith and were like a lad who goes to school, for it is written, "For Israel was a youth and I loved him etc." He said to them in the fortieth year ⁹³ that they did not have the understanding to know to that very day. Therefore it was necessary to stir them and to instill fear into them only with bodily species of compensations like peace and exile, satiety and hunger for they were unable to grasp any more with their weak intellect. But he got his words from God in a fruit-bearing language and in words conveying both an inner and an outer meaning to intelligent persons. Moses our Master began the wisdom of the Torah and Fall in order to disseminate it among Israel so that it might become firm and rooted in their understanding. From then on, the prophets in every generation began to explain more and more the secrets of the Torah and Divine Action and they revealed something of the compensations of the soul. Just as you see that Isaiah in his small prophecy teaches concerning the Garden of Eden when he says, "Thy people all of them are righteous, they shall inherit the land forever, causing the planting of the Lord of Ig Hand to be glorified." ⁹⁴ By causing the planting it is possible that he meant, "And the Lord God planted the garden of Eden to the east." ⁹⁵ On the other hand he may have

meant something of what I have written above. Also David the prophet and Solomon his son spoke a great deal about that which teaches concerning the explanation of the Divine Garden of Eden. In this path our Rabbis trod. There were those who concealed the truth of rewards and punishments and made them allegorically into a material matter because they were cognizant of the nature of the men of their generation or the members of their households or the men who were under the influence of their explanation. All this was because of the great piety of those sages, for their purpose was to stimulate the masses to good action and the keeping of the commandments. For this purpose they explained to them in a way that might please them so that they would hearken and perform, and from service which was not in the name of Heaven they would come to service which was in the name of Heaven. There were some like the one who explained further and revealed that the reward and punishment were not corporeal at all but entirely spiritual. He was encouraged to do this because he recognized the superiority of the sages of his generation and the members of his household and their wisdom. They appeared to him to be of the select and the remnant whom God calls. So we find of one of the sages that he said that Gehenna is not at some future time, but a fire leaving the body of the wicked and burning it, for it is written, "A fire will consume your spirit." It is impossible for this future to come to be the Messianic Era because the Messianic Era is not to be a time for judgement of the wicked any more than the present is, for they say that there is no difference between this world and the Messianic Era except servitude to kingdoms

alone. It is also impossible that he has reference to the world to come because in the world to come there is no corporeality, as they say that in the world to come there is neither eating nor drinking but the righteous sit with their crowns upon their heads. They mean by this that there is nothing but the remaining rational souls enduring permanently of themselves. This radiance and light is the crown which is on their heads and it says "their crowns" meaning their majestic, psychic faculties. Therefore they deny eating and drinking to it because the body needs that, not the soul. It is known that with the departure of that thing which needs something outside of itself will depart also that outside thing which was set aside for its need, and God does nothing in vain, for it is written, "In wisdom He will build the house and in understanding He will establish it." ⁸⁷ Thus there are no bodies for the righteous, and if there are none for the righteous, how much the more that there are none for the wicked, because if you say that there are no bodies for the righteous, how much more fitting than this that there should be none for the wicked to increase their punishment. Thus we come to the conclusion that spiritual compensation is more real than material. It is also impossible that he has reference to resurrection of the dead, because according to the word of our opponent, the wicked has already received his judgement in Gehenna in his soul has been burned in material fire. Therefore this judgement which will come about now cannot escape one of three alternatives. Either it is more severe than the first or it is more lax or it is equal to it. If you say that it is more severe, then this is a perversity for the

wicked has been judged already for a thousand years in fire and it is fitting now that his punishments be lessened rather than increased. If you say that it is more lax, then the sage comes to give me information about this lessening of the punishment of the wicked from the Scripture, and it is known that the Scripture does not come to make it easier for the wicked but to make it more difficult and to threaten them with great punishments in the future to come so that they may be afraid and guard themselves against sinning or so that they may return to God. It is a known fact that Scripture does not endeavor to make known the lightness of the punishments for the wicked but to instill fear and terror into them and to threaten them only with evil and not with good. If you say that it is equal to it, what would be the need of this great change since there is no difference at all between them. Is it not true that it is not the method of action of a wise man to change a certain activity, except for a great need which will be satisfied by this change. Therefore it remains that the saying of the sage has reference to immediately after death, and he means by his explanation that there is no Gehenna in the future to come. That is, immediately after death the soul is not burned in the fire of a material Gehenna as the majority of men believe. But "A fire goes out of the body of the wicked and burns it" he uses to teach allegorically a very important point, namely, that the natural faculties or bodily passions in which the wicked revels and which are plentiful in him in his lifetime, are the cause of the burning of his soul, that is, of its destruction. "The fire that goes out of his body" is a phrase hinting at the multitude of bodily passions like "for his heart will grow fat" and "like a furnace

of fire burning in their midst.⁸⁰ This burning which he says burns him hints at the destruction and the return to nothingness, like every fire which destroys things and reduces them to nothing. The proof that he did not mean to say that the soul of the wicked is burned is that he would have had to say "and it burns his soul". That he meant the burning of the body is likewise impossible because the body does not feel anything except through the power of the soul. Furthermore, if the fire goes out of his body then it must have been in his body formerly. If it was in his body now is it that it was not burned at once. Certainly these words are not to be taken literally but allegorically teaching what I have said. Furthermore I say that the Sage intends by this to refute the faith of those who believe that the soul is burned in material fire. Furthermore the Sage meant when he said "in the body of the wicked", namely, in his own body, that he receives his punishment when he sees the pleasure which the soul of the righteous enjoys and he sees himself distinguished by his evil, and he remembers his sins and the rebellions which he practised against his Creator and he judges himself and this thing becomes in his soul like a flaunting banner and consumes it, as it is written, "He shall see and become angry etc." Likewise, "And your disgust shall be before you." Likewise, "Behold My servants shall eat and you shall go hungry." A further proof for the fact that it is only an allegory as I have said is that he deduces it from the verse which says, "You shall conceive dry grass, you shall give birth to stubble." If the explanation is according to its literal meaning without allegory, then the verse must also be taken literally

without allegory, and he would then mean that the wicked become pregnant with real fire and give birth to real stubble. This is false and foolish. But this allegory is similar to that which a certain sage used that in the future to come God brings the sun from its sheath and judges the wicked with it, for it is written, "Behold the day burns like a furnace,"⁹² and, "All the wantons and all the evil-doers shall become stubble and it shall burn them etc."⁹³ It is known that the prophet did not intend that the bodies of the wicked should be changed to actual stubble literally but allegorically, just as it was not the intention of the prophet either that "The House of Jacob will become fire, the House of Joseph a flame and the House of Esau stubble"⁹⁴ should be taken literally but allegorically to mean that the one should prevail against the other and destroy it. It is likewise in connection with this verse that they are explaining, and that is that the bodies of the wantons will not become stubble literally, also that the fire will not burn like a furnace literally nor that it will burn them materially, but he meant to show by this that beautiful allegory which was intended by it, namely, to warn the wicked that they should not trust for their prosperity to the power of the planets because in the latter days their hope will be proved to be false, and that they will be doomed for the destruction like the stubble receives the fire when it strikes it. The "day burning like a furnace" hints at the future time to come which will enclose them like a furnace until they are consumed. Since this verse is necessarily allegorical as I have explained above, it follows all the more that its explanation is also allegorical. Also, "He will bring the sun out of its sheath and judge them with it"

he means by it a very important matter and not according to its literal meaning. That is, it is known that the peoples, their kings, their rulers put themselves under the power of the arrangements of the hosts of Heaven, the sun, the moon, the stars, and they place all their trust and pin their hopes in the spherical powers and remove their hope from the Providence of God, for they say, God cannot be seen. They attribute all their prosperity to the power of the sun which is the most important of the celestial bodies. Therefore God threatens them so that in the end of days they will be made ashamed of their thought. The coming out of the sun from its sheath hints that there will be revealed to them the errors of their faith and that system in which they trusted, that the foundation of their prosperity was false, that that which was a light to their steps will be changed to evil and become the foundation of their desolation and punishments. It will emanate its power over their ruin and it will bring them evil from the very source from which they hope for good, for Essau follows the Solar Calendar. For Israel there will be a healing in its wings, namely, the means of reckoning the seasons and the days which will bring an end to their exile. This "future to come" does not have reference to after death, nor to after the resurrection of the dead, nor to the world to come, but it has reference to the time of the Messiah who will come to redeem Israel and destroy the rest of the nations. Thus you see that this phrase "future to come" does not have the same connotation in all places to our Rabbis. But at one time it teaches concerning that which happens to man immediately after death, as I have

proved previously. At another time it teaches concerning the Messianic Era as I have just shown. At another time it teaches concerning the world to come, the world of souls. Just as they say that all the prophets prophesied only the Messianic Era but no eye has seen the future to come. It is known that this "world to come" is an inclusive phrase for the world of souls. Although they distinguished between the world to come and the resurrection of the dead, the whole thing is one and at the time for the general resurrection of the dead takes place only in the world to come, because in the Messianic Era only the uniquely righteous will come to life like the Seven shepherds and the Eight Princes. But in the world to come all the dead righteous will come to life while the completely wicked will be judged and will return to Sheol and then be completely destroyed for after it there is no other reckoning. This resurrection will be only to demonstrate the wonderful power of God. Nevertheless there are some who say in Bereshith Rabbah that the might of God in reviving Nature is both for the righteous and the wicked, but resurrection is for the righteous only. They mean by this the resurrection after which there is no death. But the resurrection which is only for the purpose of standing in judgement is only to demonstrate the wonder of God, and that resurrection is also for the wicked. This one, say in Perek Utsalek: The Men of Sodom have no portion in the world to come but they do stand in judgement. Concerning those who do not stand in judgement they say in Bereshith Rabbah that they are not living. These are like the generation of the flood, of whom it is written, "My spirit shall no longer judge

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man." Or like the generation of the wilderness, according to the opinion of the first Tanna. But the rest of the wicked shall live and they shall be sentenced to Sheol. The righteous shall remain in their exalted position in the world of souls. This is the meaning of "their crowns upon their heads", as I said previously. Some say that this has reference to immediately after the decree of the judgement which God will render. Some say, after the world will be destroyed. Whether it is one way or the other, or if the world will be destroyed in all its particulars and individuals and the universals remain extant, this is no place for such an investigation for there has already been said a great deal about this in many books. One says thus and another says thus and each one produces proof for his words as it appears to him, but God alone knows the future, how it will be and according to what arrangement it will be. Everything that we have explained concerning that which is found in the words of the Rabbis either agreeing with some of the scriptural verses or somewhat similar to what is explained in them, concerning these we say, explain and receive the reward. It is unnecessary to elaborate them any further than what is sufficient to draw to them that which is seeming, that which is more comprehensible, that which is close to the possible and further removed from the impossible, in order to bring their words to truth and right. But the "future to come" is a composition of words associated with various proofs. Even the phrase "world to come" is a figure of speech in some places for the Garden of Eden which is immediately after death. Just as it happens in many places in the Talmud that a bath Kol comes forth and says that a certain person is fit for the life of the world to come.

The "world to come" likewise is spoken of in connection with the three classes mentioned previously. Although there are some who think with some of the commentators that when they say "fit for the life of the world to come" and the do not mention a particular person, this refers to the life of the life of the world to come from the point of view that that time to be is not a world. Their explanation of this, even though it is somewhat clear in its literal context, is far from the truth to one who understands the systems of compensation, because this is axiomatic that the first reward is that which a master places around a servant. He does not place around him a later one and leave the first one. So the case is in this, for it is fitting to believe that God promised the righteous the reward which He will give him first and then comes the later one, for what would be the purpose in saying that a certain person was fitted for the life of the world to come after a thousand years, and that until that time his soul must dwell without good. Therefore it is necessary that these words and names implying, of necessity, various meanings be taken according to the meaning intended by what is added to them in that statement or explanation which is related to them, and not to define them according to one sense or to limit them by one meaning. This has led many commentators and many authors, modern and ancient, astray, because they took every phrase "future to come" and "world to come" according to one meaning. In this way their explanations became finally more confused than their confusion over the original meanings.

I have been rather lengthy up to now in giving you one principle by which

you may know why the Scripture presents all the promises of punishment and reward in many places in expressions and words indicating that they are corporeally material. I have also informed you by this principle why the sages of the Talmud followed this method. You may take this principle and from what has been explained here you will understand what I have not explained. I also informed you that the sages of the Talmud, although they concealed these meanings in many places, yet they revealed in a few places that that future was not corporeal. But that which is found in them in this way is little and they expressed it in a hidden language and in words wisely chosen for it, and they did this for reasons which I previously mentioned.

Now it remains for me to solve for you some doubt by which the majority of the commentators were confused because it appeared to them on the surface of the words of the Rabbis that the punishment of the wicked was a Gehenna of material fire burning the soul in a manner literally like fire burns wood. Although there was sufficient to remove these doubts in the first proposition that I gave you about the classification of the words of the Rabbis and that which I gave you just now should have been enough, nevertheless I shall continue to write for you further in detail many particular doubts from their words, and to show you clearly that everything which they said in this respect is all words of allegory and analogies teaching important meaning as you shall see. The beginning of that which I shall explain to you in order to strengthen the belief that these future states are all corporeal is

from the authority of that which I found in the Talmud and the rest of the explanations, words indicating this on their surface. These statements are so numerous that I cannot be explicit about them. Therefore I shall not touch them. But on some of their explicit words which are built upon Scriptural verses, I have thought and give attention and it is my desire to explain them to you. For example, what they wrote in Tractate Rosh Hashanah about the three classes on the Day of Judgement. And that entire discussion which seems to be fitting to be taken all as one rule concerning all the compensations which come to the soul after death. And the section of the 'olive' chamber of the altar. And the 'light of Gehenna' which was created before the creation of the world. All these I shall explain and I shall turn them into an allegory established upon the foundations of truth. In the way that you see me explain these, you may likewise explain all the others which you find in the Talmud following this method, and thus you will be called wise and an understanding heart.

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92-1 Just as they say there is a Beraitha: Hoshan of Shammai says that there are three classes on the Day of Judgement, one of the completely righteous, one of the wicked and one of the average ones. Those of the completely righteous are reserved and sealed immediately for life. The completely wicked are sealed and reserved immediately for Gehenna, for it is written, "Many of those who sleep in the dust shall awake, some for everlasting life and others for everlasting shame and disgrace." The average ones go down to Gehenna and utter about, then ascend for it is written, "I shall put ~~the~~ third into fire and I shall test them like tried

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silver etc." and, "Their faces shall be like the edges of pots;" "The finest of Menzuz even they will be blackened in face." Concerning them Hannah says, "The Lord kills and makes alive, He brings down to Sheol and raiseth up." The House of Hillel says: He who is of me by inclines toward mercy. Concerning them David the King says, "I love when God hearkens to the voice of my supplications" and the rest of the Parasha. But the sinners of Israel with their bodies, who are they. The heads upon which Jephthah were not laid. And the sinners of the nations of the world with their bodies shall go down to Gehenna and be judged there for twelve months, and after twelve months their body will be consumed and their soul will be burned and the wind scatter them beneath the feet of the righteous for it is written, "They shall trample the wicked etc.....dust beneath the soles of their feet." But the Minim and the Skeptics and the informers and those who deny the Resurrection of the Dead and those who separate themselves from the ways of the congregation, those who put their terror into the land of the living, those who sin and cause the multitude to sin like Jeroboam b. Nebat and his followers, all of them go down to Gehenna and are judged there for generations of generations, for it is written, "And they shall go forth and see the dead bodies of men who sin against Me that their worms do not die nor their fire become extinguished." They shall be a disgrace to all flesh. Gehenna is consumed but they are not consumed, for it is written, "And their form shall be for the Netherworld to wear it away, that there be no habitation for it." And all this is why. Because they put forth their hand to destroy the

Temple. The explanation of this Beraitha and of its Scriptural verses according to the truth is as I shall explain it. Although you may find other explanations, this one is more true because I have examined everything that may have been intended by it both in the verses and in the explanations, and I have understood which words are allegorical and which are literal; which verse inclines toward the explanation given it and which was said only metaphorically as a supporting explanation or as a popular explanation of the Day of Judgement to the people. Its meaning here is immediately after death. When they say three classes, by this is meant that three types of compensations exist for the human species on the day when they stand in judgement before God for what they have done in this world, and this is immediately after death. These three classes bear the three types of compensation, each class the type suited for it, one for the completely righteous etc. I say because of this that it is immediately after death, and not at the time of the resurrection of the dead which is a later time. All the more is it not at the time of the Messianic Era. It is not at the time of the resurrection of the dead because at that time there will not be any average ones, only completely righteous or completely wicked, because the average ones take their judgement for half their sins from the time which passes immediately after death. Just as the wicked also take their judgement and the righteous their reward immediately after death, so the average ones take their judgement and are purified and made righteous, just as they explain, "And with the righteous they shall not be inscribed." These are the average ones after

they receive their judgement for half their sins. It is not to be thought that after they receive their judgement as befitting and after being cleansed, that their reward for good for half their merits should be postponed until the time of the resurrection of the Dead, for that would be a perversity in the nature of God who is called great in mercy and in truth. If you say that according to the opinion of the Hillelites they do not enter Gehenna at all, this is the answer. Do not the House of Hillel agree that they flutter about there, if there is among the sum of half their sins the sin of being sinners in Israel through their bodies, as it is objected to in the Mishnah in the name of the House of Hillel, for it is written, "I shall put the third into fire." The answer there is given the sinners in Israel through their bodies. That is, these certainly, will go down and afterwards they will ascend and be purified and become righteous. It is impossible to say that God will be satisfied with their judgement unless he judges them for half their sins by this fluttering immediately after death, and after this he will immediately give them a good reward for their labor. This characteristic would be seeming in the ways of God, May His Name be Blessed. Those who would not flutter at all, in the opinion of Beth Hillel, like the average ones who are not sinners with their bodies, God, in the multitude of His mercies, will incline the scales toward the scale of mercies and it will outweigh the sins and we will lessen the scale of transgressions, for it is written, "If he inclines his ear unto me." Its explanation is that he inclines the scales of merits and makes that scale heavier than the scale of sins. The word "Ozne" here is from the root "to listen and to investigate them". Therefore he says, "For I have been impoverished and he has been my help."

that is to say, He lessens the scale of sins and He makes lower and heavier the scale of merits in order that it may outweigh them for good and for merit in order to bring about salvation. Then they will become righteous and will be called righteous persons. All this God will do immediately after man's death. Therefore it is impossible from any point of view that at the time of the Resurrection there should be found any average persons because it might be asked, where will they exist until that time, all the more since according to the House of Hillel, they do not enter there at all if they are not in half their sins sinners of Israel to their bodies. Whoever believes that they remain in some evil place and in darkness all those years, behold he follows the belief of those who believe a perversity in the nature of God, because it is in the nature of God that He be generous in mercy and in truth, that He pay a good reward to him who does good immediately upon his entrance into the world of compensation. If there exist actually 5-x some bad part mixed with the good, He will judge it immediately with the attribute of justice for that perverse part in order that he should remain for good and become righteous. After that He will reward him for the good immediately after he has been purified. He will not weaken His judgement for the evil and He will not postpone His reward for good. This is a fitting way in the nature of God. But the flitting is not an unseemly thing in the nature of God, because it is a sort of temporary affliction without consuming any length of time. Concerning that which they produce as proof for the reward of the righteous and for the punishment of the

wicked in connection with the verse which says, "And many of those who sleep in the
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 dust shall arise," the answer to your words is this. Is this not the thing which I
 told you many times that these verses which are interpreted in this manner are only
 for purposes of general support. But the verse does not mean this at all, and by
 examining its explanation closely you will find that it must be understood more to
 refer to the Messianic Era. Especially since it says 'many of those'. But at the
 time of the Resurrection all of them will arise in order to behold the winners of
 God, blessed be He. Then comes the explanation of the verse which they explain,
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 "He will call to the heavens above and to the earth beneath to judge His people,"
 as meaning that He will revive all the children of men who are dead, those who are
 fitted to stand in judgement, and He will return every soul to its body and He will
 judge the soul with the body together as did the king to the blind man and the lame
 and when he brought them together to guard the vineyard. Then He will assign for
 the wicked what He promises them of the second punishment by which they are to be
 punished, for it is written, "Therefore in this land they shall inherit trouble, and
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 a terrible destruction does He cause for them." He meant by this that they will yet
 be punished by another second punishment which will be material only, the pain which
 which formerly was suffered by the incorporeal soul without matter. The phrase,
 'their land' implies their matter and their body. Afterwards they will return to
 their material judgement to establish what is written, "The wicked will return to
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 dust." It is not written 'they will go' but 'they will return', that is, to the
 place from which they came. When it says 'many' and it does not say 'all', we

infer by this is meant the Messianic Era. And it is known that this matter of the three groups cannot have reference to the Messianic Era because 'there is no difference between this world and the Messianic Era except the servitude of tyranny.' It is also impossible that it have reference to the time of the Resurrection, as I proved above, because then there will be no average persons, either according to the House of Shammai or according to the House of Hillel. Therefore the verse which comes in the Baraita is only a citation to which they attach the explanation by a very far-fetched analogy. Furthermore we clearly see that what it says in the Baraita it means immediately after death from what it says previously, 'but the sinners of Israel through their bodies shall go down to Gehenna and be judged there twelve months.' This certainly means immediately after death, for if it were only after the Resurrection, where would they exist during all the intervening time. If you say that when it says 'they will go down to Gehenna and be judged there twelve months' it means that they will be judged only by the absence of good and not by any punishment of burning. Therefore when it says after this, 'but the heretics etc etc.' up to 'and they will be judged in it throughout all generations,' it also means that they will be judged by the absence of good only, and its explanation will be false and delusory. Therefore it is impossible from any point of view that that verse, whether in connection with the righteous or in connection with the wicked, should mean anything but immediately after death. And that verse which they produce for this was not intended for the explanation at all. Since this is so, therefore also the verse which they explain as referring to the average persons is only an

analogous basis of authority for purposes of clear expression. The prophet did not mean what they explained by that verse. This is because when he says, "I will put the third into fire," it is impossible that he meant by this third the class of the average persons but it is possible rather that he meant the class of the wicked because the first degree is the class of the righteous, and the last, which is the third, is the class of the wicked. And the middle is the class of the average persons. Therefore they are called average because they are midway between the righteous and the wicked, since their righteousness and their wickedness are balanced, and they are connected with the one as well as with the other. This is a middle class. Therefore it must be called second and not third and the class of the wicked is the class of the third from the point of view of any reckoning of the classes. Therefore the meaning of the verse was not what the House of Shamai explained, but they attached their words to it as a sort of analogy, as I said above in the fourth section of their words. Perhaps this was the meaning of the prophet when he said 'the third', like, "thus does God act twice, yea three times with a person." That is, He will wipe out and seal those three sins and not hold them against the sinners provided they do not sin any more. Or perhaps He meant the third exile which Israel was to endure. Thus he prophesied for them that they would return to Jerusalem righteous and tried. Also the surviving part of them, that is, that small part which would survive of them would be tested in the fire of exile and He would bring them to Him, as they say, "We come in fire and water etc." The fire and water

are symbols for the kinds of trouble different from each other. Therefore he says, "And I shall put the third into fire," according to the explanation like, "And I shall take one in the city and two from the family etc." These are words of prophecy making known metaphorically Israel's future in the end of days. The verse does not mean at all what the House of Shammai explained by it. Their words in this respect are explanatory words which they received from their fathers, and they attach them to this verse because in some of its words it was similar to what they explained in the Baraita. Thus I have proved for you clearly what the meaning of this Day of Judgement is. I have also shown that these verses did not mean this explanation at all, for I have explained their meaning.

Now I shall explain to you the words of the explanation itself and I shall show you that they did not mean when they said that they shall go down to Gehenna, and flutter, the punishment of real, elemental fire, literally. This is because you see that they say concerning the first class that it is the perfectly righteous who are inscribed and sealed immediately for the life of the world to come. This world to come means here a double promise. It teaches concerning the good reward which the soul will receive immediately in the true Garden of Eden as I said many times, and it teaches concerning the promise that one are prepared to have their destiny in the world of souls, while the wicked are inscribed and sealed immediately for Gehenna. It is known that the punishment of the wicked is the opposite of the reward of the righteous. If the reward of the righteous will be

the life of the world to come for their souls, certainly the punishment of the wicked will be the death of the world to come for their souls, just as it says, "the soul that sins it shall die."¹¹ It does not say, 'it shall be burned.' So the sage says: "The way of life is above for the intelligent man that he may turn from death below." And it is shown that below is the opposite of above. But they speak of the reward of the righteous as being literally the life of the world to come, and of the punishment of the wicked they say Gehenna which is a noun composed of *ge* and *henna*. Some of them indicate that *ge* is a secret for select persons, and some for that which may be revealed to the masses. The secret is the punishment of death for the soul and its explanation in Notarikon is 'Valley of Sleep'. That is, the reward of sleep from the root, 'and he afflicted the sons of man,' which is restricting and perishing. And *henna* is from the word 'yonom' which is similar to sleep since it means the cessation of the faculties of the soul, just as sleep is the absence of all the faculties. It is a close analogy from one point of view. All the more since the wicked in this world are like a lazy man who is always immersed in his sleep. Now which is revealed is a teaching concerning the punishment of falling to sleep beyond and to words of ecstasy. Its explanation in Notarikon is 'Valley of Sleep', that is, 'Valley of Weeping', which they use as a noun, like, 'and I wept for him.' They use this noun as a metaphor for 'Valley of Weeping,' like Gay Ben Hinnom. Therefore our Rabbi's stated the punishment of the wicked by the use of the noun Gehenna, to mean by it some sort of indication both for the select person and

for the masses, because the indication that clearly comes from it may put a great deal of fear into the masses and they will act in the name of Heaven to keep the Torah and the Commandments and not sin etc., because the mass are unable to imagine the punishment of the soul without material punishment, as I previously explained at length. At the same time it does not prevent its being a profound analogy teaching concerning the real punishment that it is not material. But the life of the world to come they imagine in the image of this life, and they believe that it is eternal life in which there is great corporeal punishment or without corporeality, according to what the measure of the intellect imagines, one from the other. The words are pleasant to them and they accept the explanation. That which they say concerning the class of the average persons who flutter and ascend, this is an analogy teaching concerning the degrees of ascent, which are less for them than the degree of the completely righteous. 'Fluttering' is a word associated in its connotation with both murmuring and hovering. With murmuring its meaning is like the crooning of birds which is a weak and low cry, that is, their soul is troubled with a bit of trouble, and this is the literal meaning clearly understood by the people from the connotation of this word. But that which is understood of its connotation by select individuals is the meaning of hovering, not sinking completely to the degree of the wicked and not ascending completely to the highest degree, but like hovering over the face of water which is not sinking into them nor ascending from them, but inclined more toward ascent. So the souls of the average

persons do not ascend to the degree of the Active Intellect immediately after death, but they are short of this station, and they remain in a less honoured degree than that. Perhaps it is the degree of the soul itself, that is, just as it is a spiritual soul in essence which is below the degree of the Active Intellect, just as, Al Farabi wrote in his book on the Six Principles. This degree is to the average soul like fluttering, by way of analogy, and afterward it ascends. What they bring for this explanation the verse, "The Lord killeth and maketh alive. He brings down to Sheol and raiseth up," is far from the meaning of the explanation and it is unnecessary to dwell upon it. But what they say in the paraitna that concerning that David the King said, "I love that the Lord should hear my voice and my supplications," ¹¹³ and the entire section, it is possible that they meant what the prophet meant concerning them when he prayed for himself and said, "The sorow of death encompassed me, and the straits of the nether world got hold of me. I found trouble and sorrow. But I called upon the name of the Lord. I beseech thee O Lord deliver my soul. Gracious is the Lord and righteous; yea our God is compassionate." ¹¹⁴ The meaning of his words is this. After he says that He has inclined His ear unto me, that is, my deeds are weighed in the scales as I explained above, and the righteousness and wickedness balance each other, then He inclines the scale of righteousness for He is plentiful in mercy inclining toward mercy. For this mercy I shall call unto Him all my days and I shall be grateful for it. Furthermore I shall mention before You my grievances and I shall say: If their deeds are balanced in righteousness

and wickedness, remember for me in Thy mercies the sorrows and accidents that have encompassed me and reached me in this world, and placed before Thee the many troubles that got hold of me in my life. And receive them out of love to counter-balance the sins which I sinned before thee so that they shall cancel each other. Then shall my soul be saved by Thy righteousness and by Thy mercies, O Lord, who guardest the simple, etc. That is to say, although I was foolish in the way of my keeping Thy commandments and I was perverse, guard me by Thy mercies from falling into the knowledge of those who are wise in doing evil. If I was lax with the commandments, save me by Thy graciousness. Return my soul unto Thy rest. This he says on behalf of the soul for when He has taken hold of it and has been gracious unto it, then do not fear and be at ease, for the Lord has hearkened to my supplication and He will reward me with his many mercies and I shall walk before Him in the lands of the living. I trusted even when I spoke, meaning that as I believe so I speak and I shall trust in Him that He made marvelous His mercies with me toward my soul, after death. Because I have seen that He has made marvelous His mercies with me during my lifetime, for I am very greatly afflicted, meaning that I was afflicted and low among men. From tending the sheep He brought me up to rule and if there be any man who testifies anything against Thee I shall despair of glory and say that all men are liars, how can I repay unto the Lord all His bountiful dealings toward me. Behold I have explained the verses to you according to what the prophet definitely meant by them, and I have explained the matter of ascending to heaven and fluttering and ascending, and I have shown you that they all but mean

by it a Gehenna of material fire literally nor the burning of the soul in fire for, behold, the soul is not body that it can receive the burning of corporeal fire, and the burning of the spirit which they explained among the children of men is the burning of the vital, natural spirit which gives man feeling and life, like the burning of the daughter of a priest. What they say in the paraita that their faces are like the edges of pots, they mean that the masses should understand it literally and their fear will become so great that they will not sin. The select persons shall understand it by way of wisdom, that is, that they are put to shame because of that which they sinned, and similar to this. As for what they say that at that time the faces of the enemies of David will be turned about like the edges of pots, they meant by this that they will be confused. And when they say that the faces of the men of Meehuza will become black, they added this in order to establish the truth of the matter further for the masses and especially honor the men of Meehuza. Therefore they will fear God more and they will keep themselves from sinning. They say: But the sinners of Israel through their bodies and the sinners of the nations of the world through their bodies shall go down to Gehenna and be judged there twelve months, and after twelve months their body is consumed, their soul burned and their spirit scattered beneath the soles of the righteous, for it is written, "And they shall tread upon the wicked for they shall be dust beneath the soles of their feet." ¹¹⁵ The sinners of Israel through their bodies, that is, he who does not touch the *tefillin*, through which he shows contempt for the commandment, meaning that

he denies Him who enjoined the commandment upon them. Therefore his sin is great and his punishment is great. The sinners of the nations of the world through their bodies, its explanation is through their bodies alone and not through their souls. That is, they did not sin by the denial of faith. They believe in the Creator and they fulfill the seven commandments which were enjoined upon the sons of Noah, except this one. There is the opinion of one who says that they are one degree lower than the righteous person of the nations of the world, except for that one ugly sin which is found in them and it is weighed against the rest of their merits. Therefore their punishment is lighter than those who are previously mentioned. Nevertheless he meant the sinners of the nations of the world for a thing of sin with the rest of the transgressions, and this is connected with them in order to increase their punishment on account of its ugliness. But at any rate it is necessary to say that there is no sin in them because of this, because if there were sin in them because of this and they denied faith in God, why is their punishment lighter than that of the sectarians and the skeptics who are judged with their children throughout all generations.

But when they say that they will go down to Gehenna, they do not mean by this the burning of fire literally and the verse which they produced for this is only a general support. The proof of this is that after they go down to Gehenna, their souls also come into Gehenna, therefore it is burned. How can it be said that it is burned only after twelve months since it has already been burned in Gehenna immediately

after death? If you say, its explanation is that their body is consumed and their soul burned during the twelve months, then according to your words it would have been sufficient to say that they are judged in it twelve months and their body is consumed and their soul burned and nothing is left after twelve months. Either he should have said that their body is consumed and their soul burned after twelve months or he should have said that it has already been burned. What he certainly meant by this¹³ that all twelve months the rational and sensory faculties of the soul remain in the position of feeling their evil and their descent from the station which is fitting for soul, and the soul recognizes and understands its evil and its darkness and it knows what it lost of the divine, exalted, eternal pleasures. But it is not completely consumed in the sense that it returns to non-existence. This is its great punishment at that time, when it comprehends its evil and its darkness. This is the Gehenna meant here. It is a time of great punishment for the soul. After twelve months, that is, after the cycle of the twelve signs of the Zodiac, during which the soul has found neither star nor planet which might help it to save them from the destruction, their body is consumed and it returns to the dust as it was. Their soul is burned, that is, it perishes and returns to non-existence with the destruction of their body, just as fire consumes everything that comes into it. They say 'beneath the soles of the righteous' because the world of the righteous is the transcendental world and the feet of the transcendental is by analogy the intermediary world, that is, the world of spheres which is the stage of

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the garment, and the soles of its feet is the lower world, that is, the world of the elements. Our rabbis have informed us by an important and hidden analogy that the soles of those wicked perish in the world of elements (like the spirit of the animal which goes downward) and their spiritual substance perishes like the perishing of their bodily material substance. This is the destiny of their soul for evil. This evil, damned existence which their soul undergoes for the twelve months is the basis of their great punishment, for the soul comprehends and recognizes its wretchedness its fear and its lowliness through the imaginative faculty, and it knows that it is being cut off from the land of the living. But a burning which would be perceptible would be a sort of lessening of its punishment, because then its trouble would cease when it is burned, that is, when the destruction would come upon it and it would return to shame without understanding or feeling any evil or good. This is its burning, not the burning of literal fire. It is known that the words of our Rabbis in this regard are completely metaphorical for there certainly are no feet by which they tread. Even the dust does not feel its treading. The verse has other meanings. They say that all the Sectarious and the Sceptics etc. will go down to Gehenna and be judged there throughout all generations, for it is written, "And they shall go out and shall see the ^{corpse} ~~corpses~~ of the men etc." ¹¹⁶ Gehenna will be consumed and they will not be consumed etc. He meant by this the degree of the punishment for those wicked ones for they are in the most serious degree of rebellion, because they deny faith in God and the Resurrection of the dead, and they desecrate His commandments and His laws and they lead the multitude to sin and they enslave the

people for the sake of arrogance and not in the name of heaven. Therefore their punishment will be increased according to their rebellion and will extend indefinitely because their soul will remain in despicable trouble and dense darkness which it will recognize and comprehend forever. This is its great punishment as I have said many times and it is very, very heavy, more than that which was ascribed to those above. They did not mean by this burning by literal fire, but they said so in order to increase fear among the masses for the reason which I gave many times. The proof of the thing that the matter is not according to its literal meaning is that they said that Gehenna will be consumed and they will not be consumed. If Gehenna, which is the locus of their punishment, will be consumed and they will not be consumed, this would be very good for them, since their punishment would end and they would remain. But the words are certainly not according to their literal meaning, but they are used by way of exaggeration in punishments, in order to inspire the masses with fear. This is all done in the name of Heaven. There have been some who explained that Gehenna will be consumed etc. as meaning new punishments to come one after the other, from many species of punishments. In this ^{way} they explained, 'for their worm will not perish etc.' But there is a difficulty in that explanation in the explanation that they give of, 'My arrows I shall consume against them', as meaning that My arrows will be consumed and they will not be consumed. That is, the punishments will end and they will not be consumed but they will remain for ever. Therefore in the place in which this is said it is not a curse but a mixed blessing.

It must be said that this does not mean here to destroy arrows literally but it means like, 'and their form shall destroy Sheol', that is, there is no end to their evil. They destroy Sheol, which is eternal, from being a habitation. Our Rabbis explain also concerning the greatness of their punishment the verse, for they attach the explanation to it not to mean this, but to teach through an important analogy the troubles and the evils which shall come to the wicked in the Messianic Era while they are alive, for it is impossible in any way that this should mean after death, for behold immediately afterward it says that it shall be during the New Moon etc., that all flesh shall come to worship before God. It is shown that the righteous after their death are unable to come to the court to worship either on the New Moon or on the Sabbath. It is also impossible that it refer to the world to come, because in that world there is no flesh nor body but only rational soul, existing in their substances eternally. Although our Rabbis explained this as referring to every one who draws out his heart like flesh, and this is a very good explanation, despite all this it is impossible that this should be so in the world of souls for there they exist eternally before the Lord which their crowns upon their heads. They have no especial time for this either on the New Moon or on the Sabbath. Even the time of the general Resurrection when the dead come to life with their bodies does not continue, but most of them return to their degrees after the completion of the judgment and they do not come to worship on the New Moon or on the Sabbath. Therefore it remains in truth that it means the Messianic Era. The prophet meant a miracle by

this, just as in the time of the Temple, when Israel would go up to pilgrimage thrice in the year, so in the Messianic Era all the inhabitants of the land will go up to Jerusalem on every Sabbath and every New Moon, that is, in order that then they shall incline one shoulder in the service of the Creator and the earth will be filled with the knowledge of God. Those righteous men who will go up to Jerusalem shall see the downfall of those wicked ones who were mentioned above, those who used to sanctify and purify themselves for worship in the gardens for there shall come upon them many troubles in their lifetime because they did not put themselves in the class of those who make the pilgrimage. They shall be called dead corpses, for our Rabbis say that the wicked in their lifetime are called dead, for it is written, "The dead shall die and his shame shall be for all flesh." Its meaning is that there will be an object lesson in them for all men. The worm that shall not die and the fire that shall not be extinguished, both of them teach metaphorically the rigor of their punishments which will be great and known to men, just as the worm and the fire are destructive agents toward everything over which they obtain dominion. He reduces as an analogy for punishments those things which meant fear in their lifetime in order to instill fear into the masses, just as they said, that the worm in the dead person is hard like a needle in living flesh. The explanations which are attached to these verses are bare, a popular basis of agreement, and the words of the verses themselves are mostly metaphorical teaching as I explained. Know that it is so for this class of which they say that they will go down and be judged through at all generations. For when it is written that they shall go out and

they shall see etc. it refers to the class of the Sectarials and the Skeptics and those who deny the Resurrection of the dead etc. It is known that those men whom the verse calls corpses are those whom he mentioned previously, namely, those who sanctify themselves and purify themselves for worship in the gardens. It also refers to him who is in the midst of those who eat the flesh of the pig and the abomination and the mouse, two kinds of people who deny divinity. They have no ethical or intellectual virtue and all their affairs incline toward heresy and gluttony until they pass out of the class of the human species. If the verse were really intended for the explanation, it would have mentioned some one of those sins which are spoken about in the explanation. But the meaning is not so, but as I explained. So it is the method of the Talmud to attach explanations to some verse which teaches according to the explanation in order that it be more acceptable to those who hear, as I showed previously in connection with the divisions into which I divided the statements of the Rabbis. That which comes in these two verses, that which promises evil to the wicked and good to the righteous, all of it is said concerning the Messianic Era. Should I have explained to you the entire Paraita of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel, its explanations and its verses and everything that is to be understood from it revealed and hidden. Know that this Paraita is the foundation and basis of Talmudic teaching concerning all the matters of rewards and punishments which the soul will receive after death for what it does during life, that is, at the time of attachment. It is the principle and true proposition for

everything which we find in the Talmud of this matter. Whatever there is in the Talmud of this in other places, all of it follows the meaning of this Baraitha, and everything comes back to it, revealed or hidden, to the one who understands the secret of these true statements. But you will find in some of the Aggadoth statements concerning this which must be completely rejected. There is no reality in them for they were spoken by way of hyperbole and tradition by women and old men in their senility or by the masses, and whoever hears them fixes them in his mind and considers them words of wisdom, and writes them with ink on a parchment and makes of them an essay or a sermon. Afterwards many students follow him and think that they are words of Mishnaic or Talmudic Aggada since they were found written in an ancient manuscript of parchment. Know that not everyone who speaks or expounds is a sage and not every manuscript written in Hebrew writing is a book of truth. But the fundamentals which you find in the Talmud of this matter are all true and established. It is fitting that you should understand it wisely and turn it toward the aspect of possibility and not toward impossibility, just as I explained concerning the Baraitha which is the foundation and basis and cornerstone for all of them. Therefore I examined it minutely and I was a bit elaborate in its explanation.

The matter of the Kal ve Chomer which they explained of the altar of gold that the fire would not rule over it, was to prove concerning the sinners of Israel who are as filled with commandments as a pomegranate, that the fire of Gehenna

would not have dominion over them. This was certainly a regular explanation in the name of Heaven which they would present to congregations on Sabbath and Holy days, to men, women and children in order to draw their hearts to repentance in order that the sinners should not fall into despair when they remember the multitude of their sins, and say: Now we are in despair, our hope has been cut off because of the multitude of the sins which we have committed. The sages used to say that these words were in their mouths in order to strengthen their heart by explanations which are reasonably acceptable to those who hear so that they should receive them out of love. And whoever sins his heart will trust in repentance and the good deeds which he will do from then on, so that he may not despair. Whoever has not sinned will strengthen and fortify his heart in the service of God and in the keeping of the commandments. The explanation is not according to its literal meaning, that is, a Gehenna of real, burning fire like that which we know. A clear proof that the words are not according to their literal meaning is that the example is not similar to the metaphorical use made of it, from the point of view of the example, because the fire was on the altar and the fire touched the altar so that by natural law it would be consumed in the course of time. Therefore a miracle was performed so that nothing was lost from the power of the fire. But the sinners of Israel will not escape one of two alternatives. Either they will come to Gehenna or they will not come. If you say that they will come into a Gehenna which is fire literally according to your words and the fire will not have dominion over them and they will

not be affected by it, I must ask you why they are brought there. Is it to play or to promenade in Gehenna that they will come? If you say that they will not come there and the fire will not touch them, then what additional knowledge has been added? Why will the fire have dominion over them since they do not approach it? Certainly if they approach it, it will have dominion over them and burn them. Therefore the example is not like the use to which it has been put but a sort of distant analogy clearly spoken for the reason that I gave. That which we find in many places in the Talmud that smoke ascended from some of the graves of the wicked, that latter is a miracle by the will of God like some of the miracles which we find in the Torah. God does it for the need of the hour and the need of the generation, and it is not of the order of Creation, but it is a matter created for the time being and we may not deduce any proof from it. When they say that Gehenna was created before this world was created, for it is written, "hell is prepared from yesterday," ¹⁷ this is certainly a corroboration specifically designed for all these words. Also that which they attached to this, that the Torah and Repentance and the Throne of Glory etc. were created before the world was created. From this you can certainly see that the light of Gehenna of which they speak is not literal fire but it is one of the forms of divine punishments for the soul, a form which is stripped of all bodily or elemental characteristics. Just as the soul receives this punishment, it is likewise a thing in the substance of its being separated from matter and body. Since it was created before the creation of the world, that is, the world of

elements, one of them being the elemental fire which is matter, not the burning fire that we know. This was created before it. Therefore it is not of it, and if it is not of it and it is body or matter, therefore that light is not body nor matter. But they applied the term light to it in order to teach metaphorically concerning the destruction, as I explained above, and it is only like a decree of judgement which was formerly decreed. See with your eyes that they associated with these matters which are all spiritual matters, some of them soul concepts, like Remittance, some of them spiritual concepts like the others which are completely incorporeal without material characteristics. A certain sage said that that fire which is called Gehenna is to Religionists a divine instrument of judgement distinct from other fires. He meant by this that it is stripped of matter by the will of God who created it for this purpose, to judge the souls of the wicked by it. Perhaps we may admit this to him for the purpose of a miracle, just as we may admit concerning the Created Voice which is also a miracle. It is perforce necessary that the matter should be so. It is known that God has no restraint from performing marvelous miracles, the like of which have never been created on earth and which are impossible for any agent outside of God. But that there should be incorporeal judgement, this cannot be established from any point of view. What they explain in the Misra concerning the verse, 'that soul shall surely be cut off,' means that as it has been cut off in this world, so it will be cut off in the next world. There is a dispute over the explanation of this verse. But that explanation does not refute even one of my words as one of the commentators thought. On the contrary

It agrees with me and it furnishes me help when they say, 'His sin is in it.' It seems by this 'it' and not 'him', that every sin depends only on it and not on the body, for we see that after its separation from the body, it (the body) is left like a stone which has no changes. It does not feel. It does not do right and it does not do wrong. Therefore it is necessary that every sin should be related only to it. Therefore every punishment falls only on it. Because it is spiritual without corporeality, therefore its punishment will be without corporeality because it is impossible for any corporeal activity to exist in something which is not corporeal. Just as it is impossible for a fiery activity to exist in something which is not fire, but the opposite of fire or a stony activity in something which is not stone. But the essence of stone, furthermore, all bodily activity that comes from some cause or bodily agent must be performed through contact. No contact is possible except within perceptible limits, that is, point to point and line to line, just as we think James into contact with and touches the other. Just which is not body cannot have any sort of contact because there are no perceptible in it. Although James explained it, 'While the sin is in it', the whole thing comes back to my explanation when it says 'it' and not 'him'.

and it is necessary for you to know that this 'pulling off' is not the cutting of fire but it seems an survival of that which is imperishable, that is, its being cut off and removed from all the excellencies and the goods which are fitted for the righteous soul, just as I mentioned previously many times. There is no punishment in the world more distressing than this, how severe may this be, for this seems separating from the land of the living. So it says, 'they shall perish in this

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wilderness and there they shall die." It means by this that they shall perish in this world which refers to the separation of the soul from the body for then they shall perish and all the bodily and psychic faculties which are in the soul shall perish from the point of view that it is a soul attached to body. This punishment which is the death of existence they shall bear here in this world. But the death of the soul which is the destruction of its ascent, from the point of view, that it is only so, this will be there, namely, in the other world to come which is the divine spiritual world. Similar to this is when it says that the object of Divine anger shall fall there. The use of 'shom' here is equivalent to the use of 'shom' in the other case. Therefore he doubles the exaggeration of the greatness of evil and says 'there they shall die.' You see that he does not say, 'they shall be burned.' Also he does not say, 'in this wilderness they shall perish and in it they shall die,' for thus he should have said. Happy is he who merits escape from that degree of punishment and ascends to the degree where God has commanded the blessing of life forever. Behold I have already shown that it is completely impossible that the soul should receive any material corporeal activities after its separation from the body by way of reward or punishment. This I first proved by clear proof taken from axioms which never have any sort of refutation. After that I proved this from the Written Law and afterward from statements of the Talmud. All the propositions that appeared contradictory I explained to you according to the methods of truth and I brought them back to their original meaning without any

difficulty. I have not said a single word that was superfluous but I brought powerful and clear proofs acceptable to any reader. I prefaced the beginning of this book by informing you why I went to all this trouble to remove these doubts. Open the eyes of your mind and see; and strip off from you the tunics of skin and your eyes shall see correctly.

Praise be to God who brought me to see my desire fulfilled in this book. So may He bring me to guard and to keep according to all that is written in it, in order that my deeds may be greater than my wisdom, my roots were numerous than my branches so that I may be one who expounds well and performs well. Amen. Blessed is He who gives strength to the faint; and might to those who are without powers.

SUMMARY OF RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF THE BOOK

The first part of the discussion is almost purely philosophical and highly technical. But it would be well to obtain some general idea of Hillel's line of reasoning before looking at the religious and theological implications of his argument. In this first part we find him to be the exact logician and careful metaphysician. He is the master of the latest philosophic and scientific method. He knows the literature. Consequently he speaks with authority and with assurance. He opens his treatise by telling us that few people have studied the problem of the soul because it is, after all, a very difficult and elusive problem. Those who have studied it have been unable to arrive at any satisfactory solution. All they have really done is to agree that the problem is difficult.

In approaching the problem Hillel does not claim too much originality for himself. He admits that he has gathered his material from other writers, and the only profit he seeks by his own investigation is knowledge of the truth "for there is no other single purpose in knowing the truth than to know that it is the truth."^{*} At the very outset he reveals his profound earnestness and his intense desire to discover truth at any cost, even at the loss of his own pride and prestige. "I adjure every intelligent person who reads it not to pass over it cursorily but to understand it deliberately, in a spirit free from lust and jealousy, to be zealous of it, and then if he sees any errors in it, let him examine them carefully and teach me the truth in God's name. Then I shall accept the superiority of his

* Pg. 1 a.

wisdom as one receives instruction from his master and God shall aid me."*

The soul exists in the human body. Because of its power the body lives, obtains nutrition, feels, moves, and thinks. Corporeality of itself could not and does not furnish these activities because we observe many corporeal objects which do not have them. This necessitates the existence of another principle which we may call soul. Furthermore, material bodies could not act upon each other through their materiality alone. Every material body needs an efficient cause by which it is acted upon. A body needs a mover. This mover must be immaterial. This motive power is the soul. The soul is also that which sustains life in the body. There is a trace of Vitalism in this view revealed in the use of the term meaning a principle which furnishes and sustains life in the body. The soul is not called soul because of its formation or essence but because of its government of bodies and its relation to them. Unrelated to bodies the term 'soul' would have no meaning. Further, the soul may be spoken of as a product or possession or force in relation to the effects which it produces. Thus it must be conceived of in relation to that which it conceives and perceives. Thus far Hillel has demonstrated that the soul exists.

Now what is it? It is either an essence or an accident. According to Aristotle an accident is that which can be conceived of as existing apart from its subject. The body cannot be conceived of as existing after the departure of the soul nor as existing without the soul in it. Therefore it is not an accident. Neither here nor in the arguments that follow can we undertake to be critical of

Hillel's deductions. They follow logically from the Aristotelian definitions which he accepts unquestioningly just as did all the medieval philosophers. Furthermore, the soul is not a peculiarity because peculiarities travel from species to species while the soul remains constant. Peculiarities are activities in themselves, but the soul is both the cause of peculiarities and the cause of activities without itself acting or changing. Therefore it is an essence. It is an immaterial essence because it escapes all the activities of material substances. It does not move in itself. It is not divisible into parts. It does not undergo change of any sort. At this point Hillel discusses the various forms of motion and shows that all of them are impossible for the soul. Change appears in the soul, not because of its being soul, but because of its attachment to the body. In discussing this problem he reveals a bit of naive conceit which is more charming than it is offensive, "Now, thou who looks into this book, that this doubt, concerning which we are troubled, aroused my spirit to reveal the secrets of very important interpretations about the soul and things which you will not find explained in the philosophical books. You could not even be able to understand them clearly after great difficulty and close speculation. I placed them before you illuminated as the sun at noonday."* In concluding this argument, he says that great care must be taken not to attribute materiality, movability, or change to the soul because it is an emanation from God. And if we are careful not to attribute these to the soul, how much more careful must we be not to attribute them to God, the majestic source of the soul.

We are now ready for Hillel's definition of the soul. "The soul is one degree of emanation. It is a form substance constituting its own essence, standing by itself in the fourth degree of creatures, after the degree of the Active Intellect, giving the primary perfection to the natural body, emanating from the true, good, perfect man, in final cause God through the medium of transcendent powers which are above it in a higher degree."* It can be very easily observed that part of this definition shows markedly the mystical influence of Plotinus and the Neo-Platonic Theory of Emanations. What we really get in this definition is a rather confused blending of Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic elements as Husik points out in his, "History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy."**

The third phase of the discussion is the purpose of the soul. The rational soul perceives the Active Intellect and brings things perceived in potentiality to percepts in actuality. Thus man who is reflective in capacity becomes reflective in actuality. The first activity of the Active Intellect in the soul is the potential or material intellect which is the possibility of becoming rational. "Just as the darkness is illumined from the light so the potential intellect is illumined from the faculty of the Active Intellect."*** Through the activity of the Active Intellect the material or potential intellect becomes speculative. In the final stage it becomes united with the Active Intellect.

Here Hillel goes off on a tangent in the investigation of a related but

* Pg. 7 b.

** Pg. 317.

*** Pg. 8a.

important problem, whether the soul is all one in genus "just as the light of the sun is all from one body"* or "whether the souls of mundane creatures are many in number according to the bodies which are found here."** This inquiry leads to a similar one concerning the material intellect and whether it is soul, a part of soul, or completely distinct from soul. On this problem there is a wide difference of opinion among the Aristotelian schools. Ibn Roshd, recognized as the foremost commentator on the works of Aristotle, and his school say that it is all one in number and that the intellect is not soul nor a part of soul. The Christian philosophers or Religionists counter by arguing that if the soul is all one, punishments and rewards will all fall on one soul at one time, an heretical and irreligious view. Hillel is inclined to agree with them. He tells us that up to his time the Jewish philosophers had not grappled with this problem. Nor is it possible to obtain a solution of it through a surface examination of Biblical verses because they contradict each other.

He presents Ibn Roshd's view in detail and cites his proofs. Then he takes up the Biblical verses. He shows that there are verses which imply that the soul is one and some that imply that it is many and he explains the apparent contradictions. We need not enter into the details of the explanation. It is cleverly even if somewhat fancifully done. He comes to the conclusion that while the soul is one in essence, in species and in number, it emanates many individual souls like one sphere may be emanated from another. What he has done is to attempt an

* Pg. 8 a.

** Pg. 8 2.

harmonization of the view of Ibn Roshd with that of the opposing school. Here he makes an interesting statement. He says that his view that the soul is one in essence and emanates many souls can be established as the basis of Reason. The other view that the souls are many and created anew from day to day rests on Faith alone. Such a view neither helps nor injures the person who accepts it. But since Reason is the foundation of the world it is better for an intelligent person to follow a view which can be established as the basis of a Reason which has been harmonized with Faith.

The next step is the continuation of the analysis of the three types of intellect, based on the commentators to Aristotle. He takes up the difference between the intellect and the sense. The relation of the sense to the percept is somewhat like the relation of the intellect to the concept except that the intellect conceives species while the sense does not perceive species; and the intellect becomes one with the concept while the sense does not become one with the percept. We possess intellection in potentiality. This potentiality must pass to actuality. This requires an actualizer on the outside which must itself be intellect, because an incorporeal substance can only be acted upon by that which is like it. This actualizer is the Active Intellect as Maimonides pointed out. Thus the material intellect may become joined with the Active Intellect. This is in harmony with Divine Justice which decrees that perfection must be bestowed upon all things which potentially have the possibility of attaining it. Not only that, but the material

intellect does actually often become joined with the Incorporeal or Active Intellect. If not, its potentiality to do so would be useless and God creates nothing purposelessly. This union of the material with the immaterial comes to pass only after a long period of intense, constant reflection and through habit. Such unity usually takes place near the time of the separation of the soul from the body, because intellectual perfection is the opposite of bodily perfection. All the philosophers are agreed that the ultimate purpose of the intellect is its unity with the Active Intellect.

The final step is to determine whether the intellect is part of soul or not. On this point there is a dispute between Ibn Roshd and the other commentators to Aristotle. He presents the passages from Aristotle which bear on this problem, and here he reveals the absolute dominion which Aristotelian thought swayed over both Christian and Jewish thinking. "He (Aristotle) is the great head after whom follow all the camps of the philosophers and the strong fortress upon whom all depend for strength who rely on natural and Divine wisdom. Since his words there have been nothing new and no man has been found since his time who disputed him."* He takes up the Aristotelian passages, presents Ibn Roshd's interpretation of them and then gives his own in reply. He arrives at the conclusion that the intellect is part of soul and that it is the form principle and efficient cause of the soul just as the soul is the form principle and efficient cause of the body. Furthermore, the intellect gives the soul its perfection, furnishes it with its major faculties and

* Pg. 15 a.

is eternal, being that part of the soul which survives the death of the body.

In the second chapter Hillel embodies the religious and the theological implications of his thought in his doctrine of Reward and punishment. He tells us that there has been a great deal of dispute concerning the type of reward and punishments that the soul will receive after death. The majority believe that all compensation is bodily, rewards in the form of corporeal pleasures and punishments in the form of corporeal pains. Some think that rewards will be spiritual and punishments material. A very small group believes that both rewards and punishments will be spiritual.

In determining the solution of this problem, the question must be asked whether the rewards and punishments of the soul can possibly be material. The answer to this question lies in the argument presented about the soul in the first chapter. There it was proved that the soul is without matter, without body and that it is purely a psychic substance. Hence, since it is not body and anything which is not body may not be affected by something which is body, the soul will not be affected nor can it be compensated by material compensation. Further, a form essence which is not composed of parts may not be acted upon by the power of a material agent.

If one should argue that the reward of the righteous is material, it follows that all the promises that God has made the righteous for keeping the Torah and the Commandments--the Garden of Eden, the Light of Life, the Lands of Living etc.--are all corporeal states where the righteous person may regale himself with actual

physical pleasures. The reply to this is that there would then be no purpose in death and in immortality since, according to that view, there is really no difference between this world and the Garden of Eden. It would be better if God would leave the soul in the body and keep both of them alive. Many of the righteous would be pleased with such a life of pleasure if it were eternal. The wicked would then see the rewards of the righteous and desiring these rewards for themselves would ~~and~~ their ways. If you say that this would mean service for the sake of receiving a reward, the fact of the matter is that men do serve for the sake of receiving a reward. Hillel entertains no illusions about human nature.

True reward, however, is when the "soul of the righteous mounts ever upward into eternal degrees to behold the presence of the Lord God of Hosts, Blessed be His Name, and there it remains forever satisfying itself from that Radiance and Eternal Illumination."^{*} Thus the reward is spiritual. Punishment is the opposite of reward. Therefore we are forced to conclude that punishment is likewise spiritual. If you argue that the reward is spiritual and the punishment is material you get into a number of insoluble difficulties. The sensation of punishment which the soul receives after death is either like the sensation which it felt at the time of its attachment to the body or it is different from it. The sensations cannot possibly be alike because, with the soul's departure from the body, the body loses the capacity of experiencing the same sensation which it could experience while the soul was in the body. Furthermore, if the sensations are similar, there is no point

to the great change brought about by death. The soul might as well be left in the body. The answer cannot be that God decreed so, because such an answer denies intelligence or justifying the cause to the work of God. We have a right to understand the ways of God. Both Abraham and Moses demanded justifying reasons of God for certain actions of His and He acceded to their demands. Significantly enough, Hillel, honest thinker that he is, refuses to take refuge in the argument of Inscrutable Wisdom. But back to the argument. If the sensation is not equal, it is either stronger and finer or weaker and coarser. Suppose we analyze the first. A man must be either righteous or an average wicked person. If he is righteous, it is perhaps valid to say that the sensation after death should be stronger and finer, because God may be liberal and increase the reward of a good servant. If the person be wicked, this means that the measure of pain which he suffers after death is greater than the amount of pleasure which he enjoyed during his lifetime in sinning. This would be a perversity in the nature of God who is great in mercy and love. Hillel is very careful in preserving an exact balance between God's Justice and His Mercy. If we adopt the other view that the sensation is weaker and coarser, it leads us into similar difficulties. The punishment of the wicked would be less than the pleasure that he enjoyed through his sins. This would surely be merciful on the part of God. But then the reward of the righteous would also be less than the pleasure he might have had in this world if he had been a sinner. Which would not be exactly just, but as much of a perversity in God's nature as in the other case.

All these impossible deductions at which we arrive when we argue that the punishment may be corporeal forces us to conclude that it is spiritual like the reward.

There is a certain way of approach to the spiritual Garden of Eden. God in His love for the human species made the human body the subject for the soul. He graced the union of soul and body by bestowing upon it the possibility of attaining to the degree of the Active Intellect. There are three degrees through which the soul may ascend to the Active Intellect and thus to God. These three degrees are the three kinds of intellect, the material, the acquired and the Active. At this point Hillel quotes Maimonides on Prophecy. Prophecy consists in the perfection of the rational, imaginative and ethical faculties through the activity upon them of the Active Intellect. Sometimes the Active Intellect concentrates upon one or two of the three, leaving the third deficient. If the rational is powerful and the imaginative is deficient, the person will be a scientist. If the imaginative is powerful and the rational deficient, he will be a statesman or diviner.

Wisdom is incomplete without deeds. The Rabbis, says Hillel, have repeatedly enunciated the principle that the Torah is not only useless but positively injurious to him who does not become meritorious through the performance of good deeds. "A man should incline all five of the senses for one purpose which is the service of God."* This is a prevalent Jewish idea, that the method of morality is the habituation of the senses to good action. Not only should a man incline his sentient faculty to the service of God, but his stimulative faculty for strength

* Pg. 22 b.

as well, for through it "he may overcome his inclination and submerge it and then he will be called a mighty man in truth and he will exalt his heart to go in the ways of the Lord."* The stimulative faculty for the other emotions may likewise be bent to the service of God. For example, with his stimulative faculty for pleasantness a man may be brought to forgive the person who has sinned against him. Unlike in Christian Theology, forgiveness of sin is made a matter of human will-power rather than a pure act of *Imitatio Dei*. With all the rest of his qualities a man should conduct himself in the middle path. Being a devout Aristotelian, Hillel follows the Golden Mean. According to Maimonides, he says, a man who perfects himself in these ways may even in his lifetime attain the degree of those who are like the Ministering Angels and who perform wonders. There is nothing to separate such a person from God except the fact of the attachment of his soul to matter. But after death such a soul attains the desired station for then "the Eternal Light illumines it and it ascends constantly from one degree to another in the Light of Life. When its journey has been completed, then it is in the lands of the Living and in the sight of the Presence." The imaginative faculty is fitted to survive and to be united with the intellect for the reception of reward and punishment, but the corporeal faculties like eating, growth and reproduction are not worthy of survival.

It may be asked, how is it possible for the soul which has been joined with a body to ascend to a degree which it previously occupied when it was pure from the accidents and impurities of matter? The answer is, first, that God for an

ultimate good purpose will not withhold from any creature the destiny fitted for him. Secondly, it is fitting that further perfection be bestowed upon any one who constantly prepares himself for perfection. God is gracious to those who are worthy in proportion to their relation to themselves and their relation to others. He presents the analogy* of a nobleman who possesses all the qualities of leadership. But the nobleman is incomplete until those qualities have been tested in the difficult and extreme task of ruling a rebellious province. If he succeeds in ruling well and wisely and bringing the province peacefully under the dominion of the king, he merits all the praise and glory which his King can bestow upon him. Then he is perfect. It was only according to the simple demands of Justice that this nobleman receive his opportunity and not be allowed to waste his powers at the court. The soul without a body is like the nobleman before he has been entrusted with the government of the province. God sends it into the body to guide it. If it succeeds in bringing the body to the service of God completely, it has performed its task and deserves all the reward that God can bestow upon it. This reward is the divinely spiritual Garden of Eden.

The punishment of the soul if it fails in its appointed task is the opposite of the reward which it merits if it succeeds. It will not return to its original form but remain in darkness. Its entire time will be spent in trouble and grief, in fear and trepidation. Through its imaginative faculty it will constantly sense the darkness in which it is immersed. Through its rational faculty it will reflect upon the good which it might have received had it been righteous. It will

also comprehend the pleasure of the righteous soul, whereupon its own grief and sorrow will be magnified. This is the meaning of Gehenna and it is the opposite of the Garden of Eden. But it is not material. And it does not include any burning in material fire. The Garden of Eden is ascent or life eternal. Gehenna is descent or forsakenness.

Hillel here runs into a serious difficulty in maintaining that punishment is incorporeal, because there are numerous Biblical verses and Rabbinic interpretations which indicate that punishment is material, and that there is a Gehenna which consists of real, material fire. He solves this difficulty by saying that the words of the Rabbis may be generally divided into those which are meant to be taken literally and those which are meant to be understood allegorically. He therefore gives us a highly interesting classification of the statements of the Rabbis into six divisions and cites examples for each division.*

1. Statements which are to be taken according to their literal meaning without addition or subtraction, like explanations of the commandments of the Torah, hermeneutical rules, conclusions a minori ad majus, standard rules, identic categories, etc. They are to be understood and fulfilled literally. Anyone who does not do so forfeits his membership in the religion of Israel.
2. Allegories or proverbs teaching some exalted purpose. They have a hidden meaning clear only to a chosen few. Anyone who takes them literally is a pious fool.
3. Prophetic statements which come from God either in dreams or in waking states. They are to be taken allegorically. Otherwise we would be attributing foolish words

and impossible sayings to the prophets and sages.

4. Special Aggadoth and popular explanations presented on Sabbaths and Holy Days to the mass of men, women and children in order to draw their hearts to God and to the fulfillment of the Commandments. Sometimes they are even put in the form of threats and exaggerations in order to instill fear and awe into the masses. The sole purpose of the Rabbis in this regard was to produce service in the name of Heaven.

5. Words of amusement designed to rejoice the hearts of sages after they have become wearied with fine speculation and difficult study.

6. Narratives of miracles which God performed in honor of the righteous for whose sake He changed the natural order. Hillel believes firmly in these miracles provided they were performed for some great need like the need of saving a generation or of spreading respect for the righteous among the masses, in order to avenge the righteous upon the wicked or to provide a suitable memorial for the righteous. It might seem a rather odd mental twist which could transform a rationalist like Hillel into a believer in miracles. But we can understand his psychology. He had as yet no absolutely scientific basis upon which to deny the possibility of miracles. In fact, a complete denial of miracles would have been peculiar when we consider what a hold the belief in miracles had at the time and what a halo of sanctity tradition had thrown about that belief. But he does show an advance in his absolute insistence on the principle that the natural order cannot be subverted except under the compulsion of some great necessity.

Hillel believes that every explanation of the Rabbis which seems to indicate corporeal reward and punishment can be included in the second, third or fourth

division, and can and should be allegorized. He argues that the Rabbi ascribed the punishment of the soul in corporeal terms in order to instill fear into the mass of the people who are foolish and who would only accept the laws of the Torah and the Commandments on the basis of material reward and punishment. This is because they are entirely corporeal in their nature, "like animals who are afraid only when a hand is waved over them with an axe or with a stone or when one shoots at them, or strikes them with reins." They understand only what is perceptible to them. Similarly, in the matter of rewards, the mass of the people are like goats and love to serve their master only when he feeds them. So they serve God in the hope of longevity, wealth and honor in this life and in the hope of spending an eternity in pleasant Paradise in the world to come. But the fact of the matter is that incorporeal existence is more real than corporeal existence. To prove this he uses the philosophical example** of an imaginary creature who is born with his spiritual and material elements completely divorced, each unaware of the existence of the other. Little by little the spiritual becomes aware of the material. But the material seems strange and secondary and non-essential to its existence. It always regards its spiritual self as the foundation of its being, the original and the important principle of its existence. But the mass of the people, who are material in philosophy, and scientific method, will not understand this and Hiliel despairs of their ever being able to do so. Therefore the Rabbi had to present reward and punishment to them in picturesque and popular form so that they at least accept the laws of God and fulfill them.

* Pg. 26 b.

** Pg. 27a - 27 b.

Hillel takes up various statements of the Rabbis, analyzes them in relation to their Biblical verses and tries to demonstrate both the allegory presented and the real meaning behind the allegory. He concludes from his examination that the Rabbis did not really mean what they appear to say on the surface except for the previously mentioned purpose of popular explanation. Whoever understands their method of allegory will understand that they did not intend to convey that reward consists in the enjoyment of a material Garden of Eden or that punishment is a Gehenna composed of physical fire. The real meaning of their statements is that both reward and punishment are spiritual as Hillel has maintained throughout his book. He discusses here, too, the three classes to be judged on the Day of Judgement, the completely righteous, the completely wicked and the average persons who are in the majority. The completely righteous receive the reward of eternal spiritual life. Their souls become one with the Active Intellect and enter into the very presence of God. The completely wicked are reduced to non-being, soul and body. The average souls go through a sort of test period of fluttering about and then ascend upward.

Interestingly enough, he denies Resurrection in this world for the majority of people, but identifies it with the world to come or the Day of Judgement. Its only purpose is to demonstrate the power of God. The Messianic Era is a time of resurrection only for the uniquely righteous. For the completely righteous and the completely wicked, reward and punishment are immediate. The righteous live in the world of souls. The wicked are reduced to nothingness, and it is in the process

of that reduction that their punishment consists. The consciousness of the wicked soul that it is being reduced to non-being is the greatest affliction, in his opinion, that can come to it. Only for the average soul is judgement suspended for any length of time. His reasoning throughout this argument is vague and somewhat inconsistent but it is, after all, only incidental to the main purpose of the book, to demonstrate the spirituality of reward and punishment.

Hillel's logic in this second chapter is often faulty, his reasoning fallacious and his method unscientific. He often ceases to be the philosopher and the exacting scientist that he was in the first part of his discussion and becomes the man of faith. But he is always in earnest. And his purpose is an important and noble one, almost modern in fact. He wants to shatter the delusory and firm-rooted belief of his day--and for all too many in our day--in celestial banquets and stanic horror, a belief which has been an almost insurmountable barrier to clear and progressive thinking in Religion. The standards of critical logic cannot and ought not to be applied too closely to his reasoning. He is primarily the religionist and then the philosopher. But he is far more thorough and consistent in his thinking than many of the Medievalists.

INDEX OF AUTHORS AND TITLES

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS. Came to Athens toward the end of the second century C. E.; became head of the Lyceum where he lectured on Peripatetic Philosophy. Most celebrated of the Greek Commentators on Aristotle.

ANAXAGORAS. Born around 500 B. C. E. Greek philosopher. Born in Asia Minor and settled in Athens. With him Greek speculation moved from the colonies and found its center in Athens.

ARCHIGENES. Unknown. Book: Healing of the Brain.

ARISTOTLE. 384-322 B. C. E. Celebrated Greek philosopher and founder of the Peripatetic school at Athens. Held undisputed supremacy over Medieval thought, Christian, Arabic and Jewish. Books:

Book on Physics
Book on the Sense and Objects of Sense
Book of the Substance of Heaven
Cosmology
De Anima
Metaphysics
Physics
Rhetoric.

AUGUSTINE. 354-430 C. E. One of the four great fathers of the Latin Church. Philosopher and Theologian. Author of numerous philosophical and theological works which exerted great influence over the thought of Medieval Christianity.

AVENZOAR or Al Farabi. Arabian physician who flourished at the beginning of the twelfth century C. E. in Seville. His works show extensive knowledge of Medicine:

Postulates of Existing Things
Six Principles.

AVICENNA. 980-1037 C. E. Arabic philosopher. Commentator on Aristotle and authority on Medicine.

EMPEDOCLES. 490-430 B. C. E. Greek philosopher and statesman. Teachings are vague and uncertain except his doctrine of the four ultimate elements, fire, air, water, earth.

GALEN. 130-200? C. E. Authority on Medicine and Logic. Versatile writer. Said to have written five hundred treatises. Usually classes as a Neo-Pythagorean. Books:

Book on Chemistry
Methods of Healing
The Small Work.

ISRAELI, ISAAC. c. 832-c. 932 C. E. African Jewish physician and philosopher. Versed in all the Sciences but gained fame as a physician. Book:
Book of Elements.

9. II
MAIMONIDES, MOSES. 1135-1204 C. E. Foremost Medieval Jewish philosopher. Tried to reconcile Jewish teaching with Aristotle. Books:
Moreh Nebuchim
✓ Twenty-Five Halakimot
Shmoneh Perakim.

PLATO. 427-507 B. C. E. Great Athenian philosopher and founder of the Academy, first important philosophical school. Philosophy embodied in his Dialogues. Probably exerted unparalleled influence on history of human thought.

RUSHD, IBN (Ibn Rushd or Averroes). 1126-1198 C. E. Arabian philosopher of Cordova. A leading commentator on Aristotle. Helped to introduce Aristotle among Christian Schoolmen who read his commentaries fully a century after his death. Book:
Book of the Substance of Heaven.

THEMISTIUS. 317?-387 C. E. Philosopher and Rhetorician who taught at Constantinople. Eclectic in his thought. Held that Aristotle and Plato were in substantial agreement. Author or paraphrases of several of Aristotle's works.

NOTE: Material from the Jewish Encyclopædia and from the Encyclopædia Britannica. Titles of works given in English except those of Maimonides which are better known by their Hebrew titles.

Hebrew books quoted in the book are not mentioned

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