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THE PERSONALIZED PHILOSOPHIES

OF MARTIN BUBER AND GABRIEL MARCEL

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DIGEST

The philosophers Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel have written on the problem of man's inability to communicate with his fellow man in a world characterized by increasing alienation. This thesis traces parallel themes, among which are the need for genuine dialogue and the possibility for personalized relations among men. Beginning with biographical sketches of Buber and Marcel, the thesis delineates the respective epistemologies of these philosophers, who are neither fully subject-oriented nor fully object-oriented and who refuse to systematize or formulate categorically. Treated are the concepts of eastern mysticism, orientation, and realization -- the bases for Buber's later development of the philosophy of Dialogue; and metapsychical experimentation with clairvoyance and intuition -- the foundation for Marcel's ultimate formulation of Participation. From this point, the thesis traces the progression from the early stages of these thinkers to the expression of the need for the unfolding of the Other, over and against manipulating and using.

Expressed by both philosophers is the twofold relation of man to the Other: the I-It relation is one of experiencing, while the I-Thou or "je et toi" position is a shared relation of participation. All shared relations are grounded in a communion with the Supreme Thou, Who is God.

The thesis next approaches the problem of evil from within the framework of two metaphors: Buber's Eclipse of God and Marcel's Broken World, both of which express the increasing difficulty of relation in a mechanized world.

Finally, this paper treats the application of Buber's Dialogue and Marcel's Participation to different fields of human interest: education, politics, psychology, art, and faith. It is through this application, in particular, that the writings of these philosophers become relevant for modern society.

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INTRODUCTION

The writing of Martin Buber expresses a felt need of many people of this age to break through the impersonal, mechanized relationship characteristic of modern society, and to penetrate the world of the Other. Buber is concerned with the whole situation of man who finds himself confronted with the possibility of genuine dialogue. An interest such as this is far too important and far-reaching to be limited to the writing of Buber alone; and as a result, other philosophers have sought to grapple with the same subject matter. Many of these philosophers -- such as Emil Brunner, Karl Heim, and John Baille -- have acknowledged the direct influence of Buber upon them. Other thinkers -- such as Ferdinand Ebner and Karl Jaspers -- have arrived independently at a philosophy similar to that of Buber. But the writing of one such man, Gabriel Marcel, bears such a striking resemblance to the work of Martin Buber that it would seem inconceivable that Marcel could not have been exposed to the I-Thou philosophy of Buber, who wrote in German almost ten years before Marcel ever presented his ideas on "je et toi."

Maurice Friedman, considered by many to be the foremost American authority on Buber, implies his astonishment that "The thought of Marcel, the French Catholic existentialist, bears remarkable resemblance to Buber's even in terminology" (although he adds that Marcel claimed not to have been influenced by Buber's I and Thou when he wrote his Metaphysical Journal).[1] Certainly, it is understandable

that the expression of a need to break through from the realm of the impersonal to the personal could spring up in a variety of places, even during the same epoch. But the correspondence of exact terminology may arouse, in the minds of some, a high degree of skepticism. It would be a reasonable coincidence if the correspondence were limited only to general subject matter: to the need for interrelations, for dialogue among men, and for a transcendence of the world of the sterile and mechanical. But the correspondence goes beyond these general categories: Marcel's later use of "je et toi" appears to be identical to Buber's "I and Thou." Furthermore, Marcel's "Intersubjectivity" resembles in many respects Buber's "Interhuman." And Marcel also speaks of the existence of an "Absolute Thou" which parallels Buber's concept of the "Eternal Thou."

Yet in 1966, Marcel steadfastly asserted that he had never been influenced by the work of Martin Buber in the formulation of his own thought. In an article on "The Philosophical Anthropology of Martin Buber, " he remarked:

> Comme on vous le rappelait tout à l'heure il y a une parenté certaine entre ma pensée et la sienne; elles se sont développées en effet parallèlement. Je sais que Martin Buber avait cru quelque temps que j'avais commis une sorte de plagiat envers lui; il a su ensuite qu'il y avait eu simplement rencontre. [2]

In his denial that he was influenced by Buber, Marcel

asserted that such a coincidence was plausible because the subject matter of dialogue is of such central importance for living a meaningful life today. But he advances no explanation for the correspondence of the above-mentioned technical terms. Marcel charged that Martin Buber has suspected him of having committed plagiarism against him; but such an assertion, I believe, may reflect some self-questioning of his own; for it is possible that Marcel "doth protest his innocence too much" in attempt to establish his thinking as entirely independent of that of Buber. Only an exposure to the biographies of both of these writers and a close study of their respective lifestyles and philosophies will enable the reader to make an objective evaluation of the originality of Marcel's work -- or of the possibility that he was, consciously or unconsciously, influenced by the writing of Buber.

Martin Buber was born in Vienna, capital of the Hapsburg monarchy, in 1887; but he did not remain in Vienna for very long. At the young age of three, his parents underwent divorce, after which he was entrusted to the guardianship of his grandparents in Lemberg, Galicia. His grandfather, Salomon Buber, was an unusual personage, able to combine the qualities of a successful businessman, a prosporous farmer, and a scholar of midrash.[3] On account of his grandfather's religious background, Martin was afforded ample opportunity to make Jewish learning and Biblical studies an integral part of his life. During the summer months, Buber spent much of his time in the neighboring towns of Sadagora and Czortkov, where he was exposed to the hasidic communities that were to have such a momentous impact on his later life.[4] Even in his early childhood, Buber was consumed by difficult philosophical questions: "When was the beginning of time? Is there a limitation to space?" Yet his concerns were not limited to bare abstract concepts; he possessed a feeling for "the Other," even at his early age, which was to be the foundation for his dialogical philosophy. One of his autobiographical fragments entitled "The Horse" exemplifies his early concern for establishing relation:

> When I was eleven years of age, spending the summer on my grandparents' estate, I used, as often as I could do it unobserved, to steal into the stable and gently stroke the neck of my darling,

> a broad dapple-gray horse....
> I must say that what I experienced
> in touch with the animal was
> the Other, the immense otherness
> of the Other.[5]

When Buber commenced his official studies in Vienna in 1896, he felt very comfortable, able to extend not only his philosophical studies, but also his "romantic" interest in dialogical relation with the Other. For there was no greater place than Vienna in the late eighteen hundreds to discover the paradoxical combination of serious philosophy and romanticism.[6] Buber was thus enabled to occupy his time with both philosophical education and aesthetic influence.

As early as 1898, Buber had made the acquaintance of Theodor Herzl and was transformed into an ardent Zionist. He became editor of a Zionist journal in Vienna; but suddenly, there ensued a rift between Herzl and Buber: Herzl's Zionism was of a political nature for the creation of a Jewish state, while for Buber, Zionism was a cultural movement whose purpose was to be the communal renewal of the Jews. For the time being, Buber withdrew from the Zionist scene, moving to Berlin where he opened a Jewish publishing company.[7]

During the following years Buber passed much of his time in the study of hasidic texts and traditions which served as a basis for the later formation of his philosophy of dialogue. Then in 1916, he became editor of the journals Der Jude and Die Kreatur, devoted to Zionist and religious problems in general. In the 1920's, Buber worked with Franz Rosenzweig

on the translation of the Tanach into German. During these same years, Buber taught philosophy and religious history at the University of Frankfort and wrote the book which was to become his best-known work on genuine dialogue: I and Thou. Finally, in 1938, he left his home in Germany to reside in Palestine where he served as a professor of social philosophy at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. There he died, in 1965, in his state of Israel.

Born in 1889 in Paris, Gabriel Marcel was the son of a distinguished foreign minister to Sweeden -- a religious skeptic who refused to have his own son baptized. Marcel suffered tragedy at a very early age: his mother died when he was only four years old, so that subsequently he was raised by his aunt, who imposed upon him a strict moral discipline. As a result, explains Marcel, he existed in an unstable and arid surrounding. It is a little-known fact that Marcel's mother was of Jewish descent.[8] The lack of religious direction in the home made him uncomfortable and eventually spurred him on to a conversion to Catholicism in 1929. Thus the absence of any religious training ultimately constituted a positive influence toward his spiritual quest.[9]

Biographies indicate that Marcel was always considered to be an astute student, but he despised the methods by which he was taught.and the sterile academic system to

which he was exposed. He was forced to undergo parental pressures and to achieve his utmost maximum capabilities. Top grades were of prime significance to his family, and Marcel was, therefore, unable to derive any creative enjoyment from his studies in school. The events and unhappiness of his early childhood days are reflected in his philosophy of education in The Mystery of Being:

> A history teacher, for example, has to din dates into his pupils. They have to give back just what they have been given, unchanged by any mental process, and they have to memorize the dates in a mechanical way.[10]

His early educational experiences were negative enough to affect his later writings, since he recalled his education with great distain. An impersonal and mechanical mode of teaching was anathema to Marcel. This is, perhaps, why he does not fit the usual mold of the philosopher and was not associated with any university chair.

A sad and lonely child, Gabriel Marcel was forced to fantasize and to create fictitious characters to keep him company. In fact, several characters from his later plays were created out of the depths of his own lonely childhood and reflect his unhappy situation. His mother's fatal illness, his own isolation, and his search for hope in God are all themes of his most noted plays. Claude, the main character in A Man of God written in 1921,[11] suffers from a world which lies in ruin around him. He has lost his daughter

and his wife, and his faith is lacking. In 1936 Marcel wrote the play Ariadne, in which the lead character suffers from virulent tuberculosis and a life of progressive illness. Yet she seeks a glimmer of hope. There is little doubt that Marcel's early life of sickness and sadness played a significant role in his later works. Nor is there doubt that his plays reflect what was to become his polished philosophy: that Being can be discovered only when the Other becomes a Thou.

Following travels to Stockholm, Marcel received education at the Sorbonne in Paris, but he failed to fulfill the requirements for a doctoral thesis. Between the years of 1915-1922, he taught at French preparatory schools and served as a reader for publishers in Paris.[12] At the age of eighteen, Marcel began working on a philosophical diary, and 1927 marked the publication of his first related work of major significance, The Metaphysical Journal. In his second work, Being and Having, Marcel continued his description of the struggle with idealsim and the establishment of an I-Thou relation with God. It was in 1929 that he underwent conversion to Catholicism, a step that added a new dimension to his thinking.

Once again, it should be emphasized that all of his work stresses his many personal experiences from which he gained direction of thought. Marcel's work with the French Red Cross Rescue Team during World War One was of special significance in the development of his philosophy. His assignment was to

obtain news of wounded and missing soldiers and to inform their relatives officially -- a task which afforded him encounters with people in a very concrete way. So anxious and concerned were the relatives that for Marcel, the mechanical term "missing-in-action" lost its abstract nature.[13] For him, mere statistics gave way to a sensitive concern for the bereaved with whom he came into daily contact.

Gabriel Marcel was the William James lecturer at Harvard University in 1961. He continued his studies until his death in 1974.

The question of the origin of knowledge has been approached differently by idealists and empiricists. The idealists assert that reality consists only of ideas --that only what transpires in the mind is real and is the ultimate source of knowledge. Plato is thus the founder of this school of thought which has been carried on by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. On the other hand are the empiricists, who pursue knowledge by observation and experience, with the implication that there are no innate conceptions. This group is represented by philosophers among whom are Bacon, Locke, and Hume. Members of these two schools of thought have been in rivalry for centuries-- the idealists claiming that the subject of a relation is of utmost importance, and the empiricists claiming that the object of a relationship is of supreme importance.

Neither Martin Buber nor Gabriel Marcel has ever professed to belong to any definitive philosophical camp. In a letter written in 1951, Buber expressed his wish not to be forced into a philosophical corner when he asserted, "I have no inclination to systematizing."[14] There is no trace of methodism in what Buber writes. Similarly, Gabriel Marcel -- though he presents elements of phenomenology, idealism, and empiricism-- defied any classification and refused to be tagged with a public label. He was notoriously unsympathetic with those who attempted to shelve his philosophy "like a piece of goods."[15] Marcel is not the kind of thinker who insisted upon

formulating everything logically and neatly or who defied overlapping and disjointedness. "He is not the kind of thinker for whom the world is a neat pyramid of billiard balls in hieracrchical graduation."[16] Neither the subject-oriented idealism nor the object-oriented empiricism would serve any useful end for the Marcellian philosophy of relation, which -- by definition-- laid equally significant emphasis on subject and object.

Likewise, Buber is opposed to the philosophy which attempts to establish absolutes and universals.[17] Real knowledge, he feels, is found in Being, not in systems and in propositions. The traditional philosophies of subject-object relationship stress either the importance of the rational thinking of the mind or empirical knowledge gained by the senses and experience. But Buber invalidates the sole authority of both of these traditional systems and substitutes his I-Thou dialogue through which genuine knowledge is apprehended. Descartes had stressed that man must beware of the objects to which he relates -- transmitted beliefs, impressions, and false experience. All of man's sensations must be considered as untrustworthy, according to him. Man must deny his senses and, in fact, believe that he really possesses no body. Only of one thing can man really be certain in the opinion of Descartes: that he thinks, that he can reason. Descartes thus places full concentration on the subject as he relates, and only through man's reasoning can he then come to understand himself.

Martin Buber finds quite a different means of attaining understanding through his premise that "As a man becomes I, so he says Thou."[18] A subject cannot relate to an object by the means suggested by either idealists or empiricists; man cannot attain true understanding either by withdrawing into his own reason or by collecting empirical data. For as Buber so aptly states, a person is not constituted as a person except through his having met with a Thou. True knowing stems from a dialogical meeting in life's fulness. True, the mediation of the senses as stressed by the empiricists is of crucial import to Buber's philosophy -- but not the objective senses of the empiricists, not the senses that can be measured, graphed, or plotted. True knowledge ensues when man says "Thou" to another, when he enters into a dialogical relationship that cannot be denied.

Gabriel Marcel also refused to admit that reason and abstract thought constitute all reality. For him, the outer world also plays a significant role in which the body, sensations, and other external factors are all very real. In Marcel's estimation, an experience transcends mere abstract thought. Participation and resultant knowledge are the products of the experience of one person with another-- not a purely mental faculty. This experiential relation that Marcel describes cannot be verified or observed by the senses in such a way that it is defined in an idea. Here, mind cannot be cut off from body, as the idealists and empiricists were wont to do. For Marcel, sensation is a very

legitimate mode of expression.[19] It is the body through which we exist in the world; an idea does not exist. Those thinkers who denigrate the body as something crude probably consider the body to be an instrument -- something to be "used," something "had." Just as one might consider an implement or a tool as an extension of the self, so, too, misguided philosophers envision the body as something which belongs to the person. Marcel, however, considers the body to be the self. Whereas Descartes considers the mind to be the one indubitable, Marcel sees the body as that which cannot be denied. The act of sensation is not tantamount to the reception of something; it is the immediate participation in being itself. Feelings are so crucial for Marcel, for when a person feels, he participates -- just as one might receive a guest: when he receives a guest he first opens the door, lets him into the house, shakes his hand, and gives of himself. Without that which Marcel calls this "hospitality," there can be no reception. And so, too, without feeling and without openness, there can be no relation. Therefore, one participates through the medium of sensation, as Marcel has stated in his Metaphysical Journal:

> Things exist for me insofar as I regard them as prolongations of my body.[20]

Thus, Marcel has denied the idea of Descartes whereby nothing attests to reality except the cogito; but he also takes exception with the empiricists who claim that what exists can be grasped and arranged, toted up and balanced.

For Marcel, to cry "Is!" is to say "Yes!" just as for Buber, to enter into relation is to say "Thou!"

Marcel does confess that an instrumentalist view of the body does exist for scientific purposes, and thus he established what he calls "primary" and "secondary" reflection.[21] In primary reflection one comes to realize that his body is only one among many. It is endowed with no special privleges. Primary reflection has taken an outlook of detachment to the fact that a particular body belongs to a particular person. Secondary reflection manifests itself in the refusal to treat the body as a given person as "just another body." Asks Marcel, "Is my body mine, just as my dog belongs to me?" Perhaps Marcel found him wandering wretchedly in the streets and he brought him home. For the dog to really belong to Marcel, there must exist between the animal and him a positive relation, not just a condition of ownership.[22] The dog must be happy to live with him, and he must accept the responsibility for having the dog. There is a reciprocity of relationship entailed here. In the same manner, a person is his body to the extent that he enters into a relationship with the body. It must not be brought down to the level of only an object. This is the essence of secondary reflection. Both Buber and Marcel, then, skirt the traditional philosophical schools by maintaining that real knowledge is found , not exclusively in the subject or the object, of relation, but rather in Being and in Dialogue.

During his years as a student at the University of Berlin, Buber was exposed to a variety of thinkers who influenced him strongly. His teachers presented to him Nietzsche's theory from which he learned that man is free to do what he wills with himself. He has the potential of being inferior and passive-- or of being a superhuman who developes his unlimited potentialities. He also learned of Kierkegaard, who had maintained that man is bound to muster up the courage to plan his own life, to make choices, and to determine outcomes. And one of his professors, Wilhelm Dilthey, helped Buber to direct his thinking in terms of his philosophy of "realization," what was to comprise a link between Buber's view of mysticism and his polished philosophy of Dialogue.

It is in his work Daniel that Buber first evidences his concern for unity and realization:

> In each thing, in the experience of each thing, there opens to you the door of the One if you bring with you the magic that unlocks it: the perfection of your direction. For direction is only complete when it is fulfilled with power: the power to experience the whole event. Power alone gives one only the fulness, direction alone only the meaning of the experience-- power and direction together allow one to penetrate into the oneness itself.[23]

Buber then explicitly defines the twofold relation of men to their experience: orientation and realization. He maintains that doing and suffering, creating and enjoying, man orders for the sake of his goals. If man orders an experience, he

works with it according to laws and forms. Everywhere that knowledge of orientation is maintained alone, the experience of reality is compromised. Realization, on the other hand, offers true meaning in life which stems from an intensified perception. To realize is to relate experience to nothing save itself. While in the system of orientation one must only order his life, in realization one must present the wholeness of his being to cope with an event. Men live -- but do not realize what they live, for their lives are all ordered without ever being comprehended. The wholly creative person possesses the power of realization, and in his creativity is included a mature orientation which complements his power of realization.[24]

Buber stresses "direction" as the powerful tension in the human soul which impels man to choose from a selection of possibilities. Man can, for example, relate to a pine tree in two ways: he can compare its properties to those of other trees, classify, categorize, explore its history, and its growth. But, explains, Buber, one cannot discover the truth of the being of the tree in this fashion, by this orientation. However, if one draws close to the tree, he can feel the power of its glance, the power of direction. It is then that the person can receive the tree and accept it on its own terms. Such an act is the realization of what was a potential relation of direction. Ours is a world of many possibilities from which each person chooses his reality.

In our own age there is a paucity of men of realization, for orientation is in vogue: we tend too much to objectify, to inform, to attain, to acqqire, and to secure; these are all functions of orientation. Yet Buber is quite practical in his thinking. "We cannot live without the world of It," he explains. Yet he who lives exclusively in the word of It forsakes the experience of reality. As Buber points out:

> Realization and orientation dwell close together, like conception and pregnancy, like knowledge and dissemination, like discovery and utilization.[25]

The orienting-man concerns himself with formulas, statistics, and regulations; the realizing-man occupies himself with the individual value of each person or thing. Inanimate objects are included, for just as Buber related to the pine tree, so he sees himself transformed by a pieee of mica lying on the ground; he lifts it up and is caught in the stone. At this particular moment, he is neither conscious of object or subject, and herein Buber begins to move from the philosophy orientation to the dialogue of I-Thou.

The revival of mysticism, which resulted in Buber's writing of Daniel and the influence of Hindusim and Taoism made great impact on the thought of Martin Buber. He was soon to be led to the concept of the realization of God through relation between man and man. The relationship between man and the rest of the world accounts for much of

Buber's early interest in mystical trends. In the essay "With a Monist," written in 1914,[26] Buber emphasizes the meeting between man and that which is over against him. He now borders on his later dialogical philosophy when he maintains that although the world is not comprehensible, it is certainly embraceable through the embracing of one of its beings. Each thing and each being has a twofold nature: "the passive, absorbable, usable, dissectible, and combinable--and the other, the active, the non-absorbable, unusable, undissectible, and uncombinable."[27] According to Buber in "With a Monist," the person who experiences a thing so that it springs up to him and embraces him has in that thing come to know the world. To reach reality and the world, man must melt the shells of darkness and passivity, until things meet and embrace us.

Buber emphatically denies that he is a mystic:

> I still grant to reason a claim that a mystic must deny to it. Beyond this, I lack the mystic's negation. I can negate convictions but never the slightest actual thing. The mystic manages to annihilate the entire world to press forward to his God. But I am enormously concerned with just the world, this painful and precious fulness of all that I see, hear, and taste. I cannot wish away any part of its reality. I can only wish that I might heighten the reality.[28]

Buber's philosophy, then, is diametrically opposed to that of the mystic who annihilates the world and all that his senses permit him to experience. For Buber, man must meet

and embrace the world with his supersensory powers. Reality is not a fixed condition, but a quantity which can be heightened by the intensity of man's experiencing. For Buber, reality is strenghhened by one's seeing the seen with all the strength of his life, and by hearing the heard and tasting the tasted in the same manner.

One of the articles contained in the collection Pointing the Way entitled "The Teaching of Taoism"[29] is of a decidedly mystical nature. Buber writes in the introduction to Pointing the Way that it was necessary to include this essay because of its importance in the development of his thought.[30] He explains that upon opening Taoism's Bible, the Tao Te Ching, a person at once senses that everything revolves around the concept of Tao itself. Literally, the word means path or way, but there are three general senses in which the word can be better understood. Primarily, Tao is the way of ultimate reality; this type of Tao cannot be perceived for it goes beyond the reach of all the senses. If it were to manifest itself in all its power and glory, man would be unable to bear its vision. Not only does it exceed all senses, but it also transcends all thoughts and imaginations as well. The Tao Te Ching aptly puts it: "The Tao which can be perceived is not the real Tao."[31] The real Tao is behind all and beneath all-- "the basic mystery, the mystery of mysteries, the entrance into the mystery of all life." Tao can be known only through mystical insight.

In its secondary sense, Tao is explained by Buber as immanent as well as transcendent; the apparent paradox here is resolved when man sees Tao as the way of the universe as well as the way to ultimate reality. Tao represents the rhythm, order, and driving power found in nature -- what Thomas might call the "Force that through the green fuse drives." The third meaning of Tao Buber explains as the way man should order his life to jibe with the way the universe runs. The basic quality of life in tune with the universe is called Wu Wei. The phrase is often misleadingly translated into "do-nothingness" or "inaction," but these translations are not adequate; a better rendition would be "creative quietude."[32] This creative quietude would seem to combine in an individual two diametrically opposed qualities, namely activism and relaxation. But Buber maintains in "The Teaching of Taoism" that these apparent irreconcilables can co-exist, for man is not a self-enclosed entity. A mystical explanation becomes necessary: genuine creation comes when the more abundant resources of the self are released, necessitating a disassociation from the surface-self. Only when the conscious mind relaxes is it possible to break through the law of reversed effort in which the more we try, the more our efforts fail us.[33]

Buber mentions the phenomenon which the Taoists see as bearing the closest relation to Tao itself: water. Water supports objects and carries them easily on its tide. But water is also the embodiment of Wu Wei, the supreme action

that flows through us; it seeks out the lowest places. Despite its accomodation, water holds a power unknown to hard and sharp things. It follows the edges of sharp stones only to turn them into smooth and rounded objects. Infinitely supple and, at the same time, decidedly strong are the forces of water, and Wu Wei as well. The man who works this way, according to the Tao Te Ching, "works without working."[34] Thus, according to Buber, Taoism depicts two ways of life: one is mere thoughtless living, the using of life until it is extinct; the other is eternal change and unity in spirit. He who is not consumed in his life but renews himself and affirms himself in change attains self-affirmation and conscious reality. Tao verifies itself, in the coming and going of all things and in the unity of eternal change. Thus it says in the Tao Te Ching, "What has no origin and continually engenders is Tao."[35] For Buber, all of this signifies one thing: that what man calls knowledge is no knowledge at all. Only the undivided man knows, for only in him is there no separation from the world.

Buber, then, certainly did pass through a mystical period in order to reach his independent relation to truth. But he is not a mystic in the common sense of the world. Later, in his interpretations of hasidism, he decreases his emphasis on ecstasy to stress the concrete, the "hallowing of the everyday." Buber affirms not the denial of the senses, but the life of Dialogue. Actually, he calls his own outlook

> an active mysticism for which the world is not an illusion from which man must turn away in order to reach true being, but the reality between God and him in which reciprocity manifests itself, the subject of his answering service of creation, destined to be redeemed through meeting of the Divine and human need; a mysticism, then, without the intermixture of principles and without the weakening of the lived multiplicity of all for the sake of a unity of all that is to be experienced. [56]

Just as Martin Buber underwent a period of mysticism which influenced his later dialogical philosophy to a great extent, so Gabriel Marcel's early influence consisted of metapsychical experimentation in the area of clairvoyance. By clairvoyance is meant a recognition in which a person perceives an object by means other than the typical five senses. It occurs spontaneously to some people as an intuition. During his writing of the Metaphysical Journal, Marcel was convinced of the reality of such a realm in which communication is carried out by clairvoyance and a mystical communion between beings. Much of his discussion on this subject has a direct bearing on his later theory of participation of the I and the Thou.

In the Metaphysical Journal Marcel explains that the body expresses an inner need to make itself felt since it posseses a psychic reality of its own. From the body, a consciousness must be extracted, but the process must not be performed in an objectified manner, like the digging out of a piece of

information, as if the body were only a mechanism. Instead, there must be a partcipation with the memory, and it is the function of the clairvoyant to participate in the memory of another human being, to inform himself of the other's recollections of the past -- thus, to be one with him:

> But I repeat we must not identify memory with a collection...to recall really means to relive.... What relation is there between my past and myself? I notice that I am the less my past, the more I treat my past as a collection of events registered or ennumerated in time, with my body serving as a link.[37]

Marcel thus portrays the clairvoyant as he who is able to recapture the past through participation in the other; he terms this experience as "trans-living." Even a dead person can become present again for a clairvoyant. The presence of Marcel's mother was thus felt by the philosopher even after her death as a "hidden polarity between the seen and the unseen."[38] The clairvoyant opens himself up to fresh suggestion. But all of this supposition is predicated upon the idea that a body is not only an object. To see into another's person is to recollect the other -- even to <u>become</u> the other, the other whose body has ontological meaning.

> I visit a clairvoyant. She describes to me people about whom I was not thinking but who really played a part in my life. What happens? These people really form part of my past-as-subject.... The clairvoyant allows herself to participate.[39]

Participation is therefore the key for Marcel, even during his early stages. If one thinks of another person as

merely a "somebody else," this person becomes only an object. But to be a clairvoyant -- to see into another -- is to recollect the other. What Marcel terms a will-to-identification is crucial for the clairvoyant. He must participate in the other person and be penetrated by him. This trans-living comes about when an interested party is at one with another in sympathetic participation. Some people are better suited for clairvoyance only because they are more willing to open themselves up to participate in the feelings of people. But each one of us possesses certain intuitive feelings; each of us can be a clairvoyant by dint of our readiness to become emotionally involved with those around us. There was a time, suggests Marcel, when it was believed that only a few persons were clairvoyant, but actually, the phenomenon is more wide-spread. When a person is withdrawn from partcipation in life, his abilities to be a medium are considerably lower; but when he is a being-with for others, then he can commune.[40] The concept of transliving, then, forms a logical bridge between Marcel's early concept of the metapsychical and his later theory of participation. The more one treats the other as a Thou, the less exterior he is. The intimacy between two people involves a trans-living that can be perceived by means other than the five bodily senses.

As is so fitting, it was a personal experience that provoked Buber to progress from the mystical stage to the hallowing of the everyday. As Friedman explains the experience in The Life of Dialogue, Buber was one day visited by a young man who was in the throes of a great dilemma: "Was he to continue to live, or to end his life in despair?"[41] Although Buber was outwardly friendly to the young man, he was not fully attentive, not "fully present." He could not bring himself to grasp the gravity of the situation, to be involved to the fullest extent. The young man later died, after which Buber gave up the "religious" -- the exception, the extraction, the ecstasy, and pursued the everyday, the fulness of every mortal.[42] Shortly thereafter, Buber proceeded to write I and Thou, which first appeared in 1923 in German. In this work, Buber concerned himself with the whole situation of man and with an infinite numer of relations. The mystical withdrawl from the everyday was now forsaken and, in fact, Buber explicitly condemned a mystical retreat in his I and Thou:

> (The Other) is not outside you, it stirs in the depths of you.... But guard against wishing to remove it into your soul -- for then you annihilate it.
>
> To step into pure relation is not to disregard everything but to see everything in the Thou, not to renounce the world but to establish it on its true basis. To look away from the world or to stare at it does not help man to reach God.[43]

When man attempts to move things into his soul, he makes them objects for himself and has no true concern for these things in themselves. Such a movement constitutes a violation of

the I-Thou relation for which Buber pleads. At the outset of I and Thou, Buber introduces the distinction between two types of relating; for man, the world is twofold , in direct accordance with the twofold nature of the primary relations: I-It and I-Thou. The I-It relation revolves around objectification and utilization, whereas the I-Thou relation concerns encounter and genuine dialogue. The I-Thou relation is characterized by directness and mutuality; the I-It relation denotes using and manipulation. This definition of man's two basic attitudes of relating is really an extension of the orientation and realization in Daniel. The subjective relation of I-It takes place within a man, while the I-Thou relation takes place between a man and the rest of the world.

> The man who experiences has not part in the world. For it is "in him" and not between him and the world that the experience arises. The world has no part in the experience.[44]

Experiencing, ordering, utilizing, objectifying, and having take place within a man; they constitute a means to an end. But when the I and the Thou are in relation, there is no goal beyond the relation itself.[45]

The reader must not be led to think, however, that the I-Thou relation of dialogue can be equated with love's emotion and feeling; feelings result from love, but they are not identical to it:

> Love itself cannot persist in the actual immediacy of relation; love endures, but in the interchange of actual and potential being.[46]

Love cannot, in Buber's terminology, be called the enjoyment of a pleasurable emotion. Love cannot even be included within the framework of empathy, for empathy is not realistic; it confuses the individual positions of two people who enter into relation:

> Empathy means, if anything, to glide with one's own feeling into the dynamic structure of an object... as it were, to trace it from within.... It means to transpose oneself.... Thus it means the exclusion of one's own concreteness, the extinguishing of the actual situation of life.[47]

Thus love is not emotion, feeling, or even empathy, so far as Buber is concerned; it is, rather, responsibility of an I for a Thou. The concept of responsibility carries with it two different senses: the will to respond to a call out of an inner felt need, or accountability to respond in such-and-such a way. Responsibility to a human being is the very highest calling; but responsibility as obligation would fall within the realm of the I-It. One person is responsible for another, not out of obligation alone, but out of a deep mutuality of interest. Responsibility is <u>between</u> the I and the Thou, and so it is expressed not in terms of feelings which accompany love, but in terms of the responsibility of an I for a Thou. He who does not realize this distinction cannot love. "The Thou," writes Buber, "meets one through grace."[48] By definition, the Thou is not that which one actively goes out and seeks. If this were the case, it would then be a goal-oriented object, and the I-Thou relation would then

be destroyed. "The Thou meets me; then I step into relation with it." Therefore, it is not within one's power to induce another person to become a Thou for him:

> The Thou meets me. But I step into direct relation with it. Hence the relation means being chosen and choosing, suffering and action in one.[49]

The meeting of dialogue is not confined to man and man: there are different spheres of relation -- man to nature, man to man, and man to the spiritual. In Daniel is mentioned the dialogical relation between man and a pine tree, and between man and a piece of mica. Similarly there are encounters of dialogue between man and animals and inanimate beings. Buber considers a tree:

> I can look on it as a picture: stiff column in a shock of light, or a splash of green shot with a delicate blue and silver of the background. I can perceive it as movement: flowing veins on clinging, pressing pith, suck of the roots, breathing of the leaves, ceaseless commerce with earth and air....[50]

The sad irony of every dialogical relationship, however, is the necessity that every Thou must later become an It. Man only needs to fill each moment with using or experiencing and the Thou is no longer. Man's decreasing power to enter into relation accounts for the fleeting nature of an I-Thou relation:

> Every Thou in the world is by its nature fated to become a thing, or continually to re-enter into the condition of things.[51]

The reader must understand that I-It relations are essential in this world; they cannot be avoided. It would be simplistic,

naive, and erroneous to believe that Buber intended us to see all I-Thou relations as "good" and positive, and all I-It relations as "evil" and negative. Both of these primary relations exist by necessity and constitute main elements in human life. The twofoldedness of these relations runs through all the world, through each person. No man is all I-Thou, and no man is so rotten that he is all I-It. We must recognize that the world of I-It is necessary if man is to live in an orderly society. "It is the exalted melancholy of our fate that every Thou must become an It."[52] An I-Thou relation cannot be sustained for more than a series of moments. But Buber issues us a strong warning about the over-acceptance of objective relationships: "Without It, man cannot live; but he who lives with It alone is not a man."[53]

While Martin Buber stresses the importance of dialogue in relations, Gabriel Marcel emphasizes much the same idea. A large extent of the material in his Metaphysical Journal is concerned with the need for participation in relationships. He claims that the idea of "je et toi" is basic to the human experience. The similarity in terminology of Marcel to that of Buber is striking:

> All spiritual life is essentially a dialogue.... The dyandic relation is what my previous enquiries I have called participation.[54]

Just as Buber insists that man must initiate a turning to his fellow human beings, so Marcel maintains the significance of dialogical relation. In the Mystery of Being, Marcel asserts

that as long as man relates at the level of a thing -- the physical object -- the encounter can only be considered as the intersection of two series. There cannot be an encounter or a meeting in the fullest sense unless there is present an inwardness. This inwardness corresponds to one of Buber's two primary relations, that of I-Thou. The distinction made by Marcel between Thou and It is not a distinction of objectivity alone; the dialogical relation described by Marcel involves a "withness"; Buber, too, had made an important distinction between relation to something and relating with something. Marcel is explicit in his Journal about I-It relations: when a person thinks of someone or something as "it" or "he" or "they" he makes a detached and objective judgment, in which the other figures are objects of thought. Other people are the objects of one's thoughts when he tries to analyze them in terms of concepts and calculations. Such a self-centered person remains incapable of responding to others. Shut up in his own world, such a person cannot sympathize or break through to other people.

Participation is of crucial significance to Marcel; to be is to participate in being. One cannot practically isolate that in which one participates from himself as a participant. He coins the neologism "communion of presence" to refer to the act of one making the Other a Thou -- a non-objectifiable presence. When there is no communion of presence, alienation results; for "when the Thou is ejected from the front door,

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the I leaves by the back." Marcel's phraseology is certainly more "folksy" than that of Buber, but his content is strikingly similar. Aside from the difference of his non-technical style, much of what they have to say is shared. Marcel also affords the reader graphic examples. It suffices for Buber to make the statement, "As I become I, I say Thou," after which there is little explication forthcoming. But when Marcel maintains that his communion of participation arises in personal response, he offers examples of encounters. For instance, he tells of the man who meets a stranger by chance on a railroad train. He engages in conversation about the weather, his final destination, and seemingly petty matters. Even while he and his companion are discussing these subjects, the companion remains only "a someone." But if the traveler is interested in striking a genuine relation, he will learn more things about his companion, and gradually, there will be the discovery of a hidden tie. "Exterior communication" (of an I-It level) will give way to the communion of presence. For Marcel, it is the presence of the Thou that makes a very singular I. One cannot be present by himself, for if he withdraws from the

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"living tissue of communion," he ceases to be a real person. Only when one addresses another person as a Thou is he <u>with</u> him -- not just juxtaposed <u>to</u> him.

It stands to reason, then, one cannot say of every encounter that it represents a communion of presence. It is more often the exception than the rule today that persons encounter each other as persons. Someone can accompany another person in a room, for example, and still not be present.

It is not necessarily physical communication that is lacking; the person may understand the words of the other, but not the other himself. This constitutes "communication without communication." Thus, presence signifies something more than just being in proximity; it means to become a being with others -- not only alongside others. Aside from the term "communion of presence," Marcel also employs the word synidesis to indicate a withdrawl from the outward, fragmented experience of the routine into a deep and reflected experience of participation in being. It is the corresponding term to Buber's genuine dialogue, as is Marcel's concept of "transcendence," which means "going beyond," in its simplest form..But there are various ways of going beyond, as Marcel points out. There is going beyond in space, as the explorer does on some surface. But in Marcel's limited defintion, transcending indicates that man should have no difficulty in putting himself in the place of someone else. A true transcendence is grasped through an intimate, lived experience. We often think of experience as a sort of "given," more or less shapeless substance. But experience is not an object. Not only does the word transcendent not mean transcending experience but on the contrary, there must exist the possibility of having the experience of transcending.

A typical example of experience in the narrow sense would be tasting. In such a case, experience seems to be linked to the presence of something for me, and in me, and we can interpret it as the ingestion of something. But it is clear that this ingesting is not part of the essence of the experience.

Real experience is not so much absorbing into oneself as it is straining oneself toward something. It goes far beyond the domain of the senses. However, the inner need for transcendence should never be interpreted as the need to pass beyond all experience. For beyond all experience there is nothing. Transcendence is really concerned with the inner self-transformation that can take place within a relationship. As an example, consider a husband who has begun to think of his wife in relation to himself, in relationship to the sensuous enjoyments she can give him, or even simply in relation to the service she can give him as an unpaid cook! Let us suppose that he is gradually led into discovering that this woman has a reality and a value of her own. Then he comes to treat her as a person in her own right. Such a man is witnessing a change in the mode of experience. The progress of this husband's thought substitutes his own center for another. He is beginning to feel an urgent inner need for transcendence.[57]

Other concrete examples are plenteous in the works of Marcel. Tales of misfortune and of the illnesses of others often allow man to transcend and enter into the realm of communion. Frequently man cannot respond to others under normal conditions; but, says Marcel, let him open a letter from a friend one thousand miles away telling him that he has been struck down by some degenerative disease, and --all at once -- he is <u>with</u> him. As has been noted previously, Marcel worked during World War One with the Red Cross Rescue Squad, and there he learned the meaning of true transcendence. To

feel the pain of another is to be with him, in dialogical communion. Marcel explains that true communion does not have to be expressed in speech. It may occur silently, no sound need be uttered. Marcel imagines two men sitting beside one another, speechless. They are unable to communicate until, suddenly, the world of dialogue began to spring forth for them. And so, Marcel moves quite close to Buber's thinking in I and Thou, using much of the same terminology. Of central significance to both thinkers are the ideas of participation, dialogue, and inward-turning over against detached and objec-give judgment. Genuine relation requires withness and response by a Thou who is present when he gives himself over to the other.

Despite the numerous similarities in the I-Thou philosophies of Buber and Marcel, there are some notable differences. In his Metaphysical Journal, Marcel restricts his examples of dialogue and communion of participation to human relationships. Writing on Marcel's view of relation, John B. O'Malley explains in his Fellowship of Being[58] that the existent cannot effectively be detached from his existing, as an animal would be. An animal can thus never emerge in the "toi" relation which is at the heart of genuine dialogue. Marcel therefore ascribes to animals a diminished sense of dialogue in accordance with their lesser degree of participating. It would seem that he is attempting to both affirm and deny, at the same time, the validity of a relation of participation with animals because of their limited awareness of their existence. But awareness is an I-It word in itself! In reality, the distinction made between Thou and It by Marcel is not a distinction marked merely by the difference of "people" and "things." It is the difference between two modalities of relating. This is exactly what Buber presents in the opening pages of I and Thou: "To man the word is twofold, according to his attitude."[59] One may opt for the I-Thou relation or the I-It relation towards things; or, one may opt for the I-Thou attitude or the I-It attitude toward people. Cain maintains that Marcel is not as clear about this (distinction) as is Buber in his I and Thou; yet I believe he reiterates exactly the feelings of Buber on the matter. Granted, Marcel does not assert that man may relate to a piece of mica or the like in an I-Thou fashion; but he does allude to the fact that

one can relate to an animal, not as something that is owned, but as something whose presence is deeply felt.

At no time does Martin Buber deny in the least way the legitimacy of an animal in relation. Hisacknowledgment has already been demonstrated in the account of "The Horse," in which his pet horse takes the role of Thou for him:

> When I stroked his mighty mane.... and felt the life beneath my hand, it was as though the element of vitality itself bordered on my skin -- something that was not I, was certainly not akin to me, palpably the other.
>
> The horse very gently raised his massive head, ears twitching, then snorted quietly, as a conspirator gives a signal meant to be recognizable only by his fellow-conspirator; and I was approved. [60]

It is true that animals do not have the gift of speech; but Buber has consistently played down the role of speaking anyway! Silence is the best medium for pure dialogue, particularly in the case of relation with an animal:

> Sometimes I look into a cat's eyes. The domesticated animal has not, as it were, received from us the gift of truly "speaking," but only -- at the price of its primitive disinterestedness -- the capacity to turn its glance to us prodigious beings....The beginning of this cat's glance, lighting up under the touch of my glance, indisputedly questioned me: "Is it possible you really think of me?" [61]

Thus the point is made that animals do not require speech, for they have sounds and gestures; their eyes and their glance are their language. In his postscript to I and Thou, Buber answers several questions formulated by his readers, one of which deals

with relations between humans and animals or inanimate objects. If the I-Thou relation necessitates a mutually-shared experience, how can there exist a true reciprocity? It is understandable, Buber explains, that a man can set himself up through love for a genuine relationship with an animal. But the animal is not, like the man, twofold. Yet Buber maintains that there is a latent twofoldedness involved. A plant cannot react to a person's attitude toward it; yet there is a "pre-threshold reciprocity" --the verge of mutuality on the non-human level.[62] This explanation applies not only to animals, but also to objects like works of art. In I and Thou Buber recounts how an artist is faced by a form which seeks to be shaped by him into a work of art; the marble tells his sculptor to make it into a form:

> This form is no offspring of his soul, but it is an appearance which steps up to it and demands of it the effective power.[63]

The artist can neither experience nor explain the form which meets him, yet he beholds it as a Thou --and it demands to be made a Thou for him. Thus Buber explains dialogue with non-humans in terms of a latent I-Thou relationship defined by a pre-threshold mutuality.

Both philosophers posit the existence of a supreme Thou--for Buber, the "Eternal Thou"; and for Marcel, the "Absolute Thou." There can be the realization of I-Thou dialogue only through a relation with the supreme Thou. Therefore, every

relationship into which man enters is grounded in an overriding relation to God. Buber offers no theological implications of God. His interest lies in approaching God, not defining Him, since a definition would by necessity entail an I-It relation. Buber relates how

> the first myths were hymns of praise. Then the names took refuge in the language of It. Men were more and more strongly moved to think of and to address their eternal Thou as an It.[64]

And so Buber does not concern himself with an accounting of God's acts, His strengths and weaknesses, His omniscience, or His characteristics. By doing so, he would be making God into an objectified It. A knowledge on man's part of these elements would not give way to dialogical encounter with God. Prescriptions for God are anathema to Buber. God cannot be located spatially or temporally for Buber in any way. Nor can man seek God out actively, either: "It is foolish to seek God, for there is nothing in which God cannot be found!"[65] One misses the mark when he turns aside from the course of life to find God.

To consciously seek the supreme Thou through mystical means will also culminate in failure, and for this reason, Buber ultimately denied himself mysticism. Most eastern mystics alienate themselves from the world in search of God; mysticism is grounded in ascesis.[66] Man is faced with the alternative of choosing between the world on one hand, and God on the other. But Buber is adamant when he maintains that man does not have to

forsake the world in order to reach the Eternal Thou; on the contrary, the world is not something to be abandoned. The man who goes out to meet the world and hallows the world will meet and hallow God.[67] There is no life in the world that can separate man from the Eternal God:

> If you explore the life of things and of conditioned being you come to the unfathomable, if you deny the life of things and of conditioned being you stand before nothingness, if you hallow this life, you meet the living God.[68]

If man is to step into genuine dialogue, he cannot deny what lies before him in the world; he cannot renounce the people with whom he co-exists. To deny the world, as a mystic would do, cannot result in an I-Thou relation with God. If, then, a person cannot relate to the Eternal Thou as a mystic, or even by actively seeking Him --how can he reach God? The answer is defined explicitly by Buber in I and Thou. God is to be found in the world. When a man is prepared and willing to abandon the world of I-It, when he is ready to relinquish his ways of "having" and of "using," then he can enter into relation with the Eternal Thou. But, stresses Buber, such a relationship with God is a relationship different only in degree from any other I-Thou dialogue:

> In every sphere in its own way, through each process of becoming that is present to us, we look out toward the fringe of the eternal Thou; in each we are aware of the breath from the eternal Thou; in each Thou we address the eternal Thou.[69]

This is why, for Buber, he who meets the world will meet God.

For all relationships are grounded in a relation with God. Every time a person enters into an I-Thou relation in the world, he approaches, at the very same time, a genuine relation with the Eternal Thou. "Every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou; by means of every particular Thou the primary word addresses the eternal Thou."[70] Man finds in all living things the supreme Thou, even though he may not be aware of his relating to Him in his everyday encounters.

In his Mystery of Being, Marcel mentions a supra-empirical appeal sent by man beyond the limits of experience toward the One who can only be called an absolute Thou. But he warns that man can only address God in the presence of faith. To view the absolute Thou as an objective truth is not to relate at all, but to return to the world of It:

> When we speak of God we should realize that it is not of God that we are speaking.... For this appeal to God has no meaning and value unless it is accompanied by emotion. I belong to God, but I ought to give myself to Him, to turn myself toward Him.[71]

This "turning to" the absolute Thou of Marcel is commensurate with Buber's turning to the eternal Thou, and can be accomplished in much the same manner as Buber has prescribed: when man enters into relation with other beings, he also becomes a Thou for God at the same moment. Even though Marcel does not suggest I-Thou relations with animals and inanimate objects, it is evident that for him, when man embraces the Other, he also embraces God. For Marcel, as for Buber, to ask about the

conditions under which God becomes a Thou for man would be contradictory; to actively see God would yield no relation except that of I-It. Once man has singled out his search for God, he has objectified Him. But if he affirms other people and enters into dialogue, then he shall find God, also.

While for Buber the I-Thou relation in the world (far more than prayer) is the best means of establishing dialogue with the eternal Thou, Marcel holds prayer in higher esteem. He cautions people not to envisage prayer as a pragmatic technique, however, for this would turn the Thou into an It. Prayer signifies the negation of experience and the rejection of passivity and so leads to an affirmation of the mutuality of the I-Thou relation that is possible between man and God.[72] But once man begins to inquire about his prayer--once he begins to seek an immediate and definitive response from God-- he transforms the prayer to the realm of I-It, and the prayer is no longer a genuine prayer:

> Prayer precisely involves a refusal to think of God as an it. If I ask myself what in practice is God's attitude regarding my prayer I convert my prayer into an object and I set myself outside the sphere of invocation. If I ask myself whether my prayer has in fact been heard it is no longer a <u>prayer</u> that I am thinking-- I am only thinking of a step I have taken.[73]

Only if man's prayer is free and spontaneous can he enter into relation with the absolute Thou. Buber similarly admonishes the man who is overly conscious of his prayer -- "overconscious <u>that</u> he is praying... that <u>he</u> is praying -- a consciousness that is likely to break the bond of the mutuality that is between

the I and the eternal Thou. Just as one cannot actively seek out the I-Thou relation, so, too, one cannot aim at undertaking prayer with some understood purpose other than turning to God and asking for His presence in relation. But prayer, in general, is not so important to Buber as to Marcel; or at least Buber views individual prayer within the framework of the I-Thou experience itself.

The problem of evil takes its toll for Buber in the form of his metaphor of "The Eclipse of God," and for Marcel in the form of his image of "The Broken World." Although these two thinkers do not assess evil in the same manner as many of the classical philosophers (i.e., they do not view good and evil as either irreconcilable opposites or two forms of the same entity) they view evil as a force to be reckoned with by very real and accessible means. Evil is viewed by them in terms of their own operational definitions: for both Marcel and Buber, it is genuine dialogue that makes man participate actively in life. To fail to enter into relation leaves man empty and unfulfilled -- and such a failure constitutes evil. An absence of genuine relation and subsequent lack of direction are by-products of living predominantly in the world of I-It. The person who cannot stake a claim in the communion of participation has lost his direction and freedom; he cannot say "Thou" to his fellowman and therefore cannot relate to an absolute Thou.

Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel have expressed their sentiment that our world today is characterized by so much of the evil (which they have explained in their operational definitions) that relation is becoming increasingly difficult. The absence of the ability to direct oneself to others must be followed by inability to relate to God since it has already been established by both philosophers that in every relation whereby man relates to another Thou, he will also look toward the fringe of the eternal Thou. The eternal Thou is the ground of all dialogical relation.

In his book Eclipse of God, Buber relates what happens to man when he loses confidence in his ability to relate to humanity. Nietzsche had made the proclamation several years before that "God is dead." In 1882, he had written The Joyful Wisdom,[74] describing a man who, during his afternoon walks, searched the courtyard with a lantern in hand, looking for God. Nietzsche therein proclaimed the demise of the eternal Thou, a demise that was to result in man's inability to relate. But Buber took exception with such philosophers who considered God to be an idea that is no more relevant; for God is more than an idea; in fact, He must not become an object for us. Buber claims that God has always remained open to man, but man has shut Him out by destroying the structure of the I-Thou relation. So much has he gravitated toward the mode of orientation that he suffers from "an eclipse of God." This, of course, does not indicate that God is hiding Himself from man, as many philosophers might contend. In his metaphor, Buber attempts to imply that during an eclipse of the sun, the moon moves between the sun and the earth for a period of time, so that the direct cause of the eclipse is really neither the sun nor the earth, rather a body in between. And similarly, nothing has happened to God Himself to cause the eclipse. Nor has anything happened to man, in a matter of speaking. Rather, something has come between God and man: that something is the predominance of the I-It relation which has succeeded in eclipsing God from man. God has not absented Himself from man, and certainly, God is not dead. Instead, the I-It relation

has come between man and God. To use the symbol of Buber's metaphor of eclipse, the I-It relation has become tremendously swollen, shutting off light from God:

> Eclipse of the light of heaven, eclipse of God -- such indeed is the character of the historic hour through which the world is passing.... An eclipse of the sun is something that occurs between the sun and our eyes, not in the sun itself.[75]

And so it is not that God does not exist; our modes of thought have eclipsed Him, blocking our way to Him. Fortunately, an eclipse endures only for a certain period of time; and since man has the power to overcome the multitude of I-It experiences responsible for the eclipse, all hope is not lost. When man decides to renew his dialogue with others, then immediacy will again be established with the eternal Thou. Although the realm of I-Thou has been jeopardized, tomorrow holds promise for new relation -- if man does not resign himself to It.

While Martin Buber employs the metaphor of an eclipse of God, Gabriel Marcel has devised his own image of the "broken world" to describe the plight of people who have made themselves victims of withdrawl from the absolute Thou. The image itself is drawn from the speech of one of his characters in the play, "The Broken World."

> Don't you feel sometimes that we are living... if you can call it living... in a broken world? Yes, broken, like a broken watch. The mainspring has stopped working. Just to look at it nothing has changed. Everything is in its place. But put the watch to your ear and you don't hear any ticking. You know what I'm

> talking about, the world, what we call
> the world, the world of human creatures...
> it seems to me it must have had a heart
> at one time, but today, you would say that
> the heart has stopped beating....[16]

This passage is delivered by Christiane, the central character of the play, a woman who deplores the meaningless life of her empty world. She tumbles into aimless relationships despite her hopeless attempts to enter the real world of I-Thou relation. She suffers from a genuine communication-gap with others, without the possibility of communion of participation. Although Christiane appears, at a cursory glance, to be a vivacious and happy woman, she has been swept through life by a series of meaningless relationships. Her husband is a boring government worker whom she married not out of love, but out of any other choice being non-existant. Intellectually, she is far superior to him, and inasmuch as she receives more admiration and attention from others than does he, there is a great amount of resentment and misunderstanding between the two of them. Christiane comes to the inevitable conclusion that their lives have been false, their loves have been false, and that their whole relationship has been constituted by aimless waste and lack of satisfaction. Although Christiane is fashionable and intellectually gifted, she is unable to be in touch with others. The protrayal of false love and a fake life in "The Broken World" served Marcel as a basis for his broader conception of the "broken world" which runs throughout much of his work. The phrase signifies members of a society who lead a meaningless existence in a world without a sense of community and inner

meaning. Each person goes about his daily affairs with only himself in mind, with no concern for the other, with no desire for genuine encounter.[77] The broken world is a world which reflects the anguish of division sensed by the character Christiane, who has no hope of rediscovering her absolute Thou. For Marcel, this broken unity is reflected in many crucial areas of life today, that are to be discussed in the following chapters.

Marcel maintains that we uphold too much today the traditional means of inadequate teaching which discourages a genuine interest in subject matter and in learning for learning's sake. In his Mystery of Being, he cites the gross image of the character Mr. Gradgrind of Hard Times, who is insistent upon treating each of his pupils as a container capable of holding worthless tautologies.[78] Marcel deplores such a methodology and the fact that many of our modern-day educational systems have something in common with Gradgrindism. He detests the history or mathematics teacher who is dogged about jamming dates and formulae into his student, to the extent that the mental process has not been stimulated to any significant degree. The student is merely asked to regurgitate useless information in a mechanical manner. Thus Marcel views this type of student as having been converted into a vessel, into which fluid is poured in and out once again. Marcel himself suffered negative educational experiences when he was young, and his distain is herein reflected. While dates were being crammed into his head, he yearned for content to grasp with his intelligence; he hoped for a teacher who might ask him to explain, to amplify, and to question, rather than to force-feed him worthless facts. Mr. Gradgrind attempted to reduce the concept of education to pure technique and manipulation, but education cannot be contained in a vessel. The teacher must include his pupil in the educational process of learning if he is to succeed in helping him to undergo a worthwhile experience -- not to just din back

dates like a machine. Marcel yearns for dialogue in education, and on this particular issue comes very close to the educational philosophy of Buber.

In his essays on education, Buber drives home the idea that all real living is meeting for the modern man with modern educational problems. In describing dialogue, he examines a concept only subtly treated in I and Thou: inclusion, the act of being able to confront the other in his uniqueness, not just in the realm of experience. Buber considers the relationship between teacher and student as a particularly lucid example of that mutuality which must be an integral part of each genuine relationship. The teacher's task is to educate his students; however, if he is a true teacher, he will be educated by them, as they are by him.

Buber defines education as a conscious selection by man of the effective world. The teacher must set himself up as the embodiment of the world from which the student can draw his experience. Any tendencies to dominate and enjoy the pupil the teacher must overcome, for herein lies a threat to the development of the student. By establishing a true mutuality between himself and his students, a teacher is able to educate them, but he must experience them from the other side:

> If he has really gathered the children into his life then that subterranean dialogic, that steady potential presence of the one to the other is established and endures. Then there is reality between them, there is mutuality.[79]

Buber's concept of inclusiveness is directly connected to the dialogic relation, for it is necessary that the teacher does see the other's position, while at the same time not losing sight of his own.

Outlined in his essays in education are two theories of learning which Buber scorns: the traditional and so-called modern theories:

> Modern educational theory, which is characterized by tendencies to freedom, misunderstands education just as the old theory, which was characterized by the habit of authority. The symbol of the funnel is being exchanged by the symbol of the pump.[80]

The effective teacher, then, is not the one who pours information into the student's mind --as if it were a funnel--or not the one who feels that all that need be done is to pump out the information that is already stored there. Conversely, the true teacher maintains a mutual trust by experiencing both sides and by aiding the student in selection of the effective world. Only the philosophy of dialogue illustrates how a student grows through his encounter with a teacher, or with the Thou of an author. The reality comes alive for the student -- transformed from a potential to the immediacy of a dialogical relationship wherein the student discovers the other side.[81]

Buber introduces two basic modes of influencing the minds of students: one can impose ideas on the minds of others, or can discover and foster what one infers to be the right direction in the soul of the other. By means of a contrast between propaganda-- where a man imposes his will on others-- and the work of education--where the teacher unfolds what is in the pupil--

Buber illustrates the applicability of entering into dialogue with the other. Man's being is thus composed of mutuality without imposition:

> It is the unfolding function between men, the help given for man's growth as a self, the support given to another for the self-realization of humanity in accordance with its creation, which leads the interhuman to its height.[82]

There is one hitch to the student-teacher mutuality, though this problem is easily resolved. The student-teacher cannot be simply reciprocal. From the side of the teacher there is certainly a real inclusion of the student in his entire being; but from the side of the pupil the relation can definitely not be inclusive. Buber speaks of the situation as a "one-sided inclusion" as he asserts:

> No other relation draws its inner life like this... completely directed to one-sidedness... and inclusion cannot be mutual in this case. The teacher experiences the pupil being educated, but the student cannot experience the educating of the educator. The educator stands at both ends (underline mine) of the situation, the pupil only at one end.[83]

What Buber calls the teacher's raising of the finer and the questioning glance are definite signs of that one-sidedness. The inclusiveness must be largely one-sided, for if the student were to see the teacher's point of view, the teaching relationship would ultimately be destroyed. Buber resolves this paradox in his postscript to I and Thou:

> But however much depends on the teacher's awakening the I-Thou relationship in the pupil as well --and however much depends

> on the pupil, too, meaning and affirming him as the particular person he is-- the special educative relation could not persist if the pupil for his part practised inclusion, if he lived the teacher's part in the common situation. [84]

Thus, even in this limited, one-sided relation, the experiencing of the other side is of crucial importance. Inclusiveness --even when necessarily one-sided-- is the complete realization of the person.[85]

What Buber has been saying about education applies, in addition, to the education of character, for as Friedman points out in The Life of Dialogue, man must learn to accept responsibility for all that he meets.[86] True education --education of character-- concerns itself not only with individual function, but also with the entire person as he relates to the world. Only in his entire being can man enter into the realm of I-Thou. Friedman presents a paradigm of Buber's concept of education of character as it applies to his ideas on adult education. Buber envisions adult education not merely as a continuation of university life, but as the creating of a special type of person within the framework of an historical situation. In Israel today, for example, a basic aim is the integration to one whole of the culturally different people who have immigrated there. The teachers Buber trained to meet this demand were concerned basically with personal contact derived from living together in a community. He attempted to achieve reciprocal conversation with full participation from both

sides. When a student asks a question of a teacher, his reply should stem from his own personal experience.

The philosophy of dialogue certainly does play a significant role in Buber's conception of education. Education can be a fulfillment -- if it is a dialogue. There exist today many modes of educating which can be classified as I-It modes-- "imposing and pumping." Sometimes, there is a time and a place for such methodology; but at the same time, we are obliged to act upon Buber's educational challenge.

Alleged technological progress and propaganda are targets of Marcel's attack, as he holds them responsible in part for a lack of dialogue in the world today. In his continued attempt to define the image of the Broken World, he proceeds to explain that the world in which we live today is at war with itself. Modern society pays a high price for its so-called amazing progress which constitutes a dangerous new power. In Homo Viator, Marcel contends that the transformation of the material conditions of life effected by the industrial revolution has resulted in distance between people; relationships have been severly damaged. Standardization of individuals accompanies a world in which men strive to be machines, ignoring their conditions as living human beings.[87] Man is so wrapped up in his pursuit of power that he no longer is capable of feeling passion for another. Automation has reached the point at which the world is nothing but a heap of fragments, as explained in Nietzsche's The Will to Power:

> Do you know what the world is for me? Would you like me to show you it in my mirror? The world, a monster of energy, without beginning or end: a fixed sum of energy as hard as bronze....[88]

Technical equipment and mechanization have rendered our world both broken and heartless -- discredited, devalued, and sterile. Marcel describes modern man as being pushed about, ticketed, docketed, labeled, and stripped of the identity of a person who needs to relate:

> It is all too clear that the state of universal continuous registration and enrollment, from birth to death, to which I have already alluded, can only be brought into being in the bosom of bureaucracy.... One cannot avoid, at this point, bringing in the familiar metaphor of the machine.[89]

It is in Men Against Humanity that Marcel expounds about technical progress as indifferent to moral value. The effect of technical progress upon man is the substitution of satisfaction at a material level for other types of more basic satisfaction of an inner and spiritual nature.[90] There is a spiritual sterility about mechanical apparatus, with the result that the scope of human life is very much diminished:

> Between mechanical apparatus and its possessor there cannot be established that living, that almost latently spiritual relationship that exists, for instance, between a small-holder and his piece of land: that exists here, because the very notion of the cultivation of the ground implies the notion of an extra-ordinary exchange.[91]

Marcel's denigration of extreme technical advancement is grounded in his hope for a return to the spiritual realm-- to the mutual exchange of dialogue between the I and the Thou. For Marcel, the communion of persons qua persons-- not machines-- is the essential means by which one fulfills himself as a human being. One affirms his being by participation in a society of people and by mutual creativity. It is for this reason alone that Marcel is suspicious of mass movements and mass technical advancements which contribute to our Broken World. The collectivized world in which man now lives lacks close human

relationships and the intimate quality of close neighbors, friends, and families. As a result of mass technology, many individuals have lost the intimate quality of life. Instead, they have become agents who are dutybound to contribute to a societal whole. It is not only technology which Marcel decries, but also the force of propaganda, which serves as its end. In speaking of degradation, Marcel comares the effects of Hitlerism to those of propaganda. The Germans, he explains, sought every available means to degrade the Jews. Hitler condemned them to perish in their own dirt, to drown in their own excrements. The era of Hitler is over, but one of the major techniques of degradation --propaganda-- is still being utilized. Marcel feels that propaganda in itself need not be degrading, for there was a time when propaganda had a secondary role that was not corruptible. But today it has become an end by which men lose their capacity to make decisions for themselves or to react as individuals:

> In all propaganda, of course, it is very difficult to draw a strict line between what is legitimate, and what is not; but it is obvious, for instance, that the bigger a part money plays in this sort of activity, the more the activity falls under suspicion.... Propaganda does not aim at degrading those on whom it has an effect. But this is true only up to a point. 92

In short, there is really no propaganda at present which does not manipulate the will and conscience of other men, and therefore, it is degrading to those people on whom it has influence. Such propaganda stands as a threat to the establishing of mutuality between men and to a collective society in general.

In "Society and the State," Buber concurs with much of what Marcel maintains about technology, political propaganda, and the perilous situation of society today. Perhaps his greatest contributions lie in his articles on social philosophy and on problems of community and government. Modern man, according to Buber, finds it difficult to achieve direct relation with his fellow men as members of the community. Some scholars have maintained that it is necessary to change society first to attain direct relation; they feel that this change in itself will produce an immanent change in the individual. But others claim that we must begin with the individual, and that a change in the individual will result in a new pattern of societies. Martin Buber, however, feels that he must reject both theories, because what man must <u>really</u> achieve is relation between man and man. We have discussed in depth the I-Thou relation between man and man, but here Buber speaks of the <u>we</u> relation of the community. Relation is the basis for personal integration and for the transformation of a society. For Buber, both the individual and the society exist as reality, but they are derived from the basic reality of the meeting between men. Thus the terms "individual" and "society" are both abstractions:

> The individual is a fact only so far as he steps into a living relation with other individuals. The aggregate is a fact only so far as it is built of living units of relation.[93]

The essential <u>we</u> corresponds to society as the term <u>Thou</u> refers to the level of self-being. The <u>we</u> relation comes about only

when individual people have come together in essential relation. Only people who can address each other as Thou can say we with one another, thus escaping from the impersonal nature of a group.[94] As Buber maintains in Between Man and Man, man cannot separate himself but rather must bind himself in genuine relation.

Of primary significance to Buber is the distinction between social and political principles and the ultimate need for transforming the political realm into a social one. In "Society and the State,"[95] he cites the well-known chapter in Plato's Politeia, where Plato begins by tracing the origin of the polis directly from the primaeval social fact. He suddenly finds the population split into two political sections: those who give orders, and those who obey them. Immediately we see a distinction between society and the state, and for Buber, the distinction is clear. The social principle denotes the dialogical, while the political principle indicates the ordered world of It. Buber advises a restructuring of society, since capitalism does not lend itself to an organic community. He claims that Marxist socialism is not a valid solution to the problem of poverty, since its method of centralization cannot possibly culminate in the desired end of freedom. Furthermore, Marx subordinates the formation of a new social system to a political action. And so far as Buber is concerned, the social principle must be raised above the political, so that the reality of the community can be realized. But just as the world of It is essential to life and cannot be avoided, so there is no form of social

activity that cannot become political. Social forms and state institutions are both valid principles:

> It is essential, however, that we recognize the structural difference between the two spheres in regard to the relationship between unity and multiformity.[96]

Buber describes socialism based on political principles as starting from the top with an abstract and uniform political order. Conversely, he describes socialism based on the social principle as starting at the bottom and discovering the elements of genuine community which are capable of development.

Buber thus advocates the necessity of a radical alteration of the relationship between social and political facets of life. He points out in Paths in Utopia that the state must cease to be a machina machinarum which destroys individuality and must instead become a comunitas communitatum which will unite communities among themselves. "The social vitality of a nation, " writes Buber, "and its cultural unity and independence as well, depend very largely on the degree of its social spontaneity."[97] What Buber means is simply that there is great danger when the political principle is stronger than the social principle. He coins the phrase "political surplus" to indicate the difference between the strength of the social and political principles. Such a surplus can be explained in terms of administration and government:

> By administration we mean a capacity for making dispositions which is limited by

> the available technical facilities and recognized in practice within those limits. When it oversteps its limits it seals its own doom. By government we understand a non-technical body; this signifies that, in the event of certain changes in the situation, the limits are extended and even wiped out.[98]

The excess in the capacity for making dispositions beyond that required by given conditions is what Buber understands as political power and the measure of this power-excess is called "political surplus."

The real way for society to prepare for improving the relations between itself and the political principle is social education. As Friedman describes it, social education developes spontaneity of fellowship which is harmonious with personal development. For a society to revolt against political surplus and the accumulation of power, this society itself must have overcome its internal conflicts. "Society and the State" explains that the answer to prepare the ground for improving relations is education -- the education of a generation with a social outlook and a social will:

> Education is the great implement which is more or less under the control of society; society, however, does not know how to utilize it. Social education is the reverse of political propaganda. [99]

The propaganda that Buber here describes seeks to suggest a ready-made will to citizens (this is similar to the pump-imposition analogy found in "Education.") Social education seeks to arouse and to develop -- not to impose-- spontaneity

of fellowship. We must overthrow the political trend that now dominates education throughout the world. Buber is not advocating decentralization, but rather the greatest amount of decentralization needed to maintain unity. Nor does he suggest that this social restructuring will stem from revolution or political change, but rather from social education. The domination of the political principle must be corrected from below by people who understand that we must free ourselves from purely political thought which has no bearing on the long-term problems of modern social life.

But Buber's answers are not found solely in "Society and the State," for he approaches an even more profound question in "Hope for this Hour." Here, he suggests that faith in dialogue may be the only real answer to the hatred of one political party for another. Yet we cannot hope to achieve true dialogue if we think in terms of dialogue between political parties, or even between states, or between nations. Instead, we must speak of dialogue between peoples, between trusted leaders, between social communities. Overall, adds Buber, there will be hope when we eliminate the hostile mistrust which divides the world:

> Nothing stands so much in the way of the rise of civilisation of Dialogue as the demonic power of mistrust. What does it help to induce the other to speak if basically one puts no faith in what he says? [100]

Which will prove itself to be stronger in the end --man's common trust of existence, or mutual mistrust? Buber writes that the real "hope for this hour" depends on the hopers themselves--

upon those who feel most deeply the sickness of our age.[101] The hope depends ultimately upon the renewal of the dialogical relation between men -- upon man's ability to say "Thou." The representatives of humanity realize that the world will not meet its end if men will affirm the existing other.

Aside from the correspondence between Buber's philosophy of I-Thou and Marcel's communion of participation, there is also a close parallel between Buber's concept of the Interhuman and Marcel's formulation of Intersubjectivity. In his "Elements of the Interhuman," Buber laments that in modern times the personal relation is being suppressed in favor of the purely collective element.[102] Men too often feel themselves carried away by collectivity, with the result that relations between man and man are on the wane. It is the personal element that is most significant for the Interhuman; in relation, one must become aware of the other in such a way that he does not manipulate him or objectify him. He must become a partner in a mutual event. Buber indicates that the Interhuman signifies much more than mere sympathy for the other; one must confront the other to establish genuine dialogue. For example, two strangers in a crowded streetcar might exchange cursory glances, then retreat to the state of wishing to have nothing to do with each other. But they might also be aware of each other and participate in some shared interest. There may be established a directness between them, whereby each confirms the other: a familiar smile, a common intention, or a shared goal -- any of these might indicate a state of dialogical conversation, or even a shared silence. But the participation of <u>both</u> partners is indispensible, since the sphere of the Interhuman results from a mutual unfolding.

Buber discusses two main obstacles to the establishing of the Interhuman: seeming and imposition.[103] People, he explains,

are too often concerned with the impression that they are making on others. In relating an example of two men --call them Peter and Paul-- Buber demonstrates that there is Peter as he wishes to appear to Paul, and Paul as he wishes to appear to Peter. Then there is Paul's image of Peter (which undoubtedly falls short of Peter's hopes). With all of this seeming, appearing, and shamming, there is no potential for Interhuman life:

> Whatever the meaning of the word "truth" may be in other realms, in the Interhuman realm it means that men communicate themselves to one another as what they are. (underline mine) It does not depend on one saying to the other everything that occurs to him, but only on his letting no seeming creep in between himself and the other.[104]

The realm of the Interhuman implies a necessary authenticity without which there can be no true dialogue. The problem lies in the fact that people generally do not speak to one another; they prefer to be heard than to listen. This, Buber feels, is the clearest expression of our modern plight. Man would do better to regard his partner as the one that he is, thereby allotting him his ontic status.

In addition to comparing mere seeming to real being, Buber draws a contrast between imposition and unfolding. When one utilizes propaganda, he attempts to impose his ideas and his opinions on others. The propagandist that Buber depicts evidences no concern at all for the person whom he is trying to influence. What matters for him is only the net effect of

exploitation. The propagandist occupies himself only with functions and results, with no concern for the individual and the personal. But man's true being exists without imposition. We have seen how, in education especially, a person can be a helper of the actualizing forces of life, how he can further the soul of the other:

> The educator whom I have in mind lives in a world of individuals, a certain number of whom are always at any one time committed to his care. He sees each of these individuals as in a position to become a unique, single person, and thus the bearer of a special task of existence which can be fulfilled through him and through him alone.[105]

The unfolding between men is the mark of the Interhuman, over and against both imposition and seeming.

Marcel has developed the term Intersubjectivity which corresponds to Buber's conception of the Interhuman. He calls Intersubjectivity the realm of existence to which the preposition <u>with</u> properly applies. One must beware, however; for the level represented by the word <u>with</u> could be a degenerated level. For example, passengers can be <u>with</u> one another on a train, even though they might not know one another nor care about one another. But when Marcel speaks of Intersubjectivity, he is indicating a relation of withness that is binding, not detached. He offers as examples conditions of true companionship created in the army during the war between fighting soldiers or prisoners in camps.[106] From the common cement formed by

shared intense experience derives Intersubjectivity. One of Marcel's favorite examples is the unknown person who comes up at a party to say a word or two to a shy person in order to put him at ease. The young man may not enter into relation with the person because he is on the defensive. "Why," he might ask, "is this stranger interested in me? Why is he speaking with me? What benefit could I possible be to him?" Therefore, because the young man is on the defensive and because he is suspicious of a genuine encounter, he is really not <u>with</u> the man in terms of Intersubjectivity. He is <u>with</u> him only in the sense that a chair alongside a table is said to be <u>with</u> the table. But let us suppose, suggests Marcel, that this same young man ceases to be suspicious and loosens up; Intersubjectivity breaks through, and the magical power of a reassuring voice or smile leads to a communion.[107] But in so many cases, a person might be reticent to invoke the Thou! Consider Marcel's example of a person lost who approaches a stranger on the street to ask, "Can you tell me how to get to such-and-such a place?" In this instance, it might be tempting to make of this person merely a convenience. If Intersubjectivity breaks through, the lost person may lay his cards on the table in a genuine manner: "Look, my friend, I've lost my bearings, it's late; I would like to appeal to you as a brother, so that I won't have to walk through dangerous streets for hours." In such a case the man will almost surely want to help. Therefore, disposability and engagement are key factors in the establishing of Intersubjectivity. These are capacities by which man can be open to fellow human beings,

to give without hesitation. Indisposability is characterized by holding back, by self-preoccupation, and by a refusal to consider anyone but the self.

In his work Homo Viator, Marcel attempts to explain the psychological implications of modern-day lack of Intersubjectivity.[108] Too many people, he insists, have been taken over by their egos; even the swollen ego of a child may be carried into the adult world. We often take note of how a child will paint a drawing, come home from school, and exclaim, "I did it, I drew it all by myself!" But quite often adults so the same sort of thing for appreciation and attention and for the preservation of their own egos. They close themselves off to others because their concern is chiefly with themselves--with what they have done, with how they have accomplished some feat or another, with how they ought to be the recipient of attention and recognition. It is no wonder, asserts Marcel, that many people have lost the desire to enter into communion of participation and to open the realm of Intersubjectivity. Such an overwhelming preoccupation with oneself inevitably leads to a dehabilitating anxiety.

In Being and Having, Marcel concludes that boundless anxiety results from a basic human psychological deformity: "What I have called anxiety is a fundamental human deformity.... The most vivid image I can think of is the horrible feeling I have sometimes of being delivered up to a darkness."[109] This anxiety stems from a failure of the I to meet the Thou. It occurs, as Marcel

explains in Homo Viator, when the ego is reflected in the craving to be confirmed by another. Anxiety results when one treats the other person merely as a means of resonance or as an amplifier-- when he considers the other only as an apparatus to manipulate and to dispose of at will.[110] An individual who continues to isolate himself from others can have no hope of attaining peace fro himself. Disassociation leads only to further anxieties.

Buber, as well, attributes many of the psychological problems of modern society to a failure of people to enter into real dialogue and into the realm of the Interhuman. In "Healing through Meeting," he brings his dialogical philosophy to bear in another field. According to Buber, if psychology and psychoanalysis are to be successful in their attempts to heal men, the investigators must possess a true conception of what man is. This conception must not be comprised of the individual in isolation, but with the whole person and his relation to the other people in the community and society. Thus, the investigator must possess an understanding of the essence of man in terms of dialogical relation. Friedman points out that Erich Fromm is one man who criticizes Freud for his portrayal of all interpersonal relations within the framework of biological drives (thus as a means to one's ends). Fromm proceeds to redefine basic psychological problems as specific kinds of relatedness of the individual toward the world and not that of a frustration or an instinctual need per se.[111] Fromm mirrors the ideas of Buber that man is free and responsible-- that man's

nature is a social product. Both of these men reject the Freudian belief that human behavior has no dynamism of its own or that psychological change is rooted in adaptational patterns. The psychological significance of the I-Thou relationship was recognized also by Ferdinand Ebner in Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten. Insanity, Ebner maintains, results from a closing of the I to the Thou. This condition prevails when love is no longer able to reach the patient, when he is no longer able to speak to a concrete Thou, when he sees only a projection of the world of I. Buber himself explains the condition in I and Thou:

> If a man does not represent the a priori of the relation in his living with the world, if he does not work out and realize the inborn Thou, then it strikes inward.[112]

Both Buber and Viktor von Weizäcker established the implications of the I-Thou philosophy for psychotherapy and medicine by maintaining the difference between objective understanding of something and a subjective understanding of someone. The patient under no circumstances must become an object, and the physician must start not only with subjective knowledge but also with questions. Only through I-Thou contact between the patient and the doctor does objective knowledge play a role in the curing of an illness.[113]

In "Healing through Meeting," Buber discusses inclusive therapy, using the term 'inclusive' in the same manner in which he relates his ideas on inclusive education. The most significant factor in inclusive therapy lies in the assertion

that the physician must allow himself to be changed by the patient, permitting all of the impulses stemming from the patient to affect him.[114] Only through this inclusion of the personality can the doctor bring his objective knowledge to total realization.

Buber defines most precisely his ideas about dialogue for psychotherapy by detailing the way in which the zaddikim used to heal those people who came for help. He reminds us that we must realize that the reflection of a soul in its organic life depends on a wholeness and unity gained by that soul:

> The more disassociated the soul is, so much the more is it at the mercy of organic life. The more unified it is, so much the more it is the master of its physical ailments and attacks.[115]

Buber treats the paradox of the analyst's profession in "Healing through Meeting." The doctor analyzes the patient's psychic phenomena generally with the cooperation of the patient. But in some cases, Buber points out, the doctor has a presentiment that something else is demanded of him, something incompatible with objective knowledge.[116] What is required, of course, lies in the realm of the I-Thou-- a demand that the doctor should draw the case out of objectification and set himself up as a Thou: " The psychotherapist is to return as a changed person in a changed situation. He returns to it as one to whom the necessity of genuine personal meetings in the abyss of human existence between the one in need of help and the helper

has been revealed." A soul is never sick alone, but always through a betweenness, a situation between it and another existing being.[117] And so it is that Buber (and to a lesser degree, Marcel) claims that many psychological problems can be blamed upon a lack of dialogical relationship and upon a objectification of the physician-patient association. They maintain that the number of anxieties could be decreased significantly by expanding the role of Interhuman relationships.

Art is considered by both thinkers to be a very legitimate expression of the dialogical -- the "withness of the relation between human substance and the substance of things."[118] Buber asks his readers to confront great nude sculptures which can, in no way, be grasped correctly from within the framework of the human body, that which is too often considered as a "thing." Man cannot possess his art and at the same time relate to it. In I and Thou Buber describes the feelings of a man who stands face to face with a form that desires to be made into a work of art.[119] If man so wills, he can speak the primary word of Thou, responding to the block of marble which implores the artist to make it into a form. Just as natural things such as trees and stones can have personal relations with man, so art can say something to man. If a person is willing to receive the work as more than a passive object, dialogue can be established -- even though it is not a reciprocal dialogue. The artist who is creating perceives his object and responds to its existence. But his response takes the form of an artistic creation instead of the form of dialogue. Many people would consider a relation possible only between men and things that possess minds and bodies similar to our own. But consciousness on both sides is not necessary for genuine relation; anything can say something to a human being so long as he is open for relation.

While Buber concentrates his discussion on artistic forms, Marcel emphasizes the influence of music upon his life:

> Music is my real vocation. Here above all
> I am creator.... Is it not authentic

> spirituality that is incarnated in musical expression? It is precisely because music made me understand the transcendence of thought over the use that is made of it when it is applied to objects.[120]

However, Murchland indicates that music, for Marcel, cannot be thought of as a true dialogical relation. He notes that for Marcel, "music is an interior discipline... a medium to reveal the man to himself."[121] The terms discipline and medium are themselves I-It words! And the fact that Marcel views music as a means of finding himself would indicate that it is somewhat of a tool --a means to an end. Nevertheless,there is somewhat of an intersubjective relation between the music and him who enjoys it, even though it may be used as a means by which to commune. It would appear that Marcel is being consistent in his previously-stated belief that true relation takes place between man and man -- and really not between man and inanimate objects. This assertion, of course, is in total contradistinctiom to the theory of Buber, who states that genuine dialogue certainly can, and does, take place between man and objects -- between the artist and his work, between the musician and his composition. But for Marcel, music remains a means to some sort of higher state of being.

The art of drama is frequently used by Marcel, the esteemed playwright; but once again, it would seem that his plays serve a definitive purpose of allowing Marcel to pose his philosophical problems in an appetizing formulation. Marcel's plots and his characterizations play a very specific role for

the author. There is little doubt that a direct relation exists between Marcel's philosophy and the themes and plots of his plays. He is quite explicit in his assertion that there is a purposeful relation between his dramatic work and his philosophy in general; and hence, it is no surprise that his drama reflects the motif of a soul that has become a stranger to itself and to others. This estrangement is of central significance to the totality of Marcel's outlook on relation:

> Ce n'est pas un hasard si la lecture des romans surtout étrangers a tenu une telle place dans mon emploi du temps, si je me suis donné avec une sorte d'ardeur fiévreuse à la collection étrangère que j'ai eu la joie de diriger. Et je noterai en passant que lorsqu'on fixera son attention sur les oeuvres que j'y ai incorporées, on trouvera là des indications latérales sur le fond même de mes préoccupations. [122]

A study of Marcel's thought should therefore include some consideration of his dramatic work. "It is in my drama," remarks Marcel, "that metaphysical thought defines itself in concreto." [123] Although he has not constructed his plays with the specific intent of shedding light on his philosophical notions, a familiarization with his drama affords the reader a better understanding of his approach to philosophy. Marcel himself calls his theater "the drama of the soul in exile"-- drama of a soul which has lost its way and suffers from alienation. We are, contends Marcel, strangers to ourselves in too many instances, and consequently, strangers to others with whom we live. So often man hides behind a mask, as is the case with

Christiane, the lead character in Marcel's aforementioned play, "The Broken World." Christiane is an ebullient and intelligent young lady who leads an ever-busy life of partying and socializing. All eyes are constantly upon this woman, who receives a great amount of admiration for her beauty and charm. Her husband, on the contrary, is quiet and restrained, and consequently he resents the attention that is showered upon his wife. The two characters would appear to be quite ill-matched and hardly compatible. Marcel here informs his reader that Christiane had confessed prior to her marriage that she, in fact, did not love her husband Laurent -- that she had married him only on the rebound, out of depression of a former tragedy: Christiane had been madly in love with a man who had decided against marrying her. Because of her feeling of rejection, she had always treated Laurent as a second-rate husband. She is quite aware that he is incessantly humiliated by her, that he is overshadowed by her gay popularity. As the drama progresses, Laurent makes no overt action to separate himself from Christiane, but she becomes more and more disgusted and increasingly cognizant of the destruction she is bringing about and of the hollowness of the life she lives. Deep inside, she yearns to relate, but cannot. Her acts of friendship are phoney; her love is unreal; her entire life, she comes to understand, is wasted and shallow. In great anguish, Christiane launches into a description of her lonliness and depression:

> Don't you feel sometimes that we are
> living...if you can call it living...
> in a broken world? Yes, broken, like a

> broken watch. The mainspring has stopped working.... The world must have had a heart at one time, but today you would say that the heart had stopped beating.[124]

Christiane is a prime example of what Marcel has called "the soul in exile." So much a stranger has she become to herself, that she feels a contempt for those around her, destroying and manipulating the life of her husband Laurent. Ultimately, she must fall into total despair herself. In her own "broken world," Christiane never comes close to relating to a Thou --neither in her marriage, nor in her day-to-day contact with friends and acquaintances. Without the possibility of participating with others, she cannot hope to gain the unity of the Thou.

But Marcel's claim that man is in dire need of being open to the other person is perhaps best presented in "The Funeral Pyre." In this particular drama, Aline Fortier, the wife of an army colonel, has lost a young son Raymond in mortal combat. She will not release his memory from her mind for even a moment, and as a result makes miserable the lives of those people around her. So blown out of proportion has been her grief that she is unable to relate to her husband, claiming him responsible for the death of their son. For those people who try to help her to forget the past, she feels an insatiable contempt. Octave, her husband, is blamed for Raymond's death; for he had suggested his enlistment in the service: "One word from you would have kept him at home."[125] Thus she makes the blame for the death a one-sided proposition. But the main focus of the drama centers on a relationship between Aline and Raymond's fiancée Mireille,

who decided to live with Raymond's mother at a time of grief. The sad truth is, however, that Aline is attached to Mireille only because she remains a symbol of faithfulness to Raymond! Thus Aline maintains that the two of them must remain together because they both have a shared loss: "Now that he is gone, somehow you and I seem even closer to each other."[126] In actuality, Aline is using Mireille as a tool through which she can dig up additional grief and sympathy. When, after the death of Raymond, Mireille attempts to strike up a new romance, Aline feels dutybound to intrude and break up the relationship without question -- only in order to save face for her late son. And although Aline claims that Mireille might be fooling herself into thinking that she is really in love when she is not ("That's a dangerous thing to think, dear, and you may be deceiving yourself..."[127]) it is ironically Aline who is doing all of the deceiving; she attempts to break up any potentially meaningful relationship for Mireille in the future. Aline claims to bear no end in mind except for Mireille's happiness: "It's not for me to approve or disapprove of what you do.... I would never want to influence you."[128] But the reader soon realizes that the truth of the matter is that Aline has no concern for Mireille's welfare at all; she only uses her as a device to protect the memory of her son Raymond. By manipulating and possessing, she can hope to perpetuate his memory. In both "The Broken World" and "The Funeral Pyre" selfishness and manipulation are marks of a lack of dialogue.

Just as Marcel's drama is inextricably bound to his philosophy of communion, so, too, the poetry of Martin Buber reflects his philosophy of man's need for dialogue. Encapsulized in his poem "Power and Love" is the kernel of his two-fold relations of I-It and I-Thou:

> Our hope is too new and too old--
> I do not know what would remain of us
> Were love not transfigured power
> And power not straying love.
>
> Do not protest: "Let love alone rule!"
> Can you prove it true?
> But resolve: Every morning
> I shall concern myself anew about the boundary
> Between the love-deed-Yes and the power-deed-No
> And pressing forward honor reality. [129]

Herein Buber poses the question of the irreconcilable opposites which are, in fact, one. Love is equated with transfigured power, and power, with straying love. These two elements, as Buber presents them, actually constitute one entity. It is man's hope today-- as it has been for many years gone by-- to recognize the personal nature of human existence and love, and to subdue the overriding power which would overcome us. This is a hope that is "too new and too old." Using, knowing, experiencing, propagandizing, and manipulating are all elements of human existence that fall into the realm of the It. Yet Buber sensitizes us to the need for both the world of the Thou and the It. For us, it would be naive to make a clear-cut distinction, for man must continually live the course of his life in both worlds. To "let love rule alone" would be unthinkable; Buber "does not know what would remain of us" were not love and power bound.

The two-foldedness of life is essential; the world of It is just as necessary for man's survival as the world of Thou is for his creative well-being. In his Life of Dialogue, Friedman explains that the I-Thou relation is not some abstract point in time and space, far removed from the realm of It. Love and dialogue, which are the symbols of purest relation between man and man, cannot last indefinitely. Nor do power and experiencing, which are the symbols of the realm of It, speak of that which is unredeemingly rotten and God-forsaken. I-Thou and I-It must be conceived as going hand in hand. It is for this reason that Buber admonishes, "Do not protest":

> We cannot avoid
> Using power,
> Cannot escape the compulsion
> To afflict the world,
> So let us, cautious in diction
> And mighty in contradiction,
> Love powerfully.[150]

Man must honor the reality of both realms in which he lives. The world of It is never fully-present, nor is the world of Thou. Man requires an ordered structure in his life, hence the power he exerts cannot be avoided. But a preponderance of It, he can counteract by following the formula that Buber has set forth: "Love powerfully." The realm of It he cannot, and should not, attempt to eradicate. Afflicting, manipulating, and using, we cannot escape. Both relations constitute main elements of life; both run through the world, through each individual. Man must recognize the nature of his person in all its implications: "No man can avoid the world of It; but he who lives in the world of It alone is less than a man."

In another poem entitled "Do You Still Know It...?" Buber addresses the question of the duration of an I-Thou relationship. Throughout his writing, he has emphasized that it is "the exalted melancholy of our fate" that no I-Thou situation can be sustained; no sooner have we entered into relation, when the meeting must be terminated, for each Thou is destined to become an It. Yet rarely has Buber attempted to explain whether there is any permanent effect of relation upon man's soul or upon his ability to engage in subsequent relations. Does man retain any special quality from his relating? Is he any more capable of entering into dialogue by dint of his former relations? In "Do You Still Know It..." Buber implies that an I-Thou situation --even after its termination-- can induce man to participate further. In this poem he intimates that each subsequent relation holds a little of the previous one, so that man becomes more and more sensitized with each successive dialogue: "Do you still know," asks Buber, "the beauty of the vision of the past?" Man relives his mutual, animated moments, which "were there" and are "wholly here" at the same time! One could assume that a certain quality of the I-Thou relation is timeless and eternal. The voice of dialogue speaks, and continually bears witness "to old majesty as new....":

> Do you still know, how we in our young years
> Traveled together on this sea?
> Visions came, great and wonderful,
> We beheld them together, you and I.
> How image joined itself with images in our hearts!
> How a mutual animated describing
> Arose out of it and lived between you and me!
> We were there and yet wholly here
> And wholly together, roaming and grounded.

> Thus the voice awoke that since then proclaims
> And witnesses to old majesty and to new,
> True to itself and you and to both together.
> Take then this witness in your hands,
> It is an end and yet has no end,
> For something eternal listens to it and to us,
> How we resound out of it, I and Thou. [131]

Although specific relations are fated to come to an end, the essence of pure dialogue remains instilled in the individual's soul. The spirit of a former relation lingers as a reflection of dialogue that once was and can be no more --except in a new form. Buber also reminds the reader that every relation is grounded in dialogue with God; "every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the Eternal Thou." Each relation is "an end" that "has no end," for to its eternal nature God bears witness: He listens, He gives testimony, and He shares in every dialogue, as only the Eternal Thou can do. Thus the poetry of Buber reflects, as does the drama of Marcel, the philosophical bent of the thinker. Neither Buber nor Marcel consciously uses his art-form with the express purpose of its serving as a vehicle for the philosophy of dialogue; yet these plays and poems necessarily reflect man's need to partcipate with others.

Buber evidences a concern for the twofold meaning of faith, maintaining that it is possible for man to assume two stances toward his faith: he may exhibit unfailing trust in someone without being able to explain exactly why such a trust exists; or, it is possible to have been convinced that someone or something exists and to render acknowledgment. The former example constitutes genuine trust, whereas the latter indicates mere assent that a given proposition is true. For more than forty years, Martin Buber concerned himself with the study of Jesus and Paul, the subjects of his book Two Types of Faith. Faith as belief (the Hebrew emunah) is herein correlated with the faith indicating trust, while the faith as the truth of some assertion (the Greek pistis) he correlates with Paulinism.[132]

Buber contends that even when the Greek word pistis occurs in the Synoptics, it is still being used in the sense of emunah and consequently reflects the ideas of the Biblical prophets. But in the Johannine gospel and in the writings of Paul, pistis denotes assent that such and such is true. Buber himself delineates clearly in Two Types of Faith as he says that the difference between " I believe" and " I know that" is not the difference between two expressions of faith as much as it is the difference between two kinds of faith. These are exemplified in two attitudes toward Jesus:

> If we consider the Synoptic and Johannine dialogues with the disciples as two stages along one road, we immediately see what was gained and lost in the course of it. The gain was the most sublime of all theologies;

> it was procured at the expense of the plain, concrete, and situation-bound dialogicism of the original man of the Bible, who found eternity, not in the supra-temporal spirit, but in the depths of the actual moment. The Jesus of the genuine tradition still belongs to that, but the Jesus of theology does so no longer.[133]

Thus Buber sides not with the faith of Paul, but with the faith of Jesus, whose character was decidedly Jewish, who spoke as a Jew, and who lived within the religious sphere of rabbinic Judaism. He did not demand faith in Christ from his disciples--not the faith that was pistis, a faith of assertion that. He did, however, demand that a Jew establish trust in God, not merely a knowledge about Him. But when Paul raised the man Jesus to the status of divinity, he moved from the realm of faith as emunah, to the faith of pistis, so that what Jesus reputedly preached became faith in a proposition, not a faith in the immediacy between God and man. As Friedman indicates, Paul made faith in Christ a means to an end -- "a door to salvation," with the result that there was no longer the genuine faith in God.[134] The person who finds himself in a relation of real faith need not be "converted" to it.

Beek analyzes the quotation from Mark I, 15, "The Time is fulfilled. And the kingdom of God is at hand. Repent, and believe in the Gosepl."He concludes that the last words ("and believe in the Gospel") were added and hence, not attributable to Jesus.[135] For belief in the Gospel qua Gospel reflects the belief of pistis -- not the belief of emunah, nor the belief in historical continuity of the Jews. The early period of

Israel was marked by a long-standing community faith, grounded in God's watching over His people. He is the God of Israel Who walks with His people throughout history. The Jesus who looks toward an era of fulfillment, who advises t'shuvah, and for whom the Torah is important is Jewish; while the Jesus who requires belief in the Gospel is not.

To say that the two types of faith outlined by Buber are mutually exclusive would be misleading: "The contact in trust leads naturally to the acceptance of that which proceeds from the one whom I trust."[136] The faith of emunah almost by necessity leads to the faith of pistis. As an example of the inevitable overlapping of the two types of faith, Buber cites the sentence in the Epistle to the Hebrews about the man who comes to God: "Without faith (pistis) it is impossible to please God; for whoever comes to God must believe that He is a rewarder of those who seek Him."[137] In this case, the initial acknowledgment of the relation of trust established between man and God is inextricably bound to the notion of God as the One Who will reward man if he believes that God is capable of rewarding! The initial belief is the Jewish emunah (faith in the sense of trust in existence); the second clause indicates the Greek pistis (faith in the sense of believing that God will act.

An example from the Hebrew Bible further clarifies the distinction. In the fifteenth chapter of Genesis, God comes to Abraham in a vision and promises a reward to the childless patriarch--

countless offspring to be his heir. Buber cites that it is said of Abraham that he trusted in God; the Biblical word in question is he'emin. Abraham is unmovable in his faith in God. Buber notes, however, that in the Greek translation of Genesis, Abraham does not believe in God so much as he believes Him, i.e., His words were reliable and His promise worthy of credibility. In the Hebrew account, Abraham makes no demands of God, nor does he insist upon conditions for His promise; he accepts with perfect trust that which God assures him. Is this not the whole force behind Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac?

In Eclipse of God Buber expresses the notion that "it is not necessary to know something about God in order to really believe in Him."[138] And so it is that Buber's conception of God does not rest upon reasons, but rather on acceptance with trust. By matter of extension, the emunah-faith attitude of man to God can also serve as a model for interpersonal relationships among people. Man often finds himself trusting an individual without being able to justify sufficiently his reasons for that trust. A dialogical relation often entails one's giving over of himself to another. Were we always to ask others to account for their promises and to delineate what they would do every step of the way, our world would be characterized by overriding mistrust and paucity of faith. Instead, Buber encourages that trust be engendered between men.

Marcel, also, is preoccupied with the distinction between believing in and believing that. He is cognizant of the fact that there is much confusion between these "two types of faith."

Marcel attempts to explain the former by analogy of credit. Opening a line of credit usually brings to mind the idea of the operation of a financial world: when a person is in need of money, credit is put at his disposal. But there is another manner in which credit can be opened-- if someone believes in something or someone else. In such a case, a person places himself at the disposal of another; he pledges his entire being to that person:

> In a modern philosophical vocabulary, this could be expressed by saying that to belief is attached an existential index which, in principle, is completely lacking to conviction.[159]

Conviction consists only of what one is inclined to think. When a man claims to be convinced about something, he shuts himself off from the possibility of change of belief and precludes any modification of his thought on a given subject. Conviction in no way indicates a pledge-of-person. But belief in someone indicates a rallying toward him; it is active, not passive. The strongest type of believing, says Marcel, is that which "absorbs most fully all the powers of being"; it is the believing through which one gives his all to that which he has made his own. Just as Buber warned, however, Marcel also admonishes that it is quite possible to translate "believing in" to the conviction of "believing that." There is hardly any man who is not tempted to account for his beliefs, and consequently, it is not difficult for one to turn his beliefs into convictions. When a person believes in God, he almost certainly questions-- by necessity-- his

beliefs. He will ultimately assert that he is, or is not, convinced about God's existence. That is not to say that one should believe blindly in order to believe in. There are philosophers and theologians of great intellect and penetration of thought who are, at the same time, great believers in God. Demonstrative proofs of the existence of God are not without value; but it is Marcel's contention that the man who is constantly preoccupied with justifying his beliefs is likely to be ultimately more concerned with the proposition that rather than trust in.

In the establishing of trust among people, Marcel suggests that one must exercise what he terms "critical reflection."[140] He cites the instance of the banker who approaches him and to whom he entrusts a sizeable sum of money. A friend, however, warns him that there are ugly rumors about that same banker--that he had to leave town suddenly before, and that his character was very much in question. Marcel refuses to listen, giving the new banker every benefit of the doubt. He entrusts his fortune to him, only to discover shortly thereafter that his friend had been correct in labeling the banker a crook. This is an example in which critical reflection should have been operative. Trusting is not tantamount to blind trust. Nor must trust be equated with simplemindedness.

A case of an entirely different nature is presented when a mother refuses to despair for her son, who incessantly deceives her. He may lie to her, embarrass her, and take advantage of her. Yet despite his deceptions, she may refuse to wash her hands of the son. In such a case, Marcel explains,

there exists an intersubjective bond -- an intuitive trust whereby she cannot forsake him; rather, she must continue to believe in him. Whereas "critical reflection" could be employed in the case of the banker, there had already been established a close tie in the case of the mother and her son. She must continue to trust in him and refrain from despair.

Both Buber and Marcel, then, differentiate between two basic types of faith --believing in and believing that. Buber derives the difference from an in-depth study of the denotations of the Hebrew emunah and the Greek pistis found in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. Marcel does not draw on this specific sort of scholarly background for the formulation of his two types of faith; yet his "believing in"and his "believing that" are derived from the two basic modes of relating that both of the philosophers share as central to their twofold attitudes: I-Thou and I-It. For he who lives in the world of the Thou is likely to take greater risks and to be more trusting than he who concerns himself with the convictions and propositions of the world of It. Just as no person can live in the world of Thou alone, no one can sidestep all of the propositions of life by which men live. But he who cannot trust at all-- just like the person who lives exclusively in the world of It-- is less than a man.

CONCLUSION

The parallels present in the works of Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel stress an overriding concern for man's ability to speak out with all of his being to those around him. In so doing, man enters into communion with God. In the realms of nature, psychology, education, and socio-political relations, both philosophers are in agreement that manipulation must be avoided at all costs, as much as is humanly possible, in order to insure meaningful relationships among people.

In regard to the question posed initially at the outset of this paper -- I would have to conclude that the philosophy of Marcel probably did develop independently of that of Buber. Marcel's unsettled early years, his distain for objectified and sterile learning, and his development of the drama of "the soul in exile" (which predated the publishing of Buber's I and Thou by almost ten years) all lead to the likely conclusion that such a person would crave a meeting with the Thou and would probably express it in such a way as did Marcel.

Thus despite the parallel of Buber's Dialogue to Marcel's Participation, Buber's Interhuman to Marcel's Intersubjectivity, Buber's Eclipse to Marcel's Broken World, and the similar manner in which they formulated their understanding of two types of faith -- despite all of this, there is little reason to believe that the writing of Marcel is any less original than that of Buber. Both thinkers have challenged us to confront our human task: to be fully involved with those around us.

— BRETT S. GOLDSTEIN

FOOTNOTES

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