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to the flow and development of an untidy thinker's intellectual development. In all this exquisite attention to detail, he never loses sight of the great themes in Magnes' life. And he expresses what he has studied and found in an absorbing way.

I am happy to recommend this thesis for acceptance.

Respectfully submitted,

Dr. Eugene B. Borowitz

May 5, 1981

JUDAH LEON MAGNES: ZIONIST, PACIFIST, AND DEMOCRAT
A STUDY OF HEBREW AND ENGLISH ARCHIVAL MATERIAL

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Introduction

Judah Leon Magnes strove to be a moral absolutist. He developed a set of values and then attempted to build a new world order upon them. He interpreted the prophetic ideals of justice, equality, and the sanctity of life to radical extremes. He expounded democracy, socialism, and pacifism despite the unpopularity of his positions. All this was grounded in a thoroughly Jewish life and sense of unity with the Jewish people, leading to a powerful Zionist commitment. Zionism was anathema within much of the Reform Jewish community when Magnes actively gathered support for the building of a Jewish state. He believed that this state would provide an active spiritual/cultural center for the Jewish people. This Jewish state must develop a new type of nation operating on the highest Jewish ideals. Further development of the Reform tradition of Judaism and the nurturing of Jewish responses to modern problems will revitalize the entire Jewish people. The mission of the Jewish people is helped toward fulfillment through the Jewish state functioning as a "light unto the nations". Magnes rejected the doctrinaire practice of Judaism which relegated religion's function to liturgical and theological matters. Judaism was organically and holistically woven into all aspects of life. Threads of deep spirituality held together this ideology and lifestyle.

Excepting a lapse in pacifist faith during the Holocaust, Magnes' moral commitments remained unchanged and found application in response to a variety of circumstances. An examination of these responses produces a broader understanding of his ideology. I focus on three central cords within Magnes' philosophy - pacifism, Zionism, and democratic socialism.

These themes are traced chronologically in consideration of the major events occurring in the world and the Jewish community. The description obtained from published work is then compared to the portrayal culled from archival material.

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Chapter One: Biographical Sketch

Judah Magnes was born in San Francisco on July 5, 1877. He was a first generation American; the son of struggling retailers. His father, David Magnes, was an immigrant from Poland; his mother Sophie Abrahamson was from East Prussia. The couple named their son Julian Leon; later, while pursuing a doctorate in Germany, he changed his name to Judah in order to be more fully Jewish.¹ His father provided an Hasidic flavor to Judah's Jewish background. He learned German culture from his mother. This combination in his own family later helped him relate to both groups and mediate between the two.

He grew up in the Oakland/San Francisco Bay area and attended public schools. But for his Jewish training, his boyhood years were typically American. He was a baseball fan and pitched for his high school team. He was also a member of the debating society and editor of the school magazine. Magnes assimilated the individualistic, pioneering instinct of California. He studied Judaica in the Reform Temple of Oakland where his family maintained membership; he pursued Hebrew studies at the Orthodox synagogue across the bay in San Francisco; under the tutelage of the Reform Rabbi Jacob Voorsanger of San Francisco, he learned Talmud. Dr. Voorsanger, a governor of the Hebrew Union College, influenced Magnes to study in Cincinnati.² This eclectic background allowed Magnes to be non-dogmatic and creative in his approach.

In 1894, at the age of seventeen, Magnes entered the University of Cincinnati as an undergraduate and the Hebrew Union College as a rabbinic student. He was editor of the University's student magazine the Cincinnati. In 1895, prior to the first Zionist Congress, Magnes declared himself a Zionist and published "Palestine or Death" in Emanu-el, a Bay area Reform publication just founded by Voorsanger.³ In 1900 he was graduated from the Hebrew Union College and ordained a rabbi. He received a scholarship and went to Germany to earn a doctorate. He simultaneously enrolled in the Lehranstalt in Berlin and the Berlin University. He later transferred to Heidelberg where he finished his degree in Semitic Languages in 1902. During this period he grew more devoted to Zionism and more politically active.

Magnes was a cultural Zionist from the start. His concern for the quality of Jewish life in the diaspora never waned. The Jewish State was not merely to be a political haven for refugees but the cultural center of the entire Jewish people. In 1902, when he returned to the United States, Magnes became involved in the Federation of American Zionists. He served on the Executive Committee until 1915 and represented the group to the sixth, seventh, and eighth Zionist Congresses. In 1907 he made his first trip to Palestine and was charmed by the Land of Israel.

From 1902-1904 he served as librarian and instructor in Bible at the Hebrew Union College. In 1904 he came to New York City to be the rabbi at Temple Israel in Brooklyn. There he endeared himself to the Jews from Eastern Europe. He responded to the Russian programs by helping raise funds in 1905 for Jewish Self Defense groups. He was able to rally thousands of Jews for this cause. In 1906 he moved uptown to serve as associate rabbi at Temple Emanu-el. He took the job, stipulating that he would require the freedom to speak his mind. Here Magnes ministered to wealthy Jews of German descent. He met Beatrice Lowenstein, the sister-in-law of Louis Marshall, and they were married in 1908. Solomon Schechter officiated at the wedding service. Beatrice was independently wealthy; later her ability to support their family allowed him the freedom to take radical stands without fear of financial hardship in the event that he lost his job. Their marriage was strong and Beatrice was supportive of Judah's endeavors.⁴ They had three sons - David, Jonathan, and Baruch. Amid controversy over his Zionist pronouncements, he left Temple Emanu-el in 1910. In 1911 he assumed the pulpit of the Conservative Congregation B'nai Jeshurun. Magnes sought to institute change too rapidly and left after only a year.

When he left B'nai Jeshurun, he devoted himself more fully to the Kehillah of which he had been president since 1908. He sought to develop a government for the Jewish

community of New York. The goal was to bring all types of Jews together into a democratic organization. Magnes worked for cooperation among Uptown Jews and Downtown Jews, Orthodox Jews and secularists, and political conservatives and radicals. The Kehillah established a Bureau of Industry to mediate labor disputes. A Jewish Board of Education was established. Magnes sought to have the financial obligation for Jewish education borne by the entire community. He resigned from the presidency in 1922 and the Kehillah dissolved a year later.

In response to the severe Jewish suffering in Europe as a result of the World War, Magnes helped found the Joint Distribution Committee in 1915. In 1916 he took a trip on behalf of the "Joint" into the war zone. When the United States entered the war he joined the People's Council for Democracy and Peace, a coalition of radical and liberal pacifists. He often spoke at rallies, voicing his opposition to the war on both moral and political grounds. This was an exceedingly unpopular stand in the American community and the Jewish community. His isolation permanently impaired his effectiveness as Kehillah president and may have contributed to the organization's failure.⁵

The Magnes family moved to Palestine in 1922. The cultural Zionist began building an institution for higher Jewish learning in the Land of Israel. The Hebrew

University would be a foundation stone for the cultural and spiritual center being built in Palestine. He envisaged the University sparking rejuvenation for the entire Jewish people. His connections with the wealthiest within the American Jewish community enabled him to raise large amounts of money for establishing quality programs at the University. Magnes served as the University's chancellor from 1925, when it opened, to 1935. During this time he became embroiled in controversy concerning his attempts to explore all avenues of reconciliation with the Arabs. In addition, Weizmann and Einstein, who sat on the Board of Governors, wanted to place an academician in charge of academic matters. In 1935 Magnes was made president and a rector assumed many of his duties.⁶ During the 1930's under Magnes' direction the University served as a haven for Jewish scholars from Germany.

In Palestine he supported strong non-political social projects. He felt these types of activities would build Jewish unity. Voluntarism was encouraged.

From 1929, the Year of the Arab Riots, to his death in 1948, Magnes toiled to keep the lines of communication open between Jews and Arabs. Though he had a change in his pacifist convictions during the Holocaust, he continued to work for a settlement in Palestine. He urged a bi-national solution. To this end he founded the Ichud, an organization of long time Jewish residents in Palestine seeking Arab-Jewish

reconciliation, and was its president until his death. When partition and war were realities, Magnes continued to strive for a truce and a peace settlement based on a confederation of the two states. In the spring of 1948, his health failing, Magnes travelled to the United States to promote peace. He met with Secretary of State George Marshall and President Truman but the trip was not successful. Judah Magnes died in New York City on October 27, 1948 at the age of 71.

Magnes was extremely individualistic. This caused him great difficulties, especially in Palestine where the orientation towards party action was strong. It is an interesting paradox that Magnes strove so hard to bring about unity and yet he very often took his stand alone. No doubt there were times when others considered him brash. He was an absolutist in his ideals and approach until the Holocaust. After that time he mellowed somewhat, nonetheless he held his commitments and values deeply. He never ceased to act upon his sense of righteousness and justice.

This radical rabbi activist was an intense human being. He displayed extraordinary energy and stamina. The demands which he made on himself corresponded to his high ideals. Though not to the same extent, he was also demanding of his associates. Magnes was insightful, understanding, and far-sighted. Others were drawn to the warmth and sincerity which exuded from him; he was a charismatic and forthright leader.

His perspective was broad. He courageously exerted himself to improve society. He described himself as "one of those innocents who believe in the possibility of a new world, and both as a Jew and a human being I should do whatever I can to help bring it about".⁷ Truly this was his life's task.

Chapter Two: Methodology

My own personal interest in pacifism within the Jewish community led to the selection of this topic. After choosing to research the ideas and activities of Judah Leon Magnes and after surveying the material it became necessary to limit my topic. His pacifist concerns did not stand in isolation but were closely developed in connection with his socialist and democratic ideals and his Zionist conviction. It appeared natural to deal with the development of these interrelated issues. Though he viewed everything through a religious perspective, certain aspects of his religious beliefs were not directly connected to the subjects I chose. For example, his thoughts and activities in respect to the Kehillah experiment in New York City or ideas regarding Reform and Conservative Judaism are not part of this examination. Activities and philosophies concerning other topics are included only when they elucidate the three areas under consideration.

Within this definition of the topics, I decided to trace the development and change in Magnes' philosophy as he responded to the major historical events which occurred during his lifetime and had direct bearing on the subjects of interest. These include the founding of the Zionist movement, the pogroms in Eastern Europe, World War I, the settling of the Yishuv, the violence in Palestine, the rise of Nazism, World War II, and the founding of the State of Israel and the War of Independence. Since Magnes was a

social activist and made an effort to respond to what was happening in the world, this was a natural approach to the material.

His published statements consist of mostly addresses which he had delivered, articles in periodicals, letters to the editor, some essays, and a few letters quoted in secondary sources. Among these, Biale, Goell, and Goren list archival material among their sources. In addition to reviewing this material, I also sought to compare his published statements to private materials derived from archival sources. The listings of the American Jewish Archives in Cincinnati contain materials on microfilm and originals relating to Magnes. Tens of thousands of documents are collected. The indexing for this material consists of lists of very general subjects, correspondents, or organizations.

I had hoped to review two full collections of material on microfilm. One from originals at The Central Zionist Archives and the other from The Jewish Historical General Archives; both are in Jerusalem. The films consisted of correspondence, minutes of meetings, some printed materials, cables, organizational memoranda, and even a journal Magnes kept on a trip to Europe for the Joint Distribution Committee. Each reel was estimated to contain one thousand frames. The material from The Central Zionist Archives was on one reel and the General Archives' documents were on seven reels.

I had hoped to review all the eight thousand estimated frames. When I completed reviewing the reel of material from the Central Archives I made two discoveries. First the indexing was not reliable. Second the reel contained over seventy three hundred frames! I selected two films from the remaining seven on the basis of the all too general index. There is material in English, Hebrew, Yiddish, German, French, and Italian. I read only the materials in English and Hebrew. These numbered an estimated eight thousand frames.

For about seven thousand frames of the first film, I carefully noted information on every English and Hebrew document for the sole purpose of indexing. I abandoned this because it proved too time-consuming. The microfilm was broken into sections which were designated alpha-numerically. The sections were not equal in size. Some contained only a few frames, while others had hundreds. The material did seem to have been placed in groups based on materials related to particular events or persons. The arrangement of these groups within designated sections and the arrangement of the sections seems arbitrary. Fortunately the other films have labeled sections that are more sensible. The sections are divided by persons and organizations and the range of dates and number of pages/frames is noted. Nevertheless one of these films was photographed in reverse chronological order.

This work was further complicated by the condition of the originals or the inability to photograph them. Some frames were nearly illegible. Some of the material was printed, some typed, and some handwritten. Sometimes the handwriting was so poor that I actually guessed the proper words and then figured out the letters. This was a problem for both English and Hebrew, though more so for the latter. Sometimes the pages of letters and articles were out of order or missing.

By way of comparison, I went to the Western Jewish History Center at the Magnes Museum in Berkeley. There the Magnes archival material is indexed and placed in numbered folders within numbered boxes. I was able to review quickly the material and had the pertinent documents photocopied and sent to me.

After I finished this research I set about comparing the published and archival material. I divided the data by the three topical parameters mentioned above and placed the data in chronological order. For easier analysis I distinguished four periods which correspond to significant events in history: pre-World War I; World War I - 1914-1921; the interim years between the World Wars - 1922-1938; the time from the beginning of World War II to his death - 1939-1948. The development of Magnes' philosophy was traced chronologically by periods. The published material was analyzed first and

then the archival data was compared to it. This was done by examining Magnes' ideas and their applications, dates of presentation, Magnes' interactions with others, and the responses of his contemporaries to his positions. The presentation of this investigation comprises the greater part of this thesis.

Chapter Three: A Review of the Published Material

During his college years, Magnes gave first expression to his developing values. In Cincinnati he served as editor of the university's student magazine the Cincinnati. The university authorities and Magnes had a disagreement over freedom of the press regarding the rights of students to criticize teachers. This led to the latter's resignation. Another student journal took up the issue and was suspended by the authorities. This led to a student strike, stories in the local press, and the dismissal of the university's president.¹

After listening to the oration of the Russian Rabbi Hirsch Masliansky at the College in 1895, Magnes published in the Reform journal Emanu-El, the paper entitled "Palestine - or Death". Though he clearly stated his commitment to America, he also cautioned against assimilation. He complained, "It is a sad, undeniable fact that they (our American Jewish people) have far less religion than our Christian neighbors." Since our parents and grandparents developed the Jewish tradition in a strikingly less liberal and less scientific environment, they were often deluded by superstitions in many of their practices.

Yet the great, mighty fact remains that they were terribly earnest. This earnestness permeated the whole system of living. This earnestness is what we of the present lack..."Nor do I mean to say that a return to former conditions is in any way possible or desirable, but that greater intellectuality, greater liberalism, greater freedom have been obtained at the price of still greater earnestness.

He referred to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine as "the only salvation of our present day Judaism".² Though he published the essay, Voorsanger added a lengthy and apologetic note from the editor. He explained Zionism as "an unhappy doctrine born of the fear of persecution" and harmful for American Jews.³ His sense of community with Jews throughout the world and his desire to uphold and preserve the distinct Jewish ideals grew. Herzl became a hero and the democratic nature of the Zionist organization and Zionist Congress drew him to the movement. Magnes stressed the importance of returning to Jewishness as a prerequisite for returning to the Land of Israel. He dedicated himself to nurturing and intensifying his own Jewishness.

At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States was caught in a patriotic fervor. In a letter to his parents, Judah Magnes responded by asserting his deep conviction of the sanctity of human life. He rejected war as a means of settling differences between nations. Revenge ought not be concealed by humanistic or patriotic rhetoric. Disappointed by rabbis and ministers who supported the war cries, he asserted the obligation of conscience over the obligation to country.⁴

In 1898 he was graduated from the University; he was ordained Rabbi in June, 1900. He entered the Berlin Jewish College in the same year. His second year in Germany he spent studying at the University of Heidelberg where he

finished his doctorate in December, 1902. During these two years in Europe he grew increasingly more Zionist. This provided the initiative for him to place the study of Semitics prior to philosophy. He began to eat kosher and became more traditionally oriented. Visiting extensively the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe, he felt closer ties to the Jewish people. He was deeply impressed by the spirituality of the Eastern European Jews he encountered. The lack of spirituality in America bothered him. He attended meetings of Zionists as well as demonstrating his opposition to the imperialist British Boer War. He wrote to his parents that he decided to give up all else, no matter how important, in order to work for the Jews and Judaism. He explained to his family that he was committed to revitalizing Jewish culture for the Jewish people. This must be done in a total Jewish milieu in Palestine. He could do much for this by spreading Zionism in America. He would even sacrifice serving a wealthy congregation if he could not preach Zionism freely.⁵

The loss of Jewish culture in America bothered Magnes. In 1903 he published translations of some of Bialik's Hebrew poems. He introduced the poems with a statement about culture and religion. He asserted that the Jewish culture gave birth to the universal Jewish religious ideals. The particular national culture of the Jews, of which the Hebrew

language is an important vehicle for expression, and the Jewish religion are not antagonistic. He protested the American immigrant reaction of removing from Jewish life its distinctive qualities.⁶ Both Hebrew and Yiddish are integral parts of Jewish life and development. These languages are the vehicles well equipped for the expressions of the Jewish mind and soul.⁷ Assimilation can not yield spiritual freedom. This can only be obtained through a "joyous synthesis of Jewish culture with best of non-Jewish culture".⁸ The Jewish mission as espoused in the official Reform ideology could only be effective through the development of the Jewish national spirit and the Jewish culture. After this rejuvenation the new Jewish people will contribute to the culture of the world.⁹ This full expression of the Jewish genius could only come to be in a Jewish home on indigenous soil.¹⁰

Responding to the Russian pogroms in 1903 and 1905, Magnes asserted the need for Jewish self-defense. He loved the Jewish people dearly and organized processions in New York in 1905 to collect funds for the defense of Russian ghettos.¹¹ Though he protested against violent responses for settling human differences during the Spanish-American and Boer Wars, his concern for the suffering and self-respect of Jews prompted a change. His position was not absolute. He abhorred violence and personally remained a pacifist. Nevertheless he accepted and supported Jewish self-defense.

In 1905 he was a member of the American delegation to the Zionist Congress at Basle. This was the assembly which rejected the British Uganda offer. Magnes favored rejection and the building of a Jewish state on native Jewish soil. He served as a peacemaker between the Eastern and Western Zionists. Though he sat with the Russian Rejectionists for fourteen hours during the decisive meeting, spurred by democratic ideals, he pleaded that the pro-Uganda minority be given two more years to campaign for a majority. On the one side he was a negotiator and peacemaker within the Jewish community, on the other he grew more active in the movement to provide for the physical defense of Jews in Russia. Self-defense was extended to Palestine and he raised funds to arm a ranger force to protect Jewish agricultural settlements. At the Congress he established connections to the Poale Zion, the American branch of the Socialist-Zionist workers' party and the Zionist Labor Party in Russia.¹²

From the pulpit at Temple Emanu-El, N.Y.C. he explained the major mistake of the Reform movement as the misconceived denial of Jewish nationality. The insistence on the sole retention of a Jewish Church with universal content can not bring the desired rejuvenation and survival of Judaism. Only by conducting the movement on a national basis "it became possible to consult not only the authority of the law but the authority of the People itself".¹³ Magnes wrote to

Ahad Ha'am stating that he wished "to spread the idea of a national religion and a religious nationalism".¹⁴ In 1910, he applauded the Philadelphia Section Council of Jewish Women for giving "a hearing to the Zionist heresy". He stated the fundamental element of Zionism as a love of Zion. Its greatest achievements being the unity of Jews in different lands, the support of democracy in Jewish organizations, and the revitalization of Jewish spirit and culture. He rejected the strict, doctrinaire attitudes of the "Official Reformed Church", especially with respect to its rejection of Zionism. The tradition of Reform in Judaism could not be stifled by an Official Reform which was in the process of separating itself from the Jewish people. Such a separation between the Jews and the Jewish religion is impossible; one can not exist without the other. The recognition of this is elemental to Zionism.

To this point Zionists stressed the element of the race/nation/people and the religious opponents of Zionism emphasized the quality of religion/culture/spirit. The traditional Jewish response is the interweaving of the particular and universal, the national and the religious, as well as the people and the spirit. The early Reform Movement separated these elements and gave birth to a religious system of ethical monotheism. The Zionists found the Jewish people and concentrated energies on

giving the people pride. The return to a Jewish soil and the creation of a Jewish state is preceded by a return to Judaism and the Jewish spirit. Official Reform is giving lip service to the development of the Jewish spirit. The Zionists struggle with the spiritual questions and this has been given expression through Jewish cultural contributions. While Official Reform seeks to exclude those who disagree, the Zionists have constituted a Jewish plurality. The element of the mission of the Jewish people in searching for God, as espoused by the Official Reform Movement, is important to Magnes and incorporated into his Zionism. He does not see a Jewish state as necessary for Jewish survival but it can certainly be an assurance for Jewish existence and a center for Judaism. In this environment the people can develop Jewish responses and a Jewish national life. The Zionist approach is Oriental, integrating the various elements of Judaism with all of life. All is viewed through religious eyes. The Occidental conception is the Official Reformed way. Religion is relegated to theological discussions or divine services. All aspects of life are departmentalized. This produces a conflict between Zionism and Americanism. A Jew in non-Jewish surroundings may experience difficulties developing Jewish answers to non-Jewish problems. The Zionist response is the creation of a Jewish atmosphere and national life. The Jewish state will provide an inspirational boost for all Jewry.¹⁵

Magnes rejected the idea of a conflict between Zionism and Americanism. Nonetheless if he were forced to make a choice between Jewish and American loyalties, the Jewish would come first. He supported American institutions and believed strongly in the principles of liberty and freedom. He was a person of conviction and maintained respect for those from whom his opinion differed. He believed deeply in democracy and the virtue of opposition. This was expressed in general terms and also within his Zionist ideals. He wrote to Chaim Weizmann in June, 1914 that he feared the Zionist movement was becoming too partisan. He restated his belief that the Jewish state was not necessary for ultimate Jewish survival. He also reasserted its value for all Jews everywhere as a cultural/spiritual center. The mutual influence of Palestine and the Jews of the world upon one another would be realized differently in different places. He considered this factor important for the Zionist Organization to take into account when organizing the people in different countries.¹⁶ The Zionist Organization must seek to establish a unity of world Jewries around the center of Palestine.

Magnes' views prior to World War I already indicate a synthesis of the three subjects of study. The love of Judaism and Jews was always central to his philosophy. His high ideals were drawn from the prophets and their conjunction with American ideals. Truth, freedom, conscience, and

earnestness were values he held high. His conviction would not allow him to participate in activities he considered unethical. The Jewish mission was to bring these ideals into active use by all of humankind. The vehicle to bring universal virtues to the peoples of the world was the distinctive Jewish culture. This culture was not developing in a healthy manner. In America the pressures of assimilation were especially debilitating. A Jewish nation on Jewish soil in the land of Israel and composed of a majority of Jews could provide an environment for developing modern Jewish responses to world problems. This synthesis would cultivate, in a Jewish setting, the best of Judaism and the positive additions of the modern non-Jewish world. The Zionist Organization's commitment to democracy was an example of this synthesis.

With regard to the underpinnings of his later pacifism and lapse in pacifist faith, Magnes rejected war and supported Jewish defense by arms. He cherished life and believed in its sanctity. Revenge was an unacceptable motive for human action. War was an inadequate means to deal with human problems. In this regard his obligation of conscience superseded his obligation to nation. He did accept the principle of defense and his love of the people of Israel led him to raise money for Jewish defense in Eastern Europe and Palestine.

The first World War brought a radicalization of Magnes' positions. His ideals and conscience forced him to hold

unpopular stands. This is true in the American society with respect to his pacifism and socialism. His general social activism and his divergent views about Jewish community and unity led to his resignation from the Provisional Executive Committee for Zionist Affairs of the Zionist Organization. World War I began in Europe in 1914; this year will be considered the beginning of this period. Magnes considered this period to run until 1921,¹⁷ this year will serve as the end.

The integration of these stands was expressed early in the war. His concern for the Jewish settlers in Palestine led to a desire for restraint by Zionist officials so as not to antagonize Turkey. Weizmann chose to work for an English trusteeship of the area. Magnes also opposed the Zionist Organization's use of the war crisis to gain the sympathies of American Jewry. The American Jewish Committee had called for a conference of leaders of major Jewish organizations. Rather than accepting the invitation to this conference, the Zionist Organization held a Congress based upon representation by popular vote. Magnes feared the split of the Jewish people and resigned from the Provisional Executive Committee for Zionist Affairs in June 1915 rather than participate in this divisiveness. He raised further objection to the confusion of issues arising from the war with Zionist issues and the resultant discord caused in the American

Jewish community. This detracted from the work of building a Jewish Center in Palestine. In a letter to Ahad Ha'am and the members of the Executive Council of the Zionist Organization of Europe he asserted that the only worthwhile congress is one representing a unified American Jewry. This would help the Zionists to negotiate from a position of strength. With regard to the war issues he reiterated the importance of not jeopardizing the settlers in Palestine. Only Ahad Ha'am replied, justifying Magnes' resignation; the others sent no reply. The blind majority association with war aims deeply troubled Magnes; he believed this would hurt the spiritual development and influence of the Zionist movement.¹⁸

Early in the war, when the United States was not yet involved, he concentrated his efforts on relieving the suffering left by the violent conflict. He was instrumental in the founding of the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and he represented the "Joint" on trips to Europe. After the United States became a belligerent, Magnes' efforts to stop the war intensified. He was an ardent and absolute pacifist. Influenced by Quaker friends, he asserted that the Jewish ideal corresponded to their belief. All human beings are created in the image of God and therefore all human life is sacred. He opposed war absolutely.¹⁹ He recognized that he did not represent the majority of Jews but he did claim to speak for Judaism. Judaism abhors

human bloodshed; its three cardinal sins are "idolatry, incest, and the spilling of blood". A Jew can never be forced to commit these sins.²⁰ In his opposition to the war he had more Christian associates than Jewish. The socialist wing of the American Zionists was the only Jewish group to support him. Even so, this was not from a pacifist position but rather from a hatred for Czarist Russia.²¹

Demanding an end to the hostilities, he requested that President Wilson and the Congress publicly state their aims in this war and their terms for peace. The peace terms should comprise a standing offer to Germany. He assailed the political rhetoric of the public officials. America's stated reason for entering the war was Germany's brutal submarine warfare. When all German submarines are destroyed will the United States make peace? What does it mean to make the world safe for democracy? Which type of democracy? Judged by whose standards? Was the United States going to go to war against other anti-democratic countries? He rejected the view that the military defeat of Germany was essential for making peace.²²

He favored the United States' supporting the new Russian Republic and its peace terms: no forcible annexations, no punitive indemnities, and the free development of all nations and peoples. The Russians needed peace in order firmly to establish a democracy. American support of the Russians would be the best way to assure peace and further democracy.

He further defined the terms of peace. No forcible annexations entailed a restoration of conquered territory by both sides and adjustments in borders effected through negotiation. The adjustments would only be instituted with approval of a plebiscite in the territory to be transferred. No punitive indemnities meant a peace without victory. Rather than reparations paid from one side to another, he envisaged an international fund to assist in rebuilding all devastated areas. The free development of all nations required that popular sovereignty determine the conditions of national development for each nation. All are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness without regard for color or religion. Only when all are politically, economically, and spiritually free can peace be realized. Even a league of nations can not enforce peace by power. The free will of all democracies is that which will ensure peace.²³ America had two choices. First it could choose to engage in war and uphold English desires for German colonies and the French recovery of the Alsace Lorraine. Second it could choose to assure, with Russia, peace without victory and the chance for freedom and democracy world over. The war itself made Magnes all the more determined to loathe this hopeless and unsafe means of settling national differences. He was committed to teach peace.

As the war persisted his ideas grew more radical and his criticism more searing. He questioned why no peace conference had been convened. His answer was an indictment of the United States president. The degree of German democracy did not meet Wilson's standards. The American head of state refused to negotiate with the ruthless German leaders. Magnes distinguished between peoples and governments, yet he saw no reason to continue the brutality on the account of an American dislike for Germany's rulers. This was especially true since almost all the belligerents agreed to the president's outline for peace. The British and Germans had already met to discuss the exchange of war prisoners. The best way to initiate peace was to meet and negotiate face to face. Wilson desired conclusive evidence that an agreement represented the will of the German people. Magnes insisted that negotiating with Germany would support the liberal and democratic elements in Germany. He asked that Congress develop means of communication with the elected German representatives. The rights of peoples must be guarded; political and industrial imperialists must be dethroned since they seek to make empires out of the weaker peoples of the world. To this end he expanded his suggestion for peace to forbid exclusive economic leagues and guarantee the fair participation of all nations in international trade. He went so far as to suggest international disarmament and the commitment by nations not to

use force but rather to settle differences through international arbitration. This would insure the equality of nations, the free development of national and spiritual cultures, and an enduring peace.²⁴

During the war Magnes was harassed by the Justice Department. The government not only attempted to silence him, but jailed many conscientious objectors and like spirited people. The radical rabbi decried this abridgment of freedom and after the war ended, worked for general amnesty for political prisoners. He opposed the draft from the time of its initiation believing it to be involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution.²⁵ He claimed that the Selective Service Act and the Espionage Act were designed to force conscientious objectors either to violate their conscience and religious beliefs, or technically to violate the law. Certainly there were draft resisters who used force of arms or fraud, but this was a small minority. If the nation wanted unity in war and wished to suppress the convictions of some, this should have been staged explicitly. Rather, the government found pretexts for jailing those of different beliefs. Oftentimes people were sent to dungeons because the patriotism of juries was evoked so that they would accept indirect and/or circumstantial evidence, when substantial evidence was lacking. This was cruel and unusual punishment comparable to the injustices of the Russian Czar

and the German Kaiser. Those in power wished to suppress socialists and radicals. The same social conditions existed as prior to the war. Magnes and those of like spirit would not be silenced, but would continue to pose a threat to those in power.²⁶

On humanist and socialist ideals he opposed the United States government's policy toward Soviet Russia. He spoke against the blockade of Russia and demanded that food be sent to the starving Russian people. The State Department must stop supporting, with money for arms and propaganda, the counter-revolutionaries. He abhorred violence and bloodshed including the savage Red-Terror. Nonetheless for the bloodstained Western governments to deny the Soviet government recognition, to deny the Russian people food, and to support the slaughter of thousands of innocent people by the counter-revolutionaries was criminal. As well as having been the first government to offer general peace proposals (at Brest-Litovsk), the Bolsheviks offered cease fire and amnesty to all Russians and moderate peace proposals to the other forms of government set up in other provinces. The Western governments suppressed the publication of these proposals and the gains secured for workers by the Soviets. Wilson may have been correct in calling Bolshevik proposals crude, but they were open, honest, just and understandable by all. The Western imperialists were afraid of the victory

of a new social order and wanted to show the communist government to be cruel, inefficient, and hopeless by starving the Russians. The Western leaders were afraid of a new order which would improve the world; these leaders were responsible to the capitalists and not the peoples.²⁷

Ultimately he called for action by individuals of good will to relieve human suffering. The American Red Cross and the American Relief Administration were dependent upon the State Department and only aided the counter-revolutionary forces. Food and medicine must not be tools for the political and military gain of the counter-revolutionaries. In conjunction with the Quaker American Friends Service Committee and under the influence of Magnes, the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee successfully sent supplies to Russia. The "Joint" especially directed resources for relief to sufferers of pogroms perpetrated by counter-revolutionary forces.²⁸

The Washington Armament Conference was characterized as an eleventh hour attempt by the leading powers to hold together the present world order. The imperialists wanted to hold together the present world order and divide the world for their own exploitation. The agreement with regard to China was a new attempt for joint exploitation rather than separate activities. Imperialism held an economic theory that the world resources were for profit and not the common use and satisfaction of humanity's needs.

This breeds warfare and resentment and will lead to revolution among the oppressed and exploited. No such thing existed as a satisfied imperialism; it was insatiable, always seeking wider extension. The imperialists may give the appearance of relinquishing control of government but in reality they maintain the economic advantage to assure the free play of economic imperialism. The imperialists have no interest in ten million starving Russians nor in the Russian dictatorship, but only in using the economic resources of Russia. Each world power supports factions within Russia in order to strengthen its own position and weaken that of another. A fundamental change is needed. This must be based on human freedom and the sanctity of human life. The present social order is incapable of this change because productive resources are used for selective profit and not the common satisfaction of human needs.²⁹

Magnes advocated a social order wherein freedom and democracy were essential. Democracy in politics, economics, and educational and spiritual enterprises was essential. He tired of government terrorism and brutality. Human life must never be taken. This pacifist commitment separated him from other radicals. He opposed any violence by governments or by the proletariat. At the same time he asserted the right of free speech. He believed that only when speeches were in the background and violence committed, does the government have the right to intervene. Proving one another wrong in

free discussion will prevent violence. Unfortunately the substance of social change that denies private property is too threatening for those in power. The workers were beginning to realize solidarity and power. He advocated the intelligent use of this power. The infection of society by the capitalist/imperialist power elements was severe. The media, which has great influence on public opinion, was controlled by the power elements.* Religious organizations and congregations as well as universities were also infected. The task was formidable. The workers must first strike for the improvement of economic conditions and then use economic strikes to effect political change. He was a revolutionary pacifist advocating non-violent mass worker action.³⁰

In times of crisis Judaism always provided a source of spiritual light. Magnes participated in the search for the spiritual justification for Jewish existence. The "Reformed Jewish Church - to use the name given it by its devotees - which exists only in Western Europe and in America, has proven to be bankrupt."³¹ The "church's" cardinal doctrine of the last one hundred years has been the universality of Israel and Israel's mission to the nations. This has led to nothing substantive. The same could be said of Orthodox

*It is interesting to note that Magnes had two close associates in the media, Cyrus Sulzberger and Oswald Garrison Villard, the latter a fellow pacifist.

institutions no longer in the control of the masses of Jews in Eastern Europe and America. Certainly these institutions served some charitable functions and gave Jews a sense of encouragement, but they had lost touch with the living spirit of Judaism. Jewish spirituality must be developed and expressed in ways of life and hope - morally, artistically, politically, and socially. Jewish ideals must be maintained even when tested by anti-Semitism. When catastrophe overwhelms it is not rationality but spirituality which sustains people. Jewish experience and Torah study, in the broad sense which includes the totality of Jewish literature, sharpened both Jewish spirituality and intellect. This spirituality lives strong in the masses of the Jewish people. The tradition permeates all sections of the Jewish masses. Fundamental expression of the Jewish ideals can be summed up in the "fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man".

Judaism and the Jewish people developed a "Jewish National" and a "Jewish International". The former was the people's intense sense of unique individuality. The latter was the intense consciousness of a universal membership in the family of peoples. This is a powerful force which often causes Jews to be hated. Magnes hoped this could be a positive force in the world. The "Jewish International" depends on the "Jewish National" for existence. The former is a projection into the world of the spiritual forces animating the latter. This is not a nationalism of domination,

but answers to the higher calling of God. All of humankind is thus linked in "brotherhood". Practical aspects of Jewish life must seek to develop both the "Jewish National" and the "Jewish International" and a synthesis of the two. The synthesis already exists. The principal cohesive factor is the Jewish Religion. By itself, this is now insufficient. Common industrial, economic, and social interests, as well as ideals, must be developed. The cohesive factor must remain in the realm of the spiritual, be it religious, moral, political, or social. Israel's dispersion among the nations will be key to the role and relationship of the Jewish state to other nations. The Jewish land holds national memories and offers the "Jewish National" opportunity for renewal. This is another element of cohesion. The Jewish state will become the center of creative Jewish spiritual power.³¹

It has already been mentioned that Magnes was concerned with the guarantee of the rights of small nations without the use of arms. He was concerned particularly with the rights of the Jews as a small nation. He defined the term nation in the broadest sense: "Any considerable group who regard themselves as a nation as they themselves define the term."³² In common usage the term nation is often interchangeable with nationality, people, race, ethnic group, state, citizenship, country, and land. Clarification of the term with regard to the Jews could reduce quarrels among

those in mutual agreement. Millions of Jews regard themselves as a nation; some do not. These millions wish the Jews to continue to be a nation; this is a "national will to live".³³ The question as to whether the Jews are a nation becomes merely academic. In America the use of the terms nation or national, raises a question of dual allegiance. The use of the term people eases the problem. Referring to the Jews as a race does not imply a pure race; no such thing exists. It does not have mystical implications. Simply it means that for centuries Jews have been attempting to marry within the Jewish group. Jews share the common languages of Hebrew and Yiddish for general, literary, and spiritual expression. Many present elements of daily Jewish life are derived from common experiences and a consciousness of the shared past. It also happens that non-Jews judge Jews not as individuals but as members of a class. For the most part, this is in a hostile sense.

Jews share common spiritual interests. On the highest conceptual level Jewish values are universal in character. A national Jewish culture exists which includes many aspects of cultures of other nations. There is Jewish liturgy, tradition, ceremonies, holidays, literature, aspirations, and religious life which manifest a national quality. Other nations make claim to nationhood on their own soil. The Jews are spread around the world and live dependent on the rights

of groups in the various countries where they live. In the United States the recognition of rights is individual and not national and the condition of Jewish peoplehood is cultural and not political. The Jewish right to Palestine is not dependent upon all the Jews being there. It will be a Jewish center for all the Jewish people. The Jewish state is needed to guarantee the liberty to develop the Jewish soul, life, and hope.³⁴

Jewish people constitutes a living organism. There must be unity but this is not to imply uniformity or unanimity. Different kinds of creative Jewish forces must be utilized. The Jewish workers can play a significant role with regard to the development of the Jewish people and Judaism, as well as in connection with the Jewish mission to other nations. In opposing exploitation and using creative energy for the benefit of others, Jewish workers identify with all workers of the world. Jews and all oppressed peoples must be set free. A free world and a free Jewish people go one with the other. This is part of the experience of internationalism of the Jewish people. Freedom will ultimately displace militarism and imperialism. The League of Nations is a league of governments and statespersons. In order to strengthen the new social order, a league of labor is needed. All workers - Jewish and non-Jewish have a common task. The "Jewish International" can help in making these connections.

This is in keeping with the traditional Jewish involvement in social change. Anti-semitism can not stop the Jews from doing that which is right and just. Ultimately the burden of doing right in the Jewish state will fall upon the Jewish workers.³⁵

Jewish labor must strengthen the Jewish people, organizing for the specific Jewish expression in all cultural and spiritual movements of humankind. The input of workers is needed to insure freedom. No peace conference has the right to "give" Palestine to the Jewish people. This right can only be secured by self-determination. Being "given" Palestine will place a burden on the Jewish people. The Jewish people will stand as interlopers against the Arab nations, as a people seeking favors from imperialist powers. It is essential to develop positive relations with the other peoples in Palestine through processes of education, frankness, patience, and devotion to democracy. True freedom can not be sacrificed to favoritism. The Zionist Organization of America at the Pittsburgh Conference called for worthy economic and political programs in Palestine. It is easy for slum owners in America to speak big about beautiful programs in Palestine. This is lip-service. The workers of Zion must establish these programs for real and in earnest. The workers are an integral part of the Jewish organism and when organized can be equal to organized employers and

organized capital. The traditional religious material of Judaism must be woven into a new fabric - the Jewish religion of tomorrow.³⁶

During the World War I period Magnes' moral absolutism became obvious. His pacifist commitment to uphold the sanctity of life was carried into the totality of his ideology and activities. He rejected Zionist associations with the allies. Firstly, because it jeopardized the Jewish settlers living in Palestine under Turkish rule. He feared a mixing of issues would split the American Jewish community; it certainly caused his separation from parts of the Zionist community. Later in the period when his socialist philosophy was more developed, he rejected the Zionist association with imperialist favoritism.

The commitment to human life and the reduction of human suffering led him to work for relief to Soviet Russia. He believed that the best way to prevent war was to build peace. This period marked a broadening of his perspectives to a full world view. He hoped that the Russian proletariat revolution would be a start in establishing a new global social order. He desired for the Jewish people and a new Jewish state to assert its mission and help set this new order on firm spiritual foundations. This new order could only be engendered in freedom for peoples and the consciences of individuals. He wanted to integrate thoroughly democracy

into all human institutions - economic, political, social, cultural, and religious. Workers are an international oppressed class, falling prey to the profit motive and imperialist exploitation. Oppressed ethnic groups, the Jews are one of these groups, are victimized by these same forces. In a basic way, the competition for the exploitation of resources to provide gain for a select few is the cause of wars. He called for mass worker non-violent action. Besides mentioning the use of strikes he does not delineate his ideas. He is also unclear concerning the nature of the input desired from Jewish workers to help develop the Jewish people and heritage.

He utilizes the term spirituality often. Nonetheless the conceptual reference for this term is vague. An eternal Jewish search for God is mentioned. He also uses the term broadly to include the areas of humanities, social science, and culture. Distinction is made between rationality and the intellect on one side and spirituality on the other. It is unfortunate that a clearer sense was not established for this much used idea.

By his outspoken statements of conscience with regard to civil liberties and pacifism, Magnes was alienated from American life, Jewish life in America, and the Zionist Organization. He wrote to Israel Zangwill in April of 1922 that he felt damned for having spoken freely, from the depths

of his Jewish conscience.³⁷ A year earlier (March, 1921) he sent a letter to his friend Gotthold Weil in Berlin expressing a need to get away to Palestine. He felt as if he were a constant storm center.³⁸ Moved by a need for more freedom than the land of liberty could offer and by a desire for the total Jewish life which could be developed in Palestine, the Magnes family left America for an extended visit in Palestine in 1922; this visit resulted in a permanent move. En route to Palestine he represented the "Joint" in Central and Eastern Europe. The mission sought to mobilize the creative Jewish forces in these areas and aid in the rehabilitation of the devastated communities. He sought the spiritual in the processes of education. He was to dedicate the rest of his life to building the Hebrew University as a center for Jewish education and spirituality.

He did not reassociate with the Zionist Organization when he moved to Palestine. Rather he sought to build Palestine in a practical way. He saw social evils and sought to alleviate them. In all his efforts he strove to build understanding and cooperation between Arabs and Jews. Working for prison reform he was supported by both groups and succeeded in improving prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. His commitment to freedom led him to help those with positions diametrically opposed to his own, including suspected terrorists. He also experienced some success in

gaining cooperation of the Arabs and Jews with the British in order to drain malaria swamps. He cultivated relationships and bridges for building understanding and peace within all three groups. Whenever possible he tried to serve as a mediator, bringing the groups together in a practical manner.³⁹

During the period between the World Wars his major occupation was the Hebrew University. As early as 1913, in letters to Weizmann, he expressed the idea of building a university in Jerusalem as central to the development of Jewish values and Judaism. The university should be a major force in developing Jewish answers to modern problems.⁴⁰ In 1921 he noted that the force of the Jews is spiritual or not at all. Two and three years later he began developing the Hebrew University's central role in synthesizing Judaism and the best of human and universal civilization. Practically this was manifest in an Institute of Jewish Studies for developing Judaism.⁴¹ He hoped that the establishment of the Institute of Arabic and Oriental Studies would help bridge the gap between Arabs and Jews.⁴² The university was always a place for free expression as long as it was non-violent. In the official university functions he strove to be sensitive to all. In 1925 when the Hebrew University officially opened, he expressed reservations about the participation of Lord Balfour in the ceremonies. He did not want the university to

become an anti-Arab political symbol, even if it were viewed as such only through Arab eyes.⁴³ He served as chancellor with the same spirit and values that animated the whole of his life.

With respect to his pacifist views, they were now solidly fused with the democratic and social values he had developed. This combination was now nourished in an active building of Zion. The prophetic Return to Palestine was to take shape in peace. In 1924 he established the Peace Committee and proposed an agreement between Arabs and Jews. He stressed four points: The development of a constitution which would lead to self-government by Arabs and Jews. A limited period of Jewish immigration in which the Jews would gain a majority population in Palestine. Common economic development benefiting Arabs and Jews. A larger union or federation of Palestine with its Arab neighbors. The establishment of this league would provide a larger Arab background which would allay the fears of the Palestinian Arab minority in the Jewish State.⁴⁴ He taught peace to both Arabs and Jews. In 1925, friends of Magnes founded the Brit Shalom. He helped them develop proposals for a constitutional bi-national government. He did not join the group because he did not want to surrender to majority decisions.⁴⁵

After the brutal Arab riots of 1929, he wrote in his diary that it was an act of faith for a Jew to live with the

Arabs in Palestine. It was even more important for the Jews not to label the Arabs in the same ways that anti-Semites labeled Jews.⁴⁶ Palestine is a holy land for two peoples - the Arabs and the Jews - and three religions - Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. All must strive harder for cooperation politically, economically, culturally, and socially. The entire enterprise of the Jewish people was not worthwhile if the Jewish State could only be brought to existence "upon the bayonets of some Empire". The lack of understanding on all sides made things difficult. Consideration must be given to Jewish, Arab, and international points of views. A non-violent solution must be found. It is increasingly more difficult to make concessions when it is tantamount to submitting to and thus rewarding terrorism and violence. Despite the violence Jews must exist upon internal spiritual strength.⁴⁷

He was willing to yield a Jewish state and majority for a democratic state that guarantees Jewish immigration, Jewish settlement of the land, and Hebrew life and culture. The Jews will continue to survive without Palestine. The three chief elements in Jewish life are a living Jewish people, the broad development of Torah, and the land of Israel. The land is one of the chief means for revivifying the people and the Torah, but both can exist creatively without the land. The Jewish people is sui generis and both the diaspora and

Palestine are important to healthy Jewish survival. A Zionism of despair is insufficient. The quality of Israel must be developed in connection with Hebrew culture and working the soil. This importance of Jews and Judaism to the Jews must be balanced against the importance of Arabs and Islam to the Arabs. Only by doing this will a better understanding be reached. The Jews must not succumb to power lust. A new type of nation must be built on justice and generosity. The ends and the means need to be consistent. Democracy must be essential even when the Jews are a minority. The suppression of the Arab will is against Jewish conscience, as well as Arab and European sensibilities. In the end it will only lead to the Jewish State being overrun by the large Arab populations of the region. The prophetic ideals must be upheld in the face of Arab and British hostility.⁴⁸

Joint Jewish and Arab agricultural settlement would provide a step towards building community. It was also important for the Jews and Arabs to begin working together in establishing democratic self-rule. When the White Paper included no support for bringing together Jews and Arabs, he set out to get a moderate statement from Arab leaders which would help bring about a meeting of Jews and Arabs. He did not want a Jewish state if the result was war with the Arab world. He opposed partition for this reason. In 1931 he proposed a plan for progressive stages of bi-national self-government to the British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope.

The first step called for municipal elections to choose local councils. Next a general legislative council would be elected. One Jewish Palestinian and one Arab Palestinian would then be appointed by the High Commissioner, as heads of governmental departments, to the Executive Council. These governmental heads would be responsible to the legislature. The mandate would then be terminated and a free bi-national state would join the League of Nations. In 1936 when Wauchope sought to implement the first stages of this type of plan, the Jewish Agency blocked the effort. The Jewish Agency feared that the partially elected and partially appointed council would increase restrictions on Jewish immigration, especially from Germany.⁴⁹

The rise of Nazism in Germany brought a new attack against Jews as bearers of Judaism. The Jewish mind and spirit must overcome the German onslaught. Germans feared the Jewish ideals of social righteousness, ethics, care for the less able, glory of life and spirit, and the unity of God. Israel represented the anti-paganism Germany sought to destroy. The Hebrew University must lead the struggle against the world spread of anti-Semitism. This must be done first in a practical way; as many German Jewish scholars as possible were brought to Jerusalem. The University must also strive to develop new human values on the basis of Jewish tradition.⁵⁰ The University must rededicate itself to seek

truth; the German universities did the will of the state. The "Chosen People" must rededicate themselves to serving God and in this way oppose the German ideal of brute force.⁵¹ The human spirit desires communion with others who meet the challenge of intellectual pursuit. The events in Germany restrict this. The Jews have overcome this already. The community of the Hebrew University and German Jewry are joined in a great communion despite the fact that they have never seen one another. This success gives hope that, even in such terrible times, it can be remembered that each person has something of the Image of God. The spark must be pursued no matter how feebly it burns.⁵² This demands boldness and courage.

Germany asserted the primacy of nation over all else. The building of Jewish life in Palestine has brought about an intensification of Jewish living and thinking. This must be kept in perspective. The Zionist conception that a Jewish State is the only solution to the Jewish problem must be shown false. The center of the Jewish people is in Palestine, but the people still retain a universal character. There is still intense Jewish life in the diaspora. The concentration of Jews in Palestine is neither intrinsically good nor evil. The Jewish reality is that the world Jews are endangered and the borders of Palestine are narrow. The high quality of Jewish life must continue in an active fashion. In both doctrine

and deed the Jewish people must strive to be virtuous. The nationalistic context causes a conflict of ideals. Magnes is caught in the struggle:

It is interesting, indeed rather disconcerting to find out what changes may come over men and groups when confronted with the realities of nationalism in Palestine. It does not seem to be an isolated phenomenon for a man to be a pacifist in New York and a militarist in Palestine. The Jewish labour group, which would correspond roughly to the internationalist labour groups in America are, besides having their very high social ideals, shot through with chauvinism, while conservative orange growers who are not particularly liberal in their outlook, find that their own economic needs require a liberal policy in relation to Arab labour.⁵³

This struggle foreshadows a later crisis of conscience.

In this period Magnes held the values he had previously developed and applied them to new situations. Having grown tired of being a constant center of controversy, his approach mellowed. The university and education were the means for spiritual development and the practical integration of the best of human civilization and Judaism. He protected these values and tried to build bridges of understanding between the Arabs, the Jews and the British.

In the political/social/economic arena he worked towards a bi-national constitutional democracy of Arabs and Jews. At first, he sought to establish a Jewish majority and a Jewish state. In order to avert war and to prevent the building of a Jewish state upon the destruction of Arab self-determination, he was prepared to sacrifice both the Jewish

state and majority. For this he demanded guarantees for Jewish immigration, Jewish land settlement, and a Hebrew life and culture. The common economic development of the state must be beneficial for both Arabs and Jews. He hoped for a larger Middle Eastern union. This is a practical development of his earlier yearning for a new world social order. This would also lessen Arab fears about a Jewish majority in Palestine.

His ideas about the relationship between the Jewish State and the diaspora did not change. He believed that all Jewish life would be rejuvenated by the Jewish State. He also believed that creative Jewish life is possible in the diaspora, and that Jews will survive without a state. The means to establishing the Jewish State must be consistent with the ends. The Jewish State at all levels needs to be built on a spiritual foundation, engendering the highest prophetic ideals. Understanding, justice, generosity, and non-violence are paramount values. Magnes was less restricted in the development of the universal values of Judaism in Palestine. There he did not feel threatened by the loss of distinctive Jewish qualities.

The rise of Nazism and World War II threw Magnes into an internal struggle. On the one hand he was torn by the abhorrence of war and on the other hand, by the need to prevent the destruction of European Jewry. The universal ideal and his particular Jewish concerns pulled him in different

directions. Previously, he always strove to apply his ethical standards in an absolute manner. The world situation forced him to weigh one value against another and compromise. The decision he made was not of an absolute character but relative to the particular circumstance. The intensity of his activity did not lessen because of this. In fact, the urgency of the crisis made greater demands on his time and energies. This period extends past World War II to his death in November 1948. His efforts for building peace in Palestine did not cease.

In 1939 he was invited to address the World Congress of Faiths in Geneva. Reluctant to leave Palestine during the crisis, he sent a paper. His doubts consumed him:

If you ask me, a Jew, what I would do if Germany was now at war, I confess that I very often feel that I must enlist against her. I pray that I might be given the strength to overcome this temptation and resist war, I do not know how. Yet I would want Germany beaten, for otherwise her rule and spirit might be imposed upon mankind.⁵⁴

That same year he and Martin Buber wrote to Gandhi that the question was a choice between a greater evil and a lesser evil. Hitler must be resisted. The war would be neither righteous, nor justifiable but necessary.⁵⁵

Though he agonized over his decision, his stand was clear. He believed in the pacifist faith but did not have "the strength to carry it through at the moment in practice".⁵⁶ Good can not come about by war. The war must be fought to prevent greater evil. Neither side was righteous. Wisdom and generosity were slight; bloodthirstiness and greed were

abundant. The evil of Hitler was greater than "the many iniquities within the imperialism and militarism of the so called democracies".⁵⁷ "Satan is abroad. The incarnation of the devil sits on the German throne";⁵⁸ It is through persecution that Satan expresses his will and hate. The war was on and no one could remain impartial. Hitler must be stopped. "If democracy, freedom, goodness may happen to result, it is not because of the war but in spite of it".⁵⁹ Israel must survive this affliction in order to serve God.

His support of the allied war effort was active. The university should play a role to defeat Germany, provide for the needs of the people living in Palestine, and set the groundwork for an enduring peace, especially between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine. This war was a peoples' war in the sense that no one was safe from air attacks. All must be involved, including the students and faculty of the university. He favored a draft for those who were able to fight. Lacking conscription, all unmarried men between the ages of twenty and thirty should volunteer. Those who do not serve in the military should do other war service. Some people could serve in the Palestinian police force. Scientists should devote themselves to work in fields related to the war effort.⁶⁰ The war only served to make the poor, poorer, and the needy, needier. Utilizing personal and university influence, Magnes worked with both Hadassah and the "Joint"

to alleviate human suffering. He urged students to do some kind of social service in addition to their studies.

Even while the war was raging he urged the members of the university community to think hard on the problems troubling humankind. The university strives to increase knowledge through hard thinking. Now the need to develop human uses for that knowledge is even more important. Collective, systematic thought must be used to examine every basic assumption. With open minds, it is necessary to reevaluate the work in every subject and make the needed revisions. In politics the principle of nationalism must be reviewed. It is not desirable to wipe out cultural distinctiveness. Is it necessary to have a sovereign state to protect a cultural nationality? In bi-national and multi-national states, it is necessary to maintain a balance. Internationalism must be taken seriously and a successful replacement for the League of Nations needs to be developed. Ultimately, the imperialism, which to a large degree is cause for this conflict, must be converted to a force for the better organization of humanity. The main elements of Jewish morality can serve as a basis for the new world order; they are compassion, kindness, mercy, and the love of truth.⁶¹ For the first time, the abhorrence of bloodshed is conspicuously absent from his list of fundamental Jewish values.

Individual responsibility is the essence of democracy. The Nazi infection will remain when the Nazis are gone. To

build up a life based upon the values stated above, it is necessary to develop new attitudes toward private property. Bombed out houses and businesses demand this. Individual sacrifices are required from all. Unshackled capitalism has led to marvels of production and at the same time unemployment and poverty. People must take precedence over profits. The amassing of great wealth by a few has not led to equivalent social obligations. A socialism of unselfish democracy should be developed in Palestine. The intellectual capacity exists to achieve this; it is a moral challenge. Room for variation is possible, when the main motive is that wealth be socially useful.

The Jewish people have a double responsibility. One is universal and one is particular. The Jews are among the first and last to make self sacrifice and the first and last to be victims. As believers in democracy, there can be no rest while half the world is free and half is enslaved. National unity can not be built on the persecution of others. The spiritual forces of Judaism are needed to bolster sagging moral powers. The Jews can bring to the world the directive of Sinai.⁶³

Magnes opposed the use of violence in Palestine. He hoped that Jewish/Arab cooperation, in the war effort with Britain, would lead to other cooperative ventures. He often served as a mediator between groups, constantly striving to

deepen communication. Though critical, he generally upheld the laws of the Mandate authority. At first he was opposed to illegal immigration. In the face of the destruction of European Jewry, he changed his opinion. It would be inhuman to reject refugees fleeing from certain death. He reproached terrorists but never returned to absolute pacifism. "Every people has the natural right to rebel against its oppressors, if there be no other way".⁶⁵ The use of arms was only for self-defense. He preferred passive resistance, but allowed for killing when there was no chance for escape or reason.⁶⁶

He condemned the Christian nations for not stopping the Nazi destruction of the Jews. Even the democracies became totalitarian, by using force to subject free persons to a common will. He felt an increased need for Palestine to be a haven for Jewish refugees. The Western democracies should ease quotas and admit more refugees. His beliefs about Jewish life in Palestine and the diaspora did not change.

The setting up of bi-national institutions in Palestine, would increase Arab/Jewish cooperation. The British failed to bring Jews and Arabs together. The entire Semitic world would benefit by the common development of Palestine. As before he called for more Arab and Jewish participation in government and less British involvement. Nonetheless, he favored British trusteeship in the area prior to the founding of an independent state. The British have interests in the

area and greater administrative experience. International trusteeship has not been effective. Parity in government and population must be established between Arabs and Jews. Partition both reduces the area for Jewish settlement and creates a situation of perpetual conflict.

The most difficult problem to overcome in creating a bi-national state is fear. The Jews need large immigration. The Arabs fear domination. Parity in population and land ownership is a prior condition to cooperation and understanding. A Swiss model would insure equal political rights and duties. A larger Middle East union will aid in economic and social development of the region. Jews might even settle in other sparsely populated Arab lands.

The economic should precede the political. Increasing the prosperity of the nations involved would facilitate political cooperation. This development would be difficult because of the economic dissimilarities between the countries. The states would need to give up economic sovereignty to a regional council. The council would determine the needs of each country and coordinate the use of natural resources, industry, agriculture, distribution, and consumption for the states involved to the benefit of all. A joint commission in Palestine would help coordinate the economic activities there. As the economic union developed, the political union could slowly be brought into being.⁶⁶ Even when the bi-

national proposal had been rejected by the United Nations in favor of partition, Magnes worked for the creation of a larger union of nations. He hoped that this would prevent war. It did not.

Chapter Four: Findings From Archival Research

This chapter considers the findings from my archival research. The same framework for discussion utilized in the previous chapter is employed in this presentation. The material is divided chronologically into four periods: pre-World War I; World War I - 1914-1921; the interim time between World War I and World War II - 1922-1938; the period of World War II and the Holocaust to the death of Magnes - 1939-1948. Within each period the archival material is presented in order to do the following: to define further and focus the development of Magnes' beliefs and commitments; to add to the description concerning depth of dedication to his values; and to elucidate further the values Magnes held. Also included is a discussion of the degree to which Magnes' contemporaries seriously considered his positions and ideas.

The strength of Magnes' Zionist commitment is further evidenced by the demands he made upon others. In the minutes from the Federation of American Zionist Executive meeting of September 23, 1906 Magnes recorded his own request that the Executive Committee's Rules regarding attendance be enforced. The committee approved this request and in his position as Secretary, Magnes sent a reminder and a copy of the rules to each absentee.¹

Two letters from Magnes to David Wolffsohn, then the Chairman of the World Zionist Organization Executive and General Council and later the second president of the

Organization, display Magnes' concerns about Zionist unity and the focus on Palestine which preshadows his dispute with Brandeis in 1915. In a letter dated November 23, 1905 the American urges unity among Jews worldwide. Now that both sentiments were rising in the United States, he asserted that the Federation of American Zionists should act to unify territorialists and pro-Palestinian Zionists. An international Jewish congress must be directed toward gaining national, then international solidarity, and finally culminating in Zionist commitment on the part of World Jewry. On June 19, 1906, Magnes wrote to Wolffsohn stressing the need for the Zionists to concentrate their activities and resources in Palestine. The secretary agreed that the Federation of American Zionists will support the World Organization but want projects in Palestine to have first priority.²

In both these letters Magnes also stressed the need for democracy and a degree of decentralization within the World Zionist Organization. In 1905 he asserted that the American Zionists are much more knowledgeable about American politics than the Zionist Central bureau. He claimed that all statements to the United States government should be made through the Federation of American Zionists with the American Executive Committee making the final judgement.³ Magnes protested to Wolffsohn in 1906 that the Federation of American Zionists

was far from the center of activity and that the official Zionist publications used no English, effectively excluding much of the American community.⁴

Within the Reform Movement Magnes was a voice for free expression. In 1907, Kaufmann Kohler forced the resignations from the Hebrew Union College of three professors who were proponents of Zionism. Magnes and Harry Friedenwald responded on behalf of the Federation of American Zionists.* At this time they were serving the Federation as secretary and president, respectively. Though an actual copy of the letter was not found in the archival material, they reported its contents to the Executive Committee on May 13, 1907. The minutes record the two claiming Kohler's attacks against Zionism to be unfounded and as libelous as anti-Semitic calumny perpetrated against Jews.⁵

In 1907 Magnes prepared for a trip to Palestine. In making this journey he was concerned that he be able to communicate with all inhabitants of Palestine. On April 9th he wrote to David Wolffsohn requesting an Arabic speaking guide for his trip in June.⁶ Magnes' sensitivity to the Arab community developed throughout the years. It is important to

*Meyer, 64-67. Meyer concludes that money and personality were additional factors concerning these resignations. Nonetheless the issue of Zionism was primary.

note that during this early period, when Arab nationalism was only beginning to develop as a political movement, this American Zionist leader was developing an understanding of the rights and fears of the Arab population in Palestine. Most Zionist leaders were only concerned with the Arabs as a matter of defense against marauders or ideologically with respect to the use of Arab farm workers on Jewish settlements. This early concern, and its continuing development display Magnes' farsighted perspective on an issue which today remains a serious obstacle to peace in the Middle East.

During the period of the first World War, a time of radicalization for Magnes, the ideals expressed during the previous decade are developed and acted upon more fully. The issues of Jewish unity, the primacy of Palestine and Jewish spirituality to Zionism, democracy within the Zionist Organization, and concern over relations with the Arab community in Palestine came together in his dispute between Louis D. Brandeis, the chairman of the Provisional Committee for General Zionist affairs. It is explained above that this dispute led to the latter's resignation. Exchanges between Magnes and members of the committee expand our understanding of this disagreement. These include communications between Brandeis and Magnes beginning with the latter's letter of resignation.

On June 30, 1915 Judah Magnes submitted his resignation from the Provisional Executive Committee to its chairman.

First and foremost he stressed that the need to build in Palestine a Jewish center for Jewish people was greater than ever. The Provisional Committee called for a congress of American Jews to discuss all phases of the Jewish problem. In doing this, the Zionist Organization was straying from its original goal. Zion ought to be the sole business of the Zionist organization. Besides this the call for a congress caused a split in the American Jewish community. Allegiance to Zion is needed for the Zionist Organization. Allegiance to other causes are for other groups. The Zionist cause is "a Jewish cause from whatever point of view" and the Zionist organization should urge unity among all Jews.⁷

The American Jewish Committee called for a representative conference of all groups as a show of good will and a desire for a common platform. The Zionist Organization, which once held Jewish unity as a cardinal principle, rejected this attempt to facilitate American Jewish unity. Magnes condemned this as an attempt to gain party advantage. This was more compelling because by its very nature a congress would exclude many Jews in the United States. The solution to the Jewish problem, including the Palestinian problem, was to be gained through unity. Magnes remained a member of the rank and file in the Zionist Organization and offered aid in the cause of Palestine.⁸

Brandeis and Magnes spoke further about this on July 12, 1915. The conversation is not recorded, but on September 2, 1915 the latter sent the chairman additional comments. These comments make clear the other concerns which lead to the rabbi's resignation. First he restated the explicit program of the Zionist Organization. The Organization called for equal rights for Jews throughout the world and a "secure homeland" for the Jewish people in Palestine. The phrase "secure homeland" was not clearly defined. He perceived the ambiguity of this phrase as a problem. The radical Rabbi placed himself into the position of the Ottomans. He explained to Brandeis that the Ottoman Empire was at war and there is no reason that they should not be suspicious of this phrase. The Zionists claim equal rights for Jews worldwide. The Zionist Organization wants "more than equal rights for Jews in Palestine". Magnes suggested that the Jews seek equality with others in Palestine as well. This means political and cultural freedom for the Jews. The Jews must have the right to migrate and settle in Palestine. In Palestine the Jews must be guaranteed economic and cultural freedom. The Zionist Convention in Boston made no mention of loyalty to the Ottoman sovereigns. He stated that the radicals demanding a "secure homeland" in this manner were endangering the Jews in Palestine and the international Zionist Organization.⁹

Magnes asserted that Zionism must equal the "building up of a Jewish cultural center in Palestine through the inner cultural strength of the free Jewish people in Palestine, an Ottoman Province." The development must proceed from our faith in the creative powers of the Jewish people. A Jewish cultural center must be established, and then hopefully the numerical center of the Jewish people would grow in Palestine. In this way the Jewish people both in Palestine and in the diaspora will be strengthened. This type of growth cannot be the outcome of the war. Jewish creativity must be the prime moving force.¹⁰

The congress debate was a diversion from issues of Zionist concern. This diversion only brought about disunity, discord, and confusion under the guise of addressing the "Jewish question as a whole". Energies ought to be spent on protecting Jews in belligerent lands, gaining free entrance for Jews into Palestine, and securing freedom for Jews in Palestine. Rather the Zionist Organization was concerned with the organization and authority of American Jewish community. Magnes again offered his resignation from the Executive Committee. He did not wish to cause internal opposition. He hoped that conditions would change so that he could renew his active participation.¹¹

On October 5, 1915, Brandeis accepted Magnes' resignation with regret. He accepted the resignation on the grounds that Magnes was in stated disagreement with the Basle Program.¹²

On October 19, the rabbi responded that he was not in disagreement over the Basle Program but rather over the means of fulfilling it. He argued that the Zionist Organization, including Herzl, had always interpreted the basics of the Basle Program. Rather than excluding Zionists from the Zionist Organization, Magnes suggested a frank discussion be opened in which others besides he and Brandeis would be included.¹³

Brandeis' reply is not clear but Magnes acted to put such an exchange of ideas into motion. In late November he sent letters concerning his dialogue with Brandeis to the members of the Small Actions Committee in Europe. He also wrote Felix Warburg about the Basle Program dispute on November 29, 1915. In the previous chapter it was noted that he had a similar correspondence with the entire Executive Council. Only Ahad Ha'am responded, justifying Magnes. No replies were found in the material examined.

The Basle Program states:

Zionism seeks to establish a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end: 1) The promotion by appropriate means of the settlement in Palestine of Jewish farmers, artisans, and manufacturers. 2) The organization and uniting of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, both local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country. 3) The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and national consciousness. 4) Preparatory steps toward obtaining the consent of governments, where necessary, in order to reach the goal of Zionism.

This statement of purpose was Magnes' goal as well as the professed goal of the Zionist Organization. Both were working under the intentionally ambiguous "public law" to establish a home for the Jewish people. The original plan was an effort at compromise designed to include divergent groups. The term "public law" was used in order to render the statement acceptable to Zionists from both extremes.¹⁴ It would be inconsistent with the broad form of the statement to claim either Magnes or Brandeis in stated disagreement with the Basle Program.*

It is an interesting post-script to note that Brandeis had a dispute with Weizmann which led to his resignation as well as those of Julian Mack, Stephen Wise, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert Szold - from the Executive in 1921. The central concern was one voiced by Magnes in 1906. The Americans wanted a financial restructuring within the Zionist Organization to provide directly for the development of Palestine.¹⁵

Magnes helped found the "Joint" and became its president. Nonetheless he did not forget his Zionist commitment. The minutes of meetings from April 1916-February 1917, indicate that Magnes urged that Palestine support be a high priority.

*Szajkowski in Jews, Wars, and Communism (page 98) claims that Magnes' pacifism was also involved in this dispute with the pro-Ally Brandeis. This is not documented and I found no proof indicating that this issue was involved in Magnes' resignation.

On one occasion he felt it so important to secure additional funds for an ambulance that he wrote a letter to Albert Lucas, the "Joint's" secretary, in order that it would be emphasized at the meeting.¹⁶

In October of 1916, Magnes went to Europe on behalf of the "Joint". It appears from the entries on the microfilm that he kept a journal. In the journal he noted appointments, rough copies of letters, notes concerning the trip, and ideas which he was considering. The thoughts which had caused the disagreement with Brandeis were still being developed.

In a letter to Mr. S.¹⁷, Magnes discussed the building of a worldwide operation for strengthening the Jewish spirit. The Jewish spirit is confirmed in the Jewish religion. It is still important to gain political emancipation for all Jews. It is a right. Nonetheless the political cannot compare with the Jewish spirit. It has flourished without political emancipation. This is the Jewish force. Magnes expressed a need to coordinate this total Jewish power. The way to do this was through a Jewish educational institution of higher Jewish learning on Jewish soil in Palestine. The varied forms of study would include science, humanities, archaeology, and religion. He concluded that it would take millions of dollars to build this institution.¹⁸

Several journal entries consider various aspects of Jewish spiritual concerns. The Jewish people need strength

to fulfill the mission of Israel. The strengths of the Jewish people are material and organizational and also spiritual as manifest in Jewish literature and religion. This entry concludes with the equation:

$$\text{Pan-Judaism} = \begin{array}{l} \text{סגולה ישראל} \\ \text{סגולה ישראל} \\ \text{אחדות עם ישראל} \end{array}$$

Elements of the letter and this material are developed and published over the next few years.¹⁹ The expression "Pan-Judaism" is not found again. The three Hebrew terms indicate different types of unity which Magnes applies simultaneously to the Jewish people. This is the organic quality mentioned vaguely a year later in "The Jewish People - A Spiritual Force".²⁰ סגולה ישראל refers to the whole community of Israel. Magnes highly valued the social relationships indicated by community. This reference here to the community which also has a special relationship with God, emphasized the importance of the rights and responsibilities inherent in Magnes' sense of community. סגולה ישראל is all of Israel in the sense that each individual Jew is included regardless of religious affiliation, family background, or socio-economic status. אחדות עם ישראל , Israel is one people, indicates the various senses of nationality discussed in "The Rights of Jews as a Nation".²¹ Whatever definition is adopted in a particular environment, Magnes perceived an internal bond which unites all Jews.

Even though he sensed a cohesive spiritual quality joining Jews together, he was deeply troubled by the factionalization of the Jewish community. In his journal he noted with concern the fact that Jewish radicals were joining other non-Jewish world movements. Jewish groups were taking pot shots at one another to gain political advantages. This condition had lead to Magnes' resignation from the Executive of the Zionist Organization; a year later he still urged all Jewish groups to work together. He expressed the need for revitalization of Jewish life so that Judaism could grow as a spiritual force, promoting life in a hostile world. All Jews need not be of one mind but the shared common purpose could be achieved by varied means. The differences should be voiced with decency and truth not with intrigue. This conflict of ideas would be best carried out through hard debating of the facts and issues. He mused that the positive building of cooperation could even bring together the Reform Jews and the Chasidim.²²

Magnes hoped to maintain Jewish life in modern life and deepen Jewish life through modern life. To do this individual Jewish commitment and national Jewish dedication must be developed. The Jewish people must be "ready to enrich ourselves through everything Jewish."²³

Though no direct evidence was found to support this, it seems that Magnes' ideas were influenced by Ahad Ha'am. The

two did correspond and, it would not be unreasonable to suspect that they might have even visited in London on Magnes' trip to Europe. The tone and content of these entries carries an affinity to the semi-mystical writings of Ahad Ha'am on Jewish spirituality and national unity.²⁴

The published material gives us a clear picture of the radical pacifist Magnes opposing World War I. The archival findings verify the description in the previous chapter. In November of 1916 Jacob Schiff requested the support of Magnes for the Neutrality Conference. On November 27 the rabbi replied that the League of Nations could not enforce peace, so he was in hearty accord with the purpose of the Conference. He offered his assistance. A year later Schiff did not provide Magnes with the same support.

The rabbi delivered a speech on March 24, 1917 in New York City's Madison Square Garden entitled The People Do Not Want War.²⁵ Magnes argued that the rhetoric developed to support United States involvement in the war was nothing more than the rationalizations of those for whom the war would provide material or political gain. The argument for involvement because of international law was a sham. In the final analysis the people utilizing this argument would bring the nation to war for the sake of an ambiguous legal technicality. Magnes declared that "Warfare can never redeem civilization... rather the rule of reason and the dominance of the moral

spirit" must be established. He explained that this is the way of God. The people did not want war and elected Wilson as a peace candidate. The president had properly declared that the war was equally horrible from either side's perspective and that all belligerents voiced the same aims in going to battle. The solution must be "peace without victory". Now the president sought to retreat from all he had said so that America could pick up the spoils. Not only was the war itself an evil but also the rise of militarism had brought a reduction of American liberty. He urged the audience to express their desire to avoid this self-degradation of America and tell Congress and the President to keep the United States from entering the war.²⁶

In response to this speech Schiff wrote on March 27 that he could not agree with the pacifist. The German submarine attacks had created a new crisis situation. In this circumstance the president must make the judgement concerning the involvement of the United States in the war. Schiff asserted that Wilson had been wise and prudent and must be trusted. Magnes' position would only cause irritation in the community.²⁷

It has already been shown that after the United States entered the war in April, Magnes' energies were concentrated upon ending the war. On May 21, 1917, he wrote to General Abel Davis, who was soon to be honored three times for his

part in leading the American forces in France. He faulted the American Jews for not opposing war in general and this war in particular. Though he stood in the minority, Magnes claimed to represent Jewish values. He told Davis that the Jewish tradition abhors bloodshed and rejects physical force as the final arbiter. There was no real, organized Jewish opposition to the war but Jews must nevertheless assert the Jewish passion for life and peace and uproot war.²⁸ Though Magnes stood alone within the Jewish community and among his associates, his conviction did not wane.

As mentioned above Judah Magnes felt alienated from life in America, American Jewry, and the Zionist Organization. His yearning for Palestine was great and in 1922 the Magnes family relocated to Jerusalem. The archival materials bear out the statement made above that this period saw no new developments in his moral commitments. Magnes attempted to apply his values to new situations. Though his approach had softened, the archival documents reveal that he still remained a center of controversy. This material provides us with a clearer perception of Magnes as mediator. The outspoken radical was still outspoken but was now a good deal more patient in his role as peacemaker. In this position he clearly understood his greatest obstacle was the abundant lack of trust between Arabs and Jews.

The archival material focuses upon the two major attempts at bringing about serious negotiations in the period between the World Wars. The first was from 1929-1930 and the second spans from 1936-1938. This material indicates the seriousness with which others considered Magnes' bi-national state proposals. These letters and accounts of meetings provide a picture of the consideration which his ideas received. The published materials explain more fully his views; Magnes often referred people to his printed statements. The archival papers show the application of these ideas to the political arena. Magnes' concern with Israel as the spiritual center of the Jewish people, not necessarily as a totally independent political state, gave him a flexibility in discussions with the Arabs and British which others did not have.

In 1926 Magnes was still concerned with the unity of the Jewish community. He wrote to Weizmann on the 5th day of October concerning a dispute between the Jewish Agency and the Joint Distribution Committee. Weizmann had asked for Magnes' assistance in working out an understanding. Magnes was unable to go to America with Weizmann. Nonetheless he set about bringing Weizmann and Louis Marshall, the president of the "Joint", to a working arrangement. Magnes emphasized the need for additional Jewish resources for Palestine. He told Weizmann that only through "united efforts - not only money, but also men and mind and spirit - of the whole Jewish people to give the Palestine enterprise a fair chance."²⁹

He assured Weizmann that Marshall, Warburg, Adler, Flexner and Herbert Lehman were all pro-Palestine. No one was an anti-Zionist at the "Joint". Even while attesting to the Zionism of these men, he asserted that Palestine was an all-Jewish enterprise. Institutional politics must be put aside and mutual understanding sought. The rabbi asked Weizmann to use his good office to end mudslinging in the name of the "priority of Palestine". Just as the "Joint" people must recognize the importance of Palestine, the Zionists must understand the all-Jewish point of view. Magnes actually believed in a synthesis of both views. The historical and spiritual implications concerning Palestine were primary. In the end he urges Weizmann to rise above personalities in this family quarrel. Both he and Marshall should allow each organization to rest on its own laurels and seek "peace without victory".³⁰

In this same letter Magnes addressed himself to the type of social structure which he hoped to see built in Palestine. He saw the Soviet revolution and the building up of socialism in Palestine as two great social experiments. Russian communism is militaristic and the chalutzim in Palestine are developing a pacifistic communism. The Soviets depend on the social revolution while the Jews are sacrificing now for the new society.³¹

The Arab riots in 1929 fired Magnes' sense of urgency for peace. He made contact with a one time British diplomat

and now unofficial advisor to the Saudi Arabian King Ibn Saud, H. St. John Philby who had submitted a peace proposal to the New York Times. With some changes Magnes found Philby's proposal acceptable.³² Magnes took it upon himself to broaden and strengthen the connections which could lead to peace. From the outset a lack of trust from the Zionists created controversy and Magnes became the target of attack in Palestine, Europe, and the United States.

A memo by Harry Sacher, an Agency representative in Palestine, reported a meeting on October 30, 1929. Magnes sought to gain allies with liberal sentiments in England and the United States for supporting self rule in Palestine. He had shown Sacher two documents. The first proposed a parliament with proportional representation of Jews and Arabs. The projected constitution would guarantee the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, as granted in the Balfour Declaration, and Jewish immigration. The British High Commissioner would control matters of defense and reserve a veto concerning mandate related decisions. They discussed the involvement of the League of Nations but Sacher's recollection is fuzzy. This document was written by Philby, though Magnes did not say so at the time.³³

The second document was authored by Magnes. It emphasized that Palestine was the land of three religions and not a single center for Jews, Arabs, or the English. He mentioned to

Sacher that he was considering publishing these proposals in the American press to facilitate an open discussion. The Agency representative advised against this; the rabbi said he would consider the matter.³⁴

The memo continued telling of meetings and communications which took place in early November. Magnes and Pinchas Rutenberg, then the head of the Va'ad Le'umni, had met with the High Commissioner. At this time they disagreed with one another. This caused great concern within the Jewish Agency and a series of meetings with Magnes, Rutenberg, Bentwich, and Sacher. Besides these meetings many rumors spread which portrayed the situation as being much worse than the bad scene it had been. The memo gives the opinion of both Sacher and Bentwich that Rutenberg's position had not been good for the Jews and made a poor impression with the High Commissioner.³⁵ Nonetheless this disagreement caused Magnes a great deal of bad publicity. Frederick Kisch, a member of the Agency's Executive, became one of Magnes' greatest opponents in this matter. He wrote a memo which so distorted the account of the meeting with the High Commissioner that both Magnes and Rutenberg sent Kisch letters of objection on November 14th and 15th respectively.³⁶

In another meeting reported in the memo, Sacher told Magnes that Philby was not to be trusted. The rabbi was cautioned against making any commitments to the Arabs without

reciprocal concessions in writing. He urged the peacemaker to go to London to meet with Weizmann concerning the details of the negotiations. Magnes did not go to London but cabled the information to the Zionist president. Magnes met with Ben Gurion five times between November 5th and 10th. Ben Gurion was not pleased with the University chancellor's ideas and activities. As a result the entire Palestinian executive requested that Magnes travel to London. At this time he was involved in efforts to gain support from the Labor Party and Rutenberg (later the two worked closely together in trying to bridge the Arab-Jewish gap), as well as meetings with the High Commissioner; a journey to London was out of the question.³⁷

The issue of trust was again the chief obstacle. Kisch sent two memos to the Zionist Executive which illustrate the problem from the Jewish side. On August 15, 1929 he insisted that the conditions which prevailed five years earlier, when he attempted failed negotiations with King Hussein and Great Britain, persisted. He claimed the Arabs will take no account of Zionist aspirations and even further restrict immigration. No basis existed for talks with the Arabs, even on the basis of the Brit Shalom proposal of a Parliament with equal Arab-Jewish representation, notwithstanding one group's numerical majority in the population. Kisch did not trust that the Arabs would respect guaranteed rights. Nonetheless he wanted the British to grant the Jews self-rule in Palestine. Holding this opinion, it is a wonder that he still supported

pursuing social and intellectual cooperation between Jews and Arabs. On November 20th he made his opinion clear that the Arabs are not ready for self-government because many Arabs are near savages. Kisch recommended that the Mandatory government take strong action to eliminate sedition prior to popular Arab participation in government.³⁸

These fears led to distortions of Magnes' position being spread to Europe and the United States. The archival materials contain letters, memoranda, and cables which indicate that stopping Magnes' activities was of great concern to many people. Other names not yet mentioned who were involved in this effort to discredit him include the American Jewish Congress, the Executive of the French Zionist Organization, the Executive of the Zionist Organization of America, the Palestinian Bar Association, Nahum Sokolow, Lords Melechett and Rothschild and the other members of the Zionist Organization's Political Commission Plenary, and his old associate in New York, Louis Lipsky. The Jewish Telegraphic Association Bulletin and the Jewish Daily Bulletin published statements reported to have been given them by Magnes which were slanderous.³⁹ He even considered a lawsuit but was dissuaded.⁴⁰ Instead he telegraphed a letter to the editor of the New York Day which was also published in the New York Times.⁴¹ In 1930 he published Like All Nations as an additional response and clarification of his position. Even Warburg and Kaplansky

who were favorably disposed to Magnes' position opposed the negotiations to preserve the authority and unity of the Jewish Agency.⁴²

It is clear from the minutes of the Agency's Political Committee meeting on November 11, 1929 that the misinformation which the Bulletins of November 24 had reported originated from the Committee. The minutes report Weizmann's explanation of the Philby-Magnes connection. Philby approached Magnes because the latter had connections with wealthy American Jews. According to Weizmann the rabbi's view was simple. "He did not consider that we should ever have peace with the Arabs unless we dropped the mandate and the Balfour Declaration."⁴³

The letter Magnes published in the Day and the Times clearly contradicts this opinion. He asserted that a peace agreement must be based on the Balfour Declaration and the White Paper. He proposed a bi-national settlement with safeguards for all races and religions. He saw free Jewish immigration according to the nation's absorption capability and the free development of Hebrew culture in Palestine as necessary ingredients for an agreement. He insisted that the Western powers could not impose a lasting solution upon the Jews and Arabs. The two groups must reconcile differences with one another. He called for the advancement of the high values of Judaism in the process of making peace.⁴⁴

On November 28, 1929 Kaplansky prepared a memo for the Palestinian Zionist Executive as an update to Sacher's Report. His account affirms the slanderous nature of Weizmann's statement and the articles published in the two American Bulletins. Magnes' greatest concern in the negotiations was to avoid bloodshed. Though an investigation of Philby's credentials showed him to be an adventurous journalist, it also appeared that he did represent members of the Arab Executive. Warburg confirmed, through Brandeis, what Magnes had asserted regarding the reluctance of the American Jews to raise money without a true Arab-Jewish settlement. In Kaplansky's opinion Magnes' approach was farsighted in that he called for a broad based economic, social, cultural, and political initiative before the Jews were compelled to make an agreement. Magnes asserted that helping the impoverished Arabs upgrade their lives was in the best interest of the Jews. Further confirmation of Magnes' position as stated above was included with the memo. A copy of a cable from Warburg to Weizmann on November 5, 1929 shows that Magnes was not in favor of an abrogation of the Balfour declaration or the Mandate. The University Chancellor's position was known to Weizmann six days prior to the latter's statement to the Political Committee.⁴⁵

The hardliners in the Arab community were also trying to discredit the Arab moderates and Magnes. A response to Like All The Nations was published on January 10, 1930 in the Arab

press. Kisch sent a translation from the Arabic "Sirat-El-Mustakin" to the Zionist Executive on January 22. The Arab journal stated that Magnes did not have support of the Jewish community for his parliamentary proposal. It continued to denounce the Arab papers which were lauding the rabbi's efforts.⁴⁶

On June 3, 1930 Magnes further clarified the areas of needed cooperation in a letter to Weizmann. In the economic area he explained that it was acceptable for the Jews to purchase Arab land but the peasants who have been living on the land must not be chased away. The Arab tenant farmers should be helped to develop modern agricultural methods and the tempo of Jewish immigration should correspond to this development. These matters should be regulated by an international commission. Cooperation needed to be improved in the areas of health, education, the use of natural resources, and public utilities. Politically he urged a democratic legislature based on a constitution, with Great Britain safeguarding the right of the Jewish National Home. He also pressed for economic and political cooperation with neighboring Arab states. All these proposals were made in order to reduce fear of a Jewish majority among the Arabs of Palestine.⁴⁷

A year later the attempts to discredit the peacemaker had failed. On November 19, 1930 Kisch invited Magnes to a meeting with other Jewish leaders who constituted the Bureau

on Relations Between Jews and Arabs. A month later the rabbi accepted the invitation, nevertheless making it clear that he held views which were different from the others.⁴⁸

The chancellor had not been content merely to talk. Magnes took practical steps to improve relations with the Arabs. Among the archival materials is a Kisch translation of an article in Al-Yarmuck, an Arabic journal published in Haifa. It had been reported on December 14 that the rabbi and three other Jews met with Arabs in Nazareth. As a result the Arabs established a Muslim association to promote better relations with the Jews. The four Jewish leaders agreed to help establish a bank to provide loans for Arab farmers.⁴⁹ Though some bridges were built and the Weizmann group had failed to compromise Magnes' reputation, these negotiations also failed.

During the interim period between negotiations Magnes continued to hold these views. On November 26, 1935 he wrote a private letter to Moshe Gluecksohn, the editor of Haaretz, a supporter of Weizmann, and a member of the Hebrew University's Board of Governors. The editor had published a condemnation of Dr. Bergman, the University's rector. He questioned Bergman's commitment to a secure Jewish Homeland in Palestine. The University president defended the rector's position; he explained that both Jewish and Arab aspirations are just and must be taken into account. Magnes asserted this is ultimately a matter of moral and religious concern.⁵⁰

A new period of negotiations began in May of 1936. Magnes was now working with G. Frumkin, M. Novomeysky, P. Rutenberg, and W. Smilansky. This group was developing contacts with Arabs who were willing to negotiate. This renewed effort was precipitated by an Arab general strike. This group sought full cooperation with the Jewish Agency; they worked to facilitate negotiations between Arab leaders and the Palestinian Executive. Moshe Shertok (later he renamed himself Moshe Sharett) was then the Agency's head. In a memo to Shertok on July 22, 1936, Magnes summarized the group's endeavors and indicated their dissatisfaction with the Executive's slow response. The group had met with members of the Executive, Ussichkin, Kaplan, J. Katznelson, B. Katznelson, and Shertok, on June 16. The Executive met later that day and Shertok reported that they were unanimously in favor of negotiations but split over the matter of fixing immigration; certainly no permits already issued would be waived. They would consult with Weizmann and Ben Gurion regarding this. It was also clear that they opposed any negotiations by parties other than the Political Department of the Agency. On June 24 a follow-up meeting took place between Ussichkin, Kaplan, and Shertok for the Agency and Novomeysky for the peace group. Novomeysky was promised a reply after the Executive consulted with Ben Gurion who was to be in Palestine shortly. When Magnes sent the memo to Shertok, Ben Gurion had already been

in Palestine and left, and no reply had come from the Executive.⁵¹
This was the start of difficulties between Magnes and Shertok.
The archival materials indicate that Shertok was less than
straightforward in his dealings with Magnes.

The president's views were basically the same as those
already explained and published in Like All the Nations. In
1936 when he was invited to testify before the Royal Commission
he sent them copies of this pamphlet. In attempting to promote
negotiations between the Arab leaders and the Executive, the
peace group added to this foundation. The group asserted
that the Arabs greatly feared a Jewish majority and compromise
would be needed for peace and the establishment of a Jewish
National Homeland. Even if the Jews could hold the Homeland
in a war, it would not be without the great waste of lives
and resources. The fact that Arab nationalism was strong now
would make negotiating a settlement more difficult, but it
was still possible; to bring about a discussion the Jews should
agree to a limited period, at most ten years, within which
Jewish immigration would be fixed so that at the end of the
period the Jews would comprise forty percent of the population.
During this period there was to be no Arab immigration from
other countries. These figures were suggestions which the
group believed would be acceptable to the Arabs; they stated
that the actual details of the agreement would have to be
negotiated between the Agency and the Arabs. They pushed for

Jewish-Arab equality in the matters of settlement, land purchase, employment, and politics. Magnes' concern about the Arab tenant farmers and peasants was deepened; land acquisition must be transacted only with the consent of those cultivating the land. At most, only seventy-five percent of a peasant's land could be sold. The fellah had an inalienable right to cultivate the soil. A tenant was to be helped to acquire and develop other land in the event that his/her land was sold. Politically they called for a legislature with equal Jewish and Arab representation.⁵²

The group also suggested a procedure for developing negotiations by stages. They called on the Agency to set up a committee of five for unofficial contacts with the Arabs. This group would determine the major areas of agreement and disagreement. Then the two unofficial committees would draw up a proposal to serve as the basis for negotiations. Only then, would the Jewish Agency Executive and Arab Supreme Committee consider the text and form official negotiating teams. If all went well to this point the Arabs would call off their strike and the Jews would postpone new labor schedules and formal negotiations would begin.⁵³

On August 19, 1936 Shertok spoke to an Arab leader. A meeting was arranged between the latter and Bernard Joseph, representing the former. Magnes complained to Shertok the next day that from the reports he received from Rutenberg and

from the Agency's own memo, a copy of which is on the micro-film, Joseph spent the time discussing the political weight of the Arab representative and the lack of any official authority being held by Magnes. Joseph asked the Arab to ascertain the Mufti's position and the Agency representative would call on the latter on Sunday for a reply. Joseph never followed through on the matter.⁵⁴

About a month before this Frumkin wrote to Shertok for a reply concerning the proposals. Three months later on November 4, 1936 Frumkin wrote to the Agency head again; he still had not received a reply.⁵⁵

During this period, Magnes was in contact with a group of American Zionists, some of whom were members of the Jewish Agency, who had similar proposals. This group had been meeting with Arab Americans to formulate a basis for negotiations. The group included Adler, Lehman, Backer, Lowenstein, Mack, Szold, Rothenberg, Warburg, and Wise. They supported the Palestinian peace group's proposals including the ten year, forty percent immigration suggestion.⁵⁶

In December, 1937 when the pacifist rabbi was invited to speak to the British Royal Commission he took care to consult with an American member of the Agency, Louis Stein, even though this was not necessary.⁵⁷ Later Shertok accused him of negotiating on his own without Agency authorization.

A letter from the University president to Professor Coupland of the Royal Commission on January 7, 1937 records Magnes prefacing all other remarks by stating his standing as a private person representing no one else.⁵⁸

The peacemaker went on in this letter to describe his position in more detail than he had initially provided in Like All The Nations. This has been discussed above. In addition to a general discussion of the dual rights in conflict and the settlement proposals, he urged the British to be more thorough in their hearings. He suggested that they hear other Jews and Arabs, in official and private capacities, in order to understand the issues and help establish a basis for negotiations. Both groups should be given the opportunity to participate in the solution offered by the Commission. The British should commit unequivocally to bring the parties together and set conditions better suited for a cooperative effort. He asserted that the British applied the Balfour Declaration and the mandate in contradictory ways. Magnes concluded that the development of a Palestinian Civil Service to train officials to run the mandate well would help bridge the differences between Arabs and Jews.⁵⁹

The ultimate obstacle again stood in the way. A cable from B. Joseph to Moshe Shertok on August 22, 1937 shows Joseph's suspicion of Arab motives. According to the cable, Izzat Darwazi had told Joseph that Magnes had promised the

Arab Delegation to Geneva that he would attempt to persuade the American Zionists from the Jewish Agency to participate in a roundtable talk. The discussion would be based on modified conditions including restricted immigration. Partition would be opposed in favor of a bi-national solution. Joseph asserted that this was a trick to influence the British favorably toward the Arabs.⁶⁰

In October 1937 the negotiations entered a new phase. Albert M. Hyamson, an English Jew who had served as the Chief Immigration Officer in Palestine and as consequence fell into disfavor with the Zionists, sent negotiation proposals to the Jewish Agency Executive in London and to Magnes in Jerusalem. Later it was revealed that Hyamson had co-authored the suggestion with another Englishman named Newcombe. The rabbi liked the basics though he raised questions concerning particulars. He eventually agreed to present the Englishman's "suggested basis for discussions" to the Agency Executive in Palestine. The major points stated that an independent Palestine would be created wherein all Palestinians had complete rights. The British would be responsible for phasing out the Mandate and bringing the Arabs and Jews into self-government. Each community would have autonomy and a Jewish National Home, though not a Jewish State, would be created. Homogeneously populated villages would have municipal autonomy. The Jews would remain less than fifty percent of the population during

the limited time of the agreement with immigration fixed on this basis. The British would guarantee the interests of both Jews and Arabs and would receive special rights in the Haifa port. The agreement would only be for a limited period to be set during negotiations.⁶¹

A. Lourie the Zionist Executive's Secretary in London responded the next day on behalf of Weizmann. He stated that the Agency would not agree to a permanent minority status for the Jews. He wanted to know the names of the Arab representatives supporting this proposal. Hyamson wrote to Neville Jonas Laski, chairman of the Agency's administrative committee, sending a copy of the suggestions and an advance copy of his reply to Lourie. He stated that the issue of the fixed percentage for a limited period was not a practical concern. If the period was ten years or less, not enough self-supporting Jews could get to Palestine to reach the limit. The representatives of the Arabs were from the now disbanded Higher Arab Committee and can be linked back to the Mufti.⁶²

He also indicated that he wrote Magnes. The latter replied that he accepted the proposal as did Morris Hexter to whom the rabbi had shown the text, with permission. Magnes requested that Hyamson secure backers of note who were willing to sign the suggestions as a basis for discussion. He wanted four Jews, four English subjects, and four Arabs.⁶³

Magnes presented the "suggested basis for discussion" to the Palestinian Executive in mid-November 1937. The Executive asked him to clarify the identity of the Arab backers, the dates envisaged for the agreement, and some details concerning wording. He wrote to Hyamson for answers and informed Shertok of this on December 3, 1937. On December 6, 1937 Shertok wrote a letter to the rabbi. In it he clarified some of the questions and suggested a proposal of Usishkin which would link immigration to a fixed number based on the capability for economic absorption, rather than a percentage of the population. The Agency head asked Magnes to try to get clear answers from the English group. He also asked Magnes to approach an Arab of position in Palestine to arrange an unofficial and absolutely secret meeting to clarify outstanding issues and possible agreement. Magnes responded on December 9 that he was taking steps to set up a preliminary conference. The process of clarifying details continued.⁶⁴

On December 13 Shertok wrote the chancellor questioning the Arab sincerity in light of hardline newspaper statements. The Jewish Agency used its own contacts to investigate the possibilities for an agreement and on December 28 Shertok wrote Magnes asking if Hyamson was not a bit hasty in his assurances of Arab backing. The Agency chief also wanted to know about Magnes' ideas concerning a confederation mentioned by Jamal Hussein the moderate nephew of the Mufti. The

Rabbi responded two days later that he could not speak for the Arabs but was hoping to be able to be more definite the following week. He spoke to Shertok on the phone and attempted to clarify the situation. On January 13, 1938 Shertok wrote Magnes summarizing the phone conversation of the previous day and the circumstances to that date. Magnes said that Hyamson had overstepped his bounds and misrepresented the matter of Arab backing. The Arabs were a third party to the plan; it did not originate with them or bind them. Nonetheless some of the Arabs whom Magnes approached in Palestine requested that he present a modified version of the proposals to the Agency. The peacemaker proceeded to do so.⁶⁵

These discussions continued with Magnes attempting to clarify issues for both sides. The problems revolved around the minority status of Jews in Palestine and the rate of immigration, and the wording of the guarantee for a Jewish national home. The Agency also was concerned over the political standing of the Arabs with whom they would negotiate. They remained suspicious of the entire endeavor. Magnes experienced difficulties with both groups and eventually attempted to bring the two groups together on the basis of clearly stated agreements and disagreements. He believed that any face-to-face talks would serve to further a possible understanding.

Toward the end of January 1938 Shertok felt backed into a corner. He wrote to Magnes on January 25 and accused him of lying with regard to the willingness of the Arabs to negotiate and being willfully dishonest. The disagreements between Magnes and Shertok widened. The head of the Jewish Agency slowed negotiations by asking Magnes to answer questions which had already been clarified and whose clarification Shertok himself had acknowledged. The Agency chief misrepresented the facts and his responses grew increasingly more polemic. His statements were so distorted that Magnes prepared an eighteen page report outlining the history of the negotiations and citing the numerous discrepancies in Shertok's statements as of February 21, 1938. He attached to the memorandum twenty-eight pages of appended documents and letters and sent a copy to each member of the Executive in Palestine and London.⁶⁶

Ben Gurion replied to Magnes on February 24, 1938. The former spoke of a proposal by Jamal Hussein. According to the peacemaker's response of March 3, Ben Gurion did not have his facts in order. The rabbi stated that he never met with Mufti or Jamal Hussein who were in Britain. He had met with the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri Pasha, the Anglican bishop, and a Dr. Tannous. The bishop's minutes verify that Magnes never undertook to convince anyone that the Jews should be a permanent minority. He did say he would work to get the

Agency to agree to the forty percent proposal for the limited ten year period, if a compromise could be reached on other issues. In conclusion, Magnes offered to clarify the issues for the Executive, in person. He volunteered his continued aid as a private individual. On March 13, 1938 Magnes wrote to Shertok that he would meet with the Agency representatives if they were in a position to take action. Shertok responded that the Jerusalem group would do nothing serious.⁶⁷

There is no doubt that the Jewish Agency considered Magnes seriously. Besides the people mentioned above, at least ten other members of the Agency hierarchy were consulted concerning the negotiations and Magnes' proposals. The fact that people attempted to discredit him with falsehoods indicates that those people felt threatened by him and his ideas.

The substance of his private thought is the same as that presented in the published works. The archival materials verify that they were grounded in religious beliefs. These communications also indicate the extent to which Magnes would allow himself to be abused in order to further the cause of peace. His commitments were deep.

The rabbi was still an ardent democrat and in the midst of the negotiations, he protected the University faculty's freedom of expression. Kisch wrote to Magnes on March 23 and March 28, 1937. The director of the University's Department of Hygiene, Professor Kligler had some words with Dr. Peller

of the Zionist Executive. Kisch wanted Magnes to reprimand the former and disassociate the University from the press. Magnes would do no such thing.⁶⁸

In the period of 1939-1948 the archival materials show the continuity of Magnes' beliefs and commitment. The published works reveal a lapse in the rabbi's pacifist conviction. Unfortunately the materials surveyed shed no light on Magnes' internal struggle concerning the Holocaust and pacifism. The peacemaker questioned his pacifism but he still pursued reconciliation between Arabs and Jews.

On April 17, 1940 Magnes was still meeting with Arab leaders to determine a basis for negotiations. Shertok wrote the rabbi asking about a published report of a meeting between Magnes and the Taro brothers. The peacemaker's reply confirmed that he favored political equalization and an Arab federation which included a bi-national Palestine. This would reduce Arab fears concerning the percentage of the Jewish population. It would also enable large numbers of Jewish refugees to be resettled in other Arab countries. Shertok sent more questions; no reply to these was found.⁶⁹ Magnes had not stopped building bridges and Shertok was no less concerned about the rabbi's activities.

In 1948, Magnes engaged in a final attempt to prevent war. He helped organize the Ihud Association and served as its president. This was a group of Jews who were long time res-

idents in Palestine and who supported cooperation and negotiation as the means toward a lasting solution to the Arab-Jewish problem. The Executive Council of Ihud included Magnes, Martin Buber, David Senator, Kurt Wilhelm, Simon Sheroshevsky, and Isaac Molho. On January 29, 1948, Magnes, Buber and Senator released a statement opposing mob action. This type of action is part of a war psychosis and must be resisted by all in favor of sensible action. The civil guard must be empowered to act with clear direction. Penalties for violence must be set and wrongdoers punished.⁷⁰

On March 28, 1948 the Ihud issued a statement backing Truman's call for a truce in Palestine. They asserted that the common people did not want war. In the interim before an agreement would be finalized, Palestine should be under a United Nations trusteeship with United States participation. They supported a bi-national solution with equal Arab and Jewish partnership. They favored substantial Jewish immigration. The state would be independent with membership in the United Nations. It would also be a member of a broader Middle East Union. Palestine would remain a neutral nation.⁷¹

In May Magnes was in Washington. On May 4 he met with Secretary of State General George Marshall. The Secretary's report provides a description of the meeting. Magnes stated that time was on the side of the Arabs. United States pressure was needed on both sides. He suggested using a financial

embargo. A truce must be arrived at through negotiations between both sides in Palestine. Magnes stated that voluntary negotiations were no longer possible. An imposed truce was necessary. No other nations were willing to send forces with the United States to form an interim trusteeship. Financial sanctions on both belligerents was the only hope.⁷² The pure pacifism he had embraced earlier was now changed to a less absolute position.

The rabbi told Marshall that the populace of Jerusalem, both Jewish and Arab, wants peace. He advocated that the United Nations send a commissioner to restore vital services to the city. The person selected ought to be a religious leader of stature. A small United Nations bodyguard should be sufficient to insure the commissioner's safety. Even if fighting breaks out the United Nations must push for a cease fire and peace. Both Arabs and Jews must be involved in the peace process.⁷³

Marshall was so deeply impressed by Magnes that he arranged for the rabbi to meet with President Truman the next day.

By late summer partition was very much a reality and any settlement needed to take it into account. On August 23, 1948 the Ihud issued a press release which modified its earlier proposals. The bi-national state would now be, at best, a confederation of an Arab Palestine and Israel. Borders

would be agreed through negotiations. The United Nations should decree an economic union of the two. Sovereign rights of each state would be defined by a supreme court. Sovereignty was only to be compromised on matters threatening peace or economic development. For two years each state would maintain independent sovereignty regarding land ownership and immigration. After two years it would become a Union matter. Jerusalem was to be the demilitarized capital of the confederation. The United Nations should send a commissioner to restore vital services to Jerusalem. The United Nations must provide international guarantees that the new nations will not be attacked from the outside. They urged that the refugees should not be used as political pawns. All Arabs who fled should be permitted to return to their homes immediately. Jewish refugees should be admitted to parity in numbers with the Arabs.⁷⁴

A month and a half before his death Magnes was still preaching peace. He was weakened by his efforts in America and was not able to return to Jerusalem for the opening of the University's academic year. On September 7, 1948 he wrote a letter to Professor Rabbi Assaf, the rector of the University, to be read at the opening exercises. This letter restated Magnes' commitment to seek peace as a religious ideal. He called totalitarianism and militarism forms of idolatry. Respectively they place the state and the military above all else. "There are spiritual values such as the House of

Learning or the University and the House of Religious Assembly, or the Synagogue which must be independent of army and state." Ethical qualities such as justice and mercy are "autonomous and not subsequent to army and state."⁷⁵

The materials do not provide us with insight concerning the pacifist struggle. They do indicate that Magnes' ideas in this regard changed. He no longer absolutely opposed all uses of force. The peacemaker had never condemned self-defense, but during this period he appeared more accepting of this position than at any time since 1905, when he helped raise funds for Jewish self-defense organizations in the Russian ghettos. Even so his desire to build a true peace based on justice, understanding, and cooperation never abated.

Chapter Five: Conclusions

Archival work is tedious. With inadequate indexing finding data concerning a particular subject is "hit or miss". Nevertheless my work did provide some new insights into the thought and activities of Judah Leon Magnes.

Though he was not a systematic thinker this study provides some illumination of the activist's hierarchy of values as related to the issue of unity. This value was an ideal and goal which ultimately could not be fully achieved in practice.

His concern for Zionist unity was exhibited in 1905 in his letter to David Wolffsohn. His work with the Kehillah experiment was an attempt to bring together the diverse elements of the New York Jewish community. The valuing of unity along with his concern that the Zionists focus primarily on Palestine led to his dispute with Brandeis and resignation from the Executive of the Federation of American Zionists. At this time, unity was a primary value which did not conflict with other primary values. This concern for unity caused pangs of conscience leading to Magnes' resignation.

The archival data did provide a much fuller description of the Brandeis-Magnes dispute. The strength of Magnes' view of Zionism as a Jewish cause from any perspective was clearly indicated. This all-Jewish attitude was delineated again in his letter to Weizmann concerning the Jewish Agency- Joint Distribution Committee dispute. The spiritual unity of the Jewish people must be primary to Zionism. As Jewish culture

develops in the Land of Israel it will spark a rejuvenation of Jewish life in the diaspora. For Magnes, Zionism was an all-Jewish proposition.

Not only was his ideal and goal unity, so too was his method. He sought to clarify the areas of contention and agreement and then bring the parties together, face-to-face. He hoped this direct contact would improve the chances for a settlement. Not only did he employ this method in the Agency-"Joint" family quarrel, but also in his peacemaking efforts between the Arabs and the Jews.

His suggestions concerning lasting solutions to the Arab-Jewish problem in Palestine all involved bringing the two groups together in a cooperative relationship. This included the social and economic areas as well as the political arena. In working for direct negotiations between Arabs and Jews, Magnes became alienated from much of the Jewish community. In this case, the conflict is between two types of unity - Arab-Jewish peace and the unity of the Jewish people. Magnes saw peace in the Hebrew sense of shalom. Peace is only true and lasting when the two belligerents are brought together into a mutually beneficial working relationship. At the same time his activities to promote this caused his separation from the Jewish community. Nonetheless he believed that he was truly representing the Jewish values which must be central to the growth of the Jewish people through its spiritual center of

Israel. On the basis of this and moved to prevent great evils of war and violence, he chose to work for Arab-Jewish reconciliation.

In doing this Magnes' own honesty and candor were primary to his style. He went to all parties with the same information. As before, he tried to clarify the areas of agreement and conflict. He fostered as much direct contact as possible. The consistency of his commitments and the straight forward character of his approach meant that all could rely on him. The archival material testified to the consistency of Magnes' positions. It did not contain a single discrepancy with the published statements! In this respect his personality and charisma were aids. When he was working as an individual, the importance of his own personal qualities was heightened.

In the sense that Magnes courageously spoke truth based on deeply held religious convictions, he can be likened to the Biblical prophets by whom he was inspired. He also experienced the problems of a prophet. Others with whom he disagreed were threatened by him and his ideas. They attempted to discredit him. Only when an agreement or proposal is unable to be refuted does it become necessary to prevent it from gaining ascendancy by attacking its proponent. Kaplansky of the Jewish Agency testified to the farsighted and broad based qualities of Magnes' proposals. There is no question that others considered the rabbi's ideas seriously, those who

attempted to discredit him included both Weizmann and Shertok. That his suggestions were worthy of a hearing outside the Jewish community is attested by the peacemaker's contact with British officials, General Marshall, and President Truman. In order to answer to the highest dictates of Judaism, Judah Magnes also suffered like a prophet.

The archival research provided some data which expands Magnes' definition of spirituality. The Jewish religion confirms the strength of Jewish spirituality. This spirituality is a force for unification. It is an elemental character of the Jewish people. His equation of Pan Judaism to *ספרות כללית*, *ספרות כללית*, and *תורה ודבר* expresses the total and holistic qualities of Jewish spirituality. The understanding of his philosophy in this area is still incomplete and it is possible that other data might be found to elucidate this further.

In a general way, the data examined added detail to the published works. The particulars of the peace proposals in practical application and negotiation is an example of this. The understanding of the development of Magnes' ideas and his dedication to them over time has also been enriched. His sensitivity to the Arab issue in Palestine in 1907 is a case in point.

The greatest disappointment is that no material was found to clarify the struggle which caused a change in Magnes'

pacifism. The archival research confirms that he did not return to the same position of pure pacifism which he held before the Holocaust. There are no guarantees that this material exists or that it can be found through continued archival research. Nonetheless an effort to find such documents, might start with the correspondence between Magnes and Hannah Arendt. The material is restricted and is indexed as pertaining to Palestine and personal matters. It is dated May - October 1948. This material is suggested as a starting point only on the basis of Ms. Arendt's interest in the Holocaust. This is at best an educated guess.

Another type of study might be done which concentrates on Magnes' style as a mediator and peacemaker. As well as focusing on the mediation efforts discussed in this study, his Kehillah activities would need closer examination. During this period Magnes often helped mediate labor disputes.

In summation, the philosophy of Judah Leon Magnes lacks sufficient definition and development. It is not developed in a systematic fashion. Instead he applies moral values to particular circumstances. Although his ideology is dynamic in application, it is without great depth or scope. The strongest element is the inherent synthesis of human and Jewish values, the universal and the particular. The cohesive factor which animates his thought is a great spirituality. He strove for closeness with God through his work with the Jewish people and the whole of humanity.

Appendix

Following are three outlines which index the Hebrew and English materials contained in the microfilms I examined. Film numbers 1676 and 1677 are divided into sections labeled by subject or correspondent headings. Film number 1678 is divided into sections with alpha-numeric titles. The group headings are listed in order of appearance on the microfilm. Each title is followed by the subjects found within its division. The material found under each heading is often mixed, therefore the lists of subjects within each group is not necessarily in order. The material on film number 1677 is in reverse chronological order.

- A. Microfilm 1676. War relief activities and Zionist undertakings. Mr, 1917 - Fr, 1918, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati; originals in the Jewish Historical General Archives, Jerusalem.
1. War emergency - Kehillah program of National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States; agricultural experiment in Bronx; anti-Semitism in relation to the lack of Jewish volunteers for the war effort.

2. Society for the Advancement of Judaism - Nathan Straus' resignation because of Magnes' anti-war position.
3. "Achiever" - Hisdadrut.
4. Executive Council of the United Synagogue of America - minutes.
5. Vaad haRabbonim.
6. American Jewish Relief Committee - appeals for funds.
7. Bulletins of the Joint Distribution Committee.
8. Chicago Jewish Relief Committee - request for Magnes to speak.
9. AI Elkus - relief work.
10. Dr. Emil G. Hirsch - relief work.
11. Jewish people's Relief of America - material concerning Magnes' speech the "Mission of Israel" at Cooper Union on December 29, 1917; letter of introduction for Jacob Medvedieff to A. Zucker.
12. Jewish War Relief Committee.
13. Hebert H. Lehman - relief work; appeals for funds; discussions about expenditures and expenses; donations; minutes of Juedisches Hilfsconite meeting, January 10, 1977; requests for Magne. to speak; Kehillah budget and finances.
14. J.L. Magnes - descriptions of East European Jewish suffering from report to Joint Distribution Committee

following European visit; request for Magnes to speak; hotel arrangements for speaking tour.

15. Louis Marshall - Roumanian relief work.
16. Milwaukee - letter from Nat Stone.
17. Honorable Henry Morgenthau - fundraising for relief.
18. Palestine - relief work.
19. Palestine Restoration Fund - financial matters.
20. Poland - description of Jewish suffering; political resolution; articles on Zionism; land acquisition; financial matters relating to relief work; Magnes speaking engagements and arrangements; fund raising; notes on Jewish International; evaluation of speaking/ fund raising tour.
21. Abel Davis - Magnes opposition to World War I; fund raising.
22. Russia - newspaper clippings.
23. Felix M. Warburg - relief work, Joint Distribution Committee; financial and distribution records; newspaper clippings; Zionist input regarding State Department selection of a relief commissioner.

B. Microfilm 1677. Kehillah and relief work of American Jewish Relief Committee. Je, 1915 - Mr, 1917, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati; originals in the Jewish Historical General Archives, Jerusalem.

1. Albert Lucas - Joint Distribution Committee funds for Hadassah ambulance.
2. Joint Distribution Committee - minutes of meetings of the Executive Committee and the Committees of Five and Six, February, 1917 - November, 1916; relief; appropriations; government relations; infighting among Jewish groups for funds; commission to go to Europe; Magnes' report on European trip.
3. American Jewish Relief Committee - telegrams to and from the commissioners in Europe; monthly bulletins; Eastern European Jewish suffering; Palestine relief; appeals for funds; financial reports; local committee reports from American groups; reports from the commissioners who travelled to Europe; Yiddish and English newspaper clippings from the United States, England, Canada, Argentina, and South Africa; Christian aid for Jewish war victims and attempts to convert Jews; Dutch Jews supporting only Dutch Jews.
4. American Jewish Relief Committee Commissioners - cooperation with German officials in relief work; censorship of correspondence; passports and visas.

5. American Jewish Relief Committee Instructions - resolutions by the committee directing the commissioners concerning the distribution of funds in Europe; report of the Committee of Five of the Joint Distribution Committee concerning distribution, the formation of the commission and the selection of members, problems of dealings with belligerent nations, and a voucher system.
6. American Jewish Relief Committee (Poland) - Magnes on the Jewish spirit; visas to occupied lands; correspondence with Swope of N.Y. World; descriptions of relief work in Poland, Lithuania, and Galicia; newspaper clippings on European suffering; Journal notes, interview of Jewish international and pan-Judaism, Jewish mission, Jewish spirituality, Jewish unity, financial records, appointments, immigration, distribution of funds, poverty and suffering; steamship programs; League of Jewish Youth of America.
7. Mortimer L. Schiff - funds for the Kehillah.
8. Jacob H. Schiff - Bureau of Education, fundraising; neutrality Conference; English and Yiddish newspaper clippings; Turkish relief; Schiff's 70th birthday testimonial dinner; copy and discussion of Magnes' speech "The People Do Not Want War".

9. Yiddish newspaper clipping.
10. Milah Board - instruction booklet for mohelim; certification of mohelim and lists of certified mohelim; lay advisory committee; a consultation with Magnes regarding a conversion; permission for mohelim to perform circumcisions in hospitals.

C. Microfilm 1678. Correspondence and printed material pertaining to Palestine, Zionism, and his work with Federation of American Zionists. New York, Germany, Copenhagen, Denmark and Palestine. Ag., 1905 - Ag., 1948, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati; originals in The Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem.

1. A 153/119/3 - development of a Hebrew language school system in Palestine.
2. A 187 - prayer disturbances at the Western Wall.
3. L 18/245/6 - recommendation of A.H. Fromenson for Palestine work.
4. Z 3/949 - disagreement with Brandeis, Magnes' resignation from Zionist Executive.
5. A/71 - Zionism and justice for Palestinian Arabs.
6. S 25/658 - Palestine electric company; unemployment relief; pay for teachers; freedom of speech for Hebrew University staff; malaria drainage project, fund raising; Hadassah; liberal Judaism in Palestine;

- Joint Distribution Committee funding; health committee; funds for Technion; University debts.
7. Z 2/376 - anti-Semitism in the United States; Reform and Zionism; election of delegates to World Zionist Congress; mass meeting about problems in Roumania and Russia; Zionist convention resolutions; minutes of Executive Committee of Federation of American Zionists meetings 1906 and 1907; shekel collection; financial matters of Federation of American Zionists; financial matters of World Zionist Organization, donations; Hague Peace Conference; Magnes' arrangements for Palestine trip; Jewish Colonial Trust; propaganda pamphlets for Zionist organization.
8. Z 2/374 - pogrom orphans project in Jerusalem; shekel collection; propaganda material; finances and expenses; Jewish National Fund; minutes of Executive Committee of Federation of American Zionists meetings, 1906; Americans push for active work in Palestine; distance of American Zionists from international organization; Zionist infighting; Brussels congress; American Jewish Congress; Russian Jewish self-defense groups; death of Kokesch.
9. Z 2/377 - shekel collection; Zionist pamphlets; Congress delegates; fund drive; Jewish National Fund;

financial statements and fiscal problems; spiritual/cultural centrality of the Land of Israel; immigration to the United States; Executive Committee of Federation of American Zionists minutes, 1907-1908.

10. Z 3/501 - one piece in German.
11. S 25/3050 - Philby/Magnes negotiation efforts and related documents; Magnes/Rutenberg disagreement before the High Commissioner; attempts to discredit Magnes.
12. S 25/10,129 - correspondence with Shertok on Magnes' meeting Taro brothers; bi-nationalism; Brit Shalom; fund raising for Joint Distribution Committee; private publishing expenses.
13. A 264/49 - Sylvester spy trial; peace with Arabs; United States' State Department; Jewish terrorism; need for Jewish unity in hostile world; need immigration for Jewish refugees; death of Brandeis; land redemption; fund raising.
14. Z 3/759 - fund raising for projects in Palestine, wine grower, Western Wall, schools, Pasteur Institute; fund raising for pogrom relief; meeting minutes of Provisional Executive Committee for Zionist Affairs, 1916; relocation of refugees to the United States; Hague Conference; budget and finance; distribution of relief money; Magnes/Brandeis dispute and Magnes'

resignation; Jewish congress movement; shekel collection and membership.

15. S 25/2960 - bi-national basis for Jewish-Arab negotiations; Magnes/Shertok controversy; American Jewish Zionist push for negotiations; British Royal Commission 1937; Hyamson proposals; Mid-East confederation; reports of meetings with Arabs; Arab response to Ben Gurion statement, January, 1938; Ben Gurion's comments on negotiation efforts; Magnes' report to Jewish Agency Executive summarizing history of 1936-1938 negotiations.

Endnotes

Chapter One

1. Raisin, 212-213.
2. Bentwich, 17.
3. Goell, 100-101.
4. Bentwich, 42-43.
5. Judah L. Magnes Memorial Museum, 32.
6. Ibid., 38.
7. Ibid., 2.

Chapter Three

1. Bentwich, 19-20.
2. Ibid., 20-22.
3. Goell, 100-101.
4. Bentwich, 23.
5. Goell, 102-104.
6. Magnes, "Some Poems of H.N. Bialik", 177-8.
7. Bentwich, 34.
8. Ibid., 35. From a sermon in San Francisco in 1903 entitled "Spiritual Freedom". See Note #3.
9. Ibid., 35. From a lecture on Ahad Ha'am, "The Harmonious Jew", delivered in 1903. Unfortunately Bentwich fails to cite references for many of his quotes. This causes problems in verifying and examining the original sources.
10. Ibid., 53.
11. Ibid., 39.

12. Ibid., 54-55.
13. Ibid., 45.
14. Ibid., 48.
15. Magnes, Zionism and Jewish Religion.
16. Bentwich, 66-67.
17. Magnes, Wartime Addresses.
18. Bentwich, 69-72.
19. Ibid., 98.
20. Magnes, Wartime Addresses, 98.
21. Bentwich, 102-103.
22. Magnes, Wartime Addresses, 11-12.
23. Ibid., 15.
24. Ibid., 19-25.
25. Szaжkowski, "The Pacifism of Judah Magnes", 37.
26. Magnes, Wartime Addresses, 63-80.
27. Ibid., 38-46.
28. Ibid., 47-61.
29. Ibid., 27-37.
30. Magnes, Wartime Addresses, 96.
31. Ibid., 96-105.
32. Ibid., 92.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 91-94.
35. Ibid., 106-111.
36. Ibid., 112-114.

37. Bentwich, 121.
38. Bentwich, 123. Szajkowski discusses in greater depth the relationships of others in the Jewish community and in pacifist and socialist circles to Magnes during the First World War.
39. Ibid., 134-142.
40. Ibid., 147-8.
41. Ibid., 150-152.
42. Ibid., 154.
43. Ibid., 158.
44. Ibid., 176.
45. Ibid., 185. The questions asked with regard to the conflict between his desire for freedom of conscience and his commitments to democracy could not be pursued because Bentwich neither elaborated on this, nor did he give sources documenting this as Magnes' reason for not joining the Brit Shalom.
46. Ibid., 180.
47. Magnes, Magnes Addresses, 101-103.
48. Magnes, "Like All the Nations".
49. Bentwich, 187-190.
50. Magnes, Magnes Addresses, 203-206.
51. Ibid., 223-225.
52. Ibid., 228-229.
53. Ibid., 236.
54. Bentwich, 111.
55. Ibid., 112.
56. Magnes, War and the Remnant of Israel, 7.
57. Magnes, Graduation Ceremony, 11 April 1939.

58. Magnes, War and the Remanat of Israel, 9.
59. Ibid., 13.
60. Magnes, It Depends Upon Us, 4-5.
61. Magnes, Hard Thinking - A University Task, 4-9.
62. Magnes, Moral Issues in Democracy, 2-5.
63. Ibid., 6-7.
64. Magnes, Rebellion, 2.
65. Ibid., 4.
66. Magnes, Palestine and Arab Union.

Chapter Four

1. Microfilm #1678, Z 2/374.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Microfilm #1678, Z 2/376.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., Z 3/949 and Z 3/759.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Zwergbaum.

15. Freund.
16. Microfilm #1677, B/204.
17. From the approaching birthday mentioned in this letter, and other materials found on this film relating to Jacob Schiff's 70th birthday celebration in January, 1917, I reason the addressee is the same. Magnes and Schiff had correspondence concerning financial matters as well.
18. Microfilm #1677, B/199.
19. For a discussion of Israel, the various areas embodying spirituality, the concept of spirituality being the force of survival during catastrophe, the Jewish national and international, and the cohesive role of religion, see "The Jewish People - A Spiritual Force" in Wartime Addresses, 96-105, which was originally delivered December 29, 1917. For the development of the ideas of the political rights of Jews, the qualities of spirit, and national spiritual qualities, see "The Rights of Jews As A Nation" in Wartime Addresses, 91-95, which was originally presented April 21, 1919. Both addresses are included in the discussion of the published material.
20. Wartime Addresses, 98.
21. Ibid., 91-95.
22. Microfilm #1677, B/199.
23. Ibid.
24. With respect to Ahad Ha'am's ideas concerning the unique qualities of the internal Jewish self and the unity of the Jewish people as an organic whole, see Selected Essays, 81, 84, 90, and 182-183. On the conception of Israel proceeding from its own internal, compelling spiritual strength to action see The Zionist Idea, 255.
25. Microfilm #1677, B/197. The film shows that this speech was printed. I have found no bibliographic reference to it, so I suggest that it was printed privately by Magnes for distribution to people he wished to persuade, as is Jacob Schiff in this case.
26. Ibid., 8-10.
27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.
29. Western Jewish History Center, Box 1, #37.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Bentwich, 181.
33. Microfilm #1678, S 25/3050.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Bentwich, 181.
41. Microfilm #1678, S 25/3050.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Microfilm #1678, A 71.
51. Microfilm #1678, S 25/2960.
52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Microfilm #1678, S 25/658.
69. Microfilm #1678, S 25/3050.
70. Western Jewish History Center, Box 1, #57.
71. Western Jewish History Center, Box 1, #58.
72. Western Jewish History Center, Box 1, #74.
73. Ibid.
74. Western Jewish History Center, Box 1, #C0.
75. Western Jewish History Center, Box 1, #61.

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