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NON-ZIONISM WITHIN REFORM JUDAISM: 1917-1948

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THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ORDINATION

HEBREW UNION COLLEGE -
JEWISH INSTITUTE OF RELIGION
1984

REFEREE, PROF. JONATHAN D. SARNA

DIGEST

This thesis defines and examines non-Zionism within the Reform movement in America from the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 until the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. These thirty-one years saw the increasing legitimization of non-Zionism. The purpose of this thesis is to deal both with non-Zionism's historical and ideological development and the ideological positions of some of the principle Reform non-Zionists: Jacob Schiff, Louis Marshall, Felix Warburg, Julian Morgenstern and Morris Waldman. Judah Magnes was omitted from this study because of the recent publication of his writings in Arthur A. Goren's book, Dissenter in Zion. Although these non-Zionists cooperated in the spiritual, cultural, economic and social renewal of the Jewish homeland in Palestine, they opposed all activities intended to achieve an autonomous, political Jewish state.

My primary focus is the exploration of non-Zionism and its progress and durability in the American Jewish community. This thesis begins by examining the distinctions and similarities between Zionism, anti-Zionism and non-Zionism. The next five chapters study the development of the non-Zionist attitudes of Schiff, Marshall, Warburg, Morgenstern, and Waldman. Particular attention has been focused upon the extent to which these non-Zionist personalities were able to interact with others -- Zionists and anti-Zionists -- and still preserve their respective non-Zionist positions. This study examines the question of

whether the non-Zionist position within the Reform movement formed a credible and viable alternative, with its own sphere of influence and power, distinct from Zionism and anti-Zionism.

Most of the source material for this thesis has been derived from the correspondence and memoirs of Schiff, Marshall, Warburg, Morgenstern and Waldman, found in the American Jewish Archives, as well as records which detail their conversations and decisions involving non-Zionist affairs. In addition, numerous periodical articles and newspaper accounts have been used for additional insights into non-Zionism's role in the Zionism question.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Sincere thanks are extended to my wife, Laurie, and friends who patiently listened to ideas, and responded with constructive criticism and words of encouragement. Fannie Zelcer and Kevin Proffitt of the American Jewish Archives of Cincinnati, Ohio, also eased the burden of this thesis considerably. My special appreciation goes out to my advisor, Dr. Jonathan Sarna, for his cogent suggestions and insights which were invaluable in the research and writing of this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

The Emergence of Zionism Within the American Jewish Community

Europe during the 1800's saw the development of nationalistic movements, united by land and language, which strove to achieve political independence. Nationalists argued that a people needed a state in order to regain their dignity and perpetuate their culture. Therefore, they sought to establish a nation-state, i.e., a sovereign state composed primarily of members of a particular nationality or ethnic group. These nationalist movements encouraged the emergence of the race theories of anti-Semitism, which portrayed Jews as dangerous to the national spirit of Europe because they were unassimilable outsiders. The Jewish people were accused by anti-Semites of subverting the dominant races and being involved in international conspiracies.

Prompted by growing anti-Semitism in Europe, especially after the Dreyfus Affair, Theodore Herzl maintained that the Jew accept his "apartness," and cultivate his national character. He perceived Jews as being united by culture, language and a common enemy, more than by rituals and beliefs. Herzl stated that the Jews constituted a nationality or people, possessing all the attributes of a nation, except for the fact that since their exile from Palestine they have lacked a national homeland. The collective national consciousness of Jews had been preserved through the centuries by the combination of anti-Jewish discrimination and Jewish

religious tradition, both of which worked to keep the Jews a distinct and separate corporate entity. He declared that since the Jews were a nation, the condition of statelessness was an historical aberration which had to be corrected. Herzl conceived of Jews everywhere as "exiles" worthy of "ingathering."

In his pamphlet, The Jewish State, Herzl said that the problem of the Jews acquired a political solution: Jews needed their own nation. He stated that the need for a Jewish homeland was posited upon the premise that Jews in the Diaspora were persecuted because they were considered to be aliens. Herzl believed that anti-Semitism would exist so long as there was a Jewish presence in the Diaspora, an argument that ironically the anti-Semites also utilized. He held that Jews were powerless because they lacked a sovereign state. Jews, Herzl argued, desired and deserved a nation like any other people. He maintained that only in their own land could Jews perform useful work under normal social and economic conditions and institutions. According to Herzl, a Jewish state would normalize the status of the Jewish people and, therefore, diminish anti-Semitism.

The Zionism of Herzl was directly contrary to the widely held Jewish doctrine that only God would bring about the return of the Jewish people to their homeland. Herzl contended that the Jews could not wait for the Messiah to restore their nation; they would have to work to bring it

about themselves. Religious concerns were at best secondary in Herzl's program, which advocated a concerted political effort to solve the Jewish problem. This was the beginning of political Zionism, an organized movement of Jews to secure a legally-recognized Jewish homeland. He believed that the Jewish problem could be resolved by the establishment of a Jewish national homeland through a massive political effort. World Jewry could utilize its economic, political and organizational resources for the purpose of gaining international consent for the establishment of a Jewish nation, and of helping Jews so desiring to immigrate. After this occurred, the relations between the Jewish nation and the Diaspora would cease to exist; the Diaspora would establish the Jewish nation and disappear. While at first, Herzl did not believe that the Jewish state had to be in Palestine, he later changed his position and felt that a Jewish homeland could only be where it had been historically.

Most Jewish nationalists favored the restoration of the Jewish nation exclusively in Palestine. The Zionist movement can thus be seen as an outgrowth of the traditional Jewish longing for a return to Zion. As Samuel Halperin notes: "The hitherto ethereal vision of a 'Return to Zion' became transformed into a practical political movement for the attainment of an international solution to the 'Jewish Question'--a Jewish State in Palestine."[1] Zionists believed that only in Palestine could Jews create the national

institutions and laws which would reflect their national and cultural aspirations. In Palestine, Zionists wanted to secularize Jewish life. They held that with Jews in their homeland, a proper Jewish national life and culture could be revived. They stressed biblical Hebraic culture as a means of identifying with the Hebrew tradition. Hebrew would be the language of the Jewish nation, the language of everyday speech. According to the Zionists, a Jewish state would allow Jews to perform productive work under normal social and economic conditions and institutions. Some Zionists construed a normal environment to be one that was premised upon socialist principles. They wanted to create a socialist utopia in Palestine, where a classless society would be established.

In 1897, at the first world Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, the program of the World Zionist movement was proclaimed; Zionism sought to establish for the Jewish people a homeland in Palestine secured by international law. It can be said that the goal was in turn a means to the goal of Jewish survival--physically as individuals and collectively as a nation. Herzl recognized that a Jewish state required three prerequisites: the unification of world Jewry behind the Zionist program, international acceptance of the right to colonize, and large-scale colonization. These three prerequisites corresponded to the four goals of the Congress:

> (1) The promotion on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.
> (2) The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.
> (3) The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.
> (4) Preparatory steps toward obtaining Government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.[2]

Initially Zionism had a small following within the American Jewish community. American Jews were too preoccupied with integrating themselves within the American scene to be concerned with Zionism. They felt no need to adhere to Zionist ideology since they considered themselves to be much more a part of the general populace than their counterparts in Europe. Realizing this, American Zionist leaders adapted their movement to the conditions of the New World, adopting an optimistic view of the future of the American Jewish community. The "negation of the Diaspora" need not apply to America, they said, where a new vibrant Jewish community was being developed. An exponent of this American-Zionist approach, Israel Friedlaender, termed this "Zionism plus Diaspora, Palestine plus America." Zionists argued that America allowed for the perpetuation of different religious and national cultures. American Jews were never in need of emancipation, were for the most part allowed to integrate into America, and were only one of several ethnic groups maintaining distinct institutions. Europe, by contrast, insisted on assimilation by Jews in return for civil rights.

American Zionists demonstrated that Zionism was compatible with the American Jewish experience by de-emphasizing its political goals--the creation of a Jewish state for world Jewry--and by encouraging American Jews to participate in cultural, economic and scientific activities within Palestine. American Zionists like Louis Brandeis conceived of Zionism as an effort to help needy Jews abroad and to increase self-respect among Jews; they did not adhere to the Herzlian view of an exiled Jewry living in a doomed Diaspora. They contended that supporting Palestinian Jewry would instill pride in American Jewry and thus aid in precluding assimilation within the United States. Thus, as Naomi Cohen notes, The Maccabaean, the Federation of American Zionists' magazine, adopted a policy that did not demand from its readers an ideological commitment which would separate them from their fellow Jews or Americans: "the Federation of American Zionists developed no ideology regarding the potentials of a Jewish state for economic, cultural, or religious development . . ." nor did it ever encourage the "aliyah of American youth to aid in rebuilding the desolate land. In practical terms, early American Zionists were asked for no more than financial contributions and loyalty to a political ideal."[3] This ideological development among the American Zionists allowed them to collaborate with the non-Zionist Jewish establishment.

The Emergence of Anti-Zionism Within American Reform Judaism

Reform doctrine took as its major premise the notion of the universal mission of the Jews, a mission totally humanitarian and devoid of particularism. The mission of the Jews was to spread the universal religion, ethical monotheism, of the biblical prophets. The Central Conference of American Rabbis emphasized this outlook in 1897: "We affirm that the object of Judaism is not political or national, but spiritual, and addresses itself to the continuous growth of peace, justice and love in the human race, to a messianic time when all men will recognize that they form 'one great brotherhood' for the establishment of God's kingdom on earth."[4] The Diaspora became a vital condition in Reform thinking since it allowed Israel to bring its message to the world.

Unlike the political Zionists, Reform leaders saw the raison d'etre of Jewish history as the maintenance of the ideals of Judaism, not the maintenance of Jews. These reformers repeatedly declared that the only legitimate interpretation of Judaism was a religious one; and they vehemently opposed the secularity of Jewish culture as espoused by many prominent Zionists. Reform Jews felt that the national self-understanding of the Jews was no longer spiritually, psychologically or politically relevant. Jews, they believed, constituted a religious community, united only by religious ties, not by culture or ethnic solidarity. Since Reform Judaism's conceptions of the Jew and his destiny were first

and foremost religious, it demanded integration into the integrationist ideology of Reform Judaism, the Jews were American citizens of the Jewish faith. The Reform rabbis in the Pittsburg Platform of 1885 acknowledged this sentiment: "We consider ourselves no longer a nation, but a religious community, and therefore expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish state."[5] At its 1917 convention, the Central Conference of American Rabbis voted for a resolution which did not mention Zionism but which deplored "every unreligious or anti-religious interpretation of Judaism and of Israel's mission in the world."[6]

Most of the early reformers believed Reform Judaism and Zionism to be incompatible. They considered themselves to be opponents of Zionism, anti-Zionists, who characterized Zionists as Jewish nationalists uninterested in perpetuating the universal mission of Israel. They contended that Zionism would force the Jews to abdicate their universal mission by forming a political state. The reformers resented any attempts to characterize Jews as a people, a nation or a nationality. They considered Jewish nationalism contrary to the universal religion preached by the prophets. Behind Jewish nationalism lurked ghettoism, clannishness, secularism and ethnic separatism. This sentiment was expressed earlier at the Philadelphia Conference of 1869, the first Reform conference held in the United States. This Conference

reiterated theological principles previously expressed by German Reform Judaism in matters pertaining to the self-understanding and destiny of the Jew in the modern world. Israel's messianic task, according to the assembled rabbis, was "the union of all the children of God . . . not the restoration of the old Jewish state." The dispersion of the Jews was not in punishment for their sins but divinely ordained in order to fulfill Israel's "high priestly mission, to lead the nations to the true knowledge and worship of God."[7] Thus, anti-Zionists insisted that references to a return to Zion be deleted from the liturgy since Jewish nationalism was not in consonance with the universalism of Reform Judaism. The reformers, therefore, did not merely question the means employed by the Zionists to achieve their ideal, they also discarded on theological grounds the very objective of Jewish restoration to Zion.

Reform leaders considered themselves exclusively citizens of the country in which they lived. The anti-Jewish nationalist German reformer Samuel Holdheim sought to prove that Judaism did not preclude Jews from being loyal citizens of the state. Holdheim upheld the primacy of the non-Jewish state, even when it came into conflict with the observance of Jewish ritual practice, and he "insisted that Jewish nationality had come to an end long ago, and that the Jews are like all other citizens in all national and civic functions, and distinct only in their purely religious

concern."[8] As Professor Morris Jastrow asserted: "It is impossible to belong to two countries . . . 'Allegiance must be perfect--cannot be divided. Either a Palestinian or an American.'"[9] Anti-Zionists viewed themselves as differing from their fellow countrymen only religiously: they shared the secular interests and diversity of opinion found among non-Jews.

Anti-Zionists were concerned with the political implications of Zionism upon their loyalty and citizenship in America. They believed that Jewish nationalism separated Jews from other Americans and delayed their integration into American society. Since Jewish nationalism stated that Jews in the Diaspora were a foreign group with separate political interests, the establishment of a Jewish nation could threaten the political status of world Jewry, especially those Jews living in non-democratic countries, by encouraging anti-Semites to accuse Jews of having dual allegiance. The fear of "ma yomru ha-goyim" was expressed in a resolution issued by the Central Conference of American Rabbis at its 1897 convention: "Such [Zionist] attempts do not benefit, but indefinitely harm our Jewish brethren where they are still persecuted, by confirming the assertion of their enemies that the Jews are foreigners in the countries in which they are at home, and of which they are everywhere the most loyal and patriotic citizens."[10]

Anti-Zionists viewed attempts to restore a Jewish nation in Palestine as completely impractical and unrealistic. They contended that the land of Palestine could not resolve the Jewish problem, if only because of its primitive conditions, lack of necessary raw materials, and limited absorptive capacity. Only a relatively few Jews could ever be absorbed into Palestine because of geographic and economic limitations. They also raised the question of overcoming Moslem and Christian opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine.

Although the anti-Zionists believed that the Jewish refugee problem could best be resolved through an open door policy by the United States, they did not object to giving assistance to Jewish settlers in Palestine. Michael Meyer states that the anti-Zionists based this support upon the "frequently enunciated Reform principles of concern for the downtrodden and social idealism. The pioneers were deserving of assistance not alone on general humanitarian grounds, but also because they were attempting to build a society grounded on the affirmation of social justice to which Reform Judaism in America had committed itself collectively as early as the Pittsburg Platform of 1885."[11] Yet, when they did provide assistance, anti-Zionists tended to do so individually: they would rarely participate in a concerted effort with political Zionists to support Palestinian Jewry. Anti-Zionists were extremely concerned about becoming

involved in any activity which could have been construed as supporting a Jewish state in Palestine.

Anti-Zionists perceived Zionism as a reactionary philosophy of despair because of its lack of trust in the Enlightenment and the moral evolution of humanity. They held that the Zionists' desire for self-ghettoization was incongruent with the spirit of civilization and progress. They themselves had an abiding faith in the Enlightenment, with its ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity: "Emancipation was perceived as the midwife of universalism, of which Reform was the leading exponent."[12] Rabbi David Philipson declared at the 1891 Central Conference of American Rabbis' Convention that Reform Judaism was in complete accord with the Enlightenment: "Judaism is so thoroughly in accord with republicanism that it desires all its adherents to become imbued as soon as possible with free republican ideas. Therein lies their salvation. Therein lies the salvation of the world."[13] Anti-Zionists considered anti-Semitism to be a leftover of a bygone age of reaction, which would disappear with the spread of the progressive ideals of the Enlightenment. The problem of anti-Semitism would be resolved when the nations of the world became democratic and then extended emancipation to their Jewish citizens. They argued that conditions were ripening for the eventual passing of anti-Semitism in the approaching era of messianic brotherhood. Believing in the ultimate victory of justice, anti-Zionists thus predicted a positive future for world Jewry.

The granting of political, economic and social rights to the Jews during the Enlightenment was an indication to the reformers of the moral progress of mankind. They contended that the Jews must surrender their separate national identity in order not to impede this progress. The renunciation of a distinctive peoplehood was a small price to pay, they maintained, in exchange for civil rights and social acceptance.

Early Reform leaders rejected any hope of the ingathering of all Jews in Israel and any idea of reinstatement of Jewish national life. In contrast to the Zionists, they viewed their life in America as part of a voluntary Jewish Diaspora rather than an involuntary exile from Israel. As a result, they opposed the belief that the Jewish sojourn in America was destined to be temporary. Anti-Zionists had complete faith in America: for them it was the new promised land. They found parallels linking the prophetic ideals with the American spirit; and they believed that the divine mission of Israel was destined to flourish within the United States.

The anti-Zionist leaders within Reform Judaism felt that they spoke on behalf of the majority of American Jews. This was stressed by Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise in his Presidential Address at the 1897 Central Conference of American Rabbis Convention: "The honor and position of the American Israel demand imperatively that this conference, which does represent

the sentiment of American Judaism minus the idiosyncrasies of those late immigrants, do declare officially the American standpoint . . ."[14] The American Israelite, which had been the mouthpiece of Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise and was continued by his son, wrote that "refined" native Jewish Americans were against political Zionism: "There is not one solitary prominent native Jewish-American who is an advocate of Zionism."[15] In 1918 the paper stated that all Jewish newspapers owned or edited by native Americans opposed Jewish nationalism.[16]

The anti-Zionists within the Reform movement were highly acculturated Jews, generally of German origin, who argued that Zionism was a foreign element brought to America by the ghetto Jews of Eastern Europe. Anti-Zionists claimed that support for political Zionism was limited to immigrants from Eastern Europe. Therefore, Zionism became associated with ignorant immigrants, the ghetto and hyphenated nationalism.

Due to the rapid growth of these Jewish immigrants, anti-Zionists were deeply concerned that the Zionists would eventually gain control over the institutions of American Jewry. They realized, as Naomi Cohen writes, that were "Zionism to succeed in capturing the loyalty of the majority of American Jews and in establishing its control over the community, Reform would lose the predominant position it held since the 1870's in Jewish religious and secular

institutions . . . American Reform felt seriously threatened--a fact which explains the near hysterical pitch of its arguments and the alacrity with which its leaders criticized Zionism publicly . . ."[17] Consequently, they engaged in a bitter and heated debate with Zionists in order to win the support of the Jewish community. They portrayed Zionism as being incompatible and irreconcilable with Reform Judaism: while Zionism was political, retrogressive and particularistic, Reform Judaism was spiritual, progressive and universalistic.

The Emergence of Non-Zionism Within American Reform Judaism

Non-Zionism has never been an organized, pervasive movement with a precise ideology. Instead, it represented an attitude prevalent among individual Jews, who tended to be affluent, influential, highly successful, and well-integrated in organized Jewish life. Non-Zionists like Jacob Schiff, Louis Marshall and Felix Warburg have been characterized as the "Our Crowd" German-Jewish leadership. While they were firm defenders of democracy in the American political process, they also believed in paternalism and government by "best men." They believed that American Jewish public life needed to be run by an "established order"--one in which they maintained stewardship and dominance in Jewish communal affairs. To some, this was similar to the European system of "court Jews" or shtadlanut. But as Naomi Cohen points out, the true picture was more complex:

> True, shtadlanut was inherently undemocratic. For individuals to bargain in behalf of masses, when not delegated by those masses, implied if not ambition to enhance personal prestige, at the very least, their own superiority. Shtadlanut largely paralleled the doctrine of stewardship in the American gospel of wealth, which adknowledged the philanthropic obligations of financial magnates because wealth was proof of their allegedly superior qualities. Clearly, a wide social gap existed between the shtadlanim and the rank and file of the community, and with the success of their efforts in charity and community relations, they could more easily mould the community in their own fashion. Shtadlanut usually meant, too, fear, on the one hand, of the Jewish mob and on the other, of official disfavor or popular antisemitism as a result of public demands and noisy demonstrations.[18]

The American Jewish Committee, which was founded by these non-Zionists, personified their type of American Jewish leadership: "an organization of men proud to be Jews but committed in their loyalties to the United States; men who had proven their ability and character, and who would now serve as stewards of their people . . . a club, as it were, of the best Jews, able to meet with their equally distinguished gentile counterparts to protect Jewish interests."[19]

It is difficult to define specifically what non-Zionism is since it has not been comprehensively or systemically analyzed. Even among those labelled "non-Zionists," there has been confusion as to the meaning of this term. Indeed, one well-known non-Zionist, Cyrus Adler, preferred not to use the term: "I always thought that the name 'non-Zionist' was a misnomer, and, while a member of the non-Zionist group was not a Zionist, he was usually a pro-Palestinian, which I thought the better name."[20]

Stuart Knee defines non-Zionists as those who "opposed a Jewish state . . . but not Jewish immigration to Palestine, or the revival there of religio-cultural Judaism . . . In this respect, they acted as a halfway house for those who were committed to 'Zion' as a philosophical or refugee imperative but not to 'Zionist' as a nationalistic panacea for antisemitism."[21] Knee's definition of non-Zionism describes an attitude that was first manifested as early as the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Jewish

community in Palestine was supported by philanthropists who were unconcerned with Jewish nationalism. They did not regard the goal of a Jewish state as practical or even valid. However, they appreciated the urgency of creating in Palestine a haven for the persecuted Jews of Eastern Europe. After the rise of political Zionism, many of these Jewish benefactors continued to support Palestinian Jewry even though they strongly opposed the notion of Jewish nationalism.

Non-Zionists became known as lovers of Zion who, nevertheless, remained continuously distrustful of Zionism as a movement. They were anti-nationalistic Jews who cooperated with the Zionists to insure that Palestine was open to Jewish immigration, and who sought to guarantee that the Holy Land was a safe home for the Jews, Moslems and Christians residing there. Non-Zionists envisioned Palestine to be a place where Arabs and Jews would be equal citizens with neither group dominating the other. Although the non-Zionists had an uncompromising disdain toward the Jewish nationalism espoused by the Zionists, they recognized the value of having a haven for Jewish refugees. They believed in a united effort to reconstruct Palestine economically, without any regard for political or nationalistic theories. Not only did the non-Zionists cooperate in the economic development of Palestine, but they were interested in promoting charitable, scientific, agricultural and educational

institutions there. They wanted to establish in Palestine a religious and cultural center where literature, science and art could be developed in a Jewish environment.

The primary motivation of the non-Zionists seemed to have been a concern for Jewish survival as well as the traditional religious devotion of physically rehabilitating the Holy Land. This humanitarian sentiment to aid Jews within Palestine was expressed at the 1912 Central Conference of American Rabbi's convention by Gotthard Deutsch, who maintained that liberal Jews in America "cannot turn a deaf ear to the cries of suffering co-religionists anywhere."[22] Non-Zionists like Rabbi Samuel Schulman felt that it was their duty to participate in non-nationalistic activities in Palestine in order to assist Jewish refugees: "As I envisage the practical situation today, it is the duty of every Jew to help the work in Palestine. There are not many doors of countries left open to an immigrant Jew. We must avail ourselves of every opportunity to help our brethren . . . To whom else shall they look if not to us?"[23] This cooperative spirit was based upon the notion that there existed a common heritage and destiny among all Jews.

Like Zionists, non-Zionists were committed to the rebuilding of Palestine. In this respect, non-Zionists were much closer to the Zionists than they were to the anti-Zionists. As a result of this, non-Zionists exercised a tremendous amount of restraint in their dealings with

Zionists. Stuart Knee terms this non-opposition to Zionism as the "non-Zionistic ethic": "It was an unusual instance if non-Zionists criticized the Palestinian politics of the Zionists in the press, from the pulpit or in debate. Not that they were always pleased with Zionism, but they discovered more areas of accord than discord and, with a number of notable exceptions, succeeded in submerging mutual tensions."[24] An example of this non-Zionistic ethic may be found in Rabbi Samuel Schulman's declaration that concern for settling Jewish refugees in Palestine caused him to abstain "from doing anything which would interfere with the practical work of settling as many Jews as possible in Palestine."[25] Hence, non-Zionists were willing to cooperate with Zionists in the rehabilitaiton of Palestine along non-nationalistic lines. While they did not view their work in Palestine as an expression of support for political Zionism, non-Zionists understood that Zionism was a force to be reckoned with, if the upbuilding of Palestine was to be made possible. This viewpoint was articulated at the 1913 convention of the Central Conference of American Rabbis by the Committee on Contemporaneous History, when it declared that "it is time that this conference take a positive stand on the important cultural problems of the Holy Land. Such an attitude is neither a concession to Zionism, nor a negation of it."[26]

Since non-Zionists often participated in the same humanitarian and constructive endeavors in Palestine as the Zionists, it was difficult at times to distinguish between the two groups. Yet, as Rabbi Schulman noted, the differences between Zionism and non-Zionism should not be minimized: "The profound difference between non-Zionists and Zionists is a difference which can never be compromised, because it is the expression of two opposite schools of thought in Jewish life today."[27] These fundamental differences between Zionism and non-Zionism were enumerated by The American Hebrew:

> Zionists will continue to interpret the idea of Jewish self-fulfillment in segregation; non-Zionists will continue to interpret Jewish history and the Jewish future in the sense of a spiritual heritage among all mankind. Zionist and non-Zionist will continue to be definitely opposed to each other on this question: whether the Jews need a separate State to survive or not; whether the place of the Jews in the spiritual unfolding of mankind is the whole world or delimited to Palestine as a distinct political entity.[28]

Non-Zionism, like anti-Zionism, was based upon the premise that Jews could live together with non-Jews. Non-Zionists believed in the efficacy of the liberal values of the Enlightenment in resolving Jewish-non-Jewish conflicts. They had a commitment to the Enlightenment, a belief in mankind's capacity to create through rationalism a more humanitarian and universalistic society. This distinguished non-Zionists from Zionists, whose interpretation of the Jewish problem discounted the efficacy of the values of the Enlightenment.

Like the anti-Zionists, non-Zionists bitterly opposed the political aspect of Zionism, which stressed Diaspora Nationalism and advocated a politically independent Jewish state in Palestine. Both anti-Zionists and non-Zionists felt that Jewish nationalism was contrary to the American doctrine of separation of church and state because it stood for the establishment of a theocratic state.

Non-Zionists objected to the Zionist notion that Palestine and not America or any other free land could be the national home of the Jewish people. Non-Zionists never had any doubts about their undivided loyalty to America and their unqualified allegiance to an America of which they were an integral part. Palestine, to non-Zionists, was a haven and not the homeland for world Jewry: "Palestine was to be 'a' rather than 'the' national home, a cultural and social but never a political structure."[29] Rabbi Schulman contended that non-Zionists would never subscribe to the Zionist platform until Zionism "said that it is a movement to procure a home for Jews and not 'for the Jewish people.'"[30] Although non-Zionists maintained that a part of the Jewish people would migrate to Palestine, they held that the majority of Jews would stay in the countries where they enjoyed equal civil and religious rights.

Generally, non-Zionists did not share the pessimism of political Zionism concerning the future of Jewish life in the Diaspora. In this sense, they were influenced by

the cultural or spiritual Zionism of Ahad Ha'am. Ahad Ha'am disagreed with political Zionism because he felt it ignored the spiritual needs of the Jews living outside of Palestine. The Diaspora played a significant role in his philosophy; he did not view the Diaspora as a negative and dying entity. Ahad Ha'am believed that Jews would continue to live and thrive outside of Israel. He wanted to establish in Palestine a large Jewish settlement which would serve as a spiritual and cultural model for world Jewry. The development of Judaism in Palestine would inevitably lead to the global regeneration of world Jewry. Non-Zionists agreed that it would be beneficial for Jews everywhere if many Jews would settle in Palestine, where they could develop their own religion and culture in a congenial environment. (Anti-Zionists refused to even acknowledge the possibility that a Jewish center in Palestine would benefit American Jewry. To do so, they believed, would be an admittance that Jewish life in the Diaspora was a failure.) Where the non-Zionists and cultural-Zionists differed was that the latter group maintained that eventually the center of Jewish life would be in Palestine, not the United States: "American Jewry, instead of being the leading edge of the Judaism of the future, the focal point of spiritual development," would be "relegated to the periphery, robbed of its independence."[31] Cultural Zionists felt that it was essential that eventually Palestine became the paramount Jewish center;

whereas non-Zionists had full faith in the future of Jewish life even without a Jewish Palestine.

Non-Zionists also differed with Zionists in their approaches to resolving anti-Semitism. Non-Zionists viewed anti-Semitism as something with recognizable causes that could be countered and overcome. Zionists, on the other hand, tended to see anti-Semitism as baseless, inherent, and irradicable. While non-Zionists did recognize the right of Jews to reconstruct their lives by emigration, they were opposed to an emigrationist solution to anti-Semitism involving the mass evacuation of world Jewry because they feared that such a program would place Jews everywhere in the category of unwanted citizens. Nor did they share the Zionist view that a Jewish state would be a panacea for resolving this problem since many Jews could not or would not be able to settle in Palestine. Consequently, many non-Zionists were actively involved in investigating immigration and colonization possibilities in other lands.

Non-Zionists were also offended by the Zionists' secular interpretation of Jewish life which stressed the national over the religious element within Judaism. Although non-Zionists voiced the same objections as the anti-Zionists with regard to applying political terms such as "nation" and "national" to American Jews, they did not always adhere to the anti-Zionist definition of Jewish group life as being essentially or exclusively religious. Non-Zionists saw the

Jews as being more than a religious group. They believed that Jews were bound by many ties: faith, history, culture, language and tradition. Non-Zionists would even consider Jews a nationality in places where Jews had a distinctive culture and where minorities sought national rights. While insisting that Jews in democratic countries were primarily a religious community, they did not share equally the fear of anti-Zionists - that the establishment of a Jewish state or the characterization of Jews as a nationality in Eastern Europe would endanger the political status of Jews in democratic countries. Though preferring usage of the term religious community as a definition of Jewish group life, most non-Zionists granted the legitimacy of Jews engaging in non-religious group activities, and they also favored concerted action by world Jewry for certain specific and limited purposes.

CHAPTER TWO

Jacob H. Schiff

Jacob H. Schiff was born in Germany in 1847 into a family that was influential in the business community. When he migrated to America in 1865, he began as a clerk in an investment firm; two years later he headed his own firm, Budge, Schiff and Company. Schiff married the daughter of Solomon Loeb, head of the banking house of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, and was named head of that firm in 1885, turning it into one of the most powerful private investment houses in America.

Schiff always played an active role in Jewish affairs. For many years he was one of the leaders of Temple Emanu-El in New York. He was a munificent philanthropist to Jewish as well as general civic and charitable causes, and he took an active interest in the institutions and causes he supported. The Jewish Theological Seminary, Hebrew Union College, Joint Distribution Committee, New York Kehillah, and the Henry Street Settlement were only a few of the many notable Jewish institutions that he liberally assisted.

In 1906, Schiff became one of the founders of the American Jewish Committee, an elite organization composed largely of wealthy, influential German-Jews. These men felt themselves to be the representative body of American Jewry.

Schiff originally felt that the best place for a Jewish future was in America and not Palestine. In 1906, he wrote to Israel Zangwill, the head of the American Territorial

Organization, suggesting that the interior of the United States be made a haven for Eastern European Jewish refugees. Schiff not only expressed interest in this project, but he spent a large amount of money on the so-called "Galveston Plan" which intended to settle Jews in Texas. His viewpoint toward Jewish settlement in Palestine began to change when in 1908 he vacationed in that country. After that, he pledged to support financially several Palestinian agencies. Schiff died in 1920.

Being the recognized grand seigneur of the Reform Jews of German origin, Jacob Schiff often reflected their points of view, including their opposition to Jewish nationalism. Schiff's arguments against political Zionism may be subdivided into three distinct points, all of which he defined in a speech before the Jewish Chautauqua Society. The first point was, "That it [Zionism] is but an empty, foolish dream, never to be realized at all, or if perchance it will ever become a reality it is, at the very best, a matter of the distant, dim future."[1] He maintained that Zionism was impractical and chimerical because very few Jews would settle in Palestine, including the Jews of Eastern Europe. Schiff contended that since it would be onerous and unrealistic to colonize the entire population of Eastern Europe Jewry, the Jewish problem could not be resolved in Palestine, but only in Eastern Europe. He believed that the Zionists were not even qualified to create a strong and self-supporting nation in Palestine. Palestine would always be a weak country, capable of supporting only a limited number of Jews. The only feasible alternative places for migration, according to Schiff, were America and Canada.

The second argument was "that we are not a nation, but merely a religious community, a cult, an aggregation of worshippers of the same God and ritual."[2] Schiff strongly opposed the idea that the Jews were destined to become once again a nation in Palestine; nor did he believe that the

Jews in America constituted a separate political group. He described the Jews as being adherents of a universal religion, whose mission was to transmit the word of God to the rest of the world. Schiff accused the Zionists of not only being disinterested in this universal mission, but of demonstrating little interest in Judaism. Zionism, according to Schiff, was a separatist movement inconsistent with the prophetic teaching of the brotherhood of mankind. He often expressed dismay at the irreligious character of the Zionists, who were motivated by political and not religious aspirations. Schiff accused them of being essentially anti-religious, claiming that from one-half to three-quarters of them were either atheists or agnostics.

Schiff's third argument was that "America and America only, is the future home and destiny of our race."[3] He believed that the highest priority for each Jew in the United States was to become a "true" American. Their only national obligation was to serve their fellow Americans. Zionism was incompatible with Americanism since both represented two vastly different types of ideology. According to Schiff, Americanism like Judaism represented optimism, courage and hope, while Zionism in its political doctrine embodied pessimism, despair and surrender. He questioned the loyalty of the Zionists because they felt that their destiny and that of their offspring were not indissolubly bound up with the fate and welfare of the United States. Since Zionism raised

the allegation of dual loyalty, he was concerned that the anti-Semites might be more prone to accuse the Jews of being aliens, and seek the curtailment of the Jews' civil rights. Zionist activities could encourage non-Jewish Americans to look upon the Jews as an entirely separate class with different political loyalties.

Though intensely proud and independent, Schiff was known as a man of rare clarity of thought, who was willing to listen to most suggestions that might improve the welfare of world Jewry. A primary motivating factor in his life was an intense love for Judaism and a deep and sympathetic concern for his fellow Jews. Believing that it was incumbent upon him to uphold the biblical injunction to practice charity, Schiff felt that his wealth to some extent belonged to his fellow human beings. Being a man of extreme wealth, Schiff was able to become a central presence in Jewish philanthropic endeavors. He was constantly involved in Jewish business and humanitarian enterprises. Until his death in 1920, he was the recognized philanthropic leader in the American Jewish community.

Schiff was concerned with the widespread Jew-hating that was so deeply embedded within the European populace. The pogroms in Russia and the development of anti-Semitism in Germany made him realize that far-reaching steps should be undertaken to prevent the "extermination" of European Jewry. As the situation in Europe became more grave, Schiff expressed

more of a willingness to consider any practical solution to ease the plight of European Jewry.

In January 1914, before the Menorah Society, Schiff gave a lecture entitled "Zionism and Nationalism" which expressed more of a cooperative position toward Zionism. His lecture publicly acknowledged some positive and practical elements within the Zionist movement. Recognizing Zionism as a unifying factor within the Jewish community, Schiff stated:

> [Zionism] has proven to the Gentile world that the Jew has not lost his self-respect, it has recalled to a far-reaching extent, the Jew unto himself, it has more than possibly anything else could have done this, shown him the value of his own heritage. It has quickened the efforts to rehabilitate Palestine and even if it cannot--as it is neither practicable nor desirable--re-establish there a Jewish State, it is at least effectively leading in the reclamation of the land of our birth from the slough and degradation into which it and a great part of its population had fallen, so that, with time, Palestine--attractive a center as it has always remained to the Jew--is not unlikely to be turned into a land to which, with its surrounding districts, the Jew can emigrate from the countries of his persecution. In this sense we can, wherever our own homes may be, become supporters of Zionism, even if we wish not to term ourselves Zionists, since this has been made a synonym for Jewish nationalism.[4]

Admitting that he now found Zionism less objectionable, Schiff refrained from accusing the Zionists of having a dual loyalty. He even expressed an understanding of why some American Jews joined the Zionist movement--due to the prejudice that exists in the United States. Although he recognized Zionism as an instrument of Jewish survival, Schiff was still not

supportive of Jewish national aspirations: "I am not a Zionist, if the term is used to designate the Jew as a national separatist among the nations of the world . . ."[5]

After this lecture, Schiff expressed more of a willingness to cooperate with the Zionists, provided they recognized divergent points of views. Thus, he infrequently engaged in public confrontations involving Zionism. In his lecture he admitted his uneasiness about engaging in polemics: "I know very well how to give this explanation to myself, for I feel it innermost why, as an American, though good Jew I seek to be, I cannot be a Jewish Nationalist, but if I am asked to explain this properly to others, I find this more difficult."[6] Consequently, Schiff rarely alluded to some arguments that would eventually become closely identified with the non-Zionist position. While later non-Zionists denounced the useage of physical force by the Zionists against the Arabs, he only once publicly articulated his opposition against Jews having "military dreams," and this was in an interview that he did not want to be published.[7] In the same interview, he gave token recognition to the non-Zionist argument that the Zionists ignored the civil rights of the non-Jewish residents in Palestine: "Jews ought not to claim any particular rights in any country which are not possessed by other inhabitants of that country."[8] Nor would Schiff expound upon his opposition to a theocratic Jewish state that would be controlled by the Orthodox

rabbinate. Although it could be maintained that he refrained from engaging in these non-Zionist issues because they were not widely discussed during his life, it is more likely that this omission was due to the fact that he wanted to construct a non-political program that could unite American Jewry and benefit world Jewry. Instead of becoming involved in ideological discussions, he stressed the fact that he was a businessman and a pragmatist willing to cooperate with any Jewish group interested in aiding Jews. World War One taught him that only a united Jewry could succeed in providing substantial relief for Palestine.

In 1914 Schiff described himself as a non-Zionist, an admirer of cultural Zionism: "It should be understood that while a Non-Zionist, I am, by no means, an Anti-Zionist, and I am very sorry indeed that in Europe, it appears to be so very difficult, -it is, happily, not so in this country, -for Zionists and Non-Zionists to work together in harmony for Jewish, and particularly Palestinian purposes."[9] He expressed support for a program promulgated by a British journalist named Lucien Wolf which sought to "obtain the right for the Jew to freely settle in and establish colonies in Palestine, there to be assured equal civil rights with the rest of the population, and municipal privileges whenever necessary and justified."[10] Schiff believed that American Jews, including many Zionists might be able to collaborate on such a program. In order for this

to occur, American Jewry would have to reject both Jewish nationalism and anti-Zionism. He felt Jewish nationalism and anti-Zionism were devisive issues that caused dissension and bitterness among the Jewish people. Thus, when Rabbi David Philipson tried to secure his support in denouncing the Balfour Declaration, Schiff refused to cooperate.

The deplorable conditions that European Jewry faced during World War One had a devastating effect upon Schiff. He now became more concerned with Jewish survival. Throughout the war, he received many letters that requested financial aid in order to ameliorate the pitiful condition of European Jewry. Typical of letters he received was the following request to send a commission to Europe to distribute relief:

> . . . nearly 5 million of our brethren are situated in the Eastern War Zone which . . . has been the battleground of the contending armies of Russia, Germany and Austria . . . Thousands upon thousands of them having been compelled to leave home and property and to wander about as refugees in search of food and shelter while others left in their places have been reduced to a state of despair and destitution, and most of them are threatened with starvation and disease.[11]

Schiff came to believe that the plight of European Jewry was desperate: "conditions . . . are . . . on the breaking point . . . and our co-religionists in the war and auxiliary zones are suffering almost beyond the ability of human endurance . . ."[12]

The Russian Revolution of February 1917 also had a profound impact upon Schiff, resulting in a further reformulation of his position toward Zionism. He always had a

deep interest in the political status of the Russian Government because it controlled the world's largest Jewish population. Schiff described Russia as the center of world Judaism, the reservoir of Jewish ideals and culture. While he was concerned about the Jew-hating that existed under the oppressive regime of the Czar, Schiff was more afraid of legal emancipation, of "Russian freedom for the Jew in a Russian Republic . . ."[13] After the Russian Revolution, he feared that Jews would be allowed to settle wherever they saw fit, resulting in the disintegration of the Russian Jewish community. He was convinced that with the breaking up of the ghettoes, Russian Jews, like their counterparts in Western Europe, would assimilate within two generations. As Schiff sadly noted, "In Russia [the Jew] will be free, but he will cease to be a Jew."[14] The disintegration of Russian Jewry marked the demise of the Jewish center from which American Jewry drew spiritual nourishment.

Schiff maintained that American Jews should have a sense of obligation to Russian Jewry since they brought Jewish culture to the United States. He declared that it was incumbent upon American Jewry to cooperate in the establishment of a homeland for the millions of displaced Russian Jews in order to create another Jewish center. Thus, months before the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, he came to the conclusion that given the present world situation, Jews needed a homeland in Palestine. Schiff

expressed this decision in a speech before the League of Jewish Youth in April 1917: "It has come to me, while thinking over events of recent weeks--and the statement may surprise many--that the Jewish people should at least have a home of its own."[15]

Unlike his previous writings which referred to various places of migration for Jewish refugees, this speech only alluded to Palestine as a homeland for displaced Jews. This omission was due to Schiff's growing pessimism about the survival of Jewish life in the Diaspora, including America. He now realized that anti-Semitism was too deeply-rooted in Eastern Europe for the Jewish question to be resolved there. Nor did he later believe that the minority rights secured by the Treaty of Paris would alleviate this problem since these rights were "more or less on paper."[16] His newly developed doubts about the Jewish future in America were related to his concern about the effect of the Russian Jewish community's disintegration upon American Jewry. Yet, he was also becoming disillusioned with some of the developments within the American Jewish community itself. In a letter to Rabbi David Philipson, Schiff described his utter disappointment with the low attendance in synagogues and temples; and his concern with the rapid rate of assimilation found in the younger generation.[17] Evytar Friesel contends that these developments caused Schiff to question whether it was in the best interests of the Jews that they integrate in

the lands of the Diaspora: "Jewish integration in the host countries has been a central element in the Jewish outlook of Schiff . . ."[18] While he would always maintain that the only political obligation of American Jews was to the United States, Schiff was no longer convinced that Judaism could survive in a free and open society. A Jewish homeland in Palestine seemed to him to be the best answer to this dilemma. Not only could a Jewish homeland invigorate Jewish life everywhere, but it could be the only place where Judaism could flourish and Jews were afforded complete civil, religious and cultural freedom.

Another reason Schiff might have omitted mentioning America as an alternative place of migration was that he realized the United States would not always be available for immigrants. In January 1917 a bill was sent before Congress to restrict immigration. Realizing the negative consequences of this measure upon European Jewry, Schiff wrote to United States Senator James Worworth: "It would, in my opinion, be the height of folly to pass on immigration restrictive measures at the present time . . ."[19]

After this speech, Schiff constantly expressed support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, all the way until the end of his life. By mid-September 1917, he had begun a dialogue with the Zionists in which he sought to clarify areas of agreement.

Publicly Schiff declared a willingness to cooperate with the Zionist Organization of America if it refrained from nationalistic activities and sought only the physical restoration of Palestine. All political aspirations, he felt, should be set aside for future generations to decide upon. Yet, Schiff never became a political Zionist, and privately he would often be critical of the fact that they never renounced the desire to establish an independent Jewish nation.

While he wanted to repeople Palestine with Jews, Schiff never believed that Zionism was intended to be a mass movement that would transfer world Jewry to Palestine: "Palestine is peculiarly qualified and desirable as a Homeland--not the Homeland--for our people . . ."[20] The Jews of Western Europe and America would find no need to emigrate to Palestine since they have been afforded the same rights and privileges as their fellow citizens: "there is no thought of a general migration to Palestine. There will probably be comparatively few Jews who will leave America . . ."[21] Not only was Palestine incapable of supporting a large population, but historically it never held the entire Jewish population. Schiff noted that even during biblical times Jews were living outside the Holy Land.

Schiff considered his attitude toward Zionism to be consistent with the Basle Program, which did not explicitly favor the creation of a Jewish nation. Indeed, his speech

reiterated his strong opposition to Jewish nationalism: "I am not a believer in a Jewish nation built on all kinds of isms, with egotism as the first, and agnoticism and atheism among the others."[22] Schiff considered the immediate creation of a Jewish nation impractical and an impossibility since there were not enough Palestinian Jews to justify statehood; he also construed the Balfour Declaration to mean that the British Government would not actually consent to a Jewish nation in Palestine. Believing that the immediate creation of a Jewish nation was not feasible, he considered political Zionism to be temporarily "dead," and a notion that "can't be resurrected until Palestine shall in reality have become a Jewish land, a prospect that cannot be realized for many a decade."[23]

After the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, Schiff modified his position regarding the Jewish political status in Palestine: he was no longer absolutely opposed to the future creation of an autonomous Jewish community in Palestine. As soon as Palestine became populated by a sufficient number of Jews, Schiff could see a need for an autonomous Jewish commonwealth under the protection and sovereignty of a Great Power like Britain. Since this condition could only be fulfilled "in decades to come," the elderly Schiff undoubtedly knew that he would never be placed in a situation in which he would have to deal with this matter.

Schiff wanted to immediately establish in Palestine a homeland primarily for the oppressed Jews of Eastern Europe. In order to facilitate this, he suggested that a charter be granted to a Jewish company which would insure freedom of immigration and full legal, civil, cultural, religious, political and national rights to all Palestinian Jews. Schiff believed that with its rich coastal plain, Palestine could support a larger Jewish population. Based upon "sound" economic principles, he stated that Palestine could eventually sustain a population of two to three million Jews. Schiff also contended that under the benevolent protection of the British, Palestine would be able to develop its economic, educational and religious institutions.

Schiff viewed the main responsibility of world Jewry as transplanting to the Middle East the Jewish cultural center formerly situated in Eastern Europe. He hoped Palestine would replace Russia as the center reservoir of Jewish learning and culture from which Jewish ideals may spread over the world. The settlers in Palestine should be encouraged to create a new Jewish center where Jewish civilization could be developed. Schiff wanted Jews in Palestine to "develop under their own institutions and in their own atmosphere Jewish life and ideals in their purity, and become once more a center from which the Jews throughout the world could draw religious inspiration and Jewish cultural development."[24] He believed that this could only be

done if idealistic, young Jews, unhampered by materialism, would eventually settle in Palestine.

Schiff also desired Palestine to become a religious center from which world Jewry could draw spiritual inspiration. He insisted that a Jewish homeland be based upon the Jewish religion: the law of such a homeland should be derived from the Bible. Schiff wanted Palestine to have Judaism as its cornerstone. This belief was paramount to him because Schiff primarily defined being Jewish along religious lines. He acknowledged someone as being Jewish if that person had loyalty to the "Jewish God." It was due to the lack of interest in Judaism by the Zionist leaders that attributed to Schiff not joining the Zionist Organization of America. Believing that a Jewish homeland must have the Jewish religion as its basis--"for the Jewish God, now as of old, remains a jealous God, who destroys those who attempt to displace or ignore him"--he insisted that the Zionist leaders adopt Judaism as their principle tenet in order to succeed.[25] As Schiff noted: "they must first adopt Judaism without any other isms."[26]

Schiff became a non-Zionist because he sincerely believed that it was the only constructive and practical approach to rebuild Palestine. He believed that his non-Zionist platform could unite American Jewry so long as he refrained from engaging in ideological discussions. Thus, Schiff emphasized the need for Jews to cooperate in

humanitarian and business endeavors in Palestine. He declared himself to be a practical man who was unconcerned with the political aspects of Zionism. Schiff wanted all Jews, without distinction of class or country or origin, to participate in the restoration of Palestine. To accomplish this feat would fulfill a Jewish yearning for two thousand years. He noted that the constructive rebuilding of Palestine would also gain the admiration and respect of non-Jews: "the world respects no one who doesn't respect himself."[27]

CHAPTER THREE

Louis Marshall

Louis Marshall will be remembered for two widely divergent reasons. He was one of America's foremost authorities on constitutional law and, more than any other person of his period, he was the voice of American Jewry.

Born in Syracuse, New York on December 14, 1856 to parents who had recently migrated from Bavaria, Marshall studied in a law office and eventually attended Columbia Law School. After a dozen years of working as a lawyer, he became a prominent attorney in his own firm, Guggenheimer, Untermeyer and Marshall, with which he remained actively connected until his death in 1929. His work was identified particularly with cases involving constitutional questions and problems of statutory construction. Intensely interested in immigration problems, Marshall frequently appeared before Congressional committees to urge more liberal immigration policies.

The rights of Jews always stood paramount in his consideration. Marshall never ceased to fight for the welfare of the Jews, and, what was also important to him, to strive through educational agencies, to make them more acutely conscious of the worth of their heritage. For a Jew to forget his or her Judaism seemed to him a tremendous misfortune. He was the leader of the movement which brought about in 1911 the abrogation of the treaty with Russia which discriminated against Jews. During the First World War, he was president of the American Jewish Relief Committee which,

in conjunction with other organizations, collected more than $65,000,000 for the relief of Jewish war victims. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, he headed the Committee of Jewish Delegations as representative of the American Jewish Congress, and he was instrumental in having the rights of racial and religious minorities in various Eastern European countries placed under the protection of the League of Nations.

In the cause of American progressive Judaism and Jewish education, Marshall played a prominent role. He was president of Temple Emanu-El, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Jewish Theological Seminary, Director of the Educational Alliance and Dropsie College, and a member of the Council of Jewish Communal Institutions. In 1920, Hebrew Union College conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Hebrew Letters. Marshall died in 1929.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Louis Marshall was considered to be one of the most formidable opponents of political Zionism. Believing that he represented the viewpoint of most American Jews, he declared that he could never become a Zionist because he adamantly opposed the re-establishment of a sovereign Jewish state: "I for one, and I know that I speak the views of every Jew who loves this country, and they are greatly in the majority, would never subscribe to such a doctrine."[1] Marshall could not understand why the American Jewish community needed to establish for itself a Jewish state. He contended that American Jews were not perpetually and ineradicably aliens in their own country. Marshall felt that most American Jews had utter faith in the viability of their community. Their only political allegiance was toward the United States. Nor did Marshall believe that American Jewry would always be persecuted unless they lived in Palestine. He was convinced that American Jews had the power to improve their situation, including the ability to alleviate anti-Semitism. If American Jews were deeply committed to their faith, anti-Semitism could not preclude them from being employed nor prevent Jewish culture from developing. As he noted:

> The Jew who is loyal to his faith is respected a hundredfold more than one who is constantly prating about a Jewish State and is seeking thousands of miles away a solution of difficulties that confront him here and which he can overcome if he seeks to understand the true spirit of America and evinces steadfastness of purpose and manly resolution.[2]

Marshall was concerned that the creation of a Jewish state would raise allegations of dual loyalty, the charge that Jews were a foreign group with separate political interests. American Jews would be compelled to declare their loyalty either to the United States or to the Jewish nation. Those who decided to stay in America would be constantly exposed to Zionist propaganda pressuring them to migrate to Palestine:

> Suppose a man does not recognize the idea of a "national" home, is he nolens volens to be compelled to do so? And if the [World Jewish Congress] should proclaim an edict that every Jew shall leave the land of his birth and proceed to that "national home," and he should refuse to do so, is he to be excommunicated?[3]

Marshall also questioned the practicality of attempting to create a Jewish state. He considered the task of resettling a large number of Jews in Palestine as completely unfeasible. In 1903 he refused to cooperate in a Zionist endeavor to transfer Russian Jews to another continent:

> The people of Russia will have to work out their own salvation, as other people have done. A colonial scheme of the character proposed have never succeeded since the world began. You cannot transfer a large body of people from one country to another and make anything else of them than a dependent class.[4]

Marshall believed that the Zionist goal of creating a Jewish state was so impractical and unrealistic that it was not worthy of serious consideration. He often described the Zionist leaders as politicians who were interested more in ideological discussions than in implementing practical actions to resolve the Jewish question.

Marshall also faulted the Zionist leaders for promoting secularism and ignoring the religious needs of Jews. Since he perceived the Jewish community as being primarily a religious body, Marshall believed that the non-religious Zionist leaders did not really understand an essential element of the Jewish people. He claimed that many Zionists were either atheists or agnostics who had no interest whatsoever in the Jewish religion.

Although he would always maintain his opposition to Jewish nationalism, there were various historical and personal events within Marshall's life that enhanced his willingness to cooperate with the Zionists. One important factor was his realization that there were "many shades and brands" of Zionism. In 1908 he became aware of cultural Zionism through a book by Dr. Max Stolp entitled Das Judentum am Scheidewege. This book expressed skepticism about the future of Judaism in the Diaspora. Stolp maintained that only a Jewish center in Palestine could revive Jewish spirituality throughout the world. Marshall was deeply impressed by this book: "It has certainly given me new ideas and has led me to regard the cause which it advocates with better understanding and with much more sympathy than I have heretofore given it."[5]

It is reasonable to assume that Marshall's interest in cultural Zionism was enhanced by his close relationship with his brother-in-law, Judah Magnes, as well as with Solomon Schecter and Israel Friedlaender. These men re-interpreted

Zionism in terms that were better suited to American Jewish realities in order to create bridges to American leaders such as Marshall. They abandoned the Zionist notion of "negation of the Galut" and introduced the idea that there were two great and interdependent Jewish centers, one in Palestine, the other in America. This had tremendous appeal to Marshall who favored the creation in Palestine of a center, not the center, for Jewish learning and culture.

Marshall did not consider the support of a religious and cultural center in Palestine as being incompatible with loyalty to America. He did not question the patriotism of cultural Zionists who participated in the economic and cultural rebuilding of Palestine. Marshall contended that ethnic groups could be loyal to America and still assist their country of origin. He found no difference between American Jews rebuilding Palestine and, for example, Americans of Irish descent aiding Ireland. Marshall declared that ethnic groups in America should not be coerced into abandoning their religious and cultural attachments to their ancestral homelands: "It would be most extraordinary if a country whose population consists of so many diverse elements as ours, should present the phenomenon of an utter eradication of every feeling or emotion save that inspired by the land in which they dwell. That would be Chauvinism, not patriotism."[6]

Marshall also realized that cultural Zionism had a positive impact on Jews indifferent to Judaism, and he recognized that the important contributions cultural Zionism was making to Jewish life and institutions:

> It has been productive of immense benefit to Judaism. It has stimulated a living interest in its history and development among thousands who have hitherto been indifferent to things Jewish, and among many who would otherwise have been lost to Israel. It has rescued Hebrew from the category of dead languages. It has given birth to a manly Jewish consciousness, in refreshing contrast with the apologetic attitude which preceded it. It has replaced cynicism with enthusiasm, and has made Jewish culture signify something that is positive, instead of the shadow of a name. It has sounded depths unknown to the so-called emancipated Jews, and is a force to be reckoned with.[7]

In 1917 Marshall declared in the American Hebrew that he was a sympathizer of the cultural Zionism of Ahad Ha'am and Simon Dubnow because they were committed to the perpetuation of Judaism and they believed in the possibility of meaningful Jewish survival in the Diaspora.[8] Through the cultural Zionists, Marshall learned how it was possible to be simultaneously an advocate of the establishment of a religious center in Palestine and believer in the future of Diaspora Jewry. This was important for Marshall because he never relinquished his belief that the majority of the world's Jewish population would always remain in the Diaspora. He viewed Palestine as a haven for the persecuted Jews of Eastern Europe.

Another factor that made Marshall more receptive to the Zionist cause was the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. On November 2, 1917, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Arthur J. Balfour, sent a letter to Lord Rothschild which contained the following sentence:

> His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.[9]

The issuance of the Balfour Declaration caused a great stir within the Jewish community. For the Zionists, the Declaration transformed the Basle program from a vague dream into a political reality; the Declaration became a summons for all Jews to support a practical and honorable cause. The anti-Zionists viewed the Balfour Declaration as a threat to their political status since it raised the allegation of dual loyalty against the Jews. Both the anti-Zionists and Zionists placed a great deal of pressure upon the non-Zionists to support their respective forces. Through a petition circulated by Rabbi David Philipson, the anti-Zionists hoped the non-Zionists would join the opposition to the Balfour Declaration.

Marshall felt that it was proper and obligatory to respond favorably to this Declaration since he recognized a debt of gratitude to the British Government for openly

favoring the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The fact that the Balfour Declaration was formulated in 1917 caused Marshall to suspect that it was part of the war plan of the Allies. As he wrote to Rabbi Philipson, "I am afraid that you do not give due weight to the ideas which underlie the Balfour Declaration. They are of great political importance so far as the interest of the allied nations is concerned."[10] This feeling of gratitude increased with the subsequent approval by the White House and the United States Congress for the Balfour Declaration, and the League of Nations' decision to place Palestine under a British mandate. As a result of this, Marshall believed that it was the moral and patriotic duty of each American Jew to respond to the Declaration in a positive and constructive fashion: "if we [the Jews] did not cooperate and failure would result, the disgrace would rest upon every Jew who had failed to do his duty."[11] He cautioned the non-Zionists that "indifference . . . can do us a thousand times more harm than all the Ku Klux Klans and Henry Fords" since America and its allies expected the Jews to aid their co-religionists in Palestine.[12] Marshall would always be sensitive to the need for Jews to show appreciation for non-Jewish support in rebuilding Palestine. Consequently, Marshall was extremely upset with the petition being circulated by the anti-Zionists. He opposed public displays of anti-Zionist opposition against the Declaration due to the fear that such conduct might give "ammunition" for the anti-Semites.

Another reason which compelled Marshall to support the Balfour Declaration was to provide a haven for the persecuted Jews of Eastern Europe. For centuries these Jews yearned to live in Palestine. Allowing them to settle there, he believed, would benefit society as a whole since these Jews would be able to improve their economic status.

Marshall and leadership of the American Jewish Committee felt a need to respond to the Balfour Declaration. The American Jewish Committee, which from its inception had included Zionists as well as opponents of the Zionist program, had purposefully avoided taking a stand on Zionist issues. After the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration the Committee could no longer regard Zionism as a mere theoretical program over which its members might disagree. Failure to respond to developments in Palestine, Marshall realized, would leave this important issue to the Zionists. The Committee did not want political questions about Palestine to be the exclusive concern of the Zionists. Thus, the Committee authorized Marshall to formulate a resolution that would be deemed acceptable by the bulk of the Jewish community. Marshall hoped that this resolution would placate the Zionists without antagonizing most of the Jewish community.

This statement, adopted on April 28, 1918, made the following points: 1) the Committee reaffirmed its commitment to pursue the goals upon which it was founded; 2) the Committee made clear the undivided political loyalty of

American Jews, who had established a "permanent home" for themselves and given their "unqualified allegiance" to an America of which they were an "integral part"; 3) the Committee recognized and sympathized with the traditional sentiment many Jews had for a "home in the Holy Land for the Jewish people." "A part of the Jewish people" would go there, but the majority of the Jews would stay in the lands where they enjoyed civil rights and were a "component part" of those lands; 4) the Committee approved of the Balfour Declaration and considered essential the stipulations annexed that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews" in other countries; 5) the Committee offered to help establish in Palestine a center for Judaism where literature, science and art could be nurtured in a Jewish environment and where there could be "rehabilitation of the land."[13]

This statement allowed Marshall to publicly deny that the Balfour Declaration created an independent Jewish state or in any way conferred dual citizenship upon Diaspora Jewry. The Declaration's phrase "the establishment of a Jewish National Home" was interpreted to mean that Palestine was to remain open to Jewish immigration and that Palestinian Jewry would be afforded the same rights and privileges as the non-Jews residing there. Through the statement, Marshall

was able to construe the Declaration as favoring in Palestine the establishment of a cultural and spiritual center under "proper auspices." Palestine, to Marshall, was a haven and not a homeland for the world's Jewish population. He also noted the importance of the last two clauses of the Declaration. These became known as the "safeguard clauses" because they protected the existing civil and political rights of non-Jewish Palestinians and Diaspora Jewry. The Declaration recognized that a Jewish settlement under British authority could never expect the political allegiance of the vast majority of emancipated Jews. As Marshall noted, he would have never favored the Declaration if it undermined the principle that the permanent home for American Jews lay in the United States: "We expressly declared the proposition that the vast majority of the Jews were loyal citizens of the lands in which they lived and intended to preserve their allegiance, that they did not recognize the possibility of a dual allegiance, but that they were ready to help the rehabilitation of Palestine and the creation there of a centre (not the centre) for Jewish learning and Jewish culture."[14]

Marshall felt that this resolution represented the viewpoint of most American Jews. He even believed that it was "practically adopted" by the Zionist Organization of America since only a small group of "radicals within the Zionist camp continued to be identified as Jewish nationalists." The notion of a Jewish state, Marshall believed,

was for all intents and purposes a "dead" issue.[15] This did not mean that there were no longer any differences between the Zionist Organization and Marshall. Marshall differed with those Zionists whom he believed were overly zealous toward the accomplishment of their goals. For instance, Louis Brandeis contended that if Palestine was immediately revitalized, it could soon support a population of six million Jews. Marshall thought that such an appeal was misleading and impractical since it would require years of careful planning and enormous amounts of money before it could be accomplished. Large groups of Jews should be discouraged from immigrating by focusing upon the unsanitary and primitive conditions of Palestine. As he explained, "to speak therefore of a Jewish population of six million was in my judgment playing with fire and would only excite the imagination of those who would find their hopes shattered were they to yield to the temptation which such a declaration was certain to create."[16] Marshall was undoubtedly concerned that Brandeis' call for creation of a large Jewish settlement in Palestine would have placed American Jewry in the precarious position of denying that this statement alluded to them.

The American Jewish Committee's resolution may have reflected the consensus of most Jews in the United States, but it did not represent the view of some American Jews who did not necessarily approve of the Committee's "profound

appreciation" of the Balfour Declaration. Anti-Zionists like Congressman Julius Kahn and Rabbi David Philipson, for instance, criticized the Declaration and sought to dissuade the American Government from supporting the British policy in Palestine. Marshall faulted the anti-Zionists for failing to "see the difference between the upbuilding of Palestine and a contribution to the cause of Zionism . . ."[17] Marshall rejected the anti-Zionist notion that support of the Balfour Declaration would cause dual citizenship. Sharing in the supervision of Palestine, he noted, did not imply any allegiance to political Zionism. Realizing that there was a strong anti-Zionist sentiment within Reform Judaism, Marshall proclaimed that he saw no incongruity between it and rebuilding Palestine. "If there is, so much the worse for Reform Judaism," he publicly declared; "indifference to Palestine on the part of any Jew to me spells inconsistency with the spirit of Judaism."[18] Undoubtedly, the support of Marshall for the Balfour Declaration lessened the hostility anti-Zionists had toward the reconstruction of Palestine.

Marshall proclaimed that the Balfour Declaration made it incumbent upon every Jew to cooperate in rehabilitating Palestine, both spiritually and economically. He hoped that the Zionists and anti-Zionists would put aside their differences and try to understand the urgent problems facing Palestine. He articulated these problems as follows: "The important problems of the present, so far as Palestine is

concerned, are the bread and butter question, the industrial and agricultural development of the country, the carrying on of commerce, the construction of houses, the creation of mechanical and electrical power, the supplying of credit facilities and working capital, the introduction of immigrants and the provision of opportunities whereby they may support themselves."[19]

Although Marshall wanted all Jews to participate in rebuilding Palestine, he believed that non-Zionists should take the lead in this endeavor. Non-Zionists were particularly qualified to cooperate in the industrial, agricultural and educational reconstruction of Palestine because they were "not carried away by enthusiasm, but [are] disposed to look at the [Palestine] question on strictly business principles."[20] He wanted non-Zionists to help supply the leadership, the engineering knowledge, and the experience indispensable for the physical reconstruction of Palestine. Recognizing the emergency nature of the situation in Palestine, Marshall urged non-Zionists to become involved in cultural, business, agricultural and scientific projects. He called upon American Jewish businessmen to develop a practical project for the industrial development of Palestine.

In 1919, Marshall and Brandeis discussed ways of mobilizing American Jewish capital. Although the two men agreed on the need to strengthen the economy of Palestine through private investments, they could not agree on how this could

be accomplished. Two years later, Brandeis and his followers established an investment company, the American Palestine Company, which encouraged American Jewish businessmen to invest their capital and apply their business principles to meet the crucial needs of Palestine. Marshall termed this corporation the most practical project for the benefit of Palestine because it was based upon American business standards. At a dinner for the American Palestine Company, he made the following introductory remarks:

> . . . The time for action has arrived. It is important to be inspired by ideals; it was equally important to translate these ideals into action. Whatever theories and views of Zionism were held heretofore, now there is no alternative but to act, to show the world that the Jew not only is a person to ask for opportunities, but that he is ready to act upon the mandate that has gone forth.
>
> The American Palestine Company is one of the most important plans for Palestine that has been discussed for the past twenty years. It is initiated by men who have thought temperately, dispassionately and who have approached the subject knowing there are difficulties to be overcome, but who propose to overcome these difficulties as they have overcome practical business problems in New York City.
>
> I rejoice that the American Palestine Company is going to proceed on a strictly business basis and that is not seeking large dividends. I rejoice that the surplus to be earned by this company is to be used not as profits, but for the development of Palestine. I rejoice that Jewish business men who have ideals are going to translate these ideals in an economic sense that will give them the respect of Jews and of the world.[21]

Marshall's change of attitude toward the Zionists was also attributable to Chaim Weizmann gaining control of the World Zionist Organization after the Cleveland Conference of 1921. This conference caused a schism within the Zionist

organization between the supporters of Brandeis and Weizmann. In order to offset the loss of Brandeis, Weizmann became more willing to negotiate with non-Zionist leaders like Marshall. Weizmann recognized that their wealth and social prominence could greatly contribute to the practical work of Zionism. To gain this support, he de-emphasized all discussions of Zionist political ideology, including questions of Jewish statehood. Weizmann sought the involvement of the non-Zionists in the practical affairs and governance of Palestine. He proposed enlarging the Jewish Agency, the body which served as the official liaison with Great Britain on matters affecting Jewish affairs in Palestine, to include non-Zionists. Through the Jewish Agency, Weizmann wanted Marshall and the non-Zionists to participate in the economic and social reconstruction of Palestine.

As a result of Weizmann's insistence, the World Zionist Organization considered enlarging the Jewish Agency by inviting the participation of non-Zionists, in keeping with Article 4 of the British Mandate, which called for "the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National home."[22] The first definite step leading to the creation of the enlarged Jewish Agency was taken on February 20, 1923, when the Executive Council of the Zionist Organization adopted a resolution which declared that negotiations be opened with the representatives of leading Jewish communities and

organizations for the purpose of enlarging the Jewish Agency. By having the non-Zionists brought into the Agency, Zionists hoped to bring in financial resources they could not procure themselves. Marshall later commented upon this resolution:

> The leaders of Zionism were not slow to recognize, however, that the upbuilding of a Jewish center was not a task which belonged solely to the Zionists or to any particular group of Jews. It involved a duty which rested on All-Israel. They recognized that, while the Zionist Organization had been named in the Mandate as the temporary Jewish Agency to carry out the purposes enumerated in the Mandate, it was intended that steps should be taken in consultation with the British Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews . . . They also recognized the fact that an old and neglected country could not be renewed merely by enthusiasm and oratory, or the adoption of resolutions, or by flights of the imagination, but that it needed unity and sympathetic cooperation on the part of Jews of every shade of thought, that it demanded the development of practical ideas, compliance with economic principles, the application of orderly business methods, the provision of adequate capital, the cessation of controversy and of hair-splitting theorizing--the substitution of a harmonious spirit for irritating formulas.[23]

Negotiations directed toward including the non-Zionists in the Jewish Agency were led by Weizmann who approached Marshall and Felix Warburg in 1923. Marshall responded favorably to Weizmann's offer since he considered the Jewish Agency a vehicle through which all Jews could participate in the rebuilding of Palestine: "that it was the desire of those who framed the Mandate . . . that Jews of every shade of thought should be expected to cooperate for the purpose of carrying out the purposes of the Balfour Declaration . . . and that they should have an opportunity regardless of their

own differences of view to work together for the building up of the land. That mechanism was the Jewish Agency."[24] What ultimately bridged the gap between Marshall and Weizmann was their love for Zion and their concern for the welfare of world Jewry. Both of them realized that the rebuilding of Palestine could only be accomplished through a "united Israel." Marshall insisted that unity could only come if both sides tolerated the other's points of view. He, therefore, consented to work with the Zionists if they agreed to the following understanding:

> Nobody is called upon to abandon his conscientious convictions. The Zionists cannot be expected to abjure their nationalistic tendencies, and the non-Zionists are not called upon to adopt the Zionistic philosophy. The controlling idea should be that Jews of every shade of thought shall unite for the development of Jewish life in Palestine, to bring about the economic upbuilding of the land, and to perpetuate and preserve Jewish culture. I am quite sure that we can all work together on such a platform . . .[25]

The next step towards a rapprochement between the Zionists and non-Zionists was taken in 1924. In that year, Marshall and other leading non-Zionists agreed, at Weizmann's urging, to assemble a "full scale conference of non-Zionists" to discuss participation in an enlarged Jewish Agency and the establishment of an investment corporation to aid the economic development of Palestine. On February 8, 1924, Marshall, Cyrus Adler, Herbert Lehman and Judge Horace B. Stern--all pillars of the German non-Zionist community--sent out a letter to 150 influential Jews not affiliated

with the Zionist Organization of America. The letter read: "The time has come when we firmly believe that the duty rests upon the Jews of this country who are not members of or affiliated with the Zionist Organization, to consider seriously their relations to the economic problems of Palestine and to its cultural and industrial upbuilding."[26] In this letter of invitation, the concept of the enlarged Jewish Agency, as envisaged by Marshall and his colleagues, was definitely and unmistakably set forth. The enlarged Agency was to be devoid of partisanship, and it was to supersede the Zionist Organization as the public body authorized to cooperate with the Mandatory Power. The method proposed to effectuate change was the arrangement of a plan whereby non-Zionists would be substantially represented in the Agency. Marshall reaffirmed this concern in his opening address at the Non-Partisan Conference which took place on February 17, 1924.

The tone of Marshall's keynote address was one of demand for practical action; nevertheless, his speech was at times overcome by flashes of sentiment which made it clear that he had a strong feeling and concern for the future of Palestinian Jewry: "There has never been a time since the Diaspora when Jews have not in their hearts felt a profound love and attachment for the land of their fathers, when they have not felt a tie which bound them to that sacred soil."[27] The passage of the Johnson Act in 1924, which restricted

immigration into America, confirmed his belief in the need for Jews to build up Palestine on behalf of Jewish refugees. Marshall understood that the severe restrictions placed on immigration into Western Europe and America made the opening of Palestine to persecuted Jews imperative.

Marshall's speech emphasized that the non-Zionists were operating in accordance with accepted criteria of American society: they were aiding persecuted people who were rebelling against an autocratic regime; they were practical men who loathed theoretical discussions; they were motivated by humanitarian and philanthropic impulses. Marshall also added a Jewish consideration: "What would the non-Jews say?" He asked what the British would say if American Jewry remained aloof. The Balfour Declaration had received the approval of various European and Asian powers and it would seem ungracious, even disloyal to the Allied nations, to back away from the British pledge. Marshall was also aware of the rising hostility toward Jews on the part of the gentile population whose insecurities encouraged the conspiratorial suspicions of Henry Ford and bred a revival of the Ku Klux Klan. Equally upsetting to Marshall was the large number of American Jews who seemed to have lost interest in their heritage and in their commitment to their fellow Jews. Consequently, Marshall's speech had a dual purpose: to encourage American Jews to aid Palestine, and to placate the anti-Semites by stressing the loyalty of Jews to the United States.

In terms of concrete achievement, the Non-Partisan Conference had little immediate effect. Two committees were formed, one to give further study to the Jewish Agency proposal, and the other to organize an investment corporation that would unite existing economic agencies working for the rebuilding of Palestine along non-political lines.

A year later, March 4, 1925, the Non-Partisan Conference reconvened and received the reports both of the Jewish Agency Committee and its Investment Corporation Committee. The Conference advocated the formation of an investment corporation, the Palestine Economic Corporation. The Conference also adopted a resolution stating that it would be desirable if an appropriate plan could be formulated whereby non-Zionists would become a part of the Jewish Agency; and that the political activities of the Zionist Organization as well as its control over the budget for Palestine be transferred to the enlarged Agency.

These resolutions resolved first, that the report of the committees appointed by the first Non-Partisan Conference be approved in principle; and second, that a committee of twelve be appointed to negotiate the full participation of American Jewry in the Jewish Agency on the following conditions. The Conference favored the creation of a Jewish Agency which would consist of a Council and an Executive Committee, the former consisting of 150 and the latter of 18 members. Fifty percent of the Council and the Executive

Committee would be appointed by the Zionist Organization and fifty percent by non-Zionist bodies. Forty percent of the non-Zionist members would be representatives of American Jewry.

Marshall, who presided over the Conference, applauded his fellow non-Zionists for the work that they had achieved. The results of this Conference had demonstrated to Marshall that it was possible to aid Palestine without subscribing to the political ideas of Zionism. In concluding the meeting, he stressed the importance of the unification of American Jewry with regard to the Palestine reconstruction work. He viewed this meeting as earnest proof of the fact that both Zionists and non-Zionists were ready to overlook their differences for the benefit of Palestine.

Marshall's enthusiasm subsided when a conflict broke out between the Zionists and non-Zionists over the funding of Jewish relief programs. In 1925 the Joint Distribution Committee--an American organization engaged in relief work on an extensive scale world-wide--launched a campaign for a fifteen million dollar fund to be utilized largely for the purpose of supporting Jewish agricultural settlements in the Crimea. The most prominent figures in the Joint Distribution were largely identical with the leading personalities associated with the Non-Partisan Conferences. Zionists denounced this scheme because it was an admission that Palestine was not the sole answer to the Jewish refugee

problem. They were also concerned that a drive to aid the Russian settlers would cause a decline in contributions for Palestinian causes. The result of the controversy was a temporary suspension of the negotiations between the Zionist Organization and the non-Zionists regarding the re-organization of the Jewish Agency.

Marshall was a primary proponent and major financial supporter of Crimean colonization. He contended that since Palestine could not absorb a massive number of Jewish immigrants, such colonization was vital to alleviate the tragic plight of Eastern European Jewry. Marshall's insistence that priority be given to the relief work in Eastern Europe demonstrates the non-Zionist conviction that Palestine was not the sole answer to the Jewish problem. Like most non-Zionists, Marshall believed that he could support all reasonable means, including the Crimean plan, to ameliorate the conditions under which Eastern European Jews lived.

Although Marshall claimed that this conflict did not lessen his concern to aid Palestine, it did make it impossible for him to identify with Zionism. On behalf of all non-Zionists, he declared that he would resist demands that Zionists sought to impose upon him: "We are not of the kind that will permit ourselves to be bullied, intimidated or cudgeled . . ."[28]

As the conflict continued, Marshall engaged in vitriolic attacks upon Zionist leaders. Describing them as "petty

politicians" and "irresponsible demagogues," he felt that the leaders used their opposition of the Crimean plan as a pretense not to cooperate with the non-Zionists. They were not really willing to share responsibility for Palestine or to separate Palestine development from political development. All they wanted from the non-Zionists was financial support. Consequently, they did everything possible to undermine the efforts of the non-Zionists, including misrepresenting the intentions and achievements of the non-Zionists: "The Chairman of the United Palestine Appeal [Dr. Wise] did not hesitate in a public speech which he delivered at Springfield, Mass. to say that one Bialik was worth more than a thousand Felix Warburgs."[29] Marshall also opposed what he saw as a Zionist effort to interfere within the affairs of the American Jewish Committee through their involvement in Jewish education in America: "They have announced that they will take up the subject of Jewish education in America, simply because the American Jewish Committee is considering the making of a survey of that subject."[30] He found this matter particularly upsetting since most Zionists were non-religious. Marshall held that this was part of a Zionist scheme to eventually manipulate the domestic affairs of the American Jewish community: "They are now undertaking not only to rule Palestine, but the rest of the world as well . . . We will have to come to an understanding as to what the boundaries of Palestine

are and whether the Jewish State is to include the domains of Uncle Sam."[31]

Up to this point, the dispute between Zionists and non-Zionist leaders had remained relatively private, with the Zionist view disseminated to a Zionist audience, and the non-Zionist view largely limited to allegations made in correspondence. When this controversy was exposed to the public, contributions to the Zionist Organization and the Joint Distributions began to decline. Realizing that matters had gotten out of control, the leaders of this dispute expressed a willingness to return to a more cooperative spirit. Weizmann apologized to Marshall for the Zionist Organization's opposition to the Crimean scheme. Marshall consented to patch up differences so long as the following condition was met: "Claims of priority of one cause over another are no longer in order. Every cause must be judged on its merits, and the generosity of American Jewry and their sense of justice may be relied upon to make proper response to every worthy appeal for sympathetic and effective support."[32] When Weizmann assented to this condition, they agreed to meet and discuss the future upbuilding of Palestine. According to Marshall, the object of these negotiations was "to deal, not with any political philosophies, but solely with the spiritual and economic development of Palestine."[33]

On January 17, 1927, an agreement was signed by Marshall and Weizmann which set forth that both the non-Zionists and

the Zionist Organization were in accord as to the desirability and feasibility of organizing a Jewish Agency in accordance with the terms of the Palestine Mandate. The agreement further provided for the creation of an impartial and authoritative commission for the twofold purpose of carrying out a detailed survey of the economic, agricultural and industrial resources and possibilities of Palestine and of framing a long term program of constructive work in Palestine for the reorganized Jewish Agency, along the lines of land acquisition, immigration and colonization. This commission, known as the Joint Palestine Survey Commission, was to suggest the priorities for Palestine relief work; and when its report was accepted by both Zionists and non-Zionists, the expanded Jewish Agency would go into effect. Marshall supported the creation of this Commission because its work was to be "conducted on a scientific basis, free from all political entanglements."[34] He hoped that the results of this Commission would prove of inestimable value; "Consequently, those who have heretofore refrained from participating in the devoted efforts that have been made for the economic and cultural development of Palestine should now cooperate in this significant effort to regenerate the land of our fathers and to create opportunities there for those who have so long been bereft of them."[35]

On October 20, 1928, the Non-Zionist Conference Concerning Palestine convened to consider the report of the

Survey Commission. Two resolutions termed a "pact of glory" were adopted unanimously by the Conference. Both resolutions reaffirmed the resolutions passed at the 1925 Non-Partisan Conference, and cleared the way for the extension of the Jewish Agency to include Jewish representatives of all shades of opinion, regardless of whether they affiliated with the Zionist Organization or not.

The first resolution approved the report of the Joint Distribution Survey Commission and stated that the recommendations should be regarded as a basis for "future action" by the non-Zionists of America. The second resolution provided for the appointment by Marshall of an Organization Committee of seven, that would designate the non-Zionist members of the Council of the Jewish Agency allotted to the United States. He was very concerned how the American non-Zionists were to be selected. Due to Marshall's insistence, the Organization Committee considered the following when it made its selections:

> The Committee has to the best of its ability sought to choose men who, though not Zionists, are interested in the upbuilding of Palestine. It has sought to select those who, by reason of their recognized standing in the various communities, of their past experience and their ability to deal with problems affecting Jewry, may be able to bring about a speedy development of the Holy Land . . . appointments have not been made on the basis of membership in any particular organization. It is our earnest hope that in carrying on the practical work for Palestine due consideration will be given to every shade of thought. Nobody will be expected to surrender any ideals which are cherished by him. Just as in this country we can work together for the common case of Judaism and at the same time adhere to our religious principles, so I trust that may likewise be done in Palestine.[36]

The Organization Committee was also empowered to negotiate with the duly appointed representatives of the Zionist Organization on matters connected with the interpretation of any recommendation contained in the report of the Survey Commission.

The Conference concluded by recognizing the Jewish Agency as the official body to deal with the Mandatory Power and to represent the Jewish people as a whole in all matters related to Palestine. The enlarged Jewish Agency was to take over all political and economic functions in Palestine delegated to the Zionist Organization.

The Conference also consented to the inclusion of the term "Jewish National Home" in the preamble to the enlarged Jewish Agency's constitution, and agreed to incorporate into the governing rules of the Agency clauses which endorsed: 1) continuation of Jewish immigration to Palestine; 2) the principle of Jewish labor in enterprises operating under the auspices of the Jewish Agency; 3) development of the Hebrew language and Hebrew culture in Palestine; 4) freedom of the settlers to determine their own form of settlement, provided that their economic self-sufficiency was taken into consideration; 5) recognition of the Jewish National Fund, the Zionist land purchasing agency, as the instrument for the purchasing of land in Palestine as the inalienable property of the Jewish people.

The spirit of harmony that reigned at the Conference was generally hailed as the beginning of a new era of unity in Israel. Marshall declared that the hour had come for American Jews to undertake the "sacred mission" which would result in the welfare of Palestinian Jewry. Commenting upon the spirit which prevailed at the Conference and the unanimity with which the resolutions were adopted, he said that there were no longer Zionists and non-Zionists since both groups have learned to work together. Marshall was convinced that Jewish nationalism was a "thing of the past." As he noted, "the question now is to rebuild the country on a sound economic basis for the purpose of enabling those who cannot go elsewhere to establish themselves in the Holy Land and to develop their spiritual and cultural values."[37]

The inaugural meeting of the Council of the Jewish Agency took place on August 11, 1929 in Zurich, Switzerland. This meeting took place a few days after the Zionist Congress approved the enlargement of the Jewish Agency. Speaking to the members of the Council, Marshall stated that this was the most extraordinary assembly he ever attended. Jews from four continents and of every kind of opinion were gathered. They had come together to witness the union of Zionist and non-Zionists for the rebuilding of Palestine. They had different conceptions of what should and should not be done, but of one thing he was confident--as a result of their participation in the enlarged Jewish Agency, Palestine would

be rebuilt. Marshall insisted that nobody should be expected to surrender any belief; everybody should be given the opportunity to render assistance to Palestine.

Marshall felt that it was crucial that the Council recognize the importance of the religious needs of its members. At a meeting of the Zionist members of the Council, he urged the insertion of a clause in the Constitution of the Jewish Agency that would meet Jewish religious needs. His address, one of the last of his life, pleaded for recognition of absolute freedom of conscience: "an atheist has the same right not to believe as I have to believe."[38] Marshall was concerned that the Agency recognize that "there are millions who identify themselves with Judaism the religion and who, if they think of Judaism mean the Jewish religion."[39] If the Agency failed to take into consideration the importance to the Jew of Judaism, Marshall warned it would alienate many "men of significance . . . whose connection to our affairs would be important . . ."[40] He included in this category not only Orthodox, but Reform Jews as well:

> But there is a large group of Jews who, though not Orthodox, are connected to Judaism less by the race than by the Jewish religion. They belong primarily to the great Reform communities. Their members are not Zionists, or in any case they have not joined the Zionist Organization. Indeed, some have been in large part anti-Zionist, because they have thought--whether correctly or not is not the issue here--that Zionism was somehow opposed to the Jewish religion . . .
>
> Under great difficulties, after Dr. Weizmann had interested me and others in the Jewish Agency, I went to the leaders of the Reform movement in America to draw them towards the Jewish Agency. It was a task that took four to five years until it succeeded in

> winning some of the leaders, among them some rabbis, over to the Jewish Agency. But I don't believe I am mistaken to suppose that their decision to join the Jewish Agency was determined in part by the knowledge that the time had come to commit themselves and bear witness that for the majority of Jews religion is the greatest life-interest. In any case, these people have now come into the movement: a great number of them, including several rabbis, were present at that assembly . . . when we made the decision to come into the Jewish Agency. We may not estrange these people, we may not say to these men or let them believe that the Zionist movement is interested in what up to now we have laid down in the constitution of the Jewish Agency as most essential--Hebrew language and culture, Jewish work, Jewish territory and other important principles--and make no mention of the great issue of the Jewish religion.
>
> Let me say to you that this is a concern of far-reaching consequences, of which all the Jews in America will speak: in the Orthodox synagogues, the Reform communities, and every Jewish home. They will consider it--if indeed it happens--the most astonishing and strange fact that, thanks to the Zionist element of the Jewish Agency, religion was kept out of its constitution . . . Can we alienate from us those from whom we expect a great part of the financial support?[41]

As a result of Marshall's address, a resolution was ultimately adopted, satisfactory to all parties, which read as follows: "The activities of the Jewish Agency shall include within their scope provision for meeting Jewish religious needs, it being clearly understood that individual freedom of conscience shall remain safeguarded and assured."[42]

The constitution of the Jewish Agency was formally signed on August 14, 1929 by Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow on behalf of the Zionist Organization, by Marshall, Warburg, Lee K. Frankel for the American non-Zionists, and by the non-Zionist representatives of the various countries that entered the Agency. With the signing of the constitution,

the enlarged Jewish Agency was brought into being. Thus, Marshall engaged in a partnership formally and officially as a non-Zionist with the World Zionist Organization. Yet, this did not mean that he had committed himself to the political objectives of Zionism, specifically to Jewish nationalism. Instead, Marshall entered the Jewish Agency because he believed it was important to aid the Zionists in rebuilding the Jewish community in Palestine. He offered moral encouragement and financial help to further immigration and settlement of the land, consistent with the Mandate of the League of Nations.

Within a month of this historic agreement, Marshall lay dead of a heart attack, suffered in Zurich. Judge Horace Stern, in paying tribute to Marshall, correctly observed that one of his greatest accomplishments was that he developed the means by which non-Zionists could aid Palestinian Jewry without making any commitment to a nationalist ideology. His object in doing this was to unify American Jewry:

> Marshall's work in connection with Palestine and more particularly with the formation of the enlarged Jewish Agency represents to my mind his passion for the unification of the Jewish people. Indeed, I believe that the goal of unity was far more important in his eyes than that of Palestine itself, much as he loved the land of his fathers and eager as he was to establish the homeland assured by the Balfour Declaration. And the supreme accomplishment of his life was the bringing together of non-Zionists and Zionists in the constitution signed at Zurich--supreme not so much because of the results that may grow directly out of the formation of the new Agency, but because he had shown it to be possible to attain unity even for a cause as to which the

Jewish people were apparently hopelessly divided. Marshall, like all truly great statesmen, had the vision, the mental clarity, and the moral impulse, to envisage the big factor on which men might combine without sacrifice of individual principles, and to relegate to their true perspective the minor points of difference. He saw that all Jews could unite on a present rehabilitation of Palestine, and safely leave the ultimate destiny of that country to the day when ultimate destinies arrive.[43]

CHAPTER FOUR

Felix M. Warburg

Felix Warburg (1871-1937) was born in Hamburg, Germany. From a young age, his parents sought to instill in him a sense of responsibility for the less fortunate, and urged Felix and his siblings to contribute a tenth of their allowances to worthy causes. Warburg emigrated to the United States in 1894, became a partner in Kuhn, Loeb and Company, and married the daughter of Jacob Schiff, the senior partner of the firm. Warburg also became concerned with institutions for civic and social betterment, and for the promotion of the arts. He was particularly active in the work of the Henry Street settlement, founded by Lillian D. Wald, for the improvement of the conditions of immigrant children.

Outstanding among Warburg's social labors was his work in connection with the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, founded in 1915 for the purpose of providing relief for Jewish war sufferers in Eastern Europe. After the First World War, it was concerned with the needs and sufferings of Jews in that area, particularly food and medical aid. In addition, the organization established credit cooperative societies, free loan societies and central loan banks, trained Jews in productive occupations and built medical-sanitary organizations. Warburg served as chairman of the J.D.C. throughout its early years.

As Warburg's experience and numerous contacts with social and philanthropic activities amassed, he became more

impressed with the urgent need for a Jewish social service organization which would avoid duplication of effort and high overhead costs, and maximize benefits to those in need of help. With this end in view, Warburg became one of the prime movers in the formation of the Federation for Support of Jewish Philanthropic Societies of New York in 1917. He became the Federation's first president.

Warburg also was concerned with improving relations between Christians and Jews. He was vice-president of the Welfare Council of New York, which promoted cooperation between Jewish, Protestant and Catholic welfare agencies in social and health work.

Felix Warburg became deeply interested in Palestine as a youth when he thought of it as "holy ground." He initially became involved in Palestinian affairs when he was chairman of the Joint Distribution Committee: "My first actual contact with the work there was in 1914 when I came in touch with the Zionist group on the question of sending Prof. Friedlaender on a Red Cross Mission to Palestine. Since then I have never neglected Palestine."[1] Although he consistently opposed the idea of a Jewish nation, he favored developing Palestine as a refuge for the oppressed Jews of Eastern Europe. He advocated constructive work in Palestine which would put "the country in better shape to take care of and support the people who are drifting to that country."[2] Warburg did not believe that the Zionists were qualified to pursue this endeavor. He accused the Zionists of ignoring the welfare of the Palestinians and being concerned only with espousing political propaganda. Asserting that the Joint Distribution Committee had spent millions in Palestine, he charged the Zionists of not doing the same:

> . . . and if those who profess Zionism would have seen to it that every cent collected in the name of Zionism went into Palestine things would probably be further advanced today. But through the unfortunate egotism, jealousy and other harmful qualities of some of the so-called leaders, there is very little to the credit of the Zionist organization.[3]

Warburg took a more active role in Palestinian matters through his friendship with Judah Magnes. Magnes convinced

Warburg to regard Palestine as a crucial place for Jewish scholarship and research. He made Warburg aware that Palestine lacked Jewish educational institutions. Warburg, who thought it imperative that Jews have the same educational opportunities as their fellow citizens in Palestine, became enticed by the plan to create a Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and eventually became one of its founders and chief benefactors. Although he generously supported Jewish educational and cultural institutions in Palestine, Warburg was not a cultural Zionist. His vast array of interests resembled those of a Renaissance man. Warburg felt an affinity for western, not Jewish, culture. Unlike the cultural Zionists, he did not want Palestine to become a cultural and spiritual center exclusively for the Jewish people. His support of the University was not premised upon the "desire to see the Jews dominate that country," but upon the "desire to see the Jewish religion get its share of inspiration out of these extraordinarily beautiful, historic surroundings . . ."[4] Warburg envisioned Palestine as a spiritual center for people of varying religions. Consequently, he endowed an institute for Judaic and Islamic studies so that Jews would be able to meet with Christians and Moslems.

Warburg was concerned that the Hebrew University might fall under the control of the Zionists. For the Zionists the purpose of study of the University was not only to

cultivate Judaism, but to act as a political weapon for Zionism. Warburg wanted the University not to become involved in politics and to become a cultural center for the Jews: "We feel strongly that the walls of the University must shut out politics as much as possible and concentrate on learning . . ."[5] His interest in the Hebrew University grew out of his fear "lest our people, the people of the Book, should drift away from their spiritual heritage. On that account, I felt the danger of 'irreligiousity' in Palestine, a danger which awakened my interest in the University."[6] Warburg also thought that the University would have a profound and stimulating impact upon Diaspora Jewry. He conceived a plan for sending newly ordained American rabbis to study at the University so they may gain "inspiration" from the Holy Land. As Warburg noted:

> If a new Jewish community is to be created in the Holy Land, the land of our glorious past, it must have as its foundation a specifically Jewish culture, which is not to be found elsewhere. From this standpoint, the proposed University of the Jews on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem, is an institution which calls for the heartiest cooperation of everyone who is interested in such a culture.[7]

In the Hebrew University he saw not only a center of Jewish learning, but also a means of encouraging Jewish and Arab scholars to supplement one another's studies of their inter-related civilizations. Hebrew University was to become a vehicle to advance the cause of this cultural rapprochement.

Warburg did not want the Zionists to handle any of the money that he donated to the Hebrew University. In 1923 he objected to general fund raising by the Zionists. He called for a system whereby funds would bypass Zionist political organizations and be earmarked for specific projects in Palestine. Two months later he donated $10,000 to the Hebrew University. He explained his action in a letter to Louis Marshall, a letter which revealed both his strong dislike for the political Zionists and his desire to aid Palestine:

> If Palestine is to be anything but the trash basket of dissatisfied Jews or Jewish politicians, it has to become more than an arrogant, conceited, perhaps Hebrew talking mob devoid of the humility of the Jewish religion. It was for that reason that I felt I should back the few decent English Jews, with Baron deRothschild, in his non-Zionistic, constructive Jewish education efforts, and it is for that reason that I gave Dr. Weizmann the $10,000 for the Jewish University, at the same time telling him how little I thought of any political organization by the Jews for the Jews in Palestine.[8]

In 1924, Warburg visited Palestine for the first time in order to inspect how the Joint Distribution Committee was spending its money there. He was deeply moved by the idealism and the boundless sacrifices made by the Jewish settlers (the Chaluzim) in Palestine. He complimented the settlers for engaging in constructive endeavors aimed at rebuilding Palestine rather than relying upon charity. He believed that within Palestine there was emerging a new generation of Jews who were not interested in acquiring

power and were eager to serve mankind. Nor were they committed to political Zionism because they "realize that they are only a minority out of a larger Arab population. What they know is that Palestine needs more deeds than talk."[9] Warburg later described them not as "conquerors, but colonizers, imbued with a spirit of social idealism that traces its ancestry to the prophets who once preached in the land."[10] These settlers wanted to create in Palestine an egalitarian society in which all would work together for a common goal. There would be no iniquity and injustice in Palestine. Palestine would be a "land without a ruling class, because 'all Israel are brethren and responsible for one another,' and one of the motives of the Jewish settlement in Palestine is actually to establish and live that fact."[11] He was convinced that the ideals and accomplishments of the Jewish settlers would "give something of supreme value to the whole world."[12]

Warburg was so impressed by the unselfish devotion of the Jewish settlers in Palestine that he felt that it was the obligation of every American Jew to support them: ". . . the pioneers who would sacrifice the comforts of life and the possibilities of amassing a fortune for the sake of planting their children on the soil of their ancestors, under simple conditions and high ideals, I felt that they had the right to the little help which we are planning to give them."[13] He also noted that due to the restrictive immigration policy

of America, Palestine was one of the few countries where a disenfranchised Jew had a hopeful future. Ultimately, Warburg felt that American Jews should support Palestine because "every Jew worthy of the name" must be "interested in protecting the rights of Jews of other lands who do not share the blessing of liberty and free economic opportunity that are ours."[14] There was instilled within Warburg the strong humanitarian notion that every Jew "is eager to help other Jews less favorably situated than himself."[15]

Warburg distinguished his method of supporting Palestine from that espoused by the Zionists which, he said, was premised upon "hysterics." He was generally prone to blame Zionist difficulties at least partially on financial mismanagement. Warburg favored a constructive, conservative approach to handling the Jewish issue in Palestine, one that was economically rather than politically oriented. He wanted American Jews to send their money to Palestine to improve the economic situation there, not as charity but as a good investment for the future, to "afford us the satisfaction that we have done something of which we and our children may well be proud."[16] While he favored Jews in the United States sending their money to Palestine, Warburg opposed the Zionist notion of having American Jews settle there: "We do not ask the Jews of the United States to pull up their stakes, and to endure the same sacrifices which others are willing to make. We merely ask the people of this country

to enable the suffering Jews to live that life which must be lived in accordance with their wishes."[17] He would always believe that the first concern of every American Jew was to conserve Jewish life within the United States.

To further the economic development of Palestine, Warburg was active in organizing and directing the Palestine Economic Corporation. The P.E.C., which was established by Brandeis and his followers after the American Palestine Company failed to draw large amounts of American capital, was created for the purpose of providing credit for constructive purposes in Palestine. The P.E.C. encouraged private initiative in Palestine's growth as opposed to the prevailing tendency of creating communal colonies through contributions from national fund campaigns. Through this corporation, he hoped to enlarge the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine, thus laying the essential foundation for social progress among its inhabitants. As Warburg noted:

> There are wonderful organizations in Palestine, among them the Palestine Economic Corporation, which are doing business on the highest standards of business conduct and which are meeting their obligations with the utmost sense of honor. The Palestine Economic Corporation is exerting a healthful influence in developing the economic life of the country. As an institution with the highest regard for business ethics, it is helping to lay a sound foundation for the commercial and industrial development of Palestine.[18]

In 1927 Warburg returned to Palestine as part of the Joint Palestine Survey Commission, whose purpose was to determine how the reconstruction of Palestine could be made

economically feasible. The Commission was to conduct a detailed survey of the economic resources and possibilities of Palestine, and was to be funded jointly by non-Zionists and the Zionist movement. The Commission was to investigate the diverse aspects of Palestine politics, immigration, industry and agriculture, and to suggest the priorities for the work to be done in Palestine. It was to be headed by leading non-Zionists who in turn would be assisted by economic and agricultural experts. Warburg declared that the Commission's activities would be of a constructive and not of a critical nature. The four members of the Commission were to disregard all partisan or personal factors. As one of the four commissioners, Warburg was given an opportunity to learn about Palestine in a more thorough manner than was possible during his previous visit.

The Commission's report was submitted to Louis Marshall and Chaim Weizmann on June 24, 1928 to facilitate the framing of a comprehensive and systematic program for future constructive work in Palestine and for the guidance of a reorganized Jewish Agency. Warburg believed that the underlying basis of the report was to help make Palestine self-sufficient. The report recommended that no more communal colonies be created, urging the encouragement of private ownership, abandonment of the prohibition against outside labor, creation of joint arbitration councils to settle labor disputes in agriculture and industry, a campaign to popularize Palestine

products, continuation of educational and health work with more Government support, the employment of modern devices to improve agricultural conditions, establishment of an information service to advise prospective immigrants of conditions and inform Jewish manufacturers in Eastern Europe of the prospects for transferring their plants to Palestine, conclusion of custom agreements to open up various Arab countries as markets for Palestine products, and the creation of a special land reserve to provide opportunities for individual settlers who wish to acquire land as private property. The idea of Palestine as a Jewish homeland was not referred to in the report. Palestine was described as the "land of our origin." The Commission regarded the kvutzah (collective settlement) as a radical experiment whose innovations in child-rearing and communal living threatened the traditional institutions of family and marriage. The kvutzah's social organization, which precluded individual liability, the Commission warned, did not provide adequate security for the public funds the Agency provided. The Commission also suggested that selling lands purchased by the Jewish National Fund would accelerate land development and encourage capital growth.

The Zionist leaders responded to the report with both pragmatic and ideological arguments. They attempted to justify the kvutzah on an economic basis and warned of the danger of land speculation if JNF lands were sold. For many Zionists, the kvutzah and public ownership of land related

directly to the type of society they hoped to create in Palestine.

Before the Commission's report was issued, Warburg outlined in a memorandum dated March 6, 1928 his own ground rules that would make the reconstruction of Palestine both economically feasible and a worthwhile cause. He believed that it was essential that there be an absolute abandonment on the part of the Zionist Organization of business activity in Palestine, such as the planning and administering of colonization. He wanted the Palestine Government to take charge of such activities as sanitation, immigration, education and public improvements which would be paid out of taxes. Warburg urged that at least eighty percent of the money raised for Palestine go straight to the colonists and industries.

The report of the Joint Survey Commission was ratified by the non-Zionist Conference in October of 1928. On the basis of this report the non-Zionists decided to participate with the Zionists in the Jewish Agency. Warburg voiced the opinion that once the Agency was enlarged, all its members would cooperate, regardless of their past differences and outside interests, in the common task of rebuilding Palestine on sound economic lines. He believed that every American Jew had a duty to help Palestine become economically self-sufficient: "every Jew in the United States should help that country stand on its own feet. We should do it in a

way that is most businesslike and most painless for the recipients. Let us have as many players in the game and as few coaches on the sidelines as possible."[19]

The Conference empowered Marshall to form an Organizing Committee which would select the American non-Zionists to the Jewish Agency. Marshall chose Warburg as one of the seven men of the Organizing Committee. The Organizing Committee held meetings with a similar committee of the Zionist Organization towards the drawing up of a constitution of the Jewish Agency. Warburg felt that the following points needed to be expressed during these meetings: Zionists and non-Zionists should not attempt to change the principles to which each felt bound; Palestine needed sound business management, and both Arabs and Jews should follow a path of better understanding and cooperation. He believed that Palestinian Jews should take the initiative in improving this relationship. Peace could prevail only if they showed consideration to their Arab neighbors who have their own attachments, their own reverences and their own rights of property in Palestine. These principles were to become the basis of Warburg's approach toward Palestine.

On August 14, 1929 the enlarged Jewish Agency was formally established. According to its constitution, the Agency was to consist of three organs, the Council, the Administrative Committee and Executive. Warburg was made Chairman of the Administrative Committee, which consisted

of forty members and met to consider questions of policy and supervise the work of the Agency. Each of these three organs were composed of equal members of Zionists and non-Zionists. Warburg felt that the division of fifty percent Zionist and non-Zionist would only really apply during the initial period of the Agency. Eventually the ability of the candidates would be the only criteria for their selection to the Agency: ". . . we hoped and felt then, as we do now, that the differences between Zionists and non-Zionists would become less distinct and that we should select the best human material wherever we could find it, whatever their affiliations . . ."[20] He stressed the notion that he wanted the Agency to be comprised of men of all shades of belief. He hoped the Agency would seek "support from conflicting groups and factions" and it would "find a common platform upon which men of different philosophies could agree to work together."[21] "Devoid of political ideology," Warburg wanted the Agency to be a "means whereby Jews of all types and views could cooperate in the development of a wholesome, spiritual, self-supporting Jewish life in Palestine . . ."[22] Although Warburg declared that the Agency should be comprised of men of all shades of opinion, he still did not want the Agency to become a forum where the varying opinions were expressed. Warburg believed that it was more important that Agency members work together than debate ideological positions. He wanted the Agency to follow a constructive policy

of moderation and to avoid extremist solutions. Warburg told the members of the Agency that they should work as much as possible and criticize as little as possible. They should avoid having "too many executives" with "each one [trying] to earn his salary by speaking" instead of "by wise or efficient action."[23]

Warburg felt it was necessary to limit the role of the Zionist organizations so that there would be harmony and discipline within the Agency. He urged Weizmann to make the Zionist organizations aware that their viewpoints were to be subordinated to Agency policy. Warburg, envisioning a changed role for Zionist organizations, perceived them as providing a forum for Zionists to discuss their ideas on Palestine. He insisted that the Zionist organizations recognize that diplomatic, governmental and international questions be decided by the Agency.

In a letter to Cyrus Adler, Warburg summed up his views of those matters which he considered vital to the success and continuance of the Agency:

a. That the program of the Agency be fundamentally economic.
b. That the responsibility for the health work, education and social service as soon as possible be turned over to the Vaad Leumi and the local communities, with an appropriate participation by the Government in the support of such services.
c. That every avenue toward cooperation be established so as to bring about satisfactory and peaceful conditions between all parts of Palestine.
d. That the organization of the Agency be simplified and reduced in all departments, from the Executive down.

e. That appropriate authority be granted to a finance committee, to revise and make necessary adjustments in budgetary allocations and distribution during the fiscal year.
f. That the President of the Agency and the Chairman of the Administrative Committee be granted enlarged powers to supervise and direct the activities of the Executive in matters of important policy.
g. That the Agency have a larger measure of control of the disbursements and administration of the Keren Hayesod.
h. That the status of the World Zionist Organization and the respective regional Zionist Organizations throughout the world be clearly defined so that there may not be superimposed upon the structure of the Agency, which is already divided into Zionists and non-Zionists, an additional chamber, so to speak, representative of the Zionist Organization in respect to matters of policy and finance which come squarely within the purview of the Jewish Agency itself.[24]

Warburg believed the major task of the Agency was the facilitation of such conditions as would make it possible for an increasing number of Jews to live in Palestine on a self-sustaining, sound economic basis. To further progress in Palestine, he urged the Agency to concentrate its efforts on economic undertakings without becoming entangled in politics: "I am satisfied that the calm normal operations of a business body will find a modus vivendi, perhaps long before political difficulties are settled in one way or another."[25] The Agency must primarily be interested in the "immediate establishment of livable conditions and such other safety so as to get people to live there quietly for the next years and so that people will have confidence and back enterprises in the immediate future."[26]

In order to assure that there was sufficient funds for reconstruction work in Palestine, Warburg subscribed $500,000 toward a Palestine finance corporation which was to be placed at the disposal of the Council of the Jewish Agency. He hoped that through this corporation, American Jews would unite in a cooperative effort to aid Palestine economically. Warburg was convinced that more American Jews would contribute to such a financial corporation if it was based upon sound business principles. Therefore, he wanted this corporation to be conducted "along the lines of other business enterprises, by a board which tries its best for the shareholders, without a large apparatus. The business must be conducted calmly without hysterics or indiscretion."[27] Warburg understood that many Zionists, especially labor Zionists, feared that wealthy non-Zionist investors would control Palestinian enterprises. He sought to allay their fears by insisting that this new investment corporation would only be responsible to the Agency.

The object of the corporation was to create employment in the agricultural industry in Palestine and to secure as much land as possible for the Jewish settlers. Warburg understood that the land in Palestine was also "dear and holy" to the Arabs. He was concerned that this land was procured in a fashion that would not antagonize the Arabs. Warburg felt that it was necessary to purchase the land on a limited basis in order not to arouse the anxieties of the Arabs.

Warburg also wanted to use the Agency as a vehicle to improve relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. He thought that it was essential that the Agency utilized its resources to assist the inhabitants of Palestine based upon the ideal teachings of goodwill and helpfulness for everybody. The Agency should not only be concerned with the needs of the Jewish population; it should also seek to protect the rights and liberties of all peoples who live in Palestine. Warburg hoped to involve Arabs in the Agency so that its efforts at rebuilding Palestine would be the work of the entire population. He also wanted both Arabs and Jews to derive the benefits of its improved conditions.

On August 23, nine days after the ratification of the enlarged Jewish Agency, Arab rioting broke out in a number of cities throughout Palestine. When Warburg learned of the riots, he was disappointed that after the Agency's declarations of good feeling toward the Arabs and the expressed desire to live in peace with them this outbreak should occur. Committed to the notion that better understanding was possible between Arabs and Jews, Warburg viewed the riots in Palestine as a temporary setback. He was confident that the inhabitants of Palestine would eventually want to live together based upon a sound foundation of social intercourse and progress. This could be possible once the Arabs were better educated and understood that the Jews in Palestine were not a threat: "It is our hope that the

illiteracy among the whole population will disappear soon, for that will be the best medium to prevent the vicious spreading of false rumors . . ."[28] Speaking on behalf of the Agency, he asserted: "We want no advantage for ourselves; we want no power."[29] Warburg expressed the goals of the Agency with regard to the Arabs to be the following:

> . . . there is nothing in our aims which should give rise to any apprehension to the Arabs. We wish to build up Palestine shoulder to shoulder with the other sections of the population, peacefully, equitably. There is room enough in Palestine for the sons of Ishmael and the sons of Isaac to dwell together and to devote themselves together to the task of making Palestine a country which will be the pride of both races alike.[30]

If the Agency pursued this policy, he was convinced that inevitably harmonious relations would develop between Arabs and Jews: "As Jews and Arabs living together as neighbors get to know each other and to understand each other's viewpoints and attitude, and develop a mutually cooperative spirit, the foundations that are so essential to the wellbeing of all the inhabitants and groups which make up the Holy Land would be developed."[31]

In order to prevent future outbreaks, Warburg also admonished Palestinian Jews to refrain from engaging in hostile activities and to take a more conciliatory approach toward the Arabs. He was convinced that the Jews would not bear ill feelings toward the Arabs once they learned that the riots were caused by a few agitators and that the great majority of Arabs took no part in the disorder. As Warburg noted:

> I know of no finer gesture of goodwill, of no more practicable approach to our problem than to point out to the world, to the Arabs, and to sections of our own people that we propose to go forward in a spirit of tolerance, and that while we must and shall insist on being accorded our rights, we are mindful of the fact that the destiny of our people in Palestine is bound up with the common life and living together of all the peoples of Palestine. Agitation, poisonous propaganda, organized incitements we must fight not only for our own sake but for the sake of the large mass of Arabs who are guiltless of any evil intention but who are being misled by irresponsible leaders.[32]

In order to encourage a policy of mutual understanding and mutual respect between Arabs and Jews, Warburg felt that it was necessary to end the discussions of Arab rights on one side and promises in regard to a national home for the Jews on the other side since evidently the "millennium" of good understanding would not come by dwelling on the points of disagreement. He issued a statement in which he pleaded for the following guiding principle as expressive of the purpose of the Jewish Agency in Palestine: "no political ambition, but cultural, social, economic live and let live for all."[33] He suggested to the Zionists to utilize the word "national" infrequently "as possible, for its meaning is still open to all kinds of controversy and therefore it only leads to misunderstanding."[34] While Warburg did not insist that the Zionists reject the concept of Jewish nationalism, he felt that such views must only be expressed privately. He faulted the Zionists for publicly engaging in their "nationalistic talks" which caused turmoil among

the inhabitants of Palestine. Warburg also opposed Zionist efforts to persuade Jewish employers to hire only Jews. He refused to support the Jewish National Fund because of its requirement that only Jews work its land. Warburg maintained that such policies, by treating Jews better than Arabs, only encouraged bitterness and anti-Semitism.

Warburg thought that it was essential that the Agency maintain a friendly attitude toward the Mandate Authorities and toward the British Government, based on a just appreciation of the terms of the Balfour Declaration. The Agency must have a definite philosophy and policy in regard to the establishment of proper relationship between Arab, Mandatory and Jews. His own feeling was that the aim of all should be along the lines of accomplishing peace. He was convinced that with conservative, constructive ideas a modus vivendi could be worked out. Warburg felt this way because he believed that the Jews needed the support of others to ameliorate their situation. Ultimately the fate of world Jewry was dependent upon the humanitarian sentiment of others. Warburg would always maintain hope that the entire population of Palestine would flourish under the trusteeship of England. Consequently, after the riots in Palestine, Warburg refused to publicly condemn the British even though privately he expressed disappointment with their "stupid" lack of foresight and precaution. In this sense, Warburg differed with the Zionists who were more hesitant about relying upon the

non-Jewish population to resolve the situation in Palestine. He was often critical of the Zionists for failing to compromise their political objectives to appease both the Arabs and the British. Warburg regarded the non-Zionist proposals for cooperation and goodwill among Jews and non-Jews as more hopeful of achievement than establishing a Jewish nation built upon military strength.

An example of Warburg's willingness to cooperate with the British occurred in October of 1929 when he was chairman of a delegation that met the Prime Minister of England, Ramsay MacDonald, to discuss the situation in Palestine. Warburg read a prepared statement to the Prime Minister recalling American Jewry's investments in Palestine. "Implicit confidence and trust in the assurances of the Mandatory Government," he said, "induced American Jews to take the leadership in the support of the plan to enlarge the Jewish Agency and to enlist the cooperation of groups not heretofore interested in the efforts in behalf of Palestine."[35] He then urged the Mandatory Government to maintain its liberal policy toward immigration, to allow Jews equitable participation in all government positions, to grant a fair share of public funds for Jewish education and Jewish health systems, to permanently fix the status of the Jewish Agency, and to allow properly qualified Jews to have military training under the supervision of British officers. One suggestion made by Warburg was the establishment of "an impartial broadcasting station, under Government

control, administered by a joint committee of Moslems, Christians and Jews, to be devoted to the dissemination of higher ideals of living and good citizenship."[36] Warburg departed from his meeting with the Prime Minister believing that the Mandate would be carried out just as planned. He received assurances from MacDonald that the British Government would cooperate in the solution of the problems and the development of Palestine.

Warburg's confidence in the British Government began to diminish when it appointed the Shaw Commission to investigate the causes of the riots. In March of 1930, the Commission issued a report which concluded that Palestine was not capable of absorbing more immigrants, and that the acquisition of land by the Jews had resulted in a large number of Arabs being dispossessed. Based upon the findings of this report, the British Government announced the suspension of Jewish labor immigration into Palestine. Warburg felt strongly that this suspension of immigration certificates was a "grave mistake, inasmuch as a country as nerve-strung as Palestine is bound to get the impression that this unexpected step forbodes an unfriendly attitude for the future administration of Palestine."[37] He promptly called together the American members of the Administrative Committee, the President of the Zionist Organization of America, Judge Julian M. Mack and others; and, on the basis of their collective deliberations, a strong statement was presented

to the British Government urging the revocation of the order of suspension of immigration to Palestine. This statement accused the British Government of only taking into consideration the interests of the non-Jewish population when it invoked this order. The British were also criticized for depriving the Jewish people of the "very essence and substance of the Mandate--reasonably to increase its numbers of immigration . . ."[38] Despite these accusations, the statement ended by expressing confidence that due to the "traditional justice and fairmindedness of the British" the Jews will be afforded an "equitable response."[39] Warburg hoped that if this memorandum were "couched in good courteous" language it would be "thoughtfully received and considered" and it would "convince the [British] Government of our earnestness and at the same time of our willingness to cooperate and be of assistance."[40]

Warburg's faith in the British Government was further reduced when it issued on October 20, 1930 the Passfield White Paper, which stated that Britain's obligation to the Arabs and Jews in Palestine was of equal weight and that the Jewish Agency had no special position under the Mandate. The White Paper gave the impression that Britain was no longer concerned with building a Jewish national home in Palestine. Consequently, it restricted two activities on which the progress of the Jewish national home depended, immigration and land-purchases. It indicated that no more

agricultural land could be acquired by Jews and that Jewish labor immigration would be severely curtailed. Warburg felt the restrictions on land sales to Jews and limits on the level of Jewish immigration were determined on political grounds, i.e., keeping Jews in a permanent minority status rather than on grounds of Palestine's absorptive capacity. Expressing deep chagrin over the declaration issued by the British Government, Warburg resigned as Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the Jewish Agency. He issued a statement which declared the Passfield White Paper a cruel and unfair betrayal by the British Government of its trusteeship over Palestine: "Those of us who tried to support a conservative approach in respect to the future and the upbuilding of Palestine, who assured the Arabs at every session of the agency that we had no ambitions to rule over them or to be ruled, but to live and let live, cannot but feel bitterly disappointed this day."[41] Warburg considered the Passfield White Paper a flagrant violation of the Mandate and a repudiation by the British Government of its agreement with the Jewish people as outlined in the Balfour Declaration. He felt that England had betrayed the pledge that it made in the Balfour Declaration to use its best endeavors to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. Britain had, he felt, to do more than just protect the existing Jewish settlements in Palestine. Under the terms of the Mandate,

England had the obligation of "facilitating Jewish immigration and of encouraging the close settlement of Jews upon the land. The Mandate expressly recognized the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and their right to come to Palestine . . . to earn a livelihood there and to live a good life."[42]

The issuance of another report by the British Government, the Peel Commission Report of July 1937, caused Warburg to become openly active once again in Jewish Agency matters. This report concluded that the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine was irreconcilable: there was no common ground. In place of the Mandate, the commissioners therefore recommended the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab sovereign states. The Commission also recognized the Zionist Organization as the Jewish body with which the British Government should negotiate regarding the establishment of a Jewish state.

On August 11, the day after the World Zionist Congress adopted its resolution to negotiate with the British Government on the setting up of a Jewish state on the basis of a partition plan, Warburg attended a meeting of the Council of the Jewish Agency. He had in advance sent telegrams to the members of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee requesting that they empower him to speak for them at the coming session of the Jewish Agency. They agreed, and at the session he maintained that American Jewry had

given him a mandate to speak against partition. Warburg indicated that American non-Zionists might be compelled to leave the Agency if the Council decided on a policy which did not take into consideration their viewpoint. He made it clear that this did not mean the non-Zionists would discontinue their assistance to Palestinian Jews, but he stated that the methods of support might not be the same. In order to preclude this from occurring, he hoped the meeting would accomplish the following:

> First, to stop, if possible, what seemed to be a headlong drive on the part of the Zionists for accepting the Jewish State through partition of Palestine. Second, to bring about a real effort for a rapprochement with the Arabs. Third, to reestablish the supremacy of the Jewish Agency in all affairs relating to Palestine vis-a-vis the Mandatory Government and the League of Nations.[43]

Warburg contended that the British Government could not negotiate with the World Zionist Organization because the Jewish Agency had been authorized under the Mandate to advise with the Mandatory Government in all affairs relating to Palestine. The Zionist Congress spoke only for its own members and not for the Jews of the world not affiliated with it. No solution to the situation in Palestine could legitimately ignore the non-Zionists. As a result of Warburg, a resolution was adopted by the Council that re-established the supremacy of the Agency. This resolution made it clear that the Agency and not the World Zionist Organization was the body which should be dealt with in negotiations involving the development of Palestine.

Warburg also declared that American non-Zionists had agreed to help relieve Jewish suffering and to aid in making Palestine self-supporting, but never to assist the establishment of a Jewish state. He contended that the non-Zionists within the American Jewish community were against a Jewish state in principle, no matter how long or short its boundaries would be: "We in America are a peaceful people; we hate borders, we know that people of different languages, different religions and different ambitions can live alongside each other in a country and all that without envy or any kind of attacks."[44] From a practical standpoint, he had doubts about the formation of a Jewish nation in Palestine. Palestine was a land too small to be divided: "the Socialistically inclined Jewish Government will have to exact heavy taxes to be able to administer that little country, especially so if it is expected to contribute considerably to the expropriation of the Arabs who are to leave that part of the country."[45]

Although Warburg had tremendous admiration for the Jewish settlers in Palestine, he was quite skeptical about their capacity to govern their own nation. He could not imagine Palestinian Jews, who were lacking in political experience and dependent upon financial assistance, as being capable of conducting their own national affairs.

Warburg also opposed a Jewish state because he believed Palestine should be developed only on a philanthropic basis. He regarded Jewish settlements in Palestine as a cause

which he and other Jews should voluntarily and unselfishly support through their work in the Jewish Agency. Warburg viewed the Agency as being basically philanthropic in that its success depended upon the voluntary goodwill and cooperation of the Jewish people. He was concerned that a Jewish state would replace a philanthropic approach to the situation in Palestine, that was based on the selfless service of well-meaning Jews, with a nationalist philosophy. It would rely upon force and taxation to achieve the same purposes individual Jews were already voluntarily and unselfishly doing through their involvement within the Jewish Agency. Warburg preferred that Palestine be dependent upon the philanthropy of the Agency than upon the coercive acts of a Jewish state.

Warburg urged the Council of the Jewish Agency to seek peace with the Arabs in a conference before undertaking negotiations with the British regarding the proposed partition of Palestine. He maintained that no lasting peace in Palestine was possible until all parties concerned had the opportunity to seek peaceful understanding. Warburg rejected the contention of the Peel Commission Report that peace with the Arabs under the present mandate was impossible, and called upon the Agency delegates to heed the lesson of American pluralism. He was unconvinced that the Arab population and the Jewish population could not dwell together. Harmony between the vast majority of Jews and Arabs was

possible despite the conflicting claims of nationalists on both sides. He hoped that the Mandate would be revived with Jews and Arabs induced to live together in peace without the necessity of independent statehood. Warburg wanted Palestine to become a second Switzerland where the various religious and ethnic groups would live together. Palestine could become a land where Jews and Arabs would be equal citizens with neither group dominating the other.

Shalom Asch wrote that in actuality Warburg was not opposed to the notion of a Jewish state if it took into consideration the needs and desires of the Arab population. In a private interview with Asch, Warburg stated:

> Of course I am not against a Jewish state; but I want a Jewish state which will have a reasonable amount of security, a Jewish state that will be able to exist . . . We, Jews, before we accept the partition of Palestine, before we establish a state, must manifest to the world our willingness, our desire for peace. We, more than any other people, must prove to the world that we love peace. Because of this, I must insist that before we accept England's proposition, we must demand of England that she bring us together with the Arabs at a conference table.[46]

Since this is the only evidence of Warburg's non-opposition to a Jewish state, it is questionable how much credibility should be given to it.

The Agency adopted a resolution urging two sets of negotiations, one with the Arabs for an undivided Palestine on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, the other with the British for a Jewish state formed by the partitioning of Palestine. The purpose of the resolution

was to placate the Zionists and the non-Zionist halves within the Agency. It represented an effort to preserve unity. Warburg believed this resolution would make clear "to the world that the Jews have every desire to live in peace and harmony with the Arabs in Palestine and are ready to use every means at their disposal toward that end."[47] His efforts at the Council meeting demonstrated his belief that the Jewish problem in Palestine could only be resolved through cooperation, compromise, and good faith. As Naomi Cohen notes:

> Warburg . . . succeeded in having the Jewish Agency go on record in favor of Jewish-Arab conferences, while reserving the right to pass on any concrete proposal for partition. Thus, the non-Zionists not only increased their strength in the Jewish Agency, but the idea of conferences as a means of promoting Arab-Jewish amity, on which they insisted, was later taken up by the British.[48]

Warburg's ability for negotiating agreements and his talent for bringing divergent groups together proved successful, insofar as he precluded a non-Zionist withdrawal from the Agency and formulated a resolution Zionists and non-Zionists could both accept.

CHAPTER FIVE

Julian Morgenstern

Julian Morgenstern was born in St. Francisville, Illinois in 1881. He received his bachelor of arts degree from the University of Cincinnati in 1901 and was ordained as rabbi at the Hebrew Union College in 1902. After ordination, he carried on graduate work in Semitic languages at the Universities of Berlin and Heidelberg and in 1904 received the degree of Ph.D. from the latter institution. From 1904 to 1907 he served as rabbi of Congregation Ahaveth Achim in Lafayette, Indiana. In 1907 he returned to Hebrew Union College as Instructor in Bible and Semitic Languages. He was eventually promoted, first to the rank of Associate Professor in 1910 and then to Professor in 1913. In 1921 Morgenstern was appointed Acting President and in 1922 President of Hebrew Union College. He was the first alumnus of Hebrew Union College to become its President.

Morgenstern was active as a scholar in the fields of biblical science and the history of religion, particularly the history of Judaism in the biblical period. His published books included The Doctrine of Sin in the Babylonian Religion, (1905); Amos Studies, (Vol. 1), 1941; The Ark, The Ephod, and the "Tent of Meeting," (1945) and As A Mighty Stream, (1949). He died in 1976.

Julian Morgenstern wrote about the inherent and basic antagonism between the nationalism or particularism of Zionism and the universalism of Reform Judaism. He held Jewish nationalism and Reform Judaism to be mutually exclusive and incompatible. The former stressed the individuality and uniqueness of the Jewish people, and the latter stressed universal brotherhood and a unified divine purpose in the life of mankind.

Zionists, according to Morgenstern, proclaimed that Jews all over the world belonged to the Jewish nation. He believed that Zionists had a tendency to "set the people of Israel in the place of God in Jewish thought and aspiration."[1] Morgenstern contended that Zionism was merely the latest expression within Judaism of the principle of nationalism. He attributed this to the present world-trend towards nationalism and also to the oppression of European Jewry. The revival of Jewish nationalism represented the natural, inevitable reaction to the dominant imperialism of the nineteenth century, with its "oppression of a weak, Jewish racial minority in various lands, and particularly in lands where the principle of racial-national grouping obtains, and an expression of the present general trend and urge toward racial nationalism and the establishment of countless little second-rate states."[2] Most of these nations were intolerant and oppressive of other racial elements. Zionism, like all forms of nationalism, represented a "necessary and

irresistible, historical, evolutionary process" since it was merely a reaction to the "evils attendant upon the former empire system of world-government . . ."[3] Consequently, Zionism was not a final and absolute solution to the Jewish problem.

Morgenstern bitterly opposed Zionists' emphasis on the nationalism of American Jewish life. He maintained that Zionism was incompatible both with Reform Judaism and Americanism. As a Reform Jew, he remained committed to the principle that Jews were not a separate nation but a religious people "with a particular mission to perform in the world, a particular service to bring to our fellowmen, a particular understanding of life and of human relations, as God Himself has instituted them."[4] He believed that Jews were the bearers of a universal message which espoused the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity, and hoped for international unity and universal brotherhood. As a universal religion, Judaism should not be restricted to one area on earth: "Dispersion has not only preserved the Jewish people as a people but has enabled it to safeguard its consciousness of identity, mission and destiny and to radiate its influence throughout the world."[5]

Morgenstern felt that Jewish nationalism within the United States would be unpatriotic since it made Jews out to be a distinct people with their own culture, language and ideology. Most American Jews, he believed, had accepted the

fact that their only national obligation was to the United States. Nationally they were Americans, religiously and racially they were Jews: "For them Jew connotes religious affiliation and obligation primarily, racial affiliation and obligation secondarily; and American connotes national affiliation and obligation primarily and solely."[6] The large majority of American Jews have ceased to live a separate Jewish cultural life and to aspire to the restoration of a Jewish nation, but have adapted themselves to the national and cultural environment of America. American Jews were politically, culturally and religiously a part of the United States. They did not feel that they were in exile: "Nor do I believe that the vast majority of Jews here in America, who mouth the catch-words galut and diaspora so freely, really mean it . . . I see no signs of a yearning for a return to Palestine of the Jewish exiles in America . . ."[7]

Most supporters of Jewish nationalism in America, according to Morgenstern, were recent Jewish immigrants who perceived themselves as part of a persecuted and distinct minority race. They lived in closed Jewish communities, and they had transplanted to America the environment and the dominant habits of their places of origin. He found their "militant cultural loyalties" disturbing because they only delayed the growth of a "distinct, integrated American people." These immigrants did not understand that America "rests upon a principle diametrically opposed to racial groups, that in

this country racial groupings are not considered, and racial origins and affiliations do not affect the unity of the American people nor condition the citizenship of either native-born or naturalized American citizens."[8] Morgenstern believed most Jewish immigrants would change their attitude toward Zionism once they realized that the American nation repudiated the principles of national, racial or minority groups and recognized only separate religious groups and organizations. Zionism in America was "only a passing thing, one early stage of the transformation of the immigrant Jew, or of his children, into the American Jew."[9] Indeed, he felt that the viewpoint of many Zionists was already changing: "most American Zionists, so-called, are just this kind of Zionist, that their Americanism is in every respect unqualified and beyond question, and that their advocacy of a Jewish state or commonwealth in Palestine is entirely altruistic."[10]

Morgenstern was obviously not against all forms of nationalism, since he highly valued his national obligation to America. He opposed extreme forms of nationalism, like Jewish nationalism, which advocated separatism and isolationism from the rest of the world. Since Jewish nationalism was premised upon racial nationalism, racial separatism, and racial self-government, it would create rather than resolve problems for Palestinian Jewry:

> For, on the one hand, to transplant a large body of Jews to Palestine can not mean to create a single unified Jewish state there and to evolve a distinct, pure and unalloyed Jewish culture. For the present population and their descendants who cannot be dispossessed or expatriated, Mohammedans, Christians and native-born Oriental Jews, must be reckoned with. The new Jewish group must exist alongside of these. In time it might assimilate the native Jews, but it can hardly be expected that it could, or would even desire to assimilate or be assimilated by the other two groups. It follows, then, that the successful consummation of the Zionist ideal in Palestine must necessarily have one serious consequence, viz. the transference of the Jewish problem to Palestine, the establishment of the Jew there as a separate race, and for many generations at least, as a minority race, the erection of a new state upon the lamentable European principle of separate and competing racial units and minority group rights. Instead of solving the Jewish problem it would only render it more complex and difficult, and its solution more remote.[11]

Morgenstern contended that a permanent solution to the Jewish problem could only be found if Jews acted together with non-Jews toward a common purpose and in sincereity, mutual faith and good will. Integration and not separation would preserve the Jewish people. Instead of segregating themselves by migrating to Palestine, Jews should impart to the world their spiritual heritage in order to demonstrate that they have a right to exist as a religion: "Only the ability to create new values, to contribute to the solution of civilization's new and disturbing problems, to give freely and generously . . . constitute the preservation of individuality and unique existence of nation, race, religion or culture."[12]

Despite his opposition to Jewish nationalism, Morgenstern had doubts that the universalism of Reform Judaism could resolve the world's Jewish problem. He realized that if extreme nationalism was the weakness of Zionism and the ground for charging it with failure, the extreme universalism of Reform Judaism constituted its basic weakness and destined it to failure with equal certainty. While extreme nationalism provoked hatred, oppression and warfare, extreme universalism led to complete assimilation. Neither alone could save Judaism.

Morgenstern felt that the constant, practical problem of Judaism has been to harmonize nationalism and universalism in a constructive way, compatible with both the historic spirit of Judaism and the needs and conditions of the age. This was possible because of the historical fact that Judaism always reacted with the environment in which it was situated, both borrowing from and imparting to it, and emerging as something shaped by that particular period. The solution of this dilemma was not always the same because of the changing conditions and philosophies of each new age. As he later noted:

> Whenever the spirit of the age and the conditions of environment became favorable, the balance in the life of the Jewish people swung in the direction of universalism. When, on the other hand, the spirit of the age and of the environment became repressive and unduly hostile, the balance turned in the direction of intensified particularism. When conditions became extremely oppressive for the Jewish people, too oppressive to be borne longer

> patiently and unresistingly, and at the same time conditions both within their own organization and in the organization of the world without seemed halfway favorable, this intensified particularism might express itself in the aspiration and endeavor for restored nationhood.[13]

Morgenstern also stressed how vital it was to achieve a true unity within the Jewish community, "a unity which, allowing for wide variations in interpretation, belief, practise and outlook, will nonetheless bring home to all Jews with compelling force the realization of their common Jewish origin and history, their common heritage, their common obligation to justify their persistent position of Jewish identity and uniqueness among the peoples of the earth, their common duty of service to God . . ."[14] He viewed American Judaism as the religion of no single group. Instead, he sought to effect a union of all the constituent elements in the American Jewry of his day. He realized that a positive American Judaism could be built up only by ending the factionalism among various Jewish groups: only as a unit could Israel live and thrive; only under a united Israel could Judaism progress. American Judaism could never materialize unless it became the "unity of a large family, with many members, all sprung from a common ancestry, but each in his day and in his land having his own character, his own individuality, his own strength, his own obligations to his brothers and to all his fellowmen."[15] Morgenstern understood that every American Jew, including American Zionists, had an obligation "to compose all differences in the face of their

common duty and their common goal, and to labor together to bring about union in American Israel . . ."[16]

In order to preserve Jewish unity, Morgenstern decided to recognize the legitimacy of Zionism within the American Jewish community. He called for moderation, broad vision and deep understanding of the essential character of both universalism and nationalism in Judaism and the effective harmonization of both principles: "Particularism and Universalism, Zionism and Reform Judaism, both are truly and essentially Jewish, and both, in duly balanced measure, responding to the true needs and vision of the age, are indispensable tothe true and permanent existence of Judaism."[17] Reform Jews and Zionists must put aside their differences and seek a rapprochement: "The time has surely come for all of us, for all individuals and all parties in Judaism, for Reform Judaism and for Zionism, to sink suspicions and antagonisms, to bravely put aside all extreme and inflaming slogans and dogmas, and to will and to strive for unity."[18] They should realize that the principles of nationalism and universalism must be harmonized, that without such harmonization, Judaism was doomed to extinction.

Better relations between Reform Jews and Zionists could only be possible if both sides modified their extreme positions and used unprejudiced, dispassionate thinking. They must avoid becoming involved in philosophic speculation and passionate debates which caused bitterness, dissension and

partisanship, and become more understanding and appreciative of each other. Morgenstern viewed positively development during the 1920's when both Zionism and Reform Judaism underwent significant changes. He expressed pleasure that the nationalistic doctrines of Zionism were being modified by Judah Magnes and by the formation of the B'rit Sholom party in Palestine. Zionist leaders like Magnes claimed to have a universalistic purpose as their ultimate goal. Morgenstern also noted that Reform Judaism had become less absolute in its theory of universalism, and more disposed to acknowledge the validity of the principle of particularism in Judaism and of the necessity of a constructive harmonization of the two conflicting doctrines. Consequently, Morgenstern believed that Jews were standing on the threshold of a new era.

Although Morgenstern welcomed the fact that Zionism and Reform Judaism were growing significantly closer and more tolerant of the other, he felt that they could never merge since they represented two conflicting principles in Judaism, nationalism and universalism. Both of them had a vital role within the Jewish community.

In order to help reduce the misunderstanding and dissension between Reform Jews and Zionists, Morgenstern participated in the Non-Zionist Conference in October of 1928. He viewed optimistically the creation of the enlarged Jewish Agency since it represented an "Israel united, cooperative, respecting mutual differences of view, but building

together, in moderation, in mutual trust and good-will, a Judaism and a Jewish life world-wide and enduring, a Judaism which will represent a true, livable, creative harmonization of Particularism and Universalism . . ."[19] Through the Jewish Agency, American Jews could unite in constructive endeavors, like the economic and cultural upbuilding of Palestine, and refrain from engaging in polemical confrontations: "One of the high hopes which the Jewish Agency brought to me was that we would speedily reach the period of practical testing and constructive, beneficent achievement."[20] In his address to the conference Morgenstern minimized the differences between Zionists and non-Zionists. He stated that they did not differ over crucial issues but only over matters of terminology: "I wonder whether there are any real or vital differences between us on this matter and, even if there are, what they amount to, and whether, above all, they have been worth all the effort and all the struggle and all the bitterness of these past years."[21]

The following year Morgenstern attended the Zionist Convention--the first time that a President of the Hebrew Union College had done so. At the convention he found that a conscious effort was being made to show good will toward non-Zionists and the non-Zionist point of view: "A conspicuous effort was made to say nothing that might lead to misunderstanding or bad feeling, or weaken the bonds that are now beginning to be knit between our two groups."[22] This

attitude by the Zionists undoubtedly encouraged Morgenstern to once again minimize the differences between Zionists and non-Zionists: "Much bitterness was manifested and much enthusiasm and energy wasted in warm, sometimes fervid, debating over the question of 'nationalism,' 'homeland,' and the like, when the two groups defined these terms differently and consequently had no actual basis for debate."[23] After the Zionist Convention, he believed that a unified world-wide Jewish attitude toward Palestine was possible.

In both conferences, Morgenstern stated that he was not a Zionist and that he never expected to become one. He was a non-Zionist because of his particular viewpoints regarding Jewish colonization, Jewish culture, and Jewish statehood. Morgenstern felt a responsibility to do his utmost to "build well Jewishly in every land where Jews may dwell," including Palestine.[24] He did not oppose American Jews laboring for a Jewish home land in Palestine, even as an independent Jewish state, "so long as it does not affect [their] personal attitude toward Americanism, and [their] perfect faith in the future of America as a unified nation, and in American Judaism as a living religion in America."[25] Yet, Morgenstern did not believe that rebuilding Palestine would completely resolve the Jewish problem nor even materially improve the fortunes of Jews in other lands.

Morgenstern favored Jewish colonization in Palestine if it was based upon sound economic principles and it was

concerned with the rights of the native population. Colonization would relieve the distressing economic and social problems of European Jewry. Later Morgenstern admitted that he wanted Jewish colonization in Palestine to be successful because this would "leave us Jews of other lands free to devote our attention, efforts and resources to our own specific problem, viz., the systematic upbuilding of a living, self-propagating, creative Judaism here in America . . ."[26]

Morgenstern also supported the development of a strong cultural center in Palestine, a center in which Jewish values would be fostered, and even a distinctive Jewish life would evolve. Unlike the Zionists, he did not believe that America needed a Jewish cultural center in Palestine in order to survive. He had full faith in American Judaism, in its power to develop and create new spiritual values "without the need of foreign stimuli, whether from Palestine or elsewhere."[27] He was quite certain that as much Jewish culture would emanate from America as from Palestine.

Morgenstern stated that he would not be displeased if a Jewish state evolved which took into consideration the actual will of the entire population. He did oppose an exclusively Jewish state as espoused by the Revisionists since it would be premised upon racial nationalism. He believed that such a nation could never materialize because of the following factors:

> (1) the presence of an ineradicable three-quarters of a million Arabs in Palestine, with an indisputable and inalienable right of their own to the land; (2) British diplomatic entanglements with the Arabs conflicting and unharmonizable with obligations already assumed toward Zionist leaders; and (3) the fact that we Jews, unlike all other of these racial groups aspiring to restored nationalism, are scattered throughout the world, with only a very scant minority residing in Palestine itself.[28]

Morgenstern held that due to the British and Arab presence in Palestine, only a bi-national or perhaps a tri-national government was really feasible. If the Zionists realized that the formation of a Jewish state was not possible, the primary reason for non-participation in the Jewish up-building of Palestine by non-Zionists, and even by anti-Zionists, would be completely removed. Palestine would cease to be a Zionist question, and it would become a Jewish question. So long as they were not aiding the cause of Jewish nationalism, non-Zionists and anti-Zionists would be willing to help rebuild Palestine in order to safeguard the Jewish presence there. Morgenstern maintained that no Jew, even the most extreme anti-Zionist, would want the Jews in Palestine to become a disadvantaged and oppressed group. As he noted, there was a realization in America that Palestinian Jewry had no where else to go due to the strict immigration laws passed in the United States.

Shortly after this, however, Morgenstern became disillusioned. He was disappointed that the Jewish Agency had been weakened by the unforeseen deaths and withdrawal of its

most influential non-Zionist leaders. Morgenstern also faulted the Zionist leaders for failing to develop a constructive program toward Palestine which would encourage non-Zionists to become active within the Jewish Agency.

Morgenstern was concerned that due to the rise of fascism in Europe and the increasing uncompromising antagonism of the Arabs, Jews would turn to measures that he would find unacceptable such as voluntary withdrawal, conscious and purposed separatism, or racial nationalism. Thus, he refused to endorse the project of a Jewish World Congress, which would represent Jews world-wide, because it promoted Jewish separatism and racial nationalism. He admonished American Jews that they must choose between two divergent courses, two theoretical solutions to the Jewish problem, which lead in almost diametrically opposed directions. American Jews must decide whether to support the cause of racial nationalism "with all the inevitable consequences of jingoism, suspicion, antagonism and warfare of one kind or other" or whether to promote the notion, as he would urge, of the Jews as an "united people dwelling in countless lands, yet bound together by the eternal imperishable bond of a common religion . . ."[29]

On June 1, 1942, ninety Reform rabbis, including Morgenstern, convened and organized what subsequently became known as the American Council for Judaism. The Council was the first organized anti-Zionist group in American history.

It was founded with the intent of initiating a vast organized movement which would define the Jew as a member of a religious community alone. In the Council's view, Jews had nothing to do with peoplehood, Palestine or politics.

The bulk of the Jewish community reacted to the formation of the American Council for Judaism with anger. Their indignation increased by the daily reporting of the urgent plight of world Jewry. One year after the initial meeting of the Council, it had been weakened considerably. By the beginning of 1943 Morgenstern wrote to the Council's chairman, Dr. Louis Wolsey, that he had never identified with the Council and that he thought it best if the Council dissolved. Although he was sympathetic with the principles of the Council because it stressed the priority of religion in American Jewish life and opposed Jewish nationalism, Morgenstern could never endorse an organization "with only a negative program. Its effects can be only division in our Jewish ranks."[30] He accused the Council of attempting "to split American Jewry and to make of Reform Judaism a small minority Jewish sect . . ."[31] Instead of pursuing a program which encouraged separatism, Reform Jews must maintain contact with the mass of American Jewry because within a few years there will be a "natural revulsion of disappointment over the failure of Zionist plans and purposes resulting in the inevitable post-war settlement of the Jewish problem and . . . the irresistible effect of our American environment

upon our Jewish life, belief and practice in this country will enable us once again to take the lead in building up a positive, progressive American Judaism in which the masses of American Jewry are sure to follow."[32]

Morgenstern believed that the next generation of American Jews, born and educated in the United States, would be less Zionistic, and they could be attracted to Reform Judaism if it was presented in a non-controversial, objective manner. Since Zionism was a political and not a religious issue, only a political organization like the American Jewish Committee should fight it. In June of 1943, Morgenstern co-sponsored two resolutions adopted by the Central Conference of American Rabbis; the first one stated that Zionism and Reform Judaism were not incompatible, and the second called for the dissolution of the American Council for Judaism.

In October of 1943, Morgenstern delivered a major address to officially begin the academic year at Hebrew Union College. He spoke on the topic, "Nation, People, Religion--What Are We?" and he inveighed against the idea of Jewish nationalism. In his address he followed the history of the Jews from their origin to their present crisis, to support his declarations that the Jews' contribution to the world never has lain in the area of nationalism. Morgenstern claimed that Israel, as a nation, had achieved no distinction whatever and had made no contribution to

human civilization. He stated that the history of ancient Israel as a sovereign nation was in no way different from that of numerous other small and equally powerless countries. Israel was distinguished only for its religious manifestations and the peoplehood of Israel and its covenant was meaningful only from a religious point of view. The Jews were a religious people who did not need a rebuilt nation to fulfill their "God-appointed destiny." The extreme forms of Jewish nationalism, such as the Revisionist doctrine that Jews, no matter where they may dwell, could be members only of the Jewish racial nation, and never citizens of the nations in which they lived, Morgenstern identified with the theories of Nazism and fascism. He noted that it would be "foolish, sad and tragic for the Jewish people, which has dreamed the dream and proclaimed the message of world unity, to itself reject its message, faith and destiny and to seek for itself a salvation impossible of realization, an exploded theory of restored, racial statehood."[33] Describing the urge toward Jewish nationalism as one of "sheer desperation and despair," Morgenstern declared that it was improbable that a Jewish state would be established in Palestine as a result of the present war.

Morgenstern's address gave rise to a good deal of criticism not only because of its contents, which to most Zionists appeared to take a defeatist attitude, but because of the platform from which it had been delivered--the Hebrew

Union College. Forty-four Reform rabbis in a statement issued by Dr. Joshua Loth Liebman repudiated his speech. The statement deplored Morgenstern's remarks as detrimental to the constructive solution of the problem of Jewish homelessness. Regarding his characterization of extreme Jewish nationalism as "practically identifible with Nazi and Fascist theory," the statement stated that "it is untrue and unfair so to characterize a movement which enjoys the loyalty of so many alumni of the Hebrew Union College . . ."[34] Rabbi Samuel Wohl at the Isaac M. Wise Temple also published a formal rebuttal in which he denied that Zionism represented any kind of "regression," but that, to the contrary, the work of the Zionists was in accord with the universal teachings of prophetic Judaism.

Morgenstern's speech received this reaction because it was made at a time when Reform Jewry was confronted with a request for a decision to approve or reject the American Jewish Conference's recent resolution demanding a Palestinian Jewish state. He described this resolution as a "bombastic peroration." During this time, the American Council for Judaism caused much dismay to most of the members of the Central Conference of American Rabbis. Zionists within the Reform movement were disappointed with Morgenstern's speech because it seemed incongruent with the two resolutions he co-sponsored. Both Wohl and Liebman cited Morgenstern's support for the resolutions as evidence that Morgenstern's

statements were wholly inconsistent with his earlier actions. They were embittered by Morgenstern's speech because they felt betrayed. In a letter to Liebman, Morgenstern contended that in preparing the address he attempted to be fair and objective, and that he had "leaned backward" in his "endeavor to do justice to the Zionist movement."[35] Without admitting it, Morgenstern was upset by the negative reaction his speech received, and from then on he addressed himself in a less controversial manner. This demonstrates how Morgenstern was concerned with the viewpoints expressed by his colleagues.

In his next opening address at the Hebrew Union College in 1944, Morgenstern declared unequivocally that there was nothing either un-Jewish or un-American in the program to establish a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. American Jews may either wholly endorse the theory of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine, or withhold their endorsement without qualifying in any way either their Americanism or their Judaism. He pointed out that only the actual experiment of building a Jewish commonwealth could resolve the debate as to its feasibility. Personally, he saw many difficulties in the way of the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth, particularly the difficulty of setting up a democratic state with complete separation of church and state in the midst of a Moslem world. Although he did not oppose American Jews participating in the creation of a Jewish commonwealth, he still maintained

that their primary obligation was to build a virile, creative Judaism in America. At most, he believed that Palestine could only be a secondary concern of American Jews. While this address did not basically depart from his previous position, it received a more favorable reaction among the Zionists, for it was phrased in less belligerent language.

Morgenstern realized that his position as President of the Hebrew Union College made it necessary for him to refrain from becoming a more vocal participant in the Zionist controversy. He knew that controversial statements by him would only enhance divisions that already existed in the College over the Zionism issue. He wanted the College to continue to be able to accept applications from Jews of all backgrounds, including those who were sympathetic to Zionism. Hence, he refused to accept Lessing J. Rosenwald's suggestion that the College not admit any Zionist students: "an institution like the Hebrew Union College should not definitely repudiate Zionists and exclude Zionist students from its roster . . ."[36]

Morgenstern's stance toward Zionism was undoubtedly influenced by what was being expressed at the College. He realized that non-Zionism had a strong influence among both the students and the faculty. He noted that most of them had adopted a moderate, non-political position toward Zionism and had refrained from identifying with the Zionist cause by joining the Zionist Organization. Few subscribed to the

political element of the program, and particularly to the specific theory of a Jewish state or commonwealth in Palestine. Morgenstern concluded that they "think themselves Zionists rather than being actually such."[37] He believed that members of the College were sympathetic to Zionism because they were disturbed by the sufferings of European Jewry. Although they did not believe that Palestine was adequate to resolve this problem, they saw no other solution which offered even a comparable measure of hope. Therefore, they adopted an understanding attitude toward the Palestine program. Morgenstern was convinced that this "superficial" Zionism would disappear once the war was over and the destiny of Palestine and European Jewry would be settled.

Morgenstern's subsequent writings displayed more sympathy to the Zionist cause. By the end of the Second World War, he no longer believed that Zionism was the most fundamental issue dividing American Jews. The desperate situation of European Jewry and the need to find them a home overshadowed differences among American Jews regarding Zionism. Morgenstern thought that all should unite to favor maximum Jewish immigration to Palestine, and to abrogate the White Paper, which had been issued by the British in order to put yearly quotas on Jewish immigration. As a result of this, he felt that the vast majority of American Jews could favor the Zionist cause, at least to some extent: "at heart we are all Zionists of a kind and to a degree."[38] Morgenstern

was also aware that many of his colleagues were not expressing a conciliatory gesture toward Zionist aspirations. Thus, he declared that the world situation made a Jewish nation in Palestine a possible solution to the Jewish problem. He did not become a Zionist but offered his whole-hearted support to the cause. In speaking on behalf of Palestine, Morgenstern proclaimed: "I am not a Zionist. I have never been a Zionist and I never expect to be . . . But Palestine today, in its larger aspect, has ceased to be a Zionist question. It has become an all-Jewish question . . ."[39]

Morgenstern insisted that he would not be dismayed by the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine; yet, he remained unwilling to come out either for or against its creation. He refused to specify what type of government he preferred in Palestine, whether it be a cultural community, a commonwealth, a dominion of the British Empire, or an independent Jewish nation. He justified his seeming indecisiveness by stating that Palestinian Jewry should be able to determine its own policies.

Morgenstern still denied that there was a political bond between American and Palestinian Jews. Even if a Jewish state did emerge, he insisted that it would speak only for Palestinian Jewry:

> But we who dwell outside of Palestine, in the lands of the so-called Diaspora (unfortunate name!) . . . we will not be parts of the Jewish nation or citizens of the Jewish state, nor will we, by any quibble in terms and any un-American, hair-fine distinctions in the meanings of the two words, nation and nationality,

> have any political rights or claims whatever on or in Palestine . . . But politically we will be unconditionally and completely citizens of those nations in which we dwell . . .[40]

Despite his sympathy for creating in Palestine a haven for Jewish refugees, Morgenstern would never identify himself as a Jewish nationalist. He could never subscribe to the Zionist notion that nationhood was the primary goal of the Jewish people. Instead, he continued to believe in the universal mission of the Jewish people. He maintained that Jews in Palestine were too preoccupied with physical survival as a racial or national group to be concerned with this. Consequently, the fulfillment of Israel's religious mission would not be achieved in or through Palestine. As Morgenstern noted, the "real center" of Jewish life was destined to be in America.

CHAPTER SIX

Morris D. Waldman

Morris Waldman was born in Bartfa, Hungary in 1879. He was brought to America at the age of four, and completed his education at New York University, the Jewish Theological Seminary and the Columbia University Graduate School of Semitics and Philosophy. Waldman began his career as a rabbi at a Reform synagogue, Temple Anshe Emeth, in New Brunswick, New Jersey, but he soon entered the field of social and welfare work.

In 1928 Waldman became Executive Secretary to the American Jewish Committee, a position he held until 1945. His duties concerned protecting the civil and religious rights of Jews throughout the world. During the Second World War, he was instrumental in formulating much of the Committee's policy regarding the plight of the Jewish refugees in Palestine and Europe. His campaign culminated in the adoption of an International Bill of Rights as part of the United Nations charter. He played an active role in the non-Zionist section of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and wrote two books: Nor by Power (1953), an autobiography, and Sieg Heil (1962). He died in 1963.

Waldman's most important pronouncement on Zionism came in 1941. In April of that year, Chaim Weizmann, convinced that after the Second World War America would become the leading Jewish community in the world, came to the United States to discuss with American Jewish leaders of all shades of opinion the current Zionist situation. As head of the Jewish Agency, he felt a responsibility to speak to both Zionists and non-Zionists within the American Jewish community. Weizmann sought consultations with the leaders of the American Jewish Committee because he assumed that they represented the non-Zionist element in the United States. In response to Weizmann's invitation, the President of the Committee, Sol Stroock, agreed that informal conferences would be held between prominent Zionists and non-Zionists so long as it was understood that the non-Zionists would take part as individuals and not as representatives of any organization. Among the non-Zionists present at these meetings, which came to be known as the Weizmann-Stroock Conferences, was Waldman, in his role as Executive Secretary of the American Jewish Committee. Within a few months after these conferences started, Stroock died. His successor, Maurice Wertheim, was asked by the non-Zionists to lead their informal and unofficial group in the conferences, with the hope of achieving a modus vivendi with the Zionists with respect to the future of Palestine.

During the course of these meetings Waldman issued a statement on behalf of the non-Zionists which laid the ground rules for future discussions. Presented to the Zionists on October 16, 1941, this statement indicated that non-Zionists could collaborate with Zionists only if certain assurances were given on critical questions. Waldman expressed the conviction that no modus vivendi at all would be arrived at until the Zionists foreswore their belief in universal Jewish nationalism.

Universal Jewish nationalism, according to Waldman, referred to the belief that the Jewish people needed to create for themselves social and cultural conditions that would enable them to retain their distinctive identity while living in non-Jewish countries. It was a "theory which regards the Jews of the world as distinct from the non-Jews ethnically and as such they constitute a separate nation like other nations but distinguishable from them only in the sense that for the time being there is no geographical area which is officially their sovereign state and that the Jews of every country are a part of a scattered nation."[1] Universal Jewish nationalists, like Stephen Wise, regarded the World Jewish Congress as the parliament of the Jewish nation capable of representing the Jewish people before other nations with regard to matters affecting Jews, including the relations of the Jewish population of all countries to their own non-Jewish neighbors and their respective

governments. Waldman maintained that universal Jewish nationalism was contrary to two hundred years of Jewish history in that it was a denial of emancipation; it also threatened the status of Diaspora Jewry and was contrary to American democracy, which while allowing for religious and cultural pluralism, forbade "dual or divided or hyphenated political allegiance."[2] He believed it was an error to regard the Jews as a nation in the political sense. Waldman was opposed to the secularization of the concept "Jew"; the word Jewish could not properly be associated with a political institution or a state. To Waldman, the Jews were a duality--a people and a religion, indissolubly united.

Intrinsic to the ideology of universal Jewish nationalism was the concept of national self-determination, that is, the idea that every ethnic group has the right to its own territory and independent political life. National self-determination encouraged the political character of national minorities, thereby, resulting in race-states in the Eastern European sense where there was a majority nationality and many minority nationalities. Waldman contrasted this with America which was not a state of equal nationalities since there was a decided neutrality toward ethnic differences. National self-determination was a disturbing concept to Waldman because he believed that it would compromise the status of Jews as American citizens and possibly jeopardize the situation of European Jewish communities. In his memoirs,

he wrote: "I came to the conclusion long before the outbreak of the war that the theory of national self-determination which was the product of the First World War, though noble in its motivation, was unrealistic and unworkable. Indeed, it helped to aggravate the very evils which were intended to be destroyed. It augmented and intensified the philosophical basis for hypernationalism whose most odious form was reflected to Nazism."[3] Waldman argued that national self-determination had proven to be impracticable in countries inhabited by heterogenous ethnic groups because it resulted in discrimination against the minority groups causing conflicts and dangers to internal and international peace. In order for equal rights to be secured, he called for the abandonment of the concepts of race-state, nationality majority and national minorities.

Despite his intense dislike for Jewish nationalism, Waldman recognized its usefulness in other parts of the world, including Palestine. He understood that since the Jewish problem throughout the world was not uniform, no single formula could be applied to all Jewish communities. In Eastern Europe, where Jews had a distinctive culture and language and where minorities sought "national" rights, Jews would lead a group life different from the Jews of America and Western Europe where Jews have adopted the culture and language of the general populace. This refusal to see a universal "Jewish problem" subject to one, universal pattern of resolution distinguished Waldman's viewpoint from Zionist

organizations and the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism, both of which tended to propose a single solution for the problems of Jews in different countries.

The main contention in the Weizmann-Stroock conferences was the question of whether or not Zionism must necessarily be equated with Jewish nationalism. Waldman's paper viewed Jewish nationalism and Zionism as two distinctive ideologies. Zionism was premised on the "homelessness" of the Jewish people, but did not concern itself with life in the Diaspora, except for the practical purposes of securing potential settlers and of obtaining moral and financial support from Jews outside of Palestine. Whereas universal Jewish nationalism included Zionism, Zionists, according to Waldman, did not necessarily have to be nationalists in the universal sense.

Waldman believed that "non-nationalists may also be Zionists in the restricted Palestinian area of interest."[4] Did non-nationalists want to become Zionists? He believed that this depended on the impact of a possible Jewish state on the Diaspora as well as this state's form and content. Non-Zionist cooperation with Zionists would also depend on Zionists' policies regarding Palestine and the Diaspora.

Non-Zionists like Waldman had further misgivings. Would Zionists be willing to take Palestine out of the "central foreground" of Jewish problems? Would the Jewish state be "racial," or would non-Jews have equal rights?

Could an Arab become that state's president? Would church and state be separated? Would there be restrictions on non-Jewish immigration? Would the Jewish state attempt to represent world Jewry? As for post-war plans for resettling Jews, "will the Zionists abandon claims and slogans which may hamper efforts to reestablish destroyed Jewish positions throughout the world, as for example soft-pedalling the hoped for absorptive capacity of Palestine which only tends to shut the doors to Jews elsewhere?"[5]

As a non-Zionist, Waldman felt that he could cooperate with the Zionists if they dissolved the World Jewish Congress and ceased their Jewish nationalist propaganda. Zionist leaders, he felt, must yield on the question of establishing in Palestine the national home of all the Jewish people. Palestine should not become a country politically identified with Jews living outside of Palestine: "this Palestine should not be called a Jewish Palestine or by any name that might connote any organic relation between it and Jews outside . . ."[6]

Waldman hoped that universal Jewish nationalism would not prove to be an insurmountable issue between Zionists and non-Zionists. He maintained that efforts to nationalize Diaspora Jewry were not a vital concern to most American Zionists, who were mostly concerned with rebuilding Zion. American Zionists would not claim allegiance to the Jewish nation in place of the United States, and they would not regard themselves as living in exile:

> I am sure that there is no Jew in the United States, Zionist or non-Zionist, who expects that if and when there should be a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, he would have any political identification with it. I think it would be accurate to say that his identification with the country would be only spiritual and philanthropic and sentimental, in the noblest sense of the word, springing from an ancient common heritage. American Zionists, I am sure, regard the term "national Jewish home" in this figurative sense and not as a country to which any Jew outside would owe an iota of political allegiance. Distinction must be made between the words "loyalty" and "political allegiance." All of us have multiple loyalties--family, friends, church, club, college, etc., etc. We have only one political allegiance--allegiance to the U.S.A.[7]

If the Zionists disassociated themselves from universal Jewish nationalism, Waldman stated that he would not oppose a commonwealth in Palestine--so long as it came into being after Jews became a majority of the population, and it guaranteed all inhabitants regardless of race or creed equal civil and religious rights. National or racial priorities should not be tolerated in Palestine. He was concerned that a Jewish political entity, which did not assert the right of every human being to equality, opportunity, security and freedom, would become racist and fascist. Waldman regarded cooperation between Arabs and Jews as essential for building up Palestine and for meeting its basic problems. This commonwealth should have a constitution and a bill of rights in which the essential principles of democracy, including the separation of church and state, would be embodied.

Waldman maintained a global view of Jewish life. In view of the present world upheaval, he noted, it would be unrealistic to attempt to define the ultimate political structure of Palestine. The fate of Palestine rested not merely with Zionists or non-Zionists or the Jews as a whole, but with the outcome of the world war: "It is puerile to expect the same kind of political world that existed before September 1939 or even the same human relationships which obtained within the particular borders of the countries of the globe."[8] Ultimately the political structure of Palestine would be decided by the new world order which would bring about "revolutionary changes" in "conceptions of relations between nations and individuals; that new concepts of nation and state are likely to be adopted, and that the future status of Palestine will have to jibe with whatever the new conceptions will be; in short, that the Zionist political objectives at this stage are therefore largely academic."[9] Consequently, security could not be insured for Jews in Palestine, no matter how large its population and even if they had a commonwealth, unless the new world order would guarantee it. Instead of disputing the future political structure of Palestine, American Jews should concentrate on the realistic and pressing task of securing the maximum immigration of Jews into Palestine and the fullest possible agricultural, industrial and religious development. Waldman envisioned that after the war there

would be no need to create a Jewish national homeland because it would be a "world made decent enough for all men to call 'home.'"[10]

As a result of these meetings, Wertheim and the non-Zionists prepared a formula for cooperating with the Zionists, the aim being to find a common denominator on which both Zionists and non-Zionists could agree. The formula provided that non-Zionists would support maximum development of Palestine and its eventual control by Jews, if, in return, the World Zionist Organization would agree to divorce itself from universal Jewish nationalism and to seek the dissolution of the World Jewish Congress. Non-Zionists could then cooperate with Zionists toward the following objectives:

> a) For the maintenance of Jewish rights under the Mandate in Palestine for the immediate future;
> b) For the fulfillment of the original purposes of the Balfour Declaration, whereby through unrestricted Jewish immigration and large-scale colonization under a regime designed for this purpose, Jews may constitute a majority in Palestine and establish an autonomous commonwealth, it being clearly understood that
>
> (1) In such a commonwealth, all the inhabitants, without regard to race or religion, shall enjoy complete equality of rights;
>
> (2) The establishment of this commonwealth will in no way affect the political or civil status and allegiance of Jews who are citizens of any other country.[11]

Waldman summed up the formula as follows: "'Universalism' and 'Nationalism' are thought of as two interests, and by and large the 'deal' is that universalism agrees to keep out of the Palestine territory if Jewish nationalism keeps out of its territory, i.e., the rest of the world."[12]

After this formula was submitted to Weizmann, he privately replied that he favored the principles, but it would create a great deal of internal dissension within the Zionist ranks. He was willing, however, to sponsor an effort to persuade the World Jewish Congress to confine its activities exclusively to Europe and to have the Congress change its name to the European Jewish Congress. Waldman and the non-Zionists agreed to this compromise; at least, they felt, the Congress would cease to be a world organization.

Wertheim believed that the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee, whose members had been the leaders of the non-Zionist segment of the Jewish Agency, should be informed of these developments. At his suggestion, a committee of eleven men was appointed, including Waldman, with Louis Kirstein as its chairman. On June 7, 1942, the Kirstein Committee met at the Cos Cob home of Wertheim in order to vote on the essentials of the formula. Potentially the "Cos Cob formula" could have been the most vital breakthrough in relations between the Committee and the Zionists since the Weizmann-Marshall rapprochement of 1929.

Waldman drew up a memorandum in support of the formula. In it, he posited that Zionism should not be the major concern of American Jewish life, nor should the postwar problems of migration and settlement be seen as "opportunity for promotion of Palestine activity." At the same time,

non-Zionists should not prejudice any program for a Jewish commonwealth. Waldman wanted Zionist leaders to end all propaganda and political activities based on the recognition of a "politico-national Jewish affiliation" of World Jewry.

These basic conditions gave rise to the following corollaries:

(1) An essential part of the post-war policy would require that the rights of European Jews be rehabilitated. This entitled a struggle for the "extension, not repudiation, of emancipation"; the position of European Jews would not be abdicated by "wholesale migration," based on the thesis of the "untenability of their position," although no inflexible standard would be applied everywhere. Post-war migration and colonization plans would be considered objectively and without regard to their impact on Zionist plans.

(2) A Jewish army would be acceptable on the condition that it be "essentially composed" of Palestinian Jewry.

(3) Efforts to bring Jews to Palestine should not go so far as to undermine the Allied war effort. Jewish interests needed to be subordinated to the paramount consideration of an Allied victory.

(4) An autonomous American Jewish Peace Delegation would be acceptable, but it must not act "a priori" as part of a world Jewish delegation, and it would need American governmental sanction of its proposals.

(5) Financial aid to Palestine must be seen as part of total aid to needy Jews and not as a substitute for total aid.

(6) The establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth with a Jewish majority would be an important objective of Jewish immigration. The Jewish Commonwealth would grant complete equality to all citizens, regardless of race, religion, or nationality, and efforts would be made to raise the living standards of Palestinian Arabs.

(7) The Commonwealth's policies would not adversely affect the status of Diaspora Jewry: "Only inhabitants of Palestine and those settling there become nationals of the Commonwealth of Palestine. No attempt will be made to identify Jews of other countries with Palestine nationals, nor will Palestine citizenship be conferred on stateless persons who are not residents of Palestine."[13] Following the formation of the Commonwealth, the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization would be dissolved. The Commonwealth's relations with Diaspora Jewry would be similar to those between countries and their natives who have adopted "civic allegiances elsewhere."

(8) In the United States, Zionists must drop plans for an American Jewish Congress claiming to represent American Jewry; a cohesive Jewish community attained by evolution, however, would not be excluded.

The formula, termed a "Proposed Joint Declaration," was to be issued by the Committee and the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs. The Declaration reaffirmed the Committee's endorsement of the Balfour Declaration, and it contained a commitment by the Committee to (1) aid maximum European immigration to Palestine and (2) help establish for Palestinian Jews a legally secured national home where they may expect to constitute a majority of the population and "may look forward to self government" provided non-Jews received equality and Diaspora Jews were not endangered. (These two conditions were, in effect, the "safeguard" clauses of the Balfour Declaration, which insured equal rights for all the inhabitants of Palestine regardless of race and creed as well as political non-identification of Jews outside of Palestine.) Waldman contended that this Declaration was in line with the Committee's previous policy of endorsing the Balfour Declaration and consistently cooperating with the Zionists in "trying to keep the doors of Palestine open within the economic absorptive capacity of that country" while at the same time never coming out as "favoring a self-governing Jewish community (commonwealth or state)."[14]

The Emergency Committee for Zionist affairs would, in its turn, declare that by "Jewish national sentiment and consciousness" Zionists meant only that Palestinian and Diaspora Jewry would be associated by ties of religion, common heritage and cultural kinship, but not of a political

nature. The Emergency Committee would ask the World Jewish Congress to dissolve since its efforts impeded attempts to "win all Jews for the support of Palestine."[15]

A substantial majority of the Kirstein Committee expressed approval of the principles of the formula: eight were in favor, including Waldman, and three were opposed. The disapproval of the minority led the committee to advise the non-Zionist conferees to delay further conferences with the Zionists until another opportunity was afforded for consideration in the hope that it would result in a unanimous vote in favor of the formula.

Waldman understood that the basic problem with the committee document was that it attempted to satisfy two groups with "basically different faiths." "Compromises in ideology must always represent insincerity or surrender," he noted. "It was our grave error to have devoted months of negotiations in an area where negotiations do not properly belong."[16] Yet at the same time, Waldman recognized that the Committee had no choice but to negotiate with the Zionists because of the Committee's past record. When the Committee was established, it was not founded on any ideological basis. As the preamble to its Charter indicated, it was created for the purpose of protecting the religious and civil rights of world Jews and to afford relief from calamities affecting Jews wherever they might occur. Thus, the Committee was committed to helping develop Palestine as

a refuge for Jews oppressed in other nations. Like his predecessors in the Committee, Waldman decided to cooperate with the Zionists by focusing upon the non-ideological rehabilitation of Palestine:

> Negotiation has its place, as does compromise, in another area--that of practical action. Two groups, two parties, two faiths can fruitfully work out areas in which they can act together on programs and projects mutually agreeable to both. Such agreements to act together are the essence of our day-to-day existence, and I am convinced that Zionism and non-Zionism, faced with concrete proposals, could find "give-and-take" formulas for joint action. But a joint ideology--that was a quest doomed from the start to fail.[17]

Waldman also realized that the Committee was pressured into making this "deal" with the Zionists because it was rapidly losing support within the American Jewish community. This diminution was attributed to the increasing number of Jews sympathetic with the idea of a Jewish Palestine and also to the "conflicts between our inner feelings and our outward demeanor (the former against Jewish Palestine and the latter for it) which has paralyzed our faculty for making decisions."[18] Time was also on the side of the Zionists, as the Jewish public, in the waking of the growing tragedy in Europe, became increasingly concerned with the resettlement of Jewish refugees in Palestine. The issue of Palestine was transformed from an ideological to a humanitarian issue; rehabilitating Palestine was vital to alleviate the suffering of European Jewry. Waldman believed that some type of Jewish autonomous government would be established

regardless of the Committee's stand on Zionism. He admonished the Committee not to get into a position where it would appear that it was attacking the Jewish presence in Palestine or even engaging in an attack upon Zionism. An all-out public campaign against the Zionists, as demanded by the Committee's anti-Zionists, was tactically unwise because it would isolate the Committee within the Jewish community. The Committee would be perceived as just being the opposition party to Zionism. Consequently, the Committee's chief program, the defense of Jews against anti-Semitism, would be endangered since the Committee relied heavily on cooperation with other Jewish groups. If any open struggle was to be undertaken, a clear and well defined difference needed to be drawn between Zionism and Palestine on the one hand, and Jewish nationalism and its World Jewish Congress, on the other. It was, therefore, highly desirable, if not compelling, for the Committee to seek a rapprochement with the Zionists. As he noted at one of the earliest of the Weizmann-Stroock meetings: "we so-called non-Zionists should gladly yet solemnly welcome the opportunity to explore with the Zionists every avenue of balm for the sufferings of our people and every road that may lead to their permanent peace and security."[19]

When news of Waldman's "Proposed Joint Declaration" leaked out there was immediate opposition from the anti-Zionists within the Committee. Some left the Committee and became

active in the American Council for Judaism. There was a strong sentiment within the Committee to have it merge with the Council because both organizations were perceived to have the same anti-Zionist objectives. To this idea Waldman replied that only opposition to Jewish nationalism united these two groups, the Council was essentially a religious movement committed to the fundamental doctrines of Reform Judaism; whereas, the Committee was a civic-protective organization engaged in the task of protecting Jewish rights. Waldman understood that there were fundamental differences between the anti-Zionists within the Council and the non-Zionists like himself within the Committee. Hence, he felt that it was necessary to explain the meaning of the terms Zionist, anti-Zionist and non-Zionist. Noting that the term non-Zionist had never been officially defined, Waldman explained that:

> A non-Zionist is a person who does not subscribe to the doctrine that the Jews of the world constitute a nation, in the modern accepted political sense of the term, or to the belief that the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine is the sine qua non for the survival of the Jewish religion and culture; at the same time he would favor the eventual establishment of a state in Palestine controlled by the Jewish population, on condition that this is hedged in by guarantee of equal rights to all its inhabitants and by safeguards against the impairment of the political and civil status of Jews elsewhere, and will avoid the connotation that the Jewish people as such constitute a secular nation. Believing that the Jews and Judaism can survive in other lands than Palestine, the non-Zionist, unlike the Zionist who believes that hope for Jewish survival lies only in Palestine, considers it the destiny and right of Jews to live everywhere on an equality with all other elements in the population. He does not regard a Jewish Palestine as the only

> solution of the Jewish problem. Indeed, he holds that a Jewish Palestine cannot guarantee security to its inhabitants unless Jewish life is secure in the world at large. Moreover, he believes that Jewish life cannot be secure anywhere unless the world is dominated by democratic ideals and practices which safeguard the rights of all human beings regardless of race and creed.[20]

Waldman resented the attempt by some of the members of the Committee to turn it into an anti-Zionist organization. He cautioned the Committee not to identify or join with a group that was as despised as the Council. The Committee should avoid being placed in a position where it would appear as an anti-Zionist organization and "more flagrantly a 'destroyer of Jewish unity'" which intended to sabotage "'the most fervent aspirations' of the great mass of Jews throughout the country" which "may satisfy a number of our anti-Zionist supporters but in my opinion will make it exceedingly difficult for us to regain the position we now more happily hold in the Jewish community."[21] The Committee should maintain its traditional broad base and encompass Jews of every point of view.

In order to distinguish itself from the Council, Waldman recommended that the Committee reaffirm its historic attitude to Palestine: "that we cherish the hope that it continues to be open, to receive as many Jews as wish to go there freely to find security, peace and opportunity develop their lives, and that we will continue to aid in this as we have in the past."[22] The Committee supported the special Jewish claims to Palestine with its approval of the Balfour Declaration

and the British Mandate; whereas, the Council opposed these claims. Implicit in this approval was the recognition that the Jews were entitled to some sort of territorial entity in Palestine. Unless the Committee repudiated that action, Waldman noted, it was on record as not opposing an autonomous Jewish government in Palestine. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate were not merely a promise but constituted a solemn pact between the British Government and fifty or more nations, on the one side, and the Jews of the world, on the other side. This pact stated that if the Jews built up Palestine and transformed it from a virtual desert into a productive land, when the Jewish settlers constituted a majority Palestine would be given its independence. The millions of Jews throughout the world who contributed their effort and financial means, like the Committee, entered into that contract in good faith and with complete confidence in the good faith of the other parties. As a result of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, it was universally conceded, except by Arab nationalists and the American Council for Judaism, that the Jews should be in Palestine. The Jewish people, therefore, had a legal and moral right to migrate and settle in Palestine. To oppose this would vitiate the intent of the Balfour Declaration by causing Palestinian Jews to become a perpetual minority.

Shortly after the vote of the Kirstein Committee became public, Wertheim announced that he would not stand for

re-election for the Presidency of the American Jewish Committee at the expiration of his term in January 1943. Judge Joseph Proskauer, a professed anti-Zionist, became the Committee's new president. Unlike Waldman, Proskauer indicated utter disbelief in the possibility of arriving at an accord with the Zionists. Viewing a Jewish commonwealth, even in the indeterminate future, as a "Jewish catastrophe," Proskauer opposed the notion that the Jews were a political unit either in Palestine or in the Diaspora. He contended that a Jewish state would entail political ties between Diaspora Jewry and that state. Waldman, although agreeing with Proskauer that Jews were a "faith people," not a "political people," differed from Proskauer regarding the subject of political ties: a Jewish state would mean political ties only if the state was seen as the national home of world Jewry. Waldman believed Weizmann, Ben-Gurion and most American Zionists would accept his concept of a Jewish state representing only Palestinian Jewry.

In August-September 1943 a meeting was held of most major Jewish organizations and representatives from Jewish communities throughout America, for the purpose of creating an American Jewish Assembly to deal with post-war problems including Palestine. The American Jewish Committee consented to attend after it was agreed that the proposed "Assembly" be changed to "Conference" (Assembly suggested a representative political body) and that it be understood that the

Committee's freedom of action would not be compromised by any actions of the Conference.

The Conference passed a resolution calling for a Jewish commonwealth. The Committee dissented because the United States Government claimed that this resolution would compromise the Allied war effort in the Middle East. Waldman contended that the Committee voted this way in response to pressure conveyed from the White House and the State Department. In October 1943, the Committee decided to withdraw from the Conference. Waldman, who considered himself neutral regarding the issue of a Jewish commonwealth, supported this action. Although he did not accuse the Zionists of a lack of patriotism by passing this resolution--"American citizens have the right to criticize and oppose Government policies, domestic and foreign"--it was important that the special interest of every group be subordinated to the "larger interests of our country, the winning of the war, etc., to press, as the Zionists were pressing in the face of the known sentiments of Washington was mistaken zeal and fraught with embarrassment if not danger to all Jews in America and elsewhere."[23]

Waldman, as Executive Secretary, took to the road in order to explain the Committee's withdrawal to the Committee's own membership and other Jews. On his return he issued a report which noted widespread belief among Jews that emancipation might not be permanent. This pessimism involved a

feeling that aid to European Jewry's rehabilitation in Europe would be worthless. There was a universal demand for Jewish unity in order to meet threats to Jewish existence. Consequently, the average American Jew strongly resented the Committee's separatist policy. Waldman was thus aware of how important it was that the Committee seek a rapprochement with the Zionists in order to restore its badly damaged communal prestige. He felt it essential that Committee members attempt to improve their relations with the Zionists by disassociating themselves from any causes anathema to the Zionist movement.

When the war ended in 1945, the Jewish community debated various solutions to the Palestine situation. One of the most controversial responses, which various Zionist organizations condemned, was put forward by Judah Magnes. In June 1946, Waldman had the opportunity to hear Judah Magnes, Chancellor of the Hebrew University, present the case for the Ihud, an organization in Palestine headed by him, which promoted the idea of a bi-national state as a solution to the situation in Palestine. The basic objective of the Ihud was friendly cooperation between the Jewish and Arab inhabitants of Palestine. According to Magnes, the Arabs and Jews would each constitute a permanent political division and these two divisions would govern the nation. Jews would be compelled to belong to the Jewish division and every Arab, both Christians

and Moslems, to the Arab division. The separate nationalistic interests of Arabs and Jews would govern state policies.

Waldman considered this impractical. He felt that a bi-national Palestine would constantly be deadlocked due to the vast cultural disparities between the two peoples. He accused Magnes of being in actuality a Jewish nationalist, notwithstanding his bi-nationalism, because racial nationalism underlined his proposal. Waldman, by contrast, opposed racial considerations: individuals, and not people, he felt, should comprise the political units of any nation. Powerful as the consciousness of race or nationality was made to be, Waldman insisted that human beings regard their individual interests as even more essential. He wanted Palestine to become an "unnational state like all the democratic countries of the world in which the political unit will not be a race or people, but where the individual will be the unit, all inhabitants having equal rights and obligations, a Palestine in which Jews, Moslems and Christians; Arabs, Jews and other Europeans and other nationalities, though enjoying cultural freedom and equality, will not constitute political entities."[24]

Magnes maintained that his proposal was feasible because of the strong bond between Arabs and Jews, both related Semitic peoples. Waldman disagreed, doubting that there was any blood relation between Arabs and Jews. Even if there was a blood relation, Waldman stated, the Jews had been scattered for over two thousand years and certainly the

overwhelming majority were regarded as an Occidental people and not an Asiatic or Oriental people. According to Waldman, labeling the Jews as a Semitic people would only bolster the argument by the Nazis that the Jews were a non-European race who did not belong in Europe.

After the Second World War, Waldman hoped that the Zionists and the Committee would reach some sort of understanding regarding the situation in Europe and Palestine. As a result of the war, Zionists were convinced that the problems of European Jewry were related to the future of Palestine. Waldman agreed with the Zionists that with a new world in the making this was the psychological as well as the logical time for the tragic dilemma of Palestine to be resolved. If such a decision was deferred and Palestine continued to remain under the Mandate or was placed under a wider trusteeship, conflicts between the Arabs and Jews and conflicts within the Jewish community would grow in intensity. Yet, Waldman was unconvinced that the solution for the survivors of the Holocaust solely rested on the political future of Palestine. He still believed that in the new world order the importance of nationalism would be diminished. If lasting peace was to be insured, there should be greater emphasis upon human self-determination rather than upon national self-determination. Waldman did not rule out the possibility of having the uprooted European Jewish refugees return to their former homelands to be integrated as free

citizens. He felt that the Jews of Europe, like all European peoples, had an historic right to live and enjoy full rights in those countries which they had inhabited. The solution of their problem might be found there and not necessarily through wide-scale immigration to Palestine.

In the summer of 1946, Waldman was a delegate to a conference that had been arranged with various Jewish organizations in Paris, for the purpose of incorporating into the peace treaties with the fascist countries provisions to ensure Jews equal rights and the restitution of their property. At this meeting the Zionists were attempting to gather support for their plan to partition Palestine in such a way as to permit the establishment of a Jewish state. Waldman was willing to advise the Committee to support the Zionists for partition on condition that Palestine should not be a "Jewish state in a racial or religious sense but only in the sense that the U.S.A. is Christian; Christian because the majority is Christian; a State in which, like the U.S.A., church and state will be separated; a State in which all the inhabitants will enjoy equal rights and equal duties; a State in which races or nationalities will not be political units but the individual will be the unit; and, last, but not least a State with which nationals of other countries or even stateless persons will not be politically identified."[25] He noted that these conditions conformed with the Committee's previous position regarding a Jewish

state. He then submitted the following draft reflecting what he believed the position of the Committee with respect to the Zionist proposal should be:

1. The Committee must retain independence of action and not be a tail to the Zionist kite.
2. The Committee should stress its emancipationist position as distinguished from nationalist ideology, namely, Palestine is not the be-all and end-all of Jewish life.
3. Efforts should be made to create opportunities for settlement in countries other than Palestine for European Jews who desire to emigrate, over the 100,000 we have been demanding for Palestine.
4. The Committee should endorse the partition plan on the following conditions:
   a. The territory must be large enough to give reasonable prospect for self-support on the part of the population for their own self respect and so that the Yishuv will cease, in due course, to remain financially dependent on world Jewry.
   b. The territory, though autonomous, must not be a Jewish state in name and in a racial or religious sense; all the inhabitants, Jews and non-Jews, to enjoy equal rights.
   c. Naturally, it would be expected that once the autonomous territory is established and self-sustaining the Jewish Agency for Palestine would automatically cease to function. However, in order to make sure that it does not continue to promote any policy with regard to Palestine it should at such time be formally dissolved.[26]

In the final analysis, Waldman's position made him susceptible to criticisms from both the Zionists and the anti-Zionists. This was because he was determined to prove that universal Jewish nationalism was antagonistic to the aspirations of American Jews, while at the same time, he supported the Zionists in the upbuilding of Palestine. Waldman later believed that the cause he stressed, namely that Jewish

nationalism be tolerated within Palestine but not outside its borders, effected the state of Israel: "A State established under the name of 'Israel'--not 'Jewish'--and its citizens known as 'Israelis'--not 'Jews'--thus makes it distinctly obvious that Jews outside of Palestine are not politically identified with the Palestine state."[27]

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

Reform non-Zionists defined themselves as compromisers and mediators between Zionist and anti-Zionist factions. Their ability for negotiating agreements and their talents for bringing divergent groups together proved successful insofar as they encouraged many Reform Jews to become involved in the rebuilding of Palestine. They had to constantly persuade Reform Jews, reared in the tradition of the Pittsburg Platform, that the rebuilding of Palestine was compatible with Americanism and Reform Judaism. Conservative Jews who were non-Zionists, like Cyrus Adler, had no need to do this: most Conservative Jews favored the restoration of Palestine.

As a group, non-Zionists were characterized by their non-conformity, their uncompromising belief in personal freedom. Non-Zionism in America thus represented the policies of prominent individuals, not those of any collective body. Non-Zionists refused to form a non-Zionist organization for fear of being subject to a majority decision that would offend their conscience and their personal integrity. Considering themselves stewards of the Jewish community, some wealthy non-Zionists like Jacob Schiff, Louis Marshall and Felix Warburg refused to join forces with the Jewish masses. This disdain for democracy within the Jewish community led to their refusal to widen the non-Zionist base and to organize a rank-and-file movement. Schiff, Marshall and Warburg were concerned with asserting their own will and practicing their own unique

approach to the situation in Palestine. Their understanding of Palestine's significance was often vague, and none ever developed a systematic approach to non-Zionism. They were businessmen and philanthropists uninterested in developing ideological schemes. Indeed, Marshall and Warburg based their partnership with the Zionists on a practical program devoid of ideology. Their romantic notions about Palestine were strong enough to keep them interested in its future, but too general and nebulous to provide them with any specific program. In this respect, they differed from non-Zionists like Morgenstern and Waldman, scholars with a firm historical understanding of Judaism, who used their research to evaluate the contemporary situation of the Jewish world. Morgenstern and Waldman were closely identified with two organizations, the American Jewish Committee and Hebrew Union College, which had members with varying views regarding Zionism. As a result, they often had to modify their non-Zionist positions in order to placate those who had differing opinions within their respective organizations.

Reform non-Zionists were committed Jews pledged to supporting all reasonable endeavors aimed at improving the condition of the Jewish people, including the cause of rebuilding Palestine. They reflected American Jewry's willingness to support a wide range of overseas Jewish causes, Palestine among them. By 1937 the Central Conference of American Rabbis adopted an official position of neutrality

regarding Zionism and sympathy toward Palestine similar to the non-Zionist positions of Schiff, Marshall, Warburg, Morgenstern and Waldman. The CCAR implemented at its 1937 convention the Columbus Platform, which replaced the Pittsburg Platform, technically the "Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism." In the Columbus Platform the CCAR reaffirmed the obligation of all Jews to aid in creating a haven for Jewish refugees in Palestine. The turn toward non-Zionism would also be made by the lay leaders of Reform Judaism, the members of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. In a resolution adopted at its Thirty-fifth Biennial Convention in 1937, the Union affirmed its support for and eagerness to cooperate with the Jewish Agency in the upbuilding of Palestine. The Union urged its members to give moral and financial support for the creation in Palestine of a Jewish cultural and spiritual center.

Palestine was to the non-Zionists not only a place which could provide a home for Jewish refugees, but a place of inspiration for American Jewry. They favored the creation of a Jewish center in Palestine because they were concerned with the cultural and spiritual predicament of American Jews facing assimilation. Non-Zionists envisioned a Jewish center in Palestine enriching Jewish life everywhere but not replacing it. In this respect, they were influenced by the cultural Zionism of Ahad Ha'am, whose vision of Palestine as a spiritual center that would help sustain Diaspora Jewry

fit the non-Zionists' perception of American Jewry's needs. Ahad Ha'am's emphasis on the spiritual rather than the political problems facing the Jews--the plight of Judaism rather than the plight of Jews--also profoundly influenced the non-Zionists. They found no less persuasive Ahad Ha'am's views on Jewish ethics: the message of the Hebrew prophets, the ultimate expression of the Jewish spirit, enunciated the "universal dominion of absolute justice" and stressed the "predominance of the spiritual life over physical force." For Ahad Ha'am, as for non-Zionists, the return to Zion constituted a spiritual renewal--building a just society imbued with universal significance.

Non-Zionists realized that Zionism exerted a positive influence on Jews indifferent to Jewish matters, and they recognized the important contribution Zionists were making to Jewish life and institutions in America. They, thus, were willing to cooperate at times with Zionists, on an ad hoc, pragmatic basis: they neither accepted Zionist philosophy nor stood in clear opposition to it. At the same time, their acceptance of Reform Judaism's conception of Israel's universal ethical mission made them wary of political Zionism. Their main disagreement with the Zionists was over the issue of Jewish nationalism. Non-Zionists considered a Jewish state in Palestine to be economically unsound, politically unsafe and (except for Schiff) against the spirit of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.

They also rejected the notion of a preferred political status for the Jewish people in Palestine. Unlike Zionists, non-Zionists denied that Jews had a special right to the land in Palestine. They recognized that the Arabs were entitled to live in Palestine too. Aside from making it clear that they did not envision a Jewish state where Jews would dominate, non-Zionists also urged an end to injustice already existing in Palestine, such as the end to restrictions on the employment of Arab labor on land owned by the Jewish National Fund. They maintained that a Jewish nation would not bring harmony between Arab and Jew; rather, discussions should be held which would create understandings which in turn would negate the need for statehood. Non-Zionists were convinced that harmony between most Arabs and most Jews was possible despite the conflicting claims of extreme nationalists on both sides.

Due to their concern with the plight of European Jewry, non-Zionists often cooperated with Zionists in the rehabilitation of Palestine. One of the reasons that from the beginning had inclined non-Zionists to participate in the Jewish Agency had been the mounting scale of Jewish emigration from Europe and the inability of American Jews to keep the doors of the United States open. Despite their intense dislike for Jewish nationalism, non-Zionists understood that practical cooperation with the Zionists would further the cause of Jewish refugees. Consequently, they joined Zionists

in rejecting any measures by the British Government which precluded more Jews from settling in Palestine. In agreeing with Zionists, they opposed restrictions on land sales to Jews and limits on the level of Jewish immigration which would be determined on political grounds. Non-Zionists maintained that limits to Jewish immigration should only be based upon Palestine's absorptive capacity, not on any desire to keep Jews in a permanent minority status. They did not believe that their cooperation with the Zionists would lead to a Jewish state in Palestine. Instead non-Zionists thought that Zionists would in the end be satisfied with some form of relative autonomy in Palestine if coupled with opportunities for reasonable growth of the Jewish settlement.

Though the rebuilding of Palestine was important to non-Zionists, they did not consider it central to their lives as did many Zionists. This attitude helped keep American non-Zionists within the Jewish Agency but led to their inactivity. It enabled Zionists to eventually formulate the American Jewish community's policy toward Palestine.

It is difficult to overestimate the value of the non-Zionists. The non-Zionism of Schiff, Marshall, Warburg, Morgenstern and Waldman had a profound impact upon Reform Jewry, especially the Reform rabbinate. Their writings and addresses sensitized Reform Jews of the need to support Palestinian Jewry and the Jewish Agency. Due to their

influential positions within the Jewish community, their (except for Schiff) affiliation with the Jewish Agency gave legitimacy to that organization among Reform Jews.

Non-Zionists included some of the most gifted and far-sighted Jewish public servants and communal leaders of their generation. They played a pivotal role in the creation and development of an extraordinary number of Jewish institutions and communal enterprises, both in America and in Palestine. Their greatest accomplishment was that they made it possible for American Jews to support Palestine without necessarily becoming Zionists. In so doing, it may be argued, they made the rebuilding of Palestine more respectable, especially to some of America's most wealthy and influential Jews. Thus, paradoxically, non-Zionists made an enduring and profound contribution to the Zionist movement of which they never formally became a part.

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