

Statement by Referee of Senior Thesis

The Senior dissertation entitled:

"An Historical Analysis of Some Changing Concepts in the
Reform Rabbinate Between the Two World Wars on the Basis
of the Central Conference of American Rabbis Yearbook 1918-1942"

written by Sydney L. Hoffman
(name of student)

1) may (with revisions) be considered for
publication: (☒)

cannot be considered for publication: (☐)

2) may, on request, be loaned by the Library: (☒)

may not be loaned by the Library: (☐)

E. Rivkin
(signature of referee)

Ellis Rivkin
(referee)

March 9
(date)

Microfilmed
3/6/69

AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SOME
CHANGING CONCEPTS IN THE REFORM
RABBINATE BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD
WARS ON THE BASIS OF THE CENTRAL
CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN RABBIS
YEARBOOK 1918 - 1942

by

Sydney Lewis Hoffman

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the
Master of Hebrew Letters Degree
and Ordination .

Hebrew Union College-Jewish
Institute of Religion
Cincinnati, Ohio
February, 1955

Referee:
Professor _____

Dr. Ellis Rivkin

DIGEST OF THESIS

The object of this study is to begin to determine the role of the non-rational in the thinking of the Rabbis of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, between the two World Wars, 1918 - 1942, with special reference to the concepts of social justice, God, and nationalism.

The writer first assumes a modified Platonic position. (a) There are Ideals whose ontological status transcends the phenomenal world. (b) There are, actually or potentially, concepts-which-are-ideals which correspond to the Ideal. (c) There are concepts-which-are-rationalizations which are concepts which are, in any wise, called into existence and preserved by non-rational interests. (Non-rational interest is broadly defined to include any limitation which is imposed on a human being as the result of the phenomenal world. Even human finitude is thereby included within the category of non-rational interest.) The Ideal, being absolute, never changes. The concept-which-is-an-ideal never changes, else it would no longer correspond. Therefore, change in concepts has meaning only with reference to concepts-which-are-rationalizations. It is further deduced that the phenomenon of rationalization does not challenge the sincerity of the thinkers or the value of their concepts and that concepts-which-are-rationalizations may become significantly autonomous of non-rational interests.

It is then demonstrated that the concepts of

social justice, God, and nationalism did undergo change in the Central Conference of American Rabbis between the two World Wars. Social justice prior to World War I was rooted in charity; in the twenties, in an onslaught upon the employer class; in the thirties, in an assault upon the Capitalist system; after the New Deal had taken effect, in an attack on the employer class alone. Before World War I "monotheism" in "ethical monotheism" was less important than it came to be in the twenties. In the early thirties, with the rise of Humanism, Reconstructism, and "Zionistic Nationalism", there was an additional intensification of theism. Before World War I the concept that Judaism is basically a religion prevailed. During the twenties, "charitable nationalism" was espoused by the majority of the rabbis. In the thirties, "charitable nationalists" compromised with "theistic nationalists" against the "non-theistic nationalists" and a modus vivendi was achieved at Columbus in 1937. Non-rational interests are suggested to account for each of the changes.

It is suggested further that changing emphases in each of the three concepts was, on some level of Consciousness, often related to changes in either or both of the other two concepts.

Respectfully submitted,

Sydney J. Hoffman
Sydney Lewis/Hoffman

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Analyses -----	Page 1.
II. Backgrounds -----	Page 22
III. Social Justice -----	Page 39
IV. The God Concept -----	Page 66
V. Nationalism -----	Page 87

CHAPTER I.

ANALYSES

That non-rational factors exert influence upon rational concepts is a commonplace to students of modern thought. To date, this understanding has been applied by psychiatry in the analysis of individuals and by materialist philosophers and sociologists in the analysis of groups and institutions. The present study is an attempt to apply the same understanding, on a very limited scale, to some of the sacred concepts of religion. Specifically, it will endeavor to ascertain the role of the non-rational in the thinking of the Rabbis of the Central Conference of American Rabbis during the years 1918- 1942 with special reference to the concepts of social justice, God, and nationalism. ⁽¹⁾

The first chapter will treat two preliminary questions: I. A. Are theological concepts rationalizations? B. If in any way they are, must they always remain rationalizations? II. Is it possible on the basis of a single principle such as rationalization adequately to account for changes in theological concepts?

I. A. ARE THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS RATIONALIZATIONS?

The concept of rationalization as herein understood presupposes the concept of varying levels of consciousness and the concept of interest. In his analysis of dreams, Freud demonstrates that because of basic drives such as ego-satisfaction and wish fulfillment, which we shall term "interests", there is a difference between the latent content of dreams which is subconscious and not a datum of

experience and the manifest content of dreams which is (2)
conscious enough to be a datum of experience while dreaming.
The significance of Freud's analysis as applied to dreams
for the analysis of the "manifest content" of waking
moments, i.e. concepts, is readily apparent if we examine
the philosophy of Leibnitz, for the difference between what
we call a state of consciousness and states of lesser con-
sciousness such as dreams, unconsciousness, sleep, and even
perhaps death, is one of degree and not of kind. (3) Moreover,
Freud's assumption has been the ground for many subsequent
analyses. Pareto's distinction between "residues" and
"derivatives" suggests Freudian influence as does James
Harvey Robinson's differentiation between "real" reasons and
"good" reasons. "We can readily give what seems to us 'good'
reasons for being a Catholic or a Mason, a Republican or a
Democrat, an adherent or opponent of the League of Nations",
Robinson avers, "but the 'real' reasons are usually on quite
a different plane." (4) "This spontaneous finding 'good'
reasons to justify our routine beliefs -- is known to modern
man as 'rationalizing' -- clearly only a new name for a very
ancient thing. Our 'good' reasons ordinarily have no value
in promoting honest enlightenment, because no matter how
solemnly they may be marshalled, they are at bottom the
result of personal preference or prejudice, and not of an
honest desire to seek or accept new knowledge." (5) In other
words, the manifest content of our minds during waking
moments is influenced by the factor of interests, in this

- case supposed to be "personal preference or prejudice".

Sensing the consequences of his position, Robinson notes that "the astonishing and perturbing suspicion emerges that perhaps all that had passed for social science, political economy, politics, and ethics in the past may be brushed aside by future generations as mainly rationalizing"⁽⁶⁾ and cites John Dewey (Reconstruction in Philosophy)⁽⁷⁾ as reaching this conclusion in regard to philosophy. Moreover, "there have been obstructionists in all times, not merely the lethargic masses, but the moralists, the rationalizing theologians and most of the philosophers, all busily if unconsciously engaged in ratifying existing ignorance and mistakes and discouraging creative thought."⁽⁸⁾ Trotter goes even further in maintaining that when "we find ourselves maintaining an opinion about which there is a quality of feeling which tells us that to inquire into it would be absurd, obviously unnecessary, unprofitable, undesirable, bad form, or wicked, we may know that opinion is a non-rational one and probably, therefore, founded upon inadequate evidence"⁽⁹⁾.

According to the views thus far presented the "real" reasons why we possess certain concepts rather than others is hidden from ourselves as well as from others; that is, they are not on the level of consciousness.⁽¹⁰⁾ The significance of this fact is that none of these positions challenge sincerity or reduce man to a scheming creature. Charles Beard, however, in An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, departs from the above mentioned thinkers and

seeks to make interest a conscious factor. To affirm that the Constitution of the United States and the ideals contained therein such as "general welfare or some other abstraction known as justice ... was the results of a group of economic interests which must have expected beneficial results from its adoption", ⁽¹¹⁾ is one thing, for expectation is not the same as motivation. For example, one can do a mitzvah and visit one's elderly grandmother even though he knows and can expect that she will offer him some delicacies; yet, it is at least not a datum of experience to a person (i.e. he is at least not conscious) that the primary motivation of the visit is the sweets that he will receive. If this were all Beard was saying there would be no issue. However, on the very same page he states as follows: "The point is, that the direct, impelling motive was the economic advantages which the beneficiaries expected would accrue to themselves first from their action." ⁽¹²⁾ (Italics mine.) He then proceeds to "prove" that each member of the Constitutional Convention sought to profit directly in an economic way from the adoption of the Constitution. Beard cites as evidence of direct, conscious motivation instances in which an individual stood to acquire pecuniary gain from the adoption of the Constitution. For example, "Blair took advantage of the excellent opportunity afforded by the formation of the new Constitution to profit by the rise of securities. He appears frequently in the fiscal transactions between the federal government and the Virginia loan office." ⁽¹³⁾ This is like

saying that if one travels to Boston to visit his parents and takes advantage of the trip to spend a day in New York that the conscious motivation of his trip home is to see Broadway. It is interesting to note that the few instances which do not fit his theory he dismisses in a footnote on page 151, "The fact that a few members of the Convention, who had considerable economic interests at stake, refused to support the Constitution does not invalidate the general conclusions here presented. In the cases of Yates, Lansing, Luther Martin, and Mason, definite economic reasons are forthcoming but this is a minor detail."⁽¹⁴⁾ Max Lerner in evaluating Beard's theory asserts that "it was oversharpening making the economic interpretation a theory of man's motives rather than of man's ideas."⁽¹⁵⁾ "It is as if, in seeking to explain the anti-New Deal rulings of the Supreme Court majority during the crises of 1935-1937 one were to seek to show that their own investments were at stake. What was relevant in a theory of economic conditions was the relation between class and group interests on the one hand and ideas and behavior on the other. What was relevant was not the property holdings of the members of the Convention but their property attitudes."⁽¹⁶⁾ Empirical evidence to support Lerner's contention is the fact that sincerity is a datum of experience to nearly every man. On the other hand, "a theory of direct economic motivation leads quite naturally to a penchant for seeing conspiracies."⁽¹⁷⁾ If one accepted Beard's position how would he save sincerity?

The more moderate position, to which Lerner makes reference, has the support of economic analysts such as (18) (19) Veblen and Laski. Laski's thesis, according to Lerner, is that "the economic forces shaping government practice do not get translated into specific events except through the mediation of intricate psychological factors." (20) Moreover, the "metaphysical absolute" of LeDantec, the "myth" of Sorel and Delsisi, the "folklore" of Arnold, the "vital lies" of Lee, the "throbbing" of Ward and the "intentional orientation" of Hayawaka likewise exhibit a proclivity to explain rationalization in a manner consistent with sincerity as a datum of experience. (21) Even the Marxian view allegedly "stresses attitudes as outgrowths of interest and the attitudes of a particular individual need in no sense be related to his sense of a direct economic interest." (22)

Accepting the latter widely held thesis the writer in considering the possibility that theological concepts may be rationalizations in no wise questions the sincerity of the persons who possess these concepts.

That at least some theological concepts are rationalizations has been explicitly stated on a number of occasions on the floor of the Central Conference of American Rabbis. Commenting on the negative attitude of some Reform Jews toward an influx of Jewish immigrants to the United States from Germany just prior to the outbreak of the second World War, Rabbi Henry Berkowitz observed that "much of the resentment poured into our ears is due to an uneasiness upon the past of our own people ... The criticism leveled at

the emigres are mostly rationalizations of this discomfiture. We hear people say 'These Germans are too arrogant or too obstinate, or too opinionated', when what we really mean is, 'These Germans are going to endanger our security by coming into our communities and attracting too much public attention.'⁽²³⁾ Nor, is rationalization limited to the Reform laity. The origin of Reconstructionism according to Rabbi Samuel Goldenson can be accounted for on the basis of rationalization. "Perhaps, civilization as a sanction for the movement", he asserts, "is nothing more than a eulogistic rationalization of the mere fact that Jews, as Jews, want a national existence of their own".⁽²⁴⁾ Moreover, Rabbi James Heller notes with dismay "the unctuous and seductive garb of lofty principle" which clothes non-rational factors which impel men to Zionist or non-Zionist positions.⁽²⁵⁾ To be sure, such analysis in terms of rationalization made by members of the Conference assumes that interest is acting on a level other than complete consciousness. Deceit, conspiracy, and wilful distortions of reality are consequently out of the question.

A strong indictment of the rationalization being practiced in the Reform rabbinate was made by Rabbi Ferdinand Isserman before the Conference in 1940.

"We believe in democracy with such conviction that without it most of us would not care to live. But repugnant to us is the philosophy that Jews should be for democracy because Jews are safe under a democracy. We believe in peace with all our hearts, with all our soul, with all our might... But loathsome to us is the suggestion

that we should preach peace to gain goodwill. We are patriots, love America, appreciate its idealism and do what we can to advance its highest interests. But offensive to us is the suggestion to demonstrate patriotism merely to win the favor of fellow citizens... (What would) lay leadership make of us, heirs of the psalmists, guardians of the Torah and of the heritage of Israel? Cheap traders, bartering our ideals and principles for freedom from persecution." (26) (Italics mine).

"Because Jews are safe under a democracy," "to gain goodwill," "to win the favor of fellow citizens," "for freedom from persecutions," these are interests which Rabbi Isserman suggests that some of his colleagues possess, which motivate them to possess the lofty ideals enumerated. However, notice should be taken of the fact that implicit in Rabbi Isserman's statement is the assumption that interest (or at least the particular interests mentioned) need not necessarily motivate the ideals; i.e. they can and should be held in and of themselves (or presumably out of a higher interest, e.g. *per se*). A statement equally as forceful was made before the Conference in 1937 by Maurice Eisenrath.

"Democracy, like patriotism, may indeed be the last refuge, if not of the scoundrel, then at least of the timid. What a multitude of sins this purely quantitative standard of the 'people's will' or the welfare of the group may cover! It presses even further than it has ever been exalted by the most mayofes generation of Jews, the 'mah yomeru hacoim' philosophy of Jewish existence. It would predicate our moral judgements exclusively upon how the nations treat our people. If British imperialism serves our group interest, let us grovel in the dust before the image of John Bull... and pander to Il Duce, no matter what

human rights he violates, at least until the precise moment when he, too, turns against our own...For the sake of Shalom, Shalom, Shalom; for the sake of a superficial and spurious unity between pew and pulpit, laymen and rabbi, we are supposed to hold our tongues in leach even though the whole world trembles and threatens to fall apart..."(27)

"People's will", "welfare of the group" - "Shalom..." --

these are rationalizations motivated by self interest!

Are theological concepts, then, rationalizations?

To the extent that they are motivated by non-rational interests, and we have seen that many Reform rabbis are at least aware of the possibility, we answer in the affirmative, for by definition we have assumed that a concept which is called into existence by non-rational interests is a concept which is a rationalization .

B. IF IN ANY WAY THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS

ARE RATIONALIZATIONS MUST THEY ALWAYS REMAIN RATIONALIZATIONS?

We noted above the possibility that if interests which are first on the non-conscious level become conscious through revelation or enlightenment that persistence in the concept which is a rationalization to which the interests first lead us, on the basis of the same interests, may involve one in deceit. We have now to consider the possibility of the obverse; namely, that though non-rational interests may in some way cause the genesis of concepts which are rationalizations, including theological concepts which

are rationalizations, the original interests may be for-
gotten from the subconscious and the concept which at
first was a concept which is a rationalization come
eventually to be a concept which is free from rationaliza-
tion.

Let us first examine the two underscored terms
in the last sentence -- "forgotten" and "cause". The
concept of forgetting involves us in an apparent difficulty,
for inasmuch as we assume to begin with that the interest
which "causes" the concept which is a rationalization exists
on the non-conscious level how is it possible that the
interest does not continue to exist in the race only on a
lower, more confused level of Consciousness, as very tiny
"petites perceptions" as Leibnitz would say? Certainly this
is the implication of an organic type philosophy, which the
writer assumes; namely, that the interest is related to every-
thing that is or ever was or ever will be. The crucial
factor, however, may not be whether the interest will ever
disappear completely from the farthest reaches of the
subconsciousness of the race. Rather, what may be of sig-
nificance is the fact that the interest, once on a relatively
high degree of subconsciousness where it is of considerable
moment for the gestation of concepts which are rationaliza-
tions, may "drop" to such a low level on the graded scale of
sub-Consciousness that it no longer is of vital import for
the continued preservation of said concept which is a

*Consciousness with a capital "C" is here used to refer to any
level of real/apparent consciousness or non-consciousness.

rationalization. This is the most that we can mean by forgetting, that is, a lessening of dependence upon non-rational interests. The implication of this concept of forgetting which is implicit in organic philosophy as we shall momentarily see, is that a concept which is a rationalization can never quite become a concept which is an ideal, which we have yet to define.

Before probing the term "cause", it is necessary for the writer to explain the modified Platonic bias which he assumes. First, there are Ideals which exist absolutely, that is apart from the phenomenal world. Secondly, there are concepts which are ideals which are concepts potentially or actually in the minds of men which correspond to the Ideal. Thirdly, there are concepts which are rationalizations which are concepts in the minds of men which are called into existence and preserved in part at least by non-rational interests. With these distinctions in mind we may now ask whether the non-rational interest that we know is the cause of the concept which is a rationalization and if it is, in what sense is it the cause. We have seen that for those who maintain a theory of direct relationship between interest and concept that the non-rational is for all intents and purposes the sufficient cause of the concept. For example, for Beard in An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution economic interest is alone sufficient to account for the genesis of (or change in) certain concepts. On the basis of

empirical evidence i.e. that given certain non-rational factors -- socio-economic climate, etc. -- certain concepts appear, the most that logic allows us to assert is that the non-rational factors may be a necessary condition for the appearance at a given point in space-time of certain concepts, a condition without which the concept would not appear, but not necessarily a sufficient condition. In fact, on the basis of strict logic we should go farther still and assert that the most that we can maintain is that the non-rational factors which we know may be contributory causes but not necessarily sine qua non causes, for there may be other non-rational factors which may also be able to bring about the appearance of the same concept about which we are ignorant. To summarize: non-rational interests may be contributory to the genesis and preservation of concepts but are not thereby necessarily either necessary or sufficient conditions for such genesis and preservation.

On the basis of the above analysis and on the basis of the modified Platonic bias of the writer we have next to ask: to the existence and preservation of what type of concepts can non-rational interests be contributory? First, inasmuch as the Ideal transcends the phenomenal world it, of course, can not be caused in any wise by non-rational factors which are phenomenal. Secondly, inasmuch as a concept which is an ideal corresponds to an Ideal which never changes, it, too, can never change else it would no longer correspond. Therefore, we can assert that if a concept changes it cannot

be a concept which is an ideal. However, this does not eliminate the logical possibility that non-rational interests may be contributory to the genesis and preservation of a concept which is a rationalization which may subsequently become autonomous⁽²⁸⁾, (that is, the interests having become forgotten, forgotten non-rational factors might be said to be contributory to the appearance of concepts which are ideals but not to the preservation of the concepts which are ideals, their having been completely forgotten being a necessary condition for the appearance of the concept which is an ideal.) The writer recognizes that this is a logical possibility though as heretofore mentioned the consequences of an organic philosophy, viz. that the interests are never entirely forgotten eliminates this possibility as does the factor of human finitude which is another assumption of the writer, for human finitude i.e. the psychological and other drives / needs etc. of a human being, likewise constitute a non-rational interest which man can never totally escape. Therefore, though it is logically possible for non-rational interests to be contributory, in the sense above explained, to the appearance of concepts which are ideals, the implications of (a) organic philosophy and (b) human finitude militate against such a position, and render absurd the thought of the possibility that concepts which are rationalizations can ever become concepts which are ideals. However, and this a crucial

point, the fact that concepts which are rationalizations may never be able quite to become concepts which are ideals does not mean that concepts which are ideals are necessarily merely goals toward which men may gropingly strive but never quite possess; that is, it does not eliminate the possibility of man's possessing concepts which are ideals through direct revelation. Thirdly, concepts which are rationalizations are by definition concepts to whose existence and preservation non-rational interests are contributory.

On the basis of the above analysis the most that we can assert in answer to the question: "If theological concepts are in any wise rationalizations must they always remain rationalizations?" is (a) It is logically possible though actually unlikely that a concept which is a rationalization can ever become a concept which is an ideal. (b) However, inasmuch as there are different degrees of "forgetting" of interest, we may suggest that there are different degrees of rationalization. Moreover, where interests are "forgotten" except from the farthest reaches of the subconsciousness of the race (this would include, of course, the forgetting of self, i.e. of human finitude by means of, for example, Hindu mysticism aspiring for Nirvana) non-rational interests may cease to be of "vital import for the continued preservation of said concept which is a rationalization". (c) Inasmuch as Ideals cannot change and concepts which are ideals can not change, to speak about changing theological concepts has meaning only if we refer to changes within concepts which are in some degree concepts which are rationalizations.

(d) Though from the fact that concepts appear to change, we can infer that such concepts are in some degree concepts which are rationalizations, we can not assume the reverse; namely, that if concepts do not appear to change that they are thereby concepts which are ideals for (1) though the phenomenal world necessarily changes and though thereby non-rational interests necessarily change, the logical possibility exists that changing non-rational interests may "cause" the apparent preservation (i.e. apparent unchangingness) of a concept and (2) the human mind may not be able to detect the change.

We have next to mention a very significant point: the value/truth/"x" of a concept is not logically connected with its origin. To assume the contradictory is to commit what has been termed the genetic fallacy. For example, the fact that a great artist is neurotic does not detract from the beauty of his painting; the fact that a man became a scientist for x, y, and z psychological reasons does not detract from the efficacy of the drugs which he helped discover, nor does the fact that Capitalism has been at least a contributory non-rational factor in the gestation and heightening of concepts such as "general welfare" etc. mean that such a concept has no value/truth/"x". Neither does the fact that non-rational factors were contributory in the appearance and "heightening" at a given point in space time of certain theological concepts thereby mean that these concepts have no value/truth/"x", nor the fact that the very origin of religion

may have been in magic (Malinowski) or animism (Tyler) or in human finitude leading to a feeling of dependence (Schliermacher) etc. thereby detract from the value/truth/"x" of religion.

II. IS IT POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF A SINGLE
PRINCIPLE SUCH AS RATIONALIZATION
ADEQUATELY TO ACCOUNT FOR CHANGES IN
THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS?

If we make the definition of concepts which are rationalizations as broad as we have, to include concepts which are in any wise called into being by any manner of non-rational interests can we then begin to account for changes in theological concepts on the basis of a single principle?

The danger of any monistic system of interpretation is the fact that all-inclusive theories which attempt to account for all phenomena themselves change. This indicates that these theories themselves are not autonomous but are in some degree concepts which are rationalizations. Only when the time comes, if it ever will, when a single theory will be able to account for all phenomena without ever undergoing change will the possibility exist that we possess a genuine theory which is a concept which is an ideal. However, even from the fact of non-change, as we have already indicated, we do not know for certain that a concept is a concept which is an ideal. It goes without saying that this is true of the concept "concepts-which-are-rationalizations" as well.

Cantril's theory of suggestibility is of significance in this matter. If one begins a study with any manner of preconceived schemata his mind is "overstuck", i.e. he associates on some level of consciousness -- even though he strives for objectivity, -the data which he studies with the preconceived schemata. The will to believe is there and data become suggestible. On the other hand, an "understuck" mind is likewise a liability, for "people will act uncritically (with a reduction of determining tendencies) if they are relatively unfamiliar with a topic, unaccustomed or unable to check up on the suggestion offered to them -- (29) in short, if their mental organization is unstructured. There is danger whether we come with a single sharply defined structure or whether we come with everything and hence with nothing.

With this limitation in mind we may note a number of monistic explanations of social structure (and "ideology" which have been employed in the past. Hedonism was the point of departure for Bentham. His attempt to account for the social structure on the basis of the drive in man to seek pleasure and avoid pain was modified by Mill and the Utilitarians and by Freud and his theory of the id and wish fulfillment. Whether we can ascribe a particular non-rational interest to account for any of these theories is not important here. To conjecture that support of laissez-faire "liberalism" of his day was contributory to Bentham's philosophical concepts or that the Utilitarian school was

rooted in an "anti-social action" interest to justify the sweat-shop conditions of mid-19th century Britain to the benefit of the wealthy class is not our task. However, we can see from the fact that a particular type of theory undergoes change that the theory itself can not be a concept which is an ideal. Moreover, Egoism likewise has been the starting point for a number of theories from Plato's Thrasymachus, through Hobbes to LeDantec in the present century. Making use of Freudian psychology, LeDantec's position is that "we can not afford to admit that our motives are purely egoistic and that the only basis of solidarity is common hate and distrust. To do so would weaken further the already precarious fabric of society. Hence a fantastic superstructure of 'metaphysical absolutes' has grown up. A metaphysical absolute is any doctrine, taught with the sanction of tradition that masks the basic egoism of human life. Conscience is the carrier of such doctrines, and is created by parents and teachers in children in order to preserve the hypocrisies that are so essential in social life."⁽³⁰⁾ However, to account for cooperation between allies in war time LeDantec assumes that nations place their basic egoistic drives in abeyance until the common enemy is defeated, i.e. they espouse an enlightened Egoism. In other words, LeDantec has to modify his original theory slightly to account for certain instances which his basic theory of non-enlightened Egoism can not comprehend. In other words, the theory of Egoism (a) will account for such and such instances but in order to account for certain other

instances we have to assume the theory of Egoism. In-
sofar as the theory changed it was a "concept which is a
rationalization".

Of other monistic theories which might be
mentioned such as sympathy, gregariousness and herd in-
stinct, suggestion, and conformity, ⁽³¹⁾ let us consider
the last mentioned theory. Erich Fromm, in The Sane Society,
asserts that in spite of material prosperity, political and
sexual freedom, the world of the middle of the twentieth
century is mentally sicker than it was in the 19th century...
There is no overt authority which intimidates us, but we are
governed by the fear of the anonymous authority of confor-
mity. ⁽³²⁾ However, the concept of conformity as Fromm uses
it in this instance is to be applied to a certain type of
people, i.e. persons living in a Western World-Capitalist
type of society, who are alienated. As for people who are
not bound by the capitalistic determinants or who within
the latter world are strong enough to employ reason and go
counter to the current it seems that a subsidiary hypo-
thesis would have to be invoked.

Intriguing though such monistic attempts are
we may note that since the turn of the century with
McDougal's theory of instinctual drives there has been a
tendency away from analysis in terms of a single motive
or mechanism which claims to be an all sufficient ex-
planation of social behavior. "Yet even today we find
authors who favor some one predominating factor to the
relative neglect of others. Among them are such favor-
ites as conditioning, reinforcement, anxiety, guilt,

frustration, conformative organization, role, and social
(33)
class.

Each one of the above theories the writer is sure has much to recommend it . Yet the very existence of a multiplicity of theories each one claiming to be adequate is grounds for some doubt that in reality any one is indeed adequate i.e. (is a concept which is an ideal). Certainly the interpretations are not all on the same level. Beyond the particular interpretation which we may espouse "it may be that some larger world process is working through each series of historical events." (34) An explanation of why it is raining today can be made in terms of specific meteorological data in terms of broad geological principles in terms of a theory such as chance or pre-established harmony.

By definition we shall let non-rational interest refer to all levels of interest as implied in the aforementioned theories, including, as previously mentioned, the very fact of human finitude. Conformity, egoism, hedonism, self preservation, profit motive, etc. may be classified as non-rational interests, though we realize that conformity as an interest is not on the same level as human finitude as an interest and may even perhaps be included within the interest of human finitude.

By definition we shall let "a concept-which-is-a-

(35)
rationalization refer to any concept which is called
into existence in any wise by any "non-rational interests" (36)

The point being made then is that even though the
present study subsumes a plurality of factors within one
term ; namely, "non-rational" interests (which lead to the
genesis and preservation of concepts which are rationalizations)
it does not claim to be a monistic interpretation.

We have next to consider the general background
of the times between the two world wars.

CHAPTER II.

B A C K G R O U N D S

I THE NEW MESSIANISM

The entrance of the United States into the World War in 1917 was accompanied by a crescendo of Messianism. With the proclamation by President Wilson that this country was fighting "to make the world safe for democracy" the mobilization of the nation was secured around a lofty ideal. America was indeed fighting a holy war. The "darling of providence" was carrying out a divine mission for the benefit of all mankind. Through a steady stream of propaganda which percolated with dispatch through every nook and cranny of this broad land any loyal American citizen was able to say with sincerity, as Dr. Priestly had said long before, in the time of George Washington: "It is impossible not to be sensible that we are acting for all mankind. (1) Democracy was Americanism; Americanism was Democracy, and both of them were motivated by the universal standards of God. With the country in such a mood who would dare analyze the world-wide holocaust in terms of a battle for markets in a shrinking capitalist world. Who would risk the accusation that not all right was on one side; that the prevalent universalism in reality (2) was only a form of particularism; that Americanism was called into existence, in part, at least, by interests which were not so holy? And should such a daredevil arise would he not at once be consumed by the righteous indignation of the nation!

Nor was the war the only impetus to the new "Americanism." The revolution in Russia may have been contributory, as well as the danger of dual loyalties of resident aliens. (3)

To what extent was the ideal of Americanism a concept which is our ideal? A candid statement made by the Secretary

of the Navy, Curtis Wilbur, in a speech before the Connecticut Chamber of Commerce in 1925, is revealing: "Americans have over twenty million tons of merchant shipping to carry the commerce of the world ^{worth} / three billion dollars. We have loans and property abroad exclusive of government loans of over ten billion dollars. If we add to this the volume of exports and imports for a single year -- about ten billion dollars -- we have an amount almost equal to the entire property of the U.S. in 1868, and if we add to this the eight billion dollars due us from foreign governments we have a total of \$31 billion. These vast interests must be considered when we talk of defending the flag. ...We fought not because Germany invaded or threatened to invade America but because she struck at our commerce on the North Sea and denied to our citizens on the high seas the protection of our flag. ...To defend America we must be prepared to defend its interests and our flag in every corner of the globe." ⁽⁴⁾ However, authoritative though such a statement may appear, one must be on guard against over-simplification. First of all, such a statement itself may be called into existence, in part at least, by non-rational interests such as the wish of the government to stimulate investments by the upper middle class in foreign countries which, during the twenties, were economically unstable. Secondly, to assert that the heightened concept of Americanism was called into existence in part, at least, by non-rational interests, such as economic interests, is not to deny that contrary to what the Secretary stated, the interest of selfpreservation was also contributory to Americanism, and that many did fear eventual military attack upon the United States.

A vast majority of Rabbis in the C.C.A.R. embraced the "new messianism" with the enthusiasm of an ardent lover. (5)

Americanism was universalism; Americanism was Judaism. "We speak today," proclaimed Rabbi Henry Berkowitz, "of the identity of American and Jewish ideals, --of both of them as being expressions of an unwavering confidence in a true democracy as the best expression of human progress in both spiritual and temporal affairs." (6) Moreover, to Rabbi Louis Grossman it was self-evident that

"...our religion as well as our citizenship posit that ...even in the tragic hardships of war, tragic for the refinements of our ethical faith, Judaism and Americanism are identical, as in times of peace so now in these ordeals of blood. (Accordingly) we may dare claim, as a historic fact and a characterization of ourselves today, that Judaism is democracy gone into every phase of human life." (7)

Indeed, as was stated in a letter read before the Conference in 1918, "America, that sun-kissed and God-blessed land is just now engaged in the gigantic task of writing a new Torah of humanity." (8) Germany was all wrong and "the American people, with unanimity and spontaneity, has expressed its resentment against the many-sided wrongs done to civilization by Germany and its allies. It is proceeding with an indomitable will to abate the evil which is threatening to disrupt the world." (9)

Indeed, Rabbi Abram Simon opined that "it would be well for our America" to follow the lesson of Israel and accept it as a Divine mission to "create an American school of prophets aslow with the divine truth and leading the race to a universal republic of righteousness." (10)

To what extent was the concept of Americanism as professed

by a majority of the Rabbis in the Conference a concept which is a rationalization? In addition to the presence of the non-national interests noted above as apply to the entire country, we may suggest another possible interest, namely the interest of security. Reform, at this time predominantly anti-Zionistic, was beginning to feel the challenge of the nationalists, whose philosophy regarding Palestine threatened to undo its interrelation into the plush American bourgeoisie world. Therefore, Zionism was attacked, Americanism championed. Rabbi Ethelberg, for example, waving the banner of the "new messianism" lambasted Zionism on the grounds that it "has mocked the idea of a Jewish mission upon which Reform had laid stress." Moreover, "Zionism has made propaganda for itself, created confusion among the Jews of America, and thought it had dealt a death blow to Reform Judaism."⁽¹¹⁾

The interpretation of the Zionists was a faulty one. For the mission of the Jews was "to serve God everywhere as the international religious community." Universalism was a divine injunction, for "stronger and loftier than all artificial nationalisms that are of man's devising are the universal bonds that are of God's making."⁽¹²⁾

Moreover, the interest of security was intensified by the fact that anti-Semitism was inferred to be caused by the fact that Christians do not know sufficiently well that Jews, too, worship the ideal of Americanism.⁽¹³⁾

To summarize: Americanism was an ideal around which the American people, in good faith, could rally in fighting the World War without facing the underlying economic and other non-national interests. The Reform rabbinate serving predominantly middle class Jews who were integrated and economically secure espoused Americanism

and equated it with Universalism in order to attack the nationalists whose philosophy ultimately threatened their security. We may note in passing the irony of protestations of universalism being rooted in avid particularism. Indeed Americanism, as popularly understood after the War, meant, as Senator Lodge allegedly stated "to stand aloof and mind our own business."⁽¹⁴⁾ We can see the likelihood, therefore, that Americanism in some degree was a concept which is rationalization. It could hardly pretend to be a concept which is an ideal.

II. DISILLUSIONMENT OF THE TWENTIES

That hopes of Messianism had been premature was sensed almost at once after the war by the masses though the secure upper middle class remained in a white castle for a time. Unlike in Germany and on the Continent where the development of crisis philosophy, neo-Thomism, and a tendency toward the old Aristotelianism" appeared, disillusionment in the twenties in this country took a predominantly veiled form. To be sure, disgruntled groups such as farmers, cotton manufacturers, coal miners, textile manufacturers, shipbuilders and leather manufacturers, which did not have a hand in the pie, manifested more overt signs of disillusionment, some manifest signs of which were anti-semitism, anti-racism and other K.K.K. activities. However, such overt disillusionment was not widespread until Depression times.

The veiled disillusionment to which we refer can be seen from (a) the new morality (b) increasing "alienation" (c) a subtle revolt against rationalism (d) overtones of messianism and (e) the revolt of the intellectuals.

(a) Certainty had departed from life. The world was still "an awful mess." Who knew what the future held in store?

In this climate the Dionysiac which had been suppressed by the prevailing rationalism which had manifested itself through Victorian morality, came once again into play. Frederick Lewis Allen describes the mood of the age: "In effect the women of the post war decade said to man: 'You are tired and disillusioned. You do not want the cares of a family or the companionship of mature wisdom. You want the thrills of sex without their fruition. I will give them to you. And to herself she added, but I will be free.' " (15) Moreover, the nation was spiritually tired. Worried by the excitement of the war and the nervous tension of the Big Red Scare, they hoped for quiet and healing. Sick of Wilson and his talk of America's duty to humanity, callous to political idealism, they hoped for a chance to pursue their private affairs without governmental interference, and to forget about public affairs. (16)

(b) As implied above the Dionysiac, the wild, the unordered, is the antithesis of the rational. Even though Karl Barth, Jacques Maritain, et al, made no major inroads in the U.S. in the twenties, the "Sweet reasonableness of John Locke and the belief that man could use his God-given powers of reflection to create a sound order based on education, freedom and democracy." (17) were increasingly now becoming empty phrases. Moreover, increased interest in Christian Science, in faith cures, even in the slowly increasing emphasis upon ceremonialism, were signs of this change. Faith in science, notwithstanding, Apollo had ceased to be revered as king by the masses and even in the upper middle class Dionysius was making more than occasional inroads. This anti-rational tendency may have been called into existence in part, at least, by what Fromm calls the increasing "alienation of man."

(c) Though not a result of the war, the tendency toward bigness in business was not reduced by the war. Through the twenties and on through the thirties the trend toward bigger and bigger business units was increasingly pushing the individual entrepreneur out of competition. According to Fromm, by 1930 of 573 independent American corporations covering most stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange 130 companies controlled more than 80% of the assets of all the companies represented. (18) Moreover, whereas in 1800 four fifths of occupied persons in the U.S. were self-employed entrepreneurs. In 1870 the percentage was only 33% and by 1940 only 20%. (19) The consequence of this tendency has been to remove the worker further and further away from his product. The concreteness and definiteness of one's frame of reference disappears; man in capitalistic society adds abstraction to abstraction. Concomitant with this, his world becomes materialistic. No longer coming into contact with his daily work with the essence of things, he increasingly sees life on a superficial level, in terms of function, utility, etc. (21) Man in capitalist society, therefore, has increasingly become alienated from the essence of reality, alienated from himself, increasingly "other-directed", increasingly attempting to conform to the level of "others" even though that level be the shallow depth of passive and consumer-type society. (22)

(d) The breakdown of idealism after the war, the return to selfish nationalisms was sensed perhaps most acutely by the "intellectuals." Defiant and cynical they looked askance at belief in God. "They were united in a scorn of the vast bourgeoisie majority which they held responsible for prohibition, censorship, Fundamentalism and other regressions." Skepticism

was the credo of the Draisers, the Schells, the Andersons, the Sinclair Lewises and the Menckens. They lambasted the Rotarians, the reformers and the religion of Coolidge prosperity. Indeed, Mencken "looked upon the American scene, in general, with raucous and prophetic laughter." (23) The social gospel of Bruce Barton, the talk about reforming society was viewed by these men as therapies whereby the bourgeoisie could with the least amount of discomfort to themselves ease their consciences. (24).

To summarize: The disillusionment which set in after World War I was primarily of a veiled character. That it was veiled and not overt, as in Europe, was due in part to an American economy which, though beginning to feel the pressures of declining world markets, was still tough and strong, and to a number of "divergent mechanisms" which we have now to consider.

III. DIVERGENT MECHANISMS

It was to the interest of the upper bracket bourgeoisie to prevent too many people from getting overly disillusioned, for this would constitute a threat to their continuance in power. Therefore, a number of "divergent mechanisms" came into existence. Some of these mechanisms which helped save the power position of the bourgeoisie in the twenties were (a) Americanism and the Red Scare; (b) false optimism based on false prosperity; (c) sensationalism/ escapism/ alienation; (d) the new morality; (e) anti-semitism; (f) emphasis on the practical, in education, rather than upon the liberal; (g) the changing nature of liberalism.

(a) A number of new conditions faced the bourgeoisie after the war. Among these are the end of the frontier as a source for new markets and the rise of labor. These factors constituted

a threat and perhaps are interests which explain in part the appearance of the "Red Scare" and the activities of Palmer. That the Communist scare was entirely trumped up may not have been the case any more than it is today. However, that the action taken, the propaganda spread, was not greatly in excess of the impending danger is questionable. Americanism, formerly a new Messianism, increasingly more had become anti-Communism and it was only in this way that it remained an ideal around which to rally labor and the lower middle classes. Once labor had been restrained and other divergent mechanisms had come into play, the "Red Scare" could cease. Indeed, too much governmental interference was hardly appealing to the "ruling" bourgeoisie who cried (25) against the government for encroaching on personal liberty.

(b) Though Harding and Coolidge prosperity had been built on tenuous foundations, money was plentiful and the stock market apparently in good condition. Even though danger was felt the government was reassuring. There was really no danger. "Go and have fun," the times said and the people went.

(c) A sensationalistic press took over the country. As Allen describes the situation, Hearst made the American scene look like a three ring circus. "As the tabloids rose, radicalism fell." (26) Fads sprang up everywhere. Hero worship was at its height. Baseball, boxing---sport in general--served as a mechanism to channel aggression. It was all clean fun. Don't fight the Bourgeoisie; cheer for Dempsey! Indeed, sport had become an American obsession. (27)

(d) The new morality likewise served as a divergent mechanism. "Young men and women who a few years before would have been championing radical economic or political doctrines were championing the new morality and talking about it everywhere and thinking of it incessantly." (28)

(e) As inferred above, anti-semitism allowed disgruntled groups to let off steam without attacking the Bourgeoisie.

(f) Moreover, emphasis on the practical side of education, produced a generation in America comparatively ignorant of the economic analysis. As revolutionary movements usually originate away the youth of a country deemphasis of liberal arts was a force keeping many bright youth from economic analysis which would constitute a real danger especially in an age without an ideal. (Americanism is

(g) Also, the changing interpretation of liberalism was crucial. Laissez-faire and majority rule had been alright when labor had been impotent, but now that it had achieved manhood and was a threat, the idea that the "majority rules" was replaced by increased emphasis on "minority rights." "Loyalty to the teachings of the Founding Fathers implied the right of the businessman to kick the union organizer out of his workshop." (29) The open shop became the American way of life, backed up by the Supreme Court. Though not all of his colleagues agreed with him the following statement of Rabbi Samuel Schulman indicates that some Reform rabbis joined the bandwagon: "Judaism was the cry for righteousness and justice," he proclaimed before the Union of American Hebrew Congregations in 1919. "It never was a demagogue flatterer of the masses as such. It never pandered

IV. DISILLUSIONMENT OF THE THIRTIES

We saw above the disillusionment of the twenties was (a) veiled and (b) certainly was not overt among all but a few disgruntled classes in the population of the stock market in 1929, however, a new trend set in. Disillusionment in the lower economic echelons became more overt while the middle strata bourgeoisie began to manifest a veiled type of disillusionment, the likes of which had descended upon the low income groups in the 20's. This latter type was now reflected by the liberal clergy including the C.C.A.R. The more overt disillusionment of the working and lower middle classes manifested itself through such media as anti-semitism, and strong criticisms of the existing economic system; whereas the disillusionment of the middle strata of the bourgeoisie in some instances remained covert and in other instances resulted in a ^{more} moderate criticism of the existing order. The latter is true of the Reform Rabbinate during this period as we shall subsequently see.

V. SAVING MECHANISMS FOR CAPITALISM

Though the economic condition of the country was manifestly much worse in the thirties than in the twenties, crisis philosophies leftwing economic systems comparatively little support especially in the bourgeoisie. To be sure, socialistic thought was steadily mounting, but the ranks of the radicals were surprisingly few. Several mechanisms were called into existence which helped to secure the interests of the bourgeoisie: Among these were (a) Humanism (b) Republican Reassurance (c) New Deal Compromise (d) anti-semitism (e) a war-preparedness program.

(a) The rise to popularity of humanism in the United

States followed immediately on the heels of the crash in 1929.⁽³³⁾ Not that James and Dewey had not written long before then, but now there was deperate need for a saving philosophy, one that would reassert individualism and preach unbridled optimism and a faith in man to achieve through effort "the highest ideals;" which can be thought. Progress, aspiration into achievement, and on and on to further and higher aspirations without end. Whatever influence it exerted elsewhere, however it made relative little headway in the Reform rabbinate for reasons which we shall note in chapter 4.

(b) By the time of Hoover's administration the country was beginning to feel the effects of processes that had begun a decade or more before. Not only did the closing of the frontier mean an end to inner expansion, but international tensions and a shrinking world economy meant that foreign markets were destined to be inadequate as well. We may mention in passing that the fact that there was not adequate place for re-investments may have been of significance for the espousal at this time by the upper echelons of the old German bourgeoisie Reform Jews like Louis Marshall and Felix Warburg intensifies the program to rebuilding Palestine. The extent to which the prospect of new markets in the middle East altered their ideology (concept which is a rationalization) toward nationalism we shall consider in chapter 5. Moreover, during the twenties, consumption had not kept pace with

production of both consumer and producer goods. This placed the country in the ironical position of having produced an over abundance of goods while millions of unemployed faced starvation. Yet in the face of such a dilemma President Hoover kept reassuring the people that the economy of the country was basically sound; that the discomfiture was only temporary, that a reawakening of the good old days was just around the corner. Indeed the depression was "a passing phenomenon not inherent in the economic system, a kind of evil spirit that could be vanquished by legislation."⁽³⁴⁾

However, labor had to be reckoned with seventeen million unemployed some type of compromise with the system was necessary.

(c) Such a compromise was the New Deal. To alleviate the plight of labor - to put more money into circulation and make it easier to borrow - this was its alleged goal. To what extent the New Deal was motivated, on some level of consciousness, by the desire to secure, insofar as possible, the interests of the bourgeoisie (for revolution was not totally impossible even in this country) is a matter of speculation, which we can verify in part by examining the attitudes of the upper echelons toward the New Deal, (though this would restrict us to conscious factors). There is some reason to believe that those who look at the immediate personal disadvantages opposed it outrightly; those who were motivated, in part at least, by a more enlightened self interest were more conciliatory.

However, the New Deal and the changes which it brought did not mean thereby a reversal of the concept of liberalism which had taken place in the twenties. Rabbi Phillip Bernstein notes that in essence the New Deal had not stemmed the tide of a changing concept of liberalism. "The nation is turning in upon itself," he stated in 1938. "The psychology to change from extrovert to introvert." So long as we were pioneering, building, working, prospering, we cared little about the variations in our population. There was, it seemed, enough for everybody. (The attitude was live and let live) but with the closing of the frontier, and the contraction of the national economy, a new psychology emerged. The have-nots were increasingly bitter against the haves. Suddenly and through no change in their conduct, the patriotism and usefulness of minorities which had been considered an integral and valuable element in American life, (were) being questioned. (35)

(d) A saving mechanism for the status quo during the Hoover Administration, which helped divert the energies of disgruntled elements in the population, was the appearance of intensified anti-semitism. During the first Roosevelt administration there was a further heightening of the same device with the arrival on the scene of Pelley and his Whiteshirts and after 1936 with the campaigning of Father Coughlin. The former, diverted the energies of the petty bourgeoisie and as well as fixed income people and big corporations the unemployed proletariat/ from the New Deal; the latter, the energies of little steel and the lower middle class in general, who by 1936 had been put somewhat back on their feet.

It is interesting to note that Father Conglin faded away in 1938 and 1939 with the appearance of the war preparedness program.

(e) That the war preparedness program was launched in part at least to save the economy after the reunion of 1937 is not to say that such a program could have been called into existence had not the international climate been ready. To be sure, military leadership even in a democracy can heighten crises to the point where war becomes unavoidable.⁽³⁶⁾ Yet the prospect existed also that should even America sit back and do nothing there was real danger from the Fascist host in Germany. Moreover, the Tory-Fascist pact at Munich in 1938 and the Russo-German pact in 1949 heightened the sense of insecurity even of the United States, for who could trust a contemporary ally. Perhaps she would tomorrow be your enemy. Though Jewish Labor (Working Man's Circle) opposed the preparedness program as we would naturally expect, the program met with much resentment also on the floor of the C.C.A.R. Rabbi Philip Bernstein for example notes with some cynicism that "The system under which we destroy products in order to prosper has been supplanted by one under which we produce instruments of destruction in order to provide employment for those who will ultimately be destroyed. The contradiction of our Capitalist economy is conducive to dictatorship, militarism, and war."⁽³⁷⁾

To summarize: in the thirties we see also a number of "mechanisms" which help channel the discontent of those dissatisfied with the system.

Though no crescendo of messianism was reached in 1941,

the nation had to be rallied around a unifying ideal. Unlike the divine goal offered by Wilson in 1917 to make the world safe for democracy, the rallying point for the country in 1941 - a people in a much more sombre mood, much more "realistic" - was predominately negative rather than a positive element: the common enemy. To be sure, the positive element, democracy, liberty, etc. was kindled by the Pearl Harbor fiasco and by a steady stream of propaganda, but that such concepts are concepts which are rationalizations (in great part at least) is evidenced by the fact that while fighting Hitler the people were not alarmed at Franco, and that though Russia was "undemocratic" the people were not opposed to having her as an ally till V.J. Day.

We have now in terms of backgrounds and interests to analyze three major theological conceptions held by members of the Central Conference of American Rabbis between the two wars, (1) social justice (2) God,, and (3) nationalism. The writer recognizes among other limitations the fact that not all statements which appear in the Yearbooks are of equal value, that often rabbis may feel it best to be silent on an issue, that frequently much noise can be made by a small group. Therefore, though caution has been attempted this study can by no stretch of the imagination begin to be definitive. As inferred above, any conclusions drawn on the basis of the evidence examined can be considered no more than hypotheses which to be verified or repeated would require detailed clinical study, if indeed in every case such clinical study is possible.

CHAPTER III.

S O C I A L J U S T I C E

L. THE NEW SOCIAL JUSTICE (1918-1929)

To what extent was the concept of social justice as possessed by members of the Central Conference of American Rabbis between the two world wars a concept which is a rationalization and to what extent was it a concept which is an ideal? To begin to determine answers to these questions we have to ascertain changes which occurred in the concept during the years specified. To the extent that we find change we may speculate about the possible interests which are related to these changes.

We may note to begin with that in the Pittsburgh Platform (1) social justice was mentioned as if in passing and during the three decades subsequent to the issuance of this statement its primary connotation for the American Reform Rabbinate was charity helping the poor by dispensating, assisting the large immigrant population by integrating them into the mores of the land. The "haves" were some how superior to the "have-nots"; "spiritual selectivity" (2) was some how operative. The obligation of the "haves" was to educate the "lesser breed of men" so that they might be able subsequently to merit more than they now possessed. Such an interpretation absolved the "in group" from any guilt as to why the poor were poor, and exonerated the structure and placed predominant responsibility upon the "have-nots" themselves. With the first world war the concept of social justice in the C. C. A. R. was changing. More responsibility was placed upon the "in group", the employers class

though, the structure was still not to be criticized. Only statements such as the following became prevalent. "The ram-parts of vested interests (i.e. the employer class) founded on special privilege and greedy exploitation, will not fall at the first blasts of the trumpets. All the forces of economic or industrial selfishness are being martialed to stem the tide of thorough-going social reform"⁽⁵⁾ Only by the end of the twenties as we shall see did the structure itself meet the attack of the rabbis in the name of "social justice".

What was responsible for the change which coincided with the first world war? Was it the fact that the employer class was becoming more brutal? That the working class was being subjected to more misery than had hitherto been the case? If anything the reverse was true. The sweat shop conditions of the nineteenth century were more intolerable than the working conditions of the middle teens. Israel Mufson describing for example, conditions in the women's garment industry in the nineties and at the turn of the century stated that "The working hours in these sweat-shops during the busy seasons were indefinite and were generally stretched at both ends of the day. In the inside shops the hours were sixty a week... in the outside shops the hours were 84 hours a week. Besides regular hours, there was overtime in both the inside and outside shops and in addition many of the workers took material home and worked until two or three in the

morning. It was quite common to work 15 or 16 hours a day, from five in the morning until nine at night, and in the busy season men frequently worked all night. And for such work they received as little as \$3.50 per week. (4) Nor are other aspects of the conditions of labor in the United States unbeknown to any student of those times. Certainly, the exploitations of the employer class were no greater than they should now be blamed where formerly that they should now be blamed where formerly been held comparatively guiltless. Therefore, consideration of the working class, desire to improve their lot is not an adequate explanation to account for the changing conception of social justice in the rabbinate at this time; for, if employer brutality, if pure and pious consideration for labor were the only motivation for the social justice concept which emerged after World War I why had it not developed in the 1880's, in the 1890's, when labor's plight was even worse? That "the ideal of social justice has always been an integral part of Judaism", (5) as the Commission on Synagogue and Industrial Relations stated in 1918, may have been true in word, yet the referent of the term "social justice" in 1918 was certainly not the same as the referent of the term social justice twenty or thirty years earlier. Indeed, the old concept of social justice had been a concept which (6) is a rationalization.

What interests can be suggested to account for this change? We may propose the following: (a) conformity, (b) changing attitudes of labor, (c) the need for an ideal which could be a saving mechanism for Capitalism.

(a) To the extent to which it can be shown that

if "a" follows "x", then "b" follows "x"; if "a" follows "y" then "b" follows "y"; if "a" follows "z" then "b" follows "z"..etc. that "b" is conforming to "a", to that extent it can be shown that the elements of conformity was present in the changing conceptions of social justice.in the conference. For example several years prior to the outbreak of World War I the Methodists and liberal Christians began a social justice movement which by no stretch of the imagination held the employers class guiltless. Several years later, in 1918, the name of the theretofore impotent Committee on Synagogue and Industrial Relations of the Conference was changed to the "Commission of Social Justice", and its first "tour de force" was to promulgate a fourteen point platform, the tone of which was to place responsibility for change upon the employer-class. The provisions of the statement were as follows:

1. A more equitable distribution of the profits of industry.
2. A maximum wage consistent with a fair standard of living.
3. An eight hour day.
4. Compulsory one day of rest in seven for workers.
5. Safe and sanitary working conditions, especially for women.
6. Abolition of child labor.
7. Adequate workmen's compensation for industrial

accidents and occupational diseases.

8. Legislative provision for universal workmen's health insurance and careful study of social insurance methods for meeting the contingencies of unemployment and old age.
9. An adequate, permanent national system of public employment bureaus to make possible the proper distribution of the labor forces of America.
10. Recognition of right of labor to organize and bargain collectively.
11. Application of principles of mediation, conciliation and arbitration to industrial disputes.
12. Proper housing for working people (through government regulations where necessary).
13. The preservation and integrity of the home by a system of mother's pensions.
14. Constructive care of dependents, defectives, and criminals with aim to restoring them to a normal
(7)
life wherever possible.

That the example of the Christian liberals was not the only possible stimulus to conformity, moreover, can be discerned from the fact that many of the ranks in this platform echo sentiments which the federal and state governments had already made law (or at least which had strong support in the political arena). "At a time when most of the rights here stated are already on the statute books it seems strange that we who are supposed

to look ahead should be discussing matters which are already the law of the land."⁽⁸⁾ Nor was the stand of the Reform rabbis lacking either in conformity to the changing attitude of the employer class itself toward the working man. "It is easy to say you are the friend of the workingman," we read, "at the time when everybody says he is the friend of the workingman, including the employer."⁽⁹⁾ Indeed, though many tried to give the impression that the new Social Justice was a concept which is an ideal by asserting for example, that "The concept of social justice has always been an integral part of Judaism,"⁽¹⁰⁾ one may suggest the hypothesis that the interest of conformity influencing on some level of Con-sciousness, a changed concept of social justice, which is in some degree a rationalization, is at least worthy of exploration. The fact that the new social justice, moreover, was espoused by the majority of the rabbis only after certain events had transpired is further evidence that this hypothesis is worthy of consideration.

(b) In bad times or when wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few who are not readily observable by the downtrodden, the latter will accept a world beyond philosophy as compensation for their deprivation in the here and now. With the expansion of the middle class, however, the appearance was given that wealth was now more abundant. Good times being here for the multitudes the proletariat was no longer willing to sit idly back and accept the next world in lieu of material prosperity in this world. Moreover, the

increasing emphasis of uncertainty in the science of the twenties and the coincidental decline of fundamentalism may also have been contributory causes in the workingman's loss of faith in a certain and glorious world to come. The reverse thought that the heightened emphasis of uncertainty in science and the decline of fundamentalism in the United States were in part due to the increasing power of labor in the class struggle that is, a labor no longer content to accept a philosophical and scientific ground that justified the status quo is not impossible. The heightened appeal to Aristotelianism on the Continent following World War I may have reflected the desire/"x", on whatever level of consciousness, of the bourgeoisie to rebuff the rising power of labor in Europe as symbolized in uncertainty science. If the old science based on certainty had been called into existence, in part at least, by the non-rational interests of justifying the rising middle class which was dependent on a Capitalism fraught with risk and uncertainty and which, therefore, needed a "certainty" principle to counterbalance this uncertainty, the new science can be seen as having been called into existence, in part at least, by the non-rational interest of justifying a rising proletariat. Aristotelianism could then be accounted for on the basis of an attempt by the bourgeoisie to counteract this trend.⁽¹¹⁾ On the other hand, the possibility exists that inasmuch as Capitalism was connected with risk and uncertainty, inasmuch as uncertainty in life on an existential level had been experienced for several centuries by labor, that labor's

interests were symbolized on whatever level of Consciousness, by an appeal to Aristotelianism, in which case the uncertainty science can be accounted for as an attempt of the bourgeoisie to keep alive the uncertainty necessary for Capitalism.

Moreover, we may mention also the factor of disillusionment, of uncertainty in life which was most pronounced in the lower economic echelons, 'which, irrespective of the cause of its existence made labor more of a hungry lion than a tame satisfied and purring kitten. Labor would no longer be satisfied with chance scraps and charity; it wanted and it would demand its rightful share of the economic surplus, much of which the employer class had. It wanted "social justice".

(c) With the breakdown of the ideal of Americanism which temporarily assuaged labor during the war, labor was left without an ideal. Moreover, as we have seen above, it would no longer countenance acceptance of the status quo and it was disillusioned, if only in a veiled sort of way. It was, therefore, an immediate danger to the status quo, to the system. From this, the hypothesis may be suggested that the changing concept of social justice at the time of World War I was in part at least, called into existence on whatever level of Consciousness as a saving ideal of the rabbis to preserve as much of the Capitalist system as would be consistent with the increased power of labor. The facts that at this time the rabbis (1) made no attack on the institution of private property which guaranteed the supreme rights of the employer class and (2) made no attack on the profit motive essential to the interests of the employer class may be evidence to corroborate the worthwhileness of such an

hypothesis; namely, that the new social justice was called into existence in part at least to serve bourgeoisie interests, that is, that the rabbis through their changed concept gave labor what they demanded in the minimum. The writer is by no means saying that such evidence corroborates the hypothesis, but merely that such evidence further suggests that the hypothesis may be worthy of a detailed testing. The hypothesis, moreover, is consistent with the fact that in general the rabbis at this time were secure within the Capitalist system.

Chapter 2 The above hypothesis does not intend to imply a Rabbi/laity plot to give labor the minimum of its stubborn demands so that labor would feel satisfied that it could achieve decent standards under the Capitalist system and thereby be rendered least dangerous. "Plot" usually refers to a conscious manipulation which implies insincerity and deceit and the rabbis were anything but insincere and deceitful. The level of Consciousness on which the above mentioned interest was operating, if indeed such interest did operate, would require psychoanalysis of the rabbis involved, if indeed even psychoanalysis would be able to discern in every detail such interests, (for is psychoanalysis itself disinterested?) and, therefore, is, of course, far beyond the scope of this study. We may note, however, a number of significant points regarding the attitude of the Reform Jewish laity toward the new social justice which may be of some import for this hypothesis.

The laity in the U.A.H.C. though it was more conservative regarding the new social justice than the Reform rabbinate followed only a little behind the rabbinate. It, too, during the war formed a social justice commission which though its pronouncements were less severe on the employer class than the pronouncements of the C.C.A.R., nevertheless, by 1925 had endorsed the Rochester Platform of the C.C.A.R. (1920) which basically reaffirmed the C.C.A.R. platform of 1918 mentioned above. We now, however, have to account for a strange appearing phenomenon; in 1927 and 1928 the Union defected and began to take a sterner attitude toward the new social justice. In 1927, the Executive Board of the Union refused to establish a bureau of social action ⁽¹²⁾ and in 1928 the Social Justice Commission of the Union was dissolved and the suggestion of a subvention to the Social Justice Commission of the Conference, to carry on the work ⁽¹³⁾ was overwhelmingly defeated. Yet the defection of the Union is not quite so strange if we remember that 1927 and 1928 were peak years of prosperity even for labor. The slight recessions and strikes and tensions of the early twenties having been greatly reduced. In other words, what we are suggesting is that the threat of labor having been greatly diminished by 1927-1928 the new social justice which on whatever level of Consciousness sought to placate labor no longer had to be espoused by the laity. If this is so, then the new concept of social justice which the laity espoused never to any significant degree became autonomous and once the interests which had rightfully called the new social

justice into existence were gone. There was no longer any need for the concept. Contrariwise, the new concept of social justice among the rabbis had become more autonomous, for in 1928 at the height of prosperity and before the depression the C.C.A.R. heightened the new social justice and hinted at defects in "private property". More than this, of course, is involved in the changed laity position, but we shall note this shortly. The fact remains that the hypothesis is worthy of investigation that the new social justice in its genesis was for the majority of the rabbis a concept which is a rationalization which was called into existence in part at least by the interest of preserving as much of the Capitalist system as possible in view of a rising labor class.

To summarize: We have demonstrated a change in the concept of social justice in the C.C.A.R. coincident with World War I, thereby suggesting that the original concept of social justice which was a rationalization. We further suggested several non-rational interests as hypotheses to account for the change: (a) conformity, (b) changing role of labor, (c) the need for an ideal which could be a saving mechanism for Capitalism. We next examined the possibility that the new concept of social justice in the C.C.A.R. was becoming relatively autonomous by the end of the twenties.

We may now note more specifically how the new social justice manifested itself through (a) improved working conditions and (b) child labor.

(a) Beginning with the Social Justice Platform of 1918, the Conference began to espouse the cause of labor. More rights for labor, restrictions on rights for the employer class was the cry. Collective bargaining, eight hour day, conciliation and arbitration -- these and the other principles mentioned above were reiterated at Rochester in 1920 and championed by a majority of the Conference throughout the twenties. Jews participated in conferences with Catholics and Protestants in the alleged (14) interest of labor. If the primary motivation of the new social justice had been genuine concern for the welfare of labor how is it that the rabbis never went to labor, never before 1928 met with them in Conferences, never encouraged them with statements of support. As the relationship of the Rabbinate to the workingman was predominantly indirect so we may suggest the hypothesis that his interest in the workingman was not direct, but that another interest intervened, namely to save the system and thereby serve the employer class.

(b) We may next examine the attitude of the Conference toward child labor. The horrendous factory conditions under which thousands upon thousands of children, many not even teen-agers, worked in the 1890's and in the early 1900's in many cities in the United States is a well known fact. Yet, strong pronouncements against child labor were not forthcoming from the rabbis during these years. This is not what we should have expected were the concept of the elimination of child labor a concept which is an ideal. We may

note the times at which the Conference became most articulate in the condemnation of this "evil", 1915, 1922, 1932 -⁽¹⁵⁾

35. The former two years followed a recession in the economy, the latter, a major depression. Common to each of these years, however, is the fact of rising unemployment and it is of significance that in each of the above instances when the elimination of child labor is discussed in the Conference it is in a context wherein the frame of references is "How can we help solve the unemployment problem?" In 1915, the child labor proposal was one of a number of devices which included Public works, emergency fund for the unemployed, etc. Yet, when one comes to the paragraph on child labor one finds that it is well clothed in high sounding phrases: "The children of the future will be safeguarded only if the children of the present are given the opportunity to develop all their powers of body, mind, and soul, not only children of the rich but children of the poor ..."⁽¹⁵⁾ However significant statements like the above may be, none can compare to a most revealing statement made by Sidney Goldstein in The Synagogue and Social Welfare. It can be noted from the following quotation how, within the space of a single paragraph, a concept which is clearly and almost admittedly a concept which is a rationalization at the beginning of the paragraph can become apparently autonomous, apparently a concept which is an ideal, by the end of the paragraph:

"The third item in our program," to solve the unemployment problem of 1935, "was limitation of the working force". Notice the primary, admitted interest with which Rabbi Goldstein begins: to limit the working force.

He continues:

"This we believed could be accomplished first through the elimination of child labor. We supported, as did other organizations, the movement for a Federal Child Labor Amendment. This movement failed as a result of the opposition of a number of groups, some industrial and some religious; but child labor has been largely curtailed through state legislation and indirectly through federal legislation. The children have been taken out of the mines and mills and sweat-shops. A report of the National Child Labor Committee states that there are still about two million children employed in migratory work and in berrypicking and similar occupations. In time even these will be placed in school and allowed to develop as normal children should. The evil of child labor must end not only in this country but in other countries of the world." (*Italics mine*) (17)

Almost "prophetic" in its ending it is evident that an interest which responsible, in part at least, for calling into existence in 1935 of a heightened attack on child labor was the elimination of the employment problem.

To summarize: It is questionable whether the welfare of labor either on the adult or child level was the interest which called the new social justice into existence. We suggested above that in addition to conformity the hypothesis is worthy of being investigated which asserts that enlightened self interest was a contributory interest in the rabbis calling the new social justice into existence, that is, that the new social

justice in the genesis was for the rabbis a concept which is a rationalization which was called into existence, in part at least, by the interest of preserving as much of the Capitalist system as possible in view of a rising labor class.

II. THE "SOCIALISTIC" SOCIAL JUSTICE

That the concept of social justice. (1918-1928) was in part at least a concept which is a rationalization can be seen from the fact that beginning in 1928 and especially during the Hoover administration it underwent a change. The change was that whereas between 1918-1928 social justice though it involved criticizing the employer class (because of interests about which we have speculated above) did not criticize the system, after 1928 the concept of social justice involved not only criticism of the employer class but also an attack (18) on the system as well. We shall attempt first to show that this change did take place then we shall speculate as to possible interests connected with this change.

The attack on the system took the form of (a) criticism of two elements basic to the system -- the institution of private property and the profit motive and (b) the advocacy of "socialistic" measures.

(a) In 1920, the same year in which the Rochester Platform was issued advocating collective bargaining, the eight hour day and many other rights for labor, The Committee on Jewish Ethics of the Conference summed up the then held

majority view of the rabbis toward private property.

"The individual's freedom, responsibility, the fullest measure of his influence, according to his powers, natural and acquired are safeguarded by property. The institution of property is the expression of personality. History teaches that freedom of the individual grew in proportion as the individual became emancipated from his complete submergence in the community or the nation, in proportion as he possessed property, which was the measure of freedom of the power and influence of his personality.... The individual's freedom can only be safeguarded by the institution of property" (19)

That this view had changed considerably by 1928 evinced by the following statement: "We maintain that the unrestrained and unlimited exercise of the right of private ownership without regard for social results is morally untenable." (19a)

However, one should observe that even the latter remark does not really attack the institution of private property; it merely cries out against the "unrestrained and unlimited exercise of the right of private ownership". Stronger statements than this were made only after the depression.

"We must fearlessly declare", said Rabbi Lazaron on the floor of the Conference in 1932, "that where the rights of property conflict with the welfare of humanity property has no rights which need be regarded". (20)

The above statement is open to interpretation. Is the assumption that rights of property necessarily in some measure conflict with the welfare of humanity or is the intent rather that property rights and human welfare can exist side by side. If the former, then the institution of private property is attacked; if the latter then only the wrong use of private property is condemned. It is apparent, of course, that one

can by no means use such a statement as conclusive proof. The most that can be asserted is that with respect to time prior to the depression the system was not attacked, by the rabbis, though the laity may have had the impression that it was. We hinted before that in 1928, over a year before the depression, there was considerable tension between the C.C.A.R. and the Union and that the Union disbanded its Social Justice Commission. We suggested above that one possible reason was that the laity no longer had such a strong fear of labor that it should feel it necessary to "appease" labor. We may now add the suggestion that another possible reason to account for the Union's defection was the fact that the laity viewed the pronouncement of the C.C.A.R. on private property as containing the germs of a criticism of the system. Furthermore, another factor which alienated the laity was the fact that in 1928 the Conference took the position that an American citizen should get redress for laws that are "unjust" in other countries only in that country. This view was harmful to interests of many investors in Mexico whose economic interests were involved. Men like Rabbi Foster presented the point of view that justice demanded that the United States government should safeguard interests of United States investors in other lands. ⁽²¹⁾ Moreover, in 1928 "The Social Justice Commission endorsed United States Senate Resolution No. 47 by Senator Burton K. Wheeler, asking for an investigation of all foreign concessions held by Americans. The purport of the resolution was to throw light on matters which, in our

increasing national imperialism, are our most immanent source of war." (22)

(b) Though the system may have been thought by some to have been attacked by the Rabbis in 1928, an examination of the 1928 Platform reveals that though the terms are slightly stronger than preceeding pronouncements the system is really not at all attacked. Statements to the effect that "Those who labor, those who lead labor, as well as those who employ labor or invest capital in industry must alike recognize this principle in the exercise of any and all functions, rights and privileges" (23) certainly are not attacking the system. In reality it was only after the depression that the system was attacked by discrediting the profit motive and proposing a new social system. We must strive for a "modification of a proper motive which in effect exalts gain above all human consideration". (24) Moreover, "we would direct attention to the necessity for increasing emphasis on the fundamental ideal of the new social order," the Social Justice Commission stated in 1934, namely that an economic organization governed by the principle of competition and production for profit, must be entirely motivated in the interest of a finer ethical ideal." (25) Indeed, "we must protest against a system which in the most approved laissez-faire fashion of the Manchester School engenders periodically a most tragic culmination of a moderate but continuous unemployment condition". (26) "We challenge the system which as late as

March, 1932, according to Federal Reserve Board and Journal of Commerce figures, permitted interest and dividend payments in industry to remain almost 20% higher than they were in 1925, while factory payrolls diminished to less than 50% of what they were at that time...⁽²⁷⁾"

Moreover, "From many angles, present day Capitalism is under grim suspicion as to its ability ever to achieve a satisfactory sense of social responsibility. It has in effect placed the safeguarding of investments above the safeguarding of human life"⁽²⁸⁾. Furthermore, "There is something fundamentally wrong with our economic system which in its mighty, mad swirl throws off as useless men and women who are willing to labor but who are not given the chance"⁽²⁹⁾. In truth, "a proper social control of our present profit system places upon government a responsibility which can not be delegated"⁽³⁰⁾. This to be sure was an attack on the system.

(b) What, however, should replace the system?

Though the Social Justice Commission in 1934 went along with the overconsumptionist New Deal philosophy it did not stop with such measures as limitation of hours of labor to thirty, elimination of child labor, retirement of the aged, unemployment insurance, construction, but forthright demanded a change in the system; "Investigations and studies extending over a long period of time proved beyond any doubt that it is not safe for society to leave

the social enterprises in the control of private groups that operate these enterprises for private profit instead of for service to the community. The members of the C.C.A.R. welcome the plan of the present administration to socialize the basic enterprises of society especially the following:"

- (1) The banking system of the United States
- (2) Transportation System and Communications.

"This program should include also all forms of commercial communications. The socialization of these enterprises should not be postponed but put into effect at the earliest possible moment."

(3) The Power Plants: "Our modern economic life is dependent upon such sources of energy as coal, oil, water power and electricity. These sources of energy should no longer remain in the hands of private groups..."⁽³¹⁾

We see then that by attacking the institution of private property (?) and the profit motive and by supporting a plan "to socialize the basic enterprises of society", the C.C.A.R. (or a significant portion thereof) was attacking the system. Social justice had become not merely an assault upon the employer class but on the old system which had for so long nourished them. This was the social justice of early depression days.

What interests can we suggest to account for this change in the concept of social justice? What interests made the profit motive for example, inconsistent with social justice? We may note the factors of (a) Maintaining as much of the system of giving labor a minimum of what it

would demand. (b) Self interest.

(a) How one might ask is it possible that on the one hand the C.C.A.R, or a significant number of rabbis thereof, can attack the system and at the same time it can be said that the C.C.A.R. seeks to preserve as much of the system as possible. Again, the interest of enlightened self-interest is suggested to account in part for the change. With seventeen million unemployed in 1934, the possibility of revolution was not foreign, at least on some level of Consciousness, among the rabbis. The revolution of 1917 had occurred only seventeen years before. Though, of course, conditions were far different in this country than in Russia, the eventual rule by the proletariat was not an impossibility even in this country. To preserve the maximum of the system consistent with giving labor the minimum which would placate it, even if that minimum were a type of social democracy, is the proffered hypothesis. The fact that after 1935 and especially after the war-preparedness program was begun in 1938, the New Deal improved the economic condition of the country, unemployment was somewhat reduced, labor, somewhat placated and hardly a whisper of the old fire of '34 was heard on the floor of the Conference, indicates that the "socialistic" social justice of the rabbis had not been a concept which was an ideal.

(b) Self-interest may have also been involved in the social justice of 1934. Some rabbis were unemployed. Many others were underpaid. The rabbis, unlike in the twenties began to feel themselves in the employee class and

(32)
to take on the characteristics of this class. As just mentioned, the social justice of the Conference after 1934 reverted to the social justice of post-World War I days. By 1936, at the Cape Ann Convention, the system was again in good standing in the C.C.A.R.

III. THE PROPHETIC ELEMENT IN SOCIAL JUSTICE

The Social Justice Commission of the C.C.A.R. has often aligned its efforts with those of the prophets. We may justifiably ask, therefore, to what extent was the changing concepts of social justice in the C.C.A.R. prophetic? The answer to this question will depend upon our definition of prophecy. Describing prophets, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver declared: "They imposed a distinctive and distinguishing regimen upon their people and called upon them to be not like unto all other nations, but unlike."⁽³³⁾ Moreover, "if the cause were set forth, if the message were thundered, it was sufficient for a prophet to whom the message was more important than the messenger."⁽³⁴⁾ According to this interpretation, prophetic Judaism consists in "going against the current" where the current deviates from the absolute law of God. Another definition of prophecy is contained in the following statement: "The essence of liberalism in Judaism is adaptability to the changing thought and conditions of life but remaining always true to our prophetic ministry."⁽³⁵⁾ In other words, adjustment and readjustment to the socio-economic system is not inconsistent with the prophetic ideal.

However, adjustment of what we may ask? Are ideals to be adjusted to the prevailing socio economic system? Or is the system to be adjusted to the ideal? That is to say, to what extent is the prophetic ideal autonomous?

The second quote seems to support the former view. for do people adjust to life, to social and economic conditions, without changing their former ideal? We have seen this to be so in the case of rabbis, "kal ve chomer" with the laity.

The first quote, on the other hand, buttresses the view that we should not adjust to changing thoughts and conditions if such adjustments mean changing our ideal.

Only the latter ideal can possibly be a concept which is an ideal; the former is logically a concept which is a rationalization.

If we deny that rationalization enters into true prophecy then prophetic ideals can not undergo change no matter how much society changes. If we affirm that prophetic ideals are concepts which are ideals then to be consistent with prophecy we must insist that society must change; society must adapt/be adapted (to the ideal). Therefore, those who urge adjustment to the system are hardly prophetic though they speak in its name. As Joshua Liebman stated shortly after the end of World War II: "We Reform Jews may not in our day become prophets of righteousness but we can become happier and better adjusted Jews if we will learn what psychology and sociology have to teach us about the needs of a vital American Jewish life." (36) Indeed, old

line Orthodoxy may be closer to prophecy than adjustment-bound Reform!⁽³⁷⁾

However, this is not to say that social justice for the rabbis was not in some degree prophetic, in some degree autonomous in all or at least some of the instances touched upon above. However, was the concept of social justice significantly autonomous in any area? Let us examine the concept of peace for a moment. Certainly if "peace" is a concept which is an ideal we can not say that peace is a good thing under such and such conditions but under such and such conditions it must be forsaken. There was a small group of pacifists in the Conference who maintained "peace" with such determination that their concept of "peace" may in a significant degree be a concept which is an ideal. In peace time they urged peace; in war time they preached peace. The implication of their position is that only through peace can non-rational interests be overcome. "To commend severity", asserted Dr. Cronbach, "is not only to give bad temper and therefore, injustice an entering wedge, but is also, to open the door to persecution and oppression. We should retain in mind enough history to know that what yesterday called wrong, today calls righteous. Yesterday's villains are today's martyrs. Yesterday's Trotskys are today's Christs. There has never been a persecution or exploitation in history but has used as its warrant the doctrine of severity as a means of securing justice. This is the most dangerous even though the most

respectable doctrine in the world."⁽³⁸⁾ The essence of Dr. Cronbach's words is that rationalization for particular interests (that is changing the concept of peace-which-is-a-rationalization) is often used to justify aggressive-ness and war which is the antithesis of peace. Moreover, a universal element is evident in the following statement of the Committee on International Peace in 1935: "It is, therefore, our well considered opinion that it has become impossible in our world to fix responsibility, or to hold anyone people exclusively culpable. Wars are not really acts of aggression and defense, for we must recognize a difference between proximate and true causes... War is an unmitigated evil, and we should abstain from all participation in it."⁽³⁹⁾

If one is willing to die rather than to adjust his ideal, if even the interest of self-preservation is not strong enough to cause him to do so, perhaps we may possess a concept which is significantly autonomous. The prophets, the martyrs of history testify to the fact that interests (at least the ones mentioned in this study) are not always vigorous enough to cause a man to adjust his ideal to fit the interests, no matter how great or pressing those interests may be.

We may note, in passing, a difference from the above by citing several other statements of the Conference apparently apparently also in the interest of peace. For example, in opposing war preparedness even after war preparedness was invoked in 1937, as a means of resolving

the unemployment crisis. The following resolution, was adopted by the Conference in 1938 counter to New Deal policy: "Be it resolved that the C.C.A.R. repudiate the policy of false prosperity through armaments endorse a policy of sound prosperity based on a program of housing, public works, conservation of natural resources, expanded education and improved health services."⁽⁴⁰⁾ Moreover, the Social Justice Commission asserted in 1940: "Whatever may be the needs of national defense, stimulation of industrial activity through the production of arms will not provide a permanent method of abolishing unemployment."⁽⁴¹⁾ However, note that it is really not "peace" -- a concept which is an ideal -- which motivates these last two statements. Rather, war is not the correct technique to achieve prosperity; it is not an adequate mechanism for abolishing unemployment!

To summarize: If we assume that prophetic ideals are absolutes; that is, concepts which are ideals, then the very fact that the concept of social justice changed with the times indicates that it was not purely a concept which is an ideal but was in part, at least, a concept which is a rationalization. Only when a concept is steadfast, though times change, are we unable to affirm for certain that a concept is a concept-which-is-a-rationalization and that it may be significantly autonomous.

Social Justice could be attacked in the Conference only by nationalists or theists. There was not a single

rabbi in the Conference (1918-1942) who did not champion at least one of these three causes. Else, what would his rationale be for being a rabbi? Since nationalism was relatively weak in the Conference before the early thirties, the primary criticism of social justice came from men with (42) a strong theistic position. This is by no means to say, however, that strong theists could not and did not espouse the new social justice, for reasons which we shall see subsequently. In addition, we shall observe that rabbis who embraced the new social justice sharply criticized nationalism and especially reconstructionism which threatened to reduce the synagogue, the stay and support of the rabbis, to an inconsequential status. "Twenty-five years ago", Sidney Goldstein stated in a rebuttal of Mordecai Kaplan in 1932, "it seemed to us that the most necessary thing to do was to socialize our religion. Now we recognize that we must not only socialize our religion, but we must (43) religionize our social life." Nationalism, in fact, caused many ardent supporters of the new social justice to seek additional support in theism. We have next, then, to inquire into the God concept in the C.C.A.R. during these years (1918-1942).

CHAPTER IV.

THE GOD CONCEPT

I. THE GREATER STRESS ON THE "MONOTHEISM" OF "ETHICAL MONOTHEISM", AFTER WORLD WAR I.

That the God concept of many Reform rabbis in the United States during the decades preceding the first World War was basically theistic, despite the existence of some Deistic thought, is apparent from the writings of men such as Wise and Einhorn. The consequence of scientific research will be to "unite us again in the firm belief in the Holy One, for whom our fathers suffered and for whom we, their early descendants are ready to make every sacrifice"⁽¹⁾, the founder of the Hebrew Union College stated. In the same vein, the famed rabbi of Har Sinai averred, God is personal and "man himself, the child of God."⁽²⁾ It is also true, however, that during these years the aspect of Kantian philosophy which stressed the ethical above the theistic (not in place of the theistic) was exerting widespread influence on the Reform rabbinate in this country. By the time of the appearance of Kohler's Jewish Theology in 1918, moreover, the theistic position in the C.C.A.R. was manifesting signs of intensification. Such an intensification is reflected in a diminution of Kantian influence and the assertion that God and not morality is the root of Judaism. This can be seen, for example, by statements such as the following made by Rabbi Abram Simon in 1918: "Even Mr. Wells' new ethical program, however much we may be indisposed to accept his renewing youthful and finite God, has at least to its credit the possibility of an emotional

stimulation in a sanction higher than duty.⁽³⁾ To be sure, "the pages of human history have been darkened by shutting out the light of God's countenance from great areas of human experience."⁽⁴⁾ Indeed, whereas prior to World War I the ethical had been in some degree considered more important than "monotheism", with the first World War monotheism was adjudged of equal importance at least. In truth, a change was taking place. An intensification of God-consciousness was transpiring, for the Reform Jew had again "to be filled with the deep God-consciousness that produced the prophetic vision."⁽⁵⁾ "Reform Judaism", the cry was in 1918, "in addition to its conviction that its philosophy and religious teachings are in accord with the best thought of the day must constantly deepen its experience of God."⁽⁶⁾ Moreover, "who knows how much of the great world calamity is due ... to this unhappy divorce between things profane and things holy?"⁽⁷⁾ There was no denying, the rabbis proclaimed that "we yield to no group or generation in Israel in devotion to the word of God."⁽⁸⁾

That the emphasis, however, upon the ethical had been by no means diminished is discerned, for example, by the fact that Kohler, while asserting that "cut loose from religion, ethics is but a broken cistern that holds no water," at the same time affirmed that "the basis of Judaism is Jewish ethics."⁽⁹⁾ Whether ethics should be considered the flower of religion or the root of religion, it, in either case, was tremendously vital, as can be seen from the vigorous social justice movement after World War I.

What interest can be suggested to account for the change and degree of emphasis on the "monotheism" of "ethical monotheism"? Let us consider first the interest which may have been contributory in bringing about the slightly greater emphasis upon the "ethical" in "ethical monotheism" which existed in the decades prior to the War, and secondly, the intensified emphasis upon "monotheism" in "ethical monotheism" in the years subsequent to World War I.

The following interests may be suggested as contributory to the particular emphasis which the rabbis placed on "monotheism" in the decades prior to the War:

(a) conformity, (b) a mechanism of comfort and security, and (c) self-preservation.

(a) That the Kantian emphasis upon morality was widespread among the members of the upper economic echelons in the early years of Reform in this country is a well known fact. As a philosophy, it provided a ground for middle class aspirations. One may suggest the possibility that Reform rabbis representing a bourgeoisie laity was motivated in some degree by the desire to conform to general bourgeoisie patterns.

(b) With the pogroms of Czar Nicholas in 1881 hundreds of thousands of East European Jews began migrating to the United States. Within a few years Reform felt the danger of Orthodoxy which brought with it strange customs, ceremonies, and even personal appearances which threatened

to change the symbol "Jew" in the minds of Christian America from one who is very much like the Christian archetype to one who is different. The security and comfort of a rising bourgeoisie Jewry threatened, it had to take action. As indicated previously one aspect of such action was to attempt to Americanize the Jew. However, in addition Christian America had to be apprised of the fact in no unclear terms that Reform was different from Orthodoxy, that is, it was like Christian America. Therefore, at the Pittsburgh Convention in 1885 it was explicitly stated that: "We hold that all such Mosaic and rabbinical laws as regulate diet, priestly purity, and dress originated in ages and under the influence of ideas entirely foreign to our present mental and spiritual state. They fail to impress the modern Jew with a spirit of priestly holiness; their observance in our days is apt rather to obstruct than further modern spiritual elevation."⁽¹⁰⁾ Moreover, it had to be made known to all America that whereas Orthodoxy was particularistic, Reform emphasized a universal God and a universal ethics. However, though both heightened emphasis upon the God of the prophets and the ethics of the prophets could serve as a device whereby, on some level of Consciousness, the tendency was to emphasise the latter, inasmuch as ethics could be counterposed against ceremonialism, the symbol of Orthodoxy, even slightly better than the God of the prophets could be counterposed against ceremonialism. "Ritual versus ethics" was perhaps more easily

understood than "ritual versus the God of the prophets who had no desire of ritual", especially inasmuch as it was debatable whether the prophets consistently had challenged the efficacy of ritual.

(c) With the arrival of the Zion-looking Orthodox to these shores, the very preservation of Reform was jeopardized. The diaspora had to be justified to Jews, nationalistic ideology, discredited. Therefore, the fifth plank of the Pittsburgh Platform affirms that "we recognize ... the approaching of the realization of Israel's great Messianic hope for the establishment of the kingdom of truth, justice, and peace among men". Moreover, "we consider ourselves a religious community," and therefore we do not expect "a return to Palestine"⁽¹¹⁾. It can be seen clearly from this citation that ethics and God were counter-posed equally against the threat of an ideology of nationalism which constituted a threat to the very preservation of Reform Jewry. We shall observe the full impact of this fact further on.

To summarize: We can see from the above that in addition to widespread Kantian influence the interests of conformity and security may have been contributory in causing the rabbis before the first World War to place slightly more emphasis upon the adjective "ethical monotheism" than upon the noun. As the interest of self-preservation heightened appeal to universal ethics as well as to universal God it is no proof in this matter.

We have next to speculate as to interests which may have been contributory in causing the Reform rabbinate to place greater emphasis upon "monotheism" in "ethical monotheism" after 1918 than it had done prior to the War. We may suggest the following: (a) a mechanism of attacking 1. the new social justice; 2. "Zionistic-nationalism" and (b) the uncertainty of the times.

(a) Whereas the old social justice had served upper strata bourgeoisie interests, the new social justice was seen by some rabbis (e.g. Rabbis Foster, Rauch, et.al.) in the same light in which the majority of the old-line German laity viewed it, that is in terms of immediate loss rather than in terms of enlightened self-interest. We suggest, therefore, that inasmuch as nationalism could hardly be counterposed against the new social justice, there was resort on some level of Consciousness to a heightened God concept. For example, one finds theism counterposed against the new social justice by rabbis who tried to weaken it in statements such as the following: Judaism's "greatest strength lies not in its leaders, in the institutions they build and direct, the visions they see and the ideal doctrines they preach (i.e. the new social justice), but is to be found only when the knowledge of the Lord is embedded in the hearts of our people and when all their acts are not motivated by a consciousness of and devotion to Judaism." Moreover, study is more important than action. " תלמוד תורה כנגד כולם "

must continue to remain our ideal. In truth, a heightened

theism "is our imperative task". For, "many of our people are in danger of becoming estranged both to the word of God and to our spiritual treasures."⁽¹²⁾

The failure of Jews in the countries of Europe to receive "the rights" after World War I for which the integrated German Reform bourgeoisie had hoped before the war, the outcropping of anti-semitism on the continent, lead to an increasing interest in nationalism in this country, especially among the rising new middle class of East European Jews. In fact, nationalism may have symbolized the aspirations of the new middle class for a power position in American Jewry over against the established German incumbents. Therefore, we suggest that inasmuch as some Reform rabbis could not subscribe to the new social justice, which also could serve as a mechanism with which to forestall a budding nationalism, that this further motivated among these men an augmented emphasis upon the "monotheism" in "ethical monotheism". We suggest that inasmuch as "Zionistic nationalism" was seen by many rabbis as a greater threat to the interests of the employer class and to the system than social justice was, the interest which called the new social justice into existence for these rabbis, in part at least, was that it also could serve as a mechanism with which to fight nationalism. It is interesting to note in this respect that by the time of the depression when (1) the rabbis were criticizing the system and (2) assuming increasingly more the characteristics of the employee class and of the new middle class, and when (3) a significant

number of reform rabbis were becoming "genuinely" interested in nationalism. This "new nationalism" accompanied by a sudden rise of interest in "humanism" called for a still greater intensification of the God concept which we shall see. We may suggest further that after 1930 a few of the old guard (e.g. Rabbi Foster) still did not espouse the "new social justice" as a weapon against rising nationalist interest in the Conference, even though they vehemently opposed nationalism. Instead these men relied upon an increasingly impassioned appeal built around monotheism wherewith to attack both social justice and nationalism, though it is true that nationalism was by this time the greater danger for these men; and many men formerly merely theists and opposed to the new social justice embraced the new social justice as well as an energetic theism in an attempt to secure their position in view of a mounting percentage of nationalists among the Reform rabbis. We may note in passing, that this may help to explain why a strongly socialistic platform should be overwhelmingly supported in 1934.

(b) The post World War I period was characterized by a climate of uncertainty. This uncertainty manifested itself in a veiled disillusionment on the part of the proletariat and lower middle class and in a somewhat overt disillusionment on the part of a large group of intellectuals (Mencken, Lewis, DosPassos, etc.) and also through (1) an attendant revolt against rationalism among the same classes and (2) through the rise of uncertainty in science.

(1) The essence of rationality is limitation and differentiation. Its antithesis is undifferentiation and mysticism. Derivative from the concept of rationality is the concept of order and system. It is the type of concept, whether it be Aristotelian rationalism or the rationalism of the seventeenth Century, which can be used to justify the status quo. The measured, the fixed, the Apollonic,-- these can be used by the "in-group" to support the existing structure. Specifically, we are submitting that rationalism could be used, on whatever level of Consciousness, as a support for middle class interests. It may be of significance in this connection as we have already mentioned in treating the "alienation of man" that the Capitalist system in its tendency to produce greater abstractions, "emphasizing the abstract quantitative element rather than concrete aspects of human suffering"⁽¹³⁾, is in its evolvement bound up with rationalism. Therefore, the Dionysiac element which was so widespread among the proletariat and lower middle classes after World War I can be seen not only as a reaction to rationalism but a reaction to laissez-faire Capitalism. In the same way, the crisis philosophy, existentialism, and mysticism which developed in Europe (e.g. Barth, Buber, Rosensweig, Maritain, et. al.) can be viewed as a reaction to the economic system. Accordingly, it is interesting to note that there was only a slight response to the anti-rationalistic tendency in the C.C.A.R., not even sufficient to prevent many Jews from seeking emotionalism in Christian⁽¹⁴⁾ Science and in Jewish Science.

(2) The uncertainty science of the twenties can be seen as an attack against rationalism. Perhaps, to some degree, criticisms of science on the part of many rabbis at this time reflect a desire on some level of Consciousness, to preserve the system, though to a greater degree their apprehensions about science can be understood as an attempt to preserve the integrity of organized religion to which they were committed. This might be the import of statements to the effect that "the synagogue is different from both science and philosophy by a religious genius".⁽¹⁵⁾ The fact that many rabbis looked with favor upon science is not necessarily refutation of the above suggestion, for one way to attack is to support and to reconcile and thus to render harmless.

We suggest that the new uncertainty may have symbolized the aspirations of the proletariat and that the heightened monotheism of the twenties was called into existence in some part, as a weapon with which to attack the new uncertainty. Though the stronger appeal to theism was an appeal to authority it was quite different from the plea for authority in the form of the new Aristotelianism in Germany and on the continent after World War I. In the former case, as we suggested above, the employer class may have invoked authority in an attempt to keep the proletariat under control; in the latter case, the appeal to authority by some rabbis in the form of a heightened theism (a Creator God, God of order, etc.) may have been called into existence to show the working man that he was not left to the fates.

It should not be overlooked, however, that this heightened God-concept was by no means universally approved in the Conference in the twenties. Indeed, that it should have been as widespread as it was in light of a decade described as "unpropitious to religion in general", is remarkable. A great many rabbis, began to assume the characteristics of the new middle class and for these rabbis the latent disillusionment of that decade was a real concern. To be sure for this group of rabbis (the budding nationalists) there was a diminution rather than an intensification of emphasis upon theism. It is against this latter group still in a minority by 1929 that Rabbi David Philipson berates in pleading for a strengthening of the God-concept: "Because a rabbi can crowd his temple by speaking on a play like 'The Strange Interlude' et hoc genus omne is this sufficient reason for such a departure". (i.e. for not preaching about God so much any more) "Is it our purpose," he continues "to follow the line of least resistance and swim along with a popular current or have we an ideal for our pulpits that shall point upward and beyond."⁽¹⁶⁾

To summarize: After World War One, the noun in "ethical monotheism" received greater emphasis than it had prior to the war. We have suggested as possible interests which may have been contributory in calling this change in existence to be (a) a desire for a mechanism to fight (1) the new social justice and (2) "Zionistic-nationalism," and (b) the desire to combat the climate of uncertainty. To the extent that such interests were operative the God-concept

of the rabbis in the twenties was a concept which is a rationalization. We have suggested further that middle class aspirations may have been a contributory interest in this matter.

II. THE HUMANIST HULLABALOO (OF THE EARLY THIRTIES)

That the theism of the twenties should be embraced still more passionately in the early thirties is not surprising in view of the many interests which were calling for such intensification. Among these we may mention (a) the challenge of humanism and (b) the threat of "nationalism" and (c) the challenge of Reconstructionism.

(a) Humanism did not appear with any degree of aggressiveness in the Conference until 1930. But when it did it made considerable noise in the Conference. That David Lefkowitz was correct in stating that the number of humanists in the Conference was "very insignificant in numbers" ⁽¹⁷⁾ is borne out by the fact that the humanists were unable to get even one out of five humanistically-oriented ⁽¹⁸⁾ services incorporated into the new prayer book. Moreover, from the following remark of Rabbi Barnett Brickner one sees that they met strong attack from the theists: "Why should these men who are attempting theological reform, be decried by some of you as if they were unworthy of the mantle and function of the Reform rabbi?" ⁽¹⁹⁾ Why should they be regarded as intruders in this Conference. A minority group of the humanists were apparently numerous enough to constitute

a threat which the theists would have to answer.⁽²⁰⁾

It has been suggested in an earlier chapter that the popularity of humanism during the early years of the depression, after making little headway in the twenties, can be explained by viewing Humanism as a saving mechanism for Capitalism in trouble.⁽²¹⁾ The depression brought with it overt disillusionment for the proletariat and considerable uneasiness for the lower middle class. President Hoover could maintain that the depression was merely "a passing phenomenon not inherent in the economic system, a kind of evil spirit that could be vanquished by legislation."⁽²²⁾ But the starving, disgruntled masses felt differently. President Hoover could give "good reasons" for optimism; yet the crowds were sunk deep in pessimism. Additional techniques were needed to maintain optimism; to speak in terms of aspirations into achievements on to new aspirations to fruition. The optimistic Professor Dewey could be seen behind the words which Rabbi Brickner spoke: "God is that Something that renders the individual and the world significant and worthwhile and which, when we relate ourselves to it, elicits from us the highest kind of thinking, the deepest kind of emotion, and leads us to the noblest kind of living."⁽²³⁾ Moreover when we do find a "sense of security, of well-being, and the increasing richness and worthwhileness of life",⁽²⁴⁾ then we have found God. Indeed, "God is the Ideal which strives to objectify itself in Reality, and Reality endeavors to perfect itself by reaching out toward the goal."⁽²⁵⁾ Constant

reaching, constant aspiring, constant achievement in realms of ideals and values -- this was the optimism of humanism. It was just such a message which the new philosophy of humanism, emphasized the good in life, the ideal, the ethical, brought. Nor was Professor Dewey the only source from which such optimism was forthcoming. Whitehead's philosophy, too, provided a base for new optimism. Such optimism is reflected in numerous statements by the humanists in the Conference, including its leader, Rabbi Barnett Brickner. "God is for me" Rabbi Brickner stated before the Conference in 1930, "The Spirit of Life, moving through order, to the fulfillment of some purpose; though as yet we may not know what that purpose is. God is not only the source from which we spring, but a goal toward which we move. In the light of the theory of creative evolution from consciousness (?) to consciousness, from instinct to reason, from chaos to order, full of comprehended possibilities, but fulfilling itself in the creatively evolutionary processes of the world."⁽²⁶⁾

Since we and the system are moving toward a goal, there is no need for pessimism. Moreover, the humanistic emphasis upon the "individual" served further to support a system based on individualism.

Why, however, we ask, if humanism was a mechanism of preserving the system, did a number of Reform rabbis who voted with the large majority against the system (e.g. Brickner) espouse an energetic humanism? To this question

one can answer that either (1) the rabbis in criticizing the system really sought to preserve the maximum of the system consistent with the new socio-economic conditions or that (2) though aggressive humanism may have been a saving mechanism for capitalism for many who sought to preserve the system, once having come into existence it could be used by some rabbis for some other interest. One may suggest that such an interest was a mounting pro nationalist tendency in the Conference, which, on whatever level of Consciousness, saw in humanism a means of attacking theism which was a thorn in the side of aspiring nationalists. "We are through with the sort of religion", Rabbi Brickner (a Zionistic-nationalist) asserted, "whose essential nature was miraculous and mysterious and that sought to explain the universe in terms of a supernatural person known as God."⁽²⁷⁾ Moreover, "morality becomes from this point of view, the heart of religion, and Goodness and God are almost identical."⁽²⁸⁾ Furthermore, statements such as the following by Rabbi Baron, clearly indicate instances where nationalism "works through" humanism to undercut theism.⁽²⁹⁾ Urging one humanistic service out of five in the Revised Union Prayer Book, Rabbi Baron affirms: "There are many rabbis, and I believe they articulate the opinion of a growing number of Jewish laymen, who cannot subscribe to some of the theological doctrines of the present prayer book."⁽³⁰⁾ However, it may not be primarily humanism that he seeks to champion but nationalism: "It is possible for Jews," he continues,

"to gather in worship in accordance with Jewish tradition without repeating constantly the praise of the Lord. It is possible to gather in worship and hold in the foreground the spiritual ideals and historical aspirations of the Jewish people rather than supplicate for favors." ⁽³¹⁾ State-ments such as these called for a theism strengthened and reinforced in its universalism, and in its prophetic dimensions. Such an intensified theism could be, on some level of Consciousness, a weapon with which the "anti-nationalists," their numerical majority slowly diminishing, could rebuff the nationalist philosophy. That not all nationalists espoused the humanistic philosophy is not a contradiction for numerous other interests may have lead many nationalists in other directions. The significant fact, however, is that a very large percentage of humanists in the Conference were pro-nationalists. (e.g. Brickner, Baron, etc.)

To summarize: Why did Humanism suddenly become aggressive in the Conference in 1930? Why did it not blast forth the message of More and Babbitt in the twenties? We have suggested two factors present in 1930 which were not present in the twenties: (a) The depression and need for a saving philosophy and (b) the increasing popularity of "Zionistic-nationalism". One must not, of course, in any of these matters, forget the autonomous aspect of the humanism concept. We have attempted to indicate merely that humanism was not a concept-which-is-an-ideal.

(b) That a greater appeal to theism was a technique of combatting "Zionistic-nationalism" which grew by leaps and bounds in the thirties can be seen by analyzing statements of "anti-nationalists" in the C. C. A. R. We observe such a heightening, for example, in the theism of Rabbi Bernard Heller (an anti-"Zionistic-nationalist"). Whereas in 1928, Rabbi Heller could say that "the nearness and the reality of God...is only an hypothesis",⁽³²⁾ but not true in the sense that H₂O is water. In 1930, he became more aggressive in his theism: "Judaism is a system of thought and life," he averred, "which is grounded in the belief in an Infinite, Eternal, but Personal God, who is the Supreme Source and Sanction of the ever expanding ethical and social ideals. He is beyond our reach and yet we intuitively feel that He is near us wherever and whenever we wish to turn to Him in Sincerity and Truth."⁽³³⁾ Moreover, addressing the Conference in 1933 he proclaimed: "The Jewish votaries were never inclined to what may be called spiritual solipsism. They were not Santayamists who would rhapsodize about an aesthetic and poetic but non-existent God. Nor were they Pragmatists who would affirm a proposition not because it was true but because it was useful."⁽³⁴⁾ Indeed, with the appearance of humanism and growing nationalistic sentiment in the Conference the God-concept of men like Heller became more certain. Nor was Heller by any means the only one. "To our fathers," asserted Morris Lazaron in 1932, "God was a reality. To us He is more or less a phrase. He must once more become

a reality to us...It is for us to find God again.

We may now suggest that the intensified theism of the thirties symbolized in some degree the aspirations of the established German middle-class, whereas, the aspirations of the rising East European element as represented in the C. C. A. R. were symbolized by "nationalism".

Seen in this light, the new platform as presented at Cape May in 1936 and approved the following year at Columbus, represents a compromise between theism and "nationalism"; between old German and new East European Reform. On the one hand, "the heart of Judaism...is the doctrine of the One, living God"; on the other hand, "we affirm the obligation of all Jury to aid in its upbuilding (i.e. Palestine) as a Jewish homeland by endeavoring to make it not only a haven of refuge for the oppressed but also a center of Jewish culture and spiritual life". The beginning of a fusion of theism and nationalism had been achieved.

(c) Reconstructionism embraced, in part at least, the nationalist aspirations of the rising East European middle class. However, its direct attack on theism having been questioned by too many potential adherents, it modified its tack, added the word "religious" to "civilization", and proceeded to attack the centrality of the Synagogue. This could be even more effective, for by challenging the role of the Synagogue, Reconstructionism attacked not only theism and hence the established German middle-class, but also social justice which could also be a "weapon" against nationalism. The intensification of theism in the early

thirties, can be viewed in part at least as a reaction to the threat of Reconstructionism. Defending the Stern Plan in 1932, Rabbi Morris Lazaron, for example, cried out against the separation of the secular and the profane in modern Jewish life.⁽³⁶⁾ Nor, it is interesting to note, was his attack merely against the Reconstructionists who were doing just that -- separating profane and secular. Humanism was equally to be attacked. It was indeed unfortunate that "the center of life had been shifted from God to man".⁽³⁷⁾ Bernard Heller presents a similar line of thought in his cutting criticism of Rabbis Mordecai Kaplan, Solomon Goldman,⁽³⁸⁾ and Herman Lissauer.

In all of these discussions, a crucial nuance can not be overly stressed. The fact that theism (also social justice) can be utilized by some rabbis, in some degree and on some level of Consciousness as weapons, is never to say that every theist (or every supporter of the current social justice) is motivated except in the depths of his unconsciousness by such interests. To assert more than this would be to assume a universal where only a particular has been proposed, e.g. from the fact that "some rabbis who heightened their theism did so to resist nationalism", it is incorrect to say that "all rabbis who heightened their theism did so to resist nationalism". We may, however, say with greater probability that some who heightened their theism did so for reasons other than to fight nationalism. Contributory proof of this would be the fact that some

nationalists (though not very many!) maintained a strong theistic position during the years of rising nationalist popularity. (e.g. Rabbis James Heller and Felix Levy.)
(39) (40)

To summarize: We have suggested that the vigorous theism of the early thirties may have been called into existence in part by the need (felt on whatever level of Consciousness) to answer (a) Humanism (b) Nationalism and (3) Reconstructionism. We shall note in the next chapter that strong though the theism of this group of rabbis may have been, it was not potent enough to counter-balance two forces which motivated an intensification of nationalism, namely, Anti-Semitism in this country and the persecutions of Jews in Europe.

III. THE LATE THIRTIES

Though the tide of humanism was pretty well restrained, the rise of nationalistic influence in the Conference could, by 1933, no longer be held down. Already in that year, the theists began to sense that they might not, for very long, continue to be in the majority. The mounting anxiety of the theists is reflected, for example, in a statement by Rabbi Samuel Goldenson: "There has developed in our midst the desire of establishing the Jews in Palestine. As time went on, we found that a certain group in Jewry, the group that has emphasized the religion of Israel and the God of Israel above everything else, has not been as warmly interested in the new movement.

As a result, the desire (among the nationalists) developed to redefine Judaism so as to dislodge those individuals (theists) who would not accept the new program on account of the religion of Israel⁽⁴¹⁾". A modus vivendi for the two groups was necessary, and at Cape Ann in 1936, as we have seen already⁽⁴²⁾, the nationalists and the theists arrived at a compromise position.

After the Columbus Platform, some who had hitherto been cool to nationalism set out on another tack. Granted that "Zion be restored far beyond the niggardly limits which, rumor hath it, Britain at present contemplates," Reform still has a "mission", a "purpose", of which the religionizing of Israel, is one phase. For inasmuch as Reform stands for the principle that God's purpose is to "give thee (Israel) for a light unto the nations that My Salvation may be unto the ends of the earth," and inasmuch as *שְׁמִי* ⁶ *יְהוָה* is contained within "the ends of the earth" Reform can justly include within its mission the bringing⁽⁴³⁾ of God to Zion.

To what extent was the concept of God in the C.C.A.R. during the two World Wars a concept which is a rationalization. Insofar as the concept for some rabbis, as we have seen changed, we know that it must have been a concept which is a rationalization. The fact, however, that many rabbis maintained a fairly consistent theistic position may be grounds for the belief that for many rabbis the concept of God was to a large degree, at least, autonomous of non-⁽⁴⁴⁾ rational interests.

CHAPTER V.

NATIONALISM

Early Reform in the United States persisted tenaciously in the emancipationist philosophy which grew out of the French resolution. Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo and the attendant age of romanticism which stressed difference rather than likeness was not decisive or immediate enough despite the insight of men like Moses Hess to stem the liberalistic and universalistic aspirations of a large segment of German Jewry. The incongruence between such aspirations and the prevailing mood of the times accounts for the failure of Reform to develop in Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Jews to the East, however, not having breathed the liberty, equality, fraternity, atmosphere of the closing years of the eighteenth century could be more consistent with the nationalistic temper of the age. This explains the tendency of a large segment of East European immigrants to the United States, with notable exceptions, toward nationalism. The fight between these two groups of Jews began after the programs of Czar Nicholas in 1881 compelled thousands of Russian born Jews to seek shelter in the United States and is reflected in the pronouncements of the Pittsburgh platform of 1885. National life in Palestine had merely been preparation for the mission. Moreover, the Reform rabbis asserted, "We consider ourselves no longer a nation, but a religious community, and therefore expect neither a return to Palestine nor a sacrificial worship under the sons of Aaron, nor the reconstruction of any of the laws concerning the Jewish State."⁽¹⁾ Moreover, "the Zionist Utopia," Rabbi Louis Grossman affirmed in 1918 in the spirit of the Pittsburgh Platform, "is not practicable nor founded on a true conception

of Judaism or the function of the Jewish people in the economy of the world." ⁽²⁾ Fifty-two years after the pronouncement of 1885, Rabbi David Philipson, one of the signers at Pittsburgh moved the passage of another Platform which represented a compromise between the two forces of American Jewry. "In the rehabilitation of Palestine, the new pronouncement read, "we behold the promise of renewed life for many of our brethren. We affirm the obligation of all Jewry to aid in its upbuilding as a Jewish homeland by endeavoring to make it not only a heaven of refuge for the oppressed but also a center of Jewish culture and spiritual life." ⁽³⁾ To be sure, this did not mean that there was unanimity concerning this middle ground. Suggestions of territorialism, a sustained social justice and theistic approach, and the beginnings in the early forties of the American Council for Judaism indicates that a minority still clung, as for dear life, to their "anti-nationalist" point of view. The fact remains, however, that the Platform of 1937 marked the end of the "anti-nationalist" majority in the Conference.

I. THE "CHARITABLE NATIONALISM" OF THE C. C. A. R.

AFTER WORLD WAR I.

We indicated in Chapter two that the intensification of "anti-nationalism" on the part of many rabbis during and after World War I was in reaction to rising nationalist sentiment in the Conference. We mentioned that the "anti-nationalism" manifested itself in a positive way in the new messianism and that criticism of this new messianism by Rabbis such as Felix Levy and Max Adler was in reality criticism of "anti-

nationalism" (and thereby evidence of pronationalistic sympathy). We have now to examine (a) the concept of nationalism which the rabbis were fighting. We shall then describe (b) the concept of nationalism which emerged among a majority of rabbis in the C. C. A. R. during the twenties. Finally, we shall attempt to suggest (c) possible interests which may have been contributory in calling the concept of nationalism as possessed by the majority of Reform rabbis in the twenties into existence.

(a) The concept of nationalism which the rabbis were combatting during the years of the heightened messianism included primarily two elements. These were (1) the notion that Palestine is of some special significance for all Jews, including in the extreme, of course, the concept of the physical return of all Jews to Palestine, and (2) the notion that Jews should form a separate group in the total community. The attack upon the former can be grasped from statements such as the following: "There is something tragic in the cry of so many leaders in Jewry: Back to Palestine. (4) Indeed, "The Zionist Utopia is not practicable (i.e. all the Jews cannot fit into Palestine) nor founded on a true conception of the Jewish people in the economy of the world." (5) Attacks on the latter can be seen from the statements such as the following: "Think of the sad irony of it all, that we who brought to the world the universal and messianic ideals should seek to take out of this horrible world catastrophe nothing for ourselves than a promise that our racial sep-

arateness shall be assured and established." ⁽⁶⁾ Moreover, sharp criticism of East-European Jewry may also indicate that nationalism which the Reformers feared involved ghettoization. "Zionism as a political and nationalistic theory," Dr. Morgenstern made known, "is a purely imported, European product" ⁽⁷⁾ (i. e. imported from countries where Jews were not integrated into the general society, where they were different). However, that many Reform rabbis went further and in attacking nationalism were attacking as well the notion that Judaism includes anything more than a religion can be discerned from statements such as that made by Rabbi Samuel Schulman at the U. A. H. C. Convention in 1919: "We must, therefore, act accordingly to the facts, which is according to the truth. Let then the U. A. H. C. tell the world once more that Israel is a church, a religious communion and is entitled to be recognized as part and parcel of any nation or state in whose midst it dwells". ⁽⁸⁾ It should be noted that the nationalism which the majority of Reform rabbis opposed in 1918 was as yet predominantly a threat from the outside, that is from the "Zionistic-nationalists" in Conservative, Orthodox, and secular circles. We may mention in passing, moreover, an extremely revealing statement by the president of the Conference in 1922 which indicates succinctly why Zionism was opposed: "It is therefore, not only a mistake, it is a tragedy for Jews to seek for recognition of Judaism as a political or nationalistic entity. It posits a false interpretation of our faith and our mission. It is cutting the ⁽⁹⁾ ground from under our feet here in America." (Italics mine).

(b) In 1913 the Conference approved the recommendation of the Committee on the President's Message which asserted that "we naturally favor the facilitation of immigration to Palestine of Jews who, either because of economic necessity or political or religious persecution desire to settle there." (10) This marked the beginning of "charitable nationalism," which was to grow in strength in the Conference during the twenties, i. e. the attitude that though we ourselves do not want to go to Palestine (and though we reject group separatism in America) we view with favor the settlement of downtrodden Jews there. However, issue was taken with the phrase in the Balfour Declaration: "Palestine is to be a national home for the Jewish people," on the grounds that "we are opposed to the idea that Palestine should be considered the homeland of the Jews in America are part of the American nation." (11) The rabbis were not chancing a careless confusion between "a" and "the". Moreover, not only was Palestine not to be considered the homeland of the Jews, but not even was it to be considered a homeland for all Jews, i.e. a place to which all Jews, if they wanted, even Jews living in America, could go if they so desired. The point to be observed here, then, is that with respect to Palestine the incipient nationalism (included above within the category of anti-nationalism) among the majority in the Conference in 1913 had applicability with respect to Jews less fortunate than the Jews in America--Jews in need of "charity". We must mention, moreover, that the concept of charitable nationalism which continued to develop in the

Conference in the twenties was nurtured by the unfolding of the concept that Jews are Jews by virtue of something more than religion alone. "That we constitute a separate group in the world," Dr. Bettan avowed in 1926, "only the captious spirit of narrow partianship will deny. We are more than a religious sect, more than a denominational church"⁽¹²⁾. Moreover, a more committed nationalist pleaded in tones reminiscent of Halevi: "Our peculiarity emanates not so much from our religion as many would have it, but our religion springs from our peculiarness as a people"⁽¹³⁾. Though ghettoization was ever to be deplored it was increasingly more apparent that there is a band between Jews which transcends religion and which makes it incumbent upon all Jews, by virtue of this, relationship, to be charitable to all other Jews.

That the rabbis thus motivated increasingly supported the program to develop Palestine can be discerned from the following facts: In 1920, they referred to the San Remo Conference as "an event which must stir the imagination of all Jews." The same year, they endeavored to arrive at some practical expedient of cooperating with the Zionist Organization toward the rebuilding of Palestine". However, this effort was spurned by the Z. O. A. "Almost a year ago", Rabbi Leo Franklin stated before the Conference in 1921, "the Executive Board instruct its president to write a letter to the Z. O. A., and in that letter, to offer the cooperation of the Conference for work of reconstruction in Palestine. Receipt of this letter was acknowledged to the President of the Conference. It simply read: 'I beg to

acknowledge receipt of your letter addressed to the Z. O. A.' "(14)
Nevertheless, during the following two years increasing interest was aroused in a non-partisan organization which would have as its object the function of "forming the Council of the Jewish Agency as adopted by the World Zionist Organization, and in keeping with Article IV of the Palestine Mandate of The League of Nations". (15) In 1928 the creation of the Jewish Agency became a reality indicating thereby "the readiness of many non-Zionists and even of anti-Zionists to cooperate in the economic and cultural rehabilitation of the land so closely connected (16) with Jewish tradition and sentiment.

To summarize: After the first World War and during the twenties the concept of nationalism among the majority in the Conference denoted the willingness to be charitable in helping downtrodden Jews in other countries find a heaven in Palestine. This charity sprang not only from the feeling of religious kinship but from a feeling of relatedness which transcended religion. In addition to "charitable nationalism", however, there was also in the Conference another concept held by a minority which has been referred to in a previous chapter as "lurking nationalism" and which we shall treat in a subsequent section.

(c) We may suggest the following interests as possibly contributory in calling charitable nationalism into existence.

(1) Security, (2) Genuine concern for the persecuted.

(1) By 1918 the number of East-European Jews in the United States far exceeded the number of German Jews in this country. Two additional factors gave the latter cause for

anxiety: a. the steady integration of the East-European Jew into the socio-economic structure, his progressive ascent on the ladder of middle-class prosperity, and: b. the continuous immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe. These phenomena were of concern in that they pointed to the eventual usurption by the new group of the dominant power position in American Jewry a position long possessed by the German Jews. Therefore, we suggest that the attempt to cooperate with the Z. O. A., the attempt to establish a non-partisan agency, etc., that is the emergence of "charitable nationalism", was, in part at least, the result of a desire, on whatever level of Consciousness, (on the part of a large number of Reform rabbis representing the interest of the German-Jewish bourgeoisie) to continue in a leadership role in American Jewish life (by taking over from the inside).

Moreover, the security of the old bourgeoisie was threatened on another level. The persecutions of the Jews abroad during the war and the failure of the Jews to secure citizenship rights in many lands after the War created a situation which a number of rabbis may have thought, would arouse the humanitarian consciousness of the world (even though the "world" was unable materially to do anything to alleviate the situation. "Mah yomeru hagoyim?" Furthermore, the end of the frontier, the shrinking of new world markets, in short, a contracting Capitalism coupled with more organization, more power among the proletariat meant

that should too many more immigrants be admitted to this country the danger of labor would be substantially increased. ⁽¹⁷⁾ Therefore, Reform, though it may have desired to take a stand was prevented from doing so by virtue of the real or imaginary mah yomeru hagoyim. And on the other hand they were no longer able to say "Come to America, ye weary, ye tired people". We suggest that the interest of resolving this dilemma may have been contributory in the genesis of "charitable nationalism."

(2) In all this we do not deny the role of genuine concern for the downtrodden. The extent to which "charitable nationalism" was autonomus, however, is further limited by the fact that Reform did not espouse this concept in the 1890's and 1900's, in the times of the Kishinev pogroms, for example.

II. "ZIONISTIC NATIONALISM BEFORE 1930"

We mentioned above that in addition to "charitable nationalism" another concept of nationalism existed though among a smaller number of Reform rabbis even before 1930. We shall attempt first to show (a) that this is so and (b) to suggest interests which may have been contributory in calling "Zionistic nationalism" into existance. That even in 1913 some rabbis in the conference favored a "stronger"nationalistic position is seen for example from a statement made by a vowed Anti-Zionist, Rabbi Fox: "Last year the Zionists tried to force down the throats of the Conference a Zionist declaration". Moreover, a minority of rabbis in the C. C. A. R. favored the Balfour Declaration in toto even though the in-

interpretation given by the Zionists that Palestine is the national homeland of the Jew, was the prevalent circulated one. Rabbi Leibert, for example, asserted in a harangue against old German interests. "The Jewish world looks with suspicion upon the reputation of (Reform) Judaism as the ambassador of wealth and vested interests. What is the objection to Zionism? It is that these vested interests will lose their opportunity of amassing wealth. It is not on account of religious interests but because they would lose their fleshpots, their material luxuries, their club-houses and pleasures. There is a spiritual question involved in Zionism and if we go on record as opposed to the Balfour Declaration we place a sword in the hands of our enemies. (18) We see, then, that "Zionistic nationalism" (i. e. nationalism which views Palestine as having some special, binding claim on even Jews in America) was operative in the C. C. A. R. even in 1918. It was this latter concept is found lurking in the Conference., that the anti-nationalist berated.

Furthermore, the fact that in 1920 "Zionistic Nationalism" was lurking in the Conference can be discerned from the presidents message which supported "charitable nationalism" as described above. A minority report was submitted, signed by Rabbis Max Heller and Horace J. Wolf, favoring a stronger nationalism, one that involved, as stated in The San Remo Conference, a "publicly secured, legally (19) safeguarded home for the Jewish people in Palestine", and one which represented the interests of "theistic nationalism".

Dr. Samuel Cohon, a supporter of the former point of view berated the "radicals" as follows: "What more can the Conference do? Surely the signer of the minority report does not want the Conference to become a branch of the American Federation of Zionists?"⁽²⁰⁾ The pronouncements and pleadings of Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver likewise ring of "theistic nationalism" rather than of "charitable nationalism". Palestine is necessary as a Jewish homeland in order to preserve Jewish identity which is necessary for the fulfillment of God's mission: "The strength of liberal Judaism has been its adherence to the mission ideal. Its weakness lies in the fact that it has labored under an anti-nationalistic, anti-nomistic incantation which is fundamentally foreign to prophetic and Pharisaic Judaism. The ideal of the mission of Israel is unextricably intertwined with the ideal of the people of Israel"⁽²¹⁾ Indeed, this essentially was the position of Rabbi Felix Levy who later, in 1935, became the first pro-Zionist President of the Conference. "It is well enough to cry Spirit," said he, "but Spirit⁽²²⁾ vanishes into ether, if it has not a substantial residence". "The Jew is the dynamo that supplies spiritual energy to all... All of us find our kinship in the fact that we are preempted in the service of God. We are different from all other people in that we form a spiritual group, but a group we must remain."

To summarize: We have cited evidence that "Zionistic-nationalism" was a concept of nationalism possessed by a minority in the Conference in the past World War One period,

which viewed "charitable nationalism" as inadequate and which saw Palestine as necessary for the preservation of Judaism. It was attacked repeatedly by the charitable nationalists but was unabated (except perhaps for a brief time after a diminution of Anti-Semitism in 1922.)

We may now suggest the following interests as possibly contributory to calling "Zionistic nationalism" into existence in the Conference after World War One:

(a) The increasing new middle-class character of a large segment of the Conference, (b) Anti-Semitism, (c) the need for a new ideal.

(a) By the twenties, as we saw previously, more than fifty percent of the H.U.C. student body was of East European extraction, however, by this time the Conference was manifesting characteristics of the new middle-class.

The criticism of the old-line German Reform by Rabbi Liebert, quoted above, is an illustration of the new overtones in the Conference. Moreover, inasmuch as "Zionistic nationalism" may have symbolized the aspirations of the new middle-class, we submit that class interest may have been contributory to calling "Zionistic nationalism" into existence among a minority of rabbis in the C.C.A.R. after the first World War and throughout the twenties.

(b) The vituperative Anti-Semitic campaigns of Henry Ford and of the K.K.K. to divert the antagonism of groups who suffered in the early post-war years away from the bourgeoisie, could be seen by the new middle-class which

was not so dependent on the system, in slightly clearer terms than the established German Reformers were able to see this phenomenon. The latter, attempted to explain away the phenomenon as a product not indigineous to America, one which could not long exist in America. "The Fordian billions of hatred and falsehood", Rabbi Cabish "reasoned" in 1922, "broke against the splendid break-water of the American sense of justice and fair play. The Dearborn Independent ceased its campaign of mendacious and malicious vituperations. It was indeed fortunate for the old-line Reformers that the Anti-Semitism abated and made the above interpretation plausible. (24) However, the new middle classes were able to interpret Anti-Semitism in a light wherein its development, even to extremes, was not at all impossible even in this country. (25) (26)

(c) The new middle-class element was closer to the vieled disillusionment of the twenties; it was close also to people who could sense somewhat more realistically, the fact that the economic order was hardly Utopian. Theism, or at least theism by itself, was not a potent enough ideal, nor was social justice a strong enough ideal, to capture the spirit. Therefore, we suggest that the desire/"x" for a new ideal may also have been contributory to calling "Zionistic-nationalism" into existence among a minority of Reform rabbis in the Conference from the time of World War One and through the twenties.

To summarize: We have suggested three following interests which may have been contributory to the existence among a minority of rabbis in the C.C.A.R. (1917-1929) of a concept of "Zionistic-nationalism". We may note that it was this type of nationalism which was referred to in the preceeding chapter as the object of theistic and social justice attack.⁽²⁷⁾ That this type of nationalism, i.e. "Zionistic-nationalism", was decidedly a small minority moreover accounts for the fact that there wasn't a need for a "merger of theistic and social justice forces" before the depression. This helps to account for the fact that "new social justice" measures passed in the Conference continually by a scant majority. After the depression, we stated, social justice and theism did merge and we suggested that the "coalition" was an attempt to counteract a heightening of "Zionistic-nationalism".

At this point we must introduce a distinction between two types of "Zionistic-nationalism", (1) that which viewed the preservation of the Jewish people as a sine que non condition of the fulfillment of the mission, (i.e. the carrying out of the will of God) and which viewed Palestine as a vehicle to assure the continuity of the mission. Rabbis Felix Levy and Abba Hillel Silver, espoused this type of "Zionistic-nationalism" a nationalism which was rooted in theism, and (2) that which viewed the preservation of the Jewish people more as a goal in itself. Rabbi Barnett Brickner embraced this type of "Zionistic-nationalism". It would be

incorrect, however, to maintain that the Zionist-nationalism of Silver was not in part, at least, motivated by the interest of preservation of the Jews (i.e. in terms of the Jewish problem) nor that the motivation of Brickner had no goal except self-preservation. However, the difference is more one of emphasis and degree, rather than one of kind.

Let us for purposes of clarity, introduce a distinction in names. Let us call the former type of Zionistic-nationalism, theistic-nationalism, and the latter type of Zionistic-nationalism, non-theistic (to secular) nationalism.⁽²⁸⁾ When we assert that "Zionistic-nationalism" was gaining momentum in the Conference in the thirties, we refer primarily to the increase in interest in non-theistic-nationalism, which was practically non-existent in the Conference before 1930. This is not to say, however, that the "theistic-nationalism" in the Conference was not finding new adherence as well. The fact that both types of Zionistic - nationalism viewed Palestine with personal involvement and religious fervor as 'insiders' and not as charity givers from the 'outside', gave the adherents of both groups a common ground which the charitable nationalists feared. In this light, as we shall note more fully in awhile, the compromise of the middle thirties can be seen on some level of Consciousness as a compromise between the charitable nationalists and the theistic-nationalists, whom they feared in coalition with the non-theistic-nationalists.

III. NATIONALISM OF THE THIRTIES

That Zionist nationalsim was heightened in the Conference in the thirties can be seen from statements such as the following: ⁽²⁹⁾ "When modern Zionism was born," asserted Rabbi Brickner in 1931, the leaders of Reform were still hopeful of the messianic effects of political emancipation for the Jew. Although I do not despair of the beneficent effects of policial emancipation, yet the spectacle of how our people are being treated in Germany should by itself alone, be sufficient to indicate the inadequacy of political emancipation to solve the Jewish ⁽³⁰⁾ problem." In other words nationalism is necessary for the very existence of Jews. (This is the non-theistic self-preservationistic "Zionistic nationalism" mentioned above.) "The early Reformers feared Zionism because they said that a homeland in Palestine would unhome us everywhere; yet now without a homeland, the Jews of the world are unhomed nearly everywhere, and even in our own country we are being forced in an unusual way perhaps because of economic conditions to come to grips with economic and social anti-⁽³¹⁾semitism." Even when Jews prosper in America "we delude ourselves that this apparent stability of American Jewish life is permanent, that there are no dangers here." ⁽³²⁾ Such analysis was dangerous to the established German Reform interests. It was imperative, therefore, for the charitable nationalists to combat this type of nationalism.

That the theistic Zionists were likewise gaining momentum should not be minimized. "The peoplehood of Israel",

urged Rabbi Abraham Feldman, is "essential to the preservation and manifestation of the religion of Israel." (33) Faith and people should be the appeal rather than faith versus people.

Of course, as mentioned above, the two aspects of Zionistic-nationalism were not completely divorced by the rabbis and the preservationist emphasis can be seen as Rabbi Feldman continues: "Apart, neither the one nor the other will survive." (34) However, "salvation, I am convinced, will come

from ... the religious nationalists who believe in the synthesis and unity of people and faith, of God and Israel." (35)

The fact that the theistic Zionists and the theistic non-Zionists had theism in common did not prevent tension and antagonism between the two groups. Just as the non-theistic nationalists did, so the theistic nationalists criticized the nationalists. "It is not enough", Rabbi Wohl proclaimed, "that some rabbis help in financial campaigns, it is not enough that some rabbis participate in the leadership of the Zionist movement or the Jewish agency. Judaism and Eretz Yisroel are not to be placed in separate compartments." (36)

The Pittsburgh Platform with its insistence that Israel is a religious community solely and which renounces any future hope for the building of Palestine is outdated and must be changed. "Much has happened, much has transpired and changed in Jewish life and thought in these forty-nine years. A new statement, a new declaration of principles is imperative, a declaration that will recognize and re-assert the spiritual and ethnic gemeinschaft of Israel and take sympathetic cognizance of the spiritual and cultural

values inherent in that phenomenal development." ⁽³⁷⁾ Even a former charitable nationalist asserted that: "The universal and national are both parts -- equal parts of our inheritance." ⁽³⁸⁾ The Zionistic nationalists pushed and the charitable nationalists grew increasingly fearful. In fact, in 1934, an amendment to table a motion that a Zionistic service be included in the Union Prayer Book was defeated by a vote of only 45 to 43. The charitable nationalist majority had been whittled away to practically nothing. This was a contributory cause leading to the compromise at Cape Ann in 1936 between the charitable nationalists and the theistic nationalists.

~~Before~~ Before suggesting interests which may have been contributory to the heightening of Zionistic nationalism in the Conference after 1929, we might mention in passing that charitable nationalism continued in the Conference unabated though its numerical majority was sharply reduced. ⁽³⁹⁾ Indeed, after 1929 there was somewhat of an intensification even of charitable nationalism. "I, therefore, recommend "Rabbi David Lefkowitz stated in 1931, "that we place ourselves on record as in hearty accord with the call upon American Israel for the needs of Palestinian Jewry and for the succor of our East-European brethren." ⁽⁴⁰⁾ "The future of Jewry in Germany seems hopeless, Rabbi Morris Newfield asserted in 1933, "Palestine alone seems to offer possibilities for settlement of a comparatively large number. The Jewish Agency is taking steps to make such a mass settlement possible. Irrespective of our views on Zionism, American

(41)
Jewry will respond." Dr. Samuel Cohon, too, persisted in this view of charitable nationalism. In 1935, he asserted: "When the Pittsburgh Platform declared that we are no longer a nation, it referred to a political entity which seeks to segregate itself from all others and establish itself in Palestine. That position has not changed for us. Our place in America and in other countries where emancipation is a reality is not as a national minority but as a religious community." (42) It is somewhat ironical that though both charitable nationalists (representing the established German interests) and non-theistic secular nationalists (representing the new middle class interests) concerned themselves primarily with the Jewish problem, that is with the problem of the preservation of the Jews, they nevertheless represented in the Conference polar (43) opposites.

What factors may have been contributory in calling a heightened nationalistic Zionism into existence in the Conference after 1929? We suggest (a) the intensification of anti-Semitism in the United States after the depression began and the persecutions of the Jews in Europe, especially after Hitler's ascent to power in 1933, (b) the further appropriation by many rabbis of characteristics of the new middle class, (c) the provision of a vehicle through which some Reform rabbis could attain leadership roles unopen to them within the limits of "charitable nationalism".

(a) The anti-Semitism directed against Jews after the beginning of the depression in 1929, served during the

Hoover administration, in part at least, as a mechanism to direct the antagonism of the disgruntled working population and suffering lower middle class away from the privileged class. With the advent of Roosevelt and the New Deal even some of the bigger businesses suffered and this added even further to the anti-Semitism. The rise of Pelley and his Silver Shirts to prominence during the first years of the New Deal may indicate this. The lower middle class-directed Coughlinism which persisted until the war-preparedness program was begun in 1938 and then some, made the American Jew increasingly less secure. Now, even the one land -- America -- which two decades previously had been proclaimed as one in which anti-Semitism could not long survive, could no longer be depended upon as an eternal haven, a secure dwelling place. 1933 marked the breaking point, for not only did Pellian anti-Semitism heighten the uncertainty of the American Jew (even threatening the security of the established German element though it would not admit the fact) but the advent of Hitler meant more dreadful persecutions of Jews in Europe. The physical preservation of the American Jew was no longer secure even in America. (44) We suggest, therefore, that after the beginning of the depression, anti-Semitism in the United States plus atrocities in Europe led to a vigorous Zionist nationalism in the Conference. This intensification caused even the economically secure German middle class to feel their security challenged; if not economically, then by Zionist nationalism which, should it become the

prevailing view among the Gentiles would lead to their eventual undoing in this country. Therefore, charitable nationalists began to increase their support of social justice in the hope that the ideals of theism and social justice combined would capture the spirits of enough potential Zionist nationalists and divert their energies into "safer channels". That this may have been so is evinced by the fact that by 1932 (before the New Deal) many rabbis representing the interests of the old middle class, who only three or four years previously had viewed the new social justice, which attacked only the employer class, with considerable misgivings, suddenly began to embrace the social justice of the early thirties, which attacked the system as well. Whereas, in the twenties "new social justice" measures often passed by a scant majority, the sharpest attack on the system, the most left-wing proposal ever uttered on the floor of the Conference (1934) passed by a 59 to 16 majority. To be sure, the fact that the depression effected the immediate security of the rabbis would be expected to exert a leftist influence on many of them. However, even in 1934, the number of rabbis who were actually suffering severe economic hardships was very few due to the fact that despite the New Deal the upper middle class managed to keep economically secure. Moreover, it is open to question whether either their deprivations or the hardships of the poorer element in Reform, whose interests they were serving, are adequate to account for such a radical change in their attitude toward social justice.

Before 1933, the rabbis who served, on whatever level of Consciousness, the interests of the old German middle class, "thought" theism plus social justice adequate to withstand both theistic nationalism and non-theistic (to secular nationalism). After 1933, however, insecurity became so great, especially among the new middle class element in the Conference that "theism combined with social justice" alone was inadequate to restrain the breakwaters. The preservationistic strain in the non-theistic (to secular) nationalists skyrocketed with the Hitlerian persecutions and with mounting anti-Semitism in this country, with the result that the charitable nationalists made an alliance by 1936 with the theistic nationalists against the non-theistic nationalists (though, of course, many on each side persisted in his former position). Significant in this matter is the fact that 1935, Rabbi Felix Levy, leader par excellence of the theistic nationalists, was elected president of the Conference.

(b) Reference has been made before this to the fact that already by the twenties a majority of the students at the Hebrew Union College were from East-European backgrounds. In addition, by 1931, fifty percent of the Reform laity was (45) non-German. We suggest, therefore, that by the thirties an increasingly larger segment of the rabbis in the Conference reflected the characteristics of the new middle class. This class because of (1) its relatively recent-found dependence upon the system, (2) its suffering during the depression, (3) its tradition of separatism, espoused

Zionistic nationalism (of either sort) which may have , on some level of Consciousness symbolized middle class aspirations, that is, the desire to assume a leadership role in the American Jewish community.

In passing, we may note that the prospect of new markets in Palestine, especially after the depression, by men like Warburg and Marshall, contributed primarily to "charitable nationalism " though actually the nationalism of these men may belong in a category of its own. However , as these men were laymen, their views are beyond the scope of the present study.

(c) A number of Reform rabbis assumed roles of leadership in organizations with a philosophy of Zionistic nationalism. That they did so, in fact, because of a genuine commitment to the concept of Zionistic nationalism may well be the case. However, that Zionistic nationalism may have served other interests, for example, a desire on whatever level of Consciousness for leadership roles can be seen from the fact that men like Rabbi Wohl, a leader in the Labor Zionist movement, Zionism was only a second best ideal. "It has been our misfortune" Rabbi Wohl stated in 1937 (even after the Columbus Platform had been approved) that with the exception of Zionism which produced the legions of Halutzim, there has been no movement that would rouse our youth towards a great purpose and a great goal."⁽⁴⁶⁾ We may suggest that such leadership aspirations were not only on the individualistic

level but that the desire of Reform (as an institution) to take over from the "inside" and preserve its leadership position in the American Jewish Community may also, strange to say, have been operative in calling a heightened Zionistic nationalism into existence in the Conference in the thirties.

To summarize: We have suggested as factors contributory to the heightened Zionistic nationalism of the thirties in the C.C.A.R.: (a) increasing anti-Semitism in the United States and persecutions of Jews in Europe, and (b) the mounting new middle class character of the Conference. We submitted, further, (1) that after World War I theistic anti-nationalism (same as charitable nationalism) was sufficiently strong to attack both the theistic nationalism of Rabbis like Felix Levy and Abba Hillel Silver and the new social justice, and (2) that after the depression began and during the Hoover administration, while anti-Semitism though increased was not yet running amuck in the United States and before Hitler had greatly intensified persecutions of European Jews, many theistic anti-nationalists (charitable nationalists) embraced the new "new social justice" as an additional weapon against the Zionistic nationalists. After 1933, however, the charitable nationalists grew increasingly less secure as many rabbis came to champion Zionistic nationalism. Therefore, the theistic non-Zionists who had espoused social justice, now, on some level of Consciousness, attempted a league with the theists among the

nationalistic Zionists in order to offset the more to-be-feared non-theistic nationalists who by 1935 had reached the point reflected in the following quote:

"It is ridiculous to think of a people scattered all over the world, influencing the thought of the world, but with a place where we can be free, live, and express the spiritual and creative forces of our nature, we strengthen our lives wherever we may be."⁽⁴⁷⁾ This alliance manifested itself firstly, in the form of the Neutrality Resolution⁽⁴⁸⁾ passed by the Conference in 1935, and, subsequently, the Columbus Platform, proposed at Cape Ann in 1936 and passed, with revision the following year at Columbus; and, it may have been symbolized in the fact that Rabbi David Philipson (established German interests) moved the acceptance of the platform while Rabbi Felix Levy, a theistic Zionist, sat in the President's Chair!

The compromise at Columbus, however, was by no means unanimously accepted. Some wished to see an even stronger nationalist position endorsed by the Conference. Others, representing the interests of the early (German) middle class persisted in theism alone. That both extremist groups were small can be seen from the facts that (a) Humanism and Reconstructionism, the philosophies of non-theistic Zionists had comparatively few staunch adherents in the Conference by the end of the thirties, and (b) Territorialism, logically the last resort of the anti-nationalists found little support in the Conference. Nor, did the American Council for Judaism with its emphasis on theism completely divorced from any type of nationalism

make more than a slight inroad into the Conference with its inception in 1942. However, the "theistic-social justice" stress as espoused by men such as Rabbis Isserman and Eisendrath in the name of "ethical monotheism", still maintained some degree of popularity in the Conference after 1937.

That all three concepts of nationalism were, in part at least, concepts which are rationalizations can be seen from the following facts: (a) charitable nationalism came into existence only after certain events which we have cited took place. If it was a concept which is an ideal, why did the rabbis in the 1880's, 1890's and early 1900's not espouse this concept? (b) Theistic nationalism was embraced by many rabbis only after the breakdown of the new messianism, the rise of anti-Semitism, and the brutality of Hitler, (and not in the 1880's, 1890's or early 1900's with notable exceptions). (c) Non-theistic nationalism was admittedly motivated by the interest of self-preservation. That the concepts, however, were not entirely concepts which were rationalizations, is not denied. The only thing which is questioned is the assertion wherever made or the thought wherever held that a particular concept of nationalism as espoused by a particular group of rabbis was entirely a concept which is an ideal. This is true also of the concepts of social justice and of God, held by the rabbis between the two World Wars as has already been seen.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

- (1). The writer does not begin with the assumption that the rational is definitely a product of the non-rational. However, inasmuch as he has been looking out for signs in the "rational" which might indicate non-rational influence his mind has been suggestible. C.f. Handbook of Social Psychology, vol.1, p 28 f.
- (2). Freud, Sigmund, The Interpretation of Dreams, in The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, ed. Brill, A.A., The Modern Library, New York, 1938, pp. 319ff.
- (3). Leibnitz, in an analysis which anticipates Freud by two centuries, makes a brilliant plea for monism which is of significance for our study. Perceptions (the counterpart of Whitehead's non-cognitive prehensions) pass imperceptibly through gradations into apperceptions (i.e. conscious perceptions). During sleep, monads which have been apperceptive, i.e. clear enough to be conscious, have passes through degrees into a more confused stage wherein they perceive less clearly. Waking is accounted for on the basis of monads becoming clearer. i.e. passing again into consciousness. The significant implication of Leibnitz positions for our study is that even on the lowest levels of subconscientness "perceptions" take place; that Conscious activity (referring to any level of consciousness or subconscientness) takes place even on the level of the non-rational.
- (4). Robinson, James Harvey, The Mind in the Making, Harper and Bros., New York, 1921 p.41.
- (5). Ibid. p.44
- (6). Ibid.
- (7). Ibid.
- (8). Ibid. p.56
- (9). Ibid. p.42
- (10). Ibid.
- (11). Beard, Charles A., An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, Macmillan Co. New York, 1913 p.17.
- (12). Ibid.

- (13). Ibid.
- (14). Ibid.
- (15). Lerner, Max, Ideas Are Weapons, The Viking Press, New York, 1939 p.161.
- (16). Ibid.
- (17). Ibid.,
- (18). Ibid. p.135ff.
- (19). Ibid. p.341ff.
- (20). Ibid.
- (21). Allport, Gordon, "The Historical Beginnings of Modern Social Psychology", in The Handbook of Social Psychology, Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, 1954, vol. 1, p.17.
- (22). Lerner, Max, Op. cit., p.162.
- (23). Berkowitz, Henry J., "Conference Sermon," in Central Conference of American Rabbis Yearbook, vol.1940 p.240.
- (24). Goldenson, Samuel, "President's Message", in C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLV, 1935, p.143
- (25). Heller, James, "President's Message", in C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.LII. 1942, p. 226.
- (26). Isserman, Ferdinand, "Scared Scapegoat or Suffering Servant," C.C.A.R. Yearbook vol.L, 1940, p.224.
- (27). Eisendrath, Maurice, "Retreater Advance," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLVII, 1937, p.222 f.
- (28). Gordon Allport's concept of functional autonomy is of significance in this matter. Cf. Gardener Murphy, "Social Motivations", in The Handbook of Social Psychology, Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, 1954, vol. 2, p. 604.
- (29). Allport, Gordon, op. cit., p. 27.
- (30). Ibid.
- (31). Ibid. p.12.
- (32). Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society, Rhinehard and Co., Inc. New York, 1955 p. 102
- (33). Allport, Gordon, Op.cit. p.9.
- (34). Beard, Charles, Op.cit. p.18.

- (35). It has been the attempt of the writer to stay away from value judgements in this study. Realization is intended as a descriptive term, not an evaluated term.
- (36). (a) "Faulty analysis" within this definition is meaningful only insofar as a concept is a concept-which-is-a-rationalization. Indeed, all concepts, which are rationalizations involve "faulty analysis". (b). The danger of imputing motive, is of course, a great one, especially when we are not always conscious of the complexity of our own motives. Any attribution of motive in this study, therefore, even where someone may admit that x,y, and z are his motives, are suggested and not offered with the thought of finality.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 2

- (1). Niebuhr, Rhinehold, The Irony of American History, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1952, p.70.
- (2). Ibid.
- (3). Beard, Charles and Mary, The Rise of American Civilization, Macmillan, New York, 1940 vol. 2, p.766.
- (4). Ibid. p.705.
- (5). Cf. Simon, Abram, "The Spiritual Challenge of the Age", in C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXVIII, 1918, pp.188-210.
- (6). Calish, Edward W., "Wise as American", in C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXIX, 1919, p.210.
- (7). Grossman, Louis, "President's Message", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXVIII, 1918, p.159.
- (8). Bernheim, Isaac. W., Letter to C.C.A.R. , in C.C.A.R. Yearbook, ibid. p.143.
- (9). Grossman, Louis, op. cit., p.161.
- (10). Simon, Abram, op. cit., p.197.
- (11). Enelow, H. G., "The Position of Reform Judaism in America", Hebrew Union College Monthly, March 1918, p.195.
- (12). Philipson, David, "Israel the International People," 43re Annual Report of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Blatimore, Jan. 1917, pp. 8098f.
- (13). Franklin, Leo, "President's Message", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXX, 1920, p.163.
- (14). Allen, Frederick, Only Yesterday, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1931, p.28.
- (15). Ibid. p.108.
- (16). Ibid.
- (17). Murphy, Gardner, op cit. p.602.
- (18). Fromm, Erich, op cit., p.104f.
- (19). Ibid. p.105
- (20). Ibid.

II..

- (21). Ibid. p.120f.
- (22). Riesman, David, The Lonely Crowd, Doubleday and Co. Inc.
New York, 1953, pp.34ff.
- (23). Allen, Frederick, op cit, p. 231.
- (24). Ibid.
- (25). Ibid., p.76f.
- (26). Ibid., p.81.
- (27). Ibid., p.79.
- (28). Ibid., p.120.
- (29). Ibid., p.48.
- (30). Schulman, Samuel, "The Jew and the New Life", 45th
Annual Report of the U.A.H.C., May 1919, p.8472f.
- (31). Grossman, Louis, op. cit. p.172.
- (32). Olan, Levi, Reform Judaism, Essays by Hebrew Union
College Alumni, H.U.C.. Press, Cincinnati, 1949, p.40f.
- (33). Allen, Frederick, op. cit., p.160f.
- (34). Beard, Charles and Mary, America in Midpassage,
Macmillan, New York, 1939, vol.1, p.142.
- (35). Bernstein, Philip, "Toward a Program for American
Judaism," in G.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLVIII, 1938, p.280.
- (36). Niebuhr, Reinhold, op. cit., p.146.
- (37). Bernstein, Philip, Ibid.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 3

- (1) Philipson, David, The Reform Movement in Judaism. Macmillan, N.Y., 1907, p.492.
- (2) Goldenson, Samuel, "The Position of Reform Judaism in America" in the H.U.C.Monthly, June 1918, p.261.
- (3) Wolf, Horace, "The Synagogue, the War & the Days Beyond," in C.C.A.R.Yearbook, vol. XXIX, 1919, p.352.
- (4) Mufson, Israel, "The Women's Garment," in C.C.A.R.Yearbook, vol. XXXVIII, 1928, p.301.
- (5) "Report of Committee on Synagogue and Industrial Relations," C.C.A.R.Yearbook, vol. XXVIII, 1918, p.101 f.
- (6) It should be made clear, of course, that the change was not to be found universally among the rabbis. Indeed many opposed the new interpretation. Cf. Goldenson, Samuel, op.cit. and Rauch, Joseph, "Torah in the Life of Israel," in C.C.A.R.Yearbook, vol. XXXIV, 1924, p.164
- (7) "Report of Committee on Synagogue and Industrial Relations," Ibid.
- (8) Rauch, Joseph, in C.C.A.R.Yearbook, vol. XXVIII, 1918, p.103.
- (9) C.C.A.R.Yearbook, vol. XXXIII, 1923, p.268 f.f.
- (10) Same as footnote (5).
- (11) The second possibility leads to the conclusion that the new science was helping to preserve capitalism.
- (12) "Report of Commission on Social Justice," C.C.A.R.Yearbook, vol. XXXVII, 1927, p.140.
- (13) Ibid. vol. XXXVIII, 1928, p.78.
- (14) Ibid. p.77.
- (15) Ibid. vol. XXXII, 1922, p.67.
- (16) Ibid. vol. XXIV, 1915, p.98.
- (17) Goldstein, The Synagogue & Social Welfare, Bloch, N.Y., 1955, p.287.
- (18) These are generalizations which apply to a major segment of the C.C.A.R. The older concepts were always retained even though they became the minority view. That even by 1931 the pre-World One concept of Social Justice still had a following in the Conference is attested to by the following statement: "The Church and Synagogue cannot afford to stand neutrally by whilst the very foundations

II.

of our social and economic systems are being challenged. They cannot salve the conscience by blessing charity, when it is social justice that mankind is crying for. If organized religion is to survive, it must become socially dynamic and enter the arena and battle for a better social order." (Brickner, Barnett, "The Reform of Reform Judaism," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLI, 1931, p.173.

- (19) "Report of Commission on Social Justice," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXX, 1920, p.86.
- (19a) "Report of Commission on Social Justice," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XXXVIII, 1928, p.82.
- (20) Lazaron, Morris, "God and Israel," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLII, 1931, p.226.
- (21) Ibid. p.95 f.
- (22) Ibid. p.76.
- (23) Ibid. p.81-86.
- (24) "Report of Commission on Social Justice," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLI, 1931, p.89.
- (25) "Report of Commission on Social Justice," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLIV, 1934, p.103.
- (26) Lefkowitz, David, "President's Message," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLI, 1931, p.184.
- (27) "Report of Commission on Social Justice," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLIII, 1932, p.97.
- (28) Ibid.
- (29) Lazaron, Morris, op.cit. p.221.
- (30) "Report of Commission on Social Justice," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLIII, 1933, p.61.
- (31) "Report of Commission on Social Justice," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLIV, 1934, p.102.
- (32) Of significance is the alleged fact that by 1928 a majority of the students at H.U.C.were from working class backgrounds. Turner, Jacob, C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XXXVIII, 1928, pp.527-535. Moreover, that many rabbis in the C.C.A.R.were unemployed was stressed on the Conference floor during the height of the depression. Cf. "Commission on Social Justice," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLIV, 1934, p.108.

III.

- (33) Silver, Abba Hillel, "Spiritual Return and National Redemption," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. LII, 1942, p.249.
- (34) Wolsey, Louis, "The Prophets in Israel," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXIX, 1919, p.147.
- (35) Currick, Max, "President's Message," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLVIII, 1938, p.175.
- (36) Leibman, Joshua, in Reform Judaism, Essays by Hebrew Union College Alumni, H.U.C. Press, Cincinnati, 1949, p.58.
- (37) This is ironical inasmuch as a possible interest of the early Reformers in espousing "Prophetic Judaism" was to give them a basis to justify their break from orthodoxy.
- (38). Cronbach, Abraham, C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol XXIX, 1919, p.344.
- (39). "Committee on International Peace", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLV, 1935, p66.
- (40) "Commission on Social Justice", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLVIII, 1938, p.141.
- (41) "Commission on Social Justice", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. I, 1940, p.102.
- (42) Rabbi Foster, for example, constantly opposed the new social justice. Fighting the attack on the employer class and then upon the system, he appealed to a pure type of theism. "Our duty", he said, "is to lead our congregations along spiritual lives... we must make a clear distinction between our fundamental function as rabbis, as teachers of religion and our duties and obligations in a practical way in other relationships". C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLIV, 1934, p.115.
- (43) Goldstein, Sidney, "The Synagogue and Social Service", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLII, 1932, p.271.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 4

- (1) Philipson, David, The Reform Movement in Judaism, Macmillan, New York, 1907, p.477.
- (2) Ibid. p.479.
- (3) Simon, Abram, "The Spiritual Challenge of the Age" in C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXVII, 1918, p.195.
- (4) Goldenson, Samuel, "The Position of Reform Judaism in America", H.U.C. Monthly, June, 1918, p.263.
- (5) Marcuson, Isaac, "Judaism and Life", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XXVII, 1917.
- (6) Simon, Abram, op. cit. p.199.
- (7) Goldenson, Samuel, op. cit., p.261.
- (8) Wise, Jonah, "Conference Lecture", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXIX, 1919, p.140.
- (9) Cohon, Samuel S., Judaism as a Way of Living, vol, 1, Cincinnati, 1942.
- (10) Philipson, David, op.cit, p.491f.
- (11) Ibid. p.492.
- (12) Rauch, Joseph, "Torah in the Life of Israel", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XXXIV, 1924, p.163.
- (13) Fromm, Erich, op. cit., p.113.
- (14) Cf. Levy, Clifton Harby, in C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXXVII, 1927, p.360f.
- (15) Witt, Louis, "The Spirit of the Synagogue", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XXXI, 1921, p.125.
- (16) Philipson, David, "Authority and the Individual Spirit", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol XXXIX, 1929, p.210.
- (17) Lefkowitz, "President's Message," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLI, 1931, p.193.
- (18) "I have the impression that the humanists are more vocal than numerical and thus we have the impression that there is a tremendous demand for including humanism in our prayers", Davis, Daniel, C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLIII, 1933, p.92.

II.

- (19) Brickner, Barnett, "The Reform of Reform Judaism," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XXXI, 1951, p.176.
- (20) Cf. Cohon, Samuel S., "The Religious Idea of a Union Prayer Book," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XL, 1950, p.236.
- (21) A possible drawback to this suggested interpretation is the fact that humanism eliminates a personal God which can be an important outlet for downtrodden people.
- (22) Beard, Charles and Mary, America in Midpassage, vol.1, Macmillan, New York, 1939, p.142.
- (23) Brickner, Barnett, "The God-Idea in Modern Thought," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XL, 1950, p.307.
- (24) Ibid.
- (25) Ibid. p.314.
- (26) Ibid.
- (27) Ibid. p.309.
- (28) Ibid. p.308.
- (29) If "humanism" were an autonomous concept would the liberal Reform that had "tolerated" Deistic influence in the 19th century and Whitehead's process God and Spinozism in the twenties, have made such a fuss about a system which contained the ethical elements of Judaism and which, according to Brickner, did not eliminate "God"? If the basis of the attack on humanism (as Rabbi Heller affirms it to be) is the fact that humanism denies a personal God, why was Whiteheadian philosophy and Spinozism countenanced with scarcely a word of criticism in the twenties, for is the God of Whitehead or Spinoza any more personal than the God of Dewey?
- (30) Baron, Joseph L. C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLIV, 1934, p.77.
- (31) Ibid. p.79.
- (32) Heller, Bernard, C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol XXXVIII, 1928, p.280.
- (33) Heller, Bernard, "The Modernists Revolt Against God", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XL, 1950, p.337.
- (34) Heller, Bernard, "The Concept of God in Jewish Literature and Life", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol XLIII, 1953, p.249.

III.

- (35) Lazaron, Morris, "God and Israel", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLIII, 1932, p.222.
- (36) Ibid, p.219 f.
- (37) Ibid.
- (38) Heller, Bernard, "The Modernists Revolt Against God", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol XL, 1930, p.337.
- (39) Levy, Felix, "President's Message", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLVI, 1936, p.140ff.
- (40) Heller, James, "Some Musings on God", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, ibid., p.165ff.
- (41) Goldenson, Samuel, C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLIII, 1933, p.293.
- (42) "Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLVI, 1936, pp.89-107.
- (43) Eisendrath, Maurice, "Retreat or Advance", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLVII, 1937, p. 220.
- (44) Of course, the fact that change is not observed in a concept does not, necessarily mean that the concept is significantly autonomous, for changing interests may successively produce the same concept. Moreover, seismograph-like detections of small variations in concepts is beyond the scope of the present study.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 5

- (1) Philipson, David, op. cit., p.492.
- (2) Grossman, Louis, "President's Message", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol XXVIII, 1918, p.173.
- (3) "Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. LXVII, 1937, p.98.
- (4) Goldenson, Samuel, "The Position of Reform Judaism in America," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XXVIII, 1918, p.260f.
- (5) Simon, Arbam, "The Modern Candelabrum", Baccalaureate Address at the Hebrew Union College, June 2, 1917.
- (6) Goldenson, Samuel, "The Position of Reform Judaism in America," H.U.C. Monthly, June, 1918, p.260f.
- (7) Morgenstern, Julian, "Were Isaac M. Wise Alive Today", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XXIX, 1919, p.235.
- (8) Schulman, Samuel, "The Jew and The New Age", Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Council of the U.A.H.C., May, 1919, p.8468.
- (9) Galish, Edward, "President's Message", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol XXXII, 1922, p.112,
- (10) "Report of Committee on President's Message", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol XXVIII, 1918, p.133.
- (11) Ibid. p.134.
- (12) Bettan, Israel, "The Tendency of the Age and the Task of the Pulpit," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXXVI, 1926, p.157.
- (13) Levy, Felix, "The Uniqueness of Israel", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XXXIII, 1923, p.118.
- (14) Franklin, Leo. C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XXXI, 1921.
- (15) Simon, Abram, "President's Message," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXXV, 1925, p.231.
- (16) Cohon, Samuel S. What We Jews Believe, Department of Synagogue and School Extension of the U.A.H.C., Cincinnati, 1931, p.95.

II.

- (17) Though the C.C.A.R. spoke out against the new immigration laws, the fact that they attempted no action to change these laws indicates that these laws in significant degree may have been merely pronouncements.
- (18) Leibert, Julius, C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXVIII, 1918, p. 135.
- (19) "Minority Report on Recommendation XI of Committee on President's Message," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XX, 1920, p. 142.
- (20) Cohon, Samuel S. Ibid, p. 148.
- (21) Silver, Abba Hillel, "The Democratic Impulse in Jewish History", vol. XXVIII, 1928, p. 215.
- (22) Levy, Felix, op. cit. p. 123.
- (23) The East-European Jews, who came to America brought with them the idea that the Jew formed a separate group based on something more than a religion, and it is this view which has filtered into the Reform ranks bringing recognition that the group is of equal potency with the religious idea in the fulfillment of the Messianic principle". Gup, Samuel, C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXXI, 1931, p. 308.
- (24) Calish, Edward, op. cit. p. 102.
- (25) It is interesting to note that in 1922 after Henry Ford had capitulated, there was an alleged lessening of Zionist-nationalism in the Conference, and a corresponding intensification of "charitable-nationalism". This is the import of Rabbi Calish's statement: "The Conference has to its credit an unbroken record of opposition to Political Zionism. Today Zionist leaders, themselves, if not convinced in principle, are at least more cautious in pronouncement. While protesting that their politico-nationalistic hopes have not been abandoned, the energies of the Zionists are now being turned toward an economic program for the rehabilitation of Palestine".
- (26) The old-line German Reformers could not countenance such a possibility. The most that they would assert was, for example, that "we must not fling away our ideal of universal message to humanity because of our despair of the eventual extinction of Anti-Semitism and Jew hatred." Schulman, Samuel, Forty-fifth Annual Report of the U.A.H.C. May 1919, p. 8475.
- (27) The "Zionistic-nationalism" in the Conference in the twenties was practically limited to "theistic-nationalism", as will be explained further on in the text.

III.

- (28) Not all "non-theistic nationalists were secular nationalists. e.g. the humanists in the Conference.
- (29) The vote to include the "Hatikva" in the Union Mynal in 1931 is of significance in this matter.
- (30) Brickner, Barnet, "The Reform of Reform Judaism," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLI, 1931, p. 181f.
- (31) Ibid.
- (32) Lazaron, Morris, op. cit., p. 226f.
- (33) Feldman, Abraham, "Between the Living and the Dead", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol XLIV, 1934, p. 183,
- (34) Ibid.
- (35) Ibid. p.186.
- (36) Wohl, Samuel, "The Synagogue in the Direction of Jewish Affairs," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLVII, 1937, p.245.
- (37) Feldman, Abraham, op. cit. p. 183.
- (38) Lazaron, Morris, op. cit. p. 228.
- (39) (a) It goes without saying, of course that the motive of charity may be present in other concepts of nationalism as well. (b) There were a few old-live Reformers who opposed even charitable-nationalism. Cf., Foster, Solomon, "Israel's Present Struggle for Survival", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XL, 1930, p. 188.: "Zionism has diverted funds that were needed in our American Jewish life..."
- (40) Lefkowitz, David, "President's Message", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol, XLI, 1931, p. 187.
- (41) Newfield, Morris, "President's Message", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XLIII, 1933, p. 132.
- (42) Cohon, Samuel, C. C. A. R. Yearbook, vol. XLV, 1935, p.357.
- (43) Further irony was noted by Rabbi Felix Levy who as early as 1923 affirmed that "charitable-nationalism", even though supported by the "theists" was preservationistic rather than missionary in orientation. Cf. Levy, Felix, "The Uniqueness of Israel," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. XXXIII, 1923, p.118.
- (44) Even in 1942 Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver interated this sentiment when he asserted that Jews "are again confusing formal political equality with immunity from economic and social pressures." Cf. Silver, Abba Hillel, "Spiritual Return and National Redemption", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. LII, 1942, p.246.

IV.

- (45) Cf. Supra.
- (46) Wohl, Samuel, op. cit. p.243f.
- (47) Brickner, Barnett, C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLV, 1935,p.352.
- (48) Cohon, Samuel, C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol.XLVI, p. 96.
- (49) Isserman, Ferdinand, "Scared Scapegoat or Suffering Servant", C.C.A.R. Yearbook, vol. LII, 1940, p. 224f.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Frederick Lewis, Only Yesterday, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1931.

The American Hebrew, 1918-1942, Passin.

Beard, Charles A. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, Macmillan Co. New York, 1915.

Beard, Charles and Mary, The Rise of American Civilization, Macmillan Co. New York, 1927, 2 volumes

Beard, Charles and Mary, America in Midpassage, Macmillan Co. New York, 1939, 2 volumes

Burtt, Edwin A, Types of Religious Philosophy (revised edition) Harper and Brothers, New York. 1951.

Central Conference of American Rabbis, Yearbook, vol. XXVII-LII, 1917-1942.

Cohen, Henry, Reactions of the American Jewish Community to Major Problems During the Years 1929-1939, As Reflected in the Angle-Jewish Press, Rabbinical thesis, Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, Cincinnati, 1953.

Cohon, Samuel S. What We Jews Believe, Department of Synagogue and School Extension, Cincinnati, 1951.

Cohon, Samuel S. Judaism as a Way of Living, (revised edition) Mimeographer by the H.U.C. Placement Bureau, Cincinnati, 1942.

Frank, Waldo, In the American Jungle, Farrer and Rinehart, New York, 1937.

Freud, Sigmund, The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, editor Brill, A.A. Random House, New York, 1938.

Fromm, Erich, The Sane Society, Rhinehart and Co. Inc. New York, 1955.

Goldstein, Sidney E., The Synagogue and Social Welfare, Bloch Publishing Co, New York, 1955.

Handbook of Social Psychology, Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, 1954. 2 volumes.

Hebrew Union College Monthly, 1917-1919.

Kaplan, Mordecai, The Meaning of God in Modern Jewish Religion, Behrman, New York, 1957.

Kaplan, Mordecai, Judaism as a Civilization, Macmillan, New York, 1934.

- Kohler, Kaufman, Jewish Theology, Macmillan, New York, 1919.
- Leibnitz, Discourse on Metaphysics, Open Court Publishing Co. New York, 1937.
- Lerner, Max, Ideas Are Weapons, The Viking Press, New York, 1939.
- Lippmann, Walter, American Inquisitors, Macmillan Co. New York, 1928.
- Niebuhr, Rhinehold, The Irony of American History, Charles Scribners' Sons, New York, 1952.
- Philipson, David, The Reform Movement in Judaism, Macmillan Co. New York, 1907.
- Reform Judaism, Essays by Hebrew Union College Alumni, H.U.C. Press, Cincinnati, 1949.
- Reform Judaism in the Large Cities, U.A.H.C., Cincinnati, 1931.
- Response of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, compiled by Schwartz, Jacob, U.A.H.C., New York, 1954.
- Riesman, David, The Lonely Crowd, Doubleday and Co., Inc. New York, 1953.
- Robinson, James Harvey, The Mind in the Making, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1921.
- Whitehead, Alfred N. Religion in the Making, Macmillan Co. New York, 1927.
- Whitehead, Alfred N. Process and Reality, Macmillan Co. New York, 1926.
- Zeitlin, Joseph, Disciples of the Wise, Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 1945.
- Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Proceedings, vols. IX-XIII, 1916,-1940.