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"A Story of Betrayal: A Study of the Relationship of the
German Industrialists to the Nazi Extermination Policy"

written by Leon A. Jick
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Report on Thesis by Leon A. Jick
Entitled
"A Story of Betrayal: A Study of the Relationship
of the German Industrialists to the Nazi Extermination Policy"

The ghastly extermination of six million Jews by the Nazis is unparalleled in the history of man and his savageries, and of the Jews and their sufferings. Yet this stark tragedy is rarely referred to anymore, having been repressed as too frightful for contemplation and too embarrassing in the face of present-day realities.

As Jews, however, we cannot completely erase the tragedy from our consciousness, for it time and time again thrusts through as a frightful specter which cannot be completely exorcised. The need for a critical understanding of the factors that precipitated this policy is imperative, especially in view of the very limited critical literature on the subject,

Mr. Jick undertook the examination of the role played by German industrialists in formulating and carrying out the extermination policy. He has examined with care all the materials available in the published volumes of the Nuremberg Trials of such influential industrialists as Flick, Krupp, etc., and has critically evaluated their relationship to the Nazi regime. The evidence which Mr. Jick presents conclusively demonstrates not only the involvement of these industrialists in the emergence and consolidation of the Hitler regime, but as the architects of the policy of conquest, subjugation, and extermination.

Mr. Jick points out that these industrialists planned to de-industrialize the conquered areas and to exterminate the excess population that such a process would inevitably bring in its wake. Mr. Jick cites documents which explicitly called for the extermination, along with the Jews, of 30,000,000 Slavs in the event of a German victory. Mr. Jick likewise shows that the initiative was taken by the industrialists, that their interests were carefully protected, and that other powerful groups were overridden whenever a conflict of interest occurred. The author also is careful to point out the role of the industrialists in the expropriation of Jewish property and in the operation of the slave labor camps. Yet, despite the damning character of the evidence, not a single industrialist was given more than token punishment,

Mr. Jick's analysis is commendable. He has organized his materials with skill, discrimination, and insight, and he has presented his findings in a clear and effective style. Mr. Jick has made a very real contribution towards the understanding of the economic and social dynamics of genocide.

It is with great pleasure, therefore, that I recommend the acceptance of this thesis.

Ellis Rivkin
Referee

A STORY OF BETRAYAL

A Study of the Relationship of the German
Industrialists to the Nazi Extermination Policy

by

Leon A. Jick

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
the Master of Hebrew Letters
Degree and Ordination.

Hebrew Union College-
Jewish Institute of Religion
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Referee: Dr. Rivkin

SUMMARY

This thesis shows the relationship of the German industrialists to the Nazi rise to power and to the policies instituted by the Nazi regime. Relying primarily on the documents collected by the prosecution staff of the Nuremberg trial, it proves that the industrialists enabled Hitler to seize power so that they could protect their profits and continue their aggressive cartelization policies without danger of popular or governmental interference. They fostered the implementation by the Nazis of a coldly calculated anti-Semitic policy which was used to distract the German middle classes from the inroads made against them by rampant monopolist expansion. They spurred the enactment of anti-Semitic measures in order to enrich themselves by means of "Aryanization" of Jewish property.

At all times, they succeeded in annulling those aspects of Nazi doctrine or practice which interfered with their aims.

The industrialists cultivated Nazi ideology, particularly racism, as a means of preparing the German people for the imperialist war which was their unchanging goal. As a result of this war, they hoped to institute the "Germanization" of Europe in which, the economy of the entire European continent would be subjugated to the needs of German industry. They recognized that the accompanying industrial shrinkage in areas outside Germany would create a tremendous "surplus" population which could no longer be supported by the areas in which they lived.

Plans for resettlement of these "unsupportable masses"

somewhere outside Europe were discussed, but after the invasion of Russia when victory seemed at hand, the quick, and comparatively easy solution of extermination already considered was introduced. Not only were the Jews to be killed, but the Slav population was to be decimated by 30,000,000.

The leading German industrialists as confidants and leading supporters of Heinrich Himmler and the S.S., bear full responsibility for the execution of this policy. Through the brutal exploitation of slave labor in their own camps and factories they directly supervised the murder of hundreds of thousands of human beings by means of starvation and overwork.

In the final analysis, the policy of genocide was the inevitable result of the policy of economic imperialism which rendered large masses of people economically surplus. The industrialists were fully conscious of the implications of their policies and cognizant of these, invoked and fostered the extermination policy upon which their chosen regime embarked.

"We are not dealing in this case with murderous fanatics to whom one may pay the single compliment of sincerity. We are dealing with men so bent on the attainment of power and wealth that all else took second place. I do not know whether or not Flick and his associates hated the Jews; it is quite possible that they never gave the matter much thought until it became a question of practical importance, and not their inner feelings and sentiments. The story of this case, is in the last analysis, a story of betrayal."

Opening statement of the Prosecution
at the trial of The United States of
America versus Friedrich Flick et al.

Dedicated to
The 6,000,000

"O that my head were waters,
and my eyes a fountain of tears,
that I might weep day and night
for the slain of the daughter of my people"

Jeremiah 9:1

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CHAPTER I

IF WE VIEW THE STUDY

"If we view the study of the catastrophe not merely as an exercise in social science, but rather...as an important part in the struggle for Jewish survival, and if we are to go further in assuming that the catastrophe presents certain implications for all humanity from the point of view of morality in relations between man and man, such research assumes universal importance. In a world which has been tolerating mass genocide and in a civilization which permits mass murderers to go unpunished and still shows indifference to utilizing anti-semitism as an instrument of politics, it is indeed the task of the Jewish community to see to it that the nightmarish reality of the catastrophe be investigated, interpreted, and brought to the attention of the decent elements of society... This is the responsibility of... Jewish scholars.

Abraham G. Duker at the "Conference on Problems of Research in the Study of the Jewish Catastrophe 1939-1945" --
April 3, 1949

Jewish Social Studies

January 1950, Vol. XII, No.1, p.79.

Large scale persecution of Jews is a phenomenon which has manifested itself in history for at least 2000 years and perhaps more. However, in the recent past most men were convinced that anti-semitism was a rapidly diminishing relic of barbarism which would soon disappear in the wake of advancing civilization. When the fascist governments which gained power in the 30's made anti-semitism a cornerstone of state policy, an incredulous mankind sought to dismiss these actions as part of a bad dream, a "mistake," and anachronistic wrinkle in the road of progress which would soon be ironed out. Most German Jews as well as American Jewish observers, believed that the Nazi excesses derived from a "rashness" which would soon be restrained by the harness of "responsibility." There were many responsible Jewish groups who actually welcomed Hitler's entry into the German government in 1933 on the grounds that the obligations of government would curb his irresponsible statements and attitudes.

There were a few observers who attempted to examine the nature of Fascism and to understand its use of anti-semitism. In the 30's books like Guerin's "Fascism and Big Business" and Drucker's "The End of Economic Man" appeared. Instead of labeling the new developments as inexplicable "throwbacks", these men analyzed the forces at work in society which led to the emergence of Fascism. They postulated the theory that powerful drives inherent in modern society evoked the new trends, and they attempted to show that, unless curbed, these forces would lead to a spreading and intensification of Fascist tyranny.

These few "prophets of doom" came closest to perceiving the scope and the significance of Nazi barbarism. Yet even in their most incisive analyses, they failed to anticipate the lengths to which this inhumanity led. Not even the most pessimistic observer foresaw the systematic murder of 6,000,000 Jews and of millions of other human beings. Indeed most analysts believed that the Nazis needed the Jews to serve them as perpetual scapegoats, and therefore regarded even expulsion of the entire Jewish population of Germany as unlikely.

This extermination, the phenomenon which has been labeled genocide, is something new under the sun. This is something which the Jew^s has never before encountered in 2000 years of anti-semitic persecution, which mankind has never witnessed in the 5000 years of recorded history.

In spite of the magnitude of the tragedy, (perhaps because of it) few attempts have been made to study the factors and forces which led to the holocaust. There have been innumerable personal accounts of experiences in camps and ghettos.¹ In all of these, lurid description takes the place of reasoned analysis with the result that our sympathy is aroused, but our understanding is deadened. Such works have an important place in our libraries, but the accumulation of this kind of material is no substitute for analytic study. The testimony of personal witnesses is not history. At best, it is a source which can contribute insights to history.

In the recent past, there has been a rapidly growing tendency to turn away from considering the material concerning

Nazi mass murders altogether. In certain circles the aversion for the facts has reached the stage of denying that the crimes ever took place.² Some Jewish publications have been in the vanguard of the effort to wipe out the memory of the dead in the process of making Germany acceptable as the key ally in the arch of American foreign policy.³

Among the small number of studies of the material unearthed in connection with the conduct of the so-called Nuernberg trials, most have dealt with either the legal problems involved in an "international tribunal" trying "war crimes," or with the question of "the guilt of the German people." Discussion of the first problem is limited in scope and at no point comes to grips with the problem of understanding the motivation of the Nazi program. Discussion of the second, has been reduced by recent political developments to a sterile exercise in ethical theory.

The first attempts which have been made to really explain the phenomenon of genocide are all rooted in what might be called pseudo- psychological explanations. They trace the brutality back to individual bestiality -- especially of the few Nazi leaders -- and frequently come to rest on the malignant background of the so-called German folk character.

This paper represents an attempt to understand the phenomenon of genocide. In view of the multitude of personal accounts of the tragedy, we will not review what happened, but why. Why did the German government undertake the systematic extermination of millions of human beings? Was this policy

rooted in the "nature of Germanness," or in the psychosis of a few leaders, or is it in some way related to the emergence of totalitarian tyranny in our times.

Because of the almost universal practice of laying the sole responsibility for the mass murders at the doorstep of a few psychotic leaders, we will consider the relationship of a sane, responsible, "respectable" segment of the population to this policy, namely the industrialists. It is hoped that the study undertaken in this paper will in some small way enhance the readers' understanding of the forces at work in all of modern society which can lead to the annihilation of human rights, for only that which he understands can man master.

THE SOURCES

In examining the materials and documents from which we must try to draw certain conclusions, we must remember that "the Nazi crimes were committed in a situation where the criminals themselves were the police and could destroy evidence and remove witnesses."⁴ This explains the difficulty we have in unearthing much specific information concerning the discussions preceding the decision to exterminate. Confident though they were of victory in the war, the Nazis attempted to conceal the monstrous operation which they were undertaking. They used circumlocutory references to "a final solution of the Jewish problem"⁵ rather than direct reference to death camps and gas chambers. As a result, we possess no direct transcript of any

of the discussions which preceded the implementation of the extermination policy. We shall have to rely on careful study of the policies of the regime as they were actually carried into effect, to reconstruct the aims and motives of these policies.

There are other factors which limit our study even further. In the first place, the American and British prosecutors in the The Trials of the Major War Criminals dealt only with the first two of the four counts in the indictment. These two counts were: (1) The common plan or conspiracy; and (2) Crimes against peace. The second two counts, namely (3) War crimes, and (4) Crimes against humanity were handled by the French and the Russians. The documents which were used by the American staff in prosecuting counts (1) and (2), were collected in a ten volume work called Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. However the French and Russian documents which are more closely related to our research are unavailable. The daily transcript of the trial was of little help since most of the documents used in evidence were not read, but were merely referred to by number.

We must therefore be aware at all times that the evidence which we have at hand represents only a minute portion of that which might be in existence.

The introduction to Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression describes the problem faced by the prosecution of selecting evidence in the face of limitless sources: As the American armies had swept into Germany, military investigating teams had filled document centers with an increasing wealth of

materials... They soon found themselves embarrassed with riches... Among the prize acquisitions were all the personal and official correspondence of Alfred Rosenberg, together with a great quantity of Nazi party correspondence... An innocent appearing castle near Marburg was found to contain some 485 tons of crated papers which inspection revealed to be the records of the German foreign office from 1837 to 1944... Among other acquisitions were more than 300 crates of high command files, 85 notebooks containing minutes of Hitler's conferences..."⁶ Obviously all of this material could not be thoroughly examined in the few months available for preparation of the trials. In the end "more than 100,000 documents were individually examined in order to segregate those of importance. Of these 100,000 documents, approximately 4000 were found to be of clear or potential value. This group of 4000 was further reduced... to a total of 2000..."⁷ We do not know how many important documents were never uncovered by the investigating teams, how many were overlooked in the hasty perusal, how many which would be of extreme importance to our investigation were rejected as irrelevant to the prosecution of counts (1) and (2). Only the 2000 documents finally winnowed out of the larger total are available for our scrutiny.

We see our handicap clearly when we examine the few brief paragraphs which we are told are "the outstanding excerpts of the 42 volumes of diaries written by Hans Frank."⁸ Hans Frank was the Gauleiter of Poland and as such was directly responsible for the extermination of over 3,000,000 Jews. The

few excerpts from his diaries which are included among the trial documents are incomplete, torn out of context and therefore confused. One finds two statements extracted from the same entry which seem to contradict each other. Obviously without access to the full text, we cannot understand the author's real intent.

Another limitation arises from the fact that many important records were deliberately destroyed by the Germans. Josiah Du Bois, one of the prosecution staff at the I.G. Farben trial, describes the methods used by Farben directors to destroy the papers which proved their connection with the Auschwitz, concentration camp. The weekly reports sent from the camp to Farben directors Ambros and Buetefish were never found.⁹ The evidence indicates that arrangements to destroy any incriminating documents were made months before the end of the war. The testimony of one of the Farben secretaries told how he complied with orders telling him what to hide in the event the Nuernberg prosecution came "snooping."¹⁰ Another executive told of burning documents before the American armies arrived in 1945. All that the prosecution staff was able to recover in this case was the empty folders marked with the key word Auschwitz.¹¹

In view of these numerous problems, it is surprising that so much direct evidence is available. A tremendous amount of evidence which casts light on the Nazi policies, their motivation and execution, remains among the documents collected in connection with the various war trials.

As noted above those documents collected in connection

with the prosecution of the first two counts of the so-called "Trial of the Major War Criminals," are published in a ten volume work called Nazi Conspiracy and Agression.¹² A second series of trials included three cases involving German industrialists: The Flick Trial, the I.G. Farben trial, and the Krupp trial. The documents related to these trials are published in Volumes VI, VII, VIII, and IX of the series "Trials of the War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10." Unfortunately, the volume dealing with the Farben trial was not available at the time this study was made. As a result, material relating to the activities of the Farben combine was derived from a work called "The Devil's Chemists" written by Josiah E. Du Bois of the trial staff. The book contains numerous excerpts from documents used in evidence, as well as of trial testimony.

In addition the 1942-43 diaries of Goebbels,¹³ and the memoirs of Von Papen,¹⁴ and the memoirs of Fritz Thyssen¹⁵ provided valuable primary material.

A number of secondary sources were helpful in providing background material and in focusing the attention of the author on trends which could be traced in the documents. These are listed in the bibliography.

Finally, a series of personal interviews with survivors of the concentration camps were helpful in providing an integrated picture of the atmosphere in these institutions, as well as specific information concerning the use of slave labor in German industry.

CHAPTER II

NATIONAL CHARACTER - THE LAST RESORT OF BAFFLED HISTORIANS

"It is widely held that the development of Germany and Italy has been caused by traits and forces exclusive to these two countries... Opinion in the democratic countries is largely inclined... to lay the blame for the fascism on the national character and the history of the Italian and German people. The continuity in aims of Italian and German foreign policy, trends in literature and philosophy of these two countries and real or fictitious traits of national character are cited in support of this view. Such explanations sound very convincing and can apparently be fully documented. Yet the old saying that 'national character' is the last resort of baffled historians unwilling to admit their inability to explain puzzling events, fully applies to them."¹

Peter F. Drucker

Now that the Germans are being rehabilitated as allies of the west and Nazism is being re-evaluated from the perspective of its contribution to the struggle against communism, apologies has replaced explanation in the treatment of Nazi anti-semitism and brutality. The few explanations which were offered in the past, commonly traced these phenomena back to sources in German history and culture. Therefore, before proceeding with an investigation of the motivations for the policy of genocide, we must first examine this "explanation" by dealing with the concept of the so-called German national character.

This concept is developed in numerous works dealing with Germany. For example, Kurt London traces the historical roots of Nazism back to Luther, Fredrick William I and Fredrick the Great, and finds its philosophical origins in Kant's categorical imperative (sic!), Fichte, Hegel, et al.² Joseph Tenenbaum traces the "glorification of the sword" back to the Goths and finds in German thought "a tradition erected over centuries... to the effect that war, murder, and rapine perpetrated on other peoples constitute the highest code of honor."³

In his article "Diagnosing the German Malady" which reviews a number of recent approaches to German history, Samuel Hurwitz finds that even those which utilize social, economic, and political data, rely on their material as a basis for constructing a German national character which made the Nazi debacle inevitable. He cites one analysis by a psychiatrist who

maintains that "life in dark forests affected German thinking."⁴

Jacob Lestchinsky, the well known Jewish economist is less bizarre but no less dogmatic in asserting that "the unique character of the Nazi extermination... is a product of a long history of anti-Jewish feeling."⁵

No one disputes the fact that there was a long history of anti-Jewish feeling in Germany, but there was also a long history of such feeling in England, France, Russia, Spain and every other European country. During the Middle Ages, Germany was no more conspicuous than England or France in regard to persecution of Jews. If anything, conditions in divided Germany which made the complete expulsion characteristic of England and France impossible, operated in favor of the Jews. The fact that Germany fell behind the two western nations in liberating the Jews, can be explained in the light of the overall lag in the tempo of middle class development there.

The somewhat retarded position of the Jews in Germany, did not prevent them from singing paeans of praise to Germany, to German history and thought, nor from identifying themselves with what they considered the "German national character." From the days of the 18th century maskilim down to 1933, German Jewish literature glows with enthusiasm concerning the sterling attributes of this "character." Such exultation reached its climax in the last decades of the 19th century when Moritz Lazarus made loyalty to the German state a tenet of Jewish religious ethics.⁶ This was the period when the German conservatives dropped anti-semitism from their platform (1885),

when the leader of the Social Democrats Bebel denounced anti-semitism as the "socialism of fools."⁷

The evidence is conclusive that before the actual advent of Nazism, no one was able to predict such a development on the basis of German history, philosophy, or "national character." On the contrary, many were using these devices to show precisely the opposite, namely that Fascism could never come to Germany.

Drucker tells us that "only one year before Hitler assumed power a distinguished Italian anti-fascist 'proved' to me that France would go Fascist first whereas Germany would remain democratic."⁸ He based his superficially very impressive thesis upon those 'pro-fascist traits' in French history which manifest themselves in the rapacious and entirely destructive wars and in the tyranny of Louis XIV, in the dictatorships of the two Napoleons, in the reactionary sentiment that caused the Dreyfus affair, and in the pro-fascist leavings of the Catholic and royalist opposition. In Germany, on the other hand, he saw -- using the popular oversimplification -- the gradual ascendancy of Weimar over Potsdam."

Guerin cites a series of pre-1933 statements by well known "analysts" which use German conditions to show precisely why Fascism could not come to Germany.⁹

Harold Lasla tells us in his forward to Brady's "Spirit and Struchiro of German Fascism" that "it was a favorite exercise of German observers before 1933 to explain that

Germany was not Italy, and that German national character would prove toughly resistant to Fascist ideas."¹⁰

These few statements suffice to demonstrate the folly of basing the development of Nazism on the supposed German character or on any malignancies inherent in German history or thought. "The national character" of every modern people is so complex, seemingly so contradictory and so largely determined by intangibles, that almost anything can be read into it."¹¹ Even we pacific and powerless Jews have had our John Hyrcanus', our Jabotinskys, our Menachem Beigins.

Further evidence of the weakness of the "character" explanation is provided in the Nuernberg documents and other primary sources which clearly show that all the "character" analysts notwithstanding, the status of anti-semitism as a mass movement within Germany is open to question.

In examining this status, we observe that in spite of the continuous flow of anti-Jewish propaganda in Germany before and after 1933, there is no record of a single spontaneous outbreak against Jews throughout the years of the Hitler regime. The rioting against Jews was invariably the work of professional Nazi hooligans, and even they usually reserved their rioting for those occasions when direct orders were given from above.

A study by Theodore Abel of "original life stories" of 600 Nazis, documents the hostility of the general population to Hitler's followers before 1933. Some of the accounts contain descriptions such as: "People cursed and even spit on us

as we marched... The women were the worst of all, They grabbed us by our brown shirts and tried to tear them from our backs... At times we could obtain no halls for our meetings, as every innkeeper knew he would lose his customers once he took in the "damned Nazis'." In addition to a multitude of personal accounts of this kind, the survey showed that "12% of our informants... lost their jobs or had their business ruined after joining the N.S.D.A.P. (Nazi party)."¹² If we can assume that opposition to Nazism can be equated with a lack of virulent anti-semitism, these accounts provide us with an indication of the lack of mass anti-semitism in pre-Hitler Germany. This indication is considerably strengthened by the fact that fully 60% of the contributors to the survey -- all pre-1933 Nazis -- "make no anti-semitic feelings... Nearly 4% did not hesitate to express their disapproval of anti-semitism, although they were members of the Party."¹³

Perhaps it was evidence of this kind which led Franz Neuman in his excellent work on "the structure and practice of National Socialism" to conclude that "although anti-semitism was nowhere so actively propagated as in Germany, it failed to strike root in the population."¹⁴ Neuman's observation led him to conclude that "paradoxical as it may seem... the German masses are least anti-semitic of all."¹⁵ Whether or not we can accept this judgment we must certainly accept the fact that anti-semitism never became a mass movement among the Germans as it was in Eastern Europe.

The Nuernberg documents contain a report by the

American consul in Leipzig following the anti-Jewish riots in November 10, 1938. The report attributes the careful execution of the "debacle" to "SS men and Storm Troopers," and describes in detail the looting, plunder, murder, brutality, etc. In the portion of the report which deals with the public reaction, the consul observes that "the spectators who viewed the wreckage when daylight arrived were mostly in...a bewildered mood." He describes how the Nazi rioters "commanded horrified spectators to spit at them (Jews)...the crowd was powerless to do anything but turn horror-stricken eyes from the scene of abuse or leave the vicinity." The consul's conservatively worded conclusion is "so far as a very high percentage of the German populace is concerned, a state of popular indignation that would spontaneously lead to such excesses, can be considered as non-existent."¹⁶

The text of this report shows clearly that its author is not attempting to "whitewash" the horrors. His recital of the events is brutally frank and so, we may assume, is his description of the popular reaction. Such evidence -- strengthens the thesis that we cannot find the explanation for the mass murders in any natural predisposition of the German masses.

The papers of the leading Nazis are full of references to the popular apathy and even antipathy toward the anti-semitic program. In spite of the risk of capital punishment for harboring Jews or informing them of forthcoming measures, Goebbel's diary records a number of instances of aid given Jews

in Berlin. As late as March 2, 1943, he reports many Jews escaped a roundup because "our better circles, especially the intellectuals, once again have failed to understand our policy about the Jews and in some cases have even taken their part. As a result, our plans were tipped off prematurely so that a lot of Jews slipped through our hands."¹⁷ This complaint is registered again on March 11 when Goebbels refers to "industrialists who warned the Jews in time."¹⁸ In this entry he specifically mentions 4000 as the number of escapes who "are now wandering around Berlin without homes." These 4000 were undoubtedly housed by Germans who risked their lives by taking in Jewish fugitives. A third Goebbels entry expresses concern over an outbreak of popular resistance to the evacuation of a Jewish home for the aged: "Unfortunately there have been a number of regrettable scenes at a Jewish home for the aged, where a large number of people gathered and in part even took sides with the Jews. I ordered the S.D. not to continue Jewish evacuation at so critical a moment."¹⁹

There are indications that resistance of this kind existed even in official Nazi circles. Goebbels warns against "mistaken sentimentality about it (extermination of the Jews)."²⁰ Hans Frank, the governor-general of occupied Poland, in a speech to his cabinet on 16 December 1941 says: "I know that many of the measures carried out against the Jews in the Reich, at present, are being criticized. It is being tried intentionally as is obvious from reports on the morale, to talk about cruelty, harshness, etc." Who is critical? Who is intentionally "talking

about cruelty? Whose "morale" is reported on? The excerpts which we have from Frank's diary give no indication. Frank does, however, continue to address this group of high ranking Nazis by importuning: "I want to beg you to agree with me on the following formula: we will principally have pity on the German people only and nobody else in the whole world..."²¹ This is how Frank attempts to counteract an apparent "pity" for the Jews which he finds in his own cabinet.

In an October 24, 1941, order from the Gestapo we find the following commentary on German Jewish relationships: "Lately it has repeatedly become known here that, now as before, Aryans are maintaining friendly relations with Jews, and that they show themselves with them conspicuously in public... I order that in such cases the Aryan party is to be taken into protective custody..."²²

It is not my intent in citing these documents to maintain that virulent anti-semitism did not exist among large segments of the German population. These indications of humanitarian sentiments in no way detract from the monstrosity of the crime which was committed. The citations do, however, provide a dramatic refutation of any attempt to explain the policies of the Nazi regime by blaming German "character" or "tradition," or "code of honor."

That the policy of anti-semitism was instituted despite the lack of popular enthusiasm, ^{leads us} to seek other motives; that the Nazi police state, which had no need to countenance internal dissent against any government project, still found

it necessary to conceal and disguise its extermination of the Jews, drives us to analyze this program in the light of the same rational, objective criteria by which all actions of men and governments are to be examined.

CHAPTER III
AMIDST ALL THIS CHAOS

"We were at the worst time of the inflation.
(October 1923) The money... sank in value from one day to
the next. In Berlin the government was in distress...
Authority was crumbling. In Saxony a communist government
had been formed... Thuringia had given itself a communist
government... Amidst all this chaos...my first meeting with
Hitler took place.

Fritz Thyssen¹

Since we have shown that Nazism was not a product of any inherent German predilection for evil, how shall we explain the rise of Hitler to power and the use of anti-semitism by his regime culminating in the fearful extermination policy?

A full answer to this question is extremely complex and is obviously beyond the scope of this limited study. What we shall attempt to examine is the relationship of one responsible group within the population to Hitler and his policies in the hope that this limited research will indicate the direction in which a more nearly complete explanation lies.

We chose to deal with the industrialists because cursory investigation had led us to conclude that their role was central in the Nazi regime. It is our belief that the results of the investigation not only establish this centrality but show the responsibility of the industrialists for the conditions which made genocide inevitable. In order to demonstrate their relationship to Nazism and to its policies, we must turn back to the beginnings of the Nazi party and the role of the industrialists in helping the party to gain power.

In chaotic post World War I Germany, the very foundations of German society and state seemed to be crumbling. Fritz Thyssen himself spent a few terrified days in prison in the custody of revolutionaries.² After the revolutionary forces were suppressed, the atmosphere of disintegration remained. In the wake of the inability of the German economy to function under post-Versailles conditions, insecurity and fear were

rampant among all groups in German society.

As the situation appeared more and more hopeless, large numbers of people began to turn to radical solutions of their problems. Each segment of society sought the kind of solution which it believed would best enable it to maintain its status. There can be no doubt that the industrialists would have preferred a traditional right wing program which would have attempted to restore the old pre-1914 privileges and probably the monarchy along with them, but they saw that this program could not rally popular support. Furthermore, the revolutionary uprisings of 1918-19 had thoroughly terrified them, and they had no confidence in the ability of established institutions to maintain "law and order." To quote Thyssen: "The impression which those agitated days left upon me has never been blotted out... During an entire year 1918-1919, I felt that Germany was going to sink into anarchy."³

Even after the new government established its authority and repressed the revolutionary movements, the leaders of German industry were still unable to revive German economy. They recognized, as Thyssen says, that "Germany after 1918 was overindustrialized." He describes this condition as the logical consequence of a development which had taken place since 1870."⁴ The leaders of light industry might hope for relief in expanded trade which a policy of peace and trade agreements could bring, but heavy industry could see no solution outside rearmament.

One palliative measure which all industry could agree

upon was an increasing tempo of monopolization and cartelization. Markets and profits could be protected if "marginal" producers were squeezed out and if artificial prices were maintained. The figures which show the rapidity of monopolization under the Weimar republic are astounding. Neumann summarizes the trend as follows: "The inflation of the early 20's permitted unscrupulous entrepreneurs to build up giant economic empires at the expense of the middle and working classes... The largest trusts in German history were formed during the Weimar republic."⁵ The details are available in this and numerous other sources.

Even these measures, combined with the influx of foreign loans after 1924, were still not enough to keep the tremendous capacity of German industry at work. "At no time in the Republic were the productive capacities of German industry fully or even adequately used. The situation was worst in heavy industry, especially coal and steel...that still dominated the essential business leadership."⁶ In the light of these facts which highlight the problems of "overexpanded" German heavy industry, we are able to understand the political attitudes and objectives of men like Thyssen and the steel baron Stinnes, "the most inveterate enemy of democracy."⁷

Thyssen records that "in the early years of the Weimar republic, I supported various semi-military formations, among them the National Socialist party."⁸ This support blossomed into vigorous patronage in time of stress. In 1923, when unrest in the wake of the inflation which the industrialists

themselves had stimulated,⁹ produced the threat of uprisings, Thyssen was requested to "revive successfully the national counterrevolution in which Kapp had failed in 1920."¹⁰ Thyssen and his colleagues had, however, learned from Kapp's failure, that a revolution is not engineered so easily, and they sought to find means of gaining popular support. Thyssen places in the mouth of Ludendorff, the advice that "there is but one hope, and this hope is embodied in the national groups which desire our recovery."¹¹ Among these national groups, Ludendorff recommended "above all the National Socialist party of Adolph Hitler." Thyssen had undoubtedly supported Hitler before this time, however, in 1923 when a crisis once again threatened, direct relationship between the two were established. Thyssen attended "several public meetings organized by Hitler." Here he found what he was looking for: the man who could win the support of the masses, " ... I realized his oratorical gifts and his ability to lead masses. What impressed me most was... the almost military discipline of his followers."¹²

When Hitler and Thyssen met, "the conversation ran on political topics." These conversations were so satisfactory, that Thyssen made a contribution of 100,000 gold marks, a staggering sum for the then numerically and politically insignificant group. Thyssen tells us further that "he (Hitler) had already solicited and obtained the help of several industrialists, particularly that of Herr Minoux of the Stinnes firm."¹³

The anti-capitalist coloring of much early Nazis propaganda, tended to obscure the true nature of the movement

and of its backers. At a time of suffering under the stress of a big business sponsored inflation,¹⁴ this is precisely the function which such propaganda was intended to serve. We can be certain however that in Thyssen's satisfactory "conversations on political topics" with Hitler, any possible misunderstandings concerning real objectives of the Nazis, were ironed out.

We have additional testimony concerning the complete understanding reached between Hitler and his wealthy backers at this early date. Konrad Heiden quotes the testimony of "Hermann Aust -- a great industrialist in Munich" who tells of the following meeting early in 1923. "For the purpose of ascertaining Hitler's hitherto unknown intentions in regard to economic policy, an interview with him took place in the office of Privy Councillor Dr. Kuhlo, Director of the Association of Bavarian Industrialists, at which were also present Dr. Nöll and the Chairman of the Association of Bavarian Industrialists, as well as myself. The conversation in the office of the Association led to the holding of a small meeting in the Herren Club and a much larger meeting in the Merchants Hall. At the latter, Herr Hitler delivered a lecture on the subject of his aims. He was listened to with much applause. Moreover, appreciation for the remarks showed itself in the fact that several gentlemen unacquainted with Hitler personally but who knew that I was acquainted with him, gave me donations for the movement with the request that I would hand the sums in question to Hitler himself. I believe I am right in saying that Swiss francs were

included among the various sums which passed through my hands." ¹⁵

Heiden tells us further of Hitler's acquaintance in 1922 with "the great locomotive manufacturer, von Borsig, who was also the leader of the German industrialists." He mentions "a factory owner in Augsburg named Grandel," "lectures which Hitler delivered in the National Club in Berlin (in 1922) which also helped to introduce him to further sources of financial supply," and "many other (donations) that came to the Nazi Party from well-to-do private individuals (specifically mentioned in this category are art publisher Hanfstangl, and piano manufacturer Beckstein)." ¹⁶

In addition, Hitler received important aid from foreign industrialists from the first. "Hitler had also his collectors in foreign countries. One of the most zealous of these was a Dr. Gansser in Switzerland... An attempt was at least made to solicit money from Henry Ford." ¹⁷ There is no record of Ford's response, but we know that during this time, when inflation was rampant in Germany and foreign currency was priceless "the Party officials, or at least those of the SA, were in part paid in foreign money. For example, Kriebel received 200 Swiss francs monthly." ¹⁸ This sum is nothing short of fabulous for those days, and is an indication of the kind of financial support the Nazis were receiving.

We may be certain that all of Hitler's early supporters, German as well as foreign, were just as sure of Hitler's "Intentions in regard to economic policy" as were Thyssen, Stinnes

and the Association of Bavarian Industrialists.

When we consider the numerical insignificance of the party at this time, the extent of the financial support which Hitler gained is almost incredible. In 1922 the Nazi party had only 6000 members. In 1923, at the height of the panic, the party claimed only 55,787 adherents. Outside of Bavaria, Hitler was virtually unknown.

The extensive financial support which he and his cohorts received, enabled these unknown leaders of an insignificant band of street rowdies to become, in 1923, possessors of a daily newspaper and commanders of a well paid standing army (the S.A.). With the vast funds at their disposal, they were enabled to set up a party bureaucracy and to spread their propaganda and their terror far and wide. They now had the means to hire halls and publish leaflets almost without limitations, and to buy arms in large quantities. Hitler was encouraged by this support and stimulated by the success of Mussolini in Italy in October 1922. When the rampant inflation intensified the atmosphere of fear and desperation, he determined to make a bid for power. Since ^{the} Mussolini "revolution" had been carried off "with no street fighting, no strikes, no attack on the Crown, and no heads broken,"¹⁹ the mood of certain Germans was very sympathetic toward such a "revolution."

The problem at this juncture was that Hitler was not the only aspirant to the role of leader of a Fascist uprising. Another rightist, the Bavarian Government commissioner, Herr von Kahr, who was armed with dictatorial powers, was planning a coup

against the Reich government."²⁰

It was von Kahr who dispersed Hitler's putsch of November 9, 1923. The ease with which the demonstration was dispersed by "a few dozen police summoned from the country districts"²¹ is additional proof of the weakness of the Hitler movement at this time, despite the already significant financial and moral help from important German industrialists.

On the other hand, the fact that not one of the Nazi leaders was wounded, much less killed is one of many indications of the lack of real hostility on the part of the authorities, against the demonstrators.

The handling of the conspirators by the courts gives us added evidence of the attitude of the German ruling classes to the Fascist groups. Neuman compares the sentences imposed in the various left wing uprisings, with those which followed the right wing Kapp putsch in 1920, and the Hitler putsch in 1923, "After the downfall of the Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919... every adherent who had the slightest connection with the unsuccessful coup was sentenced." Following the Kapp Putsch..."not one person had been punished."²²

As for the judicial handling of the Hitler putsch, let us note that "although section 9 of the Law for the Protection of the Republic clearly and unmistakably ordered deportation of every alien convicted of high treason, the Munich People's Court exempted Hitler on the specious argument that, in spite of his Austrian citizenship, he considered himself German."²³

Not only was Hitler not deported, he was allowed to make his trial a sounding board for his program. "He was allowed to deliver a two hour harangue packed with insults against high government officials and threats against his enemies..."²⁴ At the end of the trial Hitler was sentenced to a mild five year imprisonment of which he served only nine months. During these nine months "Hitler was sitting in the fortress of Landsberg where he was free to receive delegations, hold conferences, and issue proclamations as though he were in his office in Munich."²⁵

We have no accounts proving that Hitler's industrialist patrons intervened directly with the judges on his behalf; neither do we have a list of the business ties which these and other judges had. However, a scanning of the record of the German courts in dealing with the large number of right wing atrocities and murders between 1918 and 1931 provides dramatic proof of judicial sympathies as they reveal the complete failure of the courts to prosecute, often in the face of pleas of guilty. These same courts were remarkably severe and efficient in handling the left wing atrocities which were about 7% of the former in number.²⁶ Let the reader decide whether this protection of right wing terrorists by the courts is in any way related to the support given these same groups by the industrialists, or whether this protection was an independent boon.

Toward the end of 1923, after the suppression of communist governments in Saxony and other provinces, as well as of Hitler's putsch and von Kahr's successionist ambitions in

Munich, the government of Gustav Stresemann succeeded in stabilizing the German economic situation. With the implementation of the Dawes Plan, "enormous sums of money, chiefly from the United States, were pouring into Germany in the form of loans to the government, municipalities and private corporations. With the consequent revival of industry and the virtual elimination of unemployment, there was a striking change in attitude toward the Republican regime. (Even) the national conservative parties... signified their approval of the regime by entering the government..."²⁷

The years between 1924 and 1928 were generally prosperous. During these years the Nazi movement remained tiny and insignificant in spite of its strong backing and of the wide publicity which it and its leader had received throughout Germany. Surveys of the social origin of those who were attracted to Nazism during these years show that the majority of these early party members came from certain segments of the middle class which had never recovered from the inflation. Even during the period of prosperity these groups were subjected to a continuing squeeze by the accelerating rate of cartelization and concentration of trade and industry. Party membership which had been 55,787 in 1923, rose to 72,590 in 1927, and to 108,717 in 1928.²⁸

We have pointed out during the years of prosperity "even the national conservative parties signified their approval of the regime by entering the government." During the years the industrialists benefitted from the fact that "the largest

trusts in German history were formed."²⁹ But in spite of the predisposition of the government in their favor, the industrialists were uneasy because "after all the framework of the German government was still a parliamentary democracy, and what if movements threatening the established monopolistic structure should arise within mass organizations? (They remembered that) as far back as November 1923, public pressure had forced the Stresemann cabinet to enact a cartel decree authorizing the government to dissolve cartels and to attack monopolistic positions generally. Not once were these powers utilized, but the danger to privileges inherent in political democracy remained and obviously became more acute in times of great crisis."³⁰

These "dangers to privileges inherent in political democracy" combined with realization that the bubble of prosperity would likely burst one day, made it desirable that Hitler and his group be kept in existence even though, at the moment, they did not attract a sizable following. Men like Thyssen remained staunch supporters and liberal contributors.

During these years, at the request of one of the directors of a coal mining company, Thyssen bought Goering a house in Berlin. He "met Hitler occasionally at Goering's house" and at least "on one occasion Hitler, Hess and R hm slept at my late father's house."³¹

We know also of the support of Geheimrat Emil Kirdorf, "for many years director-general of the Rhewish-Westphalian coal Syndicate. At Kirdorf's suggestion, Thyssen gave the Nazis the money to pay for the Brown House in Munich."³²

For a number of reasons, it is difficult to document the exact amount and specific sources of the assistance which Hitler received during these years. In the first place, "all this money flowed into Hitler's hands and into his hands alone. Out of regard for the donors Hitler dared not breathe a word about the sources from which he received his money. His business manager, Amann was his sole confidant."³³

Secondly, many of "the big industrial corporations... did not give (their money) directly to the Nazis. They gave it to Dr. Alfred Hugenberg (head of the German National Peoples Party, an official of the Krupp works and other large business interests) who placed about one-fifth of the donated amounts at the disposal of the National Socialists."³⁴

Finally, when Thyssen tells us that although many industrialists helped Hitler, he was one of the few who "freely exposed himself in this connection" he helps us understand why we do not have the names of the benefactors and the amounts they contributed during the years 1923-30. Beginning in 1928, when the storm clouds of economic reverse were already on the horizon, Hitler's backers became less chary about revealing their identity.

William Keppler, a high ranking Nazi and one of Hitler's economic advisors tells in his testimony at the Flick Trial, of Hitler's lectures before "industrialists in the Ruhr" in 1927 and 1928. The lecture halls were "overcrowded; enthusiasm during the lecture was also there...."³⁵

In 1928 the Nazis waged their first "costly election campaign," they received 809,000 votes, 2.6% of the total. Their membership in 1928 was 108,717. In 1929 their membership had risen to a still not imposing figure of 176,426. But when the economic crisis with its attendant unemployment and business failures emerged there was no confusion on the right such as had been the case in 1923. There were still those who preferred the old line rightism of Krupp director Hugenberg, but even these recognized the necessity of financially assisting Hitler in order to mobilize mass support for the achievement of their aims. "By the summer of 1930, most of the great industrialists and bankers associated with them were underwriting the national Socialist party."³⁶

In the elections of 1930 when the full impact of the depression was making itself felt, the Nazi party which by now had a membership of 389,000, polled 6,406,400 votes. In one brief year of crisis and turmoil they had emerged from virtual insignificance to the position of the second largest party in the Reichstag with 18.3% of the vote.

In a 1935 speech, Hitler himself described what his financial backing enabled him to achieve in the crucial 1930 campaign. Evoking the memory of that "astonishing campaign," Hitler emphasized "what it means when a thousand speakers each has a car at his disposal and can hold in one year a hundred thousand public meetings."³⁷ Let us bear in mind that such a project involves an outlay not only for the upkeep of the automobiles, but of the speakers as well.

Thyssen who estimates his own contributions to the Nazis as "altogether one million marks...not more," tells us that "it was during the last years preceding the Nazi seizure of power that the big industrial corporations began to make their contributions.... All in all the amounts given by heavy industry to the Nazis may be estimated at two million marks a year."³⁸

In 1931 Thyssen openly joined the Nazi party and participated in public rallies. Late in 1931, Hitler asked his chief economic advisor Keppler to get together "a few economic leaders...who will be at our disposal."³⁹ It was at this time that Keppler formed the "circle of friends" which maintained liason between the Nazi party and the leading business enterprises of Germany from 1931 until the fall of the Nazi regime.

CHAPTER IV
THE RISE TO POWER

"Do not forget that you owe your rise to power not
to a great revolutionary uprising...."

Letter from Fritz to Adolph Hitler
December 28, 1939¹

Thyssen

The year 1932 found Germany in a catastrophic political, economic and social crisis. Thyssen tells us that "the aspirations of German industry (in this crisis) may be summed up in one phrase: 'a sound economy in a strong state.' This was, I remember, the slogan of a meeting of the Ruhr industrials in 1931."²

Neumann in analysing the German crisis at this time, points out a number of alternatives by means of which Germany might have been saved from either socialism or fascism. But he also points out that these solutions "could operate (only) if the ruling groups made concessions voluntarily, or under compulsion by the state. That would have led to a better life for the mass of the German workers and security for the middle classes at the expense of the profits and power of big business. German industry was decidedly not amenable, however, and the state sided with it more and more."³ Furthermore, as we have pointed out before, there is always a danger inherent in the democratic structure that a mass movement to curtail the power of the growing monopolies, would arise. Unwilling to curtail its profits, unwilling to risk curbing of its power, German industry determined to destroy democracy.

That this was the attitude of Thyssen and his Ruhr associates in 1931, is clearly shown by his verdict that "the German people had clearly shown that it was not fitted for a republic." The decision: "to back Hitler and his party...(in order to) contribute to the reinstatement of real government..."⁴

So determined were these groups to put an end to the republic that in 1932, at the depth of the crisis, "the reactionaries refused to support a large scale public works program, lest it revive the declining power of the trade unions,"⁵ and we might add, lest such a program contribute to any revival of faith in democratic institutions. The opponents of public works were seeking their economic solutions in other "circles."

When in 1931, Keppler began organizing his "Circle of Friends" among the industrialists at Hitler's request, he met with an enthusiastic response. Leaders of the foremost German industries were invited and there is no record of a single refusal of the invitation. The participants are listed in Keppler's affidavit at the Nuernberg trial.⁶ Among the numerous firms represented were the following: Siemens Electrical Works, I G. Farben, the Mitteldeutsche Steelworks, Deutsche Bank, Ilseder Huette (steel), Deutsche-Amerikanische Petroleum, Reich-Kredit-Gesellschaft, Dresdser Bank, Rheinmetall Borsig, Busch Jaeger Metallwerke, Wintershall Steel, United Steel, Braunkohle-Bengin, Felten and Guillename Carlwerke and others.

On December 11, 1931 Otto Steinbrink, "a leading official of numerous Flick enterprises and later of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke" (United Steel), arranged for Walter Funk, leading Nazi and later Minister of Economics, to meet Baron Kurt von Schroeder. Steinbrink describes von Schroeder as "partner of the banking firm J. H. Stein Cologne, and a cousin of the well known London banker.... For many years he has been closely

connected with the whole movement and therefore has much understanding...."⁷ Steinbrink explains that von Schroeder is interested in the views of the party toward certain questions affecting the international banking business. How well Funk was able to satisfy Schroeder is evidenced by Schroeder's role in helping Hitler to power in January 1933.

Precisely how many such private meetings were held we shall never know. But the reference to "the whole movement" is added evidence of the kind of continual contact maintained between the Nazis and their wealthy sponsors.

When Steinbrink ends his communication to Funk by planning to meet him "again early next week," we know that this too was not simply a single personal meeting between an individual industrialist and an individual Nazi. For at the same time, the entire "Circle of Friends" was meeting regularly with all of the top Nazi leadership.

"In May 1932, after I (Keppler) had met with the gentlemen of the Circle of Friends several times, I asked the Fuehrer whether he could not see the gentlemen some time. Then the Fuehrer received the gentlemen in the small hall of the Kaiserhof Hotel on 18 May 1932. As far as I can recall, the gentlemen...were all present.... The Fuehrer made a short speech and in it disclosed among other things, as points of his program -- abolition of trade unions and abolition of parties other than the NSDAP (Nazi). No one raised any objection. These points of the Fuehrer's program met with the fullest approval of the members of the Circle of Friends, but they

expressed their apprehension that he would not be able to carry out these excellent ideas."⁸

From this time forth, the industrialists of Germany whom this group represented bent every effort to ascertain that Hitler would "be able to carry out these excellent ideas," that he would overthrow the government, wipe out all opposition, and establish the regime of Fascist tyranny.

Lest some maintain that the support for this program, was limited only to the "Circle of Friends" let us call attention to "the connection between Hitler and the entire body of Rhenish-Westphalian industrialists." On January 27, 1932, Hitler "made a speech lasting about two and a half hours before the Industry Club of Dusseldorf... In consequence of this a number of large contributions flowed from the resources of heavy industry into the treasuries of the National Socialist party."¹⁰ The publisher of Thyssen's memoirs comments that "on this occasion Hitler met the entire body of German industrial leaders."¹¹

While the "Circle of Friends" was laying its plans, while public works projects were being delayed and unemployment was rising, and the industrialists were making their contributions, a presidential election was taking place (March 13, 1932). In an atmosphere of uncertainty and terror the Nazis doubled their 1930 vote, receiving 11,341,000 choices. On April 16, a second presidential election gave Hitler 13,418,000 votes, and the Reichstag elections of July 31, 1932 garnered 13,745,781

votes for the Nazis. This gave them 36.9% of the total vote.

The financial support which Hitler had received made possible a propaganda drive which made even the 100,000 meetings of the 1930 campaign seem paltry. The propaganda drive was accompanied by a full-pledged reign of terror waged by a standing army of gangsters armed with bootlegged American machine guns.¹²

Throughout 1932, the "Circle of Friends" met and consulted with top Nazis at least once a month.¹³ At the same time numerous private meetings were being held to mobilize money and support. In September 1932, Thyssen tells us "I had invited a number of gentlemen to my house in order to enable them to put their questions to Hitler, Hitler answered all questions directed to him to the utmost satisfaction of all present.... Great industrialists were present."¹⁴

In March 1932, a DuPont representative wrote from Germany: "It is a matter of common knowledge that I.G. Farben is financing Hitler."¹⁵

Everything seemed to be going along according to plan and the day when Hitler would "be able to carry out his excellent ideas" seemed to be approaching when suddenly, at the end of 1932, things went awry.

Somehow the popular trend toward Fascism was reversed, public confidence rose and in the Reichstag election of November 6, 1932, the Nazis polled only 11,737,386 votes, a loss of over 2,000,000 since July. The left wing popular vote totaled 13,232,000 in that election.

Panic seized the Nazi ranks. In an article written after Hitler was securely a power the "Angriff" (Goebbels' newspaper) described the temper of December 1932 as follows: "A mood of despair soon began to make itself felt on the outskirts. Many feared openly that they would never achieve their aim and saw no reason for living up to the rigorous demands of the Party."¹⁶

Defections from the party took place not only among the masses, but on the leadership level as well. Stegmann, the chief SA leader of Franconia, renounced his allegiance to Hitler. Heiden points out that this resignation was "a symptom of the general crisis."¹⁷

The top party councils were torn by indecision. Two of the top party leaders, Frick and Strasser, "wished to save the movement by making a compact with Schleicher (chancellor at the time) against Hitler's wishes."¹⁸ Many of the other party leaders were in favor of the party's taking posts in the government. As for Hitler himself, "in those days, when Hitler's star seemed on the wane, he was incapable of taking up any definite standpoint."¹⁹

The industrialist backers of Hitler were also disturbed, but unlike the Party leadership, they were not confused. They saw the possibility of Nazi disintegration; they saw the "danger" of the survival of the republic and they determined to strike, to put the Fascist regime into power before the opportune moment had passed.

When Fritz Thyssen heard in December 1932 that there was a move on Strasser's part to bring the Nazi party into a

coalition government with Schleicher he promptly contacted the Party and some of his industrialist friends to protest.²⁰ He was against compromise even with the reactionary government of General Schleicher whose "real intention" according to Thyssen's own evaluation, "was to put into practice the National Socialist program without letting Hitler seize the power."²¹ The time had come for the establishment of 100% unadulterated Nazism, with Hitler himself in power. Too long had the tycoons been hampered by the tedious processes of democracy and by considerations of human rights.

To achieve the complete Nazi victory, the complete destruction of the republic, "the first thing that happened was that a group of industrialists in Western Germany...made themselves responsible for a considerable part of the National Socialist debt."²² In spite of its extensive financial support, the scale on which the party had been campaigning in the numerous recent elections had resulted in a debt which threatened not only its bureaucracy, and its private army, but also its very existence. Gregor Strasser, Nazi second in command, realizing that this reliance on "funds supplied by private industry... would make the party once again dependent upon large scale industry and finance,"²³ resigned from the party. The extent of the domination by "large scale industry and finance" was too much even for a veteran like Strasser to endure.

The second arrangement to be made by the industrialists was to secure transference of power into Hitler's hands. It was the Cologne banker, Baron von Schroeder who in January

1933 arranged a meeting at his own house between Hitler and Franz von Papen.²⁴ Documentation of Von Papen's political and industrial connections in the Ruhr are too readily available to require description. At this and subsequent conferences, the means whereby power would be turned over to Hitler were worked out.

General von Schleicher who was chancellor and who represented an ever diminishing segment of light industry, the old aristocracy and the Wehrmacht, was anxious to adjourn the Reichstag and possibly press for another election -- "another election at which they (the Nazis) would lose still more votes Nobody had any doubt that they (the Nazis) would lose in a Reichstag election."²⁵

"It was on January 28 that Schleicher found to his dismay that the President (Hindenburg) had no intention of giving him the required order (to adjourn the Reichstag). Hindenburg had freely given this order on request to the right wing chancellors preceding Schleicher. The reason was that Papen had been to see him on the day before....," and had convinced him to appoint Hitler chancellor."²⁶ No need to risk new elections; no danger of popular uprisings. The second step was thus achieved and power was bestowed upon Adolph Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers Party.

The party had gained power, but this power was not yet consolidated. The months following January 1933 were months of feverish activity. Even the few magnates, like Krupp,

who had not heretofore openly supported Hitler but had concentrated their backing on Hugenberg's German National Party, joined wholeheartedly in the effort to insure the securing of absolute power by the Nazis. As soon as Hitler had the power, Herr von Krupp became one of his most loyal party adherents."²⁷

While the Nazi rank and file were spreading terror throughout the streets, burning the Reichstag, intimidating opponents and generally creating a reign of fear, Krupp was chairing a meeting of industrialists (20 February 1933). "Krupp initiated the collection of over 3,000,000 R.M. from the assembled industrialists with a pledge of 1,000,000 R.M. from the Ruhr."²⁸ DuBois records that at this meeting the banker Schocht said "on this table we must raise a fund of 3,000,000 marks" and that Farben alone "put up 400,000 marks."²⁹ Flick's contribution was 240,000 marks.

Gustav Krupp's file, "Private Correspondence 1933-34" contains Krupp's notes on Hitler's and Goering's speeches at this February 20 meeting. In this speech Hitler states once again that "private enterprise cannot be maintained in an age of democracy" and promises, that if the election is lost, he will seize power by force.³⁰ Following the meeting, on February 22, Krupp sent Hitler a note expressing the gratitude of the "industrialists present for having given us such a clear picture of your ideas."³¹

When the election¹ was finally held on March 5, the Reichstag had been burned as a pretext for terrorizing the

population and destroying the Communist party; restrictions had already been placed on freedom of speech press, assembly, "opinion" and "association"; Hitler had already voided rights of privacy including postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications; Thyssen's, Krupp's, Flick's, von Schroder's, Schocht's, the Circle of Friends' "real" government was well on the way to being restored.

In spite of all this terror and intimidation the Nazi party polled only 43.9% of the votes, less than a majority. In keeping with his promise to his friends, Hitler took over the government and proceeded to institute what the "Circle of Friends" had praised a year earlier as his "excellent ideas."

No one can maintain that the industrialists invented Hitler or that they provided him with his slogans; no one can deny Hitler's personal ability nor belittle the numerous forces at work which made possible the triumph of this kind of leadership at this time. At the same time, the evidence conclusively establishes the fact that the industrialists supported the Nazi party, gave it the means with which to spread its propaganda and establish its organizational strength. They financed its campaigns and the army of black shirts which helped it seize power. At the appropriate time, they arranged for the transfer of power into Hitler's hands. All along they made sure that Hitler was really their man, that his plans were their plans. Was it then inaccurate of Thyssen to remind Hitler that he had not been borne to power by a popular uprising? I think not.

If there remains any doubt concerning the identity of the real power behind the Nazi rise to power, the program of the regime after its installation, clearly indicates the identity of the primary beneficiaries of its policies.

CHAPTER V

FRIENDS OF HIMMLER

"The defendants Frick and Steinbrink were members of a group known as "Friends of Himmler"...which throughout the period of the Third Reich worked closely with the S.S., met frequently and regularly with its leaders, and furnished aid, advice, and support to thw S.S., financial and otherwise. This organization was composed of about thirty German business leaders, and a number of S.S. leaders including Heinrich Himmler, head of the entire S.S. from 1929-1945; Karl Wolff, Himmler's adjutant...; Oswald Pohl, chief of the S.S. main Economic and Administration Department; Otto Ohlendorf, a leading official of the S.S. Main State Security Department; and Wolfram Sievers, Director of its Institute for Military Scientific Research. The business and industrial members of the Circle included leading officials of the largest enterprises in Germany... Each year from 1933 to 1945, the circle contributed about 1,000,000 marks to Himmler to aid in financing the activities of the S.S...."

Trials of the War Criminals Before the
Nurenberg Military Tribunals, Volume VI,
"The Flick Case" page 23.

We have described the crucial role of the industrialists in making possible the emergence of the Nazi party and in facilitating its seizure of power. The policies initiated by the new regime after its installation confirm our conclusion that the industrialists were the real power behind the Nazi throne.

Within a few months of their rise to power, the Nazis had broken the trade unions, abolished all political parties, and destroyed freedom of expression, thereby restoring the "dependable," "stable," "orderly" government so ardently desired by Thyssen and the members of the Circle of Friends. In addition they had instituted a host of new economic measures, designed to protect the position of the large capitalists and to insure their profits in the face of shrinking economic surplus.

The new government at once began returning to their original owners, millions of shares of industrial and banking stocks which the Weimar government had purchased to save these enterprises from bankruptcy. Beginning with an enactment of June 1, 1933, it gave extraordinary tax exemptions to the upper income group.

The old, inoperative law giving the government the right to break up cartels was replaced by a new law (July 15, 1933) giving the government the right to force cartellization. This new law sanctioned the unlimited use of economic boycott as a means whereby cartels could eliminate competitors, especially those who failed to abide by fixed price agreements.¹ To

complete the control of the existing enterprises over the economy, the law prohibited the creation of any new enterprises without consent of the Minister of Economy.²

Beginning in 1934 the regime hastened the liquidation of municipally owned plants which had shown profits even during the depression years of 1932 and 1933 and were therefore coveted by private industry. Shortly thereafter, they forbade the distribution of electric power by any cooperative or "socialized" organization stating that "such an organization of the distribution of electric power is contrary to the basic idea of the National Socialist concept..."³

It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe in detail the functioning of Nazi economic policies. We must, however, point out the overall effect of these policies by observing that "the statute for compulsory cartellization maintains and solidifies the existing organizational patterns. In the first stage of National Socialist economic policy, the object was to secure the profits of the industrial combines even with the reduced volume of production."⁴ At the same time the small businessmen, as well as laborers, suffered continually increasing hardships. In spite ~~of~~ the revival of business brought about by German rearmament, the number of small retailers, wholesalers, and handicraftsmen continued to decline precipitously throughout the Hitler regime.⁵ As for the working class, their share of the national income declined rapidly after 1932 despite a marked increase in productivity.⁶

The architects of this "purification" of the economic system, as they called their approach, were the industrialist leaders. Even before the Nazis had come to power, Fritz Thyssen "was chosen by the National Socialist party to found an institute charged with the preparation of the introduction of the corporative order (for organizing industry)... We therefore founded this institute or academy... We also organized an experimental Chamber of Corporations."⁷

When, after the Nazis came to power, opposition to Thyssen's plans developed within the so-called left wing of the party, "Hitler declared solemnly that everything was to be done as I (Thyssen) and my friends proposed; within eight days we were to establish the corporative system in Germany."⁸

On 23 March 1933, a meeting of the Reich Association of German industries was held, with Gustav Krupp presiding. This meeting addressed a letter to Hitler hailing the new regime and promising "to do everything in our power in order to assist the government in its difficult task."⁹ Krupp met with Hitler on April 4, 1933 to discuss the reorganization of German industry.¹⁰ On 25 April 1933 Krupp addressed a letter to Hitler outlining his views on the reorganization of the Reich Association of German industry. His plan, he says, is "characterized by the wish to coordinate...both economic measures and political necessity adopting the Fuehrer conception of the new German State." He foresees "closest contact between the Reich government... and the Reich Association (of Industries)." He affirms that "the turn of political events (i.e. the Nazi sei-

zure of power) is in line with the wishes which I myself and the board of directors have cherished for a long time."¹⁰

At the same time, Flick began to participate personally¹¹ in the deliberations of the "Circle of Friends" which had been set up for the purpose of "consulting upon the plans for the National Socialist leadership of the German national economy."¹² As was stated previously, this group included "leading officials of the largest enterprises in Germany."¹³ Under the supervision of these officials the reorganization of the German economy in their interest proceeded apace with the organization of the "national industry groups" and "the chambers of industry." The extent of the domination of Nazi policy by the industrialists led many observers to conclude that "the regime which the Nazis proceeded to establish was... a dictatorship of monopoly capitalism. Its 'fascism' is that of business enterprise organized on a monopoly basis, and in full command of all the...power of the state."¹⁴

When we become aware of the overall nature of the regime, and its objectives, the use of anti-semitism as a means of attaining these objectives becomes clear. Today's philo-semitic expressions of the German industrialists notwithstanding, the evidence proves the calculated and deliberate use of anti-semitism by the big industrialists to aid in achieving control of the economy which they sought.

A common theme which characterizes the apologetic literature written by German industrialists or in their defense, is the claim that they were opposed to "Hitler's anti-semitism."

When we recall the numerous occasions between 1922 and 1933 on which Hitler reviewed and revised this program to the satisfaction of the industrialist group, this purported opposition to anti-Semitism rings hollow. Furthermore the numerous examples of the way in which the industrialists brought Hitler into line on those matters concerning which they had any real objection, highlights the fatuousness of their apologia. One has but to note the purge of the so-called "left wing" of the party which opposed Krupp's and Thyssen's plans for reorganizing the German industrial structure¹⁵ for a sample of the kind of cooperation the industrialists could get from Hitler when they had any real objection to tendencies within the Nazi program. During this purge the leadership of the Nazi union cells were killed, along with the leaders of the Nazi party army, the S.A. as one of the steps taken to destroy the two groups within the Party which threatened the complete domination of the industrialists in economic affairs and of their Reichswehr general staff allies in military matters. In these purges Hitler did not hesitate to murder large numbers of his oldest, most loyal supporters in order to thwart the fulfillment of key parts of the Nazi platform which were now¹⁶ dropped at the behest of the industrialists and the generals.

It seems eminently clear that had the industrialists had any real objection to Nazi anti-semitism, they could certainly have brought about at least a modification of this aspect of Hitler's policy. That they made no attempt to do so results from the fact that Hitler's anti-semitism was for them an

essential part of his program to be carefully used and taken advantage of.

The most obvious use of anti-semitism by the industrialists was to provide a convenient excuse for expropriating sizable segments of industry with little or no indemnification. "Aryanization," as the process was called, became a powerful stimulant to the process of capital concentration and monopolization which was basic to the nature of the Nazi regime.

"On May 8, 1935 the Frankfurter Zeitung was forced to admit that far from benefitting the German middle classes, Aryanization chiefly served the interests of the giant enterprises, which used the opportunity to 'round off and extend' their holding..."¹⁷

"Monopolist growth by way of Aryanization was particularly marked in the banking field. Between 1932 and 1939, the number of private banks decreased from 1350 to 520. Aryanization not only assisted the interests of powerful banking institutions; it also became a means for industry to acquire banks of its own and extend its activities in the banking field. For example, the powerful banking firm of S. Hirschland of Essen ...was Aryanized by a group controlled by Thyssen and Flick."¹⁷

The Nuernberg trial procedures and documents give us considerable insight into the mechanics of the aryanization process. The indictment in the "Flick Trial" states that "between January 1936 and April 1945 the defendants Flick, Steinbrink, and Kaletsch...were principals in, accessories to, ordered

abetted, took consenting part in, and were connected with plans and enterprises involving persecutions on racial, religious, and political grounds including particularly the "Aryanization" of properties belonging in whole or in part to Jews... The means of forcing Jewish owners to relinquish their properties included discriminatory laws, decrees, orders, and regulations, which made life in Germany difficult and unbearable for the owners;...and particularly the ever present threat of the Gestapo to arrest, try, and kill Jews without recourse to any reviewing board or court. The defendants Flick, Steinbrink, and Kaletsch and the Flick Concern participated in the planning and execution of numerous Aryanization projects. Activities in which they participated included procurement of sales which were voluntary in form but coercive in character, efforts to extend the general Aryanization laws, and several types of perversion of governmental authority."¹⁸

As early as July 13, 1933 we have a letter from Steinbrink, then a leading official in the Flick Concern, to Heinrich Himmler suggesting that "it will be best...to eliminate the persons in question" from the supervisory board of certain industrial plants."¹⁹

Flick's first major industrial acquisitions through aryanization were the blast furnaces of the Jewish owned Hochofenwerke Luebeck (1937). In the course of Flick's campaign to acquire Luebeck, "we find Flick and his associates exploiting not only the general pressure against the Jews in Germany, but also a number of special types of fraud and coercion

... They repeatedly stressed their special authorization by the government to accomplish the Aryanization..."²⁰ Flick threatened the owners with government reprisals if they sold abroad. He and the others "noted with satisfaction in their memoranda the fear engendered in the minds of the owners by threatening speeches of Goering and other Nazi leaders."

Flick induced one of the Jewish groups holding an interest in the Leubeck plant to sell by giving them an assurance that their remaining industrial interests would not be touched. Shortly after the transaction, Flick wrote a letter to one of his officials indicating his knowledge that this promise was merely a temporary stall. Within a few months, the remaining interests of the group were Aryanized by another concern.²²

The best documental example of the way in which Aryanization functioned is provided by Flick's role in the so-called "Petschek Case." A Czechoslovak Jewish family, known as the Petscheks, owned properties which yielded coal production equal to 20% of the total tonnage of all kinds of coal mined in Germany.²³ The extensive Flick files on this case show clearly the maneuvers resorted to in order to gain control of these properties.

In 1937 one branch of the Petschek family was induced by mounting pressure against the Jews to sell its holdings to the Wintershall Concern at "a good deal less than their market value."²⁴ In the meantime Flick's officials were negotiating with Goering to ascertain that the coal fields would fall into

their hands and that even the low price offered by Wintershall should not be paid.

The testimony of Erich Gritzbach,²⁵ one of Goering's assistants, indicates the manner in which Flick and his associates maneuvered in order to get Goering to direct that "Flick would be the only one who was authorized to carry out negotiations for the acquisition of the Julius and also the Ignaz Petschek property."²⁶

Thus when the Petschek representatives arrived in Berlin to negotiate with Wintershall, they were faced with a government order canceling these negotiations and forcing them to deal with Flick.

Documents from the Flick files begins with a memorandum dated December 30, 1937 which reviews a discussion between Goering, Steinbrink and Flick concerning the best method of taking over the Petschek properties. They agreed that expropriation was possible but in view of international complications, was to be used only as a last resort. They decided instead to invoke the threat of expropriation and urged the government negotiator to make known the threats "with fullest brutality."²⁷

In a memorandum containing "notes for the information to be given the General (Goering),"²⁸ Steinbrink notes: "We think it is no use negotiating without government pressure..."²⁹ In spite of the fact that British and American banking circles have an interest in the Petschek holdings, Steinbrink opines

that "it is only a political question depending on the overall foreign policy situation..." whether consideration of these interests should in any way restrain direct action in taking over the mines."

A memorandum of Flick (19 January 1938) made in preparation for an "imminent conference with Goering" notes the unwillingness of the Petscheks to sell. Flick agrees that "should we begin to confiscate the property... the consequences, from an international point of view cannot be overlooked."³⁰ Therefore he advises that such measures be reserved while threats and pressure are intensified.

Subsequent notations by Steinbrink include the record of a conference in January 1939 in which one of the Petschek representatives was told "emphatically...the general measures against the Jews which were about to take place."³¹

In pressing his claim for his right to a major share of the properties about to be taken over, Flick writes: "As a result of Jewish intrigues, it (Flick's Mittelstahl Company) has been deprived of its natural brown coal basis. It is only a matter of course that this condition must be remedied when Jewish holdings are distributed."³²

In a memorandum of 17 February 1938 Steinbrink speculates on the possibility that "the change in the Austrian situation (i.e. the impending Anschluss) will make any impression on the Petscheks."³³ He recommends a plan whereby a press attack shall be undertaken to "expose publicly the conduct of the Petscheks during the time of the inflation...and to revive

the Hohenlohe affair." In the memorandum one sees a sample of the influence of the industrialists in stirring up anti-semitic propaganda when it suited their needs.

As a direct outgrowth of these and other similar situations, the Nazi government, spurred on by Flick and many others like him, issued its decree of 26 April, 1938 concerning registration of Jewish owned property³⁴ and its decree of 14 June 1938 stating the conditions under which industrial enterprises are considered Jewish etc.³⁵ Shortly thereafter, one of the two Petschek groups sold its interests to Flick for a fraction of its value (25 May 1938). In granting formal approval of the acquisition, Goering's deputy remarks: "The problem of Julius Petschek having been solved, I am awaiting your (Flick's) proposals for the further handling of the problem of Ignaz Petschek."³⁶

Further documents include the following: (1) analysis by Flick's lawyers of ways in which seizure could be facilitated under the new decrees (Document NI-898); (2) pressure on the government from Steinbrink on 22 June 1938 to the effect that "still other measures must be adopted...in the interests of the efforts to Aryanize" (Document NI-897). The anti-semitic legislation adopted by the Nazis was not stringent enough to satisfy Steinbrink and his associates.

From this time on Flick representatives continued to take the initiative in finding ways of most profitably securing the transfer of property to themselves. After the Munich Pact of 29 September 1938 the Germans seized control of the

Sudetenland where the Petschek headquarters were located. Flick representatives staved off a threat that the government itself might take over some of the property and maintained its position as sole negotiator. A dispute ensued over distribution of coal in which managers of the state owned, Herman Goering Works vied with Flick. When an agreement was finally reached on January 1940, the settlement worked out by the Flick representatives was accepted and was evaluated as "for us (Flick Concern) an excellent private transaction."³⁸ The Jewish owners received nothing for their property. The negotiations leading to this settlement show again the ability of the industrialists to bend the government to their will when they desired to do so.

The example of Flick is typical of the relationship of the industrialists to the Aryanization policy. Both Farben and Krupp trials provide us with an abundance of similar examples.

As early as 1936, Paul Halfliger, a Farben director was using Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland as a threat to attempt to force Jewish firms in Austria to sell to Farben. At this early date Farben director von Schnitzler was negotiating with the German government for rights to claim property in Austria.³⁹

In 1937, after the murder of Dollfuss by the Nazis, Halfliger went back to Vienna to see the managers of Skoda-werke-Wetzler, whose parent corporation was owned by the Rothschilds and the Czech National Bank. He attempted to coerce them into selling 51% of their stock to Farben in view of the

impending Anschluss of Austria to Germany.

In February 1938, Skodawerke's general manager gave the firm's last voluntary answer in a letter to Dr. Schmitz: "It is not possible to relinquish our standpoint that the Kreditanstalt unconditionally must keep 51% of the shares in its strict control."³⁹

When German troops took over Austria on March 12, 1938, Hitler's economic advisor in Vienna at first issued a decree forbidding any German firm from acquiring Austrian enterprises. Even Jewish enterprises were to be left temporarily unharmed.

When this decree was issued the Farben directors remaining in Berlin "approached the Goering circle. From March until June they reminded Goering repeatedly that there were many Jews in the Austrian chemical industry who should be replaced by Aryans whom Farben stood ready to supply. Even before a decision was made, Schmitz prepared the directives which 'would safeguard uniform Farben interests.' (These directives stated:) 'all non-Aryans employed by Austrian organizations should be given leave of absence, i.e., should be dismissed. Likewise, the directors and members of the managing boards, insofar as they are non-Aryans are to be asked to give up their mandates.'⁴⁰

Schmitz the Farben director, appealed to "Nazi idealism" in order to override Nazi official Wilhelm Keppler and facilitate seizure of Jewish property. As a result of continued

pressure in Berlin by another Farben director, Dr. Max Ilgner, conditions for the Austrians became more and more untenable. Finally, "Pollack, manager of Skodawerke Wetzlar called in Farben's Vienna representative and surrendered his desk... The 'offered price' for Skodawerke had been extremely low, but the Austrians accepted it because Farben had promised protection for their lives... But Farben did not try to save the two Jewish directors... Pollack's house was 'searched' and he was literally trampled to death... by SS men."⁴¹

After this first victory, "Farben did not have to hint or dicker in dealing with the other Austrian companies." The two largest remaining chemical firms in Austria were "owned by both Aryans and Jews. In pushing the owners to sell, Farben deceived them by stating that all personnel of both firms would be considered Jewish by the Nazi government, that their property would be confiscated... These two firms were taken by Farben under a contract which would be illegal on its face anywhere in the world. For nothing but the promise to go on paying dividends for twenty-five years, Farben got all properties and interests."⁴² Here was Aryanization at its best; here was anti-Semitism yielding abundant fruit.

The same pattern was followed in the Sudetenland where Farben backed Sudeten newspapers which helped spread propaganda and atrocity stories, contributed heavily to the Sudeten Germany Free Corps which engaged in inciting border riots, and at the same time prepared a plan known as "The New Order for the Chemical Industries of Czechoslovakia."⁴³ The transfer of the Czech

industries to Farben was more orderly than the Austrian procedure.

When the Munich Pact was signed, Schmitz of the Farben Directorate wired Hitler: "I am impressed by the return of Sudeten Germany to the Reich, which you, my Fuehrer have achieved. Farben puts at your disposal an amount of half a million Reich marks for use in the Sudeten German territory."⁴⁴

Farben followed the same procedure in Poland. In the summer of 1939, one of its agencies presented to the German government a survey called "The Most Important Chemical Plants in Poland." The survey "set forth detailed charts of facilities, biographies of the plants' directors and owners... When the invasion came, Farben representatives were on the spot at Boruta (Poland's largest chemical plant) before the plant fell into army hands."⁴⁵ Before Lodz, let alone Warsaw was conquered, Baron Von Schnitzler was on hand inspecting leading dyestuff firms. A week before there was any German civil administration in Poland, he wired his subordinates in Berlin to prepare to negotiate with the Nazi Ministry of Economics.⁴⁶

One of the Jewish directors of a Polish chemical firm testified at the Farben trial concerning the "particularly rigorous" treatment he and his family received from the Farben representatives despite the fact that he knew them personally and had done business with them before the war.⁴⁷ With regard to properties in Poland as elsewhere, Farben brought a great deal of pressure to bear on the Nazi government to hasten the transfer

of property to itself, and to ascertain that the owners got not a cent. "Everything was taken over but the debts."⁴⁸

The same pattern for acquiring property was followed by Krupp. The Krupp trial documents the seizure of the Bernsdorf plant in Austria, the Austin Plant in Lancourt France, the Elmag Plant in Mulhouse France, and the Alsthom Firm in Belfort, France.

The documents collected in connection with this trial, include minutes of a meeting in which a message from Nazi Finance Minister Funk was delivered to the iron and steel manufacturers. This group, known as the "Small Circle," met on 7 June, 1940 to discuss ownership and operation of enterprises in newly occupied Western European areas. Funk the Nazi had to plead with the executives to maintain "a reasonable attitude ... and to repress the desire for annexation,"⁴⁹ Funk reminds the executives that "he has given considerable assistance to business, particularly as regards the problem of taxation."⁵⁰ Now he asks that "care be taken that no excesses occur." Despite Funk's plea, annexation of expropriated Jewish property was spurred under pressure from Krupp and his cohorts.

The results of the Aryanization policy may be summarized as follows: "The economic legislation against the Jews was one of the most important methods for distributing spoils... It redistributed property among those strata of the population whose support is vital for the regime: the powerful financial and industrial capitalists."⁵¹

"National Socialist observers admit that the acquisition of Jewish property played a considerable role in the expansion of the industrial combines... The beneficiaries of Jewish industries have without exception been the most influential industrialists..."⁵²

These benefits which accrued to the industrialists as a result of Aryanization, might in themselves have provided sufficient motivation for them to seek out an anti-semite like Hitler and assist him into power. Actually this was only one of the many ways in which anti-Semitism served the ends of the industrialists.

In the early phases of the Hitler regime, the role of anti-semitism in providing an outlet for the anti-capitalist sentiments of the German middle class was for more important. Anti-semitism enabled the Nazis to speak the language of anti-capitalism and anti-monopolism while at the same time strengthening the monopolies. The industrialists, unwilling to seek a solution of the economic problems of the country which might curtail their powers or profits, simply diverted the mass wrath against the failing system onto the Jews.

After the Nazis came to power, even the Jewish owned department stores, which had borne the brunt of Nazi "anti-monopolist" propaganda, were not closed but were merely taken over by joint stock corporations owned by German's largest banks.⁵³ While the industrialists were waxing fat on Aryanized Jewish wealth, the middle classes, far from benefitting from

the Aryanization policy, found their distress intensified. Thyssen observed: "In all our towns with a large working population, the department stores remained open... As for the retailers who stupidly believed that the slump of their business was due to Jewish competition, they were subsequently ruined...and sent to work on the fortification on the western frontier."⁵⁴

It is obvious that under such conditions, as the concentration of wealth in the hands of the industrialists proceeded, their need for anti-semitism as a diversion and a camouflage with which to distract the masses increased. The record of German anti-semitism shows that outbreaks against the Jews were carefully timed to cover up unpopular measures by the State. "The discontent of small businessmen because of their elimination from business had to be diverted... Instead of exterminating Jewish economic life at one blow, the National Socialist administration proceeded gradually... The administration kept a number of anti-Jewish measures up its sleeve and enacted them one by one, whenever it was necessary to stimulate the masses or divert their attention from other socio-economic and international policies."⁵⁵

It is no coincidence that the 1938 economic and physical assault on the Jews "coincided with the purge of 'inefficient' personnel from retail and handicrafts business: that is to say, with the repudiation by National Socialism of its pledge to protect the old middle classes... The economic persecution

of the Jews was a mere diversion intended to conceal the assault on the middle classes as a whole."⁵⁶

It is clear that this use of anti-semitism was an indispensable aid in the execution of the entire policy of monopolization and cartellization so basic to the Nazi state. The documents previously cited indicate the role of the industrialists in urging the government to decree ever more stringent regulations against the Jews.

We must consider briefly one additional aspect of the use made of anti-semitism in pursuing the policies of the industrialists. The handmaiden of anti-semitism is racialism. By exploiting and fomenting German racialism, the regime was able to rally the entire German people around the program of imperialism which the industrialists had so long cherished. Rearmament and war "required an ideology that could justify the huge effort in the eyes of the people."⁵⁷ The theory of German racial superiority and the apparition of the international Jewish enemy provided the basis for this ideology.

These observations concerning the exploitation of anti-semitism by the industrialists in attaining their goals, help us to see that Hitler's anti-semitism was essential for them. It helps us understand why they abandoned old fashioned reaction, as typified by their old line right wing parties, in favor of Hitler. These parties could never rally the masses To exhibit the complete personal immersion and loyalty required by total war. They needed a new ideology, democratic in

appearance, in which the rulers and the ruled could be represented as pursuing identical interests, in which internal social antagonism could be utilized and transformed into external aggression. The Nazi racial doctrine and its by-product, anti-semitism, provided this ideology, and enabled, the industrialists to achieve their aims.

In view of the way in which the new regime served the ends of the industrialists it is not surprising that they were so uniformly enthusiastic in the support which they tendered. Even Fritz Thyssen who left Germany in 1939 for reasons not fully known, nowhere repudiates the Nazi regime or Hitler, in his memoirs.⁵⁸ He refers to differences on specific issues, and to dislike for some of Hitler's associates, but he defends the basic structure of the regime and its policies.

The others who remained in Germany showed their appreciation by sharing the stolen Jewish loot with the Nazi bureaucracy and by extending their unstinting support not only to the regime, but to the Nazi party as well.

It was Gustav Krupp who in May 1933 organized the "Adolph Hitler Fund" to finance the activities of the Nazi party. According to his suggestion, collections for this fund covered "all firms in German industry, including agriculture and banking." Krupp assumed the chairmanship of this fund saying: "Inspired by the will to give my full cooperation to this project, which is to represent a token of gratitude to the leader of the nation, I accepted the chairmanship upon

unanimous request of the leading associations."⁵⁹ This "Adolph Hitler Fund" became the "greatest private source of funds for the NSDAP. Krupp alone contributed in excess of 6,000,000 R.M. to it. Its leadership, originally assumed by Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, subsequently devolved upon... Alfried Krupp."⁶⁰

The deliberations of the "Circle of Friends" led it to increasingly close relationship to Himmler and the S.S. It became known in 1934 as "the Circle of Himmler Friends." As was stated previously, this group included representatives of the leading industries⁶¹ in Germany. From the time of the Nazi access to power, "this group started to make financial contributions to Himmler's private funds aggregating about one million R.M. per year. Flick's regular contribution was 100,000 R.M. per year."⁶² These contributions made possible the development of the S.S. from its position as small and insignificant group in 1933, to the all powerful executor of terror which it soon became. Lest there arise any claim that industrialists were coerced into joining the Circle let us note the testimony of Wilhelm Keppler, Hitler aid and organizer of the group:

"I (Keppler) have mentioned already that it was sometimes difficult to refuse gentlemen who wanted to become members of the Circle. I can tell you that I had application from people who offered thousands of marks in case they became a member of the Circle."⁶³

Thus we have seen how the program of the Nazi regime fulfilled the desires and plans of the large industrialists and

how this group continued to be the staunchest supporters of the regime. Furthermore, the evidence has shown the function of anti-semitism in the attainment of the industrialists' goals, and has revealed the frequent intervention of these men to hasten and to intensify anti-semitic measures by the regime in order to secure additional gain. Though the passionate anti-semitic bias of Hitler and many of his followers was undoubtedly irrational, the application of anti-semitic policy by the government was always carefully and rationally planned in order to yield the greatest advantages to the Party and to the industrialists.

The monopoly capitalists, unwilling to curtail their power or their profits in seeking a solution for the problems of a sick society, engineered the sacrifice of one group in the population in the attempt to save themselves. The Jews, having served as the offering many times before, were admirably suited to play the role once again.

CHAPTER VI

THE INSTRUMENTS DEvised FOR MAKING HUMAN BEINGS SUPERFLUOUS

"Today with population almost everywhere on the increase, masses of people are continually being rendered superfluous by political, social, and economic events. At such a time, the instruments devised for making human beings superfluous are bound to offer a great temptation: Why not use these same institutions to liquidate human beings who have already become superfluous?....

The Nazis knew exactly what they were doing when... they set up those factories of annihilation which demonstrated the swiftest possible solution to the problem of superfluous human masses. There is no doubt that this solution will from now on occur to millions of people whenever it seems impossible to alleviate social, political, or economic misery in a manner worthy of man."

Hannah Arendt¹

The acceleration of the process of monopolization which took place in Germany in 1938 displaced considerable segments of the German population and rendered them economically "surplus." the preparations for war then in progress enabled the regime to defer the necessity of coping with this problem by putting the eliminated Germans to work in the unproductive task of building fortifications.²

As for the Jews, the Aryanization phase of the monopolization program had deprived them of their possessions and of any opportunity to earn a livelihood. In addition to being considered according to Nazi ideology socially undesirable, they now became in a real sense economically unnecessary.

Their dilemma and the plight of the bankrupted German shopkeepers and craftsmen, highlighted the consequences of the German economic policy; the contraction of the economy which resulted from monopolization created unsupportable population surpluses.

Since the German Jewish community was relatively small, and opportunities for emigration were available, there was not yet an urgent need for concrete measures to cope with the implications of this problem. Shortly thereafter, however, the implementation of the long cherished ambitions of the industrialists to "reorganize" the economy of the entire European continent created a population problem which made an immediate solution crucial.

The industrialists had realized from the first that the gains to be derived from cartellization and aryanization

were at best only temporary pallatives for the problems of "over-expanded" German industry. Even during the peak boom year of 1929 the steel and coal industries had not operated at near capacity.³ They concluded that nothing short of an imperialist war, and a reorganization of the economy of the entire European continent centered around German industrial production could solve their problems.

All the industrialists boasted frequently during the Hitler regime about their unceasing efforts to bring about German rearmament. For example, in a speech delivered in January 1944 at the University of Berlin Gustav Krupp boasted: "It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy that it did not remain idle during those bad years (1919-1933), even though its activity could not be brought to light for obvious reasons. Through years of secret work, scientific and basis ground work was laid in order to be ready again to build the German Armed Forces at the appointed hour."⁴

It was through Hitler that their ceaseless efforts to resume German rearmament were realized. Hitler's greatest value to them derived from the fact that his "program" made the attainment of this goal feasible. More than this, his racialism and anti-semitism prepared the people to fight the inevitable war by creating the illusion of a menace and uniting all Germans. When the need arose, these same doctrines provided a handy ideological justification for the economic reorganization which required subordination of the needs of the "inferior" peoples of Europe to those of the "master race."

While observing the exploitation of racialism in the interest of the economic goals of the industrialists, we must also note the curbing of this ideology when it interfered with these goals. Those among the Nazi leadership who took their racial theories seriously were prevented from invoking them when they threatened German imperialist aims. One has but to compare the harsh repression meted out to the "superfluous" Slavic Poles with the generous treatment accorded the munitions producing Slavic Czechs, or to contrast the Nazi regard for the Asiatic Japanese, with their harshness to the "Aryan" Dutch, for blatant examples of the cynicism with which the Nazis applied their racial theories. This cynicism never inhibited the use of racism as a facade which transformed the ruthless ambition of the industrialists into an idealistic national goal.

Germany's imperialism," wrote Franz Neumann in 1942, is primarily the policy of its industrial leadership, fully supported by the National Socialist party... The imperialist war is the outcome of the internal antagonisms of the German economy."⁵

The annexation of the industrial capacities of Austria and the Sudetenland by German industry had served as a prelude. Full implementation of the plan awaited the conquest of Poland. We have seen how the representatives of the I.G. Farben company were on hand at Polish chemical plants before receiving official authorization from the government, before there was even any German civil administration in Poland.⁶

"Then, in November (1939), Karl Wurster (Farben director)

took a trip through conquered Poland to inspect...(chemical) companies. In most cases Wurster urged that equipment and installations be dismantled and brought to Farben's home plants. Immediately and without permission of any Reich representatives, Farben began taking the equipment back to Germany."⁷

The German policy regarding Poland was explicitly stated in a directive by Goering on 19 October 1939:

"On the other hand there must be removed from the territory of the Government General (area of Poland not annexed to Germany) all raw materials, scrap materials, machinery, etc., which are of use for the German war economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely essential for the meager maintenance of the naked existence of the population must be transferred to Germany, unless such transfer would require an unreasonably long period of time, and would make it more practicable to exploit those enterprises by giving them German orders, to be executed at their present location."⁸

On October 3, 1939, a month after the war began, Hans Frank, newly appointed administrator of Poland described his responsibilities as follows:

"Poland can only be administered by utilizing the country through means of ruthless exploitation, deportation of all supplies, raw materials, machines, factory installations, etc., which are important for the German war economy, availability of all workers for work within Germany, reduction of the entire Polish economy to absolute minimum necessary for bare existence of the population, closing of all educational institutions, especially

technical schools and colleges in order to prevent the growth of the new Polish intellegensia. Poland shall be treated as a colony; the Poles shall be the slaves of the Greater German World Empire.... By destroying Polish industry, its subsequent reconstruction. After the war would become more difficult, if not impossible so that Poland would be reduced to its proper position as an agrarian country which would have to depend upon Germany for importation of industrial products."⁹

An order issued by Hess in his capacity as Deputy Fuehrer on 20 November 1939 states:

"...Warsaw shall not be rebuilt nor is it the intention of the Fuehrer to rebuild or reconstruct any industry in the Government General (Poland)."¹⁰

Thyssen noted in his memoirs that in May 1939, a discussion took place at a board meeting of the Reichsbank at which the necessity of "Germanizing" Russia to the Urals¹¹ was discussed. The occupation policy in Poland demonstrated what was meant by "Germanizing."¹¹

Substantially the same procedure was followed in all of the occupied countries including France, Holland, and Belgium. The industrial potential in the West made it expedient to keep a larger proportion of industry temporarily at work in the interests of the war effort. However, the same overall pattern revealed that the ultimate intentions of the Germans were the same. Raw materials were seized and sent to Germany. Special army economic squads were attached to tactical troops in order to

speed up the process of locating, seizing and preparing materials for shipment to Germany.¹²

Production facilities not deemed to serve German interests were shut down. The action in Belgium, which is typical, led to the closing of at least 400 steel plants, "not important to the war effort," by April 15, 1945.^{12a} 1360 out of 2164 plants in the textile industry were closed.¹³ Enlargement of existing plants or construction of new ones was prohibited, and the German military commander was given the right to close down factories at his discretion.¹⁴

Those plants which were necessary for the German war effort were kept in operation, but every means was used to force the owners to "sell" their stocks or at least to transfer control to German companies. The German industrialists who supervised these policies always emphasized the necessity of securing the transfer "legally." They did not like the idea of outright expropriation even when applied against non-Germans. However, when threats and coercion failed to secure a "sale," they did not hesitate to use a direct military order to secure possession.¹⁵

The industrialists who were the chief beneficiaries of the reorganization, were intimately involved in administering its details. Aside from their normal functioning as members of all of the economic agencies of the government, captured records of certain private meetings of the industrialists show their aggressiveness in intensifying these policies. On 17 June 1940, before the surrender of France, "leaders of the seven biggest steel companies of Germany (comprising a group known as the Kleiner

Kreis)...were taking the initiative and actually trying to push the German government itself into dispossessing the French owners."¹⁶

We have already noted that on 7 June 1940 the Nazi Minister of Economics Funk had to urge the industrialists to restrain their desire for annexation "and take care that no excuses should occur."¹⁷ His admonition apparently had little affect on the steel barons and "within six months they had persuaded the government to adopt a plan under which the steel mills and smelting plants in Lorraine would be turned over to the big German concerns."

When one of the officials of the ministry of economics (von Hanneken) suggested in July 1940 that French owners be allowed to retain minority stock participation of 20-25%, Flick responded: "In my opinion this is unnecessary."¹⁸ A few days later, on 5 August 1940, he is quoted in a memorandum as saying: "One should not even consider the question of French circles keeping a minority participation."¹⁹

One of the witnesses at the Krupp trial described the preoccupation of Alfried Krupp and some of his friends at the time of the invasion of Holland. When the radio reports indicated that the military situation was "consolidated," Mr. Krupp and friends gathered around a map "with their fingers pointing to certain places in Holland.... All talked excitedly and with great intensity.... One of them said, 'Here in Village A, there is Mr. Moyer'.... 'This village is yours.....' 'Here is Village B; there is Mueller; he is yours, and there is Mr. Schmidt, or Heiber, or somebody, he has two plants. Well, we will have him

arrested.' And so it went on."

Considerations of space limit the number of examples which can be described. Those cited are typical of the role played by the magnates with regard to every occupied country.

The scope of the population problem created in the wake of this "Germanization" of Europe's economy is patently clear. As conquered countries were subordinated to the interests of the dominant monopolist economy of Germany, the industrial contraction which ensued deprived millions of people of the basis of their existence. "The imperialist program of Germany during the war was tantamount to passing a death penalty on entire peoples and on 'useless' or politically dangerous strata in those groups which were allowed to survive."²¹

The problem of population surplus was most intense in Eastern Europe where it was severe even before the war. Jacob Bestchinsky places the pre-war figure of "superfluous" peasants and impoverished nobles, at 8,000,000.²² The existing crisis was compounded by Nazi destruction of the Polish economy, and intensified still further by annexation of areas of Poland to Germany from which all Poles and Jews were to be eliminated.

The problems arising in the wake of their policies were fully anticipated by the Germans. In a secret document dated January 1940, the Academy of German Law presented a thorough analysis of the consequences of their programs with recommendations for possible solutions. The head of the law academy at the time the report was prepared was Hans Frank²³ who was made Governor-General of Poland.

The excerpt from the report included in the collection of documents reads as follows:

"Short consideration of the prerequisites for a political legal system of the peoples.

1a. Resettlement (pages 6-8)

For the carrying out of costly and long-term measures for the increase of agricultural production, the Government-General can at the most absorb 1 to 1.5 million resettlers, as it is already overpopulated.... By further absorption of 1.6 resettlers, the 1925 Reich census figure of 133 inhabitants per square kilometer would be reached, which practically because of already existing rural over-population and lack of industry would result in double over-population."

The report goes on to point out that the aforesaid resettlement of 1.6 million which would "result in double over-population," would still leave six to seven million Poles without a place to go. The report points out the magnitude of this problem and concludes that "a resettlement of many millions can only be undertaken after victory and only in connection with an overwhelming reorganization of the East, which would create space for the surplus Poles, be it in Siberia, or be it in the bordering territories for example after the resettlement eastwards of the White Russians. A resettlement of several million Jews, perhaps in Madagascar, could also create space...."²⁵

As an immediate measure, the report suggests a slave labor program which would "hamper their native biological propagation."²⁶ The report concludes with the admonition that this

and other "detrimental" reports be "kept steadily under lock and key so that they will not someday fill the White Books printed in Paris or the U.S.A."²⁶

This report shows how clearly the Germans understood the problems of surplus population and anticipated the inevitable difficulties which their economic reorganization was creating. Though the alternative discussed in the report must lead us to regard it as unlikely that the extermination policy had been definitely adopted at this time, other documents leave no doubt that this expedient solution had been considered and was being held in readiness.

It is impossible that the industrialists who were master-minding and accelerating the entire reorganization were unaware of its implications for the displaced populations. On the contrary, they clearly saw the problems and were anxious to see them "solved" in as expedient a manner as possible. The role of the industrialists in creating the conditions leading to extermination ~~had~~ us to conclude that though the Jews of Europe were executed at ~~Amschwitz~~ Auschwitz and ~~Belsen-Bergen~~ Bergen, they were sentenced in the chambers of the Reichbank and at the meetings of the Kleiner Kreis which planned and pushed the "Germanization" of Europe.

CHAPTER VII
IN THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN

"In the execution of this plan, care must be taken that economic security suffer no harm in the occupied zones. The needs of the army should be particularly kept in mind..."¹

Memorandum of Heinrich
Heydrich to SS Group Leaders

Many analysts have tried to find the origins of the German extermination policy in the psychotic compulsions of a few Nazi leaders. These observers usually maintain that the irrationality of the German behavior is proven by the uneconomical operation of the extermination policy. This policy they contend operated in a way which harmed German interests. Referring to the functioning of the extermination policy, Hannah Arendt maintains: "...all this interfered disastrously with the war in the East, as the military authorities as well as Nazi officials...pointed out repeatedly."²

The documents do not corroborate either the statement that the extermination policy "interfered disastrously," nor the assertion that numerous authorities "pointed (this) out repeatedly." On the contrary, the evidence shows that the carefully conceived "ultimate goal" of reducing the "population surplus" caused by the Germanization of Europe, was implemented in such a way as to serve the "short term" needs of German's war effort. The implementation of each stage of the policy toward the Jews reveals the calculated rationality and meticulous efficiency of the Germans. This policy was at all times only one aspect of their dealing with their larger "population problem."

The way in which the German policy functioned is explicitly shown in memorandum addressed to "the chiefs of all detailed groups of the security policy" at the time of the invasion.

"Concerning the Jewish problem in the occupied zone. I refer to the conference held in Berlin today; and again point

out that planned joint measures (i.e. the ultimate goal) are to be kept strictly secret.

Distinction must be made between

(1) the ultimate goal (which requires a prolonged period of time) and

(2) the sectors leading to the fulfillment of the ultimate goal (each of which will be carried out in a short term).

The planned measures require thorough preparation both in technique and in the economic aspect.... The first prerequisite for the ultimate goal is first of all the concentration of the Jews from the countryside to the larger cities."³

The "final solution" referred to in this document seems to allude to extermination. Nonetheless, the short range plans outlined scrupulously subordinate this "ultimate goal" to immediately needs.

Not only did the invading Nazis refrain from killing Jews at this time, they were actually "considerate" of Jewish needs: "No scruples are to be voiced if the migrating Jews take with them all their movable possessions.... Jews who do not comply with the order to move into cities are to be given a short additional period of grace...."⁴ The order reveals the reason for this considerate treatment when it continues as follows: "In the execution of this plan, care must be taken that economic security suffer no harm in the occupied zones. The needs of the army should be particularly kept in mind, e.g. it will not be possible to avoid leaving behind some Jews engaged in trade who absolutely must be left behind for maintenance of

the troops."⁵

The report goes on to elaborate on the way in which the SS chiefs are to take inventory of Jewish property, survey the number of Jewish workers, and carry out the process of concentrating Jews in a few cities. Throughout, maintenance of economic security and "avoidance of loss" is the primary basis for determining policy.

From September 1939 until June 1941, the best interests of the German economy dictated that the Jews be kept alive in spite of their status as an ultimately unsupportable surplus. First of all they had a potential value as hostages for whose release a bribe or some concessions might be extracted. More important, they provided a source of supply for slave labor for use in the war effort.

Such utilization of Jews as slave labor in the German war effort was the primary object of the German policy regarding the Jews during this stage. In an entry in his diary (volume from 25 October 1939 to 15 December 1939) Hans Franks, governor general of Poland states: "Especially urgent is the instituting of forced labor for the Jews. The Jewish population if possible must be extracted from the Jewish cities and be put to work on roads. The critical questions of housing and feeding are still to be cleared up."⁶

On 26 October 1939, Frank issued the decree ordering all Jews to register for forced labor: "For the Jews domiciled in the General Government forced labor is established to take effect immediately. For this purpose, the Jews are to be con-

centrated into Forced Labor Troops."⁷

An entry in the diary dated 2 December 1939 clearly indicates the problems faced by the Germans in utilizing Jewish labor and shows the attempts to cope with them: "The question of forced labor for the Jews could not be solved satisfactorily from one day to the other. Prerequisite for this would be the card indexing of all male Jews from 14 to 50 years of age. In this it had to be ascertained which trade the Jews had so far carried on, because just in those territories, the Jews had had various skilled trades, and it would be a loss if this manpower would not be usefully exploited. To do this, sweeping planning is necessary. For the time being, the Jews had to be gathered in columns and had to be employed wherever there was a pressing need. It is the task of the chief of the district to determine these needs."⁸

A meeting was held in Berlin on 12 February 1940 on "questions concerning the East" which included in its discussions the problem of Jewish evacuation and forced labor. The chairman of the meeting was Goering; among those present was Dr. H.C. Winkler, an official of I.G. Farben and "the Head of the Main Trust Office East."⁹ "By way of introduction, the General Field-marshal (Goering) explained that the strengthening of the war potential of the Reich must be the chief aim of all measures to be taken in the east." In keeping with this aim, the reports of the Gauleiters in the east relate that "the Jews are employed on road construction and are needed for this purpose for a time." The Gauleiter of one of the areas scheduled to be cleared of Jews

reports that although 87,000 persons had already been evacuated, "among these were no workers, except those politically tainted; agricultural workers have not been deported."¹⁰ In order to cope with the problems created by the resettlement in an orderly way, this document records the allocation of the "Lublin area" as a reservation for deported Jews.

Reports which leaked out of Germany at that time indicate that the Germans had begun transporting Jews to this Lublin reservation as early as November 1939.¹¹ Jews deported to this area to start "colonizing work were urged to bring as many tools as possible with them. The deportees were "compelled to work at road building, draining marshes, and rebuilding damaged villages. There is compulsory labor service for men up to seventy years old and for women up to fifty-five."

Early in 1940, the concentration of Jews in the Lublin area was supplemented by the establishment of ghettos in the large cities in which additional Jewish masses might be concentrated. "Already in April 1940 the area destined for the ghetto was called 'the closed contaminated area' and was surrounded with walls."¹² In October 1940 the order was given defining the limits of the ghetto and ordering the concentration of Jews from all over Warsaw within these limits.¹³

The process of ghettoization, as well as the way in which this process was carried out, aided the Germans in effecting their Aryanization program, in organizing Jews for forced labor and in controlling food distribution, and in curtailing

Jewish resistance. It was in keeping with the unchanging German aim of instituting all measures necessary for the benefit of Germany's war economy. Most important of all, ghettoization placed the Jews in a position where they could easily be handled in the future, when the unchanging aim would necessitate a change in practice.

During the period from September 1939 to June 1941, numerous references were made to a possible extermination of the Jews.¹⁴ However, no such program was undertaken, and other suggestions were still under consideration. As late as March 28, 1941, the arch anti-Semite Rosenberg referred to a solution of the Jewish problem "when the last Jew¹⁵ has left the European continent."

Mass annihilation of Jews began on June 20, 1941. It began not with the Jews of Poland, but with the Jews of the Soviet Union. It began not in the concentration camps, but in every Russian and Lithuanian village and city, where the advance of the German army was accompanied by the simultaneous slaughter of millions of Jewish inhabitants. Here is how the extermination program was instituted:

"In June 1941, I (Otto Ohlendorf) was designated by Himmler to lead one of the special commitment groups (Einsatzgruppen), which were then being formed, to accompany the German armies in the Russian campaign. I was chief of Einsatzgruppe D Himmler stated that an important part of our task consisted of the extermination of Jews -- women, men, and children -- and of communist functionaries. I was informed of the attack on

Russia about four weeks in advance.... When the German army invaded Russia, I was leader of the Einsatzgruppe D in the southern sector, and in the course of the year...it liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women, and children. The majority of those liquidated were Jews... The unit selected for this task (implementation of the extermination program) would enter a village or city and order the prominent Jewish citizens to call together all Jews for the purpose of resettlement. They were requested to hand over their valuables to the leaders of the unit and shortly before execution to surrender their outer clothing..."¹⁶

A report from Einsatzgruppe A in the northern sector, shows that the extermination of the Jews began "as ordered on 23 June 1941, the second day of the campaign in the East... Native anti-Semitic forces were induced to start pogroms against the Jews during the first hours after capture, though this inducement proved to be very difficult....

It was desirable that the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at least in the beginning, since the extraordinarily harsh measures were apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the world that the native population itself took the first action by way of natural reaction...."¹⁷

This document reveals that the extermination policy was not a result of German anti-Semitism nor was it a "natural reaction" of Latvian and Lithuanian populations. It was a premeditated policy instituted by the Nazis in order to achieve their long established goals.

How different the policy instituted in Russia was from that which followed the invasion of Poland! Here we find not registration for labor, nor concentration, nor communal organization, but immediate, on the spot murder. What change in conditions made immediate extermination now seem desirable, when at the time of the invasion of Poland, labor registration was called for?

Subsequent German statements and actions enable us to deduce the answer to this question. These show: (1) that once the attack on Russia began the war assumed an irrevocable character, plans for negotiated compromises were definitely abandoned; (2) once areas of Russia were occupied, unlimited numbers of people more willing and better suited than the Jews, became available for slave labors, and therefore there was no longer any need to preserve the Jews for work; (3) the prospective "Germanization" of Russia intensified the problem of surplus population and the need to reduce some of this surplus in order to make room for expelled population from farther west.

The Germans, anticipating a quick victory, realized that even they would find it difficult to carry out mass extermination during peacetime, and was therefore anxious to get as much killing as possible done in the shortest possible time. IN the spring of 1942, Eichmann, a top Nazi leader declared: "Victory is ours. The end of the war is near. We must hurry as this is the last chance to free Europe of the Jews. After the war, it will not be possible to utilize such methods."¹⁸

In view of these new conditions, the interests of the

Germanization policy, now required a thorough going, efficient extermination policy.

Heydrich had already issued an directive ordering execution of Jewish prisoners of war on the eastern front.¹⁹ On 31 July 1941 Goering wrote to him: "Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January 1939 which dealt with carrying out of emigration and evacuation, a solution of the Jewish problem as advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you with making all necessary preparation in regard to organizational and financial matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question...."²⁰

In Poland, where the Jews had already been concentrated in cities, speedy and efficient execution of the task necessitated the use of other means than those employed in Russia. Hoess commandant of the Auschwitz camp from May 1940 until December, 1943 testified before the International Military Tribunal that in the summer of 1941, Himmler notified him that the extermination of Jews was to begin at Auschwitz.²¹ Hoess told how he planned the execution facilities at Auschwitz: "We built our gas chambers to accommodate 2000 persons at one time." "Mass executions," he reports, "began during the summer of 1941."²²

An address delivered by Hans Frank to his cabinet on 16 December 1941 sums up the attitude of German officialdom toward the extermination of the Jews. After noting that "many measures carried out against the Jews are being criticized," he "begs" his colleagues to "agree with me on the following formula: we will principally have pity on the German people only and nobody

else in the whole world...." Apparently there was still some discussion of alternatives to extermination, for Frank asks: "What should be done with the Jews? Do you think they will be settled in the 'Ostland,' in villages?.... We can do nothing with them either in the "Ostland" nor in the 'Reichskommisariat' Gentlemen, I must ask you to rid yourself of all feeling of pity. We must annihilate the Jews in order to maintain the structure of the Reich as a whole...."²³

Here is no impassioned mania. Here is a rational reasoned appeal to self interest. Indeed, Frank was right. The structure of the Reich, "as planned by the industrialist architects and erected by their Nazi partners had made annihilation a "must."

In the same address, Frank notes that " a great discussion concerning that question (i.e. extermination of the Jews) will take place in Berlin in January (1942)." Since the extermination was already a foregone conclusion, the discussion was apparently intended to iron out the technical details, for as Frank points out: "We cannot shoot or poison 3,500,000 Jews, but we shall nevertheless be able to take measures, which will lead somehow to their annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic measures to be determined in discussions from the Reich."²⁴

The "measures" which were introduced were for the most part characterized by the same ruthless efficiency and passionless self interest as had marked the German handling of the Jewish problem up to this time. At the height of the extermination

Jews capable of hard physical labor were not gassed. Even the Einsatzgruppen on the Eastern Front spared "Jews who were still indispensable from the economic point of view."²⁵

The procedure followed at the notorious Auschwitz camp is described by Hoess, camp commander, as follows: "The way we selected our victims was as follows: we had two SS doctors on duty at Auschwitz to examine incoming transports of prisoners. The prisoners would be marched past one of the doctors who would make spot decisions as they walked by. Those who were fit for work were sent into the Camp. Others were sent to the extermination plant."²⁶

This policy led, according to Hoess' estimate to the extermination of "70%-80% of all persons sent to Auschwitz as prisoners, the remainder having been selected and used for slave labor in the concentration camp industries."²⁷ According to a September 1942 memo of Thieroch, Minister of Justice, "the intended aim of the Government in clearing up the Eastern problem (could best be achieved) by the delivery of anti-social elements from the execution of their sentence to the Reich Fuehrer of SS to be worked to death."²⁸

Even during this period of frantic haste in extermination, the mass murders were carefully executed in a manner consistent with Nazi manpower, transportation, and production problems. A cable of 16 December 1942 ordering deportation of 45,000 Jews discusses the following considerations: (1) "In accordance with the increased recruitment of manpower into concentration camps...at least 10,000 to 15,000 laborers will be available when

the (45,000) Jews arriving at Auschwitz are assigned." (2) The deportation will serve "in order to reduce...the excessive number of inmates (of the Biolystok ghetto) to slightly below 48,000. (3) Since "the Reichsbahn (German owned state railway) cannot make available special trains for the evacuation during the period 15 December 1942- 10 January 1943 on account of the increased leave traffic of the Armed Forces," the transportation will start on 11 January 1943."²⁹

The deportation of Jews from Germany itself began in November 1942 when Poles, displaced by resettlement of Germans, become available as labor replacements. "The Jews who will become available as a result of the employment of Polish labor will be deported on a shuttle system. This will apply first to Jews engaged in menial work since they can be exchanged most easily. The remaining so-called qualified Jewish laborers, will be left to the industries until their Polish replacements have been made sufficiently familiar with work processes.... Loss of production will thus be reduced to the absolute minimum."³⁰

Further proof of the careful planning characteristic of the German policy is seen clearly in the record of the deliberations of the General Government cabinet. On 24 August 1942, Hans Frank reported to the cabinet on the critical food situation in Germany. The "occupied Eastern territories - Ukraine and Ostland were not yet able to make an important contribution toward the relief of Germany's food problem. "The victory which Eichman said was "at hand" in spring had not materialized, and a winter of difficult fighting lay ahead. "Under these circumstances"

continues Frank, "before the German people are to experience starvation, the occupied territories and their people shall be exposed to starvation.... This means a six-fold increase over last years (food) contribution from the General Government. The new demand will be filled exclusively at the expense of the foreign population.... If possible, the provisioning of those working in German interest shall be maintained. The feeding of a Jewish population, estimated heretofore at 1.5 million, drops off to an estimated total of 300,000 Jews who still work for German interests as craftsmen and otherwise. For these, the Jewish rations, including certain special allotments, which have proved necessary for the maintenance of working capacity, will be retained.... That we sentence 1.2 million Jews to die should be noted only marginally."³¹

The death sentence of 1.2 million Jews is then, according to Frank, a "marginal" by product of the need to conserve food. The plan provides that despite the desperate food shortage, the 300,000 Jews still working for the Germans, will receive "special (food) allotments."

In spite of the care taken to avoid interfering with German needs, Frank recognizes that there may be instances in which the need to preserve food will cause a hardship in some other area of the war effort but this cannot be avoided. In commenting on the plan he states: "Debate about the figures or measures would be completely superfluous.... For every debate would give rise to the illusion that perhaps some other method would be possible. I must point out that some sectors of the administration

will feel this keenly. In the first place the police.... The economy will feel it... I also assume that our transport system will feel it...."³²

In view of this conflict of interests, it is not altogether surprising to find Frank commenting (in an unidentified fragment attached to the document cited above): "Not unimportant manpower has been taken from us in the form of our old proven Jewish communities. It is clear that the working program is made difficult when in the middle of this program, during the war, the order for complete annihilation of the Jews is given."³³

Unfortunately, this statement invariably quoted by the proponents of the "psychosis" explanation, is contained in an undated, unidentified fragment excerpted from Frank's diaries. In order to fully understand what moved him to make this statement we would have to know when, why, to whom, and in what connection it was uttered. Under the circumstances we can observe that this isolated comment flies in the face of the policy as extensively documented in the diaries themselves. It is possible that, as Frank foresaw, two conflicting German needs created a dilemma in which the fulfillment of the food conservation policy resulted in unavoidable strain on the economy. More likely, the content of the rest of this fragment indicates that Frank was merely invoking the extermination as an excuse for failure to fulfill building quotas for which he was responsible.

The documents include a handful of other often cited complaints that the extermination policy was being pursued with a ruthlessness which actually interfered with German economic

interests. There is one directive addressed to the "Reich Commissioner for the Ostland" (occupied Russia excluding the Ukraine) which states that "economic considerations should fundamentally remain unconsidered in the settlement of the (Jewish) problem."³⁴

In seeking to explain these exceptions to the general rule, let us note that the few such expressions which one finds, are limited to the period between June 1941 and December 1942, and always relate to conditions in Russian Territory. This was the period when the confidence that "victory is ours, the end of the war is near"³⁵ stimulated a certain rash wastefulness.

Reminiscencing about this period in an October 1943 address, Heinrich Himmler himself explained how such slips had occurred at that time:

"I can give you a picture of this first year (of the war against Russia) in a few words.... The Russian Army was herded together in great pockets, ground down, taken prisoner. At that time, we did not value the mass of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, as labor. What after all, thinking in terms of generations, is not to be regretted, but is now deplorable by reason of loss of labor, is that prisoners died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and hunger."³⁶ Thus, Himmler explains the exceptions and assures us that even these, though contrary to immediate economic needs, are "not to be regretted" in the light of the overall, long range aim of "Germanization."

In December 1942, changes in the military outlook brought about a change in the German handling of manpower in

occupied countries. Rosenberg, Minister for the Occupied East wrote at that time: "Since the eastern war has turned out unexpectedly long, it is the opinion of civilian and military commanders that German Eastern policy must be changed. Food rations allowed for the Russian population are so low that they fail to secure mere existence. The Russians are faced with death by starvation.... The position at one time taken by Germans that there are too many people in the East and that their extermination would be a blessing, must now be changed, since the Wehrmacht lives by the work performed in Eastern cities."³⁷

When the extermination policy was instituted, the German regime was of the conviction that it had unlimited manpower resources at its disposal. The Germans were confident that the extermination of Jews and of other peoples, necessitated by their plans for the economic reorganization of Europe, would in no way interfere with the needs of their war effort. After December 1942, when the prospect of immediate victory faded the extermination policies were increasingly modified under the impact of the growing concern with the need to conserve manpower. After this time, one continues to find excesses on the part of lower echelon S.S. units eager to continue their plunder. But as these tended increasingly to contradict the needs of the labor ministry, complaints against them increased, and they were more and more harshly repressed. "From autumn 1942 this number (i.e. the number of exterminations) was falling."³⁸

After December 1942, the intensive recruitment of masses of foreign slave laborers for work within Germany reached a climax.³⁹

By March 1943, programs for improved treatment of prisoners were instituted, and the differentials in rations between Eastern and other foreign laborers were dropped. The Nazis were still confident that their supply of potential slave laborers was almost inexhaustible. Nonetheless, the prospect of a protracted war necessitated greater concern for the survival of those working in the interest of the German war effort. By October 1943, Himmler was, as we have seen, referring to "the mass of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, labor...." and was calling the loss of labor which resulted from the ruthless policies of 1941-42, "deplorable."⁴⁰

An intensification of the extermination policy regarding Jews occurred again in March 1944 when the deportation of Hungarian Jews was undertaken. In this case, the motives for the action are clearly stated. In February 1944, the transfer of industry made necessary by the allied air war created a need for 100,000 laborers.⁴¹ By this time, the deteriorating military situation in the East made procurement of Russian slave laborers difficult. The most readily available source was Hungarian Jewry. Hitler himself ordered Himmler to make 100,000 Hungarian Jews available for labor.⁴²

At this time Eichman and Hoess met in Budapest and discussed the percentage of Jews suitable for use as laborers. "On the basis of transports previously received at Auschwitz and the supply of Jews inspected by him at the collection centers, Hoess stated that only 20 or at the most 25 percent of these Hungarian Jews could be used for labor."⁴³

475,000 Hungarian Jews were deported.⁴⁴ Hitler got his 100,000 laborers and the rest, unfit for labor were exterminated. It is interesting to note that as late as April 1944 the Germans considered a proposal to spare the Jews of Hungary in exchange "for payment in trucks and raw materials with the condition that they would not be used against England or America."⁴⁵ Only when the negotiations failed were the planned actions instituted.

This attempt shows again, the way in which the German leadership could juggle their plans for the Jews. It serves to discredit further the assumption that the anti-Semitic policy was the work of a few deranged psychopaths relentlessly pursuing the destruction of the Jews without regard to objective consideration.

Between the middle of September and October 1944, when the defeat of Germany in the war became a foregone conclusion, Himmler ordered the extermination to stop: "Effective immediately I (Himmler) forbid any liquidation of Jews and order that, on the contrary, hospital care should be given to weak and sick persons. I hold you (SS Generals Kaltenbrunner and Pohl) personally responsible if this order should not be strictly adhered to by lower echelons."⁴⁶

The final note of irony is provided by Himmler's last minute attempt to bargain through neutral intermediaries for the lives of the few Jews who remained.⁴⁷

To the very end, the policy toward the Jews was determined by expediency. German anti-Semitism was at all times, the

policy of a leadership bent on attaining both its short range goal of winning the war, and its long range goal of reducing the population of the colonialized sections of Europe.

At all times, the genocide policy operated in the "best interest" of the Greater Reich being created. Indeed, as has been indicated, the creation of this new Germany, made genocide inevitable. The extermination of the Jews was but one phase of a plan to decimate the population of Eastern Europe by 30,000,000.⁴⁸ When the Maidanek camp was captured, most of the Jews of Europe had already perished. But enough Cyclon B gas was found to destroy four million human beings.

The German industrialists were the chief architects of German monopolistic imperialism which bred this catastrophe.

CHAPTER VIII
ASSISTING IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY

"I am pleased to inform you at this opportunity that your (Himmler's) circle of friends has again placed to your disposal this year a sum slightly in excess of RM 1 million for 'special purposes.'

Please be assured that we will always do everything in our power at all times to assist you in every possible way."

Letter from banker Baron Kurt von
Schroeder (On behalf of Himmler's
Circle of Friends) to Heinrich
Himmler, 27 August 1943.¹

We have seen the centrality of the industrialists in conceiving and directing the policy of economic imperialism which led inevitably to the mass annihilation of subjugated peoples. Furthermore, we have seen the scrupulous efficiency with which the extermination policy was carried out by their regime. The point which remains to be investigated is the immediate role of the industrialists in the actual physical execution of the extermination policy.

It is clear that their direct participation was far wider than can be explicitly shown in the documentary sources which are available. There are numerous indications that the industrialists were careful to avoid written references to their relationship to the exterminations, and were thorough in their destruction of documents which contained such references.

The notes of one of the S.S. doctors at Buchenwald describe Farben's participation in medical experiments on human beings. This source reveals the use of pseudonyms by Farben officials in their correspondence concerning the project. They quote a statement made by Farben official Dr. Weber on an inspection tour of the site of these experiments: "Officially I.G. (Farben) would like to remain in ignorance of the experiments on human beings or of artificial infection being practiced on human beings."²

Though these attempts to camouflage the direct connections of the Concern with the concentration camp activities were thorough. Farben officials found it necessary to destroy the

daily memoranda which were sent from Auschwitz to I.G. Farben headquarters. Among the material salvaged, the prosecution of the Farben trial "turned up ten (empty folders) which, though designated in complicated fashion, were all marked with the key word Auschwitz."³

In spite of this suppression of direct testimony, there is a plentitude of general information which enables us to reconstruct the general pattern of the relationship of the industrialists to the actual extermination process.

The primary link between them and the extermination program was the "Himmler Circle of Friends." As has been previously indicated, this group consisted of representatives from all of the leading German industrial and banking firms.

This group had been organized before Hitler's rise to power as a means of establishing liason between the top industrialists and the Nazis. At the time, the Nazi economist Keppler was the organizer and leader of the circle. However, shortly after the rise to power, when "liason" between Nazis and industrialists was maintained through numerous official channels and the coordination of economic aims manifested itself as state policy, the nature of the "Circle of Friends" changed. Instead of disbanding, the Circle became attached to Himmler and the S.S. The attachment became so close that the group soon came to be known as "Himmler's Circle of Friends."

Keppler himself described the change in his testimony at the Flick trial on 18 August 1947: "The advisory activity with regard to economic problems only took place before Hitler

came to power and then afterward for another year or two.... During the real economic meetings the SS leaders were never present. They came in later on when it only was a question of social gathering."⁴

Keppler would have us believe that the only reason for the continued functioning of the Circle after "the first year or two," was the "real friendly relationship" which developed. "Therefore the Circle remained until the end as a circle of real friends."⁵

This flimsy explanation is completely refuted by the testimony of Otto Ohlendorf, a top SS leader who was introduced to the Circle somewhat later. Rather than a group of "real friends," he describes the group as "people who were strangers to me." He who was a leading S.S. leader was surprised to discover who the members were, for he tells us: "I knew the connections of the combines, but not their directors.... I simply couldn't understand how Flick could play such a part, because I recalled very well the time of 1931-32 when he (Flick) was vehemently attacked by the Volkischer Beobachter because of his doubtful business transactions."⁶

Ohlendorf estimated that the yearly contributions of the circle to the SS amounted to "1½-2 millions (R.M.) annually" which went "most of all to SS leaders."⁷ He testified that he personally disapproved of the use of the Circle of Friends as a source of financial gain, believing that greater sums could be raised by approaching the industrialists separately. However

he did sanction the existence of the circle on the grounds that "it was right that the Reich Leader (Himmler) should have people with whom he could speak freely."⁸

In Ohlendorfs account we see the function of the Circle of Friends somewhat more clearly. It was the means by which intimate connection was maintained between the industrialists and the Nazi secret police responsible for administering the concentration camps, for implementing political terror and anti-semitic riots, and for carrying out the extermination policy. It is particularly interesting to note that of all of the instrumentalities of the Nazi party, the industrialists were especially close to the SS; of all Nazi leaders, they were particularly close to Himmler.

The letters of appreciation to Himmler which accompanied the contributions always expressed extreme satisfaction with the SS and its leader.⁹ The members of the circle always attended the Reichsparteitag celebrations at Nuremberg under Himmler's auspices and "on each 9 November, they went to Munich to attend Nazi memorial exercises and witness the swearing in of new SS men. We also know that Himmler took the circle on tours of the concentration camps at Dachau, Oranienburg and elsewhere. He also frequently invited them to visit his headquarters. Members of the circle recall one such visit to his headquarters on the eastern front in December 1943."¹⁰

During the visit they undoubtedly had the opportunity to verify by first hand observation, the report which they had received in October 1941 from the representative of the iron

producing industry: "The city (Dnepropetrovsk) is free of Jews; so are Kiev, Krivoi Rog, and a few other towns that we passed. Those who did not escape were liquidated."¹¹

On their trips to the camps and SS field headquarters, the industrialists, in addition to being "people with whom Himmler could speak freely" about his plans and activities, became eye witnesses to the murderous activities of the S.S. within the concentration camps and without.

The verdict handed down by the presiding judge at the Flick Trial summed up the relationship of the members of the circle to the SS as follows: "It remains clear from the evidence that each of them gave to Himmler, the Reich Leader SS, a blank check.... It seems to be immaterial whether it was spent on salaries or for lethal gas."¹²

In spite of the close relationship which they maintained with Himmler, the industrialists showed themselves fully capable of opposing him when their interests clashed with his.

The documents show that Himmler wanted to use concentration camp labor to set up new industries under his control, or at the very least to maintain some control over slave labor allocated to private industry. "The industrialists arranged for Hitler himself to veto such an infringement on their domain.

Albert Speer, the Minister for Armaments and Munitions and member of the Central Planning Board, pointed out to Hitler that "no possibility exists of organizing armament production in the concentration camps...(Furthermore) I pointed out to the Fuehrer the difficulties which I expect to encounter if the

Reichsfuehrer S.S. Himmler should be able, as he requests, to exercise authoritative influence over these factories (i.e. those using slave labor.)"¹³ Apparently this reference to "difficulties" which the industrialists would cause, was sufficient to force a compromise in which Himmler received a 3% share of the materials produced by using slave labor as "compensation," but the industrialists maintained full control over their factories and the camp inmates who worked in them. Those who had built Himmler's power as the agent of terror, were quick to curb that power when it interfered with their plans.

With the question of control of concentration camp labor settled and an "equitable" distribution of the profits of this labor arranged, the wholehearted cooperation between the industrialists and the S.S. continued unabated. The agreement laid the basis for a continuing relationship in which the S.S. provided the manpower to enable the industrialists to expand their economic position and increase their profits.

The industrialists knowing full well the processes by means of which slave laborers were obtained, and the relationship of the slave labor program to the ultimate aim of population reduction, vied with each other for control of the largest number of camp inmates. By their exploitation of camp labor they participated directly in murdering masses of people, Jews as well as others.

The ruthless methods of the Farben Concern are typical of the manner in which the industrialists operated. It was Farben

officials who chose the town of Auschwitz as the site of their prospective synthetic rubber and gasoline factories. A report by Farben director Ter Meer reported that the site had all of the necessary "industrial prerequisites."¹⁴

Only manpower to build and man the factories was not available in this sparsely populated area. The Farben representatives made plans to use the inmates of a small concentration camp nearby and then arranged for the construction of a second camp to house the 4000 Jews and 7000 Poles who lived in the town of Auschwitz.¹⁵ In addition to making workers available, they planned by this move to make housing available for the supervising staff which Farben was bringing in.

The report of the Farben engineer Santo states: "The concentration camp already existing with approximately 7000 prisoners is to be expanded. The inhabitants of the town of Auschwitz, especially the children, make a very miserable impression.... The 4000 Jews and 7000 Poles could be turned out so that the town would be available for the staff of the factory. A concentration camp will be built in the immediate neighborhood of Auschwitz for these Jews and Poles."¹⁶

Once the directors of Farben had decided on the Auschwitz site, they proceeded to arrange for the large scale shipments to Auschwitz of slave labor necessary for the manning of the vast project planned. They pressured Goering "to make sure the order for (concentration camp) inmates was put through." Goering "ordered Himmler to turn over inmates to Farben," and Farben

director Krauch wrote: "At my request, the Reichsmarshal (Goering) issued special decrees a few days ago to the supreme Reich authorities concerned...to meet your requirements in skilled workers and laborers...at I.G. Auschwitz."¹⁷

Apparently, the Farben requests for laborers were favorably acted upon by the SS. A letter to the Farben home office reports: "On the occasion of a dinner given for us by the authorities of the concentration camp, we further decided upon all measures for the use of the camp for the benefit of the buna works. Our friendship with the SS is proving very profitable."¹⁸

Before long, the Farben directorate was trying to arrange for the construction of additional factories and for new camps to house the increase in labor which these necessitated.¹⁹

Eventually the Auschwitz extermination center grew up around these factories. When the trainloads of deportees arrived at Auschwitz, those unable to work were sent to the gas chambers for immediate extermination. The others were turned over to the "I.G. Farben concentration camp"²⁰ to be worked to death.

In 1942 Farben requested permission to build a camp nearer to its buna plant. "The government not only approved the building but also granted Farben's request for full authority over the working, eating, and sleeping of the inmates."²¹

The camp which Farben built and operated was the notorious "Monowitz concentration camp." "Farben's full technical committee voted the money to build it -- the two million dollars required for its barbed wire and guard towers, for buying the inmates, for feeding, clothing, and housing them, for paying

the guards."²²

Under Farben's management, the camp, built for 5000 workers, held as many as 20,000 at one time. "In 1942, they had as many as 3000 foreign workers living in one barracks, with only three huts for washing facilities."²³ Living conditions were indescribably bad. "The Monowitz inmates worked only at double pace, from morning to night. When the inmates were counted, the living would hold up the dead for counting purposes so they could continue to draw their rations."²⁴

Within the plant, "Farben overssers outnumbered SS by ten to one." Survivors testified that "once the inmates became assigned to the Farben Meister, they became his slaves."²⁵ Every day after work, the detail was given a cursory examination and those who limped or showed signs of weakness were sent to the gas chambers. "The fear of extermination was used by the (Farben) foremen to spur inmates to greater efforts."²⁶

An inmate-doctor at Monowitz summed up the Farben policy as follows: "On account of the severe living conditions, the prisoners were exposed to the slow process of physical and mental dissolution. The final aim was unmistakable: the de-humanization and eventual extermination of the prisoners employed in I.G. Auschwitz."²⁷ It was cheaper and easier to procure new laborers than to keep the old ones alive. Besides, the procedure had the added advantage of serving the "long range aim" of reduction of population.

We have seen that late in 1943, when the German army began to experience major reverses and increasing difficulties

hampered procurement of additional slave laborers, the German policy toward these workers became much more considerate.

At this time, the SS itself protested against the ruthless treatment which Farben was inflicting upon its workers." "In late 1943...the SS issued repeated warnings and protests to Farben officials and conducted hearings against the supervisors responsible for 'excessive brutalities and incredible living conditions.'²⁸ "When inmates first arrived at the I.G. Farben factory, they looked reasonably well. In two or three months, they were hardly recognizable as the same people; the worst thing was the lack of food.... The SS at Camp I became concerned with the depletion of the labor supply. The most ironical occurrences were the repeated complaints of an SS man to his superior that a Farben foreman was beating the prisoners too often."²⁹

One of the weekly reports by a Farben mine supervisor complains that "in spite of the squalid effect of beatings, the Labor Office has forbidden it."³⁰ In the end the prohibition against beating had to be enforced by the Nazi Labor Office against the practices of the Farben industrial management.

The exploitation of slave laborers by Farben was directly responsible for the death of hundreds of thousands of Jews, as well as Poles, Russians, and even Western Europeans.

Although the case of Farben is more bizarre than that of any other single enterprise, the same general practices were indulged in by the entire German industrial leadership.

Krupp's own records show the number of slave laborers

in his employ at various times. In September 1944, 73,892 slave laborers were employed by the company.³¹ An undated record from the Krupp files lists no less than fifty-six "camps established and used by the firm of Krupp" to house these workers, and shows the location, capacity, and type of foreign labor housed in each.³²

Numerous documents illustrate the manner in which "the Krupp companies specifically requested and actively sought out the employment of prisoners of war and foreign laborers.... Concentration camp labor was requested by Krupp...."³³

A survivor of one of the Krupp Concentration Camps described the Firm's practice of securing important posts in the S.S. for some of its key personnel in order to put the Firm in a better position to exercise its influence on the distribution of labor resources. He testified that such procedures were followed by all of the industrial concerns.

In October 1942, Krupp arranged for the construction of a factory at Auschwitz to be manned by concentration camp labor. The file memorandum notes that "we are to procure the machines and installations; the management will be in our hands. The concentration camp at Auschwitz will place the required manpower at our disposal."³⁴

In March 1943, Krupp's representative in Auschwitz was informed of the availability of about 500 skilled Jewish workers, deported from Berlin, to work in his factory. The S.S. economic representative "again pointed out that...we could count on the full support of the SS...."³⁵

Production in Krupp's Auschwitz factory was to have started in April 1943, but was delayed because of shortages. During that month, the Krupp manager in Auschwitz met with Hoess the camp commandant and reported the following prospects to Krupp headquarters:

"If production starts too late, then the workers will have been taken in the meantime by other firms... Up to now it was always supposed that the supply of workers in Auschwitz is unlimited as regards quality and quantity.... It might happen...(that) the free disposal of workers will no longer exist, because to say the least the best workers will no longer be available.... The technical office must therefore, if necessary by postponing other important programs, give priority to work for the fuse workshop (at Auschwitz)."³⁶

Conditions in the Krupp camps paralleled those in Farben's Auschwitz camp. The documents describe the malnutrition, miserable housing and sanitary facilities and complete lack of clothing and medicine. Torture and continual beatings were routine and the work day was twelve hours long.³⁷ "Steel switches which were used to beat the workers were distributed pursuant to the instructions of Kupke, head of the Krupp camps for foreign workers."³⁸ Once again the death rate was phenomenally high. Dr. Jaeger, senior camp doctor in Krupp's workers camps testified: "They (the workers) collapsed like flies. The cause was bad housing, the poor quality and insufficient quantity of food, overwork, and insufficient rest.... Medical supplies were virtually non-existent.... Krupp was responsible for housing and feeding."³⁹

During air raids all workers went to shelters "with the exception of concentration camp inmates."⁴⁰

The situation in the Flick concern was exactly the same. Flick used as many as 121,484 slave laborers at one time.⁴¹ As in the previous cases "workers were exploited under inhuman conditions,"⁴² the death rate was extremely high, the turnover in labor was "staggering."

A report of the "chief of labor allocations of the Buchenwald camp" in January 1945, lists one hundred and one factories in which inmates of that camp were employed.⁴³ The use of such labor was universal and rivalry to secure larger numbers of camp inmates was heated. Frequently the factory owners resorted to direct contact with concentration camps in an illegal effort to secure more than "their share" of inmates: "SS Oranienburg is complaining that numerous plants are contacting them directly. Reich Association Iron (the association of German iron manufacturers responsible for allocating slave laborers in the armament industry) points out expressly that all communications with Oranienburg, whether written or verbal will be conducted by themselves."⁴⁴

The treatment of slave labor described in the installations of Flick, Krupp, and Farben was paralleled in all of German industry. Verification of this is to be found in a complaint issued by the Nazi labor office in mid-1943. As we have seen, this was the time when the Nazis realized that the continuous flow of slave laborers was endangered. The report describes

the inspection of "eastern workers' camps of factories in the Gaue of Dusseldorf, Essen, South Westphalia, and North Westphalia (made by) representatives of the German Labor Front, the SS, and the Dortmund Regional Labor Office."

It calls attention to "considerable shortcomings...the immediate relieving of which is essential.... The shelters are considered inadequate.... The food is largely poor and inadequate.... The medical care is largely inadequate.... As for treatment, it was⁴⁵ learned that in spite of instructions issued from time to time, eastern workers are still being beaten."

This document, directed against the general practice rather than against any individual concern, confirms our observations concerning the treatment of slave labor. At the same time, it provides us with another ironic example of the intervention of Nazi administrators to protect slaves needed for labor, against the ruthlessness of the industrialists. All of the industrialists participated in this inhuman exploitation of workers; all were directly responsible for large scale murder.

In addition to this general involvement of the German industrialists, those who manufactured chemicals knowingly furnished the poison gas used for the mass exterminations⁴⁶ and those who manufactured drugs participated in the large scale experiments conducted on human beings.⁴⁷

Such participation by the industrialists in the actual mechanics of extermination, highlights the final phase of their participation in the policy of genocide. The entire process of

extermination was the inevitable result of their attempt to save themselves and defer the necessity of solving the problems of a sick society, by sacrificing first the Jews and later large masses of Europe's population, and by enslaving the entire European continent.

The way in which this policy emerged and operated shows us that it was not based on any uniquely German conditions but was "deeply rooted in the trends of modern civilization and especially in the pattern of modern economy.... The dreams of Western civilization may still become reality if mankind can free itself from the use of human beings as surplus or commodities or means. Otherwise we too may face the terror."⁴⁸

CHAPTER I

Footnotes

1. See Phillip Friedman and Koppel Pinson "Books on the Jewish Catastrophe" (Jewish Social Studies, Volume XII, Number 1, January 1950). See also Phillip Friedman "Research and Literature on the Recent Jewish Tragedy" in the same issue. The books listed contain much description but no analysis.
2. A recent issue of Time Magazine published a report that "only 1,000,000" Jews had been murdered, as if the alleged reduction in the number of dead reduced the magnitude of the crime.
3. See Stephen Schwartchild "The Commentary-Monat Axis" (Menorah Journal Spring 1953) on the policy of the State Department in Western Europe and the relationship of Commentary to this policy.
4. Ben Halpern "The Nurenberg Trial" (Jewish Frontier, January 1946, page 31.)
5. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, A Collection of Documentary Evidence and Guide Materials Prepared by the American and British Prosecuting Staffs for Presentation Before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany, volume III, page 525, Document 710 P.S. Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1946. Hereinafter this work is designated as N.C. See also, page 7787 of the Official Transcript of Testimony before the International Military Tribunal, April 15, 1946.
6. Ibid, volume 1, page V.
7. Ibid, page VI.
8. Ibid, page XII.
9. Josiah E. DuBois. The Devils Chemists, page 173. Boston, The Beacon Press, 1952.
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11. Ibid, page 190.
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14. Papen, Franz Von, Memoirs. New York, E.P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1953.
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7. Neumann, Franz, Behemoth, page 210. New York, Oxford University Press, 1942.
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12. Abel, Theodore, Why Hitler Came to Power, page 98. New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1938.
13. Ibid, page 164.
14. Neumann, op.cit., p.110.
15. Ibid, p.121.
16. N.C. volume VII, page 1037. Document L-202. State Department Dispatch from D.H. Buffum, American Consul General at Leipzig 21 November 1938.
17. Goebeels Diaries, p. 261-262.
18. Ibid, p.294.
19. Ibid, p.276.

20. Ibid., p.276.

21. N.C. Volume IV, p. 891. Document 2233d-PS

22. Ibid., Volume VII, p.903, Document L-152.

CHAPTER III

Footnotes

1. Thyssen, op.cit., page 80.
2. Ibid, pp.49-53.
3. Ibid., p.54.
4. Ibid., p.33.
5. Neumann, op.cit.pp 15-16.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Thyssen, op.cit., p.35.
9. Konrad Heiden, History of National Socialism, page 96. New York, Knopf, 1935.
10. Thyssen, op.cit., page 79.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid, page 80.
13. Ibid, page 82.
14. Heiden, op. cit., page 96. "As a matter of fact the inflation had been encouraged mainly by great industrial magnates like Hugo Stinnes...."
15. Ibid, page 102.
16. Ibid, pp.100-103.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., page 97.
20. Ibid., page 105.
21. Ibid.
22. Neumann, op.cit., pp.20-23.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.

25. Heiden, op.cit., page 108.
26. Neumann, op.cit., p.479. See for statistics on political murders and judgments against these.
27. Abel, op.cit., p.75.
28. Ibid, page 311.
29. Neumann, op.cit., p.16.
30. Ibid.
31. Thyssen, op.cit., page 100.
32. Ibid, page 98.
33. Heiden, op.cit., page 103.
34. Tyssen, op.cit., page 103.
35. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, Volume VI, page 290. Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1952. Hereinafter cited as Flick Trial.
36. Guerin op.cit., page 24.
37. Quoted by Guerin, op.cit., page 25.
38. Thyssen, op.cit., pp.102-103.
39. Flick Trial, page 285, Document NI-903.

CHAPTER IV

Footnotes

1. Thyssen, op.cit., p.24.
2. Ibid., p.32.
3. Neumann, op.cit., p.34.
4. Thyssen, op.cit., p.32.
5. Neumann, op.cit., p.30.
6. Flick Trial, p.285.
7. Ibid., p.233.
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9. Thyssen, op.cit., p.100.
10. Ibid.
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12. DuBois, op.cit., p.81.
13. Flick Trial, p.286.
14. Thyssen, op.cit., p.110.
15. DuBois, op.cit., p.81.
16. Heiden, op.cit., p.218.
17. Ibid., p.224.
18. Ibid., p.219.
19. Ibid., p.224.
20. Thyssen, op.cit., p.107.
21. Ibid., p.106.
22. Heiden, op.cit., p.222.
23. Ibid., p.219.
24. Ibid., p.223; see Thyssen, op.cit., p.109 for another version.
According to Thyssen Papen arranged the meeting and invited
Von Schroeder.
25. Ibid., p.226.

26. Ibid, p.226.
27. Thyssen, op.cit., p.104.
28. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, Vol. IX, p.13. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952. Hereinafter cited as Krupp Trial.
29. DuBois, op.cit.,p.323.
30. Krupp Trial, p.337, Flick Trial, p.230.
31. Krupp Trial, p.338.

CHAPTER V

Footnotes

1. Neumann, op.cit., p.264.
2. Guerin, op.cit., p.215.
3. Ibid, pp.208-222.
4. Neumann, op.cit., pp.267-68.
5. Ibid, pp.264-265.
6. Ibid., p.434.
7. Thyssen, op.cit., p.125.
8. Ibid, p.126.
9. Krupp Trial, p.338. Doc. NI-910.
10. Ibid, pp.340-343 document D157.
11. Flick Trial, p.45.
12. Ibid, p.286.
13. Ibid, p.23.
14. Brady, op.cit., p.22.
15. Thyssen, op.cit., p.126. See also Heiden, pp.407-428.
16. Guerin, op.cit., pp.189-192 for destruction of Nazi labor cells, p. 147 for analysis of crushing of S.A.
17. Neumann, op.cit., p.117.
17. Ibid.
18. Flick Trial, p.21.
19. Ibid, p.234.
20. Ibid, p.94.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid, p.46.
24. Ibid, p.95.
25. Ibid, pp.575-598.

26. Ibid, p.578; also Ibid, p.460, document NI-900 and p.464, document NI-899.
27. Ibid, p.438, document NI-10125.
28. Ibid, p.446, document NI 3251.
29. Ibid, p.447, doc. NI-3254.
30. Ibid, p.451, document NI 784.
31. Ibid, p.457, Document NI 3249.
32. Ibid, p.462, document NI 3675.
33. Ibid, p.465, document NI 3241.
34. Ibid, p.459, document 1406 P.S.
35. Ibid, p.477, document 1404 P.S.
36. Ibid, p.476, document NI 3320.
37. Ibid, p.561, document NI 934 and p563 NI-937.
38. Ibid, p.571 document NI 10142.
39. Du Bois, op. cit, p.90.
40. Ibid, p.91.
41. Ibid, p.92.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid, pp.270-272.
44. Ibid, p.271.
45. Ibid, p.112.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid, p.109-110.
48. Ibid, p.114.
49. Krupp Trial, p.484, document NI 048.
50. Ibid.
51. Neuman, op.cit, p.121.
52. Ibid, p.275.

53. Ibid, p.117.
54. Thyssen, op.cit., p.187.
55. Neumann, op.cit, pp.119-121.
56. Ibid, p.116.
57. Ibid, p.103.
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62. Ibid.
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5. Neumann, op.cit., p.202.
6. Du Bois, op.cit., p.112.
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11. Thyssen, op.cit., p.26.
12. NC, vol. VII, p.604, document EC 618.
- 12a. Ibid, p.407, document EC 335.
13. Ibid, p.636, document ECH-19.
14. NC, Vol. VI, p.388, document 3616-PS.
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16. Flick Trial, p.71.
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19. Ibid, p.72, Document NI-3018.
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23. NC, Vol.V, p.390, document 2749-PS
24. NC, Vol. III, p.472, document 661-PS.
25. Ibid, p.473.
26. Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

Footnotes

1. N.C. Vol. VI, p.97, document 3363-PS.
2. Arendt, Hannah, "Social Studies and the Concentration Camps" (Jewish Social Studies) January 1950.
3. N.C. Vol VI, p.97, document 3363-PS.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. N.C. Vol IV, p.903. Document 2233 G-PS.
7. NC Vol VI, p.169, document 3460-PS.
8. N.C. Vol. IV, p.884, document 2233A-PS.
9. N.C. Vol. VIII, p.402, document EC-305.
10. Ibid.
11. N.C. Vol V, p.332, document 2613-PS.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. See Hitler's intentions as revealed by the testimony of Lahousen at the International Military Tribunal. Quoted in Nazi Germany's War Against the Jews, page 1-32, New York, American Jewish Conference 1948. Hereinafter cited as N.G.W.A.J. Also Funks Statement in October 1940, N.C. Vol. IV, p.890, document 2233C-PS.
15. N.C. Vol. V, page 554, document 2889-PS.
16. Ibid, p.341, document 2620-PS.
17. N.C. Vol VII, p.978, document L-180.
18. N.C. Vol. V, p.313, document 2605-PS.
19. N.C. Vol.III, p.123, document 078 P.S.
20. Ibid, p.525, document 710 PS.
21. Page 7787, official transcript International Military Tribunal.
22. N.C. Vol. VI, p.787, document 3868, PS.

23. N.C. Vol. IV, p.891, document 2233D-PS.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p.944, document 2273-PS.
26. N.C. Vol. VI, p.787, document 3868-PS.
27. Ibid.
28. N.C. Vol. III, p.467, document 654-P.S.
29. N.C. Vol. IV, p.49, document 1472-PS.
30. N.C. Vol. VII, p.816, document L-61.
31. N.C. Vol. IV, p.893, document 2233-E-PS.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. N.C. Vol. VI, p.402, document 3666 PS.
35. See statement of Eichmann cited in Note 18 above.
36. N.C. Vol IV, p.572, document 1919-PS.
37. Shiloh, op.cit., p.128.
38. N.C. Vol V, p.1104, document 3311-PS.
39. N.C. Vol III, p.60, document 017-PS.
40. N.C. Vol. IV, p.572, document 1919-PS.
41. Ibid, p.117, document 1584, I-Ps.
42. N.C. Vol. VIII, p.146, document R-124.
43. Ibid, p.608, Affidavit C.
44. N.C. Vol V, p.313, Document 2605-PS.
45. N.C. Vol. VIII, p.614-5, Affidavit C.
46. N.C. Vol VI, p.645, document 3762, PS.
47. N.G.W.A.J. page I-69.
48. Testimony of S.S. General Boch-Selewski before the Nuremberg Tribunal on 7th January 1946: "Himmler planned to decimate the Slav population by 30 million."

Footnotes

1. N.C. Vol VII, p.512, document EC-454.
2. DuBois, op.cit., page 210.
3. Ibid., p.190.
4. Flick Trial, p.293.
5. Ibid., p.292.
6. Ibid, p.297, document NI-3510.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. N.C. Vol. VII, pp.510-513 documents EC-453 and EC-454.
10. Flick Trial, p.109.
11. Ibid, p.698, document NI-5253.
12. Ibid, p.1221.
13. N.C. Vol VIII, p.146, document R-P4.
14. DuBois, op.cit., p.155.
15. Ibid, p.156.
16. Ibid, p.172.
17. Ibid, p.235.
18. Ibid, p.172.
19. Ibid, p.235.
20. Ibid, p.205. In a slip of the tongue, Farben director Ambros himself referred to the "I.G. Farben Concentration Camp in his trial testimony.
21. Ibid, p.222.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid, p.165.
24. Ibid, p.223.

25. Ibid, p.179.
26. Ibid, p.192.
27. Ibid, p.225.
28. Ibid, p.221.
29. Ibid, p.181.
30. Ibid, page 165.
31. Krupp Trial, page 674, document NIK-4022.
32. Ibid, page 678 NIK-10214.
33. N.C. Vol. II, pp.801-802.
34. Krupp Trial, p. 708, document NI-2868.
35. Ibid, p. 719, document NIK-6565.
36. Ibid, p.724, document NIK 4723.
37. N.C. Vol.II, pp. 791-804.
38. Ibid, p.801, document D-230.
39. Ibid, pp.797-798, document D-288.
40. Krupp Trial, p.753, document NIK-7454.
41. Flick Trial, p.755, document NI-4735.
42. Ibid, p.15.
43. Ibid, p.759, document NI-4185.
44. Ibid, p.754, document NI-5598.
45. Ibid, p.742, document NI-456.
46. DuBois, op.cit., page 214.
47. Ibid, pp.125-130, page 210.
48. Leo Lowenthal "Terror's Atomization of Man." (Commentary) January 1946.

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