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THE SABBATIAN MOVEMENT

IN THE YEAR 5426 (1665-6)

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A TENTATIVE INQUIRY

INTO THE HOPES OF ITS SUPPORTERS

AND THE FEARS OF ITS OPPONENTS

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by

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THE SABBATIAN MOVEMENT IN THE YEAR 5426 (1665-6)

A DIGEST

In the middle of the seventeenth century, much of Europe was in transition from the provincial and ingrown existence of the Middle Ages to the dynamic life of a commercial society whose horizons were the ends of the earth. The transition was trying and painful: it involved devastating wars, drastic shifts in power centers, and extensive social dislocation. Though playing no leading part in the transition, Jews were among its special victims, for they were characteristically treated as shock-absorbers for the blows their Gentile neighbors sustained.

The mid-seventeenth century was a halcyon day for mysticism in general and, in particular, apocalypticism. Richly nourished by the insecurity of non-Jewish society, it was in the Jewish world -- in the Sabbatian movement -- that they were to find their most hospitable home.

The movement, in its international scope, may be dated from the last days of Elul, 5425 (September, 1665), when Nathan Ghazati, the "prophet" of Sabbatai Zevi, first announced in letters broadcast through the Jewish world that his master was the Messiah. From that time on, Sabbatai traveled in increasing triumph through Palestine and Syria, and in a short time set out for his first great goal as Messiah, the imperial city of Constantinople. Arrested there, he spent the remainder of the year in prison, not however as a convict, but as a monarch holding court and receiving the homage of untold numbers of awed visitors. At length the Ottoman government determined to end the show and presented him with an ultimatum. Bowing to it, he submitted to conversion to Islam: this was

in Elul, 5426 (September, 1666), almost exactly a year after his name had first become widely known.

During the year, Sabbatai's following had grown phenomenally. His movement had appealed to the mass of Levantine Jewry, that seemed to expect of him liberation from the oppressive hand of Gentile society and of Jewish community leaders as well. He had drawn great strength, as is well known, from the shattered Jewry of Poland and the hounded Jews of Central Europe. Some Jewish leaders and men of wealth had been attracted to his movement, it seems, as an answer to their longing for prestige and status in an increasingly nationalistic world. Other leaders of Jewish communities had doubted Sabbatai's Messiahship but paid him lip-service lest they jeopardize their positions of leadership.

On the other hand, a number of influential Jews in the Levant and a minority in other lands had been skeptical of Sabbatai's pretensions and antipathetic to his movement. The former saw in its anti-Ottomanism a potential threat to their own security and position. The latter, notable among them Jacob Sasportas, feared it as a force for subversion in every community, and as a disrupting influence on Jewish loyalties.

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CHAPTER ONE

A CENTURY OF INSTABILITY: EUROPE AND THE LEVANT BETWEEN 1550 AND 1666

On a December day in 1665, the son of a onetime chicken-dealer stepped into a waiting sailboat at the Anatolian town of Smyrna. The boat was bound for Constantinople, and it was said that there the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire would make obeisance before the chicken-dealer's son. It was said he would acknowledge him as Messiah of the Jews and rightful King of the world, and would remove his own imperial turban and place it on the newcomer's head. As the boat unfurled its sails and pushed out from the shelter of Smyrna's hills, unnumbered Jews sent after it their prayers for its passenger's success. Other multitudes of Jews no longer felt the need to pray for him: they were certain he was the Messiah and his Kingdom was at hand, and the certainty had worked an inner transformation in them.

Neither the force of logic, nor eloquence, nor police power, nor political advantage were at his service. Only the magic word "Messiah"

was at his service. Yet, in the space of a few months, the chicken-dealer's son became the mightiest man in Jewry, his name and his cult all but engulfing our world and stirring Gentiles as well.

This was truly an astonishing phenomenon. We cannot state with certainty why it happened, but we may be sure that, as Sabbatai Zevi was boarding his Messianic boat, history stood in the shadows and impelled him, and his followers and adversaries as well, to do as they did. We may, in these pages, set down some portions of that history that seem to be significant, and we may suggest wherein their significance lies.

A. THE MEDITERRANEAN'S BRILLIANCE IN ECLIPSE

The economic theory of conspicuous consumption may be a modern one, but the practise is not. Some centuries ago, well-to-do Europeans were anticipating Veblen by scrambling after the most conspicuous and extraordinary in eatables and wearables. Since one of the chief determinants of the conspicuous seems to have been the distance the material was hauled, a considerable and highly lucrative trade developed, as early in the Middle Ages as Europe had sufficient wealthy men to make it worth while, with Persia and India and Java and China -- the most distant

lands that Europeans knew and whose products they coveted.

Beginning in medieval days and continuing well on into the Renaissance, goods were funneled through the ports of Egypt and Syria and taken from there by Tuscan and Venetian traders, who distributed them to Europe. This process continued to operate until Europe had become so wealthy and demanding that, compared to the Levantine funnel, she was "a giant fed through the chinks of a wall";[1] it continued, also, until the center of Europe's wealth had so definitely moved westward that Italy could no longer maintain her trade monopoly.

On a midsummer day in February, 1488, Bartholomeu Diaz discovered the cape that he or his Portuguese King dubbed Good Hope. Ten years later his countryman Vasco da Gama sailed around the new-found cape to opulent India, and grateful Portugal immediately understood that he had blazed a new and far cheaper highway between Europe and the East.[2] Portugal was extraordinarily quick to exploit her new route, and the other nations of Western Europe -- she, of course, could not keep the Indian Ocean as her monopoly -- did not wait many years before following her.

Venice, at that time much the greatest Levantine trader among the Italian states, did not need to wait for the Cape route to become well traveled before she understood her dire predicament. As soon as news came to her of the success of Lisbon's second expedition to India, "cadauno ne rimaxe stupefacto". So tells us a diarist of the day, adding, out of the depth of his depression, "Fu la peggior nuova dal

perdere la libertà in fuora!"[3] Desperate, the Adriatic republic cast about for some way to maintain herself. She even had the idea of re-digging the ancient Suez Canal to give her galleons direct access to the Indies; the plan might perhaps have succeeded, had not West Europeans opposed it in the court of the Mamelukes.[4] At length, left without an alternative, the Venetians saw their Orient trade go into near collapse as early as 1502.[5]

With its remarkably abrupt shift of the centers of commerce, the beginning of the sixteenth century brought prosperity to important towns in the Atlantic seaboard region, and recession to the proud ports and market-cities of the eastern and middle Mediterranean. Egypt suffered from the decline of Cairo and Alexandria, and all Turkey felt the pinch of her loss of customs duties.[6] The golden age of Florence, the Tuscan capital, and of Venice were over.[7]

Still, the Mediterranean centers managed to readjust. Turkey nursed her wounds for a decade or so and then proceeded to recoup her loss a hundredfold -- not by attracting trade to herself, be it emphasized, but by conquering places where trade was already carried on. Under Selim I (1512-20) nearly all the Middle East -- upper Mesopotamia and Syria, the Arabian peninsula and Egypt -- fell before the Ottoman sword. Selim's son, the great Süleyman (1520-66), added to his empire such far-flung lands as the Barbary coast, Hungary, and as much of the Balkans as was not yet in his hands. Quite understandably, the Ottoman Empire basked in prosperity as long as it could engage itself in digesting these conquests. Whether the Empire's prosperity had a solid

or an ephemeral base is another question.

Venice managed to reconcile herself to the loss of her Indies trade. She remained busy, though of course on a less pretentious scale, acting as merchant between the Ottoman Levant, her own extensive Mediterranean possessions, and Europe.[8] In addition, she could maintain an air of wellbeing throughout the sixteenth century by living in part off the vast capital she had amassed in her golden age.[9] Truly, she made of the sixteenth a century of magnificent cultural display. It was the era when some of her noblest palaces and churches were built. It was the era of Bordone, Tiepolo, Veronese, Tintoretto, El Greco, and Titian.

The turn of the sixteenth century, in conclusion, was the point at which the centers of the world's commerce moved from the Mediterranean, leaving that sea to its local trade, and settled near the Atlantic Ocean, in Lisbon, Seville, and above all in Antwerp.[10]

B. FEUDALISM'S TROJAN HORSE -- INFLATION

To Lisbon, Seville, and Antwerp came galleons not only from the Indies, but from an entirely new continent as well -- from America.

Among their varied cargoes was one material especially prized in Iberia, the silver of Mexico's mines. Its importation beginning about the middle of the fifteenth century, little more than a decade was needed before it was pouring into Seville at the rate of a quarter billion maravedís per year.[11]

We are told that the Spanish government looked with great favor upon the influx of precious metal, for according to her favored "bullionist" theory of economics, gold and silver were the basis and the source of national strength.[12] Undoubtedly, the silver -- and, to a lesser extent, the gold -- of America's mines did do much to stimulate world trade and usher in the day of true capitalism.[13]

Mid-sixteenth-century Spain, however, had neither the middle class nor the material resources necessary to make economic use of her vast store of precious metal. Instead of helping her, therefore, the gold and silver gave rise to an inflationary price rise that helped to bankrupt her government and then went on to alter the social complexion of Europe.

Prices rose steeply in Spain, and they went beyond her borders to rise as steeply in all the lands that had close economic ties with her.[14] Poland, for example, was then a prosperous land; she was "the granary of Western Europe."[15] Nonetheless, inflation brought her the first pangs of coming discontent, as -- in Lwów -- the cost of living more than quadrupled and real wages fell by over one-quarter between 1521 and 1600.[16]

Through great areas of western and central Europe, inflation crippled the creditors, the workingmen who lived on fixed wages, and the medium and small landowners, who subsisted on their fixed rents.[17] Bankruptcies among the peasantry and the lesser gentry became common; these bankruptcies forced interest rates up to multiples of what they had previously been, and this development in its turn brought added misery.[18] It was a classical picture of inflation and its evils.

There were those, however, who profited from the inflation. The merchants and master craftsmen of the cities, who could keep ahead of price rises, found attractive investments for their surplus cash in the debt-ridden estates of the gentry. To a somewhat lesser extent, independent farmers found themselves able to buy up the mortgages of bankrupt estates. As a result, the inflation did much to work a great social change in late sixteenth-century Europe: it greatly strengthened the bourgeoisie and the independent farmers, and at the same time considerably weakened the feudal landowners, while pushing many of the poorer peasants, the servants and artisans into the ranks of the jobless proletariat.[19]

C. BUSINESS MEN -- THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY'S REVOLUTIONISTS

The merchant class was now, so to speak, a revolutionary class. Increasingly aggressive, going from ambition to greater ambition, its members were steadily broadening their horizons and their spheres of influence until -- in a remarkably brief time -- they encompassed the entire world. By the early years of the seventeenth century, international commerce had acquired such stability and such importance that, indirectly, it caused a considerable slowing-down of the inflationary curve in Europe's important places.[20] At mid-century, its practitioners were without doubt the most influential class in the larger cities.[21]

We have noted above that Lisbon, Seville, and Antwerp had succeeded to the title of the world's great trade hubs. For the two former cities, the title was quite transient and, in addition, of considerably lesser importance than would have been the case had the Iberian lands possessed an active middle class. Antwerp, on the other hand, enjoyed a period of great commercial importance[22] until the last generation of the sixteenth century, when she took part in the Dutch War for Independence and Spain brought her to her knees.[23]

By this time, the hub of world trade had definitely moved to the Northwest of Europe. Only a city in the same area could take Antwerp's place, for only there could be found a centuries'-old manufacturing region and, adjoining it, the crossroads of the Atlantic and Baltic sea

lanes and of Europe's greatest overland trade route. Amsterdam was the town that succeeded to the place of Antwerp.[24]

Amsterdam was not content, however, merely to imitate her predecessor. Her ambition for world trade and the course of events combined to place her well in the forefront of the seventeenth century's revolutionary commercial course.

Was business on a world scale too great an endeavor for one man to undertake alone? He accordingly joined with others of like mind to form a company, so that their pooled capital could outfit a ship and send out a crew. Did the company's trade grow, so that the partners wanted more capital to finance it further and a larger number of owners among whom to share the risks of storm and distant pirates?[25] They then formed a joint-stock company[26] and allowed its shares to be traded. Did they feel cheated by the public cashiers who cashed their customers' bills of exchange? If so, they joined in petitioning the city fathers for the establishment of an official exchange bank.[27] Was the company troubled by other Amsterdammers encroaching on its trading territory? Or did it merely wish to forestall the possibility? Then, quite as a matter of course, it received monopoly rights from the city fathers.[28] Did the company, finally, fear foreign competition in its trading territory? If it did, it invested in industry[29] so that it might trade in industrial products and hedge against a loss of profits.

By such devices did Amsterdam grow. In such fashion did she become a city of over 150,000[30] ruled by international merchants and

financiers and manufacturers who gave her her style -- that of a canal-city of steep-gabled homes, their exteriors severe but their interiors luxurious with high-colored Levantine tapestries and heroic family portraits.[31] In such a way, finally, did she become -- and remain throughout the seventeenth century[32] -- far and away Europe's leader "as shipping center, as commodity market, and as market for capital."[33]

Still a further cause for Amsterdam's preeminence -- and one that is all-important in the context with which we are dealing -- is her hospitality to newcomers, whether or not they were refugees, and whatever their faith and nationality;[34] and, in addition, the ease with which she allowed newcomers to become citizens.[35] Not a few of those who came to her gates were merchants and craftsmen who proved most valuable to her.

The business men of other places in West and North Europe -- notably of England and France -- expanded and acquired worldwide interests at the same time as did the Amsterdammers. There was one striking difference, however: the latter made their own plans and, through their own representatives, legislated in the interest of their companies; the English and the French, on the other hand, were living under powerful monarchical governments[36] that sought to keep the trading companies under their own control.[37]

In France and in England, the governments played a leading part in the foundation of the trading companies.[38] They granted the companies monopoly rights and raised money for them when it was needed.[39] They

upheld and strengthened and coddled the companies in every way that suggested itself to their ingenuities. They sent their armies and navies against their companies' rivals[40] and then drafted laws to make the companies all the more profitable so as to pay the mercenary armies' bills.[41] As wealth-creating adjuncts of the trading companies, they encouraged the building of home industries: France, especially under Colbert, did it by means of fantastic manipulations of her economy and the rights of her citizens;[42] and England accomplished it with strict import and export controls.[43] If, in response to the manipulations, there was economic dislocation that bore heavily on some of the poorer people, there must then be a still greater volume of manufacturing to keep them from going idle.[44]

After the Kings of France and of England had practised for a time the policy of using the state to expand commerce and commerce to centralize the state, their theoreticians published the policy as a dogma. Today we refer to it as mercantilism. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Mun, an Englishman, wrote the classic exposition of mercantilism,[45] while Grotius, a Dutchman, was most responsible for the attempt to set limits to the rampant nationalism that it encouraged.[46]

We may say in conclusion that the century or half-century before 1666 witnessed a revolution of several facets. There was a great change in the world's commercial hub: it moved to Amsterdam. There was a remarkable increase in wealth, a broadening of the wealthy class, and an unparalleled extension of the traveled world. There was, furthermore, a considerable amount of social mobility, some of it brought

about easily and painlessly, some not so painlessly. Lastly, the lines separating nations were taking on an unwonted firmness, and men were beginning to feel that nationalism was a meaningful concept.

D. THE REVOLUTION BREEDS UNREST

One of the most striking works of the revolution of which we have been speaking was a feshuffling of class lines. Much of it was accomplished quietly and peacefully, with the joining in marriage of rising bourgeois families with declining noble families -- the one contributing wealth, the other its aristocratic name and lineage, to form a felicitous union.[47]

Not infrequently, however, the seventeenth century was a witness to social dislocation so great and embittering that no frictionless realignment could be made. In these cases, there was strife leading even to outright war at times, and the various groups took sides in different ways: the landed aristocracy, the smallest peasants, the servant class, and the journeymen craftsmen, though all fighting with desperation to hold on to something of their former position, were not necessarily on the same side in ptactise; while the international merchants and large capitalists, the manufacturing masters, the local

merchants, and the independent farmers -- though the more impatient among them shared an ambition for rising faster than they had been doing -- did not always fight on the same side, either. Chief among the social wars and skirmishes of the century were the struggle of Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants in the Netherlands (1617-19),[48] the Fronde revolt against Mazarin in France (1648-53),[49] the famous English civil war of the '40's, some actions in the Thirty Years' War and, farther afield, the rising in the Neapolitan lower classes (1647-8).[50]

A social war that calls for special mention is that waged by the Cossacks against Poland (1648-60). Poland's commercial and urban development had suffered serious blows in the sixteenth century,[51] and she was now a land of feudal nobles and tenant peasants , considerably more poorly developed than her Western contemporaries.[52] The war consequently had a medieval flavor: it was a revolt of a young frontier gentry, which was Cossack, against the control measures that had been attempted[53] by the established State-supported gentry, which was Polish. The Ukrainian peasants, oppressed by the Polish nobility, rallied round the Cossack warlords, who they believed would fight for their own liberation; at the moment of victory, however, they were betrayed.[54]

The social wars and the wars between rival nations were so frequent as to constitute a catastrophe for the seventeenth-century man. There were, first, the dislocations and the tragedies that attend all wars. In addition were the ferocity and the extra measure of destruction that wars between countrymen bring. Finally, the very size of Europe's

kingdoms lent an unprecedented depth of terror to the wars they fought.

Seventeenth-century armies were unusually large, for the times had produced an unprecedented number of European powers, most of them blessed with the riches of commerce, all of them infected with nationalism and jealous of one another and, in consequence, seldom reluctant to throw their resources into war. The problem of provisioning these swollen armies was one that Wallenstein solved: his men lived off the land.[55] Many of them foreigners hired to fight, his troops and those of the commanders who emulated his example desolated Germany almost past belief[56] and, in the Franco-Spanish War of the '50's, made a shambles of northern France.[57]

The poorer classes bore a very heavy share of the taxes for the wars.[58] It seems that, to compound the injury, they suffered out of all proportion from the wars and the revolts. A report to Mazarin at the time of France's civil strife remarks that "les pauvres courent nos rues et leurs visages languissants donnent de la compassion et de l'effroi à tout le monde",[59] and a relief worker in the provinces devastated by the War with Spain writes, "Il n'y a point de langue qui puisse dire, point de plume qui puisse exprimer, point d'oreille qui ose entendre ce que nous avons vu."[60]

Officialdom was increasingly unsympathetic to the poor.[61] They were treated roughly by the leaders they had believed in and for whom they had fought, like Chmielnicki in the Ukraine and Cromwell in England. Small wonder that they were bewildered and dazed, and that some awoke

from their daze to organize groups like the semi-economic journeymen's unions of France[62] and the egalitarian Levellers and communistic Diggers of civil-war days in England.[63]

E. THE QUEST FOR SALVATION IN THE MIDST OF UNREST

If the seventeenth was a century of desolating wars and profound distress, it was at the same time a century of intense religiosity.[64] Throughout its first half, at any rate, it preserved and in some circles deepened the habit that its predecessor had acquired of conducting its thinking within a religious Gestalt and performing its actions in religion's name. Nonetheless, we must be aware that religion meant quite different things to different groups of people.

To kings and to most of the established clergy, religion was of the greatest importance as a tool for centralizing the state. The formula of the century-old Peace of Augsburg, "cuius regio eius religio", reaffirmed as it was by the signatories at Westphalia,[65] well expressed the feeling of the sovereigns that there was little difference between religion and the state nationalism. When the Inquisition, still filled with zeal, burned Bruno and hundreds of others, and when the Bishop of Würzburg put to death a reported 9,000 witches and wizards in 1627-8,[66]

they were fitting their action to their conviction that nothing so frivolous as a citizen's conscience may be allowed to deter him from marching in step behind his sovereign. When the Jesuits disciplined away their individual personalities to disseminate their Gospel, it was done "ad majorem gloriam", not "Dei", but "ecclesiae" -- and they did homage to their ecclesia as to a temporal state.

It is doubtful whether the best efforts of kings and priests really succeeded in effecting civic unity by enforcing religious uniformity. We are told, for instance, that from about 1580 to 1620, "the growth of superstition and delusions, often shared by the accused with the accusers, became epidemic in Germany. The fury of persecution which accompanied this revival raged both in the ecclesiastical lands ... and in the temporal territories ... The perturbation created by these proceedings, and the spirit of unreasoning terror and reckless self-defence which they aroused, beyond a doubt sensibly contributed to the widespread feeling of unrest, and to the general desire for remedies as violent as the evil itself."[67]

In Europe's growing towns and cities, where so many were learning to get ahead on their own initiative, there was increasing distaste for authoritarianism in religion as well as in all other fields. To the absolutist philosophy of religion were opposed a myriad of counter-philosophies and antipathetic sects.

We may serve simplicity, though we do violence to their historic interconnections, if we consider these philosophies and sects as grouped

under three schools.

One school was humanistic: to the absolutists' claims it opposed the doctrine that somehow man is the touchstone of religious experience. The Arminians of the Dutch cities held that the Scriptures have authority beyond that of any Church, and that right-minded individuals are free to interpret them. Their fellow-burghers, the main branch of the Mennonite sect, no longer the dour ascetics their grandfathers had been, tended to agree with the Arminians.[68] Those Englishmen known as the Cambridge Platonists, though called "latitudinarian", were more orthodox than these others and taught that a Divine spark must dwell in that soul that would interpret Holy Writ.[69] At the opposite extreme, Polish Socinianism (many of whose adherents fled to Holland in 1661) and the primarily English religious rationalism maintained that not Biblical precepts but rather ethical laws are the heart of true religion.[70] At the same time, a feeling -- more often than not unspoken -- was developing in bourgeois hearts that religion has nothing at all to say on secular affairs.[71]

The second school might perhaps be called Augustinian: it proclaimed that God is the supreme power and man a helpless sinner, and the various sects within it drew various conclusions therefrom.

Some of the sects were no enemies of institutionalism, provided it did not tamper with the channels of Divine grace. One of these bodies was the Puritan, in its pure Calvinist aspect, in which it preached the individual ever facing his Maker and "the belief that the relation between

the invisible spirit of man and the invisible God was immediate rather than mediate."[72] Another such body was the Jansenist, that agitated for more evangelism and less ritualism in the Church of Rome and enjoyed its greatest ascendancy in the '40's and '50's.[73]

Some other sects (and individuals) were less friendly to institutionalism, or even indifferent to it. Known as Quietists, they were overwhelmed by a conviction of man's spiritual helplessness and depravity. The only way to strength and redemption, they taught, was to induce in oneself an utterly passive attitude -- "sicut cadaver", in Luther's vivid phrase -- and wait for God to reach down and take possession of the self. The Spaniard Juan Falconi, in the '30's, was the first Quietist of the century to attract a following. Within a short time, a number of aristocrats in France had been attracted to the philosophy, and in 1667 a certain Nicole felt impelled to write a book, Les imaginaires et les visionnaires, attacking Quietists.[74]

Cousin to Quietism was the Antinomian doctrine bequeathed by the Reformer Agricola to some English Dissenters of the time, a bizarre doctrine that faith justifies perfectly and no works -- not even the ethics of the Decalogue -- are at all necessary.[75] Few men, fortunately, had the courage to claim this doctrine.

It is but a short distance from the feeling that the individual is too weak to save himself from sin to the conviction that humanity has not the power to redeem itself from inhumanity and bloodshed -- that is to say, from belief in Quietism to preoccupation with eschatology.

Such was the state of affairs in the seventeenth century that it was not difficult to believe that God was intervening in the events of the world, or soon would do so. There had been so many calamities, so much misery. When London burned in 1666, even the matter-of-fact Evelyn could consider the possibility that the Almighty was requiting England for her sins.[76]

Nonetheless, we can hardly be prepared for the wave of chiliasm and apocalypticism that we actually do find when we make even a cursory study of the century. Silver speaks of several hundred English apocalyptic pamphlets of the '40's and '50's alone.[77] Among the many millenary prophets were the mathematician Pell, who predicted Rome would fall in the '70's or '80's,[78] Burton in the '40's,[79] Harwood in the '50's,[80] and Anna Trapnel the "poor instrument" in the same period[81] -- all of them preaching the imminent day of judgment. The Fifth Monarchy movement was devoted to calculating the apocalyptic date; generally it fixed on the year 1666.[82] The Seekers, though chiliasts too, were a bit more modest; not stopping to determine the date, they were content merely to "wait and seek" the final consummation.[83]

So much for millenary calculations in England. Germany, where we are told superstition intensified during the Thirty Years' War, was hardly behindhand.[84] Two mystics in that land were inspired to prophesy the imminent end when they saw comets in the sky.[85] The visionary Boehme alluded to the approaching apocalypse.[86] Finally, "a contemporary, Friedrich Brekling, enumerates one hundred and eighty visionaries of that century, men and women, who were millenarian dreamers and

eschatologists."[87]

Some there were who anticipated the coming millenium by anointing themselves its Messiah or, more modestly, his precursor. In the '40's Arise Evans called himself the Christ,[88] and during the following decade Reeve and Muggleton announced they were the heralds of the imminent Day, founding thereby a sect of remarkable persistence (notwithstanding their poor showing as prophets).[89] James Nayler, the most picturesque of the lot, proclaimed himself the Messiah, and one day in 1665 rode through Bristol in Messianic pose but sans clothing, to the hosannas of a handful of followers.[90]

We have been speaking of what we referred to as the second school of religious thought -- that which holds man helpless. The third school agrees but adds a qualification that renders it all but antithetical to Calvinism, yet not far from Quietism -- the qualification that within man dwells God, usually unnoted but ever latent with spiritual force. The Cambridge Platonists joined this teaching to their rationalism.[91] The remarkable "shoemaker theosophist" Jakob Boehme (died 1624) approached it in his philosophy that the individual, once "reborn", could apprehend the ideas that underly phenomena and synthesize the former with the latter to arrive at what to him was reality.[92] The Quakers, most prominent representatives of this school, deprecated churches and sacraments and even learning; they would meet together to await in silence an "opening" or revelation to the "inward Light" within them, and when it arrived, "then began we to sing praises to the Lord God Almighty and to the Lamb forever, who had redeemed us to God, and

brought us out of the captivity and bondage of the world, and put an end to sin and death." George Fox began to preach Quakerism in the late '40's, and the movement grew rapidly during the '50's, making converts in Holland as well as in England.[93]

From a belief in the "inward Light", it is not a long step to the feeling that one is blessed with supernatural powers. Many in the seventeenth century century took the step. There was Antoinette Bourignon, the "bride of the Holy Ghost" from Lille, who preached her evangelistic message in Amsterdam in the '60's.[94] There was Simon Morin in the '40's, who led his "illuminates" to mystic union.[95] There were the Guérinets of Picardy in the '30's, and the Rosicrucians or Illuminati, whose vogue spread from Ger many through Western Europe in the '10's and '20's.[96]

There were many more sectarian curiosities in the seventeenth century. In England alone, there were Ranters and Familists and Anti-Scripturians and Libertines, and others. What we have set down here, however, will suffice to show the profundity of redemptionist feeling in seventeenth century Europe.

F. CONCLUSION

We opened this chapter with a view of Sabbatai Zevi, and with the remark that he and all who played a part in his drama had in them, willy-nilly, a good deal of history. I have set down in the chapter some of the general (not Jewish) history that appears to me to have gone into the making of Sabbatians and anti-Sabbatians.

I should say that one of the clearest pictures that emerges from the chapter is that of a period of over a century when history manifested a peculiar gift for buffeting men with storms, for disappointing them, for making sea-changes in their way of life -- in short, for rendering them intensely insecure.

A profound change was the increase in the world's size, and there is little doubt that men felt less at home in it than when it had been smaller. A man of 1490 knew fairly well what he might expect of his known world of Europe and its environs; his descendant of 1660, on the other hand, knew as little what to expect of America and Japan and the East Indies as we today do of the planets and stars, to whom we are now in the process of acquiring a personal relationship.

An undoubted cause of insecurity was the rapidity with which countries and cities rose and fell as centers of prosperity. I have spoken of the sudden fall of Venice and Florence and, later, Antwerp and of the apparently sudden decline of Poland. We of the twentieth century know well

how precipitously business curves can rise and fall, but in the seventeenth century they were new to capitalism and (though certainly the economic picture was simpler than in our society) did not know. We may well imagine, then, what a calamity a local trade crisis must have been to a merchant prince paying for the upkeep of his palace, to a financier who has loaned heavily to the shipowners of the city, and to the craftsmen whose products will no longer be loaded on the city's wharves.

We may be sure that another source of insecurity was the inflation that reigned in so many places throughout the second half of the sixteenth century. Its most profound psychological damage must have been in its rearrangement of the social pyramid. Nothing could have been so damaging to the peace of mind of the feudal nobility as the sight of their ancestral lands lost to them and themselves in retreat before an upstart class.

As a whole, I believe, the rise of capitalism was a development fraught with insecurity for man. It is no coincidence that by the seventeenth century the medieval social theory of the organic and stable community was of interest only to antiquarians, and various individualistic philosophies held the stage. It is rather an indication of the fact that competition was now much keener, that suspicion between classes was heightened, and that within the growing merchant class self-interest ruled.

In a very material way the development of commerce aggravated insecurity, for it multiplied occasions for war. Kings and merchants fought one another in devastating civil wars, to detemine who would control the

country's commerce. Nations fought one another for commercial advantage, the enlarged armies of the day sweeping clean the peasants' countryside.

It is no wonder that, unsure of their position in the everyday world, men of the seventeenth century turned fervently to the world of religion. It should not surprise us that many kings saw religion as a sort of policeman that does service as an enforcer of civil obedience. Contrariwise, many capitalists and intellectuals who moved in their circles held that faith is a matter for the individual conscience. Other men, in the throes of insecurity, embraced religious systems that actually emphasized and even exaggerated their powerlessness and hopelessness and taught them they could not possibly achieve security by their own efforts -- rather, said these religious systems, must they surrender their will to God's, and let His grace sustain them. Still other men followed religions preaching that, in their insecurity and doubt, men turn within themselves and find a Divine source of assurance, power, and purpose there.

In close logical relation to the religions of individual helplessness were the teachings, extremely widespread in the seventeenth century, that mankind as a whole was weak and sinful, and there would shortly supervene a Divine apocalypse to set things right. In a world of strife, where so many men's dreams were cruelly frustrated and so much suffering fell upon the innocent, it was not unnatural for many to feel that the human dispensation was ceasing to be viable and must be succeeded by the Divine. In a world in violent transition from an old

era to a new, it is not unduly strange that there were men who mistook the growing-pains of capitalism for the birth-pangs of the Messiah.

NOTES ON CHAPTER ONE

1. Margaret James. European Civilization: Its Origin and Development, vol. V. London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1937. P. 19.

2. Auguste Bailly. La Sérénissime République de Venise. Paris, Arthème Fayard, 1946. P. 168. Bailly says use of the direct sea route, by eliminating the expensive caravan charges and imposts incurred in overland transit, enabled the Portuguese to buy Indian commodities at one-quarter the price the Venetians had to pay.

3. Diarii di Girolamo Priuli, 1494-1512. Quoted by Pompeo Molmenti, "La Decadenza di Venezia" (La Vita Italiana nel Seicento). Milan, Fratelli Treves, 1897. P. 96.

4. Bailly, op. cit., p. 169.

5. Albert H. Lybyer. "The Influence of the Rise of the Ottoman Turks upon the Routes of Oriental Trade" (Annual Report of the American Historical Assocn., vol. I of 1914). Washington, 1916. P. 129.

6. Albert Vandal. Les Voyages du Marquis de Nointel (1670-1680). Paris, Plon, 1900. P. [illegible] 11.

7. Lybyer, op. cit., p. 133.

8. Bailly, op. cit., p. 170.

9. Suggested by Molmenti, loc. cit.

10. James, op. cit., p. 20.

11. Henri Hauser. Peuples et Civilisations: Histoire Générale, 2d ed., vol. IX. Paris, Presses Universitaires, 1940. P. 197 f.

12. John Herman Randall, Jr. The Making of the Modern Mind, rev. ed. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1940. P. 192.

13. G.N. Clark. The Seventeenth Century. Oxford, Clarendon, 1929. P. 32.

14. Hauser, op. cit., 198 ff. For the decline in Germany, see A. W. Ward, Cambridge Modern History, vol. IV. New York, Macmillan, 1906. P. 7 f.

15. P. O. von Törne. The Cambridge History of Poland to 1696, ed. W. F. Reddaway et al. Cambridge, University Press, 1950. P. 475.

16. J. Rutkowski, ibid., p. 449.

17. Hauser, op. cit., p. 203.

18. Ibid., p. 202.

19. Ibid., pp. 112, 204 ff. Philippe Sagnac and A. de St.-Léger. Peuples et Civilisations: Histoire Générale, 2nd ed., vol. X. Paris, Presses Universitaires, 1944. P. 67.

20. Hauser, op. cit., p. 440.

21. Ibid., p. 450 f.

22. James, op. cit., p. 20 f., discusses the Spanish and Portuguese ports and Antwerp.

23. Violet Barbour. "Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century" (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical & Political Science, series LXVII). Baltimore, 1949. P. 15.

24. Ibid. pp. 15-18.

25. On the wide extent of piracy, see A. Hilliard Atteridge, European Civilization: Its Origin and Development, vol. V. P. 1105.

26. For the joint-stock companies, see Clark, op. cit., p. 33 f. For the Dutch East India Co., Hauser, op. cit., p. 274 f. For the Dutch West India Co., ibid., p. 428.

27. See Barbour, op. cit., pp. 43-59, for the Amsterdam Exchange Bank.

28. See Clark, op. cit., p. 37, on monopoly grants.

29. See Barbour, op. cit., pp. 60-73, for Amsterdammers' industrial investment.

30. Ibid., p. 17.

31. Hauser, op. cit., p. 451.

32. Clark, op. cit., p. 45.

33. Barbour, op. cit., p. 18.

34. Ibid., p. 23 ff. Hauser, op. cit., p. 278.

35. Barbour, op. cit., p. 16.

36. Michael De La Bedoyere. European Civilization: Its Origin and Development, vol. V. P. 763 discusses the centralization of state power.

37. Clark, op. cit., p. 91.

38. For France: Eugene O. Golob. "Mercantilism" (Chapters in Western Civilization, vol. I). New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1948. P. 315 f.
For England: Hauser, op. cit., p. 176.

39. This was almost exclusively a French, not an English or Dutch, problem. See Clark, op. cit., p. 39 f.

40. The period abounded in wars fought largely on account of commercial rivalry. Examples are:
a. Holland and England vs. Spain (1586-1604; the war of the Armada);
b. England vs. Spain (1624-30);
c. England vs. Spain (1655-59);
d. "French" period of Thirty Years' War: France, Sweden, Holland vs. Spain and Holy Roman Empire (1635-48);
e. England, intervening on the Huguenots' side, vs. France (1627-30);
f. France vs. Spain, after Peace of Westphalia (1648-59);
g. England vs. Holland (1652-54).

Some of these wars were actually begun by piratical action carried out in behalf of one or another of the trading companies.

41. The armies of the time were in the process of transition from feudal and mercenary forces to citizen armies. See: Clark, op. cit., pp. 101 ff., 108 ff. Atteridge, op. cit., pp. 1096-1102. Ernest Barker, ibid., pp. 1034 f., 1042.

42. A. E. Feaveryear, ibid., p. 655 f. Sagnac and St.-Léger, op. cit., pp. 69-75.

43. Ibid., p. 26 f. Feaveryear, op. cit., p. 658 f.

44. Sagnac and St.-Léger, op. cit., p. 169.

45. See Randall, op. cit., p. 192 ff., and Hauser, op. cit., p. 209 f., for theory of mercantilism.

46. See Randall, op. cit., pp. 197-201, for the teachings of Grotius.

47. Hauser, op. cit., p. 206 f.
G. N. Clark. "Political Institutions of the Seventeenth Century" (Chapters in Western civilization, vol. I). P. 326 f.
Ferdinand Schevill. A History of Europe from the Reformation to Our Own Day. New York, Harcourt Brace, 1925. P. 275.

48. Hauser, op. cit., p. 284 f.

49. Ibid., pp. 363-6.

50. Ibid., p. 381 f.

51. J. Siemieński. The Cambridge History of Poland. P. 426 ff.
Ward, op. cit., p. 420, indicates that Poland's grain trade suffered lasting damage from the Thirty Years' War.
As for the inflation of the sixteenth century (see p. 6, above, and note 16), I do not have enough evidence to be certain that it contributed to Poland's decline; I can merely suggest that it may have.

52. Siemieński, op. cit., p. 438 ff.

53. M. Korduba, ibid., pp. 507, 510.

54. Ibid., p. 515.

55. Schevill, op. cit., p. 244 f. Mansfeld's men, too, are mentioned as having pillaged extensively in Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., vol. XXII, p. 136.

56. Ward, op. cit., pp. 417-24, discusses the War's effect on the German people. He says Germany's cities suffered horribly, though it is true the wealthier burghers could invest their wealth outside the war zone and keep their fortunes fairly intact (p. 419). The peasants, he tells us, were most cruelly treated of all; having no city walls behind which to hide, they and their property were completely at the mercy of the soldiers, and "whole districts were converted into deserts" (p. 418). Writing at the dawn of the twentieth century, he expresses the opinion that "the general effects of the War ... furnish perhaps the most appalling demonstrations of the consequences of war to be found in history" (p. 417). For an appreciation of the full impact of the War on the common people of Germany, read Grimmelshausen's classic Abenteuerliche Simplicius Simplicissimus.

57. Hauser, op. cit., p. 366 f.

58. See Ernest Barker, op. cit., p. 1047, and Montague Fordham, ibid., p. 95 ff., for the general situation.
See Barbour, op. cit., pp. 59 and 84, for Amsterdam.
See Ward, op. cit., p. 418 f., for Germany.

59. Hauser, loc. cit. See also note 56, above.

60. Hauser, op. cit., p. 370.

61. R. H. Tawney. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1938. Pp. 227-44.

62. Hauser, op. cit., p. 456 f.

63. Montague Fordham, op. cit., p. 82 f.
Tawney, op. cit., p. 229.
G. W. Prothero and E. M. Lloyd. Cambridge Modern History, vol. IV. P. 345.

64. Clark, The Seventeenth Century, p. 322 f., characterizes the religious coloring of the age briefly but well.

65. Ward, op. cit., p. 410.

66. Ibid., p. 423. See Clark, op. cit., p. 246, for other attacks on sorcery.

67. Ward, op. cit., p. 6.

68. Wilhelmus J. Kühler. "Mennonites" (Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings). New York, 1908-27. Vol. VIII, p. 553.
Of similar tendencies were the General Baptists, founded by English exiles in Amsterdam about 1610, and the Collegiants, who were strong throughout the second quarter of the century, and to whom Spinoza was so close. On the latter group, see William T. Whitley, "Rynsburgers", Hastings Encyclopedia X, pp. 877-80.

69. John Alexander Stewart, "Cambridge Platonists", ibid., vol. III, pp. 167-73.

70. Randall, op. cit., p. 284 f.

71. Tawney, op. cit., pp. 169-78.

72. E. Dowden. Puritan and Anglican. London, 1900. P. 15.
Quoted in "Puritanism", Hastings Encyclopedia, vol. X, p. 513.

73. Viscount St. Cyres, "Jansenism", Hastings Encyclopedia, vol. VII, pp. 476-81.
George C. Williamson. "Jansenius and Jansenism" (Catholic Encyclopedia). New York, 1910. Vol. VIII, pp. 285-94.

74. Mrs. E. Herman, "Quietism", Hastings Encyclopedia, vol. X, pp. 534-38. The Quietist movement did not reach its full flowering until the second half of the century, when the mystics of our period had produced such distinguished scions as Molinos, Spener and the German Pietists, and Mme. Guyon and the celebrated Fénelon.

75. J. Macbride Sterrett, "Antinomianism", ibid., vol. I, p. 581 f.

76. John Evelyn. The Diary of John Evelyn, ed. John Bray. Akron, St. Dunstan Society, 1901. Vol. II, p. 26.
London's Great Fire, it should be remembered, followed hard on the heels of her Great Plague.

77. Abba Hillel Silver. A History of Messianic Speculation in Israel. New York, Macmillan, 1927. P. 174 and n. 53, same p.

78. Ibid., p. 180.

79. Ibid., p. 174.

80. Ibid., p. 175.

81. "Illuminism", Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., vol. XIV, p. 100.

82. Silver, op. cit., pp. 175 ff., 180 f.

83. Ibid., p. 174 f.

84. Ward, op. cit., p. 423, speaks of the intensification of superstition.

85. Silver, op. cit., p. 165 f. and n. 34, p. 165.

86. Ibid., p. 163.

87. Ibid., p. 162.

88. Ibid., p. 175; "Illuminism", loc. cit.

89. William T. Whitley, "Muggletonians", Hastings Encyclopedia, vol. VIII, p. 871.

90. Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. XVI, p. 177 f.

91. See p. 17, above, and n. 69.

92. George W. Allen, "Boehme", Hastings Encyclopedia, vol. II, pp. 778-84. Cp. p. 19, above, and n. 86.

93. William C. Braithwaite, "Friends, Society of", ibid., vol. VI, pp. 142-7. The quotation, copied from this article, is from Edward Burrough's contemporary preface to George Fox's Great Mistery.

94. Mrs. Herman, op. cit., p. 537.

95. Hauser, op. cit., p. 492.

96. Ibid., p. 492 f.; "Illuminism", loc. cit.

CHAPTER TWO

THE LEVANT:
CROSSROAD OF COMMERCE AND SUSPICION

At the time when our chicken-dealer's son made his voyage from Smyrna to Constantinople, there were other than mystical and apocalyptic thoughts in the minds of many men. Some had quite worldly thoughts of derring-do and adventure, of intrigue and gutter politics, of new markets and high dividends, of how to reshuffle or how to preserve the relative positions of the various nations trading in the Levant. In the world of the seventeenth century, international politics had risen to the position of an all-important subject for large groups of people, and there were few areas where it was more important than the Levant.

A. INTERVALS OF PROSPERITY AND DECADES OF DECLINE

We have already mentioned (page 4 above) the growth and increasing prosperity of the Ottoman Empire after the sack of Constantinople. We may further emphasize here that the latter years of the fifteenth and all but the end of the sixteenth century were an age of wealth and commercial advance for the Empire. In this age tremendous conquests were made: they were made under Mehmet the Conqueror and consolidated under Bayazit, made further under Selim I and the great Süleyman, until finally all the shoreline of the eastern Mediterranean and much of the shore of the middle Mediterranean, in addition to vast hinterlands, were all under the Turkish Crescent.

I believe that much or most of the prosperity of the Ottoman lands was due to the fact that, for the first time in several centuries, these far-flung regions were all under one government, whose word could wipe out the former multiplicity of boundaries and local imposts that had inconvenienced commerce, and whose armies could keep the roads secure and safe for traders. There are indications that Constantinople enjoyed an especial access of prosperity because the government adopted a policy of channeling trade through that city.[1]

As the Ottoman realm grew, the Mediterranean -- as it were -- shrank in size. Inevitably, Turks encroached on what had been the preserve of the Venetians, and for a century and a half the two peoples

carried on an alternation of wars and of attempts to find and maintain a modus mercandi. After Venice's victory in a preliminary naval skirmish in 1416, each succeeding war brought her nothing but defeat and added losses of Levantine lands. In 1430 Turkey took from her the commercial town of Salonika, from 1463 to 1479 some East Mediterrranean islands and part of the Morea or Peloponnesus, from 1499 to 1503 most of what she still had in the Morea, in the '30's and '40's all the Aegean islands except Crete, from 1570 to 1573 -- despite the Turkish naval debacle at Lepanto -- the island of Cyprus and a sizable indemnity, and finally from 1645 to 1669 the island of Crete.[2]

We have already seen (page 5, above) that the Adriatic republic was able to adjust herself during the sixteenth century to her reduced circumstances and, as a trading power in the Levant, maintain something of her old prosperity. With the loss of Crete, however, this was no longer possible; now her sphere was little more than the narrow Adriatic, and she had no more influence and small commercial interest in the Eastern Mediterranean.[3]

During the year that concerns us most particularly, 1666, the War for Crete was in its final stages. The Turks were long since in possession of all the island except the lone city of Candia, against which they had been mounting a siege for twenty-one weary years. The Venetians fought mostly on the sea, where they could take the offensive against Ottoman shipping. Year in and year out, they blockaded the Dardanelles in order to discourage Turkey from provisioning the siege troops around Candia; the Venetians won numerous naval victories, but

the blockade nonetheless was effective only at times. An influential group, numbering even the doge in 1664 (and possibly in 1666, as well), was sick of the long drawn-out war and tried, not yet successfully, to induce the Senate to sue for peace.[4]

Turkey's numerous victories over Venice did not suffice to prevent her from following the Most Serene Republic down the road to decline. It seems that the acme of Ottoman power and prosperity were achieved under Süleyman I, who ruled until 1566, and under Mehmet Sokullu, the powerful Grand Vizier who held sway for twelve additional years. Thereafter a depression set in and assumed alarming proportions before many years had passed.

By 1622, Turkey's economy had suffered such reverses that an English ambassador ~~(the first to be accredited)~~ could observe: "All the territory of the Grand Seignior is dispeopled for want of pasture and by reason of violent oppression -- so much so that, in the best parts of Greece and Anatolia, a man may ride three or four, or sometimes six, days and not find a village to feed him or his horse, whereby the revenue is so lessened that there is not wherewithal to pay the soldiers and to maintain the Court. It may be patched up for a while out of the Treasury, and by exactions which are now onerous upon the merchants a nd labouring men to satisfy the harpies.

"I can say no more than that the disease works internally that must ruin this Empire; we daily expect more changes and effusion of blood. The wisest men refuse to sit at the helm, and fools will soon

run themselves and others upon the rocks."[5]

Two years later a correspondent in the Ottoman Empire was able to report to one of the young Parisian newspapers, "Cet Empire se va ruinant de tous costez, et par rebellions, et par desordres si grands, qu'il ne se peut remettre sans miracle."[6]

Very shortly thereafter, in 1627, we already find in an Aleppo merchant's letter an analysis that was to be echoed by the much later phrase, "the sick man of Europe": "L'Estat Ottoman est maintenant en grand desordre; et si n'estoit que c'est un grand corps, la maladie qui l'afflige depuis plusieurs années l'auroit desia accablé."[7] In the same year, the French consul at Aleppo predicted for the Ottomans "une chute presque inevitable."[8]

However, Turkey was not to fall so easily. Her decline, at least superficially and on the battlefield, was halted abruptly by the coming to power of a series of strong men, who ruled with the help of frequent blood purges and who seem to have arrested at least the political decline of the Empire for approximately a half century. The first of the strong men was a Sultan, Murat IV, whose coup d'état against some ranking Army officers kept him in absolute power from 1632 to 1640.[9] After the death of the new Sultan in 1648 at the hands of an Army faction, and after several years of a terrible struggle for power,[10] a new strong man came to the fore. He was an aging Albanian, Mehmet Köprülü, who held office as Grand Vizier from 1656 to 1661, and during that time is said to have executed 35,000 dissidents in order to consolidate his

own position and to induce in the administration a rather terrorized efficiency.[11] His son Ahmet succeeded him; his fifteen-year rule was marred by his ill-fated march up the Balkans, which ended in his defeat in 1664 at the hands of the Austrians and their French volunteer allies at the convent of St. Gotthard.

Ahmet Köprülü was probably as absolute a dictator as his father had been. A French ambassador found his subordinates powerless when he tried to negotiate with them, their initiative paralyzed by dread of the man they called "infallible".[12] The Sultan himself, according to the ambassador, left affairs of state to Köprülü; though only six years separated their ages, he spoke of his Vizier as his "foster father".[13]

Though the strong men of the seventeenth century, Murat and the two Köprülüs, advanced the Ottoman Empire militarily, it is difficult to say to what extent they succeeded in recouping her economic fortunes as well. The standard histories of the Empire, of von Hammer-Purgstall, of those from whom he copied and of those who copied from him, are not much help. Written according to the canons of what might be called the pikestaff-and-boudoir school of historiography, authored by men who (some or most of them apparently strong nationalists and royalists in politics) were so dazzled by the goings-on of the Court and battlefield that they could see little else, these histories are poor guides into the realities of Ottoman life.

There are some signs that the depression of the '20's was not fully dissipated by the '50's. There was Mehmet Köprülü's terrible purge, of which we have already spoken. There was his decree of the death penalty,

in 1660, for anyone who might mention affairs of state outside the Court. There was the retrenchment he ordered for the Court.[14] It may be doubted if any of these measures would have been taken in a country enjoying prosperity. On the other hand, we are told that the younger Köprülü maintained both a tolerant civil administration and a well-filled treasury.[15] Perhaps the '60's were happier times for Turkey than the '50's had been.

Whatever the condition of the Empire in general may have been, we know that some parts of it were depressed in the '60's. We know that Egypt was suffering on account of the complete stoppage, about 1630, of the commerce that had previously traversed the Suez Isthmus and the Red Sea on its way between South Asia and the ports of Europe.[16] We know, too, that Constantinople endured important commercial damage as a result of the Venetian blockade of the Dardanelles (see abov e, page 35), and that in the late '40's there was a movement of foreign traders t o Smyrna.

If we take a broad and panoramic view, we may see the Levant of several centuries ago as a poor area consistently trying to live beyond its means. Before the discovery of the Cape passage to India, it is true, large revenues came to the Levant by reason of the Oriental freight that passed along its trade routes and was transshipped from its ports. Thereafter, the Ottomans embarked on a grand career of conquest, apparently hoping that great size could create great wealth. Nevertheless, in the long run the essential poverty of the Levant showed through. In the long run, the Levant perforce manifested in poverty, in inefficient

and corrupt government, and in military reverses, the fact that it had no production base to speak of but was rather a sparsely settled area of inefficient farms and scraggly pasture-lands.[17]

B. EUROPEANS STRUGGLE TO MAKE THE LEVANT A COMMERCIAL COLONY

Despite its essential poverty, the Levant remained consistently important to European merchants and therefore to European governments as well. As the economy of West Europe slowly began in the seventeenth century to take on a somewhat modern form, the Levant came to be important -- as we shall see a little later -- precisely because of its poverty. Whether because or in spite of poverty, the Levant was never far from the minds of sixteenth and seventeenth century European traders and diplomats.

The first West European nation to take a deep interest in Ottoman trade was France. When the sinuous foreign policy of Francis I and the expansionism of Süleyman for a time coincided in a common anti-Austrianism, she was able to formalize her interest in the Capitulation of 1535. This fateful treaty was the precedent for a long series of capitulations (so called not in the modern and derivative sense, but rather because they happened to be drawn up in "capitula" or chapters) granted by Turkey

to a number of powers down through the centuries.

Although in many ways novel, the Capitulation of 1535 was not unprecedented. Rooted perhaps in Roman concepts of citizenship, it could number among its forebears the treaties granting extraterritoriality by Harun al-Rashid to Charlemagne's subjects, by Byzantium to Venice in 1082 (and several times renewed, both peacefully and at sword's point) and subsequently to Genoa and Pisa as well, and by the Crusaders' principalities to French and Italians.[18]

What was novel about the Capitulation of 1535[19] was its broad scope and its extensive implications. It was by far the most sweeping and inclusive grant of privileges by a Levantine ruler to outlanders.[20] Furthermore, if we except the treaties concluding the Turko-Venetian Wars (these, of course, did not grant commercial rights but limited them; see above, page 35 and note 2), it was the first commercial agreement yet made between the Ottomans and a European power, the first agreement on East Mediterranean trade since the Cape route had been developed, and the first accord concerning the Levant to be made by a power standing on the threshold of modern capitalism.

The Capitulation of 1535 gave France most-favored nation status in Ottoman foreign trade, several free ports, and extraterritoriality for her subjects in Turkey, with justice to be administered by the French consuls; it put the Christian holy places under French protection, and -- what was to prove most crucial -- ordered that all European ships except those of Venice could put into Ottoman ports only if they flew

the flag of France.[21]

For a good many years, as her wealthy class became wealthier, France's trade with the Levant increased. For a good many years, too, she was able to keep the Capitulations in force and even render them increasingly favorable. They were renewed in 1569,[22] in 1581,[23] in 1597,[24] in 1604 with the added proviso that France was the protector of all non-Turkish Christians and their ecclesiastical property in the Empire,[25] and in 1614.[26]

In time, as it appears, the character of the Levant trade underwent a change. The French economy was changing: France was developing manufactures, her towns were growing, prices were rising (see above, page 6 f.), and the increasing number of people connected with capitalist endeavor were becoming increasingly prosperous. No longer was she primarily interested in buying luxury goods fo r the few, as she had been doing a century before (see above, page 2 f.). Now raw materials for her workshops and markets for the finished products they produced were an important concern.[26a]

Simultaneously, Turkey's prosperity was wearing thin (see above, page 36 f.), and the Levant appears now to have begun to play a new role vis-à-vis the French traders. Previously, in its prosperity, the area had been a supplier of luxuries; now, in its poverty, it began to be a raw-material source for French workshops and a market for French manufactures. In 1572, in a French ambassadorial report, we are given a glimpse into the character of the Franco-Turkish traffic at what may

have been (although I cannot say with precision) the time of the transition: raw goods for French workshops -- wool, cotton, silk and hides, tannins, dye fixatives and waxes -- were already being loaded in quantity onto France's ships in the Levant, alongside the old drug staples and such familiar luxuries as spices, Oriental rugs, porcelain ware, and corals for jewelry; the return voyages to the East were already bringing many of the workshops' products -- finished wool and linen fabrics, canvas, and pewterware.[27] High-placed Ottomans of the day already had a yeh, we are told, for such European ware as precision manufactures, like clocks, and fine fabrics such as cambrics and brocades, some of which was undoubtedly fashioned of Turkish raw materials.[28]

As time went on, the Levant's new position in French commerce became more firmly established. Before a century had passed, the manufacture of porcelain -- to give but one example -- had undergone an unmistakable shift to France.[29] A French ambassador in the Constantinople of the early 1670's speaks of the important export of vegetal ashes from Syria to Venice for glass manufacture and to Marseille for soap-making.[30] He remarks that France's chief export to Syria is finished cloth, and that the return trade in its latter days had been mostly in silk and cotton yarn.[31] French traders, in brief, were engaged, from about the end of Süleyman's Golden Age on, in making the Levant a commercial colony.

This colonialization, however, was a game that more than one power could play. It turned out, in fact, to be a game that Holland and England, whose early capitalistic development was well ahead of France's,

could play to much better advantage.

England's Levantine trade assumed important proportions early in her bustling Elizabethan age. In keeping with her commercial policy (see above, page 10 f.), the Queen soon granted a monopolistic charter to a group of English Levantine traders banded together under the name of the Turkey Company; by 1592, the interests of efficiency had dictated that it merge with the Venice Company, and the combined group became known as the Levant Company.[32]

The Turkey Company and its successor handled a steadily growing volume of trade with the East, and a trade that in ever-increasing degree meant the exchange of English manufactures for Levantine raw goods. As early as 1578, the Company obtained Turkey's permission to trade under England's flag, rather than under France's, as had been the law (see above, page 41 f.). Neither France's protests nor even the formal revocation, in the French Capitulation of 1581, of the English privilege had any effect; an English Capitulation in 1583 granted the Turkey Company still more rights than it had gotten five years before.[33]

French-English competition in the Levant became extremely lively by the first quarter of the seventeenth century, and the Italian states were drawn into it. In consistently seeking Venice's friendship, France made of the Adriatic republic practically a junior partner in her own Eastern commerce. She tied Venice to herself in using her good offices to bring about a Turko-Venetian peace in 1540,[34] and further strengthened her own position by negotiating the treaty of 1573 (see above, page 35).[35]

Later, in the more difficult years of 1639 to 1660, the charge of the French ambassador to the Sublime Porte was to attempt to mediate between France's protectorate, Venice, and her customer, Turkey.[36] When the customer proved recalcitrant, France quietly came to the aid of her protectorate with sizable forces of "volunteers" dispatched unofficially to the aid of Candia.[37]

Tuscany came under France's protection as well, about 1660, when her Medicean Grand Duke was in terror of the Spanish and Papal ascendancy in Italy.[38] Nevertheless, in the Levantine trade Tuscany was of considerably greater service to England than to France; when Grand Duke Fernando I (1587-1609) developed his port of Leghorn[39] and when it became a free port, it filled a serious need for England (who possessed no Mediterranean ports in those days), which used it as its great Mediterranean base of operations and had its ships call there on the way to and from the Levant.[40]

England steadily increased her share in the Levantine trade and her influence in the East. Though the French Capitulations of 1597 and 1604 attempted to outlaw the tendency, she began to usurp in ever-greater degree France's old prerogative of protecting European traders in the East.[41]

A new nation of traders, however, had arrived in Levantine waters to complicate still further the competitive picture. These were the Dutch, who were present in such numbers by 1605 that a bitter rivalry had arisen between the English ambassador at the Porte, who insisted

they and the Flemish be put under his protection, and the French ambassador, who was adamant in maintaining they must continue to sail under his country's flag, as had been provided in the French Capitulations. The dispute was patched up in two or three years with the compromise agreement that France should continue to charge Netherland captains the 2% levy she exacted from all non-French ships that had her "protection", but that in the case of the Flemings she should split the income with England.[42] In a very short time, however, the Dutch had become so strong in the East that they no longer needed to defer either to France or to England; by 1613, they had their own treaty with the Ottomans, and the flag of the United Provinces was recognized throughout the Levantine coasts.[43]

During the first half of the seventeenth century, the growth of Holland's Levant Company was even more rapid and striking than had been that of its English namesake and competitor, a generation before. Like the latter, the Dutch company utilized the free port at Leghorn as its chief base and way-station between the home ports and the Levant.[44] However, so wealthy and so practiced were the capitalists of Amsterdam (see above, page 9 f.) that they were able to provide severe competition to the merchants of England in the business of buying raw materials and selling manufactures in the Ottoman markets.

In a systematic effort to worst the Dutch in the East Mediterranean trade and in all other places where their galleons met, the English under the pre-Commonwealth Stuarts and under the Commonwealth as well developed manufacturing and discouraged the production of raw materials

for export. Thus, at the beginning of the century the English undertook to make for themselves the fabric dye mordants that had previously (see above, page 43) come in quantity from the Levant.[45] They began to manufacture soap of English, rather than the thitherto important (page 43) Syrian, raw materials.[46]

In the days of James I, the Levant Company group proposed an ambitious scheme. They were anxious to improve their trade balance by exchanging the most profitable export possible for the raisins, the Cretan wine, the tanning agents, and the raw or yarn cotton that they were importing from the Levant. Textiles, they believed, were the magical export that could multiply their profits: textiles light in weight for easy bulk transport, and highly colored to make an appeal to the Turkish trade. Textiles, furthermore, would enable them to compete on more favorable terms with the Dutch, already edging ahead in the Levantine market because of their status as chief shippers of the Continent's output of finished fabrics. The Levant Company's scheme, therefore, was for nothing short of a remaking of England's economy so that, instead of shearing sheep and exporting their wool, she would weave it in workshops and export the cloth. As it turned out, they were somewhat ahead of their time;[47] it was actually not until 1660 that London was able to cast a satisfied glance over the growth of manufacturing and interdict -- under cruel penalties -- the exportation from England of raw wool.[48]

Despite this measure and all the other efforts of Englishmen, despite the indirect effects of the Navigation Act of 1651 and the

Anglo-Dutch War of 1652-1654, the commerce of the Netherlands and the influence of her merchants grew apace in the Levant.[48a] Of no small advantage was the Amsterdam Exchange Bank (see above, page 9 and note 27), whose phenomenal liquidity enabled Dutch businessmen to extend two years' credit while themselves paying in bills of exchange on the Bank, in ready specie,[49] or even in gold ingots from the late '40's on.[50] English merchants, though allowed to export gold from 1664 on,[51] had not nearly the same advantageous banking facilities as their competitors enjoyed; a 1650 memorandum of the English Levant Company laments the fact.[52]

While the English and the Dutch were competing in Ottoman ports, France slowly faded from the picture. For one thing, there was so much to concern her in other areas -- her long foreign wars (see above, page 28), the internal religious war and the non-religious strife culminating in the Fronde (above, page 13), the administrative reorganization under Richelieu, and in general the all-consuming interest in homeland and in Europe -- that she was effectively distracted from her quondam relation with the Levant. For another, the France of Catherine de Médicis and Richelieu and Mazarin simply did not possess the capital and the shipping that the England of the first Stuarts and the Commonwealth and the Holland of Maurits of Nassau and Jan de Witt had at their disposal.

The pashas of Turkey were not slow to comprehend the French decline. As a result, there was no renewal of French capitulations between 1614 and the end of the period with which we are concerned. The Ottoman ports, once full of the bustle of France's ships, began to discriminate

against her: by midcentury, she was saddled with a duty of 5% ad valorem on the goods she brought into the Levant, as against the mere 3% levied against her English and Dutch competitors.[53] The official duty, however, was becoming a minor expense, for ship-captains and consuls were encountering a mounting volume of arbitrary imposts that are perhaps best described as shakedowns.[53a]

The French were not the only traders who began to feel the demands of "shakedown artists" in the ports of the Levant. They perhaps suffered more than the English and the Dutch because the increasingly-resented Capitulations system was historically a French system, because France was now less influential in the Levant and less able to fight shakedowns than her competitors, and finally because Ottoman ships in the Mediterranean were so often pillaged by French pirates.

The pirate captains were, many of them, sons of aristocratic families of the Provence. Some were second sons, prevented from enjoying the ancestral estates by the primogeniture law.[54] Some may have been victims of the inflation of the second half of the sixteenth century (see above, pages 7, 12). Whatever the causes for their turning to buccaneering, the Provençal pirate captains did a flourishing slave business and delighted in playing hob with Ottoman interests along the North African shore.[55] Paris generally was not unfriendly to them. Henri IV (1589-1610), to give an example, while officially a great friend of the Sultan's (it was his ministers who negotiated the highly favorable Capitulations of 1597 and 1604), was sub rosa the protector of the pirates, from whose gains he received a veritable "rakeoff"; to avoid embarrassment to their sovereign, the pirates would ply their trade under the flag of Tuscany,

Naples, or Malta rather than France.[56]

Malta at that time was the very citadel and shrine of piracy.[57] Preying upon shipping and insufficiently protected ports, especially if they were Ottoman, was -- notwithstanding its ecclesiastical name -- the very raison d'etre of the Order of Saint John of Malta. The members of this onetime Crusaders' Order, the so-called Maltese Knights, were in great part French noblemen.

Christians were not the only pirates. The Barbary corsairs, operating under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire, made Mediterranean traffic quite hazardous for French, English, and Dutch alike.[58] By mid-seventeenth-century, certainly, the French were least able of the three to absorb their blows. What with all their difficulties with Turkey, the French decided at the outbreak of the Candian War that they had a chance to hold onto at least one East Mediterranean ally; they accordingly went to the aid of Venice, albeit unofficially (see above, page 45).

France's partisanship in the Candian War proved to be an added excuse for the pashas and kadis to discriminate against her shipping.[59] By the time we reach our terminal year of 1666, we find her woes so grievously multiplied that there was not much left of her Eastern commerce. In Aleppo's harbor, where she had once enjoyed a lucrative monopoly,[60] the English and the Dutch were now damaging competitors.[61] In depressed Cairo and Alexandria (see above, page 39), whence all other European agents had fled, her factors alone remained to preside over a trickle of trade and to suffer shakedowns of up to 20% of the value of a

cargo.[62]

France's Levantine trade had been a 30,000,000 livre a year business occupying one thousand ships at the beginning of the century. By 1620 it already had as few as 400 vessels, and its valuation was down to 18,000,000 livres. When the '60's arrived, it had shriveled to a wraith: using in all but thirty bottoms, France imported less than 3,000,000 livres' worth from the Levant and exported nearly nothing.[62a] On account of Barbary pirates and the other uncertainties of the time, insurance cost 15% of cargo worth. Shakedowns to Ottoman officials did away with as much as another 25% to 35%.[63] In Mehmet Köprülü's reign, which began in 1656, the French ambassador's influence disappeared almost entirely, and he was twice arrested;[64] shortly after his recall in 1660, his son was named by Louis XIV to succeed him, but France waited over four years for a Turkish change in attitude before letting him depart for Constantinople.[65]

As we have clearly seen, the passage of time brought ever sterner competition into the Levantine trade. 1600 was more competitive than 1550, and 1665 more so than 1600. It was undoubtedly this factor more than any other that gave rise to the steady increase in sentiment in favor of a new Crusade -- a Crusade of united Europe against the Turk.[66] Crusade fever was in the air in 1517-1519,[67] during the Cyprus War in 1571-1573,[68] at the beginning of Turkey's decline in 1585-1589,[69] each time the Papacy led in the attempt to inspirit the European powers and unite them behind the idea of wresting the Levant from the infidel. The seventeenth century, when France was losing ground in the East, saw

Crusade projects forming under French rather than Vatican leadership. There was the "grand dessein" of Henri IV and Sully for conquering Turkey, which loomed large in the monarch's mind between 1607 and 1609.[70] There was Père Joseph's scheme, upon which the "Gray Eminence" labored indefatigably from about 1615 to 1625.[71] There was finally, during the Turkish push through the Balkans in 1661 to 1663, a new Crusade project promoted once again by the Holy See.[72]

While plotting external aggression, Christian leaders did not neglect the encouragement of subversion within Turkey as well. As traditional protectress of the Christians within the Empire, France was in a peculiarly favorable position for doing so. (One writer has expressed it thus, "When French influence was at its height in the Levant, the French ambassador at Constantinople was a veritable vice-emperor of the Orient, the Grand Vizier of the Christians."[73]) Her legitimate patronage of Levantine Christians -- such as her centuries-old protection of the Lebanese Maronites,[74] her special diplomatic mission of 1621-1622 for the promotion of Catholicism in Palestine[75] -- could merge at times into more questionable activities, such as bailing out of Turkish jails Jesuits accused of subversion[76] and introducing the Capuchin Order into the Empire, under the sponsorship of that Capuchin would-be Crusader, Père Joseph.[77]

It is enlightening to recall the elaborate aggressive and subversive plans of the 1610's, in whose latter workings Père Joseph played a large part. The plans began with a strange accord, providing that a disaffected Emir of Beirut and a pretender to the Ottoman throne would

each lead more or less simultaneous revolts, and that an assorted navy made up of a Tuscan fleet and of French pirate ships flying Tuscan, Neapolitan and Maltese flags, would give them immediate support. Some of these ships remained in Levantine waters from 1608 to 1610, waiting vainly for the revolt to break. Meanwhile, the web of intrigue widened: Austria secretly gave a nod of encouragement; Persia, at war with Turkey, was drawn into the plot; and a revolt in Greece was fervently supported by the French Duc de Nevers, who announced himself a scion of the Byzantine royal house and raised an army and a collection of money in France. Underground organizations in the Levant began propagandizing Levantine Christians in Nevers' favor -- there is suspicion that the Jesuits Turkey arrested (see previous page) were accused of complicity in this propaganda -- and in 1612 the Orthodox bishops of Greece petitioned Nevers to hurry to their side in the name of Christ.[78]

Although this ambitious plan, with its combination of sedition and Trojan-horse tactics, did not bear fruit, there is little doubt that many of the French and Italian monks in Ottoman lands played the role of agitators against civil loyalty among the native Christians. More than likely, it was their influence that prompted the Greek patriarch of Antioch and the Armenian patriarch of Aleppo to write in the '60's to Louis XIV as their hoped-for "deliverer".[79]

It is noteworthy that of all these and the many other schemes for destroying the Ottoman Empire's power, not one even approached implementation. That this is so is due, paradoxically, to the same factor that gave rise to t he schemes -- competition. On the one hand, the Levant-

ine traffic was so competitive that a drive on the part of one power to monopolize it would have found itself opposed in short order by an ad hoc concert of the others. On the other hand, the rise of nationalism (see above, page 10 f.) having made the "balance of power" a fetish of European diplomats, it was next to impossible for a coalition of powers to be formed, to win a diplomatic or military victory, and then to survive the mutual suspicions that would inevitably supervene.

For example, the Crusade that Leo X urged in 1517 was stopped short by the hostility of the German princes to the Holy See and the decision of Francis I, after losing his suit for the Holy Roman Empire's crown, that Europe's balance of power could be preserved only by his entente with the Porte against Charles V.[80] Henri IV's "grand dessein" likewise foundered on the rock of Franco-Austrian rivalry.[81] The rather informal coalition of Venice, Spain, France, and the Vatican that won the victory at Lepanto could not capitalize on it to advance further against the Turks because Spain and France were more immediately interested in checking each other.[82] The Crusading plans of Père Joseph got nowhere because the powers of Europe were expending their entire energies on the Thirty Years' War,[83] while the international force of Germans, Austrians, French, Hungarians and Italians who turned back the Turks at St. Gotthard in '64 fell apart when Austria, frightened of her French allies, signed a hurried peace with the Levantine enemy.[84] Finally, we may note that Pope Alexander VII's request of three years earlier for an alliance looking toward a Crusade was taken coolly by Mazarin, because of the Vatican's closeness with Spain at the time.[85]

While human enemies seemed unable to unite to do her damage, the Ottoman Empire of midcentury had her share and more of cold, economic foes.[85a] A French ambassador of the '70's found Palestine's soil so infertile and unpromising that he was willing to consider the country's Biblical prosperity a veritable miracle of the Lord.[86] He added that the inhabitants were poverty-stricken. Jerusalemites found money so scarce that "on se soumet à tout pour en avoir."[87] In Gaza, while the Pasha lived in palatial style, "Le peuple est miserable jusques à estre reduit à demander l'aumosne, et il est aussy difficille qu'incommode de la donner par l'accablement de ceux qui la demandent."[88] While a member of the French embassy staff reported in 1640 that street beggars were a rare sight in Constantinople, the very poor being employed in public works projects,[89] it may be doubted if the Constantinople of the middle '60's was prosperous. If the Smyrna of the time was as bustling and as well-to-do as it is described,[90] it is likely that its wealth was merely what had been transferred from partly blockaded (see above, pages 35, 39) Constantinople.[90a] Other countries besides Turkey suffered: there seems to have been a depression in Tuscany in or about the '60's.[91]

With all this, the competition of European traders in the Levant remained brisk; it seems to have been at least as lively in the decade of the '60's as in any one previous. The Dutch discouraged pirate attacks by sending their merchantmen into the Mediterranean in convoys, and mounting six cannon or so on each of them.[92] Mehmet Köprülü demanded that the English and Dutch ships in the Levant do duty as arms- and troop-carriers for him during the Candian War, and Cromwell, for one, meekly acquiesced rather than jeopardize his Levant Company's trading privileges.[93] The

Dutch, apparently dissatisfied with their port facilities in Leghorn, entered negotiations (which proved inconclusive) for leasing a harbor on the island of Elba.[94] The position of the Dutch had become so strong that they were actually doing some of Venice's shipping for her; they had offices and quays at the Adriatic city;[95] much of the importation of Levantine raw materials for Venice's glassworks was in their hands by now (see above, page 45 and note 30).

France, seeing her Levantine position melt away, played a double game for a long time. Henri IV, while plotting his "grand dessein", remained officially on the best of terms with the Sultan.[96] A decade later, Paris made the Duc de Nevers adopt a non-French flag, and sacrificed her Syrian consul who publicly blessed the Emir of Beirut's revolt (see above, page 52 f).[97] When Louis XIV sent a generously large army to help the Austrian Emperor against the Turks in '63 (see above, pages 38, 54), he apologized to Vienna that he could not do more and simultaneously apologized to the Porte for having sent any help at all.[98] In similar vein, he tried to disguise the French army at Candia by ordering it to fly the Pope's flag.[99]

When Colbert, after four years in power, turned his mind to the sick Levant trade, he applied to it his wonted bold approach. Sending as ambassador to Constantinople De La Haye, Sieur de Vantelet (he arrived December 1, 1665[100]), he charged him with furthering a remarkable scheme: La Haye-Vantelet was to propose to the Porte that duties on French goods be cut to 2% while English merchants should be placed under increased impositions and the Dutch be required again to sail under France's flag; in return, France being granted a monopoly at Suez,

she would build two large fleets, one to carry freight from India up the Red Sea to Suez and the other to take it -- after an overland haul across the Suez Isthmus -- from Egypt's Mediterranean harbors to Europe, with the result that a new Europe-to-India route would be opened and the Levant retrieve the rich source of revenue it had lost when the Cape route was initiated.[101] The new ambassador, however, far from finding the Porte receptive to negotiation, was made the whipping-boy for its grievances against Europeans; the defeat at St. Gotthard and France's part in it rankled in Ahmet Köprülü's heart, and he remained unfriendly to La Haye-Vantelet throughout the latter's stay in Turkey, which lasted past 1666.[102]

Though they were not to bear fruit within our period, Colbert's Levantine plans were well conceived within the frame of his mercantilistic rationale (see above, page 11). A number of men were skeptical of the Ottoman commerce's utility, some in France because of their country's unfavorable trade balance with the Levant (see above, page 51), others -- Calvinists in spirit -- in both France and England on the ground that so much that was imported from the East was "useless superfluities and vain pomp". Richelieu had answered the former class of doubters with the observation that trade with the Levant redounded to the benefit of France's international trade in general,[103] and Colbert now gave what amounted to an answer to all the skeptics with his great scheme for broadcasting manufacturing monopolies through the Provence and developing the Levant and the lands beyond as their raw-goods source and their market.[104]

The Levant of the 1660's was a colorful theater in which European

rivalries were dramatized. Merchants of the Western powers met and competed there for the favor of the Ottoman officials and entrepreneurs, and for the privilege of playing the largest part in the reduction of the Levant to the status of commercial colony.

C. CONCLUSION

It has not been easy to find meaningful material on the Levant of our period, nor has my search for it been very successful. In the hope that the numerous facts I assembled might in the aggregate tell us something significant about the economy of the seventeenth-century Levant and the hopes and fears of its inhabitants and foreign exploiters, I have set them down, diffuse though they have made the chapter. Thus, I have had to lean heavily on what is best documented but least important for our purposes, the military and the top-level political events and the course of Turkish diplomacy (especially with France, whose diplomatic relations with the Porte were especially active and eventful); and I have been able to draw the least on what would have been of most help, such as adequate sources on Levantine commerce (especially with Amsterdam, Hamburg, Leghorn, and Venice -- towns that were so important in the Sabbatian movement) and material on the sociology of the large Levantine port communities in the seventeenth century.

It is unfortunate that I have not been able to make of this chapter as clearcut a presentation of historic fact as would have been desirable. It is nevertheless possible, I believe, to draw from the chapter certain conclusions that may have bearing on the rise and spread of Sabbatianism within the Levant.

Probably the most striking condition in the sixteenth and seventeenth century Levant is the growing European interest in the area. It was no longer the way-station for the India trade and the small-scale producer of goods for Europe that it had been in the fifteenth century. Now, with the signing in 1536 of France's first Capitulation, with the founding early in the second half of the century of the English Turkey (later Levant) Company, and with the influx of Dutch traders beginning about the turn of the century, the Levant assumed a vital role in the development of European mercantilistic capitalism.

Merchants in the mercantilist tradition, infatuated with the profit-making possibilities in manufacturing, sought in the Levant a dependable source of cheap raw materials -- especially for the production of cotton, wool, and silk fabrics, to a smaller degree for the manufacture of glass, soap, and leather goods -- and, secondarily, a market for their manufactures. By mid-seventeenth century, it was evident that Holland, who of all European lands had made the most successful transition to capitalism at home, was also the leader in the Levant commerce; that England, the second capitalist nation, was second in the Levant; and that France, the first to open the Levant but the last to grow toward modern business methods, lagged badly in her traffic

with Ottoman ports.

I have no evidence indicating whether or not English or Dutch merchants followed the example of their countrymen in the East Indies and the Americas by using deceit, gangster methods, and murder to further their trade in the Levant. There is abundant evidence, on the other hand, that during the century ending in 1666 certain elements (notably Provençal capitalists and pirates) in France did whatever could be done under cover toward persuading European armies to war against the Ottomans and encouraging disaffection and sedition within the Empire. The French, still doing considerable business with the Empire, had to do in secret the subversive work that they hoped would eventuate in their recouping their old place as chief European trader with the Levant. However, they had allies in the work -- the Vatican, Tuscany, Venice, an old Crusaders' Order now reduced to buccaneering -- who, long having lost their place in the Levantine sun, had no need to plot in secret.

Whatever subversive agitation there was in the Ottoman realm, it was in all likelihood abetted by bad economic conditions, of which we have some hints and indications in the contemporary sources. The Ottoman Empire was throughout our period an overwhelmingly rural nation, with moreover what must have been a subsistence economy. The effect of the great conquests undoubtedly was the creation of a far-ranging economic entity -- a long chain of ports under one government with a solitary customs law, backed up by an extensive heartland newly freed of internal frontier barriers; and the upsurge of trade that we are given to believe accompanied the sixteenth-century Golden Age must have been due in large

part to this development. But her great land mass and her array of harbors did not suffice to keep Turkey prosperous: it may be that, with an economy essentially primitive and not very productive, she could not remain well-to-do for long without conquering new lands. At any rate, there is little doubt that in the first half of the seventeenth century she was attacked by depression.

By midcentury, the depression seems to have been over in some places, such as Smyrna, although it certainly continued in Palestine. Undoubtedly the sons of the many immigrants Turkey had welcomed at her apogee -- so many of whom had entered the ranks of the middle class -- had suffered from it.

Through depression and prosperity, the ties between the trading cities of Europe and those of the Levant were becoming closer and more tightly bound; and the heightened intimacy was spelling out the achievement of a symbiotic relationship between Western Europe and the Levant, a relationship that meant the commercial colonization of the latter by the former -- a relationship in which Ottoman resources were becoming a prize to be intrigued over or negotiated for among capitalists of foreign lands and Ottomans allied to them. To an extraordinary extent, mid-seventeenth-century Turkey had become a focus of the more advanced nations' economic rivalries.

NOTES ON CHAPTER TWO

1. Bailly, op. cit., p. 173.

2. Ibid., pp. 159 ff., 164 f., 172 f., 175-79, 277-95.
Lord Eversley. The Turkish Empire from 1288 to 1914. London, Fisher Unwin, 1924. P. 126 f.
These sources discuss the Turko-Venetian Wars and the treaties resulting from them.

3. Bailly, op. cit., p. 294.

4. Ibid., p. 292.

5. Sir T. Roe's Embassy, pp. 66 f., 178; quoted in Eversley, op. cit., p. 159.
Signs of decline as early as the 1570's are mentioned in: Clarence Dana Rouillard. The Turk in French History, Thought, and Literature (1520-1660). Paris, Boivin, 1938 (?). Pp. 69, 73.
Further indications of decline may be noted in French ambassadorial reports of 1585 and 1608, quoted respectively in: Ibid., p. 135, n. 2, p. 142.

6. Mercure, X, 275-84 (1624); quoted in Rouillard, op. cit., p. 89.
Some other events of the same year, such as Cossack raids reaching almost as far as Constantinople, and persecution of Christians in the capital on suspicion of having helped the Cossacks, are mentioned in the same reference.

7. Mercure, XIII, 763-64 (1627); quoted in Rouillard, op. cit., p. 90, n. 1.

8. A. Boppe. Journal et Correspondance de Gédoyn "le Turc". Paris, 1909. Pp. 73, 152 f. Quoted in Rouillard, op. cit., p. 249.

9. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 90.
Hauser, op. cit., p. 380.

10. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 101 f. Even in these near-anarchic days, however, Turkey showed some promise of recovery; ibid., p. 99 f.

11. Ibid., p. 102 f.; Eversley, op. cit., p. 168 ff.

12. Vandal, op. cit., p. 66.

13. Ibid., p. 61. "Foster father", on the other hand, may have been merely a figure of speech; cf. Hauser, op. cit., p. 407, for his reference to Mehmet Köprülü as "my father".

14. Hauser, op. cit., p. 407.

15. Eversley, op. cit., p. 171. However, the remakk on the following page concerning the lowered quality of the army may point to a persistence of economic deficiencies.

16. Vandal, op. cit., p. 12.

17. I am taking deliberate exception here to the opinion of the von Hammer school of Ottoman historians (Eversley is a disciple) that the Empire's prosperity or decline depended on whether the reigning Sultan happened to be "energetic" or "degenerate" -- that is to say, whether or not he subscribed to the Puritan code of morals.

18. I.F.D. Morrow, "Capitulations", Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., vol. IV, p. 812 f.
Bailly, op. cit., pp. 65, 73, 123, 126.
Clark, The Seventeenth Century, p. 172 f.

19. Actually signed in 1536, it was negotiated the previous year.

20. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 113.
Ernest Jackh. The Rising Crescent: Turkey Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow. New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1944. P. 76 f.

21. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 112 f; Golob, op. cit., p. 313.
Under the Capitulary system, the French consuls became extremely important men, fulfilling a number of the functions of civil rulers, especially for the Christian populations in their bailiwicks, and especially in the Cyclades (cf. Vandal, op. cit., p. 123 ff.) and in the great French-dominated port of Aleppo.

22. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 131

23. Ibid., p. 134.

24. Ibid., p. 140, n. 5.

25. Ibid., p. 140; Vandal, op. cit., p. 44 f.

26. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 147.

26a. Vandal, op. cit., p. 10.

27. François de Noailles, in: Ernest Charrière. Négociations de la France dans le Levant. III, p. 254, n. Quoted in Rouillard, op. cit., p. 158.

28. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 129, n.4; p. 134, n.2.

29. W.B. Honey, "Pottery and Porcelain", Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., vol. XVIII, p. 351.

30. Vandal, op. cit., p. 151 f.

31. Ibid., p. 152.

32. "Chartered Companies", Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., vol. V, p. 307.

33. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 134 & n. 3.

34. Ibid., p. 118 & n. 1.

35. Ibid., p. 132; Hauser, op. cit., p. 91.

36. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 153.

37. Hauser, op. cit., p. 408; Vandal, op. cit., pp. 5, 19.
Actually, French aid was not forthcoming until 1654, the year after the conclusion of the Fronde; in 1659-60, about 3,000 French troops landed on Crete and tried vainly to relieve Candia.

38. Sagnac and St.-Léger, p. 8 f.

39. Pasquale Villari, "Medici", Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., vol. XIV, p. 192 f.

40. Hauser, op. cit., p. 447.

41. Morrow, loc. cit.

42. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 141, n. 5.

43. Ibid., p. 157; Morrow, loc. cit.; Vandal, op. cit., p. 45.

44. Hauser, op. cit., p. 276.

45. Howard Spence, "Alum", Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., vol. I, p. 712.

46. Hauser, op. cit., p. 444.

47. Ibid., p. 445; Barbour, p. 94 & n. 36.

48. Aldred Farrer Barker, "Wool", Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed., vol. XXIII, p. 726 f.

48a. Heinrich Srbik. Der staatliche Exporthandel Österreichs von Leopold I bis Maria Theresa. Vienna, 1907. P. 69. Srbik discusses Amsterdam's extensive iron, steel, and copper shipments to the Levant, and the refusal of the Dutch government to act on an Austrian protest that the traffic was building up Turkey's military might. I took this reference from Barbour, op. cit., p. 40 & n. 108.

J.G. van Dillen. Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Wisselbank. I, p. 77. "Aslani", Dictionnaire Universel de Commerce (1723), vol. I, p. 166. These sources speak of the extreme popularity of the so-called "lion dollar" of Holland in the Levantine ports. References taken from Barbour, op. cit., p. 48 f. & n. 24.
Spanish specie, which French traders utilized, was also in demand in the Levant, according to Hauser, op. cit., p. 447.

49. Barbour, op. cit., p. 94 f. & n. 38, 39.

50. Hauser, op. cit., p. 441.
(Pieter de la Court; wrongly attributed to Johan de Witt.) The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and West Friesland. London, 1702. (Trsln. of: Interest van Holland ofte Gronden van Hollands Welvaren, 1662.) P. 98.
Van Dillen, op. cit., I, p. 220 f. These sources speak of Holland's importing much more from the Levant than she exported, and of the consequent necessity for sending gold and silver thither. These references, and the additional information that receipt of many commercial services by Dutchmen in the Levant went toward balancing the account, are to be found in Barbour, op. cit., p. 52 & n. 37.

51. Randall, op. cit., p. 194.

52. M.A.E. Green, ed. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Ser., 1649-1650. London, 1875. P. 12. Referred to in Barbour, op. cit., p. 95, n. 38.

53. Hauser, op. cit., p. 447; Vandal, op. cit., p. 2.

53a. Archives des Affaires étrangères, Correspondances diplomatiques et consulaires, 1660-1670. Paris.
Archives de la Marine, 1660-1670. Paris.
Inventaire des Archives historiques de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille.
Paul Masson. Histoire du Commerce français dans le Levant au XVII^e siècle. Paris, 1896. Bk. I, "L'anarchie commerciale, 1610-61".
These references cited and, in part, quoted in Vandal, op. cit., p. 6, n. 1, and Rouillard, op. cit., p. 159, n. 1.

54. Vandal, op. cit., p. 3 f.

55. Ibid., p. 4. The pirates were equally active off the Dodecanese, the Cyclades, and the shores of Greece, Turkey, and Syria.

56. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 143.

57. I have used the word "piracy" with some reservations, since -- in speaking of the seventeenth century -- it conveys the false impression of, on the one hand, a group of honest and righteous merchants and, on the other, the "pirate" gang of evil whisky-guzzling cutthroats. The truth, I believe, is that piracy was part of the game in the seventeenth century; that, if a ship-captain's home port were wealthy, he was first of all a trader and only incidentally and occasionally a pirate, while if his port were poor or depressed, he was primarily a pirate.

58. Vandal, op. cit., p. 3.

59. Ibid., p. 5 f.

60. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 158.

61. Vandal, op. cit., p. 154.

62. Masson, op. cit., pp. 397-400; contemporary sources cited prev. p., n. 53a. Reference from Vandal, op. cit., p. 13 & n. 1.

62a. Detailed notes on French commerce in the Levant in the 1670's may be found in: Report of Ambassador Marquis de Nointel to Foreign Minister Marquis de Pomponne. Dated Sidon, June 28, 1674. Archives des Affaires étrangères, Turquie, vol. XII. Reproduced in full in Vandal, op. cit., pp. 306 ff., 309-17.

63. See prev. p., n. 53a.

64. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 154.

65. Vandal, op. cit., pp. 16, 18.

66. Ibid., p. 7, speaks of the increase in Crusading sentiment.

67. Rouillard, pp. 35 f., 356.

68. Ibid., pp. 69, 73; Hauser, op. cit., p. 89.

69. Rouillard, op. cit., pp. 138, 359 ff.

70. Ibid., pp. 140 f., 360 f.; Vandal, op. cit., p. 7.

71. Rouillard, p. 361 f.

72. Vandal, op. cit., pp. 7, 15; Hauser, op. cit., p. 408; Sagnac and St.-Léger, op. cit., pp. 9, 106 f.
Moritz Brosch. Geschichten aus dem Leben dreier Grosswesire, Mohammed Sokolli, Mohammed u. Ahmed Kiupruli. Gotha, 1899 (8°) Referred to by Hauser, p. 406, and Sagnac, p. 105.

73. Gérard Tongas. Ataturk. Paris. Quoted in Jackh, op. cit., p. 77.

74. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 153.

75. Ibid., pp. 91, 152.

76. Ibid., pp. 147, 152, 162.

77. Ibid., pp. 152, 163.

78. Ibid., pp. 143 f., 148, 361 f. The latter reference also includes mention of the proposal made at that time by the French ex-ambassador to the Porte that France should begin a systematic campaign to propagandize and win over the Christians of the Levant and captured Ottoman soldiers (who had been born Christian).

79. Archives des Affaires étrangères, Constantinople, vol. VIII; cited in Vandal, op. cit., p. 8 f.
Report of Ambassador de Nointel to King Louis XIV. Dated Jerusalem, April 15, 1674. Arch. Aff. étr., Turquie, vol. XII. Reproduced in full in Vandal, p. 298. Here the ambassador urges his sovereign to liberate Palestine, not from the Ottomans but from the Greek monks who compete with the Romans in taking care of the Holy Places.

80. Vandal, op. cit., p. 188; Rouillard, op. cit., pp. 35 f., 106 ff.

81. Ibid., p. 361.

82. Ibid., p. 132; Hauser, op. cit., p. 89 ff.

83. Rouillard, op. cit., p. 362.

84. Sagnac and St.-Leger, op. cit., p. 108.

85. Ibid., p. 9; Hauser, op. cit., p. 408.

85a. Vandal, op. cit., p. 248. Here Ambassador Nointel reports to his King in 1699 that the Turkish government is in deplorable state. Though he enumerates those details -- a degenerate dynasty, corrupt ministries -- that would flatter France in the comparison, it is quite likely that

underlying the ills of the government was a general weakness in the nation's economy, and that this weakness was felt in the '60's as well as the '70's.

86. Dispatch of Ambassador Nointel to King, Jerusalem, Apr. 15, 1674. Dispatch of Ambassador Nointel to Foreign Minister Pomponne, Jerusalem, Apr. 25, 1674. Arch. Aff. étr., Turquie, vol. XII. Reproduced in Vandal, op. cit., pp. 294, 299, repsectively.

87. Dispatch to King, cited in prev. n. Vandal, p. 294.

88. Dispatch of Nointel to Pomponne, Sidon, June 28, 1674. Arch. Aff. étr., loc. cit. From Vandal, p. 306.

89. Du Loir. Les Voyages du sieur Du Loir. Paris, Fr. Clouzier, 1654. P. 191. Quoted in Rouillard, op. cit., p. 350.

90. Vandal, p. 175.

90a. Moïse Franco. Essai sur l'histoire des Israélites de l'empire Ottoman depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours. Paris, A. Durlacher, 1897. P. 95.

91. Pasquale Villari, "Medici", Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., (1911), vol. XVIII, p. 39.

92. Hauser, op. cit., p. 276.
E. Baasch. Holländische Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Jena, 1927 (8°).
S. van Brakel. De Hollandsche Handelscompagnieën der 17e Eeuw. The Hague, 1908 (8°). Cited by Hauser, p. 272.

93. Hauser, p. 408. Cf. above, p. 67, n. 72, for further reference.

94. Georges Depping, ed. Correspondance administrative sous le règne de Louis XIV. III, p. 349 f. Cited in Barbour, op. cit., p. 128 & n. 111. It is of interest to note the intimate commercial ties between Holland and Tuscany during our period:
Much silver from Mexican mines was shipped to Leghorn to Dutch trading houses, according to: Chas. Chillingworth to Jos. Williamson, Jan. 2, 1666 (Dec. 23, 1665, O.S.). State Papers, Foreign, Tuscany 6. London, Public Record Office. Cited in Barbour, p. 51 & n. 33. Amsterdammers and Tuscans traded together in Russia, and Amsterdam capitalists held some special export rights from Tuscany, according to

Barbour, p. 116 f.
Furthermore, Tuscans owned banks in Amsterdam and stock in the Dutch trading companies, we are told in Barbour, p. 57.
Consequently, Florence and Leghorn are reported as very pro-Dutch in the second Anglo-Dutch War (1664-67), according to the following references: Sir John Fitch to Sec. Arlington, Oct. 20 (Oct. 10, O.S.), 1665. State Papers, Foreign, Tuscany 5. Public Record Office, London.
Sir John Fitch to Grand Duke of Tuscany, July 7 (June 27, O.S.), 1666. State Papers, Foreign, Tuscany 7.
These references cited in Barbour, p. 57, n. 53, and p. 101 & n. 79, respectively.

95. Dispatch of Nointel to Pomponne, cited above, n. 88, prev. p. From Vandal, p. 314.

96. Rouillard, p. 140; cf. above, p. 49 f.

97. Rouillard, p. 148 f.

98. Vandal, p. 16 f.

99. Ibid., p. 19.

100. Ibid., p. 18; cf. above, p. 51.

101. Memorandum of King (prob. written by Colbert or Foreign Minister) to Ambassador De La Haye-Vantelet, Aug. 22, 1665. Arch. Aff. étr., Constantinople, vol. VII, fol. 202. Reproduced at length in Vandal, pp. 274-78.

102. Vandal, p. 18 f.

103. Hauser, p. 446 f.

104. Vandal, p. 10.
Cf. Sagnac and St.-Léger, p. 69, for Colbert's views on developing manufactures within France and commercial colonies outside.
Cf. Ibid., p. 74, for some examples of industries he founded and enfranchised in the '60's which, according to his plans, would operate on Levantine raw materials. In general, it seems that his Levantine plans were in little more than the embryonic stage in 1666.

CHAPTER THREE

THE JEWS VICTIMIZED BY SOCIETY'S UNREST AND SEEKING RELIEF

In the first chapter we discussed those social, economic and political conditions that made seventeenth-century Europe ripe for the growth of mystical religious movements. Why, however, was the most noteworthy and enthusiastic of these movements a Jewish one?

Furthermore, the Levant, as we said in the second chapter, had a special function and position in seventeenth-century commerce. Was there any reason, however -- aside from the presence of Zion -- why it was especially important and desirable to Jews of the time?

It is to a consideration of these questions that this chapter will be devoted.

A. EUROPE SACRIFICES JEWS AT THE GRAVE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

Rabbis and Jewish historians in America like to preach that Jews thrive best in a democratic society. Foregoing the question of whether this is true in the present, we may seriously doubt its verity in the past. Certainly, the initial steps that Europe took from the authoritarianism we associate with the Middle Ages toward the relative democracy of urbanism and capitalism were steps that cost much Jewish heartache and not a little Jewish blood.

In the seventeenth century, Poland was closer to the middle ages than most European countries (see above, page 13). Large numbers of Jews served the Polish nobility as bankers, overseers, estate managers, or rent collectors, and thus had a function and a stake in the feudal system there.[1] When the great Polish aristocratic houses took to themselves estates in the Cossack plains of White Russia and the Ukraine, they made many Jews their agents in these new lands: the early decades of the seventeenth century saw an influx of Jews into the Cossack country, where some became virtual civil rulers over the peasants and petty tradesmen of Russian stock. Jews acted as civil judges in the name of the feudal lord; they collected taxes -- for the lord and for themselves -- on farm produce, on the profits of flourmills and inns,

on fish caught in the streams, even (against the counsel of rabbis) on sacraments performed in Orthodox churches.[2]

Hatred and resentment brewed in the hearts of the taxed and humiliated peasants of Ukrainia and Ruthenia. Some of the antipathy, to be sure, was directed against the Polish Catholic lords who oppressed them; but the lords, after all, were distant and shadowy to a degree, while their agents, the Jews, presented a more conspicuous and appealing target, since they moved among the peasants, filled their purses in the peasants' presence, and joked in the peasants' hearing about "haKozak hanigzal."[3]

When the peasants rose, in 1648, they most assuredly rose against the Polish lords. Although their hetman Chmielnicki, rich in cattle and in lands, was no more the democrat or less the medievalist than any of the proud Koniecpolskis, Potockis, or Wiśniowieckis, they nonetheless dealt a staggering blow to the feudalism of an important part of Europe. But, significantly and tragically, they struck at the Jews first and most fiercely; they wrought among the Jews greater devastation than among the Poles.

The Jews in the Ukraine and White Russia had stood between two hostile groups. They had served the nobility by fulfilling for it those odious duties that few but immigrants will undertake. As recompense, there was part of the taxes and rents they collected. True, the peasants came to hate them more than they hated the nobility, but the Jews counted on the nobility to protect them. The nobility, however, knew the Jews

stood between it and the peasants, and on some occasions -- as at the siege of Tulczyn[4] -- sacrificed the Jews in an attempt to save its own position. In this way, a great social war of the seventeenth century, while weakening the feudal system, also created a great mass of homeless Jews and spread a cloud of insecurity over the Jewish world.

The struggles of petty bourgeois and master craftsmen, in the seventeenth century, to preserve or strengthen their status in the economy of their city was not much different from the similar struggles that had taken place in the middle ages. Then, however, they had been sporadic, while now they were common; perhaps this was because cities were now more numerous, because they were larger and life in them more competitive; quite likely the master craftsmen feared the competition of burgeoning capitalist industries and of the greatly multiplied urban proletariat;[5] quite likely, too, the petty bourgeoisie was disturbed at the inflation (see above, p. 5 ff.) and the rise of great trading organizations that had come upon the scene with the first growth of capitalism and threatened to make a profitable existence difficult for them. Furthermore, economic crises were now common, and prosperous cities from time to time entered upon protracted periods of decline (see above, pp. 3 ff., 8, 22 f.), undoubtedly contributing greatly to the insecurity felt by the lower- and middle-middle classes. Finally, the bourgeoisie, if not the craftsmen's group, was -- because of its increased size -- able to influence the affairs of the city and the counsels of the magistracy to a significantly greater degree in the seventeenth century than before.

The great antagonists of the bourgeoisie were the nobility, with their feudal attitudes and preferences. With a consistency that may astonish us democrats, the nobility sought out Jews as allies and assistants, in return protecting them to a degree against their foes. This was the case in pre-1648 Poland, where the landed aristocrats and -- except when it was necessary to yield to anti-Jewish pressure -- their creatures the Kings were staunch upholders of Jewish rights and privileges.[6] This was the case in mid-sixteenth-century Italy, where the Doge of Genoa opposed Jewish expulsion from his dominions[7] and a Roman cardinal was a devoted protector of the Jews against ritual-murder accusations.[8] The Bohemian nobility was equally pro-Jewish; it pleaded for the reopening of Prague to Jews in the 1560's, and the Pope reinforced its plea.[9] Later, in 1616, it was the aristocracy that was instrumental in the readmission of Jews to Frankfurt-am-Main and Wurms after the lower orders had expelled them.[10] Finally, it was Catholic and medievalistic Austria that, in the Thirty Years' War, ~~that~~ ordered her commanders to protect the Jewish quarters of towns,[11] ~~that~~ saved the Jewish section when Prague was pillaged after the White Mountain,[12] and prevented suffering German towns from expelling their Jews;[13] it was Austria that extended the privileges and residence rights of Jews immediately after the Peace of Westphalia.[14]

The patriciate certainly favored Jews because it was able to make direct use of some of them as its bankers and its agents in various capacities. In addition, it undoubtedly looked with some favor on the fact that humbler Jews were performing a function in lending money to the middle classes. It may be, however, that the nobles saw the Jews in

another guise as well: as a bourgeois element dependent on themselves for status and favors, and valuable as a counterpoise to the growing and rebellious Christian bourgeoisie.

Whether or not the nobles thought this, it is certain that the middle and lower orders of the bourgeoisie had little love for the Jews. To some extent, they may have associated the Jews with the nobility and with the feudal system, and sought to attack that system by venting their wrath upon its weakest and most vulnerable member, the Jews.

The Polish burghers -- very many of them of German origin -- and their allies the clergy despised the Jews.[15] The burghers of mid-sixteenth-century Prague,[16] the citizens of Rome in the same period,[17] and many of the tradesmen of Hamburg[18] and of Vienna[19] about eighty years later were eager to take measures against the Jews.

In the sixteenth century, aristocrats had been strong in many places and had been able, as we saw above, to protect the Jews. By the following century, however, the bourgeoisie was in many localities more powerful than it had been, and the aristocracy weaker. Consequently, Jews now saw their foes multiplied and their once-puissant defenders shorn of power. The bourgeoisie was not slow to take advantage of its increased strength in order to strike at the feudal system with renewed vigor by attacking the Jews; and many members of the nobility joined in their anti-Semitism either because of opportunism or as an act of self-preservation.

It must not be imagined, however, that the anti-Semitism of burghers

was the by-product of anything so abstract as an ideological disapproval of feudalism. While they and their spokesmen often spoke in theological jargon, their anti-feudalism was for the most part grounded in eminently practical considerations (though this is not the place for analyzing them).

Furthermore, by no means all of the anti-Semitic feeling of seventeenth-century burghers can be written off as simple anti-feudalism; many burghers had other, more direct grounds for attacking Jews.

The growing class of retailers in the Christian population of cities and towns was confronted with Jewish competition in the seventeenth century as never before. With the heightened power of the bourgeois in city magistracies, Christian retailers were able to secure legislation barring Jews from the retail trade in new textiles in Tuscany in 1649, after the Florentine silk weavers had protested in 1620 against Jewish competition;[20] Venice barred Jews from the woolen trade in 1554, and issued various other restrictive decrees in the seventeenth century,[21] until there were no fields open to them in the Republic of San Marco other than pawnbrokerage, the wholesale and second-hand trades.[22] In 1617, the Empire acquiesced in the severe legal restrictions of Jewish rights in Frankfurt-am-Main and Wurms, a concession largely to Christians angered by the competition of Jews.[23] Five years earlier, the Hamburg Senate had ruled that only Jews of whose occupations that body approved would b allowed to take up residence in the city.[24] Finally, in 1661, the lawmakers of Strassburg put severe occupational restrictions on their Jews.[25]

By mid-seventeenth century, there was hardly a place in Europe where retailing was not legally closed to the Jews. But in cities that were suffering from economic decline or the pinch of hard times, an additional measure was invoked: the ghetto, that device by means of which the Christian bourgeoisie could assure itself that Jews would not be competitors. The pioneer ghetto had been established in Venice in 1516,[26] before she had recovered from a severe economic panic (see above, p. 3 f.). Rome, with perhaps 5,000 Jews,[27] followed suit; the Holy Office of the Inquisition, in authority within the ghetto,[28] helped to hem in the life of the Roman Jews and keep them from competing with Christians a good deal more thoroughly than was the case in Venice.[29] Verona put its Jews in a ghetto in 1599,[30] Padua in 1602,[31] Modena in 1638,[32] and Gorizia in 1648.[33] In 1659, Papal Ancona's anti-Jewish laws were made so stringent that the ghetto was turned into a virtual prison or community under siege.[34] By the first quarter of the seventeenth century, we are told, it was already the general rule throughout economically depressed Italy for Jews to be confined behind ghetto walls and thus removed from the going urban economy.[35]

Not only retailers but also guild-craftsmen were watchful lest Jews become their competitors. In Padua, for example, they were warned away from carpentry,[36] and in Venice and other places from weaving.[37]

The equilibrium between the tendency of Jews to enter the crafts and the efforts of guilds to keep them out went sometimes one way and sometimes another.[38] However, occasionally the guildmasters took things into their own hands, as in 1614 under the baker Fettmilch and his

craftsmen who sought to build in Frankfurt-am-Main a Calvinist "kingdom of God", their disabilities under former patrician rule to be cured by an expulsion of the Jews.[39] The guildsmen of Wurms staged a similar rising in the following year; they too expelled the Jews of their city.[40]

Competition in trade and crafts were not the only facts disposing sixteenth- and seventeenth-century burghers toward Jew-hatred. Indebtedness to Jewish moneylenders was, in some places, quite as serious a cause. Germans had no less a precedent than Luther for berating Jews -- to whom not a few of them owed money -- for their dealings in gold and silver.[41] It remained, however, for deeply depressed Italy, with her large debtor class, to go the limit in preaching against and curbing the "usurious" Jews. In this country, it was especially the Papal States that legislated against Jewish moneylending, with the progressively severer laws of the 1550's,[42] of 1589, and of the seventeenth century, of which the latter -- ostensibly for the relief of Christian debtors -- made it next to impossible for most Jewish loan-bankers to make a living.[43]

There must have been times when burghers and their clerical friends, about to embark on anti-Jewish campaign, realized with a start that public opinion was not with them. It appears to me that these were the times when propaganda drives were launched, undoubtedly in an attempt to realign the city's views. Of such nature was the claim, made by the partisans of Jewish expulsion from Prague in 1542, that the Jews were arsonists and, in addition, Turkish spies.[44] The commonest propaganda slogan, however, was that of ritual murder:[44a] it was pressed into service again and again, as for instance in Bavaria in 1540,[45] in Rome in 1555,[46]

in Verona in 1603, and in Casale in 1611 and 1628.[47] It seems to me that ritual murder accusations were less frequent in the mid-seventeenth century than one hundred years before; if so, this perhaps indicates not that Jews were less hated in the mid-seventeenth century but, paradoxically, the contrary, that anti-Jewish burghers were by then in such positions of power that they could railroad discirminatory laws through their city Senates or magistracies without having to pave the way by first broadcasting fanciful propaganda.

Anti-Jewish feeling and anti-Jewish propaganda led sometimes to repressive measures against the practise of Judaism. This was especially so in the Papal States and those Mediterranean places under Vatican influence, in the fear-ridden, suspicion-laden Counter Reformation days. In 1542, the Roman Inquisition had been established;[48] in the '50's, the Vatican burned Talmuds[49] and censored Hebrew books,[50] while in the following century censorship, then a common rule in Italy,[51] was supplemented by the new regulation of requiring Jews to hear conversionist sermons.[52]

Opposition to Jews led also to imprisonment and physical violence against Jews, as when the Holy See jailed the Marranos of Ancona in 1555,[53] when Fettmilch's partisans (see above, p. 79) staged a pogrom, and when the Jewish quarter of Turin suffered from an anti-Semitic riot in 1639[54] and the Jewish quarter of Ferrara in 1581[55] and 1648.[56]

In Chapter One we gave evidence of insecurity and economic decline among a number of classes of the population in widespread areas of Europe. In the above pages of the present chapter I have sought to indic-

ate that, to a great degree, those localities that endured decline and those classes that suffered insecurity tended to load their own disabilities, multiplied in quantity, upon the Jews in their midst.

Because of this tendency, one who reviews the life of the Jews in the seventeenth century finds an unrelieved somber picture of suffering, poverty, and hopelessness throughout large areas of Europe. In Italy, for example, where we have already seen that depression was then the rule, there were far profounder depression and poverty in the ghettos of Pesaro,[57] Urbino,[58] and Casale,[59] poverty coupled with near-confiscatory taxes at Ancona[60] and Sinigaglia,[61] suffering compounded by the havoc of war in Mantua,[62] and a steady emigration of Jews from distressed Ferrara.[63]

Venice had a few Jews wealthy enough to engage in international commerce,[64] but the bulk of her ghetto-dwellers considered themselves fortunate if they could deal in secondhand clothing and furniture.[65] Leghorn, who had thrown open her gates to Jews and Marranos in 1593,[66] never found it necessary to isolate and segregate Jews as did the rest of seventeenth-century Italy;[67] nevertheless, even in this relatively prosperous port did it become more difficult for Jews to make a living, as we have seen above (p. 77).

All Italy -- except for one or two seaports -- was poor in seventeenth century. All Germany -- also with the exception of her ports -- was poor; and Germany was in addition a theater of class conflict. In such situations, the Jews of these lands were meeting evil times, indeed.

They were overtaxed, maligned, persecuted;[68] and the large proletariat among Italian Jewry made its meager living by peddling and ragpicking.[69]

We might say, in summary, that the seventeenth-century Jew was the victim of a double burden. In the first place, an anti-feudalist small bourgeoisie and peasantry hated him as a ward of the feudal nobility -- a class waning in power and now little able to protect him in many areas. In the second place, the retailing and guildsmen's class, while growing in numbers and in political influence in increasingly urbanized Europe, also encountered the various kinds of insecurity and economic crisis to which Chapter One alluded; as a partial palliative, retailers and guildsmen, with the help of the city clergy, turned on the city Jews, forcing them out of retailing and the crafts, restricting them -- if times were very bad -- in the lending of money and isolating them completely from the city's economy by penning them in a ghetto, at times rioting against them or curbing their practise of their religion, and -- if the city was not anti-Jewish enough to support such measures -- conducting a propaganda campaign, especially with ritual murder as its theme.

B. JEWS CROWD INTO CENTERS OF PROSPERITY, BUT EVEN THERE EQUALITY ELUDES THEM

When Jews seemed to be menacing competitors and no other measures appeared adequate, Christian city-dwellers of the seventeenth century would turn to the final resort of expulsion. Jews were expelled from Genoa in 1550,[70] from Prague in 1561,[71] from Vienna in 1556[72] and again in the 1590's,[73] from the Papal lands in Italy -- except Rome and Ancona[74] -- and in France[75] in 1569 and again from the former in 1593,[76] from Brandenburg and Brunswick in the 1590's,[77] from the area of Milan in 1597,[78] and from Oran in the first part of the seventeenth century.[79]

To be exiled was a dire hardship; in the sixteenth century, however, it was at least possible for quite a few Jews to find a new home to exchange for the one from which they had been driven. For example, when the Papal States oppressed their Jews in the 1550's (see above, pp. 78, 80), the Dukes of Urbino and of Ferrara invited them to their domains.[80] Prosperous Turkey welcomed Jewish exiles from the Papal domains, as well as from all other lands from which they were expelled.[81]

In the seventeenth century, however, matters were different. World insecurity was more widespread (as we saw in Chapter One), and larger groups of Jews were at their rope's end. There were the masses of dis-

placed Jews from Poland (see above, p. 73 f.) and the many restless and impoverished Jews in the generally depressed cities and towns of Italy and Germany (see above, p. 81). Not since the Spanish expulsion had so many Jews been homeless wanderers on the highways of the world. Not since 1492 had there been so many Jews without roots as in the '40's and '50's of the seventeenth century.

Not only that, but there were now fewer places that would receive Jews. Turkey, suffering from depressions (see above, pp. 36-41), was by no means the refuge she had been. Furthermore, the Counter-Reformation was continuing to do its work: when the Duchy of Ferrara fell to the Vatican in 1597, there were left almost no places hospitable to Jews in all Christian Southern Europe.[82]

Nevertheless, the Polish exiles managed eventually to find stopping-places. Some went close by, to Hungary -- and in less than two decades the city of Buda doubled her Jewish population.[83] Other refugees made their way to Venice[84] and ~~Florence~~ Leghorn, those seaport cities that were in better economic state th an the rest of Italy. Still others trickled into such places as Urbino[85] or wherever else they could find lodging and a meager livelihood. They faced monumental difficulties and extreme hardships in their search for new homes; in time, however, they settled themselves, a few in a place, almost everywhere in the Jewish world; while the Jews of Holland, of Italy, and especially of Turkey -- who had spent much of their remaining wealth to ransom so many of the Polish Jews from captivity[86] -- set out to resume their normal lives.

Now a new area, a new haven from oppression, and a new and rich center of activity enters into Jewish history -- the newly-prospe rous cities of northwest Europe, especially Amsterdam (whose rise to commercial prominence, beginning toward the end of the sixteenth century and continuing through the end of our period, has been discussed above, p. 8 ff.).

Certainly Jewish refugees from Poland, Italy, and other places (including Marranos who were still slipping out of the Iberian Peninsula) made their way to Amsterdam. In fact, from the '30's to the '60's of the seventeenth century, the Jewish population of the Dutch city increased at perhaps twelve to fifteen times the rate of the steadily growing general population.[87]

Romanticizing historians, to whom we shall have occasion to refer again, have taken at face value the effusions of contemporary Jewish chroniclers[87a] to the effect that Amsterdam was "the new Jerusalem" and a perfect arena for Jewish industry and culture. These historians, unfortunately forgetting that one must read the literature of a period with discernment and with an ear attuned to the period's accents, have ignored the fact that the contemporary chroniclers, in lauding Amsterdam's philo-Semitism, were using the euphuistic and inflated style of their day.

Th. facts are that the dizzying influx of Jews into Amsterdam and other Dutch cities was accompanied by a good many problems. It is certain that anti-Jewish feeling cropped up among the Amsterdam burghers,

although the city administration remained relatively tolerant and never enacted Grotius' recommendation of 1615 that its Jewish population be limited by law[88] nor used the permission extended by the States General in 1619 to exclude or ghettoize all Jews[89] nor the permission reiterated in 1651 (after the mass immigration of Polish Jews had gotten well under way) to place Jews in a ghetto.[90]

Although Amsterdam took no extreme anti-Jewish measures, her tolerance (as I indicated above) was only a relative one -- relative to the practises common in the seventeenth century. Actually, she put her Jews under a broad gamut of economic and social restrictions.

Amsterdam Jews, naturally, could not hold civic office[91] (this restriction, of course, was a matter of course in all burgher-led governments, though we must remember that in Turkey and under feudalistic governments thingswere quite different, for there individual Jews could and did rise to the highest court positions). Until 1657, officialdom considered them a semi-alien body, but in that year the Jews of Amsterdam along with those of all the United Provinces were declared to be Dutch "ingezetenen" (subjects or denizens) -- a status inferior to that of "poorter" or "burger" (citizen) in that the former carried with it no right to civic office or, more important, to the practise of any occupation in which guildsmen were active.[92]

In the professional field, Amsterdam Jews were allowed to be physicians and surgeons[93] (and even to study medicine at Dutch universities) but not to operate on Christians.[94] They were permitted to be apothec-

aries, but could dispense drugs only to Jews.[95]

A very large field closed to Jews in Amsterdam as in most European cities was that of retail trade. In a specific prohibition, the city government, acting in 1629 on a petition from Christians in the retail tobacco business, enjoined Jews from that trade.[96] Far broader was the regulation of 1632, reiterated in 1654 and again in 1656, forbidding retailing in general to Jews.[97]

Not only Christian retailers but also Christian guildsmen insisted on eliminating Jewish competition in Amsterdam just as in other cities at that time. After the city administration had responded to retailers' demands by legislating Jews out of retail shops, it placated guildsmen with an ordinance prohibiting Jews from selling in the streets.[98] Furthermore, Jews were kept from competing with the gold- and silversmiths' guild by a regulation of 1661 preventing them from selling or peddling goods made of precious metals.[99] We have already seen that the professional guilds restricted their Jewish competitors. Finally, the sweeping decree of 1632 forbade all guild occupations to Jews.[100]

That favored occupation among Jews of the period, moneylending, was fully as difficult to follow as were retailing and the crafts, in Amsterdam. It was quite difficult to compete with that huge, efficient, and convenient money-dealer, the Amsterdam Exchange Bank.[101] Furthermore, the city fathers had invested the Bank with a monopoly in certain areas, such as the exchanging of foreign monies, that in other cities were the province of the private moneylender and helped him make ends meet.[102]

Graetz, it seems to me, has seen the non-participation of Amsterdam Jews in moneylending in the light of his idealizing bent, and speaks of it in a somewhat misleading tone. Referring to the Portuguese Jews of seventeenth-century Amsterdam, he says: "Sie betrieben meistens mit ihren bedeutenden Kapitalien den Handel im grossen Style, waren bei der ostindischen and westindischen Compagnie betheiligt oder leiteten Bankgeschäfte. Dem Wucher aber, der die Juden anderer Länder so sehr verhasst machte, waren sie abgesagte Feinde."[103]

Too many historians, like Graetz in the above quotation, have been so dazzled by the few magnates among Amsterdam Jewry that they have all but forgotten about the great majority who were of modest means or of no means at all, and to whom making a living was a hard struggle against competitors and against Gentile restrictions. This Jewish majority included the peddlers and street-hawkers (probably in contravention of the ordinance mentioned on the previous page) of cheap furniture and kitchenware, of clothing, foodstuffs, and peat; the artisans;[104] the highly skilled workers in the diamond industry,[105] and the less skilled workers in tobacco processing,[106] in sugar refining,[107] and in other industries.[108] This majority included also those families that the community supported on relief -- more than one-fifth of the Sephardic community in 1647,[109] not to speak of the far poorer Ashkenazic group!

Notwithstanding poverty and occupational restrictions, Jews forced by the extr me pressure of persecution or greater distress elsewhere kept crowding into Amsterdam throughout our period. It is likely that German Jews immigrated following the Frankfurt and Wurms persecutions of

the mid-1610's[110] (see above, pp. 78 f., 80) and following the dislocations brought on by the Thirty Years' War.[111] Larger numbers of Ashkenazim -- this time from Poland and Lithuania -- came after the Cossack pogroms, especially in 1654 and 1656.[112] The city's poorer Jewish quarters became crowded with poverty-stricken refugees of outlandish mien: Gentiles (and Sephardic Jews as well?) eyed them askance; they were given relief by Sephardic Jews, and many of them -- doubting the possibility of their making a living in Amsterdam, and encouraged perhaps by their benefactors -- were sent on by the Sephardim for resettlement in Germany.[114] Still, Amsterdam's Jewish population remained very large, with a mass of poor and unskilled Jews competing against one other to make a living within that rather small slice of the city's economy that the Gentile burghers had left to them.

This completes our presentation of the modesty of means of so many Amsterdam Jews and of the economic restrictions and disabilities with which Gentiles tried to hedge them in. It may have been a surprising presentation: Graetz and the numerous Jewish historians who have copied from him have reproduced in all good faith the statements and the attitudes of contemporary chroniclers -- as, for example, Manasseh ben Israel -- who (aside from that quality of theirs to which we have already referred above, p. 85 & n. 87a) were upper-class gentlemen and had only the upper class in mind most of the time that they wrote about the Amsterdam Jewish community.

Graetz, echoing these seventeenth-century chroniclers, writes: "Holland wurde damals der duldsamste Staat auf dem ganzen Erdrunde. Die

Juden unterlagen keinerlei Beschränkung, ein und dasselbe Gesetz war für sie und die christliche Bevölkerung, nur dass sie nicht Staatsämter bekleideten, was sie auch gar nicht beansprucht haben."[115] Surely this is a far different picture from the one just set forth in the present paper!

But let us turn our attention to the Jewish upper class. Graetz has just spoken of them as having been as free as the Christians (here, similarly, we must certainly add "the Christian upper class"). Not only that; he goes farther and implies that among them were the chief builders of Amsterdam's greatness. He says, referring to the 1610's, "Indessen, das damals noch nicht reiche Amsterdam konnte die Juden, welche Reichtümer und Weltkenntnis dahin verpflanzt hatten, nicht mehr entbehren."[116] A little later, he speaks quite baldly of "den durch die portugiesischen Juden Amsterdam zugefallenen Wohlstand."[117] A further quotation seems to make it quite clear that it was no figure of speech but the expression of a real conviction for him to ascribe to Jews the initiation of large-scale capitalism; in this quotation, he discusses "sich portugiesisch-marranische Juden von den Niederlanden aus in Frankfurt niederlassen wollten, um diese Stadt zu einem Handelsplatze ersten Ranges wie Amsterdam und Hamburg zu erheben."[118]

If Graetz is correct in his belief that upper-class Amsterdam Jews were both perfectly free and in the forefront of the city's enterprise, then certainly only a metaphysician or a Freudian -- of which Graetz is neither -- would dare conclude that they were anything but content with their lot and secure in their "new Jerusalem". Graetz does make it

clear to us that he is sure they felt content and secure. But soon something very illogical happens, for Sabbatai Zevi is proclaimed Messiah, and the Amsterdam Sephardic maamad enthusiastically becomes his partisan.[119] Do perfectly content and secure men act so? Although Graetz nowhere raises the question, it is certainly a most crucial one.

The truth -- as we can see it more clearly in the light of fuller historical knowledge than was available to Graetz -- undoubtedly is that Graetz was wrong in believing that upper-class Amsterdam Jews were either perfectly free or in the forefront of the city's enterprise. We may confidently say they were neither.

Let us first consider the latter question, that of the Jews' preeminence in Amsterdam business. We find that, among the founders and early promoters of the Exchange Bank and of the East India Company, but a very few -- and they not the leaders -- were Jews.[120] We discover that, while Jewish industrial capital was concentrated in silk, sugar, publishing, diamonds, and tobacco throughout the century, it was only in diamonds and possibly in tobacco that Jews were the largest magnates.[121] We find further that, according to the 1631 tax returns, Jewish per capita wealth was one-eighth below Christian, and the estates of 160 Christians exceeded a valuation that no Jewish estate reached![122] The 1674 tax returns show a somewhat different picture: the per capita wealth of Sephardim only (not Ashkenazim) was almost twice that of Christians, but even now Jews were not among the very wealthiest Amsterdammers, for the combined wealth of the four richest Jews fell short of the wealth of the single richest Christian.[123]

Recent historians agree that the Graetzian picture of Jewish preeminence in seventeenth-century Amsterdam's commerce and industry is a grossly overdrawn one.[124] They show us the upper-class Jews as prosperous business men and industrialists, but by no means more prosperous or more successful than their Christian neighbors.

Let us now turn to the question of whether upper-class Amsterdam Jews of the seventeenth century were, as Graetz has said, free and untrammeled. The answer is that they definitely were not.

One reason for the deficiency in Jewish freedom -- in the field of business -- is the very lack of financial preeminence of which we have just spoken. Jews may have pioneered the East Indies trade;[125] they seem to have pioneered the spinning of silk in Amsterdam.[126] In either case, however, Christians joined the enterprise and, as soon as it became profitable and gave hope for the future, gathered together much larger funds than the Jews could amass and drove the latter out of the enterprise.[126a]

In general, Jews entering the capitalist arena in Amsterdam had to choose a field that was still fairly young and undeveloped, not heavily capitalized and monopolized. They had, one might say ,to enter the capitalist economy at one of its margins. Sometimes, as we have just seen, the enterprise they entered did not remain long on the margin, and they were squeezed out. But sometimes, as with sugar refining (a relatively new and expanding industry in the '50's -- though here too Christian entrepreneurs tried their best to keep Jews out),[127] or with diamond

cutting and polishing (of necessity an individualistic industry, difficult to monopolize),[128] powerful Christians did not enter into serious competition, and the Jews were able to keep their positions. Similarly, when international trade became Christian-dominated, Jews pioneered in a branch of merchandising related to it, that of jobbing. Jobbing remained sufficiently small that Jews were able to keep a dominant place in it.[129] Upper-class Jews, then, far from having the run of the Amsterdam economy, were as a rule confined to the edges of big business and subject to being ousted from their places by wealtheir Christians whenever the latter might become envious.

Under capitalism, of course, every entrepreneur and capitalist is always -- in a sense -- in a precarious and insecure position. In this sense, certainly, Jewish entrepreneurs and capitalists in seventeenth-century Amsterdam stood on precarious ground. But why single them out as Jews? Was the uncertainty they confronted at all special or different because they were Jews?

Yes, I believe it was. I believe that a complex set of circumstances caused specific difficulties and disabilities to fall to the lot of Jews.

In the first place, the Christians always considered them somewhat foreign and alien. Although individual prominent Jews were allowed to purchase "poortersrecht" or citizenship, it was never the full citizenship to which Christians might aspire.[130] Of course, there was also the fact that Christians could and did fashipn great commercial houses with

the help of strategic marital alliances,[131] a process in which ambitious Jews were strictly limited by the religious barrier. There were any number of other reminders, big and small, in the life of the Jew, that the Christian community saw him as someone set apart -- such reminders as the ordinance (I know not how well enforced) forbidding him from having Christian servants.[132] Finally, what was in all likelihood the prime cause of Christian segregation of the Jews was the eternal, seldom-relenting pressure of competition-sensitive retailers and guildsmen[133] -- a pressure that, while not seriously affecting upper-class Jews directly, may nevertheless have created an almost irresistible unvoiced demand that they stay with their less well-to-do fellow-Jews, submit themselves to a segregation almost as thoroughgoing as their fellows endured, and be communal leaders to their fellows.

Concomitant with the segregation that Christians forced on Jews, the Jews themselves developed machinery for living and working efficiently under this segregation -- machinery that in its turn undoubtedly tended toward maintaining the segregation pattern. Part of this machinery was the Jewish communal organization of Amsterdam, with its strong and authoritarian maamad and bet din.[134] Another part was the network of international trade routes that had developed among Jews themselves, and whose world center Amsterdam Jewry now became.[135]

Amsterdam Jews had a most important trade tie with Livornese and Venetian Jews.[136] As for the Levant, it is thought that Jews initiated Amsterdam's trade with that area;[137] most likely, most Amsterdam Jewish shippers to the area utilized their own connections and facilities, and

shipped independently of the Dutch Levant Company.[138] Interestingly enough, it seems to have been the very fact that Jews did not possess great wealth that was of great importance in their forming international shipping agreements of their own; had their resources been as great as the resources of some of the Christian magnates, they might well have joined and become influential in the great Dutch mercantile companies.[139] As it was, their relative independence in shipping contributed largely to their successful carrying-on of a segregated life-pattern.

There are hints that, segregated and operating off the main stream of the Amsterdam economy, the upper-class Jews of the Dutch city felt quite insecure. The fact that they were well in the forefront among speculators on the Stowk Exchange[140] may point to a feeling of insecurity. So might the information -- though it is not conclusive -- that chroniclers of the time give us to the effect that some rich Jews of Amsterdam made unusually conspicuous display of their wealth.[141]

To sum up, we may say that we saw in this section that the world's increasing insecurity and unsettled state created an unusually strong population pressure of displaced Jews in the years 1600 to 1666, and that few places but northwest Europe, especially Amsterdam, were able to receive them. Jews entered that city at a great rate, but -- contrary to widespread opinion -- they by no means enjoyed perfect freedom there.

Jews of the lower and middle classes were, in general, forbidden to practise (except among their fellow Jews, and within the Jewish economy) occupations controlled by guilds or to set up almost any kind of retail

shop. Because of the Exchange Bank, there seems to have been very little opportunity to practise moneylending. In short, there was only a difference of degree -- and that not an overly great one -- between the restrictions placed on lower- and middle-class Jews by Amsterdam and those ordained by one of the more liberal cities of seventeenth-century Italy or Germany. The real difference seems to have been, first, that Amsterdam's economy was vital and healthy and Jews could make a living even though restricted and, second, that -- because of the city's healthy economy and the relative unconcern of the burgomasters -- Amsterdam Jews may have evaded the restrictive laws more often and more successfully than Jews in other places.[142] Nevertheless, ever-present restrictions and the practise of, at times, evading them must have given lower- and middle-class Amsterdam Jews something of a feeling of insecurity.

As for upper-class Jews -- the industrialists, international merchants, and capitalists -- they were not nearly the greatest moneyed men nor the chief pioneers of business in Amsterdam. On the contrary, they tended to be at a disadvantage in business, because their inability to command very large capital among their Jewish associates condemned them to the margins and interstices of big business; and because a certain part-legal, part-cultural chasm rendered difficult a close business association with Gentiles.

The chasm between upper-class Jews and upper-class Christians in Amsterdam was there because the Jews were barred from full citizenship and could not hold civic office, because of several petty restrictions against Jews, and -- perhaps most important -- because the grave

restrictions under which lower- and middle-class Jews labored necessitated a partial segregation of the Jewish group (with their own craftsmen and professionals, their own retailers, and their own semi-autonomous community council) -- and upper-class Jews were well-nigh forced, willy nilly, to segregate themselves along with their poorer brethren. The busy international shipping trade that Amsterdam upper-class Jews carried on with other Jews in far-flung ports was both partial cause and partial effect of the near-segregation of the Amsterdam Jewish community.

As we may well imagine, upper-class Amsterdam Jews felt no more secure and at ease than their less well-circumstanced brothers; perhaps they felt even less secure. They were uncomfortable children of a transitional age, half emancipated and half ghettoized. There must have been a little of Uriel Da Costa in many of them.

C. ~~CONCLUSION.~~ JEWS SEEK RELIEF FROM INSECURITY

Different classes of Jews in different places sought relief from various brands of insecurity; this, of course, goes without saying. The Jewish community councils, for example, were deeply interested in maintaining the communities inviolate, safe both from Christian attack

and from internecine class strife. They adopted such precautionary measures as -- to give but one example -- sumptuary laws, pioneered by the Mantua community in 1598[143] and becoming widespread some time thereafter.

To an extent seldom realized, the Jewish community leaders' class appears to have held a position roughly analogous, in our century, to the Christian class of kings and ruling princes. Both were newly risen to positions of preeminence and power, and both looked for support and sustenance to the wealthiest -- though often not the most energetic -- propertied group within their domains. Both had, to a great extent, had power and leadership thrust upon them by the pressure of external foes (other countries, in the case of the Christian rulers; bourgeois ghetto-makers, in the case of the Jewish rulers); and both now, in mid-century, found themselves beset by the old foes externally and by new ones internally. Both classes resorted increasingly to nationalistic ideas and acts as countermeasures against the external enemies.

We have already spoken of nationalism as preached by the Christian ruling classes during our century (above, pp. 10 ff., 14, 15 f.). As we have seen, it is not difficult to show that this and the preceding century were marked by a striking growth in nationalistic sentiment and action among the Christians. To show that Jewish nationalism rose correspondingly during the same period is, unfortunately, quite difficult. For doctrinal and for sociological reasons too obvious to enumerate, particularism had held profound sway over the Jewish people for many centuries, and a cursory glance at our period fails to show a ~~qualita-~~

quantitative difference.

A closer look, however, reveals what I believe are definite signs that Jewish leaders in our period were, if not demonstrably more nationalistic and particularistic at heart, then certainly more inclined than previously to express their nationalism collectively and in an organized manner. Reubeni and Molcho, who flourished from 1524 to 1532, had stirred men more profoundly and in a broader segment of the Jewish world than had any Messianic pretender since, perhaps, Bar Kochba. Jacob Berab's plan for reinstituting semicha, to which he devoted himself from 1538 to his death in 1541, had been a far more serious-minded and far-reaching scheme for the establishment of a central authority than anything that had been dreamed of among Jewish leaders for many centuries past. The legal codes that Berab's adherent Joseph Caro had painstakingly compiled between the 1520's and the '50's (Caro, incidentally, dreamed himself of one day holding sway as a sort of supreme rabbinic pontiff over the Jews in the Arabic world)[144] had been accepted with such alacrity and -- after Ashkenazic modifications -- with so nearly unanimous a concensus that it must be evident to us that Jewish leadership in the sixteenth century was characterized by a mood of quasi-political international closeness and unity among Jews -- a mood markedly different from the regionalism and the provincialism that had predominated in the centuries immediately previous. With certain changes, the nationalistic mood persisted among Jewish leaders into the seventeenth century.

To a large degree, the reasons for Jewish nationalism seem to have

paralleled the reasons for nationalism in the Christian countries of the time. There were both positive and negative grounds for the prevalence of the ideology.

Prominent among the positive grounds was the simple fact that the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century man was more mobile than his ancestors had been. No longer likely to live out his entire life within the confines of his native village or county, he tended to broaden his allegiances until they might encompass his entire nation -- if he were a Christian -- or world Jewry -- if he were a Jew.

An intimately related factor was the great growth of international trade, and especially the development of international trade among Jews and Marranos. Amsterdam Jews carried on large-scale commerce with Marranos of Lisbon and Seville, Leghorn Jews with Constantinople and Smyrna Jews, Smyrna Jews with Jews of Venice, and Jews of Venice with those of Hamburg and Amsterdam.[145] A very large proportion (if it has not yet been done, the study of just <u>how</u> large a proportion should make an instructive subject for research) of the international commerce of the large Jewish entrepreneurs of our century was an intra-group affair, a commerce among Jews and Marranos.[146] It was because they alone had connections with Jewish and Marrano shippers in the Mediterranean that, in the early seventeenth century, Jews of Amsterdam and other mercantile centers were invited to settle in Denmark, in Nice and Reggio,[147] and in Hanau.[148]

Jews traded across the seas with one another because of family and

business ties; the Expulsion of 1492 and the untold vicissitudes of the succeeding years had scattered to many lands Jews who were members of single families or single business partnerships, and it was natural for them to keep in commercial contact with one another even in their dispersion. Jews traded with one another for the additional reason, alluded to above (p. 91 f.), that they were forced back on themselves by the fact that they were neither wealthy nor powerful enough, nor freely enough accepted by their Christian colleagues, to play important roles in the great Christian merchant combines.

Jews trading with other Jews and with Marranos more than they traded with Christians were likely to be concerned with Jewish interests and questions of Jewish rights. Jews carrying on international commerce with other Jews were likely to develop a world Jewish outlook -- a nearly-political nationalism embracing Jewry throughout the world. Jews, furthermore, whose commerce was subject t o harrassment by government agencies acting in the service of their competitors (as, for example, the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions harassed the commerce of Dutch Jews[149] and as France demanded unsuccessfully of Turkey that she take measures against Jewish merchants[150]) might long for some way in which a government could be induced to protect them and serve their interests. For all these reasons -- and despite my failure to discover in the historical literature any discussion of it -- I offer the suggestion that we consider the possibility of and make a further search for a widespread nationalistic (I should almost like to say pro-mercantilistic) feeling among Jewish merchants and capitalists, influential rabbis, and those associated with them, in the greatest centers of seventeenth-century

Jewish commerce -- Amsterdam, Hamburg, Leghorn, Venice, Constantinople, and Smyrna.

There were negative reasons, which may have been fully as important as the positive ones, why influential Jews became tinged with nationalist sentiment. Certainly their anomalous position in the economic, civic, and social life of their cities -- their insecure, uncertain position as half free-, half ghetto-men -- was one in which they did not glory. We may theorize that many of them longed for some security or other: the security of knowing they and their children need not fear expulsion or the confiscation of their goods, the security of following an occupation without fear of molestation by the Christian bourgeoisie, the security of feeling that they and the Jewish people and the Jewish religion were not without prestige and dignity, the security of knowing they belonged and their lives were a meaningful part of the life of some collectivity. All these forms of security, of course, could be provided in some measure by a functioning Jewish nation. Perhaps -- I merely suggest it -- influential Jews of the seventeenth century dreamed of Jewish nationhood as an answer to their longing for security. In a world of nationalisms, a world of religious civil wars that was still attuned to the doctrine of "cuius regio eius religio", a world that had not yet heard of any practise so individualistic as assimilation, there seems to me to have been little for Jewish capitalists to fasten their hopes o n except nationalism. But, of course, I am again mer ely theorizing.

Let me theorize further and say there may have been an additional negative reason for uppe r- class Jews' nationalism -- namely, worry

over the existence of so many Jewish refugees, with so few places that would admit them. Certainly, as we have already mentioned (above, p. 84), there were more Jews displaced than there had been at any time since the Spanish Expulsion and, in addition, there were now far fewer places able or willing toadmit them. As a consequence, thousands of Polish and German Jews -- so many of them members of the lower classes -- were crowding into such centers of Jewish wealth as Amsterdam and Hamburg, Venice and Leghorn. We have seen (above, p. 89) that in the 1650's leading Jews of Amsterdam arranged a resettlement project away from Holland for some of their proletarian newcomers. Perhaps this is an indication the upper-class Jews were worried that a Jewish proletariat swollen beyond the capacity of the economy to absorb it would be a potential subversive force in the Jewish community and that, furthermore, the swollen numbers of the proletariat might arouse the fears of the Christian burggmasters and cause them -- as, in point of fact, it almost did (see above, p. 86) -- to take measures against the Jewish group as a whole.

As I have indicated above, there seems to have been a difference between the nationalism of upper-class Jews in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. The expressions of nationalism which I mentioned (above, p. 99) in the former century looked toward a strengthening of Jewry in its traditional, rabbinical framework. In the seventeenth century, howeve r, conditions were different: men were already entering into the penumbra of Enlightenment and Emancipation. Jewish merchant-princes of this century, no matter how great the discrimination against them, were doing business in a non-Jewish commercial world,

whose rules and whose system of values were the work of non-Jews. The Jewish merchant-princes, then, while they may not have been accepted as equals by their Gentile confreres, were nevertheless drawn toward the latter's world and constrained t o place high value on its mores and its standards of prestige.[151]

I do not mean that the Jewish merchant-princes of the seventeenth century had abandoned Jewish mores and values. As I hinted previously (above, pp. 93-95), they were ambivalent: they did business after the non-Jewish fashion and, more or less, in the non-Jewish world -- and they seem to have longed to enter this world sociologically as well as commercially; but religious groups in those days were still corporate bodies with high walls around th em, and the merchant-princes were forced to remain in the Jewish group -- in fact, to become all-the-more devoted leaders in it -- while at the same time carrying in their breasts non-Jewish hopes and values.

The somewhat non-Jewish cast of mind of the seventeenth-century merchant princes naturally caused them to set less store by traditional Judaism than had the upper-class Jews of the previous century. Some, influenced perhaps by non-Jewish deistic thought of the time, inclined to rationalism.[152] Others, more important in Jewish history, remained theists but were infected with antinomianism.

I should like to suggest that uppe r-class antinomianism was an important element in the Sabbatian sentiment of 1666. In passing, I should like to say that antinomianism seems to have come increasing ly

into evidence in the years following our period, as Abraham Miguel Cardoso, Chiya Chayun, Moses Chaim Luzzatto, and Eybeschütz succeeded one another on the stage -- until at length Emancipation and nineteenth-century materialism arrived on the scene, overthrew the walls behind which each religious group had flourished, and rendered passé the ambivalence that had been the raison d'etre for upper-class Jewish antinomianism.

While it existed, this antinomianism made Jewish life interesting, to say the least, as a succession of Kabbalistic fads swept over Jewish communities throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and gave rise to numerous internecine quarrels. In an important way, however, upper-class antinomianism may have had an opposite effect as well, that of a preserver of Jewish unity. In Western Europe, where it was strong, it worked in a sort of symbiotic relationship with lower-class antinomianism, encouraging the latter to develop and to express itself within the confines of Jewish society.

In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, Christian society was still much more feudal than capitalistic, and there was consequently not the ambivalence nor the equivocal attitude toward Jewish values among upper-class Eastern Jews that could be found among influential Jews of, say, Amsterdam or Venice. Consequently, the antinomian attitudes of lower-class Jews in Eastern Europe had a considerably less friendly reception among Jewish leaders there than was the case with unorthodox notions preached by lower-class Jews in the West. Possibly the defections from Judaism among unorthodox sectaries in the East -- the conversions of followers of Judah Hasid, the baptisms of Frank and his adherents,

and the fact that Chayun thought of baptism during his sojourns in the East -- were forced on these lower-class Jews and their leaders by the intransigeance to their ideas of the Jewish authorities.

But I have wandered into the eighteenth century, and I must return to the seventeenth, in which I belong. Let me return by entering a discussion of lower-class Jewish antinomianism. Quite different in etiology from upper-class antinomianism, it seems to me to have had its roots in the deepening bleakness of lower-class Jewish life in the seventeenth century.

I have spoken at some length of the increasing difficulties the Christian bourgeoisie was placing in the way of lower- and middle-class Jewish town dwellers who would lead normal lives. These, of course, tended to solidify the Jewish group. (See above, pp. 76-87.)

Equally important, however, were developments that tended to alienate the traditional Jewish leaders -- the rabbis and their influential lay associates -- from the Jewish masses. One important such development was what was apparently a large growth in the Jewish urban proletariat, due undoubtedly to the sizable growth of some cities during the century and to the fact, already spoken of, (see above, p. 84), that there were now fewer places open to Jews than there had been. Class distinctions seem to have become marked: German Jews in Amsterdam did menial work for wealthy Sephardim,[153] and in 1674 only three German Jews had accounts in the Exchange Bank while Sephardic capitalists made up thirteen percent of all the accounts.[154] Soon there was an additional source of trouble, for

we hear of Polish Jewish newcomers to Amsterdam complaining that the German Jews were mistreating them.[155]

If I may, I should like to summarize -- on the basis of admittedly insufficient data -- what factors seem to me to have caused the Jewish urban lower classes to be disaffected. To begin near the beginning, our era was one of capitalist growth, and this growth -- as we have seen -- brought in its wake inflation. Inflation-ridden Christian burghers sought relief from their ills by attacking their most vulnerable competitors, chief among them the Jews.[155a] Ten thousands of Jews were made homeless and, as capitalist growth had brought droves of new settlers to the important commercial centers, Jews too flocked to these centers. Now, just as many Jews had become displaced persons and members of the proletariat, so a few other Jews had benefited by capitalist growth and become large merchants, manufacturers, or moneyed men; consequently, the large commercial centers were sites of wide class cleavages among Jews. Since, even in these centers, Christian burghers did not cease to oppose the Jews, the Jewish community tended to be isolated from the general life of the city and withdrawn within itself, with its own civic organization, its own maamadim and batey din (see above, p. 94). On account of the class distinctions within the Jewish community, the rabbis and laymen who headed Jewish civic organizations could not simultaneously serve the interests of all classes, but had to choose. I suggest, though on the basis of little evidence (these matters were seldom documented), that they generally chose to serve the interests of their closest allies, the Jewish bourgeoisie, or of the merchant princes and intellectuals, whose restiveness under traditionalist community discipline they were anxious

to allay. Consequently, I further suggest, the Jewish lower classes in the capitalistic cities suffered both at the hands of the Gentile bourgeoisie and at the hands of the constituted Jewish leaders. Perhaps they resented the Jewish leaders more, for they were closer to them than to the Christians. Perhaps, too, on this account they became interested in Kabbala -- a study sometimes pursued with frankly subversive intent, -- and antagonistic to the Talmud of the rabbis. Perhaps on this account they tended toward antinomianism.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then, were a period of widespread Jewish dissatisfaction with traditional, Talmud Judaism. They were a period, furthermore, of considerable insecurity. If, in Chapter One, we painted a picture of insecurity in the Gentile world of the time, then we must realize that the Jews suffered all the uncertainties and doubts that Gentiles suffered, and in addition those peculiar to their own situation, which we have discussed in the present chapter.

We spoke (above, pp. 15-21) of Christians turning to various forms of religion to give them the security that society failed to provide. I should like now to discuss the parallel phenomenon among Jews.

Lower-class Jews of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries found the greatest solace in apocalyptist and chiliastic teachings, for it seems to have been easiest for them to believe that man's government of affairs had failed and God was due to take a hand. Quietistic doctrines made little impression on lower-class Jews: they were individualistic (see above, p. 18), and the life of the ghettoized Jews was eminently

communal.

Thus it was that we read of many, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who wrote longingly of the day of Divine redemption and of others -- a surprisingly large number -- who were "m'chashvey kitzim" or who appointed themselves the Messiah or his precursor. Behind all their dreams, giving authority to them, stood the Zohar and the other books of Kabbalistic lore.

Kabbala, quite understandably, enjoyed a great vogue among the Spanish exiles of 1492.[156] Undoubtedly the calamity they had undergone contributed to the great popularity of Ascher Lämmlein, a German Jew living in the environs of Venice, who announced himself the precursor of the Messiah in 1502.[157] We have already spoken (above, p. 99) of the movement of those somewhat reluctant collaborators, Reubeni and Molcho, who followed Lämmlein by a generation.[158] Another generation in the future, Isaac Luria appears to have considered himself a Messianic precursor,[159] and his heir Chaim Vital Calabrese seems to have ascribed to himself the dignity of Messiah ben Joseph.[160]

Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the mystics who devoted themselves to the all-consuming study of the Kabbala spread their influence from their Lurianic center of Safed and made of Italy a new home of mystic conventicles.[161] Thence Kabbala went out to all of Europe, all but usurping the place of the Talmud in the batey midrash,[162] and especially engulfing Poland after the Cossack massacres.[163] Jews everywhere, believing with the Zohar that God's redemption would begin

in 1648, did penance as that year approached. The rabbis of Palestine, with circular letters to the Diaspora communities, urged them on.[164] In one instance, we are told, the excitement of the Jews had tragic results, as a demonstration of redemption-minded Ashkenazic Jews in Turkey somehow turned into a riot, in which a number of Jews were killed by the Turks and others exiled.[165]

The leading Jewish writers spoke longingly of redemption. Joseph Ibn Verga, in his Shevet Yehuda, prayed for Israel's speedy deliverance,[166] while Samuel Usque resorted to a sort of neo-Platonic theory of history to show, in his Consolação, that redemption was not far off.[167] Nathan Nata Hanover, writing in 1648, called that year the "year of redemption."[168]

Many were those who actually calculated, on the basis of Bible, Talmud, or Zohar, that the apocalypse would soon arrive. Among them were such men as Isaac Abarbanel (who put it in the first half of the sixteenth century),[169] Abraham Halevi (who calculated it would be in 1530),[170] Solomon Molcho (whose favored date was 1540),[171] Isaac Luria (who expected the Messiah in 1575),[172] Isaiah Horowitz and Yom-Tov Lipmann Heller (both of whom calculated that the Messianic year would be 1648),[173] and Manasseh ben Israel (who confined himself to saying that redemption was "very near at hand").[174]

We may understand from the above that the Messianic hope of the Jews was very widespread in the sixteenth and, especially, in the seventeenth century. It was abetted by the attitude of numerous Christian visionaries, who themselves wrote and preached the coming redemption of

the Jews, with or without their conversion to Christianity.[175]

For religious reasons it was only natural that Jews who hoped for a Messiah should also dream of a restoration to the Holy Land. The Jews of Palestine and of the Levant in general were quite poor in the middle of the seventeenth century: we know that th e Jerusalem community was poverty-stricken and unable even to secure its normal support from the Diaspora;[176] the Adrianople ghetto was filthy,[177] and the inhabitants were no longer able to make a living because of the intense economic depression.[178] Jews of the Levant had every reason themselves to look for redemption.

We must not forget, however, that the Levant was s till an inportant center of commerce for Jews, and we must consider the possibility that some Jews' hopes for restoration to the Holy Land was bound up with their commerical life. There was precedent for it: when Joseph Nasi, Duke of Naxos, acquired his tracts of land on Lake Tiberias, h e had in mind not only that on them should be established a refuge for Jews but also that they might become an important silk-growing region, so that his silk from Tiberias and the silk in Antwerp in which he had an interest might compete with the silk of southern Europe.[179] In our time, many years after Nasi and his prosperous era, many Jews in the great ports of the Ottoman Empire -- Smyrna, Aleppo, Cairo, Salonica -- were moneychangers or moneylenders, customs officials, and agents for international commercial houses,[180] and thus may reasonably have been expected to have a business interest in the influx o f Jews to Palestine.

D. CONCLUSION

Without mentioning Sabbatianism by name, I have been examining in this chapter the conditions and attitudes of seventeenth-century Jewry that may have made it listen with respect to the Messianic pretensions of the chicken-dealer's son from Smyrna. I must emphasize again the tentative and conjectural nature of many of my conclusions.

In Chapter One I discussed general world conditions in the seventeenth century. I spoke of a world in transition from bucolic feudalism to urbanized capitalism, and of the many stresses that men had to undergo while the transition was underway. Jews, of course, had to take the same stresses; in addition, they suffered from another disability -- persecution.

The feudal aristocracy had, to a great extent, favored the Jews and used them, for the Jews were a foreign and therefore dependent group, and the nature of feudalism required many dependents for each lord. The rising urban middle classes, for whose wellbeing quite different economic conditions were required than for the welfare of the lords, were natural antagonists of the latter. Because of that fact, and because the century was fraught with competitiveness and insecurity, the urban bourge-

oisie and the guildsmen's class were sensitive and combative, and they vented much of their combativeness on the Jews, who they felt contributed to their insecurity.

For expedient reasons or for political or social advantage, it was not uncommon for city magistracies and -- increasingly, as their real power waned -- for members of the aristocracy itself to abet the burghers and craftsmen or to acquiesce when the latter insisted on measures against Jews. As the seventeenth century succeeded the sixteenth and the bourgeoisie became more influential, Jews came to be quite generally prohibited from practising retail trade or the crafts; in fact, in places like Italy and Germany where the economy was in the doldrums, the extreme step was taken of eliminating Jewish competition by actually fencing Jews off physically from the rest of the community and placing them in ghettos.

In prosperous centers of the new commercial capitalism -- such towns as Amsterdam, Hamburg, Leghorn -- the Jewish smaller bourgeoisie and lower classes were naturally better off. It is not true that they lived in freedom, as is sometimes imagined; on the contrary, they were subjected to much the same restrictions here as elsewhere. I believe we may confidently assert, however, that in the prosperous cities the restrictions were neither as dire nor as stringently enforced.

An additional circumstance, the large-scale influx of poor Jews into the large centers, may however have tended to lower the status of lower class and small bourgeois Jews. The seventeenth century was at

one and the same time a period of terrible pogroms and expulsions and a period of such economic turmoil and insecurity that very few places had their doors open to Jewish newcomers. Consequently, it appears from as much evidence as I have found that Jewish refugees in imposing numbers crowded into the few centers of commercial capitalism. Although immigration was relatively unrestricted there and there were undoubtedly some opportunities for employment, it is nevertheless likely that many of the newcomers found themselves in a sort of rootless, precariously-existing proletariat.

What was the state of mind of the less fortunate Jews, the poor and the nearly-poor? Certainly they suffered from the same uncertainties and insecurities as did their Gentile counterparts, whom we have discussed in Chapter One. These alone might have sufficed to have rendered them deeply dissatisfied with conditions as they were. But there was more: the eternal mistreatment at the hands of Gentile society certainly made these Jews fearful and suspicious of non-Jews. A third factor, which I think has been far too little appreciated, is the likelihood that relations between classes within the Jewish community were not very good and that the lower classes resented the upper. I say this with the thought in mind that, to some extent, the Jewish ruling classes in the cities very likely tyrannized over the proletariat, in view of the facts that Jewish community organization (in reaction against the isolation imposed on Jews by the outer world) was tightly-knit and undoubtedly authoritarian and that (especially after the Cossack refugees came) there were fairly wide class cleavages within each Jewish community. It appears to me, then, that the Jewish small bourgeois and proletarians, in depressed

and in prosperous localities alike, experienced the most profound insecurity and sense of oppression, and that in all likelihood they longed for a new order, radically different from the one under which they labored, that would free them from the yoke of Gentile society, of the Jewish ruling classes, and of the many nameless insecurities and fears to which men of the seventeenth century were prey.

As for Jews of the upper classes, the burgeoning of capitalism had allowed many of them -- particularly in the centers of Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice, Leghorn, and Smyrna -- to participate in the commercial life of the non-Jewish world to an extent unheard-of in recent centuries, and as a result a sizable number of Jews had a taste of the way of life, the culture, and the values of the wealthier Gentile bourgeoisie. It was no more than a taste, however, regardless of how it may have tantalized the palates of the tasters.

It was no more than a taste because a number of serious obstacles stood in the way of the free entry of Jews into the non-Jewish world. There was the business obstacle that Jewish capitalists, not being among the wealthiest people and not being in close social connection with them, tended to be pushed out of enterprises that were becoming large and to be confined to the edges of big business. There was the civic obstacle that, not held full citizens in any European country, and living in a mercantilistic age, their commercial activities were sometimes disturbed by unfriendly powers and may -- perhaps -- not have received the same protection from their home country that the activities of Gentile traders would have had. There was the social obstacle that,

in a century in which religious differences were an almost insurmountable barrier between groups of men, Jews in any numbers could not hope to make easy friendships with numbers of Christians, no matter how close the outlook of the former grew to approach that of the latter. Finally, there was this obstacle: that every rebuff the wealthier Jews suffered at the hands of the non-Jewish business world turned them ever more strongly to the Jewish world, and that the persecution suffered by their poorer brethren had indirectly the same effect on them, so that they came to seek within the Jewish world their commercial profits, their social satsifactions, and their prestige as leaders.

As I believe I have to some extent indicated, the seventeenth-century Jewish world was subjected to many strains and stresses, some common to the society of the time, some more or less peculiar to the Jewish group. Quite naturally, the Jewish people reacted to the stresses and the other new conditions of life brought on during our century and the preceding one, and attempted to adjust to changed situations.

The fact that people now traveled more and were less inclined to stay rooted to their birthplace (even if they were not expelled from it) than in past centuries meant that Jews now acquired a cosmopolitan perspective and saw themselves as members of a world ethno-religious community. This fac t, added to the nationalist vogue in Christian states, helped create the conditions for Jewish nationalism in the period we are considering. The fact that Jewish entrepreneurs in all the large port cities did a great deal of business among themselves certainly intensified the feeling of particularism and nationalism

within this highly influential group.

The same group, that of the entrepreneurs, felt a certain amount of ambivalence, due to their working in the non-Jewish business world yet living in the Jewish religious world, and finding it impossible either to withdraw into one to the exclusion of the other or to reconcile the disparate values of the two. Undoubtedly they dreamed of a more normal life, in which their ambivalence could be resolved.

The Levant was one of the chief areas into which Jewish-operated commerce extended, and among the Jews of the Ottoman ports were many prominent in commerce. In view of the international rivalries that centered on the Levant (I spoke of them in Chapter Two), it is not beyond the realm of probability that Jewish capitalists too cast covetous eyes at the Levant or part of it, and dreamed of enlarging their interest in the area.

When we speak of the longing for Zion among Jews of our period, we of course abandon the conjectural and enter into the realm of certainty. We know without a doubt that the oppressed and cheerless lower orders of the Jews were pathetically eager for a restoration to the land of Israel -- a restoration that would return to them their lost prosperity.

I feel we are right in suggesting that, among the many Jewish capitalists and community leaders who also looked toward Zion, there may have been hopes of a somewhat different cast: capitalists may have expected, just as Joseph Nasi had expected, that a return to Zion would mean a

commercial boon and opportunity for them, that -- perhaps -- Gaza might become a rich Jewish port as Aleppo had been a French one and Smyrna was now a Dutch and English one; furthermore, community leaders, not unlikely worried over the size and rootlessness and foreignness of the Jewish proletariat in the great Jewish centers of Amsterdam, H amburg, and Leghorn, may well have hoped that a new refuge would open soon in the hostile world and that poor and discontented Jews could migrate to that refuge with confidence. The ideal refuge, of course, would be the land of Israel.

Finally, let me speak of the lower classes and the small bourgeoisie among the Jews, wherever they were. Like the Gentile poorer people, they too suffered as the ultimate victims of inflation, the most helpless sufferers from the century's exceptionally bloody wars, and the class most easily hurt -- and most incomprehensively to itself -- by the conflicts of other classes and the not infrequent economic crises brought on by urbanism and capitalism. But the Jews suffered more than the Gentiles, for all this and more -- the attacks of mobs, degrading or cruelly discriminating laws, expulsions -- was visited upon their heads. As an ultimate blow, the lower classes of Jews seem to have felt at times -- how frequantly or regularly I do not know -- that the Jewish ruling groups treated them arbitrarily and high-handedly. Small wonder that these poorer Jews considered who on earth could come to their aid and succor, and were nonplussed; that the deliverance that they passionately prayed for was one created in Heaven and brought to them on the wings of a quasi-Divine Messiah. All mankind, it was true, seemed to be ranged against them; surely, then, this was the time of "chevley Mashiach",

and the Lord would soon come to their aid.

To my mind there was possible in the seventeenth century but one comprehensive answer to the varied problems of Jewish people, but one all-inclusive response to the dreams and yearnings of the different segments of our people. That answer and response was a Messianism of precisely the type put forward by the Sabbatianists. Sabbatianism offered nationalism with authoritarian rule to the community leaders; it dangled the prospect of nationalism with imperialism before the eyes of the capitalists; it gave the promise of eventual colonization in Zion to those troubled by Jewish population pressures; to both the restive poorer Jews and the ambivalent capitalist Jews it offered antinomianism, a relaxation of the restrictions of Talmud and rabbis; and finally, to those Jews who were nonplussed and had given up faith in mundane help, it proclaimed a supernatural Messiah and a neo-Platonic theology aimed at his apotheosis. No other doctrine that I can think of could have been so nearly perfectly attuned to the needs and the strivings of the Jews of the time.

Furthermore, it appears to me that the time when Sabbatianism appeared was -- give or take a few years or a decade -- the optimum time for its appearance. Europe, in the Thirty Years' War, had just been scourged as never before or after for several centuries. The Jews had, in the Cossack massacres, suffered more cruelly perhaps than since Titus and Hadrian, and Jewish life everywhere had been disrupted. Furthermore, capitalist activity had become so extensive by then -- but hardly before then -- that the class struggle was a problem in Europe and the ambi-

valence of influential Jews was troublesome. Finally, postal systems had just been developed to the point that it was now possible for propaganda to be disseminated from land to land with enough rapidity for a movement to become international in short order; but communications were not yet perfected sufficiently that wild rumors or cooked-up stories of miracles could be refuted as easily as they were spread.

Those historians who, following the contemporary chronicler Coenen, attribute Sabbatâi Zevi's influence to personal qualities -- his intellect, his magnetism, his handsomeness and stature -- are wrapping a small truth in a very great deal of silliness. The physical attractiveness to which those who saw Sabbatai testified, and a certain presence which he is said to have possessed certainly must have helped him to draw a following in such places as Smyrna and Hebron, where people saw him face-to-face. No personal characteristics, however, can have helped in the conversion to his cause of so many European Jews; nor do these characteristics even explain the transformation that his movement wrought in the lives of the Jews of Smyrna, where he lived. These Smyrna Jews had presumably seen tall and handsome men, even men with magnetism, before, without having fits and screaming that God was about to save them.

Let me also say that the many historians who look no farther into the motivatio s of Sabbatians than to call the latter deluded and foolish are themselves deluded. It is easy, with the infinite wisdom of our a posteriori judgment, to call the seventeenth-century Jews victims of a hoax or of some temporary blindness, and to favor them with condescending

pity. But it is neither fair nor very intelligent to condemn them for not having reacted to Sabbatai Zevi like nineteenth-century Breslau professors.

The fact, as it seems to me, is that in the mid-seventeenth - century a great proportion of the Jewish people were sick of the status quo and were anxious for a change. When an obscure chicken-dealer's son from Smyrna announced he was the Messiah, all the groups in Jewry that had been desirous of change or revolution hurried to hail him as their leader and to fasten onto him the program of their particular group. Sabbatai himself, an unbalanced and indecisive man who seems never to have had a well thought-out plan, was caught up with dizzying speed in a movement far too large and deep for him. Let us, however, not censure him overmuch for his failure to take effective leadership; since the Lord did not choose at that time to intervene in history in our favor, it is most unlikely that anyone -- even a Moses -- could have brought our fathers to the Promised Land, against what would undoubtedly have been the opposition of all influential nations. All nations, as I mentioned above (p. 53 f.), were most jealous of the "balance of power" and could not yet cooperate with one another in sincerity, let alone with an upstart Jewish power.

It was a "dog eat dog" era in international relations, and the Sabbatian movement was perhaps doomed from the outset. Nevertheless, I think the Sabbatians have already been reviled enough for their quixotticism and their irrationality. I think it is time we admired them for their courage in the face of staggering odds, for the idealism with

which they met the bitter conditions of their lives, and for their beautiful vision of a hopeful tomorrow.

NOTES ON CHAPTER THREE

1. Kostomarof. Bogdan Chmielnicki (Fr. trsln. by Mérimée, Journal des Savants, 1863, beginning).
Stupasky de Konary. Letter of 1637 to Gerhard Vossius, in: Vossii Epistolae II, no. 66.
Both quoted in: Heinrich Graetz. Geschichte der Juden X. Leipzig, Oskar Leiner, 1897. P. 49, n. 2.
It should be noted here that Graetz' Hebrew translator, calling Kostomarof an anti-Semite who thought of the Polish Jews as bloodsuckers, complains that on the above page Graetz accepted that chronicler's judgments trustingly. The translator generally registers strenuous objections to Graetz' attitude toward Polish Jews, and I must say that his objections seem to me to have some validity, for Graetz certainly appears biased against the Jews of his native land and supercilious toward them in quite a number of places in his history.
See: Shaul Pinchas Rabinowitz (Shofer). Divrey Y'mey Yisrael VIII (Trsln. of Heinrich Graetz, Gesch. der Juden). Esp. p. 91 ff., n.

2. Rabinowitz, 127 f. In Graetz, 50, it is said that peasants actually needed Jewish permission for every infant baptism. This statement is discussed and doubt cast on its veracity in: Simon Dubnow. Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes VII. P. 21, n. 1.

3. Dubnow, 20 f.

4. Graetz, 63 f.

5. Sagnac and St.-Léger, 77.

6. Graetz. Geschichte der Juden IX. Leipzig, Oskar Leiner, 1907. P. 56 f.

7. Ibid., 306.

8. Ibid., 323.

9. Ibid., 347 f. In 1542, when the Jews had previously been expelled from Prague, the local nobility had reacted similarly: ibid, 293 f.

10. Graetz X, 34.

11. Ibid., 36 f.

12. Ibid., 38.

13. Ibid., 36.

14. Ibid., 46 f.

15. Graetz IX, 56 f.
Rabinowitz, 95.

16. Graetz IX, 293 f.

17. Ibid., 318.

18. Graetz X, 19 f.

19. Ibid., 46 f.

20. Cecil Roth. The History of the Jews of Italy. Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1946. P. 372.

21. Roth. History of the Jews in Venice. Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1930. P. 172 f.

22. Roth, Italy, 334.

23. Graetz X, 35.

24. Ibid., 17.

25. M. Ginsburger, "Strasbourg et les Juifs", Revue des Études Juives 79 (1924), 69-72.

26. Roth, Venice, 51.

27. Roth, Italy, 352.

28. Ibid., 330.

29. Ibid., 383 f.

30. Roth, Venice, 273.

31. Ibid., 282.

32. Roth, Italy, 340.

33. Ibid., 337.

34. Ibid., 331.

35. Ibid., 328.

36. Ibid., 371.

37. Roth, Venice, 173.

38. Roth, Italy, 371 f.

39. Graetz X, 29 ff.

40. Ibid., 32 f.

41. Graetz IX, 298 ff.

42. Ibid., 324 f.

43. Roth, Italy, 370.

44. Graetz IX, 293 f.

44a. In Graetz IX, 294 f., we are told of an unusual Lutheran pastor of the 1540's, who scored the ritual murder accusation as a pure invention of hard-pressed debtors of Jews and of clergymen with a saint-making mania.

45. Loc. cit.

46. Ibid., 323.

47. Roth, Italy, 388.

48. Graetz IX, 264.

49. Ibid., 321, 343.

50. Ibid., 322.

51. Roth, Italy, 382 f.

52. Ibid., 381 f.

53. Graetz IX, 326.

54. Roth, Italy, 389.

55. Ibid., 314.
Roth, "Notes sur les Marranes de Livourne", REJ 91 (1931), 1-27. P. 2.

56. Roth, Italy, 332 f.

57. Loc. cit.
Letter of Sabbatai Raphael Hai di Mondelfo, Rabbi of Pesaro, in: David Kaufmann, "David Carcassoni et le rachat par la communauté de Constantinople des Juifs faits prisonniers durant la persécution de Chmielnicky", REJ 25 (1892), 202-216. P. 211.

58. Roth, Italy, loc. cit.
Letter of Rabbi Judah Amhatov of Urbino, in Kaufmann, 212.

59. Roth, Italy, 343.

60. Letter of Rabbi Joseph Fermo of Ancona, in Kaufmann, 213.
Fermo, like all the other Italian rabbis whose letters relative to Carcassoni's fund-drive Kaufmann reproduces, complains feelingly of the bad economic conditions in his community which do not permit his Jews to donate toward the ransoms of their Polish brethren as generously as they would like. One may take these letters as first-hand testimony of the profound depression and distress of mid-century Italian Jewry. On the other hand, one may concievably be justified in adding to the rabbis' apologies a small grain of salt, in view of the fact that people, who probably haven't changed much in this respect, are wont nowadays to protest how generous would be their donations to charity if only times weren't so bad and taxes weren't so high.

An intriguing exchange of letters between Rabbi Mahalalel Halelujah of Ancona, Fermo's contemporary, and the Venetian rabbinate relative to the same subject, Ancona's relief effort for the Polish captives, corroborate's Fermo's testimony to the community's poverty and unbearable tax burden. See: Simon Bernstein, "The Letters of Mahalalel Halelujah", HUC Annual VII (1930), 497-536. P. 507 ff.

61. Rabbi Samuel Isaac Norzi of Sinigaglia, in Kaufmann, 212.

62. Roth, Italy, 339.

63. Ibid., 332 f.

64. Roth, Venice, 175 ff.

65. Ibid., 173 ff.

66. Roth, Italy, 346.

67. Ibid., 348.

68. Graetz IX, 445.
Letter of Rabbi Moses Zacut of Venice to Constantinople community, in Kaufmann, 207.

69. Roth, Italy, 373 f.

70. Graetz IX, 305 f.

71. Ibid., 348.

72. Ibid., 347.

73. Ibid., 442.

74. Ibid., 354.

75. Ibid., 305, and n. 2, same p.

76. Ibid., 453.

77. Ibid., 444.

78. Ibid., 454.

79. Roth, "Notes sur les Marranes de Livourne", 12.

80. Graetz IX, 326.

81. Ibid., 356.

82. Ibid., 455.

83. Salomon A. Rosanes. Korot haYehudim bTurkia veArzot haKedem IV. Sofia, Amichpat, 1935. P. 28 f.

84. Roth, Venice, 107, n. 12.

85. R. Judah Amhatov, in Kaufmann, 212.

86. Kaufmann, passim.
Nathan Nata Hannover. Yeven Metzula, end. Referred to in Rosanes, 27 f.

87. I have done some rough interpolation, using the figures for Jewish and general population growth in:
Herbert I. Bloom. The Economic Activities of the Jews of Amsterdam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Williamsport, Bayard, 1937.

87a. Bloom, p. xv f., and n. 9.

88. Bloom, 19.

89. Ibid., 19 f., and 20, n. 90.

90. Ibid., 21, n. 96.

91. Ibid., xvi f., 30 f.

92. Ibid., xvii, 22 f.

93. Ibid., 23.

94. Ibid., 67.

95. Ibid., 68.

96. Ibid., 63, and n. 139.

97. Ibid., 23, and n. 106.
That conditions were becoming easier and perhaps that there had been a good deal of evasion of the restrictions is shown by the fact that two years after our period, in 1668, the burgomasters officially opened to the Jews large areas of retailing. See Bloom, 31.

98. Ibid., 66.
The date of the ordinance is not given, and it may be after the conclusion of our period.

99. Ibid., 176, and n. 10.
I doubt Bloom's opinion that the purpose of the regulation was to protect a Bank monopoly; it rather seems to me that it was to safeguard a monopoly of the gold- and silversmiths' guild. I say this because specie trading was no longer under strict control of the Exchange Bank (see my text, p. 48 above, and n. 49 and 50), and because the regulation as quoted in Bloom refers not to specie nor raw metal nor to the Bank, but to articles handicrafted from the metal and to the guild.

100. Ibid., 23.
We may have an idea how intransigeant was the anti-Jewish sentiment of the Amsterdam guildsmen when we read in Bloom, p. 31, that the sweeping decree of 1668 threw open guild occupations to foreign Christians who had achieved the status of "ingezetenen", but kept the restrictions against Jews in full force.

101. Bloom 172 f. shows that the Bank was founded to do most of the things that money-lenders were doing in other places.

102. Ibid., 176 f., and n. 11.
The reference speaks of a later date, but the Bank's monopoly most likely goes back to our period.

103. Graetz X, 2.

104. Bloom, 66.
Peddlers of clothing could be those who dealt in nearly new stuffs, or they could be rag-dealers. As is the case today, rag-dealing was often though not always synonymous with poverty; Bloom 67 and n. 155 speaks of one Polish rag-merchant (later than our period, it is true) who was heavily capitalized.

105. Ibid., 41, 66.

106. Ibid., 24, 61.

107. Ibid, 39; one Jewish sugar worker is mentioned.

108. Ibid., 24.
Printing, as our reference says, was one field specifically permitted to Jewish entrepreneurs.

109. Isaac de Pinto. Reflexoës Politicas tocante a constituição da Nação Judaica. Amsterdam, 1748. Quoted in Bloom, 214.

110. Bloom, 24.

111. Loc. cit.; Graetz X, 7.

112. Bloom, 25.

113. Ibid., 28.

114. Ibid., 25 f., and n. 113.

115. Graetz X, 7.

116. Graetz IX, 471.

117. Ibid., 472.

118. Graetz X, 28.
In these quotations and others of like nature encountered here and there throughout his works, Graetz speaks of Jews as Midas-fingered builders of capitalism in much the same terms as have numbers of anti-Semites, especially anti-Semites of leftist proclivities. The difference, of course, is that Graetz is for the Jews and their supposed capitalistic genius, while the anti-Semites are against. It seems to me they are both wrong; Brentano first pointed out their fallacy.

119. Graetz X, 220.

120. J.G. van Dillen, "De Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam in de Eerste Helft der Zeventiende Eeuw: I, De Portugeesche Joden", Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 50 (1935), 4 ff.
Van Dillen, "De Economische Positie en Betekenis der Joden in de

Republiek en in de Nederlandsche Coloniale Wereld", Geschiedenis der Joden in Nederland, ed. Hendrik Brugmans and A. Frank. Amsterdam, 1940.
Both above sources referred to in Barbour, 25.
Cf. Bloom 118, n. 9, for indication that Jewish participation in founding of Exchange Bank was minute, and that six Jews and no more were small depositors in the Bank during the first three years of its existence.

121. Barbour, 25.
There seems to be some difference of opinion between Barbour, who denies Jewish preeminence in any important field, and Bloom 40 and 62, where claims are made that Jews held, respectively, a near-monopoly in diamonds and the temporary leadership in tobacco dressing.

122. Bloom, 11 f.

123. Ibid., 204 f., and n. 7.
Barbour, 25.

124. Barbour, 25, citing van Dillen (see above, n. 120) and other modern authorities. She wrongly credits Bloom with being the only fairly recent writer to hold to what I have called (see above, p. 91 f.) the Graetzian view. Actually, one might almost say Bloom's book on Amsterdam Jewry is dedicated to the proving of the same thesis of the relative insignificance of Jewish capitalists as Barbour upholds. Again and again Bloom brings forward this thesis, as for instance on:
pp. xii, xvi, 10 and n. 44, 88, 204 ff., 221.
See also, for further confirmation, his article, "The Dutch Archives, with Special Reference to American Jewish History", Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society 32 (1931), 7-21. Pp. 7, 21.

125. Bloom, Economic Activities of Jews of Amsterdam, 33, 220.

126. Ibid., 34 f.

126a. It must not be imagined that Jews alone suffered from the juggernaut tactics of the great companies. In G.N. Clark, The Seventeenth Century, 37 f., are given examples of Christian complaints against the monopolies of the day. But Christians were not the consistent victims that Jews were -- Jews almost everywhere being considered alien and placed at a disadvantage, sometimes palpable, sometimes subtle.

127. Bloom, 36-39.

128. Ibid., 40 ff.

129. Ibid., 220 f.

130. Ibid., 30.

131. Barbour, 140.

132. Bloom, 20.

133. Ibid., 71.

134. Ibid., 18, and n. 83.
Graetz X, 12.

135. Barbour, 25, with same references as in n. 120, p. 130 f., above.

136. Bloom, 97 f.

137. Ibid., 74.

138. Ibid., 86.

139. Ibid., 4.

140. Ibid., 84 f.
Same as n. 135, above.

141. Bloom, 206.

142. Ibid., 66.

143. Roth, Italy, 369.

144. Joseph Caro. Maggid Mesharim. P. 38. Quoted in Graetz IX, 286 f., n. 3.

145. For Amsterdam-Leghorn trade: Bloom, 98, 126; Barbour 117, n. 57.
For Amsterdam-Venice trade: Bloom, 97 and n. 81.
For Hamburg-Iberia trade: Graetz X, 18.

For the trade of Amsterdam Jews with the Levant and with other lands: my text, p. 94 f., above; Bloom, 72-124.

146. See n. 135, prev. p.

147. Graetz IX, 472.

148. Graetz X, 28.

149. Bloom 90-95.
Roth, "The Strange Case of Hector Mendes Bravo", HUC Annual XVIII (1944), 221-245.

150. Memorandum of King Louis XIV to French Ambassador to Ottoman Empire, La Haye-Vantelet; cf. n. 101, p. 70, above.
The part of the memorandum that interests us here reads as follows: "Il faudroit de plus que le Grand Seigneur envoyast un de ses officiers intelligents dans toutes les eschelles avec ordre de travailler avec un François nommé par l'ambassadeur pour liquider toutes les debtes ... annuller toutes les promesses faites aux Maures et aux Juifs pour des intérêts ou usures."

151. In seventeenth-century Venice, for example, the wealthier Jews adopted a wide range of styles and customs from the upper levels of Christian Venetian society; cf. Ellis Rivkin. Leon da Modena and the Kol Sakhal. Cincinnati, Hebrew Union College, 1952. P. 24, n. 26; p. 28 f., n. 37; p. 36, n. 46.

152. Rivkin, 5-17, speaks of some extreme cases (Uriel da Costa, the two Farrars); not unexpectedly ,they lived in Amsterdam.

153. Bloom, 30 and n. 133, 41, 61.

154. Ibid., 176.

155. Israel Halperin. Pinkes Vaad Arba Arazot. Jerusalem, Mosad Bialik, 1945. Item no. 305.

155a. In p. 74 above, I have given a more detailed picture of the difficulties facing the Christian bourgeoisie.

156. Graetz IX, 202 f.

157. Ibid., 205 f., 506 f.,
Silver, Messianic Speculation, 143 ff.

158. Silver, 145-150.

159. Graetz IX, 395, 399.

160. Ibid., 401.
Silver, 183 f.

161. Roth, Italy, 403.

162. Silver, 152.

163. Silver, 157 f.

164. Ibid., 151.
Ibid., 186, for illustrations showing that belief in 1648 as the Messianic year was widespread.

165. Joseph Sambarry Cattaüi. Divrey Yosef. Cited in Franco, Histoire des Israélites de l'Empire Ottoman, 88.

166. Graetz IX, 310.

167. Samuel Usque. Consolação ás tribulações de Israel, 1552. P. 241. Cited in Graetz IX, 315.

168. Original title page (?) of:
Nathan Nata Hannover. Y'ven M'zula hamarbe lsaper g'zerot v'hamilchamot.

169. Silver, 121-125.

170. Ibid., 131.

171. Ibid., 134.

172. Ibid., 137.

173. Ibid., 184 ff.

174. Ibid., 188.

175. Ibid., 163-181.
Bloom, 24.
Joseph Kastein. The Messiah of Ismir (Trsln. fm. German original Sabbatai Zewi). New York, Viking, 1931. Pp. 82-86.

176. Franco, 98 f.
Graetz X, 73, n. 1.

177. According to Vandal, Voyages de Nointel, 58, the French ambassador Nointel waited upon the Ottoman court at Adrianople in the winter of 1670 and, because of an extreme housing shortage, was lodged in the town's Jewish section. Nointel, calling it "quartier infect", says of the building from which a Jewish occupant had been evicted to make room for his party, "Le plus bel appartement ne consiste qu'en une chambre... Imaginez-vous la puanteur et la vilenie des Juifs causées par la quantité de misérables familles qui logent ensemble, et vous jugerez qu'on a besoin de bonnes cassolettes pour s'en préserver. J'en ai plusieurs dans ma chambre."

178. A pitiable letter by Rabbi Israel Adato apologizes for the Adrianople Jews' inability, by reason of dire want, to contribute to the support of their brethren in Palestine. In: Abraham Danon, "Documents et Traditions sur Sabbatai Cevi et Sa Secte", REJ37 (1898), 103-110. P. 109.

179. Graetz IX, 362.

180. Michel Febvre. Théatre de la Turquie. Paris, 1682. Quoted in: Israel Lévi, "Les Juifs d'Orient d'après les Géographes et les Voyageurs", REJ 20 (1890), 97-107. P. 97.