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DIGEST

The North American Jewish community is at a crossroads. As a community we are peering over the wall into the 21st century and wondering what our future holds and what we can do to affect that future. One of the most significant concerns is the apparent absence of Jewish values education in our religious schools. In a world where young people are becoming ever more assimilated there is an increasing need to consider the job our Jewish supplementary schools are doing towards creating a strong Jewish identity. Today, there is a need to reinstate those values that are traditional to Judaism and to teach them as being distinctively Jewish.

The goal of this thesis is to establish as a paradigm one core Jewish value - Gemilut Hasadim, examine that value in detail and recommend a teaching strategy for use in a supplementary religious school. I will show that this will help to create and reenforce a concept of Jewish identity that has been missing.

Chapter One: This chapter summarizes the prevailing theories of values and valuing, including the sociological, psychological and philosophical perspectives. The differences between core and peripheral values are delineated. How values are formed, changed, and operate is examined. Finally, a discussion of how values and education are related.

Chapter Two: The similarities and differences between moral education and the values concepts discussed previously is discussed. How values can be taught is outlined. Significant moral education theories and methodologies are presented and evaluated.

Chapter Three: A rationale for teaching values in Jewish supplementary schools is presented. The possible methodologies for such instruction are presented and synthesized. A new methodology is suggested and outlined.

Chapter Four: A methodology for discerning Jewish values is outlined. *Gemilut Hasadim* is defined as a Jewish value. Traditional texts concerning *Gemilut Hasadim* are discussed in terms of their relation to Jewish values.

Chapter Five: A teacher weekend retreat is outlined. The purpose of the retreat is to persuade and instruct teachers regarding the use and teaching of Jewish values, specifically *Gemilut Hasadim*, in their classrooms.

In summary, this thesis offers a review of how values operate in our lives and presents a new way of approaching values in the modern Jewish supplementary school.

TEACHING CORE JEWISH VALUES USING TRADITIONAL TEXTS: GEMILUT HASADIM

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Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion

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Referee, Professor Samuel K. Joseph

To my wife

Diane

A true woman of valor

who made this, like so many other things, possible.

and to

My daughter


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Who inspires in me hope for tomorrow.

No effort of this magnitude can be accomplished without the support of many people. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Rabbi Sam Joseph, whose patience, encouragement, and gentle prodding brought to this point. Joel Grishaver and Eliot Spack encouraged me in this course of exploration even before a formal thesis topic was chosen and offered their thoughts and suggestions as the effort progressed. Finally, my wife, Diane shares much of the credit for any success I have enjoyed. She proofed every page, commented on every thought and supported me throughout.

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The North American Jewish community is at a crossroads. Recent studies show an ever-increasing rate of intermarriage, a consistent decrease in synagogue affiliation and an overall decline in the length of average Jewish education.¹ This points to an increased rate of assimilation by the Jews of North America. As a community, we are peering over the wall into the twenty-first century and wondering what our future holds and what we can do to affect that future. One of the most significant concerns is the apparent absence of Jewish values education in our religious schools.²

In a world where young people are becoming ever more assimilated, there is an increasing need to consider the job our Jewish supplementary schools are doing towards creating a strong Jewish identity. With the exception of ritual practice, what sets the Jews apart in today's society? This question increases in importance if, as some say, the practice of Jewish ritual is decreasing in the homes of Reform Jews across North America. As a result, the Jewish community must seek a return to its prophetic roots and create a value-based identity system in our religious schools.³

For a great many years, we knew children needed values and we tried to teach children those values we consider important. Historically,

¹ Barry Kosmin, Contemporary American Jewry: Implications for Planning (New York: North American Jewish Data Bank, Paper 4).

² A Time to Act (New York: University Press of America, 1990) 15, 26-30.

³ ibid., 28-32.

those values were transmitted by parents to their children. In the Jewish tradition, values transmission also took place through learning. The traditional Jewish texts are filled with examples of values education.⁴ These texts were, without a doubt, a significant component in classical Jewish education. However, today this is not the case.⁵

Today, there is a need to reinstate those values that are traditional to Judaism and to teach them as being distinctively Jewish. This will help to create and reenforce a concept of Jewish identity that has been missing. It is these values that will help compel the young people who come from the supplementary schools to be more than just good people, but also good Jews. It is these values that will motivate the most basic of humane and just Jewish actions. This would be no small accomplishment and stands as no small task. There are more than 280,000 young people in North American Jewish supplementary schools.⁶ These young people are the future of Judaism and the audience for our teachers.

⁴ Julius Guttman, Philosophies of Judaism (New York: Schocken, 1964), 42-44.

⁵ Brenda Munsey, Ed., Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg: Basic Issues in Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, and Education (Birmingham, Alabama: Religious Education Press 1980) 303-313.

6 A Time to Act. 33.

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CHAPTER I A QUESTION OF VALUES

Prior to any discussion of what is best for those young people, we must first examine what it is that is being addressed. This leads to a question of values. What are they? How do they work? I have noticed that as soon as the word values enters a conversation, whether the conversation is about education or simply daily life, everyone present has something to contribute. I have also noticed that during these conversations there seems to be a problem with the terminology. Everyone seems to be talking at each other rather than to one another. This is caused, I believe, by the multiplicity of understandings and conceptions of what values are and with what meaning the different terms are loaded.

DEFINITION OF VALUES

Why study values? One answer makes sense more than any other. Milton Rokeach, the leading theorist in the area of values and value systems, said the value concept, "more than any other, should occupy a central position across all the social sciences - sociology, anthropology, psychiatry, political science, education, economics and history. More than any other concept, it is an intervening variable that shows promise of being able to unify the apparently diverse interests of all the sciences concerned with human behavior."⁷

Values is relatively new as a technical term. It has found its way into our regular conversation only in the last few years and in that time has made tremendous headway. Everybody talks about it and yet they

⁷ Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 3.

speak with different understandings of what it means.⁸ Hunter Lewis points out, "Presidential candidates now campaign by telling crowds, 'I share your values,' and the General Secretary tells an American President, 'We do not need anyone else's values.'"⁹ This dilution of the significance of this term has led to some level of confusion in discussion about what values are and how they relate to the education of children.

One of the chief problems of defining the term value is its own usage in the American language. Webster's defines value as:

> a fair or proper equivalent in money...for something sold or exchanged...2. the worth of a thing in money or goods...
> estimated or appraised worth or price...4. purchasing power...5. that quality of a thing according to which it is thought of as being more or less desirable, useful, estimable, important, etc.; worth or degree of worth.
> that which is desirable or worthy of esteem for its own sake; thing or quality having intrinsic worth.
> the social principles, goals, or standards held or accepted by an individual, class, society, etc.
> precise meaning; as of a word.
> denomination; as of a postage stamp...etc.
> ...proportioned effect, as of light and shade, in an artistic work.

⁸ Hunter Lewis, A Question of Values: Six Ways We Make the Personal Choices That Shape Our Lives, (New York: HarperCollins, 1990) 7.

9 ibid.

which a symbol stands...12. ...the relative duration of a note, tone, or rest. 13... the quality of a speech sound.¹⁰ Our own language gives the word value thirteen different, although frequently similar, meanings. This may be the cause of some of the confusion. A value can be either the worth of a thing or whether or not something is worthy. A person can be said to have value or a person can value something. That is to say, a person has a value or a thing has a value.¹¹ For the purposes of this discussion, we will focus on the value(s) that a person is said to have. This would be closest to the Webster's definition number seven. Although, as we shall see, this definition also lacks both specificity and sufficient depth to really define the term value.

Renowned value theorist Robin Williams, quoted in Rokeach's work, notes that values, even with the above cited limitations, can refer to so many things, including "interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, goals, needs, aversions, attractions..."¹² To end the debate over how to understand a general conceptualization of values, Williams and Rokeach refer to values as "the presence of criteria or standards of preference."¹³ Values, like anything else, do not exist in a

10 Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, (New York: CollinsWorld, 1978) 1568.

11 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 4.

¹² Robin M. Williams, Jr., "Change and Stability in Values and Value Systems: A Sociological Perspective," in *Understanding Human Values*, Ed. Milton Rokeach (New York: The Free Press, 1979) 16.

13 ibid.

7.

vacuum. Rather, they are part of the world and thus it is incumbent upon one studying values to examine both what values are and how they act in a world filled with actors. For this reason, Rokeach goes on to describe the role values play in the world. He asserts, "Values merge affect and concept."¹⁴ That is to say, values do not just exist as a concept. They are constantly involved in the process of guiding our actions and reactions. We are constantly judging good and bad, beauty and ugliness, choosing one form of conduct over another. Values are an *active* component in our lives.

MODERN VALUE PERSPECTIVES

Modern discussion about values focuses on three general fields of understanding. The first is a sociological perspective of values. Values are seen from their relationship to the way people operate and interrelate. This view highlights the role values play in activities of groups and social relationships. It also reflects on the principles and process of change within these groups and the principles and processes that govern their relationships.

The second significant understanding of values I will refer to as the psychological perspective. In this instance the individual is paramount. Values are, from this perspective, universal and constant. They change as an individual changes and as the events affecting one's life change. There is an emphasis on self-awareness and personal growth.¹⁵ This view is

14 ibid.

¹⁵ Brian P. Hall et al., *Developing Human Values*, (Fond du Lac, WI: International Values Institute of Marian College, 1990), preface.

influenced by eastern religious and philosophical thought. It operates in a classically holistic way.

The third concept of values is best described as an educational or philosophical viewpoint. Here the philosophy of what a value should and can be is primary. There is little consideration of the individual except as the individual plays a role in the philosophy of values. Similarly, a general philosophy of the community and social relationships governs the way values play a role and not vice versa, as in the first perspective.

A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH

According to Rokeach, the leading spokesperson for the sociological perspective, values are part of the social contract to which we all belong. He points out, "The employment of values as standards is a distinctively human invention that is not shared with other species and is therefore one way of defining the difference between human and non-human,"¹⁶ Rokeach and others of this school see values as a way social actors interact. For this to be true, the values a person is said to hold must be, to a certain extent, a part of who that person is - a part of their very being.¹⁷ This is what makes creating a definition of value and valuing so very difficult.

16 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 13.

Williams, "Change and Stability," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Rokeach,
The alternative view would have values as a tendency as observed by an outside observer. This makes the value nothing more than what someone watching believes it to be. The value, then, has no intrinsic worth, nor can it stand alone. It is simply one individual's observed preference.

One element of this difficulty with definition is that values are similar to standards to which a society holds its members. Rokeach explains,

> "We start with the observation that all continuing human groupings develop normative orientations -- conceptions of preferred and obligatory conduct and of desirable and undesirable states of affairs. Such normative orientations are highly diverse across different societies, and are concretely very complex. Essentially, however, the most important types of normative elements are *norms* (specific obligatory demands, claims, expectations, rules) and *values* (the criteria of desirability)."¹⁸

The values defined above fall into two broad categories. If we understand values to be part of a social contract, then they must serve that social contract. A society or grouping of people makes demands upon one another for the purpose of living together. These demands make certain behaviors obligatory within a society where trust exists. After all, there would be no point in behaving morally if no one else was going to behave in a similar fashion. In contrast, paltry attention is paid to demands concerning competent modes of behavior. Few people seem to care whether or not they are competent at a certain task. They are far more concerned with whether or not their actions are competent. Past presidential elections and recent presidential campaigns demonstrate that

¹⁸ Williams, "Change and Stability," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Rokeach, 15.

the public's attention is focused more on the moral or immoral actions of the candidates than whether or not they are competent at the job they seek. Moral values seem to hold a higher degree of "oughtness" than do more general values, although both are important to the individual and the society.¹⁹

Williams maintains a person's values serve as criteria for judgment. He says, "Value-as-criterion is usually the more important usage for purposes of social scientific analysis."²⁰ The definition to which most social scientists and many others subscribe is actually Rokeach's. His definition has been found throughout the literature in the field of values. It is as follows:

> "A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-state of existence along a continuum of relative importance."²¹

¹⁹ Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values*, 9. In his book Rokeach refers to oughtness using the definition of Heider. *Ought* can be "represented as a cognized wish or requirement of a suprapersonal objective order which has an invariant reality, and whose validity therefore transcends the point of view of any one person"

²⁰ Robin M. Williams, R. M. "Values," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Ed. E. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968) 283.

21 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 5.

Although Rokeach's definition offers a higher degree of specificity than we have encountered before, it still requires a degree of fine-tuning and further elaboration. Similar to the term value, the terms within Rokeach's definition need to be defined and examined. The word "enduring" is used to connote a sense of non-permanence and a sense of semi-permanence at the same time. For values to be part of the social contract there must be some continuity and consistency within the society's values. This is necessary for survival. If the values were constantly changing, society would be unstable and thus unable to flourish. On the other hand, if all the values within a society were eternal, the society could never adapt to changes in the world in which the society lives.²² So, a value must be constant for as long as possible but able to change when necessary as part of the unique human adaptive process.

Rokeach identifies three kinds of beliefs. The first, existential beliefs, are those beliefs that are able to be either true of false. The second, evaluative beliefs, are the cases where an object of belief can be judged as either good or bad. Finally, prescriptive or proscriptive beliefs are where "some means or end of action is judged to be desirable or undesirable. A value is a belief of the third kind - a prescriptive or proscriptive belief."²³ Values, then, are beliefs that people hold and act on based on preference.

Beliefs have cognitive, affective and behavioral components. Because values are beliefs about the way things ought to be, values also have

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22 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 6, 7,

23 ibid.

cognitive, affective and behavioral components. To have a value is to know what is desirable. That is to say, a person with a value knows the correct behavior or correct end-state for which to aspire. That a value has an affective component is to say that a person has feelings about having that value. A person does not just have the value - a person feels the value. One can feel good or bad about the value and the value can produce emotions as a result of experiences. If a value a person holds causes that person to disapprove of an action, and that person saw that action take place, then that person would feel badly as a result of having that value come into contact with that action. Finally, people behave out of and as a result of their values. In the previous example, the person who sees the action with which his or her value disapproves may leave the room where the action is taking place or may choose to stay and protest. Both actions would be in response to their value coming into contact with the undesirable action. Having that particular value at that particular moment led to a particular behavioral reaction. The value produced a behavior.24

Edwin Cox reminds us values are not the same as beliefs and vice versa. He defines beliefs as what we believe to be ultimately real in our lives. This has some of the same connotations as the image of beliefs about what ought to be as discussed by Rokeach. But to Cox, beliefs are not simply the product of the values we hold. Rather, they are the result of deep personal experience and may even help to form the values we hold.²⁵

24 ibid.

²⁵ Edwin Cox, "The Relation Between Beliefs & Values," Religious Education, 82:1, (1987): 10-11.

This thinking is important not only as a possible clarification of (or objection to) Rokeach's thinking. It is also significant for our later discussion about John Dewey and the role experience plays in our value systems.

The definition cited above refers to modes of conduct and end-states of existence. Desirable modes of conduct are those values that help a person achieve something else or greater modes of conduct. These are instrumental or means values. They are means to particular ends. Desirable end-states of existence are the desirable place to end up or to be at a certain point. These are goal or terminal values. They are the ends that one wants to achieve at different times.²⁶ Neither the instrumental nor the terminal values have a greater or lesser significance in a person's value system. Both are necessary parts of a total system of operating values.²⁷

Although the definition suggests that preferences exist only as related to "opposite or converse modes of conduct or end-states of existence,"²⁸ Rokeach adds that there is another way in which a value can represent a specific preference. "A person prefers a particular mode or end-state not only when he compares it with his opposite but also when he

26 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 7.

²⁷ I will define and examine what it means to have a values system later in this section. For the moment, a values system is simply an organized, prioritized group of values working together within an individual or society.

28 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 5.

compares it with other values within his value system. He prefers a particular mode or end-state to other modes or end-states that are lower down in his value hierarchy."²⁹ This is particularly important because this allows for a relatively simple mechanism for a person to change his/her values.³⁰

In the United States, there is considerable public and private emphasis on diversity and individuality.³¹ It would seem that for all the diversity of people, culture, and opinion that exists, there would be a commensurate amount of values and even some values confusion in the United States. People, one might think, have hundreds of values and those values would be ever-changing. The latter issue of change has been somewhat addressed in the definition discussed previously. Concerning the number of values a person has, Rokeach asserts that it is relatively small and certainly smaller than one might have thought.

> "On various grounds - intuitive, theoretical and empirical - we estimate that the total number of terminal values that a grown person possesses is about a dozen and a half and that the total

29 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 10.

 30 Changing one's values will be discussed at greater length later in this section. What is significant at this point is that by broadening the perimeters of the original definition there is a greater allowance for change.

³¹ This is particularly true during these years surrounding the anniversary of the Bill of Rights. This manifests itself in the courts, schools, arts, etc.

number of instrumental values is several times this number, perhaps five or six dozen."³²

Rokeach and his colleagues arrive at this assertion because there are only so many end-states to aspire to and only so many modes of behavior that are instrumental to that end-state of existence. On the other hand, people are linked, one to the other, by their values. He says, "...out of a very nearly universal or constant list of values, societies differ in the patterning of values."³³ It is not the values that differentiate people, but only the patterning of those values. It is their common values that serve as a unifier.

Williams writes, "It is the rare and limiting case if and when a person's behavior is guided over a considerable period of time by one and only one value...More often particular acts or sequences of acts are steered by multiple and changing clusters of values."³⁴ This highlights the fact that values do not exist within a person or society in a vacuum from other values. Rather, it is the interplay of values that makes them so very functional for our daily lives. Each value that a person has or acquires becomes part of an organized system of values called a values system.

32 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 11.

Williams, "Change and Stability," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Rokeach,
 18.

³⁴ Williams, "Values," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Ed. E. Sills, 287.

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Each value within that system exists relative to other values in that same system. One value is given a higher priority relative to the rest of the values in the system, and another value is given a lesser priority relative to the rest of the values in the system. When we encounter the need to adapt to a new and different situation, we can do so by simply reordering the relative priorities of our values within our values system. This allows us to maintain an enduring values system while at the same time having the flexibility to respond to the need for change. Further, the relatively closed nature of the system allows a person to bond with others who hold similar values as part of their system, while allowing the individual to remain an individual by acknowledging the ability of those values systems to have a different relative prioritization.³⁵

For what do we use a values system? The interaction of the values in that system allows a person to make judgments and evaluate options for action based on their values. "A values system is a learned organization of principles and rules to help one choose between alternatives, resolve conflicts, and make decisions."³⁶ It helps the individual to make decisions about how to behave in a social world. A value system is used "in making selections of objects and actions, resolving conflicts, invoking social sanctions, and coping with needs or claims for social and psychological defenses of choices made or proposed."³⁷ In this way, the values system

35 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 11.

36 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 14.

Williams, "Change and Stability," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Rokeach,
 20.

serves not just as a predictor of actions, but also as a rationalizer of past actions and behaviors. The system in which the values operate serves as a guide that is itself guided by the relative prioritization of the values an individual has acquired.

For the purposes of a further, in-depth discussion of values, Rokeach offers the following extended definitions of values and value systems.

"To say that a person has a value is to say that he has an enduring prescriptive or proscriptive belief that a specific mode of behavior or end-state of existence is preferred to an opposite mode of behavior or end-state. This belief transcends attitudes toward objects and toward situations; it is a standard that guides and determines action, attitudes toward objects and situations, ideology, presentation of self to others, evaluations, judgments, justifications, comparisons of self with others, and attempts to influence others. Values serve adjustive, ego defensive, knowledge and self-actualizing functions. Instrumental and terminal values are related yet are separately organized into relatively enduring hierarchical organizations along a continuum of importance."³⁸

The potential problem that the expanded definition raises is that values, as understood by this definition, sound analogous to attitudes. However, this is not the case. Attitudes differ from values in terms of what they are, how they are acquired and how they function once they are

38 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 25.

acquired. An attitude is the collection of several beliefs about a specific situation. Values consist of only one belief and transcend any single object or situation. Further, a value serves as a standard for reactions to situations, whereas an attitude is not a standard but one of many possible reactions based on a standard. Given the thought process that was used to limit the number of values an individual probably has, the identical thought process would lead one to believe that a person might have thousands of attitudes. This is because a person has an attitude that is related to each specific situation s/he encounters. It is then logical to assume that since a person has thousands of encounters with specific objects and situations, a person would have an equal number of attitudes.³⁹

Values and attitudes differ on other levels as well. Rokeach comments on this, saying, "values occupy a more central position than attitude within one's personality makeup and cognitive system, and they are therefore determinants of values as well as behavior."⁴⁰ This implies that attitudes are a function of values and therefore not the analog for values. Finally, values are more dynamic than are attitudes. Values influence behavior in a direct way, whereas attitudes do not. Values, not attitudes, serve as a direct link to action in a given, specific situation.⁴¹

39 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 18-19.

40 ibid.

⁴¹ ibid. and Patrick E. Connor, & Boris W. Becker, "Values and the Organization: Suggestions for Research," in *Understanding*[®] Human Values, Milton Rokeach Ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 72.

Social norms have always held the position in our collective thinking about society of something more enduring than attitudes. Are social norms more like values? Perhaps, but they are still not the same. Social norms are only modes of behavior, in this case similar to instrumental values. However, values as a whole can also be end-states of existence, something a social norm cannot be. Further, a social norm is a prescription or a proscription for specific behavior in a specific situation. In this way it is similar to an attitude. An attitude describes a preference for behavior in that situation where the social norm describes the prescribed or proscribed behavior in that situation. However, a value describes a preference for behavior in a wide variety of situations because a value is non-specific to either an object or a situation. Finally, a norm is arrived at by consensus within a community and then internalized by the individual. A value is personal and internalized by the individual and then projected to the community through actions which result.⁴²

If individuals differ in terms of the values they hold, what is it that makes them different? "Rokeach has indicated that differences among individuals may not be so much in the presence or absence of particular values as in the arrangement of values, their hierarchies or priorities."⁴³

⁴² Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 19.

43 Williams, "Change and Stability," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Rokeach, 17.

We know that most people have a relatively small set of values in their values system and there is not a significant difference among those values between different people in a society. This understanding is in keeping with Maslow's hierarchical theory of human motivation, which ranks human needs in order of priority and necessity. Lower order needs such as food or shelter would produce a higher value within a person for food and shelter. When a person finds him/herself lacking in food or shelter, that need becomes so important that food or shelter become the value that is most important for the person in need. Whereas, if a person was wealthy and food and shelter were no longer significant concerns in terms of needs, food or shelter would likewise be lower priorities on that individual's value hierarchy. Instead, that wealthy individual would have different values corresponding to his position on Maslow's scale of needs.⁴⁴

However, it is not necessarily true that a person who ranks a particular value at a lower level is taking that value for granted. There are many reasons why a value may be ranked high or low. A person may, because of culture, religion, or social situation, appreciate something more than something else and it therefore becomes a high value. For example, a devout Christian will rank salvation as a higher value than a non-religious individual might. Further, a person may not be aware of a value or be mature enough to desire it and therefore that value, if ranked, will be ranked low. For example, a child might rank a sense of accomplishment

44 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 327.

low because he or she is unaware of that value's potential role in his or her life.⁴⁵

Let us consider the ideas of different kinds of values - terminal and instrumental values. These two types of values play different roles in different people. Further, terminal values are more consistent and have a higher degree of similarity among similar groups. It may be these terminal values that link groups of people into social organizations and thus determine membership in a particular organization. Finally, there is no research to suggest that both terminal and instrumental values, despite their differences, can be changed in the same ways and reordered according the the changing experience of the individual.⁴⁶

Having discussed the differences between different types of values and between values and attitudes and beliefs, we now consider how they operate together. A person potentially has millions of beliefs, thousands of attitudes, dozens of instrumental values and maybe a dozen or so terminal values. These are all systemized into a belief system that allows the individual to function in a world filled with objects, events, and other individuals. Consider this system as a series of concentric circles. Terminal values are at the center and surrounding them are the instrumental values and surrounding them are a person's attitudes and surrounding them lie a person's beliefs. Emanating out from all of this are a person's behaviors and actions in the world. Rokeach remarks that, "The

45 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 62.

46 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 326.

reason it is a functionally interconnected system is that the objects and situations around which a person organizes his attitudes arouse various instrumental values which are perceived to be instrumental to the attainment of various terminal values."⁴⁷

In addition to the cognitive, affective and behavioral functions of values, which were discussed above, there is another function - a motivational one. Instrumental values motivate the individual because they guide and direct the individual toward the attainment of the much desired terminal value or end-goal. If we do what our instrumental values guide us to do, then we will attain the terminal value we desire. That is wonderful motivation, particularly because the terminal value is more central to our value system than is our instrumental value and thus it is more important. What is more, these terminal goals and terminal values can never really be achieved. They are beyond our capacity to do something that will reach that point. This is because, as we get closer to meeting our terminal values and goals, these values and goals are enlarged as a result of seeing a larger scope in which the values and goals can operate. This keeps the individual forever motivated.⁴⁸

The reader should be aware that an instrumental value need not simply be instrumental to a terminal value. An instrumental value can

⁴⁷ Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 215.

⁴⁸ Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 14.

also be instrumental to another instrumental value.⁴⁹ However, for our purposes it is easier to conceive of an instrumental value as instrumental to the attainment of a terminal value or goal.

Rokeach identified two types of instrumental values - moral and competence values. I referred to moral values in an earlier discussion and will not repeat that information here. Suffice it to say that moral values have a different sense of 'oughtness' and thus a more narrow definition than do general values. Moral values deal with the interpersonal world how a person relates to others. Competence values deal with the intrapersonal world - how a person views him or herself. If a person violates a competence value (i.e. thinking logically), that person feels inadequate. A person can have many of each of these types of values. Competence and moral values can come into conflict (i.e behaving lovingly and offering intellectual criticism), as moral values can come into conflict with other moral values (i.e. behaving honestly and lovingly) and competence values with other competence values (i.e. thinking imaginatively and thinking logically).⁵⁰

Just as there are different types of instrumental values, so too are there different types of terminal values. Rokeach admits that there may be many ways of categorizing terminal values. However, one significant distinction stands out. All terminal values are either self-centered

49 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 12.

⁵⁰ Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 8. The examples listed in this section were adapted from examples cited by Rokeach in his discussion of the topic.

(intrapersonal) or society-centered (interpersonal).⁵¹ A person's instrumental values will be guided by the kind of terminal values s/he possesses. If, for example, a person has the intrapersonal value of inner harmony, his/her instrumental values will be geared around that terminal value. If, on the other hand, a person has the interpersonal value of world peace, then his/her instrumental values would be geared around that. Because people have more than just one or two terminal values, it is likely that people have several personal and social terminal values. However, because these exist on a hierarchical continuum, either the personal or the social must hold a higher ranking on the continuum. As a result, people behave in either personally oriented or socially oriented ways. Finally, it is asserted that an increase in one social value will lead to increases in other social values and, similarly, increases in one personal value will lead to increases in other personal values.⁵²

The values described are determined not in a single moment but over a lifetime. Rokeach maintains that "The data...show a continual development of values from early youth to old age, a finding that is more in accord with Erickson's than with Freud's view of personality development."⁵³ There is also some research to suggest that there are significant differences in the prioritizing of values between men and

51 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 7-8.

52 ibid.

⁵³ Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values*, 327. Rokeach does not, however, specify which of Erickson's stages is most appropriate for this thinking. Rather, he notes the need for further research to determine this.

women. This is the result of both the way the values are developed and the differences between the sexes in terms of their social vs. personal world outlooks. Rokeach asserts that women have a more interpersonal and social world view than do men. Men, on the other hand, have a more intrapersonal and personal world view than do women.⁵⁴

As has been pointed out repeatedly, values do not exist in a vacuum. On the contrary, they are formed, prioritized, and reevaluated periodically as a result of the milieu in which those values are acquired and exist. This is true of the existence of values in society in general and in more specific situations. Socialization and subcultural experience also help to determine a person's values.⁵⁵

Values assist the individual in making action choices in his/her life. In simple terms, we assume that values affect our behavior. Despite the fact that we arrive easily at this assumption, Williams points out, "Evidence that values do influence subsequent behavior is not available in the quantity and with the decisiveness we would prefer, but the total research-based data are nevertheless quite impressive.... Data indicating that values are consequential for behavior have come both from experimental studies...and from non-experimental studies using the most diverse methods and settings."⁵⁶

54 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 57.

55 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 95.

Williams, "Change and Stability," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Rokeach.
23.

Before we go further, a look at what is meant by behavior would seem in order. There is simple behavior (i.e. voting for a particular candidate) and more general behavior (i.e. pursuing a career choice or educational choice). General behavior is a composite of many simple behaviors.⁵⁷ If we could show that a particular value led to a particular simple action (like voting for a certain candidate), the "proof" for the link between values and behavior would be clear. However, most people function in the realm of general behaviors and thus the connection is not as clear.⁵⁸

Behavior takes motivation and motivation is linked to values in two ways. First, terminal values provide the individual with goals that serve as the sources of satisfaction and thus something for which to strive. This establishes motivations for a person or sustains other motivations. Instrumental (and some terminal) values identify how to get satisfied and thus provide motivation to have that particular value necessary to achieve that satisfaction. Finally, motivation affects an individual's behaviors.⁵⁹ Because each person has many values and thus many motivations, it is the combination and prioritization of values and accompanying motivations that create and affect behaviors. No behavior is a product of a single

- 57 The examples are adapted from Rokeach. The Nature of Human Values, 123-124.
 58 ibid.
- 59 Williams, "Change and Stability," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Rokeach, 24.

motivation or value. Rather, behavior is the end result of a valuing and motivating process that is constantly at work in every human being.

This discussion of the ways in which values and behavior are linked might easily lead one to the assumption that values can be used to predict behavior and vice versa. Nothing could be further from the truth! As noted above, a person does not act out of one value or motivation; therefore a value can elicit any one of many different behaviors, depending on the other values a person holds and how they interact and are prioritized. On the other hand, a single behavior may be the product of a combination of values, making it impossible to identify what value is tied to a particular behavior. Rokeach adds, "In a world of continually varying realistic exigencies and of multiple values, only a maniac or a saint will always act consistently in terms of a (1) simple, (2) prearranged, (3) hierarchy of (4) fixed desiderata."⁶⁰

All this is not to say that some predictions concerning behavior and attitudes can not be made. Rokeach's research shows that socioeconomic, religious and political values are the most significant determinants of attitude and behavior. He points out that according to the Rokeach Value Survey, the three values that are significantly related to more than half the behaviors as well as to many attitudes are 1) a comfortable life, 2) equality, and 3) salvation. These reflect the socioeconomic, political and religious value determinants of attitude and behavior. However, it is

⁶⁰ Williams, "Change and Stability," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Rokeach, 28.

important to note that this research only shows how values, which have been polled for, and attitudes and behaviors which have been polled for, are related. Both sides of the equation are known and neither is really predicted by the other. Rokeach points out that it would be nearly impossible to predict one side of the equation if we only knew the other side of the equation.⁶¹

Despite all this, there are certain limited areas where known values might be able to predict behavior within a certain limited domain of behavior. Certain behaviors and attitudes are inexorably tied to certain values. A person with a certain value might also be display attitudes and behaviors associated with that one value. For example, if a person had a value about a particular institution (i.e. religion), certain behaviors within and towards that institution could be predicted. Further, variations in religious values would be most associated with variations in religious behavior, etc.⁶²

Values are linked to more than just behaviors. They are really linked to all of the aspects of the behavioral sciences. Rokeach adds,

> "The findings suggest that culture, society, and personality are the major antecedents of values and that attitudes and behavior are their major consequences. Virtually every comparison we have undertaken between groups differing in cultural, demographic, social class, or personality variables has

61 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 159.

62 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 96.

uncovered distinctive value patterns. Similarly, distinctive value patterns have been found to underlie differences in virtually every attitudinal, behavioral, lifestyle, interest, and occupational variable. Thus, values seem to be implicated either as dependent or independent variables at virtually all levels of social analysis - cultural, institutional, group, and individual."⁶³

It is in keeping with these findings that we see shared values in communities. The more cultural homogeneity of a community, the higher the homogeneity of the values and value systems held by the members of that community. This is particularly true of religious communities. Finally, research suggests that of all the religious communities tested, it is the Jewish community that has the highest level of cultural homogeneity and highest level of corresponding value and value systems homogeneity.⁶⁴ Findings such as these will prove important when we later turn to the issues surrounding religious education and values.

Beyond the issue of homogeneity, Rokeach remarks on the fact that religion (organized religion) has its own values and value systems. Rokeach finds, "All religious groups are similar in considering a world at peace, family security, and freedom the most important terminal values, and an exciting life, pleasure, social recognition and a world of beauty the

⁶³ Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 326.

⁶⁴ Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 137.

least important."⁶⁵ Christian community members rank salvation and forgiving very high, whereas Jews and nonbelievers rank salvation last or near the bottom of their list.⁶⁶ Rokeach also notes that there exist differing types of religious personalities within each religious community. These religious personalities or orientations have an even higher level of homogeneity of values than the rest of the larger religious community.⁶⁷ This is significant because it means that, even among Jews, there is no universal agreement on values. Rather, there are levels of diversity within the religious groups and thus within their values and value systems.⁶⁸

If, as teachers, we would like to influence students, we must ask if behavior can be changed. If that is our goal, then the values of those individuals must first be changed. Can values be changed? Rokeach suggests that they can. He maintains, "A number of experimental studies now suggest that long-term changes in human values can be brought about as a result of a self-confrontation treatment in which individuals are given certain feedback and interpretations concerning their own and significant others' values."⁶⁹ He asserts that the feedback mentioned above makes a

- 65 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 82.
- 66 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 114.
- 67 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 111.
- 68 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 114.

⁶⁹ Milton Rokeach, & Joel W. Grube, "Can Values Be Manipulated Arbitrarily," in Understanding Human Values, Milton Rokeach Ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 241.

person aware of contradictions between their values and their own selfperceptions of their values. Further, if they are aware of the inconsistencies, they become "dissatisfied" and, as a further result, work to change that state of dissatisfaction by changing or rearranging their values so that they will be more consistent.

We showed that values do not exist one at a time; rather, they are part of a person's value system. This system of values is what makes for an enduring society. Therefore, change must not be so substantive as to destroy the enduring qualities of the value system. With this in mind, Rokeach asserts that change happens but only within a limited field. Changes in values are limited by the constraints of external reality stemming from the role of a value within a system and the many external influences on that system.⁷⁰

To know how to change values within a values system we must first examine how values are learned. Rokeach notes that most research points to the fact that values are developed as a result of some kind of experience. Experiences of pain or pleasure, deprivation or gratification, etc. all influence the way we view ourselves and the world around us. Even short-lived experiences may affect our values.⁷¹ It follows that as the world changes, an individual's experiences change, and that

Williams, "Change and Stability," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Rokeach,
 21.

Williams, "Change and Stability," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Rokeach,
 22.

individual's values change along with the societal changes occurring around him/her.⁷²

Experiences through which we acquire our values are part of what our societal institutions do. Values are acquired through experience that is spontaneous and experience that is organized by parents, religious and societal institutions. These are sources for values and thus values change. Rokeach adds, "...religious institutions are institutions that specialize in fostering a certain subset of values we call religious values..."⁷³

Rokeach follows his assertion that values can be taught with a plan for teaching values. Because values are acquired through experience and changed when they are brought into juxtaposition with other values and ideals, teaching needs to incorporate these factors. The ideal opportunity for such a teaching moment is found in the classroom using the Socratic method. Rokeach created a values profile that allows the individuals to determine what their current values are and what they believe them to be.⁷⁴ This, coupled with a dialectical approach, is what seems to prove most effective for Rokeach.⁷⁵

- Williams, "Change and Stability," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Rokeach,
 34.
- 73 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 24-25.
- ⁷⁴ See Appendix A for a copy of the Rokeach Values Profile.
- ⁷⁵ Ronald H. Epp, "An Approach to the Teaching Philosophy," in Understanding Human Values, Milton Rokeach Ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 274.

His plan is a five-part plan for teaching and changing values.

• **Discussion** This is the opportunity for teacher and students to discuss the findings of the Rokeach profile and how they might be projected to the future.

• Exploration The students must now explore their own values and those of others. Their values and value systems are being challenged both from within and from without.

• Sharing By sharing their own values and ranking preferences with others, a student has the opportunity to hear and contrast others' views with their own. This provides a check and balance for their own views.

• **Theorizing** Having identified their own values and compared them with others; students have the opportunity to consider what might be the ideal and how that ideal might function in a particular society. They further postulate whether universal values exist and what they might be.

• **Relevance** This is a time of synthesis. Students discover how the original discussion of their own values and the later discussion of ideals and universal values come together.

In closing his description of his teaching methodology, Rokeach adds, "I am still refining the above technique and recognize that it should be altered and amended as befits the temper of the class and its teacher." He also points out that this is but one of many possible methodologies, and that others are and should continue to be cultivated.⁷⁶

76 ibid.

What effect does the teaching of values have on the belief system to which values are interrelated? The change of a person's values through education comes about through eventual self-enlightenment concerning contradictions within one's belief system. People have such a wide variety of terminal and instrumental values, it is likely that everyone has some contradictions within their values and their belief systems. Teaching values may be the only way to bring these apparent contradictions out into the open. Rokeach points out, "People in everyday life remain chronically unaware of whatever contradicting beliefs they may have because most social circumstances will encourage camouflage and ego defense and few social circumstances will facilitate or force self-awareness."⁷⁷ In this way, the educational opportunity becomes a healthy self-examination for the individuals in a society and may even aid the society's growth by providing such a service.

Values education becomes important for the group or society for another reason. As was noted earlier, values are a cause of behavior. Certain behaviors and actions are generated directly by the values one holds, others in a less direct manner. However, all behaviors are related to values held by an individual and/or society. Thus, if values are taught and changed through this educational process, so too are the resultant behaviors of those values. In this way values education can be used to alter and improve an individual's or even a whole society's behavior.⁷⁸

77 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 331.

78 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 338.

It is because of this that Rokeach and others (such as Skinner and Bruner) believe that education deserves so much attention. Educational institutions are not just in the business of transmitting knowledge from one generation to the next, but also of transmitting and improving one generation's values for the next generation.⁷⁹ It follows that an individual educator or educational institution should and can choose what values to teach and how they should be taught. This decision is influenced by the type of person or institution, and by the society in which they exist. For example, religious institutions may wish to teach values in harmony with their religious values. Similarly, the military may want to stress cooperative and obedience related values.⁸⁰

A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH

Most of the researchers in values and value systems tend to agree in general terms with Rokeach's conception of values and value systems. There is broad agreement that values manipulate behavior and attitudes and that values are acquired by experience. However, individual conceptions of values and valuing differ among the researchers. Brian Hall is a leading spokesperson for the psychological perspective of values and valuing. He, along with Piaget, Kohlberg, and others, sees values as something that are acquired through a process of maturation. As a person grows, he/she develops values and a value system to accommodate them

- 79 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 335.
- 80 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 334-335.

in the world in which they are living at the moment. As a person matures, the world changes and so do their values.⁸¹

While not specifically contradicting Rokeach's definition of values offered earlier, the psychological school of thought adds certain specifics to make the definition more appropriate to their perspective. Hall et. al. note, "Values are symbols, designated by certain words in the spoken and written language, that provide human consciousness and motivate human behavior."⁸² Janet Kalven, a colleague of Hall's, describes values by breaking them down into two types. Operative values are those that directly help a person to operate better in the world around them,. This would include the value of avoiding pain. With that value a person would act in a certain way and thus avoid pain. The second type of values is known as conceived values. Through the unique human ability to reason, an individual conceives of values such as honesty, saving, etc.⁸³

Hall states, "Values are the consciously or unconsciously held priorities that reflect the world view of an individual or an institution."⁸⁴ He further asserts that a person holds values that are stable and evident. These values are universal and applicable in all times, places, communities,

- 81 Hall et al., Developing Human Values, preface.
- 82 Hall et al., Developing Human Values, 164.
- ⁸³ Janet Kalven, "Personal Value Clarification," in *Readings in Value Development*,
 Ed. Brian P. Hall et al., (Ramsey, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), 7.

84 Hall et al., Developing Human Values, 22.

and groups. Hall bases this assertion on modern research that reveals, "...each thought, feeling, and action is preceded by an internal image. That image is transformed into action through language. Value words act as bridges between the inner world of thoughts, feelings, sensations and intuitions and the outer world of concrete reality."⁸⁵ This process is called the Genesis Effect.

When a person has an internal image of something produced by an experience or encounter, that image must be acted upon in some way. The first step of this action is to give the image a tag, label, or name. This name becomes the value word described previously. The language we use in our society is laden with value words. Thus, the language plays a role in the transmission of value words and images from one person to another and from one generation to another. Hall and others discovered, "Based on research findings, 125 value words have been identified in our written and spoken language that consistently appear throughout the life span of individuals and organizations."⁸⁶

Each person holds a certain number of values at certain points. That individual further acts out of those values at the given moment. The value system of that individual is ultimately influenced by the individual's world view - that is, the assumptions that a person makes about the world in which he or she lives. How does that individual see him/herself, see

85 ibid.

⁸⁶ ibid. See Appendix B for a list of the 125 value words and their conceptual definitions.

others and see others in relation to themselves? Kalven calls this an individual's "state of consciousness."⁸⁷ It is the world view or state of consciousness that defines how the person is to interact with the set of 125 values at a particular moment.

Similar to Rokeach's view explained earlier, Hall asserts values do not exist in isolation. Theoretically, a person can hold all 125 values, although that is rare. On the other hand, a person will probably have more than one value at a given moment. The many values a person holds are organized based on that person's world view or phase of consciousness. The values pattern, cluster and change as a person grows and encounters situations that assist that person in moving forward (or, on occasion, backward) from one phase of consciousness to another. In addition, values communicate with one another. Because they exist together in a system, there is a certain degree of intersystemic dialectic that puts one value or cluster of values into opposition to or support of another value or grouping of values. Further, these clusters of values interact within the cluster to form new clusters of values.⁸⁸

Because, as noted earlier, the acquisition of values is part of an individual's personal development, it follows that values can be ordered developmentally. Hall isolated four major and eight minor stages of

⁸⁷ Kalven, "Personal Value Clarification," in *Readings in Value Development*, Ed. Brian P. Hall et al., 7.

⁸⁸ Brian P. Hall, "Value Development," in *Readings in Value Development*, Ed. Brian P. Hall et al., (Ramsey, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), 59-62.

development for a person and for that person's values. The four major stages are referred to as the "Phases of Consciousness." In each of these four phases there are two stages - A and B. The A stage of each phase represents a personal dimension within that phase. This is how the individual sees his or her basic needs in response to the environment in which s/he exists. The B stage of each phase has a more social dimension. It is when the individual seeks to satisfy those basic needs by acting on and within their environment.⁸⁹ For example, in phase I stage A there is the value of self-preservation, and in stage B the value of security. In stage A the effort is to survive on the most personal and basic level. However, as one approaches stage B the effort is broadened to the wider conception of security for self and may also include family, friends and others. The stage B is conceptualized in terms of the larger world, whereas the stage A value is conceptually limited to the individual.⁹⁰

Hall suggests that a tension exists between the two stages within each phase. Hall also isolates a difference between "goals" and "means" values. A close reading of Hall et. al. indicates that these are the same as Rokeach's terminal and instrumental values discussed earlier.⁹¹ The

⁸⁹ ibid. And Hall et al., Developing Human Values, 22-24.

90 Hall et al., Developing Human Values, 22.

⁹¹ For a better description of Hall's definition of goal and means values, see his discussions in Genesis effect, and Hall et al., *Developing Human Values*, 24. Also see Hall, "Value Development," in *Readings in Value Development*, Ed. Brian P. Hall et al., 59-74. For the remainder of this discussion I have chosen to keep the words terminal and instrumental when referring to different types of values. The definitions are, in my opinion, sufficiently similar to allow this.

significant addition Hall makes is a discussion of how terminal values interact. We know from the earlier discussion that instrumental values are means to reaching the terminal values or desired end-states of being. Hall asserts that terminal values are connected and build upon one another.⁹² It is the building block nature of values as characterized by Hall et. al. that is fundamental to the phase system of values development.

Again, like Rokeach, Hall et. al. speaks in terms of a prioritized system of values. Hall's language uses the word core values to describe the central values a person holds. Rokeach would put such values at the highest points on the values continuum. Hall adds, "...core values are those particular values the person chooses that give meaning and shape to a lifestyle... They are concrete motivators."⁹³

Values lead to and are intricately connected to a person's behavior. Conversely, a person's behavior serves as an indicator of what values that person holds, and that person's world view. These value indicators, as Hall refers to them, serve to indicate what a person's core values might be and at what phase of consciousness that person finds him/herself.⁹⁴ This is fundamental to Hall's strategy for developing higher-level values in the individual. Only by knowing where you are can you get to where you are going.

92 Hall et al., Developing Human Values, 24.

⁹³ Hall, "Value Development," in *Readings in Value Development*, Ed. Brian P. Hall et al., 60.

94 ibid. And Hall et al., Developing Human Values, 28-29.

Let us briefly discuss the four phases of consciousness.⁹⁵ Phase I is primarily characteristic of young children. In this phase the world is a mystery from which the individual needs protection and significant assistance in coping. It is very self-centered and limiting for the individual. Power is something other people have and use to control the individual. There is a survival-oriented consciousness throughout this phase. The skills one uses are instrumental to survival and are limited to that. Self-gratification becomes the centerpiece of phase one behavior. As a person develops, s/he gains a greater sense of self in relation to others and thus a sense of how their own survival depends on others. The individual is now a member of the social world.

As such, s/he enters phase II. The world is no longer as scary and is now seen as a complex problem to be mastered or solved. The question now becomes how should the person function in relation to this larger world? How can an individual belong and succeed in the larger social world? The world is now available to others and not just to the self as it was in phase I. Self-esteem, identity, and social order now are a part of the phase II person's consciousness. They are, however, not fully refined and are in need of constant manipulation to adjust to the larger world. There is still a great deal of dependency, as in the phase I person. Yet, the phase II person has begun to use social behavior such as work and success

⁹⁵ For a lengthier and more detailed discussion see Hall et al., Developing Human Values, Part 1; Sections 1 and 2. or Readings in Value Development, Ed. Brian P. Hall et al., Chapter 4.

to control the world on which s/he is dependent. Because of the new social relationships necessary for this phase, there is a concurrent emphasis on interpersonal skills. These skills help the individual to be the social person s/he desires.

Belonging is so important to the phase II individual that almost all actions occur out of a sense of group and reflect group thinking and group behavior. These actions allow the individual to meet his/her basic needs of belonging and thus the individual must begin to seek meaning for his/her life outside the group. This is when an individual enters the third phase of consciousness. A person now moves beyond the world of the "they" and into the world where the individual begins to see his/her own independence in the interdependent world. Self-worth is no longer the result of interaction with others. Rather, self-worth becomes something that one does for oneself. As a person's horizons are broadened, the individual takes greater charge of his or her life. There is now personal power where institutional authority used to be. As a result, creativity and imagination become increasingly important. Imaginal skills are the ones needed to get through this phase. These feelings lead to a sense of more than what the self is feeling, to what others are feeling and what rights others have. Social action, in the classical Jewish sense, becomes a critical component in this phase.

Having broadened one's consciousness to such a significant extent, the individual is now a transcendent thinker and is no longer concerned with the self qua self. Rather, the individual turns to see the self as part of the whole and thus concern also focuses on the whole. Things are now

seen as interrelated and interdependent at an entirely new level. The world is a system of which the individual is now a part. Working through and as a part of that system is the new role of the individual in the world. Thus, systems skills are necessary for success in this phase. The result of this transformation is that since the individual is no longer an individual but a part of the whole, the term "individual" becomes the wrong word. There is also a greater sense of integration among the people and things in the world. Tools and the users are interdependent and thus the meaning of each, like the meaning of individual, is modified. Global harmony and a sense of renewal are the hallmarks of this phase.

The purpose of all of these phases is to construct a system of meaning for our lives at different points in our lives. This is done through an ever-expanding set of values. Each phase is dependent upon the prior phases. To skip ahead is a prescription for failure. Hall notes that one needs certain skills to have certain values. That is to say, "...all values are receptacles of skills."⁹⁶ He goes on to outline what is necessary for a person to grow from one phase and its accompanying values to the next phase and its values. This healthy growth requires three minimal conditions.

 A person must have the minimal skills necessary to support the most basic of values at each phase of development.

• A person must have a certain level of self-awareness in order to grow. S/he needs to be aware of what skills and values s/he has and which ones are needed in order to continue to grow.

96 Hall et al., Developing Human Values, 30.

• A person must be in an atmosphere that reinforces a person at least one stage of development above his/her current level.

Hall adds, "The growth process is fostered by reinforcing the environment at the phase of the individual's present experiences and also at the next phase to which she or he aspires. Environmental reinforcement enables the person to experience these conditions that permit the internalizing of the primary values proper to each growth stage."⁹⁷

This raises an important point. At each stage of growth, the individual does not abandon one set of values for another. Rather, the values are internalized and become part of the person. When a person moves to the next stage, the values of the past stage become a part of the person. Those values are now what Hall defines as foundation values. They are part of the individual's foundation. Values that the individual has in the forefront of his/her operating system are defined as focus values, values and skills at use in the present. Finally, some values and skills are reflective of where an individual would see him/herself in the future. These aspirations are defined as future values, values not yet a part of his/her operating system.⁹⁸

Hall, together with Dr. Benjamin Tonna, designed a testing instrument to help individuals determine in what stage and phase they are currently

97 ibid.

⁹⁸ ibid., 37. And Brian P. Hall, "The Four Phases of Consciousness," in *Readings in Value Development*, Ed. Brian P. Hall et al., (Ramsey, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), 56-57.

operating and where their values or skills are inappropriate for their current stage in life. Using this measurement tool, together with educational materials designed by Hall and his colleagues, individuals can design an action plan to address their shortcomings, to learn new skills and acquire new values. Values education becomes the process by which a person becomes aware of the self and its position in the stages of growth, and then uses that knowledge to advance, with help, to the next stage of growth.⁹⁹

A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

Beginning in the early twentieth century, a group of educational philosophers began to discuss the role of values and morals in the educational system. The real emphasis made by these thinkers was a concentration on what society should be like. They felt that society should be moral and good and ethical and that this could be achieved by teaching goodness, values, morality and ethics. In many ways, much of what today's value theorists work with began with these thinkers.

John Dewey was a leader among these thinkers. He believed that character education in the public schools was essential to the well-being of the schools and society as a whole. Although he never used the modern language of values and value systems, his work and thinking endure as a guide for modern values theorists. Many of Dewey's early efforts opposed

⁹⁹ Hall et al., *Developing Human Values*, 58-68. And Larry Rosen & Anthony Jones, "Values and Teaching," in *Readings in Value Development*, Ed. Brian P. Hall et al., (Ramsey, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), 97-103.

the teaching of ethics in the school. He did not feel that ethics were wrong, but that the method was wrong. Teaching ethics could only be effective, he reasoned, as long as it was tied to a theory of moral behavior and that the ethics were not taught for ethics' sake but for ethical behavior's sake.¹⁰⁰

In support of this position Dewey wrote:

"Moral education in school is practically hopeless when we set up the development of character as a supreme end, and at the same time treat the acquiring of knowledge and the development of understanding, which of necessity occupy the chief part of school time, as having nothing to do with character. On such a basis, moral education is inevitably reduced to some kind of catechical instruction, or lessons about morals."¹⁰¹

He felt that moral education or values education must be part of the overall instructional program. Dewey believed that if students were taught the right skills, they would acquire the correct values and act on those values. Students should be taught how to think morally and critically. He believed that students able to do that would arrive at the moral action in a given situation because they would apply the correct line of logical and moral reasoning. This, in turn, would lead to moral behavior and a better society.

100 Jeanne Pietig, "John Dewey and Character Education," Journal of Moral Education, 30, (1976): 175.

101 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, (New York: The Free Press, 1916), 354.

This line of thought points out that moral values do not solve problems. Rather, moral values highlight methodologies for solving the problems they help to identify. In this way Dewey is rather like Hall and his colleagues. Dewey believed that moral values are acquired over time and are the result of a growth process.¹⁰² By training a child in specific critical thinking techniques, that child can grow and acquire higher level values - a more moral life. The result is an ongoing change in behavior that helps the individual function better in an ever-improving society.

In summary, all three perspectives - Rokeach, Hall, and Dewey - are similar in that they give a great deal of weight to how values are played out in behavior. Thus the mechanism of value change for all three is similar. The thought is that if a person can become aware of contradictions between their behavior and their values, or between their values as acted out in the present and the values they would like to have in the future, that person can change. It is awareness that is primary to all three visions of values, value systems and value change.

An individual's values are important not just because they serve as guides to behavior. Values have an intrinsic value and thus their development in children also has an intrinsic value. Rokeach says it best:

> "...the functions served by a person's values are to provide him with a comprehensive set of standards to guide actions,

¹⁰² J. Theodore Klein, "A Brief History of Value Philosophies," in *Readings in Value Development*, Ed. Brian P. Hall et al., (Ramsey, NJ: Paulist Press, 1982), 25.

justifications, judgments, and comparisons of self and others and to serve needs for adjustment, ego defense, and selfactualization. All of these diverse functions converge into a single, overriding, master function, namely, to help maintain and enhance one's total conception of oneself."¹⁰³

VALUES AND EDUCATION

Much of the theoretical view of values discussed up to this point included education. If the purpose of values is a better society, and a better person in that society, then education is essential to that purpose. A recent editorial by Milton Meller, a high school principal in Brooklyn, New York suggested, "The majority of lessons at all levels should contain some noticeable references to values. Education should not include merely the restricted concept of instruction in disciplines. It should embrace the need for ethical living. No goal in education is more noble."¹⁰⁴

The calls for a return to the organized teaching of values are mounting in many quarters. Bill Honig, Superintendent of Public Instruction for the California Department of Education, voiced what many parents and educators are now feeling. "We must transmit a sense of values to our young people if they are to lead successful, productive lives

103 Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 216.

¹⁰⁴ Milton L. Meller, "Incorporate Values Education Across the Curriculum," NASSP Bulletin, 72, (1988): 110-111. as members of our free society."¹⁰⁵ Perhaps it was Horace Mann who said it best when he said, "When the teacher fails to meet the intellectual wants of a child, it is the case of asking for bread and receiving a stone; but when he fails to meet the child's moral wants, it is giving a serpent."¹⁰⁶

There seems to be general agreement that mere facts as part of a child's education are not enough. A child must know how to use those facts to better his/her society. Further, that child must have instilled in them the desire to make such a change. The question is then raised - can values be taught? It appears that they can. Rokeach, Hall, Dewey and many others wrestled with the problem and found that given the right circumstances values education is possible. Certainly their methodologies vary. Yet, to date, I can find little or no evidence to prove that values can not be taught to either children or adults. Certainly, values education becomes more difficult as the learner becomes older. But few, if any, deny that it can be done.

The real debate today deals with three areas of dispute. The first is whether or not values should be taught. The most common response to this dispute is that an attempt was made and it failed. One commentator wrote, "Like it or not your schools are teaching values...Schools can never be free of values; nor can they take on the same responsibility or moral

Bill Honig, "Teaching Values Belongs in our Public Schools," NASSP Bulletin, 74, (1990): 6.

¹⁰⁶ As quoted in Bill Honig, "Teaching Values Belongs in our Public Schools," NASSP Bulletin, 74, (1990): 6. education that rightly belongs to families and religious institutions."¹⁰⁷ It is well recognized that education involves the transmission of values. This is what Kohlberg referred to as "the hidden curriculum" of all education. The only real debate, then, is whether or not that transmission will be intentional and organized or accidental and haphazard.

The second argument deals with which values should be taught. A certain portion of this discussion may well be moot, depending on the theory of values and value systems to which one subscribes. In certain constructions, such as Hall, what is to be taught is decided by the theory and the phase at which persons find themselves. Nevertheless, there are plenty of methodologies and theories that allow for and even encourage the individual or community to face this issue. The reasons and rationale for one value over another value are endless, as are the discussions on the subject. Suffice it to say that each community will, at some point, be forced to come to grips with this question and begin to develop a response for their own community.¹⁰⁸

The third area of discussion is how to teach values. The journal exchanges on this subject are both peaceful and friendly. There is a certain commonality of intent that pervades the discussion. The exception is what Barry Chazen refers to as the problem of indoctrination vs.

¹⁰⁷ Pamela B. Joseph, "Like it or Not, Your Schools Are Teaching Values, So Emphasize These," *The American School Board Journal*, 173, (1986): 35-36.

¹⁰⁸ For more information on this debate, see the special issues of *Momentum*, September, 4986 and *Curriculum Review*, October, 1986.

clarification."¹⁰⁹ Should we, and, for that matter, can we, teach values without showing our own values? Can values be taught without judgment? On the other hand, do we want to present one right answer or even several ideal or better answers? Discussion of these issues will continue in the next chapter. For our purposes, the real issue at this point is methodology. By far the most well-known and perhaps the most popular methodology is values clarification. Three men stand out in the field of values education. They are Louis Raths, Merrill Harmin and Sidney Simon.

Raths, Harmin and Simon developed a theory of values that involves three processes. The first is choosing - a person must choose value and behavior freely, from among alternatives and after thoughtful consideration of those alternatives. The second is prizing - a person must like the choice s/he has made and want to stick with it. An important part of this is a public demonstration of the choice through a restatement or affirmation of the choice. Finally, there is acting - the person must act based on the choice s/he has made. One-time action is not sufficient for this. The action must become part of the person - habitual and repeated. The results of this process are called values.¹¹⁰

For Raths, et. al. values clarifying is the attempt to help learners examine their own values and become aware of choices and alternatives in

109 Barry Chazen, The Language of Jewish Education, (New York: Hartmore House, 1978), 78-82.

¹¹⁰ Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, Values and Teaching: Working With Values in the Classroom, (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1966), 28-30.

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their lives. They wish to help the individual find meaning in their daily activities.¹¹¹ For example, when a student says to a teacher, "I'm going camping with my family this weekend," the teacher might ordinarily respond, "That's nice" or "Have fun." Values clarification asks the teacher to open the door for clarification by responding with, "Are you glad about that?" or "How does that make you feel?"¹¹² Rokeach adds, "The purpose of values clarification is alleged to be clarification but not modification of values."¹¹³ Opposition to values clarification stems from two perspectives on Rokeach's statement. If the purpose of values clarification is nonjudgmental and valueless, why do it? It will have no effect. On the other hand, if the purpose is to change values, is there not some inherent slant in one direction or the other? Do not the teacher's and/or society's values carry over into this process? As we turn our discussion to types of moral education, this controversy will become increasingly more important.

Values clarification and even values education are but attempts at moral education. As noted earlier, the intent of teaching for and about values is to improve both the person and the world in which that person lives. Moral education is an expansion of that effort. Emil Durkheim pointed out,

> "There is therefore a great distance between the moral state in which the child finds himself as he leaves the family and the

111 ibid., 51-82.

112 ibid. 51-53.

¹¹³ Milton Rokeach, "Value Education in Educational Settings," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Milton Rokeach (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 266-267.

one toward which he must strive.... Intermediaries are necessary. The school environment is the most desirable."114 The modern guru of moral education, Lawrence Kohlberg conceives of the goal of moral education as

> "...the stimulation of the 'natural' development of the individual child's own moral judgment and capacities, thus allowing him to use his own moral judgment to control his behavior. The attractiveness of defining the goal of moral education as the stimulation of development rather than as the teaching of fixed rules stems from the fact that it involves aiding the child to take the next step in a direction toward which he is already

tending, rather than imposing an alien pattern upon him"115

Either conception points out the need to improve the individual student and the society in which he or she lives. By considering moral education in greater detail in the next chapter, we will gain a better insight as to the role of values in moral education and the current role moral education plays in our secular and religious society.

¹¹⁴ Emile Durkheim, Moral Education: A Study in the Theory & Application of the Sociology of Education, (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 230.

¹¹⁵ Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education," In Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg, Brenda Munsey, Ed., 72.

CHAPTER II MORAL EDUCATION

MORAL EDUCATION: WHERE ARE WE NOW?

Most of moral education today is an outgrowth of early research into values and society and Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Kohlberg asserts that in every human being, a natural process of moral development takes place simply by living. The process is enhanced and expedited through the use of moral education, which Kohlberg refers to as education's "hidden agenda."¹¹⁶ He recognizes that education is not simply the imparting of factual information, but is also the process of socialization to the norms, values, attitudes and morals of a society. I will refer to this process as moral education for the rest of this discussion.

The terms moral education and religious education serve as flashpoints for discussion about the teaching of values in our society. Much of the discussion that surrounds these issues is often heated and very emotional. Not only do these terms (moral and religious) describe certain aspects of our lives, but they are the same terms used to urge, defend, and judge those aspects. The result is often inflammatory debate.¹¹⁷ In this discussion of moral education and religious education, I will concern myself with the descriptive qualities of the terms and attempt to avoid judgment about what moral or religious qualities are good or bad.

¹¹⁶ For a more detailed explanation and discussion of the "hidden agenda," see Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education," in *Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg*, Brenda Munsey, Ed.

117 Chazen, Language of Jewish Education, 78-79

In the previous chapter, we noted three essential problems that exist in any discussion about moral education. The first deals with whether schools should be involved in moral education at any level. There are those who firmly believe that schools should not be teaching values through moral education for any reason. Some of this argument extends to the liberal religious world. Their reasoning is that if diversity of opinion is encouraged, how does a school teach just one or even a limited number of opinions. The second major issue of debate is, can one and should one find a balance between indoctrination and education. The third, and perhaps the largest, issue concerns which values and morals should be a part of moral education. The debate surrounding these issues will serve as a guide for considering the state of moral education today and what direction moral education is taking as we look toward the twenty-first century.

DEFINING MORAL EDUCATION

Prior to any detailed discussion, we need to review several different conceptions of moral education. Barry Chazen, a religious educational philosopher, has isolated five major conceptual perspectives on moral education.¹¹⁸ The first seeks the creation of morally acceptable behavior patterns and responses. The student is measured by whether or not s/he has behaved in a morally acceptable manner. The second notion says that the moral principle is the most important component of moral education. If students are taught moral principles, they will behave morally. Thus, teaching the correct principles becomes primary. The third perspective is

118 Chazen, Language of Jewish Education, 83-85.

concerned with the creation of desirable attitudes and inclinations. From these a person will be inclined toward moral behavior. This is not a thought process. Rather, it is an emotional process toward moral behavior. A fourth concept is the type of moral thinking emphasized by Kohlberg. If one is taught the skills needed for moral decision making, one can indeed make moral decisions. The fifth concept is closer to values clarification. The effort is to help learners clarify their own values and thus find values in themselves that they judge to be moral values.¹¹⁹

ISSUES IN MORAL EDUCATION

Most people today agree that we should engage in moral education at some level. The real debate is how much moral education we want. Much of the discussion focuses around the idea of ethical relativism. Even many Christian fundamentalists, who would prefer that no formal moral education take place in the schools, encourage a fight against moral/ethical relativism.¹²⁰ They do this because even the most extreme communities fear the absence of morality and moral education more than they fear moral education contrary to their beliefs. Milton Meller, a high school principal in New York, adds, "Values education should be accepted as both

¹¹⁹ Without discussing the finer points of each of these concepts, it is enough to note that the first three emphasize the teacher and the methodology, while the last two emphasize the learner and his/her personal thoughts and attributes. It should further be noted that I am making no effort to judge one perspective as better than the others. Rather, by providing a general framework of definitions, the discussion can be more wide-ranging and cover a greater amount.

120 Honig, "Teaching Values Belongs," 9.

the foundation and the domain of all courses of study."¹²¹ Similarly, another educator says...

The school is the social organization that serves as the socialization agent for society. It prepares young people for participation in a democracy; it prepares young people to enter the work force; it prepares young people to interact with other people; and it prepares young people to appreciate and transmit the traditions and values inherent in society. In effect, the public school is more than an institution concerned with the transmission of cognitive values. It is a social institution whose core value structure is concerned with developing citizens who will support and reinforce dominant civic and ethical values."¹²²

Further, it makes sense that schools must teach a certain degree of morality and values. If a student is caught cheating, is it not right that that s/he be punished? And what reason could there be for punishing than if that behavior was immoral? And if that behavior was immoral, we are judging and teaching morality?¹²³

All of this is not to say that there are no objections to moral education. There certainly are. However, most of the objections stem from

121 Meller, "Incorporate Values Education," 110.

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¹²² Raymond L. Calabrese, "The School as an Ethical and Democratic Community," NASSP Bulletin, 74, (1990): 10-11.

¹²³ Edward L. Harris and John Hoyle, "The Pros and Cons or Teaching Ethics in the Public Schools," NASSP Bulletin, 74, (1990): 17-23.

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issues related to whether or not we can judge what is moral and whether it belongs in the schools. We will discuss this issue further as we look at another major apprehension surrounding moral education.

INDOCTRINATION OR EDUCATION

A few of the objections to moral education note that it is the equivalent of indoctrination. In the secular world, this is a very legitimate issue. Proponents of values clarification claim that it can be done in a value-free way. The reality, as Rokeach noted in the last chapter, is that by virtue of having live teachers with personal viewpoints and behaviors that reflect those perspectives, value-free education is impossible.¹²⁴ On the other hand, if one believes that certain values should be taught over and above other values (that is to say, that some are preferable to others), then the assumption is that the teacher wants the learner to glean certain bits of knowledge and come to certain predetermined conclusions. That might qualify as indoctrination.¹²⁵ The traditional perspectives concerning indoctrination are to be considered under the headings of method, content and aim. The issues raised surrounding values clarification touch on the first two of these concerns.

¹²⁴ See explanation by Milton Rokeach, "Value Education in Educational Settings," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Milton Rokeach (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 266-267.

125 Richard A. Baer, Jr., "Teaching Values in the Schools: Clarification or Indoctrination," *Principal*, (1982): 17-18. The real significant issue is the aim of education.¹²⁶ Are teachers supposed to indoctrinate their students? The question is based on the assumption that either one is indoctrinaire or one teaches from a valuefree perspective where everything is acceptable. This assumption presumes that there is no middle ground. At least one researcher believes there is a middle ground.¹²⁷ Bruce Suttle notes that moral education as indoctrination is wrong only when we attempt to impose morals without the accompanying critical thinking skills to make those morals work. He adds that certain moral values should be taught, but only after the critical thinking skills (like those described by Kohlberg) are developed to a point where those moral values can reasonably be discussed.

Indoctrination in the religious world of education is another issue entirely. Chazen believes that the modern practice of religious education is the pragmatic case of indoctrination. He asserts this because religious education, due to its educational nature, aims to create a religious person.¹²⁸ On the other hand, the educational nature of the goal of religious education is to end with a certain type of person who behaves in certain ways. Therefore, religious education is indoctrinaire. The reader should be aware that this is not necessarily a position that Chazen

¹²⁶ Bruce B. Suttle, "The Need for and Inevitability of Moral Indoctrination," Educational Studies, 12, (1981): 154 -160.

127 ibid.

¹²⁸ Barry Chazen, "Indoctrination and Religious Education," *Religious Education*, 67, (July-August, 1972): 243. See also Berard L. Marthaler, "Dilemma for Religious Educators: Indoctrination or Indifference," *Religious Education*, 82 (Fall, 1987).

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supports. Rather, he goes on to argue that there is a need to create a methodology for a non-indoctrinating religious education.

In constructing his argument, Chazen explains that much of the discussion surrounding religious education and indoctrination pits education against indoctrination as though indoctrination was, exclusively, some form of brainwashing and had no educational component. Indoctrination, in this view, is all evil and bad. Even teachers who engage in indoctrination of some form do so saying that it is a necessary evil to achieve their desired goals. But, they go on to say that such indoctrinating activities should be minimized to the best of the teacher's abilities.

Chazen goes on to present several conceptions of the word indoctrination. The content explanation is based on what one teaches rather than how one teaches. Chazen says, "The contents of indoctrination are doctrines and belief whose validity is uncertain and speculative, in the sense that there is not enough evidence for their acceptance by any sane and sensible person."¹²⁹ The method concept says the indoctrination takes place through and as a result of the methodology of teaching. If there is no room for argument and discussion and one must believe all that one is told as part of the lesson, then it is indoctrination by method.¹³⁰ Finally, the third concept claims that indoctrination is defined by the intent that is the basis for the methodology. Chazen says, "...the intention school argues that indoctrination is characterized by the aim of unshakably implanting belief

129 Chazen, Language of Jewish Education, 60.

130 ibid., 59.

in others, by the objective of wanting students to accept their beliefs from their elders in a non-questioning, non-critical, non-rational manner."¹³¹

In the end of his discussion, Chazen says that religious and moral education can be non-indoctrinary. This is because the desire to persuade, logically and rationally, is not the same as indoctrination. This is, he points out, the real goal of religious moral education - logical and rational persuasion of the individual learner toward choosing a specific set of beliefs and practices.¹³² However non-indoctrinary religious education may be, it is nevertheless a form of moral education. Are the two the same? Clearly, they are not. Notwithstanding their differences, they are, to a certain degree, interdependent. Rabbi David Hartman, a philosopher living in Israel, points out that he believes it is possible to be an ethical person without being at all religious. However, from his perspective, it is impossible to be a religious person without also being moral or striving to be moral. This is because, as he sees it, morality and moral growth are part of what religion requires of a person.¹³³ Thus, a certain amount of religious education necessarily is devoted to moral education.

Still fewer of the objections to moral education note that moral education belongs in the home. Those who hold that moral education is the right of every person to dictate in their own home, still admit the need for

133 David Hartman, Speaker, The Hartman-Stendahl Event, Cassette Recording, Muskegon, MI (October, 1991).

¹³¹ ibid., 61-62.

¹³² ibid., 73-76.

moral education. They differ only on the contents and methodology. It should be noted that a majority of the research points to the school as being the logical and most successful site for such education.¹³⁴ Finally, a very few individuals contest the potential effectiveness of any form of moral education. Even the majority of opponents to moral education dismiss this final perspective as baseless. They agree that values and morality can be taught, but disagree over whether or not it should be taught.

MORAL EDUCATION METHODOLOGIES

As we begin to examine specific methodologies and philosophies of moral education, we must somewhat narrow the scope of our discussion. Up to this point the words morals or morality and ethics were used interchangeably. The time has come to specify the differences. Edward Wynne notes that ethics is a branch of the overall science of values. Ethics have application to specific situations and circumstances. In contrast, morals or a moral code are, "...a set of relatively simple principles of rather general applicability..."¹³⁵

Because morals have such general applicability, they are taught in more general terms and thus are more difficult to pin down. Therefore, little, if any, effort will be made to identify specific morals at this time.

¹³⁴ Berard L. Marthaler, "Dilemma for Religious Educators: Indoctrination or Indifference," *Religious Education*, 82 (Fall, 1987): 555-568.

¹³⁵ Edward A. Wynne, "Ethics vs. Morality: Should the Conflict Come to the Classroom?" NASSP Bulletin, 74, (1990): 40.

Rather, attention will be paid to educational methodologies. My effort in this section is to identify what major methodologies are in use or under consideration in North American schools. The discussion of each method will include a look at how it addresses the arguments presented at the beginning of this chapter and its potential advantages and disadvantages. This undertaking is not an endeavor at judgment. Rather, I want to clarify the issues for the reader and allow the reader to decide what might or might not be best for them under their own circumstances. In spite of all this, or perhaps because of it, I do have preferences and these will be expressed. I believe that for the reader to make use of this analysis, the reader should be aware of why I feel certain methodologies are preferable over others.

Current research suggests that moral education is effective at creating moral thinking and moral behavior. Some of the research links the two, but much of the research does not. The research does agree that moral education is superior to simply teaching <u>about</u> values. A thorough and integrated process of moral education offers a higher probability of success relative to moral action than does a one-dimensional teaching of a list of values.¹³⁶ The result is the modern emphasis on moral education and the effort to improve methodologies for moral education.

Perhaps the most well-known and widely used methodology for moral education is that developed by Lawrence Kohlberg. I will refer to

¹³⁶ James S. Leming, "Curricular Effectiveness in Moral/Values Education: A Review of Research," Journal of Moral Education, 10:3, (1980): 146-161.

this approach as the cognitive-developmental approach. Kohlberg identifies six stages of the moral development of human beings.¹³⁷ He asserts that skills necessary to function at each of the six stages can be taught and demonstrated.¹³⁸ Joanne Glosser, who wrote about Kohlberg and Jewish education, points out that Kohlberg is chiefly interested in cognitive process and pays little attention to emotional or attitudinal process.¹³⁹ Kohlberg asserts that children have a natural sense of justice that is developed through a universal set of stages. By discussing a series of moral dilemmas, the student can "push the envelope" of his/her own moral reasoning skills and move to ever-higher stages of moral reasoning.¹⁴⁰

Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach has a great deal to offer the classroom teacher. Through the use of the moral dilemma, the

¹³⁷ See Appendix C for a detailed list of the six stages, their definitions, and their sociological and educational implications.

¹³⁸ For thorough discussions of Kohlberg's theories, see Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education," in *Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg*, Brenda Munsey, Ed. or Barry Chazen, *The Language of Jewish Education.* Presented in these books are both Kohlberg's theory of moral development and considerable discussion about the theory. The discussion in Munsey includes a look at some of the criticisms of Kohlberg and how his work integrates into a wide variety of other subjects and topics.

 ¹³⁹ Joanne Katz Glosser, "Moral Development and Jewish Education: In Search of Synthesis" (MEd. Thesis, Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion, 1977), 2-5.

140 Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 8-14. student is confronted with potential conflicts in his/her own values system and, at the same time, a peek into other students' value systems. By doing this, the student reflects upon his/her own values system and may reevaluate the ordering of certain values and even replace certain values.¹⁴¹ On the other hand, two significant criticisms arise out of the moral dilemma situation.¹⁴² Pekarsky and others noted that the use of a moral dilemma is the equivalent of situational ethics and thus ignores the necessity of finding and preserving universal moral principles of enduring values. Rather, the student is encouraged to find only limited solutions to very specific problems in his/her own mind.

¹⁴¹ For a clear and brief discussion of the advantages of Kohlberg's cognitivedevelopmental approach, see either Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg, Brenda Munsey, Ed. or Moral Development: A Practical Guide for Jewish Teachers by Earl Schwartz or, finally, Barry Chazen's, Contemporary Approaches to Moral Education: Analyzing Alternative Theories, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1985). The advantage discussed here is related to the observations of Rokeach and Hall that only by coming into contact with other values can a person change his/her own and this can only be done when there is an apparent conflict within the individual's own valuing system. For a more detailed discussion of this please refer to Chapter 1.

¹⁴² Daniel Pekarsky, "Moral Choice and Education," Journal of Moral Education, 12:1, (January, 1983): 3-13 does a nice job synthesizing the arguments against Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach. Clear discussions of the objections can be found in more detail in Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg, Brenda Munsey, Ed. and in Barry Chazen, Contemporary Approaches to Moral Education: Analyzing Alternative Theories, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1985), and in a variety of shorter articles and papers. Many of these are listed in the bibliography.

This raises the second and far more specific concern. The dilemmas Kohlberg proposes are very narrow and one-dimensional. The result is that they have little, if anything, to do with the real world in which the student participates. Can such a learning experience really help the student to cope in a more moral framework with the realities of his/her everyday life? Those who support the more Deweyan approach would say no.¹⁴³ One group of commentators on Kohlberg put the problem this way:

> "The problem with such dilemmas is their failure to engage people in the richness and ambiguity that real life situations can offer. A variety of ways to approach and solve the moral problem is lacking. Although the questions that follow the hypothetical dilemma are open-ended, the situation itself is a tight moral package; it contains a narrow focus on the rights of the people involved and their outstanding moral obligation, or responsibility to others... In contrast, more 'naturalistic', or 'true-to-life', moral problems come closer to the ambiguities of social experience. More important, real moral problems offer the potential for students to act on the solution to the conflict."¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ See the comments in both Daniel Pekarsky, "Moral Choice and Education," Journal of Moral Education, and Israela Ettenberg Aron, "Moral Education: The Formalist Tradition and the Deweyan Alternative," in Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg, Brenda Munsey, Ed.

144 Richard Hersh, Diane Pritchard Paolitto, and Joseph Reimer, Promoting Moral Growth (New York: Longman, 1979), 143-144

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While Kohlberg's theory of cognitive-developmental moral development may be useful as a guide for moral education, it appears that some of his specific pedagogical suggestions may not be as sound.

A common attempt at practical application of Kohlberg's cognitivedevelopmental approach is found in the moral community approach to education.¹⁴⁵ This builds on the idea of moral discussions as originated in the research of Blatt and Kohlberg.¹⁴⁶ Blatt held moral discussions with students in a classroom and felt that the openness of the discussion would enable better moral development. Kohlberg witnessed a communal approach to moral discussion and decision-making during a 1969 visit to kibbutz Sassa. He observed the discussions or moral action taking place in both the kibbutz as a whole and also in the classrooms of the kibbutz school.

The synthesis of these experiences led Blatt, among others, to look at the classroom as an opportunity to act on real-life moral situations. Different classroom situations could be used as a focus for discussions of moral problems. In the moral community approach there would be a consistent pattern of group discussion and decision-making to promote

¹⁴⁵ This is also known as the just community approach to education. For a very thorough discussion of the moral community approach see Clark Power, "Moral Education Through the Development of The Moral Atmosphere of The School," *Journal of Educational Thought*, 15:1, (April, 1981).

¹⁴⁶ M. Blatt and Lawrence Kohlberg, "Effects of Classroom Discussion on Moral Thought," in Lawrence Kohlberg and E. Turiel, *Moralization Research*, the Cognitive Developmental Approach (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971).

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moral discussion, activity and growth. Students would have the immediate opportunity to live out the moral decisions they made in their classroom environment. When there are occasions of misbehavior or rule infraction (rules that are set by the class as a whole), there would be a just community approach to corrections and punishment. The class as a whole would discuss the problem and decide what would be the morally acceptable response to the problem. This response would have to meet the test of being universally applicable within the classroom. By behaving and thinking in this way, the class would establish a collective norm under which they would function. This hands-on experience would help students to apply morality to their everyday lives and to see its usefulness in application.¹⁴⁷ Although individual teachers tried this on a class by class level, I know of no schools that adopted this methodology across the board and still have it in use.

Another response to the perceived need for moral education has been the directed moral thinking approach. This approach assumes several elements. The most significant of these elements is that the teacher or school knows what moral principles are true, which ones need to be taught and in what order. Teachers then teach those morals as cognitive knowledge for students to acquire. The students do not need to discover anything or synthesize information. This method eliminates the problem of the student arriving at what may be a less than desirable

¹⁴⁷ For a wider ranging discussion of this, see Clark Power, "Moral Education Through the Development of The Moral Atmosphere of The School," *Journal of Educational Thought*.

moral principle or the ever-present struggle over what are the right and true moral principles to be taught in a particular school. For example, the Baltimore County public schools developed a list of "vital values" they felt their students should have. They are: compassion, courtesy, critical inquiry, due process, equality of opportunity, freedom of thought and action, honesty, integrity, justice, knowledge, loyalty, objectivity, order, patriotism, rational consent, reasoned argument, respect for others' rights, responsible citizenship, rule of law, tolerance, and truth.¹⁴⁸ Another example of directed moral thinking can be found in the McGuffy reader, which was much in use during the earlier part of this century. Through readings, definition exercises, etc., students would learn what moral values the authors felt important, and they were told that these values should also be their values. For example the following poem...:

"Lazy Ned

'Tis royal fun,' cried lazy Ned.

'To coast upon my fine, new sled,

And beat the other boys; But then, I can not bear to climb The tiresome hill, for every time

It more and more annoys.'

So, while his schoolmates glided by And gladly tugged uphill, to try Another merry race,

148 Bonnie S. Copeland and Mary Ellen Saterlie, "Designing and Implementing a Values Education Program," NASSP Bulletin, (October 1990): 49.

Too indolent to share their plays, Ned was compelled to stand and gaze,

While shivering in his place.

Thus, he would never take the pains To seek the prize that labor gains,

Until the time had passed; For, all his life, he dreaded still The silly bugbear of uphill,

And died a dunce at last."149

This example tells the student what is the correct moral principle or value to be held and what the consequences are for not holding it as part of their personal value system. While the directed moral thinking approach may be easier in many ways, it also presents certain problems. The greatest problem is that a teacher can not necessarily discern principles for his/her students. Further, students may not accept this moral principle as a way of life and may merely learn it as a piece of cognitive knowledge.

A third method of moral education is known as source teaching. This method uses sources to define morality. The most significant example of this method can be found in the last few years' trends concerning civics education in public schools. With the recent anniversaries of both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, many teachers used this opportunity to

¹⁴⁹ Jacques S. Benninga, "An Emerging Synthesis in Moral Education," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 69:6, (February, 1988): 416. Yet another example can be found in the work of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development which developed a profile of the morally mature person for use in classrooms. See Appendix D.

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teach from those documents. By taking the document and trying to discern the values inherent in the source, students learn about their own values and what correct values for the United States community ought to be. The Cincinnati public school system adopted such a methodology when it asked teachers to use the Bill of Rights and apply the "rights" to classroom situations with their students.¹⁵⁰

The significant advantage with this method is that it creates a sense of cultural and communal identification among the learners. The source document must be accepted by them as important and they all build a moral code out of that document. Problems arise if the students do not see the source as important or if they disagree with the interpretation as offered in class. This method also has significant implications for religious moral education, which will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

In an age when civics education is receiving renewed interest and inquiry, political moral teaching becomes another methodology for consideration. This is an updated version of John Dewey's vision of a better and more moral citizen. Within this conception is the duty of the schools to prepare students to live as productive and cooperative citizens in a larger social contract-based society. This is done by emphasizing social contract. The values highlighted are those that help the society. For example, one writer on civics-based moral education notes, "Schools should

¹⁵⁰ David Shepard, former principal at Walnut Hills High School, Cincinnati, Ohio, interview with author, June, 1991.

teach the fundamental values of our democratic political system... the chance for long-term enjoyment of pluralism will be enhanced by a commitment to common good as we go through this difficult passage. At least for now, a little less pluribus and a little more unum."¹⁵¹

This is a clear case of socialization for morality. But it also reminds one of Pete Seeger's song about little boxes all looking alike. There is little individuality in this system, and the goal of the society is then to quash individualism. The other crucial problem with this method is that it presumes to know the values of our political and civil system. I suspect that in our society there would be little or no agreement on this issue. On the other hand, however noble the goals are, the means can be found in a variety of the methodologies mentioned in this review.

A group in Illinois known as the Century II Foundation has developed another approach to modern moral education. It is similar to values clarification¹⁵² and depends heavily on Rokeach's approaches discussed in the last chapter. The group calls its approach valuing analysis and describes it this way:

> "Valuing Analysis is an exercise in critical thinking about the principles involved in moral valuing. The process involves an examination of past and contemporary ideas that influence the quality of life in our world, and creates increased awareness of

152 See the discussion of "Values and Education" in Chapter 1.

R. Freeman Butts, "Curriculum for the Educated Citizen," Educational Leadership,
 43 (October, 1980): 6-8.

the common moral standard required in an open society. The result is a workable paradigm representing the inextricably interrelated principles - philosophic, economic, and scientific involved in decision making and problem solving. Valuing Analysis provides both method and content for moral education. The method is personal, Socratic discovery of both the dynamics and structure of valuing. The exercise in moral reasoning uncovers the paradigm of reality principles operating in all personal relationships."¹⁵³

It is assumed that if the student learns how values are developed and held, the student will likewise discover the "true" values to hold. This is something of a leap of faith. The group offers a certain degree of research to support its notion that children better understand what values are when they understand the structure of valuing and value development. However, there is little empirical evidence to support the conception that this knowledge leads to the development of certain values. On the other hand, this approach treats students like intelligent human beings who need a knowledge base to support values they may come to hold later in life. The creators of valuing analysis point out that by understanding the structures, students will understand how values work

¹⁵³ Arthur I. Melvin, Donald D. Reber, and Marian R. Melvin, "Valuing Analysis - A Practical Approach to Teaching Moral Education," NASSP Bulletin, 68 (November, 1984): 99. later in life and will be less tempted to "blow with the wind" with regard to their personal value systems.¹⁵⁴

A subcategory of the moral dilemma school is known as situational ethics. In the situation ethics approach, moral decision making is still paramount. However, the dilemmas one faces are all real-life situations and the decisions one makes are different from the standard moral dilemma approach characterized by Kohlberg. William Hare notes,

"Situation ethics, on the other hand, rejects the view that moral decision making is merely a matter of trying to determine which moral rule applies in a particular situation. It also takes the view that circumstances can even alter principles, thus recognizing that general principles may need to be revised in the light of specific judgments."¹⁵⁵

This approach addresses some of the basic concerns of Kohlberg's concept. It has real-life moral dilemmas and admits that moral principles, while enduring, are not permanent and thus subject to variation and change. The greatest problem with this approach is that it, by virtue of being situational, deals with the very specific and not with the generally applicable. This is similar to the distinction between ethics and morals made earlier. Finally, situation ethics assumes that a person is openminded enough to be willing to change in almost any situation. The reality

154 ibid., 97-104.

¹⁵⁵ William Hare, "Open-Mindedness in Moral Education: Three Contemporary Approaches,"-Journal Of Moral Education, 16:2, (May, 1987): 102.

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is that most people have some firmly held moral beliefs that might be inflexible in certain situations.¹⁵⁶

Many of the methodologies discussed above were developed by men and have what may be called a male bias. This has led to a separate, but parallel, discussion of feminist approaches to moral education. Much of the discussion focuses not on what may be a new or uniquely feminist methodology, but on what existing methodology best serves the feminist community's goals. Anne Higgins, a feminist writer, suggested what she believes to be the best alternative from among those discussed herein. She says,

> "I argue that the just community approach [referred to above as the moral community approach] is the best available values education program in the high schools for meeting the primary goal of feminism, the elimination of injustices due to sexism. In order to eliminate sexism, I suggest we look beneath educational policies and practices to the social and value structures of schools as institutions."¹⁵⁷

While Higgins' argument makes sense as constructed, many of the other methodologies would, I believe, equally serve her needs. However, as a form of education on the subject of feminism, Higgins is absolutely correct. The moral community approach has a great deal to offer feminists.

156 ibid., 103.

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157 Ann Higgins, "A Feminist Perspective on Moral Education," Journal of Moral Education, 16:3, (October, 1987): 240. Items in brackets are mine.

Finally, another derivative of the Kohlberg moral dilemma approach is the moral role-taking methodology. In this approach, discussion is elevated to role playing. Students play out the moral dilemma by acting the parts of those involved in the dilemma. They then step out of their parts and engage in the same discussion of the dilemma as was outlined in the Kohlbergian approach. The feeling is that if students are exposed to the affective side of a moral dilemma, it will better help them to make moral decisions and to think morally. This approach grew out of a perceived shortcoming with the Kohlbergian approach. In the "real" world, people face not just cognitive dilemmas, but also affective dilemmas. That is, moral thinking is not just thinking, it is also feeling. The approach was developed to help students to feel as well as think.

RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS MORAL EDUCATION

As soon as one talks about moral education and religion in the same breath, opinions from every possible perspective come flying forth. There are those who feel that all religion is really moral education and those who believe that moral education is separate from religion. Finally, there are those who took the middle ground and declared that religion and religious education have a moral education component but religion is not wholly moral education.¹⁵⁸ To better discuss this issue, we need a definition of religion that is sufficiently wide-ranging to allow for a variety of

¹⁵⁸ For a fuller discussion of the issues involved in the merging of religion and moral education, see E. O. Iheoma, "The Role of Religion in Moral Education," *Journal Of Moral Education*, 15:2, (May 1986): 139-149.

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perspectives of moral education. I suggest the noted theologian Paul Tillich's definition:

"Religion is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, a concern which qualifies all other concerns as preliminary and which itself contains the answer to the question of the meaning of life."¹⁵⁹

In Jewish education there is a rising call for a review of the current, modern emphasis on moral education. Jewish education is a multifaceted and often loaded term. Chazen describes two major forms of Jewish education. The first is classical Jewish education. This describes the situation of Jewish education as described in the Torah and the subsequent rabbinic texts. The second area and the area of Jewish education I plan to address is modern Jewish education.¹⁶⁰ In the modern world of Jewish education there are two schools of operating methodology. First, is the Orthodox Yeshiva approach. The second is the Reform and Conservative approach which, of necessity, blends modernity with history, secular concerns with religious concerns. For the purposes of this discussion, the Reform and Conservative approach to Jewish education will be our focal point.

¹⁵⁹ Paul Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 4.

¹⁶⁰ See Chazen, The Language of Jewish Education for a detailed discussion of the distinctions within the world of Jewish education.

All of the methodologies discussed earlier that are, or were, at use in the secular educational world do now or have existed in the Jewish educational world. Many of them show a certain degree of effectiveness in one forum or another. However, there are no conclusive results that show one method absolutely superior over the others. The debate over how Jewish education should approach moral education has been raging for more than two decades. Friedman points out that since the early 1970s there has been agreement that the Jewish educational system has not been meeting the acknowledged goal of educating for "menschlichkeit." At the same time, however, there is no agreement as to what the best strategy might be. The proposed solutions include many of those discussed elsewhere in this chapter.¹⁶¹ In recent years, the debate has turned from what is moral education to what is the best methodology for our schools.

Joan Davidson has synthesized the work of many thinkers in this field and developed a religious school model of moral education. It is a three-pronged model that moves from caring to judging to acting.¹⁶² These are the three essential components to morality as described by the Kohlbergian school of moral development.¹⁶³ A general application

161 Jerry Friedman, "New Approaches to Jewish Moral Education," Jewish Education, 56:3, (Fall, 1988): 3-5

162 Joan Davidson, "A Religious School Model of Moral Education," The Pedagogic Reporter 36:4 (November, 1985):1-2.

163 ibid., 1.

perspective of this model created by Rabbi Samuel Joseph may be found in the appendix.¹⁶⁴

Caring focuses upon creating the reasons for caring behavior. This is done by beginning the process of caring for oneself and for others so that one would want to act morally towards them. This is the significant affective component of the model. Students and teachers use their emotions and their imaginations to better understand how they can and do feel about others, themselves and certain situations. Davidson says, "This aspect of caring focuses on an exploration of feelings, our and others', to generate solutions to problems."¹⁶⁵

Judging is a method for objective thinking based on moral principles derived from Judaic sources, individual values and "other sources."¹⁶⁶ This is where the students learn to apply what they feel to what they know. Here the students learn about moral principles and their own values and value systems and try to apply the feelings they encountered earlier. Davidson adds, "The focus of this aspect is the ability to think through Jewish moral obligations."¹⁶⁷

- 166 ibid.
- 167 ibid.

¹⁶⁴ See Appendix E.

¹⁶⁵ Davidson, "A Religious School Model of Moral Education," 2.

Finally, acting is the opportunity to put the derived principles into action. The goal of almost all moral education and all religious education is to promote activities and actions outside the classroom and school community. In this phase of the model, students discuss how a principle might be acted upon and develop action plans or strategies for action outside the classroom. Moreover, students are given specific, wellstructured opportunities for such action.

The creation and discussion of the religious school model of moral education does not preclude the need for, exploration of, even the use of, other moral education methodologies within the religious school setting. As noted earlier, many of the secular models are currently in use in religious schools throughout North America. I shall try to make note of some of these and comment on their current application in religious schools. Rather than restating the descriptions of each approach, I will attempt only to elaborate on what is unique about this approach for Jewish education.

Perhaps the most obvious and most popular of those in use in Jewish schools is the text-based model of moral education.¹⁶⁸ In many ways this fits well as a part of the religious school model of moral education. The presentation of Jewish texts serves to stimulate discussion for the judging section of the program. It is, of course, also used alone. Students work with texts to determine what Jewish moral principles are and should be.

¹⁶⁸ For a full discussion of this approach, please refer to its description earlier in this chapter.

They then look to the texts for models of how to implement those moral principles into everyday life. This is largely a cognitive activity in most schools.

A modification of this text-based approach is what I will refer to as the literal approach. It seeks out clear statements of moral action and discusses them at face value. Students find Mitzvot (caring for the elderly, visiting the sick, thou shall not-kill, etc.) and try to convert each Mitzvah into action. For success, this relies heavily on the students own conception of what is a Mitzvah. The rationale behind the Mitzvah is taken to be "because God said so" and thus action is all that we, as human beings, are obligated to perform. If, on the other hand, Mitzvah is seen as good deeds, then the teacher must show how their appearance in the text is in some way an obligating force. Barry Holtz asserts that by using traditional texts, we create a sense of context and connection that allows students to have their own sense of participation in Judaism's moral principles.¹⁶⁹

In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was, in Jewish education, a resurgence of the values clarification approach as discussed in chapter one. Many of the Jewish applications for values clarification were designed by Dov Peretz Elkins and his growth associates group.¹⁷⁰ The thinking was that by giving students an opportunity for autonomous valuing, they

¹⁶⁹ Barry Holtz, "Why Text," The Pedagogic Reporter 36:4 (November, 1985): 6-9.

¹⁷⁰ See Friedman, "New Approaches to Jewish Moral Education," 4-5 for a further discussion of values clarification in the Jewish educational world.

would engage in moral action. Elkins' work is more affective than cognitive and relies heavily on humanistic psychology theories.¹⁷¹

A few words are in order about the state of Kohlberg's cognitive developmental model for moral education within Jewish education. Friedman characterizes this as the most popular approach now in use within Jewish education. However, he notes that most of the textbooks now available are not well-constructed for this purpose. He highlights two texts and a program currently in use as based almost entirely on Kohlberg's work.¹⁷² He cites Schwartz's *Moral Development: A Practical Guide for Jewish Teachers* and Kaye et. al.'s *Why Be Good* as excellent examples of textbooks designed for use in a curriculum based on Kohlberg. He also describes a comprehensive curriculum based on Kohlberg and designed by Norman Amsel called LAVE: Life and Value Education. LAVE relies on trigger films to present moral problems and to initiate discussions on moral problem solving.

Friedman ends his discussion of moral education in Jewish schools with the following comment.

"A comparison of the text-centered, value clarification and Kohlbergian approaches to moral education suggest the following conclusion: It seems that a modified Kohlbergian cognitive-developmental approach to moral education which focuses on curriculum content reflecting Jewish values and

171 ibid.

172 ibid., 5-10.

ethics using moral dilemma discussions - in a non-threatening classroom atmosphere which encourages free expression would be the ideal structure for an effective Jewish moral education curriculum."¹⁷³

A few words are also in order concerning textbooks for schools. All of the major Jewish publishers made an attempt to respond to the needs moral education curricula around the country. At this time, I will not attempt to evaluate each book. A more detailed discussion of some of the books currently available can be found in the appendix.¹⁷⁴ Very few of these textbooks are whole curricula, and even fewer claim to address themselves to a particular curriculum. There are a few, like those noted above, that offer the teacher a clear methodological direction for their use. Still others offer no clear direction and can be employed in a variety of settings.

JEWISH MORAL EDUCATION INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Clearly, moral education is alive and well in Jewish education. There is a great deal of interest and awareness about the need for and the use of moral education. The effects of moral education are proven and there is no shortage of available methodologies. The need for the future is to integrate Jewish tradition with those methodologies most applicable to that tradition and to the unique school structure of the modern Jewish community. Jewish tradition is an almost limitless reservoir of moral

173 ibid, 10.

174 See Appendix F.

principles and ethical teachings. Within it can be found the values of a people. Teachers in the next century must consider what and how much to drink from this reservoir and the best way to share that liquid history with their students.

CHAPTER III VALUES EDUCATION: A RATIONALE

All of the consideration given to studying values and moral development leads to two general conclusions. The first is that values and moral development can be understood in a human context. We know how values come to be and how a person develops morally. The second important conclusion is that, given our understanding of values and moral development, we can influence, even change, the values a person holds and the process through which a person develops his/her moral character. Underlying both of these conclusions and the research that led up to them is the concept of desirability. We want to know about values and how to change them so that we <u>can</u> change them. We want to know about moral development and what influences that process so that we can influence that process.

TOWARD A RATIONAL CHANGE IN VALUES

The assumption is that the person desiring to make a change or to influence the process does so out of a conviction that what they have to offer is good, as opposed to bad, and better, as opposed to worse. We want to make the world a better place to live, our lives fuller, and ourselves more sentient human beings. In the educational world there is growing agreement that the path to this destination is found in the teaching of values.¹⁷⁵ If Milton Rokeach is correct about our ability to influence our

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¹⁷⁵ Proof of this growing consensus can be found in the extraordinary increase in the number of articles on the subject from the 1970s to the 1980s and beyond. The discussion of the subject has overlapped into a variety of disciplines, and an increasing amount of research is being published on the subject.

own values and our children's values, I believe that it becomes incumbent upon us to do so to the best of our ability.¹⁷⁶

Further, Rokeach asserts that no education is truly value free.¹⁷⁷ As responsible people, it is our obligation to ensure that if values can not be excluded from the classroom, the "right" or "better" values be the ones that are taught. I am somewhat hesitant to make such a statement. Although the Jewish tradition never hesitates to affirm those values it considers better than others, there is an inherent problem when one chooses to encourage one set of values over another.

For centuries aggressors, conquerors, dictators and propagandists used values as a rationale and justification for their actions. In the name of teaching or promoting "correct" values, cultures have been destroyed and millions killed. Rokeach and others have pointed out that values are, by definition, subjective. That is to say, they are not absolute and provable. As discussed in chapter one, values must be derived and determined.

The reader should be aware that although distinctions between values education and moral education may have been important in other aspects of this discussion, for the purposes of this chapter they are used interchangeably.

¹⁷⁶ See the discussion "Value Change," in Chapter I. See also Rokeach, & Grube, "Can Values Be Manipulated Arbitrarily," in *Understanding Human Values*, Milton Rokeach Ed, 241.

177 Rokeach, "Value Education in Educational Settings," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Milton Rokeach, 266-267.

No one is more sensitive to this problem than the Jewish community. It repeatedly has been a victim of another community's sense of which values are the right ones. Nevertheless, it is this very sensitivity that I believe offers significant hope that we can direct the moral growth and value development of our young people without straying over the line of indoctrination and brainwashing. The Jewish tradition offers a unique set of "guide posts" for determining moral action and the values that motivate that action. The values of this generation of Jews are the product of generations dating back to Abraham and before.

SHOULD VALUES BE TAUGHT?

Recent population studies have shown that American Judaism finds itself at a crossroads. American Jews find themselves in a significantly changed circumstance from twenty years ago. As the Jewish community girds itself to face the next century, there is a quest for answers to the problems our community faces. The Council of Jewish Federations, as part of its search for solutions, undertook a National Jewish Population Study.

> "The data of the 1990 National Jewish Population Study (NJPS) suggest serious problems for the future of American Jews. They are less likely to marry than others with similar backgrounds; they have a smaller birthrate than other groups in the population; they have a higher divorce rate; and their rate of intermarriage is high and increasing steadily. These behavioral traits mean... the Jewish population is likely to steadily decline.

"Education is obviously the principal mechanism to socialize succeeding generations to be Jewish, and to stimulate adult Jews and Gentile spouses to foster the religious and secular interests of the community. To a considerable degree, what the Jewish community of the future will look like occupationally, culturally, and Jewishly, will be a function of education..."¹⁷⁸

Over and over, the data of the NJPS reveal that the more Jewish education a person has, the more involved and committed that person is Jewishly.¹⁷⁹ That is, in my opinion, the fundamental rationale behind Jewish education in America today. The question then is narrowed to what kind of Jewish education is best.

It is the secular world that has, to date, offered the most comprehensive answers to that issue.¹⁸⁰ For many years, the secular

¹⁷⁸ Seymour Lipset, "Education Findings from the Jewish Population Study -Executive Summary" (New York, 1991): 1.

¹⁷⁹ Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, Council of Jewish Federations (New York, 1990): 31. The figures concerning education are listed on this page of the "Highlights" report. However, throughout the report correlations are made concerning, among other factors, the level and depth of Jewish educational experience.

¹⁸⁰ Although values were certainly discussed in the Jewish community and in the context of the educational process, there was little debate over role and use of values education. Rather, the assumption was that values were an important part of the Jewish educational model. This is highlighted by the writings of the <u>Musar</u> movement and the later work of liberal Jews in discussing the ethical foundations of

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educational community has debated the role and place of values within the educational framework.¹⁸¹ This debate has provided fertile ground for the nurturing of a variety of viewpoints about the use and place of values in education. An overview of the argument is that values are a skill necessary for succeeding in the world today. And the school's role is to prepare young people to live in the world and to give them the skills to do so.

The argument is summarized by William Schubert of the University of Illinois at Chicago.

"Separating knowledge and skills from values, attitudes, and appreciation is, at best, confusing the results of analysis with reality. We analyze things, take them apart, to look more carefully, but we must put them back together. Biologists study the several body systems..., but they realize that all the systems work together in the living organism. Similarly, skills, knowledge, and values are inseparable in the mental storehouse of the human mind."¹⁸²

Judaism as separate from the ritual traditions. For a more complete discussion of this separation, please refer to Michael Meyer, Response to Modernity: A History of the Reform Movement in Judaism, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988) specifically the sections concerning ethics and education.

¹⁸¹ This discussion began in a formal sense_at the turn of the current century with the work of John Dewey, as discussed in Chapter I.

182 William, H. Schubert, "The Many Faces of Values Education," Curriculum Review
 19:3 (June, 1980): 211.

Schubert goes on to accentuate the role that values instruction can potentially play in the learning process of the student.

> "...telling others what is right or good neglects a matter of great importance: it does not teach them how to value. To give students a value may help them in a specific situation, but to teach them how to value equips them to grow for a lifetime.....If we act, it can be assumed that we have values that the actions represent, but if we learn to articulate those values we come to know ourselves better."¹⁸³

WHY TEACH VALUES?

The role that schools play in the formation of values is, therefore, vital. As educators, we become obligated to teach values and valuing to the young people who are entrusted to our care for education. Horace Mann put it this way over a century ago, "When the teacher fails to meet the intellectual wants of a child, it is the case of asking for bread and receiving a stone; but when he fails to meet the child's moral wants, it is giving a serpent."¹⁸⁴ The arguments for teaching values in secular and religious situations fall into three general categories. There is, of course, a wide variety of opinion on the subject. However, the three categories cover the bulk of the reasoning most commonly used.

183 ibid., 212.

184 As quoted in Honig, "Teaching Values Belongs in our Public Schools," NASSP Bulletin, 74,:6. The first view asserts that because schools are already teaching values, that effort should be an organized one. I shall refer to this as the default argument. The second view asserts that to create better citizens (or better Jews), there is a need to teach values. In this argument, the society is seen as the ultimate beneficiary. This I shall refer to as the better citizen/conformity argument. Finally, my own argument addresses the interdependence of the needs of the individual for values and the needs of a society to have individuals who are responsive to societal values. I refer to this as the Messianic Age argument.

THE DEFAULT ARGUMENT

In chapter one, Milton Rokeach argued that values clarification or values education was a necessity because we already teach values in our present educational system. He said,

"The purpose of values clarification is alleged to be the clarification, but not the modification, of values. Such a view is, I believe, an untenable one. How would one proceed to demonstrate the effectiveness of a classroom procedure that seeks to clarify but not to change values? If it is demonstrated not to affect values, can one claim it is effective? If it does have effects, it must surely effect values to one extent or another, in which case, can one claim it is value-free?"¹⁸⁵

This argument is similar to what Kohlberg refers to as the "hidden agenda" of modern education. He asserts that because there are people teaching in

¹⁸⁵ Rokeach, "Value Education in Educational Settings," in Understanding Human Values, Ed. Milton Rokeach, 266-267.

the classrooms, and these people have values of their own, and because it is impossible for human beings to completely mask or disguise their feelings and behaviors, values are being transmitted in the classroom.¹⁸⁶

The default argument asserts, with little contradiction, that values are a part of our everyday experience. To a certain extent, that experience can be controlled and/or altered. However, that experience can not be suppressed. Our human senses allow us to take in sensory input, and our brains process that input around the clock. This view says, "Educators cannot avoid influencing, either directly or indirectly, the values of students. Most of the activities in which teachers are engaged suggest that they subjectively value some idea, topics, and behaviors as more important for students to consider. **Pure objectivity in education is an illusion**."¹⁸⁷ Supporters of this argument for teaching values say that because some input will be absorbed and processed, we should control that input and teach the correct or proper values. In some cases this may mean deciding what values to teach and not to teach. In other cases, some educators advocate the simple organization and conscious application of that which has been going on in a disorganized subconscious fashion.

Edward Wynne summarizes the argument in this way.

186 Kohlberg's discussion on the subject and a critique of his view can be found in Moral Development, Moral Education, and Kohlberg, Brenda Munsey, Ed.

¹⁸⁷ Edward L. Harris & John Hoyle, "The Pros and Cons of Teaching Ethics in the Public Schools," NASSP Bulletin, 74, (1990): 23. Bold print added. "...there is nothing wrong with such tacit shaping of character. Most of us, in our family and our work lives, similarly follow routines which express your own personal values. And, while we do not frequently examine such patterns consciously, the patterns are usually the outcome of incremental, deliberate decisions. Still, it is a good idea for educators to occasionally engage in more deliberate analysis of the values they practice and transmit.... We hope to better equip readers to identify the values already being applied in their own schools and classrooms, and to consider some alternative approaches for transmitting the values they most wish students to learn."¹⁸⁸

THE BETTER CITIZEN/CONFORMITY ARGUMENT

John Dewey felt that the real reason to have values and morals taught to students was for the eventual societal benefit. There was little concern for what might be right for the individual. Rather, supporters of this argument believe that by teaching certain societal values and moral principles, people can be conditioned to behave in certain ways beneficial to the society. The goal is to create conformity through education.

In the Jewish community, the sense is that teaching the right values will, in turn, create Jews who are more committed. The intent, by itself, may not be all bad. However, the problem arises when one examines the intent in detail and in context. The objective is to create a more committed

188 Edward A. Wynne & Herbert J. Walberg, "Character Building: Transmitting Values in Schools," Curriculum Review 26 (October, 1986):18. Jew so as to benefit the community. There is little concern whether or not this is the best course of action for the individual. The end result, not the process, is what is important. How a person becomes a more committed Jew is not the issue here. Rather, the only concern is that the individual does become such a committed Jew.

The argument says that as changes in society demand, similar changes in education of values will be made to adapt to the societal changes. For example, in the secular community, as crime in the community increases, there needs to be a concurrent increase in anti-crime related values education. It would follow, based on this argument, that as intermarriage in the Jewish community increases, there will likewise be an increase in anti-intermarriage related values education. At no point is the individual left to find out what is important to him/her. Nor is the individual given the tools necessary to determine his/her own values in the future.

One civics educator puts it this way, "Americans cherish individual freedoms and self-expression, but our youngsters must also understand that ethical codes are necessary if that freedom is to endure."¹⁸⁹ Another says, "An efficacious civic education will recognize that students have different backgrounds, interests, and capabilities, but the goal is to achieve, as much as possible, common understanding and common commitment to democratic value claims."¹⁹⁰ Finally, Thomas Lickona encourages the

Honig, "Teaching Values Belongs in our Public Schools," NASSP Bulletin, 74,:7.
Butts, "Curriculum for the Educated Citizen," Educational Leadership, 43,: 7.

teaching of responsibility along with teaching opportunity when it comes to values.

"Because smart and good are not the same, societies since the time of Plato have made moral education an essential part of schooling. Our own Founding Fathers argued that moral education was crucial for the success of a democracy. Citizens in a democracy must understand and be committed to its moral underpinnings - such as respect for law and the rights of individuals, voluntary participation in public life, and concern for the common good."¹⁹¹

It is clear that if consensus can be reached about what are societal values, then they can be taught for the ultimate benefit of the entire society.

THE MESSIANIC AGE ARGUMENT

This argument is one that I have formulated based on the other arguments presented and the research presented in the first chapter of this work. This argument supports the significance of both process as well as result. Certainly, better Jews and better citizens are important. But, their preparation is equally as important. Individuals need to know not just what values are important, but how to arrive at those values and how the existing values were derived. Further, the process becomes important in another way. By teaching the process of valuing and moral development, individuals learn the tools necessary to make good decisions about themselves and the values they will hold.

¹⁹¹ Thomas Lickona, "Educating the Moral Child," Principal 68:2, (November, 1988): 6.

The effort then becomes one of persuasion. The instructor of values needs to persuade the student of both the significance or rightness of the values, as well as the importance of the value's end result. In other words, it is necessary to persuade the individual that Judaism, and thus those values derived from Judaism, have something to offer that individual and are right for him/her and his/her context.

Noted Jewish philosopher Max Kiddushin points out, "Jewish value concepts are part of a moral vocabulary that spells out a moral life."¹⁹² In the traditional Jewish view, the family has been the primary transmitter of values. "However, the Jewish family has undergone a number of radical changes in our generation. As a result of these changes, many Jewish families are unable to transmit basic Jewish value concepts to their children."¹⁹³ Families in this situation and their children require special assistance to teach values. James Cooper supports this, saying, "However, a person's lifestyle may be so limited or different from the lifestyles of others that he or she requires assistance in learning the public elements of concepts."¹⁹⁴ Guth adds,

 Max Kiddushin, Worship and Ethics: A Study in Rabbinic Judaism. (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 21.

¹⁹³ Karen Debra Guth, "Teaching Jewish Values in the Middle School: Four Learning Units - Hashavat Avadah, Gimelut Chasadim, Lashon Hara and Kibud Av V'Aim" (MA thesis, University of Judaism, 1987), 1.

James M. Cooper, Classroom Teaching Skills, (Lexington, Mass.:D.C. Heath, 1990),
 204:

"...a major problem within the Jewish community today is that our children's lifestyles are so limited in terms of Jewish learning that they require assistance in learning the elements of basic Jewish value concepts. If we as Jewish educators are to be successful in our work, we must begin to help fill the void left by the lack of Jewish value concept learning."¹⁹⁵

I believe that values and values education must be a part of every aspect of the teaching and learning experience. Values can not and should not be taught in a vacuum. Rather, only when the values and moral principles are made a part of the total experience of learning and not separated will they be absorbed as part of the total learning experience. Milton Meller makes this argument most cogently.

> "Values are taught best by example. This is especially true in the lower grades where role-playing might be effective. In higher grades, values education may be included in a more subtle way, in formal developmental lessons. In some instances merely a rhetorical, thought-provoking question may be sufficient. Every opportunity must be seized to stress values. Here are some ideas:

• While reading a novel or short story in which a character is faced with a critical decision, his or her options should be discussed in terms of underlying values...

195 Guth, "Teaching Jewish Values in the Middle School," 1.

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• Values held in the past and present, as reflected in the fine arts and music of the times, should be stressed."¹⁹⁶

MATTERS OF METHOD

The integration of values and overall education I am suggesting is not foreign to the traditional Jewish learning experience. Rabbi Samuel Joseph notes that moral study and the study of morality are not different from one another. Similarly, the value of learning and the learning of values are not different from one another.

> "There is non division between morality and religion, both are one and the same. Together they form an organic unity that is centered on the fact of God. God is the source of religion and morality, and all human beings strive to be God-like in their lives. In the classic Jewish sense one lives in a godly way through the study of Torah, and the adherence to its teachings. The study of classic Jewish sources is itself a moral act, the texts themselves are valuable as moral truths which lead to a more moral-religious life... The assumption is that it is relevant to study texts, and the student will uncover the moral values inherent in the text during the course of that study."¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ Meller, "Incorporate Values Education," 110-111. Please note that the second idea could also apply to a historical or traditional text, such as Bible, Talmud, or other rabbinic writings.

¹⁹⁷ Samuel K. Joseph, "Caring, Judging, Acting: How to Promote Jewish Values in the Religious School," *Compass*, 9:2 (Winter, 1987): 8.

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This view of text study and its link to Jewish values and action is supported by Dr. Kerry Olitsky.

"Although cognitive learning does not necessarily imply that affective learning will take place (if moral behavior can be placed in this category), a combination of study in creed and deed (via Pirke Avot) will foster moral and ethical behavior within the context of the Jewish system of Mitzvot."¹⁹⁸

Finally, Rabbi Daniel Gordis asserts that there is a critical need to infuse modern Judaism with passion and intensity.¹⁹⁹ I believe that this intensity and passion are part of the need for and the potential of a modern Jewish values education. Our schools need to teach values not because they want to produce good Jews, but because they want to hasten the coming of the Messianic Age. I believe that this change in philosophy will serve to stimulate this type of passion among both the teacher and the learner. It also gives the values a modern context. No longer is the reason to learn because the teacher wants you or the Jewish community to behave in a certain way. Rather, the reason to learn becomes a personal effort to bring on the Messianic Age.

Both the passion and the context for Jewish values can be found, I believe, in Jewish texts. These texts represent both the value concepts that

¹⁹⁸ Kerry Olitsky, "Teaching Mitzvot Using Pirke Avot," *Pedagogic Reporter*, 34:4 (October, 1983): 13.

¹⁹⁹ Daniel H. Gordis, "Jewish Love, Jewish Law: Can Liberal Judaism Weather the Intermarriage Crisis," Jewish Spectator 56:3 (Winter 1991-92): 6-11. have supported and nurtured the Jewish people for hundreds of years and the intensity that makes these concepts a living tradition. Even the rabbis of the Talmud understood this and were moved to write the following.

> "The question was raised: which is greater study or action? Rabbi Tarfon said, 'Action is greater!' Rabbi Akiva said, 'Study is greater!' Then they all said that study is greater because study leads to action."²⁰⁰

In the same Mishnah that the rabbis say that *Gemilut Hasadim* is among "the things in this world that are without measure" and that "the fruits thereof are enjoyed in this world and in the world yet to come,"²⁰¹ they also point out that "The study of Torah is equal to them all."²⁰² Subsequent commentaries and glosses on this section point out that the reason study is equal to all the wonderful values and behaviors listed is because study leads to all of those values and actions.²⁰³

The rabbis understood what modern thinkers are only recently coming to grips with. Text study is, as mentioned earlier, a moral act in and of itself, and by engaging the traditional texts of the Jewish people, individuals learn not just what the values of that people are, but how they are arrived at and how they are to be applied. Through the study of

200 Talmud Bavli, Megillah 40b. The translation is mine.

201 Mishnah, Pe'ah 1:1. The translation is mine.

202 ibid.

203 A thorough discussion of this can be found in Jacob Neusner's translation of the Talmud Yerushalmi. See also Talmud Bavli, Shabbat 127a for an expansion on this theme.

traditional Jewish texts, one learns more than just the answer to the question of what are Jewish values. One is also given the question(s) that lead to that answer. Finally, and most significant, the learner is exposed to and taught about the process by which Judaism finds answers and discovers values. Contributing to this line of thought, Elliot Dorff writes,

"Perhaps the most obvious goal for those who use text study for moral education is to inform about what is good and bad. The classical literature of a tradition announces its norms through maxims, laws, poetry and stories, and those who study that literature therefore learn how Judaism identifies the good and the bad... In sum, text study contributes to moral education by informing students about the whole range of moral values, motivating them to achieve them, training their powers of moral Judgement, and inculcating specific moral values in the process of learning - not the least of which is the value of study itself."²⁰⁴

As a part of his article, Dorff points out that this thinking is not unique to modern educational theorists. Rather, Jewish thinkers throughout the ages have seen the same useful connection between text study and the teaching and learning of Jewish value concepts. Mordecai Kaplan points out,

> "The main purpose in teaching the bible...should be to fortify Jewish consciousness and to give it ethical and spiritual content....Thus the study of Torah is the process of training oneself and others in the development of character through

204 Elliot N. Dorff, "Study Leads to Action," Religious Education 75:2 (March-April, 1980): 175, 185.

whatever thought, feeling, and behavior is directed toward the building of a better and happier world for the generations to come....As Jews we should be concerned particularly with what the study of Torah as a system of character training might contribute to a better future for mankind."²⁰⁵

Samson Raphael Hirsch makes a similar comment with reference to Talmud.

"The study of these writings is the finest training both in theoretical and practical reasoning, all the more so because their subjects are the circumstances of actual life. In them the rules laid down in the 'scripture' are given precision and made practically applicable. Their form is such that the youthful mind is continually trained to analyze statements presented synthetically in order to find the principles underlying them, to apply such principles, whether given or discovered, to new and analogous cases, and to discern the real disparity between cases which seem analogous and the real analogy between the cases which seem disparate. In a word,...in the study of Talmud we have the finest school for forming logical and ethical judgments."²⁰⁶

205 Mordecai M. Kaplan, The Future of the American Jew (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 468,488, 489.

206 Samson Raphael Hirsch, Judaism Eternal, I. Grunfeld, Trans. (London: Soncino Press, 1959), Vol. I, 201-202.

More than just the values of the Jewish people are to be found in Jewish texts. Within the pages of hundreds of volumes lie both the content and the methodologies for teaching values at every level of Jewish education. What is more, each of these texts has the expressed purpose of not just making people better Jews but of bringing about the Messianic Age. Despite varying interpretations, this is a goal that Jewish educators, and indeed Jews the world over, have embraced and worked toward for generations. The need now is to redefine the learning experience in terms of the learning and application of Jewish values for the purpose of setting the stage for the Messianic Age.

CHAPTER IV A JEWISH CORE VALUE: GEMILUT HASADIM

WHOSE VALUES?

Throughout our discussions about values, the same issue arises again and again. On a theoretical level, we defined values and their role in our lives. The teaching of values was covered, as well as practical applications of that theory. A fundamental problem is what values to teach? Long before the language of values was in vogue, Jewish tradition and text focused on behaviors and concepts that it saw as part of the ideal Jew or ideal person. It is these concepts that form the foundation of what we now refer to as the "Judeo-Christian tradition."

The Talmud and other early rabbinic writings made an effort to delineate how to live a life that is in keeping with Jewish law. The rabbis were concerned with outlining methodologies for such a life. The goal of leading this life was to create a whole world, one in which the Messiah could be a part.²⁰⁷ During this effort to outline a way of life for the Jew, the rabbis promulgated laws that would dictate this proper way of life.

These laws evolved out of the rabbinic interpretation of the Torah. The rabbis saw guidelines for living in the words of Torah. These guidelines are concepts that continue to guide the Jew in his/her life today. In the Pirke Avot, the rabbis made an effort to highlight those concepts that guided them in their interpretation. The second Mishnah of the first

²⁰⁷ For a comprehensive review of Jewish philosophy please refer to Guttman, *Philosophies of Judaism* (New York: Schocken, 1964). Perek of Pirke Avot quotes Simon the Just saying, "The entire world relies upon three concepts: Torah, Divine service and Gemilut Hasadim."²⁰⁸

Like so many discussions involving both values and Jewish concepts, defining the concept, in this case the phrase *Gemilut Hasadim*, is no easy task. Before we can proceed with a discussion of *Gemilut Hasadim* as a value, we must first examine what the phrase meant to the rabbis who coined it and to those who now use it. The most obvious answer is to simply translate the phrase *Gemilut Hasadim*.

However, translation does not ease the burden of definition. By translating the phrase, some of the original meaning is lost or concealed. An additional effort can be made to translate the meaning and the context of the phrase. Yet, this too falls short of perfect. In this case, the translator brings to bear his/her understanding of what the limits of meaning and context are and thus alters the phrase being translated.

A. Alan Steinbach notes, "The art of translation from one vernacular to another... entails complexities resulting in a certain degree of loss. It is , like putting old wine into new bottles; there is an inescapable diminution in bouquet, in essence and depth."²⁰⁹ This is the potential pitfall any

²⁰⁸ The translation is mine. Without engaging in a detailed explanation of the phrasing of this Mishnah, this translation best reflects the actual meaning of the phrase. For a more complete examination of all the ramifications of the phrase and each of the three concepts, see Irving M. Bunim, *Ethics From Sinai*, (New York: Feldheim, 1964).

209 A. Alan Steinbach, "Special Reviews," CCAR Journal 18:3 (June, 1971), 84.

translator or translation faces. This is not to say that attempts have not been made at translation. However, the variety of solutions to this problem underscore the difficulty and the absence of a single correct translation. The most popular translation of *Gemilut Hasadim* is "acts of loving kindness."²¹⁰ Even the Soncino translation of the Babylonian Talmud recognizes the shortcomings and difficulties in translating this phrase and has thus appended a lengthy footnote to further explain its translation. The translator notes,

> "This is the literal meaning of the phrase, Gemilut Hasadim. It is sometimes translated, 'the practice of charity,' but that is inexact. Every act of kindness is regarded as done out of one's love for his fellow beings...[The inner meaning of the phrase is, 'making good,' 'requiting' - a making good to man for goodness of God, and it is concerned with tenderness and mercy to all men and all classes.]"²¹¹

Still others translate the phrase as "the practice of kindness"²¹² or "benevolence"²¹³ or "good deeds"²¹⁴ or "the bestowal or loving

²¹¹ Footnote to the Soncino translation of the Babylonian Talmud, Baba Mezia, 30b.

²¹² Birnbaum, Philip, A Book of Jewish Concepts. (New York: Hebrew Publishing Company), 127.

213 ibid.

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²¹⁰ See the Soncino translations of the Babylonian Talmud and the Midrash Rabbah. See also the many publications currently available for classroom use. Most of these use the phrase "acts of loving kindness." Finally, virtually all UAHC publications and Reform-related publications use this translation.

kindness²¹⁵ and "charity.²¹⁶ The inadequacy of these translations can be found in their lack of use in the very texts in which they were translated. The authors and editors have chosen not to translate the phrase except where absolutely necessary for understanding. Rather, they have chosen to use the phrase, intact, as a technical Hebrew term for this particular concept.

An alternative process allows the translator to begin with an intent and translate according to the need. Jacob Neusner calls this process "analytical translation."²¹⁷ This is because during the process of translation the translator analyzes the piece in question and ascribes to it certain qualities and attributes. Some of these are derived from the work, and others are applied to it by the translator's analysis. Translation is, on the one hand, perhaps the only way to expose a great Hebrew concept to an English-speaking population. On the other hand, the original work is altered, irreparably, by the process.

It is with all of this in mind that I have concluded that the best alternative for this paper and, I believe for teaching, is to retain the Hebrew original as a Hebrew technical term. I have also come to the

214 Bunim, Ethics From Sinai, 39-53.

215 Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol. 7. (Jerusalem: Keter), 373.

216 ibid.

²¹⁷ Jacob Neusner, Translating the Classics of Judaism. (Scholars Press: Atlanta, Georgia, 1989), 1-5.

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conclusion that an acceptable definition of Gemilut Hasadim would be "the virtue of loving kindness." This is close enough to the literal meaning of the Hebrew and still retains the depth of meaning and diversity that exists in the technical use of the phrase.

IS GEMILUT HASADIM A JEWISH VALUE?

Jewish tradition has always been divided into two categories -Halachah and Aggadah. There is little talk of values or concepts. Thus, in the tradition of interpretation, it becomes the modern reader's role to determine those values that existed in the text at the time of its writing. How is this done? We must first determine what is a Jewish value. What does it look like? How it is distinguished from Jewish law and Jewish action (ritual and otherwise)?

There is no real discussion of Jewish values in the traditional texts. Rather, the rabbis wrote out of their own sense of what God had commanded for the Jewish people. This is true of both action and thought. This is not to say that all Jewish law and writing concerning thought and action exists in a vacuum. The consistency that has existed in this writing throughout the ages can be due only to a certain degree of reliance upon foundational concepts that have always guided Jewish thinking.²¹⁸

²¹⁸ For a more thorough discussion of the guiding principles and processes of the traditional texts, see the discussions of text found in the introductory essays to C.G. Montefiore and H. Lowe, *A Rabbinic Anthology*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1974). See also the relevant chapters in Barry Holtz, Ed., *Back to the Sources*, (New York: Summit Books, 1984). It is in these discussions that a detailed analysis of Jewish textual composition takes place. It is particularly helpful to understand the

These are what I believe to be foundational Jewish values. These values have served to inspire, guide, and even limit, Jewish writers for generations. The values in Judaism can be found in what they are and in what they are not. For example, a Jew's life is dictated by the law - rules which tell the Jew how to and how not to act. Each of these rules is specific enough to be precisely followed and that following precisely measured. This is not true of the values. They are, of necessity, general and often vague, with the specifics left open to interpretation and redefinition by each generation.

To define a value, we must discriminate between the value and the behaviors and actions that grow out of the value. Further, in the Jewish legal system there is a differentiation between foundational concepts upon which laws are based and the laws that evolve from those concepts. Finally, is *Gemilut Hasadim* still a value for Jews?

Gemilut Hasadim does not really fall into either the category of Aggadah or Halachah. It is discussed in both areas, and yet neither is the source of the concept. Gemilut Hasadim is not an action in the classic sense of the word. It can not be measured or specifically defined. There are, however, actions that stem from the value of Gemilut Hasadim. These actions are measurable and definable. In legal terms, failure to perform this so-called action would not be punishable or even actionable in a court of law - Jewish or non-Jewish. Again, however, the specific actions that

personalities involved in the transmission of these ideas and their historical contexts.

this value motivates are actionable in court, and one can be punished for failure to perform certain actions.

Throughout the texts that discuss Gemilut Hasadim or any other Jewish value, a tension exists between actionable laws, Halachah, and nonactionable concepts, values. The texts were designed as guides for living. As such, the text attempts to offer specific guidelines for leading a Jewish life. While concepts (values) are helpful to that discussion, only by doing the Mitzvahs does one actually lead the Jewish life conceived of in the text. The authors of these texts strived to find a balance between the doing, Mitzvahs, and the values, concepts, that are the basis for that doing. The result of this tension is the occasional blurring of the line between value and action, between Halachah and concepts. In practical terms, this leads to an occasional effort by some Jewish writers to portray Gemilut Hasadim as a measurable, actionable Halachah or Mitzvah.

We have shown that *Gemilut Hasadim* is not an action. We must now show that *Gemilut Hasadim* is also not an attitude. The Jewish tradition's discussion of *Gemilut Hasadim* isolates it as an ethical guide for all generations for all times. The tradition does this in Pirke Avot (1:2) with the statement, "The entire world relies upon three concepts: Torah, Divine service and *Gemilut Hasadim*." In another discussion, the first Mishnah of Pe'ah says that *Gemilut Hasadim* is among "the things in this world that are without measure" and that "the fruits thereof are enjoyed in this world and in the world yet to come."²¹⁹ Nowhere does it say that *Gemilut Hasadim* is an approach or attitude toward something, even the entire world. Rather, the text spells out the conceptual make-up of this value by saying that it does not fit in with the other rules and regulations of Judaism. It is accorded a separate and unequal status. This status distinguishes *Gemilut Hasadim* as a value. Moreover, the general rule is that rewards found in this world are at the expense of rewards in the world to come.²²⁰ The fact that *Gemilut Hasadim* is considered to offer rewards in both this world and the world yet to come identifies it as a guide that is useful for both living life and for fulfilling the commandments that give meaning to the life of a Jew.

The RaMBaM notes that Gemilut Hasadim is essentially an ethical guide which has many manifestations. In his Yad HaHazakah RaMBaM points out that many different Jewish behaviors fall under the rubric of Gemilut Hasadim. The individual practices and behaviors tend to become redundant as they are all aspects of the single Jewish virtue of Gemilut Hasadim.²²¹

²¹⁹ Mishnah Pe'ah 1:1. The translation is mine. Please refer to the comments on translation earlier in this chapter.

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220 Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol. 7. (Jerusalem: Keter), 373.

221 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Evel 14:1.

In modern discussions of *Gemilut Hasadim*, the common mistake is to consider it the same as *Tzedakah* (charity). Nothing could be further from the truth. Out of the tension between Halachah and value discussed earlier, some commentators assert that *Gemilut Hasadim* consists of actions performed by the body (i.e. burying the dead) and actions performed with money (i.e. *Tzedakah* and the redemption of captives).²²² However, there are already Halachot that address these issues. To add *Gemilut Hasadim* as another catagory would be superfluous. Rather, it becomes clear that *Gemilut Hasadim* is not the actions noted above, it is a core Jewish value.

The differences between the two are illustrative of *Gemilut Hasadim* as a value, and *Tzedakah* as a behavior motivated by that value. Many textbooks currently or recently in use in Jewish schools use these terms interchangeably. They are unable to give specific expression to the value of *Gemilut Hasadim*, as opposed to the behavior of *Tzedakah*. As a result, the definitions have been blurred.

Unlike Tzedakah, Gemilut Hasadim is not actionable. There is a history of and methodology for taking a person before a Bet Din (rabbinical court) because that individual has not given enough Tzedakah. Moreover, the Jerusalem Talmud in its discussion of the Mishnah from Pe'ah notes that Tzedakah is done only with money, whereas Gemilut Hasadim is done with personal (physical, mental and emotional) service.²²³ It also highlights the fact that the value of Gemilut Hasadim is unlimited in scope

222 For an overview of this argument see Bartenora to Mishnah, Pe'ah 1.1.

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223 Jerusalem Talmud., Pe'ah, 15b.

and action, while the behavior of Tzedakah is of necessity limited to no more than one-fifth of one's possessions.²²⁴

Thus, Gemilut Hasadim encompasses a wider range of delivery than does Tzedakah. Tzedakah can be given only to the poor, while Gemilut Hasadim can be applied to both rich and poor. Similarly, Tzedakah can only be done for the living, but Gemilut Hasadim can be applied to those both living and dead.²²⁵ The clearest statement is that of Rabbi Eleazer:

> "Rabbi Eleazer stated, greater is he who performs Tzedakah than [he who offers] all the sacrifices, for it is said, 'to do Tzedakah and justice is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice.'

Rabbi Eleazer further stated, Gemilut Hasadim is greater than Tzedakah, for it is said, sow yourselves according to your Tzedakah, but reap according to your Hesed, if a man sows, it is doubtful whether he will eat [the harvest] or not, but when a man reaps, he will certainly eat. Rabbi Eleazer further stated, the reward of Tzedakah depends entirely upon the extent of Hesed in it for it is said, sow yourselves according to your Tzedakah, but reap according to your Hesed."²²⁶

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224 See also Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah, 49b.

225 Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah, 49b.

226 ibid.-

The rabbis also discuss motivation as a way to distinguish *Tzedakah* from *Gemilut Hasadim*. They note that because *Tzedakah* is done only for the living, one might, albeit in a distant and remote way, believe that there might be some reward to come from the recipient and not from the act itself. However, because *Gemilut Hasadim* can be applied to the dead as well as the living, performing acts in accordance with *Gemilut Hasadim* is truly altruistic; the dead person can not reward the individual for their actions, only their actions can serve as their reward.²²⁷

Finally, is *Gemilut Hasadim* still a value for the Jewish people? Did the value apply at one time only, or was it intended to be a value for all times? The same rabbinic texts that have guided the previous discussion speak to this issue as well. Avot DeRabbi Nathan points out that *Gemilut Hasadim* is the replacement for the Temple as far as its ability to guide the Jewish people is concerned.

> "As regards *Gemilut Hasadim*, it is said, 'I desire *Hesed* and not sacrifice.' At the beginning the world was created only by the virtue of *Hesed* as it is said, 'the world is built by love.' It once happened that Rabbi Yohanan Ben Zakkai went forth from Jerusalem and Rabbi Yehoshua went out after him and he saw the Temple destroyed and he said, 'Woe unto us, for the place where the sins of Israel find atonement is destroyed. Then Rabbi Yohanan said, 'Grieve not, for we have an atonement

227 See the discussion in Tanhuma, Va-Yechi, 3.

equal to that of the Temple. And what is this, it is Gemilut Hasadim' as it is said, 'I desire Hesed and not sacrifice.'"²²⁸

The rabbis felt that from the time of the destruction of the Temple until the time of the Third Temple (the Messianic Age), *Gemilut Hasadim* would be the guiding principle of Jewish life. This sense is repeated and expanded upon in Ecclesiastes Rabbah, where it is explicitly stated that *Gemilut Hasadim* is fundamental to Judaism on a conceptual level. "Rabbi Judah said, 'Whoever denies the virtue of *Gemilut Hasadim* is as if he has denied the root."²²⁹ The 'root' is the very foundation of faith, of Judaism, even of God. That is to say that *Gemilut Hasadim* is the ultimate value of Judaism in this time and for all times. A passage in Ketubot(8b) adds that Jews are a people characterized by their value of *Gemilut Hasadim* throughout the generations.²³⁰

Clearly, *Gemilut Hasadim* is a Jewish value, at least within the Jewish construction of what might be a foundational concept or value. However, the final test must be a secular one. Using the definition of value espoused by Rokeach earlier, is *Gemilut Hasadim* a value?²³¹ We established that

²³¹ Rokeach's definition of value is as follows: "A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence. A value system

²²⁸ Avot DeRabbi Nathan Perek 4, Section 5. (My translation)

²²⁹ Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7:1 (My translation)

²³⁰ See also Babylonian Talmud, Beitzah, 32b for a similar statement.

Gemilut Hasadim is, indeed, an enduring belief. It has been discussed from the earliest rabbinic writings to this very day. It is a belief in that as a value Gemilut Hasadim can be both prescriptive and proscriptive. Gemilut Hasadim is a belief that people hold and then act upon based on a preference for this belief.

For the Jew, this belief is both personally (rewards to be attained in this world and the world to come) and socially (given the communal aspects of Jewish law and philosophy) preferable. *Gemilut Hasadim* could be both a mode of conduct or an end-state of existence. Its application could be a means to an end or the universal application of *Gemilut Hasadim* as a value could be the end desired. I believe it is clear that *Gemilut Hasadim* is a value both in secular terms and in terms of the role it plays within Jewish tradition.

In the Pirke Avot, the Mishnayot that follow the statement of Simon the Just go into detail to specify how one applies Torah, Avodah, and *Gemilut Hasadim* to the world in which the Jew lives. The value, *Gemilut Hasadim*, then finds expression in all efforts of goodwill, receiving others cheerfully, loving peace and striving for peace.²³²

is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-state of existence along a continuum of relative importance."

232 See Bunim, Ethics From Sinai, commentary on Perek 1.

CHAPTER V GEMILUT HASADIM: IMPLEMENTING A JEWISH CORE VALUE FOR A LOCAL SCHOOL As demonstrated in previous chapters, there is both a compelling need for teaching and the ability to teach Jewish values to our young people. Over the last few years many teachers in many schools have begun this process. Often, their efforts have been haphazard and even unconscious. During this same period, textbook writers and publishers have begun to emphasize moral education as part of their book offerings and their curricular suggestions.

Unfortunately, the organized Jewish educational community has not taken the lead in encouraging, creating or implementing quality moral education programs. This absence of educational leadership creates a situation in which teachers are not motivated to engage in moral education. There is a need to introduce teachers to the advantages and methodologies of moral education.

Because values education is needed in the schools of our Jewish community, the issue becomes a matter of methodology and not whether or not to have such a program. The logical starting point for a program of values education is with teachers. Before a values education program can be brought to the students, the teachers need to feel their own sense of ownership of the program. Further, students know when their teachers value the subjects they are teaching. Therefore, teacher support is essential to a successful values education program.

There are a number of methodologies available to introduce a school's faculty to values and values education. For the purposes of this thesis, I have chosen a weekend retreat format for this introduction. The

need is great to get a school started on an intensive program of values education. The intensive nature of a weekend workshop serves to dramatize this and serves as an opportunity to bring the school's faculty together around a single important teaching issue.

The imaginary school I have chosen consists of teachers who teach kindergarten through tenth grade in a Reform supplementary school. The faculty of 22 includes classroom teachers and specialists who work with any number of different classes. Teachers are being asked to come to a local camp for the entire weekend. Teachers will be paid extra for the weekend to help ensure that this will be quality time. It is best if this workshop could take place before the beginning of the school year. Goals, objectives and a schedule for the weekend follow. Descriptions of the specific activities for the weekend follow that.

GOALS:

Participants in this workshop will:

1. Experience an environment that reflects the Jewish value of Gemilut Hasadim and explore how Gemilut Hasadim is a part of the learning process and how values, in particular Gemilut Hasadim, affect their classrooms.

2. Explore their own values and those of their colleagues, and assess the perceived and actual values of their school.

3. Support the basic theories and philosophies of values and valuing.

OBJECTIVES:

At the conclusion of this weekend, participants will be able to:

1.1. Understand the textual basis for Gemilut Hasadim as a core Jewish value.

1.2. Identify how *Gemilut Hasadim* as a core value can and does affect their classroom and their teaching.

1.3. Develop role-play situations to better understand the role of *Gemilut* Hasadim as a core value in their classroom and their teaching.

1.4. Identify the ideal qualities of a school with Gemilut Hasadim as a core value.

1.5 Develop a plan to incorporate *Gemilut Hasadim* as a core value into their school culture.

2.1. Identify their own values, the ideal values of their school, and the values of their school.

3.1. Describe what values are and how they operate.

3.2. Define values, moral education, and Gemilut Hasadim

SCHEDULE:

FRIDAY

3:00-4:00	Welcome/Arrival & Registration/Get Settled
4:00-5:00	Getting to Know Each Other
5:00-6:30	Dinner
7:00-8:15	Services
8:30-10:00	Mitzvah Project
10:00-???	Late Night
RDAY	

SATURDAY

7:00-7:30	Services (Optional)
7:30-8:30	Breakfast
8:30-10:00	A Lesson in Values

10:00-10:15	Break
10:15-11:45	Core Value Activity
11:45-12:30	Begin School Balloon Activity
12:30-1:15	Lunch
1:15-2:00	Finish School Balloon Activity
2:00-3:00	Text Study
3:00-3:15	Break
3:15-4:30	Gemilut Hasadim in the Classroom
4:30-6:00	Creating Role-Plays
6:00-7:00	Dinner
7:00-7:30	Break
7:30-10:00	Role-Playing
YAC	

SUNDAY

7:30-8:30	Breakfast
8:30-10:15	An Ideal Gemilut Hasadim School
10:15-10:30	Break
10:30-12:30	Putting Gemilut Hasadim into our School
12:30-1:30	Lunch
1:30	Thanks for Coming!

FRIDAY

Because teachers are coming to the camp from their very hectic week, everything Friday night is designed to help them relax, integrate into a new environment, and introduce (or reintroduce) them to one another.

GETTING TO KNOW EACH OTHER

Objectives: 1.2

<u>Resources:</u> Large puzzle pieces cut from white paper each with a number on the backside, new boxes of crayons, welcome handouts²³³, snacks, drinks.

Activities:

SET INDUCTION: The teachers will be arriving in small groups over a period of time. The opening program and welcome need to accommodate this sporadic arrival. Upon arrival each person will be given a welcome handout. The welcome handouts will explain where the sleeping cabins are and the weekend's schedule and goals and objectives. The second sheet will ask participants to use their crayons to draw some action they did or saw in the last two weeks that reflects their own conception of the virtue of loving kindness. They are to use no words on the page. Give the participants puzzle pieces and ask them to begin coloring. DO NOT TELL THE PARTICIPANTS THAT THE SHEETS ON WHICH THEY ARE COLORING ARE TO BE PUZZLE PIECES!

PRIMARY ACTIVITY: The facilitator will ask the participants to introduce themselves, tell what grade and content they teach, describe why they wanted to become a religious school teacher, and what was their greatest teaching moment. If there is time, begin the process of asking each person

233 See Appendix G.

to describe to the assembled group the picture s/he drew, why s/he chose to draw that particular action, and how that action is reflective of the Jewish virtue of loving kindness.

CLOSURE: Ask participants to write (or color) their name on the back of their puzzle piece and to leave it in a pile near the door to the room.

SERVICES

Objectives: 1.1, 1.2

Resources: Gates of Prayer prayerbooks.

For reasons of consistency and comfort, the service used will come from the Gates of Prayer. In keeping with the theme of the weekend, I suggest the use of Shabbat evening service IV (p. 176ff). This service focuses on justice, *Gemilut Hasadim*, and the role we play in bringing these values into our society. This service will assist in setting the tone for the rest of the weekend and, let us hope, for the religious school year. The opening song should be Al Shlosha Devarim and the closing song, Im Ein Ani Li Mi Li. Consider adding any or all of the following readings to the body of the service:

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• Rabbi Eliezer said: Let the honor of your fellow be as dear to you as your own.

How is this so? This teaches that even as one looks out for one's own honor, so he should look out for his fellow's honor.²³⁴

• Rabbi Eleazar said: Since the destruction of the Temple the gates of prayers are locked....But, even though the gates of prayers are locked, the gates of tears are not. Rabbi Hisda said: All gates are locked except the gates through which pass the cries of people who have been wronged.²³⁵

• Disciples increase the wisdom of their teacher and broaden his mind. The sages said, "I learned a great deal of wisdom from my teachers, more from my colleagues, and the most from my students."²³⁶

• Seven attributes serve before the throne of glory, they are: wisdom, righteousness, justice, the virtue of loving kindness, compassion, truth and peace. As it is said, "And I will espouse you forever: I will espouse you with righteousness and justice and with goodness and mercy. And I will espouse you with faithfulness; then shall you be devoted to the Lord."²³⁷ Rabbi Meir says: Why does the verse say "Then you shall be devoted

- 234 Avot DeRabbi Natan, 15.1,2.
- 235 Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia, 59a.
- 236 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Hinuch, 5:13.
- 237 Hosea 2:21-22. This is the Jewish Publication Society's translation.

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to the Lord?" To teach that whoever has all these attributes knows the will of God.²³⁸

MITZVAH PROJECT

Objectives: 1.2, 1.5

<u>Resources:</u> Giant puzzle board in the shape of the world hidden under a sheet, several glue sticks.

Activities:

SET INDUCTION: Continue the process of asking each person to describe to the assembled group his/her picture, why s/he chose to draw that particular action, and how that action is reflective of the Jewish virtue of loving kindness. When they have concluded, unveil the puzzle board. Then ask each person, in numerical order, to place his/her drawing within the outlines of the matching numbered section on the puzzle board. At the conclusion it will be clear that one puzzle piece will be missing.

PRIMARY ACTIVITY: The facilitator should tell participants that, as Jews, our role in this world is its repair - Tikun Olam. The world is unfinished a piece is missing - and we, as teachers, are engaged in replacing and repairing the missing and broken pieces. S/he can then lead a brief discussion based on the following questions:

1. How are we, as teachers, engaged in Tikun Olam?

238 Avot DeRabbi Natan, 37:4.

2. What is the virtue of loving kindness?

3. How is the virtue of loving kindness connected to Tikun Olam?

4. What specific classroom programs and techniques (not content) reflect the virtue of loving kindness?

CLOSURE: Thank and congratulate the participants for their openness and efforts this evening. Explain that we all understand how difficult it is to make the transition from the busy week to a Shabbat of study and learning. Distribute copies of the articles "Moral Development" and "Values" from the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Barry Chazen's "Holy Community and Values Education," Joan Davidson's "A Religious School Model of Moral Education," and Elliot Dorff's "Study Leads to Action."²³⁹ Ask participants to skim all the articles and read carefully the two encyclopedia articles.

LATE NIGHT

Objectives: 1.1, 1.4

Resources: Song leader, song sheets, comfortable room.

Activities:

As this evening comes at the end of a long day and a long week, the goal is to keep the intellectual stress level low and the enjoyment level high. Therefore, the rest of the evening will be spent just sitting around singing.

239 See Appendix H.

This will allow participants to turn their attention from the cares of the week to the joy of Shabbat and the goals of the weekend. See the appendix for a list of suggested values/Gemilut Hasadim related songs.²⁴⁰

SATURDAY

Following the optional Shacharit service and breakfast, the entire group will gather in a large, comfortable room with sturdy chairs and tables at which to work.

A LESSON IN VALUES

Objectives: 3.1, 3.2

Resources: Small pads of paper for taking notes, pencils.

Activities:

SET INDUCTION: The facilitator should again thank everyone for coming to the weekend and spend a few moments leading a discussion about the following questions, keeping in mind that there are no right or wrong answers:

1. How would you define the word "value"? (Facilitator may want to read the many dictionary definitions.)

2. In your own mind, what songs from last night represent what values?

240 See Appendix I.

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES: The facilitator leads a lesson on values from the following outline, using the information presented in chapters I and II of this thesis:

1. Why study values?

A. Values are pervasive in our society. Milton Rokeach, the leading theorist in the area of values and value systems, said the value concept, "more than any other, should occupy a central position across all the social sciences - sociology, anthropology, psychiatry, political science, education, economics and history. More than any other concept, it is an intervening variable that shows promise of being able to unify the apparently diverse interests of all the sciences concerned with human behavior."²⁴¹

B. Values, by their very nature, affect every behavior we have and that our students have.

II. How do we define values?

- A. Discuss the participant's own value definitions.
- B. Discuss the definitions from the encyclopedia article.
- C. Repeat Rokeach's definition from chapter I and explain that:
 •Values are not stable but they are enduring.
 •Values have a relative quality relative to other values.
 •Values can not be isolated because we do not live in isolation.

•Values affect beliefs and thus affect actions.

241 Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, 3.

•If values affect behavior then there are also certain skills that can be taught to affect the value and thus the behavior.

D. Explain that in the definition of values, the word "belief" carries two definitions. The first is existential, a belief is either true or false. The second is evaluative, a belief is either good or bad. Further, there are three kinds of values.

1. Cognitive - we know what is right or wrong, correct or incorrect.

2. Affective - the feelings we have about certain values and the people who display those values.

3. Behavioral - when these values are activated, it leads to action on our part.

E. Finally, divide values into two categories. Terminal or ends values are those that signify an ideal end state of being or existence. They fall into the realm of personal and social values. Instrumental or means values are those that signify the best methods of achieving the terminal or ends values a person has. They fall into the realm of moral and competence values.

III. How do values operate in our lives?

they made

A. Values operate within a system.

1. Values are prioritized.

2. The prioritization is done relative to the other values one holds.

B. An example of a values system is a non-linear spiral line that has values, represented as bells, all along the spiral. When

one bell is sounded (when a particular value is activated) all the bells (values) resonate with a certain harmony. However, when one attempts to incorporate a value that is not in tune with the entire system, either the system must change or the value must change.

C. At the center of the values spiral is a person's core values. When these are rung, all the outer values resonate along with them. However, when an outer value is rung, only those nearest that value will resonate. Core values are the most difficult to change and the most important values a person holds.

IV. Can values be taught? Rokeach suggests the following five-part plan for teaching and changing values:

• **Discussion** This is the opportunity for teacher and students to discuss the findings of the Rokeach profile and how they might be projected to the future.

• Exploration The students must now explore their own values and those of others. Their values and value systems are being challenged both from within and from without.

• Sharing By sharing their own values and ranking preferences with others, a students have the opportunity to hear and contrast others' views with their own. This provides a check and balance for their own views.

• Theorizing Having identified their own values and compared them with others, students have the opportunity to

consider what might be the ideal and how that ideal might function in a particular society. They further postulate whether universal values exist and what they might be.
Relevance This is a time of synthesis. Students discover how the original discussion of their own values and the later discussion of ideals and universal values come together.

V. Call participants' attention to the fact that all of the articles they were given last night discuss some aspect of values education and would serve as excellent resources for both theoretical and practical ideas.

CLOSURE: Discuss again what songs were reflective of what values. How do those values fit into the understanding of values we've created? End the discussion by asking participants to rank those values along the spiral continuum discussed earlier.

CORE VALUE ACTIVITY

Objectives: 2.1, 3.1

Resources: Large pieces of white paper, pencils, pens.

Activities:

SET INDUCTION: Hand out list of possible values and ask if anyone needs a definition of one of these.²⁴²

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES: Divide the group into groups of four or five. Tell participants to take as much time as necessary to choose the fifteen (15) values that most represent their own values system, rank those values in numerical order. Participants may add values, especially Jewish ones, they do not feel are represented on this list. As part of the ranking process, they should indicate whether the value they are ranking is a Jewish or a secular value.

Now, in the small group, try to do the same assignment for the religious school in which the participants teach. We're trying to find out the core values of our school.

CLOSURE: Each group should present to the larger group what values it feels are part of the school. Participants should give the rationale for choosing those values, as well as the reason for their particular ranking.

SCHOOL BALLOON ACTIVITY

Objectives: 2.1, 1.4

Resources: Large sheets of white butcher paper, markers.

242 See Appendix J.

Activities:

SET INDUCTION: Divide into small groups again. Tell participants that they are about to take a trip. Ask them to close their eyes and get comfortable, and describe to them the following:

Picture a peaceful spring field. All the flowers are in bloom and the smell is fantastic. Look around, all the trees, flowers, children laughing and playing. ...Now you are looking down on the field. You are riding in the air, able to see everything around you and beneath you. You are riding in a colorful balloon with a glass bottom that allows you to silently float above the field and see everything without disturbing anything. ...The balloon continues to drift, and in the distance you see a building. As you get closer, you see that the building is the synagogue at which you teach. As you get even closer, you notice that something is different. The roof and walls are gone. They have been replaced by glass. You can see everything that is going on inside your school. However, you can not hear anything. Inside you see yourself and your colleagues teaching your regular students. Now, please open your eyes.

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES: Ask participants to, on the paper provided, write down the behaviors they see. What are the teachers doing? What are the students doing? Who else do you see? What are they doing? What do you see in the classrooms? What do you see in the other parts of the synagogue? Remember, you can only describe behaviors you see, not feelings or verbalizations. You can only describe your observations. After you have described the situation in your school as you saw it, list, next to each behavior, the value that behavior reflects. What value causes/motivates the behavior you have described?

CLOSURE: Now, compare the list of values you thought your school held and the list of values you discovered from the balloon. What are the differences, the similarities? Each small group should share their observations with the entire group. Create a master list of values you OBSERVED in your school. Rank those values.

TEXT STUDY

Objectives: 1.1, 3.2

Resources: Handouts with the texts printed on them, paper, pencils.

Activities:

SET INDUCTION: Distribute Barry Holtz's article "Why Texts: Literature and Jewish Education."²⁴³ Ask participants to read the article. Discuss, for a moment, the use of texts in Jewish education.

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES: Divide into new small groups. Hand out the text handouts. Each handout should have one of the following eleven texts printed on it with the following questions:

243 See Appendix K.

• "Rabbi Eleazer stated, greater is he who performs Tzedakah than [he who offers] all the sacrifices, for it is said, 'to do Tzedakah and justice is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice.'"²⁴⁴

• "Rabbi Eleazer further stated, *Gemilut Hasadim* is greater than Tzedakah, for it is said, sow yourselves according to your Tzedakah, but reap according to your Hesed, if a man sows, it is doubtful whether he will eat [the harvest] or not, but when a man reaps, he will certainly eat. Rabbi Eleazer further stated, the reward of Tzedakah depends entirely upon the extent of Hesed in it for it is said, sow yourselves according to your Tzedakah, but reap according to your Hesed."²⁴⁵

• "As regards *Gemilut Hasadim*, it is said, 'I desire *Hesed* and not sacrifice.' At the beginning the world was created only by the virtue of *Hesed* as it is said, 'the world is built by love.' It once happened that Rabbi Yohanan Ben Zakkai went forth from Jerusalem and Rabbi Yehoshua went out after him and he saw the Temple destroyed and he said, 'Woe unto us, for the place where the sins of Israel find atonement is destroyed. Then Rabbi Yohanan said, 'Grieve not, for we have an atonement equal to that of the Temple. And what is this,

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244 Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah, 49b.

245 ibid.

it is Gemilut Hasadim' as it is said, 'I desire Hesed and not sacrifice.'"²⁴⁶

• "Rabbi Judah said, 'Whoever denies the virtue of *Gemilut Hasadim* is as if he has denied the root."²⁴⁷ (The "root" is the very foundation of faith, of Judaism, even of God.)

• "Simeon the Just was one of the last survivors of the Great Assembly. He used to say, 'The world depends on three things: Torah, Divine Worship, and the virtue of loving kindness.'"²⁴⁸

• "Our rabbis taught, 'When Rabbi Eleazar Ben Perata and Rabbi Hannia Ben Teradion were arrested, Rabbi Eleazar Ben Perata said to Rabbi Hannia Ben Teradion, 'Happy are you that you have been arrested on one charge. Woe is me, for I have been arrested on five charges.' Rabbi Hannia replied, 'Happy are you who have been arrested on five charges but will be rescued. Woe is me who, though having been arrested on only one charge, will not be rescued. For you have occupied yourself with Torah as well as the virtue of loving kindness, whereas I occupied myself with only Torah.'"²⁴⁹

246	Avot	DeRabbi	Nathan	Perek	4,	Section	5.	(My	translation))
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- 247 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 7:1 (My translation)
- 248 Mishnah, Pirke Avot, 1:2

249 Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah, 17b.

• In their explanation of the Hebrew Aleph-bet, the Rabbis said, "Gimmel Dalet, show loving kindness to the poor. Why is the foot of the Gimmel stretched out to the Dalet? because it is fitting for those who have the virtue of loving kindness to run after the poor."²⁵⁰

• "Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Bana'ah, 'What is the meaning of the verse, 'blessed are you that sow beside the waters, that sent for the feet of the ox and the ass?' It means this, 'Blessed are you,' when you occupy yourselves with Torah and the virtue of loving kindness. Their inclination is mastered by them, not they by their inclination... For what is meant by 'sow'? The virtue of loving kindness."²⁵¹

• Seven attributes serve before the throne of glory, they are: wisdom, righteousness, justice, the virtue of loving kindness, compassion, truth and peace. As it is said, "And I ill espouse you forever: I will espouse you with righteousness and justice and with goodness and mercy. And I will espouse you with faithfulness; then shall you be devoted to the Lord." Rabbi Meir says: Why does the verse say "then you shall be devoted to the Lord?" To teach that whoever has all these attributes knows the will of God.²⁵²

- 250 Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat, 8a.
- 251 Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah, 5b.
- 252 Avot DeRabbi-Natan, 37:4.

• "These are the things for which there is no fixed measure: Gleanings, First Fruits, the Feast Offering, the virtue of loving kindness, and the study of Torah."²⁵³

• "These are the things whose rewards a person enjoys in this world and in the world to come:

Honoring father and mother

The virtue of loving kindness

Making peace between a person and his/her fellow, and

The study of Torah is equal to them all."254

QUESTIONS:

- 1. Based on these texts, what is the virtue of loving kindness?
- 2. Of what importance is the virtue of loving kindness?

3. Why do we concern ourselves with the virtue of loving kindness?

4. What behaviors might be related to the virtue of loving kindness?

CLOSURE: Return to the large group, where each small group should share the text they read and the conclusions they drew based on that text with the large group.

253 Mishnah, Pe'ah, 1:1

254 ibid.

GEMILUT HASADIM IN THE CLASSROOM

Objectives: 1.1, 1.2, 1.4

Resources: Large sheets of white butcher paper, markers, paper, pencils.

Activities:

SET INDUCTION: Review the potential behaviors that might be related to *Gemilut Hasadim*. Ask participants to list some of their own teaching behaviors that they believe are related to *Gemilut Hasadim* - be specific.

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES: Break into new small groups. Each group should be instructed to answer the question, How might *Gemilut Hasadim* affect my classroom in the area of:

- · Behavior/Discipline (Teacher and Student)
- Content
- Holidays
- Observance/Ritual

CLOSURE: Return to the large group, where each small group should share their conclusions with the large group. Take notes on large sheets of butcher paper and tape these on the walls of the room when finished.

CREATING ROLE PLAYS

Objectives: 1.2, 1.3, 1.5

Resources: Large sheets of white butcher paper, markers.

Activities:

SET INDUCTION: Review the suggestions of how Gemilut Hasadim relates to the classroom in the different areas mentioned.

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES: Break into new small groups and in each of the four areas mentioned related to classroom activity, create a role-play situation based on the way *Gemilut Hasadim* might affect a classroom in the school. The four areas were:

- · Behavior/Discipline (Teacher and Student)
- Content
- · Holidays
- Observance/Ritual

The role play in each area should be clear enough for anyone to understand and act out. They should have a duration of about five minutes each. It is acceptable for them to be open-ended so the actor can decide what to do based on suggestions offered as part of the role play.

ROLE PLAYING

Objectives: 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5

Resources: The role-plays written earlier.

Activities:

SET INDUCTION: Meet as a large group. List the four areas under discussion that *Gemilut Hasadim* might affect in the classroom, then review the suggestions of how *Gemilut Hasadim* relates to the classroom in those areas.

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES: Break into small groups, give each group a roleplay or two, and ask them to be ready to act it out in ten minutes. No group should have the role-play it wrote. Return to the large group and begin watching the role-plays. After each one, ask for comments on what other ways a person might have handled the situation and if teachers would want to try this in their own classrooms.

SUNDAY

AN IDEAL GEMILUT HASADIM SCHOOL

Objectives: 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 3.2

Resources: Large sheets of white butcher paper, markers.

Activities:

SET INDUCTION: Divide into small groups again. Tell participants that they are about to take another trip. Tell them the following:

You are again riding in a colorful balloon with a glass bottom that allows you to silently float above the field and see everything without disturbing anything. ... The balloon continues to drift, and in the distance you see a building. As you get closer, you see that the building is the synagogue BUT NOT THE ONE AT WHICH YOU TEACH. THIS SCHOOL IS ONE that HAS DONE A PERFECT JOB AT INTEGRATING GEMILUT HASADIM INTO THE CLASSROOM AND THE SYNAGOGUE AS WHOLE. As you get even closer, you notice that something is different. The roof and walls are gone. They have been replaced by glass. You can see everything that is going on inside the school. However, you can not hear anything. Inside you see PEOPLE LIKE yourself and your colleagues teaching ideal regular students. Now, please open your eyes.

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES: Ask participants to, on the paper provided, write down the behaviors they see. What are the teachers doing? What are the students doing? Who else do you see? What are they doing? What do you see in the classrooms? What do you see in the other parts of the synagogue? Remember, you can only describe behaviors you see, not feelings or verbalizations. You can only describe your observations.

After you have described the situation in the school as you saw it, list next to each behavior the actions that might motivate the value that behavior reflects. What value causes/motivates the behavior you have described?

CLOSURE: Now, compare the master ranked list of values and behaviors you observed in YOUR school with those of this ideal school. What are the differences, the similarities? Each small group should share their observations with the entire group.

PUTTING GEMILUT HASADIM INTO OUR SCHOOL

Objectives: 1.4, 1.5

Resources: Large sheets of white butcher paper, markers.

Activities:

SET INDUCTION: Review the many ways in which *Gemilut Hasadim* can be a part of a school based on their own school and on their view of the ideal school. Consider as a large group what their school might do to better incorporate the value *Gemilut Hasadim*.

PRIMARY ACTIVITIES: Divide into small groups to plan the different aspects of an all-school kick-off for their *Gemilut Hasadim* program. Groups should communicate with one another and learn what the others are doing. Items to consider include, but are not limited to:

• Will there be a large program?

What will each classroom do?

 How will teachers be made partners and not just implementors of the program?

- When will this take place?
- · How will students learn about Gemilut Hasadim?
- What affective resources will be used?
- What cognitive resources will be used?
- What publicity will there be?
- · How will parents be involved and informed?
- What kind of home follow-up will be planned?

- How will the rest of the congregation be a part of this?
- · What kind of publicity will be done?

SUMMARY

Several suggestions come to mind that might be implemented during the course of the weekend.. It might be interesting to ask participants to make one of their meals a reflection of their commitment to *Gemilut Hasadim*. Following the meal, ask them to discuss what was different about the meal, their behavior during the meal, and the way the meal felt to them as a result. Another meal might be spent discussing only topics related to *Gemilut Hasadim*. Ask the participants how this meal was different.

At the conclusion of the weekend, the teachers should each leave with as much of the paperwork as they want to keep. That which is left should be transported to the school and posted in the teacher's lounge or, if appropriate, in the hallways. To reinforce the import of the weekend, individual thank-you notes should be sent to the participants from the director of education, the president of the congregation, and from the rabbi. A bulletin article about the weekend should also be published.

APPENDIX A255

255 Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values, (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 355-361, 421-428.

ROKEACH VALUES PROFILE

Instructions

On the next pages are 18 values listed in alphabetical order. Your task is to arrange them in order of their importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life. Each value is printed on a gummed label which can be easily peeled off and pasted in the boxes on the left-hand side of the page.

Study the list carefully and pick out the one value which is the most important for you. Peel it off and paste it in Box 1 on the left. Then pick out the value which is second most important for you. Peel it off and paste it in Box 2. Then do the same for each of the remaining values. The value which is least important goes in Box 18.

Work slowly and think carefully. If you change your mind, feel free to change your answers. The labels peel off easily and can be moved from place to place. The end result should truly show how you really feel.

A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life) AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life) A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution) A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict) A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts) EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all) FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones) FREEDOM (independence, free choice) HAPPINESS (contentedness) INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict) MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy) NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack) PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life) SALVATION (saved, eternal life) SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem) SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration) TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship) WISDOM (a mature understanding of life) WHEN YOU HAVE FINISHED, GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE.

Below is another list of 18 values. Arrange them in order of importance, the same as before.

AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring) BROADMINDED (open-minded) CAPABLE (competent, effective) CHEERFUL (lighthearted, joyful) CLEAN (neat, tidy) COURAGEOUS (standing up for your beliefs) FORGIVING (willing to pardon others) HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others) HONEST (sincere, truthful) IMAGINATIVE (daring, creative) INDEPENDENT (self reliance, self-sufficient) INTELLECTUAL (intelligent, reflective) LOGICAL (consistent, rational) LOVING (affectionate, tender) OBEDIENT (dutiful, respectful) POLITE (courteous, well-mannered) RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable) SELF CONTROLLED (restrained, self disciplined)

Rokeach Value Change Instrument

VALUE SURVEY -PART 1 NAME SEX: MALE FEMALE BIRTHDATE CITY AND STATE OF BIRTH

This is a scientific study of value systems. There are no right or wrong answers in this study. The best answer is your own personal opinion.

This questionnaire is intended not only to gather new scientific facts, but also as a teaching devise. In return for your cooperation, we hope to provide you with some interesting insights into yourself.

Below is a list of 18 values in alphabetical order. We are interested in finding out the relative importance of these values to you.

Study the list carefully. Then place a 1 next to the value which is most important to you, place a 2 next to the value which is second most important, etc. The value which is least important should be ranked 18.

When you have completed ranking all the values, go back and check over your list. Feel free to make changes. Please take all the time you need to think about this, so that the end result truly represents your values.

- ____ A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)
- ____ AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
- A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)
- A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)
- A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)

- _____ EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
- _____ FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones)
- _____ FREEDOM (independence, free choice
- _____ HAPPINESS (contentedness)
- INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)
- MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
- NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
- PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
- _____ SALVATION (saved, eternal life)
- _____ SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
- _____ SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
- TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
- _____ WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)

When you finish this page, go right on to the next page.

Now we are interested in knowing how you feel about the way you ranked these 18 values in general. Please circle one number on the following scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
I ca	are ve	ry						It	does	not
mu	ch abo	out						п	nake m	uch
the	order	iņ						c	differe	nce
whi	ch I r	anked						w	nich or	der
the	se val	ues.						l pu	t them	in.

Below you will find the same 18 values listed again. This time, rank them in the order you think MSU students on the average would rank them.

- A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)
- AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)
- A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)
- A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)
- A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
- EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)
- FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones)
- FREEDOM (independence, free choice)
- HAPPINESS (contentedness)
- INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)
- MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy)
- ____ NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack)
- PLEASURE (an enjoyable, leisurely life)
- SALVATION (saved, eternal life)
- SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem)
- SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration)
- TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship)
- WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)

You have now completed Part I of the Value Survey.

When you finish this page, go right on to the next page.

VALUE SURVEY - PART 2

Please do not sign your name!

Now copy your answers from the value scale on Page 1 (your *own* value rankings) onto this page.

MY OWN VALUE SYSTEM

____A COMFORTABLE LIFE

AN EXCITING LIFE

A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

____ A WORLD AT PEACE

A WORLD OF BEAUTY

EQUALITY

FAMILY SECURITY

FREEDOM

HAPPINESS

INNER HARMONY

MATURE LOVE

____NATIONAL SECURITY

PLEASURE

____ SALVATION

_____ SELF-RESPECT

SOCIAL RECOGNITION

TRUE FRIENDSHIP

WISDOM

When you have finished this page:

1. Hand in Part I.

2. Wait for further instructions. DO NOT GO ON TO THE NEXT

PAGE.

Now, I would like to tell you some things we have already found out about the value systems of Michigan State students. I am sure that many of you would like to know what they are.

This same value system scale was filled out by 298 students in Psychology 151. The responses of these students were obtained and averaged together. The table below shows the results.

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TABLE 1. RANK ORDER OF IMPORTANCE TO298 MICHIGAN STATE STUDENTS

- 13 A COMFORTABLE LIFE
- 12 AN EXCITING LIFE
- 6 A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT
- 10 A WORLD AT PEACE
- 17 A WORLD OF BEAUTY
- 11 EQUALITY
- 9 FAMILY SECURITY
- 1 FREEDOM
- 2 HAPPINESS
- 8 INNER HARMONY
- 5 MATURE LOVE
- 16 NATIONAL SECURITY
- 18 PLEASURE
- 14 SALVATION
- 15 SOCIAL RECOGNITION
- 4 SELF-RESPECT
- 7 TRUE FRIENDSHIP
- 3 WISDOM

One of the most interesting findings shown in Table 1 is that the students, on the average, felt that freedom was very important - they ranked it 1; but they felt that *equality* was considerably less important - they ranked it 11. Apparently, Michigan State students value freedom far more highly than they value equality. This suggests that MSU students in general are much more interested in their own freedom than they are in freedom for other people.

Feel free to spend a few minutes comparing your own rankings on the preceding page with those of the 298 students, shown in Table 1. After doing that, please stop and wait for further instructions. DO NOT GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE.

We have one other finding which we think is unusually interesting. In order to make this finding more meaningful and relevant to you personally, you should first answer honestly the following question on civil rights:

Are you sympathetic with the aims of the civil rights demonstrators?

Yes, and I have personally participated in a civil rights demonstration.
Yes, but I have not participated in a civil rights demonstration.
No.

The 298 students who participated in the previous study of value systems were asked this same question. They were divided into three groups, according to how they responded. Table 2 shows the average rankings of Freedom and Equality for each of these three groups.

TABLE 2. AVERAGE RANKINGS OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY BY MSU STUDENTS FOR AND AGAINST CIVIL RIGHTS

Yes, and Have		Yes, But Have	No, Not Sympathetic
	Participated	Not Participated	to Civil Rights
FREEDOM	6	1	2
EQUALITY	5	11	17
DIFFERENC	E +1	-10	-15

Notice in Table 2 that:

Pro and anti-civil rights students all value freedom highly. Of
 values all groups rank freedom among the top six.

2. Students who are strongly for civil rights value equality rather highly - they ranked it 5; but those against civil rights place a much *lower* value on equality - they ranked it 17 to importance. Those who are sympathetic but nonparticipants ranked equality 11.

3. The distance between freedom and equality is +1 for the strong civil rights group, -10 for the middle group, and -15 for the anti-civil rights group.

Apparently both freedom and equality are important to some people, while to others freedom is very important but equality is not.

This raises the question whether those who are *against* civil rights are really saying that they care a great deal about *their own* freedom but are indifferent to other people's freedom. Those who are *for* civil rights are perhaps really saying they not only want freedom for themselves, but for other people too. What do you think?

(Please circle one number)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1 ag	ree			1	'm no	ot				I disagree
stro	ngly	with	this		sure.					strongly
inte	rpre	tation	۱.							with this
										interpretation

Before you go on to the last part of this questionnaire, please spend a few minutes comparing your own rankings from the first page with these results. Then go on to the next page.

We would now be most interested to find out how you feel about the method we have used to teach you something about the value systems of Michigan State students.

Did you find it thought-provoking?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Ext	remel	у							Extrem	ely
tho	ught-p	orovok	king						bor	ing

Do you think this technique of teaching will lead you to do some more thinking about your own values?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Yes	, very								No,	not
muc	h								at	all

Do you feel that your responses were somewhat hypocritical?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Yes	, very							No,	not at	all
hyp	ocriti	cal						hy	pocriti	ical

Right now, how satisfied do you feel about the way you have ranked the eighteen values?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Ext	tremel	У							Extren	nely
sat	isfied	Ê.						di	ssatis	fied

GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE.

Now look again for a moment at your own rankings on the first page. Which rankings do you now feel satisfied or dissatisfied with? (Please indicate whether you now feel satisfied or dissatisfied with each one, by a check mark or an X)

I am satis-	I am dis-
fied with my	satisfied with
ranking of:	my ranking of:

	A COMFORTABLE LIFE					
	AN EXCITING LIFE					
-	A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT					
	A WORLD AT PEACE					
	A WORLD OF BEAUTY					
	EQUALITY					
	FAMILY SECURITY					
,	FREEDOM					
	HAPPINESS					
	INNER HARMONY					
	MATURE LOVE					
	NATIONAL SECURITY					
	PLEASURE					
	SALVATION					
	SELF-RESPECT					
	SOCIAL RECOGNITION					
	TRUE FRIENDSHIP					
	WISDOM					

In your own opinion, do you think that the Michigan State findings I have described to you are scientifically valid?

__Yes ___No

In the space below, please explain why you answered the previous question the way you did.

Do you have any other comments you wish to make about this study? Please comment in the space below. Remember, everything in this questionnaire is absolutely confidential, and to be used *only* for scientific purposes.

Thank you for your cooperation.

APPENDIX B256

²⁵⁶ Brian P. Hall et al., *Developing Human Values*, (Fond du Lac, WI: International Values Institute of Marian College, 1990), preface.

VALUES AND THEIR DEFINITIONS List of 125 Values

INTRODUCTION

These definitions are brief and are not intended to be comprehensive. They do provide a working guideline for persons seeking to understand the meaning of a value.

1. Accountability/Ethics: The ability that flows from one's personal awareness of one's own system of moral principles to enrich others by addressing their conduct in relationship to their value system. This assumes the capacity to understand another's level of ethical maturity.

2. Achievement/Success: Accomplishing something noteworthy and admirable in the world of work or education.

3. Adaptability/Flexibility: To adjust one's self readily to changing conditions and to remain pliable during ongoing change.

4. Administration/Control: Having the authority to be in command and to exercise specific management functions and tasks in institutions.

 Affection/Physical: Physical touching which expresses fondness or devotion.

6. Art/Beauty/as Pure Value: Experiencing and/or providing pleasure through that which is aesthetically appealing, in both natural and person-made creations, for the mental and emotional stimulation and pleasure it provides.

7. (Self) Assertion/Directness: The will to put one's self forward boldly regarding a personal line of thought or action.

Being Liked: To experience friendly feelings from one's peers.

9. Being Self: The capacity to own one's truth about one's self and the world with objective awareness of personal strengths and limitations, plus the ability to act both independently and cooperatively when appropriate.

10. **Care/Nurture:** To be physically and emotionally supported by family and friends throughout one's life from childhood through aging and to value doing the same for others.

11. **Collaboration/Subsidiarity:** The ability of an organizational leader to cooperate interdependently with all levels of management to insure full and appropriate delegation of responsibility.

12. **Communication/Information:** Effective and efficient transmission and flow of ideas and factual data within and between persons, departments and divisions of an organization.

13. Community/Personalist: Sufficient depth and quality of commitment to a group, its members and its purpose so that both independent creativity and interdependent cooperation are maximized simultaneously.

14. **Community/Supportive:** The recognition and will to create a group of peers for the purpose of ongoing mutual support and creative enhancement of each individual. It is the additional awareness of the need for such a group in the work environment and with peer professionals necessary to enable one to detach from external pressures that deter one from acting with clarity on chosen values and ethical principles that might be otherwise compromised.

15. (Self) Competence/Confidence: Realistic and objective confidence that one has the skills to achieve in the world of work and to feel that those skills are a positive contribution.

16. Competition: To be energized by a sense of rivalry, to be first or most respected in a given arena, e.g. sports, education or work.

17. **Congruence:** The capacity to experience and express one's feelings and thoughts in such a way that what one experiences internally and communicates externally to others is the same.

18. **Construction/New Order:** To develop and initiate a new institution for the purpose of creatively enhancing society. This assumes technological, interpersonal and management skills.

19. Contemplation/Asceticism: Self-discipline and the art of meditation that prepares one for intimacy with others and spirituality.

20. **Control/Order/Discipline:** Providing restraint and direction to achieve methodological arrangement of persons or things according to the prescribed rules.

21. **Convivial Technology:** The capacity to creatively apply technological expertise, both organizationally and with technical instruments, to develop means to improve social conditions in the world by improving means of distributing the basic necessities of life.

22. **Cooperation/Complementarity**: The capacity to enable persons in a corporation or institution to work cooperatively with one another such that the unique skills and qualities of one individual supplement, support and enhance the skills and qualities of the others in the group.

23. **Corporation/New Order:** The skills, capacity and will to create new organizational styles or to improve present institutional forms in order to creatively enhance society.

24. **Courtesy/Hospitality**: Offering polite and respectful treatment to others as well as treating quests and strangers in a friendly and generous manner. It also includes receiving the same treatment from others.

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25. Creativity/Ideation: The capacity for original thought and expression that brings new ideas and images into a practical and concrete reality in ways that did not previously exist.

26. Criteria/Rationality: The trained capacity to think logically and reasonably based on a formal body of information. The capacity to exercise reason before emotions.

27. **Decision/Initiation**: To feel that it is one's responsibility to begin a creative course of action, or to act on one's conscience without external prompting.

28. **Design/Pattern/Order:** Awareness of the natural arrangement of things plus the ability to create new arrangements through the initiation of arts, ideas or technology; e.g. architecture.

29. Detachment/Solitude: The regular discipline of non-attachment that leads to quality relationships.

30. Detachment/Transcendence: Exercising spiritual discipline and detachment so that one experiences a global and visionary perspective.

31. Dexterity/Coordination: Sufficient harmonious interaction of mental and physical functions to perform basic instrumental skills.

32. **Discernment/Communal:** The capacity or skill to enable a group or organization to come to consensus decisions relative to long term planning through reflection and honest interaction.

33. **Duty/Obligation:** Closely following established customs and regulations out of dedication to one's peers and a sense of responsibility to institutional codes.

34. Economics/Profit: Accumulation of physical wealth to be secure and respected.

35. Economics/Success: To attain favorable and prosperous financial results in business through effective control and efficient management of resources.

36. Ecority/Aesthetics: The capacity, skills and personal, organizational or conceptual influence to enable persons to take authority for the world and to enhance its beauty and balance through creative technology in ways that have worldwide influence.

37. Education/Certification: Completing a formally prescribed process of learning and receiving documentation of that process.

38. Education/Knowledge/Insight: The experience of ongoing learning as a means of gaining new facts, truths and principles.

39. Efficiency/Planning: Thinking about and designing acts and purposes in the best possible and least wasteful manner before implementing them.

40. **Empathy:** Reflecting and experiencing another's feelings and state of being through a quality of presence that has the consequence of them seeing themselves with more clarity, without any words necessarily having been spoken.

41. Endurance/Patience: The ability to bear difficult and painful experiences, situations or persons with calm stability and perseverance.

42. Equality/Liberation: Experiencing one's self as having the same value and rights as all other human beings in such a way that one is set free to be one's self and to free others to be themselves. This is the critical consciousness of the value of being human.

43. Equilibrium: Maintaining a peaceful social environment by averting upsets and avoiding conflicts.

44. Equity/Rights: Awareness of the moral and ethical claim of all persons, including one's self, to legal, social and economic equality and fairness, plus a personal commitment to defend this claim.

45. Evaluation/Self System: Appreciating an objective appraisal of one's self and being open to what others reflect back about one's self as necessary for self-awareness and personal growth.

46. Expressiveness/Freedom/Joy: To share one's feelings and fantasies so openly and spontaneously that others are free to do the same.

47. Faith/Risk/Vision: Behavioral commitment to values that are considered life-giving even at risk to one's life.

48. Family/Belonging: The people to whom one feels primary bonds of relationship and acceptance and the place of dwelling of one's parents.

49. Fantasy/Play: The experience of personal worth through unrestrained imagination and personal amusement.

50. Food/Warmth/Shelter: Personal concern about having adequate physical nourishment, warmth and comfort and a place of refuge from the elements.

51. Friendship/Belonging: To have a group of persons with whom one can share on a day-to-day basis.

52. Function/Physical: Concern about the ability to perform minimal manipulations of the body to care for one's self and concern about the body's internal systems and their ability to function adequately.

53. Generosity/Service: To share one's unique gifts and skills with others as a way of serving humanity without expecting reciprocation.

54. Growth/Expansion: The ability to enable an organization to develop and grow creatively. This assumes skills in management design and organizational development at a corporate level.

55. Health/Healing/Harmony: Soundness of mind and body that flows from meeting one's emotional and physical need through self-awareness and preventive discipline. This includes an understanding that commitment to maintaining one's inner rhythm and balance relates to positive feelings and fantasy.

56. **Hierarchy/Propriety/Order:** The methodical, harmonious arrangement of persons and things ranked above one another in conformity to established standards of what is good and proper within an organization.

57. Honor: High respect for the worth, merit or rank of those in authority, e.g. parents, superiors and national leaders.

58. Human Dignity: Consciousness of the basic right of every human being to have respect and to have her/his basic needs met that will allow her/him the opportunity to develop her/his maximum potential.

59. Human Rights/World Social Order: Committing one's talent, education, training and resources to creating the means for every person in the world to experience her/his basic right to such life-giving resources as food, habitat, employment, health and minimal practical education. 60. Independence: Thinking and acting for one's self in matters of opinion, conduct, etc., without being subject to external constraint or authority.

61. Integration/Wholeness: The inner capacity to organize the personality (mind and body) into a coordinated, harmonious totality.

62. Interdependence: Seeing and acting on the awareness that personal and inter-institutional cooperation are always preferable to individual decision-making.

63. (Self)Interest/Control: Restraining one's feelings and controlling one's personal interests in order to survive physically in the world.

64. Intimacy: Sharing one's full personhood -- thoughts, feelings, fantasies and realities -- mutually and freely with the total personhood of another on a regular basis.

65. Intimacy and Solitude as Unitive: The experience of personal harmony that results from a combination of meditative practice and mutual openness and total acceptance of another person which leads to new levels of meaning and awareness.

66. Justice/Global Distribution: Commitment to the fact that all persons have equal value but different gifts and abilities to contribute to

society, combined with the capacity to elicit inter-institutional and governmental collaboration that will help provide the basic life necessities for the poor in the world.

67. Justice/Social Order: Taking a course of action that addresses, confronts and helps correct conditions of human oppression in order to actualize the truth that every human being is of equal value.

68. Knowledge/Discovery/Insight: The pursuit of truth through patterned investigation. One is motivated by increased intuition and understanding of the wholeness of reality.

69. Law/Guide: Seeing authoritative principles and regulations as a means for creating one's own criteria and moral conscience, and questioning those rules until they are clear and meaningful.

70. Law/Rule: Governing one's conduct, action and procedures by the established legal system or code. Living one's life by the rules.

71. Leisure/Freesence: Use of time in a way that requires as much skill and concentration as one's work but that totally detaches one from work so that the spontaneous self is free to emerge in a playful and contagious manner.

72. Life/Self/Actualization: The inner drive toward experiencing and expressing the totality of one's being through spiritual, psychological,

physical and mental approaches which enhance the development of one's maximum potential.

73. Limitation/Acceptance: Giving positive mental assent to the reality that one has boundaries and inabilities. This includes an objective self-awareness of one's strengths and potential as well as weakness and inability. The capacity for self-criticism.

74. Limitation/Celebration: The recognition that one's limits are the framework for exercising one's talents. The ability to laugh at one's own imperfections.

75. Loyalty/Fidelity: Strict observance of promises and duties to those in authority and to those in close personal relationships.

76. **Macroeconomics/World Order:** The ability to manage and direct the use of financial resources at an institutional and inter-institutional level toward creating a more stable and equitable world economic order.

77. **Management:** The control and direction of personnel in a business or institution for the purpose of optimal productivity and efficiency.

78. **Memberships/Institution**: The pride of belonging to and functioning as an integral part of an organization, foundation, establishment, etc.

79. **Minessence:** The capacity to miniaturize and simplify complex ideas or technological instruments (tools) into concrete and practical objectifications in a way that creatively alters the consciousness of the user.

80. **Mission/Objectives:** The ability to establish organizational goals and execute long-term planning that takes into consideration the needs of society and how the organization contributes to those needs.

81. Mutual Responsibility/Accountability: The skills to maintain a reciprocal balance of tasks and assignments with others So that everyone is answerable for her/his own area of responsibility. This requires the ability to mobilize one's anger in creative and supportive ways so as to move relationships to increasing levels of cooperation.

82: **Obedience/Duty:** Dutifully and submissively complying with moral and legal obligation established by parents and civic and religious authorities.

83. **Obedience/Mutual Accountability**: Being mutually and equally responsible for establishing and being subject to a common set of rules and guidelines in a group of persons.

84. **Ownership:** Personal and legal possessions of skills, decisions, and property that gives one a sense of personal authority.

85. **Patriotism/Esteem:** Honor for one's country based on personal devotion, love and support.

86. **Personal/Authority/Honesty**: The freedom to experience and express one's full range of feelings and thought in a straightforward, objective manner. This ability comes from a personal integration of thoughts and feelings and results in experiencing one's own integrity and power.

87. Physical Delight: The joy of experiencing all the senses of one's body.

88. **Pioneerism/Innovation/Progress:** Introducing and originating creative ideas for positive change in social organizations and systems and providing the framework for actualizing them.

89. **Play/Recreation:** A pastime or diversion from the anxiety of dayto-day living for the purpose of undirected, spontaneous refreshment (which provides for a potential self to be experienced).

90. **Presence/Swelling:** The ability to be with another person that comes from inner self-knowledge which is so contagious that another person is able to ponder the depths of who he or she is with awareness and clarity.

91. (Self) Preservation: Doing what is necessary to protect one's self from physical harm or destruction in an alien world.

92. **Prestige/Image:** Physical appearance which reflects success and achievement, gains the esteem of others and promotes success.

93. **Productivity:** To feel energized by generating and completing tasks and activities and achieving externally established goals and expectations.

94. **Property/Control:** Accumulating property and exercising personal direction over it for security and for meeting one's basic physical and emotional needs.

95. **Prophet/Vision:** The ability to communicate the truth about global justice issues and human rights in such a lucid manner that the hearer is able to transcend her/his limited personal awareness and gain a new perspective on herself/himself and the needs of the disadvantaged.

96. **Relaxation:** Diversion from physical or mental work which reduces stress and provides a balance of work and play as a means of realizing one's potential.

97. **Research/Originality/Knowledge:** Systematic investigation and contemplation of the nature of truths and principles about people and human experience for the purpose of creating new insights and awareness.

98. **Responsibility:** To be personally accountable for and in charge of a specific area or course of action in one's organization or group.

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14-6

99. **Rights/Respect:** The moral principle of esteeming the worth (and property) of another as I expect others to esteem me (and mine).

100. **Ritual/Communication:** Skills and use of liturgy and the arts as a communication medium for raising critical consciousness of such themes as world social conditions and awareness of the transcendent.

101. **Rule/Accountability:** The need to have each person openly explain or justify her/his behavior in relationship to the established codes of conduct, procedures, etc.

102. Safety/Survival: Concern about the ability to avoid personal injury, danger of loss and to do what is necessary to protect one's self in adverse circumstances.

103. Search/Meaning/Hope: A personal exploration arising from an inner longing and curiosity to integrate one's feelings, imagination and objective knowledge in order to discover one's unique place in the world.

104. Security: Finding a safe place or relationship where one experiences protection and is free from care and anxieties.

105. Sensory Pleasure/Sexuality: Gratifying one's sensual desires and experiencing one's sexual identity.

106. Service/Vocation: To be motivated to use one's unique gifts and skills to contribute to society through one's occupation, business, profession or calling.

107. Sharing/Listening/Trust: The capacity to actively and accurately hear another's thoughts and feelings and to express one's own thought and feelings in a climate of mutual confidence in each other's integrity.

108. **Simplicity/Play:** The capacity for deeply appreciating the world combined with a playful attitude toward organizations and systems that is energizing and positive. The ability to see simplicity in complexity and to be detached from the world as primarily material in nature. It can include the mutual sharing of property within a group.

109. Social Affirmation: Personal respect and validation coming from the support and respect of one's peers which is necessary for one to grow and succeed.

110. Support/Peer: To have persons who are one's equals who sustain one in both joyful and difficult times.

111. Synergy: Experiencing the relationships of persons within a group to be harmonious and energized so that the outcome of the group far surpasses its predicted ability based on the total abilities of its individual members.

112. Technology/Science: Systematic knowledge of the physical or natural world and practical applications of the knowledge through manmade devices and tools.

113. Territory/Security: Provision for physically defending property, a personal domain or nation state.

114. **Tradition:** Recognizing the importance of ritualizing family history, religious history and national history in one's life so as to enrich its meaning.

115. Transcendence/Global Equality: Knowing the practical relationship between human oppression, freedom and creative ecological balance based on a simultaneous awareness of the finite and the infinite so that tone can influence changes that promote greater human equality.

116. Truth/Wisdom/Integrated Insight: Intense pursuit and discovery of ultimate truth about all other activities. This results in intimate knowledge of objective and subjective realities which converge into the capacity to clearly comprehend persons and systems and their inter-relationships.

117 Unity/Diversity: Recognizing and acting administratively on the belief that an organization is creatively enhanced by giving equal opportunity to persons from a variety of cultures, ethnic backgrounds and diverse training.

118. Unity/Uniformity: Harmony and agreement in an institution that is established to achieve efficiency, order, loyalty and conformity to established norms.

199. Wonder/Awe/Fate: To be filled with marvel, amazement and fear when faced with the overwhelming grandeur and power of one's physical environment.

120. Wonder/Curiosity/Nature: A sense of marvel and amazement about the physical world coupled with a desire to learn about it and explore it personally.

121. Word: The ability to communicate universal truths so effectively that the hearer becomes conscious of her/his limitations such that life and hope are renewed in the individual hearer.

122. Word/Labor: To have skills and rights that allow one to produce a minimal living for one's self and one's family.

123. Workmanship/Art/Craft: Skills requiring manual dexterity that produce artifacts and modify or beautify person-made environment.

124. Worship/Faith/Creed: Reverence for and belief in God that is expressed and experienced through a commitment to doctrines and teachings of religious belief.

125. Self Worth: The knowledge that when those respects and esteems really know her/him, they will affirm that she/he is worthy of that respect.

APPENDIX C257

²⁵⁷ "The Six Stages of Moral Judgment," Appendix, pages 409-12 from Lawrence Kohlberg, *Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice*, Vol. 1 of *Essays on Moral Development*, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981) 409-412.

The Six Stages of Moral Judgment

Level A. Preconventional Level

Stage 1. The Stage of Punishment and Obedience Content

Right is literal obedience to rules and authority, avoiding punishment, and not doing physical harm.

1. What is right is to avoid breaking rules, to obey for obedience sake, and to avoid doing physical damage to people and property.

 The reasons for doing right are avoidance of punishment and the superior power of authorities.

Social Perspective

This stage takes an egocentric point of view. A personal at this stage doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize they differ from actor's, and doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are judged in terms of physical consequences rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Author's perspective is confused with one's own.

Stage 2. The Stage of Individual Instrumental Purpose and Exchange

Content

Right is serving one's own or other's needs and making fair deals in terms of concrete exchange.

1. What is right is following rules when it is to someone's immediate interest. Right is acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what is fair; that is, what is an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.

2. The reason for doing right is to serve one's own needs or interests in a world where one must recognize that other people have their interests, too.

Social Perspective

This stage takes a concrete individualistic perspective. A person at this stage separates own interests and points of view from those of authorities and others. He or she is aware everybody has individual interests to pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense). The person integrates or relates conflicting individual interests to one another through instrumental exchange of services, through instrumental need for the other and the other's goodwill, and through fairness giving each person the same amount.

Level B. Conventional Level

Stage 3. The Stage of Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Conformity

Content

The right is playing a good (nice) role, being concerned about the other people and their feelings, keeping loyalty and trust with partners, and being motivated to follow rules and expectations.

1. What is right is living up to what is expected by people close to one or what people generally expect of people in one's role as son, sister, friend, and so on. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, maintaining trust. loyalty, respect and gratitude.

2. Reasons for doing right are needing to be good in one's own eyes and those of others, caring for others, and because if one puts

oneself in the other person's place one would want good behavior from the self (Golden Rule).

Social Perspective

This stage takes the perspective of the individual in relationship to other individuals. A person at this stage is aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations, which take primacy over individual interests. The person relates points of view through the "concrete Gold Rule," putting oneself in the other person's shoes. He or she does not consider generalized "system" perspective.

Stage 4. The Stage of Social System and Conscience Maintenance

Content

The right is doing one's duty in society, upholding the social order, and maintaining the welfare of society or the group.

1. What is right is fulfilling the actual duties to which one has agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties and rights. Right is also contributing to society, the group or institution.

2. The reasons for doing right are to keep the institution going as a whole, set respect or conscience as meeting one's defined obligations, or the consequence "What if everyone did it?"

Social Perspective

This stage differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives. A person at this stage takes the viewpoint of the system which defines roles and rules. He or she considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.

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Level B/C. Transitional Level

This level is postconventional but not yet principled. Content of Transition

At Stage 4 1/2, choice is personal and subjective. It is based on emotions, conscience is seen as arbitrary and relative, as are ideas such as "duty" and "morally right."

Transitional Social Perspective

At this stage, the perspective is that of an individual standing outside of his own society and considering himself as an individual making decisions without a generalized commitment or contract with society. One can pick and choose obligations, which are defined by particular societies, but one has no principles for such choice.

Level C. Postconventional and Principled Level

Moral decisions are generated from rights, values, or principles that are (or could be) agreeable to all individuals composing or creating a society designed to have fair and beneficial practices.

Stage 5. The Stage of Prior Rights and Society Contract or Utility

Content

The right is upholding the basic rights, values, and legal contracts of a society, even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of the group. 1. What is right is being aware of the fact that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to one's group. These "relative" rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights such as life, and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.

2. Reasons for doing right are, in general, feeling obligated to obey the law because one has made a social contract to make and abide by laws for the good of all and to protect their own rights and the rights of others. Family, friendship, trust, and work obligations are also commitments or contracts freely entered into and entail respect for the rights of others. One is concerned that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility: "The greatest good for the greatest number."

Social Perspective

This stage takes a prior-to-society perspective - that of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. The person integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective impartiality, and due process. He or she considers the moral point of view and the legal point of view, recognizes they conflict, and finds it difficult to integrate them.

Stage 6. The Stage of Universal Ethical Principles Content

This stage assumes guidance by universal ethical principles that all humanity should follow.

1. Regarding what is right, Stage 6 is guided by universal ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice; the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individuals. These are not merely values that are recognized, but are also principles used to generate particular decisions.

2. The reason for doing right is that, as a rational person, one has seen the validity of principles and has become committed to them. Social Perspective

This stage takes the perspective of a moral point of view from which social arrangements derive or on which they are grounded. The perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the basic moral premise of respect for other persons as ends, not means.

APPENDIX D258

²⁵⁸ "Moral Education in the Life of the School," *Educational Leadership*, (May 1988): 5.

The Morally Mature Person

What kind of human being do we want to emerge from our efforts at moral education? What are the characteristics of the morally mature person?

A moment's reflection tells us that moral maturity is more than just knowing what is right. The world is full of people who know what is right but set moral considerations aside when they find it expedient to do so. To be moral means to *value* morality, to take moral obligations seriously. It means to be able to judge what is right but also to care deeply about doing it - and to possess the will, competence, and habits needed to translate moral judgment and feeling into effective moral action.

We submit that the morally mature person has six major characteristics, which are derived from universal moral and democratic principles. These characteristics offer schools and communities a context for discourse about school programs and moral behavior.

The morally mature person habitually:

- 1. Respects human dignity, which includes
 - showing regard for the worth and rights of all persons,
 - avoiding deception and dishonesty,
 - · promoting human equality,
 - respecting freedom of conscience,
 - · working with people of different views, and
 - · refraining from prejudiced actions.
- 2. Cares about the welfare of others, which includes

- · recognizing interdependence among people,
- · caring for one's country,
- seeking social justice,
- · taking pleasure in helping others, and
- · working to help others reach moral maturity.
- Integrates individual interests and social responsibilities, which includes
 - becoming involved in community life,
 - · doing a fair share of community work,
 - displaying self-regarding and other-regarding moral virtues
 - self-control, diligence, fairness, kindness, honesty, civility
 - in everyday life,
 - · fulfilling commitments, and
 - developing self-esteem through relationships with others.

4. Demonstrates integrity, which includes

- · practicing diligence,
- taking stands for moral principles,
- · displaying moral courage,
- knowing when to compromise and when to confront, and
- accepting responsibility for one's choices.
- 5 Reflects on moral choices, which includes
 - · recognizing the moral issues involved in a situation,
 - applying moral principles (such as the golden rule) when making moral judgments,
 - thinking about the consequences of decisions, and

 seeking to be informed about important moral issues in society and the world. 6 Seeks peaceful resolution of conflict, which includes

• striving for the fair resolution of personal and social conflicts,

· avoiding physical and verbal aggression,

- · listening carefully to others,
- · encouraging others to communicate, and
- · working for peace.

In general, then, the morally mature person understands moral principles and accepts responsibility for applying them.

-ASCD Panel on Moral Education

APPENDIX E259

²⁵⁹ Samuel K. Joseph, "Caring, Judging, and Acting: How to Promote Jewish Values in the Religious School," *Compass*, 9:2 (Winter, 1987):8.

CARING

The Bible states "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Caring is feeling support for self and concern for others. Caring moves us to work for the welfare of others. Caring is not just an emotion. It includes our ability to understand the situation of another. We care only in relation to how much we understand. We as teachers can promote the desire and ability to care. Ideas for Promoting Caring in the Classroom

1. Learning to listen to others: Have students practice restating classmates' words in their own words. In pairs have students tell something about themselves as the other listens closely. Then, the other student reports what s/he heard to the class.

- 2. Make holiday cards for classmates or shut-ins.
- 3. Care for class pet. Care for class plants.
- Set up peer tutoring for Hebrew studies.
- 5. Make a bulletin board about friendship.
- Study Jewish texts on compassion.

Exodus 22:20-23-"You shall not wrong a stranger or oppress him...." Leviticus 19:9-10-"Leave the corners of your field for the poor...." Maimonides' Ladder of Tzedakah

Ethics of the Fathers

JUDGING

When we look at certain actions and we say they are right or wrong, ought or ought not to be done, we are making moral judgments. We also make moral judgments about people, motives, or traits of character; for example, "Sarah was a good woman." In other cases, we make statements about what the godly way consists of, and what should be classified and passed on to the next generation.

Questions of moral judgment confront us every day. Should we lie to a dying patient? Should we conceal from a child that s/he is adopted? Should we tell the store owner that we saw a 'poor looking person' steal some food?

As teachers, we must provide opportunities in school for our students to learn how to make moral judgments and the chance to practice making them.

Ideas for Learning About and Practicing Moral Judgments in Class

 Practice solving moral dilemmas. See: Moral Development: A Practical Guide for Jewish Teachers by Earl Schwartz (Denver, Colorado: A.R.E., 1983).

2. Do values exercises and discuss. Examples may be found in *The* Jewish Experimental Book, by B. Riesman (New York: Ktav, 1979).

Clarifying Jewish Values, by Dov Elkins (Rochester, N.Y.: Growth Associates, 1977).

Have regular class meetings regarding moral issues in the news.
 Give each student a specific role: Chair, Recorder, Agenda Writer,
 Paraphraser, Summarizer, Silencer, Speakers' Order.

ACTING

All teachers hope that what they teach is somehow lived out by the students outside of the classroom. We can learn and practice all we want, but students must have real world experiences too. Students need to feel a part of the larger community, with the opportunity to use their caring and judging values.

Ideas for Action Projects

1. Have a member of the synagogue's Social Action Committee meet with the class.

2. Attend a meeting of the Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC).

3. Assist with collecting food for the local foodbank.

4. Work in a night shelter for the homeless.

5. Take part in a demonstration to free Soviet Jews.

APPENDIX F

There is an ever-increasing number of religious school textbooks that claim they teach ethics or are in some way engaged in moral education. The following comments are an attempt to list some of those books and evaluate them based on what has been presented in this thesis. They are listed, in no particular order, by publisher.

KTAV

EXPLORING JEWISH WISDOM I & II (Grades 2-3) This uses values clarification strategies along with Midrashim. It emphasizes situational ethics with a Jewish flavor. The exercises are excellent. However, the instructor will need to do a great deal of their own preparation and follow-up for these exercises.

LET'S DO A MITZVAH (Grades 3-4) This uses Jewish texts and asks very affective, value related questions. Although traditional in focus, it has a great deal to offer any group of young people.

LET'S TALK ABOUT BEING JEWISH (Grades 3-4) This book attempts to define basic Jewish ethical dn value concepts for the student. the definitions are not always clear, but they are well tied into Jewish texts and language. The values clarification exercises are not well explained but can be adapted for use as a set induction for a particular unit. JOSEPH & ME (Grades 4-6) There are some excellent value concepts illustrated through the use of texts and questions. However, their placement in a 'Holocaust textbook' is difficult to overcome with students. CHOOSING TO BE CHOSEN (Grades 6-8) this is less about values than it is about situational ethics. In that respect it does an adequate job. Again,

the use of traditional sources to illustrate modern points is a welcome addition.

EXPLORING RABBINIC JUDAISM (Grades 7-8) This is an excellent effort at teaching values through texts. Its one significant shortcoming is that the work on values is too brief relative to the work on texts.

ALTERNATIVES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

TEACHING MITZVOT This teacher's helper is valuable for teachers of any grade. it serves as an excellent how to teach values guide for the beginner and as a great supplemental source of information, ideas, and sources for the more advanced moral educator.

TORAH AURA PRODUCTIONS

This company does not offer a particular text for teaching values. Rather, their catalog says of their entire line of books, "The central goal of...curriculum is to facilitate each learner's dynamic relationship with the...text. A relationship goes far beyond the acquisition of basic knowledge, the mastery of basic skills, and the internalization of basic values."²⁶⁰ Their books all use a text based approach and are thus very useful to a values curriculum. However, there is little guidance for the teacher as to how to use either the texts or the textbooks as part of a values curriculum. One exception to that is the JEWISH LAW REVIEW series. Text and values are nicely woven together in these books.

260 Torah Aura Productions, Curriculum Catalog, 1991-1992.

BEHRMAN HOUSE

STORIES FROM OUR LIVING PAST AND LESSONS FROM OUR LIVING PAST (Grades 2-3) these companion volumes offer a rich blend of traditional Midrash and modern storytelling. However, they are more moralistic than they are moral education related. According to Kohlberg's stages this may well be the most appropriate method for this age group. THE TEN COMMANDMENTS (Grades 3-4) This book does a very good job making the connection between Jewish text and Jewish action. Children respond well to it and the questions asked ignite excellent discussions. MITZVAH (Grades 6-7) the use of traditional Jewish texts related to values is excellent. However, the book is difficult to work with if the teacher is unfamiliar with either the material or value theory. WHY BE DIFFERENT (Grades 6-8) This is a fairly good values clarification book. However, its links to Judaism, Jewish texts and traditional Jewish thought are buried so far beneath the surface, students will find it difficult to make the connection without a great deal of teacher intervention.

These books represent a selection of the many books available for use in a values education program for a religious school. All of them have strengths and all have weaknesses. The common thread to the good books is that they support the teacher and create a connection through traditional Jewish text. In closing it should be noted, all of the books mentioned, and many that were not, require good teacher intervention and support. They do not teach themselves. Teachers engaged in values education should be prepared to follow-up the efforts begun in the textbooks.

APPENDIX G

The welcome handouts will explain where the sleeping cabins are as well as the locations of other facilities.

Welcome to:

GEMILUT HASADIM: IMPLEMENTING A CORE VALUE FOR OUR SCHOOL.

Your presence is yet another indicator of your commitment to our school and to the transmission of Jewish values from one generation to the next. Enjoy yourself this weekend. Although we will be working hard, there will be time to enjoy yourself. Expect to work hard and to learn a lot.

GOALS:

Participants in this workshop will:

1. Experience an environment that reflects the Jewish value of *Gemilut* Hasadim and explore how *Gemilut Hasadim* is a part of the learning process and how values, in particular *Gemilut Hasadim*, affect their classrooms.

2. Explore their own values and those of their colleagues and assess the perceived and actual values of their school.

3. Support the basic theories and philosophies of values and valuing.

OBJECTIVES:

At the conclusion of this weekend, participants will be able to:

1.1. Understand the textual basis for *Gemilut Hasadim* as a core Jewish value.

1.2. Identify how *Gemilut Hasadim* as a core value can and does affect their classroom and their teaching.

1.3. Develop role play situations to better understand the role of *Gemilut* Hasadim as a core value in their classroom and their teaching.

1.4. Identify the ideal qualities of a school with Gemilut Hasadim as a core value.

1.5 Develop a plan to incorporate *Gemilut Hasadim* as a core value into their school culture.

2.1. Identify their own values, the ideal values of their school, and the values of their school.

3.1. Describe what values are and how they operate.

3.2. Define values, moral education, and Gemilut Hasadim

SCHEDULE: FRIDAY

	3:00-4:00	Welcome/Arrival & Registration/Get Settled
	4:00-5:00	Getting to Know Each Other
	5:00-6:30	Dinner
	7:00-8:15	Services
	8:30-10:00	Mitzvah Project
	10:00-???	Late Night
SAT	URDAY	
	7:00-7:30	Services (Optional)
	7:30-8:30	Breakfast
	8:30-10:00	A Lesson in Values
	10:00-10:15	Break
	10:15-11:45	Core Value Activity
	11:45-12:30	Begin School Balloon Activity
	12:30-1:15	Lunch
	1:15-2:00	Finish School Balloon Activity
	2:00-3:00	Text Study
	3:00-3:15	Break
	3:15-4:30	Gemilut Hasadim in the Classroom
	4:30-6:00	Creating Role Plays
	6:00-7:00	Dinner
	7:00-7:30	Break
	7:30-10:00	Role Playing
SUN	DAY	
	7:30-8:30	Breakfast
	8:30-10:15	An Ideal Gemilut Hasadim School
	10:15-10:30	Break
	10:30-12:30	Putting Gemilut Hasadim into our School
	12:30-1:30	Lunch
	1:30	Thanks for Coming!

The strange shaped piece of paper you received when you arrived is important. In many ways, it is a symbol for what this weekend will be about. As many of us have learned from our own children, there is little that is as fun as a new box of still sharp crayons. That is why you were given your very own box of new crayons. Enjoy yourself!!

Please take a few moments to think about the following questions:

• How is Gemilut Hasadim - the virtue of loving kindness - reflected in our actions?

• In what actions have you recently engaged that reflect the virtue of loving kindness?

• What actions have you witnessed recently that reflect the virtue of loving kindness?

On the strange shaped piece of paper please use your crayons to draw some action you did or saw in the last two weeks which reflects your own conception of the virtue of loving kindness. Be prepared to share your drawing with the group later tonight.

APPENDIX H

STICLER, GEORGE J. 1958 Ricardo and the 93% Labor Theory of Value American Economic Review 48 357-367

SWEEZY, PAUL M 1942 The Theory of Capitalist Derelopment: Principles of Marxian Political Economy New York: Oxford Univ Press

VALUES

I THE CONCEPT OF VALUES Robin M. Williams, Jr. 27. VALUE SYSTEMS Ethel M. Albert

1

THE CONCEPT OF VALUES

The term "values" may refer to interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, needs, aversions and attractions, and many other modalities of selective orientation (Pepper 1958, p. 7). Values, in other words, are found in the large and diverse universe of selecuve behavior. Presumably sheer reflex behavior does not manifest values or valuing: neither an involuntary eyeblink or knee jerk nor any one of numerous biochemical processes in the human body constitutes value behavior. However, it is very doubtful that any one descriptive definition can do complete justice to the full range and diversity of recognizable value phenomena.

The limits of value may be conceived very broadly or quite narrowly, but the limits should never be arbitrarily set, and their location ought to be justified in any particular case. A broad, comprehensive conception of value has the advantage of calling attention to possible value elements in all behavior save the most rigidly instinctive or automatic. A narrow definition may have the virtues of specificity and definiteness but may lead to errors if the excluded phenomena are not taken into account through concepts closely related to the idea of "value."

One of the more widely accepted definitions in the social science literature considers values to be conceptions of the desirable, influencing selective behavior. In this restrictive definition, a distinction is made between what is desired and what is desirable, the latter being equated with what we ought to desire; values regulate "impulse satisfaction in accord with the whole array of hierarchical g enduring goals of the personality, the requirements of both personality and sociocultural system for order, the need for respecting the interests of others and of the group as a whole in social living" (Kluckhohn 1951, p. 399). This is a highly socialized view of values, which rules out, for instance, purely hedonic values. In the broader view, anything good or bad is a value (Pepper 1958, p. 7), or a value is anything of interest to a human subject (Perrv 1954). Men are not indifferent to the world, they do not stop with a sheerly factual view of their experience (Köhler 1938). Explicitly or implicitly they are continually regarding things as good or bad, as true or false, as virtues or vices. A comprehensive view of the total field of valuing seems most useful to begin with, more specific conceptions can then be developed for particular purposes.

VALUES: The Concept of Values

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Accordingly, we look first to the common features of all value phenomena. It seems that all values contain some cognitive elements (although some definitions do not include this), that they have a selective or directional quality, and that they involve some affective component. Values serve as criteria for selection in action. When most explicit and fully conceptualized, values become criteria for judgment, preference, and choice. When implicit and unreflective, values nevertheless perform as if they constituted grounds for decisions in behavior. Men do prefer some things to others; they do select one course of action rather than another out of a range of possibilities; they do judge the conduct of other men.

Evidently purposive actions fall within the boundaries of evaluative action. Within purposive actions we can identify three main kinds of value: conative (desire, liking), achievement (success versus frustration), and affective (pleasure versus pain or unpleasantness). Within any purposive act, these values may be strung out or distributed along the total history of the act (Pepper 1958, pp. 304-305).

In ordinary speech the term "value" is used interchangeably in two senses that must be kept separate here. In one meaning, we refer to the specific evaluation of any object, as in "industrialized countries place a high value on formal education" or "governmental regulation is worthless." Here we are told how an object is rated or otherwise appraised, but not what standards are used to make the judgments. The second meaning of value refers to the criteria, or standards in terms of which evaluations are made, as in "education is good because it increases economic efficiency." Value-ascriterion is usually the more important usage for purposes of social scientific analysis (Williams [1951] 1960, p. 401).

The definition of value we use for purposes of anchoring and clarifying the discussion of values is a descriptive definition, which is continually being confronted by the tests of adequacy imposed by actual behavior. Thus the description must be empirically verified or it must be changed: "the value facts themselves are the ultimate evaluative criteria" (Pepper 1958, p. 300). The value facts are implicit in evaluative acts, therefore, explicit definitions of value are always potentially open to reformulation in the face of new evaluative acts. That which is implicit in evaluative acts is a "selective system" or "natural norm."

Related concepts. Value as an explicit concept was in early use in various narrow technical meanings in the field of economics. Only in the last three decades or so have value concepts found widespread use among the other social sciences, although a pioneering effort was made by Thomas and Znaniecki prior to the 1920s in The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (1918). Psychologists have employed an array of related terms: attitudes, needs, sentiments, dispositions, interests, preferences, motives, cathexes, valences (Smith 1963, pp. 326-331). Anthropologists have spoken of obligation (Brandt 1961), ethos, culture pattern, themes, and life style. Sociologists and political scientists have referred to interests, ethics, ideologies, mores, norms, attitudes, aspirations, obligations, rights, and sanctions.

Clearly there is no point in extending the meaning of the term so broadly that there is no way of distinguishing between values and other determinants of behavior. Human social behavior is the outcome of physiological states and capacities of the organism, of the stimulus field to which it reacts, of the conceptual schemes within which it interprets its environment, and of "motives" or "needs" which are not identical with the value elements which enter into them. Values constitute only one among several classes of factors that should be taken into account if one seeks to predict and understand human behavior.

Although it is often difficult in specific instances to distinguish between values and such related concepts as beliefs, needs, or motives, reasonably clear distinctions can be drawn in general terms. When, for example, we think of values as components of personality, it is clear that values are not the same as needs or desires. Needs derive from deficiency or disruption. Desires are wishes or appetitions directed toward certain objects or states. Desires may become so intense as to become needs, and needs are typically intermingled with corresponding desires. In any case, however, it is possible for there to be a need or a desire (for example, for food) in which values are not the only, or even the most important, component. On the other hand, values themselves may be a source of needs

and desires, as when one seeks to remove the pangs of not fulfilling "one's duty" or positively as, pires to live up to high standards of craftsmanship

Values are not motives. Many particular motives may reinforce commitment to a given value: "A given value may have a strength that is relatively independent of any particular motive, though it remains in some sense a function of the total motivational system" (Kluckhohn 1951, p. 425).

Values are not the same as norms for conduct Norms are rules for behaving: they say more or less specifically what should or should not be done by particular types of actors in given circumstances. Values are standards of desirability that are more nearly independent of specific situations. The same value may be a point of reference for a great many specific norms; a particular norm may represent the simultaneous application of several separable values. Thus the value premise "equality" may enter into norms for relationships between husband and wife, brother and brother, teacher and student, and so on; on the other hand, the norm 'a teacher must not show favoritism in grading" may in a particular instance involve the values of equality, honesty, humanitarianism, and several others. Values, as standards (criteria) for establishing what should be regarded as desirable. provide the grounds for accepting or rejecting particular norms. Thus achievement values, stressing active instrumental accomplishment against a standard of excellence, may be reflected in norms for sports, games, occupational activities, community service, political life, education, science, and so on. The same principle holds for values considered as desirable objects or states; for example, a high positive evaluation of "freedom" or "authority" may be one of the grounds for a great many specific norms in various areas of society, culture, and personality. On the other hand, many norms are multivalued, relating simultaneously, for example, to hedonic criteria, considerations of efficiency, and values of social integration. A minor but clear case in point might be norms of etiquette for social dining.

As one moves along a scale of increasing generality, in which norms become more and more detached from particular circumstances, a point eventually will be reached at which "norm" becomes practically indistinguishable from value. Marginal cases naturally are debatable and difficult to classify, but a knowledge of the context usually permits a reasonably satisfactory assignment of the concrete specifications of conduct to the class of "norms" and the standards of desirability to the category of "values." The injunction "Be honest" bas the appearance of a norm, but unless we know what behavior qualifies as honest in various circumstances we have no real guide to particular conduct: we know only that something called "honesty" is regarded as a desirable thing. Careful study of a large sample of norms dealing with honesty typically is required to disentangle the generalized value principle from the admixture of other values and other determinants of behavior.

Empirical study of values. Description and analysis of values by social scientists rest on the use of several lines of evidence. Preliminary clues may be obtained from testimony, individuals are able, to some extent, to tell what values they hold. Although such testimony is not fully accurate or complete, it should not be ignored. Further evidence may come from systematic study of choices of objects and actions, either in "natural" behavior or in various kinds of tests, interviews, and experiments. Research may chart indications of directions of interest as shown by cultural products as well as by behavior directly observed. Content analysis of verbal materials is often a suitable technique in this connection, identification of implicit assumptions in social discourse often reveals values not otherwise readily discovered. Another particularly valuable source of evidence concerning values is found in observations of rewards and punishments. By observing which behaviors are praised and otherwise rewarded and which are criticized, condemned, or punished, we gain important data for identifying the socially effective standards that are actually operating in any group or society.

A full description of the values present in any situation comes only from the cumulative data from all of the sources listed above. As I have said elsewhere:

Starting with the initial location of value in a relation of a person to an object of interest, the sources of evidence mentioned above indicate just so many "operational definitions" of value: value as overt choice or preference, as attention or emphasis, as statement or atsertion, as implicit premise, as a referent of social sanctions. These various evidences are "pointers" that say "this is what is meant." Not all are of equal usefulness for every purpose, but all are useful. When used in combination, these several different approximations gain reliability in so far as they are mutually consistent. (Williams [1951] 1960, pp. 408-409)

A sound general principle in observing social behavior is to follow the dynamic course of sanctions wherever this may lead. Extremely close analysis of every detail of rewarding or punishing social consequences of a particular line of action typically will reveal important value data. For values that are concealed by conformity to social conventions and taboos, as well as for those camouflaged by defenses arising from repressions, recourse must be had to indirect approaches through projective testing, ingenious experimental designs and techniques, and intensive clinical interviewing and observation. In this connection it should be noted that much of psychotherapy involves the identification and strengthening of some value commitments and the weakening or redefinition of others.

Although values are not identical with ideologies, it is feasible to extract useful data on values from content analysis of ideological materials.

Undoubtedly the empirical study of values by objective methods is in its infancy. Results already achieved, however, are grounds for expecting very important, and now unsuspected, findings in the future.

Values in social science. In its efforts to attain higher levels of objectivity and scientific rigor, a considerable part of Western sociology for a generation or so after 1900 tended to avoid explicit dealings with values. Values were often regarded as somehow "subjective" and were not included among the "hard facts" that were thought to be proper objects of study. Beginning perhaps with The Polish Peasant in Europe and America (1918). the concept of values found increasing use, although the full influence of this study was not felt until the 1930s. By 1949, it could be said that a movement was under way "to come out in the open with an explicit presentation of values and full analysis of their moral presuppositions, deductions and consequences" (Mukerjee 1949, p. vii).

Economics. In the nature of the case, of course, economics has worked continuously with one or another variant of the concept of value—for example, value-in-exchange or preference order. The long struggle to develop measures of utility has largely been renounced in modern times in favor of direct indices of preference or choice and substitutability, as in "indifference curve" analysis. Thus for certain kinds of economic analysis, "value" is "the relative position of a good in a preference ordering, and the higher its position the greater is its value" (Kuhn 1963, p. 266).

Anthropology. Much work in modern anthropology has made use of the concept of "value" or of closely related ideas. Aside from the explicit value analyses of Clyde Kluckhohn (1951), Caudill and Scarr (1962), and Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck (1961), there are the influential notions of dominant cultural patterns (Ruth Benedict), cultural focus (Alfred L. Kroeber), and the conception of cultural themes developed by Morris E. Opler (1948; 1959).

Psychology. As M. Brewster Smith (1963) has shown, the presuppositions of twentleth-century academic psychology have militated against effective use of value concepts in research and theory. Experimental psychology, in spite of a willingness to accept many hypothetical intervening variables, long resisted the use of value theory. But the pressure of repeated empirical observations could not be denied beyond a certain point (Asch 1952, pp. 353–384), and modern learning theories appear increasingly to recognize the phenomenon of massive learning of generalizations under affectively charged conditions.

Political science. Political science in its traditional forms has been in considerable part a normative discipline, often attempting to state desirable specifications for political life. Newer emphases on the scientific study of political behavior tend to force a more explicit recognition of hidden value assumptions and to direct attention at the same time to values as relevant facts to be explained or used in their turn as explanatory factors in political analyses.

Insofar as history elects to strive for objectively tested generalizations rather than only literary narrative or humanistic interpretations, it likewise confronts the dual needs of controlling the influence of values upon the historian's conclusions and of analyzing values as variables in historical events and sequences.

Thus, problems of values appear in all fields of the social sciences, and value elements are potentially important as variables to be analyzed in all major areas of investigation.

Value classification and value analysis. Values may be usefully classified in a large number of different ways; each mode of classification points to potentially important properties, modalities, or dimensions. Any value analysis must at least take into account the existence of values answering to appetites and aversions, including both affective values, having to do with pleasure or gratification and the avoidance of displeasure, and conativeachievement values, having to do with the attainment of desired states. In addition, such an analysis must be aware of prudential values, character (personality integration) values, social values, cultural values, and biological survival values (Pepper 1958). In short, values enter into each of the four great systems of human action: organism, personality, society, and culture. Both philosophical analysis and social science often fall into serious error by paying attention to a single kind of value while ignoring or underestimating others.

Values as empirical elements in human behavior certainly arise out of human experience and hence may be affected by any conditions, including social conditions, that affect experience. Values may therefore be analyzed as dependent variables, subject to changes that are consequent to changes in population, technology, economic production, political organization, and so on. Once established, however, values also operate as independent variables, channeling reactions to prior innovations and serving as a basis for further innovations.

Sociological thought generally attributes strategic importance to moral values in processes of institutionalization and social control. Indeed, one important modern social theory holds that "Moral standards constitute, as the focus of the evaluative aspect of the common culture, the core of the stabilizing mechanisms of the system of social interaction* (Parsons 1964, p. 22). A crucial problem for further study arises in just this connection. All conflict of values that occurs within a single organism-personality is resolvable, in principle, within a single locus of integration. But there is an enormous (and perhaps unbridgeable) gap between the individual and the social levels (Arrow 1951). In a very crude way we already know that as the sociocultural systems are pressed more severely for survival, they impose increasingly stringent restrictions on "personal" values. The extent to which individual value realization is compatible with social, cultural, and biological survival values requires much additional analysis.

Values do not emerge in experience as sharply separated, unitary standards, each self-contained in its monadic independence from other coexisting values. Instead, the actual content and boundaries of any particular value will be affected by its changing relations to other values. In one group or society men may conceive of "freedom" only within the limits set by commitment to a principle of submission to a hierarchical order of authority; in another society, freedom is closely tied to equalitarian values. The two societies will not experience the same "freedom."

Oppositions and conflicts of value are present in all societies. Under conditions of rapid social change, special strains are placed upon value integration. When serious conflicts arise over basic values, it is doubtful that either suppression or compromise is effective in producing new integration as is the expansion of interests to rearrange and recenter value priorities (Allport 1959, p. 146).

It is the rare and limiting case if and when a person's behavior is guided over a considerable period of time by one and only one value. Such a

value would represent an "absolute preference" (Wright 1963a). More often, particular acts or sequences of acts are steered by multiple and changing clusters of values. Furthermore, oppositions and contradictions among values are not unusual. and both individuals and collectivities must, inescapably, face choices among values from time to time. At the very least, even the most harmonious systems of values require selectivity in the balancing of different claims to time, energy, and other resources. Not all desiderata can be equally met at any one time.

ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR.

Directly related are the entries ATTITUDES; CREATIV-ITY, article on SOCIAL ASPECTS, DUTY; ETHICS, article on ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES. MORAL DEVELOPMENT, MOTIVATION, NORMS, SANC-TIONS: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, article on social systems. Other relevant material may be found in AESTHETICS; IDEOLOGY; INTEGRA-TION; LAW, article on THE LEGAL SYSTEM; NATIONAL CHARACTER; SOCIAL STRUCTURE; UTILITARIANISM. UTILITY; and in the biographies of BECKER; KLUCK HOHN, KÖHLER, SOROKIN, THOMAS, ZNANIECKI

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11 VALUE SYSTEMS

In the study of cultural value systems, diverse conceptions of values may be converted from competing alternatives into indices of the kinds of values that should be included in a comprehensive model for descriptive and comparative study. The assumption that different kinds and levels of values -specific and general rules, goals, norms, and other criteria that govern conduct, evaluation, and sanctions-compose a cultural value system is complex. In addition to categories for naming and classifying values, the theory of value systems requires a means of specifying the relations among them. Values may be embedded in verbal, actional, and situational contexts. Each involves different types of relation and structure, logical, or behavioral, or social. Hence, values may appear as variables in systems of personality or society as well as in culture.

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The hypothesis that each culture has a distinctive value system can be explored through examination of relevant observation data, concepts, and methods. The basic data from which a cultural value system can be constructed are abundant in verbal and nonverbal behavior. The data include explicit value judgments and such indices of values as verbal and actional reward and punishment. blame and praise approval and disapproval, appreclation and rejection encouragement and suppression The differential expenditure of resourcestime, energy, and the natural environment, for example-provides another clue to values. Behavior in situations of conflict and choice is relevant. Both positive and negative values belong in a value system Thus, the value system organizes explicit and implicit values-those given directly in value judgments and those that can be inferred from valuerelevant verbal and nonverbal behaviors

As raw data of observation, evaluative behavior may appear random. Analysis discloses patterning in the evaluations of members of any sociocultural community. There is consistency in responses to recurrent situations among individuals who speak the same language. Inhabit the same geographic area, and interact in the same social system. Intracultural variation occurs in even the simplest society Part of the pattern is the systematic variation in values according to sex, age, personality, and social role. Hence, a cultural value system does not describe the values of any individual. It is a summative construct in which the diverse value sets of individuals and groups are related as complementary elements of a single system.

Values are by definition distinct from conduct. The supulation of positive and negative sanctions presupposes the possibility of departures from norms and failures to achieve goals. A value system, then, represents what is expected or hoped for, required or forbidden. It is not a report of act tual conduct but is the system of criteria by which conduct is judged and sanctions applied.

In sum, operationally, a cultural value system is the inductively based, logically ordered set of criteria of evaluations, constructed from explicit value judgments and inferences from inexplicit, valuerelated behaviors. Theoretically, it is the patterned or structured criteria, explicit and implicit, by reference to which evaluative behavior becomes intelligible. Functionally, it is the set of principies whereby conduct is directed and regulated and a guide for individuals and the social group.

Problems of definition, method, and theory. Sull in an exploratory stage, the study of cultural value systems is part of a general trend toward the view that subjective and humanistic subject matter is a suitable object of rigorous inquititransition from the traditional preoecupinal value theory entails redirecting definitions ods, and theory toward observational data meterations and away from purely verbal formular The question whether values are "real" and value "causal influence" is being recast as specific fiable hypotheses in which values figure as mandependent variable. The question whether values are "emotive" or "cognitive" is being translated studies of the nature and functions of evaluation and its relation to cognition. Constructing systems from existing materials remains problematic.

The literature on values includes several the user sand studies, of varying length, of ethics, law, real, gion, politics, art, social values, child rearing, and more. The values of many different societies, social groups, and personalities have been described Interdisciplinary research combines data, concepts, and methods from many social-behavioral sciences and relevant research is done on such topics as artitudes, motivations, sentiments, socialization, social control, and ideology.

Utilization of the abundant, diversified research resources is hampered by side effects familiar in other social-behavioral specializations. Descripute studies do not employ parallel categories, theories tend to be overextended or monocausal and to overlap or conflict; methods, models, and hypotheses are often of narrow scope and in need of refinement. Within and among the social-behavioral sciences, moreover, the benefits of a plurality of viewpoints and procedures are often neutralized by the difficulties of communication. For the foreseeable future, it is doubtful whether a definition of values can be produced that embraces all the meanings assigned the term and its cognates or that would be acceptable to all investigators. The diverse lines of approach are not likely to converge with ease in a unified theory and methodology.

Recognition of the fluid state of value studies may be used as a safeguard against the dangers inherent in the ambiguity of the term "value" and in a premature commitment to a method or theory. The selection of research objectives and of the definitions, methods, and theory appropriate to their realization continues on a trial-and-error basis. With these strictures in mind, we may examine several alternative modes of describing cultural value systems.

Descriptive-comparative models

Assembling diverse value-relevant data in a single system effects a great simplification. Evaluative discourse and conduct relative to goals, Ideals.

ethics, aesthetics, kinship, politics, religion, law, socialization, social control, etc. can be logically and economically ordered by drawing out the underlying general criteria. Formal and functional similarities in value judgments, evaluations, and sanctions, as well as systematic interdependences among them, tend to be obscured by the apparent heterogeneity of special categories of values. Thus, in a number of societies as remote from each other as imperial China and the central African kingdom of Burundi, the model of filial piety, associated with a rigidly hierarchal ordering of all social relations, draws together in a single formula masses of verbal and behavioral data. In parent-child relations, husband-wife relations, politics, religion, and economics, the same superordinate-subordinate pattern applies. "Cattle" as a prized object among the herding peoples of Africa draws into a unified value cluster such seemingly diverse elements as economic, political, and military patronage; patrilineal inheritance rules; ideas about the nutritive value of milk, blood, and beef; the aesthetic appreciation of minutely detailed bovine charms, and bridewealth in marriage. An additional methodological gain from following specific cultural lines to generalized values is diminution of culture-bound distortion from Western conceptions of values in the study of non-Western cultures.

Impetus and direction for the study of cultural values have come from the work of Alfred L. Kroeber, Clyde Kluckhohn, Talcott Parsons, Charles W. Morris, Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, Raymond Firth, A. I. Hallowell, and many others in anthropology and allied fields. Models and techniques have been pressed into service from linguistics, logic, philosophy, and other fields. Adequate description of cultural value systems is closely bound up with comparative, cross-cultural study. Comparison, methodologically significant in its own right, is virtually indispensable for constructing descriptive models that transcend the cultural boundaries of individual investigators. Several models for the description of cultural value systems have been devised in the course of comparative, cross-cultural study. Clyde Kluckhohn, in 1949, initiated a comprehensive, long-term project for the comparative study of values. Guided by his writing and thinking, the project utilized field-work research and the extensive resources of value theories in the social sciences and philosophy. [See KROEBER; REDFIELD; WORLD VIEW.]

Diversity and comparability

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From the above project emerged the theory of value orientations of Florence Kluckhohn (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961, chapter 1). Intracultural

and cross-cultural variations were comprehended in the schema used for comparative statistical analysis of five cultures in New Mexico Differential preferences, within different societies, are assumed. with respect to variations of a set of basic value orientations: (1) conceptions of the character of innate human nature: evil, neutral or mixed, good, and mutable or immutable; (2) the relation of man to nature and supernature subjugation, harmony, mastery, (3) temporal focus of human life past. present, future, (4) modality of human activity being, being-in-becoming, doing, and (5) the modality of man's relationship to other men : lineality. collaterality, individualism. Internal and cross-cultural variation is exemplified by the rank-ordering of the "time orientations" of the five cultures: for the Spanish-Americans, present, future, past; for the two Anglo-American groups (Texans, Mormons), future, present, past; for the Zuñi and the Navajo Indians, present, past, future. The valueorientation schema has been used in studies of Japanese and other cultures.

In the same comparative study and drawing extensively on the research and theory of Clyde Kluckhohn and others, a model for description and comparison was devised by the author, with a view to maximum comprehensiveness and detail (Albert 1956, pp. 221-226). The principle of organization is logico-semantic. Positive and negative values are classified and related according to their level of generalization and function in discourse and conduct. At the lowest level of generality, "valued entities" are the numerous specific events, states of feeling, and other objects of explicit everyday evaluation. Categories of specific value qualities may be directly derived by classifying such evaluations. They also identify the basic vocabulary of values and its range of reference. At the next higher level of generality are normative value qualities. These are derived from culturally defined character qualities-virtues and vices, ideal models for kinship, political and other roles-and from directives for conduct, usually accompanied by stipulations of positive and negative sanctions. Specific normative value qualities, fitted into a pyramid of ascending generalization, are instrumental to central or focal cultural values. These are usually few in number: they constitute a mutually interdependent set that defines the "good life." Positive focal values are usually rewards for respecting normative values, and negative focal values are usually punishments for failure to do so. Finally, at the highest level of abstraction and generality are the "first principles" or logical foundation of the value system. These include the unquestioned, selfjustifying premises of the value system; definitions

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of basic, general value terms, for example, happiness, virtue, beauty, and value orientations that define man as a moral agent and judge of values

Conceived as a skeletal structure, the logicosemantic model for a value system is a relatively neutral frame of reference for describing and comparing the specific contents and the relational and structural dynamics of diverse cultural value systems. Several examples will suggest the range and content of cross-cultural diversity.

For the Navajo Indians, the value system is oriented to this-worldly happiness. Its language is specific, empirical, situationally relative, and pragmatic. Consequences are the principal point of reference for value judgments. Preservation or restoration of harmonious order in the universe is the central focus, and correction, compensation, and neutralization of evils dominate the operation of the value system. For the Zuni Indians, the overall goals of the value system are ethnocentric stability and well-being. Control, orderliness, and integration are the principal means to realizing values. Ceremonialism, formalism, materialism and hedonism, confidence, and conservatism support the operation of the value system. Value judgments are directed primarily to actions and consequences. For the Spanish-Americans, religion, custom, and fatalism are combined in a value system conceived in intensely personalistic, aesthetic-emotive terms. Rigid hierarchy differentiates the applications of value judgments. Duty, authority, and fixed, abstract, ideal values are accepted bases of evaluation. For the Anglo-American Texan community, secularized, individualistic idealism and practicality are primary in the value system. High ideals are recognized as an incentive and guide for the good life, but are assumed to be unattainable. Alternative levels of evaluation and compartmentalization of value categories characterize value judgments that are closely related to the concrete conditions of existence [see KLUCKHOHN]

The complexity of value systems

Even in a more extended sample, similarities and differences in the contents of cultural value systems would appear but each cultural combination would be unique. For this, as for other descriptive-comparative generalizations, however, refinement of concepts and methods and additional research are needed. Increasing the geographic range of systematic descriptions of value systems would broaden the base of comparative inquiry. Comparative techniques have advanced only a little beyond simple, parallel descriptions, toward consideration of functional equivalences and hypotheses relating values to other phenomena. Improvements in descriptive models are needed to relate the values of individuals and subcultural groups to the larger cultural system and to serve for the study of societies of such different orders of complexity as the small tribe, the small nation, and the heterogeneous, heavily populated large state. For the collection of data, increasingly refined instruments are being sought to supplement conventional field-work study, interviews, and questionnaires. The inverse ratio of precision of techniques to comprehensiveness of results is an unsolved problem not only in data gathering but also in analysis and interpretation.

Experience with comparative study suggests some guidelines for collecting culturally valid values data. Identification of the value vocabulary of a people is an obvious first step in the process of constructing their value system. Any anthropologist is prepared for nonequivalence between the set of value terms in his own language and in that of the culture being studied. The appropriate techniques transcend routine translation problems. Few languages have a general term equivalent to "value." Not a few languages combine ethical and aesthetic value in a single word. An extreme case, the single Navajo word hozoni refers to what in English are differentiated as aesthetic, practical, spiritual, hedonic, and ethical values. Combining such features in a single word makes a denotative difference. It also eliminates familiar connotations, for example, of the incompatibility in most Western thinking of "spiritual" and "hedonic" or "aesthetic" and "practical." Unfamiliar connotative associations to seemingly familiar words can effectively block comprehension of a value system. In Mediterranean fatalism, the ethical and aesthetic are conjoined, not conflictual; resignation is heroic acceptance of adversity and of humility in prosperity, not passive submission; paradox and contradiction reveal the nature of the universe, not carelessness of logic.

Contextual analysis is a necessary corrective in comparisons. Health, security, wealth, enjoyment. faith in the supernatural, knowledge, and other values that figure prominently in the value systems of many cultures are similar in name only. In different cultures, knowledge refers to such diverse contents as revealed religious doctrine, traditional formulas, and modern science. Context is needed also to locate value judgments that do not contain explicit value terms, the counterparts in other languages of the English "That simply is not done!" Verbal explanation as well as context is needed to understand nonlinguistic signs of evaluation, including sanctions. Not every spanking is a punishment: it may only express parental ill temper. Not every smile is a sign of joy: it may only express

incomprehension Silent approvals and disapprovals have observable cues: "thumbs up" and "thumbs down" are specific examples. Distinctively different meanings of a single nonlinguistic form. for example, hissing, have also to be mastered.

Extracting a cultural value system from the flow of discourse and actions requires a method not unlike Socratic midwifery. By questioning and observing individuals and subjecting their responses to logical analysis, we discover not only what is commonly expressed but also what is commonly believed but left inexplicit, because it is "taken for granted" by everyone in the culture. To avoid oversimplifications, inquiry must be directed to discovering the relativity of values to situations: solemnity is right in church, gaiety at weddings or funeralsdepending on the culture. Since no value system is a perfect fit to life conditions, each contains socially acceptable alternatives to formally established principles. These secondary rules and norms permit individuals to come to terms with reality without running afoul of society. Even where truth is sovereign, a falsehood that saves lives or prevents gratuitous suffering is generally applauded. At the other end of the values continuum, in a strict, patriarchal society, the strong-willed wife of a weakling may run the household without causing scandal. Complex and varied, cultural value systems encompass the culturally unique and the universally human.

Progressive refinement of every aspect of the endeavor is the goal of continuing research in the comparative study of cultural value systems. Interdependence among the social-behavioral sciences often makes progress in one dependent on progress in others. As research in values moves toward exploration of their relations to other phenomena, It becomes increasingly interdependent with other research interests-notably study of the nature of culture and definition of its constituent features and dynamics and research in verbal behavior, cognitive mapping, linguistics, systematics, and descriptive semantics. Scholars from many different cultures increasingly participate in social-behavloral inquiry. Cross-cultural perspective is perhaps the most promising single factor for refining and enriching our comprehension of cultural value systems.

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VAN GENNEP, ARNOLD See GENNEP, ARNOLD VAN.

VARIANCE, ANALYSIS OF See under LINEAR HYPOTHESES.

tions frequently retained him as special counsel, and from 1925 on he was a director of the Equitable Life Assurance Society. His private papers (including many boxes of correspondence) are in the Library of Congress and are much used by students of the diplomatic history of the period during which he was active

LINDSAY ROCERS

[For the context of Moore's work, see INTERNATIONAL LAW.]

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MORAL DEVELOPMENT

The study of moral development has long been recognized as a key problem area in the social sciences, as indicated by McDougall's statement that "the fundamental problem of social psychology is the moralization of the individual by the society' (1908) or by Freud's statement that "the sense of guilt is the most important problem in the evolution of culture" (1930). However, it is hard to make clear distinctions between moral development and the broader area of social development and socialization (learning to conform to cultural standards). Such topics as the development of patterns of cooperation, of aggression, or of industry and achievement are generally studied under the broader rubric of socialization, although they may also be viewed as moral development insofar as cooperation or nonaggression are considered "good"

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and insofar as they involve learning to conform to cultural rules. The past decade has witnessed a great deal of research on moral development (reviewed in Kohlberg 1963a, 1964, Hoffman 1966) viewed as the particular aspects of socialization involved in internalization, i.e., learning to conform to rules in situations that arouse impulses to transgress and that lack surveillance and sanctions. In this research literature, moral development has usually been conceived of as the increase in internalization of basic cultural rules. Various theories and researchers have stressed three different aspects of internalization - the behavioral emotional, and judgmental aspects of moral action.

A behavioral criterion of internalization is that of intrinsically motivated conformity, or resistance to temptation. Such a conception is implicit in the common-sense notion of "moral character" which formed the basis of earlier American research on morality, Hartshorne and May (Columbia University 1928–1930) defined moral character as a set of culturally defined virtues, such as honesty, which could be measured by observing the child's ability to resist the temptation to break a rule (for example, against cheating) when it seemed unlikely that he would be detected or punished.

A second criterion of the existence of internalized standards is the emotion of guilt, that is, of self-punitive, self-critical reactions of remorse and anxiety after transgression of cultural standards. Both psychoanalytic and learning theories of conscience have focused upon guilt as the basic motive of morality. It has been assumed that a child behaves morally to avoid guilt.

In addition to conduct that conforms with a standard and to emotional reactions of remorse after transgression, the internalization of a standard implies a capacity to make judgments in terms of that standard and to justify maintaining the standard to oneself and to others. This judgmental side of moral development has formed the focus of the work and theory of Piaget (1932) and others (Kohlberg 1966).

In recent research, then, answers to the problems of moral development have been sought by examining how socialization factors, such as amount, type, and condition of punishment and reward, or opportunities for identification with parents, are related to individual differences in resistance to temptation, guilt, or moral judgment.

Internalization versus situational factors. Kohlberg has argued (1964; 1966) that the study of internalized socialization has cast a limited light upon the classical problems of moral development. Problems have arisen, in the first place, be-

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cause internalization does not represent a clear dimension of temporal development. Experimental measures of resistance to temptation (honesty) do not indicate any clear age trends toward greater occurrence of honesty from the preschool years to adolescence. Projective measures of intensity of guilt or moral anxiety also do not indicate clear age trends, except in terms of rather rapid and cognitively based age changes in the years eight to twelve, and these changes are in the direction of defining moral anxiety as a reaction to moral self-judgment rather than to more diffuse external events. While clear trends of development have been found in moral judgment, these trends cannot be easily considered to be trends of internalized socialization as such.

In the second place, problems have arisen because a distinctive set of socialization factors has not been found that can be considered as an antecedent of moral internalization. Research results suggest that the conditions which facilitate moral internalization (e.g., parental warmth) are the same conditions which, in general, facilitate the learning of nonmoral cultural rules and expectations. In other words, this research does not indicate a distinct area of internalization or of "conscience"—of moral control linked to guilt feelings—that is distinct from general processes of social learning and social control.

Recent research findings, then, reinforce the skeptical conclusions about both common-sense and psychoanalytic conceptions of a faculty of conscience or superego. Such conclusions were the major results of Hartshorne and May's monumental studies of moral character. These scholars found that the most influential factors determining resistance to temptation to cheat or disobey were situational factors rather than a fixed, individual moral character trait of honesty. The first finding that led to this conclusion was the low predictability of cheating in one situation for cheating in another. A second finding was that children could not be divided into two groups-the "cheaters" and the "honest children." Children's cheating scores were distributed in bell-curve fashion around an average score indicative of moderate cheating. A third finding was the importance of the expediency aspect of the decision to cheat; that is, the tendency to cheat depends upon the degree of risk of detection and the effort required to cheat. Children who cheated in more risky situations also cheated in less risky situations. Thus, noncheaters appeared to act more from caution than honesty. A fourth finding was that even when honest behavior was not dictated by concern about punishment or de-

tection, it was largely determined by immediate situational factors of group approval and example (as opposed to determination by internal moral values). Some classrooms showed a high tendency to cheat, while other, seemingly identically composed classrooms in the same school showed little tendency to cheat. A fifth finding was that moral knowledge or values had little apparent influence on moral conduct, since the correlations between verbal tests of moral knowledge and experimental tests of moral conduct were low. A sixth finding was that where moral values did seem to be related to conduct, these values were somewhat specific to the child's social class or group. Rather than being a universal ideal, honesty was more characteristic of the middle-class child and seemed less relevant to the lower-class child.

The Hartshorne and May findings, then, suggested that honest behavior is determined by situational factors of punishment, reward, group pressures, and group values, rather than by an internal disposition of conscience or character. The general problem raised by these findings is whether moral traits describing moral character are simply value judgments of behavior made by the group or whether they correspond to some inner disposition in the person and hence help us to understand and predict his behavior. Psychologists have usually used "moral development" to mean the formation of internal standards that control behavior. This conception of an internalized standard seems to require some cross-situational generality. It is not useful to speak of behavior as being determined by an internalized rule like "Be honest" or "Don't cheat" if the rule does not predict the individual's behavior and situational forces do. We do not find it useful to speak of the morality of the dog or the rat, although both have been trained to 'resist temptation" in specific situations. We do assume, however, that the animal's resistance to temptation is produced by anxiety aroused by situational cues, rather than by regard for a moral rule. To the extent that human resistance to temptation is not general across situations to which a moral rule pertains and must therefore be predicted by purely situational factors, it would seem to be no more useful to describe human behavior as the result of conscience than it is to describe animal behavior in these terms.

Since MacKinnon's research (1938), studies of morality have generally attempted to cope with Hartshorne and May's findings by defining moral internalization in terms of superego, rather than "moral character." Researchers have recognized that moral action was not the direct result of an internal disposition toward honesty or moral character and instead have assumed it to be the result of a complex balance of internal and external forces, including strength of drives aroused by temptation, defenses against these drives, situational fears, group pressures, etc. However, one distinctively moral force, guilt, was assumed to be a major determinant of action in situations of moral conflict or temptation. The disposition to feel guilt was assumed to be the result of early childhood identifications and experiences of punishment, rather than of situational forces. Accordingly, while moral behavior might be situation-specific, one might still be able to isolate a general process of moral internalization or guilt formation having the same childhood antecedents, regardless of the particular moral situation involved. These childhood antecedents should then have some value for predicting guilt and resistance to temptation in any situation, even though they did not produce a consistent disposition of moral character.

Subsequent research on parental antecedents of guilt and of resistance to temptation has fulfilled this hope only to a very limited extent. Usually the child-rearing correlates of children's resistance to temptation in one situation have not proven to be correlates of resistance in another, and the child-rearing correlates of projective test measures of guilt have not proven to be correlates of actual moral behavior. Finally, projective measures of guilt have not proven to predict consistently actual resistance to temptation behavior (reviewed in Kohlberg 1963a).

Kohlberg (1964) has argued that this more recent research evidence is consistent with the Hartshorne and May findings by suggesting that the variables leading to resistance to temptation arise primarily from the situation rather than from fixed habits, character traits like honesty, or permanent superego dispositions to feel guilt. Following Burton's analysis of honesty (1963), however, one would agree that there is some personal consistency in honest behavior or some determination of honest behavior by general personality traits. These traits, however, seem not to be traits of moral conscience but rather a set of ego abilities corresponding to common-sense notions of prudence and will. In a tradition of moral psychology dating back to the British associationists and utilitarians, moral character is believed to result from practical judgment or reason. In this view, moral action (action based on rational consideration of how one's action affects others) requires much the same capacities as does prudent action (action

based on rational consideration of how it affects the self's long-range interests). Both require empathy (the ability to predict the reactions of others to action), foresight (the ability to predict longrange consequences of action), judgment (the ability to weigh alternatives and probabilities). and capacity to delay (delay of response and preference for the distant, greater graufication over the immediate, lesser gratification). In psychoanalytic theory these factors are included with other aspects of decision making and emotional control in the concept of ego strength. Some of the ego abilities which have been found to correlate consistently with experimental and rating measures of children's honesty include the following: intelligence (IQ), delay of gratification (preference for a larger reward in the future over a smaller reward in the present), and attention (stability and persistence of attention in simple experimental tasks). [See DECISION MAKING, article ON PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.

These findings suggest that one can predict honesty about as well from an individual's behavior in cognitive-task or other nonmoral situations as one can from his behavior in other situations involving honesty. This, in turn, implies that the study of moral behavior in terms of early experiences centering on specifically moral training of honesty, guilt, etc., is less likely to be fruitful than is a study of moral behavior in terms of more general experiences relevant to ego development and ego control in nonmoral contexts.

Some specific moral determinants. While the findings stressed so far suggest the determination of moral action by nonmoral situational and personality forces, there are also some findings suggesting the determination of action by specifically moral values. This research conclusion should not be taken to mean that there is any direct correspondence between conformity of verbal moral beliefs or attitudes and conformity of moral action. Subjects who say that cheating is very bad or that they would never cheat are as likely to cheat in an experimental situation as are subjects who express a qualified view as to the badness of cheating (studies reviewed in Kohlberg 1966). Apparently, the same willingness to deceive in order to make a good appearance which impels cheating also impels the child to make pious moral statements about cheating.

A conclusion more consistent with actual research is that there is considerable correspondence between maturity of moral values (the possession of rational and internal reasons for moral action) and maturity of action in moral-conflict situations.

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Clear relations between maturity of moral judgment and mature moral action are found in situations in which social norms are ambiguous or conflicting and in which developmentally advanced values clearly predispose toward one course of action rather than another. Such a correspondence is suggested only to a limited extent by Hartshorne and May's findings of moderate correlations between age-linked measures of moral knowledge and experimental measures of honesty. This limited correspondence occurred because they defined moral knowledge largely in terms of verbal conformity of attitudes rather than maturity of moral reasoning and because resistance to cheating is not clearly a developmentally more mature choice or a choice based on moral reasons in the young age group studied. There is evidence, however, suggesting that resistance to cheating does become a more mature alternative at older ages or higher levels of development than those involved in the Hartshorne and May study. Only 11 per cent of college subjects who were at the level of moral principle in a verbal moral-values test cheated in an experimental situation, whereas half the subjects at a level of conventional moral values cheated (this test is discussed later in this article, the findings cited are reviewed in Kohlberg 1966). With younger subjects, the same relations between moral judgment and cheating are not found, since few of the younger subjects are at the level in which not cheating may be defined as relevant to principles of contract, trust, and equity. While college-age subjects making principled moral judgments were more likely to conform to an experimenter in the matter of moral expectation about cheating, such subjects are markedly more autonomous, or less conforming to an experimenter, where the experimenter's expectations violate the subjects' moral values. Whereas 75 per cent of the morally principled subjects refused to give increasing levels of shock to an experimental "victim" when ordered to do so by an experimenter, only 13 per cent of the remaining subjects refused to do so.

Major questions. The evidence suggests, then, that the baric social science problem of moral development is not that of accounting for Individual differences in moral character as revealed in behavior. Moral behavior that involves conformity to social rule is, on the whole, to be explained as the result of the same situational forces, ego variables, and socialization factors that determine behaviors which have no direct moral relevance. A more distinctive focus of analysis centers instead upon the direct study of the development of moral values, judgments and emotions. The study of actual con-

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duct becomes relevant to problems of moral development insofar as research is able to find links between the child's conduct and the development of his moral values and emotions.

The major questions which may be asked about moral development, then, are as follows. What is the origin of distinctively moral concepts and emotions in the child? To what extent does the child's development indicate typical or regular trends of change in these concepts and sentiments? What causes or stimulates these developmental changes in moral concepts and sentiments? To what extent are these developmental changes in moral concepts and attitudes reflected in developmental changes in the child's moral action under conditions of conflict or temptation?

Culture and cultural agents. All of the questions may also be asked about the development of morality in cultures. The present article will not attempt to deal with the development of cultural moralities, a topic still most comprehensively treated in the work of Hobhouse (1906). It must be pointed out, however, that most recent psychological as well as sociological thought has assumed that the problem of the origin of moral values is a cultural problem. It has been assumed that morality is a system of rules and values defined by the culture and that the individual child acquires these readymade values by general cultural-transmission mechanisms such as reinforcement learning or identification. If this were the case, our understanding of the content of the individual's moral beliefs and emotions should be based on seeing it as a cultural, rather than an individual, product. This culturological approach to moral development was first clearly outlined by Durkheim (1898-1911; 1925), who based it on assumptions about the cultural relativism of moral values which are still widely held but which do not seem to be supported by recent research findings. Durkheim developed his position out of a critique of the British utilitarians (e.g., Hume 1751; Smith 1759; and Mill 1861). The utilitarians assumed that moral values were the products of individual adults, possessed of language and intelligence, who judged the actions of other individual men. The utilitarians suggested that actions by the self or by others whose consequences to the self are harmful (painful) are naturally deemed bad and arouse anger or punitive tendencies, and actions whose consequences are beneficial (pleasant) are naturally deemed good and arouse affection or approving tendencies. Owing to natural tendencies of empathy, to generalization, and to the need for social agreement, acts are judged good (or bad) when their consequences to others are

good (or bad), even if they do not help (or injure) the self. Logical tendencies lead these judgments of consequences to take the form of judging that act right which does the greatest good for the greatest number. [See UTILITARIANISM and the biographies of HUME, MILL, SMITH, ADAM]

In his critique of the utilitarians Durkheim pointed to the following four phenomena: (1) Morality is basically a matter of respect for fixed rules (and the authority behind those rules), not of rational calculation of benefit and harm in concrete cases. (2) Morality seems universally to be associated with punitive sentiments, sentiments incompauble with the notion that the right is a matter of human-welfare consequences. (3) From group to group there is wide variation as to the nature of the rules arousing moral respect, punitiveness, and the sense of duty. (4) While modern Western societies divorce morality from religion, the basic moral rules and attitudes in many groups are those concerning relations to gods, not men, and hence do not center on human-welfare consequences.

According to Durkheim, these facts in turn implied the following. The mere fact of the existence of an institutionalized rule endows it with moral sacredness, regardless of its human-welfare consequences. Accordingly, moral rules, attitudes, and consequences originate at the group, rather than the individual, level. The psychological origin of moral attitudes, then, is in the individual's respect for the group, the attitudes shared by the group, and the authority figures who represent the groups. The values most sacred to the individual are those which are most widely shared by, and most closely bind together, the group.

While Durkheim's views of the group mind have been widely questioned, the essential implications of his position have been widely accepted. Assumptions common to Durkheim and Freud underlie the research studies of moral internalization previously discussed. Unlike Durkheim, Freud (1923; 1930) derived moral sentiments and beliefs from respect for, and identification with, individual parents, rather than from respect for the group. Furthermore, Freud derived this respect and identification from instinctual attachments (and defenses against these attachments) and viewed the central rules of morality as deriving their strength and rigidity from the need to counter these instinctual forces. In spite of these differences, Freud agreed in viewing morality (superego) as fundamentally a matter of respect for concrete rules which are culturally variable or arbitrary, since these rules are a manifestation of social authority, and he agreed in viewing punitive or (self-punitive) sentiments toward deviation as the clearest and most characteristic expression of moral internalization or respect.

The research findings on individual moral judgments in a variety of cultures seem incompatible with either of the extreme views just contrasted (Kohlberg 1966). Moral judgments and decisions in all cultures are a mixture of judgments in terms of individual human-utility consequences and judgments in terms of concrete categorical social rules. The utilitarian derivation of respect for rules from utilitarian consequences is as psychologically unfeasible as Durkheim's derivation of concern for individual welfare consequences from respect for social rules as such. A culturally universal core of moral values and moral development may be found. but it is not based on a culturally universal acceptance of moral principles of the utilitarian variety. Individual moral beliefs and sentiments involving universal principles not directly embodied in concrete social rules often develop and often function at a level of conscious opposition and transcendence of group authority, as the utilitarians implied, but this development itself presupposes the development of respect for group authority discussed by Durkheim. Such, at least, seem the implications of recent research oriented to a third, or "developmentalist," concept of morality.

In general, the developmental approach to moral psychology (Baldwin 1897, Mead 1934, McDougall 1908; Hobhouse 1906; Piaget 1932; Kohlberg 1966) has attempted to mediate between the extreme positions represented by the utilitarians and by Durkheim. Moral judgment and emotion based on respect for custom, authority, and the group are seen as one phase or stage in the moral development of the individual rather than as the total definition of the essential characteristics of morality it was for Durkheim. Judgment of right and wrong in terms of the individual's consideration of social-welfare consequences, universal principles, and justice is seen as a later phase of development. This phase depends upon and integrates many of the emotional features of the earlier customary phase and does not spring directly from the minds of unsocialized rational adults, as it did for the utilitarians. Both a morality of respect for social authority and an autonomous rational morality are to be understood as arising from the development of a self through the process of taking the roles or attitudes of other selves in interactions occurring in institutionalized patterns.

Stages of moral development. As elaborated in Piaget's developmental theory (1932), the child first moves from an amoral stage to Durkheim's stage of respect for sacred rules. This is not so

much respect for the group as it is respect for the authority of individual elders such as the parents. Plaget believes that the cognitive limitations of the child of three to eight lead him to confuse moral rules with physical laws and to view rules as fixed external things, rather than as the instruments of human purposes and values. Plaget believes that the child sees rules as absolutes and confuses rules with things because of his "realism" (his inability to distinguish between subjective and objective aspects of his experience) and because of his "egocentrism" (his inability to distinguish his own perspective on events from that of others). In addition to seeing rules as external absolutes, the young child feels that his parents and other adults are all-knowing, perfect, and sacred. This attitude of unilateral respect toward adults, joined with the child's realism, is believed to lead him to view rules as sacred and unchangeable.

Piaget believes that intellectual growth and experiences of role taking in the peer group naturally transform perceptions of rules from external authoritarian commands to internal principles. In essence, he views internal moral norms as logical principles of justice. Of these, he says.

In contrast to a given rule, which from the first has been imposed upon the child from outside ... the rule of justice is a sort of immanent condition of social relationships or a law governing their equilibrium (Piaget [1932] 1948, p. 196). The sense of justice ... is largely independent of [adult precept] and requires nothing more for its development than mutual respect and solidarity which holds among children themselves (p. 195).

By "the sense of justice," Piaget means a concern for reciprocity and equality between individuals. However, norms of justice are not simply matters of abstract logic; rather they are sentiments of sympathy, gratitude, and vengeance which have taken on logical form.

Piaget believes that an autonomous morality of justice develops in children of about age eight to ten and eventually replaces an earlier, heteronomous morality based on unquestioning respect for adult authority. He expects the autonomous morality of justice to develop in all children, unless development is fixated by unusual coerciveness of parents or cultures or by deprivation of experiences of peer cooperation.

Certain aspects of Piaget's theory have been supported by subsequent research findings, while others have not. Piaget's stage theory suggests a number of cross-culturally universal age trends in the development of moral judgment. At least three such trends have been found to occur in a variety

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of Western, Oriental, and aboriginal (American Indian and Malaysian) cultures (evidence summarized in Kohlberg 1966) These include: (1) Intentionality in judgment Young children tend to judge an act as bad mainly in terms of its actual physical consequences, whereas older children judge an act as bad in terms of the intent to do harm. (2) Relatitism in judgment. The young child views an act as either totally right or totally wrong and thinks everyone views it in the same way. If the young child does recognize a conflict in views, he believes the adult's view is always the right one. In contrast the older child is aware of possible diversity in views of right and wrong. (3) Independence of sanctions. The young child says an act is bad because it will elicit punishment, the older child says an act is bad because it violates a rule, does harm to others, and so forth.

The young child's absolutism, nonintentionalism, and orientation to punishment do not appear to depend upon extensive parental use of punishment. Even the permissively reared child appears to have a natural tendency to define good and bad in terms of absolutism and punishment, a tendency which his awareness of punishment by teachers, police, and other parents seems sufficient to stimulate. While specific punishment practices or cultural ideologies do not appear necessary for the formation of the young child's moral ideology of punishment. they may lead to the persistence of this ideology into adolescence or adulthood. In other words, specific cultural factors appear to stimulate or retard age trends of development on the Piaget dimensions, but they do not appear to actually cause the age shifts or trends observed.

Plaget, then, appears to be correct in assuming certain characteristics of the young child's moral judgment in any society, characteristics which arise from the child's cognitively immature interpretation of acts labeled good and bad by adults, according to the derivation of their goodness or badness from their association with good and bad consequences of physical harm-punishment and reward. However, his interpretation of these aspects of the young child's morality-as deriving from the child's sense of the sacredness of the rules and of adult authority-has not been supported. Plaget (1932) attempts to demonstrate that the young child's attitude toward rules is one of unilateral sacredness by observations of children's behavior and beliefs about the rules of the game of marbles. Swiss children are quoted as saying that the rules of the game can never be changed, that the rules have existed from the beginning of time and have been invented and handed down by God, the head

of the state, or the father. More systematic research suggests that attitudes of rigidity toward game rules seem to decline with age in American children of five to twelve but that attitudes expressing the rigidity or sacredness of moral rules or of laws increase in this period, rather than decline. The young child's ignoring of subjective factors such as intention, then, is not based on respect for sacred rule but on a more or less pragmatic concern for consequences. An example of the fact that young children orient more or less pragmatically to punishment rather than to sacred rule is indicated by a study by Kohlberg, Krebs, and Brener (Kohlberg 1963b) Young children were asked to judge a helpful, obedient act (attentively watching a baby brother while the mother is away) followed by punishment (the mother returns and spanks the baby-sitting child). Most four-year-olds, ignoring his act, say the obedient boy was bad because he got punished. By age seven, a majority say the boy was good, not bad, even though he was punished.

Piaget also appears to be incorrect in postulating a general trend from an authoritarian to a peergroup, or democratic, ethic. Postulated general age shifts from obedience to authority to peer loyalty, from justice based on conformity to justice based on equality, have not been generally found. Peergroup participation has not been found to be a factor facilitating development on the Piaget dimensions.

More broadly, however, Piaget is correct in assuming a culturally universal age development of a sense of justice, involving progressive concern for the needs and feelings of others and elaborated conceptions of reciprocity and equality. As this sense of justice develops, however, it reinforces respect for authority and for the rules of adult society; it also reinforces more informal peer norms, since adult institutions have underpinnings of reciprocity, equality of treatment, service to human needs, etc.

The last-mentioned conclusion is derived primarily from cross-cultural research by this writer and his colleagues on children's responses to a number of hypothetical moral dilemmas, such as whether to steal an expensive drug to save one's dying wife. In this research every sentence or response of a subject could be reliably classified into one of six stages that have also been divided into three major levels of development as follows:

Level 1. Premoral:

Stage 1. Punishment and obedience orientation.

Stage 2. Naive instrumental hedonism.

Level II. Morality of conventional role conformity Stage 3. Good-boy morality of maintaining good relations, approval by others.

Stage 4 Authority maintaining morality.

- Level nr. Morality of self-accepted moral principles:
 - Stage 5 Morality of contract, of individual rights, and of democratically accepted law.
 - Stage 6 Morality of individual principles of conscience.

Each of these six general stages of moral orientation could be defined in terms of its specific stance on some 32 aspects of morality. For example, with regard to the aspect "motivation for rule obedience or moral action," the six stages were defined as follows:

- Stage 1. Obey rules to avoid punishment.
- Stage 2. Conform to obtain rewards, have favors returned, and so on.
- Stage 3. Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others.
- Stage 4. Conform to avoid consure by legitimate authorities and resultant guilt.
- Stage 5. Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator judging in terms of community welfare.
- Stage 6. Conform to avoid self-condemnation.

It is evident that this aspect of moral development represents successive degrees of internalization of moral sanctions. Other aspects of moral development involve successive cognitive reorganization of the meaning of culturally universal values. As an example, in every society human life is a basic value, even though cultures differ in their definition of the universality of this value or of the conditions under which it may be sacrificed for some other value. With regard to the value of life, the six stages are defined as follows:

- Stage 1. The value of a human life is confused with the value of physical objects and is based on the social status of physical attributes of its possessor.
- Stage 2. The value of a human life is seen as instrumental to the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or of other persons.
- Stage 3. The value of a human life is based on the empathy and affection of family members and others toward its possessor.

Stage 4. Life is conceived as sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious order of rights and duties.

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- Stage 5. Life is valued both in its relation to community welfare and as a universal human right.
- Stage 6. Life is valued as sacred and as representing a universal human value of respect for the individual.

It is evident that these stages represent a progressive disentangling or differentiation of moral values and judgments from other types of values and judgments. With regard to the particular aspect-the value of life-the moral value held by the person at stage 6 has become progressively disentangled from status and property values (stage 1), from his instrumental uses to others (stage 2), from the actual affection of others for him (stage 3), etc. While philosophers have been unable to agree upon any ultimate principle of the good which would define "correct" moral judgments, most philosophers agree upon the characteristics which make a judgment a genuine moral judgment (Hare 1952; Kant 1785). Moral judgments are judgments about the good and the right of action. However, not all judgments of "good" or "right" are moral judgments; many are judgments of aesthetic, technological, or prudential goodness or rightness. Unlike judgments of prudence or aesthetics, moral judgments tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and based on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds. "She's really great, she's beauuful and a good dancer" and "The right way to make a martini is five to one" are statements about the good and right which are not moral judgments. since they lack these characteristics. If we say, "Martinis should be made five to one," we are making an aesthetic judgment, we are not prepared to say that we want everyone to make them that way, that they are good in terms of some impersonal ideal standard shared by others, and that we should all make five-to-one martinis whether we wish to or not. In a similar fashion, when a tenyear-old answers the "moral should" question "Should Joe tell on his older brother?"-in stage 1 terms of the probabilities of getting beaten up by his father and by his brother-he does not answer with a moral judgment that is universal (applies to all brothers in that situation and ought to be agreed upon by all people thinking about the situation) or one that has any impersonal or ideal grounds. In contrast, stage 6 statements not only use specifically moral words like "morally right" or "duty" but use them in a moral way: e.g., phrases such as "regardless of who it was" and "by the law of nature or of God" imply universality: "Morally, I would do it in spite of fear of punishment" implies

impersonality and ideality of obligation, and so on Thus, the responses of subjects at lower levels to moral-judgment matters fail to be moral responses the same way that the value judgments of subjects at higher levels about aesthetic or morally neutral matters fail to be moral responses.

In this sense we can define a moral judgment as "moral" without considering its content (the action judged) and without considering whether it agrees or not with our own judgments or standards.

It is also evident that moral development in terms of these stages is a progressive movement. toward basing moral judgment on concepts of justice. To base a moral duty on a concept of justice is to base that duty on the right of an individual. to judge an act wrong is to judge it as violating such a right. The concept of a right implies a legitimate expectancy, a claim which I may expect others to agree I have. While rights may be grounded on sheer custom or law, there are two general grounds for a right-equality and reciprocity (including exchange, contract, and the reward of merit). At stages 5 and 6 all the demands of statute or of moral (natural) law are grounded on concepts of justice, i.e., on agreement, contract, and the impartiality of the law and its function in maintaining the rights of individuals.

It is apparent that the stages just defined are stages in the development of moral judgment. Rather similar stages, however, have been independently arrived at by Peck and Havighurst (1960), who include emotional and behavioral as well as judgmental traits in their stage definitions.

The progressions, or stages, just described imply something more than age trends. In the first place, they imply an invariant sequence in which each individual child must go step by step through each of the kinds of moral judgment outlined. It is, of course, possible for a child to move at varying speeds and to stop (become "fixated") at any level of development, but if he continues to move upward, he must move in accord with these steps. The longitudinal study of American boys at ages 10, 13, 16, and 19 suggests that this is the case (Kohlberg 1966).

Second, a stage concept implies universality of sequence under varying cultural conditions. It implies that moral development is not merely a matter of learning the verbal values or rules of the child's culture but reflects something more universal in development, which would occur in any culture. In general, the stages in moral judgment just described appear to be culturally universal. Middleclass urban, lower-class urban, and tribal or rural village boys aged 10 to 21 have been studied in Taiwan, Yucatan, Turkey, and the United States. In all groups, stage 1 appears first and becomes less prevalent with age. Stage 2 appears next and then stages 3 and 4, which increase with age. In all middle-class groups, and some lower-class groups, stages 5 and 6 appear at later ages (primarily ages 16 to 21). These last two stages are not found among tribal or village peasant groups. (Kohlberg 1966).

Factors in development. It seems obvious that moral stages must primarily be the products of the child's interaction with others, rather than the direct unfolding of biological or neurological structures. However, the emphasis on social interaction does not mean that stages of moral judgment directly represent the teaching of values by parents or direct "introjection" of values by the child. Theories of moral stages view the influence of parental training and discipline as only a part of a world or social order perceived by the child. The child can internalize the moral values of his parents and culture and make them his own only as he comes to relate these values to a comprehended social order and to his own goals as a social self.

Culturally universal invariant sequences in the child's social concepts and values imply that there are some universal structural dimensions or invariants in the social world analogous to those in the physical world. Universal physical concepts have been found because there is a universal physical structure which underlies the diversity of physical arrangements in which men live and the diversities of formal physical theories held in various cultures. In somewhat analogous fashion, the social stages imply universal structural dimensions of social experience; this is based on the fact that social and moral action involves the existence of a self in a world composed of other selves playing complementary roles organized into institutional systems. In order to play a social role in the family, school, or society, the child must implicitly take the role of others toward himself and toward others in the group. One side of such role taking is represented by acts of reciprocity or complementarity (Mead 1934), the other side by acts and attitudes of sameness, sharing, and imitation (Baldwin 1897). These tendencies, intimately associated with the development of language and symbolism, form the basis of all social institutions which represent various patternings of shared or complementary expectations, [See INTERACTION; LAN-GUAGE, article on LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT; ROLE, article on PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.]

Such institutional expectations have per se a

normative or moral component involving rights and duties and require moral role taking While the concrete definitions of required behavior in given roles are relatively fixed throughout age development, the perspectives in which these behaviors are related to a moral order undergo successive stagelike transformation. Required behavior may be based upon power and external compulsion (stage 1), upon a system of exchanges and need satisfactions (stage 2), upon the maintenance of legitimate expectations (stages 3 and 4), or upon ideals or general logical principles of social organization (stages 5 and 6). The order in this development is largely the result of general aspects of cognitive development. Concepts of legitimate expectations presuppose concepts of reciprocity and exchange, while general principles of social organization and justice presuppose concepts of legitimate expectations.

The large cognitive component of moral role taking is suggested by correlations between the development of moral judgment and cognitive advance on intelligence tests or on Piaget's cognitivestage tasks. Intelligence may be taken as a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of moral advance. All morally advanced children are bright, but not all bright children are morally advanced. Cognitive advance is associated with emotional aspects of moral role taking (e.g., the movement of moral motives from punishment to disapproval to self-condemnation) as well as with more intellectual forms of moral role taking in terms of the values and the rights of others (e.g., the movement from conceiving of life as a physical value to conceiving it as based on a universal respect for the human individual).

In addition to cognitive advance, opportunities for participation and role taking in all the basic groups to which the child belongs appear to be important for moral development. Plaget's theory (1932) has stressed the peer group as a source of moral role taking, while other theories (Mead 1934) stress participation in the larger secondary institutions or participation in the family itself (Baldwin 1897). Research results suggest that all these opportunities for role taking are important and that all operate in a similar direction by stimulating moral development rather than producing a particular value system. In three divergent cultures studied, middle-class children were found to be more advanced in moral judgment than matched lower-class children (Kohlberg 1967). This was not because the middle-class children heavily favored a certain type of thought which corresponded to the prevailing middle-class pattern.

Instead, middle-class and working-class children seemed to move through the same sequences, but the middle-class children seemed to move faster and farther. Similar but even more striking differences were found between peer-group participators (popular children) and nonparticipators (unchosen children) in the American sample. Studies underway suggest that these peer-group differences partly arise from, and partly add on to, prior differences in opportunities for role taking in the child's family (family participation, communication, emotional warmth, sharing in decisions, awarding responsibility to the child, pointing out consequences of action to others).

Our discussion has stressed the role of intellectual advance and of social participation and roletaking opportunities in family, peer group, and secondary institutions as they facilitate the development of moral judgment. While the evidence is less complete, these same factors appear to correlate with clinical ratings of maturity of moral character (Peck & Havighurst 1960) and experimental or rating measures of honesty and of moral autonomy (Kohlberg 1967, Columbia University 1928-1930).

Parental identification and guilt. It is important to note that some of the findings used here to argue for the centrality of role-taking opportunities in moral development have also been interpreted as indicating the centrality of parent identifications in conscience formation. In psychoanalytic and neopsychoanalytic discussions, identification has meant the general tendency to take the role of the punishing and criticizing other; that is, in order to criticize or punish himself after transgression, the child must take the role of another toward himself. Otherwise he would continue to view himself and the situation as he did when he performed the act. For self-criticism to be guilt, the child must "take the role of the other" in a deep or internalized sense, regardless of whether the other knows about his transgression. Such deep, fixed role taking or identification has been variously hypothesized to result from needs to substitute for an absent or rejecting love object (Freud 1930; Sears et al. 1957), from the need to defend against fear of aggression (A. Freud 1936), or from "status envy needs (Whiting 1960).

It is evident that identification is a special or particular form of role taking as previously defined. As opposed to more general theories of role taking, identification theories of moral formation have assumed: (a) that the child's role taking of parents represents a unique, special, and necessary basis for conscience formation rather than one of

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a number of general role-taking relationships. (b) that the basic moral role-taking tendencies leading to conscience formation are formed in early childhood, when the child's weakness can create overwhelmingly strong tendencies to love, fear, and respect and lead to introjecting adult figures and their prescriptions; (c) that basic role taking of parents leads to direct introjection, transfer, or municking of fixed parental standards rather than being a step toward the development of general role-taking tendencies which move out into wider social realms and so promote moral advance.

In general the research findings suggest the importance of children's role taking of their parents in moral development, but they do not support the notion that conscience is a unique product of parent identifications (Kohlberg 1963a, 1963b; 1964; Hoffman 1966). Parental warmth, children's positive attitudes toward parents, and children's expressed desire to be like their parents correlate positively with acceptance of the conventional moral code as measured by tests of conventional expressions of guilt and of moral judgment. Little evidence, however, has been found to indicate that these variables are correlated with the fixed introjection of particular, individual parental moral values. Furthermore, little evidence has been found to suggest that a close bond to one or both parents. is crucially necessary for conscience formation. The most relevant studies come from comparison of kibbutz-reared and family-reared children in Israel. While kibbutz children have regular contacts with parents in evenings and on holidays, parents are little involved in making or enforcing moral or socialization demands upon the child. This task is primarily the function of the nursecaretaker, the teacher, and the peer group. Few clear differences have been found between these children and city children in moral judgment, in projective measures of guilt, or in naturalistic observations of moral control of behavior (studies reviewed in Kohlberg 1964). It would appear, then, that affectional relationships (or identification) with parents are important in moral development. more because positive and affectional relations to others are generally conducive to ego development and to role taking and acceptance of social standards than because they provide a unique and direct basis for conscience formation. [See AFFECTION.]

Common psychological notions that parental punishment and resultant guilt play a critical role in moral development seem even more questionable in the light of research findings. It seems selfevident that self-induced pain after transgression (guilt) must originate largely from experiences

of transgression-related pain caused by others (punishment). Some core experiences of punishment, or at least of blame, are presumably necessary for the development of guilt reactions, and even the most permissively raised children experience them. Punishment, however, does not directly produce guilt, since the very young punished child does not experience guilt. Furthermore, there does not appear to be a direct relationship between amount of punishment and amount of guilt. We are also not able to say that the more psychologically painful the punishment, the more likely it is to produce guilt. Physical punishment seems to show a low positive correlation with children's use of punishment fantasies as consequences of transgression, but it does not relate positively to types of transgression reaction more representative of guilt. Even for punishment reactions, young children whose parents report they never use physical punishment may make heavy use of it in doll-play transgression stories.

Punishment by love withdrawal (ignoring, isolation, a mother's statements that she doesn't like her child when he is bad) has been thought to be especially critical in producing guilt, because loss of love is believed to be more psychologically painful or anxiety-arousing than physical punishment and because it would be expected to lead to implicit role taking or identification with the parent's disapproval. However, love withdrawal has not been found to relate to self-critical guilt (Hoffman 1966).

Rather than showing striking or unique relationships to punishment experiences, projective measures of internal guilt show the same general age trends and social correlates as measures of maturity of moral judgment in the school years. This suggests that the development of conscious internal standards of judgment and of empathic and role-taking capacities is the major factor in the genesis of guilt (Kohlberg 1964; Hoffman 1966).

The findings just reviewed, together with findings presented initially in this article, are inconsistent with the notion of a fixed moral structure (conscience-guilt) developing out of experiences of parental punishment and reward and determining moral behavior. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the obvious importance of punishment and reward in the short-term situational control of "moral" (conforming) behavior, as suggested by the Hartshorne and May findings. Experimental studies that manipulate punishment parameters show striking effects upon short-term resistance to temptation in given situations (Aronfreed 1966). In contrast, naturalistic correlational studies of parameters of parental punishment and reward suggests few clear or persisting effects of these parameters upon later moral behavior (findings reviewed in Kohlberg 1963*a*). Thus, S-R reinforcement theories may be useful in explaining short-run learning of behavioral conformity, without being adequate for the understanding of what we have considered as characteristic of moral development.

Neurotic behavior. In addition to distinguishing between moral development and situational conformity with regard to punishment-guilt factors, it is important to distinguish between moral development and the formation of neurotic inhibitions, anxieties, and punitive feelings resulting from punishment-guilt factors. It is obvious that neurotics suffer from strong feelings of anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, and inhibition. To a considerable extent, psychopathologists have held that these feelings result from guilt experiences resulting in turn from real or fantasied childhood transgressions and associated punishments, and they have developed general theories of moral development from these clinical data.

The research findings on guilt and moral factors in neurosis are sparse, but they do suggest limitations to the notion that neurotics suffer from too much general guilt or moral restraint. There is little reason to believe that neurotics are more scrupulous about moral ideals or more morally restrained in their conduct than normal people. Neurotic children have not been found to be higher (or consistently lower) than normal children in projective measures of guilt, in moral judgment, or in resistance to dishonest behavior. (In contrast, pathologically delinquent children are markedly lower on guilt and moral judgment than are either neurotic or normal children.) While neurotic symptoms do not seem to be explainable as the result of too much general guilt or moral concern resulting from childhood experiences, it does seem plausible to view distinctively "neurotic" moral anxieties and inhibitions (anxieties about matters viewed as morally permissible by the general culture) as the result of childhood experiences and fantasies of parental punishment. Clinical observations as to the genesis of these idiosyncratic moral anxieties may be valid, then, even though they have not provided a useful model for the general understanding of moral development. Such understanding rests on further elaboration of the processes of ego development as these interact with social experiences of which the moral is a universal dimension.

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[Directly related are the entries DEVELOPMENTAL PSY-CHOLOGY and SOCIALIZATION Other relevant material may be found in CONFORMITY. DELINQUENCY; JUSTICE, LEARNING, article on REINFORCEMENT, PER-SONALITY, article on PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT; PSYCHOANALYSIS; ROLE SYMPATHY AND EMPATHY; UTILITARIANISM; and in the biography of DURK-HEDM.)

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MORALS

See MORAL DEVELOPMENT.

MORBIDITY

See EPIDEMIOLOGY, HEALTH, ILLNESS, MEDICAL CARE, MENTAL DISORDERS, PUBLIC HEALTH.

MORES

See NORMS; VALUES; the biography of SUMNER.

4. Holy Community and Values Education

Barry Chazan

One of the concerns of recent approaches to moral and values education has been to emphasize the central role of the individual in morality. Such approaches as values darification, John Wilson's theory, and Lawrence. Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental approach, have focused on the individual as a vital force in the initiation and operation of moral processes. For some of these approaches, society or the group has become the great enemy, i.e., it represents an external force that comes to impose upon and manipulate the individual and, in so doing, to deprive him of his freedom and dignity.¹ Thus, a major assumption of much of contemporary moral and values education has been that the group is a problem for morality, and consequently there is a need to return "the locus of evaluation to the person."²

Judaism and Jewish education would seem to offer an alternative position; they would seem to imply that the community in fact constitutes a powerful value and creative force in the sphere of morality and valuing, and consequently, in the sphere of values education. It is this theme which I should like to discuss in this chapter.³

Judaism is a religion in which the notion of community is primary and writ large.⁴ It joins such other key notions as *Malkut Shamayim* (the Kingship of God), *Middat Hadin* (God's justice), *Middat Harahamim* (God's love), *Gemilut Hasadim* (acts of loving kindness), *Torah* (Study) and others to spell out the ultimate agenda of Judaism and Jewish education, which is the imitation and emulation of the godly way.⁴ The notion of community in Jewish life is often denoted by the word 'Israel," which refers not only to the State of Israel or Land of Israel per se, but rather to the Jews as a community and

peoplehood. This notion of community is linked to other terms, especially to the Brit, the holy or convenantal community,* as well as to the Land of Israel.* The notion of the covenantal community means that Israel is not simply an aggregate of individuals, but a group of like-minded people who have jointly entered into a covenant with God which demands that they live a unique life-style. The notion of the Land of Israel implies that Israel as community is not an exclusively metaphysical or extra-national concept, but is linked to specific venues and to patterns of communal life therein.

One of the underlying points of this emphasis on Israel as community is the assumption that a person's life and relationship with God and the world is seen not in exclusively individual terms, but rather as part of a larger, like-minded collective. Man is not alone both in the sense that he is part of a covenant with God and also in that he is part of the covenantal community of Israel.

This theme is exemplified in many aspects of classical and contemporary Jewish life. Much of Jewish prayer is written in the plural ("We sanctify thy name . . . "; "Restore us, our Father, to thy Torah; draw us near, our King, to thy service"; "We ever thank thee . . . "-from the Shemoneh Esreh prayer, standard prayer book). The confessional and other prayers on the New Year and the Day of Atonement are said publicly and in the plural ("Our Father, our King, we have sinned before Thee, Our Father, our King, we have no King except Thee"; "We have trespassed, we have dealt treacherously, we have robbed "; "For the sin which we have committed before Thee under compulsion of our own will"-High Holiday Prayer Book). Exile from Israel (i.e., being outside of the Land of Israel and out of relationship with God) is related to the collective sins of the people ("Because of our sins, we were exiled from our land and removed far away from our country"-prayer book). The link with Zion and the Land of Israel remained an important aspect of Judaism throughout the centuries, even as Jews moved to many countries throughout the world (at a Jewish wedding, a glass is broken to symbolically remind all present in the midst of their joy of the sorrow of the destruction of the Holy Temple in Jerusalem and of the subsequent Exile; and on Passover, the Seder service is concluded with the statement "Next year in Jerusalem").

Prophecy, too, may be seen in light of this notion of community. While the prophets are often depicted in the modern genre of lonely iconoclasts, lashing out against a corrupt and alien world and society, they are probably better seen as members of the holy community invoking the Godly covenant to point to the corruptions of that community.^a Their call was to individuals as part of a people or a nation; they warned a community that had gone astray that it had better return to being "a kingdom of priests and a holy people."

This concern with community remained an aspect of Judaism as it entered the modern age, and in some ways, became even more prominent (partly because of the diminution in importance of some of the more theological and religious aspects of Judaism). The Zionist movement, culminating in the modern State of Israel, is, in many ways, a continuation of the classical motif of peoplehood and community.⁹ Contemporary Diaspora Jewish life is also marked by this great preoccupation with fellow Jews, the organized Jewish community, and sister Jewish communities throughout the world.⁹ This is particularly expressed by Jewish concern for intermarriage; the centrality of the Holocaust in the collective memory of the Jewish people; Diaspora Jewry's continued support for Israel; the concern for Jews in the Soviet Union, Iran, and Argentina; and the

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complex organizational matrix of Jewish life on the local, national, and international level.

This concept of community has consequently become a central theme and context of Jewish religion and education.¹¹ That is, community functions as an important aspect of the overall concern of classical Jewish education to educate for the life of Torah and Jewish citizenship, and the concern of contemporary Jewish education to educate for Jewish group identification.¹² In the classical school, the major devices for such character and citizenship education were deeds and the study of the holy texts.¹² As part of their school experience, children prayed together, recited the collective blessings over

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food, prepared for and celebrated their community holidays. The life of the school in many instances functioned as a macro-community, reflective of the larger community's ethos. The study of texts was not essentially a private. individual matter. The Holy Texts were accessible to all, and they were studied together in the group, making use of group process (one of the characteristic techniques of study was heoruta-a buddy system where groups of two studied texts together). (Indeed, even today as one walks through some of the ultra-religious sections of Jerusalem, which are, in many ways, attempts to perpetuate traditional Eastern European life, one hears a chorus of voices reciting and studying the holy texts together. To some ears it is noise; to others if is a symphony of a community.) Moreover, the contents of the schools-e.g., Bible and Talmud-were replete with the message of community as an important aspect of Judaism. While Jewish education in the modern era has changed radically from its classical forebears, it has retained the theme of community. The contents studied-history, Israel, the Holocaust, Jewish communities throughout the worldtransmit this idea; and school activities-Keren ami (money collected weekly for "my people"), assemblies, holidays and celebrations-also preach the message.

Community functions in several ways in the process of Jewish character education (indeed, in ways somewhat analogous to the functioning of text study). First, the activities, rites, rituals, and laws of Jewish communal life convey and transmit basic values and principles of Judaism. Thus, the child who prays, observes the Sabbath, and observes the dietary laws, comes to understand basic principles of Judaism (e.g., piety, holiness, the sanctity of time and life). In that sense, community becomes a means to helping a youngster understand his tradition. Second, the use of community in education is a vehicle of developing social habits and patterns of behavior. Community is in part a means of the socialization of the young Jew into habits and behaviors that are regarded as essential in Judaism (habit is not regarded as a completely negative factor, although it is also not regarded as the exclusive good). In this sense, community is a means to helping a youngster become

socialized into his tradition. Finally, participation in community is a "good deed" in itself; thus, the very act of participating in community contributes to a child's religious development by enabling (or forcing) him to perform a *mitzzah* (a religious deed, commitment, and action). In this sense, community is not a means to other ends, but rather an end in itself.

The first part of my argument, then, has been that the notion of community (and more precisely, larael as holy or covenantal community) is a central theme and value of the Jewish experience, and is reflective of some basic assumptions about man's nature and education. The second part of the argument is the contention that this stance is at odds with much of contemporary moral education, which has either neglected or rejected the community as a factor in moral education.⁴⁴

The starting point of values clarification is the claim that the young person today exists in a new and complicated world of competing and confusing value perspectives, each of which comes to impose itself on the young." The plurality of such ideologies, and the attempted imposition of them by society onto children, constitute the crisis of moral education, and are the catalyst for VC's proposal of a new approach, VC objects both to the imposition of values about which there is no consensus and to the subjugation of the individual to the group in the values domain. Instead, one of the main messages of VC throughout all its variegated literature is that values are a personal matter, and they should not be determined by external forces." Consequently, ,VC, has developed a pedagogy which is essentially individualistic in nature and, according to some critics, closer to psychological models of self-actualization and client-centered therapy than to values education." While subsequent versions of VC have tried to be more sensitive to its original neglect of the social, it remains a strikingly individual-oriented theory which at the best disregards community and at the worst regards it as the enemy. Here Sprakt

John Wilson's theory of moral education focuses on morality as a process or procedure ("a particular kind of human thought") that is determined by rational and

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autonomous deliberation, and a basic concern for the welfare of others." Wilson's theory is more social in nature than VC in two senses. First, his list of moral components does include items that reflect a concern for others (PHIL) and the ability to interrelate to others. Second, Wilson specifically affirms the social nature of persons in terms of a fraternal instinct and a need for communication.20 Thus, Wilson's rational morality does assume and relate to the social context. However, he is not, like our Jewish model, concerned with "community" as a basic good; rather, he is concerned with the welfare and good of others as individuals. The difference between Wilson and the Jewish model we have suggested is implied in the distinction between "covenant" and "social contract." For Wilson, community is a functional agreement or arrangement (a social contact) between individuals for the larger good of moral thinking and autonomy, which is ultimately individualistic in nature. The notion of "covenant" implies a much more basic and a priori link and commonality between individuals, beyond that of an "T'll scratch your back-you scratch mine" morality. While Wilson's theory of moral education is more socially sensitive than VC, it too does not affirm the value or primacy of community.

The notion of community has emerged in Kohlberg (particularly in his later writings and in the work of some of his colleagues") as a prominent educational theme, in terms of the phrase "the just community." The assumption in this emphasis seems to be that the structuring of schools and other educational programs as just communities is a valuable way of facilitating cognitive-moral development along the various stages, and hopefully can improve the possibility of reaching the highest stage of justice. Thus, the just community reflects some of Kohlberg's initial assumptions about the sociability of man and the operationalization of justice in daily life. At the same time, it seems even more significant in Kohlberg's work as a pedagogic device; i.e., along with the Socratic dialogue, the just community becomes a valuable vehicle for individual moral development. Thus, while Kohlberg's "just community" is certainly more social than either VC's pure individualism or Wilson's

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social contract morality, it still does not imply a notion of community as an inherent value. Kohlberg's "just community" is in two senses different from the notion of "holy community" that we developed above. First, in the Kohlberg scheme, the just community is a valuable educational device for reaching Stages 5 and 6 but the community per se is not a part of these stages; i.e., it is not a value inhesent in Stages 5 and 6. The inherent value of 5 and 6 is justice as a universal human value. In the covenant community, being part of the covenant is in itself a value; it is not simply a means to an end, but is an end (much as in Judaism the performance of a mitzoah is its own reward and is not simply a pedagogic. device to lead to other values or actions). The very act of being part of the covenant community is a value. For Kohlberg, the just community and the moral dilemma stories become important because they seem to be effective ways of moving " toward Stage 6; for Judaism, Israel and Torah are not just stepping stones but are in themselves part of the highest stage (and therefore holy).

A second distinction between Kohlberg's "just community" and Israel as holy community is implied by the modifiers "just" as opposed to "holy." These terms are not equivalent, and while the just is regarded as a part of the holy (as my colleague Joseph Reimer indicates elsewhere in this volume), it is not exhausted by it in Jewish tradition.²² Israel as holy community includes justice, but it also includes other phenomena: God, a common language, collective responsibility for group existence, cultural artifacts, a place. Thus, the Jewish notion of community is much larger and more inclusive than Kohlberg's notion, which seems to focus on one parameter only (Mordecai Kaplan has characterized this. multi-dimensional nature of Jewishness by the phrase "Judaism as a civilization"²³).

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Thus, I am suggesting that there is a sense in which contemporary moral education has been preoccupied with the redemption of the individual from the alleged excesses and tyranny of society. The collective has frequently emerged as the source of man's discontent, and the task of moral and values education has been often conceived of as rescuing basically moral man from immoral society.

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The notion of community implied in the concept of Israel as holy or covenant community would seem to suggest a different possibility, namely that the morality of the individual is very much related to and a facet of community. Rather than thwarting individual morality, community properly understood is an indispensable aspect of moral development. This would mean that community could constitute an important means of values education, as apparent from Kohlberg's scheme, but also that it is an indispensable end of values education, as Durkheim has argued. There are important new educational implications for values education that emerge from this different notion of the relationship between community and values.

In this context, one must be wary of a point Martin Buber emphasized when he distinguiahed between "national" and "nationalistic" education.²⁶ Buber warns that there is always the danger that an education for which the group or the community is an important value could easily degenerate into a glorification per se of the group; i.e., that instead of the group constituting one value of a people, it becomes the sole concern and focus of an educational system. In such cases, national education becomes nationalistic, i.e., too exclusively concerned with the external symbols of group survival (flags, national anthems, the fight for survival), and not enough with the spiritual and internal values of the people. Such a form of education focuses exclusively on the term "community," and neglects the terms "holy" or "covenant."

Thus, one must beware; the use of holy community as an educational concept in values education is a two-edged sword. It may promise new vistas not to be found in other contemporary approaches to values education, but it could also be tragically misused to be "anti-Israel" and "anti-Christ"; i.e., to be an agent of immorality and paganism. The question that could be posed to value educators today is whether they can utilize the educational concept of holy community as a plowshare and a pruning hook that can be used to build vineyards, rather than as a sword and a spear that will be used to wage yet another war.

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 The major educational exception to this emphasis in the contemporary literature of moral education is Emile Durkheim, who in many ways may be described as the forgotten man of contemporary moral education. See: Buile Durkheim, Moral Education (New York: Pres Press, 1961); Education and Sociology (Free Press, 1956); Emays on Morals and Education, ed. W. S. P. Pickering (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).

- Howard Kinschenbaum, "Beyond Values Clarification," in Readings in Values Clarification, ed. Howard Kinschenbaum and Sidney Simon (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1973), p. 97.
- I should like to emphasize the difficulty of talking about "Judaian" and "Jewish education" per se. Neither is a monolithic concept, and, particularly in the modern world, there are several senses of and interpretations of each. Moreover, in the classical world Judaian and Jewish education were not presented in nest, philosophically tight systems; they were rather spalled out in a complex weave of religious behavior, value concepts, homilistic discussions, educational pretices. Thus one must be cautious in using these phrases in one definitive, normative sense. See Max Kaduahin, The Rabbink Mind (New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1972); Solomon Schecter, Sens' Aspects of Rabbut Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1910); E. Urbach, The Sager Theor Compts and Beliefs (Jerusalam: The Wagner Press, 1975). Set Marcel 4. For a discussion of this theme in Judaian, see A. J. Frenchel, Ged in
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- I have attempted to argue elsewhere that Jewiah education is best seen in terms of the category of character education. See Barry Chazan, "Jewiah Education and Moral Development," in Moral Development, "Moral Education, and Kohlberg, Brenda Munsey, ed. (Birmingham: Religious Education Press, 1980), pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980), pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Education Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Here Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, The Language of Press, 1980, pp. 303-4; also Barry Chazan, pp. 303-4; also Barry Cha

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A Religious School Model of Moral Education

By Joan Davidson

Moral education depends on the teaching of three things caring, objective thinking, and determined action.

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In Donald H. Peckenpaugh's monograph, "Moral Education: The Role of the School," he asked many eople, "What is a moral person?" and received a wide ariety of answers. One little girl answered, "to love other eople and to act so they can love you. You know, to know that's right and to do it."

In these two sentences she expressed the three facets of norality that are needed to make morality work. Morality humane caring, objective thinking, and determined ection. The Religious School Model of Moral Education rovides a way of thinking about these three facets, earing, judging and acting, in a Jewish educational acting.

This model is designed to help the Jewish child inderstand and practice caring, judging and acting in all spects of his/her life.

Philosophy Behind the Model

A model of Moral Education focuses upon the realms of mane caring, objective thinking and determined action. Morality is neither good motives nor right reason nor molute action; it is all three."⁴

A morality itself is not based upon one realm or the ther but on the three realms integrated; so too moral dication requires a combination of the cognitive as well the affective to create an integrative approach.

John Dewey in Moral Principles in Education' wrote, ust as the material of knowledge is supplied through the mass, so the material of ethical knowledge is supplied rough emotional responsiveness."

John Wilson advocates that individuals need to learn tot only how to deal with questions about what to do in Suffict situations but also how they feel. He believes that wareness of one's own and other's feelings and emotions a basic skill needed for moral judgment and behavior. his writings he discusses the importance of identifying Bobions and the impact they can have on one's decisions ad behaviors."

Moral educators like Clive Beck' and Jack Fraenkel' gue that the theory of moral development needs to be apled with an "interactive" approach that enables dividuals to become aware of the feelings and thoughts at influence their behavior. R.S. Peters' contends that

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the most important question in moral education is-How do children come to care?

Based upon the prior philosophical assumptions, this model, the Religious School Model, to meet a broader, more integrative approach has been synthesized from four existing models: The Cognitive Moral Development Model of Lawrence Kohlberg; the Values Clarification Model of Raths, Harmin and Simon; the Inculcation Model of Superka et. al., and the Action Learning Model of Fred Newman. The strengths of each model have been drawn selectively in order to deal with morality's three realms: Caring, Judging (Thinking) and Acting.⁴

Jewish Focus

The "Jewish" focus of the Religious School Model is based upon the principles by which all children and adults can guide their conduct in life situations, through the use of the Jewish value system. The model is designed to focus emphasis upon an understanding of how Judaism views a life of humane caring, objective thinking and determined action.

It is important that the young people learn to respect and value the specific moral laws and to understand that moral laws are expected to be kept.

The essence of the great moral principles can be expressed in a few short sentences:

All persons are obligated

All persons are precious and there are no exceptions

This is the heart of (Jewish) ethics and should be taught.'

The process of educating our children about Jewish values must include an ability to apply these principles, laws and values. Therefore, a base of knowledge must be developed in dealing with Jewish values which enables the Jewish child to readily apply these principles, laws and values to life situations.

In addition, there should be a sense of creativity on the part of the children to solve moral problems. Part of this creativity includes the use of the decision-making process by which these principles can be modified and improved, adapted or abandoned. There must also be a recognition of the autonomy of the individual to be self-governed in determining what he or she is going to do. The autonomy extends to determining what one should do to make up one's own mind about what is "true," and not merely accepting the statements of someone else.

It is the purpose of moral education in the Jewish School to help the student form principled ideas and to help strengthen the ability to work within these principles even when it is difficult to attain sought-after goals.

Instructional Model

Caring:

This model will encourage ways of Caring through the use of thinking processes; so that one can get to know and understand both ourselves and others. This aspect of Caring focuses upon reasons for caring behaviors.

Another aspect this model promotes is the use of our emotions and imagination to help us understand how we can feel and also how others feel. This aspect of Caring focuses upon an exploration of feelings, ours and others, to generate solutions to problems.

In this aspect of the model the teacher's role is viewed as one in which the desire to Care is fostered through role modeling. The teacher can be an exemplar of Caring behaviors in the classroom. The teacher can also provide role-taking experiences through dilemmas and role-play exercises. The focus here is to show how it feels to stand in the other person's shoes inside and outside of the school.

Through this aspect of Caring the teacher can promote the ability to know and understand what the Jewish view of Caring means. The focus is to explore through Jewish sources a "Jewish View of Caring."

It is through the school environment that the child can observe and analyze the behavior of others. The school is also a place to become involved with interpersonal relationships, where Caring can be experienced through practice. These interpersonal relationships exist with teachers, principal, rabbi and cantor as well as with other children in the school. The school can be seen as a place where an emotional climate of mutual trust can be created so that ideas may be freely expressed.

Judging

This model will also promote ways of Judging (Thinking) based upon working out a set of moral principles from Judaic sources, personal values and other influences. The emphasis will be upon learning and applying moral rules, i.e., prescriptive statements from tradition. There will be a recognition and encouragement of the point at which moral principles might cause one to abrogate a rule. The focus of this aspect is the ability to think through Jewish moral obligations.

It is the teacher's role to help the students understand why one needs principles to guide one's life; and to help the students to learn rules derived from Judaism's view and how to apply these rules in life situations. The teacher will also be able to help the students utilize the decisionmaking process: to decide choices to be made between principles and rules (to provide dilemma situations). The next step in the process will be to help the students confront these dilemmas and to utilize modes and methods of making creative autonomous decisions.

Acting:

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This model will promote ways of Acting which extend the principles and rules learned; as well as providing the ability to take action based upon these principles and rules. Specific opportunities will be selected so that values can be acted upon beyond the classroom and the school and the community. Included will be the planning and implementing of the choices made and the action to be taken. The focus of this aspect is upon "Acting Jewishly-

The teacher will help the student to become aware of problems, theirs or those of the larger community and will assist the student to gather and analyze information to that personal value positions may be taken. It will be the responsibility of the teacher to assist the students in planning strategies and in organizing possible action, and also to provide the opportunities within the communits to carry out plans as individuals or groups. There will be a need to guide the students into considering the conse quences of these actions for others and themselves.

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STUDY LEADS TO ACTION

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The question was raised Is study greater, or action? Rabbi Tarfon said, "Action is greater." Akiba siad, "Study is greater " Then they all said that study is greater because study leads to action.

(Talmud, Megillah 40b)

Moral education is one of those things which everybody wants but nobody is quite sure how to get. We clearly must instill notions of right and wrong if society is to function, and we must also transmit aspirations for good if it is to function well. The problems in doing that, however, are immense. They range from theoretical questions like defining then justifying a moral code to the practical issues involved in inculcating it.

In this paper we will explore one method for teaching morality¹ used by one tradition in human culture for a very long me. The method is classical text study, and the tradition is judaism. It is clear to all that cognitive learning of any type is not afficient in and of itself to teach moral values and motivate moral aton, but Jews have gone further than any other cultural group musing text study as one method to inculcate moral values. It is

This paper was originally prepared for the faculty seminar of the Samuel Melton sar for Jewish Education in the Dissipora of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem 1 - all like to thank the members of that seminar for their helpful critical comments, weigh Dioctors Michael Rioenak, Barry Chazan and Joseph Bruckenstein.

Throughout this paper I shall understand "moral obligations" to refer to those which is at actionable in court, in contrast to legal obligations. I am not assuming either an solution of relativist position in ethics in this article except to the extent that the authors I sider all claim that one way in which the lewish tradition contributes to morality is by easing what is good and right and what is had and wrong. This excludes only those exists positions which claim not only that there are absolute moral standards for all many, but that we know them spart from our cultural traditions — but that is a highly evidence and their practice, and I am interested in exploring how text study can solute to both.

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therefore appropriate to ask how Jews have justified and applied that methodology. Specifically, we are interested in what aspects of text study contribute to morality, how the texts must be used if they are to have morally beneficial effects, and which other elements in the learner's environment are crucial for text study to function effectively in moral instruction.

The writers whose work will play a role in our study van enormously in their approaches to Judaism. Samson Raphael Hirsch was the nineteenth century German founder of the neo-Orthodox movement, which retained the supernaturalia theology and strict patterns of observance characteristic of the older Orthodoxy, but advocated the study of secular subjects along with a strong training in Jewish texts. Mordecai Kaplan founded the Reconstructionist Movement in the United States about fifty years ago and has been its major spokesman ever since He argues for a naturalist theology and an evolutionan understanding of Jewish history, ideology and practice. Martin Buber was in the existentialist tradition of thought, sharing its emphasis on the individual and his personal encounters with others together with its distrust of fixed forms of thought and practice. These differences will give this study a broad ideological base so that our treatment of this issue will not be confined to one understanding of Judaism.

On the other hand, these three men are alike in a number of characteristics that are important for our purposes. They share, first of all, an interest in using text study in moral education, and they have all taken the trouble to explain why and how. They also share an awareness of the problems and opportunities of Jewish life in the post-Enlightenment era, when the supportive environment in which text study functioned in the past can no longer be taken for granted. They are therefore prepared to face serious questions about whether that should still be a method on which Jews rely for moral instruction. Their reflections on tha methodology are especially significant because they all combined their theological interests with substantial activity in practical Jewish education. They thus understood the potentialities and putfalls of this method under conditions similar to our own.

The Contributions of Text Study to Moral Development

1 Content Perhaps the most obvious goal for those who are text study for moral education is to inform students about whata good and what is bad. The classical literature of the traditis announces its norms through maxims, laws, poetry and stone

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and those who study that literature therefore learn how Judaism identifies the good and the bad. This is a cognitive goal, and educators who advocate text study are clearly interested in much more than that, but it is important at the outset to recognize that the transmission of this cognitive information is one of the objectives of moral education generally and of text study in particular. As Kaplan says:

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Even if children are not sent to religious schools, they are usually taught worthwhile ideals. But just as parents supplement the child's vernacular with systematic school training in grammar, rhetoric, and literature, so they should supplement this vague, casual and more or less inarticulate imparting of higher ideals with a systematized presentation of them in the religious school.³

Sone of the thinkers we are considering, however, advocates using the classical texts straightforwardly as a prescription for ction. Even Hirsch, who goes furthest in that direction, is utimately ambivalent on this issue. He clearly identifies the Law s the articulation of moral standards,3 and he even thinks that lewish law is the law for all humankind just as the laws of nature avem all objects," but he also says that the Bible "was not placed nour hands to establish a transcendental dogma, to show us our say to the hereafter, to serve as a guide-book in this world, nor ave we to transmit it to our youth as such."5 Kaplan and Buber sould not even go as far as Hirsch does: for them the law does not we correct moral instructions in many of the areas where it does rislate, either because the law itself must be updated,⁶ or scause correct moral responses can only emerge from the free sterchange of an I-Thou relationship with God, not from a code laws.7

The immediate educational implication of this is that the ugnitive goals of moral instruction through text study are not stricted to individual moral rules. All three of our philosophers walso interested in imparting a general moral outlook, or blik (in

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the popular contemporary term introduced by Hare.⁸ Even Hirsch, who is the most interested of the three in using the texts a a manual of specific instructions, also wants to transmit a broader moral Weltanschauung to his students. He is concerned to do this in part because only a person who has such a framework will be able to deal with new situations not covered by existing laws and also to enable students to see the ultimate goals of morality so that they will be willing to forfeit immediate immoral gains to achieve those ends.⁹

Kaplan takes a similar stance: to accomplish our moral objectives we must put specific issues into the broader contexts of living as part of the Jewish people and contributing to the betterment of humans, and he is concerned to demonstrate that these two goals are not contradictory: on the contrary, it is only through a strong sense of peoplehood that one can contribute meaningfully to the welfare of humankind.¹⁰ Text study is to be used to clarify these goals and thus contribute to the development of character:

The main purpose in teaching the Bible ... should be to fortify Jewish consciousness and to give it ethical and spiritual content. Thus the study of Torah is the process of training oneself and others in the development of character through whatever thought, feeling, and behavior is directed toward the building of a better and happier world for the generations to come ... As Jews we should be concerned particularly with what the study of Torah as a system of character training might contribute to a better future for mankind.¹⁰

He also strongly affirms, however, that the student not be taught that it is only the Jews who know what morality really is and who have a moral mission, despite the Chosen People concept in traditional literature. That, he claims, would give an immoral direction to the student's thought and action. Thus the study of

¹ R. M. Hare, "Theology and Falsdication," in Antony Flew and Alasdair Muclishe, eds. New Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959, pp. 594-103.

They would not, however, accept Hare's contention that bliks are not susceptible a confirmation or disconfirmation on the contrary, all three are concerned to prese atgoinents for convince Jews (at least) to adopt the Jewish viewpoint. In any case, may writers have concorded Hare on this point, even as they have recognized the importanced unitably sical view points. CL, for example, Frederick Ferre, Banc Modern Philosophyse Relicion (New York, Charles Schröhner vision, 1967), pp. 367-8, 425-7, and James Wa, Ms Clendon, Jr and James M. Smith, Understanding Beligious Connections (Notre Dame London, University of Nature Dame Press, 1975), Chapter Two.

" Hursch, Judaism Eternal, Vol. 1, pp. 187, 200

¹⁰ Mordes at M. Kaplan, Questions Jeu's Ask. Reconstructionist Answers (New York The Resonstructionist Press, 1956), pp. 35-36, 413-414.

Modes at M. Kaplan. The Future of the American Jew (New York: The Macmilia Company, 1948), pp. 468, 496, cf. pp. 463, 471, 489, (henceforth cited as Future)

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texts should be aimed at transmitting the ultimate goals of morality as well as specific norms, but in both areas the texts cannot be taken at face value.

2. Judgment. Morality is not only a matter of following rules, however wise and good these rules are. In real life situations values often conflict, and therefore good judgment in resolving moral conflicts is a necessary asset of a moral person. Those who can only follow orders or rules are not moral agents in the full sense of the term, neither in the way they arrive at decisions nor in the content of the decisions themselves. They are automata and their blindness to the range of values can lead them to blatantly immoral actions. Consequently, moral education must seek to develop the individual's powers of judgment, including the ability to weigh values and to think creatively of practical ways to reconcile them when they conflict.

Our authors point to two types of text study to aid the development of moral judgment.¹² Hirsch strongly recommends the study of the Talmud for this purpose:

The study of these writings is the finest training both in theoretical and practical reasoning, all the more so because their subjects are the circumstances of actual life. In them the rules laid down in the "Scripture" are given precision and made practically applicable. Their form is such that the youthful mind is continually trained to analyze statements presented synthetically in order to find the principles underlying them, to apply such principles, whether given or discovered, to new and analogous cases, and to discern the real disparity between the cases which seem disparate. In a word, ..., in the study of Talmud we have the finest school for forming logical and ethical judgments.¹³

Part of his enthusiasm for the Talmud no doubt stems from his traditional approach to Judaism, but it is noteworthy that he sresses the Talmud and not the codes in this context. The codes give the reader clearcut prescriptions for action. They can sumulate intense debate and judgmental acumen if they are added comparatively, but their form encourages the reader to accept their dictates passively without asking the basis for the ndings or even how they are to be applied to different cases. The Ialmud, on the other hand, cannot possibly be studied that way.

"Hesch, Judaism Eternal, Vol. 1, pp. 201-202

⁴⁴ Mordecui M. Kaplan, The Meaning of God in Modern Jewish Religion (New York Islaman House, 1907), pp. 94f; Future, Ch. 13. Also of, his Judaism without sanaturation (New York: The Reconstructionist Press, 1958), Ch. 4, where he applies in aulysis in detail to Christianity as well as Judaism. ⁴⁴ Hunch Judaism Example View and Statem.

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The style in which it is written requires the student to understand conflicting arguments on the issues it treats since it records not only differing opinions but also the reasons each side would give for its decision and the ways it would meet the objections raised by the advocates of the other positions. It thus is a more significant aid to the development of moral judgment than the codes are – and, indeed, traditional Jewish education has devoted much more time to the Talmud than to the codes. Similar considerations underlie the case-study method used in most modern law schools

Buber and Kaplan would also use classical text study for developing the student's power of judgment but in a very different way. Since they do not accept the enduring authorih and relevance of Jewish law, they are more interested in teaching students how to approach the texts than in demonstrating how to master the reasoning of the texts' arguments. Thus students should exercise their powers of judgment by standing outside the text and evaluating it rather than by standing within it and striving to understand it. For Kaplan the student's assessment should take the form of reinterpreting the text since that is the way that the Jewish tradition has gained new meaning and relevance throughout history.

In the course of his Jewish studies, the Jew should nowadays be fully apprised of the causes which have rendered the Torah, in its traditional form, largely irrelevant to his needs. This knowledge would clear the ground for that process of reinterpretation which would make of Jewish tradition a means of stimulating our people to resume its quest for the good hie. It should be the purpose of adult Jewish study to train the Jea, in that process of reinterpretation, so that the tradition of hu people, even if not infallible, might function as a potent influence an shaping the etheral and spiritual ideals which alone can render life worth hung "

Buber is even less concerned with the traditional texts themselves. For him they should be used as a stimulant for a dialogue between the teacher and the student in which they can encounter each other as individuals and struggle together over the moral issues which the text raises. The student's powers of judgment would thus be sharpened through the dialogue rather than through an analysis or reinterpretation of the text.¹⁵

But how can we develop the student's powers of independent udgment through text study if we also want to impart knowledge of the tradition's moral stance? Are not those two uses of the texts untradictory? Once we have taught what the tradition says about a given issue, have we not made it impossible for students u judge the matter on their own and express contrary views?

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All three of our writers would deny that there is any conflict. some teachers, and some settings, can, of course, be intimidating is the student, whether the subject is moral issues or anything the. None of our three theorists would advocate such an amosphere for text study. Even Hirsch, who is most assured of be correctness and authority of the tradition, is interested, as we we seen, in stimulating the student's ability to analyze stements, apply them to new cases, and discern what is palogous and what not. That would apply all the more to Kaplan ad Buber. If faced with the question we are now considering, ilirsch would point out that the Jewish tradition itself encourages ctive debate, both in the form of its texts and in the way they are raditionally studied.10 Kaplan and Buber's methods of study call in even greater use of the student's powers of judgment. All aree, however, would claim that moral education cannot be estricted to the formal elements involved in reasoning or to a infication of the student's own views: it must convey moral autent as well. In that they would simply be reflecting a basic munption of Judaism, i.e. that it has something to teach people, but a person's unaided moral judgment is less good than a scision based upon a thorough study of the traditional texts scause those texts record a wealth of human experience and (in uring senses for our three thinkers) the will of God. Thus adents should be taught to apply their reasoning powers to the

*Specifically, all of the texts — including the Bible and Codes — are not studied by we but rather as materials for varying interpretations and thus varying approaches to the set treated, following the mode of the Talmud. The student is expected to learn what we tays, but that is never enough: he must learn to reason with them too. In fact, there ways ubjections to the development of codes of Jewish law in the Middle Ages for at their authoritative, cut-and-dried form might cut off the lively discussions of us in Jewish haw and its ability to change as necessary. Cf. Asher ben Yehiel's meanin, "Using the Code of Maimonides," in Solomon Freehof, A Treasury of taxing (Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1982), Ch. 8, cf. - s the end of Section (B-2).

¹¹ Kaplan, Euture, p. 476 this statics), et also Judaism as a Civilization, pp. 484-485 and On spins Jews Ask, pp. 359–360.

¹ Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, Ronald Gregor Smith, trans. (London Keya Paul. 1947), pp. 105–107, 115.

These are clearly not the only ways in which is set study can aid moral judgment to

to: for example, which our authors do not mention is this, the use of texts enables people a leal with moral questions at a distance removed from the hot, emotional issues of the as it allows for moral discussion and clarifies moral judgment by putting moral adenus into a context which is not immediately connected to the partics themselves for, however, as in the other areas of this paper, I will confine myself to the points made a az authors, which are rich enough!

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traditional texts, and in that way they can both learn ther religion's system of values and also develop their powers of adgment

3 Motivation. That text study can give students information about values and that it can help in training them to think clearly in moral matters may not come as a surprise, but our authors go further: they claim that it can even stimulate one's desire to be moral. Hirsch claims that a person's study of the traditional text "stirs his passion for the noble and good, for the pure and virtuous, and inspires in him an antipathy for what is rough and common, vile and bad;" "the refreshing draughts" which he draws from it give him "new strength to meet the troubles of life."¹⁷ He does not explain the specific mechanism by which this happens, but, gives what he has said in other contexts, one would presume that for Hirsch it is the combination of a constant exposure to detailed moral rules, the inspiration of the Jew's ultimate moral mission, and the continual practice in good moral reasoning that together accomplish this.

Kaplan, like Hirsch, thinks that the long-range thinking characteristic of a religious view of life motivates moral behavior because it gives people a reason to sacrifice immediate, immoral gains:

The sort of education implicit in the Jewish ideal of Talmud Torah would give to the democracies the one thing that they have thus far lacked, the long-range view that renders a people willing to make sacrifices for the building of a better world based on reason, righteousness and peace.¹⁶

But he concentrates more on the fact that religion fosters a feeling of peoplehood, which, he stresses, is absolutely indispensable in motivating moral behavior. When people have ties to a group, they gain a sense of responsibility to those beyond the memben of their own family, sympathy for them, and loyalty to them. When the group extends over past, present and future, as the Jewish group does, it also gives one a sense of rootedness and purpose. I should act morally so that I do not frustrate, but rather further, the noble goals of my ancestors and insure a better work for my children. Group membership, in addition, provides a person with a sense of self-worth since it betokens the fact that there are others who are concerned for your welfare and who need you. Furthermore, the group represents a reservoir of taleat

energy and accomplishment which can give a sense of justifiable pride to all of its members far beyond that which any member could earn individually. A person with such dignity and pride would think twice before compromising that by doing something annoral. And finally, the group creates expectations of its members, and those are among the most powerful stimulants to uoral behavior because few people are willing to disappoint bose who are near and dear to them, let alone risk being alienated from them.¹⁹ For these reasons Kaplan claims that group identity a crucial for morality:

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We cannot forego that unity, without foregoing all that gives us human dignity, self-confidence and a purpose in life. It thus spells for us the very source of all religious values. Remove that unity and sense of Jewish peoplehood and those values are dried up for us at the very source.²⁰

Kaplan is well aware of the possibilities for nationalistic abuse prolved in the feeling of collective consciousness, especially in modern times, when nationhood has acquired religious agnificance. He says, in fact, that one of the most important functions of religion is precisely to expose such abuses so that the mergies generated by national fervor can be used for good purposes. But he recognizes that national feeling is both normal and powerful, that indeed "nationality, next to physiological bredity, is the most decisive influence in a person's life,"¹¹ and that therefore religion neither can nor should ignore it. Instead religion should seek to mobilize and direct national feelings toward moral ends.

Text study is an important method for creating group consciousness and gaining its moral benefits: "To be able to affirm aur peoplehood in that (moral) spirit, we have to become once gain Bible conscious."²² Studying the group tradition aids any goup in strengthening its sense of identity, but for the Jews it is specially important, according to Kaplan, because of the argative way in which others have portrayed them:

A tradition which would present in dignified fashion the case of the Jewish people is absolutely indispensable as a therapeutic to Jewish character. The Jew must regard Jewish life not through the eyes of a bostile civilization, but through the authentic voices of its own heroes,

* Ibid., pp. 82-83, 94-96, Religion, pp. 178-182 * Kaplan, Fature, p. 457 * Ibid., p. 519; cf. generally pp. 516-522 * Ibid., p. 457

[&]quot; Husch, Judiasm Eternal, Vol. 1, pp. 192-193, cf. also p. 168

[&]quot; Kaplan, Eurore, p. 492 (Ins italics)

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sages, poets, prophets, and leaders Stifled by the poison gas of antipathy and contempt, the Jew requires the spiritual oxygen of his tradition to adose los character with the therapy of human dignity ³⁴

Thus text study can serve as a stimulus to moral behavior because it fosters those group feelings of love, sympathy, loyalty rootedness, direction, self-worth, pride and responsibility what are crucial for an effective moral system.

Group feeling, however, is not the only way to motivate moral behavior, the effect of a respected individual can also be ven telling. Text study uses this factor in two ways: it portrais exemplary (and not-so-exemplary) personalities of the past and it aids teachers in being a personal model themselves. The biographies of honored leaders of the past have long been used a inspirations for the people of the present and as the basis for the discussion of moral issues, and this mode of moral teaching and motivation has recently been given careful attention b philosophers of ethics.24 Hirsch and Buber heartily endorse the use of the texts. Buber devoted many of his writings to Biblical and Hasidic figures, and Hirsch included many such moral homilies based on Biblical personalities in his commentary to the Bible Kaplan is also interested in exploring "the inwardness of the religious experience of those who shaped the religion of Israel' and he complains that Jews have not devoted enough attention to the religious life of the ancient priests, Psalmists, Job, Kohelett Rabbis and writers of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha: the spotlight has continually been trained on the people of the Pentateuch and the Prophets. But he also issues a caveat: we must beware of sentimentalizing a remote ancestry: "The ven remoteness of ancestors is conducive to the tendency of idealization and apotheosizing them into a race of supermen who knew Cu more truly and more intimately than any other people and what noted down their experiences in the Bible, which is the greatest religious classic of all time." One must be careful that such tendency does not make our study of the figures of the past a escape from the concrete issues of the present.25

Text study can also aid the teacher to function as a model if as used correctly. Our authors differ, however, as to how to do the

scording to their varied understandings of the texts themselves. for Hirsch, the Bible, Talmud and codes are the eternal and adisputable word of God. Therefore teachers become models or their students to the extent that they themselves accept the ents as divine and follow Judaism's precepts unquestioningly. for Buber and Kaplan, that is precisely what the teacher should wt do, both because the texts do not embody a fixed corpus of prescriptions in their view, and also because when presented as uch they have no power to motivate. As Buber says, those "who we seriously laboring over the question of good and evil rebel shen one dictates to them, as though it were some long stablished truth, what is good and what is bad; and they rebel ust because they have experienced over and over again how hard a is to find the right way."20 Instead the text, to be ethically dective, must be used as a springboard for discussion in which mchers reveal how they personally respond to the values of the radition. That gives the tradition concrete reality so that it can dect the student through the teacher. Similarly Kaplan claims but "we must avoid as far as possible the oracular approach which ignores challenges, questions, and alternative solutions," pretending that all is clear and simple; instead "we should take the adent into our confidence and make him aware that we are all agaged in a common search after a way of Jewish life that shall deit from us the best we can be and that shall enable us to bear be worst that can befall us."27 In that way text study can motivate noral conduct by mobilizing the effectiveness of both the teacher and the tradition.

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Probably the most straightforward way in which text study notivates moral action, though, is through informing the learner that the tradition imposes obligations on all Jews. Hirsch gives a teological explanation for the authority of those obligations. (i.e. e should obey the Torah's moral rules because God comanded them); Kaplan gives a sociological justification (we hould obey Jewish moral rules as an act of identification with the (wish people and as part of its endeavor to actualize the divine in munan life); Buber gives a psychological account (we should bey Jewish moral rules in response to the I-Thou encounters we use with God). These varying understandings of the power of prtext to obligate a person meet with varying degrees of success acording to the one being addressed. The simple fact, though, is

*Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 105; ef. pp. 107, 114 *Kaplan, Future, pp. 471–472

[&]quot; Heligun, pp. 151-152

¹⁴ Most expectally in James Win, McClendon, Jr., Biography as Theology (Nadva and New York: Abingdon Press, 1974).

¹ Kaplan, Religion, pp. 194-185, 198-189. Hirsch provides a good example as a danger against which Kaplan warns he speaks of "the spiritual and moral liak was surrounds the head of Abraham" in *Judoism Eternal*, Vol. 11, p. 59.

that classical Jewish texts do impose responsibilities on the Jewish reader however their authority is explained, and if Jews do not know what the traditional commandments are, they cannot possibly obey them. Knowledge, therefore, can be a stimulus to action, as our opening citation from the Rabbis maintains.

4. The moral values attached to study itself. Until now we have concentrated on how text study helps a student learn moral values that have nothing directly to do with study itself, but we must remember that the Jewish tradition sees study as a value in its own right. The Bible includes the commandment to teach the tradition to children, and more significantly, it makes teaching the law to the people an important task of religious leaders,²⁰ but it was the Pharisees who made study an end in itself — perhaps, as Moses Hadas suggests, under Greek influence.²⁰

Hirsch reflects the Pharasaic development in claiming that there is no "opposition between intellectual and moral education," that, on the contrary, striving for intellectual perfection is "an act of pure duty of the highest order," "the first of all moral commandments." He quickly adds that the tradition "certainly placed its main emphasis not on knowledge but on deeds and held right doing to be the test of right knowing." he thus echoes the continued ambivalence regarding the relative value of study and practice in the Rabbinic tradition, a ambivalence which was largely absent in the Greek view. But he is definite in his claim that intellectual perfection is itself a goal "knowledge should be sought for its own sake, and intellectual training and perfection should be part of everyone's calling a life "This duty includes not only the practical training necessary for earning a livelihood but also learning in and for itself a commending the Talmudic approach over that of his times, he says, in strikingly modern terms:

Expressions such as "to be educated above one's station in life" or "to become useless for one's occupation through too much education" were quite alien to those times. Work for one's livelihood and work for spiritual nourisliment were both equally ennobled by the command of the moral law #

¹⁷ Deuteromomy 6.7: 31-19, 22, Ezra 7:10, 11 Chronicles 17:7-9, and note that each tage the Billie introduces a series of Laws, it does so with the words, "And Moses spoke to the Children of Israel." This definitely was not a tradition that was kept in the hands of anelas sloray. Just one disseminated conversity and pervisively among the masses.

Moses Hadas, Hellenatu Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p 69-71-1 would like to thank Rabbi Ned Gillman for this reference.

"Husch, Judasm Eternal, Vol. 1, pp. 179-151. Husch gives several proofs its intellectual perfection is itself a moral duty within Judaian. (1) study for its own sales. Kaplan and Buber are less convinced of study as an end in itself. They value education sufficiently to write about it and engage in it extensively, but their approach is much more pragmatically oriented. Thus Kaplan does not even list study in his 95-page thapter entitled "Basic Values in Jewish Religion" (subsequently published as a separate book)31 and he continually declares that world betterment is the aim of education, to be achieved through making the Jewish heritage relevant to the present moral and spiritual needs of the Jews.³² In line with that, however, he advocates more study and less praying, since "worship and prayer are directed toward the attainment of peace of mind, [while] the study of Torah can set in motion all of the moral nfluences that go into the molding of character and the shaping of society."33 For Buber also the aim of education is functional: it is a means to train good character by exposing the student to God as a model (to the extent that the instructor can).34 It is interesting that these two thinkers, as different as they are, share the pragmatic undencies of the twentieth century when it comes to ultimate ams, together with its disenchantment with study for its own ake. In this Hirsch, ironically, is more cultured than they!

But study is not only an end in itself for Hirsch: the very process of learning inculcates other moral values. Specifically morality is largely a matter of the proper exercise of one's will. The development of mental skills, though, is also a matter of free will since students will engage in concentration, analysis, memorization and creative thinking only if they choose to. Thus "the entire intellectual schooling of our youth" is, in effect, a "continuous exercise in moral education" since it trains the student to choose to act constructively. Moreover study inculcates specific moral virtues, including "obedience, the readiness to comply with a superior will, the consequent exercise of self-control, the punctual and most perfect possible performance of duties imposed, the pleasure of work and pure joy in

taked over and above vocational training in Rabbutic sources; (2) God's Covenant, acording to the Bible, is with the people, not the leaders, and hence the people themselves may tody its terms and implications; (3) wisdom, the highest value of the third section of the Bible (the Hagiographia), includes both practical and theoretical knowledge; and (4) the naturation of children is given priority over rebuilding the Temple in Rabbinic law, and building schools takes proceedence over building synagogues. Cf. Ibid, pp. 180-186 "Kaplan, Future, Ch. 15, reprinted (together with Ch. 14) as Basic Values in Jewah

Algion (New York: The Reconstructions) Press, 1957, 1963)

* Ibid. pp. 440. 468, and Ch. 25, Section Lexp. pp. 488-489, Religion, pp. 155-189, 197-

" Religion, p. 175

"Baber, Between Man and Man, pp. 101-104

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work done, self-disciplined serenity, modesty, sociability, friendliness, (and) team-spirit" in addition to "care, caution exactitude, and circumspection."33

In sum, text study contributes to moral education by informing students about the whole range of moral value, motivating them to achieve them, training their powers of moral judgment and inculcating specific moral values in the process of learning — not the least of which is the value of study itself.

Matters of Method

For the text study to aid moral development in the ways enumerated above some important methodological issues must be addressed. We shall consider two of them, the choice of texts and the approach to be used in teaching them for moral purposes 1. The Choice and Language of the Texts. In one of his earliest essays, Hirsch complains bitterly about those who send then children to religious lessons after school, "perhaps only in preparation for their Bar Mitzvah" (Nothing has changed!). Part of his complaint concerns the short amount of time that such students invest in their Jewish studies, but another part is directed to the method used. The children learn a few selected extracts "What, in truth, can these religious extracts, printed, copied and learned by heart, achieve?" he asks. Even if they were the most comprehensive and representative citations that could be found they would only represent God's word as reflected by a human editor and, as such, they "would reproduce only one color, one aspect of God's word."

The Dryme teaching is, however, infinitely more than that, there is in it not a phrase, not a word, but embodies a plentitude of light and life, a rich muse of the most manifold truth, teaching, admonition, comfort, and exhortation for every variety of age and station in life, of situation and mood. The Divine word is like a paradise of flowers; instead of opening its portals to your children you are content to distill the fragrance of a few flowers and to put a little bottle of this extract in the values which they carry on their life's travels, an alcoholic drink which stimulates and moxicates them for the moment and then leaves them listless and prostrate.

Instead Jews must be exposed to the whole of Jewish tradition (he mentions specifically not only the Bible, Talmud and Shulkhan

Arukh, but also Yeha Halevi) if they are to have enthusiasm for putting it into practice and for learning still more.³⁰

Few Jewish educators, I suppose, would quarrel with that if they could command the time necessary for such extensive instruction. The significant increase in Jewish Day Schools in North America in recent times is, in part, a belated recognition of the need for such an investment of time if the tradition is to be effective in any area, morality included. But what do you do when conditions are less than ideal, when, in point of fact, people will not devote the time necessary to learn as much as we would like?

Hirsch would simply begin the process of introducing the sudent to classical Jewish texts and take it as far as he could go. That is the import of his German translation and commentary on the Bible and his summary of the hows and whys of Jewish law in *Horeb*: despite his clear commitment to Hebrew, ³⁷ he recognized the need to make primary Jewish text material available in the vemacular for the many who would not learn Hebrew, and his decision to create educational materials on the Bible and Jewish tw indicates his commitments as to the choice of texts. His approach is thus holistic: get the student into the stream of Jewish literature as much as you can. If the tradition is allowed to speak in is own order and idiom, it has the best chance to exert moral influence.

Buber and Kaplan do not agree. For Buber the text is largely a format for inducing dialogue between the teacher and student. In line with his emphasis on the personal nature of life, Buber's own work in the classics of the tradition revolved primarily around the stories of the Bible and the Hasidim. These bespeak divine values³⁸ and yet are concrete enough to stimulate discussion and emotional involvement. Buber would therefore use such texts — Jong with anything else that can motivate a real dialogue.¹⁹

Kaplan's interest in using the classical texts of the tradition is geater than Buber's because he is interested in fostering feelings of peoplehood in addition to moral commitments. Moreover, he aconvinced that it is impossible to teach religion or ethics without teaching some particular content drawn from the sacred lerature of a specific societal group. Therefore "so long as there to be found any room in the contemporary scene for Jewish life,

¹ Hirsch, Judanm Eternal, Vol. I, p. 178. Hirsch is especially concerned war in micating obechency and submission to authority, perhaps a function of his Orthaal, intentation, C1. Huil, Vol. I, p. 230 and Vol. II, pp. 280-281.

^{*} Ibid Vol. 1, pp. 166-168, cf. also p. 178.

[&]quot; Ibud . pp. 188-202

^{*} Buber, Between Man and Man, pp. 101, 116

[&]quot;Ibid p 107

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the knowledge of Torah must figure in it, or that life will be anything but Jewish."⁴⁰ Kaplan also emphasizes the need to teach Jewish texts in their original languages (Hebrew or Aramaic) in order to produce the group feelings necessary for morality and to ansure a correct understanding of the values themselves:

The Greek translation of the Bible placed the large and important community of Jews in Alexandria outside the stream of Jewish life and caused them to be swept into the current either of Paganism or of Christianity. What happened to Alexandrian Jewry should serve as a warning to those who nowadays count upon the possibility of maintaining a Hebrew-less Judaism anywhere in the diaspora. The sterile values and bizarre aberrations which a translated. Judaism yielded to a Philo of Alexandria, or to a Hermann Cohen of Germany, should discourage any lesser philosopher from attempting to effect a revaluation of Jewish values that is not rooted in a knowledge of Hebrew, both ancient and modern.⁴¹

Kaplan, like Hirsch and Buber, says that the Bible should playa major role in the curriculum, and he places particular importance on the Pentateuch. In contrast, however, to Hirsch's holistic method and Buber's personalistic orientation, Kaplan strongh advocates a problem-oriented approach to Jewish education, and thus would choose those texts which speak directly to the needs and problems of students.⁴²

2. Perspective and Approach. Hirsch and Kaplan are further apart in their views of the texts themselves: for Hirsch the written and Oral Torah are the immutable word of God, while for Kaplas they are the written record of how Jews of ancient time conceived of God, the good, etc. That difference underlies many of the other differences that we have noted, and it has direct implications for the methodologies they would adopt in teaching the texts for moral purposes.

Hirsch complains bitterly about the critical, historical approach to the tradition, primarily because it denies the diviaauthorship of the Bible and Talmud and does nothing to insparobedience: on the contrary, he writes, have the practitionen a this approach "ever written or published anything which did az amount more or less directly to throwing stones at the actapractice of Judaism?" There are plenty of intellectual problem with the historical approach which would justify its rejection, b. the practical issues alone should suffice: Judaism can command obedience if and only if it is accepted as the word of God. Consequently Hirsch argues for the traditional approach to the texts, in which "the word of God, and the wisdom of the Sages which was derived from it and was built upon it, furnished each one with his axioms and principles and the absolute standards by which he tested and measured the inner and outer world, the truth of an idea, the purity of a sentiment, the moral worth or worthlessness of a saying or an action, and all social and political phenomena and events in the past and present."⁴³

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Kaplan takes precisely the opposite tack. For him it is the traditional approach which repels people and makes the tradition seem irrelevant. Consequently, the main purpose of Jewish study hould be to train Jews to reinterpret the tradition in the light of modern knowledge and needs so that it can again function refectively in shaping their ideals and behavior. The alternative, traditional approach may arouse strong religious emotions in ome people; but since such emotions are based on an irrational vew of religion, they can easily become a moral menace. Moreover, most people cannot identify with Judaism in its traditional form, and therefore it must be studied with full atellectual honesty if it is to be morally persuasive and aspiring.⁴⁴

Buber also adopts an historical approach to classical Jewish exts, but for him that is not the major methodological concern. The important step in making the Bible morally effective is to make it personal. Teachers should not just teach the text as an objective entity: they should, instead, show how they respond to a, how it answers moral questions in their lives — and let the students react to it, too. It is by using the classical texts as a open of the students of the students is a static text of the students that it can some to exert potent influence.

With this wide variation in approach to the texts, one might will wonder whether our three thinkers are even talking about the

^{*} Kaplan, Judavin ava Civilization, p. 410 (from which the quotation comercast). 27 generally. Eurore, pp. 457–459.

^{*} Kaplan Relieven pp 191-192

[&]quot; Kaplan, Future, pp. 471 472, 512, 519

[&]quot; Hasen, Judaum Eternal, Vol 11, pp. 287, 284, c1 generally pp. 274-290, esp. pp. 284-

^{*} kaplan, Fature, pp. 476-479, Religion, 182-187 and 195-196 where Kaplan makes this satery forcefully, religion will be studied from a scientific point of view whether science prophewant it to be studied that way or not, and it is therefore in the best interests indigen to use that approach in the training of its clergy and laypersons in index to deal so the problems of faith it raises within a congenial setting. Moreover, Judaian itself react with a method. "Shall we change the well-known ubbleal saying. "The fear of the and its religion — is the beginning of wisdom," to read, "The fear of the Lord is the end?"."

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same thing when they advocate text study as part of moral education. They clearly would differ greatly in which texts from the classical tradition they would teach and in how they would teach them, but they are, in fact, talking about the same body of hterature. What holds them to it is the conviction that a moral stance can only be defined as Jewish and can only reap the benefits of the rich, Jewish tradition if it is linked to classical Jewish literature.45 That may seem to be a rather weak, almost contrived unity to the person not familiar with Judaism, but a must be understood in light of the tremendous diversity in interpretation which has existed within the Jewish tradition, a diversity recognized and even lauded in the Rabbinic tradition itself:

Lest one say, "Since some scholars declare a thing impure and others declare it pure, some pronounce a thing to be forbidden and other pronounce it to be perimited, some disqualify an object while other uphold its huiess, how can I study Torah under such circumstances?" Scripture states. "They are given from one shepherd" (Ecclesiaster 12 11): One God has given them, one leader (Moses) has uttered them at the command of the Lord of all creation, blessed be He; as it says, "And God spoke all these words" (Exodus 20:1). You, then, on your part, should make your ear like a grain receiver and acquire a heart that can understand the words of the scholars who declare a thing impure a well as those who declare it pure, the words of those who declare a thing forbidden as well as those who pronounce it permitted, and the words of those who disqualify an object as well as those who uphold its Although one scholar offers his view and another offers his, the words of both are derived from what Moses, the shepherd, received from the One Lord of the Universe. (Numbers Rabbah 14:4)

The Limits of Text Study in Moral Education

We have discussed a number of factors intrinsic to Jewishter study which make it a good technique for moral educate Nobody pretends that it provides a guarantee for producing moral person: it is unrealistic to expect that any education method could do that. But it cannot even function effectively a means to that end unless other elements are present in a environment of the learner, elements which constitute limits the efficacy of text study in moral education. The ones that a authors single out for special attention are these:

A moral model as a teacher. Even Hirsch, who has then 1

cognitively-oriented approach to the tradition, stresses the extent to which teachers act as models - and the degree to which their falure to act as a positive model can vitiate their instructions in lexts:

The efforts of the pedagogue must founder if the child catches him going astray, if in his own private activities he fails to pursue the good with that steadfast constancy which he demands from the child, if in his own life he does not practice the same command which he asks of the child. The pedagogue often makes the deepest impression on the child when he does not deliberately set out to instruct but simply performs his own duties and obligations."

Kaplan stresses this too,47 and for Buber the teacher is unquestionably the most important factor. Even within the purrow confines of the classroom, teachers influence the content of moral instruction through their selection and interpretation of exts, and they virtually determine the effectiveness of the classical materials through the attitude that they evince toward mem. For some students, of course, the text can sustain interest men when taught by a poor teacher, and some teachers can teach worality effectively without the use of texts. Under normal cucumstances, however, both are necessary, the teacher acting as an interpreter, motivator and model for the texts, and the texts untributing to moral education in the ways enumerated in section (A) above.

But if teachers are to function as models, how can they unultaneously sharpen the student's powers of judgment? After I, if they articulate specific judgments in their speech and behavior, do they not prejudice the case in favor of their own pusition and make it impossible for the student to exercise adependent judgment? Modern advocates of values-clarification chniques certainly think so and consequently maintain that rachers should be as neutral as possible in their moral stance.48

This problem is analogous to the one we discussed above in action (A2), and the answer given by our three theorists is milar. Just as there is no conflict in using text study for both tenning the content of Jewish values and developing the student's puwers of judgment, so there is no conflict between the teacher ating as a model and yet teaching students how to judge matters a their own. On the contrary, for all three (and especially

^{**} Husch Judawan Eternal, Vol 11, pp. 280-281, Kuplun, Judaian as a Civilizana. 404-410 Bober does not say this explicitly, but his industrious work in translating de l into the German comacular and in interpreting Biblical themes and period demonstrate- his commitment to that text. All three men, however, would not us jo tests exclusively of Section (C-3, below

^{*}Husch, Judaiam Eternal, Vol 1, p 229

^{*} Laplan, Judaum as a Civilization, pp. 491-492, 503-508

^{*}L1, for example, Louis Rathy, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney Sunon, Values and . Any (Columbus, Ohio Chas' Merrill, 1966)

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Buber), only if teachers do manifest commitment to specific moral convictions can they stimulate students to take moral issues seriously; if they are apathetic, agnostic or otherwise noncommittal, students may surmise that the whole area of morality really does not make much difference at all or that there are no standards, that "anything goes." Teachers, of course, cannot be dogmatic or authoritarian if they are to succeed in stimulating the type of moral debate that sharpens moral judgment. Moreover, they must be well-informed of the arguments on all-sides of an issue and endeavor to present them fairly, sympathetically and even passionately. If they feel that they cannot do that, they might invite others to present opposing views. Commitment, in other words, does not preclude objectivity, openness and even ambivalence on some issues. But teachers must not only teach their subject enthusiastically, but demonstrate commitment to specific values in their lives if they are to convince their students that morality is not just a matter of talk.

2. Home and Community. The home and community are important in all aspects of the educational process and perhaps the most important in moral education, where we are dealing with considerably more than cognitive skills. Of our three philosophers Kaplan is most aware of these crucial elements in the education of character. He points out that the religious school cannot possibly inculcate moral ideals and behavior by itself since the child attends only a few hours a week. The home must be actively involved if Jewish educational efforts are to succeed:

The home is undoubtedly the most important determining influence in the formation of character. Scarcely any phase of the problem of Judaism could be more urgent than that of getting the Jewish home to instill into the child Jewish ideals and religion. It is necessary to devise some way of reaching the home and enlisting its cooperation with Jewish educational endeavor conceived as an all-comprehensive communal undertaking.⁴⁹

He is also keenly aware of the moral role of the community. He envisions a reconstituted Jewish community which could set, enforce, and teach moral standards.⁵⁰ Moreover, he repeatedly stresses that "Jewish educational endeavor which confines itself to formal schooling and the teaching of texts is foredoomed to failure," that students must be taught Jewish civics and be

" Ibid pp 495-496, cf p 553 n 14

¹⁶ Kaplan, Judawin as a Cristianion, Ch. 21, Future, pp. 38-44, Ch. 6, Questiona Jeu, Ask, pp. 241-232, 359-361, and Ch. 5 The reality, though, is that many modern Jews are Jewishly ignorant and uninvolved, and consequently Jewish homes and communities do not encourage intensive Jewish study or practice. The best chance to change that situation is to take Jews out of their homes and communities for a time and expose them to Jewish living and learning in a more supportive context. Kaplan was thus among the first to see the educational value of the camp setting⁵² – although he also devoted much time and effort to changing Jewish homes and communities more directly so that they would take Jewish education seriously.

3. Non-Jewish studies. Hirsch is most famous for his claim that one can and should combine Orthodox education, ideology and practice with a general education. He is honest enough to point out some of the moral problems involved in the secular education of his day (and, largely, ours). These include the fact that the goals of a secular school are vocational, and that puts the ego and its advantage at the center of concern; the educational methods (e.g., competition, ambition to win praise) are of doubtful ethical value; the subjects which could be used for moral education are not, and instead analysis, memory and reasoning are stressed; and, in any case, the teachers in secular schools have neither the time nor a conducive setting to get to know their students in all respects and provide moral guidance. But he also delineates a number of moral advantages to a secular education: it trains the student in the skills necessary to earn a livelihood, and acquiring such knowledge is "a holy duty;" it acquaints the student with the elements and roots of present-day civilization, and learning that too is "a religious duty;" and it deepens and broadens the Jew's religious education by providing the general knowledge necessary for understanding elements in Jewish ideology and bw, the skills necessary to construct and follow a proper argument, and the knowledge of science and history which makes lewish law and history all the more impressive and the Jewish mission all the more imperative. Therefore a proper moral education must include secular studies - although any contradictions between what one learns in Jewish texts and what one learns

M Kaplan, Judaism as a Civilization, pp. 490-493; Questions Jews Ask, pp. 359-360

¹⁰ Kaplan, Judaiam as a Civilization, p. 491; cf. generally pp. 483-484, 489-493 and Faure, pp. 438-445, 474-476; Raligion, 183-184

in the university must be resolved in favor of Judaism, since that is the word of God and scenlar studies are the product of humans.⁵³

Kaplan accepts the need for general education for Jewish moral purposes, but without Hirsch's final caveat and for yet a different reason. Jewish moral reasoning must be done in full knowledge of secular culture because otherwise it will be totally out of touch with the modern Jew.⁵⁴

4. A Religious Viewpoint. A religious orientation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for being moral, but when used properly, it can help in a number of ways. Hirschstresses the authority that religion provides for ethical norms, the wealth of experience within the tradition, and the expansive scope of its vision and concerns;³⁵ Kaplan writes about the sense of worthwhileness that a person derives from religion, a sense which makes moral effort and sacrifice reasonable and which gives life direction and meaning;³⁶ and Buber is interested in the fact that religion provides absolute moral standards as well as the cosmic, but personal framework in which to learn and understand them.³⁷

Text study can thus be an important aid in moral education. To function effectively, though, issues concerning the choice of texts and the approach to them must be resolved, and other, supportive factors must be provided in the environment of the student. Despite these limitations, the Jewish tradition is convinced of the crucial role that text study can play in the development of character, making it a value in and of itself. It is equally clear, however, in declaring that the goal is not learning alone.

Rabbi Hyya said. If a man learns the Law without the intention of fulfilling it, if were better for him had he never been born. Rabbi Aka said. He who learns in order to do is worthy to receive the Holy Spirit.

(Leviticus Rabbah 35.7)

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³⁵ Hirsch, Judaism Eternal, Vol. 1, pp. 166-173, and Ch. 17, esp. pp. 200-218, Vol. II, pp. 234-236

¹⁴ Kaplan, Future, pp. 187, 465-469, Religion, 192-3, 195, 199-200.

56 Harsch, Judawm Eternal, Vol 1, pp. 161-168, 199-202, Vol 11, pp. 282-290

³⁶ Kaplan, The Meaning of God in Modern Jewish Religion, Ch. 1 and parami, Future pp. 44-53, 59 105, 343-350, Chs. 10-12, etc.

⁶ Buber, The Eclipse of God, Ch. 6, exp. pp. 95-99, Between Man and Man, pp. 13-18, 101-101. For a more general discussion of this topic, cf. E. Dorff, "The Interaction of Jewish Law with Morality," Judawin, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Fall, 1977), pp. 455-466

APPENDIX I

SUGGESTED VALUES/GEMILUT HASADIM RELATED SONGS

Yom Zeh L'Yisrael Adamah Eili Eili Im Ein Ani Li Amar Rabbi Akiva Emet Anu Banu Artzah Heinai Mah Tov Dundai Hava Nagilah HaDerech Arukah Lo Yisa Goy Tzenah Torah Lanu Simi Yadech Shir HaAvodah Sisu V'Simcha Shalom Chaverim Dona Dona Sim Shalom Oseh Shalom

This is a list of some suggestions. It is by no means complete or authoritative.

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APPENDIX J

Accountability/Ethics Achievement/Success Adaptability/Flexibility Administration/Control Affection/Physical Art/Beauty/as Pure Value (Self) Assertion/Directness Being Liked Being Self Care/Nurture Collaboration/Subsidiarity Communication/Information Community/Personalist Community/Supportive (Self) Competence/Confidence Competition Congruence Construction/New Order Contemplation/Asceticism Control/Order/Discipline Convivial Technology Cooperation/Complementarity Corporation/New Order Courtesy/Hospitality Creativity/Ideation Criteria/Rationality Decision/Initiation Design/Pattern/Order Detachment/Solitude Detachment/Transcendence Dexterity/Coordination Discernment/Communal Duty/Obligation Economics/Profit

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Economics/Success Ecority/Aesthetics Education/Certification Education/Knowledge/Insight Efficiency/Planning Empathy Endurance/Patience Equality/Liberation Equilibrium Equity/Rights Evaluation/Self System Expressiveness/Freedom/Joy Faith/Risk/Vision Family/Belonging Fantasy/Play Food/Warmth/Shelter Friendship/Belonging Freedom Function/Physical Generosity/Service Growth/Expansion Happiness Health/Healing/Harmony Hierarchy/Propriety/Order Honor Human Dignity Human Rights/World Social Order Independence Integration/Wholeness Interdependence (Self)Interest/Control Intimacy Intimacy and Solitude as Unitive Justice/Global Distribution Justice/Social Order Knowledge/Discovery/Insight

Law/Guide Law/Rule Leisure/Freesence Life/Self/Actualization Limitation/Acceptance Limitation/Celebration Loyalty/Fidelity Macroeconomics/World Order Management Memberships/Institution Minessence Mission/Objectives Mutual Responsibility/Accountability Obedience/Duty Obedience/Mutual Accountability Ownership Patriotism/Esteem Personal/Authority/Honesty Physical Delight Pioneerism/Innovation/Progress Play/Recreation Presence/Swelling (Self) Preservation Prestige/Image Productivity Property/Control Prophet/Vision Relaxation Research/Originality/Knowledge Responsibility **Rights/Respect** Ritual/Communication Rule/Accountability Safety/Survival Search/Meaning/Hope

Security Sensory Pleasure/Sexuality Service/Vocation Sharing/Listening/Trust Simplicity/Play Social Affirmation Support/Peer Synergy Technology/Science Territory/Security Tradition Transcendence/Global Equality Truth/Wisdom/Integrated Insight Unity/Diversity Unity/Uniformity Wisdom Wonder/Awe/Fate Wonder/Curiosity/Nature Word Word/Labor Workmanship/Art/Craft Worship/Faith/Creed Self Worth

APPENDIX K

Why Texts: Literature and Jewish Education

By Barry W. Holtz

we been asked to reflect upon literature and its place a Jewish school, a question that admits of many ble approaches. We could consider the relationship en secular literature and Jewish literature, particin the day school setting. We could discuss the ration of specific literary techniques — the tools of bland a model of such an application through a liesson plan. I propose to do something slightly ent. I would like to discuss what might be called the all enterprise." of Jewish education and consider that enterprise is all about — why do we teach texts what way should that teaching proceed.

e years ago in an article of considerable import-Walter Ackerman made the following statement the nature of Jewish Education:

matter what its structure or orientation, the school conceives its primary function to be transmission of knowledge of the sacred texts. schools may study the texts themselves and as may only learn about them, but all of them are on them.

surface this may not appear to be a particularly point of view, but to me Ackerman has said somequite remarkable — the "primary function" of Education is teaching texts. How many educators rould really accept this formulation — what about pride? What about "customs and ceremonies"? bout Hebrew Language? In fact in this off-hand ckerman is making a significant — and often

W. Holtz is Co-director of the Melton Research The Jewish Theological Seminary. His book the Sources: Reading the Classic Jewish Texts was published by Summit Books/Simon and ignored — point: at its heart the enterprise of Jewish education is the study of texts, an enterprise, I would add, that makes Jewish education, at least in part, a *literary* endeavor.

Thus to consider the relationship between Jewish education and texts is almost a tautological exercise. We are a people of readers and writers, and our history is the history of a literary culture. Not to see this textual preoccupation as the center of our educational concern is to ignore the heart of what Judaism has always been about. As Jewish educators we *must* be concerned with literature. We have no other option.

But this does not mean that textual, literary education is an easy matter. Particularly today, when we live in a visually oriented culture, a culture of television and film, not one of books, this task is a considerable challenge. Let us consider how this textual process works — what happens to people when they study texts and how might this help us think about the work we should be doing.

Significant Testual Experiences

I would like to reflect upon this autobiographically for a few moments to see if my own experience might touch a chord with the reader. I do this not because my own experience has been so unusual, but rather because it may be very typical, and from my own life I begin to make some sense out of what we are doing when we educate toward an appreciation of texts. I'll begin by asking the reader to consider the following question: when did you first find yourself touched by texts? What text was it and where did it happen? In a classroom? At home? Was it a Jewish text? And why did it touch you?

For me the answer is surprisingly easy to remember. It was not in school or at home, but rather in the context of a youth group studying in a synagogue when I was in the 10th grade. The text also sticks in my mind. From Genesis Vayeshev (Genesis 37:1):

R. Aha said: At the time that righteous people dwell (voshvim) in tranquility and wish to dwell in tranquility in this world. Satan comes and accuses them saying "It's not enough that the world-to-come is appointed for them — they also wish to dwell in tranquility in this world too!" "You should know that this is so — our father Jacob, because he wished to dwell in tranquility in this world was attacked by the Satan of Joseph, hence the verse, "And Jacob dwelled..."

That was the formative Jewish textual experience that sticks in my mind. Why was this? Perhaps because of the specific content of this text, that tranquility is not what the *tzaddikim* of this world should expect, that those who wish to have the tranquility will find themselves beset, as Jacob was, by sorrow and suffering. Or perhaps it is not so much the particular meaning of this text, but the form, the whole nature of Midrashic interpretation that each work of the Torah is sacred. Va-yeshev is not a casual word, but one which our Rabbinic ancestors pondered, interpreted, and considered with remarkable care. At any rate the combination of these factors had a great impact on my own thinking.

I think of this as my first significant Jewish textual experience, but another setting comes to mind, from a slightly younger age. Here, from the eighth grade, I recall a very different text, but one which also had a great impact, at lease in the way it was taught that day:

Whose woods these are I think I know. His house is in the village though. He will not see me stopping here To watch his woods fill up with snow.

The woods are lovely, dark and deep. But I have promises to keep. And miles to go before I sleep. And miles to go before I sleep.

The lines are from Robert Frost's "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening" and what stands out here is what the teacher did in class that day. After finishing the poem, she asked, "What is this poem about?" Of course we replied "It's about snow;" "it's about winter," whatever. But she said, "I think this is a poem about death." Death? It doesn't even matter if she was correct. It was the idea that was remarkable — this poem was *about* something; it wasn't just descriptive or a string of rhyming words — *it* was meaningful. The idea that literature was more than story, that it dealt with meaning, was a radically new vista for this particular eighth grader. Thus I have two examples — one Jewish, one not, but both about the relationship of literature to meaning, or to put it in another way, the relationship between text and life.

And there is more. I think even farther back, to the first and second grades. Being taken to the school library for "story hour." Surely all of us look back on that time with nostalgia, for here we were exposed to the pure joy of stories. This too, I believe has implications for Jewish textual education.

To me these three incidents indicate something about the way that texts get into one's system, get under one's skin. And these anecdotes suggest to me, based on my be: As teachers our job is to make text count in the live our students. First, as in my tale about library visits, the pure love of the tale, and second, later, because te help make sense of things. They deal with questions have and raise issues we've never even thought about. If at the bottom, they have meaning.

In my own life those early stories and that later prowere not Jewish sources. Midrash Rabbah came mulater. But it strikes me that the task we Jewish educathave is to see that our students are excited, touched a moved by the great Jewish texts, either in the classroom out of it. The study of texts, after all, is the dominareligious preoccupation throughout the history Judaism. And when we today study that literature, wh we teach it, something important happens to us. Vpenetrate into the minds of the great thinkers of the Jewpast and we also come face to face with those issues th form the universal core of all great literature — what dohuman life mean? What is our relationship to the divin-What is justice? Hope? Tragedy?

In an essential way Jewish history is the history reading. The Rabbis throughout Jewish history a readers. The text was the Torah; the task to read that te For the Rabbis reading, however, was not a pass occupation. An active indeed interactive, reading a their method of approaching the sacred text called Tor By "interactive" I mean to suggest that for the Rabbis the tradition, Torah called for a living, dynamic respon The great Jewish texts are the record of that response, a each text in term becomes the occasion for la commentary and interaction.³

But in talking about the Rabbis as readers, 1 shot add an important dimension that has importaimplications for practical Jewish education. Much of wtextual literature was not just a matter of writing, but was quite literally *Torah she-b'al peh* — oral Torah: t Midrashic sermon, the Talmudic discussion, the Hasic homilies all were oral presentations, later written dow Even the Zohar is written in the form of discussions. at the medieval commentaries of Mikraot Gedolot seem to speaking to one another across the pages. Even thou, this spoken Torah has now been written down, now env in books, we should not forget that so much of wliterature is the record of talk, the student and teach meeting through speech.

So what are the implications of all this for real life Jewish education? For me three things stand out. Firour tradition lives through its texts, and as educators if our task to keep that alive and important for our studen in ways that Robert Frost and Midrash Rabbah and stuhour spoke to me, and other texts and experiences hav spoken to anyone reading this piece.

Second, if Torah is tied to interaction as I believe it ' our classrooms too must be interactive: text and studer. student and text, student and student. Study involve much as anything else an occasion for meeting our felk students. It's the way Jews have always talked to " another and our classrooms should allow for that kind meeting."

Finally, we ought to try to begin to find ways reconnect with the oral nature of our oral tradition. It may be that certain pedagogic techniques are called for his interactive spoken tradition and that by adopting the style of western, non-Jewish culture we are something. What for example, should a library be The non-Jewish model says a place of monkish e. But for Jews the Bet Midrash was a noisy place, a of argument and discussion. Isn't the Jewish style thing we should consider? Similarly, we should think hevruta, paired learning. To reconnect with the oral fon we ought to think about stories as told and read and, drama and even the sermon as pedagogic igues. Memorization too might have an appropriate in Jewish educational settings.

Difficulties

be of this is easy particularly because we lack the ral supports of our educational forebears — the basic elitments of children and families, the acceptance of radition and its role in one's life. We have to find our ways of breaking through to the text, but these are not without difficulties. Let me suggest a few rms about issues that confront us as we try new timents in pedagogy.

est is the issue that might be called "textual coniness." We like to think that the texts of the tradition coessible to us because our lewish ancestors were very like we are today. They lived at a different time, but he, after all, are still people. This assumption, that consciousness is like the consciousness of the past, be less clear than we might think. Perhaps these texts et a gap that is far greater than we might like to be less clear than we might think. Perhaps these texts et a gap that is far greater than we might like to be less clear than we might think. Perhaps these texts et a gap that is far greater than we might like to be some like Morris Berman" have argued that an consciousness has followed an actual evolutionary m. Others arguing from a less spiritual and more rical point of view have also raised serious questions the connections between past and present. The fan Robert Darnton, for example, presents the case a following way:

. Nothing is easier than to slip into the infortable assumption that Europeans thought d felt two centuries ago just as we do today owing for the wigs and the wooden shoes. We instantly need to be shaken out of a false sense of miliarity with the past, to be administered doses of ture shock."

ossible that we should be viewing the texts of the past anthropologist might, as evidence from a totally ent culture from our own, and that is no small task." cond is the problem of "contemporary translation." ue that one often sees in pedagogical methods for ing lewish texts. For example, some time ago I had a reation with a teacher who was very pleased by the er class was mastering Rambam's laws of Talmud from the Mishneh Torah. Now at the beginning of class, she told me, when the teacher comes in all the ints stand up and say "Welcome honored " She earnestly believed that in her students' out of the scenario of the Mishneh Torah with this exercise, they had "translated" the text to our But, although there was nothing really harmful in the students were doing, she was missing the point. students were not translating the Rambam, they herely mimicking the text. The real task was to take guage and sensibility of the Rambam's world and

express that in our own contemporary language and attitudes. What she was doing was only distancing the students from the Rambam text, not bringing them into connection with it.

Finally there is the problem my colleague Joseph Lukinsky calls "so what." "So what" is the phenomenon in which teachers deal in depth with a contemporary issue. let us say ecology or war and peace, then pull out the classic Jewish text that deals with the same issue only to discover that students rather than feeling illumination from the Jewish text, will exhibit ennui - "so what." Why, the students are saying, do we turn to a text to confirm what we've just talked about (war is bad; ecological issues are important) without any need of the text at all? Pedagogically we have to find ways to lead students into the text, without stealing the text's thunder. We need to show the profundity of the text or its unusualness, otherwise - to the great frustration of the teacher there often will be little more than a bored reaction from the students. This can be a particularly difficult problem for the teacher since out own basic commitment to Judaism often will let us give great credence and authority to the text, even if the specific teaching is something that we could have come to on our own, without the text's "help." (This, I imagine, is in part due to the fact that our attitudes and values have already been strongly influenced or shaped by other Jewish texts which we have studied in the past. We are in harmony with the text to begin with and even if we only find confirmation there of our own beliefs, the power of the text's authority makes a big difference.) But it is an issue we have to try to find ways to overcome

Many errors will be made in the name of a good cause and we have to expect that. We live in times that are hard for those who value texts and what they can do. But Jewish education cannot avoid this particular battle. If education — and Judaism — is going to mean anything in the lives of our students, the enterprise of the text will stand at the center.

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- Walter I. Ackerman, "Jewish Education For What?" American Jewish Yourhook, Vol. 70 (1969), p. 18.
- These remarks summarize a longer discussion in my Introduction to Back to the Sources: Reading the Classic Jewish Texts (New York: Summit Books, 1984), pp. 13-18.
- For more on this idea see Samuel Heitman. The People of the Book (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).
- See Morris Berman, The Re-Enchantment of the World (New York: Bantam Books, 1983).
- Robert Darnton, The Grout Cat Massucer (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
- 6. An amusing, but illuminating example of the whole issue of texts numing across cultures is described by the anthropologist Laura Bohannan in her article "Shakespeare in the Bush." The narrator describes with good humor her attempt to tell the story of Hamiet to an African tribe who hear it with their own cultural "ears." The essay originally appeared in *Natural History*. August-September, 1966 and has been anthologized in *Contornaty and Conflict* edited by James P. Spralley and David W. McCurdy (Boston: Lattle, Brown, 1971), pp. 22-12.

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