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26  
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43

Freedom of the Will  
as  
Found in Saadya.

Graduation Thesis  
by  
Samuel Koch. M. A.

Dedication.

To my parents who, conscientious, though unpre-  
tentious, doers of justice, early imbued me with a love of  
fair play, I dedicate this essay, insignificant  
though it be, with love and affection.

## PREFACE.

"How blest should we be, have I often conceived,  
"Had we really achieved what we nearly achieved!  
"We but catch at the skirts of the thing we would be,  
"And fall back on the lap of a false destiny."

Owen Meredith.

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Meno: Introd. and Text(passim)

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Gesch.d.Philos. vol.6: Augustinus--(II)

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(1) Kindly loaned by Prof. Feldmah. To whom I am also beholden not only for the theme of this essay but also for the suggestion of a method of treatment; treatment followed in the main.

~~III.~~  
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Stein L. Die Willensfreiheit

"	"	"	in ihrem Verhält. zur gött-
"	"	"	lichen Omniscienz
"	"	"	in ihrem Verhält. z.Providenz

~~II~~  
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«מנוח ודעות» sd I (Josephov) to wh. pagination refers.  
id. sd II. (Cracow)



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*sd II. (Cracow)*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Dedication-----	p. I,
Preface-----	p. II.
Bibliography---	p. III-V
Introduction-----	p. 1-7
PART I.	
Pagan and Christian Theories of the Will-----	p. 8-31,
Ch. I Pagan Theories of the Will---	p. 8-25,
A.---Plato-----	p. 8,
B.---Aristotle-----	p. 13
C.---Stoics-----	p. 21,
Ch. II Augustine-----	p. 26-31,
PART II.	
A Jewish Theory of the Will and its Origin----	p. 32-68.
Ch. I The Time of Saadya-----	p. 32-49
A.---Without.-Islam----	p. 32.
B.---Within.-Judaism---	p. 44.
Ch. II Saadya's Conception of the Will-p.	50-64.
A.---Freedom of the Will-p.---	50.
B.---Free Will vs. Omnipotencep.	55.
C.---" " " Omniscience p.	60.
Ch. III Appreciation-----	p. 65-68.
Ch. IV. Emunoth WeDeoth ch. IV-transl.---	p. 69-105.
Conclusion-----	p. 106.

## INTRODUCTION.

The Jews are carriers of Philosophy but not Philosophers & They have not originated systems of thought, but have transmitted them (1). Twice only in their history did they come in contact with peoples who were pre-eminently philosophical, or who, at least, were actively engaged in the consideration of philosophical questions(2). In its struggle with Hellenism the Jewish Genius - little given to subtle thinking because of the Rationality of its faith-found itself ill-fitted to cope with a people with whom Philosophy was an original endowment, and who, nurtured on concepts, wielded dexterously an exacting Dialectic. Alexandrian Jewish Philosophy, therefore, was predominantly Hellenistic. It fused Occidentalism with Orientalism and was especially effective along Neo-Platonic lines (3); but as for Judaism, it left no impress upon it ~~xxxxx~~ which might be ascribed to it alone.

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(1) Mu. Melan. pp. 469, 479.

(2) Mu. Melan. pp. 464, 469, 470; Eis. Pt. II, p. 15 seems to differ estimating higher the possible influence of Persian and Indian Philosophy.

(3) Mu. Melan. p. 469.

Some ~~eigh~~<sup>th</sup> centuries later the Jew was again brought to reflect consciously on the nature of Being. But conditions had~~e~~ changed. Talmudic Jurisprudence with its intricate Hermeneutics, if little calculated to produce Philosophers, developed, at least, a subtlety of mind which could apprehend Philosophy. And the strength within was made the greater by a weakness without. Islam, as regards Philosophy, was not to the manner born. Not only was Philosophy a thing of foreign growth new come among them, and insufficiently understood at that, but, such as it was, it was looked at askance by the great majority of Believers. Unlike in the days of Hellenism, therefore, Judaism could encounter the Philosophy of the Mohammedan Peripatetics and hold its own; it could even adopt some of <sup>their</sup> ~~its~~ principles and still maintain its identity. This JUdaizing of Philosophy was prolific of results that affected indelibly Jewish History; but it produced nothing of distinctive importance in universal thought. The sequel here was as before: the Jew became the philosophic Middle-man; the speculative

thought which he erstwhile carried from the Greek to the Gentile, and which, in the end the Arab alone came to prize, he now takes from this Arab, weltering in a sea of troubles, and gives it to the modern world (4).

But though the Jew has been a mere carrier of Philosophy, yet he has ever insisted upon carrying it in his own peculiar way. In fact the only Philosophy which he would consent to carry at all was that which passed muster before the tribunal of his faith. The Jew was a Religionist first and a Philosopher only secondarily. Thus the Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy is, at bottom, an attempt to identify Hellenism with Judaism, to make it trace its origin, as did Judaism, back to Moses and even to Abraham (5). And so in Mediaeval Jewish Speculation, Philosophy is wholly subordinate to Religion, its one object is to provide a rational basis for Belief (6); and where an ingenious exegesis prevailed it was not at all difficult

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(4) Mu.Melan.p.486 seq.

(5) Britannica : Philo; Mu.Melan.p.465 seq.

(6) Eis.Pt.I,pp.1-4; Mu.Melan.pp. 479,486.

for one to square one's proofs to one's conclusions. Mediaeval Jewish thinking, therefore, is religious in character; it is religious Philosophy; and, as it seems to me, even had the nature of the Zeitgeist not been religio-philosophical, yet, notwithstanding, Jewish thinking at this particular time, whatever might have been its form, must inevitably have received a pronounced religious bias because of the training to which the Jewish spirit had been subjected during the centuries immediately preceding, <sup>being</sup> and <sup>as it</sup> ~~which~~ was, chiefly concerned with finding a scriptural basis for life.

In Mediaeval Jewish Speculation, therefore, the spirit only is Jewish; the matter on which it works is of alien origin. Nor may one ascribe this "matter" wholly to the reigning Philosophy of the time - Mohammedan Peripateticism. For, as even the name indicates, Arabic Philosophy is, for the most part, Greek thought ~~came~~ to light again after having percolated through Syrian Christian medium. Then too, the age was polemical. Men looked less to the

origin of an argument than to its efficiency in controversy. We find, accordingly, Jews adducing arguments pro and con which were first advanced e.g. by a Church Father. It would seem, therefore, that the correct method of procedure in dealing with Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy as a whole, or even <sup>with</sup> any of its parts, would be first to consider the contributions possibly made to it by Arab, Christian and Greek (7).

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(7) The original scope of this thesis was much larger—the theories of at least Jehuda Halevi and Maimonides were to have been included. As the Greek thinkers in Arabic guise did not begin to exert their greatest influence in the realm of Metaphysics until after the time of Saadya (Mu.Melan.p.479) there is scarcely anything in Saadya's theory of the will to be traced positively to the Greeks or Christians. Still, as regards his Philosophy in general, he differed from the Greeks, as did all Jewish Philosophers—Maimonides probably excepted—in the doctrines of Creation and Providence, extending it over particulars (Schmid p.267). Saadya, moreover, was the first to assert the pre-eminence of man (vid. Emunoth WeDeoth infra p.69 line seq.

(8) Besides the facts of Talmudic Jurisprudence and the rationality of the Jewish faith (Gutt.pp.3, 12.) other reasons for the late appearance of the Speculative tendency in Judaism are, political conditions (Gutt.p.11; Mu.Melan.p.459 seq.); and identity of object between Religion and Philosophy (Eis.Pt.II, p.1 seq.). (Vid. supra p.1.2.)

But in going back to the Greeks it is not necessary that one begin with the first thinker whose name and thoughts History has happened to preserve to us. It is enough if one begins with Plato. Plato not only presents us with all that his master, Socrates, probably taught, but also with all that is valuable in pre-Socratic thought. The ceaseless **Flux** of Heracleitos, refusing reality to unity and rest; the Being of Parmenides, diametrically opposed, denying Plurality and Motion; the mechanical, purposeless, extraneous Mind-Stuff of Anaxagoras—these all are harmoniously adjusted in the Platonic Dialectic and given a new significance. The Socratic concept hypostasized in the eternal, immutable Ideas, far removed <sup>from</sup> the world of sense; the multitudinous particulars of this world of sense even, deriving whatever reality they possess from these pure, undefiled Essences, and possessing reality in proportion to their participation in these; these particulars, moreover, forever impelled by an indwelling, purposeful Thought, Soul, Mind towards the real-



ization of the supreme idea of the good,- it is thus that Plato resolves the opposition between the Eleatic and Ionic Schools into a higher synthesis, and the Anaxagorean Mind-Stuff is converted into a principle in-dwelling, immaterial, eternal, pure and teleological(9).

It is because Plato not only represents the beginning of the new but rests fundamentally on the old that we shall begin with Plato.

We have, therefore, to consider in the following pages and from the particular view-point of the subject in hand:-

- I)-Pagan and Christian theories of the Will.
- II)-Freedom of the Will as found in Saadya,  
prefacing this necessarily with a sketch  
of the Schauplatz.

[9] Vid. *Archer-Hind, Intro.*

## PAGAN THEORIES OF THE WILL.

## A.--PLATO(1).

Plato, in the domain of morals, adhered closely to the teaching of his master, Socrates. Hence his interpretation of the Will, though it discloses an original psychological increment, is chiefly ethical in character(2). With Plato as with Socrates the Will is subservient to the Intellect, to Knowledge or Insight (3). Nor does the Freedom which Plato ascribes to the Will on psychological grounds escape this tyranny. For, according to Plato, the Will can choose only when under the Guidance of Knowledge. The only voluntary or free acts, therefore, are Knowledge Acts(4). And Knowledge, in Plato's thought, is wholly and exclusively of the Good. Knowledge, therefore, is Virtue (5). And as Knowl-

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(1) In addition to references cited see especially Win.p.191 Alex.p.33 seq.

(2) Win.p.191.

(3) Alex.p.33 seq.

(4) In the Laws S 861 seq. Plato distinguishes three kinds of acts: voluntary, involuntary and intermediate.

(5) The identity of Knowledge and Virtue is discussed in the Protagoras along with the teachableness of Virtue (Jow.113). In the Meno the discussion is given the hypothetical form:

up the talmudic sentence:

אין אדם חוטא אלא אם כן נכנסה בו

רוח שטות

edge is not a habit which can be acquired by practice, so Virtue can be gained only through instruction. Virtue, therefore, is teachable. But because Virtue is teachable it does not follow that all men can be taught or even that of those whom can, all will consent to be taught. Now since Virtue is Knowledge and free acts are Knowledge Acts only, and every one seeks his own good (6) it follows that "no one voluntarily sins", "that bad men are always involuntarily bad (7). Ignorance is sin (8). Had men Knowledge men could not sin, since Knowledge is good. The supremely wise are the supremely virtuous and the supremely happy (6).

The Determinism involved in this ethical

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(5 cont.) if Knowledge and Virtue are identical then Virtue is teachable. The conclusion is reached: Virtue is teachable yet is not teachable because there are no teachers. This, aimed at the Sophists. (Jow.259 Intr.).

(6) As to the relation between ancient Determinism and Eudaemonism vid. Win. History of Ancient Philos. p.131 seq.

(7) Laws S 860 end.

(8) Sophist S 226 seq. Where two kinds of evil are distinguished: the evil of disease and the evil of deformity. To this latter belongs the evil of ignorance and this evil is subdivided into "ignorance of the soul" and "conceited ignorance". vid. also Timaeus p.S 86 seq.

conception of the Will seems obvious. Knowledge is Virtue; Sin is Ignorance. Yet ignorance is involuntary~~ly~~, if for no other reason than that if it were voluntary~~ly~~, it would be rooted in Knowledge and so be good. Then, too, though Virtue is teachable, all men can not be taught(9). Native character keeps down some; bad instruction has rendered others hopeless. And lastly, not even voluntarily~~ly~~ acts are free acts. Not a voluntary act but what it is rooted in Knowledge; Knowledge, therefore, determines the Will and deliberation is superfluous (10).

From this ethical Determinism inherited from Socrates, Plato, in his later years endeavored to escape. For he realized that, since all men were not endowed with the ability to learn, many might with justice not only endeavor to extenuate their wickedness but also persist in wrong-doing. Moreover, to Plato "God was good and the Author of good and of good only" and "not <sup>the</sup> steward of good

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(9) Alex.p.36.

(10) Alex.p.34.

and evil" (11). Plato would, therefore, shift responsibility for human conduct from God to man. In order to do this he resorts to a myth (12) in which the pre-existent souls of mortals, as yet uncontaminated by bodily investiture, are presented to us as choosing, in the presence of the Daughters of Necessity, Lachesis, Clotho and Atropo, their respective lots in life. Not only will their earthly characters be according to their choice - predominantly good or bad - but when once the choice is made, it is irrevocable. And for this choice the souls themselves are responsible, since they did the choosing - they chose Virtue or its opposite, Vice, and neither of these, them(13). Nor is the character of the lot affected by the order of the choice. The soul that chooses last can choose as good a lot as the soul that chooses first, if only it choose with insight. The Fates are impotent according as insight is used.

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(11) Timaeus p.S 379 seq.

(12) Repub. p.S 617 seq; Timaeus p.S 40 seq; vid. also Jow. Rep. Intro. p. 135 seq.

(13) It should be noted that Plato, as the ancients in general conceived of the human soul as material. Nor did they regard it a Unity. Plato e.g. distinguished three souls: the Rational, Emotional and Appetitive, each having its seat in a different part of the body. The first only was immortal.

Now by this doctrine of "Original"Choice Plato has succeeded, indeed, in giving the problem of the Will a psychological basis; but it may not be said that he has escaped the Determinism that he strove to shun. For here, too, Knowledge - whatever may be its nature here - is supreme. The greater the insight, the better the choice; the choice reveals at once the degree of insight behind it. And even if the insight were eliminated, yet even then, the doctrine would be Deterministic. For what makes the souls choose differently? If they are neutral - neither good nor bad - then choice is impossible; if some are inherently good and others inherently bad, then the kind of choice is determined beforehand(14).

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(14) Alex. p. 36.

## B.--ARISTOTLE.

Aristotle thought that he expounded Freedom of the Will; it would ~~seem~~ seem, however, that the logical consequences of his exposition are <sup>d</sup>eterministic. And it is not a little curious, too, that this quasi-libertarianism of his, as regards its ethical aspects, was evolved through his opposition to the ethical Determinism of Socrates and Plato. These held: I.- Knowledge is Virtue

II.-Virtue is teachable

III.-Vice is involuntary.

I.--- Now to these propositions Aristotle could not subscribe. His divergence from the first was indicated in the distinction which he drew between the dianoëtic or theoretical Virtues functioning in the Understanding and, for the most part, having their end in themselves, and the practical Virtues functioning in the Will and aiming to control the desires (1). This division of Virtue - defined, from the standpoint of man, as the right activity of reason and based on his psychology of the soul (2) - for the first

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(1) NeE. Bk. I, ch. 13, par. 15.

(2) N.E. I -7, 10 seq; II-2, 2; II-6, 10; VI-1, 1 seq.



time in history (3) defines the sphere of Ethics. Though Knowledge may be Virtue, Virtue is no longer always Knowledge. In short Knowledge and Will are no longer practically identical. It is recognized that the desires arising from ignorance may be stronger than the determination of the Will by Knowledge. Yet to attain Moral Virtue, the desires must be curbed. The Will, therefore, and not Knowledge is the specifically ethical element in the domain of action. Moral Virtue depends less on right Knowledge than on good Will (4). And furthermore, as the practical Aristotle believed it to be the object of Ethics to discover, not, what the good is, as thought the idealist Plato, but what is good for man - man the individual, <sup>man</sup> the member of a family and man the citizen - the practical Virtues alone were of supreme importance for man (5)(6). Moral Virtue, as distinguished from Intellectual Virtue, is Practical

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(3) Wundt, *Aristot., Ethical systems.*

(4) Wundt Eth-Systems p.19.

(5) N.E. II-2,1 seq; VI-2,5 seq; I-5,6.

(6) Not that they were superior to the theoretical dianoetic Virtues, which they were not, but the attainment was possible only through the practice of these.


Virtue, it concerns itself with human action, with action which is in our power (7).

But not all human actions are the subject of Moral Virtue. In fact not even all voluntary acts are moral acts (8), though all moral acts are voluntary (9). Voluntary acts done through ignorance of principle are


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(7) N.E. III-2, chs. 3-6; III-3, 3 seq, 9 seq, 12 seq.

Aristotle's Psychology of the Soul. (N.E. I-13; VI-1.) :-



--or--



(8) N.E. II-5, 6 seq; III-2, 1 seq, 11.

(9) Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of action: voluntary involuntary and intermediate i.e. those which are sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary. N.E. III-1, 1 seq. For table of Aristotle's division of acts v. Browne N.E. ~~XXVII~~

eliminated from the possible Moral (10). Besides an element of Knowledge, a voluntary act to be moral, must have been brought to a culmination by deliberative preference i.e. by a conscious choosing between different possible alternatives or means to an end. It is because deliberative preference is a deliberation with reference to the possible means to an end that it is distinguished from volition which is deliberation with reference to ends possible or impossible (11). A completely moral act, therefore, is one which possesses a).- an element of Knowledge, b).- is deliberatively chosen and c).- is voluntary i.e. the principle or impulse to ~~action~~ lies in the doer who is cognizant of the particulars or circumstances of the act, and not in external force or in ignorance. Acts done through constraint or ignorance are involuntary (12).

II.-----Moreover, Moral Virtue is not teachable but practicable (13). It is not a thing brought into man from

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(10) N.E.III-1,15 seq.

(11) N.E.III-2,4 seq.

(12) N.E.III-1,21.

(13) Intellectual Virtue N.E.II-1,1seq.

without, but brought out of man from within. Though no man is born with Virtue, yet every man possesses natural Virtue i.e. innate capacities or dispositions towards Virtue (14). These can be strengthened or converted into Moral Virtue only through practice. And the reward for practice, as indeed the stimulus to it, is what every man desires - happiness (15). So natural Virtue is Moral Virtue, and of attained Moral Virtue, happiness is the unfailing concomitant. As to the content of Virtue, it is a mean between extremes (16). There may be as many Virtues as there are men and probably as many means of Virtue. Now since a virtuous act is an habitual act (17), voluntary in origin and deliberatively preferred, and as moreover, its aim is to choose a right mean between extremes, Virtue may be defined as the habit, accompanied with deliberative preference, of choosing the mean defined by reason (18).

III.---And lastly since man exercises a habit of choosing

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(14) N.E.II-1; 5,7. vid. also VI-13.

(15) N.E.I-1,1 seq; 4,1 seq.

(16) N.E.II-6.

(17) N.E.II-5.

(18) N.E.II-6,10.

with deliberative preference, he is responsible alike for his good as for his bad choosings. Vice is no longer involuntary, but voluntary. The power to do, involves the power not to do and vice versa (19). Nor may one urge as excuse for his wickedness the overpowering force of bad habits or bad conceptions. Though these together or separately may render present conduct involuntary, yet, notwithstanding, for this conduct the doer is responsible: he is older than the habits or the imagination that caused it; had he chosen, he might so have directed these in the beginning that ~~these~~ present action would be virtuous (20).

Now, for all the strenuousness of this attack on the Platonic theory of the Will, men are loath to grant that Aristotle has established Indeterminism. Indeed, it is even held that Aristotle himself in asserting that only voluntary acts, and not even all of them, were moral, did not mean to imply Indeterminism. And for this reason, ~~because~~ the only acts contrasted to the voluntary are the

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(19) N.E.III-5, chs.1-8;

(20) N.E.III-5, 9 sq.

involuntary i.e. those determined, not by motives or character, but by external force or ignorance (21). But, be that as it may, Aristotle's interpretation of the Will is certainly, at bottom, Deterministic. Even his definition of Virtue reveals this. For though Virtue is a habit of willing, yet, before anything can be willed, there must be something to be willed and this something is the mean Virtue - insight. Then, too, as regards bad habits and bad imagination, responsibility is scarcely shifted to man by urging that, at the time of their formation, men had the power to change them. For, granted a present habit is bad, then, why is it that, at the beginning this habit or capacity was not turned in the direction of the good? Voluntary agents always aim at the good (22). The explanation, therefore, why the good intention in the beginning, turned out to be only an apparent good, as evidenced by the present bad habit, can only be that "this beginning" is in itself the result of a preceding "bad habit". But this

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(21) Alex. p. 51.

(22) N.E.I-1, 1.

new bad habit, too, had a beginning clearly, and this beginning needs to be explained. Thus the responsibility for present bad habits that Aristotle urges becomes attenuated into a meaningless phrase through infinite regression(23).

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(23)vid. Sidgwick's Outlines of Hist. of Eth. pp. 67-70.

## C.---THE STOICS.

Complete Emotionlessness is, in, theory, the one and only Stoic Virtue.(1) But, as man lives in the world and the passions therefore cannot be dodged, the only way that one can approach the realization of this Virtue is by suppressing these passions. We have here the basis of Stoic Indeterminism: a suppressor and the suppressed, that to be suppressed - the passions, that to do the suppressing - the soul, or more particularly, that part of it whose seat is in the heart and to which the other parts or ramifications - seven in number - are subordinate(2). This Hegemony or ruling part of the soul however, no longer the classical, triple apartment house of reason, emotion and appetite, is now conceived of as the living Unity of personality, though still corporeal. It is, therefore, at once the seat of the affections and appetites as well as of the reason and the Will(3) converting sensations into perceptions and "excitations of the feelings into activi-

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(1)Win.p.165/ 168 seq., 172.

(2)Ritter I p.525, 548 seq., 551 seq., 553.

(3)Ritter I p.151.



ties of the Will" (4). In it these all contend for the mastery; the passions, unnatural and irrational, or at least contrary to reason, lock horns with that which is natural and rational. If the reason yields, we have the one and only Stoic, theoretical opposite to Virtue- Vice; if the reason prevails, -and the lively Stoic consciousness of duty and responsibility feels that it can and should-, we have Virtue. So there emerges as the Stoic conception of Freedom of the soul: that assent which it chooses to give to certain ideas, and which it is persuaded to give because of their rationality. Now, as the passions and feelings are irrational or contrary to reason or at most vitiated reason (5), the principle of the Will, as Alexander points out (6), is one of apathy.

But this anthropological, ethical dualism of a vitiated element in the soul contrary to reason and a rational

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(4) Win. p. 168.

(5) Ritter I p. 552.

(6) Alex. p. 58.

element <sup>there</sup> ~~these~~ superior to it, in which the Stoic Indeterminism was rooted, was in open conflict with the metaphysical Monism that underlay the Stoic Pantheism (7). According to this, the universal Pneuma was wholly Rational (8), and all things, including the individual soul, were but concrete and necessary determinations of it. In the face of this, for the Stoics to predicate an irrational element in the soul - the suppression of which was the function of the Will- was an inconsistency which they saw or were forced to see. They, therefore, exerted themselves to show that this Indeterminism of theirs was a plant indigenous to this universally Deterministic soil. To do this they made a distinction between main and accessory causes (9). The Will was indeed a product resulting from the reciprocal action of environment and personality. But in this process of Will-formation the environment or universal Pneuma was wholly subsidiary - an accessory cause, while the personality was supremely

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(7)Win.p.190

(8)Ritter I pp.518 seq. 522 seq. 526, 528.

(9)Win.p.193.

dominant - the main cause. Indeed, the Hegemony, though a fragment only of the homogenous, universal Pneuma, was, notwithstanding, unique: it differed from all other hegemonies, as these differed from it and from each other, and this uniqueness was in each case due to itself. It seemed enough to the Stoics thus to establish the independence of the soul without investigating further whether the influence of character, disposition and circumstance upon it, which they admitted, did not again divest it of the freedom so hardly won(10).

But however satisfied the Stoics may have been with their defence of Indeterminism, the validity of that Indeterminism itself is questionable. Indeed it seems that the Stoics, like their predecessors, taught, when logically considered, the very opposite of what they intended. And the ~~same~~ salient characteristic of this Determinism is its Intellectualism. For not only is the Stoic ideal that of the wise man who, by very virtue of his wisdom, overcomes within himself the world without, but the only Virtue

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(10) Alex. p. 59 seq.

that they recognized in theory - Emotionlessness - is at once the result, as the measure of the amount of wisdom a man possesses. And this Virtue, again, when translated into positive terms is none other than life in harmony with nature, nature, whether human or universal, being identical with the reason (11). The unvirtuous man is he who yields to the passions; the virtuous man he who rises superior to them : ratio recta, accordingly, determines the Will. And this Determinism, too, reveals its distant Socratic origin. For since the passions, which are vicious, can be controlled by the reason, Virtue is voluntary (12), and, on the other hand, since Vice is assent to the passions and the passions cannot be avoided, it seems a fair inference that Vice is involuntary (13).

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(11) Win. 171 seq.

(12) Alex. p. 58 points out that they also held that Virtue was teachable, and shows the contradiction between the two propositions.

(13) Alex. p. 62.

## CHAPTER II.

## AUGUSTINE .

According to Augustine, he who lives, at the same time understands and remembers and wills. Not even the doubter can deny the reality of these three - Understanding, Memory and Will - he thinks, since by the very act of doubt he affirms them (1). These three, moreover, constitute the living whole of personality: regarded from the standpoint of consciousness they are essentially "one life, one mind, one essence" (2); it is only because of their relations to one another and of their external reference to the things understood, remembered or willed that they are distinguished. On Understanding and Memory, because of this external reference, Knowledge and Science rest; but before either of these can be enjoyed or used there must be Will (3). Will thus comes to be the supreme fact in the psychical life. Its freedom - which is real - is a spontaneous, con-

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(1) On the Trinity Bk. X. ch. 10 par. 13 seq.

(2) Bk. X-11, 17 seq.

(3) Bk. X-10, 13.

scious, self activity (4), and this appears in the decision it announces, the choice it makes or the assent it gives independent of the operations of the intellect (5).

The Will evinces its freedom, too, as a principle of union (6). As such it is <sup>frequently in kind</sup> superior to the things it unites; but even where a difference in kind does not exist, the Will is still invariably superior to the things united; for according to Augustine's fundamental metaphysical scheme, the active element in any process is superior to the passive element there (7). Thus vision or the seeing "sense informed" e.g. is due to the union brought about between the external object and the seeing sense by the attention of the superior and incorporeal Will (8). And what is true of the lower class of perceptions in the "outer" or sensual or physical man is true also of the higher trinity in him (9): the image of the external ob-

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(4) Ritter II p.346 seq

(5) Will. p.282.

(6) And this implies the converse also - a principle of separation.

(7) Bk. XI-6;5.

(8) Bk. II-chs. 2-5 .

(9) For this outer man vid. Bk. XI-3.

ject retained in the memory becomes an element in thought only when "the eye of the mind" is brought to bear upon it by the unifying purpose of the Will (10). And this composition trol<sup>l</sup>ong, which the Will possesses in the outer man it retains in the inner, at least as far as appertains to the "lower" reason, the reason concerned with actions (11). It loses its power of effective agency only when it comes in contact with the higher reason, the reason of contemplation, the reason in which the eternal, immutable truths inhere (12). In accordance with the metaphysical principle noted above, the Will in the presence of these eternal truths is passive and bereft of all power of self-activity; for these truths inhere in the mind, not because of anything man has or can do but solely because of Illumination through Divine Grace. Still even here Augustine would preserve for the Will a *Raison d'être*. The aim of the good

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(10) Bk. XI-3.

(11) vid. XII-3 for distinction between outer and inner man.

(12) Bk. XII chs. 1-4; 14.

Will is blessedness (13). For the attainment of this, however, Faith is necessary (14). And Faith, as Windelband points out (15) "as ideation plus assent contains in the factor of assent.....an original, volitional act of the affirming judgement".

This inertness of the Will in the cognition of the eternal truths discloses in itself the other side of Augustine's character. For Augustine, the psychologist and philosopher, who asserted that "we are all wills" was quite a different thinker from Augustine, the theologian, who was overwhelmingly convinced that everything in the universe - genus and individual alike - not only proceeded from Divine Volition, but was also constantly under immediate Divine Guidance (16). The problem, therefore, that now pressed for solution was that as to the origin of evil (17).

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(13) Bk. XI-6.

(14) Bk. XIII-chs. 7, 9.

(15) Win. p. 282.

(16) Ritter II p. 346.

(17) Bk. III-7, 11; ch. 5, 7.



Now , Augustine no longer holding the Manichean hypothesis of evil as an original, independent reality, but believing it to be a degenerated good and, insofar as degenerated, non-existent, sought the origin of evil in the fact of the Will (18). Evil is due to the perverseness or wrong choice of the Will (19). Still, men no longer possess the unrestricted freedom of choosing either the good or the bad. This unrestricted freedom was lost to man through the sin of Adam ~~and in fact~~, and, in fact, because of his sin it came about that he alone possessed <sup>unrestricted freedom</sup> ~~it~~. It is because all men are under the taint of this original sin that they are in need of redemption. Indeed the very reason why God did not prevent Adam from sinning, was, not because He could not, but because He might thereby show the folly of human pride and the saving power of His Grace (20) This Grace, moreover, men, all of whom are sinful, do not

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(18) Bk. III-14, 20; Ritter II p. 350 seq.

(19) Confessions Bk. VII-3, 7.

(20) De Civ. Bk. XIV-27 .

deserve. God in his love bestows it on whom He will. With it men will be saved; without it, try how they will, they cannot be. Thus all men, from the moment of birth are destined by nature to damnation or by grace to bliss. And thus the freedom of the Will so ably put by Augustine, the philosopher is confronted ~~by~~ with the exact opposite, Predestination, by Augustine, the theologian.

## Part II.

## CHAPTER I.

## THE TIME OF SAADYA.

## A-- WITHOUT.----- ISLAM.

In 892 SAADYA was born. before 873 the first Arabic translations of Greek philosophers, chiefly Aristotle, by Arabs were made(1). In 940 Aboulhasan Ali ben-Ismael al-Ach-<sup>4</sup>ari of Bassora died(2). Renouncing the convictions of his early manhood, he had established a school which held fast to the divine origin of the Koran(3). This school, interpreting the Koran literally in all essential points, and ignoring the earlier or Mecca indeterministic suras(4), promulgated the doctrine of predestination, though not without admitting a Casb or recompence according to action in the human deeds(5,6). The fact of Greek philosophical books or commentaries to them being done into Arabic by Musselmen presupposes the existence

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(1) Mu.Dict.p.173;d.boer p.20 seq. Aboul Zaid Honain b. Ishak (809?-873), once erroneously thought a Jew, author of "Moral Maxims of the philosophers", and his son Ishak Aboul Honain(d.910?) among the first. Al-Kendi(d.after 870) the most famous; also the first of the Mohammedan Peripatetics(St.p.6). Al-Kifti XIII.cent. author of "Dictionary of the philosophers," the last. All works translated by the time of Ibn Sina(980-1037).

(2) Mu.Dict.p.176.d.Boerp.55 gives his dates as 873-935.

(3) Kr.p.233seq.; 248.

(4) St.p.30 seq.; 48,74; Kr.p.9,29 (earlier ones believed this freedom); Eisler Pt.2,p.22.

(5) Mu.Dict.p.176, Kr.p.38 St.p.86.

of a coterie of men among them devoted to philosophy(7). These-  
 the first Moslem Peripatetics<sup>etics</sup>-believing in the eternity of the  
 world, restricting Prescience to genera, questioning the divine  
 origin of the Koran and eo ipso its authority over men, and pos-  
 tulating, finally, the Unity of God and the Freedom of the Will  
 were regarded as heretics by the Ascharites, the upholders of  
 Orthodoxy(8). Thus we have on Islamitic soil at this time a com-  
 plete cleft between Religion and Philosophy, between the truths  
 of Revelation and the discoveries of the Reason.

But the principle of compromise which is at  
 once, the principle of progress and historical continuity dis-  
 closes itself unceasingly in history. The Islamitic world was  
 cleft asunder but the Motazilites, a sect of eclectic penchant,  
 were at hand to bridge the gulf(9). They endeavored to reconcile

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(6) They taught, too, and for the same reason the reality of non-essential attributes, positive and negative, though they strove to avoid the gross anthropomorphism of an earlier sect, the Citafites (Mu. p. 76; Kr. pp. 20&29).

(7) The first commentaries, in fact, came from the Syrian Christians, (Mu. p. 170). Why these were the first translators vid. d. Boer p. II.

(8) Mu. pp. 172&176; Kr. p. 20; Eis. Pt II. p. 21 (he gives the proposition of the Philosophers and the rebuttal of the Orthodox, p. 26 SEQ.)

(9) Kr. pp. 15, 26, 235; St. p. II ("The Faithful Brothers" of Bassora had the same object in view).

Religion and Philosophy. They were not, however, the child of this antagonism: They had already a history of their own some hundred and fifty years in length—a history older than Mohammedan Peripateticism; and the cause of their rise, though not the occasion, (10) was probably the opposition—an opposition in all essentials the prototype of that between the Orthodox and the Heretics or Philosophers—between the religious cliques (11) of the time, chiefly the Kadrites and the Djabarites. The Kadrites (12) were the first Protestants in Islam. They broke away from the tradition that accepted unquestioningly the authority of the Koran and in opposition to the belief in Predestination, which deprived man of all spontaneity and made effort vain, <sup>they asserted vehemently</sup> the doctrine of the Kadr or Free-Will. To these were opposed the Djabarites (djabar, constraint)<sup>13</sup> who, preaching Determinism not only denied in toto the doctrine of the

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(10) The occasion was Bacry's expulsion of Wâqil b. 'Atâ from his school at Bassora.

(11) The coeval political sects were the Charigiten and the Shyiten—They differed as to the Imâmat (Kr. pp. 3 & 16).

(12) As to etymology and sense of application here vid. Mu. Mélanges Note P. 310; St. p. 24 seq. Maabed b. Khaled al-Djohni probably the founder, St. p. 49. Other Kadrites were 'Atâ b. Jassar, his contemporary (d. 721), and Abu Marwan Gailan ad Dimaski executed under Caliph Hishâm.

(13) Founder, Djohni b. Safwân.

Kadr but also strangely enough denied the reality of divine attributes(I4).Of these Djabarites Wāḥil b.ʿAtā(699-749)was one, but differing from the school on ~~the~~ a theoretical question(I5)he was declared a dissident or ʿItazala by the leader Hasan al-Baḡry and expelled from the academy(I6).Wāḥil thereupon established a school of his own, the cardinal tenets of which were the Kadritic postulate of Indeterminism(I7)and the Djabaritic negation of attributes. The latter he maintained in the interests of the Unity of God; the former he defended on the grounds of divine Justice and human Responsibility(I8). Thus the Mōʿtazilitic School was founded, and the Mōʿtazilites- whether the early religious or the later philosophical- holding steadfastly to these two doctrines of Indeterminism and non-Attributism became known as "the Partisans of Unity and

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(I4)It is in opposition to this that the Citafites arose to whose anthropomorphism reference has been made(cf. supra note 6)

(I5)For the question and the account of his expulsion vid. St.p.25; Kr.p.27.

(I6)As to the meaning of Mōʿtazila vid. St.p.24; Kr.p.27; Mu.p.

(I7)Kr.p. #32, thinks it possible that the idea of divine Justice is in a measure due to Christian influence. d. Boer p.43.

(I8)St.p.71.

Justice! Besides Waqil, Abu-l-Hudail(d.850?) achieved distinction among the early Motazilites. These two are of especial interest to us from the viewpoint of the Will.

Waqil distinguished between the Freedom of the divine Will and that of the human Will. Natural events such as health or sickness were due to the will of God; acts proceeding from man himself were due to his own will alone. Man is free in his conduct because (a)-He is conscious of the ability to do ~~an~~ not to, do. (b)-God issues commands to man promising reward or punishment for their fulfillment or non-fulfillment; but if human conduct were determined beforehand it were incompatible with divine Justice to punish or reward him for what he could not but do(19).

Abu-l-Hudail, the chief of the Motazilites limited freedom of action to this world only(20). And of such sub-lunar human activity only such actions were to be

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(19) St. p. 51 seq.; Sch. p. 44 seq.

(20) The other side of this distinction-Determinism or Cessation of Motion in the world beyond afforded a way of egress from the Creatio ex Nihilo of the Koran to the *eternity of the world* of Aristotle.

considered free as proceeded from inner impulse and ability(21). In every free act moreover, the decision or power to choose, he thought, must precede the act itself (22). And indeed, when once this decision has been given, an act, even if only contemplated in consciousness and not yet converted into actuality, is ideally complete(23) and free. In fact it is the freest of all free acts since it is as yet independent of the mechanism of the body and of environment, both of which must necessarily exert an influence, however slight, upon it in its transition from the potential to the actual.

As regards the "necessary" or unavoidable lie, he held that man was not punishable for it(24).

These Motazilites or Rationalists(25), then, the successors to the protesting Kadrites chiefly,

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(21)As to this inner ability coming from God every one conceded(cf.d.Boer p.46).

(22)This probably aimed at the Môtazilite al-Dschubba(869?) who maintained that the ability to choose was only coeval with the action itself and therefore a concomitant and not the cause of it.(cf Guttman p.164;d.Boer p.46)

(23)Bisr disputed this point;St.p.72.

(24)In general cf.St.pp.51seq.72seq.;d.Boer p.49seq.; Gutt. p.164seq.; Sch.p.48seq.

(25)They believed also that by his reason alone man could attain to the truths of revelation(Kr.pp.27,233seq.).



departed from the ranks of the Faithful by their denial of Predestination and Anthropomorphism. Nor had they been oblivious to the value of Greek Logic in maintaining their position(26). In this as in their two fundamental propositions they were on philosophic ground(27). Still they had not severed all connection with the Believers. Indeed they were far more "dogmatic theologians" than Mohammedan Peripatetics, though undoubtedly they were the precursors of these(28). They persistently taught the Creatio ex Nihilo of the Koran(29) and from the earliest times on had busied themselves with the science of the Calām, the science of which in fact they were the founders and which proved a pastime no less absorbing to the extreme Orthodox, the Ascharites, than to themselves. And that these opposing theological sects stood in part upon common ground may be

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(25) Mu. p. 169 seq.; St. p. 4

(26) Mu. 170.

(27) vid. supra p. for doctrines of the Philosophers.

(28) Mu. 169; Kr. 10.

(29) Mu. 174, 176; d. Boer 48. As to etymology and application of the term vid. Mu. 174; d. Boer 43 seq.; Eis. Pt 2: p. 21.

gleaned from the fact that the term Motécallem<sup>^</sup>in~~k~~ came to be applied equally to them both(29). When, therefore, about the middle of the ninth century, the time that chiefly concerns us, Philosophy had won its devotees who, point by point, differed from the Ascharites, it was but natural, if not inevitable, that the Motazilites with one foot on the philosophic peak and the other on the theologic, should endeavor to close up the gulf they straddled by a reconciliation of Philosophy and Religion(30).

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(30) The Motazilites came early under the influence of Greek thought through the work of the Syrian Christians (these translated especially under the reign of Mansur [754-775]). The Motazilites who were first touched by the Greek spirit were the successors of Hudail (St. 5). And they not only clung tenaciously, as did all Motazilites ever, to their belief in the Unity of God and the Freedom of the Will but were, it seems, the first to touch upon the problem of evil. They were convinced, moreover, that their King could do no wrong that only good could come from God. Thus the Omnipotence of God was restricted in two directions: God could do no evil (St. p. 56 where Nazzam's argument is given); man in the moral realm was free. These Motazilites therefore emphasized the Omniscience of God, some of them even identifying or subsuming Omnipotence under it (al-Aswari e.g. St. p. n ). Of these theologians touched with philosophy Nazzam (d. 845) was the first. His principal successors were al-Aswari, Abu-Gafar al-Iskafi, and Bisr b. al-Mutamir. Bisr propounds the question why are not all men believers since certainly

That they succeeded, in a measure, or rather that their efforts met with royal favor is sure. Under Ma<sup>2</sup>-mûn (813-833) their doctrine as to the human origin of the Koran was made a State Dogma(31); and this doctrine in itself was at once a denial of Tradition(32) and the basis of the Unity-Justice God idea. Still Môtazilitism was not a popular movement(33). Superstition is only slowly eradi-

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(30) divine goodness and grace would have it so? In answer he says reason can be sure of but two things: a) That God if He would be just must grant men freedom of choice, and b) That He must at the same time through exhortations and prophetic messages urge men to choose the good lest failure so to speak might afford the wicked an excuse for their conduct. cf. Saadya Emunoth WeDa'oth ch. 4. p. 63 l. 11 ; p. 87 l. 16 *infra*

Neither these men nor their predecessors tried to reconcile their teachings with the Koran. There were, however, such conservative Môtazilites. Hisâm b. Amr seems to have been the first and by paidâwî ( ) who drew greatly upon his predecessor Zamahsari (lived 1144) the last.

(31) Kr. pp. 49, 236, 242-3 seq; St. p. 76.

(32) Kr. p. 50.

(33) Kr. p. 240 & 246; d. Boer p. 47.

cated; and intrigues and rebellions and wars that called for courage but strengthened the vulgus in their Determinism and in their adherence to the letter~~x~~ of the Koran. So Motawakkil (847-861) the regent of his brother Wātik's son, seeking to usurp the throne, knew no surer way than to appeal to the prejudices of the Believers(34). When, therefore, he repealed the State Dogma of Mansur and promulgated that of the divine Pre-existence of the Koran in its stead Mōtazilitism ~~did not~~ was given the blow that kills. Still Mōtazilitism did not die forthwith(35). It lingered on in a position of prominence until after the death of Saadya(35). Unabated bigotry, however, made its doom sure, until in the thirteenth century it disappeared, having already in the eleventh sunk into desuetude.

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(34) Kr. pp. 50, 245 seq.

(35) Kr. p. 34 seq., p. 248.

If the triumphant Orthodox could vent such rancour on dissenting fellow-theologians one need not expect them to have much patience with outright heretics. The fate of the Philosophers was that of the Dissidents. The cleft between Philosophy and Religion discernible already before the birth of Saadya and generally acknowledged by the time of Ibn Sîna (38), in the ~~late~~ *twelfth* century, the time of Ghazzali (1059, 1111) (36) was scarcely to be seen- it had been filled with the bodies of martyred thinkers (37).

Thus in the thought-world of Islam at the time of Saadya we discern:-

1A-Cleavage between Religion and Philosophy, and

2-A Controversy within the ranks of the Religionists themselves, a struggle between the Koranists and non-Koranists, between the upholders of Tradition and the de-

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(36) Author of "The Renaissance of the Religious Sciences"- the most noteworthy Philosopher in Islam, cf. d Boer pp.141, 149.

(37) *The most famous Arabic philosophers probably were al-Farabi and Ibn Roschd.*

(38) Avicenna (980-1037) d.Boer p.119; St.p.12,n.2.

fenders of the Rights of the Reason. And these two facts  
in the succeeding epoch led to a general Skepticism.

## B---Within.----Judaism.

The heterodox party to this schism exerted not a little influence upon the Judaism of the time(1). And this influence was rendered all the more extensive and effective because of a split within the Jewish fold, at bottom similar to that which twelve years before had disrupted the Islamic world and first demarcated there a distinction <sup>between</sup> the Faithful and the Faithless. A spiritual torpor seems to have come upon the Jew with the close of the Talmud. The restless spirit of questioning, of curiosity unabashed, the juristic itch which had produced its sixty-three laborious tomes seems to have exhausted itself by eight-hundred years of effort. Men having lost all creative ability seem to have been interested not at all in theoretical questions, and as for the rest, the conduct of life, they were content to rest satisfied with what the practical sagacity of the Rabbis had found(1). *Indeed the Talmud came to be regard-*

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(1) Joel Beitr.-Saadya p.35, *Mv. Melan. p472 seq.*

ed as the one and final Authority, and man's one duty was to live punctiliously the life that the תפנות גזירות

דברי ימי with their extensions, had circumscribed for them. In fact to afford men the assurance that they were <sup>realizing</sup> ~~living~~ the Rabbinic conception was the function of the Gaonic Schools: they were the official tribunals of Rabbinism and their hold upon the people lay in that they expounded case-made Talmudic Law. And in fact, poetry and rituals excepted, though in a sense these might also be included, the Halachoth and Teshuboth, the only other form of literature accredited to the period were merely short cuts facilitating approach to the Talmudic norms(1). So engrossed did men become in their devotion to the Talmud that the Torah at once the base and the skeleton of it, and the desire to protect which was the <sup>of it,</sup> causa efficiens <sup>was</sup> almost lost to view. Thus for about three-hundred years the Reason was atrophied and thus for three-hundred years Rabbinism, Talmudism, Traditionalism, Authority reigned supreme.



But in history one extreme ultimately ever checkmates itself with the opposite. If all men were Rabinists and clung to Tradition to the neglect of the Torah it was but natural that at last some perverse mind should stubbornly maintain the sanctity of the Torah to the disparagement of Tradition. Whatever the real facts of his rise such a rebel appeared in 760, in the person of Anan b. David. Like his Motezilitic precursors he denied the validity of Tradition(2) asserting that by additions, omissions and misinterpretations it had falsified the Torah, the one and only norm of truth. He therefore proclaimed a return to the Torah.

חפ"ש בנוריתא שפ"ר was his principle and the corollaries <sup>implicit in it</sup> were unrestrained freedom of Exegesis and everyone's right to abide by the results of honest inquiry(3). This principle, moreover, an assertion of Individualism, was also the

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(2) Graetz p. 177, vol. I.

(3) Gr. V. 5 p. 211; M. M. Melon, p. 471.

germinating seed of the Mediaeval Jewish Enlightenment. For, since the Torah was the highest truth and all men were, of course, honest thinkers, and had a right to an opinion, men sought to produce conviction by adducing Biblical support for their arguments. Thus once more a false Exegesis came into play; but thus too the sciences of Hebrew Grammar and Massora were founded(4). Nor did the Torahites or Karaites in their controversies among themselves or with the Rabbinists restrict themselves to finding Biblical support alone. They did not disdain the Syrio-Arabic opportunity presented them to renew acquaintance with Greek thought(5); and it was through them that the Philosophy of the Zeitgeist, Motazalitim, was introduced, compared and adjusted to the Jewish Weltanschauung(6). And as in Islam the adherents of Orthodoxy were at last forced in self-defence to employ the weapons provided by

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(4) Joel p.36 seq.; Gr.p.183; Karpeles thinks they stimulated but did not originate these (406 seq.).

(5) Mu. Melan. 473.

(6) Judhan (800) the first (Gr.202); (Kar.410 says Nachvendi was the first. ספר הקדושים book ascribed to him. The most famous, David b. Mervan al-Mokammec of Racca (11th.cen.), his works used by Rabbinites (cf.Gr.307).

the Philosophy they had spurned so eventually, in Judaism, and for the same reason, the Rabbinites found themselves contending on Scriptural ground and with the weapons introduced by the enemy(7).

The scientific good and cultural *disposition* introduced by Karaitic Individualism, however, came near being counterbalanced by an evil which followed in its wake. For since the Karaitic aim must have been persuasion, and since men believed themselves successful in finding support for their opinions, however diverse, in the self-same Bible, and since Grammar was still pretty much what the individual made it, it came to pass that the only religious, were the ignorant, while all others were either vacillating in Belief or outright Skeptics(8). In truth Skepticism had become so wide-spread and contagious that Chivi al-Balchi's (9) book which, besides some two-hundred

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(7) Gr. p. 198; Mu. Melan. pp. 472, 477.

(8) Gr. pp. 211, 285.

*Chorassân*  
 (9) Alive in 880 in Balch, Egypt; some think he was a Rabbinite. His book, possibly, a part of a larger work "Bible and Revelation", and this again, probably a translation from the Arabic (Kar. p. 416).

critical objections to the Authority of the Bible, pointed out contradictory Talmudic interpretations of the same Biblical passages, was adopted as the text book in Rabbinic Schools(10). It was the work of Saadya to allay this Skepticism (11). The book in which he sought to do it was one of his last (12) and certainly his greatest, a book conceived in great tribulation of spirit when an exile at Bagdad- the Emunoth WeDeoth, the first known systematic presentation of religious Philosophy among the Jews.

(10) Gr.p.286;Gutt.p.20;Kar.p.417.

(11)His deeper purpose to reconcile Religion and Philosophy (Joel pp.40&43; Gutt.p.21;Gr.p.283 seq).

(12) Emunoth WeDeoth appeared 933 or 934 (vid.Gr.note 20; Gutt.note p.27).

## CHAPTER II.

SAADYA'S CONCEPTION OF THE WILL.

A.-FREEDOM OF THE WILL (1).

Saadya bases his belief in the Freedom of the Will on Divine Justice and Human Responsibility (2). The Being from whom a certain conduct is demanded and to whom other conduct is forbidden must needs be responsible for the choice of conduct he makes - but before one can be held responsible one must be free. Then too, it were incompatible with the Justice of God for Him, under threat of punishment or promise of reward, to endeavor to exact from man a conduct contrary to what he had already preordained.

(1) vid.note 81 Stein p.44 for sketch of pre-Saadyanic Indeterminism. For list of Jewish Philosophers who treated of the Will vid.Schmiedl p.24 seq. The references to each author are given. It is not a little noteworthy that of all Jewish thinkers but two were doubtful or outright Determinists. The most emphatic liberalists were Abraham Ibn Daud ( 1100 - 1180 ) and Levi ben Gerson (1288-1345) Schm. p.25;vid.also Stein p.86 seq. The least pronounced Indeterminists were Chasdai Crescas (1340-1410) Stein p.42 seq) and Solomon Ibn Gabirol (Stein p.22) who, - probably because he was a Neo-Platonist - omitted the subject of the Will altogether.

(2) All references to ed. I.

ממה שהיו נאות לצדק הבורא \* \* \* מה שהזהירו ממנו: - 127

ג. שהחכם לא צוה אדם מה שאין ביכולתו ולא מה שלא - 127

מקשות: ועוד אם לא היה נכון לפענשו כגור : 129

פסוק שאם יתה לו טענה וגו' 129; ~~פסוק שאם יתה לו טענה וגו' 129~~

הוא יודע ששם צאלא היה לפניו לציור והוא קרלו אוחיו מרומ

or which is not in human power. In fact were men determined in their actions then far from incurring liability to punishment at all they could not but be rewarded since they all, the sinful and the virtuous alike, are but acting in obedience to the will of God(3).

The fact of human freedom, moreover, postulated by the belief in divine justice and the sine qua non of human responsibility, and supported by the reason is also attested to, as Saadya thinks, not to mention Scripture and Tradition-by the experience of every day. Every one feels himself the lord of his actions; we, each at the decisive moment, are conscious of the ability to do or not to do, of the power to choose between alternatives <sup>constrained</sup> ~~unoperated upon~~ by external causes(4). Thus Saadya's conception of libertarianism is the psychological one of freedom of choice(5).

(3) ועוד שאים אלהיה האמת ראוי למאמין ולכובר יחד וג' - פ' 129

(4) אדם שוקר בנפשו שיכול לדבר ויכול לשתוק וג' - פ' 129

(5) Although Saadya undoubtedly considers the reason the supreme fact in man and it is because of this that he thinks him the center of centers, the climax of creation (L'f. 969 seq.) and believes him capable of being commanded and warned, yet we may not, therefore, conclude that he regarded the reason superior to the will. Indeed it is doubtful whether this question of relation ever occurred to him. Certainly, judging from the tenor of the chapter and from his aim, he did not at all intend to sub-

The power or ability to choose between alternatives of which, according to Saadya, man is conscious in the act of choice can not, he thinks, be either coeval with or subsequent to the decision or outer act (6). Real freedom is possible only if this ability to choose is antecedent to the act. For if this consciousness of choosing power were only simultaneous with the act then there could be but one of two possibilities either of which would destroy human responsibility:- The power to choose and the accompanying act would either be reciprocal causes or else two Psychological manifestations, independent and not at all related. And, on the other hand, if this ability, to choose were subsequent to the act, then we should be forced to admit that man could change past action, which of course is absurd.

This note originates in a mistranslation of 12062

(5) con. ordinate the will to the reason. And there are concrete instances to prove this. Thus e.g. when speaking of the appetites and passions, (Ip. 126; infra p. 761.12) it would appear that man fulfills the behests of his God not so much by choosing what the reason discloses to be right as by assigning what appears irrational - the appetites and passions - to its proper place in the intellect. Thus the will appears as the active element in the psychical activity, independent of the volitions of the intellect, and the freedom that Saadya postulates is real.

(6) vid. P. 127 for the arguments that follow.

It seems enough to Saadya thus merely to state and to prove that the ability to choose must precede the act. As to the nature of this power, a question that bothered the Motazilites, he does not say. He does not discuss, for instance, the possibility of this "power" ceasing before the consummation of the act, and so in truth, being merely an accident that could be dispensed with; nor, though it seems implied that this power continues until the act, does he involve himself in the question as to whether this power thereby loses its accidental character and partakes of the nature of substance. (7)

The power to choose implies, as Saadya thinks, the power not to choose. In fact, since human activity—differing from divine activity which deals only with essentials—is confined to "accidents" wholly, these two "powers" are but obverse sides of the same shield: when one chooses to do one thing he thereby chooses not to choose the doing of the opposite ~~and vice versa~~.

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(7) vid. R. Boer p. 46.



All consciously chosen acts, therefore are, at bottom, positive in character. And these voluntary acts are, in Saadya's mind, the only moral acts i.e. the acts for which man is responsible. Man may not be held accountable for the acts which he did not choose to do, for, such acts are not of human origin. Nor may he be held responsible for such consequences as ~~the~~ result from a voluntary act but which he had no reason to anticipate.

## B.-FREE WILL vs. OMNIPOTENCE.

"There is no Providence in human affairs"(8) is the terse way with which Saadya introduces his conviction that the human will is absolutely unrestricted. He finds support for this in Scripture, Tradition, Observation and the Reason. We have already noted the evidence drawn from observation in that man is conscious of no coercion when exercising the power of choice. It remains for us to present the proofs for freedom which Saadya believes the reason discloses. These are five in number and the method is indirect.

If determinism were true, then!

- 1) --- Human actions would each have two agents-God and man, but this impossible (cf. supra p. 52.)
- 2) ---- It were useless to command or forbid man certain conduct since he could not but act as he had been predestined to act. (cf. supra. p. 50, note, l. 5).
- 3) ---- It were unjust to punish man for what he was compelled to do (supra I. p. 50 l. 7)
- 4) ---- The righteous and godless should be rewarded alike since both alike do the will of God (supra I p. 51 note 3).

5)----Men might plead the futility of striving against the will of God, and the godless might with justice urge this as an excuse for their sins.

Hence, since the conclusions from this assumption are the very opposite of what men believe and practice, to infer the truth of the assumption with which these conclusions are in harmony is legitimate: The Will is Free.

Saadya has already told us that man is responsible for only those acts which he himself chooses to do. Is he responsible, then, in those instances in which God has availed himself of human freedom as a means to the furtherance of His own designs? Or does the responsibility attach to God who inspired man to the deed?(9) In the answering of this question Saadya distinguishes between the aim and the method of Provi-

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(8) p.128; For following arguments vid. p.129.

(9) p.132.

dence. The death of a man e.g. is the aim; that he was killed, as in this particular instance, happens to be the method. Now for the killing, the murderer himself is responsible, since God who is omnipotent could and probably would have put the man to death in some other way had not the murderer chosen to do the deed.

In conclusion, Saadya discusses the question as to the responsibility of the involuntary lie(10). In as much as man's activity is confined to accidents and these have their ground in God, it would seem that God and not man is responsible for such a lie; it was He who placed man in the position which necessitated the lie. Notwithstanding, however, Saadya concludes that man is responsible for the lie and for two reasons:

1)----The conditions that necessitated the lie are pro-

bably the inevitable consequences of some former misconduct which was freely done, this inevitableness being now wrongly ascribed to God (cf. Aris. p. 18 )

2)----Man because of the reason which God has given him

need never lie. He can clothe his thought in ambiguities-resort to mental reservation. And this is permissible.

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(10) p.132. *vid. also supra. P 37.*

The problem of the will is closely related to that of evil. Free will implies the existence of evil. Hence the question which has troubled the Jewish consciousness since at least the time when Genesis III. (XI) was written: How can evil be reconciled with the omnipotence of a God who is wholly good(XII) .That Saadya has given it but little attention seems explicable by another fact potent in Jewish history: the tractability of the Jewish mind to the reigning Zeitgeist. Now the Motazilites whether because they regarded the question of omnipotence a purely religious, as Stein asserts(XIII) or whether as some think and as was noted above(XIV) because they were more bent on rescuing human freedom than on establishing Divine Omnipotence and were even willing, if necessary to sacrifice the latter to it, dilated but little on the nature and re-

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(11) Mu. Melan.p.

(12)

\*\*\*אך יתכן להיות בעלמא מה שצ"ל רוצה בו וגו'

(13) Stein p.105.

(14) Supra p. 39 n.

lation of omnipotence to evil. Jewish thinkers have offered, or rather adopted, but two solutions to this problem of evil. (15):

- 1)----Evil does not really exist; it is a figment begot by human finitude.
- 2)----Evil is a degenerated good.

Now the second answer was the answer of Plato and was adopted by Maimonides; the first is suggested by Saadya.

God, as Saadya thinks, is not at all concerned with accidents; man's whole activity is confined to accidents. Hence when man considers something evil it does not follow that that thing is also evil to God. Man despises the things that injure him; God despises those things too, but not because they injure Him-for He is above accidents-but because they injure us, His creatures. (16).

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(15) Schmiedl, p. 27: VI.

(16) For arguments vid. p. 129 seq.; vid. also Schmiedl pp. 25-26.

## C.} FREE WILL vs. OMNISCIENCE.

If God is omniscient, man is not free; if man is free, God is not omniscient. In the one case man can not do what God does not know, for if he could God's knowledge would be deficient; in the other, God can not know what man will do, for could and did He, He would be unjust in so far as He rewarded or punished man. This was the dilemma, the horns of which Saadya felt called upon to reconcile. And he was cocksure of his ability to do so. The solution as he thought, lay in this: God's knowledge of things is not the cause of their existence (17). This proposition rests upon the assumption that God is exalted above the temporal ~~things~~ of sense (18); in His infinite presence He simply beholds things as does puny man the things in his transient "now", without exerting any influence over them at all (19).

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(17) For this and following statements vid. p. 130 seq.  
cf. also *Emunim* II. 1-3, espec. I and 3, where also attacks this argument

(18) Stein p. 60.

(19) W&W p. 210.

The converse of this proposition, moreover, Saadya thought contained its own refutation. Were God's knowledge of things the cause of their existence, then all things must have existed from all eternity, because God's knowledge of them is eternal. But the actuality of this conclusion no one will maintain. This knowledge of God's, furthermore in Saadya's opinion, embraced only the essence of things; but such a knowledge, as he explains, includes at once the knowledge of the successive phases of development of the things. With this presentation of Prescience Saadya sweeps instantly to the basing of human freedom. A man who had intended to speak can keep silent if he will, and vice versa. Nor does such change of intention affect the knowledge of God, and for this reason: God is unaware of the logical processes of human thought; <sup>\*</sup> He knows only the conclusion to which man will eventually come. If, therefore, a man concludes to keep silent who had intended to speak, why this is the very conclusion that was known to God all along.

*This statement manifestly contradicts the one immediately preceding it (lines 9&10), as well as what is said on preceding page, and, what is more, amounts to giving up the doctrine of omniscience. The fact is the author mistranslates*

1271 סוף פרק י"ב ע"ב פ. 131, ש"ד. I



Now that he has established omniscience in the face of free will, Saadya takes up its defense.

The criticisms that men have urged are two, alike in kind(20). In as much as God knows the conclusion to which men will come then, they argue, He already knows who will be righteous and who wicked. What then is the *raison d'être* of prophets?

1)----Why send preachers of righteousness to the righteous who do not need them?

2)----Why send preachers to the wicked who will not heed them?

Saadya advances four reasons in defence of 1, and six in defense of 2.

1-Preachers should be sent to the righteous:

a)-That they may know what God desires of them.

b)- That God may reward them; for there is no reward for the doings of what is not commanded.

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(20) Arguments p. 131.seq.

c)- That recompense may be based on justice; for did God reward or punish men for actions the doing or not doing of which he did not command, He would be unjust.

d)- Because a reenforcing of the rational demands by the prophetic commands will increase men's zeal in observing the same.

2)- Preachers should be sent to the wicked :

a)- That they may not have the excuse: had God sent prophets unto us we would have believed.

b)- That men's intentions might be actualized in conduct as evidenced by their <sup>e</sup>ob<sub>A</sub>dience or rejection of the prophetic demands. For were men's intentions not so actualized, then recompense would be according to God's knowledge, not men's actions.

c)- Because as the injunctions of sense and reason are for both believers and

c) -con. ~~atheists~~, so also should be the prophetic injunctions.

d) -Because the <sup>rightness</sup> ~~stress~~ of conduct depends upon the intention not the fact. Hence though the admonitions of well-intentioned men be spurned, yet, nevertheless they will have acted nobly just as they would have done ignobly had they intended wrong (vid. infra. trans. p. 88 12)

e) -Because the rightness of intention is not gauged by the reception it receives; were it so gauged then the standard of truth might become reversed.

f) -Because as God has endowed all men alike as regards reason and capacity to choose, so all men alike should be included in the prophets' mission.\*

\* The author should not have failed to notice that (f) is all but a repetition of (c) and that Guttman's explanation (p. 172, note 3) does indeed do honor to Guttman's ingenuity, but does not justify Saadia's redundancy.

## CHAPTER: III.

## APPRECIATION.

Saadya believed in the powers of the reason. He was convinced that the reason, unaided, could, of itself attain to the truths of revelation. He made one concession, however; the reason is too slow. Revelation, therefore, becomes necessary because of the short life of man. Thus the philosophical tendency in Saadya is warped by the religious bias, and what is true of the third chapter is true of the fourth and indeed of the entire *Emunoth WeDeoth*. The proportion of philosophy to religion in the book is consequently exceedingly small. Thus in the chapter on the will, the philosophical presentation of the subject is imbedded in an introduction and conclusion of almost purely theological import; and not only are these accorded an excess of space, but the philosophical part itself is bolstered up at every turn with support from Scripture and Tradition. And it would seem that Saadya was conscious of his weakness, of his inability to break away from the religious *Weltanschauung* of his time, and follow unperturbed the behests of the

reason. Certainly the style of the philosophical portions is strikingly concise and vigorous, while that of the religious, is prolix, tautologous and unconvincing.

It would appear, moreover, from the history of thought, that thinkers greatly under the religious influence are incapable of independent creative speculation. At any rate there is nothing original in Saadya's presentation of the will. The arguments he adduces ~~in~~ proof of its freedom have their Motazilitic prototypes.

(1). Still two of these arguments, as it seems to me, are superior to the rest in acuteness and even savor of modernity. The one is his assertion that man is free because, at any moment he is conscious of the ability to choose between alternatives; though to be sure a modern would not scruple to call this consciousness of freedom and illusion (2). The other he advances <sup>when</sup> in his endeavor

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(1) Cf. supra. p. 36. Stein p. 11. seq. thinks Saadya is most indebted to Ibrahim b. Sajjar an-Nazzam. There are, however, at least as many arguments in favor of Hudail.

(2) Mill e.g.

to attach responsibility for the involuntary lie to man, he maintains that it is wrongly ascribed to God in as much as it is the result of previous misconduct which man was not compelled to do. And, as if to illustrate the strength and weakness of Mediaeval mind, this argument is in juxta position to another which, urged ~~which~~ the same object in view, is a curious bit of sophistry and no other than a commendation of deceit(3). Nor can it be said that Saadya has successfully carried through the distinction which he draws between divine knowledge and causal energy in order to establish omniscience and human freedom. For he has still to show how that knowledge which by assumption is exalted above time, and to which, therefore, neither a prior~~e~~ nor a posterior~~e~~ can be applied—he has still to show how this divine knowledge can take cognizance of particulars, of individuals whose activity is confined to accidents, and whose beginning and ending occur in time(4).

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(3) vid. supra.p.57.

(4) Stein pp. 60-62.

But however little the intrinsic value of Saadyanic philosophy to us moderns who live under a new heaven and a new earth and whose spirit has been fructified by a thousand years of thinking, the fact remains that <sup>the</sup> Emunoth WeDeoth is a noteworthy production of a noteworthy man. A Rabbanite in conviction and sympathy, and a Karaite in breadth of culture, he brought his earnestness and his learning to bear in the vindication of Judaism before the forum of the reason, in the effort to unite the religion he felt with the philosophy he knew. And not a little significant is the unfailing accuracy with which he instinctively fastened upon just those truths which have come to be recognized by the great body of Jews as Jewish, to show that they above all were in harmony with the reason. It is because Saadya, despite his zealousness for the reason yet would not compromise his Judaism that the Emunoth WeDeoth enjoys the distinction not only of having been the pioneer in Jewish religious philosophy, but also of having remained within the circle of respectful consideration even down to Albo.

I hereby thank Dr. Malter for his kindness in assisting me in the comparison of Hebrew words and phrases with the Arabic originals.

I am especially indebted to my friend and class-mate Mr. Morris Cahan for the willingness with which he helped me in the making of this translation whenever I appealed to him. Whatever merits this translation may happen to possess are in no slight degree <sup>due</sup> to him.



## CHAPTER IV.

## TRANSLATION.

## OF

## EMUNOTH WEDEOTH CH.IV.

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Obedience vs. Disobedience; Free Will(1)vs.Determinism(2)

Says Jehuda ben Saul in the name of the author:  
As introductory to the consideration of this section I would preface the following. That although we see many phenomena about us, it is not right that we should be confused as to the final purpose of them all i.e.as to what this purpose is. For,indeed,as regards this purpose, the province of nature will reveal to us what this goal of all phenomena must be; and as we investigate this province we find that the common goal of all phenomena is man. And for this reason - because it is the law of growth (השגה והבניה) to enclose every superior thing in the midst of materials not as essentially valuable as it. And we may adduce as

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(1)Despite Stein's objection to this translation of פִּדְיוֹן (p.108) on the part of Kaufmann in a similar connection (Theologie d.Ibn Fakuda p.282), we have retained it here as expressing more sharply the antithesis between the freedom and the necessity of which the chapter speaks. Stein would translate "Justice" - i.e.divine justice.  
(2)The order of this phrase reversed in Arabic -Gutt.pl59.

our first illustration an instance from the most insignificant class of things. The kernel (גרגיר) e.g. constitutes the center of every group of leaves, and for no other reason than that it is superior to them: from it comes the flower with its distinctive form (תכונתו). And the same holds true with reference to "that" from which the tree grows. If that "that" is at the same time food then it constitutes the center of the fruit as we find in the case of the almond; but if that "that" is apart of the kernel (3) then the kernel constitutes the center of the fruit, nature not at all caring for the food, leaving it in fact, on the outside of the kernel to protect<sup>א</sup>. And likewise the yoke of the egg is the center thereof because from it comes the chick, and the heart of man is in the center of his breast because it is the seat of the soul and of natural heat, and the pupil (רוח הרואה) is in the center of the eye because by means of it is sight. Now as we find that this principle (of center superiority)

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(3) I = ed. I; II = ed. II. בגרעין; II. מארץ ינוי

holds true in the great majority of instances and notice, furthermore, that the earth is in the center of the heavens and that the spheres encompass it on all sides, then we must be convinced that the converging center of the universe (מִסְכָּן בְּרִיאָה) is on the earth; And when we scrutinize carefully all its parts and discover that both the dust and water are inanimate, and find that animals are not gifted with speech, and that ~~the~~ man alone - (who is endowed with reason) - remains for our consideration it must be clear to us that he is the נִיחָאֵם the final end, the focussing center without a doubt. And when we search the Biblical books we find the word of God confirming our conclusion. Is.45v.12 - I will make the earth and man will I create upon it. But even in the first chapter of Genesis where God enumerates all created things and only after He has perfected them says, now let us make man - this is only as if one were to build a palace, decorate and furnish it and only after this was done bring in the owner. With these prefatory remarks I shall proceed as follows.

Our God has made known to us through his prophets that He has made man superior to all His other creatures (Gen.lv.28; Ps.8 entire - "from beginning to end"); that He has given him the power to serve Him and placed it before him, and given him control of this power; that He has placed free-will in his possession, commanding him to choose the good that he might live (Deut.30v.15 sec). Wonders and portents confirm<sup>s</sup> this message and we accepted it.

Later we pondered the question ~~the~~ in our minds ( **במלכות הדין** ) in what did God endow us with superiority and we concluded that man's superiority lay in the insight which God had given him and taught him (Ps.94v.10). It is by means of this insight that man preserves the memory of the things that have happened, and discerns many of the things that will come to pass; through it he is enabled to make beasts till the ground for him and bring him its produce; through it he draws water from the depths of the earth so that it flow upon the surface, even making wheels for himself that of themselves draw up the water. It is because of this insight that he can

build costly houses and wear fine spun ( *החמודות* ) garments and prepare delicate spices, wield skilfully power and rule, direct ~~troops~~ intelligently troops and forces so that men improve; because of it he is in a position to apprehend the constitution of the spheres, the orbits of the stars, the measure of their diameters, their distances and other related matters. Now if someone should think ~~that~~ that to which God gave superiority is something outside of man let him show us the attributes or some of them, at least, of this distinct thing - but this he cannot do. It is right, therefore, that that which is commanded and warned, rewarded and punished should be the center of the world and its purposive end ( *מכונן עולם* ) (I Sam. 2v.9; Prov. 10v.25)

And as I reflected on these fundaments and on what is derivable from them I felt convinced that the superiority ascribed to man was not an illusion come into our hearts (with respect to it), neither was it self-preference ( *נשית אל הועררני* ) nor pride, nor presumption that brought to claim this superiority for our souls; it was unmitigated truth and simple justice. Nor indeed did

God make him superior to everything else for any other reason than that He might make him the abiding place for His commands and prohibitions (Job 28v.28).

It remains that I note, as far as necessary, what I have thought out with reference to this subject (4). And in the first place I would say that I meditated long, ere I asked, (a) how can man be the final purpose of all that is in the world, seeing, as we do, that his body is small and despised. But I soon calmed myself in this respect when I found that although his body is small, his soul is broader than the heavens and the earth; for his mind embraces all that is in them, apprehending even that which is above them, in which, indeed, there stability is, viz. God, blessed be He (Ps. 139v.14). And when I then thought (b) of the length of the life of man, I marvelled why he did not live alway. But it became clear to me that God gave man this short life in this world, which is a world of trouble, for no other reason than that it should bring him to eternal life (Ps. 21v.5) (5). And I wondered (c) too how a frail bodily structure composed of blood and humours and two galls could be reconciled with the alleged superiority of man, and why his parts

were not pure and more enduring(6). But I was soon satisfied that did we really wish that man's parts should be better than they are, we should, in truth, be wishing that God had created him a star or an angel. For the body of man is made of these composite substances, and of all things earthy, he is the purest; and were he purer than himself then he could be one of two things only - an angel or a star. And did one desire that the body of man, composite as it is, should not possess parts, he would, in fact, be wishing it out of existence (חצה לבטל); as if one were to wish that the heavens should be only of earth or the earth of fire - his wish were nonsense and folly (Psalms 104 v. 24). And again, (d) I reflected on the diseases that afflict man and I thought "would that he were free from them or they removed from him(7). But at length I felt that they were good for him, because through them he came to repent of his

(4) II. אלה הדברים; אלה הדברים II.

(5) II. (נסך) יספיהו note by Ben Sew; accepted by Gutt. because it agrees with the Arab. - Text of both additions has

(6) חלקי זכות (ו) מתמידות - text omits the ו.

(7) הלוואי נאלץ מהם Wolff says that this is a question in

the Arabic - "Why did not God protect him from these diseases"

- and concludes that the following נדרו is wrong.

And. - הוא וקיה ען רפעת ענה? מדוקלע הציל מהם או דחם מעליו?

sins, prostrate himself before his God, and improve his actions ( וַיִּשְׁתָּחוּ ) (Job 33v.19). And I pondered too, (e) on man's experiencing the effects of heat and cold, on his being affected by the poison <sup>of serpents</sup> and injurious beasts, only to realize that his experience in this regard improved <sup>him</sup> for did he not experience pain, he would not fear the punishment of his God (Deut. 32v.33). For did <sup>he</sup> threaten him saying "I will pain thee," but <sup>as</sup> he knew not what pain meant, the threat would be useless; accordingly, God made him sensitive to these afflictions so that he should experience them and they should thereby be to him for an omen of what might come (Mal. 3v.19) (Deut. 32v.33). And I reflected (f) on those composite needs and inclinations of man, many of which are to his hurt, and became satisfied that God compounded them in him only that He might put each one of them in its place in the intellect which He had vouchsafed to him. God has given man the desire for food e.g. that he might preserve his form, the desire for sexual intercourse that <sup>species</sup> he might preserve his <sup>species</sup>. Now man busies himself with all these instincts and appetites according to his light and his grace ( כִּי שְׂבָרָה וְהִתְיַרְרָה ); if he indulges them within the limits of the permissible, he will be praised, if beyond the inmost limits of the forbidden he will be blamed (Pr



11v.23;Ps 10v.3). And I questioned(g) moreover, how an agonizing and eternal pain by fire could be destined for man (8); when I realized that counterbalancing this there was eternity of bliss and perpetuity of reward. And if these two-reward and punishment-were not, man would have no genuine(9) hope to long for or any genuine(9) fear to dread. (Dan.12v.2) And lastly, I considered(h) the fact that preceding this eternal punishment God had ordained with reference to sinners of a certain type, that such a one be put to death by one of the four methods employed for penal punishment. But I found myself persuaded that this, too, was for the good of the man and not at all unreasonable; for just as the reason discerns that a man about to lose a member of his body through illness or disease does well by cutting it off, because he thereby rescues the rest of his body, so a rational person(10) can see that the killing of one through whom people were corrupted or the land polluted is a boon because thereby the rest of the race is

(8) **העניש** free rendering of the Arabic **العقاب** "punishment"-Wolff.

(9) **גמורה** Wolff thinks this word inappropriate -and hence an interpolation, I suppose.

(10) **סוֹפֵר**, Wolff; I. ed; II. ed. = **סוֹפֵר**

saved(Deut.19v.20). Ps.25v.10 And now that I have enumerated these seven(11) aspects of divine justice in connection with what is commanded man, I would say that, in the same way, the believer should think well(12) of whatsoever instances he may find similar to these, for undoubtedly he will find ~~thin~~ them aspects of God.

And now that I have shown how the establishing of these seven types of divine justice might be brought about, I would add that it be ~~seems~~ the justice of God and his compassion for man that He endow him with the strength and the power to do that concerning which He commands him, and to refrain(13) from that with reference to which He warns him. And this is evident both from Reason and Scripture. From Reason, because God would not command man to do that which is not in his power or the doing of which would exhaust him. --From Scripture: Micah 6v.3(14), Isaiah 40v.31 Isaiah 41v.1, Micah 2v.1

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(11) <sup>הנה</sup> though there are really eight instances given vid. Supra. pp.74-seq.

(12) <sup>יחסיב בו הטחשבה</sup> Corresponds to the Arabic <sup>يحبب به الخ</sup> = Hb. "ges für etwas Gutes halte"-Wolff

(13) <sup>ללחמיה</sup> both eds. Gutt. (Note lp.159) In quotation, omits the <sup>ו</sup>, though nothing is said about it.

And I believe, (15) too, that the ability to do <sup>(16)</sup> an act should precede the act itself so that the doing or not-doing of an act may rest with the free choice of man.

For if the ability to do were coeval with the act itself then either of them would be the cause of the other, or neither could be the cause of the other. And if the ability to do were subsequent to the act, then man could undo what he had previously done. But this is absurd, as also the preceding assumption. It is necessary therefore that the ability of man to do should precede his doing so that through it he may be fully equipped to perform the commands of his God.

Furthermore, I believe it clear that as man's doing a thing is certainly an action, so his not doing a thing is also to be considered an action;: he never refrains from doing one thing but that he does its opposite. This self-restraint of man's, however, may not be likened to God's refraining, Blessed be He, to create whatever He

(14) <sup>נאיה</sup> הלא יתי (נאיה) derived philosophical meaning = the impossible. "What I have made impossible for thee" Gutt. Note 4 p.163.

(15) וראיתי After this there are two words in the Arabic which are omitted in the Hebrew-Wolff. <sup>בואר = אין אבות</sup>

(16) <sup>בגשוח = אלא שטאקיה</sup> Arab. adds ה יכולת

might(17); His refusal is not an act . When God refuses to create certain bodies or what inheres in them, the opposite of these bodies is not eo ipso made, but man, since his activity is concerned with accidents wholly, when he chooses <sup>not</sup> to do one thing, he chooses thereby to do the opposite. Thus e.g. if he will not love he must hate, if he will not be pleased he must become mad; and you can not find in him a mean between them(Lev.18v.30;Ps.119v.3)

It is note that I state, furthermore, that man himself does not really do anything except that he himself chooses to do it. For that which has no freedom of choice can not be said to act, nor can he, who is not free. And when we see that the Torah does not subject him to punishment who sinned through ignorance, it is not because he did not choose to do the sin, but because he did not know the cause and origin of it. For example, <sup>As</sup> our Rabbis (18) pointed out, with reference to the accidental killing of a man, in the instance of the tree, the man who committed

(17) II. אשר בראש; I. reference to chapter I  
p. 82. פ"ד

(18)  $\text{Wolff} = \text{כצמר} = \text{אט. סקול, אט.}$

Y the act was guilty with regard to the felling of the tree  
 inas-much as he chose to do it, but innocent as regards  
 the loss of life( לְהַשְׁמֵר )/ And similarly, in the instance  
 X of Sabbath desecration, the man was guilty as regards the  
 gathering of the wood, but innocent, that he forgot that it  
 was the Sabbath.

These facts being postulated, I maintain that  
 God does not exercise Providence in the affairs of men,  
 nor does He force men, either to obey or disobey him. I  
 adduce proof for the truth of this from: Observation, and  
 from Reason as also from what is afforded Scripture and  
 in Tradition. From the standpoint of Observation I find,  
 that man realizes in his soul that he can speak or keep  
 silent, that he can lay hold of a thing or leave it alone  
 without being conscious of an external force that can in  
 any way restrain him from accomplishing his wish. This  
 could not be, did he not control his nature by his intel-  
 lect; and if he does so control it he is wise, if not  
 foolish.

From the standpoint of Reason, (also, it is  
 clear that man is a free agent), for proofs have already  
 been adduced (19) in what preceded, concerning the impos-

sibility of one action proceeding from two causes. And should one maintain that God determined a creature to certain conduct, he would eo ipso be ascribing one act to them both. And, besides, if God forced man to act, there would be no reason for commanding or warning him. Moreover, if God forced man to a certain act there would be no justice in punishing him for it. And, furthermore, if men were determined in their actions, then reward would rightfully belong equally to the believer and the atheist; for every one of them does what God has decreed him to do, just as if e.g. one should order one of two workmen to build a house, and the other to tear it down he would have to pay them both notwithstanding. And, lastly, were men determined in their actions, then they might urge the plea that they knew that a human being could never prevail against his Maker; and were an atheist to plead as an excuse before Him that he could not believe in Him, it were only right that he should be regarded as truthful in his plea and his excuse be accepted.

From the standpoint of Scripture (too, man's freedom is clear) as e.g. from the passage already cited Deut. 30v. 20; from what is said with reference to the sinner Mal. Iv. 9. In fact Scripture states expressly that God is clear of their sins, Isaiah 30v. 1. It states explicitly, too, that He is not responsible for the doings of the liar. Jer. 23v. 21.

And (human responsibility is inferred from what is contained in Tradition as e.g. "every thing belongs to Providence excepting religion" (ברכות א), and Scripture affirms this (Deut. 10v. 12). And although after these disclosures nothing remains to be sought, yet, ~~nevertheless~~, God has given the lie to determinism in three other types of passages. The first, is in the form of a question of astonishment whereby God arouses surprise in man with reference to this subject (Ez. 18v. 23). The second, is in the form of an assertion in which God affirms that determinism is impossible (Ez. 18v. 32). And the third is in the form of an oath to the same effect (Ez. 33v. 11). Thus God reveals (אף) the matter from all sides and warns about it.

Along with this exposition however, I would raise three questions viz.-

First, that since God is guiltless of willing the sin of the sinner how is it possible that that in which He takes no pleasure should be in His world? But the answer to this question is close at hand and as follows: That that which seems improbable to us, viz. that God of His own free will should endure any thing that does not please Him-this is solely because of man. For man it is who contemns that which injures him: but as for our God, Blessed be He, He does not despise such things on His own account-for it were inconcievable that a mere accident should affect Him.- but solely on our account because they injure us, for if we sin against God and do not show ourselves grateful to Him for that for which we are under obligation to Him we are foolish(20), and if we sin against one another we destroy our souls and our substance

Inas much as this is thus clear, it can no longer seem strange that there should be something in God's

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(20) מן (20) ג' ג' ג' , Gutt. , it seems, had a different reading vid. p. 169.



World which we despise and-what should be especially  
evident to us-that God holds such things despicable solely  
because of his compassion for us(Jer.7v.19).

And secondly: Some one may urge that inasmuch as God knows that will be before it is, He already knows that man will rebel against Him, and, indeed, that it is impossible for man not to so rebel, if only there by to render complete divine Prescience. The solution of this question is even clearer than the preceding. The solution is this; That those who make this assertion have no authority for holding that God's knowledge of particulars (21) is the cause of their existence. This conclusion however they either thought erroneously or came by through presumption. (22) for if God's knowledge of a thing were the cause of its existence, then things would be eternal, because His knowledge of them is eternal; and (23) they would not pass away because He does not cease knowing them. We believe, however,

(21) I. subj.  $\gamma$ ; II. have  $\Delta$ . Wolff.

(22) An exact expression for Arabic  
as distinguished from 127777 Arabic-  
Wolff p.77

(23) 1701 - 1 not in text.

that God knows things only in the truth of their being. And as regards those things that God will allow to become (phenomenalize) He already knows of them that they will so appear (in the future); and as regards that which man will choose to do that God knows he will choose (24). And should some one ask how, since God knows that a certain man will speak, can that man remain deaf or keep silent, then we should answer plainly—making this go into the very root of the question—that if a man kept silent instead of speaking that God certainly knew that the man would keep silent. Nor would it be correct for us to maintain that God ever knew that man would speak; for he knows only the ultimate consequences resulting from the action of man that emerge when reflection is over and are dependent on time (Ps. 94v.11 Deut. 31v.21)

I realize, furthermore, that men ask with reference to this subject, what kind of wisdom can that be which commands and warns the righteous man, since God <sup>already</sup> knows of him that he will not cease worshipping Him? Now I find at least four reasons for this.

First—That man may know what God requires of him.

Secondly-That He may fully reward him (25),  
( for if the righteous man worshiped Him without his having  
commanded him He could <sup>not</sup> expect reward). And,

Thirdly-If, on the other hand, He rewarded him  
for that concerning which He did not command him or punished  
him for that concerning which (25) He did not forbid him-  
this were wrong. And-

Lastly-That He may connect for man commands that  
rest with the prophet with those that are in the reason in  
order that he may be careful and cautious.

And as to the others ( and converse) question  
which men ask-what wisdom can there be in sending preachers  
to atheists since God knows of them that they will not  
believe?- and they think this labor in vain.-I can show them  
six reasons for the same.

First-Did God not send a preacher unto the  
atheist urging him to believe, he would have an excuse to

(25) <sup>למשל כפי המוסר</sup> more exactly expressing the  
Arabic. Wolff.

12 Supply to correspond to the 12 immediately prece-  
ding. Wolff seems to think the Hebrew does not express  
the Arabic. He, therefore, suggest the reading of 12 for 12  
which in fact is the reading of II. though not of I.-And of  
12 for 12.

this effect; had God sent unto to me I would have believed  
Add;

Secondly If what is immediately in the knowledge of  
God were not brought into actuality, then reward and punish-  
ment would be according to His knowledge not according to  
the deeds of His creatures. And,

*awkward* Thirdly:- As regards his arguments (ראיה) for right  
action, sensual and rational-inasmuch as He put them in  
the world (26) for believers and unbelievers alike, so it is  
right that the arguments of His prophets also should in-  
clude both believers and unbelievers. And,

*x* Fourthly:- It is self-evident that as one who orders  
another to commit a wrong but who notwithstanding does  
not do it, never the less injures himself thereby (27)  
and is called a fool, so he who urges <sup>another</sup> to do a good, but who,  
not-with-standing, does not do it, never-the-less ennobles  
himself (לפניו) thereby and is considered wise (28)

(26) דלפי - Wolff thinks דלפי should be substituted  
as expressing better the contrast to what is imparted  
to men by prophesy. The mistake occurring through the sim-  
ilarity of form in Arabic.

(?) (27) לפניו - לפני Eth. dative. cf. Gutt. 's. trans. p. 172.

X

Lastly- Just as God has made believers and un-  
believers equal as regards intellect, strength and power  
so it is right that He should equalize between them with  
*to giving them Commands and sending prophets to them.*  
~~respect with what is commanded and to the possibility of~~  
~~redemption(——).~~

Further-more,I hold that the expression"to do a thing in vain" may be used only when one does something that is of no benefit at all to any creature. God's sending of preachers unto the atheist,however,even though they will not choose to do the message,and neither profit by it nor are instructed by it,yet the faithful and others

(28) ~~non~~ - This line omitted. It is in I. vid. Gutt. pl 72

(29) vid. *W. self.* "וזהם שהמציאה וגו' correct but ineffect.

will already, ~~then~~by, have been instructed. Just as e.g. you will notice that even to this day and on, men speak of the incident of the flood and of the people of Sodom and of Pharaoh and the like.

And again, it is asked when a man-one of the works of God- is given over to be executed-<sup>by an evil-doer</sup> whether as punishment for sin (as if sin itself did slay him (or according to שכיב האשמה for men slay sinners) ) or for martyrdom ( מרי ) -as Jezebel<sup>did</sup> some of the prophets -what shall we think of such an act, they say, and to whom shall we ascribe it? Now I claim that the death alone was the work of God but the execution, the consequence of sin; and though God willed the death ( היה ) yet had there been no sin, the man would have died by a different agency (30). And similarly as regards the question of the thief, when it appears as the decree of God that men shall lose their wealth-whether for punishment or testing-how shall we reconcile this thieving with the action of God? And my answer is this: The fact of loss is the work of God, the stealing the work of man; and although God willed

(30) Wolff thinks  $\frac{1}{2}$  is correct but not exact.

ואלו לצד קוץ הרצח הזה ויהרגהו.  $46. =$  פלו לם יתקדנהדא אלסאחל פיקחלה

the disappearance of the thing yet had the thief not stolen it, it would have disappeared in other ways. It was in this strain that Shemayah and Achiya answered the king of Edom (taanith 18a) "If once God has willed our death then though do not kill us there will be many desperadoes who will".

And, again, men ask why David was punished because of his sins with Bath Sheba, when Absalom, according to Scripture did one as bad and even worse (II Sam. 12v. 12). In reply we would state that the rebuke which the prophet Nathan administered to David falls into two parts. The first refers to the action of God to the effect that the prosperity and dominion of Absalom shall surpass any thing that was David's (II Sam. 12v. 11). And the second, to the action of Absalom done of his own free will (II Sam. 12v. 11). And God's intention in thus, by anticipation informing David of Absalom's own choice was solely thereby to grieve his heart (and not to punish him) (31). And similarly, others ask with reference to Sennacherib and Nebuchadnezzar that in-as-much as these in this world murdered and plundered and did other acts of

(31) בהקדמתו להודיע - correct but not exact - Wolff. Acc to the Arab. בהקדמתו is the object, not להודיע; hence read בהקדמתו

violence how can Scripture say of the one that he is the staff of God(Is.10v.5) and of the other that he is the sword of God.(Ez.30v.24)?

Now in reply, we would say that the relation( ~~of~~ ) of divine action to these two and others like them is that He gave them the ability and the courage to do, as is figuratively expressed by "sword" and "staff", but notwithstanding whatever they and their armies did was of their own choosing so that they incurred punishment therefor(Is.10v.12; Jer.51v.44)

And, finally, some assert that, since ~~that~~ all accidents are generated by command of God, when He causes a believer to lie on account of something which forced him to it, God Himself must be held responsible for the lie in that He brought him to it. There are two answers to this.

First, If one will consider carefully through what a man is forced to lie he will find that cause really arises ~~from~~ from some sin of man as to his own conduct, but which he imputes to God.(Pr.19v.3). And,

Secondly, That along with (32) the intellect which



is in innate in him he need never tell a lie; for when one purposely ambiguous (לֹא בְּיָשָׁר) says an untruth (שֶׁאֵינָהוּ אֱמֶת) which it is possible men will consider according to its usual or true meaning (33) one indeed says the truth and the ~~re~~ is nothing morally wrong in his words (34). Thus e.g. when Abraham said, with reference to Sarah, she is my sister meaning she is my relative (and with the same looseness of language Lot calls Abraham, his uncle, brother) and they thought she was his sister in fact, there was no sin to be imputed to him for this, but to them: they did wrong, in-as-much as it is conventional to ask a stranger as to his business and his prospects, and as to his welfare and his needs; but not to ask him as to who is with him and what his relationship to him is. And Abraham's answer was all the more justified here because he had had a similar experience with others before (Gen. 20v.11). More-over, he knew as Scripture says, that there was no fear of God in that place, and if they knew Sarah to be his <sup>wife</sup> ~~sister~~ they might slay him. And since I have refuted these arguments at sufficient length

(33) אֱמֶת הַבְּרִיָּה ; הַבְּרִיָּה - Not in Arab-but see W's.trans p/79. According change אֱמֶת הַבְּרִיָּה

(34) לֹא בְּיָשָׁר Omitted

(במה שיש בו ד') the student of this book(35) should be able to meet with their proper reputation whatever objections he may find similar to these. Therefore I shall subjoin unto the foregoing all passages concerning human compulsion in which they seem to be ambiguities and errors(36) that may cast doubt upon the truth of indeterminism .

But in-as-much as these passages are many (37) because of the richness of language which I noted in the book on unity(2nd.ch.)-for indeed were language not rich in expression, only the individual thing(1 and not the essence)-could be indicated by it-I deem it proper to enumerate the various classes of their application so that it shall appear that they are acceptable to the reason.

Having indicated how many classes there are, I shall adduce several instances of every class of them,

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(35) subjoin במה-Wolff

(36) שבותם-Arabic has .Wolff

(37) שנין האמת I Note. according to מפני שרובם

and then a thoughtful reader of this book can relate every species and every instance unto its proper genus in his intellect and understanding. There are, I believe, eight classes of these passages that might seem to indicate a belief in determinism.

The first of these embrace the "admonition" passages. Now it seems to some that the <sup>restraint</sup> ~~restraint~~ by admonition is equivalent to restraint by action, but there is evidently a wide difference between them. Thus when the Scriptures says to Abimelech "I, even I, will restrain thee from sinning against Me" (Gen. 20v.6) some think that this "restraint" was restraint in very fact, whereas it was none other than restraint by admonition and information and fear, to the effect that she was a married woman (Gen. 20vs. 3, 7). And this admonishing of Abimelech to refrain from that woman that he draw not near unto her is similar to the restriction resting on the divorced man that he marry not again the woman he has divorced after she has been married to another. (Deut 24v.4). Now as regards the "can" it is clear that Abimelech could if he would, but that he might not from the stand-point of the law (Deut. 16v.5)

The second class of passages embraces such as would appear to restrain one from appreciating the civilization of the world or his own advantages; and this restraint men think determinism, corroborating <sup>their opinion</sup> by the Scriptural verse Is.6-10. But this verse simply means to say that some cause will arise among them on account of which (38) they will not understand mundane matter as e.g. what war or calamity or something similar might engender. And they will be perplexed as to the remedy for this misfortune( פשוט ) (Deut. 22 Job.5v.13;12v.19). Now these believers in determinism think that this verse-Is.6v.10-has reference to an inability to understand the law; but this is not so. And as regards the end of the verse "He will return and be cured" it means that they will cease from warring <sup>~</sup> with their enemies and be at rest, as is said with reference to war (Hosea 5v.13).

The third class of passages refers to stubbornness as e.g. when misfortune or evil tidings come to a wicked one without destroying him. Now, the determinists learned of such things in the Scriptures (39) and thought that such a

(38) I בְּבִרְיָה; II has בְּבִרְיָה

(39) בְּפִרְיָה - inexact - Wolff. פִּי אֱלֹהִים = 46. 733 - the Bible

hardness of heart was meant as would not be susceptible to worship(40), and all the more did they think this because Scripture connect this hardness with the heart.

But this is not so; for Scripture connects this hardness with the heart only because the soul is in it(Ex.7v.3,14v.4, 10v.1;Deut.2v.30) And it was necessary that Pharaoh's soul be hardened that <sup>he succumb</sup> ~~it succumb~~ not to those plagues that had been destined for him, until they all were spent upon him. And indeed Scripture makes this clear(Ex.9vs.15-16). It was necessary, too, that Sihon's heart be hardened that he might not collapse from terror excited by the report of the children of Israel that would come to him(Deut.225).

And likewise the men of Canaan needed to be hardened that the fear aroused by Israelitish reports might not kill them (Josh.2v.11;Josh 11v.20)

The fourth class of passages comprises those that seem to assign a certain position and rank to individuals. Now men, finding mention of this in the Thora, conclude that such rank <sup>and</sup> position is wrought out and assigned before hand by God. But they are clearly mistaken, and for

this reason: in noting such rank and position God merely  
 mentions that He sees the individuals in question will  
 attain through their own free efforts. One who is skilled  
 in a certain trade can, when an object appertaining to  
 his trade declare instantly the genuineness of it and  
 reveal ( 102 ) the spurious; just as when a judge ex-  
 onerates Reuben and convicts Simon of perjury or just-  
 ifies Levi and condemns Jehudah, without at all in-  
 tending to imply thereby that he would have either of  
 them necessarily do the thing he said or even that he  
 had commanded them with respect to it, his intention,  
 indeed, being merely to declare and explain with reference  
 to each that he believes that each occupies the position  
 he has assigned him in his estimation (Deut. 25v.1). And  
 similarly I hold, that when a judge declares one note  
 valid <sup>and</sup> another forged that his declaring the one forged  
 is merely a statement of opinion, and in giving his opin-  
 ion he does not thereby forge the note. And I suspect,  
 too, that those who, with reference to two denarii of  
 gold say that the minter gave the one its full value

but made the other deficient in weight (42) do not desire  
 \* (41) after this is the phrase "especially in his  
 time" in the Arabic; this omitted by the Hebrew.  
 (42) II נחב; I. נחב

to imply that they, with their own hands made the one  
 deficient; but merely wish to state the fact that it is  
 deficient. Now if only one's thoughts will abide con-  
 tinually with this exegesis and side with it (43) then,  
 in this way, will one be able to appreciate what the  
 Scriptures say of the action of God (Prov. 3v. 34; Ez. 14v. 9).  
 I understand this to mean as regards the prophet not  
 that God persuades him but that he is persuaded. - Jer. 4, 10  
 "..... Surely thou hast greatly deceived this people.....  
 saying ye shall have peace whereas the sword reacheth  
 unto the soul". Jer. annulled the words of the false  
 prophets to the people by disclosing their import to  
 them. Isaiah 63v. 17 i.e. do not consider us transgres-  
 sors that thou should'st judge us as such but forgive  
 us and have mercy upon us. Only those who are ignorant  
 of the meaning of these and similar passages predicate  
 necessity.

The fifth class of passages comprises those that  
 have reference to atonement. We see that man prays  
 "turn me unto Thee but turn me not away from Thee"  
 (Ps. 119v. 36; 141v. 44) Now the inference men draw is that

(43) וְיָשׁוּבוּ ; omit ; Wolff; also לְהִיכָרְתָּהּ אִמְרוּ  
 instead of בְּשֵׁי הַקְּטִיּוֹת  
 (44) בְּשֵׁי הַקְּטִיּוֹת Wolff.

בְּשֵׁי הַקְּטִיּוֹת : בְּשֵׁי הַקְּטִיּוֹת

X by these two instances of prayer for guidance to the good and away from the bad is that God would thereby disclose the fact of human compulsion, whereas the fact He really intended to disclose was none other than that of reconciliation. Thus when man prays, what he would say is, if Thou wilt be atoned to me Thou wilt already in the very act have turned me unto Thee so that I shall not sin against Thee any more; but if Thou wilt not be atoned to me then wilt Thou already have cast despair (  $\text{וְאֵיךָ}$  ) in my soul? But reconciliation with Thee will bring me to incline to the worship of Thee (Ps.51v.15).

The sixth class of passages embraces those in which ~~a natural endowment is meant~~ ~~a mention of divine activity is made~~. But some think and erroneously ~~that~~ *a special making or teaching is intended*. Thus e.g. Scripture says (Prov.16v.1) "to man belongs the guidance of the heart but from God comes the answer of the tongue i.e. the innate ability to answer, just as Scripture uses "the hearing ear the seeing eye" (Prov20,12)

The seventh class includes those passages that are figurative in expression. Now when some hear such an expression they think it is meant to connote some thing peculiar. Thus e.g. when Prov.21v.1 says "



"Like the water brook is the heart of <sup>king</sup> ~~man~~ in the hands of God", they think that kings possess some unique quality which enables them to do ( ~~אז~~ <sup>אז</sup> ) only what God wishes, whereas the expression is clearly figurative to the effect that even the king, as regards the worship of God (45) - though not as regards ~~imperial~~ matters - is like the water under his own control (46) which he diverts as he pleases and employs to his own interests.

The eighth class of passages embraces those that refer to ~~the a generation of causes, the free will~~ <sup>the creation of a circumstance in connection</sup> with which man chooses some act or other of man, ~~as regards the resulting act appearing dependent upon this generation.~~ This origination of causality occurs in three aspects. The first of these is discernible in such passages as speak of a deliverance from the ~~enemy~~ <sup>Concomitantly with which</sup> enemy, ~~the result being that on account of this deliverance (though not because of it)~~ men turn to some ~~other~~ <sup>state</sup> line of action. Now these ~~explain~~, though only figuratively, of course, that he who delivered them from their

(45) Wolff would insert ~~אז~~ <sup>אז</sup> after ~~הוא~~ <sup>אז</sup>

(46) Furst and ~~considers~~ <sup>considers</sup> ~~אז~~ <sup>אז</sup> as referring to God; ~~as also in~~ <sup>as also in</sup>

enemies caused them so to change their course of action. Thus for example Scripture says "and the Lord God of Israel stirred up the spirit of Pul king of <sup>Assyria</sup> Syria (I Chron 5v.26; II Chron. 36v.22; 21v.16; Ezra 6v.22; II Chron. 25v.20; IX.12 v.15). Now all these passages refer to deliverance from the enemy and from danger.

The second aspect of the will being seemingly dependent on change of circumstances, as a cause, discloses itself in those passages in which men pray for purity of understanding and clearness of counsel, acquired through control of the passions ( אשר יאמרו ) to the end that they may penetrate to the depths of religion and science (and alter their action accordingly). Now men learning of such petitions think-but wrongly- that they <sup>involve interference with the freedom of the will</sup> ~~are sheer determinism~~. As e.g. when the Scripture man prays "Thy ways O Lord make known to me Thy paths teach me (Ps. 25v.4; 27v.11; 119v.37; II Chron. 30v.12)

The third aspect of the dependence of the will on environment is seen in such passages in which God performs some miracle, complete in every way, this mira-

cle appearing as the cause that impels the multitude to belief. Now some who read of this think - though erroneously - that such action on the part of the people is not free but necessary. As e.g. when Elijah prays "answer me, O God, answer me that this people may know" (IK.18v.37) i.e. if the fire will descend and consume this offering Thou wilt through this wonder convert(  $\alpha\theta\eta$ ) the heart of this people which is perverse. Now there is nothing indefinite in this verse even without the definite article, that we should expect the definite article with the word "perverse". And similarly with reference to the time of salvation of which Scripture says (Ez.36v.26-27) "and my spirit I will put in your breasts and I will bring it about that ye will walk in my statutes -nothing else is meant except that the people will of their own free will change, convinced by revelations, signs and wonders (47).

Having enumerated these eight classes of Scriptural passages, it only remains for us to indicate that class

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(47)  $\alpha\theta\eta$  - Wolff thinks the articles have been added without foundation in Arabic.

of passages in which there~~m~~ inheres the possibility of error on account of the structure(  $\gamma/\tau\psi$ ) of the verse. As e.g. when Scripture says (Ps.51v.6) "to Thee alone have I sinned and done evil in Thine eyes in order that Thou mightst be righteous in Thy words and innocent with Thy lips". Now he who reads this passage might easily conclude that the sinner speaks thus because he was made to sin in order that what his God had decreed concerning him might be fulfilled. But this is not so; for the phrase  $\gamma/\tau\psi$  does not refer to "I have sinned" but to the phrase in v.3 above "and from my sin cleanse me", the meaning being "forgive my iniquity that Thy words~~m~~ may be fulfilled which Thou hast spoken and decreed <sup>that</sup> ~~for~~ he who returns unto Thee Thou wilt <sup>be</sup> forgive~~n~~". Such construction is common in poetry (  $\gamma/\tau\psi$   $\gamma/\tau\psi$  ) as e.g. the phrase <sup>then</sup> "cry and~~m~~ the Lord will answer" in Ps.34v.18 does <sup>not</sup> go back to  $\gamma/\tau\psi$  in v.17 but to "the eyes of God are upon the righteous" in v.15.

With these explanations all ambiguities which might appear to indicate ~~in~~ indeterminism are removed (48). The exaction of our Creator with reference

(48)  $\gamma/\tau\psi$  inexact though correct - Wolff.

Wolff as regards this note is in error here - as Prof. Molter showed me. He considers  $\gamma/\tau\psi$  to convey he identical with the Arab. word and meaning to people, whereas the word comes for the Heb.  $\gamma/\tau\psi$  to think, consider. My

to His creatures, that they choose to,obey Him is just, nor,as regards their disobedience,may they impute the fault to Him. As Scriptures says (Job 4v.16) "is man more righteous than God or human being purer than his Maker"- as convincing miracles and the messages of the prophets have affirmed.

CONCLUSION.

"Up! forth again, Pegasus! " Many's the slip",

"Hath the proverb well said, "twixt the cup and the lip.""

Owen Meredith.

$$\begin{array}{r} 26 \\ \hline 43 \end{array}$$