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THE DOCTRINE OF PROPHECY IN JUDAH HALLEVI'S PHILOSOPHICAL AND POETIC WRITINGS

Barry Sherman Kogan

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Hebrew Letters and Ordination

Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion

1971

Prof. Alvin J. Reines
Referee

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To Stephanie

חשך אין לנגד זהרה
לא יכבה בלילה נרה
ועל אור יום נוסף אורה
ויהיה לשבעתיים

DIGEST OF THESIS

This thesis presents an investigation of Judah Hallevi's views on prophecy through an analysis of two major sources of his literary creativity, namely, his philosophical dialogue, the Kuzari, and his religious poetry. This subject was chosen because Hallevi's theory of prophecy constitutes the foundation for his entire religious philosophy. His views also represent a significant response to the questions of what constitutes religious knowledge and how such knowledge might be claimed. Lastly, the relationship between his critical views on prophecy and his poetic descriptions of religious experience shed important light on Hallevi's personal religious development and aspirations. The thesis, therefore, begins with an examination of Hallevi's understanding of prophecy and its relationship to knowledge of the natural world, knowledge of God, and the attainment of salvation. It goes on to analyze selections of Hallevi's poems in which prophetic themes are explicitly or implicitly treated, and to explain their relationship to the Kuzari. It concludes with a brief discussion of the biographical implications of Hallevi's philosophical and poetic treatment of prophecy in the light of the messianic fervor of his day.

Hallevi's theory of knowledge presents prophecy as the highest level of knowledge available to man. Prophecy is received by a special faculty, the "inner eye," which apprehends both the natural and supernatural realm directly and without distortion. Through this extraordinary power of perception, the Jews generally and the prophets in particular

are essentially different from all other human beings with respect to their knowing structure.

The differences between the philosophic conception of Deity and that of the prophets reflect the fundamental difference between natural and prophetic knowledge. The most that the philosopher can know of God through rational means is that He is the Prime Cause of the existence and motion of the universe, who acts only by the necessity of His nature. The "inner eye" of the prophets, however, knows God as an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent Being who acts by the free exercise of His will and reveals Himself to His chosen creatures in either visions or true dreams. The most significant occurrance of prophecy was at Sinai, where a multitude of Israelites received public, empirical, direct, and miraculous evidence regarding the existence and nature of God. All subsequent prophetic visions confirmed the truth of that revelation.

The thesis goes on to analyze the various prerequisites for prophecy. Once these conditions are fulfilled, the prophet apprehends an array of sensuous spiritual substances, created miraculously by the special will of God, which proceed from Him to the "inner eye" or to the external senses in the case of Sinai. Prophecy is thus composed of either visual images or intelligible words, or some combination of these. This apprehension assures the prophet of God's nearness, guidance, and love, and enables him to experience the soteriological state. The ultimate aim of one who attains this experience is to guide other men so that they too may qualify for the same level of apprehension and salvation.

There are many explicit parallels between Hallevi's description of prophetic experience and poetic inspiration. Both prophets and poets are naturally-gifted individuals who are able to apprehend and express by nature what philosophers and metric experts strive to achieve by technical expertise. The poet's inspiration comes to him through the "vision of the heart" in which he sees awesome visions essentially like those of the "inner eye." The ultimate nature of God remains hidden for both prophets and poets, but what they can know of Him is stated in virtually identical terms. Each one associates wakefulness with the experience of God's nearness and sleep with the experience of exile from God and aloneness. In Hallevi's religious poems, the Land of Israel reappears as the "gates of heaven" and "fountain of prophecy." Beyond these parallels, his poems display his great interest in knowing when the end of days would come, a matter which he suggests belongs to the realm of prophecy. Because of the concurrance of Hallevi's formal theory of prophecy with numerous poetic expressions of his quest for religious experience, the thesis concludes with the suggestion that Hallevi's journey to Israel was probably intended to fulfill the last of the requirements for prophecy, namely settlement in the Holy Land. It appears that his goal was to learn through prophecy, rather than calculation,when the Sinai redemption would begin.

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B.S.K.

CHAPTER I.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HALLEVI'S RELIGIOUS SYSTEM

A. The Historical Context of Hallevi's Enterprise

Judah Hallevi's *Kuzari* is the product of an unusually gifted and original mind in the history of medieval Jewish thought. While he was still a young man, Hallevi had distinguished himself both as a physician and as a poet of great talent and versatility. But it was late in Hallevi's lifetime, apparently just before his departure for the Holy Land, that he undertook to write the *Kuzari*. The full title of the work provides us with valuable insight into the nature of the book and what it was designed to accomplish. Hallevi's subtitle for the *Kuzari* is: *A Book of Argument and Proof in Aid of a Despised Religion.* Hallevi attempted to produce, in essence, a defense of the Jewish religion, and his theory of prophecy is the foundation for this defense.

To understand more fully what may have impelled Hallevi to write such a book and why he chose to characterize Judaism as a despised religion, it is helpful to view the *Kuzari* in terms of the social, political, and religious *milieu* to which it belongs. Yitzhak Baer has observed that during the second half of the eleventh century, "a new, militant religious spirit became dominant among Christians and Moslems throughout the world."[1] In Spain, this development expressed itself in the policy of *reconquista* inaugurated by the Christian rulers of the North. After the Caliphate of Andalusia broke up into several smaller political units at the beginning of the eleventh

century, these Moslem states began to engage in periodic internecine struggles which succeeded only in weakening one another and encouraging Christian rulers to exploit the situation to their advantage. "Until the middle of the eleventh century, the Christian princes confined themselves to the exploitation for their own ends of the fraternal strife that rent the Moslems. In return for military aid to one or another of the warring states, they obtained political concessions and an opportunity to plunder Arab territories and an opportunity to exact a heavy tribute from their rulers. But from about 1060 on, the Christians descended upon the Moslem South with the aim of permanent conquest."[2] One by one, the independent Moslem states fell to the Christian knights: Toledo in 1085, Saragossa in 1118, Tortosa in 1146, and Lerida in 1149. These victories, however, unleashed a new series of Moslem counter-attacks, first under the Almoravides in the years following 1080, and then under the Almohades after 1140. While the Christian invasion was temporarily halted, the overall result of these military thrusts from both sides was to end the autonomy of the Moslem states and to seriously threaten the social and political security of the newly conquered peoples, both Jew and Moslem.

The official policy of the Christian princes from the beginning of the reconquista was to spare the Jews living in the captured cities,[3] and, indeed, to let them remain in their former quarters. The Moslems, on the other hand, were driven outside the city walls. This favored status for Jews provoked the enmity of both the Christian and Moslem populace.

Moreover, the intersticial position they occupied as civil servants, administrators, interpreters, diplomats, and tax collectors in Catalonia, Aragon, and Barcelona only stirred the resentment of the masses further. These passions would periodically boil over and remind the Jews of their precarious situation. Thus, in 1108, Solomon ibn Ferruziel was assassinated while engaged in a diplomatic mission for King Alphonso VI. When the king died in 1109, riots broke out in Christian-ruled Toledo, Northern Castille, and the Kingdom of Leon. Civil order was not fully restored by Alphonso VII until 1127.

The fate of the Jews in Spain, both Moslem and Christian, depended largely on the individual influence of courtier Jews with the rulers they served. Their response to the advance of the Christian armies was, in general, to transfer the centers of Jewish culture from the declining Arab sphere and to reconstitute them under the somewhat more stable conditions existing in Christian domains. Uprooted and in need of refuge, most of these courtier Jews wrested whatever privileges they could for themselves and their communities by placing their talents at the disposal of the Christian kings. Others went further and sought to protect their position by conversion to Christianity and in some cases to Islam. Aside from considerations of expediency, it appears that conversion was easier for them to accept because of the religious skepticism that prevailed among so many Jews in the courtier class. Their general familiarity with the secular disciplines and high degree of philosophic sophistication

led significant numbers to doubt the truth of Judaism and to disgard its religious observances.[5] Many of those who harbored such doubts about Judaism apparently saw little reason to endure great suffering on its account and thus converted.[6] Still others reacted to these difficulties with revived messianic hopes. Indeed, a new, passionate interest in messianic speculation made its appearance at this time.[7] As a result of the precarious political situation, the popular uprisings against the Jews, the growing number of conversions, and the spread of religious skepticism, there was a serious weakening of the social fabric of the Spanish Jewish communities during the lifetime of Judah Hallevi. Judaism appeared to be a thoroughly humiliated religion in contrast to the worldly power of Christianity and Islam.

The militant religious spirit which prevailed in Spain during the eleventh century was all the more impressive within the larger context of Europe and the Near East. For the Kuzari was also written during the years following the First Crusade and clearly expresses the tensions and animosities it unleashed.[8] Both en route to Palestine and after their arrival, the Crusaders, led by Godfrey of Bouillon, devastated the Jewish communities through which they passed. In 1099, the Christians conquered Jerusalem, subjugated the Moslems, and then killed or exiled its Jewish inhabitants. The ideological motivation for combining attacks on the Jews with the campaign against the Moslem unbelievers was the belief that the Crusades would ultimately decide the historic agrument between the three monotheistic religions of the West. Whoever finally ruled the Holy Land, it was widely held, had

demonstrated the truth of his religion, for rulership of the land in general and the holy places in particular constituted evidence of God's having responded favorably to the prayers of the faithful. The origins of this belief go back as far as the prophetic books of Scripture in which Israel was threatened with exile for incurring Divine wrath. Conversely, Divine favor would be manifest in the renewed habitation and prosperity of Palestine. Christianity and Islam, of course, were the main contenders for this distinction, since Israel's exile and debased state challenged the credibility of any claim the Jews might have. Still, as long as Jews put forward such claims, they remained potential contenders and therefore, had to be vanquished along with the Moslems.[9] The central problem that these upheavals in Spain and Palestine posed to Judah Hallevi was to justify the truth of the Jewish religion vis a vis its Moslem, Christian, philosophic and even Jewish detractors. For from all of these quarters Judaism's claims to possessing ultimate truth about God, man, and the path to salvation were completely rejected. It was in direct response to this problem that Hallevi wrote the Kuzari.

B. The Significance of Epistemology for Hallevi's System

The Kuzari is essentially a polemical work. It attempts neither to uncover new truths as such nor to ultimately reconcile conflicting claims to truth presented by philosophy and religion. Its basic aim, rather, is to demonstrate that the Jewish religion is already in possession of the truth, that is to say, that Judaism is the only true religion despite

the many intellectual challenges it faced. In order to make a convincing case for the truth of Judaism, Hallevi undertook to explain what constituted a revealed religion and how such a religion was possible. He further thought it necessary to show how prophecy is one of the ways available to certain men for knowing truth, and indeed, the most superior means for doing so, and finally to demonstrate that Judaism was the only existing religion which satisfied the necessary qualifications for a revealed religion.

With those who practiced the art of the kalam, Hallevi shares the basic aim of formulating arguments in defense of religion. The Kuzari, like the works of the Mutakallimun, is designed to refute the Epicurean,[10] while the aim of the philosophers is to acquire speculative knowledge and the rational understanding of all intelligible things.[11] But Hallevi's method of establishing by argument the various true beliefs which the privileged hold without argument differs essentially from that of the kalam.[12] He does not proceed from universally accepted axioms to deduce the particular religious doctrines he espouses, as do the masters of the kalam. For this type of reasoning, he argues, can be used to establish any number of conflicting theories and religions such as those of the dualists,materialists, fire and sun worshippers, and the philosophers themselves. Conversely, were he to have adopted this method, already used by so many diverse medieval thinkers,Hallevi would have lacked any absolutely compelling grounds for rejecting conclusions contrary to his own. For his religious affirmation,

if derived from the same universally accepted axioms as Moslem theologians, Christian scholastics, Jewish Artistotelians, and other philosophers used, would have become just one more interpretation of the truth among many others. No one view could be decisively proved either true or false by this approach,as Hallevi saw it. Little wonder, then, that he should claim such proofs would lead only to heresy and injurious opinions.[13]

Consistent with his aim of showing Judaism to be the only true religion despite all other claims, Judah Hallevi deliberately adopts an empirical mode of argument. His defense proceeds from the alleged certainty of particular sensuous experiences which only a select group of people, the Jews and their predecessors, claimed to have had. These experiences, once they can be shown to have occurred in fact, are of such nature as to constitute in and of themselves prima facie evidence of the truth of Judaism. They describe the Deity as having relationships with men, performing miracles for the people of Israel, bringing them out of servitude in Egypt, directly addressing them at Mt. Sinai, and communicating His will to subsequent generations through the prophets. In order to successfully demonstrate the truth of Judaism, Hallevi must produce the most compelling evidence possible to show that these extraordinary experiences occurred as they were described. Such evidence, moreover, would have to be consistent with a clearly defined and generally acceptable theory of natural and religious knowledge. Herein lies the significance of epistemology for Hallevi's system.

To construct his case, the author of the Kuzari finds it necessary to present an analysis of the human knowing structure, that is, the nature of the mind and its operations in acquiring knowledge. In addition to a generally acceptable account of how men know, Hallevi sets out to show what constitutes knowledge and what does not. He attempts to establish satisfactory criteria to distinguish between truth and illusion regarding the testimony of the senses and to show that Judaism in fact possesses the most convincing evidence possible within the framework of this analysis. Finally, he seeks a justification for those claims put forward by Judaism which cannot be verified by recourse to ordinary sense experience, such as the experiences of the prophets, even if this will carry his epistemological analysis to another level of experience.

While the Kuzari does attempt to satisfy all of these requirements, the result is not altogether systematic. The dialogical form of the Kuzari frequently prevents the Jewish sage from treating the subject under discussion exhaustively at any one stage. To maintain interest and sustain the dramatic effect, the conversation must not degenerate into a series of learned disquisitions in answer to brief questions by the Khazar king. Consequently, many subjects are taken up, treated in part, dropped, and then returned to only at a later point. Likewise, Hallevi is not always successful in sustaining the dramatic possibilities of the dialogue form, just as he is not able to treat his material in a completely systematic form. A certain tension necessarily exists between his dual aims of orderly exposition and dramatic interest. The many difficulties involved in constructing such

a dialogue were well known to the medievals, and, not surprisingly, it is a very rare form during this period.[14] This makes Hallevi's choice of the dialogue as his medium for the defense of Judaism most significant. For there is clearly a relation between the form of the Kuzari and its aim. The author seeks not only to persuade the minds of his readers, but to engage the entire personality.[15] Ultimately, his defense of Judaism aims both at winning intellectual assent and matching it with practical action, as is evident at the very outset of the dialogue. In short, Hallevi is not satisfied with convincing. He must also convert. Action must be consistent with belief.

An additional question remains in discussing the significance of epistemology for Hallevi's system. To whom is the Kuzari addressed? The effectiveness of Hallevi's arguments depend largely upon the predispositions of those who, in reality, were the counter-parts of the Khazar king. They were clearly skeptical, but practical men like the King himself, whom the Jewish sage attempts to convince and ultimately convert to Judaism. Further this audience apparently respected empirical evidence very highly. At the same time, they were not committed to any given doctrine in either religion or philosophy. By and large Hallevi's audience was composed of well-educated men of affairs, who took religious claims seriously but could not accept them uncritically.

Hallevi fully realized that his method of argumentation would not be sufficient to persuade every possible interlocutor. The committed philosopher in particular, would have to reject

Hallevi's evidence in principle, insisting from the outset, for example, that the Deity has neither intercourse with nor knowledge of individual men.[16] Thus, Hallevi chooses his audience carefully so as to make his task as difficult as possible and its successful conclusion all the more impressive.

Specifically, the king is a Gentile rather than a Jew. As a pagan, he does not grant the divine origin of the Jewish religion. As a king, he has little reason to hold the wretched and powerless Jews and their religion in anything but low regard. Indeed, the king is positively prejudiced against the Jews. To reinforce the effect of the eventual outcome. Hallevi chooses as his setting the "actual" conversion of King Buldan of the Khazars, as recorded in the alleged exchange of letters between him and Hasdai ibn Shaprut (ca. 960), rather than a purely fictitious one.[17] Nevertheless, these factors are mitigated by certain other characteristics of the king which predispose him to respond favorably to the presentation of the Jewish sage.

The king's interest in the whole discussion is, of course, motivated by his famous dream described at the beginning of the Kuzari.

> ...A dream repeated itself to him many times, as if an angel were speaking with him. And he would say to him, "Your intention is pleasing to the Creator, but your actions are not pleasing." Now he was so devoted to the Khazar religion that he performed the service of the temple and sacrifices by himself with a whole heart. But with respect to all of those actions to which he was devoted, the angel came to him during the night and said, "Your intention is pleasing but your actions are not pleasing." This caused him to investigate the various beliefs and religions;

> and, in the end, he converted to Judaism along with many of the Khazars.[18]

This sequence of dreams becomes the basis for the king's entire investigation. He sets out to discover which mode of worship is God-pleasing, because he is convinced that the message of the dreams is true, ie. that there is such a mode of worship and that it is not identical with the Khazar religion. He came to this conclusion in part because the dreams were matters of immediate experience to him. He saw the angel and heard the message from this divine messenger personally. The dream sequence thus enables the king to enter and to comprehend the realm of experience which the Jewish sage describes. The dream is an event in the personal history of the king and it serves as the basis for his receptivity to the subsequent descriptions of the historical experiences of Israel and the prophets.[19]

Secondly, because the dream itself represented a religious experience,[20] the king concluded that the truth of a religion could not be sufficiently grasped or truly understood without such an experience. Consequently, he rejects the presentation of the philosopher by pointing out, "In addition, according to the actions of the philosophers, their scientific knowledge, their true beliefs and their devotion, it would have been appropriate that prophecy be found among them --- but we see true dreams are given to those who have neither been occupied with scientific knowledge nor with the purification of their souls, while the opposite is the case with those who strive after them."[21] The philosophers, according to their own theory, should have been competent to evaluate religious claims by

having experienced prophecy. But they have not produced prophets nor is it likely that they will do so as long as they engage in scientific pursuits. This is clearly an argument against the philosophers and their competence to judge upon religious questions. In contrast, the king obliquely refers to his own true dream and suggests that it did not result from such intellectual or moral exercises. He, thus, claims to be competent to judge religion, as it were, from the inside.

Thirdly, the king does not question the authenticity of his dream or dismiss it as a mere fantasy, not only because it was an immediate datum of sense experience, but because it repeated itself many times. Thus, the experience became self-verifying on the assumption that nature is uniform and that similar causes produce similar effects. The king could find no other cause for each instance of the dream than the appearance of the angel, that is, Divine revelation. The criterion of repetition is here introduced to distinguish truth from illusion. Subsequently, in the Jewish scholar's arguments, we find a variation of this criterion used to substantiate the authenticity of the Sinaitic experience. If what is experienced by one person many times is true, then the one-time experience of six hundred thousand persons, in effect,six hundred thousand instances of the same event,would be equally true. Repeatable religious experiences, like repeatable experiences of other types would thus be absolutely verified.[21]

Lastly, the Khazar king, as king, is "the natural representative of the practical or political life."[22] This predis-

position to attach greater value to action than to contemplation is absolutely confirmed by the dream in which he learned that however pleasing his intentions were to the Creator, his actions, referring to his form of worship, were not acceptable. It was probably this factor which, most of all, induced the king to reject the philosopher's belief in the superiority of the contemplative life and his assurance that specific forms of worship need be of no serious concern to the man who has attained the proper belief. Appropriately, his initial response to the philospher states, "I find your words are sufficient [i.e. to convince] but they are not sufficient to answer my question. For I myself know that my soul is pure and that my actions are upright and intended to win the favor of the Creator. But despite all this, my response was that this way of action is not pleasing, even though the intention was. And there is no doubt [at least for the king] that there is a way of action which is pleasing by its very nature, and not according to thoughts."[23] Concluding that the contending religions differ more significantly in their forms of worship than in their intentions, the king then resolves to speak with representatives of each. Thus, his very esteem for the practical life and his quest for the true mode of worship prefigures the king's acceptance of Israel's religion because of its great emphasis upon right action and the mizwah system.[24]

These, then, are the epistemological assumptions of the king to whom the Jewish sage addresses his arguments. They were probably shared by those of Hallevi's contemporaries for whom he wrote the Kuzari. Thus, the picture we derive of

Hallevi's audience is one of persons standing outside the official practices of the three religions, who were clearly not complete believers, but who thought true salvation must lay in one of the various religious traditions, even if they were not sure which. Most likely, his efforts were addressed to the members of the literate and sophisticated courtier classes of the Jews, Moslems, and Christians in whom philosophy had aroused religious doubts,[25] but not to the extent of provoking complete apostasy or expedient conversion. Given these features of his audience, Judah Hallevi could not simply reject the conclusions of the philosophers. He would have lost his audience immediately, had he done so. Instead of attempting to refute the conclusions of philosophy, Hallevi largely circumvented them by a prior option in favor of empirically versified knowledge. Religion, for Hallevi, and Judaism in particular, could be proved neither by philosophy nor by its refutation.

> The contrast between the source of philosophic certainty and the source of religious certainty required the man of that time to make a decision which does not arise from philosophic reflection, but precedes it. He has to choose at the outset between two positions. Only after he has decided between 'intellect' and revelation, in favor of revelation can philosophy continue and be circumvented without being contradicted . . . This is to say that the believer who grasps the fundamental principle of revelation, can respond to philosophy by arguments which he has learned (as Rabbi Judah Hallevi does in the remainder of his words). He can even draw many of his own opinions from it, but all this is possible only after the preference for revelation is made and not as a condition for revelation. For it is neither from philosophy nor its contradiction that a man may come to have a religious experience and what necessarily follows from it.[26]

Ultimately, this approach enabled him to use the arguments of philosophy against the views of his opponents and to support the doctrines of Judaism by recourse to realms of empirical knowledge unavailable to the philosophers. The framework for this mode of argument is set forth in his account of the human and the prophetic knowing structure.

C. The Structure of the Soul and the Acquisition of Natural Knowledge

Hallevi presents his full analysis of the human soul and its operations in acquiring knowledge in Book V:12 of the Kuzari. Other observations are scattered throughout the book. It is one of the few thoroughly systematic accounts in the entire dialogue. Significantly, however, the analysis is not Hallevi's own, as the king recognizes,[27] for it is part of a larger section devoted to summarizing various views of the philosophers. The source of this description of the soul was a youthful treatise by ibn Sina,[28] the Risala fi al Nafs, which had apparently come to Hallevi's attention sometime after he had written the initial portions of the Kuzari. While the Jewish sage does raise a number of objections to the views contained in it, it is nonetheless clear that Hallevi was favorably impressed with most of this summary. It is the only outside source of the Kuzari, which Hallevi quotes at length. The objections presented to it are few and far from comprehensive. If Hallevi meant to set up a "straw man," he certainly did not demolish it. And as if to confirm his general admiration for ibn Sina's exposition, he had the king, who long before this converted to Judaism, remark, "I find superior accuracy and clarity in these words of the philosophers rather than in the

words of others."[29] We may therefore, assume this section, with certain qualifications to be discussed below, to reproduce Hallevi's own views regarding the soul and his theory of natural knowledge.

Hallevi begins his account with several general observations about the nature of the soul. There are two basic ways by which existing things are moved. They can be moved by external causes and by internal causes, or by some combination of both. Those beings which possess a soul are moved by internal causes in addition to being moveable by various external causes. The existence of the soul is known by the self-evidence of internally caused motion in living beings. As Hallevi says, "The existence of the soul is clearly known by the movements and perceptions of living beings, which differ from the movements of the elements."[30] The soul, he goes on to say, is a form superadded to the natural dispositions of living beings which have the requisite physical characteristics.[31] As such, it is not a composite of the various elements of a substance, but an absolutely simple essence, an unchangeable external form impressed upon the substance which bears it just as a seal is impressed upon clay.[32] The primary home of the soul is the heart which operates as the organ of control for the entire body.[33]

We should note here, however, that a certain ambiguity attends Hallevi's analysis of the nature of the soul. At times he claims that the soul is a form impressed upon a body disposed to receive it. Thus, the unique capacity of animals and plants of various kinds to feel and to move is not the

result of their being substances, but of their having the form of a living being. This form is called a soul. In this view, the soul is a constitutive principle. In his formal definition of the soul, however, Hallevi describes it as the first entelechy of a body; "The soul is a [first] entelechy to a natural, corporeal body, endowed with organs and potentially having life; that is, it is the source of potentially vital activities and it brings them to actuality."[34] The soul brings those corporeal bodies which possess it to perfection by giving them life and all of those capacities which are indicative of life, such as local motion, reproduction, and sensation. These bodies, in turn, must have the requisite qualities and organs which are capable of sustaining life. If these are lacking in the body, the soul cannot bring the living being to its perfection.

Clearly, two distinct notions of the soul are evident in Hallevi's analysis, yet he seems to use them interchangeably. Indeed, at one point Hallevi identifies the notion of soul as form with that of soul as entelechy quite explicitly. "These forms are entelechies, because through them the dispositions of things are brought to perfection."[35] Hallevi does not really explain how this is accomplished and consequently, leaves the two conceptions essentially unreconciled. His exposition of the activities of the soul, however, is considerably clearer, and the functions he enumerates appear to be the same regardless of which conception of the soul Hallevi intended.

The character of the soul is threefold, in accordance with the various vital functions it is able to perform. To the extent

that the soul is capable of some sensation, as well as nutrition, propagation and growth, it is said to possess the vegetative power, characteristic of plants. If a living being can also move from one place to another, it has the vital power shared by all animals and man. Men, who are able to think and to speak, do so because they are endowed with a rational capacity.

The actualization of man's rational capacity depends upon a variety of factors operating in conjunction with one another. The first of them is a man's apparatus for perception. It consists of the five external senses whose seat, Hallevi tells us, in an earlier passage is in the head.[36] There are, in addition, five internal senses located in the brain but controlled by the heart. The operation of the external senses is essentially passive. They merely receive discrete impressions from the external world. In and of themselves, the external senses offer no coherent picture of the world. Such a picture emerges only when the external senses are coordinated with the independent activity of the first internal sense, the common sense or formative power.[37]

It is the function of this common sense to grasp the forms perceived by senses and to unite the various individual perceptions into a single, comprehensive conception of the perceived object. "The existence of the common sense is clearly known if, for example, we judge that honey, when we see it, is sweet. This is the case because we have a common faculty for the five senses. This is the forming power and it operates during both wakefulness and sleep."[38] What is

most significant about the joint activity of the external senses and the common sense, for our analysis, is the claim that their resultant conceptions always reflect the real world. The common sense produces no mistaken or inaccurate conceptions. The Jewish scholar explicitly states that "...the forming power is always correct" and adds, soon afterwards, that it is only able to picture its objects. The possibility of error or illusion at this level of experience, Hallevi contends, is at a minimum, because the functions involved in perception are fundamentally simple. While the problem of false apprehension due to faulty organs of perception is not really discussed, it seems clear that Hallevi's high estimation of the accuracy of direct sense experience rests on the assumption of perfectly functional sense organs and the absence of interference by outside factors. All higher functions of the mind---remembering, imagining, and exercising judgment---are distinguished by their greater complexity and consequently involve, for Hallevi, a greater possibility of error. The testimony of the senses is thus accorded, on epistemological grounds, decisive authority in determining what is and what is not the case.

The Jewish scholar turns next to the activity of memory which "retains within itself the essential conceptions of the perceived objects."[39] The memory performs a similar operation regarding the more complex data furnished to it by the faculty of judgment, although only those propositions which judgment declares to be true are retained.[40]

Imagination involves a far more intricate variety of activities. In general, the imagination which is common to both lower animals and human beings, acts to restore what the memory may have lost. Its function is essentially compositive. More specifically,

> ... There is a faculty which combines what is assembled in the common sense, distinguishes, and separates one from another, without removing the common sense from the forms. This is the faculty of imagination which is sometimes correct and sometimes incorrect . . . There is neither judgment nor decision in the faculties of perception and imagination, but apprehension only.[41]

By separating and combining the various sensations available to it, the imagination performs acts of considerably greater complexity than either the memory or the common sense. Inasmuch as the imaginative faculty does not exercise deliberation or judgment, there is nothing intrinsic to it which may direct it toward producing true conceptions or prevent the appearance of false ones. Hence, it is possible for the imaginative faculty to create new, but false conceptions of what is the case out of entirely unrelated impressions contained within it. Left to itself, the compositive animal imagination can create a world of complete fantasy, which is not subject to correction by any of the lower faculties or any power of its own.[42]

The capacity to judge between these products of the imagination, rests with the faculty of judgment or the compositive human imagination. When this faculty is engaged in distinguishing between the desirable and the undesirable, between what is to be pursued and what is to be avoided, it is said to be estimative. Such a capacity is common both to man and

lower animals. But when judgment chooses between the various representations produced by the imagination and distinguishes the true from the false, the right from the wrong, and the useful from the harmful, its activity is said to be cogitative. Cogitation,as such, is restricted to the human soul, because it occurs only when the imagination is employed by the rational faculty. In many ways, the cogitative function of the judgment faculty seems indistinguishable from the rational faculty. Yet Hallevi notes that all of these five internal senses are "beneath the rational soul," adding that all of these faculties perish when the bodily organs which support them cease to exist. This need not be the case with the rational soul once it has been actualized.[43]

The fifth and last of the internal senses is the motive power, which has no perceptive capacity per sé, but enables the individual to make approach-avoidence responses with respect to desireable and harmful objects. Its activity appears to be very closely connected with the estimative function of judgment.

The rational soul represents both the highest faculty and unique possession of the human species. It is frequently called the hylic or potential intellect because it "resembles the hyle [original formless matter] which, in actuality, is like nothing, but potentially like any thing."[44] While the rational soul is able to derive certain forms from the senses by reliance upon the mental functions beneath it, its central activity consists in producing divisions and combinations of forms originally derived from the senses. This takes the form

of genera and species, special features and accidents and similar intellectual categories which are subsequently recombined in the deductive syllogism so as to produce satisfactory conclusions. All this is carried out with the assistance of the Universal Intellect.[45]

Hallevi notes that the operation of the rational soul bears a certain parallel relation to that of the senses. "Just as the faculties of perception apprehend only what they perceive of the sensible object, similarly the intellectual faculties [apprehend what they do of the conceived object] by abstracting the form from the matter and remaining attached to the former."[46] The fundamental difference between these two faculties is the fact that the intellect "apprehends" essences, while the senses apprehand only accidents. This distinction is what allows the intellect to claim universal validity for its conclusions. Thus, as the intellect becomes fully actualized, we see that the "actualized intellect is none other than the abstracted forms of intellectual objects, existing potentially in the intellect [and made actual by it], and it is therefore, said that the actualized intellect is both the thinking subject and the object thought."[47]

The original tie between the intellect and data from the external senses comes to be replaced by a new tie between the individual intellect and the Active Intellect. The intellect eventually ceases to depend on the senses for the formation of ideas, conceptions, and syllogisms or even their verification. At what point this occurs, however, is never stated. By virtue of its own activity <u>vis a vis</u> the passivity of the sensory

apparatus, the individual intellect is able to proceed rapidly in its grasp of universal intellectual truths. Indeed, in certain instances "the rational faculty has succeeded . . . in attaching itself to the Universal Intellect, such that it raises itself above the exercise of reason and speculation, and it removes the burden [of those activities] through inspiration and prophecy. This special distinction is called 'holiness' and 'the holy spirit."[48] This, in essence, is the naturalistic theory of prophecy alluded to in the philosopher's original presentation before the king.

At this level of thought the mind is divested of all previous false judgments which derived either from the operations of the imagination or the limitations of the body.

> It remains only [to observe] that it [the rational soul which has attained this degree] is a substance existing in its own right, describable by the attributes of angels and divine beings. Its primary tools are the spiritual forms which shape themselves in the center of the brain as a result of the vital spirit acting through the imaginative faculty. It [the rational soul] brings the imagination to the cogitative level when it controls the imagination and makes combinations and distinctions, enabling it to produce knowledge. Before this, when judgment, which is not always correct, controlled it, it was merely imaginative as happens in the case of children, animals, and those whose temperment has been changed due to illness. Ultimately those images disappear from the human soul by means of the combinations and distinctions which are necessary for perfect speculation with respect to the intended opinion . . .[49]

Only the continued attachment of the rational soul to an individual body and its limitations prevents a complete union with the Universal Intellect. At such time as the body perishes, the actualized intellect, divested of all its

deficiencies and released from all possible injury, is united with the noble substance known as "the higher world."[50] That element of the rational soul which is meant here is "the kernel." What endures is not the personal identity of the individual mind, but the true conceptions which it produced.

This short account allows us to outline Hallevi's classification of knowledge. Knowledge is of two general varieties---sensible and rational. Because a kernel of the faculties existing below the rational soul is preserved within the rational soul, even after the body perishes, we know that we have sensible knowledge.[51] All the operations of the rational soul point to the existence of rational knowledge. Sensible knowledge may be classified, as we have seen, into perceptions acquired through the five external senses and representations fashioned by the common sense from this data. Rational knowledge is either of primary notions or logical deductions made from them. "And the intelligible forms exist in it [the intellect] whether they are acquired by Divine instruction or by application. Those acquired by instruction are the first intelligibles which all men share according to the course of nature, while those acquired by application are obtained through reasoning and novel demonstration."[52] In this view, sensible knowledge is essentially inductive, and it can therefore, yield no conclusions that are more generally valid than the date from which they were derived. Thus, no matter how variegated one's experience may be, it is nonetheless finite and therefore not universally certain. The rational soul, on the other hand, does possess universally certain knowledge. The truths of logic and mathematics come to it by

divine emanation; but these two realms of knowledge for Hallevi represent the extent of what is universally certain.

Hallevi's objections to this account of the soul deal primarily with certain claims made for the rational soul and what qualifies it for immortality. His attack is on metaphysics, not all rational thought. The essence of his response is that what is known by revelation is more reliable than the "artificial devices" contrived by the mind. This is certainly true regarding the question of the immortality of the soul. Hallevi argues that reason can never finally confirm or deny the proposition. He then proceeds to suggest that if the individual soul is a spiritual rather than a corporeal substance, subject neither to growth nor decay, there should be no way of distinguishing it from other spiritual substances like the Active Intellect, or even the First Cause itself. For matter, not form, is the individuating factor in ibn Sina's Aristotelian scheme. Further, there should be no material difference between the minds of Plato and Aristotle. Each one would be familiar with the other's inner-most thoughts. If complete rational illumination comes to the soul by divine emanation from the Active Intellect, Hallevi sees no reason why the ideas of philosophers should not have been conceived simultaneously rather than one after another. The claim that the rational soul or intellect ultimately ceases to be dependent upon the body is belied by the fact that the great thinkers are subject to lapses of memory and even complete loss of knowledge due to bodily deterioration. If a philosopher forgot what he had already known and sub-

sequently relearned it, thus actualizing the intellect a second time, Hallevi suggests that he would presumably have acquired two immortal souls. He also notes further that because thinkers invariably ponder over each one of their notions, it may be assumed that they, too, recognized the possibility of error in their deductions. Lastly, Hallevi raises the problem of what specific level of intellectual achievement is necessary for immortality. If complete knowledge of all existing things is required, then no one can be immortal because no one individual possesses such knowledge. If just any amount of knowledge is sufficient, presumably all men and not only the philosophers may achieve this goal. If the requirement lies somewhere in between such as an understanding of the ten categories and similar universal principles, most men could become "angels" overnight, which for Hallevi is an absolutely absurd possibility.[53] Clearly, he rejects the philosophic view that actualization of the intellect brings immortality and salvation with it.

Significantly, what fails to draw Hallevi's objections are the analyses of the external and internal senses, the classification of knowledge, and the ordinary operations of the rational soul. These features of the theory of natural knowledge remain intact and indicate that Hallevi considered them valid. Thus, sensible knowledge, deriving as it does from the joint functions of the five senses and the common sense is still always correct. And even if this type of knowledge is not universally certain, as are the axioms and truths of mathematics and logic, Hallevi shows no cause for alarm. For the empirical arguments that he adduces in support

of Judaism, namely the certainty of the Sinaitic revelation and all subsequent communications from Deity to the prophets, need not be universally certain in order to be true. On the contrary, for Hallevi's purpose, they need only be empirically certain to a particular people at particular times, and not universally certain at all.

D. The "Inner Eye" and Prophetic Insight

The epistemological basis of Hallevi's theory of prophecy is the certainty that he believed to be provided by sense experience. He proceeded on the widely-held assumption that prophecy really occurred in history. Even the philosopher, at the beginning of the dialogue, acknowledged that what is generally called prophecy---true dreams and correct visions---is possible for men to attain. But just as prophecy represents an extraordinary phenomenon which not everyone is able to share, Hallevi argues that it may be apprehended only through an extraordinary organ or psychic capacity which is likewise restricted to a select few. Were it not for this unique faculty, prophecy would either lie beyond the grasp of the senses and be impossible to experience, or periodically require the direct intervention of the Deity in the natural world whenever His will was to be disclosed, involving, in short, a train of miracles and the upset of natural causation.[54] While it is entirely true that Hallevi believed in the reality of miracles and, indeed, tied the ultimate truth of Judaism to Israel's experience of God's direct intervention at Sinai, he never claimed that Sinai or an equivalent event occurred or even needed to occur each time an individual attained the

rank of prophecy. The natural order, for Hallevi, was not subject to such recurrent interference. Rather, he affirmed both the possibility and reality of prophecy through somewhat less spectacular means, with the one exception of Sinai. Prophecy, for Hallevi, is the direct, if not necessary, result of certain explicit preconditions. The first of these was the "inner eye", which enabled the prophet to penetrate to the spiritual or divine realm and achieve genuine and verifiable prophetic insight.[55]

This "inner eye" represented a new perceptual faculty, superadded to the natural human faculties, which only the Jews and their most distinguished predecessors possessed.[56] As such, it afforded its bearers an entirely new dimension of awareness with respect to both the nature and extent of empirical reality which ordinary men lacked. As we have seen, the five external senses were only able to perceive the accidental characteristics of sensible objects rather than their real nature. This was one of the major limitations of sense experience vis a vis the operation of the intellect. It is precisely here that the "inner eye", whose existence Hallevi postulates to account for prophecy, exhibits a distinct epistemological advantage over both these sources of knowledge. In contrast to the external senses, the "inner eye" is able to perceive things without any distortion whatsoever. As against the human intellect, it requires no deductions for its knowledge, only direct sensory experience of the divine realm.

> ...The senses were not endowed with the power to apprehend the essence of things, but have a

> special power to apprehend the accidents belonging to them, from which the intellect takes evidence for their essence and cause. Only the perfect intellect, an intellect which is actualized like that of the angels, can grasp their quiddity and essence. It apprehends their real essences and quiddities without any need for the mediation of accidents. But our intellect, being a priori submerged in matter, is not able to grasp the true nature of things, except in those instances in which the Creator has favored us with special faculties which He has placed in those senses able to grasp the accidents of perceptible objects and always belonging to the entire species... He gave to those He chose from among his creatures an "inner eye" which sees things as they really are, without distortion.[57]

Thus, this unique faculty is able to avoid the limitations of the external senses by its superior capacity for grasping the real nature of its objects. In this respect its function is a direct parallel to that of the intellect. But the "inner eye" supersedes even the intellect, according to Hallevi, because the latter, submerged in matter, can only grasp essences by deducing them from their perceived accidents. He considers this procedure inadequate and subject to erroneous conclusions because it is not immediate, in the sense of being unmediated. The apprehension of the "inner eye", on the other hand, is intuitive, direct and completely accurate. It is able to perceive not only natural objects in this way, but also an entire supernatural realm which is unavailable to other men, even to the most intellectually perfect of men, the philosophers. "...The vision of prophecy is more perceptive than reasoning, and that vision apprehends the exalted multitude[of Heaven] directly."[58]

The unique capacity of this faculty prompts Hallevi to call it a "divine power beyond the intellect, the degree

through which he [Adam] achieved an intimate spiritual connection with God and the spiritual beings and knew truths without instruction, but only with slight reflection."[59] It is clear also that the "inner eye" is not really an organ as such, for Hallevi indicates elsewhere that it is a "non-corporeal power."[60] It inheres rather in the ordinary senses which are able to apprehend accidental qualities, as we have shown above. Consequently, the primary home of this faculty, like all other faculties of the soul, would be the heart. We conclude, then, that the "inner eye" is no more than an additional capacity belonging to all of the five senses which extends their range of consciousness. This becomes especially evident in Hallevi's choice of imagery for the prophetic experience both in the Kuzari and in his religious poems as we shall see below.

Hallevi also suggests, at one point, what this "inner eye" is in essence. "It is possible that these eyes are the imaginative faculty as long as it is under the control of the intellectual faculty, and they see great and extra-ordinary forms which point to undoubted truths."[61] This passage is very significant in two respects. First, it seems to claim, contrary to the general thrust of Hallevi's view, that the central organ of prophetic apprehension operates on a purely natural basis. The imaginative and rational faculties are not new or extraordinary faculties at all, and their respective functions and characteristics are well known, as Hellevi shows in Kuzari V:12. Moreover, all men possess these faculties, despite the fact that their capacities

and degree of perfection may vary. If the rational and imaginative faculties represent the sole constituents of the "inner eye", there would hardly be any basis for demonstrating that only the Jews and certain of their predecessors possessed this hidden eye and retained it on a hereditary basis. Every man possesses the elements of the prophetic faculty as part of his genetic make-up. Presumably, it would only require their perfection to attain prophecy. Secondly, this passage involves a significant divergence in translation from the Arabic original. In the latter source, the term Hallevi uses corresponding to "it is possible that" (אפשר ש...) is the Judeo-Arabic וישך אן (ويشك ان).[62] which should be understood as "it is doubtful that . . ." What Hallevi meant, then, was that "it is doubtful that these eyes are the imaginative faculty as long as it is under the control of the intellectual faculty so that they see great and extraordinary forms..." But even though the Kuzari was more widely known in Hebrew than in Judeo-Arabic, the Tibbonide translation was not generally understood to mean that Hallevi had changed his earlier views regarding the "inner eye" and who could possess it or that he really had an esoteric doctrine in addition to an exoteric one. Rather, the generally held view was that during prophecy, the rational faculty was still in control of the other mental faculties, including the "inner eye."[63] This view is confirmed in Hallevi's parable of the clear-sighted and the weak-sighted man.

In this parable, Hallevi draws a vivid contrast between the individual for whom the external senses and the imaginative

faculty are subject to reason and the individual for whom this is not the case. He examines the relationship that may obtain between them and then considers the "inner eye" and its relation to these faculties.

> And even though these characteristics [of objects pictured by the senses and/or imagination] are absurd to the intellect this has done no harm to the intellect, but benefits it because of what we have taken as evidence for our purpose, just as a perceptive, intelligent person who is looking for his camel benefits from a poor-sighted, squinting person, who is bleary-eyed and sees two objects rather than one, when he says, "I see two cranes in such and such a place." The perceptive man knows that it is the camel which he saw, but because of his weak sight, it seemed that it was a crane, and because of his defective sight, it seemed that there were two. The perceptive man benefits from his testimony and excuses his poor description on account of his poor sight. A similar relation holds between the senses and the imaginative faculty and the intellect. And just as the Creator in His wisdom established this relation between the external sense and the perceived corporeal object, He likewise established in His wisdom a relation between the internal sense and that which ["the meaning which"] is not corporeal. He gave to those He chose from among his creatures an "inner eye" which sees things as they really are without distortion; and the intellect takes evidence from them with respect to the meaning and essence of those objects. One for whom that eye was created is truly perceptive. He sees all other men as being blind [in comparison with him] but instructs and directs them.[64]

In essence, the intellect may derive useful information from limited and even faulty sense date provided by the external senses and imagination, because it can distinguish between both truth and falsehood, probability and impossibility. The relation between these faculties is like that of the clear-sighted man to the bleary-eyed one respectively. When an

individual is further endowed with the prophetic faculty, not only is his range of perception substantially enlarged, but his sense impressions are absolutely correct. The quality and extent of information received by the intellect is then immeasurably enhanced, so much so, that ordinary men are no longer bleary-eyed in comparison with him, but virtually blind and in need of direction. This almost absolute perceptual distinction between the clear-eyed prophet and sightless masses of men, including the philosophers, is crucial to Hallevi's system and is a significant theme in his poetry.

It is important to note, however, that even the "inner eye" has its limitations. Though it is able to penetrate to the super-natural world, it is still a perceptual faculty subject to the limitations of all such faculties, even on this higher level of experience. The visions it has of God, the angels, and all other figures of the heavenly host are visions, so to speak, of their apparent form. Thus, as Kaufmann suggests,

> "In the same way as the intellect takes care not to take the pictures given to it by the senses as the essences of the things themselves, so the intellect of the prophet regards the pictures of the inner senses as only having reality for the senses and the imagination and the power of conception, but not as the essence of what is itself revealed. And, finally, as our judgment regards the statement of the senses, as only accidents of the body, thus the intellect of the prophet regards the pictures of the inner eye as perceptions to which he attributes only the value of being a means for regarding the truth."[65]

The prophet, then, never comprehends the essence of God and, as we will see, never really experiences Him directly.

Ultimately, the various spiritual phenomena which the prophet apprehends during the prophetic moment are designed to certify the presence of God before him and establish the truth of any words or visions that come to him. But if only very few individuals share this experience, there arises the problem of knowing how to distinguish true perception from illusion and subjective states. Hallevi was very conscious of this problem. Indeed, he specifically suggests that such subjective religious experiences do not constitute compelling evidence of revelation.[66] Here again, the criterion of repetition, or more correctly, a variation of it, is introduced to give convincing grounds for the prophets' claim to genuine revelations. "The greatest proof for their truth is the agreement of that entire species regarding those forms, that is, the prophets who saw those things testified to one another in the same way we do with respect to our sense perceptions."[67] Just as men agree with one another that the taste of honey is sweet or that the disc in the skies which produce light and heat is the sun, the prophets were in full agreement with each other as to what they saw, according to Hallevi. Each prophet's experience confirmed the truth of all previous prophets' experiences. The apprehension of the same spiritual realm, Hallevi argues, was thus repeated with each true prophet. That other men cannot confirm this reality for themselves presents no problem for Hallevi. They lack the means for doing so, just as the blind man lacks the eyes with which to confirm the colored perceptions of the sighted.

> These things which cannot be apprehended by way of reasoning were disqualified by the Greek

> philosophers because reasoning rejects whatever does not appear like it. However, the prophets confirm it because they cannot deny what they saw with the spiritual eye through which superiority was given to them. And they were many, living in different generations; no such agreement could simply pass over to them. [68]

Even on this level of "mystical experience" Hallevi establishes clear-cut epistemological criteria for discriminating between illusion and reality. While he contends that empirical facts cannot be nullified by the power of concepts and argument, he nevertheless demands that the prophets' extraordinary experiences be in full accord with the rules of ordinary empirical evidence. Thus, we may characterize Hallevi's epistemology as one which accepts the power of man's natural faculties to arrive at knowledge, and then, proceeds to "reproduce" this capacity on a higher level of experience by postulating the existence of an additional sense.[69]

E. The Superiority of Prophetic to Philosophic Knowledge

We may now briefly formulate Hallevi's grounds for the superiority of prophetic claims to knowledge over those of the philosophers. The prophet's knowledge comes to him by means of immediate, incontrovertible sense experience. Because perception represents the least complex operation of the mind, it is subject to the least degree of error. Neither the prophets nor ordinary men can deny what they experienced, according to Hallevi. The philosopher, on the other hand, claims to know by means of direct experience and reasoning. Reason, however, involves complex operations. The conclusions it derives from sense experience are mediated by many steps and,

thus, subject to a greater possibility of error.

The prophetic experience, moreover, is intuitive. It comes in a flash of insight, all at once, and is therefore considered superior to the discursive knowledge of the philosophers. Illumination may come to the prophet in a single moment; for the philosopher it may take a life-time and more. When the Khazar king is asked if a philosopher is ever likely to have an experience comparable to that of the prophets, he responds, "This is impossible, because thinking is like narrating. It is impossible to describe two things at once, and if it were possible, it would be impossible for the listener to comprehend them at once."[70]

Hallevi never ceases to point out that what the prophets have apprehended of the spiritual world is confirmed by their consensus of view, while the philosophers' metaphysical claims are often divergent and contradictory and, therefore, subject to doubt.[71] The only truth which the philosophers may claim to know are the truths of logic and mathematics.[72] He denies that they possess any metaphysical truth at all, because there is no agreement between them in this area. Whatever divergent views appear among the words of the prophets, however, he explains as only differences in style deriving from varying personal habits and characteristics of the prophets.[73] In effect, their differences were not essential.

The prophets' knowledge, as we have seen, is able to encompass the data provided both by the external senses and by the "inner eye." The philosophers' knowledge is ultimately limited to what the five senses furnish. There is then, for

Hallevi, an entire realm of extraordinary sense experience of which the philosopher has no knowledge at all, because he lacks the requisite perceptual apparatus. The sensible objects of this realm are neither physical objects nor ideas nor thoughts. But by virtue of this additional sense data Hallevi can say of the prophets that "they apprehend the universe in its entirety and perceive their God and His angels."[74] The prophet thus possesses complete knowledge of both the natural and supernatural realms. Hallevi even understands Socrates, the prototypical philosopher, to acknowledge this indirectly when he cites the Apology. "I do not deny your divine knowledge; I say only that I do not know it. I am wise only with respect to human knowledge."[75] Next to the prophet, the philosopher is but a blind man.

Lastly, Hallevi maintains that the knowledge of the prophets, revealed in Scripture, does not contradict what we know, in the strict sense of the word, of the natural universe. "God forbid that the Torah comes to affirm anything that proof or demonstration contradicts."[76] What the prophet apprehends is always, for Hallevi, in accord with what we genuinely know to be true. His experience thus represents a complement and full explanation of our own, for the vision of the prophet allows him to see the divine causes in natural occurrences,[77] which are otherwise invisible to ordinary men. For all of these reasons, Hallevi believes that philosophers are not competent either to understand or to pass judgment on the claims of a revealed religion such as Judaism.

CHAPTER II:
HALLEVI'S THEOLOGY---THE NATURE OF GOD

A. The Divine Names and the Varieties of Religious Knowledge

Hallevi designed his theory of knowledge primarily to account for the contradictory claims made by Jews and philosophers about the nature of Deity and His activity in the world. He recognized that simply dismissing the philosophic position as untrue, even if he could present a cogent defense of the Jewish religion, would not remove the doubts of his readers. For they constituted a sophisticated audience and the philosophic conceptions of Deity which they entertained were quite consistent with their understanding of reality. These conceptions had to be dealt with seriously and on their own terms, if Hallevi's defense of Judaism were to be credible at all. Consequently he sought to explain how it was possible for reasonable men to arrive at opinions contrary to those of rabbinic Judaism by an analysis of how men generally acquire natural knowledge. From there, his aim was to show that however consistent a philosophic account of God and His activities might be with the reality known to ordinary men, such a conception was inadequate, because it lacked the complete grasp of reality available only to the prophets. To argue, however, that the philosophic claims were inadequate was not to reject them as entirely false. For Hallevi,the prevailing philosophical theology of the day possessed significant elements of truth as far as it went. His main point was merely that the philosophic understanding of God did not, and indeed could not, go far enough. The philosopher

and the prophet were on different levels of apprehension and therefore could not have the same knowledge of God. To distinguish between the levels of truth regarding the knowledge of God, Hallevi employs various names for Deity, particularly Elohim and Adonai. These names indicate both the manner and extent of an individual's apprehension of God.

The Divine essence, according to Hallevi, is one, and absolutely simple. Nevertheless a multiplicity of names and attributes may be predicated of it. These do not introduce any multiplicity into the Godhead, he contends, because their variety and difference are reflections not of God's essence but of the numerous places in which the Deity became manifest and the different perceptual capacities of the individuals who apprehended Him.[1] In effect, these names and attributes tell us more about how Deity operates in the universe, or at least, how men have grasped His activites than about His essence per sé. To illustrate the point, Hallevi compares God to the sun and proceeds to show that beams of light emanating from this source are received differently by different objects.

> I will provide an additional explanation through an analogy with the sun, which is one and the same, while the constitutions of the bodies which receive its light are different. Those objects which receive its light most completely are rubies, crystals, and, by analogy, pure air and water. This light is called "transparent light." On luminous stones and polished surfaces, it is called "bright light", and on wood and earth and other such objects, it is called "visible light." On all other objects, it is merely "light", without any special designation. This general light corresponds to what we have called Elohim, as is clear, and the transparent light corresponds to Adonai, a proper name, which is appropriate to the relation between Him and the most perfect of all His creatures on earth, namely the prophets

> whose souls are pure and able to receive His light, which penetrates them as sunlight penetrates crystal and rubies. [2]

The conception of Deity we derive from this analogy is essentially that of the perfect but unknowable One characteristic of medieval Neo-Platonism. God constantly streams forth with light, a form which is absorbed to varying degrees, or perhaps not at all, by different recipients according to their dispositions. The philosophers, whose conceptions of the Deity Hallevi subsumes under the term Elohim, do not really absorb the light at all. They merely reflect it and somewhat dimly at that. The prophets, in their various degrees, [3] on the other hand, are equipped to incorporate this emanation of light into themselves, as a prophetic vision to a greater or lesser extent. In doing so, they come to know the Deity more fully, as Adonai. The Divine names thus reflect the different levels upon which the one and unchanging God is apprehended. Clearly, the attributes associated with these names should not involve contradictory conceptions of the Deity; they should complement one another. In fact, however, the attributes in question are not altogether complementary, and at a certain point Hallevi's analogy breaks down, as we shall see.

B. Elohim---The God of the Philosophers

For Hallevi, the philosopher's conception of God was essentially that of a Being who rules and governs the universe and whose activity is evident in the operations of nature.[4] Knowledge of the Deity, so conceived, is never immediate; it is the product of reasoning based on knowledge of natural

causation.[5] By observing natural phenomena and reasoning from these phenomena to their causes, the mind arrives at the existence of a Prime Cause who has set in motion the various processes of the natural world. The evidence and axioms used in these deductions were of course, available to all men. Likewise, the reasoning process itself would be the same for all men. Consequently, the philosophic conception of Deity as Hallevi readily admitted, was basically consistent with what ordinary human beings knew of the natural order and, therefore, generally accepted. While there were various philosophic God-concepts, it appears that the distinctions were not clearly drawn in the sources available to Hallevi.[6] It is also probable that Hallevi did not consider the differences between these views to be fundamental. He thus subsumed the common features of these conceptions under a single heading, the name Elohim, and pointed out that "what is meant by Elohim, no man of intelligence will deny." [7]

Central to the philosophic conception of Deity, as Hallevi understood it, was the identification of the Godhead with power, specifically the power which causes motion in the realm of nature.[8] He maintained that this view had its origins among the ancient pagan peoples who understood the various manifestations of power in the universe, particularly in nature, in the celestial bodies, and among human judges, to be expressions of Divine power. Thus, the name "El is derived from ʾayalut, and from Him proceed all of the forces [of nature]. But he is above being compared with them."[9] The multiplicity of these forces, of course, lead them to believe that there was an

equally great number of deities. When all of these individual forces, designated as el or eloah, were taken together, the totality of forces evident in the natural world would then be Elohim.[10] Still, Hallevi points out, the eventual use of a single name for these powers did not necessarily indicate belief in a single deity to the exclusion of all others. Such a belief would result only from a recognition of the common source of all the individual forces apprehended in nature. Hallevi suggests that the pagans did not really take this step.

> But they did not turn to the Prime Force from which all of these came, because they did not acknowledge it [its existence]. Rather, they claimed that the totality of these forces was to be designated Eloah, in the same way that the soul is no more than the totality of forces which control the body. Or they acknowledged [the existence of] God, but considered it absurd that there might be any benefit in worshipping Him. They thought He was too concealed and exalted to have any knowledge of us, still less, to exercise providence regarding us...Therefore, they did not worship one being but many, which they called Elohim [understood as a plural]. [11]

In short, Elohim was originally a collective noun designating the combination of forces evident in the natural world and not their ultimate source. It was essentially a class name, and for this reason it could take the definite article ha-Elohim. [12] Hallevi notes that this view of God was so widely held in the ancient world that despite the Semitic origin of the name Elohim, it was nontheless possible for the pagan peoples to understand what the name meant and to recognize the divinity of its referent. "Elohim, you see, was a common name in Egypt. As the first Pharaoh had said to Joseph, 'Since Elohim has informed you of all this...' (Gen. 41:39) and 'a man

in whom the spirit of Elohim is.'" [13]

The philosophers, whose position represents an amalgamation of Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian views, went beyond the pagans to acknowledge an ultimate source for the multiplicity of natural forces. Proceeding from an understanding of natural causation, they argued that Deity was the Prime Cause of all occurrences in nature. They maintained further that this being was one both in the sense of numerical singularity and absolute unity. There could be only one Prime Cause, not many; and this Cause was not itself composite of either elements or forces, but a simple, unified essence. Conceived as an absolute unity, the Deity was not subject to any of the changes of state characteristic of composite beings. There was no coming to be or ceasing to be in the Deity, for example, with respect to either knowledge or will. Thus, the philosopher maintains in Book I of the Kuzari that the Deity has no knowledge whatever of the actions of individuals. For knowledge of individuals constitutes a relation between the knower and the known, and any changes in this relation would imply change in the Deity's own knowledge.[14] Similarily, God, as the philosophers conceive of Him, does not exercise will in any meaningful sense of the term. Will is identified with desire, and desire implies the existence of a lack. God's very perfection, however, implies fullness and overflowing with respect to being, as the analogy between Deity and the sun would seem to indicate. A being in whom any lack or deficiency could exist could not be perfect, by definition, and for that reason such a being could not be considered Deity.

Thus, the philosopher denies that will exists in God and further rejects the view that natural causation derives ultimately from a conscious will. "Everything is traced to the Prime Cause, not to a will [proceeding] from it, but it [whatever is caused by the Prime Cause] is an emanation, from which a second, third, and fourth cause emanated."[15]

The chain of causation operating in the natural universe, as we can see, unfolds by necessity. Each cause proceeds necessarily from a prior cause which derives ultimately from the Prime Cause. And the Deity, too, according to the philosophers, acts by the necessity of his own nature.[16] This is evident not only in the regularity of natural causation, but also in the Deity's function as a "bestower of forms." For the multiplicity of forms which are found in the natural world have their source in the Godhead. Forms continuously stream down from the Godhead, like the sunbeams of Hallevi's analogy, and are received at various levels of the natural world by matter. Where these forms eventually arrive on the chain of being depends chiefly upon the disposition of their recipients. Objects that are predisposed to carrying a given form necessarily receive it, while those which are not so disposed do not. In effect, the assignment of forms to the material world becomes essentially a mechanical process. No will or choice is involved at all, according to the philosophers, at least so far as the Deity is concerned. The disposition of the recipient, however, is dependent upon a variety of causes, one of which is choice. Certain beings may, therefore, prepare themselves to receive particular forms. Once they have achieved the requisite disposition, the form

is bestowed automatically.

This analysis of the acquisition of form is central to the philosophic conception of how Deity "bestows" prophecy upon certain individuals. Once a man has purified his soul in keeping with certain universal ethical principles and grasped the truths of natural science and metaphysics in their totality, he may expect to achieve union with the Active Intellect and experience the bliss known as the "favor of God."[17] By actualizing his intellect a man receives the maximum degree of form that is possible for him to acquire. Indeed, in several places, as we shall see, it appears that Hallevi himself shares the view that one who is disposed to receive prophecy will in fact receive it. The Deity does not begrudge a man his due. However, in contrast to the philosophers, he does not hold that God bestows prophecy through the action of intermediaries such as the separate intelligences. Such an assumption, to Hallevi, involved a form of polytheism which he deemed inadmissible.

> The Divine Influence is beneficient and desires the best for all. Whenever something is arranged and prepared to receive His guidance, He does not withhold light, wisdom and knowledge from emanating upon him. If, however, his internal constitution is faulty, he will not receive that light, and this is his loss. The Divine Influence is above change or damage.[18]

Thus, God bestows form by the same unalterable necessity as an effect follows upon its antecedent cause or a conclusion is derived from the premises of an argument. If the preconditions are met, the result is inevitable.

Hallevi's criticism of the philosophic conception of God derives ultimately from his belief that it is based on

inadequate knowledge. The God of the philosophers cannot be identified with the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, because it is the result of speculation alone. The philosopher simply does not possess the privileged information available to the prophet. Consequently, the philosophic view can have only a part of the truth.

Furthermore, to Hallevi, belief or nonbelief in the God of the philosophers has little practical consequence. The philosopher himself admitted at the beginning of the dialogue that there was no particular set of actions that ought to be followed as a result of adopting his view. On the contrary, he suggested that Khazar king might choose from any number of forms of humility, religion, or worship.[19] Thus, Hallevi maintains that denial of the philosopher's God implies no more harm than the denial of any intellectual proposition, such as the earth being round.[20] Here Hallevi seems to overstate his objection. The philosophic conception of providence, for example, depends entirely upon an understanding of natural world and how to exist in it. Thus, harmful consequences might indeed follow from such a denial. But Hallevi is right, of course, in viewing the philosophers' conception of God and his activity in the world as basically an intellectual matter. Because God is apprehended by reason, not experience, whatever relation may be said to exist between Him and the philosopher is not conditioned by feelings of love, taste, or conviction. On the contrary, the relation is essentially conceptual. It may perhaps involve a certain veneration on the philosopher's part, and a feeling of <u>eudaemonia</u>, but

only so long as this involves no harm.[21] The Deity, however, would have no particular knowledge of this in any case.

C. Adonai---The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob

The knowledge of Adonai brings to the prophets and to the Jews in general an altogether new dimension of the Deity and His activity in the world. The Jews by virtue of their unique perceptual apparatus, were able to exceed the limits of natural knowledge and apprehend God not only as the Prime Cause of motion and the Giver of forms, but as the miracle-working, omnipotent Creator of the universe who revealed Himself to man. This conception of Deity was derived from direct acquaintance, according to Hallevi, not from reasoning about the Cause of natural phenomena. As a result of the theophany at Sinai and the individual revelations which preceded and followed that event, Hallevi maintains that Israel was able to individualize the universal conception of Deity, Elohim, and thus apprehend God by his own name, Adonai.[22] For Hallevi, those who knew of God as Adonai possessed the most complete knowledge of Deity possible for mortal men to attain. This knowledge stood in contrast to that of the philosophers, whose understanding of Deity was based upon insufficient evidence. Likewise, as we have seen, the philosophers' knowledge of God was not arrived at by the same means available to the prophet. The philosopher's knowledge was not only incomplete, it was less certain than that of the prophet, in Hallevi's estimation.

It appears too that Hallevi believed the name of Adonai to designate not another Deity vis a vis Elohim, but the same Deity understood more fully. What was known of Adonai apparently contained within it all that was true with respect to the notion of Elohim. Where the two names appear explicitly conjoined, as in the second Creation narrative (Gen. 2), the aim of Scripture according to Hallevi, is not to contrast the two conceptions, but to indicate that together they give the fullest possible description of the Deity and of the universe in which He acts. Adonai-Elohim indicates that God has revealed Himself in both His natural and supernatural aspects, as Prime Cause and Form-Giver and also as the Being who miraculously establishes relationship with man. To illustrate his meaning, Hallevi cites the rabbinic epigram saying that Adonai-Elohim, as it appeared in Genesis 2, denoted "a full name over a full universe." [23] The full universe, as Hallevi interpreted the term, meant both the natural realm available to the senses and the supernatural realm available only to those endowed with the "inner eye." As for the full name, Hallevi explains, "...and because He established a connection with man, the name Elohim was changed after the Creation was completed to Adonai-Elohim." [24] By virtue of this connection or relation initiated by God with Adam and certain of his descendents, man became aware of both realms which comprised the totality of Creation and of the God who presided over them.

The name Adonai also represents the most exact designation of God in addition to being the most complete. Unlike the term Elohim, which is generic, Adonai is a proper noun.

It does not name a class, but the only member of a class; that is, it is God's own name. For this reason, the name Adonai is never found with the definite article as a prefix.[25] Put differently, Hallevi notes that Adonai is the only eloah deserving of worship.

> For He was generally called Elohim, but was called Adonai for specification, as if one asked, "Which eloah is it proper to worship, the sun or the moon, the heavens or the constellations of the zodiac, or just one of the stars or fire or wind or the spiritual angels or something else?" For each one of them has some operation and dominion, and each is a cause of growth and decay. And the answer is "Adonai" just as you designate "so and so" by a proper name like Reuben or Simeon, once their true natures are understood by the words "Reuben" and "Simeon."[26]

Hallevi maintains that the name Adonai stands for the true nature of the Godhead, and endeavors to show this in his analysis of the letters which make up the name. Particular attention is given to Moses' inquiry about God's identity in the account of the burning bush. After Moses observes that the children of Israel will naturally ask the name of the God who was supposed to have appeared to him, he asks what name he might present. The response of eh'yeh asher eh'yeh, employing as it does the root hayah, is interpreted by Hallevi to reveal only that God exists. Nothing more can be known with respect to His essence. Adonai is the One who exists, or as Hallevi puts it, "...but say to them 'ehyeh' which means 'that I am,' in the sense of the Existing One who will be with them whenever they seek Me. Let them seek no greater proof than My being among them and let them accept Me accordingly."[27] The fact of God's presence, once it is verified, thus becomes the most cogent proof of His existence.

His nature is to exist, but He remains otherwise incomprehensible. And just as the letters of the Tetragrammaton point to the necessary existence of God, Hallevi adds that they also establish the limits of what can be known about His essence. "But ehyeh can be derived from this name Adonai (YHWH) or possibly from the root hayah, and it attempts to prevent one from thinking about a real thing which cannot be know."[28] The essential reason for this incomprehensibilty with respect to the Godhead consists partly in the fact that even the "inner eye" of the prophet cannot perceive essences as such. It can only perceive outward manifestations of that essence. And even these are such as to overload, as it were, the sensory capacity of the prophets' knowing structure. Just as gazing at the light of the sun can produce blindness, Hallevi suggests that the attempt to achieve a direct apprehension of God leads to a deterioration in the prophet's general constitution and perceptual capacity. Adonai may likewise remain hidden because, according to Hallevi, He chooses not to disclose Himself. Consequently, "we examine His works, but refrain from describing His essence, for were we able to apprehend His true nature, it would be a defect in Him."[29]

Whatever, then, may be predicated of Adonai, other than His own name, tells us more about His "works", that is, His activity in the natural and supernatural realms than about His essence per sé. Hallevi takes the various names and attributes of God employed in Scripture to describe Adonai as He was apprehended under a variety of circumstances. The

difference in names would thus reflect the different circumstances of the apprehension. But regardless of these variations, with respect to time, place, perceiver, and situation, the mode of apprehension is at all times empirical. Without empirical evidence for the presence of Adonai, one cannot, in Hallevi's view, lay claim to genuine knowledge of Him.

> The meaning of Adonai, however, cannot be apprehended by reasoning, but by that prophetic vision through which a man is separated, as it were, from his species and establishes a connexion with an angelic species such that another spirit enters him . . . [30]

Hallevi goes on to claim that Adonai is never simply apprehended or not apprehended, seen or not seen. Rather, He is understood to reveal or conceal Himself or some aspect of His activity by free choice. This claim stands in direct contrast to the philosophic conception of Deity who acts by the necessity of His own nature. It is this view that Hallevi explicitly rejects when he describes Adonai as "the spirit of the universe, its soul, its intellect and its life."[31] We have seen earlier how Hallevi's analysis of the soul assumes it to be a self-moving entity. It appears that the capacity for self-movement, for initiating action or not initiating it as a result of internal rather than external factors, is essential to Hallevi's notion of free choice both in the soul and in God. This would seem to be the basis for the analogy he draws between the soul, particularly the rational soul of man, and God. This analogy is also implied in the letters of the Divine name, for they represent the vowel letters without which consonants cannot be intelligibly sounded

and formed into words. "They are like soul while the other letters are like bodies,"[32] which the vowel letters animate. God, so conceived, establishes natural causation by His creation of the universe and maintains it thereafter, all by the exercise of His will. The natural world is the product of design rather than necessity.[33] This being the case, whatever natural order is established by the command of Adonai may also be altered by His command. Whatever is observed to be the case can nonetheless be otherwise, if Adonai so desires. Thus, Hallevi allows in principle, if not in fact, for a world order that can be interrupted at any time by miracles, revelations, and other forms of divine interference. He illustrates this point most forcefully when the Jewish sage contends that Scripture "tells of miracles and changes of disposition in the nature of things, or changes of one thing into another to show the wisdom of the Creator of the universe and His ability to do whatever He wishes, whenever He wishes it."[34] Adonai's activity in the natural world can thus be immediate and direct. While He may employ intermediary causes, such as the spheres of the Aristotelian cosmology, to accomplish His aims, Adonai need not do so. Even when such intermediary causes are employed, their role is entirely "passive"; they are merely instruments of the divine will, not messengers. Adonai alone creates and fashions the universe by His bare intention and to the exclusion of any "assisting" cause.[35] When this is recognized---and only those endowed with the "inner eye" and who have experienced Adonai's presence can recognize it---it is possible to see not only extraordinary

events, but also all natural phenomena as products of the Divine will. "The maximum degree of our recognition of His true nature is that we are able to recognize non-natural causes in natural phenomena."[36] What the philosopher observes to be necessary, Hallevi suggests, the prophet in the fullness of his knowledge knows to be ultimately contingent.

Because Adonai is knowable only by acquaintance, according to the evidence presented in Scripture, Hallevi contends that it is not only possible for the Deity to stand in relation to other beings, but that it is necessary for such relationships to exist. Only one who has had direct experience of God as one who commands, rewards, punishes, etc., can know God by His proper name. Had not Adam, for example, who was first to perceive God as Adonai, experienced God in His capacity to command, reward, and punish, he could only have known God as Elohim, and would have been unable to know for certain if there were one or many gods, or whether he was aware of the world or not. Israel's own miracle-filled history, replete with instances of God's commandments, providence, punishment, as recorded in Scripture, offers, for Hallevi, even more substantial proof that to know Adonai meant to stand in a self-conscious relationship to Him. Indeed, had Scripture not offered convincing evidence for this conception of Deity, there would presumably have been no satisfactory solution to the problem of whether God speaks to man, which the Khazar king considers crucial to his search.[37] But because Hallevi considers the evidence of Scripture both credible and convincing, he proceeds to argue that Adonai has a special tie not only to certain indi-

viduals, but to the people of Israel, and even to the land of Israel and its environs. The philosophic problem of whether the Deity can have relationship to other beings is dismissed in the face of empirical evidence, or at least what Hallevi considers to be empirical evidence, i.e. the record provided by Scripture.

Finally, it is not only additional knowledge which acquaintance with Adonai affords to the prophets and to Israel in general, but the way to salvation. Practical consequences of the greatest importance follow from what is known of Adonai, for He specifically commands that mode of behavior which is God-pleasing. If the commandments of the Torah are fulfilled correctly, that is, in keeping with the explicit specifications given at Sinai, both written and oral, a man may rest assured that his actions have satisfied his Creator and that he may achieve salvation. The state of salvation, then, is based ultimately, but not exclusively, upon cognition. One must know Adonai and what He desires in order to be saved, but one must also fulfill precisely what He desires. Once both conditions are met,

> ...all his earlier doubts with respect to Elohim will disappear from his mind ["the man's heart"] and he will deprecate those reasonings through which he was accustomed to apprehend [the nature of] Divinity and Oneness. Thus, a man becomes a servant [of God]. He loves the object of his worship and is ready to sacrifice his life for His love, since he finds the pleasantness of being attached to Him is as great as the harm and distress of being distant from Him. . . Souls yearn for [the experience of] Adonai by taste and vision. . .That taste induces the one who apprehends Him to sacrifice his life for His love and to die for it" [rather than not receive it].[38]

D. The Theory of Attributes and Its Significance

Hallevi's theory of Divine attributes is apparently designed to solve two problems posed by Scripture. The first problem, arising from the anthropomorphic and anthropopathic terms predicated of God throughout the Bible, is whether these descriptions of God are to be taken literally or not. If they are literally true, then God is not incorporeal and unchanging. If, however, God is incorporeal and unchanging, some non-literal account of God's attributes would have to be presented. The second problem is whether the attributes are distinct imcorporeal entities existing in God or not. If they are real entities in their own right, the notion of God's unity cannot be literally true. But if the absolute unity of the Godhead---in the sense of simplicity or non-compositeness--is to be maintained, then some other explanation of the nature of Divine attributes is necessary. These difficulties, to be sure, represented a challenge not only for Hallevi, in his defense of Judaism, but for all other Jewish, Moslem, and Christian thinkers who sought to demonstrate the veracity of Scripture and to explain why certain religious statements about God in liturgy, and common speech were figuratively true. Both Hallevi's formulation of the problems and his proposed solution share much in common with other medieval thinkers.

Hallevi holds that the initial principles of God's unity and incorporeality are taught in Scripture. His interpretations of the relevant texts, however, indicate that he was influenced by Moslem thinkers regarding this problem.

> God forbid that I should speak what is false or anything that the intellect rejects and considers false. The first of the Ten Commandments is the commandment that we believe in God, and the second is the prohibition against worshipping gods other than Adonai, against associating [any other being] with Him, and against making idols, images, and figures. The principle involved is against representing God as being corporeal. How should we not exalt him above corporeality when we exalt some of His creatures above corporeality, such as the rational soul, which constitutes the true nature of man? [39]

Implicit in the second commandment, then, Hallevi sees three prohibitions. The first forbids worshipping other beings as God and thus understands the oneness of God to be His uniqueness vis a vis all other beings. Adonai alone is to be worshipped and nothing else. The second prohibition which was an extension of the first, enjoins against the heresy of associationism or shirk as it was called in medieval Islam. This heresy referred to associating a companion with God, particularly in the sense of understanding the attributes of God to be eternal and to exist beside Him as independent entities. The Mutazilites in particular believed this view to compromise the tawhid, that is, the internal unity or simplicity of the Godhead. The third prohibition, which seems to reflect Almohade influence primarily, forbade belief in God conceived as a body, inasmuch as all corporeal beings were composite by definition rather than absolutely simple.[40]

Hallevi proceeds to develop the main outlines of his theory of attributes in Kuzari II:2 and then continues with a detailed analysis of various names and attributes predicated of God in that chapter and in Kuzari IV:1-3, 15 and 16. All these names, other than Adonai, constitute attributes and

relative qualities.[41] which is to say that they are predicated of the Deity by human beings but do not exist in His essence as such. They represent the various ways in which men are affected by God's decrees and acts. They express how God is experienced, not what He really is. Following this general observation, Hallevi lists three categories of attributes: attributes of action, attributes of relation, and attributes of negation.

The attributes of action predicate of God all those actions which proceed from Him *via* natural causation. In essence, they enumerate all of the various natural occurances which we regard as ultimate effects of the Deity *qua* Prime Cause and Form-giver. The "active" attributes reveal nothing of God's essence. The relative attributes, here used as a special category *vis a vis* Hallevi's earlier characterization of all attributes as relative, are merely those terms which men employ to impress upon themselves the superiority of God in relation to the universe. They are expressions of veneration, which have no effect upon God as such. They do not detract from his unity in any way. For they do not describe or refer to a being, but only a relation. Lastly, there are the negative attributes which only appear to have a positive reference with respect to God, but in fact express only the negations of their opposites. Their true meaning is to deny the contrary of what they seem to describe, thus avoiding any positive assertion with respect to Deity whatever. Taken literally, these seemingly positive terms would mistakenly apply words belonging to the category of material things to

the category of the immaterial.

By virtue of this three-fold classification, it becomes clear that God-talk is not ultimately about God at all. It is, on the contrary, talk about the states of mind and beliefs of those who claim to possess knowledge about God or to be aware of something more than His existence alone. This theory is quite radical, to say the least, in terms of what it implies men cannot know about God. In effect, it leaves man only with the knowledge <u>that</u> Deity exists and no more. The list of what we do not really know about God, in the strict sense of the term, is quite comprehensive as may be seen from the following classification of attributes.

(1) Attributes of Action

a. making poor and rich
b. casting down and exalting
c. compassionate and gracious
d. jealous and vengeful
e. mighty and almighty
f. merciful and just

(2) Attributes of Relation

a. blessed
b. praised
c. holy
d. exalted
e. extolled

(3) Attributes of Negation

a. living (not dead)
b. one (not many)
c. first (having no origin)
d. last (not penultimate)

Despite the fact that Hallevi excludes the name <u>Adonai</u> from this list of attributes, inasmuch as he considers it a proper noun rather than an attribute, it nonetheless seems clear that he intended his analysis to apply to Israel's

conception of God. For several of the very qualities which he elsewhere associates with Adonai, in order to draw a contrast with the philosophic view of God, Hallevi subsumes under his three categories of attributes. Thus, "...He is certainly a righteous Judge who decrees the poverty of one man and the wealth of another, without changing in His essence... He appears to us through the impressions He leaves us, sometimes as 'a compassionate and gracious God' (Exodus 34:6) and sometimes as a 'jealous and vengeful God' (Nahum 1:2), but He never changes from one attribute to another."[42]

These observations are of crucial significance for Hallevi's attempt to explain the relationship between the philosophic and religious conceptions of God. If Adonai does not change from one attribute to another as Hallevi clearly maintains, how then are the miracles recorded in Scripture to be understood? These occurrances, as we have seen, were taken to be manifestations of Adonai's spontaneous will. As Wolfson shows, "Miracles to Hallevi, constitute the chief argument for free will in God...To Hallevi, the starting point in religious thought is the acceptance of the Scriptural accounts of the creation of the world, as well as the miracles performed on various occasions as historical facts. These establish directly the belief in the free will of God."[43] And free-will necessarily implies change in those who exercise it. The view which understands Deity to be essentially unchanging however, is ultimately reducible to that held by both Neo-Platonic and Aristotelian philosophers. The God of the philosophers produces both motion and effluences of form unceasingly and without deviation, that is to say, He acts

by the necessity of His own nature rather than by the exercise of will. These two conceptions of Adonai, as essentially unchanging and unknowable and as free and miracle-working are in fundamental conflict and not ultimately reducible to one another.

Hallevi, it seems, was aware of the difficulty and attempted to resolve it by recourse to a theory of miracles based upon the notion of pre-established harmony. In effect, it sought to allow for the occurrance of miracles, not as spontaneous manifestations of God's will interfering with natural causation, but as manifestations of that will written into the scheme of natural causation itself at the moment of Creation. The miracles, so conceived, are not spontaneous incursions of God into the sublunar world. Rather, they were created prior to the world, and unfolded by the same process of causation as other natural phenomena.

> In principle [it is necessary to assume] that these creations [i.e. the miracles recorded in Scripture] were established potentially prior to [the creation of] the world. By appearances, that which they said [in M. Abot 5:8] is false, "Ten things were created during the twilight--- the opening of the earth, the mouth of the ass, etc." [It attempts, however,] to reconcile the Torah with nature, for nature refers to the natural [i.e. constant or regular] course of events while the Torah refers to alteration in the natural course of events. The reconciliation between them is that the natural course of events was altered within [the limits of] nature, because they [the alterations] were stipulated by the eternal Will of God and laid down prior to the six days of Creation. [44]

By postulating an eternal will of God (hafez ha-kadmon), Hallevi appears to extricate himself from the difficulty we have described. But this is not really the case. If he means

by this term that the Divine will never changes the word "will" becomes superfluous. It becomes undistinguishable from necessity. It no longer means what it is commonly understood to mean, and therefore, there would seem to be no compelling reason to retain the term. If, on the other hand, Hallevi maintains the principle of God's free will and merely reduces the number of spontaneous manifestations of that will to one, i.e. the miracle of Creation then the assertion that He never changes or that His will is eternal becomes false. For the will which desires at x point in time that there should not be a world, but at y point in time that there should be a world is not one and the same will. In either case, Hallevi's solution fails to resolve the problem which is understanding of God's unity raises for the free and omnipotent will of Adonai.

In his treatment of the nature of God, Hallevi has attempted to account for the essentially divergent opinions about the Deity presented by the philosophers on the one hand and by Scripture and rabbinic tradition on the other. His theory of Divine names is evidently designed to explain these differences in terms of graded levels of apprehension which philosophers and prophets had respectively attained. The notion of a hidden eye, operating above and beyond the natural faculties of the mind, constituted the epistemological foundation for this explanation. Crucial to this attempt, however, was the assumption that the different names designated the same Divine Being. In order to support this assumption, Hallevi tried to synthesize the differences between the philosophic and religious positions, largely favoring the

philosophic view in his final remarks on the subject, especially in Kuzari V:20, but never conceding that God's activity in the universe resulted from necessity. Thus, while Hallevi's own mind confirms the existence of the Prime Cause, [45] "which is Reason itself," [46] operating through the instrumentality of intermediary causes, [47] giving each substance the best and most appropriate form and not withholding His goodness, wisdom, and guidance from anything, [48] he still maintains that "all the events that befell the children of Israel while the Shekhinah was among them are to be attributed to the Prime Will." [49] While the theory of attributes preserves the notion of God's absolute unity by making the Deity ultimately unknowable, the theory of Divine names compromises that unity by its claim to know that God really acts by free will rather than necessity. And though Hallevi is prepared to admit that there is no decisive proof which would establish that the miraculous events recorded in Scripture were caused by God rather than spherical or accidental causes, he nevertheless insists that "it is best [i.e. more practical] to attribute everything to Him, and particularly such important events as death, victory, prosperity, loss and the like." [50]

If there is a fundamental inconsistency in Hallevi's religious system, it lies in this theology. For he displays a noticable ambivalence toward the philosophic conception of God, attacking it strenuously at one point and trying to synthesize it with the Biblical and rabbinic conceptions at another. But at the very least, his attempt at synthesis seems designed to circumscribe the supernatural realm within

the bounds of a rational and semi-naturalistic framework. He establishes limits to what can be known of God. He postulates a new sensual apparatus to account for religious experience. He ultimately rejects the notion of God interfering with natural causation. In short, he endeavors to put his critical faculties in control of his religious inclinations, without utterly displacing them. Thus, the very inconsistency which appears in Hallevi's understanding of God seems to indicate his desire to reduce the contradictions between what he knew of the world as a scientist and physician and what he believed about God as a poet and religious thinker.

CHAPTER III:

Hallevi's Theory of Prophecy

A. The Sinaitic Revelation and Mosaic Prophecy

Hallevi's theory of knowledge, as we have seen, and particularly his analysis of the "inner eye" are designed to show in part what would have to be the case if men are to experience prophecy. Without such experience, he holds that no valid claim to revealed religion can be made. His theology attempts to explain what a revealed religion would be able to know about God that a "philosophic religion," for example would be unable to know. Nevertheless, a theory which explains how prophecy is possible does not necessarily establish the fact of its occurrance. Nor does a theology, which traces various levels of knowledge about God and presents different descriptions of Him appropriate to each level, verify that God is as He is described to be or acts as He is said to act. There is nothing within these explanations as such to persuade either the Khazar king or anyone else that God in fact revealed his will to men and that Judaism's claim to be the true religion was justified. Hallevi indicates his awareness of this fact when he addresses himself to the problem of verifying the revelation at Sinai, the basis of Judaism's claim to ultimate religious truth.

From the outset of the dialogue, the king displays a distinct skepticism about the notion that God literally talked with men. He tells the Moslem scholar that he must first be convinced that God speaks with man, because "the mind cannot easily acknowledge that the Creator has intercourse

with flesh and blood" who is no more than a "contemptible piece of clay."[1] He reiterates this very point to the Jewish scholar as well.[2] Clearly, the king's dream did not induce him to embark upon any leap of faith. By the same token, however, he did not deny the possibility of revelation in principle. He was clearly open to persuasion on the issue; but to be convinced of revelation, the king demanded the most conclusive kind of evidence. Thus, he considered neither the putative perfection of the language of a revelation nor a list of miraculous events, for example, sufficient to convince him that either Islam, Christianity or even Judaism itself was true.[3] Rather, he sets down more exacting criteria than these examples provide.

> If one wishes to confirm himself in divine matters and to be certain that God speaks with flesh and blood, which he considers improbable, he must become certain by means of generally recognized facts which cannot be refuted. And it would be most appropriate that they verify for him that the Creator spoke with man...by a miracle which changes the nature of things, so that he will know that only He who created them from nothing is capable of it. The matter should also have occurred before multitudes who saw it with their own eyes rather than reach them by report and tradition. They must investigate the matter and examine it repeatedly, until there is no doubt in their minds that imagination or sorcery were involved. [4]

The kind of evidence the king regards as most convincing is (1) public, (2) direct, (3) empirical, and (4) miraculous. All of these criteria must be met in order to justify a claim of Divine revelation. Public evidence refers to evidence apprehended, received, or experienced by more than one person. It is "generally recognized" or "witnessed by multitudes." Direct evidence fully confirms the belief it

is meant to support by its very occurrance. The belief that God reveals himself is implicit in the experience of hearing or seeing God. Empirical evidence represents that which is apprehended, received, or experienced by the five external senses. God, for example, must be seen with the eyes or heard with the ears and not with the imagination. Lastly, miraculous evidence, which involves extraordinary interference with natural causation, ultimately confirms the belief it supports by tracing the miracle to the Deity by means of additional arguments and inferences.[5]

The skepticism of the Khazar king, significantly enough, is shared by the Jews prior to Sinai in Hallevi's description. In this respect both the ancient Hebrews and the king appear to be the historical counterparts of Hallevi's courtier contemporaries in Spain. The claim that God truly communicated His will to men seemed utterly incredible to all three. "Moses came...to Pharaoh, to the sages of Egypt and to the sages of the children of Israel who, while agreeing with him, questioned him because they did not believe at all that the Creator speaks with man until He caused them to hear the Ten Commandments."[6] Even after the miracles associated with the Exodus from Egypt had occurred and made their impression upon the people, the Jewish scholar observes, "Even though the people believed the message Moses brought them after these miracles, doubt remained in their souls as to how God could speak with man, and whether the origin of the Torah might not be the result of human design and thought which only later became associated with God's help and power."[7] Indeed, following Hallevi's presentation of the

main elements of his argument for the truth of Sinai, he is still forced to admit his inability to explain how God's will became corporeal so that human ears could apprehend His words or how the writing on the tablets was created.[8] Hallevi's frequent mention of this general skepticism and the problems involved in the notion of a self-revealing God, underscores his thesis that the revelation at Sinai represented the answer to the doubts of his contemporaries rather than the origin of their doubts. For him, the mind simply could not doubt what experience, under certain controlled circumstances, had shown to be the case.

Hallevi introduces his arguments for the verification of Sinai and the truth of the Jewish religion by his parable of the King of India. In it, he raises the issue of how one may legitimately claim to know that an unseen king really exists and how he might be recognized by his actions. He first postulates a situation in which one hears a report about the noble qualities of the Indian king and the excellence of both his actions and those of his subjects. The Jewish scholar then asks the Khazar if such a report would obligate him to extol and honor this king. The Khazar responds in the negative, admitting that he cannot really be certain that the inhabitants of India even have a king. For the report which comes to him is not necessarily from the King of India or even from the land of India. Indeed, it appears to be from within his own realm, in which no first-hand knowledge of that distant land was available. Having elicited this response from the Khazar, the Jewish scholar, acting for Hallevi

presses on.

> If, however, his own messengers come to you with (Indian) gifts, about which you have no doubt that they are found only in the land of India and in the king's palaces, accompanied by an explicit letter that it is from him, along with medicines to heal your disease and preserve your health, and poisons for those who hate you and war against you, by which you may go out against them and slay them without weapons, would you be obliged to obey his command and to serve him? [9]

The Khazar king's answer to this question is an unequivocal "yes," because this personal contact with the king, even if it is only mediated by "his messengers," leaves no doubt in his mind that the people of India indeed had a king and that what he had heard regarding him was true.

The significance of the king's response to the parable lies in the connection between the parable and the Scriptural record of the Sinaitic revelation. The unseen King of India represents the Deity conceived as Adonai. The messengers he sends correspond to the prophets, the king's letter to the Torah, and the presents, medicines, and poisons, procureable only in India, to the miracles performed for Israel. The messengers, the personal letter, and the medicines, all constitute empirical, though indirect, evidence of the Indian king's existence and attributes, for it is assumed that they would not have been sent without his explicit decree. Since we find reference to more than one messenger, the evidence becomes public. The fact that the gifts are found only in India, and only in the royal palace, suggests that they cannot be manufactured elsewhere; that is, they are not products of causation in nature but are truly miraculous creations from

the Divine realm. All that is missing from this parable is a personal appearance by the King himself. Of the four categories of evidence we have listed, it is clear that the Khazar can in fact be persuaded of the truth of Sinai by a combination of public, empirical, and miraculous evidence. Where direct evidence is available, it is to be preferred over indirect evidence, but its absence is apparently not sufficient to warrant withholding assent. All the basic elements in Hallevi's account of the theophany at Sinai are implicit in this parable. It remains only for Hallevi to make his evidence explicit in order to convince and convert the Khazar.

Hallevi's analysis of the revelation at Sinai places great stress upon the role of ordinary Israelites in apprehending God's commandments. He specifically notes that God wished to remove their doubts about associating speech, which they considered tangible, with a divine being. To do so, it was necessary for all of them to be elevated to the level of prophecy. Consequently, Hallevi argues that their experience at the foot of the mountain was both sensuous and intellectual. The common people heard distinct and intelligible words and not merely sounds. Their qualification for this experience derived from three days of moral, rather than intellectual, preparation. They were to be inwardly and outwardly "holy" in order to be fit for the "degree of prophecy."[10] Hallevi proceeds to describe the nature of the Israelite experience so as to satisfy all of the criteria for conclusive evidence of the event as fully as possible. What the ordinary Israelite beheld is described as follows.

> The people santified themselves and became fit for the prophetic degree and even to hear the words of God publicly. This happened three days later, following great miracles, thunderings and lightnings, earthquakes and fire, which surrounded Mt. Sinai. This fire remained visible to the people for forty days. They also saw Moses enter into it and depart from it. The people heard the distinct expression of the Ten Commandments which constitute the foundations and roots of the [other] laws...The multitude did not receive these ten commandments from single individuals nor from a prophet, but from God. They did not, however, possess the power of Moses to bear that great event. The people believed from that day on that Moses was addressed with speech which had its origin in the Creator and not in human thought and design, and that prophecy does not appear, as the philosophers thought, in a soul with pure thoughts which becomes attached to the Active Intellect, which is called "Holy Spirit" or "Gabriel". It is possible that one might imagine [to himself] at that time, either in a dream or between sleeping and waking, that someone was speaking with him, so that he heard his words in his mind, but not with his ears, and saw him in his thought[s] but not with his eyes, and say [afterwards] that the Creator spoke with him. But these conjectures disappeared during that great revelation. The Divine speech was followed by the Divine writing, for He engraved these Ten Commandments upon two tablets of precious stone and gave them to Moses. They saw the Divine writing as they had heard the Divine speech... [11]

The children of Israel constituted a multitude of over six-hundred thousand. On the basis of this fact Hallevi argues that their experience was unquestionably public. Their perceptions, moreover, as well as Moses' own, were clearly apprehended by means of the external, rather than the internal, senses. The "inner eye" has no apparent role in the prophetic experience of the Israelites. They heard the Divine words with their ears and saw the writing on the tablets with their eyes, and everyone who saw the event was convinced that it proceeded directly from God.[12] The Israelites also

understood what they heard and saw as commandments, thus establishing that God had made an intelligible communication to them and that they understood it correctly.[13] Both the "writing" and the "speech" which they apprehended were miraculous creations of the special will of God and not products of any natural, physical organ.[14] They were brought into being exclusively for the revelation at Sinai. Thus, "those events are like the first act of creation, and one believes in the Torah which is dependent upon them as one believes in the creation of the world, and that He created it, as is clear, just as He created the two tablets, the manna, and other such things."[15] While Israelites were not able to see God as such, what they were able to apprehend was clearly sufficient to convince them that God had indeed spoken with them and that Moses was henceforth to be accepted as the supreme and faithful recipient of God's own commands. The public, empirical, direct, and miraculous evidence which the theophany at Sinai presented, thus, established the definitive authority of all Mosaic legislation so far as the Israelites were concerned.

To give further public verification that all the laws of Moses were authentic, that is, commanded by God, Hallevi points out that an assembly of the Elders of Israel was summoned to the top of the mountain to see what Moses had seen. Their apprehension apparently exceeded that of the ordinary Israelites in both scope and degree, for the Jewish scholar explains to the Khazar that it was "the devouring fire at the top of the mount" (Exod. 24:17) which the Israelites

saw, while it was "the spiritual form which the nobles (elders) saw, 'and under His feet was, as it were, a paved work of sapphire stone,' and they called it 'the God of Israel.'" [16] This spiritual form is subsequently identified with light, an image which Hallevi frequently uses to denote the revealed aspect of the Deity. [17] The first assembly of elders, according to Scripture, "saw the God of Israel." (Exod. 24:10) Hallevi understands this to mean that they saw the light which proceeded from God. It is never asserted by Hallevi that anyone, even Moses, ever really saw God. When a second assembly was subsequently called to the Tent of Meeting, Moses "took of the spirit that was upon him and gave it to the seventy elders." (Num. 11:25) Hallevi adds, in commenting upon this verse, that when some of the light of prophecy rested upon them "they became equal to him" (Moses). [18] It seems clear from this observation that whatever the distinguishing features of Mosaic prophecy, it was not essentially different from that of the elders or probably from that of the Israelites. For Hallevi explicitly states that "all of them (the elders) were witnesses for Moses and urged the observance of his teaching." [19] Had the elders witnessed something essentially different from that which Moses saw, Hallevi implies, their testimony on his behalf would not have been entirely credible.

What then was the nature of Moses's prophecy vis a vis that of the elders and Israelites and all of the other prophets mentioned in Scripture? Mosaic prophecy was distinguished by the unequalled degree of intimacy which existed between Moses and God. Because of this unique relation, Moses represents, for Hallevi, the most conspicuous example of those who occupy

the angelic degree. Moses is constantly attended by miracles. He is an individual "who enters fire but is not injured by it, endures without food but does not become hungry, whose face shines with a brightness the eye cannot bear to look at, who never grows ill or weak...who dies spontaneously, as one who lies down upon his bed to sleep and sleeps on an appointed day and at an appointed hour."[20] This relationship was not temporary, but lasted for forty years duration without interruption. Mosaic prophecy, furthermore, was both sensuous and intellectual, like that of the Israelites, elders, and all subsequent prophets, but Moses's experience was more complete than that of the Israelites, and presumably the elders, and achieved without the "inner eye" in contrast to other prophets. Thus, Hallevi suggests that "Moses, the leader, made the people stand next to Mt. Sinai to see the light which he himself saw, if they should be able to grasp it as he was able to do."[21] The implication is that the ordinary Israelites simply did not share Moses' capacity. We have also seen that Hallevi stresses that the prophecy of Moses was produced neither by the imagination nor the intellect, but came directly to the external senses of sight and hearing. The experience Moses apprehends invariably comes during wakefulness, never sleep. Whatever role the intellect and imagination may have played in receiving these Divine communications is simply not discussed by Hallevi.

The superiority of Moses to all other prophets consists then in the comprehensiveness of his apprehension. All the laws of the Torah were given to him with all their details.

Thus, Moses is described more than once as one who added laws to those already given to his predecessors. He is the law-giver par excellence.[22] Yet, despite the exalted place Moses occupies in Israel and among the prophets, Hallevi tends to minimize the possible differences between his prophetic insight and that of others. Moses was unique among the prophets and superior to all of them, but there was no essential difference that separated Moses from the others. Likewise, his prophecy differed from theirs only in scope and degree, not in kind. Typical of Hallevi's fundamental view is his observation that, "were it not for the children of Israel, there would have been no Torah... for their high degree was not on account of Moses, but Moses' high degree was on account of them." [23]

In sum, it is clear that, for Hallevi, the Sinaitic revelation represents the one absolutely certain source of religious truth, for genuine religious knowledge, according to Hallevi, comes from God. Moreover, it is the central proof, if not the only one, for the truth of the Jewish religion. For the experience at Sinai testifies to the existence of God, His unique relation to Israel, His miraculous activity in nature and history, and the fact that the commandments in the Torah come directly from Him. It is the keystone of Hallevi's defense of Judaism.

B. The Status of the Prophets in the Chain of Being

The questions involved in investigating the relationship between Moses, the elders, and the common Israelites with

respect to prophecy at Sinai, raise the larger issue of the prophets' relationship to other human beings in general. Aside from the extraordinary experiences and attainments which are associated with the prophets, Hallevi argues, as we have seen, that these individuals were structurally different from ordinary human limitations. For the prophets, therefore, religious knowledge did not derive from the exercise of perfect natural faculties carried to the absolute height of their capacities, as the philosopher had argued,[24] but from the unique religious faculty which only they possessed. Because of their "inner eye", the prophets were distinguished from other men as a higher species of mortal. The standard of reference for classifying this new species was the great chain of being.

The Jewish scholar explicitly subscribes to the Neoplatonic doctrine that all reality is embraced by a chain of being. It was generally understood to extend from the lowest levels of the material world to the zenith of the spiritual domain, to God. The chain itself was comprised of descending emanations of form proceeding from the Deity and becoming progressively more corporealized as they drew apart from their source. This chain, according to Hallevi, has five basic levels. The first is that of mineral or inorganic matter,representing the lowest level of existence. The next level is that of vegetable life. It is followed by the realm of animal life, which in turn is succeeded by the level occupied by the human species. The fifth and highest level below God and the angels represents the prophetic degree.

This is the level "which distinguishes those who occupy it by an essential distinction, in the same way that the plant is distinguished from the mineral and man is distinguished from the animal." [25] The prophets all belong to this fifth domain, which is called the divine or angelic degree. They in turn are generally referred to as men of God or divine men, for they possess both divine and human qualities.[26] It is this fact which accounts for the miraculous occurrances which befall the prophets or which they perform for others. Thus, their unique biological endowment in conjunction with the special will of God enables them to enter fire without harm, endure for long periods without eating or drinking, maintain their natural powers unabated until death, know what is hidden regarding both the past and future, and die spontaneously.[27] Hallevi understands these characteristics of the prophets to indicate that Divine power is directly operative on this level of the chain, exercising special providence over those who occupy it. Nevertheless, in Hallevi's view, the prophets remain mortal in all other respects. No matter how high they may rise in their vision of God and His particular providence, they are still subject to the same laws which govern the four lower levels of the chain of being as well as those special laws which apply to the fifth domain itself, as we shall see when we examine the preconditions of prophecy.

On this fifth level, there appears to be at least two classes of prophets. The lower degree of prophecy comes by means of illumination, which implants primary notions

into the human mind. This manner of knowing stands in contrast to acquiring ideas by means of inference. Hallevi's Arabic designation for this form of prophetic insight is ilham, or illumination, which Ibn Tibbon translates as limmud, hoda'ah, da'ath and ezer.[28] This is the level of apprehension which the pious individual or waliyy, in the Arabic, is able to attain.[29] Those who see the Shekhinah, the heavenly forms, and angels, and hear the divine echo do so by means of ilham. Apparently, converts to the religion of Israel can also attain to this degree.[30] The second level of prophecy, however, is restricted only to Jews. This is the kind of insight possessed by the anbiyya or prophets and Hallevi designates it appropriately as wahy, revelation. One who has reached this degree is able to apprehend the specially created images of the outstretched hand, the drawn sword, the fire, lightening, and auditory communications of warning and prediction associated with the prophets.[31] Only born Israelites, dwelling in the land of Israel or its immediate environs, and observing fully the commandments of the Torah, may experience this level of prophecy. Those who do are prophets in the fullest sense of the term. "Nevertheless, the proselyte who enters our religion does not become equal to born Israelites, for born Israelites alone are fit for prophecy while the maximum degree the others may attain is that they may learn from them [the prophets] and become learned and pious, but never prophets."[32] Presumably, the descendants of a convert may, after several generations of marriage with Israelites, ultimately be able to attain the

same level of prophetic apprehension as native-born Israelites.

C. The Prerequisites of Prophecy

While Hallevi believes that prophecy ultimately comes to man as the result of God's free will, he nevertheless maintains that God bestows prophecy only to those who are qualified to receive it. There are certain necessary preconditions which must be fulfilled, in his view, before an individual can attain to the rank of prophetic apprehension. The first of these prerequisites is that a potential prophet must be a member of the Jewish people, that is, a descendent of the patriarchs. Only those who are of the stock of Israel can inherit the unique perceptual faculty which facilitates communion with God as Adonai. Hallevi thus places the Jews as a whole on the fifth level of the chain of being, because all of them possess the "inner eye", even if it is only in an undeveloped state. The prophet represents the individual Jew who actualizes the innate perceptual capacities of the "inner eye" to their fullest extent and thereby becomes worthy of experiencing God's self-disclosure. The difference between Jews and other human beings, then, is grounded not only in matters of belief, but in biological make-up.

> The lowest plant occupies a higher degree than the highest of minerals, and the lowest animal occupies a higher degree than the highest of plants, and the lowest human being occupies a higher degree than the highest of animals. Similarly, the lowest follower of God's Law occupies a higher degree than the highest member of the heathen nations... [33]

This superiority of the Jews derives simply from the fact that God chose them. He selected them to be recipients of the

light of prophecy while they, in turn, accepted Him. This choice was apparently motivated by God's continued desire to realize His plan for human salvation, even after Adam, the most perfect and rational of human beings, sinned against God and lost the state of salvation which was his birthright in Eden. While select individuals of Adam's progeny were subsequently to receive prophecy, God ultimately chose to carry out His purpose through the instrumentality of an entire people, the sons of Jacob. They represented the "elite and kernel [of the human species], distinguished from other human beings by divine qualities, making them like another, or angelic, species..." [34] Each of them achieved one or another level of prophetic apprehension inasmuch as God allowed the Divine Influence to rest upon them. This enables them to understand and employ the Tetragrammaton, calling God "the God of Israel" and themselves "the people of the Lord." [35]

Hallevi considers this realtionship between God and the Jews to be unalterable, despite the various misfortunes that befell Israel throughout its history. Similarly, in his estimation, the religious faculty which distinguishes Israel from all other peoples and makes the direct relationship to God possible is a permanent possession. Hence, he explicitly states that the promises made to Israel in Scripture imply a continued connection with the Divine Influence by means of prophecy or something akin to it. [36] One might, therefore, have legitimate grounds for aspiring to prophecy, even after its formal conclusion during the end of the period of the Second Temple, but only if one belonged to the stock of Israel

by birth and fulfilled all other required conditions. This then is the first and most fundamental requirement for prophecy.

The second prerequisite is that of residence in the land of Israel or its immediate environs.[37] This geographical area, according to a rabbinic tradition, which Hallevi shares, represents the only place in which the Shekhinah is revealed to man, that is, in which prophecy occurs.[38] Aside from the Scriptural claim that this was the Land which God chose to give to Israel, Hallevi attaches great significance to it in his theory of prophecy because, for scientific and geographical reasons, Palestine was, to him, the choicest of territories on earth. According to the most advanced medical views of his time, the area which was the most temperate of the seven climates, directly contributed to the formation of a perfect physical and psychological constitution. Hallevi, as we have seen, regards the prophet as the most perfect kind of man, the divine man. Because perfection of the species depends in part on climatological factors, he quite deliberately identifies the land of Israel as the most temperate geographical domain and contends that the perfection of prophecy may only be achieved there.[39]

> Eber represented the essence of Shem, and Shem represented the essence of Noah because he inherited the temperate climate, the central and most precious part of which is the land of Canaan, the land of prophecy...since the land of Israel lies in the center of the world.[40]

Hallevi illustrates the organic role which the land plays in facilitating prophecy by developing the rabbinic image of Israel as God's luxuriant vine. Israel is likened to the wild root which God, the agriculturer, finds in the desert. He

tended it in Egypt and at the appropriate time transplanted it to the tilled ground of Israel. His purpose in doing so was to cultivate and improve the root until it was capable of producing excellent fruit. The fruit would be prophecy, or more correctly, the true path to salvation which only prophecy discloses and embodies. Without the proper soil and climate in which to grow, the vine, cannot thrive nor can it bring forth good grapes.[41] Clearly, in Hallevi's system, the land is absolutely essential for acquiring religious truth and salvation. As a prerequisite for prophecy, it is second only to the vine of Israel itself, which is the kernel of nations.[42]

The preeminence of the land of Israel, Hallevi goes on to show, was recognized from the very earliest times. He traces Cain's struggle with Abel to the question of inheritance and ownership of the land. The right of inheritance was crucial to them, because it determined who would be able to maintain a direct connection with the Divine Influence. Their struggle repeated itself in subsequent generations, between Isaac and Ishmael and Jacob and Esau. The patriarchs yearned to dwell in the land even while the Canaanites possessed it. The Covenant could not be either established or renewed outside of it. Even in death, the patriarchs sought to have their remains buried there. When Moses was denied entry to the land itself, it was considered the gravest of tragedies. When he was allowed to see it, albeit from afar, it was deemed an act of Divine grace. Exile from the land meant exile from the presence of God. Presence in the land was sufficient to

bring forth visions as in the case of Jacob at Bethel. And what was recognized by Israel, Hallevi observes, other nations also acknowledged, "...The nations of Persia, India, and Greece among others, sought to offer sacrifices and pray for themselves in that honored Temple. They spent their wealth at that place, even though they held to other laws.. and extol it to this day, even though the Shekhinah no longer appears there. All nations make pilgrimages to it and yearn for it, except ourselves because of our exile and our affliction." [43]

The particular attention which Hallevi devotes to the Temple in Jerusalem by citing the pagan people's high regard for it and by his own detailed description of its service, underscores the special place which Zion occupies within this analysis. While presence within the land itself contributes significantly to the appearance of prophecy, this is all the more true for Zion. It is the "gate of heaven" Hallevi states repeatedly, and the "stepping stone of the prophets." [44] By these expressions it appears he means that Zion represents the chief physical point of contact between the divine and human realms. The earthly Jerusalem is bound by a kind of corridor to the heavenly Jerusalem. From this terrestrial gate, the prophet is able to behold the full range of forms belonging to the Divine level of the chain of being. In this vision of paradise,[45] he traces, as it were, the geography of the Divine realm, the sight of which assures the prophet of God's presence. "The land of Israel" as Eli Schweid observes, "thus possesses a geotheological distinction and not only a geo-political one.

It is not merely the land with the most moderate climate, but also the site which faces the door of the spiritual world." [46]

Given this understanding of the environmental prerequisite of prophecy, the implications of exile from the land are grave indeed. Leaving the land of Israel implies departure from God's presence. Beyond the political degradation that follows from landlessness, the absence of God is far worse. With genuine prophecy no longer available, the experience of salvation would never be complete. Even the means to it would be cast into doubt. Life outside the land of Israel, as Hallevi expresses so poignantly in his poetry, is an attentuated life, and all the more degrading if Jews prefer the temporary securities of their exile to a renewed and reinvigorated bond to God in Israel. Indeed, when the Khazar king reminds the Jewish sage that his continued residence in exile, along with most other Jews, belies his high praise of the Holy Land, the sage admits this to be the real reproach of the Jews. [47] In this context, he recalls the progressive diminution of prophecy among the Babylonian exiles with the words, "I sleep, but my heart waketh," (Song of Songs 5:2) and comments that sleep is but a designation for exile, and the awakened heart represents the continuance of prophecy among the people. Hallevi laments that in his own generation, the people lack the purity of mind, and the wakefulness of heart which might entitle them to the same salvation that came to Israel in Egypt. In effect, the exile becomes a self-perpetuating phenomenon. It numbs the heart of Israel so that the people give up the very means which

might effect its healing and restoration. This view was central to both Hallevi's theory of prophecy and his soteriology. Its theoretical significance came to have an ever-increasing effect upon his practical thinking, to the point that both the Jewish scholar and his creator found it necessary to support their intellectual position by actual emigration to the Holy Land.

The third prerequisite of prophecy is the complete and proper observance of the Divine law. The commandments, both those connected with the land of Israel and those not connected with it, represent the means chosen by the Creator for cultivating the vine of Israel on its own soil. This cultivation develops and actualizes the unique religious faculty of the Jew, at first only a disposition, to the point at which it is able to achieve the prophetic degree. "For the Torah which comes from God confers upon the soul the manner and dispositions of angels. This cannot be attained by doctrine alone. The proof for this is that prolonged practice of that Law brings one to the prophetic degrees, which, of the human degrees, are the nearest to God."[48] In effect, the secrets of the Law embody the moral preparation required for prophecy by bringing the man who is knowledgeable in the Law to what is good and repelling what is evil.[49] Viewed from the perspective of a physician, which, of course, Hallevi was, the commandments serve as the Divinely-prescribed, therapeutic regimen which fosters the maximum degree of health in the body and soul of Israel. That state of health is identical with the experience of God's presence which prophecy brings.

Conversely, Hallevi argues, God does not bestow prophecy upon a man who does not observe His commandments or who is careless in his observance. For "the Divine Influence rests upon every one of these actions, because the actions prescribed in the Torah, like natural creatures, are entirely measured by the Creator and not by the power of flesh and blood."[50] Only the fulfillment of those acts He specifically commanded can be efficacious. Thus, Hallevi takes to task those who have attempted to imitate artifically the laws given to Moses at Sinai. He apparently has in mind both the "syllogistic religions" of the philosophers, whose service of God he identifies with arguing, reasoning and debating, and the superstitious religions and magical practices of the heathens.[51] He goes on to describe the "dead" nations which sought to be considered equal to and probably successors of the living Israel. They can achieve no more than an apparent resemblance to the worship of the Jews. Here it would seem that Hallevi is referring to both Christians and Moslems.

> They erected houses for God but no sign of Him was seen in them. They became hermits and ascetics so that prophecy might come upon them, but it did not appear. They then became wicked and disobedient and evil, but fire from heaven did not come down upon them, nor sudden pestilence in order to make clear to them that their punishment was from God. Their heart, that is, the house toward which they worshipped, was smitten for their iniquity, but their status did not change. Their status changed, rather, according to the greatness or smallness of their number, their strength and their weakness, their division and unity, following natural and accidental causes.[52]

Hallevi's point is that all such humanly devised systems, no matter how vivid the parallels between their religious forms

and those of Israel, do not have the power to bring prophecy and ultimately true salvation. One can never be genuinely certain, in this view, that these devices will regulate the body and the soul, much less the religious community itself, in the requisite manner. The experience of God comes only through fulfilling God's own declared will and with precision at that.

Just as speculative religious norms are ineffectual for Hallevi, it is significant that even the genuine mizwah-system commanded by God to Israel can be ineffectual in producing prophecy, if it is not observed with exacting care. The deletion of the smallest element would interfere with achieving the prophetic degree. Here Hallevi develops his organic imagery further in order to show that the parallel between the divine realm and the four natural realms remains in effect.

> ...The actions prescribed in the Torah, like natural formations, are entirely measured by the Creator and not by the power of flesh and blood. As you can see, natural formations are measured and arranged in their blended proportions of the four elements. A trifle renders them perfect and stable, and the appropriate animal or plant form is allotted to them. Every mixture receives the form that is proper to it, but through a trifle it may be spoiled. Have you not seen an egg which was spoiled by a slight accident of too much heat or cold or movement, and therefore, did not receive the form of a chicken which the warmth of the hen otherwise completes in three weeks? But the form is allotted according to its perfection. Who then can measure the actions on which the Divine Influence falls, but God alone? [53]

Clearly, the answer Hallevi would give to his question is "No man at all." For similar reasons, Hallevi discourages all attempts to make distinctions between the commandments, with

respect to which are more important and which less. All Pentateuchal legislation, including the laws pertaining to the sacrificial cult, must be in effect for the full renewal of prophecy as it had flourished during the days of the first Temple.[54] In the Torah, there are neither light nor heavy commandments. Similarly, all the ordinances of the rabbinic tradition are of absolutely equal and binding authority with the commandments of Scripture. Disobedience shown to the priest or judge is on a par with the greatest transgressions.[55]

The effect of continuous observance of the Law in all its specifications is the direct experience of the Shekhinah, which, for example, descended upon the Tabernacle immediately after its completion.[56] If a man is consistently pious and abides in places worthy of the Shekhinah, the forms associated with true prophecy come to him in reality. He sees them with his own eyes. This is the degree just below the highest level of prophecy and was shared by the most prominent of the Sages.[57] Moreover, true dreams are bestowed upon him, and he becomes fully aware that they are the direct consequence of the preceding actions and of God's special will.[58] Lastly, the commandments constitute the secret for Israel's miraculous preservation despite the most adverse circumstances.

There remains yet one more problem with respect to the prerequisites of prophecy. Hallevi describes two cases in which his theory of prerequisites is confronted by a serious challenge. The first problem is posed by Abraham who attained the prophetic degree, despite the fact that he had engaged in astrology and speculation for the better part of his life

outside Canaan. While Hallevi could have relied upon the traditional rabbinic explanation that Abraham had fulfilled all of the commandments even before they were explicitly given and received prophecy as a reward for this, he foregoes the opportunity. Rather, he stresses the fact that Abraham first engaged in meditation and speculation, and only after he realized that the universe was governed by one Being, did he encounter the Deity by revelation. He shares the widely-held view that the Sefer Yezirah was a product of Abraham's initial speculation. At that first revelation, according to Hallevi, "He uttered regarding him the words 'Before I formed thee in the belly, I knew thee.'" (Jer. 1:5) [59] It appears from this citation that Hallevi wishes to emphasize once more that prophecy is ultimately a gift of grace, a matter of Divine election. The free will of God, such as men are able to comprehend it, is the one sufficient cause of prophecy. All other conditions described by Hallevi are at best necessary conditions and in some circumstances not even that. For Divine predestination may suspend all other prerequisites, as it did for Abraham. This belief becomes an important element in certain of Hallevi's poems, as we will see below.

A similar challenge to the validity of Hallevi's pre-conditions for prophecy is offered by Rabbi Akiba. His case differs from Abraham's in that Akiba had fulfilled all of the requirements and achieved a degree so near prophecy that he held intercourse with the spiritual world. Hallevi says of him, "He was as worthy of the Shekhinah resting upon him as Moses but the time was not proper for this." [60] There is no

suggestion here that Akiba might somehow have been deficient either in merit or readiness for prophecy. This reference to him,it seems, is designed to counter Christian and Moslem claims that prophecy was forever taken away from the Jews and to show why prophecy has not reappeared among them since the early days of the Second Temple. There is no lack of merit or preparedness among certain Jews, according to Hallevi, and God too recognizes this. Only the times were unready. Yet the times had to be propitious because the reappearance of prophecy was to be one of the distinguishing characteristics of the messianic era. And this meant the beginning of an entirely new state of affairs. Hallevi also seems to indicate by this example that the special will of God can intervene to withhold prophecy when it is deserved, just as it can bestow prophecy when it is apparently not deserved in the strict sense which he defines. The nature of God's activity in both bestowing and withholding prophecy is treated more fully in Hallevi's account of the inyan ha-elohi, the Divine Influence, to which we now turn.

D. The Nature and Function of the Inyan ha-Elohi

The concept of an inyan ha-elohi, usually translated as"Divine Influence," is central to Hallevi's theory of prophecy. While it is generally understood to designate the ultimate source of prophecy, Hallevi's ambiguous use of the term has produced considerable scholarly disagreement over precisely what he meant by it. Ignaz Goldziher has argued that the inyan ha-elohi is a real being similar to the Logos of Philo and the early Christian thinkers.[61] Hirschfeld basically concurs with this view, adding only that the Logos related to the entire

universe while the inyan ha-elohi was restricted in its activity to the Israelites. "It is a kind of intermediary between God and those select persons of patriarchal and Israelitish ages who were worthy of receiving it, without being able to control its energy." [62]

A somewhat different perspective is taken by Heinemann. He does not understand Hallevi to grant the existence of an intermediary being separate from God. Rather, he claims the inyan ha-elohi is more closely related to the Stoic conception of the pneuma or spirit. He notes that each level of the chain of being has its own special power or inyan (amr in Arabic) which governs the members of that level. In the Stoic doctrine, the pneuma also is found on the successive stages of the chain. The various levels of plants, animals, and men differ only in the extent to which they have incorporated the pneuma. As the Stoics developed this concept, the pneuma was understood to animate the entire world as the principle of divinity operative in the universe. So conceived, the inyan ha-elohi (al-amr al-ilahiyy) binds together and governs all the degrees of life with pneumatic power. On the four lower levels of being, the inyan operates indirectly, through the forces of nature, while those who occupy the fifth level of the chain, experience the inyan's activity directly.[63] Epstein is in substantial agreement with Heinemann in this respect.[64]

Efros understands the inyan ha-elohi as another expression for the Divine nature or God as such, who takes the place of the Active Intellect postulated by the philosophers as the bestower of forms and the object of human striving.[65] This

is also the conclusion to which Wolfson comes in his exhaustive study of the concept. To Wolfson, "The amr ilahiyy of Hallevi... is nothing but the 'divine will', and it is used by him merely for the purpose of denying that prophecy is a straight natural process of knowledge and of introducing into it an element of election by the grace of God."[66]

Guttmann, however, accepts this only in part. The "divine word" or "the divine itself," as he sometimes calls it, is used variously by Hallevi as a power within man that enables him to commune with God and as "the divine essence, with which man comes into communion. It is this shift in meaning which has caused so much confusion."[67] To engage in a thorough analysis of the various meanings of the inyan ha-elohi is beyond the scope of the present study. For our purposes it will be sufficient to briefly summarize the major functions of the inyan as they appear in the Kuzari and to draw a conclusion with respect to its nature on the basis of this survey.[68]

The inyan ha-elohi is first of all a manifestation of God's power which sustains the universe. It directly bestows the appropriate forms, order, and design upon all things in the universe, from the microcosm represented by man to the macrocosm of the spheres. Whatever distinctions exist between objects in the universe, on account of their material bases, are united by a single wisdom present in all of them. "The wisdom in all three [the moon sphere or world of Intellect, the sun sphere governing the seasons, and the heart which regulates animal life] is one, and the Divine Influence is one, whereas the difference between them is only because of

the differences of their matter." [69] The Divine Influence unites all opposites and thus prevents the universe from breaking apart as it were.[70] In this respect, it is very much akin to the philosophic conception of nature, which is the power that strives for the preservation of the species.[71]

The activity of this all-wise and all-powerful Divine Influence goes on to determine the formation, measure, and productive capacity of the various created objects, thus leaving clear traces of divine acts (inyanim elohiyim) in the natural world. This becomes most explicit during the moment of prophecy itself, when every word that the prophet utters is direct and determined by the Divine Influence.[72] Because of this comprehensive power to bestow form and sustain what exists, Hallevi goes on to describe the Divine Influence as exercising dominion over something. "Thus, at the blessing 'With eternal love...', he will bring to mind the connection of the Divine Influence with the community that is prepared to receive it, as light is connected with a clean mirror, and the the Torah which came from Him is a principle of His will to show His rulership on the earth as it is in heaven." [73] The Divine Influence is further identified as a principle of wisdom, as we have already seen.[74] Hallevi likens it to the rational soul of man,[75] which he elsewhere claims resembles God.[76]

Another function of the Divine Influence is its role as the will, wish, or design of God. The exodus from Egypt is the direct result of the activity of God and His word.

> "When the Lord of the universe descended to Egypt..." [This verse] is to confirm the belief that the exodus from Egypt was accomplished by the deliberate will of God, not by accidents, nor by the assistance of human devices, spirits, stars, angels, nor demons, or anything that might occur to the intellect, but by the word of God alone. [77]

The Prime Will represented by the inyan is also understood by Hallevi to be evident in all of Israel's history. Here it has an essentially providential function. Both the extraordinary triumphs and disasters that have occurred in the history of Israel are the result of its immediate operation. The inyan ha-elohi follows Abraham and his posterity everywhere. It guides the pure-minded in a miraculous manner and even includes within its sphere some who are not worthy of its protection.[78] This providential aspect of the Divine Influence is especially manifest in God's love, pleasure, or goodwill. The inyan is responsible for shedding its light upon Abraham and his descendants, after bringing them to the Holy Land, "and it is called on account of this, 'Love'."[79] It is also the immediate cause of giving the Torah to Israel, which represents the supreme expression of God's love for his creatures.

This association between the Divine Influence and the Torah accounts for Hallevi's tendency to use the inyan as a synonym for God's commands. When he attempts to mitigate the gravity of the sin of the Golden Calf. Hallevi notes that "their sin consisted in the representation of God [with an idol] which was forbidden them, and in attributing a divine power to that which they made by their own hands and their own will, without the command of God."[80] In another context, the Khazar

king declares that "man does not apprehend the Divine Influence except by the command of God."[81] The Divine Influence rests upon the commandments of the Torah and particularly upon the ceremonial laws, such that the Divine Influence becomes identified with them.[82] It is in view of this identification that Hallevi describes those who aspire to the level of piety as observing "what he can of the divine commands (inyanim elohiyim) to be truthful when he says, 'I have not transgressed one of thy commands, nor forgotten' (Deut. 26:13)."[83]

In a variety of references, Hallevi also depicts the inyan ha-elohi as Divine light. This designation is significant because light is also one of the most characteristic features of God's immediate presence. It is light which the elders saw, when it is written, "They saw the God of Israel." (Exod. 24:10) It is also the Divine light which rested upon those, who were the kernel of mankind and the elite of God.[84] Whenever an individual or a community among them becomes pure, the Divine light rests upon it and guides it with miracles and extraordinary occurrances, quite outside the natural order of the universe..."[85] With specific reference to the apprehension of prophecy, we find the Khazar king acknowledging that whoever prays to see the Divine light during his lifetime, with his own eyes, and on the level of prophecy, has prayed for something that is even greater than the world to come. For the true object of his prayer is to see God, or at least His glory. The association between the prophet's experience of Adonai and the perception of light is thus a very intimate one for Hallevi.[86]

All of these citations indicate that the inyan ha-elohi is really identical with God Himself, or more specifically, with His activity in the world on behalf of Israel and the prophets. Hallevi, in fact, underscores this identification when he states in one famous passage, that "'the Holy One of Israel' is uttered as an expression for the Divine Influence..."[87] But there is one series of references, employing the term inyan ha-elohi which does not refer to God or his activities at all. Rather, Hallevi seems to have in mind that suprarational faculty of perception which he designates elsewhere as the "inner eye." Thus, in his description of Adam's unique capacities, the Jewish scholar points out that:

> He received the soul in its perfect state, the intellect at the maximum of human capacity, and the Divine faculty after the intellect, namely, the degree in which he would be in connection with The Divine and spiritual beings and know truths without instruction, but with slight thought...and thus, the Influence came to Noah, among those individuals who were the kernel, resembling Adam and called "the sons of God..." There were, perhaps, those who had no connection with the Divine Influence, like Terah, but Abraham, his son, was the disciple of Eber, his grandfather, and was born during Noah's own lifetime. Thus, the Divine Influence came into connection with them from grandfathers to grandsons.[88]

Hallevi goes on to describe the sons of Jacob as being distinguished from other human beings by inyanim me'yuhadim elohiyim, or special Divine properties, which make them like another species.[89] Only the unique perceptual structure or "inner eye" of the Jew makes him biologically distinct from other men, and it alone enables the Jew to see supernatural causes in natural occurrances.[90]

Thus, we may conclude from these examples that Hallevi does use the term inyan ha-elohi or its equivalents derived from the Arabic al amr al ilahiyy to refer to the "inner eye" as well as to God Himself. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of instances in which this term is used denote God manifest in the world by His various direct and indirect activities.

E. The Images and Imagery of Prophetic Experience

Hallevi does not offer a formal definition of prophecy for his readers. But in his descriptions of how the prophet receives prophecy and what he apprehends when receiving it, Hallevi furnishes the basic elements that would go into such a definition. As we have seen, the prophet's "inner eye", as a faculty of extended sense perception, can perceive the objects as they really are only in the natural world. In the supernatural world, it apprehends accidental qualities, but not the things in themselves. Hallevi thus limits what can be known of God. For despite his claim that the perceptions of the "inner eye" are sensations of real phenomena and not merely figments of the imagination, Hallevi readily acknowledges that this unique faculty cannot have unmediated knowledge of God, because God has no accidents. He is identical with His essence and therefore He is beyond even the capacities of the "inner eye" to see Him. God reveals Himself, rather, by means of certain words or images which are the miraculous creations of His special will and perceiveable only by the prophet's inner sense. It is precisely these phenomona which

convince the prophet of God's presence, for he can attribute their origin to no other source but Deity.[91] Moreover, during the moment of prophecy itself, the prophet becomes aware that his speech is entirely directed by the Divine Influence. He produces nothing of his own prophecy. This sense of helplessness, as it were, before the Divine Will and the feeling of being unable to speak or act on his own volition, while at the same time speaking and acting, is an additional source of the prophet's certainty that it is God who communicates with him.[92] All of these visual and auditory phenomena are understood to proceed directly from God to the prophet. They are not the product of either the Active Intellect or the separate intelligences of the Aristotelian cosmology. While Hallevi is prepared to grant the existence of these intelligences, he unequivocally denies that they have any active role in the production of prophecy, because their activity as entities apart from God would be tantamount to polytheism.[93]

What specifically does the prophet experience during the moment of revelation according to Hallevi? As a rule, the prophet sees a panoply of subtle spiritual forms, which may be either temporary or permanent creations of the Deity. With the exception of the writing (miktav) and voice (kol) specially created for the theophany at Sinai, these forms tend to be enduring fixtures of the fifth realm in the chain of being. All the prophets, as we have noted, testify to having seen them in their discrete revelatory experiences.[94] They include (1) the Holy Spirit (ruah ha-kodesh), (2)

the Ray of Divine Light or simply Divine Light (nizuz 'or elohi), (3) the Kingdom of God (malchut Adonai), (4) The messengership of God (shlichut Adonai), (5) the Presence of God (Shekhinah), and (6) the glory of God (Kabod Adonai) among others.[95]

The Holy Spirit, which is also called "Spirit of God" or just "Spirit", is identified in the rabbinic literature with prophecy itself. For Hallevi it represents, as it were, the material cause of prophecy. It is the subtle spiritual substance from which the special will of God forms the images which the prophet apprehends.

> ...the air and all bodies are acted upon by His will and formed by His command, just as the heaven and the earth were formed, and He is therefore described as 'writing the speaking.' Similarly, from the subtle spiritual substance that is called the 'Holy Spirit' the spiritual forms called 'the Glory of God' are formed.[96]

Hallevi goes on to explain that these spiritual forms emerge from the Holy Spirit and appear to the prophet by means of the Ray of Divine Light which is also a creation of God's will. This ray proceeds from God directly and acts upon the subtle spiritual matter in the same way that sun beams emerge from the sun and shine upon cloud formations, producing all the colors of the rainbow as a result. The spiritual forms which the prophet sees thus correspond to the different colors of the rainbow.[97] They are all supernatural products of God's will and are in no way identical with Him. The prophet never apprehends God as such, for He is as invisible as the sun of cloudy days.

The variety of the spiritual forms is matched by the variety of names which the prophets have ascribed to them in

Scripture---the "Pillar of Cloud" (Num. 12:5), "Consumming Fire" (Exod. 24:17), "Thick Cloud" (Exod. 19:9), "Deep Darkness" (Exod. 20:21), "Fire" (Deut. 5:19), "Pillar of Fire" (Exod. 13:22), "Paved Work of Sapphire" (Exod. 24:10), "Throne" (Isa. 6:1), and "Wheels" (Ezek. 1"16 ff.)[98] But beyond, these individual aspects of the propetic visions, lay the Messengership, the Kingdom, and the Glory of God which encompass all of them as a whole. The Messengership of God refers to the company of angels who act as the special messengers of God's will. The angels are distinguished from other beings associated with prophecy in that they are not fashioned out of the subtle spiritual substance, or Holy Spirit, but from "subtle elementary bodies" corresponding to the four elements. Some of them are transient beings while others are permanent. Hallevi even ventures to suggest that they might even be identical with the separate intelligences of whom the philosophers speak.[99] The kingdom of God and Shekhinah, on the other hand, represent a variety of phenomena denoting God's rulership in heaven and occasionally in nature.[100] The Glory is perhaps the most comprehensive term for the objects of prophetic insight. It is variously the equivalent of the subtle spiritual substance fashioned by God's will,[101] the Ray of Divine Light,[102] and all of the permanent supernatural beings, including the angels, throne, chariot, wheels, etc.[103] It is, in short, the entire range of objects created by God and associated with the fifth domain. This was the absolute fullness of vision which Moses saw. But even he was allowed to see only the "back parts," not the "face." Hallevi seems to mean by this

reference that only different aspects or degrees of the Glory could be tolerated by different levels of human beings. Beyond a certain point, the vision of the Glory could not be endured at all, lest it impair the physical constitution of the prophet.[104] From these observations it is possible to characterize Hallevi's conception of prophecy as follows: prophecy refers to sensuous spiritual substances, created miraculously by the special will of God, which proceed directly to the hidden eye of the prophets---and in the case of Sinai, to the external senses of all Israel---who apprehend either visual images or distinct words or both.

Given this account of what the prophet apprehends, it remains for us to clarify Hallevi's view on the relation between the content of the prophet's vision and the language used to express it. Hallevi asserts unequivocally that a prophet's speech, while enwrapped by the Holy Spirit, is determined entirely by the Divine Influence. His speech is free only when he is not receiving prophecy.[105] By these remarks, Hallevi is generally understood to distinguish between the communication received during the revelatory moment, which is from God alone, and the message the prophet may later bring to the people, which is freely developed and interpreted by the prophet in order to instruct the masses. In his public message, the prophet is assumed to speak to the people in accordance with their capacities, expanding the original message for clarity and stress but not altering its essential intent. He is expected to exercise the utmost care so as to preserve the sense of the original communication, which was too brief and compact to be comprehended by the masses.

Similarly, the different levels of perfection which individual prophets have attained, due to their various dispositions, also give rise to variations in style and emphasis in the prophet's message. But lest it be thought that the anthropomorphic imagery so evident in prophetic utterances is simply the creation of the prophet's imagination, Hallevi also says that "they see forms appropriate to their natures, and that which they are accustomed [to see] they describe according to the corporeal form that they see."[106] In other words, the prophet apprehends the objects of his vision as bodies, spiritual bodies, to be sure, but bodies nontheless. The relation of the "inner eye" to its supernatural objects is like the relation of the external senses of the body to the objects of ordinary sense experience. The data it receives are sensible and therefore perceived as being corporeal.

In what sense then,if any, is the prophet's imagery true? Does it correspond to reality? God, for example, is not really like the pictorial language used to describe Him, as Hallevi indicates in his theory of attributes. Hallevi responds to this question with a parable:

> Those attributes are true in relation to what is sought by the intellect and the imagination and sensation, but they are not true in relation to the thing itself sought by the intellect [alone], as we have brought out in the parable fo the king. For he who says that he is the tall, white figure who wears silk, with the crown on his head, and the like, does not lie. And he who says that he is none other than the intelligent, aware, person who commands and prohibits in such and such a land, at such and such a time, over such and such a people, does not lie either. So when the prophet sees the most perfect of forms with the "inner eye", which he sees in the figure of a king or judge, sitting upon a throne of judgment, involved with command and prohibition, appointing and deposing officials, he knows

> that it is a form appropriate to a king who is to be served and obeyed. And when he sees the figure bearing arms or carrying books, or girded to work, he knows that it is a form appropriate to an obedient servant... [107]

From the point of view of intellect alone, the anthropomorphic imagery of Scripture cannot be true, because it belies the incorporeal essence of God it purports to describe. But to the perceptual, imaginative, and intellectual capacities of the prophet, which far exceed those of the philosopher, such imagery is indeed true, if not of God's essence which is forever hidden, then of His revelatory activity on the fifth degree of the chain. In sum, Hallevi suggests that imagery should not be dismissed all too quickly by the philosopher, for he, too, relies upon the senses and the imagination. Without imagery, knowledge would not be possible. Indeed the philosopher could have no grasp of metaphysical problems at all were he to rely upon pure thought alone.[108] The imagery of prophetic address, therefore, is both true and valid in correspondence with the fuller reality available to the prophet, as far as Hallevi is concerned; it is questionable only against the more restricted reality available to the philosopher.

F. The Salvation of the Philosopher and of the Prophet

Hallevi recognizes but one way of attaining salvation, and this is by practicing the acts which are pleasing to and commanded by God. God-pleasing acts ultimately lead to the pleasure of God. And it is the aim of the Kuzari, as we have seen, to demonstrate that Judaism represents the one God-pleasing form of worship, because it alone was commanded

by the Deity. Judaism, as the true religion, thus becomes the one religion which affords genuine salvation to those who practice it. Implicit in the Kuzari, however, is Hallevi's recognition that the desire for salvation is universal. To draw near to God is the aim of all religious striving in his view. It characterizes dualists, believers in the eternity of the universe, spiritualists, hermits, and those who cast even their own children into sacrificial fires alike. But these religious and philosophic systems all present only the illusion of approach to God (hitkarbut el-ha-Elohim), and in this respect their errors seem worse to Hallevi than mere ignorance of the means to salvation.[109]

It is the philosophic conception of salvation, in particular, which Hallevi attacks. The saving act for the philosopher consists in the actualization of his intellect. This is accomplished by the progressive development of his mental capacities so that he comes to understand, as fully as possible, the operation of natural causation in both the sublunar and celestial spheres. His mastery of logic, mathematics, natural science, and metaphysics ultimately allows him to cease relying upon the external senses for knowledge and eventually to achieve union with the Active Intellect. The consummation of this act endows the hitherto passive intellect with an acquired, eternal intellect, thus saving the mind of the philosopher from ultimate death and dissolution. It is this experience which brings the philosophic mind into the soteriological state.

> His soul is at ease while he is alive because he has come into the company of Hermes, Asclepios,

> Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, for he, they, and everyone who rises to their degree, and the Active Intellect are one. This is what is figuratively or approximately designated as the 'Favor of God'...In sum, seek purity of heart in whatever way is feasible for you, after you understand the principles of the sciences according to their true nature. Then you will reach your goal, namely: union with the spiritual, that is, the Active Intellect. It is possible that it will endow you with prophecy and inform you of future events in true dreams and reliable visions.[110]

To be saved, the philosopher seeks no experience of God; indeed he would consider this both absurd and impossible. Rather he strives for complete understanding of the natural universe, of which God is the Prime Cause,and for ultimate union with the Active Intellect.

For the prophet, in contrast to the philosopher, the saving act consists in apprehending the subtle spiritual forms created by God during prophecy. This experience assures the prophet of God's active, immediate, and personal presence. The awareness of such a relationship allows the prophet, as it were, to commune with the Deity. By achieving this state, the prophet has passed beyond the limits of natural causation. Special providence guards him from harm. He is able to perform miracles. He need have no fear of death. Indeed, the prophet and the pious man are both closer to the life of the world to come than to the likes of ordinary mortals.[111] One achieves this estate as we have noted by virtue of Jewish birth and the perceptual endowments that attend it. His "inner eye" is cultivated by the climate of the Holy Land and commands of the Torah, thus enabling him to merit prophecy. But the ultimate determinant of whether

the saving act shall be consummated for him or not is the will of God. Once the prophet has been granted this experience of salvation, which is more akin to sweet taste and vision than to thought,[112] he is prepared to die before being separated from God.

CHAPTER IV.

Hallevi's Theory of Judaism

A. Judaism Is The True Religion

The theory of prophecy presented by the Jewish sage constitutes the foundation for his defense of Judaism. His aim, as we have seen, was to show that Judaism is the only true religion, by which he meant that it was identical with the structure of belief and worship commanded by God Himself. In order to support this contention, the sage undertook to prove, on the basis of the most conclusive evidence possible, that Deity had in fact revealed His will to men at a specific time and place. He believed that the evidence for this event was implicit in the Scriptural account of the revelation at Sinai, and he offered this record as the primary proof in his case for Judaism.

The Sinaitic revelation was witnessed by a minimum of six hundred thousand Israelites. Everyone of these individuals apprehended the miraculous communications of the "voice" and the "writing," thus removing any reasonable suspicion of deception or imaginative phantasy. For it was no single person or small group of individuals who claimed a unique and definitive prophetic experience and had occurred at Sinai, but an entire people. But since even the ordinary Israelites witnessed only part of the theophany, the seventy elders were summoned to act as their representatives and to verify by public testimony that the commandments received subsequently by Moses were also God-given. The public character of the revelation thus served to confirm the real occurrance of the event and to satisfy the Khazar king's

demand that it should have taken place before great multitudes.

Moreover, what the people, the elders, and Moses experienced at Sinai was conveyed to them by the external senses, as opposed to the internal senses. Everyone was fully awake when the Decalogue was revealed and heard distinct, intelligible words with their ears and saw the writing on the tablets clearly with their eyes. For Hallevi, revelation occurred while the people were in full control of their rational faculties. It was not a product of a collective imagination, collective dream, or collective trance. Both the occurrance and the content of the revelation, then, are empirical facts for Hallevi. In his estimation, philosophic speculation simply cannot undermine them.

The significance of the revelation, however, lay in the fact that it was God Himself who appeared at the mountain. The voice,heard by all, could not conceiveably have derived from any other source. The same held true for the created writing as far as Hallevi is concerned. God's direct intervention into the framework of natural causation by giving the Torah is,therefore, the decisive proof that specific actions are God-pleasing, that He communicated to men what these actions are, and that this communication is comprised in the Torah. The direct and extraordinary character of the revelation, in addition to the numerous miracles which both preceded and followed the event, left no doubt among the people nor in the mind of the Khazar king that "This is truly the Divine Influence [at work] and that which depends upon it in respect of the commandments is proper to accept. For no

doubt enters the mind on its account, neither that it resulted from sorcery, nor from a device, nor from the imagination."[1] All of these events occurred, as the sage points out, after the people were first told that they would happen. This was to underscore the belief that the miracles and the theophany were ordained by God's will and were not the result of either "nature, the influence of the stars, or chance."[2]

What all Israel apprehended at Sinai was subsequently confirmed in the dreams and visions of the prophets. With varying degrees of comprehensiveness, they were able to penetrate directly to the supernatural realm itself. There, the "inner eye" saw various images and extraordinary phenomena which were in basic harmony with other prophetic visions as to both content and form. The fact that each of the prophets, in their discrete religious experiences, viewed essentially the same manifestations of God's special will establishes once again for Hallevi that what they saw was really apparent and that their apprehension only bears out the evidence of Sinai. Also the veracity of their reports receives additional support from the belief that the prophets were not simply ordinary men, but the pick of both mankind and Israel. The testimony of such irreproachable individuals was thus believed to be beyond doubt.

The primary evidence of Sinai and the supporting testimony of the prophets, however, do not in themselves establish that the law and tradition possessed by the Jews is identical with what God had communicated. After the cessation of prophecy, it was argued, the written text of the Pentateuch could have

been altered. Moreover, new elements could have been introduced into Jewish belief and practice which were thoroughly human in origin. The Moslems and Karaites both leveled such accusations against the Jews, charging them with inaccurate transmission of the verbal and written elements of the revelation, if not outright falsification. To counter claims of this sort, Hallevi has the Jewish sage observe more than once that the tradition itself is on a par with the public and empirical character of the revelation.[3] It constitutes secondary evidence that what occurred at Sinai was truthfully and correctly reported, because it contains the oral record of an unbroken line of unimpeachable witnesses, extending from Sinai to the present day. This tradition contains creedal elements, legal procedures, and matters of history and chronology, but regardless of its size and complexity, Hallevi deems it to be absolutely faithful to fact. As it applies to the text of Scripture, Hallevi's central argument for the veracity of the tradition consists in the absolute agreement among the Jews as to the contents of the books and even the correct spelling, vocalization and accentuation of the unmarked source. Given the complexity of the material, Hallevi considers the absence of scholarly debate on these matters to be conclusive evidence for accuracy of the tradition.

> It is without doubt that it [the Book] was preserved by heart, with every patah and kamaz, division and inflection, shewa and accent-in the mind of the priests, because of their need of them for the Temple service and to instruct the children of Israel, and in the mind the kings, because they were commanded, 'And it shall be with him and he shall read them all the days of his life.' (Deut. 17:19), in the mind of the judges because of their need of them for verdicts, and in the mind of the

> hypocrites, in order to achieve distinction through them. The seven vowels and accents were appointed as signs for those characteristics which were regarded as the tradition of Moses...for an order is evident from the fixing of the vocalization and accents which could only have been assisted by [Divine] Wisdom. It is not possible that it would be accepted by the multitude unless it were a favored majority or a favored individual. Nor is it possible that the multitude would accept it from an individual unless he were a prophet or assisted by the Divine Influence. For a scholar who is not assisted [in this way] can be challenged by one near to him in his wisdom... [4]

Hallevi's argument for the veracity of the oral tradition itself, as we have seen, derives from his claim that the tradition is unbroken, that it is transmitted by the most trustworthy of the Israelites, the prophets, and that they and the sages after them constitute a multitude who are able to verify the tradition completely and in public. Thus, for Hallevi, the testimony of Sinai, of the prophets, and of the uninterrupted tradition indicates that Judaism is the only religion which both claims to be revealed and has impeccable empirical credentials to prove it.

Hallevi gives further support to his defense of Judaism as the true religion, by using the speeches of both the Christian and Moslem scholars to underscore, albeit indirectly, the veracity of the Jewish Scriptures. Both of these scholars share the philosopher's basic aim of showing their opinions to be universally true. Like the philosopher, each one begins with general statements regarding the nature of God. Both speeches stand in direct contrast to the introductory speech of the Jewish scholar who refers to the Jews' particular experience with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and

Jacob rather than with the Creator or Prime Cause. But these two religions cannot really substantiate their claims to universal truth vis a vis the teachings of philosophy, in Hallevi's opinion, firstly, because the doctrines they affirm lack intellectual certainty, and secondly, because these beliefs also lack empirical certainty.

The Khazar king responds to the presentation of the Christian scholastic by noting that logic rejects most of what he says as being absurd.[5] As for the Moslem view, the Khazar is unable to grant that God has intercourse with men on the basis of the scholar's argument alone. Similarly, the empirical basis for both Christian and Moslem claims is weak and unconvincing in the king's estimation. In each religion, only a few individuals are offered as witnesses of the miraculous events associated with the founders or their disciples. The possible effects of imagination and fantasy are not completely ruled out with respect to their views nor do they produce incontrovertible evidence of God's direct self-disclosure. Consequently, the evidence for their claims pales before the public, empirical, direct, and miraculous evidence for revelation implicit in the Jewish scholar's presentation. Unable to authenticate their own claims to religious truth against the arguments of philosophy, or to produce empirical arguments as incontestable as those of Judaism, both the Christian and the Moslem scholars fall back upon the veracity of the Jewish Scriptures, which were presumed to be above suspicion of imagination and deceit, to bolster their positions. It is largely this ultimate reliance upon Judaism that induces the Khazar king, who is prejudiced against the Jews in the first place, to consider

the presentation of the Jewish sage.

The irony which attends this development at the outset of the Kuzari is great indeed. For it is the Moslem and the Christian, the chief religious detractors of the Jews, who are responsible for giving the Jewish religion a serious hearing. Furthermore, Hallevi suggests that those who are most vehement in their denunciation of Judaism as a false religion, or at best a superceded one, can only justify themselves by recourse to the primary argument for Judaism's truth---God's genuine revelation to the Jews. Lastly, during a period torn by religious strife, the only item on which both the Christian and Moslem can agree is apparently the basic authenticity of the Jewish Scripture. Together, they offer, as it were, an argument from assent for the truth of Judaism, despite the fact that they have no intention of doing so, Judaism, for Hallevi, has the only revelation which other contending religious systems recognized as being valid.[6]

The last type of argument Hallevi adduces on behalf of Judaism is that of God's special providence with respect to Israel. In essence, it is suggested that the historical experiences of the Jews, recorded in Scripture and in later sources, are so extraordinary in every respect as to be inexplicable in terms of natural causation alone. Whether the circumstance is one of deliverance, such as the exodus from Egypt, or defeat, such as the two destructions of Jerusalem and the exile of the Jews, Hallevi finds the Divine Influence at work. It is apparently the very extremes of exaltation and suffering evident in Jewish history which lead him to this unusual position. Thus,

Hallevi argues that the sin of the Golden Calf, precisely because of its gravity, testified to Israel's unique relationship to God. "It is a sin which was magnified against them [in proportion to] their greatness. Great is the one whose sins are counted."[7] Similarly, he notes that while the "dead nations" sought to imitate the Jews in their religious practices, they were not rewarded with prophecy for their virtues, nor punished with fire from heaven or sudden plagues for their vices. Whatever fate befell these various peoples was the result of nothing more than social, political, and economic factors. The fate of the Jews, however, whether for good or ill, had another source, Prophecy and miraculous deliverances came from God only. Likewise, the destruction of the Temple and the dispersion was His punishment for their sins. The Khazar king himself suggests that, "It is so, because one cannot imagine that any nation will happen upon an exile like this..."[8]

Israel as opposed to other peoples apparently merits this special providence, because it is like the heart in relation to the rest of the body. It is at one and the same time the most vital and vulnerable of peoples, just as the heart is the most vital and vulnerable of organs. The heart is affected by many external facts which are beyond the sensibilities of the other bodily organs. By the same token, it is within the power of the heart to initiate the processes of healing more readily and effectively than the rest of the body, in Hallevi's analysis.

> And because the heart has attained its fineness of sensibility on account of the purity of its blood and its great capacity, it feels the smallest thing that contacts it and expels it as long as the capacity to expel remains within it. Another organ does not feel with its sensitivity, so that the humour is retained within it until diseases are produced from it... Thus its [the heart's] sensitivity and feeling bring many diseases upon it, but they [its sensitivity and feeling] are the reason for their expulsion at the beginning of their contact, before they have become settled. [9]

Israel's vulnerability is therefore likened to the heart's sensitivity. If Judaism is not a powerful religion struggling for the Holy Land, this is ultimately to Israel's credit, for the Jews practice the virtue of accepting God's will which Chrisitians themselves extol. If Israel sinned in fashioning a Golden Calf, it was only by fashioning an image that the people were not commanded to make. Their "real" motive remained the worship of God, who brought them out of Egypt. From these and other examples, we find that Hallevi, paradoxically, marshals the very circumstances which make Judaism the most despised of religions in order to show that Judaism is, on the contrary, Divinely favored.

The Khazar king, persuaded by the Jewish scholar's account of the Sinaitic revelation and Israel's distinctive relationship to God, thus declares his readiness to convert to Judaism. He relates the scholar's successful argument to the criteria for religious truth he had formulated during his dream. "You have assisted my purpose with respect to what had occurred to me and what I saw in my dream---that man comes to the Divine Influence only through the command of God, namely, the deeds that God commands." [10] This, for him, is

the foundation of Judaism. It alone possesses God's commandments. It is, therefore, the only religion which can be God-pleasing.

B. The Nature and Destiny of Israel

Israel's historical distinctiveness in relation to other religious communities derives largely from its biological distinctiveness. The Jews, as we have seen, are all endowed with the religious faculty which makes them alone capable of receiving prophecy. This "inner eye", inhering in the external senses, differentiates the Jews from other human beings with respect to the make-up of their perceptual apparatus. In all other respects, however, the Jew is quite like other men. Once this unique religious faculty has been properly developed by the regimen of the commandments and the superior climate of Palestine, the individual who exercises it and aspires to penetrate the supernatural realm may comprehend the truth by prophetic intuition. It is by virtue of this inherent capacity that Israel represents a direct continuation of the line of Adam.

Adam, it will be recalled, was the first to experience God as Adonai, and the uniqueness of the Jews consists in their ability to share this experience. Adam's existence in Eden was the prototype of the soteriological state, which later became associated with the various levels of prophecy. We find too that the Divine Influence, which was always with Adam, is always with Israel. Just as Adam was called "God's son" because of his perceptual and intellectual powers, all

who are like him in these respects share this same description.[11] Thus, Scripture explicitly states that the Israelites are "sons" to Adonai their God. (Deut. 14:1) Both Adam and Israel, along with certain of its forebears, occupy the fifth or angelic realm of the chain of being.[12] Because of this, Adam was said to be the "kernel of mankind" during his lifetime, and as the kernel, he became the direct recipient of the Divine light. Similarly, for Hallevi the descendants of Jacob, by virtue of their Divine qualities, are the elite kernel of mankind in relation to all other peoples, who represent the shells of the human species.[13] He goes on to say that all of the sons of Jacob aspired to the prophetic degree, which some successfully reached, while the others reached the lower degree through pious acts.[14] Lastly, it should be noted that the actualization of Adam's prophetic capacity is closely associated with the Holy Land and its salutary climate, because that is where Hallevi believes the earthly Eden was situated.[15] For the Jews too, as we have indicated, the gift of prophecy and true dreams, is possible only within the land of Israel or in its immediate vicinity.

What is missing, however, from this parallel relation between Adam and Israel is the Torah and its commandments. Adam has no Torah, nor does he need it, while Israel becomes a unique people precisely because they have the Torah. The explanation for the Torah's central role in the life of Israel appears to lie in the occurrance of the Fall, which decisively separates the experience of Adam from that of Israel. The Fall destroys man's intimate and saving relationship

to Adonai, and it is apparently in response to this event that the commandments were revealed by God. For in effect, the Torah restores the chance to experience Eden. It promises a renewed relationship with God. It presents man with another opportunity to know "God's pleasure" or "favor" by offering him a complete system of God-pleasing actions. Fulfillment of the commandments thus enables man to reach the highest degree of salvation possible after the Fall, namely, prophecy. Before the commandments were revealed, the Jews could only rely upon philosophy, natural science, and astrology to bring them knowledge of the truth and saving experiences.[16] Abraham's early pre-occupations are a case in point. But these devices, in Hallevi's view, were ultimately ineffectual by their very nature, since only God Himself could provide the appropriate vehicle to achieve these ends. This He did at Sinai. And once the Torah was revealed, a decisive new stage was inaugurated in God's scheme of salvation for man, with Israel playing a central part. For the Torah was only the initial manifestation of God's desire to display His heavenly kingdom upon earth.

What is Israel's part in this universal scheme? The Jewish scholar suggests at one point in the dialogue that the various levels of the chain of being emerged because each level constituted the essence or elite of the preceding level. Put differently, as members of the lower strata preserved themselves and ultimately produced the most perfect instances of their own kind, they allowed for the members of a higher level of existence to emerge. "...You know that the

elements were brought into being so that the minerals might arise from them, and then plant, and then animals, and then man, and then the elite of mankind. Everything came into being for the sake of that elite in order that the Divine Influence might be in connection with it. But that elite came into being for the sake of the elite of the elite, namely, the prophets and the pious."[17] Clearly, the goal of this evolution is to establish a bond with the Divine Influence, for intimate connection with the Divine Influence is the situation out of which salvation emerges. Israel represents the elite kernel of mankind,and its entire raison d'etre is to produce individuals who are able to establish this saving relationship to the fullest extent possible. All other beings contribute to this end, if only indirectly. Whenever the Jews act contrary to this purpose, by imitating the Gentile or by preferring the comforts of their dispersion to the Holy Land, for example, they are exposed to various ills and misfortunes to purge them of their rebelliousness and return them to the proper course.[18]

Nevertheless, for Hallevi, the success of a chosen few in establishing this saving relationship to God represents only a partial fulfillment of Israel's reason for existence. This alone has only the narrowest significance for the rest of mankind. But the complete fulfillment of Israel's task has genuinely universal implications, for that task requires Israel to serve as the principal agent in bringing about the messianic age. Israel in the diaspora is to act upon the peoples of the world in such a way as to make all of them

worthy of the Divine Influence, thus, restoring the entire human species to the state of salvation which it lost at the Fall. In this respect the aim of the "evolution" we have just outlined is reversed. The elite of the elite exists for the purpose of bringing salvation to all other men.

Hallevi expresses this thought by developing his analogy between Israel and the kernel.

> ...God has a secret and wise design regarding us, like the wise design in the ("grain of") seed which falls into the ground. It changes and is transformed in appearance to earth, water, and manure, leaving no perceptible impression of something similar to it for one who looks at it. However, it is the seed which changes the earth and water to its own disposition and transports them, one degree after another, until it refines the elements and brings them to its own likeness. It casts off its shells, its leaves, and all else until the kernel becomes pure and fit for the Divine Influence to fall upon it. The form of the original seed produces the tree whose fruit is like the fruit from which its seed came. It is likewise with the Torah of Moses---whoever comes after it will be changed with respect to it in his true essence, but if it is by appearance, he rejects it. These nations constitute a preparation and an introduction for the expected Messiah who is the fruit. And they will all become his fruit when they acknowledge him, and the tree will become one. Then they will revere and esteem the root which they used to despise, as we have said, 'Behold, my servant shall prosper.' (Isa. 52:13)[19]

Israel in exile must experience apparent decay and dissolution, like the seed, in order to have its effect upon the elements that surround it. But while it appears to be only the repulsive and decayed remains of its former self, it is not dead at all. It is alive within, and once it exists in the soil of the dispersion it acts upon the other peoples and religious communities in which it is situated. By succeeding stages,

they are transformed, progressively leaving behind their elementary, non-living religious forms and becoming more and more like Israel and its living Torah. Thus, while Christianity and Islam are far from identical with the religion of Israel, they resemble it in essence much more closely than earlier pagan religions, as we have seen. As such they can properly be understood to prepare they way of the Messiah. The Divine Influence exercises providence over the seedling of Israel, allowing it to grow into the form of a fully developed fruit tree. When the tree itself is ready to produce its fruit, Israel and the other peoples of the world will at last be united. Their union will be consummated by the Gentiles acknowledging the true Messiah, after which Israel will no longer be despised. Its hidden design in the scheme of history will have borne fruit and its role will have been recognized. But most important of all, the Divine Influence, once connected only with Israel, will have come into contact with all of the previously external elements now incorporated within the tree. The saving relationship with God will then have been made available to all.

CHAPTER V
Prophetic Themes in Hallevi's Religious Poetry

A. Philosophy as Metrics vs. Prophecy as Poetic Insight

> It is possible that the wisdom of the mutakallimun may do him [the naturally pious individual] much more harm than true beliefs, through what is conveyed to him of doubts and inherited opinions, as we see in respect of those who study the meters of poetry and minuetly scrutinize their rhymes. We hear from them a clamor and hasty words regarding an art which is simple for a naturally gifted person, who senses the rhyme of poetry and never passes over a word. The aim of those individuals is that they should be like the one who appears ignorant of metre, for he cannot teach it to them, nor can they teach him. It is nevertheless true that the naturally gifted person is able to teach a naturally gifted person like him with only a slight hint. Similarly, in the souls of the people who are naturally gifted with respect to the Torah and drawing near to God, sparks are kindled by the words of the pious, and these become lights within their hearts, while one who is not naturally gifted has need for the wisdom of the mutakallimun. It is possible that it will not benefit him and even that it will injure him.[1]

The analogy which Hallevi draws in this passage between the philosopher of religion and the metric expert, on the one hand, and the naturally pious individual and the poet, on the other, is the basis for our inquiry into Hallevi's religious poetry. The comparison suggests, first of all, that Hallevi saw a significant parallel between religious experience and poetic inspiration. More specifically, this means that the prophet, as the highest example of natural piety, had a way of knowing and a mode of expression more akin to poetic insight and imagery than to philosophical analysis and argument. Both the poet and prophet, in this view, are inspired. What they know, they know by means of intuition rather than argument. Both the poet and the prophet can easily communicate with those who share their unusual ability, but find great, if not

insurmountable, difficulties in communicating what they know to the metric expert and the philosopher, who lack their natural ability.[2] Moreover, the inspiration which comes to poets and prophets is a gift. It cannot be acquired by the study of metrics and rhyme in the one case or philosophy in the other. It is either in their nature to be prophets and poets or it is not.

Secondly, Hallevi's analogy reaffirms his basic contention that prophetic intuition is superior to philosophic analysis and imitation of religious experience. But this view is now extended to include poetic insight vis a vis the techniques and mechanics of writing poetry. It is an intuitive gift to which both the philosopher and the metric expert aspire in their separate ways, even though, for Hallevi, it is hardly possible for them to achieve it. They simply lack the requisite inner vision. Furthermore, metric experts and philosophers have nothing to teach the poet and prophet which the latter do not already know. Elaborate poetic theories and philosophic systems are superfluous to the naturally gifted. It is presumably for this reason that Hallevi so sharply dismisses their expert theories as "sounds" and "hasty words." Such a response, especially with respect to poetry, probably follows from Hallevi's general distaste for Arabic metres and rhymes schemes during the closing years of his life.[3] This distaste grew despite the fact that he was a consummate master of these techniques, as is evident in his secular poetry. It appears that Hallevi saw philosophers of religion and probably philosophers in general as essentially technicians rather than gifted thinkers. They merely described the contents of their

limited perception of the truth and organized their observations into a systemmatic and demonstrable form. By contrast, prophets and poets were artists. They had a more penetrating, more comprehensive vision of the truth than the technicians even if it was less demonstrable. Consequently, they could arouse themselves and others. Their vision integrated all functions of the soul, and not just the intellect.

Thirdly, the analogy may also suggest the relative importance Hallevi attached to his own poetic enterprises vis a vis his philosophic activity. As we have seen, Hallevi's efforts as a religious philosopher were designed, to "refute the Epicurean" and to bring those skeptical of Judaism's claims to a state of natural piety. In other words, he aimed at conversion. Thus, the arguments of the Kuzari were but a means to an end: the clear recognition of the truth of Judaism and the salvation which such a recognition would bring. But the naturally pious man and the born religious poet required no such means, because the desired end was already theirs. They had the necessary gift to achieve salvation.

It is in Hallevi's religious poetry, rather than in the Kuzari, that we find expresions of his natural piety. In fact, both his quest for and achievement of saving states of awareness receive their clearest formulation in his devotional poems. Although he takes up many of the same themes regarding prophecy and religious experience found in the Kuzari, the perspective in his poetry is often one of immediate involvement. It is in this liturgical medium that Hallevi's dual identity as consummate poet and homo religiosus merge. This union of

poetic inspiration and the soteriological state, it would seem, constituted the natural gift he valued so highly.

Our consideration of Hallevi's religious poetry will allow us to see how he treats the Sinaitic revelation and the miraculous occurences of Israel's history in relation to his conviction about the truth of Judaism. First, we will attempt to determine whether these events play a similar role in his poetry as they do in the Kuzari. Second, Hallevi's treatment of Mosaic prophecy will be of particular interest. Does Moses' revelatory experience stand out in the poetry as a unique phenomenon or is it essentially similar to the prophecy of the Israelites? Third, we will examine the religious significance of the land of Israel and its relation to prophecy in Hallevi's poetry. Fourth, we will devote special attention to the manner in which the poet and prophet receive inspiration and what constitutes the saving act in Hallevi's religious poetry. Fifth, we will demonstrate how Hallevi relates to the ultimately unknowable God of his theory of negative attributes and discuss the significance of his theological imagery. Lastly, our inquiry will address itself to the character of Hallevi's messianic hopes and their possible implications for his own migration to the Holy Land.

Any attempt to characterize Hallevi's personal beliefs on the basis of his poetry alone involves significant difficulties. First of all, many of these poems were written for use in the synagogue liturgy and therefore express common religious beliefs. They are meant to articulate a public religious point of view and not merely a private one. To derive a man's private views

from such poems alone would be an exercise in eisegesis, not exegesis. Yet, we do find other poems of a distinctly private and personal character, which shed light on Hallevi's individual beliefs. Also, most of Hallevi's religious poems are undated. It is consequently very difficult to say for certain what stage of Hallevi's development they may represent, unless we have explicit evidence for doing so.

With these considerations in mind, our aim will be to base our conclusions about Hallevi's personal beliefs and aspirations upon two factors: the degree of frequency and consistency which may characterize the appearance of a given theme in his poems, and, second, the correspondence of such motifs with explicit statements in the Kuzari. The first criterion would indicate the degree of importance Hallevi attached to these themes, the second would indicate that these themes are supported in what is recognized as a major statement of his considered opinions.

B. Sinai As Witness and Promise

> My love, have You forgotten how You lay between my breasts?
> Why have You sold me forever to those who enslave me?
> Did I not follow You then through an unsown land?
> Seir and Mount Paran, Sinai and Sin are my witnesses.
> My love was Yours and Your favor was in me,
> How then have You divided my glory among those who are not mine?
> Expelled toward Seir, thrust back toward Kedar,
> Tried in the furnace of Greece, afflicted by the yoke of the Medea,
> Is there a redeemer other than You, or a prisoner of hope other than me?
> O give Your strength to me, for I give to You my love. [4]

Identifying with Israel as a whole, the poet addresses God, the Lover of Israel, and recalls the intimacy that once

characterized their relationship. Especially during the wilderness wandering between the Exodus from Egypt and Israel's entry into the Holy Land, Israel was assured of God's saving presence by a sequence of visible tokens---God's direct self-disclosures at Sinai (Exod. 19, 20 ff.), the Wilderness of Sin (Exod. 16:1 ff.), Seir and Paran (Deut. 33:2). The allusion to God's having rested upon the breasts of Israel (Song of Songs 1:13) may specifically refer to those occasions when God spoke to Moses from between the two cherubim or the two staves of the ark (Exod. 25:22).[5] All of these instances taken together express Hallevi's conviction that God revealed His will to the people, directly or through Moses. And because the Israelites had no doubts whatever regarding what they saw and heard directly or what they were told by the testimony of Moses, they were faithful to God. They followed Him willingly and devotedly in the unsown land (Jer. 2:2).

But just as Israel is a witness to these expressions of God's love, Hallevi calls upon Seir, Sinai, Paran,and Sin to attest to Israel's faithfulness---a daring act in view of the frequent Scriptural references to the people's unfaithfulness. For Hallevi implicitly accuses God of unfaithfulness to Israel by not having fulfilled the promises made to her at Sinai, and he therefore summons Him to carry out His word. The promised redemption has not come and Israel remains in exile from its promised land. The four kingdoms of Daniel's vision (Dan. 7:3 ff.), Seir (the Christians), Kedar (the Moslems), Greece, and Medea (the Persians) have all punished Israel, but there is no apparent end to the

peoples sufferings. Thus, the direct evidence for both Jewish beliefs and hopes with regard to God's love and providence, seem to be controverted by the reality of the people's suffering. The religion of the Jews is mocked and Israel is a despised people fleeing to Christian domains, yet frequently pushed back again into Moslem territory. Still, in this poem Hallevi does not suggest, as he does in the Kuzari,[6] that the miseries of the dispersion,by their extraordinary harshness, are indirect expressions of Divine providence. His aim is not to explain or justify, but to speak to God for Israel, and this, significantly enough, is one of the central functions of the Prophets in Scripture. Thus, the poet chooses to remind God of His redemptive role---and responsibility---and to acknowledge that he is a prisoner of hope (Zech. 9:12). For the interim, his only merit is his love for God, his only request, strength to endure.

Despite the tribulations of the Jews, and the aspersions cast upon the truth of Judaism, the poet remains faithful to his religion and convinced of its truth because of the nature of its origin. Almost in direct parallel to the evidence he adduces in the Kuzari on behalf of the theophany at Sinai, Hallevi also recalls in several of his poems that the revelation is certain because it was public, empirical, direct and miraculous.

> He is found to be unique by all who seek Him,
> Revealed at Sinai with multitudes before Him...
> O mountain of myrrh and hill of spice,
> This mountain of God, called Sinai---
> The messenger speaks that which is right,
> The king of Jeshurun and all my multitude.
> Happy is the people to whom He has turned,
> Who have seen the Glory of the Lord...[7]

Particular attention is given in these verses to the public character of the event. It is before a multitude (hamon) that the Unique One, Adonai, is revealed, and this fact is repeated in the short passage we have cited. Moreover, what this multitude of Israelites experienced was the visual apprehension of God's glory. They saw the unique token of His direct and miraculous activity within the natural sphere. Hallevi develops this traditional visual imagery elsewhere, when he refers to the "fiery law which they received by the word of Your glory." (Deut. 33:2)[8] The auditory character of the revelation receives Hallevi's attention as well. A special voice (kol) was created for the occasion, as we have seen, and it served as the medium for intelligible speech, and not merely indistinct sounds.[9] The people heard the Ten Commandments.

> The day the voice of roaring came before the treasure (Israel)
> Moses ascended the mountain of God,
> The multitude of people made ready to be pure.
> Surrounding with a square the mountain of God
> From the midst of the flames He bequeathed to the beloved
> Two tablets written with the finger of God.
> The banners of the mistress (Shekhinah) were perfumed with myrrh,
> When they heard the Ten Commandments of God.[10]

While Hallevi employs the familiar imagery of Scripture and midrash to describe the revelation in these verses, his emphasis upon the sensuous character of Israel's apprehension represents a direct parallel to the evidence he requires for verifying the event in the Kuzari.[11] Also, by noting that Israel is the segulah, God's treasure or elite people, Hallevi seems to suggest that their purification represented the pre-Torah moral and ritual preparation necessary for the Israelites to experience prophecy. The absolute certainty of what the

six-hundred thousand saw and heard, thus becomes the chief mainstay for the entire structure of Jewish belief and aspiration.

In several of his poems, Hallevi explicitly uses the memory of Sinai to bolster the people's faith and self-confidence, as is also the case in the Kuzari. In an ahavah poem, for example, celebrating God's eternal love for Israel as embodied in the Torah, the poet imagines God addressing His people.

> O graceful gazelle, your voice is pleasant.
> As you meditate upon the statutes of Horeb,
> I pray you, faithful daughter, bring to mind
> The revelation of Mount Sinai... [12]

Thus, the revelation at Sinai and the prophecy of Moses became not only tokens of past greatness but of future hope.

The role of Moses in Hallevi's poetry as the intermediary between God and the Israelites is prominent (Ex. 20:16, Dt. 5:5). In the passages we have already examined he ascends and descends the mountain. He brings the fiery law to the people and with it all the blessings and curses that were to govern the life of Israel. He performs miracles because he knows God by name, as Adonai. But little is said about the nature of his prophecy. While Hallevi once calls him the mivhar enosh or choicest of men, [13] he does not suggest any particular reasons, other than those provided by Scripture, for this distinction. Thus, Hallevi's poetic treatment of Moses and that of the Kuzari, are essentially similar. Moses' prophecy is not separated in kind from that of other Israelites. His apprehension of God was more com-

prehensive and continuous than theirs, but not essentially different. Typical of Hallevi's treatment of Moses are the following verses.

> When the man of God descended, a hero was established on high.
> And he brought down the blessings of heaven from on high
> When the faithful hero descended into the house of his Lord. (Num. 12:8)
> He brought down the fitly spoken word. (Prov. 25:11)
> And when He that bestowed them descended to the lovers of His secret--
> He brought it down, with all the goodness of his Lord in His hand.
> When the light of Jeshurun descended, the lawgiver among their assembly,
> He brought down with him the promise of life to eternity...
> For the Almighty spoke with a voice like yours, love not that which is vain.
> My Torah---Do not forsake. (Prov. 4:2)[13]

It is clear, then, that the significance of Sinai for Hallevi the poet is much the same as it is for Hallevi the religious philosopher. It constitutes the primary evidence for his belief that Judaism is the only religion which leads to salvation. The various categories of evidence for the revelation which make their appearance in the Kuzari are likewise evident in his liturgical poetry. We also find his familiar stress upon the reliability of tradition, and it appears that at least one of Hallevi's purposes in alluding to this evidence is to strengthen the religious convictions and hopes of his fellow Jews.

Compared with the Kuzari, however, Hallevi's poetry displays a considerably greater sensitivity to the charge that Judaism was a despised religion. It seems that his painful awareness of the miserable situation of the Jews even led him to contemplate the possibility that the account of Israel's deliverance from Egypt, the evidence for revelation, and the possession of a

presumably unimpeachable tradition, might not in the last analysis have been true. In his view, Israel's fate in the diaspora clashes with the messianic promises of the Jewish religion. Thus, it would seem that Hallevi the poet was much more troubled by the problem of Israel's sufferings than the arguments of the Jewish sage in the Kuzari might lead us to believe. He apparently understood that Israel's experience could lead one to skepticism as well as to the traditional belief structure.

> The faithful recall today the wonders of olden times.
> The children groan, for they are subjected to lords other than You.
> Where is God's covenant to the fathers, where His former mercies?
> When He spoke from His heavenly dwelling, unto us, face to face--
> When He gave to the hand of the faithful envoy the two tablets of stone.
> Where are all His marvels of which our fathers have told us?
>
> How long have we drunken our fill of bitterness, and hoped for Your salvation?
> How many seasons were we sick with longing, but entreated none but You?
> And watched for the light of morning, but were covered with thick darkness?
> As though we were not a people, nor more wonderful than any people,
> As though we had not seen the day of Sinai, nor had drunk the waters of the rock,
> And Your manna had not been in our mouth, and Your cloud not round about...
>
> We stand upon our watch to keep our righteous judgments
> And even if our splendor is ruined and we be thrust from Your bosom
> And a handmaid [the Arabs] be our mistress, and those far from You rule over us.
> Yet we hold fast to our crown, the diadem of Your statutes
> Until You gather our company into the house of Your choice and desire
> Our holy place, our glory, where our fathers praised You.[14]

In effect, Hallevi suggests that the miraculous deliverence and revelations of the past must be repeated if they are to be genuinely believed by all Israel.

C. Zion as the Gate of Heaven and Threshold of Prophecy

...If the peace of Jerusalem is not to be sought,
While yet with the blind and lame she is filled--
For the sake of the House of the Lord our God let us seek
Her peace, or for the sake of friends and of brothers;
And if it be according to your words, see, there is sin
Upon all those who bend towards her and bow down,
And sin upon the sires who dwelt in her as strangers
And purchased their vaults for their dead,
And vain would be the deeds of the fathers who were
embalmed
And their bodies sent to her earth---
And they, sighing for her sake,
Though the land was full of reprobates;
And for nought would the fathers alters have been built,
And in vain their oblation offered there.
Is it well that the dead should be remembered,
And the Ark and the Tablets be forgotten?
That we should seek out the place of the pit and the
worm
And forsake the fount of life eternal?
Have we any inheritance but the sancturies of God?
How, then, should we forget His holy Mount?
Have we either in the East or in the West
A place of hope in which we may trust,
Except the land that is full of gates
Toward which the gates of Heaven are open---
Like Mount Sinai and Carmel and Bethel.
And the houses of the prophets, the envoys
And the thrones of the priests' of the Lord's throne,
And the thrones of the kings, the anointed?
To us and also to our children, He has assigned it... 16

The importance which Hallevi accords to the Holy Land as the geographic locus of prophecy and ultimately of salvation is as evident in his poetry as in the Kuzari. His songs of Zion display both a consistency of theme and a religious intensity which correspond very closely to the Jewish scholar's remarks to the Khazar king. The main motifs of these poems leave little doubt that Hallevi was expressing his most personal beliefs and feelings.

In this particular passage of "Thy words are Compounded of Sweet-Smelling Myrrh," the poet is speaking for himself in response to a certain Egyptian Jew who tried to persuade him

against emigrating to the Land of Israel. Throughout, Hallevi stresses the religious significance of undertaking such a trip. He goes to seek the peace of Jerusalem, to pray for the restoration of the ruined Sanctuary, to be with friends and fellow Jews, and certainly to be able to fulfill the commandments associated with the Land itself. Emigration for purposes such as historical sentiment or homage to the graves of ancestors connotes for him a kind of idolatry.[17] If the land has no essential religious significance in itself, it would indeed be sinful in his eyes for any one to bow down and pray toward it, or for the Patriarchs to have uprooted their homes to dwell there as strangers (Gen. 23:4). All promises regarding the Holy Land would simply be delusions, and its sanctity as a burial place for the righteous, like Jacob and Joseph, merely a vain conceit (Gen. 50:13, Ex. 14:19). If only the pious inhabitants of the land give it religious significance, Hallevi is quick to note that Palestine is usually filled with base and unworthy men like those who were contending for it during his own lifetime (Ps. 14:13, Job 15:16).[18] On the contrary, Hallevi declares, the land itself and the ancient ark hidden in it,[19] are more important than the graves of the dead, because the Land is where intimacy (kirbah) with God may be found, and with it, eternal life.

Central, to achieving this saving awareness of God were Mt. Zion and the Sanctuary. Zion represents "the house of our life,"[20] for Hallevi believed, as we have seen in the Kuzari, that when Zion would be restored the entire Israelite people of Israel would be restored also. His confidence in this result stems from the conviction that it is God alone

who ultimately directs Israel's fate both in the Land and in the diaspora. Inasmuch as He ordained the destruction of the Temple, He too would see to its rebuilding.[21] But most important of all, it would seem, is Hallevi's allusion to the Land as being "full of gates toward which the gates of heaven are opened." This allusion specifically recalls Jacob's dream at Bethel (Gen. 28:10-22) and the observation in the Kuzari that Jacob ascribed his dream-prophecy to the land rather than to his purity beliefs or integrity.[22] He recognized that Palestine was the passageway of prophecy, where the saving awareness of God could be established at its highest level. It is the axis mundi at which the heavenly Bethel ("House of God") meets the earthly Bethel. Moreover, the appearance of the gate motif is not limited to this poem. The "gate" recurs in a number of other important poems, just as it is mentioned more than once in the Kuzari.[23] It is one of the more important symbols for Hallevi's belief in the superiority of the Holy Land to all other lands and in its intrinsic religious significance.

It should be noted, however, that the "gate of heaven" extends beyond the formal borders of Palestine in this and other poems, though in the Kuzari it refers primarily to Zion. Clearly, the inclusion of Mt. Sinai as a major site of revelation along with Mt. Carmel and Bethel parallels Hallevi's inclusion of Egypt, Sinai, and Paran within the environs of the land of Israel.[24] Prophecy is not limited in either his poetic or philosophic works to the territory of Palestine, strictly defined. Thus, for example, the

importance Hallevi attributes to Egypt, is very great.

> Look on the cities and consider the villages,
> Which Israel held in possession;
> And give glory unto Egypt, and lighten
> Your steps and tread not heavily,
> Upon the streets where the Divine Presence passed through,
> To seek the blood of the covenant upon the doorposts
> And the pillar of fire and the pillars of cloud,
> And the eyes of all watching and beholding.
> From thence were hewn those who possessed God's covenant,
> And thence were carved the cornerstones of the people of the Lord. [25]

All of the miraculous occurances associated with Moses, Aaron, and the Exodus were able to occur, at least in part, because the land of Egypt lay within the larger geographical context of prophecy. And lest anyone deny that Egypt was in fact situated within this area, the poet implicitly suggests that he would also have to deny the events which transpired there, events which all eyes watched and understood as proceeding from God Himself.[26] Hallevi develops this belief regarding Egypt somewhat further by an allusion to the operation of the climatological factor within its borders.

> Praise be to Egypt above all cities,
> Whither came first the word of God!
> There a chosen vine was planted,
> Whose clusters became a peculiar treasure.
> There the messengers of God were born--
> Messengers of God, as from Bridegroom to bride...[27]

While it is surely hyperbole for Hallevi to claim that God's word came to a man for the first time in Egypt, his intent seems clear. Egypt was the scene of the beginnings of God's revelation to Israel and it served as the original seed bed for the "chosen vine." Consistent with his treatment of this botanical image in the Kuzari,[28] Hallevi apparently regarded the soil and climate of Egypt as suitable for nurturing the elite people (se'gulah) and its greatest prophets. The same

applies to the wildernesses of the Sinai penninsula, the hills of Moab, as well as Palestine itself.

> Turn aside with me to Zoan, to the Red Sea,
> to Mount Horeb.
> I will turn to Shiloh, to the heap of the ruined shrine,
> And will go along the paths of the Ark of the Covenant
> Until I taste the dust of its hiding place
> which is sweeter than honey... [29]

> Greetings to you, Mount Abarim!
> Peace be to you on every side. (I Kings 5:4)
> Within you is gathered the chosen of mankind,
> In you is the choicest of all sepulchres. (Gen. 23:6)
> If you know him not, then ask
> The Red Sea which was rent apart; (Ps. 136:13)
> And ask of the bush and ask of the mount---
> Ask of Sinai---they will given an answer to you: (Judg. 5:2)
> He faithfully bore the mission of God (Num. 12:7,
> Haggai 1:13)
> Though he was not himself a man of words...(Ex. 4:10) [30]

But in ultimate value and religious significance, Zion and the Land of Israel rank supreme. They represent the true abode of the God and the only site where God-pleasing acts can be fully perfected.[31]

> ...For I know that here [in Egypt] the Divine Presence
> turned aside,
> Like a way-farer, to the shade of the oak and the
> terebinth. (Jer. 14:8)
> But in Salem and Zion, it is like one homeborn.
> For there is the Torah, there the greatness,
> The abode of judgment, the abode of mercy,
> And there may a man hope for reward of his toil. [32]

The reward of toil, to which the poet refers, appears to involve more than an opportunity to visit sacred places in Palestine or enjoy the salutory effects of its climate. It seems, rather, that Hallevi desires a relationship with God which he could not achieve in Spain, an awareness of His presence and salvation which is unattainable during the upheavals and sufferings of his time. Thus, after leaving home and family behind, he writes,

My desire for the living God has constrained me
To seek out the place where my princes had their thrones...
(Ps. 122:5)
I no longer walk on my hands and knees,
But have set my paths in the heart of the seas,
Until I find the footstool of the feet of my God,
And there I shall pour out my thoughts and my soul.
I shall stand on the threshold of His holy mount
And set up my doors at the gates of heaven (Gen. 28:17)
By the waters of the Jordan my nard shall spring up.
And I shall send out shoots by the waters of Shiloach.
(Jer. 17:8)
The Lord is mine. Can I be afraid?
The angel of His mercy carries my arms (Song of Songs 4:13)
I shall praise His name thoughout my life
And confess my gratitude to him forever. [33]

Once again we find the gate motif, but in this instance, it is linked with the poet's expressed desire to open his soul, as it were, to a renewal of inspiration. Hallevi wishes to establish his own "doors" to correspond with those of heaven's gate. He apparently seeks an experience which will leave no possible doubt in his mind that God is aware of his desire and that he need not be afraid. Such an experience will enable him to praise God for the rest of his days, which, in the personal context of Hallevi's life, suggests a replenishing and heightening of his poetic gifts, not unlike that of the prophets, Levites, and psalmists. And all this is possible only in the Holy Land.

Shinar and Pathros, were they equal to you in their greatness?
Can they compare their vanity to your Urim and Thummim?
And with whom could they compare your anointed kings
And with whom Your prophets? and with whom your Levites
And singers? [34]

Neither Shinar, representing the territory and cultural achievements of Moslem Baghdad, nor Pathros, signifying those of Christian Byzantium, can possibly produce prophets, poets, or psalmists comparable to Zion's. Their religious forms are but

vain imitations when measured against the sacred lots of Israel and other institutions and practices commanded by God.[35] For true prophecy, genuine inspiration, and ultimate redemption spring only from one source---the Land of Israel.

> All my thoughts will be terrified at Sinai,
> My eyes and heart at Mt. Abarim.
> How shall I not weep and pour forth my tears,
> Since from there I hope for the raising of the dead?
> There are the cherubim and the written tablets...
> The place of miracles and fountain of prophecies,
> Their faces reflecting the glory of the Lord. [36]

All these themes receive their most complete and beautiful expression in Hallevi's "Ode to Zion." Although there is no real proof for the legend that Hallevi composed it during the last moments of his life as he made his way toward the gates of Jerusalem, both the content and emotional fervor of the ode leave little doubt that it represents the culmination of his thoughts and feelings about Zion. It is deservedly the most renowned of Hallevi's poems.

> Zion, will you not ask if there is peace with your captives
> Who seek your peace, who are but a remnant of your flocks?
> From west and east, from north and south---the greeting,
> "Peace" from far and near, take from every side...
> And greetings from the prisoner of hope, giving his tears
> Like dew of Hermon, longing to let them fall upon your hills.
> To wail for your affliction I am like the jackals, but when
> I dream of the return of your captivity, I am a harp to your songs...
> My heart years sorely for Bethel and Peniel,
> For Mahannaim and all the places where your pure ones have met.
> There the Divine Presence abides for you; and there your Maker
> Opened your gates to face the gates of heaven.
> And the Lord's glory alone was your light, with neither
> Sun nor moon nor stars as your luminaries.
> I would choose for my soul to pour itself out in the place
> Where the spirit of God was poured out upon your chosen.
> You are the house of the royalty and the throne of the Lord...
> If only I might wander in the places where
> God was revealed to your seers and messengers...
> I would fall to my face upon your ground, and take delight in

Your stones and be tender to your dust...
For the very life of the soul is the air of your land, of pure myrrh
Are the grains of your dust, like honey from the comb, your rivers.
Sweet would it be to my soul to walk naked and barefoot
Upon the desolate ruins where your sanctuaries were
In the place of your ark which was hidden, and in the place
Of your cherubim which abode in your innermost chamber.[37]

A two-fold meaning is suggested by the poet's yearning for Bethel and Peniel. These names are first of all stock references to Jerusalem and the Temple mount, and Hallevi clearly wishes to see these historic sites in Palestine. But there is also the intimation here of a desire to apprehend, at least figuratively, both the "house of God" and the "face of God" on a spiritual plane. Zion remains the gate of heaven and its air and climate are still "the very life of the soul." Their power to improve the species and elevate man's capacity to receive inspiration seem undiminished.[38] So in his dreams, the poet becomes a harp for the songs of Zion, suggesting that these songs which flow from him have their origin in a source outside of him. He is prepared to pour out his soul before God, knowing that he is in the place where God once poured the Holy Spirit upon the prophets and psalmists and filled their emptiness. It seems clear that Hallevi seeks to replenish his own innate poetic gifts by aliyah to the Land of Israel. Indeed, his yearning to be within Erez Yisrael prompts him to declare here, as in the Kuzari, "I would fall to my face upon your ground, and take delight in your stones, and be tender to your dust." (cf. Ps. 102:14) [39] Only there may his hopes for salvation be fulfilled.

D. Poetry and Prophecy Amidst Sleep and Wakefulness

> O Sleeper with heart awake, burning and tempest-tossed,
> Go forth and shake yourself, and walk in the light of
> My face.
>
> Arise, ride on and prosper: a star shall come for you,
> And he who lay down in the dungeon shall ascend the
> summit of Sinai.
>
> Let not their soul exult, who say: Condemned
> Is Zion, for behold, My heart is there and My eyes are
> there.
>
> I reveal Me and I conceal Me; I am angry, I am appeased. [40]
> Who shall have pity upon my children more than I myself?

In the Kuzari, the king chides the Jewish scholar for not matching his extravagant praise of the Land of Israel with the readiness to dwell there.[41] The Khazar king evokes a pained response from the scholar, who takes the allegation as a severe reproach. To him, Israel's unreadiness or unwillingness to return to the land implies a rejection of the path toward its ultimate redemption and renewed intimacy with God. It is for this reason, he explains, that the glory of the First Commonwealth was never fully restored. A majority of the Babylonian exiles, including their leaders, preferred the comforts and possessions of their subjugation to the opportunity for return and restoration. While prophecy continued among them for a time, it was only for a very limited period. For the life of the exile and the prolonged physical separation from the land of Israel numbed the souls of the people and lulled them to sleep. The prophets alone remained wakeful, aware of both of God's saving relationship to themselves and of the only God-pleasing path that could bring salvation to the entire people.

These are the very images which Hallevi introduces in this poem. God addresses Israel as the sleeper in exile whose heart is still awake. This verse parallels Hallevi's citation of Song of Songs 5:2, "I sleep, but my heart waketh," during his discussion of the Babylonian captivity. "He [Solomon] designates exile by sleep, while the wakeful heart represents the continuation of prophecy among them." [42] There appear to be few remaining in Israel whose hearts are still awake. Although, they are not prophets in Hallevi's strict definition, they nonetheless recognize God's direction of Israel's fate and seek intimacy with Him. Those who constitute this heart are especially sensitive to the tempests which afflict the people. Moreover, they yearn to fulfill God's command to walk in the light of His face. This is the light beheld in prophetic visions as well as the light of Torah itself. As we shall see, this description of the wakeful of heart seems to include the poet himself.

The promise God provides in answer to this longing, according to the poet, is the star that shall come for all Israel once they shake themselves from their slumber. The star refers here to the Messiah (Num. 24:17). The act of waking would seem to indicate a massive pre-Messianic departure from the dispersion itself, with ultimate settlement in the Holy Land in anticipation of prophecy. [43] The final consummation is here depicted as a mounting up to the summit of Sinai. The messianic time will introduce a bond of intimacy between God and Israel reminiscent of their love relationship during the wilderness wandering. A certain symmetry thus unfolds in history, as is evident from the conclusion of the poem.

God reveals Himself first to man, and subsequently to Israel alone. He conceals Himself in anger when Israel proved unfaithful, but he will be appeased, the poet suggests, because He knows that He alone can bring redemption by re-establishing a saving relationship to Israel and mankind.

The twin motifs of sleep and wakefulness recur often throughout Hallevi's poetry. What they connote however may vary radically from one poem to another.[44] Sleep generally stands for exile, dormancy, the vanities and temptations of youth, lack of intimacy with God and the desoteriological state, and sometimes simply for sleep itself. Wakefulness, on the other hand, usually symbolizes life in Palestine or the longing for it, resurgent vitality, the worthwhile purposes and projects of maturity, the awareness of God's presence, and the experience of salvation. Significantly, these motifs tend to occur most often, althought not exclusively, in the azharot la'nefesh, or self-exhortations, and selihot, or penitential poems, in which expressions of Hallevi's personal beliefs and feelings seem to be most evident. Yet, Hallevi also uses sleep to indicate the time of inspiration and prophetic awareness. It is the state in which true dreams occur, while wakefulness is the state in which dreams and prophecy are dispelled. Poems which employ the motifs in this manner are generally related to sections of the liturgy that declare God's praise and seem to reinforce the analogy between prophecy and poetry as expressions of innately gifted individuals.

Characteristically, we find the poet admonished his soul to leave the exile of Spain behind and journey to its true home in Palestine.

> Return, O eternal slave...!
> If not now, when will you escape
> From this harsh labor...?
> Arise! Why do you sleep?
> Step forth, get to your home,
> For your body hurries to go! [45]

In a similar context, the poet chides himself for wasting his life away with false dreams presumably of fame and fortune when he could arouse himself and mount up to the highest levels of truth.

> And now O man, why do you sleep?
> How long will you be idle...?
> Your days are but false dreams.
> Your life is impoverished with each passing day,
> Till you come to the end, to the lowest degree.
> While your desires mount up to the very highest degree.
> So arise and awake! Run and make haste...! [46]

Like Jonah asleep in the hold of the ship, the poet is confronted with the question of why he sleeps amidst the storm, when by waking all might be saved.(Jon. 1:6) The continuation of sleep brings impoverishment of the soul, if not of the material basis of life. It invites "the lowest degree" which in this context may be understood to be death of the spirit, the exhaustion of innate poetic gifts, and the inability to experience the Divine Presence. In another context, Hallevi observes that the worldly pleasure he knew as a member of the courtier class were ultimately "poison" and "a bitter plague", not "honey" at all. [47] The honey, he intimates, comes with wakefulness and with the fulfillment of his desire to live in Zion. Only wakefulness can reverse his increasing impoverishment and bring the soul to its highest aspiration,

communion with God.

> O sleeper, do not slumber on! Foresake your madness...
> Awake to see His heavens and the work of His fingers...!
> (Ps. 8:3)
> Go out into the streets of night, following men of renown
> On whose lips there are praises, but who lack guile and
> deceit,
> Their nights are filled with prayers, their days with
> fasting.
> Within their hearts God has paths, by His throne they have
> a place. (B. Shabb. 152b)
> Their way is a ladder for climbing, up to the Lord your
> God. (Gen. 28:12) [48]

The men of renown to whom Hallevi refers are the pious. It is they who remain awake while others are asleep, and the poet clearly considers them worthy models of wakefulness. By tikkunei hatzot and fasts, they follow, the "paths" God Himself established within their hearts to ascend the ladder whose top reaches heaven. This regimen culminates in the awareness of God's own presence. While this experience is not identical with the highest degree of inner vision, namely prophecy, it does represent a variation of it.[49] Its most important feature is the saving experience it is able to produce. The poem thus reflects the same kind of vision Hallevi ascribes to the pious in the Kuzari.[50] Hence, the poet rouses himself from his sleep, figuratively and literally, in order to pursue this saving intimacy with God.

> O my soul, search for God and His thresholds...
> If you pursue only the vanities of your allotted time
> And say all its enchantments are true...
> Know that there is nothing in your hand...
> Be rather before your God and King,
> Under whose wings you have come to take refuge. [51]

> ...Nor will I give sleep to my eyes at midnight on His
> account
> That I might see the Lord in pleasantness and visit in
> His place. [52]

Not infrequently, the poet suggests that it is God himself who

arouses the restless sleeper, whether he is Israel as imagined by the poet, or the poet himself. "I slept, but my Beloved encouraged me, and for times of love He destined me." [53] (Zech. 4:1)

> I awakened and pondered, who is it that awakened me?
> Behold, the Holy One, dwelling in praises, stirred me,
> And gave hearing to my ears, strengthened and encouraged me...
> Until a servant is favored in his supplications to his Master..
> And the laborer joins with the King at his feast. [54]

All these selections seem to indicate that the motifs of sleep and wakefulness go beyond poetic imagery per se' to the realm of genuine religious experience. This becomes especially evident in several poems where the connotations of these motifs are reversed. Sleep becomes the context of inspired dreams, in which the longed for awareness of God is experienced by the sleeper, and wakefulness becomes a barrier and threat to saving dreams. Where this reversal occurs, the connection between each motif and its alternative references, such as Palestine or the dispersion, ceases to be explicit. Thus,

> My soul yearns for Bethel, yes, it longs
> Arising even to see it in dreams.
> It arose, but found no healing; for a dream
> Heals no soul that is sick with wakefulness. [55]

Here the poet's yearning for Bethel, which may signify Jerusalem itself, the Temple mount, or a vision of God's heavenly abode, prompts him to seek out Bethel in his dreams, that is, during sleep. And yet it is wakefulness--signifying probably the diversions of exile and perhaps critical reflection itself---which causes the attempt to fail. Dreams can still occur in exile, the poet suggests, but ultimately, they do not heal or save. To find the healing he seeks, the poet is

impelled to migrate to a healthier climate. The implication is that in the Holy Land Hallevi could overcome the "sickness of wakefulness."

The sleep and dreams to which the poet aspires come to be more precious to him than life itself. He declares that if his longing were to be fulfilled and followed immediately by death, he would welcome the final, saving vision nonetheless.

> To meet the fountain of true life I run,
> For I weary of a life of vanity and emptiness...
> If only I could see Him in a dream,
> I would sleep on eternally and never wake...[56]

> ...I would deliver the remnant of my spirit to Your hand,
> Then I would sleep, but my sleep would be pleasing to me.[57]

The vision of sleep in which the sleeper is certain of God's presence is in essence a prophetic vision. It recalls the promise of Scripture, "If there is a prophet among you, I the Lord make myself known to him in a vision, I speak with him in a dream" (Num. 12:6). To achieve such an experience is to achieve the "highest degree", following which there can be no debilitating fear of death. For this kind of apprehension assures the immortality of the soul after the demise of the body and thus obliterates the fear. But what distinguishes a true dream from an imaginary, merely wishful one? How can the dreamer be sure of what he apprehends? The answers to such questions are as crucial to Hallevi the poet as to Hallevi the religious philosopher, because they determine for him whether poetry is ultimately a matter of craft and technique or whether it is indeed a divine gift. His poetic response, as we shall now see, is strikingly similar to his philosophic position.

E. Poetry, Prophecy, and Inner Vision

The splendour of the Lord of miracles, "the eye is not filled with seeing."
Tongues weary of reciting it, though in the heart lay both witness and sign.
Shall the eyes but play with us or the inmost self work deceit---
Before Him who gave hearing to the ear and expression to the lips?
Who appointed the ministers of heaven "with rings full of eyes"?
He created souls to prophesy, to come when summoned before Him.
Placing a capacity within them to encounter awesome visions.
They gaze upon His kingdom, and with his mission do they go.
On those who hold fast to His covenant, nobility of spirit is poured,
For from the fountains of His wisdom, streams of prophecy flow.
Taught by secrets and prophecies, whether by dream or by visions,
The light of the King's face they seek, the door to their Lord of Hosts.
Knowledge shines forth like the sun to bring light to all the earth.
In their mouths He put it to teach the purely spoken teachings,
To tell the eyes that are blind, that in the heavens there is true light.
See the Foundation of all creatures, He is one and from Him do they come---
For do not a thousand and ten thousand, all find their beginning in one... [58]

Compressed within this ofan poem we find many essential features of Hallevi's theory of prophecy. But of particular interest is the poet's allusion to the heart and the sure testimony of God's splendor it provides. What Hallevi means by testimony is not simply a feeling God's nearness, which is an emotion almost anyone can experience. Rather, the "witness and sign" are restricted to a particular group, the prophets, whose hearts are endowed with a special perceptual capacity to which the poet also refers. This capacity corresponds to the "inner eye" of the Kuzari. It is the additional

power within the senses which enables the prophet to apprehend things as they really are in the natural world and special sensuous phenomena in the supernatural world.[59] It is specifically associated with the heart, the primary home of the soul and the regulator of its activities.[60] The belief that the heart's knowledge comes only through direct experience of real objects leads the poet to place complete trust in its apprehension. The vision of the heart does not flow from the imagination but from the miracle-working Lord, Adonai. It is not received by the imagination, but by this unique inner sense and for Hallevi, the senses do not lie. Hence he asks, "Shall the eyes but play with us or the innermost self work deceit?" Thus, the vision of the heart plays essentially the same role in Hallevi's poetry as the insight of the "inner eye" in the Kuzari. It is designed to answer the question of whether God truly has intercourse with man

> Does God truly dwell with man?
> What can he think, each one who thinks,
> Whose foundation is in the dust---
> Since You are holy, dwelling in praise and glory only?[61]

Hallevi's answer, of course, is affirmative. It is based upon the public, empirical, direct and miraculous evidence provided by Sinai as well as all subsequent prophetic dreams and visions. Because he considers these visions of the heart to be genuine, he also regards them as saving visions. Through such experiences the prophets and those whom they influence come to see God's miraculous activity on their behalf.

This piyyut also describes the contents of prophetic visions. The prophets see awesome creatures, with "rings full

of eyes" (Ezek. 1:18), which make up the heavenly "kingdom of God." [62] They seek out the light which emanates from God, who is likened, as in the Kuzari, to the sun. [63] The radiance which they behold is not identical with God Himself, but with the effluence that emanates from Him. God remains ultimately hidden. Further, these beams of light are identified with knowledge, and are not merely inchoate sense impressions. This seems to confirm the intuitive character of the prophets religious knowledge. [64] In a similar constellation of images, reflecting Neo-Platonic influence, God is likened to an overflowing fountain; and the streams flowing from it correspond to the multiplicity of forms which descend to the natural world. Each individual who fulfills the requirements of the Torah, who "holds fast to His covenant" finds this nobility of spirit lavished upon him. [65] By spirit the poet means, of course, the Holy Spirit or prophecy. Lastly, it is not merely for an experience of personal salvation that the prophetic vision is bestowed. The prophet himself is obliged to "overflow" and teach others the path to salvation. He is to be the clear-sighted man who instructs the blind on their way, [66] and who ultimately brings light to all the earth. This is the mission and social function of the prophets, and because of this mission, they are said to be a head and heart in relation to the rest of the people. [67]

The vision of the heart motif reappears frequently throughout Hallevi's liturgical compositions and stands out as one of the distinguishing features of his poetry. To Hallevi this inner vision represents a more penetrating kind of perception than that of the external senses. By the same token,

he regards the truths it apprehends as superior to those revealed by argument and inquiry, so far as knowledge of the miracle working Adonai is concerned. In both these respects, Hallevi's poetic notion of inner vision is quite similar to that of both Jewish and Muslim mystics of the medieval period.[68]

> ...The Creator who creates everything from nothing,
> Is revealed to the heart, but not to the eye,
> Therefore ask not how or where---
> For He fills the heavens and the earth...
> See the way of the soul's secret;
> Search it out and be refreshed in it.
> He will make you wise, and you will find freedom,
> For you are a captive and the world is a prison.[69]

> ...And when my love called out to You,
> My heart and inner self found You.
> But my thinking could not reach You,
> Neither my dreams nor meditations could
> imagine You.[70]

> ...The power of thought cannot grasp
> His wonder.
> Withheld from me are the lofty towers of
> His habitation.
> But while my thoughts were powerless,
> my heart found Him.[71]

By turning away from the operations of the external senses and the rational soul both the poet and the prophet are apparently able to enter a trance-like state of extreme inwardness in which awesome visions of the supernatural realm appear.[72]

> From Your hand it came to my heart,
> To the soul that is within me.
> On the day I searched, "Where is the Lord?"
> Who was above being seen with my eyes
> I turned to my heart and my thoughts
> And found Your throne as a witness within me, hidden deep
> in my breast.[73]

In certain passages it is evident that these apprehensions are not merely visual. They may also be audible and possess intelligible content, usually in the form of adulation and

praise which the poet and prophet subsequently express to God.

> Well and good it is to have a camp within Your House
> For the people in whose midst Your name finds rest...
> Behold, upon my heart is a thought from my God,
> Yes, also upon my tongue is an answer from the Lord. [74]

> And with the eye of the heart have I sung of You...
> My soul has desired You in the night...
> In darkness I came forward that I might find Your favor. [75]

That Hallevi considers these visions of the heart to be confirmation of Jewish beliefs and aspirations seems clear from several allusions to Sinai in conjunction with the heart. By these references he suggests that the insights of the heart are engraved upon it just as the tablets of the covenant were engraved with the finger of God. Inner vision is thus a form of Divine revelation, and its contents are as true and certain as those of Sinai.

> ...And upon the heart of Your servants
> There are tablets, on which Your witnesses abide.
> For with the fingers of Your hands were engraved
> Upon these tablets, laws which may not be erased. [76]

> ...The tablets of my heart He has made,
> As tablets with both their sides engraved. [77]

> ...And my heart has seen You and believed in You
> As if revelation had recurred at Sinai. [78]

The dazzling images which the poet apprehends in his vision of the heart and later records in his sacred poetry are basically similar to those the prophet sees and states in public. Both the poet and the prophet receive extraordinary sense impressions which produce an immediate awareness of God's presence and activity. God Himself is never directly seen or heard, only the various sensuous phenomena such as light, fire, sweetness, fragrant odors, and speech, which are generally understood to proceed from God. In contrast to the prophet's insight, however, the poets' insight is not

miraculous. It involves neither interruptions in the scheme of natural causation nor special exercise of God's will on the supernatural plane. Still, the poet's experience of inspiration and insight is able to bring him to a state that closely approximates the saving act of prophecy. Thus, in a yozer poem, for example, Hallevi interweaves the image of light as a symbol of inner vision and Torah with the more conventional images of light in nature and shows how these reflect the experience of Divine salvation.

> Day and night, praise the Lord!
> He makes the light of His face shine
> toward my face.
> He kindled lamps of light and made
> the darkness vanish,
> On the day He rent open my windows
> in the sky.
> And He was pleased to bestow His radiance
> upon me,
> His spirit speaking within me by the hand
> of His faithful,
> By the way the light streamed He led me,
> The day He came from Seir and shone forth
> from Sinai.
> And when I tasted the honey of His law,
> I spoke:
> Come now and see, for my eyes are full
> of light. [79]

The poet, representing Israel, is endowed with spiritual windows capable of receiving streams of Divine light. These windows correspond roughly to the "inner eyes" which all Jews possess, if only in an undeveloped state. The radiance which Israel apprehends by God's pleasure refers to the theophany at Sinai. It is the embodiment of prophecy par excellence. Light and Torah come to Israel as a whole and to the poet in particular by means of God's most faithful prophet, Moses, (Num. 12:7) and produce both an inward brightness and a taste of sweetness which, in the Kuzari, are identical with

the experience of salvation.[80] Such an experience is described again and again in Hallevi's religious poetry. Invariably there is an anticipation of an awesome vision which evokes the certainty of God's presence.

> I will pray before Him and delight in prayer,
> My tears shall split His clouds and become sweet,
> from honey and millet.
> My heart will arise with His eyes, when it melts
> like wax.
> Like a servant before His Lord, from the fear
> of Him, it will melt...[81]

In some of the poet's visionary experiences, as we have already seen, the Divine throne appears. This apprehension is often supplemented by a more comprehensive image of God's glory.

> ...The high places are filled with His glory
> And the vision of the Lord's glory is like fire...
> He fashioned ofannim and living creatures
> Whose appearance is like coals of fire...[82]

It is precisely this vision which brings on the soteriological state that also overcomes the ultimate terror of death. The vision implicitly or explicitly promises eternal life and an unending relationship to the source of vision.

> But your approach, O my God, I hold dear,
> ...It is the joy of my heart, not a time of harvesting.
> And your withdrawal from me removes a radiant
> stream.[83]

> ...My heart has cleaved to you, I will rejoice
> exceedingly
> O my Rock, through you will I forget my melancholy...[84]

> ...Only those who abide in His secret...whose souls
> are with the Throne of Glory
> Who can envision the Lord in pleasantness, these are
> for eternal life.[85]

It is not uncommon for one who undergoes this experience to feel both fear and rapture. In certain ways, the saving vision prefigures the experience of death, because it involves, a kind of separation of the soul from the body. This perceived

separation can be terrifying insofar as it seems to threaten the individual with extinction, but it is also ecstatic to the extent that it brings a feeling of release from the "prison" of the flesh. In both cases, the individual's perceptions of the external world no longer seem to come to him by means of the external senses. Sensation is mediated rather by the vision of the heart. The result is that the soul enters a state of ecstasy in the classic sense of the term: the individual stands outside himself. In achieving this experience, the soul becomes aware of existing on a higher level of being, specifically, the divine level, and this awareness, along with the extraordinary forms and pictures it includes, arouses the confident belief in God's nearness. Hallevi explicitly describes this kind of experience when he discusses the possible effects of aspiring to prophecy, and particularly as they relate to those who fail to attain the highest degree.

> ...All of them [the descendents of Jacob] seek the degree of prophecy and most of them achieve it, but he who does not attain it is drawn near to it through [God] pleasing acts, holiness, purity, and meeting prophets. Know that the spirituality of anyone who meets a prophet is renewed for him at the time he meets the prophet and hears his Divine words. He [the listener] becomes separated from his species through purity of soul, through yearning for those degrees, and through his connection with [the qualities of] meekness and purity. For them, this is the manifest proof and clear sign regarding the reward of the world to come. For what is sought from this is only that the human soul becomes divine, separated from its senses. And it will see that highest world and enjoy the vision of the angelic light and the hearing of the Divine speech, for that soul is safe from death when the bodily organs have perished... [86]

Thus, for Hallevi, even one who does not reach the level of true prophecy is still able to have a lesser religious experience

similar to it.[87] One may still apprehend both Divine light and speech on a lower level and be assured of eternal life. All these experiences are possible if the aspirant has fulfilled the necessary prerequisites Hallevi outlines in the Kuzari. Even more important, it seems that Hallevi considered this theory to have practical as well as theoretical significance. He indicates in a variety of his poems that he personally longed for a saving experience of the sort we have described. The concurrence of these poetic accounts with Hallevi's formal theory of prophecy suggests that he aspired either to prophecy itself or at the very least to the level closest to it. This becomes especially clear in his poems addressed to the soul.

> The precious one abiding in her body,
> As light abides in deep darkness---
> Does she not long to separate from the body,
> And return to the majesty of her trappings?
> For she shall eat on the day of her separation,
> The fruit of her law---and this is its fruit:
> Honey of Eden and honeycomb of sweetness
> To satisfy her mouth with good things, (Ps. 103:5)
> The ways of her Maker shall she see,
> And shall forget the days of her affliction
> She shall praise His name with all,
> With all the souls that sing praise of God.[88]

The vision the poet describes here is very much akin to the visions of the merkabah mystics of preceding centuries. Both involve intense introspection, a disengagement from ordinary experience, such that the soul feels itself ascending, and a vision of the Throne and Glory of God. The entire experience produces a sensation of well-being and pleasure.

> ...The superiority of man to the beast is nothing.
> It is only to see the Rock of their glory by the vision
> of the heart, not the vision of the eye,
> And the source for the fountains of their secret
> which "are sweeter than wine," (Song of Songs 1:2)

For thus, O flesh and blood, will you find your God. [89]

...My request is for refuge within the wings of God's glory,
And to make the habitation of my fathers, my habitation... [90]

...I hunger and thirst for the words of my prophecies
I hunger not for bread, nor thirst for water. [91]

My love has set me aflame, and I have pursued after You
While I am among those near You, I am far from those near me. [92]

Not surprisingly, we often find Hallevi expressing his own desire for these extraordinary visions within the idiom of prophecy itself. He tends to allude to experiences and prophecies of Moses, Isaiah, and Jeremiah in such contexts, although there are frequent citations from Job also, with the poet, like the suffering Biblical hero, crying out for God to reveal Himself. Note, for example, this bakkashah poem for the Day of Atonement.

O Lord, before You is my whole desire---
Even though I cannot bring it to my lips.
Your favor I would ask for a moment and then expire---
If only my entreaty might be granted! (Job 6:8)
I would deliver the remnant of my spirit to Your hand, (Mal. 2:15)
Then I would sleep, but my sleep would be pleasing to me.
When far from You, I die while yet in life,
But if I cling to You I live, even though I die. [93]

One who longs for this life with God, even though it may bring death is essentially like one who has aspired to prophecy. He hopes his soul will remain separate from the external senses in order to prolong enjoyment of the Divine light. "He is like one who desires death in order to win eternal life." [94]

To meet the fountain of the life of truth I run,
For I weary of a life of vanity and emptiness,

To see the face of my King is my only aim;
I will fear none but Him nor set up any other to be feared.
If only I could see Him in a dream,
I would sleep on eternally and never wake,
If I might only behold His face deep within my heart!
My eyes would never ask to look beyond. [95]

Characteristic of these verses is the poet's request to see the face of God. Moses had made a similar plea, but it was denied him with the explanation, "Thou canst not see My face, for man shall not see Me and live." (Ex. 33:20) Instead, Moses witnessed a display of the glory and attributes of God. Hallevi specifically refers to this request in the Kuzari when he observes, "And He said 'yes' on the condition that he take care not to see His face which man has no power to endure." [96] Knowing that a direct apprehension of God's face was entirely beyond human capacity, Hallevi the poet longs instead to see Him in a dream, in which the vision of God's glory would appear to the eye of his heart. Like Moses and other prophets who were known as the "servants of God" (Deut. 1:1, Amos 3:7), Hallevi also wished to be God's servant. While these references could be understood in a literal sense only, meaning a pious individual in the conventional sense, the connotations of "servant" in Scripture along with Hallevi's other petitions for visions and dreams leave little doubt that he intended it as an honorific term for those who receive some degree of prophecy.

If only I could be the servant of God who made me
My friends could all desert me, if He would draw near me...
My inner heart yearns to be near You,
But my worldly cares drive me far from You.
My paths have strayed far from the way You pursue...
It is sin that makes a division between You and me
(Isa. 59:2)

And holds me back from seeing Your light with my eye.
Incline my heart to serve in Your kingdom's service.
Cleanse my thoughts that I may know Your divineness.
Do not deny Your healing in the days of my sickness.
Answer, my God. Do not chastise. Do not withhold reply.
Employ me again and say to Your servant, "Here am I."[97]

Servants of time---they are the slaves of slaves;
The servant of the Lord, he alone is free.
Therefore, when each man seeks his portion,
"The Lord is my portion," declares my soul.[98]

The poet anticipates an estrangement from his friends and worldly concerns, if he is to become a servant of God, and this he seems prepared to accept. But despite his longing for God and for release from care, he despairs somewhat over his personal concerns and unnamed sins, which he claims have led him astray and erected a barrier between him and God. Clearly he hopes for a revelation, yet he indicates that he believes it unlikely to come while he is in a state of moral or other impurity. Wishing to be re-employed ("acquired") by God as His servant and messenger, he asks that God reply to his petition in essentially the same way that prophets reply to a Divine summons. In effect the poet summons God to reveal Himself and to set aside the punishment he fears, for he severely doubts his own merit. The motif of sin and impurity as an impediment to saving visions appears not only in this poem but in many others also. Hallevi evidently viewed his past sins, whatever they were, as a serious obstacle to his aspirations.

Let Your favor pass over to me,
Even as Your wrath has passed.
Shall my inquity forever stand
Between me and You?
How long shall I search
For You beside me, and find You not...?[99]

...If you would seek your Maker
And be sanctified from your impurity,
Draw near, be not afraid of approaching;[100]
Your deeds will bring you near to Him...

Woe be to you, if you are not purified while in my body!
Sanctify yourself from your impurity, since you know not the day of your death.[101]
Arise, and awake, rise up and begone!

...How then shall I serve my Maker, while I am still
A captive to my lust, a slave to my desire?
And how shall I aspire to an exalted degree,
When tomorrow the worm will be my sister?[102]

If, for Hallevi, the absence of visions and true dreams is the result of sin, their appearance would presumably follow upon acts of self purification. This, in fact,is his view. The individual who seeks Divine foregiveness is obliged to initiate his own moral and religious preparation in order to purge himself of fault. If he succeeds in this procedure and is deemed worthy of foregiveness, his sins cease to be a barrier between himself and God. He can again experience the saving awareness of God's presence, and perhaps even on those exhalted levels occupied by the prophets and the pious. Hallevi records several occasions on which he, as a poet, appears to have undergone just this kind of inward experience.

...I have sought Your nearness,
With all my heart have I called You,
And going out to meet You, I found You coming toward me---
Even as in the wonder of Your might,
In the sanctuary I beheld You...[103]

...In the day of distress I hoped for You...
And stationed before me did I find You...[104]

I have sought Him, I have met Him---a tower
Of strength, a rock of trust---
The radiant One, like shining light unveiled and uncovered![105]

It would seem then that Hallevi's aspiration for a prophetic experience of God did meet with some success. Like Isaiah, he speaks of beholding God in the sanctuary and in a way which leaves little doubt that he was referring to his personal experience. He sees manifestations of light and radiance which he attributes to God alone, as we have seen in the Kuzari, and leaves a clear impression that he also achieves the saving intimacy which he sought. But whether these visions and dreams had some social significance for Hallevi above and beyond his personal wishes is not clear from these passages alone. If these visions were simply private ecstatic experiences, they would most accurately be called mystical. These were the inner visions which one would expect the pious to seek. If, however, they had some social or political function for the poet, such as "guiding the blind and bleary-eyed," they might also have represented for him one or another level of genuine prophecy. In our view, the religious experience to which Hallevi aspired was true prophecy.

Turning now to Hallevi's geulah or messianic poems, a number of striking connections between his saving visions and his anticipation of redemption become evident. Moreover, the poet indicates that he is entirely aware of the social and political significance of his visions and dreams.

F. Prophecy and Calculation of the End

...Shall she that was undefiled go over with uncovered locks,
A contempt and appalment to Mizzah and Shammah?
Lo, the bondwoman's son has spread terror for me,
For with a high hand he shot with the bow,
And my tent became a high place for Oholibamah,

And Oholibah--how shall she still hope, and how
long?
Since there is no miracle and no sign, no vision,
no sight---
And should I ask to behold when the end
of wonders shall be,
They (the people) answer: You have asked a difficult
question about prophecies.
Will the Lord reject forever?
Shall there be no end to the appointed times of my
dreams?
Rise up, O Lord, and let my enemies be scattered,
And return to my habitations, to the innermost
shrine;
Reveal to my eyes Your glory as from Sinai,
And requite those who reproached me with a recompense
for my sorrow.
With the dew of salvation, descend upon those who
fear and tremble---
And bring down from his throne the rebellious son of
the bondwoman,
Speedily, lest I go down in sorrow to the grave. [106]

Hallevi's request for visionary experiences akin to prophecy is intimately bound up with the social and psychological effects of the exile and with his desire to learn when the dispersion would end. The significance of exile for Hallevi, as we have seen, involves far more than the loss of a territorial base for the Jewish people. Beyond the deprivations that attended minority status and even the recurrent outbreaks of physical violence against the Jews, he sees the exile confronting the Jew with his essential estrangement from God and aloneness in the world. God has rejected His people, Hallevi suggests, and seemingly forever. The various misfortunes which attended the reconquista and the Crusades were simply manifestations of this central experience. Mizzah and Shammah, the grandsons of Esau and figurative representatives of Christendom (Gen. 36:13), expressed God's own apparent rejection in their contempt for Israel. Similarly, the terrors inflicted upon Jews by the Arabs, the descendants of the bondwoman's son, Ishmael

(Gen. 21:10), carried out God's own punishments. Referring to the Crusaders conquest of Jerusalem in 1099, Hallevi suggests thag God ordained that Israel's tent, the Temple Mount, should become a high place for Oholibamah, the wife of Esau, whose very name means "my tent is a high place." (Gen. 36:2, 5, 18) And it is presumably with God's knowledge and consent that Jerusalem, designated as Oholibah or "My tent is within her" (Ezek. 23:4), remains without God's tent (Temple) in her and is therefore hopeless. Still, even these grievous punishments display a continuing, albeit devasting, Divine interest in Israel. This same view, of course, makes up Hallevi's unusual argument in the Kuzari that the very intensity of Jewish suffering indicates that God still exercises special providence regarding the Jews.[107] But for Hallevi, the full force of the dispersion strikes home not so much in the punishments visited upon the Jews, as in the loss of God's immediately perceived presence. As the poet asks so poignantly above, "How shall she hope...since there is no miracle and no sign, no vision, no sight?" None of these is really possible for Israel in exile.

The exile thus became the most immediate expression of the desoteriological state for the Jew. It confirmed the disappearance of prophecy among the Jews. Hallevi, especially, stressed that outside the environs of Palestine there could be no saving visions, no true dreams, and no awareness of God's direct activity in the world. Without these tokens of Divine favor, the depredations to which Israel had been subjected became all the more difficult to endure. The absence of prophecy

merely underscored the experience of ultimate aloneness and helplessness, and the ever-present threat of extinction at the hand of superior powers which became so characteristic of the life-world of the medieval Jew. The considerable anxiety which this state of affairs added to the physical dangers of life in the diaspora provoked various efforts during Hallevi's lifetime to calculate the end of days and to arrive at some assurance of when final release would come. Some sought to do this by computations based on Scripture or rabbinic traditions, others by mystical experience, and still others by aspiring to prophecy itself.

It appears that Hallevi, who was clearly interested in this subject, believed that knowledge of the end was a matter which could be known only through prophecy, if it could be known at all. Thus, when he asks about the time of the "end of wonders," just as Daniel asked in his vision of the angel (Dan. 12:6), the poet is told that he has asked a hard thing, about a matter belonging to prophecy itself. He further indicates having had dreams of the appointed time for redemption, which in fact were not fulfilled. Hence, he asks if there will be no end to dreams which contain false calculations. He summons God to initiate the redemption by returning to the ruined Sanctuary in Jerusalem, by punishing those who afflicted Israel, and by revealing His glory to the poet's own eyes as He once revealed it at Sinai. Hallevi seems to seek the renewal of prophecy as part of, or at least a prelude to, the coming redemption, and his request is distinctly personal. It is not simply a generalized request made by Israel as a whole. Hallevi specifically asks for

these events to occur "speedily---lest I go down in sorrow to the grave." (Gen. 42:38; 44:31)

Hallevi frequently associates the renewal of prophecy with the approach of the final redemption and expresses his passionate desire to witness these events personally, at times out of hope, at times out of disappointment.

> O Lord, how long have You hidden away the vision of Your consolations?...
> My thoughts have abandoned hope of seeing Your face
> For my times have delayed, while all the [calculated] times come and go...
> O Lord, how long until the end of wonders, which is hidden within Your storehouses, sealed with Your seal?...
> When, O my Rock, shall I come and see the face of God to keep watch in Your halls and to see Your pleasures?
> I am impoverished, how shall I cover myself now that I am uncovered?
> The kingdom of Agag is exalted, my kingdom is brought low.
> Seir does valiantly while the son of my handmaid grows mighty.
> How long, O my Rock, until I too make of my house a threshold for Your steps, bound up with Your heights... [108]

Part of the intense interest which Hallevi and others of his day showed in eschatological speculation was apparently motivated by the non-fulfillment of a widely-held tradition that the end would come one thousand years after the destruction of the Temple. When the expected redemption did not appear, despite the signs of social upheaval already evident in Spain and soon to appear with the Crusades, the longing for it grew even greater. That longing was matched by renewed attempts to calculate the appointed time. Despite the fact that Hallevi did not engage in the "scientific" computations which absorbed the energies of so many of his Andalusian contemporaries, he

certainly shared their longing for the end. In several of his poems, he indicates that the thousand-year calculation was not fulfilled and presents, despite his disappointment, a plea for a speedy deliverance with the accompanying renewal of miracles and prophecy itself. He describes, for example, the despair of Israel, the wandering dove, over her continued travails.

> The dove, afar, she flies about the forests;
> She stumbles, she cannot shake herself free.
> Flying, flittering, fluttering,
> Round about her Beloved she swirls, storm-tossed.
> She reckoned a thousand years for the end
> of her appointed time,
> But she is ashamed of all that she counted upon...[109]

In another poem, which elaborates upon Elijah's role as the messiah's herald, Hallevi articulates this same despair but goes on to ask once more about the impending redemption.

> Our portents linger---
> Where is the God of Elijah? (Mal. 3:23)
> The son who hearkens to His words,
> Crying of violence out of his sorrows,
> Says, Where is the Rock and His years? (Ps. 61:7)
> A thousand years He has not answered him...
> Those watching for signs prophesied---
> How long, until they see the wonderous events,
> When these marvels are performed before them,
> The work of the Lord which is terrible. [110]

Beyond voicing his hope for a revelation regarding the end of the exile, Hallevi records at least one experience which he apparently believed to be a response to this request. The poet describes a "prophetic" dream in which he envisioned the impending downfall of the Moslem empire. He specifically associates that event with the year 1130, very possibly to correspond with another view, prevalent at the time, that the redemption would come approximately five hundred years after

the appearance of Mohammed. By the same token, the date may also reflect a popular feeling that Alphonso VII had sounded the death knell to Moslem domination in Spain when he proclaimed himself "imperator" of all Spain in 1126 and backed up this claim with force. The end of Moslem rule seemed at the time only several years away.[111] In its basic form, this poem is remarkably similar to prophetic oracles against the nations which appear in Scripture. In tone, its gripping sense of immediacy leaves little doubt that Hallevi regarded this dream as a religious experience of great importance. It hardly seems a mere poetic fancy to write a poem of this sort.

> You slept and slumbered, but awoke trembling,
> What is this dream which you have dreamt? (Gen. 37:10)
> Perhaps, your dream has shown you your enemy,
> That he is poor and lowly, while you are exalted!
> Say to the son of Hagar (Ishmael, *i.e.* the Moslems)
> Withdraw your hand of pride
> From the son of your mistress [Sarah] against whom you rage! (Zech. 1:12)
> I have seen you low and desolate in the dream.
> Perhaps in waking you are already desolate,
> And in the year TeTaZ [*i.e.* 1130] shall all your pride be shattered. [TuTaZ]
> You shall be ashamed and confounded by what you have devised.
> Are you he whose name was called "a wild ass of a man"? (Gen. 16:12)
> How heavy is your hand and how strong have you grown!
> Are you called "a mouth speaking great things..." (Dan. 7:8)
> And who "makes war with the holy ones of heaven'? (Dan. 7:21)
> Are you "the miry clay in the feet of iron", (Dan. 2:40)
> Coming at the end [of Daniel's vision] and exalted?
> Perhaps God has smitten you with the stone which destroyed (Dan. 2:34)
> The image and repaid you for what you have done before. (Job 41:3) [112]

In the second half of this poem, Hallevi asks quite self-consciously if what he sees corresponds with Daniel's visions of the four beasts and of the statue destroyed by the Divinely-

hewn stone. His questions apply the same basic test to this dream that Hallevi believed the prophets used to confirm the truth or falsehood of their dreams and visions. He compares it to what other prophets have seen. In the Kuzari, it will be recalled, Hallevi argues that the greatest proof for the truth of prophetic visions is the basic harmony that prevails among the prophets regarding what they have beheld. [113] It appears then that in trying to determine whether his experience was in harmony with the Biblical prophecies regarding the end. the poet wanted to know whether his dream was really a dream vision in the strict sense. At the very least, Hallevi seems to have considered the possibility seriously.

This dream was not Hallevi's last regarding the end of days and the messianic era. In another poem, he describes a rapturous experience similar to Ezekiel's vision of the reconstituted Temple. (Ezek. 40:7) He specifically depicts the sacrificial service in progress and appeals to several of the senses in his account, emphasizing once again the immediacy of his awareness. More important, Hallevi explicitly suggests that this vision is genuinely prophetic and not merely a fantasy or "dark speech."

> My God, Your dwelling places are lovely, (Ps. 84:2)
> Also, Your nearness in vision and not in dark speeches.
> (Num. 12:8)
> My dream brought me to the sanctuaries of God.
> (Ps. 73:17)
> And I beheld His beautiful services;
> And the burnt-offering and meal offering and drink
> offering, (Num. 29:16)
> And round about, heavy clouds of smoke.
> And it was ecstasy to me to hear the Levites' song,
> In their council for the order of services.
> I awoke, and I was yet with Thee, O God,
> And I gave thanks, and it was sweet to thank You.
> (Ps. 139:18) [114]

Hallevi's citation of the phrase "in vision and not in dark speeches" is taken from the Scriptural explanation of the superiority of Moses' prophecy to that of Aaron and Miriam. According to the account in Numbers, God normally reveals Himself to Prophets by visions and by dreams. To Moses, however, God was manifest clearly, literally, "in vision" and not in dark speeches. (Num. 12:6-8) Thus, there seems to be no doubt in the poet's mind that such a vision was truly vouchsafed by God. That Hallevi identified the experience of God's nearness in a dream or trance, and particularly in the context of the Temple precincts, with the experience of prophecy on one of its several levels is twice made clear in the Kuzari. In the first instance, Hallevi describes how the pious man can proceed from deliberately conjuring up awesome visions to experienceing them in fact, like those who occupy the divine degree.

> ...He directs the organ of thought and empties it of all that which has preceded in respect of worldly thoughts. And he commands the imagination to produce the most glorious of existing forms available to him, with the assistance of the memory, in order to resemble the divine thing that is sought after, such as the revelation at Mt. Sinai, the revelation to Abraham and Isaac at Mt. Moriah, the Tabernacle of Moses, the order of the sacrificial service, the descent of the glory upon the Sanctuary, and much else beside this...This moment is the kernel and fruit of his time, while his remaining hours are like the ways which lead to this moment. He longs for its approach, because in it [that moment] he becomes like the spiritual beings and is removed from the animal-like beings. [115]

Those who occupy the level of spiritual beings and have such experiences, are the prophets or pious men who have attained prophecy. In the second passage, we find that Hallevi cites the verse from Numbers 12:8 to stress the fact

that he is speaking of genuine prophecy. The passage is part of his analysis of the geographic and climatological superiority of Palestine as it relates to prophecy.

> ...For that area has an advantage. When one who has met the required religious conditions happens upon it, those [spiritual] forms will be plainly visible ["seen eye to eye"], "clearly and not in dark speeches" (Num. 12:8), just as the Tabernacle, the order of the sacrificial service, the land of Canaan and its parts, appeared to Moses...[116]

We have no way of knowing when Hallevi's poem about the Temple dream was written or if the poet was within the environs of the Holy Land at the time. We can only say that by the time Hallevi had begun to write the Kuzari, no later than 1140,[117] the association between the land and religious experiences of this sort was firmly established in his mind. Indeed, his own hope for personal salvation and for the ultimate redemption of Israel came to center more and more upon the importance of emigrating to Palestine.

> ...And all my thoughts will be terrified at Sinai,
> My eyes and my heart at Mt. Abarim.
> How shall I not weep and pour forth my tears,
> Since from there I hope for the raising of the dead...?
> The place of miracles and the fountain of prophecies,
> Their faces reflecting the glory of the Lord.[118]

> He will renew His wonders when you renew
> Before Him the dancing song of Mahli and Mushi.
> (Levitical families who served in the Tabernacle,
> Num. 3:33)
> He will restore the souls to the bodies.
> The dry bones will come to life.[119]

The saving vision to which Hallevi aspired had more than merely personal religious significance for him. His ge'ulah poems show again and again in intense preoccupation with visions of the end of the exile, the coming of the messiah, the final judgment, and the reconstitution of Israel's intimate

relationship with God in a new Sanctuary. It seems quite clear that Hallevi's aim was to learn when these events might occur. But instead of computing the end in terms of a mechanistic conception of both history and nature, as many of his rationalist colleagues in the courtier class were doing, Hallevi sought what he considered to be a more definitive and reliable source for such knowledge. He sought a prophetic vision or dream which would reveal the time of the redemption and perhaps how it might come to pass.

Were such a vison to occur, he would have a sound basis indeed for restoring the people's lost hopes. The truth of the Jewish religion would be vindicated both by the renewal of prophecy and by the eventual fulfillment of its predictions. Beyond this, such a prophecy would leave the enemies of Israel confounded and fearful with anticipation. Both Christians and Moslems would be at a loss to explain such a phenomenon occurring among the despised Jews. Moreover, Jews would presumably be able decisively to refute the philosophic detractors of Judaism both inside and outside its ranks by ultimately pointing to the public, empirical, direct and miraculous redemption itself which would doubtless follow upon a <u>true</u> prophecy. Thus a true dream or vision regarding the messianic end of days, once it were known and well publicized, could have enormous social, religious, and even political repercussions. The anticipation of such an experience, needless to say, might very well induce one to undertake daring and dangerous risks in order to attain it.

CHAPTER VI
Biographical Implications of Hallevi's Poetic and Philosophic Treatment of Prophecy

Judah Hallevi's decison to leave Andalusia and brave the dangers of both sea and land travel in order to settle in Palestine was an act of unusual daring. He was well into his fifties and very possibly past sixty when he embarked for Egypt in the spring or summer of 1140. Behind him, he left considerable wealth earned as a physician, a daughter and young grandson, and a well-established and highly-respected position within the courtier circles of Lucena, Seville, Toledo, and Cordova. True, his wife and many of his youthful friends and associates had died in the years preceding his departure. Judah ibn Ezra, Isaac ibn Ezra, Baruch ibn Albalia, Joseph ibn Ezra, Solomon ibn Ferruziel and ultimately Moses ibn Ezra, who first encouraged Hallevi's poetic endeavors, were gone. Also, the upheavals created by the Christian reconquista and the Almoravide and Almohode reactions to it probably persuaded Hallevi that the courtier life of Andalusia was no longer as stable as it once was. Nevertheless, he could have anticipated spending his last years in relative safety and ease, for such were the privileges of his class. By choosing instead to renounce these privileges in favor of aliyah, he invited the chilling prospects of capture by pirates, death at sea, the hardships of travel in alien lands, and ultimately settlement in a devastated country ruled by avowedly hostile and brutal Christian knights. It was not unusual, then,that this decision by so

eminent and admired a figure as Judah Hallevi should provoke widespread discussion and many attempts to dissuade him from his course. Indeed, Hallevi bitterly castigates those of his associates who "call their lies 'beliefs' and call the sign of my belief 'superstition.'" [1] Apparently more than a few felt he had lost his mind. Others were more restrained in their response, and for them Hallevi wrote poems not only to praise the Holy Land but to justify his decision to settle there. But by and large, Hallevi's decision was greeted with much surprise and disapproval.

Our central question is what prompted this gifted poet and religious thinker to undertake such a venture, despite both the danger and criticism which it entailed? The question admits of no ready answer. Neither in his poems nor in the statements of the Jewish sage in the Kuzari, does Hallevi provide us with an unequivocal declaration of his intentions. We have no more than a few intriguing hints, but no definitive answer. Our aim in this chapter is to survey briefly the various explanations scholars have advanced to account for Hallevi's aliyah and to submit our own conclusion based on the evidence we have examined in this study.

David Kaufmann, in a famous essay on Judah Hallevi, stresses the poet's desire to atone for the sins of his youth as the central motivation for his departure from Spain.[2] Basing himself on a large number of Hallevi's poems and the concluding remarks of the Jewish sage in the Kuzari,[3] Kaufmann argues that the poet was burdened by an overwhelming sense of guilt largely because of his misuse of the Hebrew language. Apparently, this misuse was identical with the

imposition of Arabic metric and rhyme schemes upon the natural rhythms of classical Hebrew.[4] A second source of this guilt was Hallevi's alleged denial of the fundamental principles of Judaism while he was a young student of philosophy. Kaufmann finds evidence for this youthful rebellion in one of the Jewish sage's comments to the Khazar.

> Who is there among us with a soul so strong that it is not deceived with respect to the opinions that come to it from natural scientists, astrologers, possessors of talismans, sorcerers, proponents of the eternity of the world, philosophers and others, and who will not arrive at belief until he first passes beyond many of the opinions of the heretics? Life is short and the labor is great. Rather, there are but a few for whom belief comes by nature, for whom all of those opinions are rejected, and in whose minds the cause of their error is immediately apparent.[5]

Although this passage does not constitute proof of apostasy, it nonetheless displays a real understanding of the difficulties involved in attaining faith after an exposure to philosophy. Moreover, the possibility of such a philosophic denial would help to explain Hallevi's excellent knowledge of the philosopher's views, a knowledge which would be more profound if it stemmed from identification with the material rather than mere acquaintance with it.[6] Hallevi acted as a penitent, Kaufmann maintains, and undertook his voyage for essentially private, personal reasons.

Differing views are held by Yitzhak Baer, Gerson Cohen, and Hayyim Schirmann. These scholars argue that Hallevi's decision to leave Spain for the Holy Land represented a thoroughgoing rejection of Andalusian courtier life.[7] Hallevi, they maintain, had come to regard the services which the grandees of the Jewish community provided for their Moslem

and Christian overlords as so much idol worship. Foolishly, the Jewish notables put their trust in princes and not in God. It was futile for them to think that they could truly win the favor of these rulers.[8] On the contrary, the Jewish notables were played with as captive birds in a cage. Whenever it suited the interests of the monarchs, they would be dismissed, imprisoned, or put to death.

This revolt against the political self-delusion of the upper class also led Hallevi to turn against the philosophy and artistic tastes which the courtiers had cultivated. He renounced the cosmopolitan relativism which considered all religious forms as unessential for living the good life. He attacked the prevailing rationalism which, to him,read false interpretations into both Scripture and the rabbinic tradition or substituted a host of conflicting views of reality for the truth provided by revelation. Even the prevailing form of messianic speculation, characteristic of Andalusian Jewry, was alien to Hallevi's temperament. The calculations of the end of days, in which so many of his contemporaries were engaged, reflected the same mechanistic conceptions of both the universe and history which were the hallmark of the rationalists in Jewish high society.[9] These were the very conceptions which Hallevi challenged so forcefully in his Kuzari. Lastly, Hallevi turned against the Arabic styles of meter and rhyme, of which he had become the foremost Jewish master. He eventually denounced such styles as a harmful influence upon the Hebrew language and advocated a return to the original cadences of Biblical verse. In Spain,

imitation, artificiality, fawning and flattery had become a way of life. Hallevi's decision to emigrate to Palestine merely placed the final seal upon his progressive alienation from the program and lifestyle of the courtier class. He left Spain, Schirmann suggests, out of general disappointment with diaspora life. Aliyah, so conceived,was a public act of repudiation of the courtier life.

An essentially different view is found in Ben Zion Dinaburg's essay, "Judah Hallevi's Aliyah to the Land of Israel and the Messianic Ferment During His Lifetime," and is alluded to by Schirmann as a second reason for the poet's departure.[10] Basing his argument primarily on Hallevi's poetry, Dinaburg (Dinur) claims that the poet was intimately involved in the messianic speculation of his time and that his aliyah to Palestine was intended to help force the end. Over the years, Hallevi apparently became convinced that the longed-for redemption would come only after Jews left their homes in the diaspora and settled in the Land of Israel. If he could successfully persuade others of this prerequisite for messianic fulfillment, a large-scale emigration would presumably follow and eventually bring about the desired end of days. For the people of Israel remained chosen, even in the exile. The mission of the Jews was to facilitate the progressive improvement of the nations and to bring them to the land of the prophets by clarifying the nature and workings of prophecy. Redemption follows upon the fulfillment of this mission namely, the activation of prophecy within Israel itself. The re-emergence of prophecy thus becomes a precondition for and a

cause of the messianic age. Hallevi, Dinaburg argues, saw his own aliyah as a kind of demonstration of this new messianic conception. He intended it to point the way to the redemption, just as he wished his poetry to serve as the propaganda for encouraging the participation of others. The poet's decision to leave Spain, then was first and foremost a public act of faith.

Eliezer Schweid also sees Hallevi's decision as a public act, but influenced mainly by the example of the Crusades.[11] Both Moslems and Christians had expended tremendous resources in their attempt to defend their claims to the Holy Land and to win control of it. The poet, Schweid suggests, thought it only appropriate that Jews should demonstrate their own claim to the land and devotion for it by establishing a visible presence in Palestine. Israel was thus obliged to use its own resources to return to the Land. Hallevi saw his own act as a sign to his entire generation that the obligation could be fulfilled. The ultimate effect of such an act could revive the spirit of the entire people and hasten the messianic end.

A rather novel view has recently appeared in an article by Aaron Komaim entitled, "Between Poetry and Prophecy."[12] Surveying Hallevi's poetry, Komaim argues that the decision to leave Spain was motivated chiefly by the poet's desire to obtain true prophecy on its highest level. Citing a number of poems that were written while Hallevi was in his forties, Komaim notes that the poet regarded his youth as essentially vain and worthless. The onset of middle age apparently aroused in him a desire for self-purification from the vanities of the

courtly life. In this account, Hallevi is portrayed having aspired to prophecy while he was still in Spain and having, in fact, achieved it, albeit in a defective form, with his dream vision of the fall of Islam. This dream represented the peak of his awakening from the "sleep of this world"; its clash with reality in the year 1130 struck the low point of his hopes. It was presumably in the years following this great disappointment that Hallevi grew in the conviction that aliyah was absolutely necessary if he were to achieve his true aim.

> ...Judah Hallevi left Spain, not in order to merit prophecy, but because he had already merited prophecy---a defective prophecy, but susceptible to correction. No rational argument---personal, political, philosophic, or messianic, was able to remove Judah Hallevi from his place. Only a startling, mystical-prophetic experience, an experience that was not yet exhausted, in Hallevi's feeling, was able to move him to make his way to the Land of Israel... The seeds of Judah Hallevi's life experience are hidden, as we have said, neither in the Kuzari, nor in his letters, but in his poetry.

In essence, Hallevi embarked upon his journey to the Holy Land not merely to seek personal communion with the Deity, but to re-establish the classic tradition of prophecy which he had already merited. He sought to address himself to his beleagured community and bring them the divine consolation they longed for. Such a role was possible only in the Land. His decision to emigrate, then, was a personal act with ultimate public significance. He could learn of the impending end and prepare all Israel for it.

Kaufmann's explanation for Hallevi's aliyah is a very plausible one, but takes no real account of those poems in

which Hallevi expresses his longing for personal religious experience and knowledge of the messianic fulfillment. Although his argument has excellent support in both the Kuzari and Hallevi's poetry, he fails to consider an additional reason for the poet's departure mentioned in the Kuzari: namely, his desire to obtain God's favor or pleasure. This expression connotes not only Divine approbation but also the experience of saving visions and true dreams.[14] It is not by accident that Hallevi concludes his philosophic work by having the Khazar king observe that God examines the heart, knows what is hidden, and reveals what is concealed. The Jewish sage responds by suggesting that such favor must be earned and that one who has earned it merits a "visible reward" for his labors. He ends with several verses dealing with the sounding of trumpets as a memorial before God---an image with clear messianic implications.[15] Cohen in particular passes over his dimension of Hallevi's motivation for aliyah, ruling it out of consideration and overstating his own case for Hallevi's rejection of the courtier life. While Hallevi's disillusionment with the members of his class in Andalusia is undisputed, his basic sympathy for these men appears very clearly in the Kuzari. All his letters and poems written in Egypt indicate that Hallevi was still quite willing to partake of the courtly pleasures.[16] Hallevi did not become merely a gloomy, penitent pilgrim by any means. Moreover, as we have seen, the re-nunciation of attempts to compute the end does not necessarily entail a refusal to engage in such speculation by other means, such as mysticism and prophecy.

Baer and Schirmann seem to allow for this possibility, but Cohen does not. [17] Dinaburg's analysis takes full note of the messianic aspect of Hallevi's decision to emigrate, but provides little convincing evidence that Hallevi's aim was to force the end. While the poet certainly hoped others would follow his example, it seems quite unlikely that he envisioned a large-scale aliyah, particularly in the light of the many critical reactions to his own decision. He could serve as an example at best, but hardly as the leader of a new movement. Hallevi's songs of Zion can hardly be regarded as political propaganda. Schweid's observations appear largely unconvincing in view of the few hints Hallevi did give regarding his purposes. The poet could hardly have submitted a credible claim to the land on behalf of Israel by his own isolated action.

Our own conclusion is substantially similar to that of Komaim, but differs from it in two respects, one procedural and the other substantive. Komaim takes virtually no account of Hallevi's discussion of prophecy in the Kuzari nor of the poet's personal letters. His explanation is based chiefly upon selections from Hallevi's poetry. He relies only upon the internal coherence of the poetic sources to establish the truth of his conclusion, without any control factor embodying Hallevi's considered opinions against which to test his findings. This strikes us as a serious as a serious shortcoming because it allows for an overly subjective interpretation of his sources. A good example of this tendency is the substantive point to which we alluded above. Komaim

suggests that Hallevi not only aspired to prophecy prior to his departure from Spain, which appears to be true, but that he has already merited it. He contends, in short, that Hallevi considered himself a prophet, largely because of his dream about the downfall of the Moslem empire. This argument seems faulty because Hallevi explicitly maintains in the Kuzari that genuine prophets have true dreams and visions.[18] A "defective vision" simply could not be genuine prophecy in Hallevi's eyes. This being the case, Hallevi's motivation for aliyah would be considerably less inflated with delusions of his attainment than Komaim leads us to believe.

In our view, Hallevi chose to leave Spain primarily because he aspired to prophecy and was convinced that it could be achieved, if at all, only in the Holy Land. Very probably, his specific aim was to acquire reliable knowledge of the time of the redemption, especially after the date mentioned in his dream proved to be utterly groundless. Such knowledge, he believed, belonged to God alone, but might nonetheless be given to man in a true dream or vision if all of the appropriate preconditions, propounded in the Kuzari, were met. The various religious experiences to which Hallevi alludes while still in Spain seem to have convinced him that he had reached the level of those pious individuals who stood just beneath that of the prophets. In the Holy Land, he suggests, these pious actions could become truly perfect and God-pleasing. It was there that he could nurture a genuine hope for reward.

Yet Hallevi was perfectly aware that what he sought was most extraordinary and very possibly beyond his capacity to attain. He was particularly sensitive to the sins of his youth, which he mentions both in his poetry and in the concluding chapters of the Kuzari. Indeed, several of his references to having forsaken God make Kaufmann's suggestion of youthful heresy quite plausible. We have already seen how Hallevi views sin and impurity as impediments to revelation.

> ...I met You and said---This is my Healer
> But from the day I forsook Him, I grew ill.
> I rejoiced to be supported by Your cords (Prov. 5:22)
> I called out but was not answered... [19]

Hallevi gives the impression of having made a spiritual odyssey from doubt, in which the miracle-working God of Scripture seemed alien to his view of reality, to a renewed faith in the truth of the Jewish belief structure, even though his appeals to God went unanswered. In basic outline, such a life pattern is distinctly similar to that found in Hallevi's description of Abraham.[20] The patriarch, according to an ancient tradition, originally engaged in astrology and speculation, but gradually grew toward religious faith because of his persistent examination of these beliefs. But while Abraham was ultimately rewarded with prophecy after disregarding his astrological preoccupations and setting foot in Canaan, Hallevi apparently had serious doubts about whether such an outcome were possible for him. This doubt emerges from his explicit self-reproach for aspiring to such an exalted level and to its great secret.

> Rise up, O my heart, for who stands in the secret counsel (Jer. 23:18)

When He who weighs the heart arises. (Prov. 21:2)
Do not break through (the bounds) to gaze upon
what is hidden. (Ex. 19:21, 24)
Cease from (striving after) the wonders of the Rock,
For you have no permission regarding the Foundation.
Go down from being His messenger, and do not (Prov. 25:6)
Stand in the place of the great! [21]

From the negative stance of this self-rebuke, it seems clear that Hallevi aspired to prophecy, to be included among those "great ones" who gazed upon God's secrets and served as His messengers. The reproach, in effect, reveals the true aim. Other sources, which we have already seen, provide more positive, direct evidence that Hallevi hoped for prophetic visions and dreams. One poem in particular, a petitionary devotion for the morning service, seems to capsulize the basic elements of his conception of prophecy and his conviction that such an experience was possible to attain.

You knew me before You formed me. (Jer. 1:5)
And so long as Your spirit is within me, You keep
me.
Have I any place to stand if You drive me out?
Is there any going forth for me if You restrain me?
And what can I say, since my thought is in Your
hand?
And what can I do until You help me?
I have sought You: in a time of favor answer me.
And as with a shield, cover me with Your favor.
(Ps. 5:13)
Raise me up to seek Your sanctuary early.
Wake me to bless Your name. [22]

The opening verse is from Jeremiah's inaugural vision, in which he is commissioned to be a prophet and told that this role was his destiny even before birth. Interestingly enough, this same verse appears once in the Kuzari in connection with Abraham. [23] After the patriarch had discovered by meditation both the power and unity of the Godhead, Hallevi suggests that God revealed Himself to Abraham in prophecy,

established His covenant with him, and pronounced the very words of this verse to him. In effect, this first prophetic experience told Abraham that he was appointed to be a prophet. With or without a similar experience, Hallevi seems to have shared this conviction about his own destiny. Hallevi goes on to note that he is protected so long as God's spirit is within him; this is an attribute that is particularly characteristic of prophets and pious men. Moreover, just as the prophet at the moment of his prophecy is able to speak and perform only what God commands, [24] Hallevi's sequence of rhetorical questions suggests that he longed for precisely this kind of religious experience. He acknowledges having sought God. He requests a response and specifically wishes to be "covered" round about with God's favor (or pleasure). [25] Finally, by asking to be awakened, the poet calls for that which is synonymous with prophecy itself. [26] The final gift could come from God alone. Only one step remained to be taken in order to be fully prepared for prophecy ---aliyah.

No doubt Hallevi's decision to leave Spain was facilitated in part by his progressive alienation from the courtier class and its cultural life. As is evident from the Kuzari and Hallevi's poems, he found neither political stability nor religious certainty in the communities of Andalusia, and concluded,it seems, that his salvation lay in the land which contained the "gate of heaven." This belief is the essence of a letter by Hallevi to Samuel, the Nagid of Egypt, which has recently made its appearance. It states the poet's reasons for aliyah

more explicitly than any other document now extant. The text is corrupt in several places, but its general line of thought seems clear.

> ...Peace, peace, from the servant of the Lord and the servant of my lord, Judah Hal[levi]. Spain is his country, but Jerusalem is his aim. I will sing [its] praise[s] before His mercy. And I will stand hoping before Him, "What does my Lord bid His servant?" (Josh. 5:14) Now my tongue shall speak to the ear[s] of my lord the odes of my thoughts which have driven me from my habitations...And the much-lauded Greek wisdom, whose end is only to confound, appears to enlighten, but really destroys. This one says that, and that one says [this]. (I Kings 22:20) This one praises merriment, the harp, and the psaltery (Eccl. 8:15), while that one says, "It is better to go to the house of mourning." (Eccl. 7:2) And yet another says, "This too is vanity." (Eccl. 2:19) Disputes have multiplied [among the philosophers] and doubts [have grown], along with darkness and smooth sophistries. (Ps. 35:6) No one decided, no one declared, no one even announced [with certainty] until the clear and pure Torah came to open the eyes and ears. It made their counsels appear foolish and spoiled their schemes, saying: "You turn things upsidedown." (Isa. 29:16) "You give counsel according to your own way." (Sanh. 6b) [But] "My thoughts are not your thoughts, nor your ways My ways." (Isa. 55:8) There is neither wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel before the Lord. (Prov. 21:30) Not every living soul is a man, not every man is an Israelite. Not all Israelites are priests, nor all priests Moses and Aaron. Not all the earth is Canaan, and not all of Canaan is the gate of heaven...and he who turns aside [from his path] to greet you [O. Rabbi Samuel] leaves "none to guide her." (Isa. 51:18) [27]

Once again Hallevi states his dissatisfaction with the conflicting views of the philosophers regarding the good life. Their disputes merely create confusion and heresy, but he seeks the kind of certainty which only intimate knowledge and prolonged observance of the Torah within Palestine would bring. Significantly, Hallevi concludes with an epitome of the central affirmations of the Kuzari, which explicitly

rejects the cosmopolitan notions of the Spanish-Jewish elite regarding both the common nature of all human beings and the peripheral significance of the Holy Land to Jewish life. By reiterating the graded levels of distinction between human beings generally, Israelites, priests (to whose class he belonged by birth) and prophets within the context of his reason for aliyah, Hallevi appears to give us yet another indication of what his goal really was. A pilgrimage to the Land of Israel would fulfill the last of his own pre-requisites for attaining the level of prophecy. His reference, once again, to Jerusalem as the "gate of heaven"---the name consistently used in connection with prophecy---and to himself as the Lord's servant seem to confirm this. His parting words, that the delay of his journey would leave none to guide Jerusalem, further suggests that Hallevi saw his role as that of a guide for his community. In the Kuzari, as we have noted, he described this task as one of the central functions of the prophet [28] and, indeed, admitted that without the prophets (and the priests) acting as the leaders and counsellors of the people, Israel has become like a body without a head. [29] It would seem then that Hallevi wished to restore some remnant of this leadership. While his letter is not altogether as direct as we might wish, it nevertheless appears to support our view, especially when it is read in the context of Hallevi's other writings. The aim of Hallevi's aliyah, we conclude, was the attainment of a messianic prophecy.

Judah Hallevi's theory of prophecy,as it emerges from

both the Kuzari and his poems, was not intended simply as an analysis of a distant and ancient phenomena. Rather, it was designed to establish acceptable criteria for verifying the beliefs of a living religion. These beliefs had been called into question from many quarters. Christians and Moslems denied Israel's claim to possess the true means to salvation. Karaites challenged the religious authority of the non-Pentateuchal elements of Judaism and dismissed all messianic hopes as baseless. Philosophic critics denied the possibility of revelation, providence, and miracles altogether. And the depredations of exile belied Israel's claim to chosenness. Hallevi recognized the seriousness of these intellectual challenges. He saw that both the existence and cohesion of the Jewish community were intimately related to the credibility of the Jewish belief structure now under assault. A breakdown in this structure represented a substantial threat to the community. Consequently, Judah Hallevi undertook to defend these beliefs in the Kuzari in a vigorous and forthright manner. He did so, however, not simply because these beliefs were "traditional," nor even because he believed them practical and necessary to preserve the Jewish community, but because he thought they were true. The theory of prophecy he presents in the Kuzari was designed to show why he, and any other reasonable man, could believe in their truth. In his religious poetry, on the other hand, we find that he expresses a desire to act upon this theory as a program by which to achieve both saving religious experiences for himself and knowledge of when all Jews might share this reward.

Convinced that God-pleasing acts would truly bring Divine favor, Hallevi chose the uncertain and dangerous path of pilgrimage to win the salvation he felt Spain could never provide. Only thus could he become the servant of whom he wrote, loving "the object of his worship, ready to sacrifice himself for His love, since he finds the pleasantness of being attached to Him is as great as the harm and distress of being distant from Him..." [30]

Footnotes

Chapter I.

1. Baer, "Ha-Mazav Ha-Politi shel Yehudei Sepharad B'Doro shel Rabbi Yehudah Hallevi," p. 6.

2. Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, I, pp. 46-7.

3. Baer, "Ha-Mazav Ha-Politi...," p. 7. Included in Pope Alexander II's promises to the knights of France that they could win salvation if they marched against the Muslims of Spain, was an order to let the captured Jews dwell in safety.

4. Ibid., p. 20. See also Baron, "Yehudah Halevi: An Answer to an Historic Challenge," pp. 252-3.

5. Emil Berger. Das Problem der Erkenntnis in der Religions-philosophie Jehuda Hallewi's, p. 19. "Already at the beginning of Arab apologetics, Jews are named as supporters of every kind of religious skepticism. From the beginning of the eleventh century, we have among the writings of Abu Mohammed Ali b. Ahmed (994-1064) who became famous under the name ibn Hazm, the first report about Jews who affirmed the possibility of the abrogation" (of the Torah). See also Schreiner, "Zur Geschichte der Polemik zwischen Juden und Mohammedanern."

6. Hallevi is aware of this when he mentions the relative ease involved in becoming a convert. At the same time he suggests that observance of the commandments is the most effective safeguard against the Jewish courtiers becoming converts. "But I think of the prominent men among us who are able to cast off this degradation and servitude by a word which they could utter without any effort and return free men and turn against those who subjugate them, but they do not do this on account of their observance of the Torah." (underline mine) Kuzari IV:23 p. 234. All page references to the Kuzari are taken from the Zifronowitz edition, Warsaw, 1911, and hereafter referred to as K.

7. With the outbreak of the Crusades, this type of speculation became widespread. Solomon b. Simeon, a chronicler of the First Crusade, calculated the coming of the messiah at the end of the 256th cycle (1096-1104) to be followed by the return of the exiles to the land of Israel. In 1117, in Cordova, a certain Ibn Aryeh was named as the long awaited messiah. Not long before the Almohade invasion (ca. 1127), Moses al Dari announced in Lucena that the messiah had already appeared. In Andalusia and Fez he advised Jews to sell their property and prepare to migrate to Palestine under the messiah's leadership on the first night of Passover. Johannan ibn Daud of Toledo published manuscripts of an old

apocalypse of the Final Struggle in which it was predicted that the end would come between 1179 and 1186. About 1129, Abraham b. Hiyya published his famous Megillat Ha-Migalleh which analysed the signs of the impending redemption he saw in the attacks of the Turkish Emir, Zenghi, upon territories held by the Crusaders. According to Bar Hiyya, the advent of the messiah would be as early as 1136. And not least of all, Judah Hallevi himself speculated in one of his poems that the fall of the Moslem Empire, which would usher in the days of the messiah, would occur in 1130. See also Baer, A History of the Jews . . ., I, pp. 65 ff.; Silver, A History of Messianic Speculation in Israel, pp. 58-80; and Mann, "Messianic Movements During the Crusades," pp. 243 ff.

8. K I:2,3, pp. 16-17. The Khazar king observes that if the purity of one's intentions alone were sufficient to bring salvation, the Christians and Moslems would not be locked in conflict, for each side serves God with pure intentions. They fight, rather because they believe that pious works bring one nearer to God.

9. Eliezer Schweid. "Am Yisrael W'Erez Yisrael B'Mishnato shel Rabbi Yehudah Hallevi," p. 6.

10. K V:16, p. 287.

11. Ibid., IV:19, pp. 232-33.

12. Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, p. 99. Leo Strauss claims that Hallevi's teaching and that of the typical kalam belong to the same genus and differ only in the sense that Hallevi is more strongly anti-theoretical and in favor of "simple faith" (Strauss's term) than the kalam thinker. This appears to me to miss the point. For the similarity in aim is more than overshadowed by a fundamental difference in method. The masters of the kalam do not offer empirical arguments to establish the truth of Islam. Moreover, while it is quite true that Judah Hallevi is anti-theoretical so far as speculative philosophy is concerned, he is hardly an advocate of simple faith. He fully accepts the demand for evidence as a prerequisite to faith and he offers very compelling evidence, for his time, to satisfy that demand.

13. K IV:3, pp. 206-7.

14. Only Solomon ibn Gabirol's Mekor Hayyim takes the dialogical form. But the dialogue is essentially artless, merely a series of brief questions and lengthy answers between a student and his teacher. It may be that this form was adopted to express the esoteric character of the subject which was to be transmitted only on a direct, one-to-one basis, characteristic of the student-tutor relationship, and only in answer to

the questions of the student rather than by outright exposition on the part of the teacher.

15. Heinemann. "Halak Ha-Raayonot shel Hatholat Sefer Ha-Kuzari," p. 239.

16. K , I:1, p. 11. Cf. Strauss, Persecution..., pp. 104-5.

17. Strauss, Persecution..., pp. 101-2. While the conversion of the Khazars, mentioned in the exchange of letters, may very well have been a fabrication by ibn Shaprut, it was nevertheless believed to be true in Hallevi's day.

18. K I:1, pp. 9-10

19. The king's dream is paralleled specifically by the Jewish scholar's account of the revelation at Sinai and the parable of the King of India used to explain it. These points will be discussed in detail below.

20. That dreams were thought to belong to the same category as prophecy, differing only in the degree of truth apprehended, is well-known from many ancient sources. The Talmud confirms this view when it describes the dream as a sixtieth part of prophecy. (Ber. 57a) Hallevi shares this view, and frequently speaks of true dreams when he discusses prophecy and other forms of genuine religious experience. See Kuzari, I:1, 4, II:50, and III:53, pp. 15, 17, 115 and 188.

21. Schweid, "Am Yisrael W'Erez Yisrael..," pp. 6-7

22. Strauss, Persecution..., p. 114.

23. K , I:2, p. 16.

24. K I:98, II:46, and III:23, pp. 54, 104, and 163.

25. Schweid correctly observes that Hallevi assumed his readers to share the perspective of the dream, to the extent that they were educated in a tradition based on revelation, but that this revelation, was comprehended, so to speak, several points removed from the source. Because it was not an immediate experience for his generation, it lacked compelling power. This is why the king chooses to consider the views of philosophy at the very beginning of the dialogue and even as late as Book V. He is consistently honest and critical with respect to all he learns. Thus, insofar as he cannot reach the highest level of faith, namely, prophetic insight, which would presumably remove all his doubts, he continues to rely on the views of the philosophers to answer several of his questions. Eliezer Schweid,

"Ha-Mibneh Ha-Sifruti shel Ha-Ma'amar Ha-Rishon shel Sefer Ha-Kuzari," p. 260-1, footnote #10. So we find the king declaring in Kuzari,V:1 (261) "...Because I lacked the highest degree, clarity of faith without investigation, I previously had doubts and views of my own, and discussions with the philosophers and proponents of various doctrines and religions. It is best for me that I learn and sharpen myself in responding to absurd and foolish opinions. For tradition alone is good only in conjunction with the good heart [soul] but given the evil condition of the heart, investigation is better, the more so when investigation leads to belief in that tradition. Then the two degrees, namely knowledge and tradition, are combined together.

26. Ibid., p. 263

27. K V:19, p. 292. "And there is no doubt that what you have mentioned, regarding the soul, the intellect, and these beliefs, is cited from what you recall from other sources."

28. S. Landauer, "Die Psychologie des Ibn Sina." p. 335-418, particularly pp. 335-6.

29. K V:13, p. 281.

30. K V:12, p. 272.

31. K V:10, p. 270. "And whatever being possesses these capacities--growth, reproduction, and receiving nourishment--which is not moved by local motion, is guided by nature, according to the words of the philosophers...But when the mixture of elements is even finer and prepared for the divine wisdom to be more apparent in it, it is fit for an additional form, other than the natural powers, so that it will reach its food from a distance, and have all its limbs interrelated, moveable only by its desire, be in greater control of its parts than the plant, which is not able to protect itself from damage nor pursue what is beneficial to it but which the wind plays with. It will become an animal, having the limbs which move it about in any given place, and that form which is given to it over and above nature is called: soul."

32. K V:12, p. 273.

33. K II:26, p. 97

34. K V:12, pp. 272-3. Hallevi deletes the earlier reference to the soul as a primary perfection in this definition, but there is no reason to doubt that he intended it to remain part of the definition. The soul is still the principle from which various activities flow, as the latter part of the definition suggests.

34a. K V:12, p. 272.

35. K II:26, p. 297.

36. K V:12, ha-margasha ha-mishtatefet or koak yezuri, p. 274.

37. K V:12, p. 275. The taste of honey does not in itself reveal that honey has a gold color, nor does the sight of honey indicate that it is necessarily sweet to taste. The common sense combines the various individual sense date into one unified perception.

38. K V: 12, p. 274.

39. K V:12, p. 275.

40. K V:12, p. 275.

41. K III:5, p. 141. Hallevi describes the pious man as being entirely in control of his physical and mental powers and particularly the imagination. Were this not the case, he could easily be subject to wild fantasies.

42. K V:12, p. 276.

43. K V:12, p. 276.

44. K V:12, p. 277. Hallevi identifies the Neoplatonic Universal Intellect with Aristotle's concept of the Active Intellect. The latter is intended here.

45. K V:12, p. 278.

46. K V:12, p. 278.

47. K V:12, pp. 278-79.

48. K V:12, pp. 279-80.

49. K V:12, p. 281.
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50. K V:12, p. 276. Cf. Wolfson, "Notes on the Proofs for the Existence of God in Jewish Philosophy," p. 579.

51. K V:12, p. 276.

52. K V:13, pp. 283-85.

53. K I:8, p. 21. The Khazar king, in response to the Moslem scholar, expresses the basic problem involved in any affirmation of Divine revelation. "It is not simple to acknowledge the view that the Creator has any association with men except by a miracle [demonstration]through which the nature of things is contravened." At this point in the dialogue, the king knows nothing of any "inner eye."

54. Hallevi's conception of the "inner eye" closely parallels Al Gazzali's conception of an additional religious faculty, also an eye, which belongs to both the prophets and the pious. It apprehends by intuition, and what it knows it knows as a certainty. It is generally agreed that Hallevi was familiar with Al Gazzali's work and influenced by him. Cf. Kaufmann. Geschichte der Attributenlehre, pp. 119-140 and Baneth, "Rabbi Yehudah Hallevi and Alghazzali," p. 325.

55. K I:95, 103, pp. 48-9, 57-8. We shall later take up the question of the prophet's place in the great chain of being. It suffices to note here that, for Hallevi, those endowed with this "inner eye," while human in other respects,are essentially different from ordinary human beings with respect to the knowing structure. Those who possessed this faculty thus constituted an entirely new species of mortal.

56. K IV:3, pp. 214-15.

57. K IV:3, p. 217. Also, "they undoubtedly saw that divine world with the inner eye," p. 216.

58. K I:95, p. 48.

59. K V:21, p. 303.

60. K IV:3, p. 215.

61. Hartwig Hirschfeld. Das Buch Al Chazari des Abu-l-Hassan Jehudah Hallewi im Arabischen Urtext Sowie in der Hebraischen Übersetzung des Jehudah Ibn Tibbon, p. 283. Hirschfeld accepts the Tibbonide translation in his English translation of the text, Book of Kuzari, 1905, p. 183, as does Cassel, Das Buch Kuzari des Jehudah ha-Levi, p. 312. Kaufman, however, disagrees. He proposes the translation that I have presented above. Cf. David Kaufmann. Geschichte der Attributenlehre, p. 203, and note 181.

62. See Moscato to this passage, K IV:3 (Vienna edition, p. 32), and also Isidore Epstein, "Judah Halevi as Philosopher." Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, 25, 1935, p. 213. "It is true that those who are gifted with that inner eye cannot divorce themselves entirely from the imaginative faculty that presents to their mind grand and aweful sights, bringing them in touch with things of the intelligible world and revealing to them unmistakeable truths, but these are entirely under the control of the intellect."

63. K IV:3, pp. 214-15.

64. Kaufmann, Attributelehre..., p. 208. Julius Guttmann also recognizes this in his article "Ha-Yahas Bayn Ha-Dat

W'Ha-Filosofia L'fi Rabbi Yehudah Hallevi," Dat U-Mada, p. 75. "Just as we cannot perceive the soul of man directly, but need to consider bodily phenomena through which the activity of the soul may be recognized, so not even the prophet can apprehend the presence of God amidst purely spiritual activity."

65. K I:87, pp. 43-5. The Jewish scholar distinctly emphasizes that Moses' prophecy was not imagined while asleep or even between sleeping and waking. Nor did he only hear the voice of an individual speaking to him "in his mind" rather than with his ears or see with his thoughts and not with his eyes. He is clearly aware of the possibilities for error implicit in subjective experiences of this sort. It is for this reason also that Hallevi gives Mosaic prophecy less prominence than the common experience of all the Israelites at Sinai.

66. K IV:3, p. 215.

67. K IV:3, p. 219.

68. Kaufmann, Attributenlehre..., p. 166. "Still, he does not lose himself in a labyrinth of mysticism; even where he does not give reason the right to speak, he is able to clad his expressions in the language of 'sensual observation,' in the language of reason. But it is a very visionary thought to which he gives himself, and, in many ways, the seed, which eventually comes to fruition in the Kabbalah, is found here."

69. K IV:6, pp. 222-3.

70. K I:13, IV:25, V:14, pp. 222-3, 248-9, 285-7.

71. K V:14, p. 281.

72. K IV:17, p. 217.

73. K V:14, p. 285.

74. K V:14, IV:13, pp. 286, 227. Cf. Strauss, Persecution..., p. 107. "A merely defensive attitude on the part of the philosopher is impossible; his alleged ignorance is actually doubt or distrust." This observation, I think, describes more accurately the real stance of philosophy toward religious claims both in Hallevi's time and that of Socrates. Hallevi's own interpretation, while useful for his purpose, is inaccurate.

75. K I:67, p. 35.

76. K V:21, p. 303.

Chapter II.

1. K IV:3, p. 212; p. 271

2. K IV:15, pp. 228-9.

3. It appears that the several intermediate levels between the transparent light which penetrates the prophets and the plain light reflected by the philosophers indicate different degrees of prophecy. From a variety of other passages, which shall be discussed below, this view becomes even more probable. Nevertheless, we should note that Hallevi did not develop a systemmatic account of the degrees of prophecy and their features, as Maimonides, for example, does in the Guide of the Perplexed.

4. K IV:15, IV:1, pp. 230,205

5. K IV:15, 16, IV:3, pp. 230-31, 207.

6. Cf. Guttmann. Philosophies of Judaism, pp. 130-1.

7. K IV:15, p. 229.

8. K IV:1, p. 205.

9. K IV:3, p. 210.

10. K IV:3, p. 215.

11. K IV:1, pp. 205-6.

12. K IV:3, pp. 208-9.

13. K IV:15, pp. 229-30.

14. K I:1, II:26, p. 11.

15. K I:1, p. 11-12.

16. Wolfson, "Hallevi and Maimonides on Design, Chance, and Necessity," pp. 105-63. It is essentially the Aristotelian view of necessity which receives Hallevi's attention in his criticisms of the philosophers. As we have noted previously, Neo-Platonic elements are clearly evident in Hallevi's understanding of Aristotle. The arguments that the world is the product of chance and not of Divine casuality, are associated with Epicurus. Hallevi devotes little attention to this position.

17. K I:1, pp. 14-15.

18. K II:26, V:10, p. 95.

19. K I:1, pp. 14-15.

20. K IV:15, p. 231.

21. K IV:16, p. 231.

22. Kaufmann, Attributenlehre...,p. 170.

23. Genesis Rabbah 11 cited in K IV:15, p. 229.

24. K IV:15, p. 229.

25. K IV:3, pp. 208-9.

26. K IV:1, p. 206.

27. K IV:3, p. 209.

28. K IV:3, p. 209.

29. K V:21, p. 305.

30. K IV:15, p. 230.

31. K IV:3, p. 217.

32. K IV:3, p. 209.

33. Wolfson, "Hallevi and Maimonides on Design, Chance, and Necessity." Wolfson discusses in considerable detail all of the arguments presented by Hallevi in support of the proposition that the universe was created by design, ie. the free will of God.

34. K I:67, p. 35. The Jewish sage makes this observation in the context of his discussion of creation. Scholars have disagreed sharply over just what Hallevi did believe with respect to this issue, particularly over whether he believed in an eternal hylic matter from which the Deity fashioned the world or in worlds which existed before our own or whether, in fact, he accepted the more widely-held doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Especially relevant to an understanding of this problem are Harry Wolfson's article, "The Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic Theories of Creation in Hallevi and Maimonides" in Essays in Honour of the Very Reverend Dr. J. H. Hertz, London,1942, and David Kaufman's brief essay, "Yehudah Hallevi W'Shitat Olam Kadmon," in Mehkarim B'Sifrut Ha-Ivrit shel Y'mei Ha-Baynayim Jerusalem, 1965. Whichever view Hallevi held in fact, the principle of freedom with respect to the activity of God seems to apply in any case, for it is frequently asserted in the Kuzari. Additional instances of the freedom of the Divine will may be found in the following passages in the Kuzari: V:2, I:83, I:89 and II:6, pp. 263, 41, 46, 75-6.

35. K II:2, p. 73. See also V:20, p. 299.

36. K V:21, p. 303.

37. K I:6, 8, 68 and II:51, pp. 20-21, 36, 107.

38. K IV:15, 16, p. 231.

39. K I:89, p. 45.

40. H.A.R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers. Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, pp. 542-44.

41. K II:2, p. 70.

42. K II:2,4, pp. 70-1. See also K IV:3, pp. 206-7.

43. Wolfson, "Hallevi and Maimonides on Design, Chance, and Necessity," pp. 160-1.

44. K III:73, p. 201.

45. K V:20, p. 299.

46. K V:20, p. 300.

47. K V:20, pp. 299-300.

48. K V:20, p. 300.

49. K V:20, p. 302.

50. K V:20, p. 302.

Chapter III.

1. K I:6, 8, pp. 20-1.

2. K I:67, p. 35.

3. It is interesting to note here that the king did not take the initial statement of the Jewish scholar to constitute conclusive evidence for the truth of Judaism. The king was first surprised by the fact that the scholar spoke from a distinctly historical point of view, dealing with extraordinary events in the experience of Israel rather than universal principles such as the nature and attributes of God. When the king asked the scholar to develop his presentation more fully, he was surprised once again as the scholar answered, "But the opening of my speech was the proof and it was the evidence, such that it requires no further evidence or proof." K I:15, p. 23.

4. K I:6,8, pp. 20-1.

5. The first three classes of evidence listed here, as well as the descriptions of their characteristic features, were suggested by Professor Alvin J. Reines in an unpublished lecture on "The Pentateuchal Structure of Evidence for Religious Truth", delivered on March 9, 1970. The fourth classification has been taken directly from the Khazar king's criteria for conclusive evidence of a revealed ie. true religion. The four classes taken together constitute the most complete summary of Hallevi's own criteria for the truth of the Sinaitic revelation and ultimately of the Jewish religion.

6. K I:49, pp. 29-30.

7. K I:87, p. 43. See also K II:2, p. 74.

8. K I:89, p. 46.

9. K I:21, p. 24.

10. K I:87, p. 43.

11. K I:87, pp. 43-4.

12. K I:91, p. 47.

13. A traditional accusation made by Christian theologians against the Jews, going back to the Epistle of Barnabbas, was that Israel did not grasp what God actually required of them. At the very moment when Israel's covenant with God was about to be consummated, Israel committed the sin of worshipping the Golden Calf. Thus, when the Torah was given to them, they never really understood it, for the Israelites had been overcome with spiritual blindness. Only the truly elect, who are not to be identified with the Israelites in this view, can recognize the true meaning

of the commandments. Christ becomes the teacher of the spiritual meaning of the commandments and the Church represents the elect of God. Barnabbas's view is widely reflected in the writings of the Church fathers. Understandably, Hallevi's treatment of the incident rejects this claim. He emphasizes that the calf was made as a result of factionalism within Israel due to Moses's absence, that only three thousand really sinned, and that the motive for making the calf was overzealousness on God's behalf, not faithlessness. He goes on to say that prophecy continued among the Israelites despite the incident, and that nothing was taken away from the people except for the first two tablets, which were ultimately replaced when God had forgiven the people. K I:97, pp. 51-54. See also Levi Smolar and M. Aberbach, "The Golden Calf Episode in Posbiblical Literature," pp. 91-116.

14. K II:6, p. 76. That which adapted the air to producing the sound of the Ten Commandments in the people's ears and the writing to form on the tablets is what Hallevi explicitly calls "will"(hafez).

15. K I:91, p. 47. See also I:81, p. 41.

16. K IV:11, p. 226.

17. K IV:3, IV:11, IV:15, pp. 216,226,228-30.

18. K IV:11, p. 226.

19. K IV:11, p. 226.

20. K I:41, p. 27.

21. K IV:11, p. 226.

22. K I:83, 19, pp. 42, 55.

23. K II:56, pp. 111-12.

24. K I:1, pp. 14-15.

25. K I:39, pp. 27. See also IV:3, V:10, pp. 217, 269-71.

26. K I:42, III:22, V:20, and IV:3, pp. 27, 163, 300-01, 212.

27. Shlomo Pines contends that the prophets' biological distinction reflects the probable influence of the Shiiite sect of Islam upon Hallevi. This group maintained that Ali, Mohammed's son-in-law, and his descendants were the most legitimate heirs to the Caliphate for biological reasons. They were higher beings, according to this view, and were apparently considered to be prophets. While Pines' view is of interest, it is by no means established that Hallevi was familiar with this doctrine, much less influenced by it.

28. K [illegible], I:87, p. 43. Here ilham is designated as ezer. In III:39, p. 175, it is called Hoda'ah, in II:26, p. 95, da'ath, and in I:109, p. 55, "what is similar to prophecy." For a more detailed consideration of this rather complex issue see Israel Efros, "Some Aspects of Judah Hallevi's Mysticism," pp. 35-6, and Wolfson, "Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy," pp. 63-4, 74-5.

29. K II:14, II:23, and III:19, pp. 81, 93, 159-60.

30. K I:115, p. 64.

31. K IV:5, pp. 222-23.

32. K I:115, I:27, pp. 64, 25.

33. K V:20, p. 300.

34. K I:103, p. 57. See also Kuzari, I:95 pp. 48-9. Guttman notes in this context that "the assumption of a special faculty of soul mediating the communion of elect human beings is reminiscent of the old Greek idea of theios anthropos, the'divine man'... The special position he accords to this faculty brings to mind Proclus' notion of a suprarational faculty of the soul upon which the knowledge of the divine is founded." Guttmann, Philosophies of Judaism, p. 130, cf. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Grieschen, III, p. 428, note 171.

35. K IV:3, p. 208.

36. K I:109, p. 59.

37. The inclusion of the environs of Israel as part of the geographical area in which prophecy was possible is deliberate. The Khazar king notes that Abraham, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel all experienced prophetic visions outside the borders of Israel and asks how the Jewish sage could justify this fact in view of his theory that prophecy can occur only in the land of Israel. In response to this question, Hallevi presents four alternative explanations, all of which extend the limits of his initial view. The first response is that all the prophets prophecied in the Holy Land or concerning it. The second response is that once a prophet has seen the Shekhinah in the land of Israel, he is able to remain on the level of prophecy even in exile. The third suggests that prophecy extends even beyond the geographical confines of Israel to Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the desert regions of Sinai, Paran, and Seir. The fourth maintains that the prophet himself is the abode of the Shekhinah and his very existince assists others to acquire the prophetic degree. K II:14, IV:3, III:65, II:14, pp. 77-8, 79, 208, 192, and 78.

38. Mekhilta, "Bo," pp. 2-3.

39. For a detailed discussion of the Greek and Moslem presuppositions of this theory and the polemical character of the environmental prerequisite for prophecy, see Alexander Altmann, "Torat Ha-Aklimim L-Rabbi Yehudah Hallevi," pp. 1-17, and Wolfson, "Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy," p. 65. It appears from both of these studies that Hallevi's emphasis upon the climatological superiority of the land of Israel, in addition to the biological pre-eminence of the Jews, was largely a direct response to claims put forth by the Ihwan as-Safa in their Book of Complaints of the Animals Against Man that other religions (i.e. peoples) and lands had superceded the former distinctive position of the Jews and were their rightful successors. They saw the Moslems as the elect of God and Iraq as the most desireable and temperate of climates. This seems to be the view which Hallevi felt required to challenge.

40. K I:95, II:20, pp. 49, 84.

41. K I:95, II:12, 14, IV:17, IV:23, pp. 49, 77, 80-1, 232, 235.

42. K II:12, p. 77.

43. K II:20, pp. 89-90.

44. K II:14, 20, 23, IV:10, pp. 80, 89, 93, 224.

45. K II:14, p. 79.

46. Schweid, "Am Yisrael W'Erez Yisrael...," p. 8.

47. K II:23, 24, I:115, pp. 92-4, 63.

48. K V:20, p. 300.

49. K V:20, p. 299.

50. K III:53, p. 186.

51. K I:97, 99, III:53, pp. 51,56, 186-7.

52. K II:32, p. 100.

53. K III:53, p. 187.

54. K II:14, 26, 32, III:21, 22, 53, pp. 92, 94-99, 100, 162-3, 185-6.

55. K III:39, pp. 174-5.

56. K III:23, p. 165.

57. K III:11, p. 148.

58. K III:53, p. 188.

59. K IV:27, p. 250.

60. K III:65, pp. 195-6. Hallevi's choice of Akiba is significant because, according to Rabbi Israel Hallevi, no such remark is made about him in the entire literature. It is said only of Hillel the Elder in Sanhedrin 11a that he was as worthy of prophecy as Moses.

61. Goldziher, "Le amr ilahi chez Juda Hallevi," pp. 32-41.

62. Hirschfeld, Book of Kuzari, p. 8.

63. Heinemann, "Timunat Ha-Historiah shel Rabbi Jehudah Hallevi," pp. 147-177.

64. Epstein, "Judah Halevi...," p. 215.

65. Efros, "Some Aspects...," pp. 31 ff.

66. Wolfson, "Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy," p. 59.

67. Guttmann, Philosophies..., p. 427, note 151. See also, Guttman's view in Dat U-Mada, p. 72.

68. Wolfson has already charted the basic activites of the inyan ha-elohi exhaustively in his essay, "Maimonides and Hallevi on Prophecy." Our classification is therefore largely influenced by Wolfson's.

69. K IV:25, V:4, pp. 243, 265.

70. K IV:25, p. 243.

71. K V:10, p. 270.

72. K I:77, V:20, pp. 38, 297.

73. K III:17, p. 154.

74. K IV;25, I:77, II:26, pp. 243, 38, 95-6.

75. K II:26, p. 95.

76. K IV:3, p. 217.

77. K III:73, p. 198.

78. K II:50, III:17, 19, pp. 108-9, 154, 158.

79. K II:50, III:17, pp. 109, 154.

80. K I:97, p. 52.

81. K I:98, p. 54.

82. K III:53, p. 186.

83. K III:11, p. 146.

84. K I:103, p. 57.

85. K III:17, pp. 154-5.

86. K IV:3, p. 216. In addition to comparing God to the rational soul, the Jewish scholar also draws an analogy between the Deity and light, the noblest and finest of all material things.

87. K IV:3, p. 210.

88. K I:95, p. 48.

89. K I:103, p. 59.

90. K V:21, p. 303.

91. It will be recalled here that in his parable of the King of India, the Jewish scholar describes the gifts which the Khazar might receive as being procureable only in India and in the palace of the king. Knowing that the gifts cannot be duplicated elsewhere and having a letter confirming the identity of the sender is the basis of both Israel's and prophets' certainty that their revelatory experiences are truly from God. The possibility that some omnipotent Evil Genius might have been the originator of their visions is unthinkable to Hallevi. Cf. K I:21, p. 24.

92. K V:20, p. 297. We shall see below that this belief plays a very significant part in one of Hallevi's most intriguing poems.

93. K IV:26, V:14, 20, 21, pp. 249, 286, 299-300, 304.

94. K IV:3, p. 215.

95. Efros, "Some Aspects...," p. 41. "The Active Intellect with its rationalistic and somewhat polytheistic connotations he rejects; but he accepts the alam al malakut, as well as the ittisal, dawq, ilham, wahi, and karamat, all of which are terms and distinctions taken from Mohammedan doctrine. Escaping from Arabic rationalism, he found refuge in Muslim mysticism which was more congenial to his Jewish teaching."

96. K II:4, p. 74. See also II:6, 7, pp. 75-6. This subtle spiritual substance corresponds rather closely to the "spiritual matter" or "intelligible matter" of Ibn Gabirol's Mekor Hayyim which is also acted upon by a beam of Divine light created by the will of God. Mekor Hayyim, V:30, pp. 399.

97. K II:7, 8, III:17, pp. 76, 154.

98. K II:7, IV:3, pp. 76, 218-19. Hallevi notes in the latter citation that it is unclear to him whether the objects of Isaiah's, Ezekiel's, and Daniel's visions were specifically created or permanent entities of the spiritual realm. There is no doubt in his mind that they were real.

99. K IV:3, pp. 218-19.

100. K IV:3, p. 220, cf. Efros, "Some Aspects...," p. 40. Here it is argued that the Kingdom of God refers to the supernal and changeless world of the angels and is interchangeable with Messengership. Wolfson rejects this view in favor of understanding the Kingdom to indicate general manifestations of God's dominion over the natural realm. It is interchangeable with the glory. See also Wolfson, "Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy," p. 49, note 89.

101. K IV:3, p. 219.

102. K II:8, p. 76.

103. K IV:3, p. 219.

104. Kaufmann, Attributenlehre, p. 187 and Efros, "Some Aspects...,", p. 35. "A source of confusion and contradiction in Tibbon's version is his use of the Hebrew word kavod or karamat, wonders, as well as in places where the Arabic original has kavod or kavod Adonai. These are two different concepts, for whereas wonders distinguish prophets from saints, kavod or glory may be revealed to both classes and to all Israel. It is a manifestation of divinity and is of the same order as Shekhinah, Malkut, Fire, Cloud, Image, Form, Rainbow---all attestating to the divine word. It consists of spiritual forms fashioned out of the fine spiritual substance called Holy Spirit."

105. K V:20, p. 297.

106. K IV:3, p. 216. The reference to hirgilu also suggests that different prophets may be disposed or accustomed to see the same objects from different perspectives and on different levels.

107. K IV:3, p. 216.

108. K IV:3, 5, pp. 217, 221.

109. K I:2, 26, 27, 98, II:49, pp. 16, 25-6, 54-5, 106.

110. K I:1, pp. 14-15.

111. K I:103, pp. 60-1.

112. Efros, "Some Aspects...," p. 34. "In place of reason,

Hallevi offers the direct mystic experience and the certitude of prophecy. He calls it dawq (Tibbon ta'am), a term which he uses sometimes in a literal sense, as personal taste and opinion, and therefore synonymous with qias, but mainly as a sufi term for mystic intuition and therefore antinomous with qiyas. Indeed, he finds the difference between the God of Aristotle and the God of Abraham to be due to the fact that the former is proven through qiyas and the latter is experienced through dawq. The term is defined in Arabic literature as a mystic light projected by God into the heart of his chosen and as the beginning of the appearance of divinity... In IV:15 and III:53, the prophetic sight is described as that state where man almost ceases to be man, joining the company of angels; and a new spirit, the Holy Spirit, enters into him, showing him true dreams and wonders. He sees the God of revelation and laughs at his former doubts and at qiyas through which he sought God and is ready to undergo martyrdom because of the sweetness of union. He becomes so much at one with al-amr al-ilahi that he no longer cares if he dies."

Chapter IV

1. K I:84, p. 42.

2. K I:83, p. 42.

3. K I;25, 50, II:28, 64, III:50, V:14, pp. 25, 30, 99, 117, 184, 287.

4. K III:31, 32, pp. 167-8.

5. K I:5, p. 19.

6. Schweid, "Ha-Mibneh Ha-Sifruti shel Ha-Ma'amar Ha-Rishon L'Sefer Ha-Kuzari," pp. 265-7.

7. K I:93, p. 47.

8. K II:33, p. 100.

9. K II:41, 42, pp. 102-3. Hallevi's analogy does more to explain Israel's unique historical experiences vis a vis those of other nations than it does to prove the intervention of Divine providence in its affairs. For despite the sensitivity and exceptional powers which the heart is said to possess, it is nonetheless subject to the same natural causes as other organs. Moreover, no miraculous causes seem to govern its functions, at least Hallevi does not cite any. If anything, his analogy seems to show that Israel is in substance like any other nation, only more so, in view of its greater sensitivity and its more comprehensive function in keeping the rest of the body alive.

10. K I:98, pp. 54-5.

11. K I:95, p. 48.

12. In K I:37-9, pp. 26-7, the Jewish scholar explicitly denies the suggestion, current in philosophical circles both before and after Hallevi's lifetime, that the "angelic" realm was occupied by wisest and greatest of thinkers. He stresses here that the occupants of the fifth realm are distinguished not in degree but in kind or species from the rest of mankind. The great thinker would occupy only the highest level of the fourth realm, in Hallevi's view.

13. K I:103, pp. 57-8. See also I:47, 95, IV:15, pp. 27-8, 48, 229. The distinction between the kernel or heart (leb) and the shells (kelippot) among medieval thinkers was quite common. With reference to Hallevi's use of these terms, Alexander Altmann has suggested, "The same imagery occurs also in the Rasa'il ikhwan al-safa in the Iraqi's claim, 'We are the kernel (lubb) of mankind, and mankind is the kernel of the animals,

and the animals are the kernel of the plants, and the plants are the kernal of the minerals...' Yehudah Hallevi's claim that Adam's aptitude for receiving the gift of prophecy was transmitted to the descendants of Sheth, Noah, and Abraham because they were the 'kernal' and all others merely the 'shell' of mankind (Kuzari, I:95), derives from this source." Alexander Altmann, "The Motif of the 'Shells' in Azriel of Gerona," Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism, pp. 178-9.

14. K I:103, pp. 57-8.

15. K II:14, p. 78.

16. K I:63, II:66, IV:17, 24, 25, pp. 33-4, 118-19, 231-2, 236-49.

17. K II:44, pp. 103-4.

18. K II:44, pp. 103-4.

19. K IV:23, p. 235. Cf. K II:34-44, pp. 101-4.

Chapter V

1. K V:16, pp.288-9, cf. Efros, "Some Aspects...," p.35. Efros here cites a parallel passage from Al Ghazzali's Mishkat al Anwar: "Why should it be impossible that beyond reason there should be a further plane on which appear things which do not appear on the plane of intelligence, just as it is possible for the intelligence itself to be on a plane above the discriminating faculty and the senses; and for revelations of wonders and marvels to be made to it beyond the reach of the senses and the discriminating faculty? Beware of making ultimate perfection stop at thyself! Consider the intuitive faculty of poetry, if thou wilt have an example of everyday experience taken from those special gifts which particularize some men."

2. The prophet, however, is not ignorant of the equivalent of metrics, as is the poet in this analogy. The prophets' "inner eye" discloses the substances of things in the natural world, just as reason discloses their essences. The difference between these two ways of knowing is a matter of the immediacy of the insight and the possibility of error. Furthermore, the prophet has direct knowledge of all levels of the chain of being. He alone is capable of gauging the operations of the celestial bodies correctly. He is able to comprehend the entire universe. K IV: 9, V:14, pp. 224, 285.

3. K II:73, 74, p. 123.

4. Heinrich Brody. Diwan des Abul-l-Hasan Jehudah ha-Levi, III, p. 4. This translation is adapted from those of Nina Salaman, Selected Poems of Jehudah Halevi, p. 96, and David Goldstein, Hebrew Poems From Spain, p. 93. All subsequent citations which are adapted from these two sources, or from a third source, Isaac Heineman's Jehudah Hallevi, will be listed accordingly with the appropriate page references. Citations which do not list either Salaman, Goldstein, or Heineman will be understood to represent our own translation.

5. Schirmann, Ha-shirah Ha-ivrit B'sepharad U'beProvence, I, p. 466, note 1.

6. K II:32, 33, I:93, pp. 100, 47.

7. Brody, III, pp. 110-111.

8. Schirmann, Yehudah Hallevi: Shirim Nivharim, p. 9.

9. K I:8, 87, pp. 21, 43-4.

10. Brody, Diwan..., III,p. 110.

11. K I;87, p. 43.

12. Brody, Diwan..., III, p. 84.

13. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 8.
14. Brody, Diwan..., III, pp. 97-8.
15. Salaman, Selected Poems...,pp. 106-7.
16. Heinemann, Jehudah Hallevi, pp. 135-6.
17. K IV:11, pp. 224-5.
18. K II:23, pp. 92-3.
19. K I:87, p. 45. See also Yoma 52b-53b, Tos. Sotah 13.
20. K II:23, p. 92.
21. K II:32, p. 100.
22. K II:14, p. 80.
23. K II:14, 20, 23, IV:10, pp. 80, 89, 93, 224.
24. K II:14, p. 79.
25. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 32.
26. K I:83, 84, pp. 41-2.
27. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 33.
28. K I:95, II:12, 14; IV:17, 23, pp. 49, 77, 80-1, 232, 235.
29. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 87.
30. Ibid., p. 8.
31. K V:23, 27, pp. 305, 307.
32. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 34,
33. Goldstein, Hebrew Poems..., pp. 109-10.
34. Salaman, Selected Poems..., pp. 6-7.
35. K II:30-2, pp. 99-100.
36. Goldstein, Hebrew Poems..., p. 107.
37. Salaman, Selected Poems..., pp. 3-7.
38. K I:95; II:20, pp. 49, 84.
39. K V:27, p. 308.
40. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 147.

41. K II:23, p. 92. Cf. I:114-15 and IV:23, pp. 63, 234.

42. K II:23, p. 93. This interpretation is apparently based upon the translation and comment of Targum Onkelos to this verse. Ibn Ezra's comment is similar: "Said the Congregation of Israel, 'I am asleep in the exile of Babylon like a man in darkness, while the core of my heart is awake, since I long to return with the Shekhinah as I was.'"

43. Dinaburg, "Aliyato shel Rabbi Yehudah Hallevi L'Erez Yisrael W' Ha-Tesisah Ha-Meshihit B'Yamav," pp. 157-182.

44. Aaron Komaim, "Bayn Shirah La'nebuah," pp. 680-683.

45. Brody, Diwan..., II, p. 203.

46. Ibid., IV, pp. 138-9; see also Brody, III, pp. 152, 218.

47. Ibid., I, p. 166.

48. Ibid., III, pp. 203-4.

49. K III:11, p. 148.

50. K I:103, III:5, pp. 57-8, 139-43.

51. Brody, Diwan..., III, p. 145.

52. Ibid., pp. 182-3.

53. Ibid., p. 82.

54. Ibid., p. 182-3.

55. Bernstein, ed., Shirei Yehudah Hallevi: Osef Shirei Kodesh W'Hol, p. 17.

56. Brody, Diwan..., II, p. 296.

57. Ibid., III, p. 267.

58. Ibid., p. 22.

59. K IV:3, pp. 214-17.

60. K II:26, p. 97.

61. Salaman, Selected Poems... p. 135.

62. K IV:3, p. 220.

63. K II:7, 8, III:17, IV:15, pp. 76, 154, 228-9.

64. K IV:5, 6, pp. 222-3.

65. K V:20, p. 300.

66. K IV:3, pp. 214-15

67. K II:28, 29, p. 99.

68. Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, pp. 24:33; and David Kaufmann, Mehkarim B'Sifrut Halvrit shel Y'mei Ha-Baynayim, p. 177, note 52.

69. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 94.

70. Brody, Diwan..., III, p. 8.

71. Ibid., IV, p. 66.

72. K III:5, pp. 140-1.

73. Brody, Diwan..., IV, p. 186.

74. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 143.

75. Brody, Diwan..., III, p. 159.

76. Ibid., p. 68.

77. Ibid., II, p. 272.

78. Ibid., III, p. 65.

79. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 112.

80. K III:20, IV:16, 17, pp. 160-61, 230-31.

81. Brody, Diwan..., III, pp. 182-3.

82. Ibid., p. 69.

83. Ibid., p. 38.

84. Ibid., p. 40.

85. Ibid., II, pp. 70-1.

86. K I:103, p. 58.

87. K I:109, p. 59.

88. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 108.

89. Brody, Diwan..., III, p. 204.

90. Ibid., I, p. 211.

91. Ibid., IV, p. 100.

92. Ibid., III, p. 161.

93. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 87.

94. K, I:108, p. 59.

95. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 115.

96. K IV:3, p. 220.

97. Goldstein, Hebrew Poems..., pp. 96-7.

98. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 121.

99. Ibid., p. 109.

100. Brody, Diwan..., III, p. 35.

101. Ibid., IV, p. 277.

102. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 88.

103. Brody, Diwan..., III, p. 151.

104. Ibid., p. 197.

105. Ibid., p. 231.

106. Salaman, Selected Poems..., pp. 99-101.

107. K II:32, 33, pp. 100-101.

108. Brody, Diwan..., III, pp. 304-5.

109. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 118.

110. Ibid., pp. 136-7.

111. Baer, "Ha-Matzav Ha-Politi shel Yehudei Sepharad B'Doro shel Rabbi Yehudah Hallevi," p. 20.

112. Brody, Diwan..., II, p. 302.

113. K IV:3, p. 215.

114. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 9.

115. K III:5, pp. 141-142.

116. K IV:3, p. 218.

117. K I:47, p. 28.

118. Salaman, Selected Poems..., pp. 41-2.

119. Ibid., p. 13.

Chapter VI

1. Schirmann, "Hayyei Yehudah Hallevi," p. 230.

2. Kaufmann, "Judah Hallevi," pp. 189-90.

3. K V:23, pp. 305-6.

4. K II:44, 73-4, pp. 103-4, 123. Hallevi notes that most of the ills that have befallen the Jews derive from their imitation of the Gentiles. He cites in particular the disharmony that characterizes the Hebrew language after having been subjected to Arabic patterns.

5. K V:2, p. 262. Cf. Kaufmann, Yehudah Hallevi," p. 187-207.

6. Strauss, Persecution..., pp. 108-9.

7. Baer, History of the Jews.., I. pp. 71-2, and "Ha-Mazav Ha-Politi...," p. 22, Gerson D. Cohen. Sefer Ha-Qabbalah: The Book of Tradition, pp. 295-302, and "Messianic Postures of the Ashkenazim and Sephardim (Prior to Sabbathai Zevi)," The Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture, p. 24.

8. K V:25, pp. 306-7.

9. Cohen, Sefer Ha-Qabbalah..., p. 24. Cohen goes on to suggest that Hallevi rejected messianic speculation altogether, because it was foreign to one who had "reappropriated Talmudic faith in God's providence. The Almighty would act in His good time; man's task was but to try to earn His mercy. Judah Ha-Levi's departure for Palestine was an act in that direction and nothing more. Far from attempting to anticipate the Messiah ha-Levi's move was a rejection of the Sephardic culture of his day; it was a Franco-German-type act of piety that committed all into the hands of a free and inscrutable God." Cohen overstates his case. To reject the dominant mode of anticipating the advent of the Messiah,ie., by calculation, does not necessarily require a rejection of all speculation in this area. Indeed, Hallevi maintained a lively interest in the subject and seems to have regarded another mode, true prophecy, as the most reliable one regarding such questions.

10. Dinaburg, "Aliyato shel Rabbi Yehudah Hallevi...," pp. 157-82. See also Heinemann, Ta'amei Ha-Mitzwot B'Sifrut Yisrael, I, p. 65; and Schirmann, "Sifut Hayyedi Yehudah Halleví"p.238.

11. Schweid, "Am Yisrael W'Eretz Yisrael...," p. 9.

12. Aaron Komaim, "Bayn Shirah La'Nebuah," pp. 691-695.

13. Ibid, pp. 692-3.

14. K V:27; I:1, pp. 306-7, 14.

15. K V:26-7, p. 307.

16. Schirmann, "Hayyei Yehudah Hallevi," pp. 289-305, and Goitein, "The Biography of Judah Ha-Levi in the Light of the Cairo Geniza Documents," pp. 41-56.

17. Baer, History of the Jews..., I, pp. 71-2, Schirmann, "Hayyei Yehudah Hallevi," p. 238.

18. K I:1, 4, II:60, III:53, pp. 15, 17, 115, 188.

19. Brody, Diwan..., II, p. 301.

20. K II:14, IV:27, pp. 79-80, 250.

21. Brody, Diwan..., p. 218.

22. Salaman, Selected Poems..., p. 111.

23. K IV:27, p. 250.

24. K V:20, p. 297.

25. K V:20, p. 297.

26. K II:24, pp. 94-5.

27. Abramson. "A Letter of Rabbi Judah Hallevi Regarding His Aliyah to the Land of Israel," pp. 140-1.

28. K IV:3, p. 215.

29. K II:28-9, pp. 99.

30. K IV: 15, p. 231.

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