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THE ROLE OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN MODERN
TOTALITARIAN SYSTEMS:

A HISTORICAL-CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HITLER'S
ANTI-SEMITISM

AARON KOPLIN

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILL-
MENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
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1968

REFEREE: Prof. Ellis Rivkin

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF

MOSHE ARIE KAHANA

WHO SUFFERED SO MUCH BECAUSE
OF THE NAZIS.

SUMMARY

This thesis deals with a period of capitalist crisis within Germany. The economic dislocations that followed on the humiliating defeat in World War I and flared up again after 1929 put German capitalism to unusually severe stress: the Communists and left wing socialists, during both of these crises, won such popular support that they threatened to overthrow the entire structure. The right wing was too conservative to obtain the necessary mass support to ensure the continuation of capitalism. Nationalism was tied to the interests of the old ruling classes, and socialism was in the hands of internationalist Marxists. The middle class was buffeted between the large scale capitalists and the proletariat. The middle class could not become socialist, for that would mark its end. It could not become nationalistic, since this would mean handing over their fortunes to the very capitalists who were squeezing them economically and who were the major financial backers of the nationalist parties.

Adolf Hitler offered an original solution to this dilemma by developing an ideology that was nationalistic and socialistic. His nationalism was of an imperialistic nature, and his socialism was the type that could lead to a totalitarian state. Such an ideology was eventually able to attract a large mass following when the economic

conditions became so disastrous that the choice was stark: Hitler or the Communists. His imperialism was then used to produce the type of state in which the market limitations that had plagued German industry could be overcome through the enforced concentration of economic enterprises and the opening up of new markets through external expansion.

The use of the Jews in this process is clear from Mein Kampf. This book provides us with the necessary information to piece together the origins of Hitler's anti-Semitism, the manipulative role it played in his ideology, and Hitler's reasons for making the choices that he did. Once Hitler's views on propaganda, including the value of the big lie, are understood, we have the methodological tools with which to analyze the function that Jews played in ideology and in practice. Hitler's own statements subsequently demonstrate conclusively his own awareness of the true role of anti-Semitism and Racism. These statements include his acknowledgement that they are not scientifically true theories, but merely politically useful ideological constructs. Their utilitarianism lay in setting the stage for totalitarianism at home and imperialistic expansion abroad. Racism provided the concepts of inferiors and superiors, the "natural rights" that motivated acceptance of oppression and war, and was an appeal that could

garner support from all strata of society. These developments were of direct benefit to the controlling interests of German capitalism, and preserved this economic mode within Germany.

The practice of anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany both before and during the war confirms our basic theory. At no time was anti-Semitism allowed to interfere with the basic goals of Hitler and the industrialists. The Jews were used as a spearhead for inaugurating new policies. What began with the Jews was extended to others. The variations in policy are directly related to the changing external situation, which once again demonstrates that the anti-Semitism of Hitler was governed by rational considerations and not by fanatic hatred. At all times Hitler kept himself in close contact with the actual situation, and the rationality of this procedure is not contradicted by the brutality and immorality of the system.

Finally, Hitler's relative lack of interest in the Jews once the final decisions were made also indicates that the Jews were but a means to an end, and not an over-riding obsession with Hitler. Hitler was sincere in his desire for power and enhancing the grandeur of Germany. He was useful to the industrialists, and he was manipulative in his use of the Jews. But a fanatic he was not, no matter how evil were the consequences of his actions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION A

PRELUDE TO MEIN KAMPF

PART I	THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC - POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS	Page 6
PART II	THE VERSAILLES TREATY	Page 22
PART III	STAB IN THE BACK	Page 28
PART IV	ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	Page 31

SECTION B

MEIN KAMPF

PART I	SOURCE OF HITLER'S ANTI-SEMITISM	Page 45
PART II	PROPAGANDA	Page 48
PART III	THE MASS	Page 54
PART IV	IDEOLOGY	Page 62
PAGE V	CONCLUDING REMARKS ON MEIN KAMPF	Page 65
		Page 98

SECTION C

ANTI-SEMITISM IN PRACTICE

PART I	PRE-WAR PERIOD	Page 107
PART II	THE WAR YEARS	Page 108
		Page 122

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Page 141

INTRODUCTION

This work is primarily concerned with a reconstruction of the role that anti-Semitism played in the ideology of Hitler and the Nazi movement. In this study it is proposed that Hitler's anti-Semitism can be best understood as a calculated, rational endeavor to establish an ideology that permitted the continuance of capitalism in Germany while at the same time allowed a radical transformation of the political structure necessary for such a continuance. This type of anti-Semitism was useful as it restructured the questions of the day into a new context which was then used to justify measures that otherwise would have been impossible. All economic transformations need ideologies that motivate allegiance and acceptance on non-economic grounds. This is so because there are always other ideologies that are competing for allegiance as well as conflict within the economic realm itself. Ideological "superstructures" can be used to cover up activities which would not be acceptable if called by other names. For example, imperialistic penetration into under-developed areas was done under the banners of bringing civilization to these places, of furthering progress, and of self sacrifice for the betterment of mankind. In the ideologies, the economic factors were given little consideration. It is our contention that the same process was operative with Hitler. That is, Hitler had certain aims and needed an ideology that would influence people to believe that they were fighting for one thing

while in reality the goals were something quite different. Thus, in this view, Hitler's anti-Semitism was a means to an end, rather than an end in and of itself.

In order to establish this thesis, we will investigate:

- 1) The problems facing Germany at the time of Hitler's activity;
- 2) The origin of Hitler's anti-Semitism as Hitler himself states it (the only source available even to those who arrive at different conclusions);
- 3) The use of anti-Semitism in his ideology;
- 4) Statements by Hitler which indicate his self-awareness of the functional uses of anti-Semitism; and
- 5) The practical application of anti-Semitism.

Initially, one might think that there really is no problem. In light of the destruction of millions of Jews, it would appear that even to imply that Hitler's anti-Semitism was not "sincere" is to perpetrate a joke in very poor taste. Yet, we hope to prove that Hitler's anti-Semitism was not based upon a genuine hatred or fear of Jews. It was based upon considerations that made anti-Semitism functional. This implies then that Hitler's perception of the factual situation was realistic rather than being based upon some kind of fantasy. To anticipate somewhat, Hitler's avowed anti-Semitism enabled him to construct an ideology that permitted an establishment of a totalitarian state. This state structure was then used to resolve the political and economic tensions that were plaguing Germany internally.

This ideology and its state then were used to support imperialistic expansion into Eastern Europe where the same ideology was used to justify creation of a colonial structure. We shall see the calculated use of anti-Semitism throughout the history of this movement. If we can demonstrate that Hitler's anti-Semitism was rational in terms of the problems and the goals and that Hitler was aware of this, then we will have demonstrated that Hitler was not a "sincere" anti-Semite.

It is not easy to attempt to be "objective" about Hitler and the Nazis because of the evil they did under the banner of racial superiority and a greater German volk. However, to dismiss such a development as insanity or madness is not only to flee from a reality that may be horrible, but is also a delusion, since such a view precludes any attempt at rational analysis. To say that there is something inherently wrong with the German people is to retreat from facing possible realities about men. To picture Hitler as mentally unbalanced is to avoid looking at the fact that something may be efficient and rational, though totally devoid of moral qualities. We would be better served if we look at such phenomena as intelligable. In this way, one may attempt to see what are its causes, its purposes, and its utility. If these are found, then hopefully this kind of knowledge would be helpful in preventing their recurrence. To condemn may be morally gratifying, but until conditions make such evil dysfunctional, there is no reason to assume that they will disappear. But to reach this level of

understanding, we must adopt an attitude that permits us to see such an ideology as having its validity, however monstrous it may appear to be to us. For example, it is not sufficient to demonstrate the falsity of the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." It is also necessary to discover why people at certain times believe in its validity. It is such a reconstruction that is attempted here.

At the outset to the paper proper, the reader should be warned about the use of references in this paper. The writer has utilized several studies which have been of great value. The sources are mentioned. However, when the sources are cited, the reader should not assume that the citations are necessarily supportive of the explicit or implicit conclusions of the writer. The studies have provided factual and analytical material for this writer. Yet, in many cases, the material of several scholars has been combined in such a way that the result is not representative of any single reference work. This is the reason that several sources are often used in one footnote. Therefore, citations in this paper should not be looked upon as confirmatory per se of what has been written.

This general problem becomes quite apparent when we look at the methodology usually applied to Mein Kampf. Mein Kampf is the only extensive writing of Hitler's extant, besides his "Secret Book" recently published. Records of speeches, though not complete, are readily available, as well as some conversations that others have preserved. These

sources are, of course, invaluable. But Mein Kampf remains the foundation stone. As will be indicated below, it would appear that Mein Kampf is taken seriously, but not seriously enough. That is, when a passage supports a scholar's point of view, it is quoted as proof. When a passage does not, it is not quoted. This is not to imply any scholarly dishonesty on the part of such men as Bullock or Heiden. They have collected much material, have endeavored to understand a complex problem, and have put an immense amount of data into manageable form. The criticism is that pre-conceptions prevented a full utilization of the material available so that once a conclusion was reached other material fell by the wayside. This writer feels that a more careful and intensive study of Mein Kampf would have prevented some misinterpretations. Also, while there are some significant shifts in ideology, particularly in terms of the meaning of "anti-capitalism", it will be demonstrated that shifts that are normally ascribed to Hitler are more apparent than real. The basic appeal, the basic formulations, the basic solutions, remain pretty consistent. One thing that most certainly changes is the use of anti-Semitism by Hitler himself, a fact not usually noted. And if one looks at the history of Hitler's movement, one has to admit that it is remarkably successful, suffering defeat only through external military pressure, not through internal dissention or reaction. In this respect, it proved to be more adequate than the Weimar Republic to which we now turn.

SECTION A

PRELUDE TO MEIN KAMPF

PART I

THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC - POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

On November 10, 1918 the Weimar republic was formed by workers' and soldiers' councils who replaced the rule of the Kaiser. The republic had been proclaimed two days before through the support of a general strike of workers in Berlin. The initial leaders were the majority Social Democrats, Ebert and Scheidemann, and the Independent Social Democrat Hasses. The split in the Social Democrats had occurred during the war when the majority decided to extend war credits, while a minority was against a continuation of the war. While the Independents were less "revisionistic" than the Social Democrats, there was a third group who were even more radical. This group was the Spartacist League lead by Luxemburg and Liebknecht. This party was more doctrinaire in its Marxism, more radical in its demands, and more violent in its techniques, since it was planning for the "workers' revolution." The power of the radical appeal among the workers had already made itself felt during the war, when there had been three munition strikes and a rebellion of the sailors at Kiel. The recent revolution in Russia provided a tempting example to some, while the fear of it not only caught the capitalist classes, but also the less radical socialists who were in the

process of accommodating to the political structure through, what they termed, an "evolutionary" process.

The tension between the three groups quickly became manifest, further splitting the workers who momentarily had the opportunity of obtaining control of the country. The majority socialists wanted a slow nationalization of industry, compensation for any property taken, and immediate elections to legitimize the newly formed government. The Independents desired immediate nationalization and postponement of elections till the government could establish effective control. The Spartacist wanted a complete overthrow after the Russian model, thus aligning itself against both socialist groups. The issue was intensified when in December 1918 the councils, which were theoretically in charge of the revolution, met and went over^{to/}the side of the majority Social Democrats and eliminated the communists (Spartacist) from the councils. Ebert realized the fight was far from over and that he would need allies. Therefore, he did not disturb either the imperial civil service or the military command. Ebert obtained the support of the military and returning military men were organized into Free Corps units in the event of armed resistance by the left wing radicals.

The Free Corps were welcomed by the army as a means to protect the Eastern boundaries of Germany. And their potential use as a means to suppress any radical agitation was also in the army's interest. Noske, a

commissioner of the Social Democrats, saw their usefulness as nationalistic supporters who would defend the majority Social Democrats. Thus, an alliance was formed between elements whose ideological positions would have seemed to preclude any such collaboration, a phenomenon which we shall meet again.¹

The reaction to the decision of the councils was not long coming. The Independents left the councils and many supported or actively joined the Spartacists who had changed their party's name to the German Communist Party. The Communists revolted on January 5, 1919. This revolt did not receive support from the middle-classes who were quite aware of the threat it posed to them. The Social Democrats were not oblivious to the fact that if the revolt succeeded, they, too, would be losers. Noske then called in the Free Corps and the revolt was crushed. The Communist leaders were killed, and the elections took place on schedule in a relatively peaceful atmosphere.

In July 1919, the constitution was proclaimed. The system was based upon a parliamentary democracy and Reichstag authority. But even after the socialists were in power, there was no attempt made to reorganize the army or bureaucracy which were staffed with men of a conservative orientation. Despite ideological pronouncements, no plans were contemplated to socialize industry, and no real attempt was under-

taken to redistribute the large land holdings of the Junkers.* Yet, both of these goals had been avowed in the socialist program. The new government represented at most a slight shift to the left, not a radical overturning. This is readily understandable in view of the fact that the government was dependent on the right, even though it had revolted against it, for maintaining, through the armed forces, its very existence. The calling in of the old officer class and ex-soldiers to defend the government re-established the officer corps' self-esteem and prestige. It also set a precedent of turning to the military and the Free Corps to crush anti-government uprisings when they broke out later on. This dependence on the right provided a wedge for the conservatives to maintain a good portion of the power though nominally defeated. And just as important, the opposition of the radical left turned the Social Democrats in charge of the revolution into moderate reactionaries. The following statement of Ebert is enlightening on this point.

"We (the majority Social Democrats) allied ourselves in order to fight Bolshevism. The restoration of the monarchy was unthinkable. Our aim on 10 November was to introduce as soon as possible an orderly government supported by the army and the National Assembly. I advised the Field Marshal (Hindenburg) not to fight the revolution... I proposed to him that the supreme army command make an alliance with the Social Democratic Party solely to restore an orderly government with the help of the supreme army Command. The parties of the right had completely vanished."³

*Note: This is not to imply that the republic did not gain for the workers some advantages, such as the extension of universal suffrage, institution of the eight hour day, recognition of union agreements, unemployment insurance, etc.²

Ebert was correct that the parties of the right had vanished, which made the alliance acceptable. However, the power of the right had not vanished, but remained under the surface.⁴

The central government had other built-in weaknesses which, during times of economic crises, were to become more and more threatening. Firstly, the Central Reich Government's power was diluted by the old German states which retained their own state governments and landtages. These local governments had considerable powers, including police. And when it served their particular interests, they did not hesitate to defy the Berlin government. With revolts almost continually breaking out, with numerous impasses in the Reichstag itself, and the severe economic dislocations after the war till 1924 and again after 1929, the federal system only added to the dilution of the central government's power.⁵ But perhaps even more potentially dangerous were the provisions of the Weimar Constitution providing for the election laws and for emergency decrees and enabling acts. The election laws stipulated that for every 60,000, there should be a representative in the Reichstag. The candidates were on their respective party lists so that one voted for a party, not for an individual. This arrangement gave immense power to the party machinery since each party drew up its own lists. This system lead to development of numerous splinter parties,

necessitating the formation of coalition governments. The result was ineffective compromises rather than strong, central government. With the election after the signing of the Versailles Treaty (see below), no party received a sufficient majority to rule effectively.⁶ The result was that there were periods when the parliament reached an impasse, and was unable to agree on a new cabinet.

From this total situation there were two consequences. One result was a growing anti-parliament sentiment, particularly in times of crises when profound changes were needed or desired, but the parliament was unable to effect them. The second result was the strengthening of the cabinet and subsequently the President and Chancellor. This led to the weakening of the parliament. The various enabling acts, starting in 1920, shifted fiscal, economic, and social control from the parliament to the cabinet. But even this change did not always provide a strong government, since the cabinets themselves were the result of negotiations between the various contending parties. Indeed the enabling acts only reinforced the negative attitudes towards the institution of parliament itself. The whole process dramatized the weakness of a pluralistic form of government when the basic antagonisms of the various groups prevented continual, harmonious compromise. And the continual changes in government only increased the power of the conservative civil service which remained a constant in an era of flux.⁷

Manifestations of discontent along with the central government's weakness can be seen in Bavaria, and also in the Kapp Putsch of 1920. In 1918 Kurt Eisner, a Jew, became prime minister of Bavaria. Though an Independent Socialist, he favored a parliamentary government and the continuation of the existing economic system in opposition to the radical demands for governing councils of workers, peasants, and soldiers. On February 21, 1919, Eisner was assassinated by an officer acting on his own. The moderate Social Democrats gained control of the government under Hoffman. But, in April, the Communists started a revolt and were successful. "Loyal troops" sent out to oppose the revolutionaries went over to the Communist side. Hoffman then had to call in the Free Corps of Epp, Ehrhardt and others.⁸ This action was taken with the encouragement of Berlin and by May, the Free Corps had occupied Munich and another "Red Scare" was eliminated, though not forgotten.⁹

But dissatisfaction with the republican regime at this period was not limited to the radical left. Elements of the right were also antagonistic to the Weimar Republic. The Kapp Putsch of March 1920 is indicative of this. It also illustrates how openly manipulative politics had become in Germany. Kapp was an extreme nationalist associated with the Junkers from East Prussia, and his attempted coup was a reaction by some of the older classes to the move to the left by the

central government. Kapp used the Free Corps, particularly the Ehrhardt brigade, to take over control of Berlin. The troops entered and without firing a shot took over the important buildings. The army, under von Seeckt, refused to interfere in any way, but remained on the sidelines waiting further developments. Noske, before fleeing Berlin with the central government, called upon the workers to stage a general strike. Kapp and the nationalists did not know what to do once they had gotten into power, since they had no concrete program. In addition, the general populace, while anti-proletariat, was suspicious of the putsch which was identified with the old regime. With the army remaining neutral, the middle-class suspicious, and no direction from the top, the putsch was easily stopped by workers following Noske's call for "Proletarians unite."

But then the workers got out of hand as they began to take over buildings themselves and organize fighting units. Uprisings of workers then broke out in other places, most importantly in the Ruhr. In response to this threat, Noske disavowed the general strike, claiming that he never called it. This maneuver obtained the support of the army which had no desire for radical transformations. The army and the government then enlisted the support of the very Free Corps that had just previously moved against the government to suppress the workers. This tactic was effective, with the uprisings being crushed with dispatch

and a great deal of bloodshed.¹⁰

Thus, while the army and the "socialist" government were united against any radical movement, the army initially was not antagonistic to nationalistic right-wing movements. But transference to opposition even to these elements probably was beginning at this time because it was becoming clear that any take-over by one extreme would be met with a counter-revolution from the other. This became more than explicit during the Hitler Putsch of 1923.

After the Kapp Putsch, there was an effort made by some to have the Free Corps disbanded as their usefulness was being overshadowed by their willingness to take things into their own hands. Part of the army was not so enthusiastic either, since the individual units were not under the army's direct control. The different corp units owed their allegiance to the leaders of the individual units, under whose name they marched (e. g., the Ehrhardt Brigade, the Merke Brigade, etc.). Other military men, such as Roehm and von Epp looked upon the Free Corps as a nucleus for a future German army which would "revenge the humiliations of 1918".¹¹ All the Free Corps were very nationalistic, reactionary, often anti-Semitic, and supported various conservative parties in the Reichstag. They, in turn, were supported by some industrialists and those who wanted a return to the monarchy.

The government, while not wishing to tolerate permanent armed groups which could turn against it, still needed them in case of future uprisings by the workers. The army worked to bring the units under its control, but had neither the desire nor power to eliminate them. Since the majority of the Free Corps were not organized to develop concrete political platforms, and since they did not join any particular major political party, they constituted a counter-revolutionary force more than a platform for political revolution. The ideological commitments were nationalism and conservatism, which alienated them from the middle-class. Distrusted but tolerated by the government and army, and lacking any mass support politically, they remained an important force for suppression, but not a vehicle for fundamental political change.¹²

The shift to support of the Republican regime as a form, as against a return of the right, was made during Hitler's putsch. Hitler and his party had grown dramatically during the few preceding years, from 14 members in 1920 (January) to 55,747 at the time of the putsch, from 42 mass meetings in a whole year, 1920, to 12 mass meetings in a single day on January 26, 1923, from attendance at meetings of a few hundred to several thousand.¹³ Having moved from an army indoctrination lecturer to a position of leadership in a growing political force, though primarily only within Bavaria, Hitler had become a power to be

reckoned with by the state authorities and other nationalistic parties. The nationalistic parties were particularly strong in Bavaria for several reasons. One was that the majority of the population was fearful of another Communist take-over. The lower middle-class in particular, already insecure because of inflation, was anxious lest the radical left regain its power and take what little it had left. This segment had been "saved" once before by the Free Corps which reinforced feelings of contempt for a republican form of government, and for the central government in Berlin, which had failed to stop inflation, had signed the Versailles Peace Treaty, and had not prevented the occupation of the Ruhr by the French in 1923.

The Bavarian government itself was in the hands of the right after a successful, and peaceful, coup d'etat in 1920. This change in government was supported by an election where the people clearly supported the new Bavarian government. The Free Corps moved into Bavaria with the tacit support of the state government and attracted many new recruits. The central government did not move against this reactionary movement till after 1922 when Rathenau was assassinated. Then a series of enabling acts and emergency decrees were established to give more direct power to the Reich government in all areas. As the Reich government began to exert itself, resistance built up in Bavaria and flowed in two directions.

Some groups favored a march on Berlin to overthrow the central government. Others favored a revolt to make Bavaria an independent state freed from any interference from Berlin. Hitler favored the former approach and had joined forces with the Congress of Patriotic Fighting Organizations who favored a united Germany but under a nationalistic, conservative government. Hitler was fearful that the separatists might move first or that Berlin and Munich would come to an agreement and thereby prevent him from gaining any measure of power. But his organization alone was not strong enough to move against Berlin alone and besides the various nationalistic groups were distrustful of each other. The only places he could go were to the army and the government in Bavaria for the support he needed. His attempt to force their cooperation failed and with it the putsch. General von Lossow, head of the army in Bavaria, would only defy General von Seeckt, head of the Reichswehr, up to a point. Thus, when von Seeckt telegraphed that if von Lossow did not stop the putsch, he would, the military support vanished. The civilian head of the state government, Kahr, was not about to let control pass from him to Hitler, particularly since Kahr was more of a separatist than a nationalist.¹⁴

Hitler was tried for starting the putsch and received a light jail sentence. Ludendorff, who had nominal leadership of the putsch, was let off completely. Kahr and Lossow were allowed to stay in power

though they were scarcely innocent. The Reichswehr had once again shown that it would not tolerate any violent overthrows, though it also showed that it would not prosecute severely anyone of the right who attempted to do so. It should be remembered that during the same period, the government in Berlin had troubles in other areas. In Saxony, there was a Communist takeover. The Ruhr was under heavy Communist pressure, the Rhineland had a strong separatist movement, and in the North, a garrison of the "Black Reichswehr" staged a minor revolt.¹⁵ With all these internal, political pressures the Reich government had to rely on the army. The army in turn had influence in the judiciary. But the army realized the need for pacification rather than a turmoil.

Seeckt's comments at this time are important, since he ran the army. In the Order of the Day, issued November 4, 1923, he wrote:

As long as I remain at my post, I shall not cease to repeat that salvation for Germany cannot come from one extreme or the other, neither through help from abroad nor through revolution, whether of the Right or of the Left. It is only by hard work, silently and persistently pursued, that we can survive. This can only be accomplished on the basis of the legal constitution. To abandon this principle is to unleash civil war. In such a civil war none of the parties would succeed in winning; it would be a conflict which would end only in their mutual destruction, a conflict similar to that of which the Thirty Years War provides so terrible an example.¹⁶

The putsch had meant a break between the Reichswehr and the Nazis. And the two counter-revolutionary putschs (Kapp and Hitler)

showed that to remove the parliamentary government one would have to do it with the state's machinery, not against it.¹⁷ But in order to achieve that, someone would have to provide some new ideology other than the restoration of the monarchy, the usual goal of the conservatives. If the overthrow was to be done politically, it would need an ideology that was appealing to the masses. And the leaders would have to be ones who were "untainted" by association with the "old regime." As we shall observe, "Hitler saw the handwriting on the wall."¹⁸

So far we have seen that the revolution produced a Republican government, only nominally socialist, upheld by the Free Corps which, in turn, had proven itself dangerous. However, it is not the political structure per se that led to such a chaotic situation. The underlying causes have to be found in Germany's economic crises which resulted from the defeat in World War I, the effects of the Versailles Treaty, and the reaction it produced, and the tensions that existed between various elements within the capitalist system itself. All these combined to preclude the immediate possibility of internal harmony.

FOOTNOTES

SECTION A
PART I

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18. Abel, op. cit., p. 41.

PART II -- THE VERSAILLES TREATY

Despite the antagonisms that split Germans on other issues, the treaty was one issue on which general agreement could be reached. The treaty was almost universally condemned. Abel provides us with some quotes from newspapers which show this opposition. They illustrate that Hitler was far from being alone in his opposition to the treaty, though he was perhaps unique in being able to use it for a multitude of purposes.* The Democratic Frankfort Zeitung wrote, "Unacceptable.... Germany is crushed." The Socialist Vowarts demanded rejection. The Communist Freiheit said, "no proletarian party can accept such a peace." And the Berliner Tageblatt surmised that "should we accept the conditions, military furor for revenge will sound in Germany within a few years.....". Protest meetings from all classes were held throughout Germany, demonstrating that the Junkers, industrialists, and officer corp were not alone in their resentment. The clearest indication of displeasure came with the elections of June 6, 1920, the first following the government's acceptance of the treaty. The Social Democrats and the Catholic Center Party, who had lead the drive to sign the treaty, lost a total of eleven million votes, with three million going to the Communists, and another three million going to nationalists. The center-moderate left never fully recovered from this blow to gain a sufficient majority to rule effectively. The treaty thus

*Note: He wrote in Mein Kampf, "In the boundlessness of its oppression, the shamelessness of its demands, lies the greatest propaganda weapon for the reawakening of the nation's dormant spirit of life." (p. 632, Hitler, op. cit.)

became an immediate cause of polarization within Germany.¹

While this paper is not concerned directly with the treaty, it must be mentioned that in this writer's opinion, which is by no means unique, the Versailles treaty was an example of capitalist expansion by the victorious parties against Germany.* The treaty removed Germany from colonial competition, surrounded her on the East with a number of small, independent states which became tied to France, reduced significantly Germany's internal economic resources, and placed her capitalization needs within a framework of external control through reparations. Germany, which before World War I, was superior to every other European country in industrial development and was far stronger than France and/or Russia on the continent, was placed in a dependent position by the victors. After World War I Germany stood alone among the industrial centers of Europe without an empire. Germany's area was reduced by one-eighth, its population by six and a half million, its arable by land by over 15%, its livestock by 12%, and its manufacturing establishments by almost 10%. She lost about 40% of her coal reserves, nearly two-thirds of her iron ore, seven-tenths of her zinc, and over half her lead. With the loss of her colonies Germany lost her own independent source of rubber, oil, and fibre supplies.² All rights and privileges,

*Note: Such a view makes many of the provisions "rational" rather than outbursts of a desire for revenge or plain stupidity. Here is another area in which orientation is determinative for understanding.)

trade concessions and property in areas external to Germany were forfeited. The treaty provided that in these areas the allies reserved "the right to retain and liquidate all property, rights, and interests of German private nationals or companies" with any compensation to be paid by the German government.³ Naturally, the Allies did not fail to take advantage of Germany's departure.⁴

In addition to limiting Germany's potential to move into expanding overseas markets (trade increased much more between the capitalist centers and non-capitalist areas than between capitalist states themselves), the Allies obtained a virtual blank check from Germany in terms of reparations. The reparations were based on the assumption by Germany of the guilt for starting the war. The argument went that since Germany was responsible for the war, she was liable for paying for the costs and damages incurred by the victors. By 1921 the total indemnity was fixed at \$32,000,000,000, plus interest. The schedule of payments was a fixed annuity of \$500,000,000, plus a 26% tax on exports (another technique to make Germany less competitive in the world markets). Upon threat of invasion, the Wirth government accepted the terms. But the annuities would not even cover the interest charges so that the indebtedness would increase every year no matter how faithfully the payments were made.⁵ In light of this impossible situation, the German government asked for a moratorium till the end of 1924.

England was agreeable to this as she did not want to squeeze Germany so hard as to preclude the eventual redevelopment of trade with Germany. France, desirous of enhancing her own industrial capacity, coveted in particular the Ruhr area, and thus wanted to place Germany in a position of defaulting so as to be able to take over this region.

In January, along with Belgium, France did exactly this. Claiming that Germany had been delinquent in delivering some telephone poles, French and Belgium troops occupied the Ruhr. The Ruhr produced 80% of Germany's coal, iron, and steel, and handled 70% of her commercial railroad traffic. Having no means for armed resistance, the government called for passive resistance. The French established strict controls, taking over the press, schools, and monetary policies. The passive resistance scheme meant the German government had to supply the striking workers with all the necessities of life, and was forced to give payment with more and more paper money, thus adding to the inflationary pressures already rampant in Germany. The crisis was only resolved by the Dawes Plan (later to be followed by the Young Plan). The Dawes Plan, which provided the capital needed to reestablish economic order in Germany, enabled the Stresemann government to pursue a policy of restoration within Germany. This government, unlike the ones previous to it, received the support of the nationalistic conservatives, including heavy industry.⁶ As long as the system worked, the less reactionary of the nationalist wings were not ready to turn against

the republican form of government since it was accomplishing its job of keeping the left in check and permitting capitalism to work its way out of a crisis.*

*Note: Even Thyssen lost interest in supporting counter-revolutionary groups until the Young Plan introduced capital repayment rather than goods as under the Dawes Plan. cf. Thyssen, I Paid Hitler, Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., New York, 1941, p. 87.

FOOTNOTES

PART II

1. Abel, op. cit., pp. 30-32; cf. also Bullock, op. cit., p. 59; and Butler, op. cit., p. 219.
2. Langsam, op. cit., p. 110; Parker Moon, Imperialism and World Power, the Macmillan Company, N.Y., 1928, pp. 15ff.
3. Langsam, op. cit., pp. 103ff.
4. See the relevant chapters in Moon, op. cit. for a great deal of information.
5. Langsam, op. cit., pp. 149f.
6. Abel, op. cit., p. 75; Butler, op. cit., pp. 226f.

PART III -- STAB IN THE BACK

Germany's defeat was not accompanied by destruction on her own territory. Nor did surrender come through an overwhelming defeat of her armies; large units were still intact on the front and discipline was maintained in the army during demobilization. The surrender, while a wise decision because Germany was reaching the end of her capabilities, caught much of the population unprepared. The military seized this psychological advantage to promulgate the idea of the "stab in the back" theory to explain the apparently sudden military collapse. The idea was that while the German military had done its part and was prepared to continue the fight, it had been betrayed by a crumbling homefront which was misled by some who wanted Germany to be defeated. This betrayal had prevented a continuation of the war to a victorious conclusion. The charge of "stab in the back" gained so much credence that after the war the government had to hold an investigation to attempt to disprove it.*

*Note: It was found that the military itself had proposed the armistice talks, that Germany would have been unable to continue much longer, and that her defeat was not due to any conspiracy within her own borders. But that put the blame back on Germany. However, many people already suffering from economic ruin, political instability and the "shame" of having lost, preferred the rationalization of being betrayed, thus protecting their own egos and that of the country. The report, while undoubtedly true, did not receive much acceptance.

The "myth" of betrayal was started by the military, presumably to protect its own reputation. Hindenberg, before November 1918, had billboards put up saying, "The homeland must stand behind the army, strong and united, and ready to sacrifice. We can defy every storm if it does."¹ This theme was continued after the defeat. In his farewell address, the general stated that "like Siegfried, laid low by the treacherous spear of the savage Hagen our weary front collapse." He added that a British General was right "in saying that the German Army has been stabbed from behind."² Another general is reported to have suggested that Jews be accused of causing the navy to cut off supplies from the army and thus stabbing the German people in the back.³

The munitions strikes during the war, and the November revolution itself added a seeming validity to the theory. And since the republican regime was directly associated with the armistice and the peace treaty, it was not hard to lay the charge of "November Criminals" upon its leaders. Democracy was thus accused of having betrayed the fatherland out of its own weaknesses and innate timidity, a theme pleasing to the military and conservatives, and useful to explain the difficulties that came with the establishment of democracy in Germany by those who were opposed to it.

FOOTNOTES

PART III

1. Abel, op. cit., p. 22.
2. Fried, op. cit., p. 36.
3. Ibid. p. 37.

PART IV -- ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ¹

In this section, we shall examine the economic conditions in more depth than previously. We shall concentrate on developments through 1924 and to some degree beyond. This approach is taken because when the world economic crisis begins in 1929, the same type of considerations come up again, but to a more extensive degree. The situation of capitalism in Germany did not change in essence from 1923 or early 1924 from that following 1929. It is during these periods that Hitler reached his peak and the reasons for this are substantially the same. The difference in degree of success between the twenties and the thirties is that in the thirties Hitler was not going against the political structure upheld by capitalism, but had become the controlling element, politically, within it. His ideology, his tactics, his "charisma" were only mildly successful during the economic expansion financed by the Dawes and Young Plans. When the collapse came, the ideology again had its appeal, the tactics worked anew, and the charisma is rediscovered. But since the basic problems remain constant, only disappearing through momentary solution, it is legitimate to move from one period to another to understand the background for Hitler's ideological constructs.*

*Note: This method is used by the other writers I have read, regardless of their orientation. While time is a crucial factor to understand relationship, in this situation we have a repetition which permits, in this area, the crossing over between time periods. It is the structural analysis here that is important, not sequential considerations.

Like many other politicians, he was dependent on someone else's failure for his own success.

The keystones of capitalism are profit and competition. Competition between various areas (e.g. financial and manufacturing) and within them (e.g. manufacturers of the same product) are integral to capitalism in all of its manifestations. The basic drive of any capitalist, from manufacturer to supplier to distributor, is to make a profit on the capital invested. The source of capitalist crisis is basically one not of under-production as is usually the case in non-capitalist economies, but in finding an outlet for the production and services and doing so at a profit.

But to use the word "capitalism" is not to use a construct that implies a homogenous entity. Various groupings within it at any given time have conflicting interests. When faced with a common, non-capitalistic enemy, such as the Communist Party in Germany, the contending elements will unite for mutual protection. In the absence of such threats, the system is in internal conflict. As long as capitalism keeps growing and the market (internal and/or external) expands, profits continue and the antagonism is not threatening to the system itself, though, of course, individual capitalists may not be successful. In such a situation the proletariat, through employment with a rise in real

wages, is, or can be, brought into the system as another interest group with its own demands, but nevertheless, not willing nor anxious to overthrow the system per se. This is what happened to the Social Democrats and explains the appearance of "revisionist" socialists in various countries. However, when capitalism experiences a slow down, as it did in Germany in particular, then the antagonisms well up again often leading to a revision in the political structure which may establish a new relationship between the various elements and between them and the state. Some of the most relevant inherent conflicts are the following.

Heavy and Light Industry

Heavy industry (iron, steel, mining) and light industry (finished goods) have conflicting interests and do not necessarily use the same social and political strategy. Light industry has to pay the heavy industry for its raw materials and machinery. Heavy industry often desires imperialistic expansion to obtain the raw materials, and also wants autarky to provide for protection against foreign competition. Its foreign policy is therefore usually more expansionistic than co-operative. Heavy industry also is directly involved in armaments manufacture and thus has an interest in the possibility of tension between states which would lead to increased orders in this area. Light industry, on the other hand, is dependent more on trade and therefore favors international

collaboration as a general rule. It is against autarky since this usually means that higher prices must be paid to native heavy industry.

The aftermath of the war and the obligations of the Versailles Peace Treaty impelled heavy industry groups to favor a foreign policy that would recapture its lost markets and sources of raw material, particularly in East Europe, and to shake off reparations which added greatly to their production costs. However, from 1924 to 1929 a policy of collaboration was needed since the reorganization, concentration and rationalization of industry was done with foreign capital. When this collapsed, then the need for collaboration collapsed with it. The loans provided the liquid capital not only for the enlargement and rationalization of plants, but also the further development of trusts, cartels, and combines. Cartelization was carried further in Germany than any other country. By 1932 there were some 3,000 cartels. While the central government was supposed to stop this process, this was never done, though the industrialists never did like the idea that the government had the potential power to intervene. Employer organizations controlled the labor market which was to some degree dislocated by chronic unemployment through the intensified use of technology.

Labor relations was another area of conflict between heavy and light industry. Heavy industry has a higher ratio of fixed capital (plants, raw material, etc.) to variable capital expense (wages) than

does light industry. When a crisis develops the fixed charges, such as interest, depreciation are spread out over an insufficient production and profits decrease. The only items that can be cut are the variable costs, i. e., wages. Therefore heavy industry favors a tougher policy with regards to unions, strikes, and an organized working class movement as such. The light industry owners have a greater flexibility since its fixed costs are lower. Therefore, they are more likely to be willing to work "with" labor movements. Also, this group is against measures which reduce the purchasing power of its consumers, the masses. Their choice of collaboration with the unions, or workers, is thus a tactic that is in their own interests.

This aspect explains why it was that heavy industry was in favor of using the Free Corps to suppress the Communists, while other considerations prohibited them from supporting an overthrow of the republican government as such in the early twenties. The inflation following the war and continuing till the stabilization of the mark in 1924 was not particularly disasterous for the industrial producers. Inflation enabled them to take over extensive holdings, pay off debts cheaply, and to reduce the real wages of workers. The loss of national wealth fell on the workers and the middle class. At this time, it was not to their advantage to have a radical change in the form of government. In the early thirties, the political situation in particular had changed, so that

a return of Communist power seemed to be more than just a theoretical possibility. Also, the depression was not that "useful" and some other solution had to be tried. It is only after the Young Plan and the crisis of 1929 that Hitler began to receive real support from heavy industry. Previous to that, the support was limited, though interest was never totally severed. The same considerations also explain why Hitler did not receive that much assistance from light industry until the choice narrowed down to either Hitler or the Communists. It was then decided that any form of capitalism was better than none at all.

Middle Class

The middle class itself is caught between the proletariat from below and the owners of industries, large corporations and financial interests from above. In contrast to Marx's prediction, the middle class had not disappeared in Germany. Many may have lost their economic independence and become salaried or commissioned employees of the larger enterprises. Others may have felt the squeeze from the larger enterprises (e. g. department store vs. specialty shop) and dropped from the middle class entirely. When inflation hits, as it did in Germany they are squeezed even further. Anti-capitalistic feelings become manifest, but not like that of a socialist. The socialist at that time saw the problem in terms of "exploitation of labor power and the theft of surplus value." The resolution of the problem was seen in attacking the capitalist

system as a whole with the goal being the socialization of the means of production and the elimination of most areas of private property. The middle class saw its problem in terms of competition and organization of credit. They did not want socialism, but a regulated capitalism which restricted the competitive edge of their larger rivals, a capitalism that controlled the power of concentration of credit and speculation.*

And, of course, the "sacredness" of private property was held up to the middle class as being essential to its well being. This concept can be, and was, used to attack both the socialists who denied its value, and against the "stock company" that transformed the concept of private property into a new mold which was used to control impersonally even more private property.

There is also the factor of "status" that the middle class was and is still very much concerned about. At almost any cost, a member of the middle class is in favor of class difference that maintains social distance between the middle class and the working class. The threat of being "proletarianized" was a very real factor in the psychology of the middle class in Germany. The fear of losing this status made them cling

*Note: The credit problem was particularly important in Hitler's obtaining mass support. In the first half of 1924, at the time of Hitler's first peak in popularity, the interest rates were extremely high, 90%-100%. The Reichsbank discount was considerably lower so everything depended on having good banking connections. In 1930, when Hitler began to reach another plateau, the interest rates for long term credit were as high during the depression as they were for the preceding boom period. Merchants, because of their inventories, were hard hit and so were the members of the middle class because they could not get credit easily. cf. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Reynal & Hitchcock, N.Y., 1939, Note on pp. 283-284.

even harder to it, and to listen to someone who promised to regulate capitalism and at the same time remove the threat of a worker's state.

The inflation after World War I particularly hurt the middle class. Many of them had invested heavily in government war bonds which became worthless. Similarly, their savings accounts and small investments in rent producing properties, mortgages, and the like were wiped out. With the mark becoming almost totally worthless, the middle class was faced with proletarianization. It was at this point that Hitler had made his putsch. In the crisis of 1930, the middle class was again hit hard. As consumers they paid high prices for manufactured products; as borrowers, interest rates were astronomical; the small, independent businessman felt the further squeeze from the chain store and the "one-price" store; small stockholders saw their power diminished by the creation of preferred stocks with multiple voting power. Office workers and technicians were laid off or had salaries reduced below the level of skilled workers. The stock market declined and thus further dissipated any gain made during the period of stabilization.

The economic decline in the 1930's also played havoc with the professional classes and university graduates. Competition for places of employment became fiercer as companies and the government cut back on hiring. With fewer clients having the ability to pay for professional services, among such groups as lawyers, large numbers

became "superfluous." A university education no longer gave any insurance of employment, for out of every 24,000 diplomas granted, only 10,000 positions were available.

Agriculture

Agriculture in Germany had its internal tensions as did the industrial production sector. Owners of the large estates were at odds with the peasantry, who were owners of small farms.* The Junkers primarily grew feed and grain, while the small peasants specialized in dairy and poultry products. They were thus dependent on the Junkers for the feed. But, while the Junkers received state subsidies and obtained, particularly after 1930, tariff protection, the small farms were left unprotected. The tariff problem brought part of the agricultural community in conflict with some of the industrialists as the latter were opposed to high agricultural tariff on secondary products because they feared that the other nations would reply with tariffs on their industrial goods.

During the inflation after the war, the peasants had been able to pay off their indebtedness and therefore they had no incentive to modernize. Their products commanded good prices in the city. Hence,

*Note: The Social Democrats, in their early need for allies against the more radical left, needed the Junkers who were closely linked to the army since this group supplied many of the officer corps. Thus, while a law in 1919 was passed to break up the large estates, it was never applied.

there was no initial opposition to the Weimar Republic. During the period of stabilization, while the peasants had to pay high interest rates, they did not apply the new credits to modernizing their farms, but rather used the capital for consumption. Between 1924 and 1928, the investments in agriculture were less than the expenses for normal wear and tear. The debts grew higher, but prices held firm and new credit was always available, though expensive. Starting with the summer of 1929, however, prices began to decline. While the Junkers had tariff protection, the small farmer did not. But like the Junkers, the small farmer had no desire to turn to the left with its avowed plans for removing private property. The Junkers attempted to ally themselves with the peasants saying that they should band together to get higher tariffs for everyone. But since the Junkers were clearly concerned with their own particular interests, the peasants did not join in the coalition which would have supported Hugenberg's nationalistic party. Like the middle class, the small farmer became anti-capitalistic in the sense that he wanted a regulated capitalism which would give him a chance to regain his former stability. Since the Left was also against his interests and the Weimar Republic had seemingly deserted him, another alternative was needed; a party that ideologically was tied neither to the right nor left extremes, that was anti-capitalistic, revolutionary, and not socialist or communist. For the peasant, as well as for the middle class, Hitler was the answer.

Labor Movement

Up to this point, we have concentrated on the various units that tended to be supportive of Hitler, or at least, after 1930, not particularly antagonistic to him. The election results show that by and large the working class parties held their own throughout, though many members eventually did go over to the Nazis. However, and this is vitally important, to/ bear in mind if we wish to understand why Hitler was able to obtain power, the only party besides the Nazis to show continual growth was the Communist Party.

The working class in Germany was considered to be the best organized and the most powerful in Europe. Lenin was not alone in feeling that the revolution would come next in Germany. And the events in the early years of the Republic, as we have seen, certainly indicated that the "Red scare" was not a myth. When the governments preceding Hitler were not able to control the crisis and the Communists began to gain real strength, the only alternative for the industrialists was Hitler, who by then had shown himself to be most reliable.

The Communists were not the only party representing the workers, and the split in the working class contributed indirectly to Hitler's rise to power. On the one hand, the workers were told by the Social Democrats that evolution, not revolution, was the way in which capitalism was to disappear. Thus, the increased concentration in

German industry was cited as proof that capitalism was entering into its last phase. Those who favored this line of reasoning were also against the use of counter force against the Nazis, or any movement for that matter. Having once decided that law and order were to be particularly guarded, the Social Democrats could not easily return to an ideology of revolution against the political system which they themselves had established and in which they had so vigorously participated. Having given themselves over to democracy and working in conjunction with capitalism, they were not able to provide for an alternative program or leadership that would pull the workers out of the system.

On the other hand, the Communist split the working class by its radical demands. Its proclaimed revolutionary program restricted its mass appeal to sections of the working class, and precluded co-operation with the lower middle class, peasants, or the more evolutionary minded workers. Together with the Social Democrats, they could have formed a mass movement that could not easily have been contained. However, instead of a "united front", the Communists opposed, not the Nazis, but the Social Democrats calling the latter "Social Fascists." This tactic effectively limited the power of the workers, keeping them at each other's throats rather than fighting a common enemy.*

*Note: While this tactic is usually put down as due to stupidity by most observers, Spiro has documented the real reasons behind the Communist's actions. cf. George Spiro, Marxism and the Bolshevik State, Red Star Press, N.Y., 1951, Chapter XXII.

Added to this split was the chronic unemployment which diminished the power of the various parties over the workers. Since 1926, there had always been at least one million unemployed. By 1932, over six million were out of work. Party and trade union funds were exhausted and the workers had little to contribute. In the midst of the crisis, there was an attempt to have the government start a public works program. But this maneuver was stopped by the industrialists who realized that it would only strengthen the trade unions.

The final demonstration of the weaknesses of the German trade unions and their parties was the ease with which they were eliminated when Hitler took over. Misled by ideologies that were not put into practice, suffering under the blows of unemployment, and split internally as to what to do, the labor movement in Germany at the moment of truth proved itself to be exceptionally weak and disorganized. When Hitler obtained totalitarian power, the counter-revolution had finally won.

FOOTNOTES

PART IV

1. Rather than have a footnote appearing every few lines in this part of the paper, the sources for this section are given at one time. Almost all of the sentences of this section are the result of combining several sources, and if one wishes to investigate the matter further in light of what is written, it would be necessary to read all of them. The sources are the following.

Abel, op. cit., pp. 67ff, 121ff; Bullock, op. cit., pp. 86 and 142; Guerin, op. cit., chapters I to IV; Hoover, op. cit., pp. 4-31; Langsam, op. cit., pp. 161ff; Neuman, op. cit., pp. 3-33; Fritz Sternberg, Capitalism and Socialism on Trial, Victor Gollancz, London, 1951, pp. 257-298, and pp. 352-361.

SECTION B

MEIN KAMPF

Mein Kampf is the basic work written by Hitler. Dictated during his stay in prison after his unsuccessful putsch, the two volume book constitutes an invaluable source for an understanding of Hitler's anti-Semitism as well as on most of the crucial ideological matters. It is certainly no literary masterpiece: it is fairly repetitive, at times quite dull, and apparently the German is not of the highest quality.¹ However, none of the above literary considerations should lead one to conclude that the work is without value or grounds for casting aspersions upon the author. Obviously what is said, not how it is said, is what is crucial.

Hitler relied primarily upon oratory to establish his mass appeal. He had no illusions that any book or pamphlet would produce the support he desired. As he wrote in the preface, "I know that men are won over less by the written than by the spoken word."^{*} Then why did he write the book in the first place? There appears to be at least three reasons.

1) Hitler was undoubtedly acute enough to realize that his imprisonment would give others a chance to attempt to establish control over the party.

*Note: All quotations from Mein Kampf, unless otherwise noted are taken from the Sentry Edition and translated by Ralph Manheim. This translation was checked with that in the edition published by Reynal and Hitchcock. In order to help any reader who wishes to check on the selections given in this paper, or from another source as indicated, the page number of the Sentry edition will be given immediately after the quotation. The differences between the first and second editions of the German do not play any major role in the topics under discussion in this paper. All italics are Hitler's.

By coming forth with a book that could become the ideological foundation for the party, he would thus strengthen his position as leader. 2) After the failure of the putsch, the party would have to begin to rebuild internally. As a source of inspiration to loyal followers, Mein Kampf is an excellent work. It tells of struggle, devotion, threat and promise, defeat and eventual victory. Since it also deals with method, the book serves as a manual for how the party is to proceed on its road to power. The basic motivation does not seem to be a means to attract new members, though this consideration is not entirely ruled out. Primarily the author has in mind "those adherents of the movement who belong to it with their hearts." To lay the groundwork for the future, to provide the loyal with a "more penetrating enlightenment" as Hitler puts it, were the main goals. Abel states it well: "Mein Kampf was a propaganda manual for the leaders and a means of inspiration for the followers."²

There is another consideration which is explicitly mentioned and which seems quite relevant. Hitler was not the only nationalist in the German political arena. It was therefore essential, particularly after the disastrous putsch, for Hitler to demonstrate to the army and the industrialists that he had something that no other nationalist party could give: an ideology that could capture the mass. But it was an ideology that was revolutionary, yet conservative; a socialism that was not socialistic; a nationalism of external expansion and internal cohesion;

in short, a solution to the economic and political tensions that threatened, in times of crisis, to over-turn the capitalist system in Germany. Once Hitler decided to gain power legally, and there was no other choice, he had to demonstrate that he could deliver the goods. Mein Kampf was a method of showing that no matter what the banner looked like, it would not be threatening to the capitalist system.

To construct the desired type of ideology, some means had to be found to unite various ideologies that were fragmented among different groups within the society. It is our contention that anti-Semitism was the ideological tool that provided the linkage. It is also our contention that Hitler knew this, was fully aware of what he was doing, and that therefore his anti-Semitism was calculated, rather than haphazard; was rational, rather than emotional, a means rather than an end.

PART I -- SOURCE OF HITLER'S ANTI-SEMITISM

In order to explain Hitler's anti-Semitism, one could start out with the assumption that since anti-Semitism is false, anyone who believes in it must be motivated by some kind of psychological imbalance. Since the facts do not support anti-Semitic claims, it is the psychological needs of the individual that supports anti-Semitism. Thus, in Hitler's case, there is speculation that perhaps some sexual experiences or deficiencies led him to his views. Another interpretation has it that Hitler just took over a cultural norm in which he was socialized and that this culturally determined perception became so ingrained that it perverted his entire outlook.³ Both of these viewpoints, and the variants and combinations, have one thing in common; they both picture Hitler as being out of contact with reality to a significant degree. But as we shall see, Hitler was a very keen observer of reality. Also, there is no evidence that Hitler had some kind of disabling or traumatic sexual experience that led him to anti-Semitism, nor any other indications of mental derangement at the time Mein Kampf was written or before this period. As for early cultural influence, Hitler writes, "Today (1924) it is difficult, if not impossible, for me to say when the word 'Jew' first gave me ground for special thoughts. At home I do not remember having heard the word during my father's lifetime." (p. 50) And he relates that in Linz there were few Jews and that the only "distinguishing feature" about them was the "strange religion", and this

did not seem to be a valid ground for discrimination nor did it when he first came to Vienna. (p. 51) There exists no external evidence that challenges these statements⁴, nor is there any internal evidence to discredit them. It should be noted that Hitler does not hesitate to relate how he was influenced in his nationalism by his history teacher in his early schooling. (p. 14) He has no fears of "exposing" this early source of one of his ideological mainstays. There would appear to be no reason to hide any such influence with regard to anti-Semitism if there had been one. What then does Hitler say about the source of his anti-Semitism?

Hitler traces his development through his observations during his stay in Vienna. He took advantage of the intense political and ideological activity that was then occurring in Vienna to learn about the way politics worked. He apparently did not actually participate in any organization, but spent his time observing and reading. He studied not the philosophical ingenuity of the various ideologies, but concentrated on how these ideologies were put into effect. "More than any theoretical literature, my daily reading of the Social Democratic press enabled me to study the inner nature of these thought-processes." (p. 45) This included investigating how ideologies were used to further political ends. We shall see that one of the conclusions from this period was the value of anti-Semitism as a political weapon. At first he was not impressed with anti-Semitism, but his opinion changed with his growing interest and understanding of

Karl Lueger's Christian Social Party. Karl Lueger was the long-time mayor of Vienna and an extremely successful politician. The party was primarily interested in keeping the Austro-Hungarian Empire intact in the face of the growing nationalism of the various minorities contained within its borders. Karl Lueger's party was "anti-Semitic."

What does Hitler say about this? First of all, he relates that many of his political views developed through studying the way in which Karl Lueger operated. As concerns anti-Semitism, Hitler changed his opinion through the same procedure. The change in view is not emotional, but analytical. "My views with regard to anti-Semitism then succumbed to the passage of time and this was the greatest transformation of all." And "Two years later, my sentiment^{had} followed my reason and from then on became its (anti-Semitism) most loyal guardian and sentin^el." (p. 55) Notice that Hitler places his "sentiment" in subordination to his "reason." But most important, all of these changes are directly related to a change in attitude to Karl Lueger and his party. (ibid) This change was not from disapproval to approval of Lueger's political goals, but from disinterest to admiration for a successful politician.

One might then expect that Hitler would proceed directly to his analysis of Lueger and his party. But Hitler does not do this and here is where some difficulty apparently arises. In the next several pages (56ff) Hitler accuses the Jews of being the cause of all decay, decline, political

tensions. In this long passage, Jews suddenly do not look "German", do not act "German", and become absolutely loathsome. Because these pages are so "unreasonable" and emotional, some scholars emphasize these attacks and use them to demonstrate what a fanatic Hitler was at this time.*

But to proceed in this fashion means that the passages directly before these statements are forgotten. Hitler explicitly informs the reader that Karl Lueger is the key, and then drops the connective link until later on. To forget this and rely on the propaganda contained in the pages that follow would appear to be falling into the trap of not taking seriously what Hitler said as to the source of his views and take as the true indications of his real motivation passages that are irrelevant.**

We do not hear of Lueger and his anti-Semitism until page 119, but here we find some interesting observations. Hitler notes that Lueger's anti-Semitism was a religious anti-Semitism, not a racial one. The reason that racial views were not promulgated is clearly understood by Hitler. If one wanted to preserve an empire made up of people who felt that they belonged to different racial-national groups, any racial principle would only justify the dissolution of the state as a whole. But religious anti-

*Note: For example; Bullock, op. cit. pp. 39-40; Konrad Heiden, Der Fuehrer, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1944, pp. 68f; Rudolf Olden, Hitler, Covici-Friede, New York, 1936, Chapter II; Howard Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish History, Dell Publishing Co. Inc., New York, 1963, p. 427; Shirer, op. cit., p. 26; for a more developed view, see Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 1950, Chapter IX.

**Note: It is interesting to note that often the same writers do take seriously that his views on socialism, organizations, etc. do stem from his observations at this time.

Semitism did have a purpose. Hitler reasons that Lueger and his party "thought" that religious anti-Semitism would be a "slogan transcending all of old Austria's national differences". (p. 120) This approach was ineffective in Hitler's opinion because it did not make the question seem to be important enough to unite the various groups which were in conflict with each other over other matters. Religious anti-Semitism did not seem to be a matter of life and death "with the fate of all non-Jewish peoples depending on its solution." (ibid)

Now this section which deals with what Hitler learned from Lueger is written as a reasoned analysis. Hitler sees the function of anti-Semitism as a uniting "slogan". He relates its usefulness in terms of the goals of the political party involved. He does not defend or analyze Lueger's use of this slogan in terms of its validity. Indeed, his words "they thought they had discovered a slogan" indicates that Hitler was fully aware that it was political calculation rather than a deep-rooted sincere belief in anti-Semitism that motivated its use. This is reinforced throughout his further discussions of Lueger which ends with Hitler admiring this party for its "practical shrewdness". (p. 122) This practical shrewdness is evident in their use of anti-Semitism. At no time does Hitler indicate or imply that he believed in anti-Semitism prior to his introduction to Lueger. His analysis of function is based on reality, not divorced from it. Nor did the fact that Lueger's political goal was in disagreement with Hitler's views impede Hitler from learning from him. This is not the mark

of an individual who has to place reality into a pre-determined context. Rather, it shows a mind capable of realizing that the complexity of reality necessitates learning from any person or group that demonstrates it has a grasp of the real situation.

In this analysis of Hitler's views, we also see that he realizes that a further, more effective use of anti-Semitism could be accomplished if it were put on a racial basis. Lueger could not do this because it would interfere with his own goals. But Hitler could use racism as his aim was to gain control of a people, not split by racial ideologies, but by economic and social conflicts. The Germans already had a nationalism upon which one could build. All one needed was a question that could be made to seem so vital that it would transcend the differences. Used more effectively, anti-Semitism could perform this function. As we shall see, this is exactly what Hitler did. It was with good reason then that Hitler wrote:

"I do not know what my attitude toward the Jews, Social Democracy, or rather Marxism as a whole, the social questions, etc. would be today if at such an early time the pressure of destiny - and my own personal study - had not built up a basic stock of personal opinions within me." (p. 125)

PART II -- PROPAGANDA

In his speeches before the putsch, Hitler is constantly on the attack. His speeches show little elucidation of a party platform. Rather the speeches are filled with threats to the government which are coupled with the idea of resistance to those who are reportedly purposely destroying Germany. Hitler usually takes an event that has just occurred and uses it to prove that the government is being run by "criminals" who have brought disrespect and disaster to Germany. The theme is then continued against the Communist-Jews who are labeled the real enemy. The Versailles Treaty is also used to explain why Germany is in such straits. After the problems are thus analyzed, the only solution is said to be a volkstaat under the leadership of the National Socialists.⁵ Hitler's themes in this period are consistent and constant. The reasons for these tactics are found in Mein Kampf where there is a great deal of discussion about propaganda and its usefulness in obtaining mass support.

Hitler has several inter-related principles in this area. Firstly, Hitler felt that "the broad mass of the people can be moved only by the power of speech". (p. 107) He did not discount the value of newspapers or pamphlets in influencing people, but he recognized that a great many people do not read extensively, nor are they particularly interested in reading something that disagrees with their previously held convictions. (p. 470) Hitler derived the idea of the power of the spoken

word from examining how other mass movements, particularly the Socialist, obtained their large followings. For example, he recognized that most of the workers had not read Das Capital and other theoretical treatises, so the approach must have been in other areas.

"What has won the millions of workers for Marxism is less the literary style of the Marxist church fathers than the indefatigable and truly enormous propaganda work of tens of thousands of. . . . agitators. . . . this work consisted of hundreds of thousands of meetings at which. . . these peoples' orators hammered at the masses." (pp. 472f.)

He also commends the Marxists for realizing the value of mass demonstrations. This he saw in Vienna where the scene of mass marchers made a great impression on him.

"I gazed on the interminable ranks, four abreast, of Viennese workmen parading at a mass demonstration. I stood dumb-founded for almost two hours, watching this enormous human dragon which slowly uncoiled itself before me." (Bullock translation in Bullock, op. cit., p. 44)

Hitler also felt that the masses, as well as being "intellectually lazy", are also limited in their interests and receptivity. They feel more than they think, and are more emotional than rational. (pp. 42ff., p. 470) The task of the organizer of a mass movement is to recognize these facts and adjust to them in order to gain support. As the mood of the people changes, the organizer must change with it. He must therefore keep in close contact with the people. Rather than be a theoretician, concerned with what Hitler calls "abstractly correct laws", the leader must become a psychologist. "He must take people as they are and must therefore know

them". (p. 580) He admires the Social Democrats' leaders who do keep in close touch with the members, and he condemns the bourgeoisie politicians who do not consider such an activity as worthwhile. (p. 103, p. 473, p. 580) He praises Lueger also for recognizing this factor, for Lueger "took good care not to consider people better than they are." (p. 99)

Once there is the mass meeting, how then does one talk? Does one give learned discourses, explanations of various points of view, and then conclude with reasoned arguments as to why the listener should choose the side of the speaker? Hitler would reply that such a technique is doomed to failure with the masses. Basing his remarks on observations of successful parties and on his own personal experience as a speaker, he contends that to be effective propaganda must have certain qualities.

"The function of propaganda is, for example, not to weigh and ponder the rights of different people, but exclusively to emphasize the right one which it has set out to argue for. Its task is not to make an objective study of the truth... and then set it before the masses with academic firmness; its task is to serve our own right always and unflinchingly." (p. 182)

Propaganda "tries to force a doctrine on the whole people; ... (it) works on the general public from the stand point of an idea and makes them ripe for the victory of this idea." (p. 583)

Propaganda must be done "so skillfully that everyone will be convinced that the fact is real, the process necessary, the necessity correct, etc." (p. 179)

These quotations clearly show that Hitler in his pronouncements had in mind political goals; the aim is victory, not enlightenment. Once this kind of decision is taken, there is the possibility that the leader could decide that there are no moral restraints. If influence is the only criteria of effectiveness, then the techniques to be chosen are the ones that are the most effective. Thus,

"Propaganda must be adjusted to the broad masses in content and in form, and its soundness is to be measured exclusively by its effective result." (p. 342, cf. also p. 177)

From his observations of English war propaganda and the methods of other successful political parties, Hitler concluded that effective propaganda must be persistent, contain a few essential points, and create in people's mind a fear of a single, major enemy.

Persistent emphasis on a few themes follows logically from the premise that the broad mass is intellectually lazy, is bored with hearing various possible analysis of problems, and is slow to comprehend ideas. Therefore,

"...all effective propaganda must be limited to a very few points and must harp on these in slogans until the last member of the public understands what you want him to understand by your slogan." (pp. 180-181)

Another factor that makes persistence important is that people will not change their ideological commitments overnight. Change in attitude takes time. Therefore the ideas should not be too complex, nor should they appear to change. (cf. pp. 181ff.)

Continual repetition of the same ideas need not be wearisome because the same few ideas can be promulgated in various forms. He writes,

"... a slogan must be presented from different angles, but the end of all remarks must always and immutably be the slogan itself." (p. 185)

Hitler saw examples of this procedure and its effectiveness all around.

"All advertising, whether in the field of business or politics, achieves success through the continuity and sustained uniformity of its application."

"Here too, the example of enemy war propaganda was typical; limited to a few points, devised exclusively for the masses, carried on with indefatigable persistence. Once the basic ideas and methods of execution were recognized as correct, they were applied throughout the whole War without the slightest change. At first the claims of the propaganda were so impudent that people thought it insane; later, it got on people's nerves; and in the end it was believed." (ibid)

Now if one is to be persistent, one has to be able to concentrate, no matter in what variety of ways, on a few crucial ideas.*
(p. 179) The following quote shows how far Hitler was willing to go.

*Note: It is for this reason that once the commitment has been made to a program, it is better to stick with it, even though it "should not entirely correspond to reality." To change the party program would be to lose its dogmatic quality and open the door to general discussion and thereby destroy blind faith within it. Hitler indicates that this is the procedure that the Catholic Church has used successfully for some time, and that by its refusal to change the dogmas has retained its members and its power. (pp. 458-459)

"In general the art of all truly great national leaders at all times consists among other things primarily in not dividing the attention of a people, but in concentrating it upon a single foe... It belongs to the genius of a great leader to make even adversaries far removed from one another seem to belong to a single category, because in weak and uncertain characters the knowledge of having different enemies can too readily lead to the beginning of doubt in their own right."

"Once the wavering mass sees itself in a struggle against too many enemies, objectivity will put in an appearance, throwing open the question whether all others are really wrong and only their own people or their own movement are in the right." (p. 118)**

Again, the logic is deceptively simple. To be persistent, there should be just a few ideas at the most. To carry this out most convincingly, there should be one major idea to which all the others are related. If this is so, then when one is battling other ideas and movements, the most effective way would be to combine all the opposition into one, single enemy. In all of this there is the clear implication that the presentation of truth is not a criteria by which one chooses what is contained within the propaganda. The combination of what in fact are separate entities, "adversaries far removed from one another," into a single whole, even though the speaker knows this not to be the truth, is merely a logical outcome of making effectiveness the sole, legitimate, criteria.

**Note: One of Hitler's main criticisms of the Pan-German Movement in Austria was that it attacked the Church as well as other groups. "The Pan-German movement would never have made this mistake but for its insufficient understanding of the psyche of the broad masses. If its leaders had known that to achieve any success one should, on purely psychological grounds, never show the masses two or more opponents, since this leads to a total disintegration of their fighting power..." (p. 117)

In fact, these ideas do not remain merely implicit. The lie, and the bigger the lie - the better, is seen as a most effective tool in influencing the masses. He writes that the Marxists,

"...proceeded on the sound principle that the magnitude of a lie always contains a certain factor of credibility, since the great masses of the people... tend to be corrupted rather than consciously and purposely evil and (that)....in view of the primitive simplicity of their minds, they more easily fall a victim to a big lie than to a little one, since they themselves lie in little things, but would be ashamed of lies that were too big. Such a falsehood will never enter their heads, and they will not be able to believe in the possibility of such monstrous effrontery and infamous misrepresentation in others.... The grossly impudent lie always leaves traces behind it, even after it has been nailed down." (pp. 231-232)

It would not appear to be "unfair" to anticipate then that Hitler would be more than willing, indeed even desirous, of postulating a single enemy containing within it all the elements which would oppose his conquest of the masses. If to construct this single enemy he had to resort to a "big lie" that had some small element of "truth" in it, he certainly would not hesitate to do so.

It is important to recognize the following points about Hitler's views on propaganda. Firstly, they are based on analysis. From Vienna, from his war experiences, from the operations of other parties, Hitler developed his opinions. They are not post facto rationalizations, but reasoned suggestions as to how the party leaders should act as well as explanations as to how he himself has acted. Hitler's opinions may seem morally corrupt, but that would have little to do with their validity. After all, it is a fact that Hitler was a great orator who tested his theories

in the real world and found a resonance.

A second point is that the concept of the single enemy is most important for us. We have already seen that the origin of his anti-Semitism was his understanding of anti-Semitism as a unifying force. From the idea of the single enemy, we observe a further elaboration of this idea. If the Jew can be a unifying "slogan", why not make him the single enemy in his propaganda if that will be effective in gaining mass support. Prior to the writing of Mein Kampf Hitler had been the leader of a party that had grown rapidly. In his speeches prior to his imprisonment, the "Jew" was quite clearly the enemy.* This theme is carried on in Mein Kampf and will be analyzed below. When we remember that the big lie is perfectly acceptable and that the single enemy is to change diversity into unity, we begin to see what actually are the dynamics of Hitler's anti-Semitism.

*Note: Hitler would appear to have been aware of this when he began speaking in public. This is indicated by his statement that in his early speeches "nearly everything was taken up that seemed agitationally expedient or ideologically necessary." (p. 463)

PART III -- THE MASS

The meaning of the word "mass" needs some elaboration before we are able to continue. There are two sections to the mass, the lower middle class and the workers. While Hitler wishes to capture both of these groups, his primary interest is in the middle class. Again, Hitler refers back to the success that Lueger enjoyed and the reasons for it. "By aiming essentially at winning the small and lower middle classes and artisans, it (Lueger's party) obtained a following as enduring as it was self-sacrificing." (p. 119) The main reason that this group was so ripe for political exploitation was that its social and economic situation was insecure. We have seen in the above section on economic considerations that it was the middle class that was being squeezed from above by the growth of concentration within the capitalist system, and threatened from below by the socialism of the workers. In both inflation and depression, they suffered and were thus ripe for political change. A similar situation had occurred in Vienna and Lueger "laid his greatest stress in his political activity on winning over the classes whose existence was threatened and therefore tended to spur rather than paralyze the will to fight. . . Thus he adjusted his new party primarily to the middle class menaced with destruction. . . ." (p. 100)*

*Note: For further information as to the situation in Austria and Vienna and how Lueger manipulated it, see Pulzer, op. cit., pp. 104ff. The information confirms Hitler's analysis though, of course, brings in other relevant factors. The point is that on the level in which Hitler is interested, his analysis is based upon an accurate reading of what had occurred in Austria. His observations on the fears of the lower middle class are not original, but then neither are they inaccurate.

As regards the threat that this class felt from below, Hitler correctly analyzed the situation in the following.

"The cleft between this class (the lower middle), which in an economic sense is by no means so brilliantly situated, and the manual worker, is often deeper than we imagine. The reason for this hostility, as we might almost call it, lies in the fear of a social group, which has but recently raised itself above the level of the manual worker, that it will sink back into the old, despised class, or at least be identified with it." (pp. 22-23)

The reason that the other nationalistic parties had not been able to appeal to this class was that the middle class could not identify with the economic aims of the upper classes who usually couched their nationalism with an appeal for the restoration of the monarchy. This type of nationalism was too closely identified with particular interests which in the crisis periods was clearly antagonistic to those of the small and lower middle class. Thus, one could be nationalistic, or at least potentially so, and yet not be able to support any national party.* (p. 331) Thus what was needed was a party that was nationalistic, yet not identifiable with the classes that were associated with what became oppressive capitalism.

There is another reason why Hitler did not concentrate on those persons who were already supporting other nationalistic groups. He writes,

*Note: While Hitler does praise individual monarchs, he explicitly disavows a restoration. (p. 238) This does not mean that he was against the aims of those who supported the monarchy's restoration. This becomes clear from Thyssen's book, where the distinction is acknowledged to have been quite clear. cf. Thyssen, op. cit., p. 25.

"If we understand that the resurrection of the German nation represents a question of regaining our political will for self-preservation, it is also clear that this cannot be done by winning elements, which in point of will least are already national, but only by nationalization of the consciously anti-national masses." (p. 333)

This consciously anti-national group constituted the vast majority of the voters, and in a democracy it is the votes that count. So if the goals of the nationalists were to be accomplished they would need mass support. In addition, if Hitler could obtain such support he would be able to dominate the other national parties with whom he was in constant competition.

As for appealing to the workers, Hitler has the following criticism of the other parties.

"What would have been given the masses, just supposing, Social Democracy had been broken.... It is senseless and more than stupid to believe the international fanatic who had left the class party would now at once join a bourgeois party... a new class organization. For...it cannot be denied that bourgeois politicians largely take class division quite for granted as long as it does not begin to work to their political disadvantage." (p. 173; cf. also pp. 456f, p. 535)

An acute comment indeed! Hitler has seen that the middle class parties have taken over part of the very ideologies that they were fighting. Thus, these parties present no real alternative, nothing that would appeal to someone who would wish to break his socialist or Communist allegiance, nothing that would remove such a person's opposition to nationalism. This is one of the several considerations that determined his ideology so that it would appeal to the mass.

PART IV -- IDEOLOGY

Introduction

Before one begins to analyze the anti-Semitism in Hitler's ideology, he has to make a decision about Hitler's views on propaganda. If we take his statements about propaganda to be his true thought, then it might be reasonable to expect that if we find factually untrue statements, we have verification of his thesis, if these untruths can be demonstrated to serve a fundamental purpose. Or, we can reverse this proposition and say that the deception is contained in his ideas about propaganda, whereas his anti-Semitism and other elements of his ideology are real. To put it somewhat differently, if a person says in effect that he will falsify for a purpose and then does not do so, we have to dismiss his statements on the value of falsehood. But if he says that he will falsify and then gives views that are false, we may accept his statements on the value of falsehood.

The same consideration may be approached in the following manner. If the propaganda sections express Hitler's actual views, then we would anticipate a constant repetition of a very few themes. If the propaganda sections are not actually representative, we might expect a different type of work. Mein Kampf is a book which is not subdivided into clearly defined and delineated categories, but a book that has its various topics mixed together and spread out in various combinations.

A topic will appear, disappear, and then re-appear in connection with something quite extraneous to it. And the same point will be made over and over again; the constant repetition that we would expect if the techniques of propaganda were determining how the book was written. (This means that the analytic distinctions made in analyzing Mein Kampf are for the sake of clarity and are not indicative of the way the ideas appear in the book.)

The Role of Ideology

"Any idea may be a source of danger if it be looked upon as an end in itself." (Bullock translation, Bullock, op. cit., p. 75)

One test of the purpose of an ideology is to see how consistently it is followed in practice. If the ideology is "sincere" then it will be followed even though it meets with disapproval and opposition. A variety of means may be used, but the tactics will always be determined by the ultimate goal which is to be achieved. If the ideology is not "self-serving" but rather manipulative then we find that it will be sacrificed or modified drastically when it is no longer serving its actual purpose. And if part of the ideology is a means, then in order to determine what the ultimate goal is, one has to see which part of the ideological goals are constant and which parts are changed in order to attain the goals that are constant.

An excellent example of this principle is the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. In this case the ideology of fighting Marxism-Bolshevism was discarded for the sake of the real goal, the expansion of Germany. The

goal of expansion is one that is never betrayed by Hitler. This situation demanded that the ideological attacks against Russia stop. How easily such ideological shifts could be made is illustrated by the following written by Karl Haushofer, one of the developers of political justifications for conquest. Haushofer explains the Nazi about-face and the sudden praise for Russia in this way.

"That's the good thing about hard power struggles with clever minds that they at least see their own advantage and do not stick to ideological prejudices....."6

Such easy and rapid manipulation, dictated by the circumstances affecting how the expansion was to be accomplished, indicates that the ideology is a means, not a dangerous "end in itself."

To take another example from the area of foreign affairs, at the time that Mein Kampf was written, France was the country that was most oppressive to Germany. She had occupied the Ruhr, was insistent on enormous reparations, and was moving into Central Europe to block any German expansion in that direction. England was not that antagonistic and was willing to be lenient to some degree with Germany, since she was concerned lest France become too dominant on the continent.

Hitler thought that an accommodation could be made with England, but not with France. France he saw would not be receptive to Germany's expansion to the East, while he thought that if Germany did nothing to threaten England's Empire, England would not object to such

expansion.⁷ Therefore he writes in Mein Kampf, after giving the political and economic reasons why England could be friendly and France hostile, that in England (and Italy) "the cleavage between the views of the better statesmanship and the will of the world stock exchange Jews is clear." (P. 624) On the other hand, "Only in France does there exist today more than ever an inner unamity between the intentions of the Jew-controlled stock-exchange and the desire of the chauvenist-minded national statesmen." (ibid)

Later when England opposes Germany's expansion to the East, England suddenly becomes controlled by "Jewish stock-company capitalism"⁸ The point is clear. When the foreign policy of expansion would dictate that X be the enemy, X is under the control of the Jews. When X becomes the friend, the Jewish control disappears. And vice versa. It is through analyzing what the actual goal is that one obtains the identity of the ideological statements as manipulations and the ideological statements as actual goals.

Imperialism

"...a man does not die for business, but only for ideals." (p. 152)

With the advent of the mass army such a consideration is of supreme importance. If one is to mobilize large sections of the populace, then this mass must be given some reason for risking their lives. To go out and die for profits would not appeal to the majority who have no direct

interest in profits. But to fight to protect the country, national honor, home and family, have all proven themselves to be effective appeals. The imperialist states have used a variety of ideals and motivations in order to gain popular support for their policies. They have both positive and negative in their approach and often times mixed. The positive ideals have mainly clustered around the notion that the country is fulfilling some grand purpose in the taking over of the new territory. To take up the "white man's burden" is an example of this technique. In such a situation, the native population is pictured as backward, uncultured, uncivilized. Such an approach is further justified in terms of the conquering country having a natural right to control such savages because of its natural or cultural superiority. Such idealizations were used extensively by England and France to justify expansion into Africa and Asia. They were also used by the United States when dealing with the American Indian. In these situations it was relatively easy to "demonstrate" the validity of the claim that the natives were uncivilized and then to "prove" that the superior culture had a right, from God, nature, history, etc., to dominate. However, such an approach had not been used in connection with European countries by the imperialist centers because of the cultural interconnections between the various countries and the difficulty in convincingly describing the separate national enclaves as uncivilized and backward. However, the Pan-German and Pan-Slavic movements did develop variations of such

ideologies as they attempted to justify the establishment of new national entities in areas already controlled by other governments.⁹

Other arguments and justifications emphasized negative types of arguments. Preventive self-defense was used to justify imperialist wars. The enemy is portrayed as being bent on attacking and destroying the nation, its people, its culture. This is designed to arouse fear and motivate people to feel that they are personally threatened by the competition for economic resources. Overpopulation is another argument. Once the country is described as overpopulated, it is argued that for everyone's benefit, new territory must be found and developed so as to ensure the prosperity and well-being of the citizens.¹⁰

These principles, justifications, idealizations have always been supported by those who favored a national expansion to overcome market limitations, competition from other national entities, and an excess supply of capital.

Hitler's arguments contain the very same types of appeals. It would be hard to imagine that the nationalist industrialists would reject them as being inimical to their interests if other solutions had proved to be ineffective. But the object of the statements are the lower middle class and the workers. In combining ideas that could apply to all, Hitler managed to accomplish what no other German politician was able to do.

Overpopulation

The need for Lebensraum (living space) was used by Hitler as one of the chief rationalizations for expansion.

"Germany has an annual increase in population of nearly nine hundred thousand souls. The difficulty of feeding this army of new citizens must grow greater from year to year and ultimately end in catastrophe, unless ways and means are found to forestall the dangers of starvation and misery in time." (p. 131)

"The foreign policy of the folkish state must safeguard the existence on this planet of the race embodied in the state, by creating a healthy, viable natural relation between the nations population and growth on the one hand and the quantity and quality on the other hand." (p. 642)

"The National Socialist movement must strive to eliminate the disproportion between our population and our area - viewing the latter as a source for food as well as a basis for power politics...." (p. 646)

"The highest aim of foreign policy is "to bring the soil in harmony with the population." (p. 649)

Hitler suggests that there are but four alternatives to solve the problem; 1) birth control, but this weakens the race and the strength of the nation (p. 132); 2) internal development, but this has only limited effectiveness since there is a limit as to how much Germany could produce on the land it has; 3) development of international trade and colonial acquisition outside of Europe, but this would again involve Germany in competition with England and it was just such competition

that caused World War I (pp. 135ff, p. 233, pp. 653ff.)*; 4) therefore only territorial expansion away from England's interest is possible. That meant a movement to the East. Hitler states this proposition clearly. "If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states." (p. 554 and all of Vol. II, Chapter XIV)

To reject Hitler's basic argument that Germany was overpopulated by showing that German's birth rate declined or that density per se need not be a problem for an industrialized country is to miss the point. In fact the Nazis when they got into power instituted programs to encourage large families which would have been inconsistent with the idea of ~~alleviating~~ overpopulation. The main point is that when there is intense competition for employment, when salaries are cut, and when it becomes difficult to maintain a standard of living, it is possible to convince people that overcrowding is responsible for the situation.

Justification on ideal grounds

Clearly the Russians, Poles, etc., were not going to let Germany just take over their land. Nor would overpopulation alone necessarily justify the liquidation of other human beings or the violation

*Note: Interestingly, this is a "Marxian" point of view, which would seem to be accurate. cf. V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, published by the International Publishers, N.Y., 1917; K. Zilliacus, "Economic and Social Causes of the War", The Outbreak of the First World War, edited by Dwight E. Lee, D. C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1958, pp. 45 thru 51.

of national boundaries. Hitler provides the ideal justification by demonstrating that the German-Aryan people have a right to control such people because the Germans are a superior race.

"All human culture, all the results of art, science, and technology, that we see before us today, are almost exclusively the creative product of the Aryan." (p. 290)

"If we were to divide mankind into three groups, the founders of culture, the bearers of culture, and the destroyers of culture, only the Aryan would be considered as the representative of the first group." (*ibid*)*

*Note: One of the more curious examples of the inconsistency of some scholars in analyzing the supposed sources of Hitler's views is shown in the use of Houston Stuart Chamberlain. Chamberlain's book, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, is indeed a racist book. It is very erudite, and is intended for the intelligensia, since it is filled with literary, philosophical, and historical analysis, accompanied with all the footnotes and acknowledgements that might be expected. It is also true that it is anti-Semitic. But more than that, the book is also violently anti-Catholic. In fact, the Catholic Church, even more than the Jews, is portrayed as the insidious enemy of the Aryan race as the Church strives for universalism, while the essence of the Aryan is individualism and self-fulfillment, and so on. Hitler mentions Chamberlain in his book (p. 269) in passing. But if Hitler were really convinced by Chamberlain's ideas, we would expect that he would be anti-Catholic. Yet, Hitler is not and goes to great lengths to show why it would be foolish to attack either Church, or Protestantism. The reason is, of course, that one should not make more enemies than necessary. This was the mistake of the Pan-Germans in Austria according to Hitler. Rather than go against such a powerful institution, one should attempt to bring it over to his side. Hitler attacked the Jews because they were not a powerful institution or united. To attack the Church would have been a denial of all his ideas on propaganda. This Hitler never does. It seems to me that no other explanation will account for any supposed indebtedness to Chamberlain when Hitler denies the validity of some of the most cardinal principles of the book. For another view, see H. R. Trevor Roper's introduction to Hitler's Table Talk, (London, 1953), page xxx. There is agreement, however, on the central importance of Mein Kampf (*ibid*).

Since the Aryan is the superior race, then he has the right to dominate and even eliminate others. This argument is put on "historical" and "natural" grounds. The following are just some of the many examples of this.

"Aryan races - often absurdly small numerically - subject foreign peoples, and then, stimulated by the special living conditions of the new territory (fertility, climatic conditions, etc.) and assisted by the multitude of the lower-type beings standing at their disposal as helpers, develop the intellectual and organizational capacities dormant within them." (pp. 291-292)

"The more primitive the technical foundations for a cultural activity, the more necessary is the presence of human helpers who, organizationally assembled and employed, must replace the force of the machine. Without the possibility of using lower human beings, the Aryan would never have been able to take his first steps toward his future culture." (p. 294)*

"A stronger race will drive out the weak.... burst all the absurd fetters of the so-called humanity of individuals, in order to replace it by the humanity of Nature which destroys the weak to give his place to the strong." (p. 132)

"Nature knows no political boundaries." (p. 134)

"State boundaries are made by man and changed by man."
(p. 653)

Nor has such action been without benefit, nor would it be in the future.

"But in directing them (the subjugated) to a useful, though arduous activity, he (the Aryan) not only spared the life

*Note: References to a presumed great Germanic past obviously accomplished two purposes. They provided for an historical precedent, and they restored pride to a people that had just been defeated.

of those he subjugated; perhaps he gave them a fate that was better than their previous so-called freedom" ** (p. 295)

"If the German people... had possessed the herd unity which other peoples enjoyed, the German Reich today would doubtless be mistress of the globe... (and this would mean) a peace, supported not by the palm branches of tearful pacifist female mourners, but based on the victorious sword of a master people, pulling the world into the service of a higher culture." (p. 396)

If the nation state units are artificial, their boundaries man-made, and if the Germans or Aryans constitute a natural unity, transcending the artificial boundaries, then it is only right to demand that any German state include all Germans without regard to any national boundaries that may exist so that the race may develop along natural lines.

"The German Reich as a state must embrace all Germans and has the task, not only of assembling and preserving the most valuable stocks of basic elements in this people, but slowly and surely of raising them to a dominant position." (p. 398)

Thus by placing the notion of nationalism in the context of race, Hitler provides the ideological ideal to justify the breaking down of national boundaries. He does so by saying it is for the people's benefit, yet it is implicitly tied to expansion of the economy.

**Note: The sparing of life in this quote should not be taken to mean that lower human beings were not to be killed. Putting whole classes of people in an inferior category is a device which justifies doing anything with them. This is the import of all such passages, and was used as such in the occupied countries, particularly in the East.

"It should further be born in mind that the question of regaining lost sections of a people's and state's territory is always primarily a question of regaining the political power and independence of the mother country; that therefore, in such a case the interests of lost territories must be ruthlessly subordinated to the interest of regaining the freedom of the main territory." (p. 611)

"THE AIM OF A GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY OF TODAY MUST BE THE PREPARATION FOR THE RECONQUEST OF FREEDOM FOR TOMORROW." (p. 610)

Such statement could not help but receive support from the captains of heavy industry who were interested in the expansion of the state power so as to promote and protect any expansion of control of industry and raw material of other countries. Since any such "reconquest of freedom" would necessitate the rearming of Germany, the use of a "mighty sword" (*ibid*), the military circles would also not object. Nor would the middle class, since its position was threatened with extinction.

Opposition

Hitler's ideal is international in that it dismisses the nation state from being a criteria for action. Socialism too conceived of the nation as an artificial barrier, preaching solidarity of class, regardless of which country the worker happened to find himself. The left, the Social Democrats, the Communists, etc. were thus Hitler's main opponents. We have seen that there was a split between the various elements of the socialist camp. The Communists and the Social Democrats fought each other for the worker's allegiance. Their

ultimate goal, the end of capitalism, might have been the same, but their approach and their methods were widely divergent. Hitler, following his tactic of uniting what in fact were diversities combines the two in all areas, calling them both Marxism. He further unites them by placing them under the control of the Jews.

"The German State is gravely attacked by Marxism." (P. 533)

"On the day when Marxism is smashed in Germany her fetters will in truth be broken forever." (p. 682)

"Marxism, whose goal is and remains the destruction of all non-Jewish national states...." (p. 168)

"In keeping with the ultimate aims of the Jewish struggle, which are not exhausted in the mere economic conquest of the world, but also demand its political subjugation, the Jew divides the organization of his Marxist world doctrine into two halves, which, apparently separate from one another, in truth form an inseparable whole: the political and the trade-union movement." (p. 321)

"The Jewish Doctrine of Marxism rejects the aristocratic principle of nature.... It thus denies the value of personality in man, contests the significance of Nationality and Race, and thereby withdraws from humanity the premise of its existence and its culture." (p. 64)

To deny the natural is "Jewish nonsense", and cries of international solidarity is "Jewish jabber". (p. 168f., and p. 287)

Thus far we have met two of the antithesis that Hitler uses to prove his case. The natural-Aryan versus the unnatural

Jewish; the Racial-national versus the international-Marxist-Jew.* The uniting of all into one or the other category presents an apparent simplification and crucial insight. And it provides the common enemy and the centrality of the question around which could gather all the elements that Hitler wanted to appeal to.

Once this basic principle is established, then everything else can be subsumed under it. Once the common enemy is found, then all problems can be relegated to it. Once the recognition of the situation is obtained, the necessary solution is at hand.

The Stab in the Back

Since the Germans were the best people, the most idealistic, the most culturally advanced, the supreme race, then why was it defeated? The answer, of course, is that the German nation was betrayed by its inner, till now unrecognized, enemy, the Jew.

First of all the Jew organized the munitions strikes:

"...in the last hour, with victory already threatening to be with the German banners, a means was chosen which seemed suited to stifle the German spring attack in the germ with one blow, to make victory impossible:

The munitions strike was organized." (p. 194)

*Note: The antithesis to the Aryan is the Jew, which explains why the German is so threatened by him.

"The mightiest counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew." (p. 300)
The Jew "lacks completely the most essential requirement for a cultural people, the idealistic attitude." (p. 301)

"...the Jew possesses no culture-creating force of any sort;but only and always (is) a parasite in the body of other peoples." (pp. 303-304)

The November revolution, "The greatest villany" erupted, led by a "few Jewish youths." "None of them had been at the front." (p. 206)

But then of course, "Nearly every clerk was a Jew, and nearly every Jew was a clerk." (p. 193)

The defeat occurred because the nation had not realized the importance of race. Even the middle class, according to Hitler, did not recognize the problem because it had become infested with the "Jewish poison" of Marxism. Because of this inner weakness, Germany was defeated; it could not escape from the "law of eternal retribution." (p. 329). It certainly was not the fault of the German army.

"His (the enemy's) number from the first day was greater than that of the German army, for he could draw on the technical armament of the arsenals of the whole world; hence the German victories, won for four years against a whole world, must regardless of all heroic courage and 'organization', be attributed solely to superior leadership, and this is a fact which cannot be denied out of existence. The organization and leadership of the German army were the mightiest that the earth had ever seen." (p. 229)

"The collapse of this army was not the cause of our present-day misfortune, but only the consequence of other crimes..." (ibid)

"...this military collapse was itself only the consequence of a large number of symptoms of disease and their causes, which even in peacetime were with the German nation. This was the first consequence, catastrophic and visible to all, of an ethical and moral poisoning, of a diminution in the instinct of self-preservation and its preconditions, which for many years had begun to undermine the foundations of the people and the Reich." (p. 231)

Those who would say otherwise would only be repeating the falsehoods and lies of the Jews and their "Marxist fighting organizations." (p. 226ff.)

Such a reconstruction of what were the causes of the defeat in World War I accomplishes several things. One, it took full advantage of the resentment at the defeat and the perplexity that followed it. Two, the Germans are portrayed as victims of an unrecognized enemy, unrecognized until Hitler, of course. Thus, German pride is restored by having the country betrayed rather than beaten. Secondly, such a theory indicates that there is a solution if only the real cause of the crisis is recognized. Unless it is, then no solution is possible. It cannot be emphasized enough that Hitler's popularity grew only in times of crisis, where the other parties, ideologies, political institutions could not resolve the situation. The cause of any and all crisis is the Jew who is attacking Germany internally and externally. This is the persistent theme that must be emphasized.

"Only by examining and comparing all other problems of life in the light of this one question shall we see how absurdly petty they are by this standard. They are all limited in time - but the question of preserving or not preserving the purity of the blood will endure as long as there are men." (p. 328)

Social Decay

Once the superiority of the Germanic Race is established, then it is easy to place the blame for any social ill on the influence of an inferior race that has "polluted" the superior. The Aryan, in his pure state, could not be the cause of any inferior culture or morality. The cause must then be an inferior race. And thus the Jew is the "calculating director" of vice (p. 59), the contaminator of the arts and theater (p. 366), the spreader of the causes of syphilis (p. 253), the destroyers of "Germanic spiritual life." (p. 247)

Economics

As long as nationalism was confined to the conservative elements, and socialism to the workers, Hitler would have had to choose one side or the other. But Hitler's aim was to appeal to everyone. In doing so, he was faced with the problem of accommodating the industrialists while at the same time using the resentment of the middle class and the workers against capitalism. The way Hitler resolves the dilemma is to make the economic issues dependent upon the racial one. Hitler takes advantage of the antagonisms by changing the object of the resentment. It is no longer capitalism that is wrong, but Jewish capitalism. Socialism is not anti-Aryan, but Jewish socialism is. Hitler's socialism is nationalistic, not economic or class orientated. By placing the total society under the control of the Jew, and making the

Jew the originator of the class conflicts, Hitler is extending the use of the common enemy. The Aryan race is divided by the machinations of the united Jewish race. Once the real problem is seen, then the German race can exert itself again and rise to further glory.

The middle class was being squeezed from the top by the concentration of the industrialists and by the power of the banks. Hitler shows his appeal to this group by making the Jews the moving force behind the development of stock-exchange, stock companies, and interest charging finance.

"By way of stock shares he (the Jew) pushes his way into the circuit of national production, which he turns into a purchasable or tradable object, thus robbing the enterprises of the foundations of a personal ownership..."

"Finally, the Jewish influence on economic affairs grows with terrifying speed through the stock exchange. He becomes the owner, or at least the controller, of the national labor force." (p. 314)

"A grave economic symptom of the decay was the slow disappearance of the right of private property, and the gradual transference of the entire economy to the ownership of stock companies."

"Now for the first time labor had sunk to the level of an object of speculation for the unscrupulous Jewish businessmen; the alienation of property from the wage-worker was increased *ad infinitum*. The stock exchange began to triumph and prepared slowly but surely to take the life of the nation into its guardianship and control." (p. 235)

The continuation of this Jewish influence has lead to the following;

"Between employer and employee there arises that inner estrangement which later leads to political class division." (p. 314)

"The small craftsman slowly dies out, and as a result the worker's possibility of achieving an independent existence becomes rarer and rarer; in consequence the worker becomes visibly proletarianized." (p. 316)

The Jew, bent on destroying the German state and the German economy is thus behind the development of the economic conditions that are attacking the beleaguered middle class. It is only through the Jewish influence that the conflicts have broken out. By opposing these manifestations of capitalism, Hitler could appeal to the middle class, and at the same time not be against private property or capital accumulation, two aspects of capitalism that both the industrialists and the middle class cherished.

"The sharp separation of stock exchange capital from the national economy offered the possibility of opposing the internationalization of the German economy without at the same time menacing the foundations of an independent national self-maintenance by a struggle against all capital." (p. 213)

"Previously I had been unable to recognize with the desired clarity the difference between this pure (Aryan) capital as the end result of productive labor and a capital whose existence and essence rests exclusively on speculation." (p. 209)*

*Note: The use of Feder's ideas about breaking the chains of "interest slavery" was immediately recognized by Hitler. The impracticality of the idea did not bother Hitler. What interested him was the use of it as a slogan. When Hitler came into power he did not let Feder have any measure of power and Feder dropped into obscurity; once his purpose was over, he was no longer needed. For Hitler's comments in Mein Kampf, see pp. 209ff, particularly pages 210 and 213.

Hitler also wanted to gain the workers' support. In order to do so, he had to show that they too were being betrayed and that there is no essential conflict between them and the rest of society.

"How far the inner Judaization of our people has progressed can be seen from the small respect, if not contempt, that is accorded to manual labor. This is not German. It took the foreignization of our life, which was in truth a Jewification, to transform the old respect for manual work into a certain contempt for all physical labor." (P. 318)

Blinded by the greed emanating from the Jewish form of capitalism, the many employees and bourgeoisie have turned a deaf ear to the just demands of the workers, who likewise are Germans. In this way the Jew has turned German against German. (pp. 596ff.) And the Jew has forced the workers to go to the trade unions, with their un-German class ideologies. (ibid.)

We might also quote the following:

"Millions of workers, I am sure, started out as enemies of the Social Democratic Party in their innermost soul, but their resistance was overcome in a way which was sometimes utterly insane; that is, when the bourgeois parties adopted a hostile attitude toward every demand of a social character. Their simple, narrow-minded rejection of all attempts to better working conditions.....to prohibit child labor and protect the woman.....contributed to drive the masses into the net of Social Democracy which gratefully snatched at every case of such a disgraceful attitude....they (the bourgeois) sowed hatred and

seemed to justify even the assertions of the mortal enemies of the entire nation, to the effect that only the Social Democratic Party represented the interests of the working people." (p. 45)

Once this disastrous split has occurred, the Jew takes over the workers, manipulating them by pretending to want to rectify the very situation they had created.

"...while on the one hand he (the Jew) organizes capitalistic methods of human exploitation to their ultimate consequence, he approaches the very victims of his spirit and his activity and in a short time becomes the leader of their struggle against himself. "Against himself" is only figuratively speaking..." (p. 318)

"If formerly he (the Jew) knew how to swindle his way to civil rights in the shadow of the bourgeoisie, now he hopes to find the road to his own domination in the worker's struggle for existence."

"From now on the worker has no other task but to fight for the future of the Jewish people. Unconsciously he is harnessed to the service of the power which he thinks he is combating. He is seemingly allowed to attack capital, and this is the easiest way of making him fight for it. In this the Jew keeps up an outcry against international capital and in truth he means the national economy which must be demolished in order that the international stock exchange can triumph over its dead body." (p. 319)

By establishing Marxism, the Jew is pictured as destroying the society from both the top, through Jewish capitalism, and from below, through the class struggle. The purpose of the class struggle is not to help the workers, but to destroy:

"Its (the class struggle) purpose was to cause the collapse of the whole arduously constructed economic edifice by persistent blows, thus, the more easily.... to prepare the same lot for the edifice of state. Less and less attention was paid to defending the real needs of the working class..... for otherwise there was a risk that these masses, satisfied in their desires, could no longer be used forever as docile shock troops." (pp. 48-49)

"Marxism created the economic weapon which the international world Jew uses for shattering the economic base of the free, independent national states, for the destruction of their national industry and their national commerce, and, accordingly, the enslavement of free peoples in the service of supra-state world finance Jewry." (p. 600)

The workers are not to be blamed any more than the employers who have been tricked by the Jews.

"Only a fool can behold the work of this villainous poisoner and still condemn the victim." (p. 42)

"The better acquainted I became with the Jew, the more forgiving I inevitably became toward the worker." (p. 63)

"...even today feeble-minded bourgeois in ministerial chairs are beginning to rave about the necessity of not governing against the workers and what they have in mind under the concept 'worker' is Marxism. But by identifying the German worker with Marxism, they not only commit a falsification as cowardly as it is untrue, but attempt by this motivation to conceal their own collapse in the face of the Marxist idea and organization." (p. 535)

The ultimate danger then of Jewish Marxism is that it takes real problems and transforms them into a false issue, the class struggle.

Hitler's appeal then is not to several economic classes, but to something higher than economic interest, the Race; a general interest above any particular interest. The workers are part of the race and have their rights and obligations, as does everyone else. Hitler is careful not to deny the validity of trade-unions. To do that would have shown a disregard for the workers. But the Nazi trade unions were not to be class oriented, for in actuality there are no classes, "only citizens with absolutely equal rights and accordingly equal general duties." (p. 600f) Thus, Hitler turns the whole question upside down and makes the economic factors a false issue.

We also see the method of providing an antithesis once again. There is good, productive Aryan capitalism. It is opposed by speculative, destructive Jewish capitalism. There is true socialism which is concerned with the preservation of the race. And there is the Jewish, economic class socialism which is attempting to destroy the race.

Looked at this way, nationalism and socialism become the same thing; a commitment to work for preservation and development of the race. This is precisely the type of synthesis that Hitler needed if he was to appeal to the widest number of people. By removing the ideological terms from the realm of economics and placing them in

the realm of the ideal, Hitler avoids the mistake of others of adopting part of the ideology of the opposition, and at the same time uses the resentment and conflict to bring supporters into the camp of the nationalist-capitalist classes. Hitler's synthesis is well stated in the following quotation from his speech of July 28, 1922.

"Every truly national idea is in the last resort social, i.e., he who is prepared so completely to adopt the cause of his people that he really knows no higher ideal than the prosperity of this - his own - people, he who has so taken to heart the meaning of our great song "Deutschland, Deutschland uber alles," that nothing in this world stands for him higher than this Germany, people, and land, land and people, he is a Socialist! And he who in this people sympathizes with the poorest of its citizens, who in this people sees in every individual a valuable member of the whole community, and who recognizes that this community can flourish only when it is formed not of rulers and oppressed but when all according to their capacities fulfill their duty to their Fatherland and the community of the people and are valued accordingly, he who seeks to preserve the native vigor, the strength, and the youthful energy of the millions of working men, and who above all is concerned that our precious possession, our youth, should not before its time be used up in unhealthy harmful work - he is not merely a Socialist, but he is also National in the highest sense of that word." (My New Order, op. cit., p. 39)

The State

The control of the masses is always a problem for the particular economic group at the top. With the advent of democracy in Germany, this general consideration became a more acute problem as there was the possibility that the democratic system would produce a government that would oppose the control the industrialists had over the economy. The German capitalists were able to maneuver themselves into a/beneficial position within the Weimar Republic. While not pleased particularly with such a form of government, they could live with it since they were able to live off it, at least while the rationalization process was in operation. What mattered was not the form of the state but that the state function in a manner that would not interfere with the economic activity of the capitalists. Thyssen's views would appear to be typical, and not only of German industrialists.

"I am not a politician, but an industrialist, and an industrialist is always inclined to consider politics a kind of second string to his bow - the preparation for his own particular activity. In a well-ordered country, where the administration is sound, where taxes are reasonable, and the police well organized, he can afford to abstain from politics and to devote himself entirely to business. " 11

In the crisis preceding 1923 and after 1930 the industrialists were more than willing to support a different type of government if it were possible and if it served their purpose. Their primary, one might say their only, goal was a "sound economy in a strong state."12

Sound meaning capitalistic; strong meaning control of the workers and middle class.

Hitler therefore could never come out with a concept of the state that would be against the desires of the industrialists. We have seen that in economics he was against socialism, the enemy of capitalism. By indicating that he would fight and destroy the left-wing trade unions, which he did, he was not only courting the favor of the middle class, but also stating objectives with which most heavy industry leaders would agree.

An authoritarian state structure would also be in accord with the objectives of such industrialists. It would also be favorably looked upon by the middle class if the democratic form of government collapsed and the only other alternative would be a Communist-Socialist government. But the middle class would not support a government that would openly and ideologically be in the service of the large capitalists. Nor, of course, would any worker. Therefore, Hitler faced the problem of criticizing the democratic form of government in a way that would please the industrialists, the middle class and even the worker. The race theory was the perfect ideological tool for doing so. The dissatisfaction with the Versailles Treaty, directly associated with the Weimar Republic, was helpful, but after the period of prosperity began in 1924 it was not as powerful an issue as before. The

inefficiency of the coalition government was very important, but no one else was willing to go against the system as such since all the political groups were part of the system. Only Hitler was willing to criticize the system as he gained power in and through it.

Hitler's position on the nature of the state and how it is to function proceeds with the following logic. The basis of all life is the race. Therefore the state should represent and protect the race.

"The state is a means to an end. Its end lies in the preservation and advancement of a community of physically and psychically homogeneous creatures. The preservation itself comprises first of all the existence as a race and thereby permits the free development of all the forces dormant in this race." (p. 393)

What are these forces? In order to appeal to everyone, Hitler has to show that the Aryan has certain racial characteristics and that these characteristics are determinative in how the state should be conceived. Since the concept of race is so plastic, Hitler could easily proclaim those characteristics that would fit into a totalitarian system as being Aryan.

"The greater the readiness to subordinate purely personal interests, the higher rises the ability to establish comprehensive communities.

"The Aryan is not greatest in his mental qualities as such, but in the extent of his willingness to put all his abilities in the service of his community. In him the instinct of self-preservation has reached the noblest form,

since he willingly subordinates his own ego to the life of the community and, if the hour demands, even sacrifices it." (p. 297)*

And what could be more pleasing to persons threatened with social extinction than the following:

"Every worker, every peasant, every inventor, official, etc. who works without ever being able to achieve any happiness or prosperity for himself, is a representative of this lofty idea, even if the deeper meaning of his activity remains hidden to him." (p. 298)

Because of this self-sacrifice that is intrinsic to the Aryan, the government can be authoritative, though, of course, this would be to the advantage of the group.

"A powerful national Reich... can offer freedom within, without having to fear for the stability of the state. On the other hand, a powerful national government can undertake and accept responsibility for great limitations on the freedom of the individual as well as the provinces, without damage to the Reich idea if in such measures the individual citizen recognizes a means toward the greatness of his nation." (p. 572)*

"Any man who loves his people proves it solely by the sacrifices which he is prepared to make for it." (p. 426)

*Note: The value of such an ideology in war time is obvious. It provides the ideal of noble sacrifice with the desire to advance oneself privately. Notice that the aims of the government may be against the individual personally. But if the individual can be convinced that such action is necessary in terms of the group, then the state can control him, calling any action it wants as in the common interest. The concept of Gemeinschaft which became quite pronounced in Nazi propaganda, and appearing implicitly and explicitly throughout Mein Kampf and Hitler's speeches, was one of the Nazis' most effective ideological weapons.

But if all are to be willing to sacrifice, all will be able to have equal opportunity.

"Its (the folkish state's) task is not to preserve the decisive influence of an existing social class, but to pick the most capable kinds from the sum of all the national comrades and bring them to office and dignity."
(p. 431)

The inequality of races, which is a "natural" law, also provides for the general principle from which is deduced the rationale for the establishment of a dictatorship.

"... the folkish philosophy finds the importance of mankind in its basic racial elements. In the state it sees on principle only a means to an end and construes its end as the preservation of the racial existence of man. Thus, it by no means believes in an equality of the races, but along with their difference it recognizes their higher or lesser value and feels itself obligated, through this knowledge, to promote the victory of the better and stronger, and demand the subordination of the inferior and weaker in accordance with the eternal will that dominates this universe. Thus, in principle, it serves the basic aristocratic idea of Nature and believes in the validity of this law down to the last individual. It sees not only the different value of the races, but also the different value of individuals." (p. 383)

"A philosophy of life which endeavors to reject the democratic mass idea and give this earth to the best people... must logically obey the same aristocratic principle within this people and make sure that the leadership and the highest influence in this people fall to the best minds. Thus, it builds, not upon the idea of the majority, but upon the idea of personality."
(p. 443)

"The greatest revolutionary changes and achievements of this earth, its greatest cultural accomplishments, the immortal deeds in the field of statesmanship, etc., are forever inseparably bound up with a name and are represented by it." (p. 352)

"As worthless as an army in all its organizational forms is without officers, equally worthless is a political organization without the suitable leader." (p. 349)

"...responsibility, however, can and may be borne only by one man, and therefore only he alone may possess the authority and right to command." (p. 450)

"Juxtaposed to this (Jewish democracy) is the truly Germanic democracy characterized by the free election of a leader and his obligation fully to assume all responsibility for his actions and omissions. In it there is no majority vote on individual questions, but only the decision of an individual who must answer with his fortune and his life for his choice." (p. 91)

In keeping with the tactics of effective propaganda, such an idea must be opposed by one that is antithetical to the well-being of the Aryan. Democracy becomes the handmaiden of the Jews. The Jew, the true enemy, uses democracy because this political system is the absolute opposite of what the Aryan needs in his state. And such a system contributes to the eventual defeat and extinction of the Aryan.

"The Jewish doctrine of Marxism rejects the aristocratic principle of Nature and replaces the eternal privilege of power and strength by the mass of numbers and their dead weight. Thus it denies the value of personality in man, contests the significance of nationality and race, and thereby withdraws from humanity the premise of its existence and its culture." (p. 65)

"The Western democracy of today is the forerunner of Marxism which without it would not be thinkable." (p. 78)

"Marxism presents itself as the perfection of the Jew's attempt to exclude the pre-eminence of personality in all fields of human life and replace it by the numbers of the mass. To this, in the political sphere, corresponds the parliamentary form of government, which, from the smallest germ cells of the municipality up to the supreme leadership of the Reich, we see in such disastrous operation, and in the economic sphere, the system of a trade-union movement which does not serve the real interests of the workers, but exclusively the destructive purposes of the international world Jew." (p. 447)

"And that is why this type of democracy (parliamentary) has become the instrument of that race which in its inner goals must shun the light of day, now in all ages of the future. Only the Jew can praise an institution which is as dirty and false as he himself." (p. 91)

When criticizing the parliamentary system, Hitler did not have to rely solely on the "Jew". The parliament could be attacked in several ways that could be considered objective by many persons who were not anti-Semitic. The party intrigues, the compromises, the concern for getting elected rather than with principles, the ineptitude in solving basic problems were all criticisms that Hitler used without directly relating them to Jews. (pp. 78-91, pp. 103-107, etc.) Hitler's observations echoed what many Germans could honestly feel, particularly when the parliamentary system broke down in Germany. But to be persistent, the Jew had to be brought into the picture as the one who was behind the system and its failures.

The racial conception of the state has an additional advantage. By having the state based on race, then it is possible to place all other considerations in the category of being essentially extraneous. Hitler realized, as we have seen, that he had to offer something different than the other parties. By making the state racial, he was able to say that economic considerations were not of utmost importance. The other parties were tied in one way or another to economic programs, at least officially. This was particularly true of the socialist parties. Hitler makes National Socialism essentially different in the following way.

"Only when it is understood that here, too, economics is only of second or third-rate importance, and the primary role falls to factors of politics, ethics, morality, and blood, will we arrive at an understanding of the present calamity, and thus also be able to find the ways and means for a cure." (p. 227)

"But the state has nothing at all to do with any definite economic conception or development.

"It is not a collection of economic contracting parties in a definite delimited living space for the fulfillment of economic tasks, but the organization of a community of physically and psychologically similar living beings for the better facilitation of the maintenance of their species by Providence. This and nothing else is the aim and meaning of a state. Economics is only one of the many instruments required for the achievement of this aim. It is never the cause or the aim of a state unless this state is based on a false, because unnatural, foundation to

begin with." (p. 150)*

The revolution of the National Socialists was thus not an economic one, at least as Hitler represented it. To revolt against the ubiquitous enemy was the ideological battle cry by which the mass could be manipulated into thinking that it was removing the system, whereas in actuality it removed only some unessential manifestations of the system. Hitler was quite content to let the left wing of the party continue in its belief that fundamental changes were to be made in the economic sector when the party came into power. It helped gain support, did the party no harm in the crisis after 1930, and when Hitler did obtain control those that were in favor of a real overturning were removed, either through dismissal or liquidation. But if people had taken the effort to read Mein Kampf carefully, such a development could not have come as a surprise, since at no time did Hitler actually attack capitalism per se, nor is he ever derogatory in his remarks about the entrepreneur. And the statements about the function of the state should have indicated that his socialism was a playing with words, not an economic policy.

*Note: This over-all view does not mean that the state has no interest in the economic situation. Hitler does propose "chambers of estates" and a "central economic parliament" where employers and workers will iron out their difficulties without harming the welfare of the people as a whole. (p. 602) How these groups would work is not made clear. Nor is there any effort at clarification. The object is not to show that National Socialism is better economically than the other parties, because that would mean fighting on their own ground. The idea is to make National Socialism an entirely different type of movement that has analyzed what is "really" behind the "apparent" difficulties.

PART V -- CONCLUDING REMARKS ON MEIN KAMPF

There are some themes that have not been discussed that appear in Mein Kampf. However, Hitler's comments on these could be deduced easily from what has already been written. His views on education follow logically from the premise that loyalty to the race is of supreme importance. The notion of inequality leads to the idea that members of an "alien" race who reside in Germany do not have equal rights, nor do those who would oppose the central ideas of the Nazis. The usefulness of such concepts for a totalitarian state is obvious. That the press is controlled by Jews is just another example of how the Jewish conspiracy operates at all levels and in all places. Since the basic ideology is essentially an imperialistic one, it comes as no surprise that the army is seen as a great institution and that military training is an absolute necessity. Any further questions could be answered by a similar process of deduction.

However, the main purpose of the analysis in this section of Mein Kampf has not been to show the logical consistency of the work. The objective has been to show that in order to understand the actual motivation behind the book, one has to go from the propaganda sections to other themes. This procedure, coupled with an understanding of the nature of Hitler's problems and the type of solution necessary for success, gives one the basis upon which it is possible to decide the actual role of anti-

Semitism in Hitler's ideology. We have seen that the origin of his anti-Semitism was his political analysis of the situation in Austria and of Lueger. The propaganda sections indicate the reasons why a common enemy is needed and the value of persistence and repetition. The needs of an imperialistic ideology demanded a theory of inequality; so does an authoritarian state. Competition from nationalist and socialist parties limited the kinds of appeal that could be used. Racism and anti-Semitism solved all of these problems and their use is in complete accord with the requirements of effective propaganda. In all of these instances Hitler is realistic in that he demonstrates an acute awareness of the political situation and how to use it to his advantage. To use a phrase such as "international Marxist Jewish stock exchange parties" (p. 357) is to distort reality. The cause of such a distortion is either fanaticism or rational manipulation. When the basis of Hitler's ideology is taken into consideration, it would seem to be logical to assume manipulation.

Nor should we be surprised that such manipulation occurred. There is historical precedent for it in Germany and Austria, and not only in the Middle Ages. Massing's book, Rehearsal for Destruction, documents the rise, fall, and change in anti-Semitism in Germany before World War I. Support for anti-Semitism racial or religious changed with

the political picture. Conservatives would support a man like Stoecker when it was to their advantage, and then disown him when he had outlived his usefulness. Middle class anti-Semitism rose and fell with economic cycles, rising with depression and falling with expansion.¹³ But perhaps the clearest example of conscious manipulation of anti-Semitism is given us by Hitler's political hero, Lueger. The following remarks made by Lueger speak for themselves. In Lueger's opinion, anti-Semitism was "co-terminous with the struggle against that capitalism which overruns, oppresses and entwines itself with everything." And so "The fears or hatred of pious souls virtually vanished beside the significance of the indignation at empty pockets." The calculated nature of his anti-Semitism is revealed by his utterance, "I decide who is a Jew" - "wer ein Jud ist, das bestimme ich."¹⁴ * Yet, Lueger in public was able to portray himself as a dedicated anti-Semite in order to win elections and maintain power.

The reader may still object to the thesis presented in this paper and say that while it has been shown that anti-Semitism was a useful tool, it would not be a contradiction to say that Hitler was sincere in his

*Note: The same procedure was used by the Nazis, as shown by the following that Thyssen relates. "Goering himself once told me about the great quarrel he had on account of one of his collaborators, who, it was said, was of Jewish origin. He was none other than the present head of the Air Force, General Milch. Goering told me that he had invited to his house all those who had started the quarrel; that he had addressed them in an impetuous speech, and that he had declared at the end, "I myself decide who is a Jew, or who is not, and that's all there is to it." Thyssen reports that the same criteria was applied to Geheimrat Kastl, a Jewish lawyer for the Krupp works. (Thyssen, op. cit., pp. 136-137)

anti-Semitism and at the same time a shrewd enough politician to be able to use anti-Semitism to further his political ends, and that his statements in Mein Kampf are attempts to show how reality forced him to become an anti-Semite. Records of private conversations between Hitler and Hermann Rauschning should lay such objections to rest. Rauschning broke with the Nazis after having been a party member for several years. He had served as president of the Danzig Senate after the Nazis had gained control of that body. He subsequently came to the United States and wrote several books of conversations that he had had with Hitler. While at the time they were published, few people believed them, they have since been recognized as a valuable and authentic source.¹⁵ The following is a lengthy quotation, but its importance demands that it be quoted in full.

"Once," I(Rauschning) mentioned, "I heard you say, I think, that the days of conventional nationalism are over. Did I rightly understand you?"

"The conception of the nation has become meaningless. The conditions of the time compelled me to begin on the basis of that conception. But I realized from the first that it could only have transient validity. The 'nation' is a political expedient of democracy and Liberalism. We have to get rid of this false conception and set in its place the conception of race, which has not yet been politically used up. The new order cannot be conceived in terms of the national boundaries of the peoples with an historic past, but in terms of race that transcends those boundaries. All the adjustments and corrections of frontiers, and of regions of colonization, are a ploughing of the sands."

I tried to object that there were very great difficulties in the way of this for Germany, but Hitler cut me short with a wave of his hand.

"I know perfectly well," he said, "just as well as all these tremendously clever intellectuals, that in the scientific sense there is no such thing as race. But you, as a farmer and cattle-breeder, cannot get your breeding successfully achieved without the conception of race. And I as a politician need a conception which enables the order which has hitherto existed on historic bases to be abolished and an entirely new and anti-historic order enforced and given an intellectual basis. Understand what I mean," he said, breaking off. "I have to liberate the world from dependence on its historic past. Nations are the outward and visible forms of our history. So I have to fuse these nations into a higher order if I want to get rid of the chaos of an historic past that has become an absurdity. And for this purpose the conception of race serves me well. It disposes of the old order and makes possible new associations. France carried her great Revolution beyond her borders with the conception of the nation. With the conception of race, National Socialism will carry its revolution abroad and recast the world."

Hitler concluded, with growing fervour:

"Just as the conception of the nation was a revolutionary change from the purely dynastic feudal states, and just as it introduced a biological conception, that of the people, so our own revolution is a further step, or, rather, the final step, in the rejection of the historic order and the recognition of purely biological values. And I shall bring into operation throughout all Europe and the whole world this process of selection which we have carried out through National Socialism in Germany. The process of dissolution and reordering will run its course in every nation, no matter how old and firmly knit its social system may be. The active section in the nations, the militant, Nordic section, will rise again and become the ruling element over these shopkeepers and pacifists, these puritans and speculators and busy-bodies." 16

The real function of Hitler's ideology could hardly be better phrased. The ideology is to serve action, not action ideology. To provide the "intellectual basis" of expansion, a new ideology was needed. Race, which has not yet been politically used up, was the conception that provided for both the overcoming of nationalism and the justification of transcending national boundaries. Hitler acknowledges, explicitly, that he knows his racism is not scientifically true. Hebes understand that it could be made politically and ideologically true. Through the concept of race, an entirely new basis could be evolved and anyone and everyone could be brought into it. Notice that the active element becomes the Nordic element. But since there is no real way to decide who is a Nordic, what he is saying is that anyone can be "made" a Nordic when his superior capabilities are demonstrated. This racial internationalism transcends the arbitrary and economically disfunctional boundaries of nations. It is rank imperialism and demonstrates a real insight into the need of a heavily industrialized capitalism to create a global market. The only reason that Hitler has the ideology of racism is because it is utilitarian. To tear down the old ideologies, commitments, allegiances, a new idea is a necessity. As Napoleon used nationalism to expand, so will he use racism.

The analysis of Mein Kampf that has been set forth in this thesis is thus confirmed by Hitler's own words. But what is of crucial

methodological import is that these statements of Hitler would
logically follow from my basis hypothesis/^{that/}Hitler's racism is thus
directly connected to his anti-Semitism - indeed they are umbilically
related - each was based on rational calculation, each was deliberately
fashioned to attain political goals through skillful manipulation of
ideology. This is not the fanaticism of a mad man, but the genius
of a calculating politician.

FOOTNOTES

SECTION B

1. cf. Bullock, op. cit., p. 121
2. Abel, op. cit., p. 72
3. The views of Bullock, Erikson, Heiden, Olden, Sacker, and Shirer are representative of the prevailing views. See the bibliography for the books of these authors.
4. The so-called biographies of Hitler by persons who "knew" Hitler in Vienna have not been considered of much value by competent scholars. I have not used them even where they would support my point of view. See, for example, the statement of Hanisch in Olden, Hitler, Covici Friede, Inc., New York., 1936. Also Pulzer, op. cit., p. 206.
5. Abel, op. cit., p. 64
6. Max Weinreich, Hitler's Professors, Y.I.V.O., N.Y., 1946, p. 85
7. cf. John Bengtson, Nazi War Aims, Augustana Book Concern, Rock Island, Illinois, 1962, Chapter III
8. Neumann, op. cit., pp. 187ff.
9. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Meridian Books, N.Y., 1967, Chapter 8; Moon, op. cit., Chapters III & IV; Neumann, op. cit., p. 147
10. Moon, op. cit., pp. 44f., pp. 194f., pp. 540ff.
11. Thyssen, op. cit., pp. 31f.
12. Ibid.
13. Paul Massing, Rehearsal for Destruction, Harper & Brothers, N.Y., 1949, pp. 1-23, p. 104, pp. 136f.

14. Pulzer, op. cit., pp. 204f.
15. Bengtson, op. cit., p. 132, n. 8; Bullock, op. cit., p. 378n.
16. Hermann Rauschning, Hitler Speaks, Thornton Butterworth Ltd., London, 1939, pp. 229-230. See also pages 50 and 51.

SECTION C

ANTI-SEMITISM IN PRACTICE

Introduction

Some readers will no doubt raise questions as to the validity of the hypothesis set forth above on the following grounds: the extermination policy of the Nazis would seem to indicate that whatever the original impetus to Hitler's anti-Semitism, he eventually became genuinely anti-Semitic. Such an objection seems to be predicated on the premise that the extermination policy was in some way detrimental to Hitler's goals, that it was irrational, and that it conflicted with what were the real interests of Germany both before and during the war. .

Leon A. Jick in his thesis, Story of Betrayal¹, sought to find answers to these questions. I shall examine some of the crucial points developed in his paper and indicate some additional information that has come to light since then (1954). For more detailed information, the reader should consult Rabbi Jick's thesis. As regards the period before the war, there will be some discussion to show how carefully manipulated the anti-Semitism of the Nazi regime was. This would be the kind of situation we would expect to find if our basic hypothesis is correct. It is felt that all that is necessary is to indicate what the processes were, and a detailed examination is not needed. The books cited will give the interested reader more information. However, it is

assumed that by now the basic premise has been documented and all that is needed is to show that it is not contradicted by events that occur while Hitler is in power. In Part I of this section, the pre-war period will be discussed. The war years will be analyzed in Part II.

PART I -- PRE-WAR PERIOD

Speeches after the Putsch

In the Baynes collection of Hitler's speeches and public pronouncements, we find a rather curious phenomenon. Whereas the speeches of Hitler before the Putsch were filled with attacks on the Jews, in the speeches of the late twenties and early thirties, until 1933, these attacks almost totally disappear. To be sure, Communism, Bolshevism, Democracy are continually held up to ridicule and scorn, as well as government policy. But in general in this period we find vague rather than explicit references to the Jews. We encounter an "alien race" whereas in the early twenties we would have found the word "Jew." The doctrine of racism (of "superior" and "inferior") is constant, but the common enemy, the all-inclusive Jew, is missing from Hitler's speeches at this time. Perhaps the best example of what occurred is shown by Hitler's speech in Dusseldorf at the Industry Club. This occurred on January 27, 1932. This occasion was a crucial one for Hitler as Thyssen notes.

"The speech made a deep impression on the assembled industrialists, and in consequence of this a number of large contributions flowed from the resources of heavy industry into the treasuries of the National Socialist Party." 2

This speech is reprinted in its entirety by Baynes.³ In it, Hitler covers almost every conceivable topic; democracy, communism, race, imperialism, autarky, economics, etc. Yet the word "Jew" is not used once.

What can account for such a shift in tactics by Hitler? If it be argued that Hitler was aware that the industrialists would not "buy" anti-Semitism as an explanation and as a basis from which to formulate policy and that is the reason that he did not use it, then one can just as logically reply that this insight of Hitler's shows his constant attention to reality and his willingness to manipulate his anti-Semitism around it. It certainly indicates that his was not a fanatical devotion to this theme.

Perhaps the same type of reasoning could explain the relative absence of anti-Semitism in his speeches before he came into power. By focusing to some degree on the inequities of the Versailles Treaty, but emphasizing the failure of democracy and the threat of Communism (and, of course, making them both appear to be the same), Hitler had no need constantly to bring in the Jews. His glorification of the

of the Germans, stressing their inner, but threatened, solidarity and greatness, was apparently enough of a unifying "slogan." It should also be borne in mind that other agencies of the Nazi movement kept up the theme of anti-Semitism during this period. There is no evidence that the industrialists who provided massive and decisive financial support in any way put pressure on Hitler to refrain from using anti-Semitism. And after he got into power, the industrialists were more than willing to use anti-Semitism and Aryanzation for their own purposes.

Another possible factor contributing to the lack of appearance of the Jews explicitly in his speeches may be the fact that until the full effects of the depression began to be felt, the Nazi party did not experience much growth. The period from 1925 to 1928 was largely spent in rebuilding the party and reorganizing the apparatus. In 1929 the party had 176,426 members. By 1930 the number had grown to 389,000, and in 1931 a total of 806,294 had been reached.⁴ The relationship between party growth and economic crisis is clear. What influence the relative lack of success before 1929 had on Hitler's speeches is hard to establish, but a shift in tactics should not surprise us.

Admittedly the reasons given above to explain why Hitler stopped being so vehement in his anti-Semitism are incomplete and speculative. However, the point is that whatever the reason, Hitler appears to have left the common enemy behind for awhile and this is not the type of behavior that we would have expected from a sincere, fanatical anti-Semite.

The above comments are not intended to imply that the Jew had been discarded entirely, nor to indicate that the "Jew" had become useless to Hitler. For example, in 1928 Hitler was asked by the farmers' organization if the land reform outlined in the party's program would lead to expropriations. The reply was that the phrase "uncompensated expropriation" referred only to Jewish speculators. Private property as such was, of course, supported firmly by the party.⁵ Such statements indicate that the use of the Jew to make the socialism of the party acceptable to classes and interests who were committed to the concept of private property had not been forgotten.

Anti-Semitism in the Nazi State

Anti-Semitic legislation within Germany was directly related to the crucial problem Hitler faced with regard to his ideological promises in the economic areas. Hitler came into power because of the failure of the government to provide a solution to the economic

crisis. While Hitler appeared to be promising a radical restructuring of the economic sphere, it had become clear within the higher echelons of the party that he had no real intention of doing so. The issue was actually resolved in 1930 when Hitler and Otto Strasser confronted each other over the issue of the party's socialism. Hitler was asked by Otto Strasser what Hitler would do with the Krupp Co. if the party came into power. Hitler replied:

"But of course things would remain as they were. Do you think that I should be so mad as to destroy business life (Wirtschaft)? Only if people should fail to act in the interests of the nation, then - and only then - would the State intervene. But for that you do not need any expropriation, you do not need to give the workers the right to have a voice in the conduct of the business: you need only a strong State which alone is in a position to determine its action solely from considerations without regard to interested parties."⁶

"This sharing of the workers in possession and control is simply Marxism: I would give the right to exercise such an influence only to the State controlled by a higher class."⁷

The financial support of the heavy industrialists had been essential in Hitler's fight for power, for without it the Nazi Party could not have continued its massive campaigns to gain the popular vote.* Hitler more than paid his debt. Once in power, the government

*Note: For details see George Hallgarten, "Adolf Hitler and German Heavy Industry, 1931-1933," Journal of Economic History, XII (Summer, 1952), pp. 223-246; Neumann, op. cit., pp. 14-16, pp. 30-34.

under Hitler granted tax exemptions to the higher income groups. The process of cartelization was supported by new laws, and the trade unions that were antithetical to the interests of the industrialists were destroyed. In addition, the purge of the S.A. eliminated the organizational basis of the "left-wing" of the party. The Nazi labor union (N.S.B.O.) had its radical leadership removed, and was instructed to refrain from demonstrations against any economic enterprise without the Party's permission.⁸

The program of rearmament was of direct benefit to the heavy industrialists as was the push to autarky. As industrial production increased, the number of unemployed laborers decreased sharply. Wages went up almost 50% between 1933 and 1937. The intervention of the state into the economic life of the country was thus not economically ineffective. The rearmament program did not lead to a reduction in the standard of living for millions of German workers, but contributed to the improvement of the workers' lot.⁹ Yet, the middle class continued to be squeezed. The number of small retailers, craftsmen, middlemen and small farmers dropped considerably during the pre-war years of Hitler's government.¹⁰ Anti-Semitism was used to perform two functions. It was used to increase the power of the larger economic entities. And it was also used to deflect any resentment

against the increased concentration, or against a government that might appear to be renegeing on its promises.

Neumann has made this process extremely clear. He gives cogent reasons for the anti-Jewish policies. The process of "Aryanization" proceeded in steps, not in one fell swoop. Fear of adverse foreign opinion was apparently one reason for this gradual approach, as a speech given by Frick in 1934 indicates.¹¹ Another, and perhaps more fundamental consideration, was that a disruption of Germany's economy would have resulted from an immediate exclusion of Jews from Germany's economy. And the gradual enactment of anti-Jewish laws helped to develop the necessary dislike, if not hatred, of Jews over a period of time. As Neumann points out, initially "there is no record of a single spontaneous anti-Jewish attack committed by persons not belonging to the Nazi party."¹² The need to reorient the population was met by legislation and terror.

The gradual expulsion enabled the process of concentration to proceed under the guise of Aryanization, rather than as open exploitation. Both industrial firms and financial institutions were taken over by competitors with little or no compensation under the aegis of the Aryanization laws. As an example of this, it may be noted that the number of private banks decreased from 1350 to 520 in the period from

1932 to 1939. The legality of such concentration was provided for by the Aryanization laws. They could also be defended by the government as being in line with its policy of restoring the German race to its former glories by ridding it of the cancer of the Jewish influence.¹³

The attacks on Jewish stores had a direct relationship to the continual decline of the middle class. The large department stores were a particularly favorite target of the small middle class envy. Many, if not most, of the stores were owned by Jews. The elimination of Jewish owners of these stores as well as other businesses, factories, banks, etc. not only permitted the Nazis to distribute spoils, but also allowed them to demonstrate their concern for the plight of the middle class. As Neumann puts it, "The discontent among small businessmen because of their elimination from business had to be diverted."¹⁴ It is also relevant to point out that at the same time that the Nuerenburg Laws were put into effect, there began the purge of "inefficient" personnel from small businesses. The assault on the middle class was concealed by an attack on the Jews.¹⁵ The exclusion of Jews from professional occupations meant that competition would be reduced for the remaining members. The attacks also deflected pressure from the S.A. away from big business and against the Jews.¹⁶

The inability of the party members to fully grasp what was going on, though having a realization that things were not turning out the way that had been anticipated, is shown by the remark of a party functionary who said that the expropriation of Jewish businesses "would have had still better results in relieving the pressure on retail trade if the chain stores had not used the opportunity to rent evacuated Jewish shop space in the main business areas, and thus to move their affiliates from unfavorable areas into better locations."¹⁷

There was another consideration which prompted the increasing pressure on German Jews. The expanded armament program, the preparation for territorial expansion, and consequently the probability of war, necessitated a motivating ideology that would justify the efforts in the eyes of the people. We have seen how Hitler's racism was perfectly suited for such a situation. The racist laws that were passed prepared the groundwork for the policy of imperialism in the territories that were to be occupied. They also helped to establish totalitarian rule within Germany.

Both themes are evident in the Nationality Act of 1935. In this law a distinction is made between "state-subjects" and "citizens." A state subject was someone who lived under Germany's "protection". A citizen was a person of "German or racially similar blood who by their behavior demonstrates that they are willing and able faithfully to serve

the German people and the Reich."¹⁸ By the inclusion of people of "similar blood" the law shows the disregard for the absolute purity of the race. The legislation opens up the possibility of classifying people by race and/or their willingness to cooperate as the situation demanded. Thus, people could be reclassified time and again depending on what the state's needs were at the time. This technique was used very effectively in the occupied countries during the war. Before the war, within Germany, the acceptance of this new type of classification enabled the idea of racism to become a part of the actual situation rather than remaining confined to a theoretical ideology. By gradually acclimating the German people to the notion of superiors and inferiors, in practice and in theory, the necessary psychological commitments were being made for the eventual enslavement and exploitation of countless people in conquered countries. Nor should it be forgotten that in order to "protect" the Reich, the Aryan, the "real" German, many non-Jews were jailed, killed, or put into concentration camps.

The various laws that were passed were also designed to provide concrete evidence that the Germans who ^{were/} both racially and politically "acceptable" were all equal to each other, as well as superior to everyone else. The egalitarianism to be sure was tempered with a concept of varying individual ability. But the idea fostered at all levels of society was that the elite status was available to all

since all were Aryans. This mode of social cohesiveness brought a unity within Germany that had not been accomplished during the Weimar Republic and was one of the significant achievements of the Nazi regime.¹⁹ The Jews, a visable group, were the first to be used as a reference point for developing feelings of group superiority. Once the techniques were worked out in relationship to the Jews, the same kinds of procedures could be applied to others.

Neumann has called this the "spearhead" theory of anti-Semitism. His conclusions are worth quoting, particularly as they provide the analytic insights necessary to accurately understand the functions of anti-Semitism in Hitler's time.

"An understanding of anti-Semitism is impaired by the widely accepted scapegoat theory, according to which the Jews are used as scapegoats for all evils of society. The slaughter or the expulsion of the scapegoat, however, marks in mythology the end of a process, while the persecution of the Jews, as practiced by National Socialists, is only the prologue of more horrible things to come. The expropriation of the Jews, for instance, is followed by that of the Poles, Czechs, Dutch, French, anti-Nazi Germans, and middle classes. Not only Jews are put in concentration camps, but pacifists, conservatives, socialists, Catholics, Protestants, Free Thinkers, and members of the occupied peoples. Not only Jews fall under the executioner's axe but so do countless others of many races, nationalities, beliefs and religions. Anti-Semitism is thus the spearhead of terror. The Jews are used as guinea pigs in testing the method of repression It follows that in this anti-Semitic ideology and practice the extermination of the Jews is only the means to the attainment of the ultimate objective, namely the destruction of free institutions, beliefs, and groups. This may be called

the spearhead theory of anti-Semitism."²⁰

We will now turn to the implementation of policy to attain the ultimate goals of Hitler and his regime - World War II.

FOOTNOTES

SECTION C -- PART I

1. Leon Jick, Story of Betrayal, unpublished thesis for ordination, Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1954.
2. Thyssen, op. cit., p. 101.
3. Norman H. Baynes, ed: The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922 - August 1939, 2 vols., Oxford University Press, London, 1942, pp. 777-828.
4. Abel, op. cit., p. 311.
5. David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, Doubleday & Company, Garden City, N.Y. 1966, p. 33.
6. Baynes, op. cit., p. 111.
7. Ibid., p. 112.
8. Neumann, op. cit., p. 264, Schoenbaum, op. cit., p. 85.
9. Schoenbaum, op. cit., p. 105.
10. Neumann, op. cit., pp. 264f, Schoenbaum, op. cit., pp. 130ff.
11. Neumann, op. cit., p. 120.
12. Ibid., p. 121.
13. Ibid., pp. 116-120. (For Hitler's own words see Baynes, op. cit., pp. 729-735).
14. Neumann, op. cit., pp. 118f.
15. Ibid., p. 116.
16. Schoenbaum, op. cit., p. 129.

17. Ibid., p. 147.
18. Neumann, op. cit., pp. 115f.
19. Schoenbaum, op. cit., pp. 227f.
20. Neumann, op. cit., pp. 550f.

PART II -- THE WAR YEARS

The destruction of European Jews has been investigated in great detail by a number of authors. The documentation made possible by the Nuremburg trials has provided a wealth of material for those interested in the subject. It is not my intention here to provide an exhaustive study of what happened. Rather the purpose here is to demonstrate that the policies of Hitler and the Nazi leadership were rational, though evil.

It has been maintained that the German policy of extermination was insane and had little or no economic function. According to this viewpoint the Nazi policies were inimical to basic German interests and interfered with the war effort.¹ The documents, however, do not support such contentions. What the documents do show is that the implementation of the German policies were of a consistent character when one keeps in mind - 1) the ultimate goals of the Nazis; and 2) the changing military situation. There were changes in policies, and these changes were related to new conditions within which the basic policies had to operate. When we understand the reasons for these changes, we will see that divergencies are only apparent, not fundamental.

The goal of the war was to provide for the complete domination and control of the occupied countries, for the benefit of Germany. There is ample evidence for this and only a few examples are needed.

In a report of October 15, 1940 which outlines the basic principles for the administration of Bohemia and Moravia, Hitler decided that only those elements that were valuable "from a racial or other standpoint" are to be absorbed. This represented about half of the population. The other half is to be eliminated and shipped out of the country "by all sorts of methods." German settlers are to replace them so as to ensure control and assimilation of the remaining population.² Extremely harsh measures were not applied to the Czechs because the population had the industrial skills which were of great value to the Germans. Therefore immediate deportation was postponed. However, property owners were coerced into selling to German firms and banks.³

On October 2 of the same year, Hitler outlined his plan for Poland. The Poles are only to be looked upon as a source of unskilled labor. "Every year the laborers needed by the Reich could be procured from there (Poland)."⁴ As for Polish leaders, they are to be eliminated. This includes the gentry and the intelligentsia. The justification: "This sounds cruel, but such is the law of life."⁵

In October 1939, the program was initiated for the re-settlement of Germans and the establishment of Himmler's R.K.F.D.V. program which was to restructure parts of Eastern Europe into semi-feudal

farms with the Germans as the lords, and the native population as the serfs.⁶ Since the Eastern regions were "overpopulated", the citizens either had to be moved or eliminated in some way. As early as January 1941 Himmler had decided that the destruction of thirty million slavs was the prerequisite for the implementation of complete German control in the east. The "inevitable war with Bolshevism" was to be used as the pretext for any necessary actions.⁷

On July 7, 1941, Hitler held a lengthy conference in connection with the plans for the newly occupied or about to be conquered territories of Russia. In the memorandum for the record, Hitler is said to have made the following points.

"Now it was essential that we did not publicize our aims before the world; also there was no need for that, but the main thing was that we ourselves knew what we wanted. By no means should we render our task more difficult by making superfluous declarations. Such declarations were superfluous because we could do everything wherever we had the power, and what was beyond our power we would not be able to do anyway.

"Therefore we shall emphasize again that we were forced to occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in the interest of the inhabitants that we provided order, food, traffic, etc., hence our measures. Nobody shall be able to recognize that it initiates a final settlement. This need not prevent our taking all necessary measures - shooting, re-settling, etc. - and we shall take them.

"On principle we have now to face the task of cutting up the giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able:

first, to dominate it,
second, to administer it, and
third, to exploit it."⁸

These documents prove that the aim of the war was nothing short of the most thoroughgoing and ruthless imperialistic expansion ever visualized. And everywhere the army went, so did the industrialists, who gleaned a harvest of factories, plants, sources of raw material, and a supply of cheap labor.⁹

In September 1939 plans were being made as to what to do with Jews in occupied countries. In these plans there is a distinction made between an "ultimate goal" and the short term goals. We read, "the first prerequisite for the ultimate goal is first of all, the concentration of the Jews from the country to the larger cities." Whether the ultimate goal is extermination is not clear. The Madagascar plan was not dropped until 1941. It was at that time that the decision to exterminate masses of people was reached. We shall see below the reasons for the change in attitude by the Nazis. What is clear is that in 1939 the process of "concentration of the Jews" is not to adversely effect the economy or the war effort.

"In the execution of this plan, care must be taken that the economic security suffer no harm in the occupied zones.

"(1) The needs of the army, should particularly be kept in mind, e. g. it will not be possible to avoid leaving behind here and there some Jews engaged in trade who absolutely must be left behind for the maintenance of the troops, for lack of any other way out. In such cases, the immediate aryanization of these plants is to be planned for and the emigration of the Jews is to be completed later in agreement with the competent local German administrative authorities.

"(2) For the preservation of German economic interests in the occupied territories it is self understood that Jewish war and ordinary industries and factories and those important to the 4-year plan must be kept going for the time being.

"In these cases also, immediate Aryanization must be planned for and the migration of the Jews must be completed later."10 *

As early as November 1939 Jews were being transported to Lublin to be used as forced labor. The communications from Frank, the overall boss of Poland (The General Government), contain references as to how the Jews are to be used as labor, not how they are to be executed. For example, in a diary entry of 1939 from October 25 to December 15, Frank wrote,

By Spring 1,000,000 Poles and Jews from East and West Posen, Danzig, Poland and Upper Silesia must be received by the general government. The resettlement of the ethnic Germans and the taking on of Poles and Jews (10,000 daily) must be accomplished according to plan. Especially urgent is the institution of forced labor for the Jews. The Jewish population if possible must be extracted from the Jewish cities and be put to work on roads. The critical questions of housing and feeding are still to be cleared up11 (emphasis added)

*Note: The meaning of "Aryanization" here was the same as in Germany: the expropriation of property for the benefit of a few industrialists. For details see Jick, op. cit., Chapter VI.

In the period until the German attack on the Soviet Union we thus find a policy of retention of Jews because they were useful in providing skilled and unskilled labor. We have intimations that eventually there will be mass executions, but these are always in a context of further exploitations and conquests which would involve a surplus population not only of Jews, but of everyone. The ultimate goal, which is placed in terms of a victory over Russia, is complete exploitation with the necessity of providing space and land for "ethnic" Germans. Prior to 1941 the short term goals are those of utilization for the immediate problems at hand. The grandiose plans develop as the time for the Russian campaign becomes nearer.

The extermination policy began in June 1941. This "final solution" was not initiated in Poland, but in the Soviet Union as the German armed forces advanced. Why this shift in policy? Jick, in a real contribution to an understanding of this period, has closely analyzed the documents and has provided us with the answer.

"Subsequent German statements and actions enable us to deduce the answer to this question (the decision to exterminate rather than concentration and exploitation). These show: (1) that once the attack on Russia began the war assumed an irrevocable character, plans for negotiated compromises were definitely abandoned; (2) once areas of Russia were occupied, unlimited numbers of people more willing and better suited than the Jews, became available for slave labors, and therefore there was no longer any need to preserve the Jews for work; (3) the prospective "Germanization" of Russia intensified the problem of surplus population and the need to reduce some of this surplus in order to make room for expelled population from farther west."¹²

That the destruction of the Jews was to be but a prelude to even more destruction is proven by the "Green File" which became the basis for German policy in Russia. Russia was to be ruthlessly exploited for the betterment of Germany. Only in areas in which there were surpluses of agricultural products or crude oil was there to be any consideration for the population. As for the other areas the following decision was made.

"Many tens of millions of people in the industrial areas will become redundant and will either die or will have to emigrate to Siberia. Any attempts to save the population in these parts from death by starvation through the import of surpluses from the Black Earth Zone would be at the expense of supplies to Europe. It would reduce Germany's staying power in the war and would undermine Germany's and Europe's power to resist the blockade. This must be clearly and absolutely understood."¹³

When the war with Russia began, it was assumed by the Nazi leadership that it would end quickly and victoriously. It should be remembered that up until this time the German armed forces had achieved rapid and extensive success. Even after the failure of the campaign to completely crush Russia, many, indeed most of the military and civilian administrators, remained convinced of Germany's victory. Anticipating an excess population to be available from the Russian territories, the destruction began. The same Frank, who in 1939 was concerned about preserving the Jews for forced labor, in December

1941 states that, "We must annihilate the Jews in order to maintain the structure of the Reich as a whole..."¹⁴ This is not a statement of a maniac, but of an official who was shifting his policies in line with changing developments. When we consider Himmler's plan to destroy 30,000,000 slaves and Hitler's "Green File" for millions of Russians, it is not surprising that the Jews were selected to inaugurate a basic policy of exterminating surplus populations.

It is also well to point out that even during the frenzied killing of Jews, those capable of hard physical labor were not gassed. And the Einsatzgruppen of the Eastern Front did not destroy "Jews who were still indispensable from the economic point of view."¹⁵

During the first phase, 1941-1942, very few references can be found to the effect that the extermination policy was interfering with military operations or that they were being carried out without any consideration for immediate economic considerations.*

*Note: Poliakov is one of those who thinks that the transportation of people to extermination camps conflicted with the military. Yet the one example he gives involved transportation of Jews from southeast Europe and the occupied western region to the eastern zone. As he himself states the shipment of Jews was rescheduled to permit the military to use the railroads. Thus the priority was to the military and not to the "final solution." That other freight movement came after the transport of Jews at this period may be true, but that does not in and of itself validate the general conclusion that there was constant interference. There is a large difference between dividing up the use of a resource, transportation facilities, and the contention, or better speculation, that such administrative procedures constitute a crippling of the war effort. It would appear from the secondary works I have read that only Jick has fully realized the necessity of paying constant attention to time periods and changing external situations.

As Jick points out, these documents refer to conditions within Russian territory and only rarely to other areas. Secondly, the reasons for this excess is explainable not in terms of a pathological lust for killing or a fanatical hatred of the Jews by the Nazi leadership, but due to a miscalculation as to how the war with Russia would end. The following two quotations are found in Jick's paper. The first one, of Himmler in October, 1943, shows how such a miscalculation had occurred.

"I can give you a picture of this first year (of the war against Russia) in a few words..... The Russian Army was herded together in great pockets, ground down, taken prisoner. At that time, we did not value the mass of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, as labor. What after all, thinking in terms of generations, is not to be regretted, but is now deplorable by reason of loss of labor, is that prisoners died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and hunger."16
(emphasis added)

Rosenberg's comments of December 1942 reflect the impact of the changed military situation. At that time Rosenberg was Minister for the Occupied East. He wrote,

"Since the eastern war has turned out unexpectedly long, it is the opinion of civilian and military commanders that German Eastern policy must be changed. Food rations allowed for the Russian population are so low that they fail to secure mere existence. The Russians are faced with death by starvation The position at one time taken by Germans that there are too many people in the East and that their extermination would be a blessing, must now be changed, since the Wehrmacht lives by the work performed in Eastern cities."17

With these considerations in mind, the extermination of Jews, as well as other peoples drops off.* The subsequent deportation of Jews to concentration camps where they could be put to work continued, as did the elimination of those who could not be used by the Nazis or the industrialists who greatly profited by the availability of cheap slave or forced labor. But during this period we can read of the SS inspecting camps where Jews are held and instructing the camp commanders to improve conditions so that the workers would be more productive.¹⁸

There were other changes in Nazi policy which once again demonstrate how the notion of race could be manipulated as the occasion demanded. The defeats of 1942 and early 1943 resulted in a great need for more men for the armed forces. This increased recruitment meant that German workers would have to be taken from their jobs. It was only in late 1942 that the German economy was put on a full mobilization program. The need for workers meant that foreign labor had to be used.

*Note: This point might need some clarification. It is only the workers who could be placed in the slave labor factories of such companies as I. G. Farben and Krupp that were kept alive. If they became too enfeebled to work, they too were immediately killed. The inspections at the concentration camps of the trainloads of human beings were conducted in order to decide who should live and who should die. The criteria applied was only economic, not humanitarian. But the tendency towards indiscriminate slaughter was stopped. Occasionally a local SS group would disregard the orders but such occurrences became less and less frequent.

It is during this period that we find wholesale reclassifications of workers who were formerly "non-Aryan." They became "re-Germanizable." And whereas previously a workers in certain sectors had to be racially examined, thousands of Polish and Soviet citizens were now made to work without any such examinations. Rather than consider the Slavs as total inferiors, instructions went out that the appeal should be that they are all Europeans fighting the menace of Bolshevism.¹⁹ Such a change in a policy which had previously been promulgated as being almost "sacred" could not have been accomplished by fanatics who were under the control of absolute devotion to ideological ends.

The classification process demonstrates the validity of the spearhead theory of Neumann. In Eastern Europe in particular the conquered population was classified along supposed racial lines. The Jews were at the bottom of the scale, and the "ethnic" Germans were at the top. By this method the population was divided into categories, dehumanized, since what was done with a person depended not on who he was, but on what he was. We have noted the ultimate purpose of this procedure to decide who would live under German rule and who would be considered "superfluous." This mode of classification while placing the natives below the Aryans permitted the use of the Jews as

a reference group by which even the native Pole, Slav, etc., could feel superior to someone else. The classification system also was another extension of the policy which had been initiated in Germany to indoctrinate the lower echelons of the SS, Army, and civil administration into a mold of thinking which would later justify the active manipulation of the population for the goals of the leaders and the industrialists. Always the severest measures were initiated with Jews and then extended to the others. First the Jews had to wear distinguishing emblems, and then the Poles. First the Jews were designated for liquidation, and then the "excess" Poles and Russians. The system became routine. It was through such methods that over a period of time the harshest of measures became normal. The SS general, Bach-Zelwski, when question about the massacres perpetrated by the "action groups" said,

"It's my opinion that when the doctrine that the Slavic race is inferior and the Jews not even human has been preached for years and decades, such a result is inevitable."20

The extermination of the Jews intensified during 1944 when the fronts were collapsing. Orders were issued to make as many Jews available for forced labor as was possible. This was done, and the rest were destroyed. This is the reason that Hungarian Jews were massacred at this time. The supply of Russian slave laborers was difficult to maintain because of the rapidly deteriorating military situation. The

Hungarian Jews were the most easily obtainable.²¹

The last ironic twist occurred when Himmler ordered an immediate halt to the exterminations and attempted to bargain through neutrals in order to save himself.²²

What this brief summary has shown is that throughout the war the policy toward the Jews was consistent in terms of the objectives of Hitler and the leadership of Germany, both the Nazis and the industrialists. The ultimate goal once war with Russia was initiated was the complete domination of Europe; a Europe depopulated in order to serve the ends of Germany's economy. The changes in policy depended not on ideology but were the result in variations in the military situation. Ideology changed as the needs of the war machine and economy changed. Execution of policy changed as the needs of the army and industry changed. As Jick puts it, "To the very end, the policy toward the Jews was determined by expediency."²³

Hitler During the War

During the war period Hitler used the "Jew" as an excuse to go to war. The idea of the war being forced upon people, by an aggressor, is a technique often employed by imperialist powers. Thus, in typical fashion we find Hitler saying to the Reichstag on January 30, 1939,

"Once more I will assume the part of a prophet: If the international Jewish financiers within and without Europe succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the result will be not the bolshevization of the world and thereby the victory of Jewry - but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe."24

Since the decision to destroy Jews was not taken until 1941, the above statement of Hitler's should be taken for what it clearly was, war propaganda to motivate the German population to further sacrifice. We have seen that the decision of Hitler in 1941 to begin the final solution makes "sense" if put into the proper context.

In Hitler's Table Talk, edited by H. R. Trevor Roper, we have further confirmation of our thesis. Jews appear only intermittently in Hitler's conversations. After the fateful decision, there is little interest in the Jews as a topic of conversation. His overall view is perhaps best summarized in a conversation held on January 23, 1942, which is during the period of the intense liquidation.

"One must act radically. When one pulls out a tooth, one does it with a single tug, and the pain quickly goes away. The Jew must clear out of Europe. Otherwise no understanding will be possible between Europeans. It's the Jew who prevents everything. When I think about it, I realize that I'm extraordinarily humane. At the time of the Popes, the Jews were mistreated in Rome.... For my part, I restrict myself to telling them they must go away. If they break their pipes on the journey, I can't do anything about it. But if they refuse to go voluntarily, I see no other solution but extermination. Why should I look at a Jew through other eyes than if he were a Russian prisoner-of-war?"25

Since this talk took place after the extermination policy began, and after Hitler had approved the plan contained in the "Green File"* we have to take his apparent reluctance with a grain of salt. These conversations were recorded to provide a record for a victorious Germany. Thus the placing of the blame on the Jews who would not get out of Europe when Hitler knew that they had no opportunity to do so is but more example of propaganda. The comparison at the end between the Jews and the Russian prisoners indicates the connective link between expansion of territory and the ideological justification of racism. Hitler, and the policy at that time, did indeed make no distinction, because it was not in the interest of Germany's leaders to do so then.

But what is most striking about the records is the lack of interest shown by Hitler in the Jewish question. If those who presume a fanatic or at least one during the course of the war were correct, then we should find a constant or at least increasing interest in the Jews during these talks. Yet, if anything we find a decrease of interest on the part of Hitler. It would seem that rather than the obsessions of an intense anti-Semite, we find the disregard of an administrator for whom once a decision has been made about a subject, the matter is more or less closed. In short, of no further interest. It is certainly not the type of attitude that can be logically explained other than in the terms

*Note: See above, p. 128

that we have used.

The final document that we have available is the so-called "Testament" of Hitler which was dictated during the last days of the war.²⁶ It is Hitler's last attempt to justify himself to history and to lay a possible basis for future Germans to look upon him as the great, albeit unsuccessful savior of Germany. The lucidity of Hitler's mind is still evident. He correctly predicted what would happen to Europe after the war ended; he foresaw the division of power between the United States and Russia, with England and France on the sidelines. He ponders his mistakes in the conduct of the war, particularly regretting the delay of five weeks in attacking Russia because he had to help the Italians in the Balkans. Whether his speculations on these particular points are correct or not is impossible to say since there is no way to test them, but they are not unreasonable or unrealistic.

In this testament, written for the future to read and admire, Hitler is concerned with defending himself in the light of future history. He portrays himself as a man who had a mission, a mission to "save" Germany and even Europe. He defends the racism of his ideology and the actions taken in connection with that ideology. Reminiscent of his earlier days, he attacks the enemies who are about to defeat him as being under the influence of the Jews.²⁷ Since the purpose of the book is to perpetuate

his memory, to provide a new myth for future Germans, we would expect his defense to follow these lines. In his self-glorification he attempts to place himself in an historical perspective that augurs the eventual victory of German greatness. He, of course, is instrumental in the process.

"The task I have undertaken of raising the German people to the place in the world that is their due is unfortunately not a task that can be accomplished by a single man or in a single generation. But I have at least opened their eyes to their inherent greatness and I have inspired them to exaltation at the thought of the union of Germans in one great indestructible Reich. I have sown the good seed. I have made the German people realize the significance of the struggle they are waging for their very existence.

"One day the harvest will come, and nothing on earth will be able to prevent it from coming. The German people is a young and strong people, a people with its future before it."28

Whether such an appeal will have effect in the future cannot be determined in advance. But as long as there are men, there will be ideologies. And as long as there are ideologies, there will be individuals willing and able to manipulate them for their own interests. Hitler was a master of this technique. His anti-Semitism was but a means to the end of restoring Germany in the context of his times. To dismiss him as an aberration is at best a desperate gesture. As Professor Trevor-Roper writes, "He may have been a hideous historical phenomenon, but at least he was an important historical phenomenon, and we cannot afford to pass him by."29

FOOTNOTES

SECTION C -- PART II

1. Hannah Arendt, "Social Studies and the Concentration Camps", Journal of Jewish Social Studies, January, 1950; Leon Poliakov, Harvest of Hate, Syracuse University Press, N. Y., 1966, p. 144
2. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 10 vols., Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946, vol. III, pp. 618-619 (document 862-PS) Referred to as N.C.A. in future footnotes.
3. Robert Koehl, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939-1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, p. 42
4. Trials of War Criminals before Neuremberg Military Tribunals, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952, vol. VII, pp. 224-225 (document N.D. USSR 172)
5. Ibid., p. 226
6. cf. Koehl, op. cit., for details
7. Ibid., pp. 146-147
8. N.C.A., Vol. VII, pp. 1086-1087, (document L-221)
9. Jick, op. cit., Chapter VIII
10. N.C.A., Vol. VI, pp. 97-99 (document 3363-PS)
11. Nazi Germany's War Against the Jews, American Jewish Conference, N. Y., 1948, I-26. Referred to as N.G.W.A.J. in future footnotes
12. Jick, op. cit., p.89
13. Edward Honze, Foreign Labor In Nazi Germany, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1967, p. 71

14. N.C.A., Vol. IV, p. 891 (document 2233-D-PS)
15. Jick, op. cit., p. 92; Koehl, op. cit., p. 131
16. Jick, op. cit., p. 96 (the correct page in N.C.A., Vol. IV is 558 not 572 as is given in Jick's footnotes)
17. Jick, op. cit., p. 97
18. Honze, op. cit., pp. 174ff., p. 271
19. Ibid., p. 248
20. Poliakov, op. cit., p. 128
21. Jick, op. cit., p. 95
22. Ibid., p. 99
23. Ibid.
24. N.G.W.A.J., op. cit., I-32
25. Hitler's Table Talk, op. cit., p. 235
26. Adolf Hitler, The Testament of Adolf Hitler, edited by Francois Genoid, Cassel & Company, Ltd., London, 1961
27. Ibid., p. 32-33, p. 45, p. 76, p. 87
28. Ibid., p. 95
29. Ibid., p. 2

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