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In Search of a "Modern Presence of the
Ancient God": Covenant Theology

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Hebrew Letters and Ordination
Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion

1969

Referee, Prof. Jakob J. Petuchowski

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Digest of Contents

"'In Search of a Modern Presence of the Ancient God'" is a synthesis and systematic presentation of the theological writings of those American Reform thinkers who will probably come to be known as Covenant theologians. This paper considers the new theology, first, as a movement, examining its emergence and growth with respect to the history, institutions and philosophies which have influenced it; and, second, as a theology, wherein an exposition of the definitive, positive facets of it are offered. The third part of this paper is a consideration of the critical problem facing Covenant Theology and a possible solution.

The new theology is called "Covenant" because it fundamentally grows from--or returns to--a traditional understanding of Israel's relationship with God. From its understanding of this bond--or emerging from the existential intensity of this radical agreement--Covenant Theology explains itself. God is personal. Revelation did and can occur. Halakhah may have been--or is being--commanded. The tradition is a transcendent, self-justifying standard of authority. A willingness to acknowledge a trans-rational, total human dimension of existence as real is essential for authenticity.

Covenant Theology is an attempt to provide the modern liberal Jew with an intellectually tenable stance between the authority of tradition and the freedom of Reform. It is a success.

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Introduction.

Ultimately every theological circus must play the wilderness. The great thinkers and their great ideas must perform under the big tent pitched at the foot of Sinai. And if they be quiet and sure during the roar of the crowd and the lightning and the thunder of the cotton candy hawkers, then they shall surely reach the summit. Then they shall truly be alone with their God. Then they must indeed put it all to the final question: Either that ancient, awesome God covenanted with those simple desert souls or He did not. Covenant Theology is an attempt to let a modern liberal Jew say He did--without compromising his precious bit of intellectual sophistication and without being suffocated by the corpus of an infallible tradition. And this treatise is an attempt to describe the motivation, intent and substance of Covenant Theology.

The new theology is called "Covenant" "...because a quite traditional sense of the relationship between God and the people of Israel is basic to it..."¹ This contemporary reaffirmation of the ancient bond is filtered through a personal lens and given relevance for a post-liberal age.² Only by personally reasserting an inalienable birthright can the modern Jew bind his children--

who are here this day and even those who are not--to his God and the God of their fathers--even the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.³ Hopefully "by making Jewishness rest on covenant relation rather than on tradition and law, [the theologian can win]...historic roots without inflexibility; group participation without violation of conscience; messianic hope despite personal reverses."⁴ For modern children of the covenant, "...Judaism is not so much a heritage as an achievement." Or, one might say, the decisive task is to make Judaism our heritage.⁵

Covenant Theology aims to provide the modern Jew with an intellectually tenable stance between totalitarian orthodoxy--oblivious to human difference and embalmed in the past--and liberal anarchy--letting every Jew be his own God.⁵ It is an attempt to reconcile two fundamentally exclusive religious philosophies, retaining the best of both. It takes "the Bible and tradition seriously, but not literally." There is honor for the old but no compulsion to repeat it.⁶

Covenant Theology fuses the utterly infinite and transcendent God with His immanent still, small voice.⁷ It thereby provides modern man with an alternative understanding of revelation, one between "natural inspiration" and the orthodox equation of human interpretation with the divine encounter itself.⁸ Covenant Theology knows "...too much of history and ...[has] too high a regard for man to leave him out of the process of revelation.

Yet [it also] understands that without God as a real participant we have only another variety of humanism."⁹

Covenant Theology sees itself as "...the present day (though by no means...the last) link in a chain that reaches back to Sinai and before."¹⁰ It speaks in theological tradition initiated by Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig and joins them in search of a "modern presence of the ancient God".¹¹

This paper will consider and attempt to synthesize the work¹² of the following men: Ben Hamon, Eugene B. Borowitz, Emil Fackenheim, Maurice Friedman, Samuel E. Karff, Bernard Martin, Jakob J. Petuchowski, David Polish, Herman E. Schaalman, Steven S. Schwarzschild, Lou H. Silberman, Dudley Weinberg and Arnold Jacob Wolf. I believe that they would enjoy the label of Covenant theologian. However they are surely not the only theologians of Covenant. There are many men who share and preach the same ideas but whose work has not been as yet widely circulated. I have chosen the above list by the following criteria:

- a. An inherent theological harmony.
- b. A general dissatisfaction or disenchantment with rationalist, humanist, naturalist, classical reform and orthodox expressions of Judaism.
- c. Guilt through association: participation in

either (or both) the Oconomowoc group and the I. Meier Segals Centre for the Study and Advancement of Judaism.

- d. A general attempt to attain and maintain a meaningful understanding of covenant and its implications.

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Jakob Petuchowski, for his encouragement, his sage advice and his Prussian discipline; Dr. Eugene Borowitz for his example; and my wife, Karen, who must be some kind of angel.

Covenant Theology as a Movement: Part I

Historical Perspective: The Young Turks.

Covenant Theology is not a movement; it is an eloquent handful of dissident Reform rabbis. (Who else?) They have no central body which has appointed no committees who have nominated no officers. They just happen to share essentially the same theological commitments and generally seem to agree that the rationalist-humanist frequency of contemporary Reform is a lost cause.¹ In 1957 many of them met at Oconomowoc, Wisconsin, at what was to be the first of a series of private, informal, theological discussions. "The meetings were for study, prayer and sharing. Their center was to be God, His people and His Torah--which enabled trans-denominational attendance and exorcised organizational demands."² They are a small group seriously seeking "the meaning of Jewish faith...who are trying to go beyond Buber and Rosenzweig in the search for a new sense of covenant, law and community. They cluster around Judaism and dominated the under-50 group in the Commentary symposium, 'On the Condition of Jewish Belief'."³ In 1964 many members of the fellowship moved to Montreal where they joined other theologians representing a broader spectrum of or-

ganizational affiliation and met under the auspices of the I. Meier Segals Centre for the Study and Advancement of Judaism.

"Over the years the Central Conference [of American Rabbis] had had intimations of this new-traditionalism. In 1950 Rabbis Joe Gumbiner and Steven S. Schwarzschild participated in a workshop on 'Existentialism and Judaism'. This was the first of many occasions when any effort at an open minded examination of an existential approach to Jewish theology was prevented by emotional outbursts equating Reform Judaism with rationalism, and existentialism with Kierkegaard, original sin, total depravity, and the blackest Protestantism. As the years passed the hostility was somewhat offset by the major papers of Prof. Borowitz on the idea of God, Prof. Jakob Petuchowski on revelation, and Prof. Emil Fackenheim's reflections on the bi-centennial of Hasidism."⁴

Then in Philadelphia at the 1963 convention of the C.C.A.R., Lou Silberman, Samuel Karff, Steven Schwarzschild and Eugene Borowitz--covenant theologians all--presented major papers. All were in such intrinsic theological harmony and of such profound theological consequence, that the occasion can be no less than the debut of Covenant Theology.⁵

It has been from the **beginning**, a quiet insurgency, its progenitors, to a great extent, unconcerned that they had begun to comprise a movement.

"If [God]...made Himself manifest at the 1963 meeting of the CCAR, it was not evident by thunder or lightning, by wind, earthquake or fire. But His revolution, as we are told, is the turning of men, quietly undertaken at the bidding of a still, small voice. If it was heard amidst the papers and discussions of the 1963 CCAR meeting, then something deeply significant may have begun. It has happened in less likely places."⁶

It would seem, now six years later, that indeed something deeply significant has begun.

Reactionary Considerations.

"The danger is that Reform Judaism gives every sign of turning into a caricature of Episcopalianism, with a priestly class accommodating itself to the liturgical requirements of the upper classes and their imitators. Stylish ceremonies without content, impressive rituals without faith, the comfortable suffocation of affluence--this is the threat facing Reform Judaism."

- Ben Hanon 7

In the arena of reactions, Covenant Theology is fundamentally a reaction against many of the modes which contemporary Reform has assumed. While it does not aim to be negative, it is insignificant without reference to its times and to the liberalism it seeks to influence. The new theology recognizes Reform as a reaction against ghetto orthodoxy and a child of 19th century German Rationalism. Now the enemy is no enemy and the father is dead. "Liberal" as in "Reform Jew" has come to signify "the narrow rigidity of the 'reformer' who is dominated by that against which he has rebelled, by his continual fear that someone might attempt to fasten on him again the shackles that he has thrown off."⁸ ("Does all this mean that we are accepting limits for Liberalism? The answer is an unequivocal 'Yes!'"⁹) Reform has sprung itself so far from its now crystalline, moribund grandfather that it actually stands for nothing and is committed to less.

Indeed, there is cause for lament; "we have been so 'liberal' that a bona fide Reform Jew is one who pays membership dues to his temple, and a bona fide Reform Rabbi is one who has graduated from HUC-JIR."¹⁰ In an attempt to win a battle of a war already won, Reform has severed itself from the tradition and all but set itself adrift on an unpredictable sea of secularity.¹¹ The end of such a voyage can only be nowhere.

"...Liberal religion cannot be confined to this negative tenet [of insisting that nothing can be affirmed but freedom]...genuine liberal religion consists of taking a passionate partisan stand--for without passion there is no religion, and without partisanship there is no passion--and of passionately respecting the right of others to take a different stand."¹²

Reform must recognize that "...our self-definition as Jews implies some very definite commitments, if it is not to turn into a mockery."¹³ "Judaism...has its distinctive beliefs, beliefs which, from time to time, may be redefined and expressed in whatever terminology may be contemporary. But the beliefs are there."¹⁴ Covenant Theology maintains that an authentic expression of Judaism must contain a fundamental and intrinsically related base of God, Torah and Israel.¹⁵ In so doing, all those inspirationally valuable customs and ceremonies may be reassociated with the idea of a God who commands.¹⁶

"Religion is not only a matter of being a good boy; in fact, being a good boy is a lot harder than it looked to early Reform Judaism...More profoundly, the need of

our time is the ethicizing of the apparently ritual and the ritualizing of the ethical."¹⁷

In the face of such freedom gone wild¹⁸ Covenant Theology finds it a higher wisdom to reclaim its stake in our traditional faith.¹⁹ It is clearly one of the most characteristic features of the new theologians that they strive to root themselves in authoritative tradition.²⁰ Theirs is the pious pursuit of a forgotten covenant, an attempt to understand that call-response through which Israel was born.²¹ In this respect, their approach is at least "postliberal"²² if not "neo-orthodox". It could not be orthodox, for it takes into consideration scholarly doubts about the Mosaic authorship of the Torah.²³ Being a Jew is not a matter of what custom has determined as much as it is a quest for God's word addressed to man.

"To insist that he [the Jew] must do what the past has determined because it is now customary is to make a covenant between Israel and its traditions but, in effect, thereby to supercede its covenant with God. God alone can authorize Torah, and this effort to fix authority must, as we have seen, be centered in the individual mind and soul..."²⁴

The search for God's word addressed to man commences in the tradition--in maintaining one's covenantal responsibility--and therein lies the balance mechanism between the past and the present. Covenant Theology finds record in the tradition of events which changed our ancestor's perspective on life and on life's Creator.²⁵ In the tradition we find the Jew's way of listening for God's word.

The task is great and the workmen are few. Old volumes must be dusted off and reopened. Ancient words like "sin", "atonement", "revelation", "redemption", "miracle", "The Holy One, blessed be He" must be reinserted into working vocabularies.²⁶ Perhaps there was once a place and still is, where God meets man. Where God reveals Himself to man without destroying him.²⁷ Perhaps there is a God. Like the One in the Bible. Who cares. Who listens. Who acts! It is no inconsequential parlor room discussion.

"Either the whole, long history of Jewish faith--one of no mere theoretical affirmations but of untold devotion, sacrifice, and martyrdom--rests, in the end, on a fundamental and tragic mistake or else there is need for a radical turning--a turning to the ancient God in the very midst of modernity."²⁸

Covenant Theology finds in our tradition, a living, personal God who reveals Himself to man. A God, the same ancient God of Sinai, who is even today not silent. A God today whose tongue is strange only because we have not opened the dictionary of tradition.

Covenant Theology sees much of contemporary Reform as the inevitable conclusion of the Zeitgeist during which it was conceived.

Judaism became "...a unique religious idea preserved by its similarly unparalleled social career."²⁹ It was ethical monotheism. A poetically inspired tradition³⁰ proclaiming moral truths unto the world, and universal

values for all mankind. The fact that such notions were "Jewish" was an accident of their discovery.³¹ That 19th century discovery could only find fruition in a "'religion of mankind'"³² There is no alternative: "Values are universal and are either valid or invalid; and their source is significant only to the historian, not the people who live by them."³³ Reform has progressed backwards from the foot of Sinai to the more universal, moralistic Noahide commandments.³⁴ Reform Judaism became the faith of a people with a special genius giving them "...unique insight in the realm of religious truth."³⁵ A religion sending out "...rabbis fiercely loyal to their calling but forgetful of Who it is that called them."³⁶ The demands of rationalism, at least in the opinion of Covenant Theology, are simply too great for an authentic Judaism to bear. It appears that "Kant and Hegel had a great deal more to do with the Pittsburgh [Platform's] 'God idea' than did the Holy Scriptures."³⁷ "The living God had to become a mere 'Deity', a 'Cosmic Principle'--remote, indifferent, and mute."³⁸ Or (as only Wolf could put it) "We liberals have tried to believe for a hundred years that there is no (personal) God and (Deutero-) Isaiah is His prophet."³⁹

A religion founded on reason is a rare flower planted in cement.

Contemporary Reform Judaism has moreover and more recently found expression in various and sundry combinations with other rationalisms such as humanism and naturalism. These philosophies hoped to improve Judaism by making it more 'systematic' and 'scientific' but "as becomes clearer today, they sucked the life out of it, and transformed profound insights of religious existence into platitudes."⁴⁰ Indeed, one might explain Covenant Theology as the statement of a disenchanted minority with reason's ability to order the universe and man's ultimate perfectability.⁴¹ The most heinous crimes in mankind's history have not been perpetrated "in the name of subjective improvisation but as a result of applying reason. Auschwitz and Hiroshima were deliberate and calculated triumphs of planning and philosophic argument."⁴² Reason in our age is characterized by a ruthless imperialism determined to recast all of life into I-it categories.⁴³ The last chance for reason to be man's salvation was the Second World War.

Naturalism is unacceptable for it, like all rationalisms, denies God His personality, yet still requires some primary assertion of faith. To conclude that there is a God--be He process or substance or creative spirit or anything else, requires no less an act of faith than the positing of the personal God of the Bible.⁴⁴ Indeed to

speak of God in naturalistic "physiormorphisms" is even less adequate than anthropomorphisms, "for while quantitatively more than any man, a 'Process' is qualitatively less even than a man--who can hear, speak, feel and think."⁴⁵

A relevant story is told by C. S. Lewis:

"A mother once tried to tell her young son 'the truth' about God, anxious above all to avoid the myth about the old man with the white beard. She told him that God was the basic Substance of everything. (One may, without altering the moral, substitute 'Process' or 'the sum total of our ideals.') In trying to imagine something vague, amorphous, and overwhelming enough to qualify as a 'basic Substance,' the child wound up thinking of God as a huge mountain of tapioca. (To top it all, he didn't even like tapioca!)"⁴⁶

"...To portray the highest, the ultimate reality in impersonal and subhuman forms...[only reflects] the depreciation, the devaluation of human personality that is the besetting sin of our time."⁴⁷ Covenant Theology finds it impossible to understand, let alone maintain, the covenant with a naturalist god-head.⁴⁸

Humanistic formulations--so characteristic of older liberalism, so centered in man--are likewise prohibitive of a meaningful covenantal existence. God must not only be personal, He must be more--much more than man. "A God who is my own best nature is not God enough."⁴⁹ "We are invited [by humanism] to attain to divine truth by applying entirely human tools to entirely human material: by using a human scalpel on a human body we expect to

extract a divine organ. Such a definition refutes itself."⁵⁰ A meaningful covenant can only obligate man to something beyond himself. Man's moments of great self-realization and insight are not God. And a compendium of what is best in world literature and art might be a fine sourcebook for a humanistic religion of mankind; but it cannot be a Bible like unto ours, for ours was given by God.⁵¹ The choice of whether or not to remain a Jew cannot just be a matter of taste.⁵² If it were, and the humanistic thesis were correct, then we should do much better--and more honestly--to celebrate more directly significant events in the history of man's self-understanding, such as Freud's discovery of the unconscious and the like.⁵³ There is a meaning for life which is not inherent in man's nature.⁵⁴ "In Covenant Theology man is God's vital partner, never His cosmic successor."⁵⁵

We realize that 19th century religious liberalism, in attempting to fit itself into the secular world, committed the fatal mistake of setting secularity supreme.⁵⁶ The poison of it all lies in secular reason's tendency to accept whatever trends may dominate the age.⁵⁷ Such liberal autonomy, if allowed ultimate authority, would inevitably destroy Judaism.⁵⁸ Covenant Theology has witnessed

"...that translating the service not only makes it understandable but also unbelievable to many; turning law into a matter of individual decision leads

not only to willing compliance but to gross-non-observance, almost to anarchy; and humanizing authorities makes them not only more approachable but less influential in most peoples lives." 59

Covenant Theology as a Theology: Part II

Introduction.

Covenant Theology is not a system. Categories would damage a theology, whose very breath is the rebuilding of an already overly dissected faith. They would give the false impression that each thinker had addressed himself to this or that particular theme; they would furthermore erroneously suggest that they are the only--or at least the best--rubrics by which to examine the new theology. The substance of Covenant Theology, by its existential nature, is highly unsystematic. Its ideas flow through an elaborate network of interdependencies. The covenant understanding of revelation, for example, is critical to understanding the idea of Halakhah which is a prime means of accepting the tradition and ultimately of addressing God. But the waters flow in both directions at once. The idea of God leads to revelation and from there to the covenant and so on. Covenant Theology is simply not a tidy little package. Nevertheless, system and order are the price of academic investigation.

The Theology of Covenant is definitive, unique and developed in eight general religious categories. (This paper will not concern itself with areas wherein the

new theology is not yet unique or fully developed. For instance, with respect to Zionism, the Holocaust or social action, Covenant Theology does not yet present a particularly singular stance or a position significantly isolatable from the general thinking of other theologies.) Covenant theologians speak definitively in the following areas which comprise Covenant Theology as a theology:

1. The Covenant.
2. God, the Holy One, blessed be He.
3. Revelation.
4. Halakhah; Torah-for-me.
5. The Tradition as a Transcendent and Self-justifying Standard of Authority.
6. Existentialist leanings.
7. Beyond Reason.
8. The Total Human Response.

"How much of what we say is spoken through us by Him, we cannot know. It is, we hope, far more than we suspect."

- Arnold Jacob Wolf ¹

1. The Covenant.

"For He, the God of Israel, still lives, and the liberal Jew, son of the covenant, still stands at Mt. Sinai, as did his fathers."

- Emil Fackenheim ¹

The Theology of Covenant emerges from the old understanding of the ancient bond joining man and the Holy One, blessed be He. The covenant is real. It is real like a marriage is real even when the marriage contract has been lost or when the husband and wife are thousands of miles apart. It would be insufficient merely to say that the covenant is a meaningful idea or high poetic expression. It is a real thing and to grasp the import of that reality is to understand Covenant Theology.² There is a covenant relationship between God and the Jewish people which is the source of our law, custom and community. The One God of the universe is "using the Jews in a unique way to carry out His purpose in history..."³ Or, in other words, "...All the old lies are true."⁴

It is from this fundamental awareness that the new theology grows as it does, ignoring, rebutting, creating, but above all: rebuilding.⁵ For "today's Jew is a Jew by virtue of the same covenant that united Israel in the

past..."⁶ God's covenant with Israel is still alive. And the Jew today, "as the Jew of old, is enjoined to practice, not arid law, but living commandment."⁷

"To be a son of the covenant is to remember that mixed multitude's liberation from Egypt as 'that which the Lord did for me'. It is to share the experience and accept the obligations of that people whom Yahweh, the Nameless One, redeemed and consecrated to His service."⁸

Only by so making God's kingship real in every aspect of life, can modern Judaism hope to recapture the dialogue between God and man.⁹ Only with Jews "...who are groping to find their way back to the 'God of their fathers', who are able and willing to see, beneath the legendary layers deposited by millennia of piety, the reality of God's covenant..." will Judaism survive.¹⁰ Covenant Theology is an attempt to understand the implications of the awesome truth that the covenant is real.¹¹

Man's partnership with God is far more than a once solemn contract of four thousand years. It is the very stuff of which existence is made: the loom on which a Jewish life is woven; it is the primary data of life, underlying all that a Jew is and does. From ancient times "the Hebrews [have known]...man as the single creature who is [not only] formed in God's image [but] ...bound to God as covenant partner."¹² Covenant-mindedness is "...a man acknowledging, in all his ways, a faith in the reality of his covenant with God."¹³ It is

"that interpretation of his life which understands it to be an answer to God's call, and an often devout and timid, but at times also insistent, even accusing question to God."¹⁴ The covenant is not so much an agreement binding upon one's life, but an attitude toward it.¹⁵

Yes, it is true, that when the bride and the groom promised to be "consecrated unto" each other, they entered an agreement, but only the very young would think it is only that and no more. Somehow, "the living reality of their relation with"¹⁶ each other pervades and hallows their mutual existence and raises it to the ultimate spiritual dimension. That they are consecrated unto each other is now a fundamental and definitive aspect of their being. He will always be her husband and she, his wife--be they good, bad or indifferent. So it is with the Jew's relationship with God--"...the Jew may devoutly accept the covenant, or he may rebel against it; but he cannot escape it."¹⁷

This primal existential bond generates a frequency on which a Jewish life pulsates with meaning. "The reality of our covenant with our Creator...endows our mortal lives with their only significance."¹⁸ "Through the covenant Jewish theology becomes sacred history, and Jewish history becomes popular theology."¹⁹ The question of "Why be a Jew?" is now answered "...with the best of normative Judaism: covenant existence is equally and unequivocally the

road to personal fulfillment for a man who was born a Jew and his way of sharing the vocation of a people consecrated to God."²⁰

The covenant existence defines Judaism. A Jewish act is one which emerges from living within the covenantal relationship. Worship, for instance, "is Jewish because it is born out of the covenant at Sinai and articulates Israel's bond with its God."²¹ So too, it is with being a Jew: "...A Jew is a person who by reason of his descent is obligated to the divine covenant."²² He is, in "the eyes of the new theology", one who "...affirms the covenant and has made it the basis of his existence.... Each commandment not only becomes a way to personal improvement and fulfillment, but also helps to satisfy his responsibility to God and to mankind."²³ For a Jew, the covenant is "...the channel through which all of the components [God, Torah, and Israel]...can interact."²⁴

A Jew does not participate in the covenant alone. As the original experience at Sinai was as a group, so is Judaism today. "Indeed, only in this experience did this people become a people."²⁵ Borowitz explains it:

"Standing at the foot of the mountain, the raggle-taggle band of newly freed slaves, moved by the incredible experience of exodus from the house of bondage and led by a man of extraordinary vision, enters a Covenant with God Himself...For, in the strange and overpowering events of those months, this people had become open to the presence of the Eternal Thou operating in human history, in their history. Here at Sinai, corporately, in one great moment of recognition and acknowledgment, they,

individually and collectively, bound themselves to that God. They pledged themselves, as a people, to be His people, to serve Him in human history, to carry the knowledge of Him in their midst and to exemplify it in their private and communal existence." 26

The community aspect of covenant is essential. "...Judaism is reached only when one is...ready to affirm one's special relation to the Jewish people." 27

"The Jew who seeks to know what God would have him do and what he honestly feels he would do for God, cannot Jewishly decide these questions as if Judaism consisted of God, Torah and me. Only when 'me' participates in Israel, only when the question is asked and the answer wrought in terms of my part in my people's covenant, can we hope for Jewish guidance from God, for Torah. Everyman's question of God is now transformed into the Jewish question when we ask, 'Does God want me as a Jew to do this so that through it I may help fulfill the covenant? Is this an act which I as a Jew wish to do for Him as an expression of my loyalty to Him and the covenant?' " 28

The covenant explains Israel's survival and her consequent responsibility to be a "holy people". 29 It renders meaningful for the Jew "...that great mystery of which he personally has been a witness and a participant-- Israel's continuing survival." 30 Or, as Polish puts it:

"The survival of the Jewish people would have been impossible without the subconscious awareness that we stand in a covenantal relationship not only with one another but with God. We have regarded certain pivotal moments in our history as occasions where the Brit Olam was reaffirmed." 31

Indeed, "only the covenant offers a category of a depth and a resonance sufficient to comprehend the survival of Israel, if for no other reason than that it explains one

mystery by another."³² By surviving as he has and living as a member of a holy congregation, the Jew has already begun to fulfill his mission. "Perhaps the greatest contribution Jews can make to Western culture is simply in living by the covenant of their fathers, in patiently pursuing righteousness until God's Kingdom comes."³³ Covenant existence is the means to personal fulfillment for a man who was born a Jew and the way he shares in the Jewish people's unique vocation in the world.³⁴ "However incredible it may seem, the call to Abraham and the happening at Sinai have imposed upon the people Israel the task of establishing the unity of God and of man in the world..."³⁵ Covenant theologians, explains Borowitz,

"...emphasize the mitzvah, for it is through this service, individually and communally, that Israel testifies to God's reality, nature, and existence through all of history. Israel will remain faithful to God and his service until all men come to know Him, that is, to live by God's law. Israel does not believe that any other religion has been or would be able to carry out that function. Israel believes that God will preserve and protect the Jewish people through all of history--though that care is not extended from the people as a whole to each Jewish family or individual, as contemporary Jews have so bitterly learned. Israel knows that God will vindicate its striving on His behalf on the day when all men indeed do come to know Him."³⁶

I suspect that had not the earlier reformers made such a big fuss over universalism, the covenant theologians would probably never have made the little fuss they do

over particularism. It probably would have remained quietly and clearly implied, for it is ultimately inevitable. Nevertheless, the "scandal of particularism" is overt and a necessary child of any serious understanding of covenant, (just as the inevitable and logical offspring of universalism leaves only the most trivial excuse for remaining a Jew). "The very first commandment ever addressed to the first Jew--that Abraham leave his country--is an act of singling out, not any application of a universal ideal..."³⁷ We must admit that history "...has a way of insisting that its events are not mere examples of universal truths but are 'something' which happened to 'some one'..."³⁸

Only through an honest admission of the particularistic side of Judaism can the entire realm of ritual be salvaged and set on any legitimate foundation. In this respect, Martin explains:

"Granted that the idea of the covenant involves what is often referred to in contemporary theological parlance as 'the scandal of particularity' and that to accept it as reality requires a bold act of faith, I believe nonetheless that it is only on such terms that the Jewish people can endure and that any genuine foundation for even the most minimal ritual observance can be established."³⁹

Petuchowski traces the logic :

"Israel was elected for the purpose of receiving the Torah. Israel was chosen for the purpose of entering into a covenant relationship with the God of the whole world, in order to be His 'kingdom of priests'..."⁴⁰

Such particularism need not proclaim any kind of religious

superiority. "...The rabbinic image of God's particular covenant with His holy people is a paradigm of the rabbinic understanding of God's relation to man."⁴¹ "It is not therefore impossible that there can be more than one true religion; for the one God of all men may relate Himself differently to different men or groups of men."⁴² The existence of one particular relationship--which is after all necessary for there to be any significance to the whole enterprise--does not deny the existence of other such relationships.

2. God, the Holy One, blessed be He.

"God is therefore Person. For whenever a person is in mutual relation with another, that other is person as well."

- Emil Fackenheim ¹

The God of Covenant Theology is the Holy One, blessed be He. He is very much alive and "...present in all His ancient and terrible wrath..."² If He were not real then the covenant could never have been in the first place; and if He is not real, at this very moment, right now, while your eyes are reading these words, then the covenant could scarcely be more binding than the bachelorhood of a widower. Faith in God and commitment to His service is the Jew's only true realism; "with Him Jewish history begins and through Him it continues."³ Jewish existence is intelligible only with reference to a living God.⁴

He is met and apprehended on a personal level, for He is a "...God of deep personal involvement."⁵ He is the God described by Martin Buber:

"...The living, personal God of the Jewish Bible--the God, in Pascal's terms, 'of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob, and not of the philosophers,' the only God...worthy of our ultimate devotion--and he [Buber] has shown us...a way, perhaps the only possible way, of regaining a sense of His living reality."⁶

He is man's ground of being.⁷ Both man and God attain their personality by this reciprocal address of "Thou".⁸ "We know God in this way, meeting Him even as we meet other persons, encountering Him in the midst of life... to know God in this way... is the same means which tells me you, not just your body, is real."⁹ Because God is person, He may be encountered by each man, not merely as a member of Israel, but in all His precious individuality."¹⁰ "The personal presence of God is communicated to man as person: it is a temporary grace--the spirit of God that comes and departs."¹¹

Perhaps the most characteristic assertion of liberal Judaism is that our knowledge of God is a personal, subjective matter.¹² So essential to knowing God is the "personal-factor" that He cannot be meaningfully understood in any other way. Indeed, that language must often be only pious silence.¹³ "...Our knowledge of Him simply cannot be translated into "I-it" terms, to do so would be to render God an "it"--a concise definition of idolatry."¹⁴ Throughout the theology of Covenant there is the fundamental admission:

"A God who can be an object is not God. Because a God who is subjected to man's objective judgement is not God; God can neither be proven nor disproven. If God is God, He is not an object, but the Subject. He is man's absolute existential apriori."¹⁵

The God of Covenant Theology--the God of the Bible--

shall be what He shall be. "Only the God Who is a living, personal spirit, Who somehow 'hears' and 'answers' man, that is to say, the God of the Bible, can be addressed..."¹⁶ We must ultimately resort to the same anthropomorphic language. Because it is not absolute truth does not mean that it is therefore falsehood: "it is the truth about the God-man-relation as it appears from the standpoint of man; and that relation is itself a reality."¹⁷

We must realize, nevertheless, that God's ultimate nature is beyond man's ken and none of his business. All man can hope for is a sense of the Almighty's Presence.¹⁸ "Our questions remain unanswered; all serious questions are. But we who bow and ask and bow again are now different. We have been in the very presence of the God we have sought."¹⁹ While "we do not seek paradox for its own sake,...we are not surprised when we fail to understand nearly everything the Almighty does."²⁰ God, Himself, is beyond cognitive description. He "whose existence faith asserts is a mystery."²¹ "Theology cannot imprison God's selfhood in our categories. Is is only the continual regrouping of foolhardy armies doomed to defeat."²² Perhaps it is this way for the best. "God's direct immediate Presence is too much for man to face...A God who completely revealed Himself would convert me, but only by destroying me in the process."²³ "God can only protect my integrity by keeping His distance from me."²⁴

God is He Who spoke and the world was; He who spoke at Sinai and in our own time; and He who shall speak in the end of days to redeem man.²⁵ He is The Creator and "creation is the 'act' in which God 'says yes', the act through which He who was 'hidden in the metaphysical beyond of myth' becomes visible, creation is the transformation of the aboriginal No into the Yes of the world..."²⁶ He is a God who has not withdrawn into a silent first cause but continues to address His creation--giving it meaning until its ultimate redemption.

"The mid point between creation and redemption is not the revelation at Sinai...but the present perceiving of revelation...Creation and redemption are only true on the premise that revelation is a present experience."²⁷

This personal God controls nature. Covenant Theology is quick to remind that the alternative notion would be that nature is autonomous--and that is unquestionably pagan.²⁸ Sodium and Chlorine don't make ketchup; they make salt. And they don't make salt because of so many protons and so many electrons; they make salt because the God who controls the universe wants them to make salt.²⁹ God keeps the Jewish people alive (and not the approval of the cultural leaders of the age). "He has not shown Himself daunted by the need to use the ordinary and the simple, the infirm and the unstable for His historic purposes."³⁰ Each man lives and breathes "because of the mercies of God."³¹

Even as this God of ours controls the world, he has a will which man can, in significant part, know.³² The implications are explained by Borowitz:

"If God is real, if He is truly God, men should speak to Him, seek Him, commune with Him regularly--anything less can only be considered folly. And as there is no time when He is not God, when the universe is free of His rule or when men are released from His commandments, so there is not time when men may ignore Him with impunity."³³

He is interested in and accessible to man--otherwise His existence should be of no particular religious relevance (notwithstanding antithetical to the God of Biblical and Rabbinic Judaism).³⁴ "...He takes an interest in man, because He cares, because He loves."³⁵ It is essential for a "fully adequate " Jewish idea of God that it "...imbue the Jewish mind with an assurance of the value of the continuing existence of Israel, the Jewish people,"³⁶ as well as the significance of living by His law. Judaism must perpetually reflect an authentic response to the God whose will and concern initiated it. Wolf teaches that:

"A Jew must do whatever he can for God. The assumption is that there is a God, that there is a God who cares about what we do, that some of what God cares about that we do is 'Jewish'."³⁷

A theology devoting much of its effort to reawaken in man the primal sense of awe and joy--so critical to meeting a personal God--worries not about His silence. The problem is that He speaks too often:

"My problem is not a silent God, but a God who creates so immense a world, produces so enormous a Torah, communicates so embracing and so resonant a word that I can find no moment and no country without Him."³⁸

Nevertheless, Covenant theologians exercise great caution in describing the address of God--lest such a theology be misconstrued as some kind of 20th century prophetism: "Even in moments of which I can say I have been closest and most intimate with my God, I have not found Him to speak in words--though that may prove what I well know, that I am no prophet."³⁹ In their attempts to describe an encounter with the Almighty, theologians of Covenant must invariably fall back on a poetic, Buberian kind of ongoing revelation. God "'speaks out of the burning thorn-bush of the present...in the revelation of our innermost hearts--greater than words."⁴⁰

"Whatever exists responds to us. The flower responds to my touch. The violin responds to the bow. The tide responds to the tug of the moon... And God responds to man. How? By disclosing Himself to us. God hears prayer, not by fulfilling our requirements, not by satisfying our needs, but by making Himself known to us as a living reality in our lives."⁴¹

The substance of the divine address would surely shatter the clay of words.

As God addresses man, so too in prayer can man address God.. This is possible in Covenant Theology for at least three primary reasons:

1. God is personal; He cares, loves and responds.
"It is harder to pray to a 'God concept' than it is to pray to God."⁴²
2. Man was created by God; he is not an inevitable accident of natural causes. He was created for a purpose.
3. God and man are partners in the ongoing business of creation; mutually participating in covenant.

God's "personalness" has already been discussed.

The second axiom insuring the significance of prayer involves from Covenant Theology's understanding of man.

"One's ability to pray depends, in the final analysis, upon his ability to see himself as a creature of God."⁴³

In order to pray, man must see himself in "...need of support from a Reality beyond himself."⁴⁴ The third aspect of man's relation to God makes more than prayer possible--and requires more than prayer.

God and man are partners in the covenant. "Understanding Judaism as a covenant[means knowing]...that religion always involves two partners, God and man."⁴⁵ The covenant permits Israel the hope that God will act for them in history and affords them a symbol of their mutual relationship.⁴⁶ Indeed, explains Borowitz, any authentic understanding of God

"must make some kind of covenant between that God and Israel possible; it must make Israel's continuing dedication to Him reasonably significant; it must explain Israel's suffering and make it possible for the individual Jew to intertwine his destiny with that of his people."⁴⁷

The mutual need and reciprocal help implicit in the covenant relationship further describe God. The partners are not silent nor do they go about their business in isolation. Man must rely on spiritual strength and support transcending himself; he must know himself to be a creature and needed by God as a junior partner in the ongoing work of creation.⁴⁸ "God needs Jews,"⁴⁹ "He is the master of their destiny even as He is the Lord of sociology, economics, politics, time and change. His providence guides human history surely though inscrutably."⁵⁰

Through the mutuality of the covenant encounter, through the confrontation with his object of ultimate concern,⁵¹ man's life acquires meaning. "What life has greater meaning than that of the man who believes he is needed by, and has the power to serve or betray, the Source of his being?"⁵² "The religious man knows God graciously meets him and, being what He is, fills man's ultimate inner emptiness with motive and direction."⁵³ Or, to put it in another way, "...in order to speak to man, God not only becomes a person, but makes man one too."⁵⁴ Weinberg likewise sees the man-God relationship as the source of man's humanity and the fabric of a meaningful life:

"What human beings do when they write poetry, paint pictures, or make music--even badly; what they do when they organize the enormous variety of their sensory impressions into the truth-seeking systems they call science--even inadequately; what they undertake when they attempt to establish such relationships between persons and peoples as will produce what men call justice, love, peace--however tragically they fail: none of this is understandable in a universe which seems otherwise unconcerned with beauty, truth and goodness apart from a 'word' which is spoken to man, which man 'hears' and to which he responds. God 'speaks' and man has a task--and it is precisely this divinely given task that constitutes his humanity."⁵⁵

3. Revelation.

"...The human substance is melted by a spiritual fire which visits it, and there now breaks forth from it a word, a statement, which is human in its meaning and form, human conception and human speech, and yet witness to Him who stimulated it and to His will."

- Jakob Petuchowski
citing Martin Buber ¹

Ultimately every theological circus must play the wilderness. The great thinkers and their great ideas must perform under the big tent pitched at the foot of Sinai: for that is the paradigm place of revelation. That is the beginning and the end of the line. That is where the ultimate decision must be made. This God of mine, He is either more than I am or less.² His words have either come from within me or without.³ This mountain top is either a monument to man or a place of God.

For the theologians of Covenant, Sinai is one place where the God who is more than man seared His presence onto finite tablets of mind. They invite us to join them and take revelation seriously.⁴ For only if there be revelation can the Lord of mankind become my God, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob.⁵

"A God who reveals Himself must be a Self, a Person."⁶ Furthermore, only if there be revelation can there be "...any possible religious justification for the existence of the Jewish people."⁷ Such an understanding of revelation is critical to a Covenant Theology understanding of covenant and God.⁸ It is in this sense that Schaalmann realizes that revelation must be nothing less than:

"...the event in which the divine breaks into the human sphere and discloses an aspect, a fragment, of its being...an encounter...~~be-~~
~~tween~~ God and a human partner of His choice."⁹

Revelation, in other words, "is either the direct gift of God or not revelation at all."¹⁰ Martin, likewise explains that revelation must begin beyond man. Man does not create, initiate or even imagine: he receives:

"When we suddenly and unexpectedly become aware of a certain apperception now present within ourselves but lacking just a moment ago whose origin we cannot discover, we realize that what happened to us is 'otherness'. We know that something has been given us, we experience it as bestowed upon us from a source outside ourselves, not something produced from our own unconsciousness and that was always latent in the depths of our soul. But when we recognize the gift as gift we have discovered that revelation exists."¹¹

But while man does receive, he neither sacrifices his autonomy before the infinite¹² nor does he remain inactive. In order for man to realize revelation he must first present himself and he must ultimately seize and embrace what has been given. Man must act.

He must turn to his own inner history for the meaning of his individual life: He must respond to an event with the words, "This is what the Lord did for me", only in that way does history become revelation.¹³ If an agnostic had been present there at the mountain, he would have heard only the thunder and seen the lightning.¹⁴ "...There is no essential difference between natural events and 'miracles'. Any natural event may be revelation for him who understands the event as really addressing him and is able to read its meaning for his personal life."¹⁵

Revelation can only flow from the intense intimacy of relationship. It is the sure child of a mutual love. "...Revelation was not a spontaneous moment at Sinai but a culmination which could not have occurred without the Exodus..."¹⁶ Wolf explains:

"How then do we come to know what pleases God? By personal relationship with Him in prayer, study, and doing. Relationship is not precisely revelation, but revelation only emerges from relationship. By being a father (as fully as I can learn to be), I discover what a father must do to father. My child does not tell me; I do not tell myself; the relationship tells me. But it tells me only if I attend to its subtle, insistent commands."¹⁷

It tells me--only if I have taken the time to learn the language and then been patient and sensitive enough to listen. Life is the permanent possibility of revelation.

"Perhaps the meaning of revelation is imparted to us long after the experience has occurred."¹⁸ Petuchowski teaches:

"One day, perhaps, we shall have a better understanding of what has happened to us, of how what has happened to us is related to God, and of how God Himself is made known to us in the events and happenings through which we ourselves have lived. If that understanding should ever be vouchsafed unto us, then we, too, may rightfully regard ourselves as direct recipients of revelation."^{18a}

Revelation for Covenant Theology, despite the poetic nature of the above descriptions, is, nevertheless, a very real and objective event. To lose sight of that idea would be to slur Sinai back to the old "inspiration-game". We must recognize, first off, that some things are more public, more objective and more empirically verifiable than other things.

For instance: when Columbus discovered America there was the whole crew of the two remaining ships and all the natives of San Salvador who were there to witness the event, and would gladly and certainly testify to its reality.

On the other hand: when some young couple announces to their family at the Thanksgiving dinner that they are in love and intend to get married, the question of the extent of their love is meaningful¹⁹--yet hardly verifiable in the same way that all the crew and the natives there on the beach at San Salvador would verify Columbus' presence in the New World.

There are real things which witnesses cannot witness. There are moments which happen and no one knows they happen.

How do we know, for instance, that the young couple are really in love and plan to get married. It certainly would not be inappropriate for one old maiden aunt to raise a skeptical eyebrow announcing her disbelief-- in the same way it would be for a few crew members to, despite empirical evidence, deny their presence in the New World.

Revelation in the theology of Covenant lies somewhere between the two types of verifiable reality; and the theologians of covenant, frustrated by inadequate language, struggle to maintain that delicate balance. As we have already suggested, one's presence at a place of revelation does not insure one's acceptance of revelation as objective reality and yet, revelation is clearly not a secret and intimate matter, experienced only by the emotionally involved and recognizable only by the participants' ostensible behavior. While the account of the revelation in Exodus may not be historically accurate, neither is it some poetic, ancient Near-Eastern legend of some collective inspiration. It is real. It happened many times during the day of man. And once you know the lovers themselves, if indeed, you are not one of them already, you will no longer be able to dismiss God's presence with the same cavalier sophistication that you have dismissed so much else.

Rosenzweig observed that revelation reveals nothing but itself.

"Revelation is not identical with legislation; it is, in itself, nothing but the act of revelation itself. Immediately, it is its own sole content; properly speaking, it is completed with the word vayvered ('and He descended'); even vayvedabber ('and He spoke') is already human interpretation."²⁰

The words and the ideas of revelation--which have been so piously recorded for progeny--are human. They are finite. They are what man has crystalized from his encounter with the infinite. They are the best that finitude can appropriate from that pristine moment of divine meeting.²¹ They are man's way of recording for all time that "it was told to me 'I am that I am'"²² They are God interpreted in the words of man, or as Petuchowski suggests, a kind of dialectic record between reason and revelation.²³ Fackenheim refers to the overwhelming succession of religious experiences²⁴ as the presence of the Nameless.²⁵ It is only through the process of interpretation, as it were, of giving the Nameless a name however, that man is able to transmit revelation. And, what is more, to transmit to his son the immanent possibility that the God of his father will also address him. In Covenant Theology every son, who would but fathom the words of his fathers, may also hear the God of our fathers.

We must remember however, as Fackenheim points out that:

"...revelation and interpretation can be distinguished in abstract thought, but not in the concrete existential situation in which both occur. To make the distinction between revelation and interpretation is important, lest we subject ourselves blindly to the authority of the ancient interpretation. But once we have made it we must ourselves return to the existential situation, and to its responsibilities. And to do so is to ask: what does the divine commandment demand of us? What can we hear? What can we do?"²⁶

If God reveals Himself to successive generations then the particular, the here and now, can attain ultimate meaning. Man's life need not be an unfulfilled span between Creation's beginning and Redemption's consummation. Revelation is life's assurance of fulfillment as an individual, particular and unique occurrence.²⁷ It reveals what has been there all along since creation but is now becoming conscious and experienced; it is the realization of Creation's prediction.²⁸ Through revelation God guarantees creation and forges the creature, man, into man, the human being, now capable of love.²⁹ This is possible because man is addressed by the source of his being and appropriated as partner in the cosmic corporation. Without God's address "...the emergence of the human enterprise in what we experience as an utterly nonhuman universe is totally incomprehensible."³⁰

Once we open ourselves to the reality of a God who meets man, the Torah and other documents of revelation attain their due significance. Covenant Theology sees them

as a living, personal and instantaneous record of addresses.³¹ They are the modern Jew's "...prime means of access to a divine revelation which addresses him as much as his ancestors."³² The second person of "you have seen and you have heard" must be read in the first, if the significance of revelation is to be retained as a "pointer to the reality of God."³³ Scripture, then, is historical only in the way that a marriage contract is historical;³⁴ that is, while they were both written long ago, the reality they describe is present experience. The Bible is a chronicle of concrete meetings within the course of history between a group of people and God.³⁵ The events it reflects actually occurred for they are human reflections, human attempts at capturing, divine incursions into history.³⁶

"It is obvious that what the Bible wants to describe, or to indicate, is the momentous fact that the infinite God had revealed Himself to finite man...But it is only the man of prosaic mind, the man lacking in imagination, who would read this biblical account as if it were a news bulletin..."³⁷

It is critical to a "Covenant" reading of documents of revelation to maintain a sharp distinction between the literary question of evolution and transmission of text and the theological rubric of revelation.³⁸ Petuchowski is careful to note that we shall probably never know which parts of the Torah have been preserved for us intact and which parts have not, "but for our religious orientation,

for the meaning which Torah can have for us, this hardly matters."³⁹ Borowitz too recognizes that "...what 'really' happened at Sinai lies outside the sphere of the modern academic discipline known as history."⁴⁰ We read the Torah fully cognizant of J, E, P, D, and R, and all the rest. We realize that since our ancestors were, for the most part, unaware of the quilted format of scripture, they were "ignorant of the true nature of their own literary history."⁴¹ But as theologians of Covenant we also realize full well that God probably "...made use of J, E, P, D, and all the rest..."⁴² Perhaps the best explanation of this conviction is found in Rosenzweig:

"For us, too, it [the Torah] is the work of one spirit. We do not know who it was; that it was Moses we cannot believe. Among ourselves we call him by the sign which the Higher Criticism uses to designate the final redactor assumed by it, 'R'. But we resolve this sign not into 'Redactor', but into 'Rabbenu'."⁴³

Wolf describes the same in existential terms:

"The Bible is not in and of itself a relationship. It is certainly not a univocal statement of God's will. But it is a record of the Great Relationship. It is the ground rules for the God-Man game. It is a paradigm, a poem, a prayer. It is (and all of Judaism also is) indispensable."⁴⁴

Revelation made old and Torah removed from the catalogue of the "World's Great Literature", Covenant Theology can fruitfully concern itself with Halakhah.⁴⁵

4. Halakhah: Torah-for-me.

"This [covenant] way of life entails a recognition and acceptance of a Halachic existence-- not the Halachic existence, but one which will necessarily emerge when the enduring quality of the Brit is affirmed."

- David Polish ¹

The essential function of any contract is to describe the certain laws by which the participating parties shall govern themselves. Any agreement is actually just so many reflexive laws binding upon the partners. If a person is said to "keep his part of the bargain", then we understand him to abide by its rules. The agreement or contract itself is only an abstract sort of notion signifying merely that the partners recognize the authority of the laws of the contract. It indicates that a particular relationship is governed by a certain set of laws without which the relationship could be little more than the haze of memory, if not a downright lie. When Covenant theologians assert that the covenant is real, they assert that the covenant is at least a contract. And when they speak of faith in what God has done for me, they also mean a simultaneous obligation to perform "acts of loyalty to Him."²

The theologians of Covenant recognize that 20th century, liberal man needs restore the once-eternal bond be-

tween personal religious experience and God's law, or at least "...define the one in relation to the other."³ The Jew who would be faithful to Judaism's covenant, must "observe the law that God gave on Sinai and that He has graciously allowed His sages to clarify for every succeeding generation."⁴ The Jew who would be committed to Judaism, in Petuchowski's words, is

"...groping to find his way back to the 'God of the fathers', who is able and willing to see, beneath the legendary layers deposited by millennia of piety, the reality of God's covenant with Israel and the obligation which rests upon every individual Jew to strain his ear for the Word of God addressed to him personally."⁵

Such a Jew lives by the law of the covenant "...with the God in whose service he fulfills the revealed purpose of his life."⁶

We realize that the Torah, though given by God, is written in the language of man. We accept the findings of Higher Biblical Criticism.. We understand, as a matter of fact, that much of the documents of revelation have not survived in their original form; that they are often riddled with contradiction or fettered with relevance for only certain times and certain places. They are "shot through with human appropriation and interpretation; [they are intermeshed in]...a complex composed of both eternal and 'time-bound' laws."⁷ Where then shall the

Jew who would be committed to his religion find the law he must observe to "keep his part of the bargain"? The answer of Covenant Theology is critical and, in the language of popular philosophy, strenuous to understand. Borowitz explains that the law is

"...living discipline which flows from the consciousness of standing in direct personal relationship with God, not merely as a private self, but as one of the community with whom He has covenanted."⁸

In other words, man finds law through participating in "direct personal relationship with God" as a member of the "covenant folk". The law can be accepted as real and binding for it has emerged from the forge of an encounter with God.⁹ Wolf reminds us that law which is existentially meaningful can and does flow from relationship.

"How then do we come to know what pleases God? By personal relationship with Him in prayer, study, and doing. Relationship is not precisely revelation, but revelation [which reveals law] only emerges from relationship. By being a father (as fully as I can learn to be), I discover what a father must do to father. My child does not tell me; I do not tell myself; the relationship tells me only if I attend to its subtle, insistent commands."¹⁰

These subtle, insistent commands emerging from the Jew's personal relationship with his God, Borowitz calls: "Torah-for-me".¹¹ They are the Jew's answer to "'What would God want me to do?'"¹² If a man can say that "This is an act I want to do for God; one I feel is appropriate to Him as best as I have come to know Him"--then surely God has re-

quired it.¹³ And surely he has discovered another facet of his covenant with God.

"The man who seeks the reality of Israel's covenant with God should know that it is far less likely to be found in thinking about it than in trying to live by it. One commandment will do for a beginning, any one which seems to speak to him and which he can undertake in his search to clarify his association with his people and its God. A morning prayer, study of an anthology or rabbinic literature, the blessing over whiskey, the prohibition against gossip--he can begin anywhere. And when the inner embarrassment of doing a mitzvah has been overcome, he can then see what the reality of covenanted existence might mean--and then hopefully go on to another mitzvah. Going back will be our best means of going forward."¹⁴

The Torah is probably the most authentic record of laws emerging from the original man-God relationship.¹⁵ It is the model. It is the beginning. "The Torah is given whenever Israel receives it. But the act of present appropriation is mediated through the original Sinai."¹⁶ The would be committed Jew will regard himself "...as standing at Sinai anew--at the Sinai where, according to the ancient sages, everybody understood the word of God according to his own ability."¹⁷ This is a law which then grows from personal encounter with God. This is a law by which man will abide, for he, himself, as the Torah recounts, was party to its promulgation. "...The observance of the mitzvot ultimately is rooted in the faith that they were revealed by God and constitute acts of obedience to His will."¹⁸ Without this basic feeling, both the act and the man are banished to an autonomous ethic.¹⁹

Without this basic feeling, both the act and the man are voided of meaning or value and rendered hypocrisy.²⁰

Rosenzweig's distinction between legislation and commandment is useful in explaining what Covenant theologians mean by "Torah-for-me". Legislation is "on the books"; it is a "mere matter of academic study".²¹ It is law which I may study, ponder, explain or even enforce, but it is not law which I follow. It has no necessary claim on my behavior. "Commandment", on the other hand, is law addressed to me personally. A commandment "discloses its giver along with itself."²² Torah becomes "Torah-for-me" when legislation becomes commandment. "Torah-for-me" rejects "the essentially Greek understanding of Torah as law" and returns instead to "the biblical understanding of Torah as God's guidance in dialogue with Him".²³ Only from a mutual relationship can meaningful law emerge.²⁴

A law which becomes "Torah-for-me" re-enacts the moment of revelation and experiences God as the giver.²⁵ "...Out of Dialogue with God, both historical and personal, there emerges a way."²⁶ Covenant Theology recognizes, in Petuchowski's words, that "...where there is no revelation there can be no Halakhah".²⁷ God's commanding presence in revelation must be rediscovered if there is to be "...any basis for either moral or ritual halakhah."²⁸

Wolf warns that we

"...need Halakhah...to tell us how to channel our responsibility, to ritualize our personal duty. In other words, we desperately need to be commanded, and by a Commander worthy of the name."²⁹

Petuchowski explains how one goes about listening for this command of God:

"There could hardly be a hard-and-fast rule for this. But one of the prerequisites is undoubtedly the willingness and the readiness ~~to~~ shape one's whole life according to the pattern which God gives us to see. And we do not have to start from nothing! The accumulated heritage of the Jewish past is ours to select from, ours to experiment with, in our endeavor to find out what God wants us to do."³⁰

There is a problem of creativity with respect to a fixed tradition. For this reason many Covenant theologians accept the "Torah-for-me" idea but temper it. They stress that tradition has, for our people--throughout all time--been the well spring from which each age found authentic expression for their hearing of commandment. Weinberg points out that

"Jews should observe both those commandments which are genuinely and immediately expressive of their responding love and [what is also important] those commandments which can effectively remind them that love once was and still can be."³¹

Borowitz too, while fully aware of the vital function of creativity, nevertheless reminds us that

"...knowledge of the tradition is more important than the impetus to invent new forms, though the one is often a spur to the other. And the knowledge of God precedes and judges both."³²

"That is the Reform synagogue's responsibility: teaching the pious use of Jewish freedom."³³ He goes on to explain the balance between a creative present and a fixed tradition.

"As the present is more important than the past in determining Torah, so the Jew standing in the present moment bears a responsibility to create new forms appropriate to his present faith. The Jewish tradition is an invaluable guide to him, but often he will find that new rituals and forms seem necessary to express the old yet new feelings."³⁴

Obviously, the value of Halakhah is high--for piously approached, it may all be "Torah-for-me". The Jew who would be authentically committed to the covenant must begin his search for commandment in the tradition of his fathers. No part of the tradition can a priori and arbitrarily be discounted. Petuchowski teaches:

"The modern Jew, fumblingly at first, and overcoming his initial shyness, will want to 'try out' those practices and observances which might contain God's commandment to him. Here, practice is the only way to find out. Only by actually trying to observe it, will he be able to discover whether he is dealing with a 'commandment' or just with another item of what is still only 'legislation' to him."³⁵

Friedman reminds us that "'our fathers enjoined us to put a fence around the Torah, but they did not specify whether we were to be inside or outside the fence."³⁶

Halakhah is not only valuable as a potential source of "Torah-for-me", but it is also the prime expression

of the particular Jewish response to God.³⁷ Polish realizes that

"It is the Mitzvah that makes the Jew a distinctive being in a world where the mass man is robbed of his identity. It is the Mitzvah which reminds the Jew who he is and connects him to the remotest ages of his history."³⁸

For Fackenheim, Halakhah is

"...the means by which the Jew perennially reiterates his acceptance of the covenant; his faith that all history is a doing of man and a waiting for God; his faith that this waiting is not in vain."³⁹

A reacceptance of Halakhah as law emergent of a personal God-man relationship restores the lost realm of ritual. Ceremony is now construed as a "formalized embodiment of divine truth. Otherwise there is no difference between a trumpet and a shofar."⁴⁰ In other words, insofar as rituals are human reflections of a real God-Israel encounter--they have the potency of becoming Halakhah, "commanded and fulfilled."⁴¹ Perhaps originally there was no distinction between ritual and ethical. When compared to the challenge of making an absolute commitment to God, the content of the Sinaitic covenant was "...secondary in importance; and distinctions such as that between 'ethical' and 'ritualistic' were not made until a later age."⁴²

The other problem implicit in any subjective understanding of Halakhah is its potential threat to uniformity of practice. In other words, if everyone is living Torah-for-himself, what will be Torah-for-all the people? Rosenzweig's notion of the common landscape versus the common road is useful.⁴³ We must distinguish between levels of individual, congregational, and universal practice. Borowitz suggests that:

"The specific details of what is meant by 'God's law' will vary among Jewish groups. They do not differ over the abiding relation between God and Israel, but--as is traditional in Judaism--about Torah; that is, the specific ways through which the covenant shall be made manifest in life."⁴⁴

The orthodox will read it one way, the liberals, the other. But though the ~~disagreement~~ is of utmost importance, Petuchowski reminds us that there are profound differences between the common landscape and the personal bypath. On the community level there are laws by which all must abide if there is to be harmony. The reformers, for instance, must realize that there is a realm of universal Jewish concern in such matters as marriage and divorce laws. And for the good of the community, the laws must be the same. On the personal-private level, there is law which each man must decide for himself--it is only his business and God's. The orthodox here, for example, must recognize that there are laws which are exclusive to a man's dialogue with his God and must--if they be honest--be diverse.⁴⁵

"From the point of view of Covenant Theology, then, what binds Jews together is far more important than what separates them. Their differences, particularly as modified by the role of the mitzvah in the lives of families and communities, become far more a matter of degree than of kind."⁴⁶

Petuchowski replies in a similar fashion, that

"...an undue amount of subjectivism would be checked by the requirements of the 'holy community.' Yet the 'holy community' itself, in its modern form, will become possible only because of the personal commitments of Jewish individuals, who have learned to 'observe' God's 'commandments' to them."⁴⁷

Covenant Theology is a delicate balance--perhaps the only possible balance--between private and community Judaism.

As Wolf puts it:

"Our Judaism is for us an attempt to permit the Living God to address us severally and as a sacred community."⁴⁸

5. The Tradition as a Transcendent, Self-justifying Standard of Authority.

"I begin with the tradition not as an interesting curio from the past or a source of quotations to illustrate some modern view, but as a living content of belief which confronts me in authority and a challenge...I assert no principle prior to Judaism."

- Eugene B. Borowitz ¹

A move backward usually connotes a move toward the orthodox-right or the naive-before but it can also mean a return to your native land, back to your birth-place, even to the house of your fathers. A move backward can begin a quest for the place whence you have come, the foundation upon which you have constructed your building. The first, self-justifying premise, the ultimate, rock bottom standard of authority. It is often a good idea when everyone else is madly rushing on to some still hazy goal. It is vitally important when particularly everyone else is carrying their birth-place standards of right along with them. That way they will have it right there to exchange, if the pack decides to pursue some different future. It is therefore in that sense and for that reason that the theology of Covenant takes one giant step backwards.

Covenant Theology begins with the totality of the tradition because it discerns no other absolute, trans-

centent, self-justifying standard of authority in Western culture. Not reason, nor the self, nor a philosophic system, nor the Zeitgeist are adequate to found a faith upon, but only in a tradition founded upon a standard of right and a ground of being inherent in the universe itself.

Contemporary secular, Western culture, as all its ancestors, is not clearly founded upon or committed to anything. "...One cannot detect progress in human history; one can only discern movement. To be able to determine whether that movement is progress or chaos, or--for that matter--regression, one would have to know the goal of history, for progress is movement in a known and fixed direction."² Borowitz warns that we must realize that:

"...contemporary culture is moving toward an amoral, pleasure-seeking, present-oriented human style. One cannot count on educated people to be religious, or spiritual, or even moral when a real crisis occurs. Modern secular society has no institution, no philosophy or even cultural thrust with which to divert or control its inherent drive toward use and payoff...to the new American paganism."³

He points out elsewhere that even science, in our age, can no longer be a source of ultimate truth.⁴ "...Though it took an atomic bomb to demonstrate it, science itself is in need of an independent wisdom to counsel it where human goals and purposes are involved."⁵ "Has science any monopoly on reason? Is there not also reason in art, in human relationships and, indeed, in revelation?"⁶ Indeed, there

are many kinds of validity itself. Ethics has its validity and aesthetics and building construction each have their own.⁷ We discern a myriad of ways to prove what we would but find no criteria for choosing one over the other, other than an "I like chocolate ice cream" sort of choice.

Secular man of relative culture "by popular definition, knows no transcendent reality."⁸ He must be guided by the paganism in vogue,⁹ and misguided by the relativism which allows him "to avoid facing up to ultimates."¹⁰ He can give absolute allegiance to no idea, for its degree of relativity is relative.¹¹ The human person is threatened with objectification, depersonalization and expendability.¹² Or, in other words, once Torah must comport with the "reason" of the age--there is nothing to keep a man from doing what is right in his own eyes--or indeed, to keep the age from doing as it will--and calling that Torah!¹³

Secular man, in an age pagan as any past, turns inward to himself seeking a stone by which to validate himself. "Deep within me must be the last refuge from the relative, pagan deluge without." I must, "he must say, "bring my ideal self up into the light of ultimate self-realization, then it may serve as a standard of authority." But the one, perfect, unambiguous, potential self is a

"tragic illusion".¹⁴ "Me" and my "self" are the same; and, just as a man would become different men in different seasons, his "self" can hardly be any more. The self cannot be expected to lift itself by its own face in the mirror, much less explain itself to itself. Any self attempt to supply a ground for its own meaning must invariably end in despair and boredom. For how can the ground of your emptiness fill itself up with anything more than that primal emptiness?¹⁵ Man cannot define himself without reference to a reality transcending himself.¹⁶ Ultimate integration is simply inaccessible through self-realization.¹⁷ Borowitz reminds us that:

"Surely man's self is not an entity in him. But if it is only a potential, how shall he know which of his various drives and powers lead to fulfillment? [He must have]... a standard external to his conflicted self, [if he is to]...ever know what fulfillment might be."¹⁸

Autonomy is essential to any essentially liberal religious stance but if that freedom "...leads to moral nihilism, it has vitiated its own virtue. Freedom is not an end in itself..."¹⁹

Not even the great Greek god of reason is ultimate. We realize that such a "...commitment to reason as one's sole guide is itself a commitment undertaken beyond the bounds of reason."²⁰ Even the very definition of "rational" requires an arbitrary position. The day of the self-

evident proposition is past.²¹ In the final analysis, each man must arbitrarily posit one metaphysical cornerstone. For "...it is clear that no self-justifying, autonomous principle exists, but all the possibilities themselves involve a prior act of faith."²² Borowitz explains that:

"The criterion of the adequacy of reason cannot be reason itself, for it is precisely reason that is being judged. Or, to put the matter more directly, every philosophy begins with an act of faith. That is what is meant by saying each person inevitably has his own assumptions. Assumptions are not validated by reason. They are an expression of faith."²³

Perhaps insofar as "faith" in such a theological context connotes "leap", it might be better to understand it as a modest, yet certainly critical, little jump.

Man, at this existential juncture of frustration, realizes there is more outside him than absurd and pagan worlds. There is a ground of being, fundamental to the universe, transcending his contradicted self.²³ It is a standard in whose name "...we are disgusted, nauseated, overwhelmed, outraged, at what happened to the innocent [in the Holocaust]...[for such was not] an honest reflection of reality [but] an intolerable violation of a standard of right inherent in the universe itself."²⁴

It is here that the new theology proposes a step backwards. "We shall not be converted but only returned, restored, renewed. We shall discover what was ever ours. We will find what we brought with us. We shall gain what we always had."²⁵ If I am to have a choice, then I shall build my life in open confrontation with the tradition as a matrix of value and from there I shall reach out to modern culture.²⁶

For the past many decades Jewish thinkers have sought to find one fine philosophic system and understand Judaism in its terms.²⁷ Their absolute standard might have been Neo-Kantianism, existentialism or even modern secularity through which they would filter Judaism. Judaism was always the object, the plastic which was to be moulded by this or that philosophy.²⁸ The old Liberals always blundered into "...identifying any contemporary philosophy or science as the essence of Judaism."²⁹ Invariably though, this or that philosophy left the stage of the day to take up its proper residence in the catalogues of the history of man.³⁰ And Judaism was left grounded upon nothing very relevant any more--its ideas having been meticulously translated into a now dead language. The new theology simply does not trust the general culture or any of its fashions enough to set it before the faith of our fathers.³¹

I shall choose Judaism for there is no "system of understanding God and man and history superior to Judaism." There is no "faith more basic to my existence" as a Jew.³² I shall choose Judaism, for it is man's most authentic response to a God who is my ground of being. I shall choose Judaism for "...no other human institution has yet shown the capability that Judaism has of transforming a statistically large number of individuals into socially motivated persons and groups."³³ I shall choose Judaism "...in its scandalous particularity and not in abstract general principles..."³⁴ The religion of the covenant has certain values which are unavailable in the culture of the West.³⁵ "Now Judaism becomes precious for just that quality of alienation and transcendence of the society."³⁶ The religion of the Hebrews must survive for it is the "bearer of the healing alternative..."³⁷ It assures me "that there is another, greater power moving through human events than man's brutality to man."³⁸ In Covenant Theology, Judaism becomes the first axiom,³⁹ -- the stone which the builders rejected has become the chief cornerstone.

The primary question shifts from "How can a Jew truly be a modern man?" to "How can a modern man be truly a Jew?"⁴⁰ If Judaism is to be a man's religion, it must take on ultimate importance, otherwise it is no religion.⁴¹ It must address man with the voice of God.⁴²

Seeking an absolute first premise, Karff reminds us that "God alone is the source of objectivity for all value..."⁴³ Wolf assures us "...that all the old lies are true."⁴⁴ And Fackenheim cautions that the present is not necessarily superior to the past in matters of morality and religion, for their truths must be perpetually re-discovered and relived by each man in every age.⁴⁵ For the Covenant theologian, any aspect of the tradition is worthy of being re-lived and thereby perhaps re-discovered. Everything within the tradition might prove to be "Torah-for-me".

Wolf reminds us that "...all of tradition is ours; ...there is no reason for us in principle to leave out any part...nothing Jewish can be ruled out before experiment."⁴⁶ "The accumulated heritage of the Jewish past", as Petuchowski notes, "is ours to select from, ours to experiment with, in our endeavor to find out what God wants us to do."⁴⁷ It is with such a total willingness to search out a commandment which might be addressed to "me", that Covenant theologians approach tradition. A man must first live a commandment that was Torah-for-his-fathers, if he is to know whether or not it is Torah-for-him. It is in this sense that I discern what must surely be the most primordial meaning of the cryptic "We shall do and we shall hear". Before a man can hear what may truly be addressed to him--he must do!

"And nothing in His Torah must be offensive to me. I must study it all, try it all and add to it whatever comes out of my own meeting with Him."⁴⁸ In another place, Wolf (in what can only be described as a Wolfean passage) confesses:

"I try to walk the road of Judaism. Embedded in that road there are many jewels. One is marked 'Sabbath' and one 'Civil Rights' and one 'Nashruth' and one 'Honor Your Parents' and one 'Study of Torah' and one 'You Shall Be Holy'. There are at least 613 of them and they are of different shapes and sizes and weights. Some are light and easy for me to pick up, and I pick them up. Some are too deeply embedded for me so far at least, though I get a little stronger by trying to extricate the jewels as I walk the street. Some, perhaps, I shall never be able to pick up. I believe that God expects me to keep on walking Judaism Street and to carry away whatever I can of its commandments. I do not believe that He expects me to lift what I cannot, nor may I condemn my fellow Jew who may not be able to pick up even as much as I can."⁴⁹

This is surely a Jew's only means of determining what existential claim his heritage has on him. It is not to say that he will blindly accept and give up his freedom to dissent. On the contrary--because the choice was founded upon individual assent "...it likewise guarantees the right to dissent without thereby raising the self to the status of prior principle."⁵⁰

Borowitz carefully outlines a four-part methodology of reaffirmation:

- [1.] "...Jewish theology begins not with an idealist, naturalist, ontological, or linguistic philosophy, or an existential diagnosis of the self, but with the tradition and its affirmation...I see it...as having a claim upon me and my life reasonably similar to that which it had upon other generations of Jews...I begin with the tradition not as an interesting curio from the past or a source of quotations to illustrate some modern view, but as a living content of belief which confronts me in authority and a challenge...
- [2.] Because I assert no principle prior to Judaism, I cannot know beforehand what no longer has the power to speak to me and to guide my life. I must pay as much attention to the priesthood as to the prophets ...I must, if I would be true to this faith, remain as open as possible to what Jewish tradition can teach, even if that means I might end up believing it all.
- [3.] ...My openhearted search of the tradition may from time to time lead me to dissent. Because I do not wish to make a faith of dissent, I hope not to search to disagree nor study to disavow. In my affirmation of the primary value of Judaism I cannot easily or peacefully dissociate myself from its teachings. When in all seriousness I am moved to disagree, the responsibility now rests upon me to justify that disagreement.
- [4.] ...From this dynamic process of confronting the claims of the tradition in its fullness, and working out concurrence and dissent, the individual comes to know himself fully...Both Judaism as accepted guide and as rejected standard will call forth the mixture of person and tradition that should mark the modern Jew."⁵¹

To would be theologians, the new theology describes a task of acceptance. Schwarzschild admonishes us to confront and make ourselves accessible to the totality of Jewish sacred scriptures, "without prejudgement, prior philosophical commitment, or earlier determination of any kind as to what is to be found and what must eventually

turn out to be true, essential, and viable."⁵² He must explore again and renew his loyalty to "...all the classic and legitimate texts of Jewish revelation, from the outer most 'left' boundary of scientific rationalism to the outer most 'right' boundary of unreconstructed mysticism..."⁵³ He must reject history and culture and surely philosophy as valid and "...proper tools in the determination of Jewish theological work in our--or any other --time."⁵⁴ The theologian must attempt to discover the explicit and implicit meaning of all of the traditions affirmations in all their detail.⁵⁵ Silberman similarly explains that the task is one of "...open confrontation of the tradition in its vastness, unfettered as far as humanly possible by judgments as to what is essential and what is peripheral..."⁵⁶ Modern Jewish theology must in no way alter an essence which is an authentic response of the Jew to his God.⁵⁷ The ultimate goal for Fackenheim "...is the two-way relation of a genuine encounter; a relation in which the past, to be sure, is exposed to the judgment of the present, but in which the present also exposes itself to the judgment of the past."⁵⁸ The theologian "...must be open to the real possibility that all of Torah is divine", for surely there is better history than Passover and better literature than Talmud.⁵⁹

It is only through the tradition's authority--an authority born of its being Torah-for-one's-fathers, a Torah-from-heaven, that the Jew can honestly search out its meaning for him.

The theologian, in covenantal language, seeks to define our relation--as members of the covenant--to our fathers, who already had. He must then "...formulate, and express in contemporary idiom, those categories of covenantal theology which are directly relevant to modern man's quest for a place in God's world,"⁶⁰

6. Existentialist Leanings.

"Nothing I am is permanent, nothing I say is true and nothing I know can be known forever...There is no escape from death; there is no escape from madness...all that we are...is pretty ridiculous."

- Arnold Jacob Wolf ¹

"It is the humility of human reason before the realities of human existence which is the major theme of existentialism. Man's mind is incapable of solving all his truly significant problems."

- Eugene B. Borowitz ²

There is only one thing I know for certain about existentialism, and that is better than to try and define it. Nevertheless, beyond their own acknowledged flirtations with the philosophy of the continent,³ Covenant theologians unquestionably employ themes and styles which can only be described as existentialist.

The new theology embraces openness, personalism and a philosophy for life and not for textbooks.⁴ It recognizes the individual's confrontation with reality as the basic unit of thought. There is a passionate espousal of subjectivity,⁵ a "re-recognition of the individual as the principle of reality..."⁶ and a concomitant conviction that he will only find absurdity and despair. There is an emphasis on the whole man [which will be more fully discussed in sections 7. and 8.] and not just his mind.

There is a concern "with the ambiguous and conflicted ontological situation in which man finds himself,"⁷ and the consequent loneliness. In order to live a life authentic, a man must confront ultimate responsibilities and ultimate limitations--not the least of which is death.

"It means being driven toward the making of a commitment ...toward suffering all the doubts and crises which go with such a commitment."⁸ The norm of human existence is man's innate inadequacy and anxiety.⁹ Schaalman describes the post-Auschwitz world as asking us

"to listen to, and to obey, when many no longer know whether there is a Voice that speaks. If many cannot accept the holocaust as a thunder like unto Sinai's, which those who were exposed to it also did not survive, either right then or in the divinely ordained attrition of the desert years, a thunder also that is incomprehensible because there is no Moses to understand and bring back living words, then we must fall back upon the voices of agony rising from some of the pages of the past which, in effect, defied God Himself and called upon the Jew to live even if God, as it were, had become the opponent."¹⁰

We have noted above that Western culture does not seem to be committed to anything. This absence of direction, at least from an ethical or religious perspective, is cause enough for despair--but when cast in existential hues, it becomes absurd to the point of disgust. Schwarzschild says it:

"Western culture is rightly regarded as the product of the mixture of European paganism, Greek philosophy, and the heritage of the Bible. Take away the

last, and you are left with the blood shambles that the Occident has made of human existence, the ashes of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, the automations of our society, the beasts that roam the jungles of our competitive economies, the mindlessness and vulgarity of our human condition."¹¹

Without the appeal to some transcendent source of value or even a minimal commitment to a religious ethic, there remains only an absurd void. "What contemporary social institution can be counted on to give Western man a strong sense of moral direction? The university? The mass media? The corporation? The country club? The laboratory? The couch?"¹² Indeed, the 20th century "demonstrates the fact that destructiveness is not merely something 'unnatural', the product of sickness, and it demonstrates that an idealistic attitude is not in itself a sufficient guarantee of moral goodness."¹³

Fackenheim goes on to point out:

"'Normal' men beyond suspicion of sickness, morbidity, and frustration 'express themselves' in war, destruction, and wholesale murder. 'Idealistic' youths serve evil tyrants in noble devotion, committing nameless crimes out of a sincere sense of duty, and sacrificing their lives to the kingdom of evil. This is the stark fact: when health becomes the ultimate law, the 'blond beast' is set free for breaking the fetters of morality; when the spirit is its own unqualified measure, Satan, the perverted spirit, is free also, transforming a mere urge for security into a metaphysical lust for power, a mere desire for survival and perpetuation into a mystic yearning for eternal glory gained through terror and destruction."¹⁴

The would be righteous man of the 20th century, unlike his grandparents, is further prohibited from ultimate reliance on reason. He must realize that it is

no longer certain whether "...more atrocities have been committed in the name of unreason than in the name of reason. If I [Arnold Wolf] understand the greatest atrocities--the concentration camp and the atomic bomb--they were very rational."¹⁵ In truth, so rational was their terror, that no rational explanation can be found.

"...Auschwitz will forever after resist religious explanation...No religious meaning will ever be found in Auschwitz, for the very attempt to find it is blasphemy."¹⁶

The alternatives to these initial existential realizations are atheistic and religious existentialism. Covenant Theology represents Judaism's most significant and developed expression of religious existentialism. In the preceeding discussion, we have suggested the reason for opting for an autonomous and transcendent source of morality and meaning. In an existentialist dimension, this choice is construed as commitment or an a' priori act of faith.

The decision is of ultimate significance for "what is at stake is simply--everything. A commitment of such intense involvement and immense consequence is not merely an enlightened hunch about what might possibly turn out to be right...it cannot be called less than an act of faith."¹⁷ The realization is as simple as the answer is profound:

"...I escape the question of religious living until I face the real choice: whether this 'outside is Nothing or Absolute Transcendence--the choice between nihilism and faith. This choice cannot be left in 'scientific' suspense--for my existence cannot be left in suspense, it must be lived."¹⁸

"The universe demands that we enter into the mystery and choose whether we are for God or for madness. Both claims to truth cancel each other out and I am left with an awesome decision."¹⁹ A decision which denies verification. A choice which forbids logic. For to act on verification or logic would necessarily be founded upon the prior act of faith which had chosen a logic or some principle of verifiability. "In the last analysis...we are ultimately driven to an act of personal decision and not to a compulsion of proof..."²⁰ Indeed, faith "...has nothing to do with the realm of empirical fact. Its proper object is not the phenomena with which science deals but God who...transcends all fact."²¹ "The decision of faith, then, is the only decision which man can make without qualification...because it transcends all evidence, proofs, and refutations..."²² Empirical knowledge can support the assent of faith, but it cannot refute it.²³

Any viable theology of Judaism must likewise confront itself with the human condition and the alternatives of faith or nihilism.²⁴ And for the theology of Covenant, Judaism must be founded on nothing "less than an irreducible faith in the supernatural!"²⁵ The Jew's bond with

God is so existentially primal that we would do better to speak of returning instead of leaping. "Theologically, the Jew is not born a pagan who has to leap out of his environment to meet God; he is born into a community which has 'inherited' God ever since Sinai..."²⁶ For the Jew, the question is invariably, "When did you stop believing in God?"--since it is understood that He is someone, as it were, you began with.²⁷ Or to put it another way, Covenant Theology believes "...that what the present situation of American Judaism calls for is a new and serious debate over faith and reason with the 'new Jewish theology' [Covenant Theology] being the challenger on behalf of faith."²⁸

Fackenheim defines faith "as the positive answer, given by way of personal commitment, to existential questions of ultimate significance, which reason can still raise, but no longer answer."²⁹ The inadequacy of reason, like the inability of logic or verification, to function on such primary levels of existence looms critical. The actual commitment--undertaken beyond the empirical and before the objective, and perhaps even beside the cognitive--is a prerequisite for authentic existence whatever the decision. For the Jew, it is a love of the God he cannot see. It grows from a trust and not from cognition. "It is an expression of God's power over him and not of his own unmediated experience of the divine...Man...

assumes the terrible yoke of the unseen King."³⁰ He is a King, as the legend runs, who will be seen where ever we let Him in. If an agnostic had been present at Mount Sinai, he "would have heard only the thunder and no voice of God;" the words, as any sensitive man already knows, could be heard only by an ear listening in faith.³¹ And should it be that a man having ears cannot hear, then let him begin with an act of faith that the experience at the mountain was true--that way he might have strength to go forward in silence.³²

The real obstacles to faith are the many years patient-ly engraining skepticism and blinding the eyes of wonder with which children once saw the universe and wrote letters to God. Borowitz explains:

"If anything, such a response to the universe is more natural than the skepticism that modern culture cultivates. That is why piety is normal to children and universal among primitives. Modern man has made himself unnatural by training himself not to be amazed, by working hard at not responding to the world in awe...What men need most today is to recapture that radical amazement which is the most basic level of faith. They need to let themselves ask once again with full force and fervor: Why is there anything at all? Why is it so wondrous, so unexpected? Why is it men can even ask and marvel?"³³

Over a decade ago, Samuel Cohon observed that:

"[Existentialism] owes its current spread to the general crisis which overtook humanity in consequence of the two world wars and the subsequent disintegration of European civilization...The chief casualty of the universal upheaval has been the liberal faith in reason..."³⁴

7. Beyond Reason.

"It is only to say that the logic of life as we experience life is larger than the systems of logic which our rational powers can construct. It is also to suggest that when we admit into our conscious concerns only what can be contained and managed in our logical systems, we do violence to ourselves and deprive ourselves of precious and sometimes awesome sources of meaning and joy."

- Dudley Weinberg ¹

"Nor is the fact that one cannot put what he has experienced into literal terms or exact ideas to be taken as a sign that this knowing was simply irrational. Persons cannot be reduced to strictly rational terms. We cannot define our mothers, or give the concept of our wives."

- Eugene B. Borowitz ²

It is very difficult to find Athens on the map of Covenant Theology. Sometimes it is very near the mountain of Sinai and other times it is so far from the route marked out that it is barely visible on the hazy edge. This illusive-ness is essentially due to the chartmaker's own ambivalence as to where Athens, the city of reason, properly belongs. As we have already seen, it never occurs at the beginning of the theological journey and it never occurs at the end. Reason varies in importance from being the formulator of questions and organizer of conclusions to a destructive interruption of meaning and joy.

Reason serves as a companion to faith. Schwarzschild describes reason as preparing "...the path on which faith can walk; reason clears the path once faith has begun to walk it and writes an intelligible record of the distance covered; and when faith has reached its destination, reason embraces faith, and the two companions unite..."³ It is noteworthy that most Covenant theologians invariably speak of reason only insofar as it is a corrective or guide to faith. "...It clears away from our minds the rubble of culture; it removes the veil which human history has put over our eyes..."⁴ Reason, as Petuchowski explains, has a two-fold task:

"...Through its investigations into nature and history, it furnishes us with the data in which faith might apprehend the 'mighty acts' of God. Second...reason is the indispensable yardstick to be used in 'interpreting' Revelation...[it] has no small part in deciding whether the word spoken to us emanates from a 'prophet of the Lord' or from a 'prophet of Baal'..."⁵

Reason is never an end-in-itself, a beginning-all-alone, or a sovereign means of anything-in-between. "We must let it take us as far as its outer borders..and move forward from there."⁶

There is a clear and right awareness that reason, carefully used, will open us up from the loneliness of discovering our own personal gods;⁷ and lead us out of the inevitable and overwhelming subjectivity which existential thought tends to foster.⁸ There is great and right concern among the new theologians lest their work be

swallowed up in the frenzied chaos of emotion.⁹ "We can and must find truth in Kant and the Besht."¹⁰ For it is only in "this combination of the reflective and the spontaneous, this harmonization of apparent irreconcilables..."¹¹ that the Jew might truly perceive and stand before the throne on high. Such fundamental religious themes as creation and redemption are likewise in need of reason for their initial formulation, but reason cannot supply their solution.¹²

While objective rationality plays many important roles, it nevertheless does not exhaust the universe--particularly the universe of the Jew,¹³ nor provide a standard by which all things must be judged.¹⁴ Its gifts and guidance are valuable but, in the final analysis, it must be set aside: it must never triumph over life.¹⁵ There is a need for a statement of Jewish meaning "that involves the emotions as well as the mind."¹⁶ There is a need for theologians to realize that "the only way to get to Judaism's position is by faith."¹⁷ The business of living the covenant as real and binding cannot be done with reason alone. It can be said, in this sense, that all of Covenant Theology depends upon the extent of a man's commitment to the limitations of reason. There is a genuine disillusionment with the ability of reason and logic to structure life, while not aborting its ultimate meaning and wonder.

While reason is important, we must realize that "...God's word, not man's ratiocination, must be the beginning and dominating theme of Jewish theology."¹⁸ It is no longer self-evident that "...reason is capable of furnishing truth sufficient to a total understanding of the world and a meaningful human life."¹⁹

There are great facets of life which simply transcend reason.²⁰ "...The relationship of God and man incorporates everything that man is. It incorporates his reason, too, but reason no longer abstracted and defensive, rather reason integrated with all that he is and with all that he confronts."²¹ Life is not emotion or non-reason or irrational, but neither is it to be captured by reason, "for reason is detachment."²² The new theology therefore, addresses itself to the fullness of life, unbounded by categories of the mind. "...Our minds cannot capture God in the web of human logic."²³

"The man who has encountered the eternal Thou realizes that he has known and received something, but not something that can be communicated or transmitted to others in propositional language or in terms of a set of universal prescriptions."²⁴ "The reality of the living God proclaimed in the Bible", Martin continues, "is neither proved nor disproved by reason...He...transcends all matters of empirical fact."²⁵ We recognize that Biblical

faith does not contradict reason, but rather, it lies in an entirely different dimension.²⁶

In a like manner, the address of God "...affects levels of man's being far below the conscious one of his rationality,--as indeed all love does,"²⁷ In the dimension of the most-meaningful, reason's light is insufficient. "...Reason, while a precious gift and endowment, faces a mystery irreducible in principle. Here, God is not a factor of explanation compressible and ultimately obsolete, but as creator, the very ground of being..."²⁸ "...God is covered in darkness forever. Reason tests and systematically discloses false assumptions. God's truths are the hidden and unreachable. Man longs for light, but God remains nonetheless impenetrably dark."²⁹

No God of personal experience has ever withstood the cold steel of rationality without becoming the same. No miracle has ever survived the quest for causes. No prayer has outwitted psycho-analysis. If we commence with objective rationality, we invariably conclude a universe which is not the same universe-of-meaning with which we began. There are grand dimensions of life which reason cannot comprehend--but comprehending them not--must not relegate them to fantasy.³⁰ "Religious language is...a species of poetry, an evocative rather than a descriptive tongue, a word where the reader must supply what the author can only hint at,"³¹

The classic dichotomy between the god of the philosophers and the Holy One, blessed be He is actually no more than the god provided by reason and the God met beyond cognition. He is a God met in the fullness of life; He cannot be refuted, only rejected,³² It is a distinction critical to grasping the import of Covenant Theology.

"Franz Rosenzweig relates of Hermann Cohen that the eminent philosopher of Marburg once explained to a pious old Jew the rational and purely philosophic idea of God that he had developed in his ethics.. The old man listened carefully, but when Cohen had finished his explanation he asked him quietly: 'But where here is the fore olam, the creator of the world?' The philosopher, Rosenzweig relates, answered not a single word but his eyes filled with tears. Cohen obviously recognized, as many contemporary naturalists do not, that he was holding out a stone to one in desperate need of bread."³³

The god of the philosophers is an "it", an object that can be defined and discussed; he is a God lost sight of.³⁴ He is a concept appearing at the end of a logical chain of reasoning.³⁵ But the God Who covenanted with my people and with me, is a subject, The Subject. "Any attempt to subject God's existence to critical [objective] judgment is, therefore, held to be insolence, because it means to judge the Judge."³⁶ The God of Israel precedes cognition and conception; He is an "intuitive response to the universe."³⁷ "...The 'God of Israel' is a God whose existence and nature were made manifest to Israel in certain historical situations..."³⁸ He is and indeed can only be the God Who revealed Himself at Sinai.³⁹ And converse-

ly, "only if there is, or at least can be, revelation, does the god of the philosophers become the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob."⁴⁰

A God Who hears prayer, was not invented by philosophers nor discovered by rational speculation; He is the same God of our Biblical fathers, encountered in experience by men who were aware and sensitive to His presence in the routine of their daily lives.⁴¹ Covenant theologians frequently resort to Buberian language. Here is an epistemology which integrates the subjectivity of religious experience and the objectivity of rationality.⁴² There are the two categories of the "I-Thou", the subject knowing and the "I-it", the object knowing.⁴³ Buber's contribution is so valuable precisely because he "...found a way to limit the totalitarian aspirations of technical reason, with its subordination of the personal to the impersonal, without at the same time denying its legitimacy and usefulness."⁴⁴

Petuchowski goes further. He realizes that the stuff of which covenant existence is made "...transcends human definitions--a God Who is no more exhausted by the philosopher's definitions of Him than He is by the poet's lyrical heaping up of attributes."⁴⁵ Covenant mindedness springs from total human response to life.

8. The Total Human Response.

"In his ultimate relation to Reality, man must be participant; he cannot remain spectator."

- Emil Fackenheim ¹

"If a tree should fall in the forest,
and there is no one there to hear it,
it may or it may not make a sound.

But if a tree should fall in the forest,
on someone's head, your head,
you will know it."

- Anonymous

Beyond the rational there is only life. Before you can think about it, there it is--a river of primary existence through which life flows.² A mundane carnival barrage of lights and tears, of bits of paper, tooth-aches, melody and card catalogues. An enterprise so vast and staggering in its living embrace that it quite exceeds the bonds of anything. But it is very real.

When Covenant Theology asks "What is 'Torah-for-me'?" it asks a kind of primary question which can only be answered authentically from the fullness of life--from a total human response. One cannot remain atop the detached tower of discursive thought,³ or even hope to put the real question in words. Borowitz realizes, for example, that "to read our marriage license, or in an older gener-

ation, our marriage contract, is not to understand the reality which now exists between us, even though that language will be the clearest and the most verifiable that can be offered concerning our new state."⁴ He relates that "if the existentialists have taught us anything, it is that faith is a matter of the whole self. In that case, writing [of theological matters] which restricts itself so as to appeal only to the mind cannot hope to communicate the depth of religious belief."⁵ The divine encounter "...encompasses all of existence leaving none of its facets outside but rather imprinting itself dominantly upon all aspects of world and life."⁶ One might say that life is more than emotional or rational or even existential.⁷ Wolf relates:

"To meet God is to face annihilation and rebuke. It is to be cast into the dust and hurled to the sky and again cast down. It costs a lot of money. It hurts. It undercuts all the comfortable and conformist housing which we use to cover up against the rain. It lashes us with a wind of awful, rushing force. It sends us back to the Bible no longer critical and cool but whimpering for a word of consolation."⁸

Indeed, he explains elsewhere, that it is only in the living that the meaning is found. Theology must follow life, not precede it.

"Is it not more probable that one finds out what a Jew is only by becoming one? That one finds out what a man is only by becoming human?...facts precede meanings...Criteria that precede experience can only be vapid, abstract, or castrating."⁹

"We begin", explains Silberman,

"with the concrete experience of the Jewish people in its relation to the Lord. From this we may abstract ideas, generalizing them in rational discourse to construct a statement of theology, but such ideas may never be permitted to displace the reality of the experience."¹⁰

In this sense, we see that all of authentic religion--from commandment to prayer--flows from the total human response to the divine, encompassing all of life and thereby attaining true value.¹¹

The story is told¹² of a renowned thinker who once addressed a Jewish group. As his talk went on he noticed that his audience was slowly drifting out of the hall. Dismayed, he stopped one of the last to leave. "What's wrong; where are they all going?" "Oh, it's a fine lecture," the old Jew replied, "It's just that its time to davin minchal" In the same way, Borowitz, having examined the philosophic problems surrounding Shavuot, confesses:

"But now as I begin to ponder these questions for the hundredth time, I realize that the 5th of Sivan is drawing to a close. Shavuot is upon me with its claim for observance. I will not have time to resolve these metaphysical problems before the holiday is here."¹³

And that is the significance of a total human response.

In the final analysis, the Commanding Presence of God "...burns our theologies to a crisp, but it suffers men to suffer, praise and live."¹⁴ For in order "...to arrive at a true, existential relationship with God, much more than theology is required."¹⁵

The living reality of man's relation to his creator is the existential ground from which any viable theology must grow. There can be no denial that the fundamental root experience is a personal affair. Each man must "turn to his own 'inner history' for the meaning of his individual life."¹⁶ Petuchowski realizes that:

"If the Torah is to be more than an interesting historical document for me, more than a cherished family album, if it is to be evidence of Revelation, then the Torah must do more than impart family history to me. It must speak to me. It must be 'verifiable' in terms of my own experiences."¹⁷

Only a God actually experienced by man--in the totality of his life--provides the existential certainty necessary to found a faith upon.¹⁸ Only in such a manner can one come to believe in the Bible,¹⁹ "...yielding to it totally, withholding nothing of his entire being from it, letting whatever will occur between himself and it occur, keeping himself open to the possibility of faith."²⁰

As Buber said it: "'To believe in God means to stand in a personal relationship with God,'"²¹ Fackenheim has also explained that man is

"...potentially...an outside spectator of all things--except his own human relation with God. For man either participates in that relation, responding to the presence of divine power in his human freedom, or else he does not know it at all."²²

We have come full circle. The covenant is but another name for the relation a Jew builds with God from the fullness of his life. And that is Covenant Theology.

Epilogue: Part III

- Kushner: Good evening, gentlemen.¹
- Carroll: 'Twas brillig and the slithey toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe.
- Petuchowski: It is clear that, in order to be intelligible, 'God concepts' will have to be formulated in different language at different times.²
- [Indeed, we might do well to seek] "...a new configuration more appropriate to our age."³
- Fackenheim: If there is a God, and if He is God, He embraces man's existence with such totality as to make objective detachment altogether impossible.⁴
- Kushner: It should be clear by now that the Ancient God of Sinai--He whom the theology of Covenant is a search for--will neither be described nor communicated in the theological language of the past century; essentially because it requires objective detachment and cognitive content.⁵
- Chorus: Hallelujah. Hallelujah. [The chorus has been here employed to indicate that many standard academic procedures will not be observed.]

Now all this is not to hurl ourselves into some oblivion of the spirit where thought and communication are unnecessary or impossible. It is rather, to seek a new way for talking about the reality you and I live; that's all.

Ludwig Wittgenstein once explained that:

"Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new homes, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses."⁶

It is our task to examine this latest suburb of ours. Let us seek a new language of theology which will permit us the luxury of saying--without linguistic contradiction--that religious experience is self-justifying and, who knows, maybe even empty of cognitive content.⁷ Such a way of talking would surely solve many of the problems of Covenant Theology. That is because the difficulties of Covenant Theology are actually the inadequacies of a very old theological language. A language which creates such contradictions as God's intimate immanence and absolute transcendence or anthropomorphism and God's intense personality is simply no longer functional in describing a world like this one. A new and adequate language will supply us with some way of understanding and communicating a world made new by misunderstood media into a "global village".

Once I thought that the frustration grew from not realizing that "rational" and "emotional" were merely two rarely encountered extremes on a great spectrum and not, as our Greek founders had led us to believe, universe-exhausting antitheses.⁸ It seemed to me then that the solution was to strip "rational" and "emotional" of their evaluative connotations--reason was the noblest of all human activity, raising man above the animals, while emotion was the unfortunate stamp of the Mr. Hyde within us

all. Then one merely had to recognize that most of what one experienced in his life actually occurred on some midpoint between the cognitive and the felt. In some sort of trans-rational realm which was an admixture in varying degrees of the two extremes. That too now seems inaccurate since the very extremes of rational and emotional are no longer meaningful categories today.

"I am convinced that how we talk to one another is as important as what is said."⁹ Let us concern ourselves with experiencing the media and cease understanding its content. Afterall, "...the structured modes of traditional thought and discourse are obsolescent in the new 'post literate' age of the electric media,"¹⁰ anyway.

TOGETHER WE SHALL LESSEN THE CHASM BETWEEN SPEAKING
AND THE REALITY WE ALL HAVE COME TO KNOW AND LOVE.

* * *

Art is some kind of experience which amplifies some still distant future rythm. It is also, I submit, the harbinger of a new and long awaited language. And the first word is: Groove.

The definitive nature of the new art is that it is no longer appropriate to ask, "What's it about?" To go looking after the cognitive content is to miss the point.

That is because if there be any cognitive content, it is only incidental to the aesthetic experience. And that is because artists have come to recognize that the old forms--so dependent on cognitive content, and temporal-spatial arrangements, and after-it's-all-over reflective analysis--are no longer adequate to describe or communicate the stuff of which life is made. The task of the participant, now, is to get in the same "bag" with the art. New art is simply not meant to be understood. For that matter neither was a good prayer.

There are many short things which are very understandable, cognitive, cogent, even convincing. But I don't think they are prayers. They have missed the point. We lost much more than a word when we quit davining. By insisting on understandable, cognitive content, we have denied what might have been a prayer of its chances for self-justification in a moment of religious experience. We have searched for the message once the media was over.

"The cold service is the cathedral service in which many people come and sit quietly and watch a majestically cool performance. The warm service is a small or hemish service in which they talk animatedly to each other briefly before pastry."¹¹

Thinking is cool; forgetting about thinking is warm. Covenant theologians can pray beside each other far more easily than they can argue.

Grooving "consists of opening your senses to what is happening, without anticipation or imposition of logical structures...It is the antithesis of up-tight perception, in which one accepts only what he can comfortably categorize."¹² The old categories don't adequately categorize our universe any more. "How then could a Jewish theologian go on perpetuating the unreal categories of 'universalism' and 'particularism'?"¹³ "In music, film, and drama we are entering the age of the feelie. Rational methods of perceiving the truth about man and his world seem to have failed us, and are being abandoned. 'The truth of a thing', Stanley Kubrick says, 'is in the feel of it, not the think of it.'"¹⁴ "Some of the concepts regarding God, revelation, and values which seemed appropriate in the days of so-called 'classical reform' no longer seem adequate in relation to contemporary thought and as responses to the new situations of contemporary life and history."¹⁵ "Nowadays", said Walter Kerr, "it's not good form to ask what a play may be about. Aboutness is out, content is irrelevant, conscious design is suspect."¹⁶ There is "...the growing option for nonlinear, unstructured experiences that leave out sequence, motivation, and 'argument'..."¹⁷ Like life.

"The diminished role of dialogue is a case in point... Mission: Impossible is completely unintelligible without images, Star Trek is simply an illustrated radio serial,

complete on the level of sound...more than dialogue, however has been jettisoned. Other literary values, such as sequential narrative, dramatic choice, and plot are in a state of advanced atrophy, rapidly becoming vestigial organs on the body of film art..."¹⁸ Traditional theological language is Star Trek and the new theology is 2001.

"...The hellenic penchant for philosophizing put an exorbitant premium on definition, thus imprisoning our whole civilization in straight-jacket like rigidity clearly shown also by its near universal rejection of paradox in favor of its devotion to Aristotelian logic. Greek grammar, Latin in this context being a mere appendix, by segmenting time into the three structurally differentiated divisions of past, present, and future, created the illusion of a static apprehension of time and a spurious superiority of thought over existence."¹⁹

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LIFE AND COGNITION IS CRITICAL.

So is the desire to shatter the template of the old language. "If what religion is speaking about is to be made meaningful it must somehow come to terms with modern philosophic idiom, even if that means to fight, refine or even break modern philosophy's constricted sense of what can be 'real'..."²⁰

"TO GROOVE MEANS TO YIELD YOURSELF TO THE FLOW OF ACTIVITY AROUND YOU. TO BE 'WITH IT', AS A PHONOGRAPH NEEDLE IS 'WITH' THE RECORD GROOVE, RESPONDING TO ITS MICROSCOPIC IMPRESSIONS."²¹ (Capitals mine)

"How impotent are all theories limiting God's ability to communicate with man when seen in the light of one moment of true prayer! [It couldn't be cognitive; to ask "What's

it about?" would be to miss the point.] How clumsy the attempt to fit Jewish history into a 'rational' pattern, when there is no escape from the fact of the covenant which was made 'with him that standeth here with us this day before the Lord our God, and also with him that is not here with us this day!'"²² "The story line wouldn't make a ripple if it were not scrambled and fragmented into an experience that explodes from a free-floating present into both past and future simultaneously."²³

In new art there is paradox. Not for its own sake but surely at the price of reasoned structure. There is a suspension of any critical concern with time and space nexuses. There is an "attempt to generate feelings rather than 'messages',...Groovin' requires the unification of the five senses into one receptor."²⁴ There is a new mode of attention which is multisensory, total, and simultaneous. "When you 'groove', you do not analyze, follow an argument, or separate sensations; rather, you are massaged into a feeling of heightened life and consciousness."²⁵ Have you ever been to a light show? Perhaps Times Square?

It is almost as if we are being coaxed by artists to give up the old categories, the old linkages, the old language, the objectivity, the impersonality, the critical, the reflective, and the good old "I-it" search for cogni-

tive content. They are useless for encountering this art. This art which so thrillingly invites us to enter--to groove with--our lives, with it. Afterall, when you're really grooving with your life, you don't spend every moment analyzing the one just past. That would destroy it. As amatteroffact, I'm not really sure just what space and time are anyway.

There are "...experiences which are self-justifying because they are part of the potential of being human and being alive."²⁶ Being in love is self-validating, self-authenticating, and a primary mode of experience.²⁷ And once "...the immediacy is gone, 'I-Thou' gives way to 'I-it'."²⁸ "Living in a world of pre-reflexive immediacy, the Hasidim were capable of direct trust in the self-authenticating power of religious intensity. Modern man, in contrast, if capable of such trust at all, is no longer capable of direct and simple trust. For the inner world of today is dominated by a spirit of reflection and self-consciousness. Moments of religious immediacy are inevitably followed by moments of reflection, in which what immediacy may have taken for the presence of God is suspected of being the self's own production--the projection of wish or fear."²⁹ The Hasidim, not having graduated to the reflective stage, didn't have to reject the notion that God Himself can be approached in prayer.³⁰

Indeed, "...further thinking [after man has met God] may shatter the untenable tension between the rational, or naturalistic, approach and the existential."³¹

God is real and present reality and He is not a concept for He cannot be reflected upon.³² "Revelation, Buber declared, is not experience or knowledge and yields no specific content; it is only the self-communicating of 'the divine Presence as power'. It is nothing more and nothing less than the sense of the presence of God Himself."³³ If He were a film there would be no plot, no temporal-spacial concerns and certainly no cognitive content. You wouldn't know what to say when you left the theater. And that would not mean that you had missed it. Indeed, it might mean that you had, as it were, GROOVED with it.

Covenant Theology has tried long and hard to communicate what surely are self-justifying religious experiences in the old language so concerned with cognitive content. And it just doesn't work out. We must acknowledge "...the possibility of an immediate religious reality that reason can point toward and clarify but can neither mediate nor prove."³⁴ "Man is capable of ultimate concern without the necessity of giving it a theological label...When we bypass the immense possibilities implicit in our relationship to the universe, we destroy

the one true source of belief in a deity (God or process) which is not of our own making."³⁵ We must listen to a new art which does a very good job of letting us back into lives of self-authenticating immediacy and intensity. And merely by asking us to imitate the needle in a record groove.

The "message" is to be encountered in, with and by grooving with the media of life. Look, when the Torah was given, it was not written. And then it was written and forced into a temporal, sequential media format. This destroyed its ultimate existential import. This made it more difficult to groove with, because it missed the point. Yet it is still a scroll. We must un-write her. Spin the trees so fast that the letters fly off the parchment, and no matter whether or not they re-align in sentences.

"Light does not speak; it shines...It is in this kind of silence that lovers sit and perhaps hold hands, exchanging no vocal expressions but drinking in one another's presence. It is also this kind of silence that prevails between members of a family who have just lost a common and beloved relative; they look at one another and, weeping, perhaps bemoan their loss, but words could neither help them nor properly express their sentiments... What goes on in the heart is so powerful, so inchoate, and so deeply chiseled into its flesh that, even if it could be lifted out of its setting, it would break the delicate vessels of any words into which it might be put..."³⁶

The closest we can come to primary communication is through sharing-creating a mutual experience which description could only destroy. So it goes with most of us for most of our lives, the truly meaningful before communication, without understandable content, asking only to be grooved with. No more

Perhaps "grooving-with" is the first word of a new language which can have no words.

Notes

Introduction

1. Eugene B. Borowitz, "Toward a New Jewish Theology," Behrman House Memorandum, (New York, Oct., 1968), p. 1. Borowitz here is speaking of himself and Fackenheim.
2. Ibid.
3. Eugene B. Borowitz, A New Jewish Theology in the Making (Philadelphia, 1968), p. 64.
4. Ibid. p. 139.
5. Arnold Jacob Wolf, "Response to Five Questions," The Condition of Jewish Belief: A Symposium Compiled by the Editors of Commentary Magazine (New York, 1966), p. 269.
6. Arnold Jacob Wolf, "Introduction," Rediscovering Judaism (Chicago, 1965), p. 8.
7. David Polish, "The God of Nature and the God of Existence," Contemporary Reform Jewish Thought, ed. Bernard Martin (Chicago, 1968), p. 55. Wolf explains that "The cosmic God who does not address our inward parts is too austere and forbidding, too remote to be relevant. The inward God who is not also the Ribono shel Olam is only a thread which the human spider spins out of its own being, a thread which can never bridge the void."
- 8.. Emil Fackenheim, "An Outline of a Modern Jewish Theology," Judaism, III (Summer, 1954), p. 248.
9. Borowitz, Behrman House Memorandum (Oct., 1968), p. 3.
10. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "The Question of Jewish Theology," Judaism, VII (Winter, 1958), p. 55.
11. Emil Fackenheim, Quest for Past and Future (Bloomington, Ind, 1968), p. 5; also, p. 179. It is from Fackenheim's description of Buber and Rosenzweig that the title of this paper is drawn. He relates that "...they sought nothing less than a modern presence of the ancient God," (p. 5). Borowitz in the Behrman House Memorandum (Oct., 1968) explains that Buber "...gave us a language which explained our lives." (p. 2).

12. i.e. Their available theological writings since 1950. All volumes of Judaism, Commentary, Dimension, C.C.A.R. Journal, and C.C.A.R. Yearbook have been reviewed as of February, 1969.

Covenant Theology as a Movement: Part I

1. Ben Hamon, "The Reform Rabbis Debate Theology: A Report on the 1963 Meeting of the C.C.A.R.," Judaism, XII (Fall, 1963), p. 480. He explains: "Some guides to their theological stand can be found, though no major statement has yet been produced. They focus on God where the old liberals concentrated on man. They are concerned with the authoritative claim traditional texts and traditional observance have on them. They take the concept of Halachah seriously and seek to determine what is law for them today. They do not hesitate to use religious terms...One might simply describe their position as seeking to take the Jewish religion with full personal seriousness but not literally." (p. 480).
2. Ibid.
3. Eugene B. Borowitz, "Hope Jewish and Hope Secular," Judaism, XVII (Spring, 1968), pp. 133-4.
4. Ben Hamon, p. 480.
5. The papers themselves are a primer for the student of Covenant Theology, as is Ben Hamon's synopsis (see # 1 above). In addition to the major works by Professors Borowitz (A New Jewish Theology in the Making), Fackenheim (Quest for Past and future), and Petuchowski (Ever Since Sinai), profound expressions of the new theology have also appeared in Rediscovering Judaism, ed. Arnold Jacob Wolf, and, just recently--though not exclusively--in Contemporary Reform Jewish Thought, ed. Bernard Martin.
6. Ben Hamon, p. 486.
7. Ibid.
8. Maurice Friedman, "Liberal Judaism and Contemporary Jewish Thought," Midstream, V (Autumn, 1959), p. 27.

9. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "The Limits of Liberal Judaism," Judaism, XIV (Spring, 1965), p. 156.
10. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "Footnotes to the Current Debate," C.C.A.R. Journal, (Oct., 1965), p. 16.
11. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "Self-definition and commitment," Issues, (Winter, 1965-66), p. 4.
12. Emil Fackenheim, "Liberalism and Reform Judaism," C.C.A.R. Journal, (April, 1958), p. 3.
13. Petuchowski, "Self-definition" (see # 11) p. 8..
14. Ibid., p. 10.
15. Samuel E. Karff, "Judaism, Reform and Radical Freedom," C.C.A.R. Journal, (April, 1968), p. 29.
16. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "Problems of Reform Halakhah," Judaism, IV (Fall, 1955), p. 345; and "The Question of Jewish Theology," Judaism, VII (Winter, 1958), p. 52.
17. Arnold Jacob Wolf, "Issues of Faith: A Symposium on Fundamental Questions in Contemporary Jewish Theology," Dimension, I (Spring, 1967), pp. 11-12.
18. In the face of such freedom gone wild, Covenant Theologians have come very close to becoming a political sort of movement. Petuchowski, particularly, has expressed concern over the fact that often in the C.C.A.R., religious commitments seem to be a matter of majority votes. (see # 9 pp. 155-6 above) It seems that a man's membership in the C.C.A.R. no longer indicates anything whatsoever about what he believes. He alludes to a "new body" which some are contemplating. cf. Borowitz New Jewish Theology in the Making, p. 53; and "The Individual and the Community in Jewish Prayer" in Rediscovering Judaism, ed. Arnold Jacob Wolf (Chicago, 1965), p. 127 and p. 130.
19. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 8. and p. 206.
20. Wolf, "Introduction" to Rediscovering, p. 7.
21. Samuel Karff, "The Election, the Covenant, and the Mission of Israel" in Contemporary Reform Jewish Thought, ed. Bernard Martin (Chicago, 1968), p. 164.
22. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 148.

23. Jakob J. Petuchowski, Ever Since Sinai (New York, 1961), p. 82.
24. Eugene B. Borowitz, "Toward a Theology of Reform Jewish Practice," C.C.A.R. Journal, (April, 1960), p. 30.
25. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "Reflections on Revelation," C.C.A.R. Journal, (June, 1966), p. 7; and "The Grip of the Past--A study in the Dynamics of Religion," Judaism, VIII (Spring, 1959), p. 141, here he notes that the modern theologian has the task of seriously taking "the universal human testimony that the past has known giants of the spirit whose accomplishments have as yet remained unsurpassed."
26. e.g. Borowitz (In the Making, p. 135) writes "Commandment is the consequence of relationship. Sin is not the violation of a rule but action inappropriate to our covenant. Atonement is the search for a restoration of relationship."
27. Fackenheim (Quest, p. 70) explains "But perhaps revelation has been buried prematurely, after all. It is possible that this burial proves, not the demise of the interred, but an indecent haste on the part of the undertakers."
28. Ibid., p. 6.
29. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 37.
30. Fackenheim (Quest, p. 68) explains that "poetic inspiration is not supernatural; it is the natural product of man, and a product of God only in the sense in which every natural event may be so."
31. Eugene B. Borowitz, "On Celebrating Sinai," C.C.A.R. Journal, (June, 1966), p. 15; and Fackenheim (Quest, p. 55) reminds us that "If Jewish tradition...is true ...and obligatory for all men...[then]our obligation is no longer to Jewishness but to truth and goodness."
32. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 138.
33. Ibid., p. 72 "...the values of Judaism, if valid, are universally so; Judaism becomes a matter merely of rational individual subscription to a particular doctrine or school of thought, and any religious basis for the existence of the Jewish people lies in shambles." Similarly, p. 309 and Borowitz, "Celebrating Sinai" (see # 31 above) p. 14.

34. Petuchowski, Contemporary, ed. Martin, p. 115.
35. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "The Concept of Revelation in Reform Judaism," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, LXIX (1959), p. 215, here citing the Columbus Platform.
36. Arnold Jacob Wolf, "The Negro Revolution and Jewish Theology," Judaism, XIII (Fall, 1964), p. 481.
37. Petuchowski, "The Grip" (see # 25 above), p. 138.
38. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 122, and similarly, Petuchowski, "Footnotes" (see #10 above) p. 17.
39. Wolf, "Negro Revolution", p. 480, cf. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 176.
40. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 59.
41. Fackenheim, in a lecture delivered at H.U.C.-J.I.R., New York, April 18, 1967, commented: "I find it much easier in the 20th century to believe in an infinite God as over against the infinite perfectability of man."
42. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 140.
43. Ibid., p. 129.
44. Bernard Martin, "Comments on 'No Retreat from Reason!'," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, LXXVI (1966), p. 210; and "Can Jewish Worship be Restored?" C.C.A.R. Journal, (April, 1965), p. 28: "Faith in an impersonal cosmic process or power, as this is generally described by the religious naturalists, is no more validated by reason or science than is faith in the personal God of the Bible..."; and, Borowitz, In the Making, p. 185.
45. Fackenheim, Quest, pp. 163-4.
46. Ibid., p. 161.
47. Bernard Martin, "The God We Worship: An Existentialist View," Dimensions, II (Fall, 1967), p. 22.
48. Cf. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "The God We Worship: A Traditional View," Dimensions, II (Fall, 1967), p. 21.
49. Wolf, "Negro Revolution", p. 480.
50. Steven S. Schwarzschild, "The Role and Limits of Reason in Contemporary Jewish Theology," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, LXXIII (1963), p. 201.

51. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 73.
52. Ibid., p. 125.
53. Borowitz, "Celebrating Sinai," p. 16.
54. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 28.
55. Karff, "And Radical Freedom," p. 27 (see # 15 above).
56. Emil Fackenheim, "Man and His World in the Perspective of Judaism: Reflections on Expo' 67," Judaism, XVI (Spring, 1967), p. 168.
57. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 81.
58. Ibid., p. 138.
59. Borowitz, "Hope," p. 133 (see # 3 above).

Covenant Theology as a Theology: Part II

Introduction

1. Wolf, "Introduction", Rediscovering, p. 9. As we commence our study of the theology itself, I wish to point out that I have resolved grammatical inconsistencies within the writings of Covenant Theology.

1. The Covenant

1. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 147.
2. Fackenheim (Quest, p. 179) notes that "...belief is not belief at all unless it lays claim to objective truth."
3. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 41.
4. Arnold Jacob Wolf, "On God and Theology" in Contemporary, ed. Martin, p. 44.
5. Cf. Karff, "And Radical Freedom" p. 53 (see Part I, #15 above) "The brokenness of our age should not lead us to settle for a fragmented covenant. To restore its integrity is our inescapable task. This challenge defines both our freedom and its limits."

6. Borowitz, "Theology of Reform Practice" p. 30 (see Part I, # 24 above).
7. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 144.
8. Karff, "The Election," p. 162 (see Part I, # 21 above).
9. Maurice Friedman, "Biblical Dialogue, Covenant and Hasidic Fervor: A Symposium on 'My Jewish Affirmation'," Judaism, X (Fall, 1961), p. 301.
10. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "The Limits of 'People-Centered' Judaism," Commentary, XXVII (May, 1959), p. 394.
11. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 63.
12. Ibid., p. 211.
13. Samuel Karff, "The Three Dimensions of a Spiritual Life," in The Theological Foundations of Prayer, ed. Jack Bemporad, (New York, 1967), p. 117.
14. Harman E. Schaalman, "The Meaning of Jewish Survival," C.C.A.R. Journal, (Oct., 1968), p. 32.
15. Karff, "Spiritual Life," p. 121 (see II, l. # 13 above); he explains further on (p. 122) that "Covenant faith is an attitude toward the time of our life. Either life degenerates into a futile race against time or our life pulsates with the saving truth: 'Praised be Thou, O Lord, Who hast made our fleeting life significant by enabling us to do something for Thee.'"
16. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 67.
17. Emil Fackenheim, "Judaism and the Idea of Progress," Judaism, IV (Spring, 1955), pp. 130-31.
18. Karff, "Spiritual Life," p. 121 (see II, l. # 13 above); he notes earlier (p. 118) that "man is distinguished from other forms of creation, not uniquely by virtue of his intelligence but by virtue of his capacity to enter into a covenant with the Source of his being."
19. Polish, "God of Nature," p. 61 (see notes to Intro. #7).
20. Karff, "The Election," p. 168 (see Part I, # 21 above).
21. Eugene B. Borowitz, "The Individual and the Community in Jewish Prayer" in Rediscovering, ed. Wolf, p. 124.
22. Fackenheim, Quest, pp. 63-4.

23. Borowitz, In the Making, pp. 64-5.
24. Polish, "God of Nature," p. 61 (see Intro. # 7).
25. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 116.
26. Borowitz, In the Making, pp. 137-38.
27. Ibid., pp. 44-5; cf. David Polish, "Opportunities for Reform Judaism," C.C.A.R. Journal, (Oct., 1957), p. 15, "The concept of the entire Jewish people as a covenant-community should be developed."; Borowitz, Memorandum, (Oct., 1968), p. 2, cites Buber "Jewish faith is not merely personal; it is as much communal. To be a Jew means to share Israel's covenant relationship with God..."; Maurice Friedman, "Hasidism and the Contemporary Jew," Judaism, IX (Summer, 1960), p. 205, Hasidism calls the modern Jew "to a realization of the covenant through which the Jews became and have remained a people--a reminder that to become a 'holy people' means not just becoming a collection of well-meaning individuals but a never-ending realization of righteousness, justice and loving-kindness in true community."
28. Borowitz, "Theology of Reform Jewish Practice," p. 29, (see Part I, # 24).
29. Maurice Friedman, "Martin Buber's Biblical Judaism," C.C.A.R. Journal, (Jan., 1959), pp. 26-7, reminds that "the 'covenant' must be reaffirmed as the task of becoming a holy people [says Buber] and not just a collection of well-meaning individuals."
30. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 65.
31. Polish, "Opportunities," p. 14 (see Part II, 1, # 27).
32. Schaalman, "Jewish Survival," p. 32 (see II, 1, # 14).
33. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 66.
34. Karff, "The Election," p. 167, (see I, #21).
35. Dudley Weinberg, "The Demands of Prayer" in Foundations of Prayer, ed. Bemporad, p. 10.
36. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 64.
37. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 175.

38. Lou H. Silberman, "The Festivals, Another Point of View," C.C.A.R. Journal, (April, 1956), p. 16.
39. Martin, "Comments," p. 212 (see I # 44); cf. Borowitz, "Jewish Prayer" in Rediscovering, ed. Wolf, p. 121, "The Jew as man, as sharer in the covenant of Noah, is, like all men...But the Jew shares in the covenant of Sinai as well--that is what constitutes him a Jew, not just a man..."
40. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 64; here he outlines the order: "The covenant comes before the Torah, and, before the covenant, the election. First comes the realization that God has acted in a certain manner to bring about the redemption of Israel. Then comes Israel's acceptance of the Rulership of God, its willingness to give Him its undivided loyalty. And only then comes the 'giving of the Torah'."
41. Samuel E. Karff, "The Agada as a Source of Contemporary Jewish Theology," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, LXXIII (1963), p. 193.
42. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 311.

II.2. God, the Holy One, blessed be He.

1. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 246.
2. Wolf, "Negro Revolution," p. 481 (see I # 36); Eugene B. Borowitz, "On the Commentary Symposium: Alternatives in Creating a Jewish Apologetic," Judaism, XV (Fall, 1966), p. 3. Here he notes that "for God is a real and present reality to them [the younger men participating in the Commentary Symposium] and not just a concept. Their sense of Jewishness comes from living under His commandments in the here and now. These they know from the Tradition and from their personal experience of God's commanding presence."
3. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 43.
4. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 125.
5. Borowitz, Memorandum, (Oct., 1968), p. 2.

6. Bernard Martin, "Martin Buber and 20th Century Judaism," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, LXXVI (1966), p. 157; and cf. Petuchowski, "God We Worship," Dimension, (see I, # 48 above), p. 21, "I can only pray to something I can address because it address me. And, since something is not very likely to address me, we had better come out in the open and admit that we are referring to someone."
7. Schaalman, "Jewish Survival," p. 34 (see I # 14).
8. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 246; cf. Petuchowski, "God We Worship," p. 21 (see I # 48), here he notes that "...to have a will, love, and concern means that one is so constituted as to have them; and, in our human language, that kind of constitution is called 'personality'. When the psalmist asks (94:9): 'He that planted the ear, shall He not hear? He that formed the eye, shall He not see?' he could go on to say: 'He that endowed man with personality, shall He be less?' Tradition answers: He is infinitely more; but He cannot be less!" and cf. Emil Fackenheim, in a lecture delivered at H.U.C.-J.I.R., on "The Essence and Existence of Judaism," (Cincinnati, March 1, 1966).
9. Eugene B. Borowitz, "The Idea of God," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, LXVII (1957), p. 185.
10. Ibid., p. 181.
11. Maurice Friedman, "Revelation and Law in the Thought of Martin Buber," Judaism, III (Winter, 1954), p. 11.
12. Borowitz, "Celebrating Sinai," pp. 13-14 (see I # 31).
13. Cf. Polish, "God of Nature" in Contemporary, ed. Martin, p. 51 (see Intro. # 7), here he explains that "you may taunt me, God's mute, with my frenzied, angry inability to say what I mean by 'God' but you can refute only me, not God." He understands there to be a higher order of being, as it were, beyond the games of argument and speech.
14. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 133.
15. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 43.
16. Martin, "Worship be Restored," p. 27 (see I # 44).
17. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 247.

18. Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 41 (see II. 1. # 4).
19. Ibid., p. 45.
20. Wolf, "Introduction" to Rediscovering, p. 10 (see Intro. # 6).
21. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 246; and cf. Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 44 (see II. 1. # 4), notes that "but the turth is that we do not know the truth. Dogmatic humanists are much too sure that God is not something-or-other. We on the traditionalist side are much too ready to commit the Master of the Universe in writing to one or another of our own pet projects. But God is, whatever else, a Mystery."; and He notes in the same place, earlier, that God is very much like a King. "...A King is altogether mysterious. It is of the essence of a subject to be unable to understand his king. He feels the royal yoke; he cannot ever know the king. God, the King, is even more mysterious than earthly rulers...man can only face God, not understand Him." (p. 40).
22. Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 45 (see II. 1. # 4).
23. Wolf, "Issues of Faith," p. 13 (see I. # 17).
24. Ibid., p. 13.
25. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 67, here he notes that "God too, has a share in its coming, and in His own good time, if not our own, that great Messianic Day will dawn. This sure faith that God stands with him in history can give the individual Jew the patience, the holy obstinacy, to endure and to act. God moves through history, working out His will for the creation, and man has the privilege of serving as His partner though not as His surrogate."
26. Herman E. Schaalman, "Franz Rosenzweig: A Voice for Today," Christian Century, LXXXIV (Feb., 1967), p. 235.
27. Friedman, "Revelation and Law," p. 14 (see II.2. # 11).
28. Eugene B. Borowitz, a series of private discussions on revelation, (New York, late Winter and early Spring, 1967).
29. Ibid.,

30. Eugene B. Borowitz, "Believing Jews and Jewish Writers," Judaism, XIV (Spring, 1965), p. .
31. Petuchowski, "Self-definition," p. 9 (see I # 11).
32. Borowitz, "Theology of Reform Jewish Practice," p. 28, (see I # 24).
33. Borowitz, "Jewish Prayer" in Rediscovering, p. 119.
34. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "The Dialectics of Reason and Revelation" in Rediscovering, p. 30.
35. Ibid., p. 29.
36. Borowitz, "Idea of God," p. 180 (see II, 2. # 9).
37. Wolf, "Issues of Faith," p. 11 (see I # 17).
38. Wolf, "Response," p. 268 (see Intro. # 5).
39. Borowitz, "Celebrating Sinai," p. 13 (see I # 31).
40. Friedman, "Revelation and Law," p. 15 (see II.2. # 11).
41. David Polish, "The Need to Pray" in Foundations of Prayer, ed. Bemporad, pp. 22-3 (see II.1. # 13).
42. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "Can Modern Man Pray?" C.C.A.R. Yearbook, LXXVII (1967), p. 173.
43. Ibid., p. 176.
44. Ibid.,
45. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 66.
46. Borowitz, "Hope," p. 136 (see I. # 3).
47. Borowitz, "Idea of God," p. 180 (see II, 2. # 9).
48. Petuchowski, "Pray?" p. 176 (see II, 2. # 42).
49. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 42.
50. Ibid., p. 43.
51. Martin, "God We Worship," p. 22 (see I. # 47).
52. Karff, "The Election," p. 166 (see I. # 21).

53. Eugene B. Borowitz, "Subjectivity and the Malachic Process," Judaism, XIII (Spring, 1964), p. 211.
54. Friedman, "Revelation and Law," p. 13, (see II. 2. #11).
55. Dudley Weinberg, "Response to Five Questions" in The Condition of Jewish Belief: A Symposium compiled by the Editors of Commentary Magazine (New York, 1966), pp. 246-7.

II.3. Revelation.

1. Petuchowski, "Dialectics," p. 48 (see II.2. # 34), this reference to Euber also occurs in: Petuchowski, "Concept of Revelation in Reform," p. 212 (see I. #35); and Friedman, "Revelation and Law," p. 13 (see II.2. #11).
2. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 134.
3. Ibid., pp. 67-8; and p. 8, here he states the "Judaism is a history of encounters between God and Israel of which the evolution of ideas is a mere human reflection; that revelation differs qualitatively from human inspiration; that, because revelation is an event of divine incursion shot through with human interpretation, all liberal-orthodox conflicts within Judaism are secondary..."
4. Bernard Martin, "Reform Jewish Theology Today" in Contemporary, ed. Martin, p. 198.
5. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 248; cf. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 47, reminds us that "a ruler who is held inconmun-icado cannot very well exercise his rulership to any effect. The concept of the 'Sovereign of the Universe' in Judaism, therefore, inevitably leads to the concept of Torah, to the revelation of God's Will to man."
6. Petuchowski, "Dialectics," p. 49 (see II.2. # 34).
7. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 71; Fackenheim carefully considers the implications of this paradox of infinite meeting finite, or eternal meeting temporal, and concludes that, given the ground rules of philosophy, such could not occur in time, while simultaneously preserving the identities of the participants. He suggests rather, that revelation occurred "...in the timeless moment in which eternity passes into time." (Quest, p. 74), cf. also, Quest, p. 245 and p. 249.

8. Borowitz, Memorandum (Oct., 1968), p. 3; here he notes that "so while the sacred words may be human, they have power as an authentic response to the Living God. Revelation is always a covenant between God and man."
9. Herman E. Schaalman, "Response to Five Questions" in The Condition of Jewish Belief: A Symposium compiled by the Editors of Commentary Magazine (New York, 1966), pp. 201-202.
10. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 247, and cf. Friedman, "Revelation and Law" p. 9 (see II.2. # 11), here he cites Buber, "The genuine life of faith develops on the spiritual heights, but it springs from the depths of distress of the earthbound body...Wherever the action of nature as well as spirit is perceived as a gift, Revelation takes place."
11. Martin, "20th Century Judaism," p. 157 (see II.2. # 6).
12. Fackenheim examines the philosophic problems entailed by a divinely revealed morality in an essay by the same name, see ch. 14 in Quest, and pp. 143 and 145.
13. Karff, "The Election," p. 173 (see I. # 21).
14. Emil Fackenheim, "The Revealed Morality of Judaism and Modern Thought" in Rediscovering, p. 54.
15. Friedman, "Revelation and Law," p. 10 (see II.2. # 11).
16. Polish, "God of Nature," pp. 59-60 (see Intro. # 7).
17. Wolf, "Issues of Faith," p. 13 (see I. # 17).
18. David Polish, "Current Trends in Jewish Theology," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, LXIII (1953), p. 429.
- 18a. Petuchowski, "Reflections," pp. 10-11 (see I. #25).
19. Cf. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 23.
20. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 80 and similarly, Petuchowski, "Concept of Revelation in Reform," p. 212 (see I. #35), and "Dialectics," p. 48 (see II.2. # 34).
21. Fackenheim, "Revealed Morality," pp. 65-6 (see II.3.#14).
22. Friedman, "Revelation and Law," p. 12 (see II.2. # 11), here he is citing Buber.
23. Petuchowski, "Dialectics," p. 32 ff. (see II.2. # 34).

24. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 115.
25. Cf. Fackenheim, Quest, ch. 7.
26. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 146.
27. Ibid., pp. 78-9.
28. Steven S. Schwarzschild, "Franz Rosenzweig and Existentialism," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, LXII (1953), p. 418.
29. Schaalman, "Rosenzweig," p. 235 (see II.2. # 26).
30. Weinberg, "Response," p. 246 (see II.2. # 55).
31. Schwarzschild, "Role and Limits," p. 200 (see I. # 50).
32. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 146.
33. Petuchowski, "Reflections," p. 7 (see I. # 25); cf. Ever Since, p. 36: "Torah is the result (in whatever form we may conceive of it) of an act of divine revelation. What Torah means to us will, therefore, very much depend on what God means to us."
34. Petuchowski, Ever Since, ch. 1 ff.
35. Martin, "20th Century Judaism," p. 155 (see II.2. # 6), here he cites Buber.
36. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 307.
37. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "Revelation and the Modern Jew," Journal of Religion, XLI (Jan., 1961), pp. 28-9.
38. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "The Supposed Dogma of the Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch," Hilbert Journal, LVII, no. 227 (July, 1959), p. 359.
39. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 80.
40. Borowitz, "Celebrating Sinai," p. 20 (see I. # 31).
41. Petuchowski, "Concept of Revelation in Reform," p. 219 (see I. # 35).
42. Ibid.
43. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "Not by Bread Alone," Judaism, VII (Summer, 1958), p. 234.

44. Wolf, "Issues of Faith," p. 13 (see I. # 17).

45. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 82.

II.4. Halakhah: Torah-for-me.

1. Polish, "Opportunities for Reform," p. 15 (see II.1.#27).
2. Samuel Karff, "Toward a Theological Dialogue," C.C.A.R. Journal, (Jan., 1966), p. 53.
3. Samuel Karff, "The Ten Commandments: Proxy or Paradigm?" C.C.A.R. Journal, (June, 1966), pp. 39-40.
4. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 35.
5. Petuchowski, "People-Centered," p. 394 (see II.1. # 10).
6. Karff, "Ten Commandments," p. 37 (see II.4. # 3).
7. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 308.
8. Borowitz, "Celebrating Sinai," p. 17 (see I. # 31).
9. Friedman, "Revelation and Law," p. 19, (see II.2. # 11); and similarly, Maurice Friedman, "Martin Buber and Judaism," C.C.A.R. Journal, (Oct., 1955), p. 18; in both instances he cites Buber.
10. Wolf, "Issues of Faith," p. 13 (see I. # 17).
11. Borowitz, "Theology of Reform Jewish Practice," p. 27 (see I. # 24).
12. Cf. Ibid., p. 27 and "Response to Five Questions," pp.37-8, / (see below II.4.#14) where he states that "until then I am satisfied to let each Jew ask, mindful of other Jews, and the tradition, what does God want of me, a member of His covenant people?"
13. Borowitz, "Theology of Reform Jewish Practice," p. 27. (see I. # 24).
14. Eugene B. Borowitz, "Response to Five Questions" in The Condition of Jewish Belief: A Symposium compiled by the Editors of Commentary Magazine (New York, 1966), p. 38.

15. Cf. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 41, explains that "Jewish law...is the response of the Jewish people through its prophets and sages to the demands of the real God whom it encountered in history and sought to serve in communal and individual existence."
16. Fackenheim, Quest, pp. 308-9.
17. Petuchowski, "People-centered," p. 394 (see II.1. # 10).
18. Karff, "Theological Dialogue," p. 53 (see II.4. # 2).
19. Friedman, "Revelation and Law," p. 15 (see II.2. # 11), here he cites Buber.
20. Borowitz, "Theology of Reform Practice," p. 28 (see I. # 24).
21. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "Response to Five Questions" in The Condition of Jewish Belief: A Symposium compiled by the Editors of Commentary Magazine (New York, 1966), p. 159.
22. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 143.
23. Friedman, "Biblical Dialogue," p. 301 (see II.1. # 9).
24. Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 48.(see II.1. # 4).
25. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 79.
26. Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 48 (see II.1. # 4).
27. Petuchowski, "Reform Halakhah," p. 348 (see I. # 16).
28. Martin, "Theology Today," p. 201 (see II.3. # 4); cf. Petuchowski, "Concept of Revelation in Reform," p. 223 (see I. # 35), Petuchowski notes that "the recovery of the 'revelatory occasion and idea' is that basis on which alone our deliberations on 'guides' and 'practice' can be meaningful."
29. Wolf, "Issues of Faith," p. 12 (see I. # 17).
30. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 110.
31. Weinberg, "Response," p. 248 (see II.2. # 55).
32. Borowitz, "Theology of Reform Jewish Practice," p. 32 (see I. # 24).

33. Ibid., p. 31
34. Ibid.
35. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 111.
36. Friedman, "Liberal Judaism," p. 28 (see I. # 8).
37. Fackenheim, "Outline," p. 249 (see Intro. # 8).
38. David Polish, "A Guide for Our Congregations," C.C.A.R. Journal, (Jan., 1966), p. 73.
39. Fackenheim, "Idea of Progress," p. 130 (see II.1. #17).
40. Polish, "Current Trends," p. 428 (see II.3. #18).
41. Fackenheim, "Outline," p. 249 ff. (see Intro. #8).
42. Fackenheim, Quest, pp. 116-7.
43. Petuchowski, "Footnotes," p. 15 (see I. #10); and cf. Karff, "Ten Commandments," p. 39 (see II.4. # 3) for a dissenting view.
44. Borowitz, In the Making, pp. 65-6.
45. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "Toward Jewish Religious Unity: A Symposium," Judaism, XV (Spring, 1966), p. 139 ff.
46. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 66; and cf. for a different conclusion, Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 48, (see II.1. # 4), here Wolf states: "And out of the dialogue with God, both historical and personal, there emerges a way. Now, this way is different for different people. I think, though some may disagree, that this was always true in Judaism, that the way was never a single way. It certainly is no longer a single way."
47. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 114.
48. Wolf, "Introduction" to Rediscovering, p. 9. (see Intro. # 6).

11.5. The Tradition as a Standard of Authority.

1. Borowitz, In the Making, pp. 192-3.
2. Steven S. Schwarzschild, "The Messianic Doctrine in Contemporary Jewish Thought" in Great Jewish Ideas, ed. Abraham E. Millgram (Clinton, Mass., 1964), p. 257, and cf. Borowitz, "Hope," p. 141 (see I. # 3) here Borowitz notes that "we have had the experience of reaching a hoped for future and found it wanting... [we] have learned, decisively, I think, that having is not being."
3. Borowitz, In the Making, pp. 204-5.
4. Borowitz, Discussions (see II.2. #28).
5. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 127.
6. Martin, "Comments," p. 209 (see I. #44).
7. Borowitz, Discussions (see II.2. #28).
8. Borowitz, "Hope," p. 136 (see I. #3).
9. Borowitz, In the Making, pp. 204-5.
10. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 150.
11. Ibid., p. 33.
12. Ibid., p. 177, and cf. Schaalman, "Jewish Survival," pp. 33-4 (see II.1. #14).
13. Karff, "Radical Freedom," p. 21 (see I. #15).
14. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 30.
15. Borowitz, Discussions, (see II.2. #28).
16. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 123, and cf. p. 34, and cf. Borowitz, "Response," p. 33 (see II.4. #14) and Borowitz, "Halachic Process," p. 219 (see II.2. #53).
17. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 32 and p. 35, where he states that "a self revealed as caught in relativity cannot be the source of ultimate integration, nor does it seem able to recover any access to an absolute God."
18. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 120.

19. Ibid., p. 205.
20. Petuchowski, "Limits of Liberal," p. 156 (see I. #9).
21. Borowitz, Discussions (see II.2. #28).
22. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 187; and cf. Ben Hamon, p. 483 (see I. #1); and cf. Eugene B. Borowitz, "On the Commentary Symposium: Alternatives in Creating a Jewish Apologetic," Judaism, XV (Fall, 1966), p. 6, here he explains: "We must bring the inquirer to see that this dialogue is not one between his enlightened, impartial reason and our subjective, mystic Judaism, but between two types of faith, one as personal as the other. The ultimate issue is not whether Judaism can be demonstrated as rational as enlightened secularism, but only which faith is more adequate to the human situation in its radical depth."
23. Borowitz, "Response," pp. 32-3, (see II.4. #14).
24. Borowitz, "Hope," p. 144 (see I. #3).
25. Borowitz, "Celebrating Sinai," p. 23 (see I. #31).
26. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 194.
27. Ibid., pp. 183 and 202.
28. Ibid., pp. 188-9.
29. Borowitz, Memorandum, (Oct., 1968), p. 1 (see Intro.#1).
30. Borowitz, "Response," p. 31 (see II.4. #14).
31. Borowitz, Memorandum, (Oct., 1968), p. 3 (see Intro.#1).
32. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 189.
33. Borowitz, "Response," p. 34 (see II.4. #14).
34. Lou H. Silberman, "The Task of Jewish Theology" in Rediscovering, ed. Wolf, p. 27.
35. Borowitz, Discussions (see II.2. #28).
36. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 208.
37. Schaalman, "Jewish Survival," p. 35 (see II.1. #14).
38. Borowitz, "Response," p. 36 (see II.4. #14).

39. Borowitz, Discussions (see II.2. #28).
40. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 195.
41. Ibid., p. 191.
42. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 131, here he points out that Judaism can only continue to exist if "what speaks to him [the liberal Jew] through it [the Jewish past] is not merely the voice of man but the voice of God."
43. Karff, "Ten Commandments," p. 36 (see II.4. #3).
44. Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 44 (see II.1. #4).
45. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 140.
46. Arnold Jacob Wolf, "A More Traditional and Radical Prayerbook" in The Theological Foundations of Prayer, ed. Jack Bemporad (New York, 1967), p. 98.
47. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 110.
48. Wolf, "Issues of Faith," p. 13 (see I. #17); and cf. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 108.
49. Wolf, "Response," p. 268 (see Intro. #5); N.B. Wolf's style--its poetry is critical to his point.
50. Borowitz, In the Making, pp. 191-2.
51. Ibid., pp. 192-4.
52. Schwarzschild, "Role and Limits," p. 199 (see I. #50).
53. Steven S. Schwarzschild, "Directions for Contemporary Jewish Philosophy: To Re-cast Rationalism," Judaism, XI (Summer, 1962), p. 209 and cf. e.g. Schwarzschild, "Role and Limits," p. 205 (see I. #50) where he provides a noteworthy personal example. In an attempt to expel all human, culturally determined readings of the text, he cantillates the Torah, finding that "the ta'amim force the reader to use the intonation of God rather than his own..."
54. Schwarzschild, "Role and Limits," p. 202 (see I. #50), and p. 203 where he explains that "...Judaism opposes [to any earthly society]...'the Sinaitic society', the society of God as defined in Torah and Halacha."

55. Silberman, "The Task," p. 22 (see II.5. #34).
56. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
57. Fackenheim, "Outline," p. 244 (see Intro. #8).
58. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 140.
59. Schwarzschild, "Role and Limits," p. 200 (see I. #50).
60. Karff, "Agada," p. 197 (see II.1. #41).

II.6. Existentialist Leanings.

1. Wolf, "On God and Theology," pp. 46-7 (see II.1. #4).
2. Eugene B. Borowitz, "Existentialism's Meaning for Judaism: A Contemporary Midrash," Commentary, XXVIII (Nov., 1959), p. 414.
3. E.g. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 63; Borowitz, Memorandum (Oct., 1966), p. 1; Wolf, "Introduction" to Rediscovering, p. 11.
4. Wolf, "Introduction" to Rediscovering, p. 11.
5. Joseph H. Gumbiner, "Towards a Definition of Existentialism," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, LXII (1953), pp. 405-6, here he explains: "The existentialist thinker seeks to know an ultimate source of being which is beyond the subject-object distinction. Since subjectivity is suspect in our culture and the source of existential being is in danger of being swallowed up by the objectivity of scientism, the existentialists respond with a passionate espousal of subjectivity."
6. Schwarzschild, "Rosenzweig," pp. 422-7 (see II.3. #28).
7. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 163.
8. Fackenheim, Quest, pp. 150-51.
9. Eugene B. Borowitz, "Theological Conference: Cincinnati 1950: Reform Judaism's Fresh Awareness of Religious Problems," Commentary, LX (June, 1950), p. 569.
10. Schaalman, "Jewish Survival," p. 36 (see II.1. #14).
11. Schwarzschild, "Role and Limits," pp. 202-3 (see I. #50).

12. Borowitz, "Response," p. 32 (see II.4. #14).
13. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 31 and cf. Borowitz, "Response," p. 32 (see II.4. #14), he notes: "Today, only religious faith, only Judaism or Christianity, can provide the basis for a social (and therefore personal) ethic worthy of the name. The man who values high intellectuality, social responsibility, compassion for the underprivileged, and justice for the powerless, the man who insists that self-fulfillment must simultaneously mean devotion to mankind's ennoblement, finds those values increasingly without foundation in today's world."
14. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 31.
15. Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 47 (see II.1. #4); and cf. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 140.
16. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 18; and cf. Emil Fackenheim, "Jewish Values in the Post-holocaust Future: A Symposium," Judaism, XVI (Summer, 1967), p. 270, here he notes: "No contemporary Jewish historian at the time of the destruction of the First or the Second Temple could have fully understood the world-historical significance of that event, if only because, in the midst of the crisis, he was not yet on the other side of it."
17. Borowitz, In the Making, pp. 186-7.
18. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 62.
19. Polish, "God of Nature," p. 55 (see Intro. #7).
20. Ibid., pp. 52-3.
21. Martin, "Comments," p. 210 (see I. #44).
22. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 47.
23. Ibid., p. 231.
24. Fackenheim, "Outline," p. 244 (see Intro. #8).
25. Ibid., pp. 243-4.
26. Schwarzschild, "Rosenzweig," p. 428 (see II.3. #28).
27. Borowitz, Discussions (see II.2. #28).

28. Emil Fackenheim, "In the Theological Journals: Some Recent 'Rationalistic' Reactions to the 'New Jewish Theology'," C.C.A.R. Journal, (June, 1959), p. 42, here Fackenheim is speaking of Buber, Rosenzweig, Heschel and Herberg.
29. Fackenheim, "Outline," p. 245 (see Intro. #8), cf. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 75.
30. Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 40 (see II.1. #4).
31. Fackenheim, "Revealed Morality?" p. 54 (see II.3. #14).
32. Fackenheim, Lecture 1967 (see I. #41).
33. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 151.
34. Samuel S. Cohon, "Existentialism and Judaism: Introductory Remarks," C.C.A.R. Yearbook, LXII (1953), p.400.

II.7. Beyond Reason.

1. Weinberg, "Response," p. 245 (see II.2. #55).
2. Borowitz, "Idea of God," p. 185 (see II.2. #9).
3. Schwarzschild, "Role and Limits," p. 214 (see I. #50).
4. Ibid., p. 206, he notes here also that the role of reason is to remove "from the mind everything that environment and personal prejudice, in short, everything that is not required...and leave us exclusively with the barest necessity, the primum vire, of human existence..."
5. Petuchowski, "Dialectics," p. 50 (see II.2. # 34).
6. Polish, "Current Trends," p. 427 (see II.3. # 18); and cf. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 178.
7. Schwarzschild, "Role and Limits," p. 211 (see I. #50).
8. Silberman, "The Task," p. 25 (see II.5. #34).
9. Martin, "Theology Today," p. 186 (see II.3. #4), cf. Steven S. Schwarzschild, "Speech and Silence before God," Judaism, X (Summer, 1961), pp.203-4; and Polish, "Current Trends," pp. 427-8 (see II.3. #18).

10. Schwarzschild, "Re-cast," p. 208 (see II.5. #53).
11. Petuchowski, "Pray?" p. 173 (see II.2. #42).
12. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 78.
13. Petuchowski, "Reflections," p. 4 (see I. #25).
14. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 199.
15. Borowitz, "Idea of God," p. 182 (see II.2. #9) and "On the Commentary Symposium," p. 4 (see II.5. #22).
16. Borowitz, "Midrash," p. 420 (see II.6. #2).
17. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 178.
18. Ben Hamon, p. 483.
19. Schaalman, "Jewish Survival," pp. 33-4 (see II.1. #14).
20. Cf. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 74 notes: "Metaphysical attempts are similarly doomed. The area of metaphysics, while not necessarily empirical, is yet rational; but the miraculous, if it exists, is extra-rational." Cf. also, Martin, "Comments," pp. 209-10 (see I. #44).
21. Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 48 (see II.1. #4).
22. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 201 and cf. also "Revealed Morality," p. 54 (see II.3. #14) where he points out that "...religious thinking...is from beginning to end committed thinking...[while] philosophical thinking must be from beginning to end detached thinking."
23. Weinberg, "Demands," p. 7 (see II.1. #35).
24. Martin, "20th Century Judaism," p. 160 (see II.2. #6).
25. Martin, "Worship be Restored?" p. 29 (see I. #44).
26. ibid., p. 30.
27. Petuchowski, Ever Since, pp. 77-8.
28. Schaalman, "Jewish Survival," p. 34 (see II.1. #14).
29. Wolf, "On God and Theology," pp. 40-1 (see II.1. #4); cf. p. 45: "Reason is the invasion of mystery by which, every year, less is known because more seems to be. Mind cannot complete the work it is not free to desist from altogether."

30. Lawrence Kushner, "You Can't Eat Atmosphere: A Sermon," Variant (Winter, 1969), pp. 16 ff.
31. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 133.
32. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 125.
33. Martin, "Worship be Restored?" p. 30 (see I. #44).
34. Friedman, "Buber and Judaism," p. 15 (see II.4. #9).
35. Cf. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 43.
36. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 38.
37. Borowitz, In the Making, p. 109.
38. Petuchowski, Ever Since, p. 40.
39. Petuchowski, "Reform Halakhah," p. 350 (see I. #16).
40. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 80.
41. Jakob J. Petuchowski, "The God of Experience and of Faith" delivered on The Message of Israel (March, 27, 1966).
42. Borowitz, In the Making, pp. 127-8.
43. Ibid., p. 180.
44. Ibid., p. 128.
45. Petuchowski, "Pray?" p. 173 (see II.2. #42).

II.8. The Total Human Response.

1. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 38.
2. Lawrence Kushner, "Chapel Sermon," (H.U.C., Cincinnati, 1968).
3. Fackenheim, "Revealed Morality," p. 55 (see II.3. #14).
4. Borowitz, In the Making, pp. 132-3.
5. Ibid., pp. 1 and 63.

6. Schaalman, "Jewish Survival," p. 35 (see II.1. #14).
7. Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 48 (see II.1. #4).
8. Wolf, "Negro Revolution," p. 482 (see I. #36).
9. Wolf, "Issues of Faith," p. 10 (see I, #17).
10. Silberman, "The Festivals," p. 18 (see II.1. #38).
11. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 309.
12. Petuchowski, "The Question," p. 49 (see Intro. #10).
13. Borowitz, "Celebrating Sinai," pp. 21-2 (see I. #31).
14. Wolf, "On God and Theology," p. 46 (see II.1. #4).
15. Martin, "Theology Today," p. 210 (see II.3. #4).
16. Karff, "The Election," p. 173 (see I. #21).
17. Petuchowski, "Reflections," p. 9 (see I. #25).
18. Petuchowski, "Dialectics," p. 41 (see II.2. #34).
19. Friedman, "Liberal Judaism," p. 28 (see I. #8), here he states that "a living dialogue with the tradition should be fostered in which the study of a religious text can no longer be separated from the attempt to discover its existential meaning for our own lives and for the lives of Jews of former generations!;"
20. Martin, "20th Century Judaism," p. 156 (see II.2. #6).
21. Friedman, "Buber's Biblical Judaism," p. 21 (see II.1. #29),
22. Fackenheim, Quest, p.200, cf. p. 240, in like manner do we know any being: "A self is primordially open to other selves; and unless it were thus open it would never become a self at all. A child becomes an 'I' in a relation of openness to a 'Thou'; indeed, he knows the meaning of 'Thou' before he knows the meaning of 'I'...born free of prisons of this kind, the self is subsequently cast into them by the breakdown of communication."

Part III: Epilogue.

1. This section was initially delivered as a paper entitled "The Relevance of 'Grooving with' in Understanding the Self-Authenticating Quality of Religious Intensity; A Movie," at Theological Conversations (H.U.C., Cincinnati, Feb. 20, 1969); a good time was had by all.
2. Petuchowski, "Pray?" p. 172 (see II.2. #42).
3. Petuchowski, "Dialectics," p. 47 (see II.2. #34).
4. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 43.
5. Cf. Ibid., p. 42, here Fackenheim notes: "...scientific inquiry deals with the realm of objects."
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York, 1958), p. 8.
7. Cf. Gumbiner (see II.6. #5), p. 403: "Existentialist thinkers regard man's immediate experience as more completely revelatory of the nature of reality than man's cognitive experience."
8. Kushner, "Eat Atmosphere," p. 16 ff.
9. Borowitz, "Response," p. 32 (see II.4. #14).
10. "Introduction to Playboy Interview: Marshall McLuhan," Playboy (March, 1969), p. 54.
11. Wolf, "Prayerbook," p. 97 (see II.5. #46).
12. William Kloran, "'2001' and 'Hair'--Are They the Groove of the Future?" New York Times, May 12, 1968, p. D-15.
13. Fackenheim, Quest, p. 4.
14. Kloran, p. D-15.
15. Friedman, "Liberal Judaism," p. 16 (see I. #8).
16. Walter Kerr, "But What is the Play About?" New York Times, Jan. 26, 1969, p. D-1.
17. Anthony Schillaci, "Film as Environment," Saturday Review (Dec., 28, 1968), pp. 8 ff.

18. Ibid., p. 9.
19. Schaalman, "Jewish Survival," p. 34.(see II.2. #26).
20. Borowitz, "Celebrating Sinai," p. 21 (see I. #31).
21. Kloman, p. D-15.
22. Petuchowski, "Dialectics," p. 50 (see II.2. #34).
23. Schillaci, p. 9.
24. Kloman, p. D-15.
25. Schillaci, p. 10.
26. Kloman, p. D-15.
27. Borowitz, Discussions (see II.2. #28).
28. Petuchowski, "Pray?" p. 173 (see II.2. #42).
29. Fackenheim, Quest, pp. 185-6.
30. Petuchowski, "Pray?" p. 174 (see II.2. #42).
31. Polish, "God of Nature," p. 56,(see Intro. #7).
32. Borowitz, "On the Commentary Symposium," p. 3 (see II.5. #22).
33. Martin, "20th Century Judaism," p. 157.(see II.2. #5).
34. Friedman, "Liberal Judaism," p. 28 (see I. #8).
35. Polish, "God of Nature," p. 52 (see Intro. #7).
36. Schwarzschild, "Speech and Silence," pp. 196-7 (see II.7. #9).

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