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TITLE Salomon Formstecher's Concept of Judaism...

SALOMON FORMSTECHER'S CONCEPT OF JUDAISM

as Presented in his

"DIE RELIGION DES GEISTES"

with Special Consideration of his Sources

by

Leo Lichtenberg

Submitted in partial
fulfillment of the
requirements for the
degree of Rabbi.

Cincinnati, 1940

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PREFACE

Our study is designed to give a picture as complete as possible of the system of Salomon Formstecher and to present it in its historical frame. We are aware of the fact that the completeness of this picture is impaired by the lack of a philosophical analysis, in which the influences of German philosophy on Formstecher are pointed out. However, several reasons compelled us to this omission: first of all, we are lacking the general philosophical background, which would make such an analysis valuable; secondly, some of the writers who worked on our subject before and who will be quoted in our discussion, have dealt with this particular question, and particularly Schoeps presents a rather detailed analysis of Schelling's influence on Formstecher. Since we did not want to merely report these findings without any original addition, we prefer to refer the reader to those studies which have been published. For the same reason, i. e. in order not to be repetitious, we attempt in the following to deal with the already treated parts of Formstecher's system with comparative brevity, in order to be able to devote more attention to those of Formstecher's ideas, which in the past have not been treated at all or only briefly, i. e., a more detailed description of his historical construction and of his treatment of source-material.

INTRODUCTION

Salomon Formstecher was a German Jew, who lived from 1808 until 1889 ¹⁾ With the exception of his college-years he lived in Offenbach on-the-Main, where he was "Grossherzoglicher Rabbiner" from 1842 on, after he had officiated in that community as preacher and religious teacher for ten years. In his early youth, he received both, a secular education based mainly on classical languages in a so-called "Lateinschule" and a Jewish education from the then Offenbach rabbi. He obtained his university education at Giessen where he studied philosophy, philology, and theology and received his doctorate there after three years.²⁾

Although "Die Religion des Geistes" furnishes ample proof that he had diligently absorbed the philosophical systems of his own time as well as those of ages long passed, he is not really a philosopher in the sense that he produced a system of his own. Already Samuel Hirsch calls our book "an eclectic work".³⁾ Formstecher really is a theologian, who expresses his ideas on theology, on Judaism, its history and its mission in philosophical terms or within a system of a certain philosopher as long as he can use this system for his theological purpose. When, however, this system comes to a conclusion which would contradict his own theology, he does not hesitate to depart from it. As to the philosophers who exerted their influence on Formstecher, there

is no complete unanimity among those who have written about him. There is a rather complete consensus of opinion, however, that it was Schelling's system more than anything else, which was used by Formstecher. Whereas, Wiener⁴⁾ speaks of Fegel's, but mainly Schelling's influence, Guttman⁵⁾ mentions Schelling only. Maybaum⁶⁾ states that at times Formstecher's diction bears Hegelian character; furthermore, that Formstecher adopted Hegel's profound "geschichtsphilosophische Einsichten", and that Formstecher is Hegel's disciple as far as philosophy of religion is concerned. Yet, it would be wrong to label him as a Hegelian. He, too, points to the influence Schelling has exerted on Formstecher.

Schoeps⁷⁾, who calls Maybaum's study an "oberflaechliche Rabbinatsarbeit"⁸⁾, accuses Maybaum of stating that Formstecher thought much along Hegelian lines.⁹⁾ Furthermore, Schoeps claims that Maybaum's statement concerning Hegel's influence on Formstecher seems to be wrong - if for no other reason - because Samuel Hirsch¹⁰⁾ rejected Formstecher's work so strongly. Strangely enough, Hirsch himself did not feel this way, for he characterized Formstecher's approach as being "partly à la Fichte - partly à la Hegel".¹¹⁾

Waxman¹²⁾ mentions only Schelling as a philosophical influence on Formstecher. He calls Formstecher's system "even contradictory in itself, for it is difficult to see

how the author can reconcile the election of Israel as the special bearer of the spirit with his semi-pantheistic conception of God, unless he attributes to him a personality, which assumption is excluded by the author's definition of God".^{12a)} But, since Formstecher says of God that He is "a free Being determining Himself"¹³⁾, we need not only assume that he had a personal God-concept, but we know it from this phrase. It may be, then, that this concept of the personal God is not consistent with his theory concerning the World-Soul.^{13a)}

As we mentioned before, Samuel Hirsch who so vigorously condemns Formstecher's eclecticism¹¹⁾ calling him an "eclectic of the worst kind"¹¹⁾, finds also elements of Fichte's in Formstecher's system.¹⁴⁾ Similarly, Lewkowitz¹⁵⁾ describes Formstecher as using for his philosophy of religion the "Weltbild" of Schelling and Fichte, leaning upon Schelling's philosophy of nature and on Fichte's philosophy of spirit.

Aside from these philosophical influences, which by themselves would be sufficient to classify our author as a "child of the nineteenth century", we will be more able to understand him as such when we recall some of the political and inner-Jewish circumstances by which he was necessarily conditioned, i. e. we must always bear in mind that his period was that of the German Jews' struggle for emancipation as well

as that of the early stages of Liberal and Reform Judaism.

In fact, at the time of Formstecher's writing, the first rabbinical conference discussing the measures of Reform had not yet taken place, and Zunz,¹⁶⁾ epoch-making book had just appeared a decade ago. Formstecher, then, can be rightly called a pioneer of Reform although he did not play a very conspicuous role at the rabbinical conferences as we shall soon see. In his book, however, he lays down some of the foremost principals of the early Reform-Movement, namely: the universal character of Judaism,¹⁷⁾ the secondary and transitory importance of the ritual law which he expresses by distinguishing between "Judaism as a phenomenon and Judaism as an idea"¹⁸⁾, the disappearance of a Jewish nationality¹⁹⁾, and the concept of Israel's mission to mankind.²⁰⁾ It is these ideas on which Reform was originally built and which were partly modified in the course of the development of Reform mainly under the influence of Jewish nationalism and Zionism.

Formstecher's presence at all three rabbinical conferences²¹⁾ and his utterances there show clearly how much he was a part of the newly-born Reform-Movement.²²⁾ In order to give a more complete picture of his endeavours in the field of Reform we shall briefly discuss here some of the utterances he made at these rabbinical conferences.

When, in Frankfurt, the following question was put to a

vote: "Is the Hebrew language in our services an objectively legal necessity?", Formstecher refused to vote because he did not want to be inconsistent by acknowledging an objective legality within the system of Judaism.²³⁾ Although he does not plead for the abolition of Hebrew, he is consistent enough to see that he cannot argue for retaining of Hebrew in the liturgy by ascribing to it objective legality. We may add here that no member of this conference answered the question in the affirmative. At the previous meeting, Formstecher pleads for the statement of a creed.²⁴⁾ Since he does not make any remark as to the contents of such a creed, we must not accuse him of being inconsistent with what he said on this subject in his book; for there he denies only the existence of dogmas which cannot be harmonized with reason.²⁵⁾ However, in the course of a discussion at Frankfurt, he speaks up against an inclusion of the Messiah-concept into the liturgy, "since such an inclusion could too easily be considered as a statement of dogma concerning it (the Messiah-concept)".²⁶⁾ Later on he repeats that "any definite statement of creed in the liturgy ought to be avoided".²⁷⁾

Since his demand for a creed was also expressed in a discussion on prayer, and since he says in the same context that the liturgy is determined or conditioned by a creed²⁴⁾, we must assume that he wanted such a statement of creed for

clarification and as a guiding principle, but that he was opposed to include such a statement in the liturgy as had been done centuries ago with the Maimonidaean creed.

As radical as Formstecher may have appeared to be to some of his contemporaries in Germany, he would not be a radical among the American Reform Rabbis of today. He, e. g., pleaded for retaining some reference to the sacrificial cult in the liturgy; naturally, he did not mean to pray for the reinstitution of the sacrificial cult, but he wanted it to be remembered as "the Biblical form of Divine worship".²⁸⁾

At Breslau²⁹⁾, Formstecher has occasion to deliver a rather lengthy address on the Sabbath, in the course of which he restates briefly some of the main points dealt with in his book. Previously in the discussion, someone had made the statement that the Sabbath is a symbol, whereupon our author claims that "the Sabbath is no symbol but an end in itself according to the idea of Judaism as a religion of the spirit, as is proved by the continuous reference in the Sabbath commandment to the Divine creation of the world."³⁰⁾ He then repeats his theory concerning the relationship between nature and spirit in man, stating that man needs the Sabbath for his spiritual life, since he must devote the six days of labor to the interests of the body. Without the Sabbath man would not be able to live up to the ideal of the spirit,

he would become a slave to his body.³¹⁾ Realizing the neglect of the Sabbath in contemporary Jewish life, he appeals to his colleagues to initiate and to support "Sabbathvereine", associations working in their congregations for the observance of the Sabbath. The members of these associations shall pledge themselves to keep the Sabbath in a sensible fashion and to attempt to persuade others to follow their example.³²⁾ Yet, it seems as though Formstecher's strong convictions on this subject could not be too effective even in his own congregation, where he instituted Sunday afternoon services in 1847.³³⁾

These few examples may suffice to show that our author was an active participant in the effort to bring Judaism into harmony with the contemporary German scene, and his book can only be understood and appreciated if this circumstance is borne in mind, Formstecher's stand on emancipation and the way in which he combines this question with the religious problem will be dealt with later. Attention shall be called here only to one reaction to Formstecher's work in the non-Jewish world. Friedrich Wilhelm Carove, a Catholic³⁴⁾, was obviously interested in the problem of Jewish emancipation, a subject on which he wrote a booklet in 1845.³⁵⁾ He is not opposed to emancipation; he believes "that every German state,

which claims to have reached the height of the contemporary age, should not make dependent the civil rights of Jewish and non-Jewish natives on the profession of one of the denominations publicly recognized; (the state should rather) recognize liberty, which cannot be denied without impediment to morality."³⁶⁾ Yet, when we read his opinions concerning Formstecher's work, we feel his profound resentment which might lead us to believe that he is strongly anti-Semitic. He calls Formstecher's phrase "germanisches Judentum"³⁷⁾ a "contradictio in adjecto"³⁸⁾, after he has given a rather sarcastic review of the entire book³⁹⁾, in the course of which he points out several contradictions. Admittedly, he wants to show the "invalidity"⁴⁰⁾ of Formstecher's proposition concerning the nature and destiny of Judaism. More than anything else, he naturally resents Formstecher's treatment of Christianity and Islam, which he characterizes as "paradox opinions concerning Christianity and Islam as missions of Judaism" and as "silly idea to designate Christianity and Islam as Jewish missions".⁴¹⁾ If we may draw any conclusion from the reaction of this rather friendly man, we may well say that the book did hardly succeed to prove to non-Jews that Judaism is "an absolutely necessary phenomenon within mankind" and that it will eventually become "the universal religion of civilized humanity".⁴²⁾ Neither can we believe that any non-Jew became

convinced that "the emancipation of the Jew is a need of world-history"⁴³⁾ on account of reading our author's opinions on Judaism. For he expresses - if not a national - then a religious chauvinism, which was hardly apt to win friends for the Jewish cause.

The author's purpose, without any doubt, was not only to appeal to non-Jews and to paint a presentable picture of Judaism "as the representative of a magnificent idea"⁴⁴⁾ for the non-Jewish world. True, he complains about the place to which Judaism has been assigned by non-Jewish scholars and addressing himself to them and their audience, he excuses his work with the phrase "audiatur et altera pars", adding that his book may be considered by them as an apology for his remaining a Jew.⁴⁵⁾ But on the whole we may say that Formstecher addresses himself to Jewry, attempting to justify Judaism before two classes of Jews: the orthodox "who obstinately remain on the rock of the Middle Ages and who fear for the end of Judaism due to the smallest deviation (from the mediaeval norm)"⁴⁶⁾, and the indifferent and ignorant "who know only the name of the ancestral religion".⁴⁷⁾ We must bear in mind, then, that Formstecher admittedly and advisedly presents his system as opposing orthodoxy, as advocating a departure from tradition - in practice as well as

in thought; moreover, that he hopes that members of the class of the indifferent and ignorant who may by chance read his book will be edified and moved to change their negative attitude toward Judaism.

The work then assumes both, an apologetic and a polemic character; apologetic toward the non-Jews and toward those Jews who think that they have outgrown Judaism, and polemic against the orthodox who stand in the way of progress and Reform.

PART I

PRESENTATION OF FORMSTECHEMER'S SYSTEM

Chapter 1

G O D

Judaism knows no duty to believe in the mysterion of the immanence in God, so that man become worthy of His grace. The Jew has only the obligation to believe in the facts of history and in those truths which are the results of reason, i. e. "the existence of one God and His loving relationship to the world".⁴⁸⁾ Got is to be believed in only when "to believe" means to accept as truth something which can stand the test of reason.

God is the imperceptible soul of a perceptible body - the World-Soul.⁴⁹⁾ The phenomena are the perceptible powers of God. Although God manifests Himself in these manifold powers, His existence does not depend on these manifestations. He exists, no matter whether He manifests Himself or not. He is not a conglomeration of the various powers; they are His properties, but not His essence.⁵⁰⁾ God is the source of man's self-consciousness and freedom, He must, therefore, have these properties, regardless whether or not they are manifested in man. As the bearer of all phenomena, God is not only a physical World-Soul, but an independent, free spirit, and the world is a revelation of His perceptible properties or attributes. There could be no world without

God, but God can very well exist without the world, which is a perceptible thought of God.⁵¹⁾

All we know of God, are His attributes manifested in this world. It is beyond the reach of the human mind to know God's essence, to know whether He ever existed without the world⁵²⁾, why He manifests Himself in the manner He does and not otherwise. These and similar questions are unanswerable because even the highest philosophical consciousness cannot be equated with Divine consciousness; for human consciousness is differentiated into subjective and objective, and the absolute consciousness cannot be thus construed. The human intellect in its highest perfection is only the consciousness of the earth, but not of the universe, and God's manifestations on other planets are unknown to us.⁵³⁾

Since we cannot know the essence of God, but only His manifestations in the world, we must turn to the world in order to learn what can be known of God. The world as a manifestation of God containing all powers manifesting themselves is a universal life, whereas each part of it, although partaking in the universal life, is an individual life.

Each individual life can also be considered as a universal life. Whereas the universal life is manifested in the desire to perpetuate the species, the individual life is manifested

in the desire of individual self-preservation.⁵⁴⁾

The world consists of two distinct parts, both of which are Divine manifestations: Nature and Spirit. Nature is the sum of all those phenomena which reveal themselves to us in regularity. The necessity of the laws of nature as construed by man is a subjective necessity.⁵⁵⁾ Spirit, on the other hand, is freedom and manifests itself in the contradiction to universal and individual life, in the defeat of the desire for self-perpetuation, either of the species or of the individual. Spirit causes man to act in a way which makes possible or facilitates the life of another individual. Spirit, then has as its goal the giving up of egotism, the defeat of selfishness for the benefit of others. Since man belongs to the realm of nature and spirit, he is the battle-field of the two. Spirit, whose tendency is diagonally opposed to that of nature, must suppress nature in man in order to become effective. This does not mean that man must live a life of asceticism by which nature - the human body - becomes mortified. "To resolve nature and spirit as contrasts, to bring them to identity in such a way that none of them perish, is the ideal for which the human spirit strives....." Man has realized his ideal "when nature and spirit form a unity in man under the domination of the spirit".^{55a)}

Although they are opposites, both, nature and spirit belong to the individual life of earth-organism, spirit being the conscious and free effort for the realization of an ideal; nature being subject to necessity, the unconscious imperfectible object of description.⁵⁶⁾ Because nature is unfree and unconscious, the terms of good and evil cannot be applied to it⁵⁷⁾; they are only applicable to the spirit, since spirit only has consciousness. The good or the evil deed are always expressions of the will, and a deed is called good or evil depending on whether it agrees or disagrees with the ideal. There is no physical evil, however, although nature is sometimes wrongly called evil; namely, when it does not lend itself as a means for maintaining human life. This misnomer could be corrected by saying that we would call evil nature's refusal to serve as a life-sustaining means, if this refusal came from a conscious agent which nature is not.⁵⁸⁾

God, then, manifests His powers in the two realms of the world, in nature and spirit. He is in both, or both are in Him, but His existence does not depend on these His manifestations, He is transcendent as well as immanent.⁵⁹⁾

Man, standing on the borderline between nature and spirit partakes in both. As a being belonging to nature,

he is unfree, just as the rest of creation. But as the bearer of the spirit he is separated from all other creatures, he is free. But even this freedom of the human spirit is only existent from a subjective point of view. For God has not retired from the rulership of the world after having once created it. He has not given over the world to blind fate, but His creation is a perpetual process, and the free, self-conscious Divine working reveals itself continually; the world exists only so long as He wills it. His will is identical with the human will, and whatever man wills is not against God's will; God wills in man. When man wills the good and acts accordingly, he follows the dictate of the spirit, and when he wills the evil, nature dominates him. But even in the latter case, man does not act against God, for nature is also in God. Consequently, human will is free from a subjective point of view only; objectively speaking, the human will coincides with Divine freedom and is, therefore, determined.⁶⁰⁾ The freedom of the human spirit consists of the desire to realize the will of Divine Providence. Humanity lives with freedom if they attempt to fulfill their task as the bearers of the spirit, to live up to the Divine goal.⁶¹⁾

When a whole group knows such an ideal and desires to realize it, we call such a group a religious group and their

knowledge of the ideal combined with their striving for realization a religion.⁶²⁾ There can only be two religions, because there are only two ideals, namely that of spiritual universal life and that of individual spiritual life. The ideal of spiritual universal life is realized by the perfection of nature through art, the ideal of spiritual individual life finds its realization by means of ethics. Judaism is the religion leading to the realization of the ideal of the individual life of the spirit.⁶³⁾ Its God is the ideal, which can only be emulated by man. Judaism teaches that God can neither be incarnated in man, nor must man or anything belonging to nature ever be deified.⁶⁴⁾ All religions except Judaism are different forms of Paganism largely dependent on the climate and other territorial conditions, to which the various tribes or nations are subjected. All these non-Jewish religions have deified powers of nature, and the highest level Paganism can attain to is physical monotheism; its god, being a god of nature is unfree, dependent on the world and not necessarily eternal. He is not an unreachable ideal, and Pagan man is commanded to become god whereas the Jew strives to become like God.⁶⁴⁾ Paganism can never lead humanity to perfection, since it realizes only one ideal, that of the universal life of the spirit. Having

fulfilled this function it dies.⁶⁵⁾ The God of Judaism, in his relationship to man, is unknowable as to His essence, He is a God whose providential will is identical with the human will, a God who manifests attributes of His in creation and who, through the agency of the human spirit, creates the desire in man to emulate Him, to become like God.

Chapter 2

TORAH - REVELATION

In the following it will be our task to describe the process by which God makes His will known to man. This process is called revelation, and history - Jewish history in particular - is described by Formstecher as a process of ever increasing knowledge of God's will, of the contents of revelation.

It is not the contents of revelation, which develops in the course of history, but only the knowledge thereof. For the contents of revelation, the absolutely true ideal, is pre-historic; it was created at the same time when the world was created and it has imperfectibility. Although Formstecher says: ".....we may say that at the time of the creation of the earth the revelation was created, too," he continues in the next sentence: "The objectively given revelation is the pre-historic revelation for humankind, for its becoming is outside of time, therefore, outside of the field of history."⁶⁶⁾ Maybaum is therefore correct in explaining Formstecher's term "pre-historic" as meaning not only preceding history, but being outside of history completely, - beyond time.⁶⁷⁾

Hence, in narrating history, we are only concerned with telling the story of the progressive recognition of the con-

tents of pre-historic revelation. History is the story relating how the absolutely true ideal existing from eternity became known to mankind. The history of Judaism, too, is the history of the progressive knowledge of this ideal, and furthermore, due to the peculiar position of Judaism within humanity, Jewish history is also the story relating what role Judaism played in making this ideal known to the rest of humanity. It will become evident that Formstecher's manner of writing history produces ".....an abstract construction of the history of Judaism, which neglects the real facts of history and all social and psychological factors."⁶⁸⁾

For the remainder of our discussion of revelation and history, we may well forget the doctrine of the pre-historic revelation; for, from now on, we are concerned only with historical revelation, by which God makes known the objective ideal.

There are two basically different periods in the history of the human spirit, the objective and the subjective periods.⁶⁹⁾ Between them lie two periods of transition, the first being called the period of subjective objectivity⁷⁰⁾ and the latter the period of objective subjectivity.⁷¹⁾

In the objective period, the human mind judges according to a feeling not yet become conscious, it is not a subject

but an object.⁷²⁾ Prophetic activity is the religious characteristic of this period, for the prophetic spirit is the receptacle for the truth, of which God informs man. While the prophet prophesies, he does not speak in his own name, but it is God's words which come out of his mouth. He himself remains passive, his spirit is in an objective state and does not judge the pronouncements by subjective reasoning.⁷³⁾

Just as our author distinguishes between Judaism as an idea and Judaism as a phenomenon⁷⁴⁾, he also differentiates between absolutely true ideas expressed in our prophetic literature and those ideas which are only relatively true.⁷⁵⁾ This method gives Formstecher a chance to present Judaism as a purely rationalistic and universalistic religion, for all elements which do not agree with this concept of Judaism are earmarked as either non-Jewish influences or as prophetic ideas which are not the absolutely true contents of revelation, but only relatively true ideas which are dependent on the time or place or both, in which they were expressed. In our chapter on Formstecher's treatment of the sources, we shall show that the absolutely true prophetic ideas are those which express the ideal of universalism, whereas all those passages which speak of the restoration of the state and the

sacrificial cult are only of temporal and local importance; therefore, they are dismissed as only relatively true and not belonging to the essence of prophetism and Judaism. Formstecher recognizes how closely together these absolutely true and relatively true ideas are frequently expressed⁷⁶⁾, but he prefers to consider and evaluate them separately instead of assuming that Jeremiah, e. g., did not propose to prophesy that his religious ideal must be realized by an eternally exiled or dispersed Israel. On the contrary, Israel shall not cease "from being a nation" and "the city shall be built to the Lord".⁷⁷⁾ In this instance as in many others the sources of prophetic literature are forced into a system of 19th century German Judaism, which they naturally never meant to represent. Formstecher's picture of the prophets - judged according to their "absolutely true ideas" and consequently of "Judaism as an idea" is one-sided. The prophets and Judaism are not described as they are but as Formstecher thinks they ought to be, and by the same method some 20th century fanatic nationalist could present Judaism as a system of extreme religious and political particularism. All he had to do were to lay special emphasis on those passages which are relatively true for Formstecher and to relegate the others to a position of secondary importance. Such a picture would naturally be as far from the truth as the one we are dealing with here.

The end of prophecy coincides with the end of the

strictly objective period. Now, the word of God is not heard any longer from the mouth of the prophet. Instead, God's word is embodied in Holy Scriptures, and the period of tradition begins. Scripture has taken the place of prophecy and has become the source of revelation. Truth becomes slowly the object of speculation, which really is a free activity of the spirit. Man does not yet admit that it is he himself, who found a new truth. But he interprets Scripture in his own way, presenting his own idea as though it were expressed in the written word, although the original Biblical writer may not have meant at all what the interpreter is willing or eager to read out of a given passage.⁷⁸⁾ Midrash is: ".....the finding of one's own thought in words of oral or written tradition...."⁷⁹⁾ It was the Pharasaic method "to retain the highest objective dignity for Scripture, but to nonetheless interpret it subjectively in a manner, which added more and more intensive strength to the religious life."⁸⁰⁾ Because, in this early period of tradition, which ends with the close of the Talmud, the Jewish spirit is already somewhat independent although strongly leaning on Scripture, it is called the period of subjective objectivity, i. e. the mind has made the first important step toward subjectivity, toward the goal of this historical construction.

The following period representing the next step in this

direction is that of objective subjectivity; it ranges from the close of the Talmud up to the era of Mendelssohn. "It (the spirit) came to know, understand, and appreciate itself; it ascribed to itself a certain independence; it felt that it was not only able to receive laws, but to give them, too, and, thereby, it dared the significant movement from objectivity toward subjectivity."⁸¹⁾ Although the sources of this period still show objective elements, subjectivity is already prevalent.⁸²⁾ Whereas the classical literary monuments of previous centuries consist of anthologies in which individual authorship plays only a subordinated role, the increased subjectivity of our period is indicated by many works written by one author.

Since humanity has "reached the height of the present time, the journey from objectivity to subjectivity may be considered as completed. The throne of the objective period in the field of science has crumbled due to the powerful shaking of the nations, the authority of tradition extinguished, the power of prejudice undone, and man declares his own self as the highest arbiter of judgment."⁸³⁾ It is the period of enlightenment and the decades following, during which this final development toward subjectivity took place. Whereas the philosophy of Maimonides was un-Jewish, Mendelssohn could free himself from Pagan influences, since he could

distinguish between theosophical dogma and scientific result; in the Mendelssohnian age, thinking was subjected to critical judgment, which is the expression of subjectivity.⁸⁴⁾ In other words, we have now reached the stage where no religious principle and no ritual is observed because it is part of tradition, but only because it agrees with reason. This very idea has become one of the basic principles for Liberal- and Reform-Judaism.

Chapter 3

I S R A E L

This movement from objectivity to subjectivity is the framework in which history takes place. Formstecher's main interest is naturally Jewish history and he mentions the history of other groups only for the purpose of illustration, comparison, or contrast. Although more than 200 pages of his book are devoted to Jewish history, he does not pretend to be a historian. He does not write the history of the Jewish people; he speaks of the history of Judaism.⁸⁵⁾ Naturally, he cannot completely ignore the Jews while writing on Judaism, and in the following we shall attempt to describe what he has to say about Israel as a people or as a group. His historical construction of the Jewish people shows at times strongly teleological characteristics. For, since Judaism is the representative of "a magnificent idea"⁸⁶⁾, all the events of Jewish history must be interpreted as serving the recognition and realization of this idea. We shall give here some examples of Formstecher's teleological method: "Israel's body politic would always have remained in the sphere of nature, i. e. on the level of Paganism, if it had remained such with absolute and not with transitory validity, if the whole nation had remained faithful to the hereditary monarchy, if it had always found its center in the Temple of

Jerusalem and if it like the Pagan state had recognized its highest goal in worldly rulership. But Israel was to be a kingdom of priests.....; therefore, the house of David had to be rejected as a hereditary monarchy for all of Israel, and the Temple of Jerusalem had to cease to be the center of the people, so that the first should not degenerate into autocratic despotism and the latter should not degrade the universal God to a local deity of Palestine...."87)

In this manner, which is rather unhistorical for our taste today, a justification is given for the Northern Kingdom, which is called the "negative" element and which is destroyed as soon as it becomes superfluous, due to the prophetic vision that Israel is to be a kingdom of priests and a holy nation .88)

In a likewise teleological fashion Formstecher places the Karaites as a necessary, or at least desirable though negative force, into his system of Jewish history. "The antique element (the Bible) needed support, so that Judaism should not be deformed.....This counterbalance necessary for the inner balance of Jewish life was given to this period... (in the form) of the sect of the Karaites."89)

In this case, Formstecher weakens his own case by saying: "Otherwise, the antique element is also cherished by the other Jews; Sabbath and festivals, ceremonies and rituals were observed

with the same conscientiousness as recommended by the former Talmud teachers".⁹⁰⁾ In other words: the antique element was not neglected so badly after all, but since we have the phenomenon of the Karaites before us, we have to place them; and since it is generally accepted that the appearance caused a more careful study of the Bible, it is evident that they were needed for this purpose.

We shall now describe the history of Israel, which is so to speak the body of Judaism. Formstecher's main endeavor is to present the history of Judaism, which is "the desire of the spirit to realize the ideal of its individual life"⁹¹⁾, i. e. the ideal of ethics in contradistinction to the ideal of the spiritual universal life, which finds expression in art and which is the ideal realized by the Pagan religions. In the following, we shall try to depict the role which Israel as a people had to play and has to play in this process.

The patriarchs present a rather difficult problem for our author, which he could not solve without contradicting himself. The patriarchic era is a creation of the objective spirit, it is the "ideal prototype of the latest future of humanity".⁹²⁾ The patriarchs themselves are "no gods or semi-gods like whom we in our weakness could never be, but human beings with our needs, inclinations, and emotions, but human

beings with ideal perfection".⁹³⁾ Jacob, however, is "not free from human weakness"; he "however, committed no sin".⁹³⁾ It is difficult to see how, first of all, someone with ideal perfection can have such a weakness, but it is still more difficult to agree that Jacob's way of obtaining his father's blessing was not sinful, but only a sign of weakness.⁹⁴⁾ His action was certainly sinful, for he followed the voice of nature. His moral decision was not governed by the spiritual desire to "make possible or to facilitate the desire for life of another human being"⁵⁵⁾, but his action is clearly directed at his own advantage, so that God should give him "from the dew of heaven and from the fat places of the earth and plenty of corn and wine."⁹⁵⁾ According to Formstecher's own definition such an act would be wicked or sinful, for: "If we recognize that the consciously performed deed.....contradicts the ideal, it is wicked; if it contradicts revelation, it is called sin."⁹⁶⁾ The latter is the case here, for we are told that "the golden era which humanity is to enjoy on earth in the future is presented in the form of a prototype in the lives of the three patriarchs.....it reveals according to its essential idea that in it the spirit recognized its ideal due to its prophetic feeling."⁹⁷⁾ The expression "ideal" is not used here in contradistinction to "revelation" as in the passage above,

for "The revelation of Judaism, according to its own teachings is as old as the human race; already.....the three patriarchs were men who walked with God, recognized Him.....and lived in such a manner as to be worthy of God's favor."⁹⁸⁾ In short, according to Formstecher's own standards Jacob did commit a sin, which would not have fitted into our author's scheme. In order to whitewash Jacob's character, he invents the term "weakness", which has no place in his philosophical discussion on good and evil, and sin and virtue at all.⁹⁶⁾

The exodus from Egypt is the beginning of Israel's national life, which is vastly and basically different from the national life of other peoples. For the form of Israel's national life is theocracy whereas those Pagan peoples, who were not governed by monarchic or aristocratic despots, know only of a hierarchy. The Hebrew theocracy is an expression of a friendship - relationship between God and His people. Out of thankfulness for liberation and fatherly care, they decide to follow His laws and statutes.⁹⁹⁾ God alone is the ruler and all the governing officers of the people are representatives of God and act as such only.

Although the theocratic state is ruled by an "invisible head"¹⁰⁰⁾, Formstecher repeatedly stresses the democratic elements which he finds in the ancient Jewish state. Whether Formstecher is in agreement with the Biblical sources or not, according to him the priest has to be approved of by the

people, the King and the High-Priest are elected by the people "and both are subject to the criticism of each member of the nation, who in his enthusiasm appears as prophet".¹⁰¹⁾ The executive power of the judge was granted by the people.¹⁰¹⁾ The concept of theocracy is naturally based on the belief of a personal God, who is an active force in history. Assuming, then, that this personal God is the ruler in Israel's theocracy, the division of power between God and the people is not entirely clear - neither to us nor to Formstecher himself. For in another place, we find the statement that "the king had to be selected by God (Dt. 17.15) or by His representative, the prophet, and the people was to acknowledge him and to assure him of their subserviency".¹⁰²⁾ Here the people have very little to say as to who should be their earthly ruler, and our contention that the concepts of democracy and theocracy were not clearly distinguished is also borne out by the following phrase as compared with the statement above: "Samuel (representative of God) selected and anointed David (I Sam. 16.13), and afterwards the people of Judah anointed him (II Sam. 2.4), and then all Israel (ibid. 5.3)".¹⁰³⁾ Obviously, here the people have nothing to do with the selection, they have to only accept the person selected by the representative of God, whereas above, it is the people themselves who choose their earthly ruler. This

contradiction notwithstanding, the theocratic system is given much more emphasis in the description of Israel's history, and the occasional emphasis on democratic elements may be explained as an inconsistency, which is understandable when one considers that our book was written in the decade of the revolution of 1848. Formstecher hardly escaped the revolutionary democratic influences, and no matter whether or not he was in favor of a more constitutional monarchy or even a democratic republic, we can well imagine that it was the "Zeitgeist" of this pre-revolutionary period which contributed to this inconsistency.¹⁰⁴⁾

In the pre-monarchic period, Israel is still rather unproductive. The people have not yet recognized their real task and they are occupied building nation and state, which are necessary as a foundation for theocracy.¹⁰⁵⁾ In David we find the most perfect of all Jewish kings, who was the faithful guardian and protector of the theocratic state and its institutions,¹⁰⁶⁾ and it is Solomon who "could not understand the higher destiny of Judaism"¹⁰⁷⁾, who "deviated from the path of Judaism and entered upon the field of Paganism by his lewdness".¹⁰⁷⁾ He degraded the theocracy to a despotic monarchy.

We have already dealt with the division of the kingdom, after which the Southern Kingdom represented the positive element for the "preservation of the theocratic spirit in the theocratic form"¹⁰⁸⁾ whereas the Northern Kingdom was

the negative element which was to prevent "that this form be deified, that in its externality it be considered as essential even when the spirit resting within it be disregarded....."¹⁰⁸⁾ True, the Northern Kingdom was willed by God, its inception was due to prophetic action; but it contributed nothing to the realization of the Jewish ideal because it was designed to only play a counterbalancing, i. e. in this case, negative role. But this counterbalancing force was necessary only as long as the theocratic form was needed as a vessel for the theocratic spirit. As soon as the people of the South recognized their true task "to be a kingdom of priests for all nations, a holy nation which recognized as the true meaning of its existence not worldly but heavenly government"¹⁰⁹⁾, the Northern counterpart had become superfluous.¹⁰⁸⁾ For now, Israel was prepared for his mission to mankind and knowing himself in truth, he had to realize this truth unhampered by territorial limitations.¹¹⁰⁾

It is this idea of the providential nature of Israel's dispersion, which played an important role in Liberal and Reform Judaism, showing that these movements had not only a religious but also a political character. For always, up to the emancipation, had the Jews looked forward to their eventual return to Palestine, and only when they were given equal rights or when they hoped that their complete emanci-

pation was very close did they - under the guise of religious reform - give up Palestine as their eventual goal. The mission-idea, which the Reformers found in the writings of the unknown prophet of the exile, was thought to be workable only in the dispersion.¹¹¹⁾ The advance of Zionism, however, and its slowly gaining ground among the Reformers has seriously challenged this view point, and today there is no unanimity on the subject in the ranks of Reform. Both, the mission-dispersion idea as well as the desire to rebuild Zion as a Jewish national home are present in contemporary Reform Judaism.¹¹²⁾

For Formswecher, then, the beginning of the dispersion is at the same time the moment when Israel starts to carry out his religious mission among the nations. Israel is the bearer of the spirit in a world of Paganism, of nature-apotheosis. But unlike other peoples, who spread out their ideas by making converts, either on the point of the sword or by persuasion, Israel carries out his mission by his mere existence among the nations, by being a representative of the God of the spirit, by attempting to live according to His law. The technique of this mission then differs widely from what the Christians, e. g., understand by it. Although never refusing a stranger who wants to join our ranks, we never attempt to persuade or compel anyone to become our brother

in faith. Our technique is of a more passive nature, we believe that Judaism will be eventually victorious and universally accepted (although this universal religion of the future containing the principles of Jewish ethics and theology may receive a different name) by being continually held up as a glorious example, a shining light, to Pagan humanity. In addition to this relatively passive mission-technique, history has produced missionarizing agents for Judaism.¹¹³⁾

Both, Christianity and Islam, are not religions which have a purpose in themselves, and it is due to their adherents' misunderstanding of their own religions that they believe to be the bearers of final, absolute truth.

In order to make it possible for Judaism to remain purely monotheistic, purely spiritual, these two religions were sent out to the world as missions for Judaism, Christianity to the Northern, Islam to the Southern hemisphere.¹¹⁴⁾ The nature of these missions is "a movement of Judaism away from itself, through Paganism back to itself".¹¹⁵⁾ The missions have absorbed the main-principles of Judaism, which were then diluted with Pagan elements in order to make the mission-religions acceptable and palatable to the non-Jewish world. According to the different climatic conditions in North and

South and according to the varying predispositions of the respective populations resulting therefrom, Christianity and Islam although designed to lead to the same goal are rather different in character and form.

The "main-form of life"¹¹⁶⁾ of the North is philosophy, and the mission to the North - Christianity - had to be formed accordingly as an "activity of reason"¹¹⁷⁾, whereas Islam is confronted with poetry as the predominant factor in the South and has hence to engage in an "activity of phantasy"¹¹⁷⁾.

Christianity, as the mission of Judaism, possesses absolute truth in that it strives to reconcile the spirit with itself.¹¹⁸⁾ The death of the Nazarene is the Christian symbol for this reconciliation, but it is only relative truth, - i. e. it is wrong - to see in this historical event the accomplishment of this reconciliation, which in reality has not taken place and which cannot take place as long as there is Paganism in the world. "Not the beginning of Christianity bestowed upon humanity the Golden Age of the Messiah, for it meant to bring the sword instead of peace (Matth. 10.34), but the end of Christianity was to glorify Jesus on the entire earth (Matth. 24.30; 25.31 etc.)"¹¹⁹⁾ Another element of relative, transitory truth is the fact that Christianity "erroneously ascribes to itself an absolute independence"¹²⁰⁾

instead of recognizing its true character as a mission of Judaism.

In the course of the development of Christianity we notice a constant struggle between the Jewish and Pagan elements, and in the beginning throughout the Middle Ages we see the Pagan elements victorious.¹²¹⁾ Only beginning with the Reformation can we observe a backward movement, during which the original Jewish elements come to the fore again, and it is the goal of Christianity - not yet clearly understood by all its adherents - to purify itself from all Pagan elements and to return to its original source - pure ethical monotheism.¹²²⁾

The hierarchic form of the Church is a Pagan element, which was necessary during the Middle Ages in order to protect the Church from Paganism.¹²³⁾ This and other Pagan elements became dangerous to Christianity and they were destroyed by the Reformation, and "since the Reformation Christianity recognizes ever clearer that its kingdom is not of this world....."¹²⁴⁾, and now - at the time of Formstecher's writing - the true character of Protestantism is only recognized by the rationalist-prophetic theologians, who distinguish between absolute truth and local and temporal elements in the New Testament.¹²⁵⁾ Just as Germany is the place in the world where the Jews represent the most perfect relatively

true revelation¹²⁶⁾, the Germanic tribe is also best fitted for the absorption of the true Protestant principle, for Germany is located centrally between North and South, and, "not being subjected to any particular local influences knows to enlighten religious emotion by free reason, so that it (the religious feeling) is not given over to superstition."¹²⁷⁾

Islam did not have to make as many concessions to Paganism as Christianity because the Southern half of the globe is despotic by nature. Hence, despotism could be used and was used as a means for introducing Jewish ideas with less modification into the Pagan world.¹²⁸⁾

It seems that Formstecher when speaking of the Koran breaks his promise - as he does in other places - to work with an "unbiased mind"¹²⁹⁾. He presents the particularistic and universalistic elements in the Koran as being in an "indissoluble contradiction" and the combination of relative truth and absolute truth as the "characteristic of a transitory mission"¹³⁰⁾ although he finds these very same combinations in the Bible without drawing these conclusions.¹³¹⁾

Ethics in Islam is comparable to strict police orders which are being followed not because of love for virtue but because of the punishment threatened in case of disobedience.¹³²⁾ The concept of paradise in Islam corresponds to the sensual phantasy of the Orient; this oriental phantasy "cannot con-

ceive of any joy without sensual gratification".¹³³⁾ The religion of Muhammed does not present any danger of idolatry against which it is very strict. It contains, however, dangerous elements of superstition and fanaticism.¹³⁴⁾

This description of Christianity and Islam must not be considered as an interruption of the tale of Jewish history. It really belongs here where we speak for the first time of Israel's dispersion, of Israel's assuming the task of its own mission. Although the two religions originated in different periods and centuries after Israel's first exile, the picture of Formstecher's concept of Israel's mission would be incomplete without them. For the Jews themselves, although they live in dispersion in order to carry out their mission, their task is a passive one - to shine as a light among the nations. The Jews needed Christianity and Islam as active missionaries who would bring the truths of Judaism to the nations in a fashion best fitted for them, so that Judaism itself could remain undiluted with Pagan elements as a pure religion of the spirit.¹³⁵⁾

Bearing this concept of Israel's mission in mind we may now continue to describe what happened to the bearer of this mission. Formstecher admits very frankly that the Jews in the Babylonian exile were not yet aware of the true meaning of their dispersion, that they longed to return to the land

of their fathers and to rebuild state and Temple in order to be able to lead their national life as before the exile.¹³⁶⁾ In this exilic period it was only the prophets who presented the absolutely true ideal of universalism.¹³⁷⁾ But since the prophets had also the task of speaking to the people in their language, of expressing the people's sentiments, we find even in the prophetic writings a great number of expressions of particularism. "When expressing the relatively true temporal ideas, the prophet speaks less to posterity than to his contemporaries in order to comfort them in their misery, in order to stimulate their enthusiasm for misunderstood and embattered Judaism."¹³⁸⁾ Frequently Formstecher calls attention to the necessity of distinguishing between absolutely and relatively true ideas in prophetic writings explaining that all expressions of the hope for political restoration are only relatively true, i. e. have lost their validity for today. But nowhere does he say clearly whether he thinks that the prophets themselves thought of restoration as an integral part of their picture of the future. From the statement above and from similar expressions of Formstecher's, we are inclined to believe that Formstecher takes these particularistic utterances as not really belonging to the prophets' system of faith and hope that they interjected the particularistic ideas merely in order to comfort the people.¹³⁹⁾ Never does

Formstecher say that the prophets really desired the restoration so much spoken of in their writings. But even if they did, we are to disregard all those passages when we think of the "absolutely true ideal of humanity" which cannot be presented in a purer and more beautiful form than the prophesy of Judaism has described it.¹⁴⁰⁾

In the period of tradition we find still less description of Israel as a people, which our author is not interested in in his study. From now on more than before he describes the history of Judaism, the development of its ideas and the struggle between Jewish and Pagan elements in Judaism.

We find two distinctly different types of literature in this period of tradition, and Judaism has to fight a twofold struggle, the struggle between prophesy and tradition fought in the Talmud and the struggle between Judaism and Paganism, the battle-field of which is the Kabbala, the literature of theosophy and mysticism.¹⁴¹⁾ The old and the new element fighting in the Talmud are the Halacha - representing the firm, unchangeable and conservative element - and the Haggadah¹⁴²⁾ - being the living flexible word. The principle Pagan element in the Kabbala is its underlying thesis that the human spirit can gain insight into "God's inner economy". Hence, Pagan are also the description of God's shape, height, occupations, and inclinations¹⁴³⁾, the classification of angels,

their shape and origin, the fatalistic view of the world and astrology; furthermore, theories concerning the pre-existence of the soul, its reward or punishment after death, the exact descriptions of the hereafter, of the pre-existence of the Messiah, his supernatural origin and his mystic influence on the affairs of the world. "Accordingly the following norm can be stated: descriptions of purely metaphysical character are Pagan but those concerning ethical relationships are Jewish."¹⁴⁴⁾

The beginning of this period of tradition ^{*coincides*} falls together with the return from exile. The centuries following are characterized by the Jewish people's desire for political separatism, by a "strong fight against the amalgamation with Paganism, although unwillingly a reconciliation with Paganism" took place to a certain extent.¹⁴⁵⁾ Formstecher finds this invasion of Pagan ideas in certain gnostic elements in Apocryphic literature, in the angelology and the belief of bodily resurrection, which came into Judaism at this time.¹⁴⁶⁾

The first representative of the Kabbala, however, who transplanted Pagan theorems with great ingenuity into the soil of Judaism was Philo. His method of allegory is essentially the same as that of the Midrash - namely reading his own ideas or ideas foreign to the Biblical author into the words of the Bible. But whereas in Rabbinic literature this method led

to a development of Jewish ideas, Philo's method presents a Pagan theory in a Jewish dress.¹⁴⁷⁾

Josephus, too, is an example of the absorption of Pagan ideas into Judaism; but in his writings Jewish ideas always prevailed.¹⁴⁸⁾

Before the final destruction of the Jewish state, we find three distinct parties within the Jewish people, each of which stands for one of the elements fighting against each other in Judaism. The Sadducees are the conservatives, who stand for the letter of the Holy Scriptures; the Pharisees represent tradition, Midrash, which is progressive because it is able to attach new meaning to the written word. The Essenes are the representatives of the Pagan-Jewish element.¹⁴⁹⁾

"They placed themselves due to their teachings as well as due to their life of seclusion outside the Jewish folk-life and remind us by their asceticism and the mysterious behavior of the Pagan priestly caste."¹⁵⁰⁾ According to Pagan fashion they do not believe in free will and teach immortality in Greek manner.¹⁵¹⁾ When Judaism ceases to be a nationality¹⁴⁹⁾, these different parties disappear and "Judaism shows such a conformity, so that it knows only of scholars and unlearned people" in the period of Rabbinism.¹⁵²⁾

The centuries following the final destruction of the Jewish state can no longer be characterized by Israel's

desire for political separatism. But whereas Rome destroys the individual Pagan religions - by its pantheon of syncretism -, Judaism retains its individuality by setting up the building of religious separatism.¹⁵³⁾ The center of Israel is shifted from the Temple, which was burned by the Romans, to the Torah.¹⁵⁴⁾ In spite of strict religious separatism, the Jew always participated in the life of his environment and absorbed some of the Pagan elements as superstition, theosophy, and astrology in order to satisfy his desire for those things of which people around him were so proud.¹⁵⁵⁾ The ritual law, to which an ever increasing importance was attached had and fulfilled this one important purpose: to create a strong protecting wall around the Jewish people, a wall which prevented the extermination of the people and its ideal; a wall which made impossible the complete disintegration of Judaism in the Pagan world,¹⁵⁶⁾ in which they had no worldly power, since they had to leave the administration¹⁵⁷⁾ of all secular affairs to others.

Modern times for Judaism begins with the period of enlightenment. Judaism today presents a different picture in different countries and although it is bearer of the same idea in every place, its forms must vary according to the conditions of the environment. In a place where Paganism in its "original, crude form" is still predominant, the Jew must still

observe meticulously all the rituals as a protective measure against Pagan influence.¹⁵⁸⁾ But as far as German Jewry is concerned, the discussion of ceremonies, the maintenance of this separating fence has become superfluous. Here it is much more important to solve the question: "How must the Jewish-religious consciousness be formed, so that it corresponds to the status of Weltanschauung and to the influence of environment...."¹⁵⁹⁾ It is the task of contemporary theology to bring the religious teachings in harmony with the results of scientific investigation and to distinguish between absolute and relative truth as found in our religious sources.¹⁵⁹⁾ Jewish theology is the perfection and fixation of ethics, comprising the regulation of ceremonies only in places where the Jew needs protection against Paganism.¹⁶⁰⁾

This idea of religious liberalism as found in many expressions of Liberal and Reform Judaism during Formstecher's lifetime is closely connected with the political idea of Israel's having ceased to be a nation¹⁶¹⁾ and of his demand for emancipation, for which our author argues in the following way: Christianity has defeated the Pagan form of the hierarchy, and in the contemporary state the worldly monarch stands above the clerical power; it is he who supervises the Church. It is, therefore, only consistent to demand from Christianity "to give up the hierarchic-Pagan element also

in those cases, where it impairs the right of people who by birth and by their lives are members of the state; to consistently remove the shackles, which were imposed by the Pagan element; to emancipate the Jews."¹⁶²⁾ Another reason for the emancipation is that the Jews profess a religion "which will give sufficient guarantee to the state and which will further its (the state's) highest purpose".¹⁶²⁾

Like Gabriel Riesser¹⁶³⁾, Formstecher does not want to make concessions in religious forms in order to obtain emancipation. He feels that the granting of equality to the Jew is a historical necessity and he ascribes the delay of emancipation in Germany to remnants of undue influence of Pagan elements on Christianity, which in turn is reason enough for the Jew to be cautious in his endeavor for reform. For too much reform, too little ritual observance is dangerous as long as these Pagan influences are still noticeable. He is confident that complete emancipation must come because "neither a narrow-minded nor a selfish philosophy of life can prevent something which is a historical necessity".¹⁶⁴⁾ But until the realization of this dream of complete emancipation, until the day when Israel will have fulfilled his mission to defeat Paganism, when nature and spirit will be reconciled under the domination of the spirit, Israel represents the suffering Messiah.¹⁶⁵⁾ But the day will come when

the essence of Judaism, the ideal of the Absolute God will be realized.¹⁶⁶⁾ Then all of mankind with the possible exception of the population of the equatorial and polar regions will partake in the ideal realized.¹⁶⁷⁾

"Man sieht also, dass Formstecher an Umdeutungen und Umwandlungen von Glaubenssymbolen und Geschichtstatsachen Schelling, Hegel und ihren theologischen Juengern im protestantischen Lager nichts nachgibt, nur dass diese Umdeutungen im Interesse seiner juedischen Geschichtsbe- trachtung erfolgen."

(Schoeps, Geschichte der juedi- schen Religionsphilosophie der Neuzeit, vol. I, p. 86 f.)

P A R T I I

THE SOURCE MATERIAL

INTRODUCTION

Having presented Formstecher's system, we now come to consider his source-material and the way he treated it. Since we find in his book far more than two thousand quotations from Jewish and non-Jewish sources, it is only natural that we have to limit ourselves. The following chapter does not pretend to be an exhaustive treatment of Formstecher's sources. We have limited ourselves to Jewish sources, of which we found about 1500 in the book. And even of these, we are going to deal only with those which either seemed to have received a glaring misinterpretation, or which express an idea diagonally opposed to that which they were to prove; or which are noteworthy for some other reason. Although Formstecher calls the phrase: My kingdom is not of this world¹⁶⁸) "meaningful words belonging to Judaism"¹⁶⁹, we shall not include the New Testament in this study. With only very rare exceptions, we shall abstain from introducing into our discussion any sources not quoted by Formstecher. It would require a special study to check those statements not backed up by any quotations as e. g.: "He (Israel) considered himself as stranger in his birth-place, where Nature in its rude materiality celebrated its feasts of deification, because, unconsciously, he felt his destiny: to destroy this apotheosis of nature and to teach humanity a Deity, who is higher enthroned than Nature and Spirit."¹⁷⁰) Or, the claim that the Jewish

pilgrimages to Jerusalem were of a purely ethical nature, but that these pilgrimages had a metaphysical character when performed by Christians.¹⁷¹⁾

We do not say here that these statements are wrong, but they like many others of the kind would either stand firmer or refuted, if they were considered in the light of the sources, which have reference to these subjects.

Furthermore, we found a number of statements, which are backed up by quotations, but which are doubtful, nonetheless, since possibly other sources could be found which would invalidate the statements - at least as to their general truth.

Deut. 12.11, e. g., may be cited as a proof that "in the Temple the Jew lets be enthroned only the name, the enthusing glory of his God."¹⁷²⁾ But what about Js. 8.18, Ez. 43.5/7; Ps. 74.2 ? "The Israelite never persuaded the foreigner to accept his God"¹⁷³⁾, is apparently well substantiated by Ruth 1.15/16, but a thorough investigation may show that there are other examples showing that the opposite happened, too.

In the following, we shall call attention to occasional misquotations; in three cases we were able to find the passages which were most likely meant by the author. Similarly, Ezra 5.2; 6.13 have no reference to the elders¹⁷⁴⁾ and Ezra 55; 6.14 are obviously referred to. Lev. 27.44¹⁷⁵⁾ and Jer. 8.25¹⁷⁶⁾

do not exist, but Lev. 26.44 and Jer. 7.25 are certainly meant. Only rarely does our author mention sources without giving the exact place, as he, e.g., does in the case of Kimchi, Abarbanel, and Menasseh b. Israel.¹⁷⁷⁾

We are going to deal for the larger part with Biblical references due to the fact that in the other instances we found only with rare exceptions that the sources were used in a way which makes comment superfluous. The Bible is quoted about a thousand times, more than any other source; each Biblical book is represented with the exception of Obadiah, Jonah, Nahum, Song of Songs, Esther, and since we generally determine the number of the scriptural books as twenty-four - counting the twelve minor prophets as one book -, we may say that all books are quoted with the exception of the Song of Songs and Esther. Most popular of all these books is Isaiah, Psalms following next. Although the Bible is our author's favored source, other works are by no means neglected. We find far more than a hundred quotations from the Babylonian Talmud¹⁷⁸⁾; furthermore, we find quotations from Targum Onkelos¹⁷⁹⁾ and Jonathan¹⁸⁰⁾ and LXX¹⁸¹⁾, from the Biblical commentaries of Rashi,¹⁸²⁾ Nachmanides¹⁸³⁾, Ibn Ezra¹⁸⁴⁾, Kimchi¹⁸⁵⁾, and Abarbanel.¹⁸⁶⁾ Whereas we find only eight Mishnaic quotations¹⁸⁷⁾, and three from the Pirke de R. Eliezer¹⁸⁸⁾, the Rabbot are represented to Genesis,¹⁸⁹⁾

Exodus, 190) Leviticus 191) , Lamentations 192) , and to Eccle-
 siastes 193) , the Yalkut to Genesis 194) , Exodus 195) , Leviticus 196) ,
 Numbers 197) , Isaiah 198) , Haggai 199) , Psalms 200) , and to
 Lamentations. 201) We find mention of Midrash Tehillim and
 Midrash Mishle 202) and of Pessikta Rabbati. 203) Whereas Tur
 and Shulchan Aruch are only rarely mentioned 204) , more atten-
 tion is paid to Mainonides'Yad Hahazakah. 205) The same author
 is represented by his commentary to the Mishna 206) and by
 the Guide of the Perplexed 207) , whereas of the other mediaeval
 philosophers only Albo 208) is quoted.

Before we proceed to Kabbalistic works, we shall make
 mention of non-Hebrew ancient literature, for we find quo-
 tations of the Apocryphical books: the Fourth of Ezra 209) ,
 Tobit 210) , First and Second Maccabees 211) , Sirach 212) , Book
 of Wisdom 213) , Baruch 214) . In this category belong also
 Philo and Josephus, whose "Antiquitates" 215) are quoted ten
 times, whereas the "Bellum Judaicum" is mentioned seven times 217)
 and "Contra Apionem" 218) only twice.

In Formstecher's frequent references to the Kabbalah
 he quotes a number of mystical works, of which we mention
 only the Zohar 219) , Yalkut Hadash 220) , Rekanate 221) , Menasseh
 b. Israel's "Nishmat Hayyim" 222) , Sefer Hassidim 223) , and
 Megalleh Ammukot 224) . Of modern Jewish authors, Formstecher
 mentions most frequently Zunz 225) , but Creizenach 226) , Geiger 227) ,

Steinheim²²⁸⁾, Riesser²²⁹⁾, and Lowositz²³⁰⁾ are also quoted.

Occasionally the author draws our attention to some of his own articles.²³¹⁾ Of the contemporary Jewish magazines mention is made of the Wissenschaftliche Zeit fuer juedische Theologie²³²⁾, Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums²³³⁾, Zeitschrift fuer die Wissenschaft des Judentums²³⁴⁾, and the Israelitische Annalen.²³⁵⁾

As to the bibles of Judaism's daughter-religions, the Koran is quoted 107 times on only six pages²³⁶⁾, whereas the New Testament is quoted 128 times on altogether fourteen pages.²³⁷⁾ Some of the Latin and Greek writers of antiquity referred to in our book are Cicero²³⁸⁾, Seneca²³⁹⁾, Virgil²⁴⁰⁾, Ovid²⁴¹⁾, Horatius²⁴²⁾, Tacitus²⁴³⁾, Pliny²⁴⁴⁾, Plato²⁴⁵⁾, Herodotus²⁴⁶⁾, Plutarch²⁴⁷⁾, Pansanias²⁴⁸⁾, and Hesiod.²⁴⁹⁾ Indian²⁵⁰⁾ and Persian²⁵¹⁾ sources are referred to, whereas Jacob Grimm's Deutsche Mythologie²⁵²⁾ is mentioned as a source for German mythology.

Schoeps²⁵³⁾ emphasizes that Fomstecher was a well educated man knowing "particularly the most important contemporary theological literature of Protestantism in the fields of dogmatics and exegesis. Most frequently quoted are Nitzsch²⁵⁴⁾, Bretschneider²⁵⁵⁾, Marheineke²⁵⁶⁾, De Wette²⁵⁷⁾, Neander²⁵⁸⁾, etc." We may add to this list Wegscheider²⁵⁹⁾. Modern Historians of philosophy and religion are Herder²⁶⁰⁾

and Dupuis.²⁶¹⁾

Finally, we wish to mention some travellers, whose reports are quoted by Formstecher: Semilasso²⁶²⁾, v. Schubert²⁶³⁾,
and v. Klaproth.²⁶⁴⁾

Chapter 1

MISINTERPRETATIONS

Discussing the problem of faith and reason in Judaism ²⁶⁵⁾
our author quotes Deut. 13.2-6 in order to prove that the Bible requires the Jews to even test a prophet whose prognostications or signs have come true. The Biblical statement, however, refers only to a prophet or a dreamer of dreams who would incite the people to idol worship. It is not a general demand to be sceptical of any prophet whose signs have come true, and the conclusion that this passage requires of the people not to accept any religious truth unless it can stand the test of reason is entirely unwarranted.

Speaking about the decline and end of prophecy ²⁶⁶⁾ Formstecher wants to prove that the last of the prophets lacks all authority and relies only on former prophetic utterances. The quotation cited for this purpose (Mal.3.22) presents no convincing proof for this contention, for in many places we find that God Himself speaks to Malachi just as he had spoken to other prophets before him. ²⁶⁷⁾ Although Formstecher squeezes ²⁶⁸⁾ the same interpretation out of the verse in another place ²⁶⁹⁾, he is inconsistent with himself. For in another context he says that prophecy could not admit to create new doctrines, that it always pretended to only develop the old doctrines. In this light, Malachi's reference to the Torah of Moses does not prove a lack of authority, but only that he as the other prophets pretended or thought to enunciate the old

teachings of Moses in the language of his own period. Furthermore, we find another statement which in itself refutes the original interpretation of our passage altogether, for in his lengthy discussion of history Formstecher declares that "the line of the prophets is continued uninterruptedly from the first to the second Temple" and that "the word of God was heard with the same authority while the latter was built."²⁷⁰⁾ Since he himself mentions Malachi as living at this period,²⁷¹⁾ this seems to be an indissoluble contradiction, which the author could have avoided by either not attaching too much significance to the phrase in question or by assuming that the closing words of the prophetic books may have been added by an editor who actually knew that prophecy had come to an end and who, therefore, thought it advisable to direct the reader's attention once more to the Law of Moses. Be that as it may, to interpret the phrase as though Malachi himself knew that no other prophet in Israel would arise after him to speak in the name of God, or even as though he himself had been conscious of the fact that he did not speak in God's name, is not at all justified.

Discussing the difference between Jewish and non-Jewish prophets, Formstecher declares that prophecy in Paganism appears as "the knowledge of the ideal of universal life with individual unconsciousness as a somnambulant, higher state of the soul, whereas in Judaism as knowledge of the individual

life, as an awake, higher state of spirit and soul."²⁷²⁾
The Midrash quoted to substantiate this statement²⁷³⁾ tells
us that God speaks to the Pagan prophets in speech of un-
cleanliness (and at night), they are compared to "Reshaim",
whereas He speaks to Moses (and the prophets of Israel) in
speech of cleanliness, by day; and the prophets of Israel
are called "Zaddikim". Since we can hardly translate the
terms "Tameah" and "Tahara" as the ideal of universal and
individual life respectively, because these terms are always
used in a ritual sense; and since we can hardly assume that
Formstecher would agree to the application of the term
"Rasha" to a Pagan prophet;²⁷⁴⁾ and since he uses the term
"somnambulant"²⁷⁵⁾ in his description of Pagan prophecy,
we must assume that he refers to the Midrashic passage in
which God speaks to the Pagan prophets at night and to the
prophets of Israel by day. It is all right for a Midrash
to make such a distinction, since the Midrash does not claim
to state historical truths, but for someone who gives a
"Scientific Presentation of Judaism"²⁷⁶⁾ with an "unbiased
mind"²⁷⁷⁾, it is a highly questionable undertaking to draw
any conclusion as to the difference between Pagan and Jewish
prophecy from this Midrash. - Samuel, e. g., who is called a
prophet by the Bible²⁷⁸⁾ as well as by Formstecher²⁷⁹⁾, did
receive a vision during the night.²⁸⁰⁾ Although it says in

I Sam. v. 2 "on that day", we may well assume that this expression is not used in contradistinction to "night", since the word "to lie down", is used repeatedly in the story²⁸¹⁾, and since Samuel after receiving the vision lies down "until the morning".²⁸²⁾ Gersonides also remarks²⁸³⁾ that our story takes place at a time close to dawn.²⁸⁴⁾

In contradistinction to the true prophet, Formstecher characterizes the false prophet who tells freely invented oracles to his audience as a coolly reflecting priest, quoting Deut. 18.22 as an example.²⁸⁵⁾ It is true, this verse speaks about a prophet whose predictions do not come true, but the passage does not give us any indication that such a prophet has any of the characteristics of a priest. Furthermore, our author claims that in the course of history the source of true prophecy became dry, that the ecstatic emotion which produces prophecy gives room to reflexion. No matter whether we assume that Deutoronomy was revealed on Mount Sinai or was composed in 621 under the rule of Josiah, there is no reason whatever to assume that this verse should refer to such a time when true prophecy would disappear, since the true prophets did continue to minister for centuries after Josiah.²⁸⁶⁾ We may note here the strange fact that Formstecher, although he states that "true prophecy is the perception of a relatively necessary part of the objective, absolutely true ideal..."²⁸⁷⁾

quotes this passage at all. For, in Deut. 18.22 - which cannot be separated from the preceding verse - the only criterion for whether a prophet is a true or a false prophet is whether or not the prophet's prediction came true. If Jeremiah, e. g., would be measured according to this standard, he would certainly be a false prophet, for six of his prophecies concerning individuals and four concerning Israel or other nations were not fulfilled.²⁸⁸⁾

We now turn to Formstecher's treatment of the sources quoted in his discussion concerning the freedom ascribed to God.²⁸⁹⁾ In addition to his statement that "the God of Judaism is a perfectly free Being" he says that "the anthropathism of repentance, anger, joy (Gen. 6.6; Js. 7.13; Jer. 7.18; Ez. 16.42; Hos. 11.8/9 etc.) are only ascribed to Him in order to represent Him as free as possible and to express the idea that he is not even bound to follow His own decisions, that He can change these according to circumstances, without being limited in His foreknowledge, whatever." It is true the verses containing such anthropathisms are quoted in the middle of the sentence and need be taken only as a proof for the preceding, not for the following phrase. But what is he trying to do? School children, who never looked at the Bible probably, did not read his book, and he could well assume that every one of his readers would know that

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the Bible contains such anthropopathisms. It seems much rather that this long list of quotations was to cover up the fact that the main contention of this sentence could not be proved by any quotation, since it is more than improbable that any Biblical writer intended to prove God's freedom of action. Only by doing force to the text is it possible for Formstecher to find his own philosophical concepts in verses, whose authors did neither intend to solve the problem, nor did they probably have the slightest idea that there was such a problem called "The Freedom of God".

Some of the many verses quoted to prove that true prophecy considers all deities except the God of Judaism as being non-existing²⁹¹⁾ shall be dealt with now: Deut. 3.24 and Ps. 77.14 do not exclude the existence of other gods but state that there is none who has as much power as the God of Judaism. Deut. 10.17 and Dan. 2.47 may be taken as a figure of speech, but if taken literally it would have to be interpreted as ascribing existence to the gods of other nations who are less powerful than YHVH.

When treating Israel's relationship to other nations as commanded in the Bible²⁹²⁾, Formstecher quotes Deut. 23.8 as a proof that the Jews are to be tolerant toward the Pagans wherever these do not constitute a danger to Judaism. However, the verse itself gives entirely different reasons

for the tolerance to be shown to the Edomite and the Egyptian. The Edomite there is called Israel's brother and the Egyptian is to be treated well because Israel was granted hospitality in Egypt. The preceding verses, not quoted by Formstecher, speak of the antagonism to be shown to the Moabites and Ammonites, not because they present a religious danger to Judaism, but because they mistreated the Israelites during their wanderings. In fact, I Ki. 11.1 ff. show clearly that the daughter of Pharaoh and the Edomites were just as dangerous to the purity of Judaism as the Moabites and the Ammonites.

We shall now proceed to examine some of the sources
? | cited to prove that the concept of hereditary sin plays no
role in the Bible at all, ²⁹³⁾ and that this concept did never
influence the folk-life of the Jew.

? | It takes no "verschrobene Exegesis" to see in Ps. 51.7
a rather clear expression of hereditary or at least congenital
sin ²⁹⁴⁾; the sexual act seems to be conceived of here as sin.
Ibn Ezra says ²⁹⁵⁾: ".....for at the time of birth the evil
inclination is implanted in man's heart,.....and some say that
the verse refers to Eve who gave birth only after she had
sinned." Gen. 8.21 ²⁹⁶⁾ can be cited here against the author's
contention. The fact that mediaeval commentators interpret
this verse as well as Ps. 51.7 in this manner does not
necessarily mean that they are right, yet, it shows at least

that there must have been the belief in Jewish folk-life that man was not born pure. Rashi says²⁹⁷⁾ that "the evil inclination is given to us at the moment when we leave the womb", and the commentator on Ibn Ezra²⁹⁷⁾ translates "Yetzer" as "angeborener Trieb", which most likely is the exact denotation of the word so frequently used in Rabbinic literature. Formstecher's treatment of Gen. 8.21 is entirely forced. He tells us that the chapter presents man as being born as a creature of nature who - in the beginning - lives like an animal; then, he continues, he shows frequently even later that the inclinations of his are evil from his youth on. Since the literal translation of the verse does not entirely fit into his scheme, he adds in parentheses "on account of his youth"²⁹⁸⁾, in other words, he wants us to understand the "min" in a causal sense as used, e. g., in Js. 53.5 "because of our transgressions" and "because of our iniquities." Although this is grammatically possible, it is evident that this is not the meaning of the verse; and, moreover, this interpretation "did not go down into the folk-life"²⁹⁹⁾ of the Jews, as the commentators prove. On the same page³⁰⁰⁾ a strange symbolic but incorrect interpretation is given to the serpent mentioned in Gen. 3.14. The serpent is here represented as a symbol for nature, which is entirely inconsistent with his definition of nature. Whereas we must infer from the Biblical story that the serpent was conceived of

as a conscious free agent, who is, therefore, object to Divine punishment, nature is defined by Formstecher as un-free and subject to necessity.³⁰¹⁾

In a short discussion concerning the perfection of the world, Formstecher makes the statement: "The world is imperfectible because an all-wise, all-powerful, inscrutable Being created it."³⁰²⁾ One of the verses quoted in this connection is the Messianic passage in Js. 35. 8/9. The whole chapter does not give the reader the impression as though the author thought that he lived in a perfect or imperfectible world. On the contrary, it is a cry for perfection. At another place, Formstecher uses the expression "most perfect world" in contradistinction to "imperfect man", which at first sight looks like a contradiction, since man is an integral part of the world.³⁰³⁾ However, it is possible to assume with Waxman³⁰⁴⁾ that Formstecher in this particular instance means "nature" when he says "world". But even if we take this interpretation for granted, Js. 35. 8/9 - when taken literally - does not substantiate the author's contention, since the creatures of nature - the lions and the ravenous beasts - are mentioned there as not disturbing the march of the redeemed ones.³⁰⁵⁾

Neither do Ps. 73.16,22 tell us that the author thought of the world as imperfectible; he simply states that he cannot

master the problem of Divine justice. The psalmist concludes that he cannot understand God's ways, but that he, nevertheless, trusts in God.

Speaking about the significance of the sacrificial cult ³⁰⁶⁾, he quotes Vayyikra Rabbah 22.5 with the words: "I permit you to sacrifice that you shall be saved from idolatry." Nothing resembling such a statement can be found there. However, Vayyikra Rabbah 22.8 contains a passage, which is certainly the basis for Formstecher's "translation": "They shall at all times offer their sacrifices at the Tent of Meeting, so that they shall be separated from idolatry and shall be saved." This does not mean that the act of sacrificing is thought of here as saving from idolatry, but the emphasis must be laid on "at all times....at the Tent of Meeting", meaning that it is important that the sacrifice is offered in YHVH's sanctuary. In other words, the fact that they sacrifice in a place consecrated to YHVH alone separates them from idolatry. This as well as the treatment of the following sources show clearly Formstecher's futile attempt to minimize the importance of the sacrificial cult. - In the same context ³⁰⁶⁾ we find the quotation from Vayyikra Rabbah 9.7: "The time will come when all sacrifices, except the one of thanks, will cease." The translation is correct in this case, but still the obsolescence of sacrifice is hardly proved. For

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the thank-offering is to remain even "L' atid lavo", and the
thank-offering is an animal sacrifice as all the others. ³⁰⁷⁾

Since our Midrash puts sacrifice on the same level as prayer saying that also prayer will cease except for thanksgivings, we assume that no conclusion as to the unimportance of sacrifice in general can be drawn from the passage, which has most likely no other purpose but to stress the importance of thanksgivings in a homiletical manner.

Yalkut to Num. 19.2 is quoted ³⁰⁸⁾ as a proof for the contention that "Jews.....who were free of Kabbalism recognized that all Mosaic laws were based on dietetic or ethical tendencies, which may be stated hypothetically." The Midrash tells us of two conversations which R. Yochanan b. Sakchai had with a non-Jew and with his disciples, respectively. The non-Jew first challenges the Rabbi stating that the ceremony of the "red heifer" appears to be magic and R. Yochanan explains the ritual by saying that the non-Jews drive out an evil spirit in a similar way. So far, the story certainly does not prove Formstecher's contention. After the non-Jew leaves, the disciples ask their rabbi for a more suitable explanation. R. Yochanan then makes the following statement: "The dead body does not defile and the water does not purify. But the Holy One, blessed be His name, said:

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I have made a statute and I have decreed a decree, and you are not permitted to transgress any statute." As we can easily see, R. Yochanan does not suppose any dietetic or ethical tendency on which "all Mosaic laws" are based; he simply cannot find a rational reason for the commandment, he even disbelieves in the reason given, namely that the dead body defiles or the water purifies, but, nevertheless, he believes in the Divine origin of the commandments, which, of course, is sufficient reason for him to insist on its observance.

Another verse misinterpreted by Formstecher is Joel 4.2, which is to prove that according to the Jewish conception a general world-judgment of all nations will precede the coming of the Messiah.³⁰⁹⁾ The expression "all peoples" must not be taken literally in this verse. The following phrase "....and I will enter into judgment with them there concerning my people" suggests that only those nations are referred to with whom Israel had come into contact. This becomes more evident from v. 12 which expresses the same idea: "For there I will sit to judge all the nations round about." It seems as though only those are to be judged who brought about Israel's misery (cf. *ibid.* 2b). Some of the commentaries substantiate this interpretation. Redak applies the verse rather unhistorically to Titus, whereas Metzudat David says:

"I shall then gather all the Babylonians."

In the following we shall deal with some of Formstecher's attempts to minimize the importance of Palestine for Judaism and to make his readers believe that the dispersion of the Jewish people and its missions among the nations was predicted in the earliest Biblical sources.

Deut. 11.12 is quoted to show that the Jew describes Palestine only in a most colorful manner because of its physical advantages.³¹⁰⁾ These, however, are not mentioned in our passage; Palestine is described as a land "which the Lord thy God careth for; the eyes of the Lord thy God are always upon it....." From Gen. 12. 2/3 Formstecher believes to be able to conclude that these verses contain the prediction that "the descendents of the three patriarchs will be spread over the entire surface of the world...."³¹¹⁾ He draws the same conclusion from Gen. 18.18, 22. 17/18. It needs hardly any proof that these verses have nothing to do with the dispersion, since the phrase "....and your seed shall inherit the gate of his enemy", shows that it is territorial expansion which is thought of here. The same is true of Gen. 26. 4 and certainly of 28. 14. All these passages have nothing to do with the distant future, in which Israel will be dispersed among the nations. They merely contain the frequently repeated promise that Palestine - and possibly its surround-

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ings - will be conquered by the Israelites.

I Chron. 13. 1-4 are quoted to show, that the council³¹²⁾ of the elders has an influence on the King's decision ; but in this case we are told that it is the whole people taking part in the decision, and the council is mentioned only in v. 1, but David's question as to the decision is directed to "the whole congregation of Israel"³¹³⁾. I Ki. 1.39 does not prove that Solomon is anointed by the priest "upon the prophet's command".³¹⁴⁾ The prophet is not mentioned in this verse, and although the prophet appears³¹⁵⁾ in our story as an adviser and confidential , we are clearly told that it is the King himself who makes the decision as³¹⁶⁾ to who is to be his successor. It would, therefore, have been more correct for Formstecher to say that Solomon was anointed by the priest "upon the King's command".

Discussing the historical necessity of a "negative element"³¹⁷⁾ in the form of the Kingdom of Israel , our author makes the statement "Outside of the Temple in Jerusalem God had to be capable of being worshipped also in other places (I Ki. 18.32) in order not to sink to the level of a local Pagan deity."³¹⁸⁾ The quotation here is misleading, for the first event recorded after the division is not that YHWH is worshipped also in the North, but that Jeroboam made "two calves of gold"³¹⁹⁾ to be worshipped in the Northern

Kingdom. The effect of the division was then "that God sank to the level of a Pagan local deity"³¹⁸⁾ in the Northern Kingdom. From a historical standpoint³²⁰⁾ there is no reason to assume that Elijah could not have built his altar even if the North and the South had been united in the ninth century.

Jer. 7.4, 10, 14 are quoted in the same discussion³¹⁷⁾ to show that the Northern Kingdom was necessary as a force counteracting the deification of the Temple in Jerusalem. We have already seen that the Northern Kingdom was not only a place in which YHWH could also be worshipped, but primarily it was a country in which idolatry was practiced. Although it is true that Jeremiah speaks out against the naive or superstitious belief in the saving power of the Jerusalem Sanctuary, this is no proof for the necessity of a counteractive force in the form of a Northern Kingdom, which did not exist at the time of Jeremiah's ministry. It is historically impossible to apply these utterances of Jeremiah's to an event or a period which preceded the prophet several centuries and with which these verses have absolutely nothing to do.

A number of Biblical verses are quoted in a discussion of Israel's mission³²¹⁾ and at the end of all these quotations we find the statement: "Israel will begin its mission, will leave the limited country of Palestine, will disperse among all the nations of the earth....."³²²⁾

Micha 5.6³²²⁾ is perhaps most fitted for Formstecher's

interpretation on account of the phrase: "And the remnant of Jacob will be in the midst of many peoples....." But even this verse speaks only of many peoples, not all peoples, and has no indication as to a location outside of Palestine.

"Many nations" may very well be in Palestine, they may even be in a much more limited place according to Joel 4.2³⁰⁹⁾ and according to Zech. 8. 20/23³²²⁾, which is a clear contradiction to Formstecher's statement. For in v. 22 the nations are said to come to Jerusalem. But our author attempts to overlook this verse by simply omitting it in his translation of the passage.

in passage. Js. 60. 1/3, 41.8, 44.1/2, 45.4, 42.1/4, 55.5³²³⁾ do not contain any phrase which would suggest that Israel's mission is thought of in connection with dispersion. Js. 61.9³²³⁾

"And their seed shall be known among the nations...." could be forced to refer to the diaspora. But have not other nations become known in the world without giving up their national territory, and have not peoples remaining in their territory or even expanding it exerted great influence on the world? Js. 2.3/4³²²⁾ is the quotation followed immediately by Formstecher's statement quoted above. His translation of v. 3 is somewhat strange and ambiguous, which is also true of his translation of the same word in Js. 51.4³²³⁾. He translates: "Von Zion aus wird die Lehre gehen" and "denn von mir

gehet aus die Lehre" respectively. It is very well possible that the ambiguity is due to the German language here and to the fact that "Yatza" may mean both, "to go forth" and "to leave". But in this particular context, we cannot escape the feeling that Formstecher means to suggest that "Yatza" in these cases means to "leave"; for, otherwise we cannot understand his conclusion that Israel will leave Palestine in order to fulfill his mission. This interpretation would naturally be a grave mistake. The Torah is to go forth in the future from Jerusalem and the word of God from Zion. The author of these verses meant to imply that Israel will be in Zion to receive the Divine word in order to fulfill it and to transmit it to the rest of the world. In fact, the preceding half of v. 3 - omitted willfully by Formstecher - states that even the other nations will say "come and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob.....", which naturally implies that Israel will be there, too. This same idea of the nations' coming to Jerusalem is also expressed in Js. 66.18/19³²⁴⁾, which must be read together with v. 20.

Explaining the significance of the Day of Atonement³²⁵⁾, Formstecher quotes the Shulchan Aruch³²⁶⁾ to prove that this day is mainly designed to bring about reconciliation between man and man. The headline of our passage reads "Man shall

reconcile his neighbor on the eve of the Day of Atonement", which shows that this paragraph deals with this particular aspect of the day. But neither the headline, nor the statement that "the Day of Atonement does not atone for transgressions between man and his neighbor, unless he has made serious attempts to reconcile him", ³²⁷⁾ proves that the reconciliation between man and man is the main function of the day. On the contrary, from our quotation we must draw the conclusion that the main purpose of the day is to bring about atonement for the transgressions against God, and the reconciliation between man and man is only a preliminary measure. This conclusion could easily be substantiated by going through the traditional liturgy of Atonement Day which is replete with expressions showing the desire for reconciliation between God and man. ³²⁸⁾ Furthermore, the Pentateuchal source for the Day of Atonement does not distinguish between sins against God and sins against man. It simply states: ³²⁹⁾ "From all your sins shall ye be clean before the Lord." It becomes clear then that the Shulchan Aruch passage was not only one-sidedly misinterpreted, but that other material in liturgy and Bible was disregarded by the author when he believed to prove that the Day of Atonement serves mainly for the reconciliation between man and man. ^{x)}

Rashi to Ps. 2.1 prefers to apply the verse to King

* Cf. Mishna Yoma V: דלפניו של יום הכיפורים
 וזוה"ק, פירוש רש"י לפרק י"ב, וזוה"ק
 פירוש רש"י לפרק י"ג. (From here the Shulchan Aruch quotes -
 וזוה"ק, פירוש רש"י לפרק י"ג, וזוה"ק, פירוש רש"י לפרק י"ג)

David rather than to the Messiah. But Rashi gives no evidence here that he does so because "the protection against Christianity requires to give up the Midrashic way of interpretation."³³⁰⁾

In fact, Rashi's interpretation is Midrashic, too, for he proves his contention by quoting: "And the Philistines heard that Israel had anointed David as King over them, and the Philistines gathered their camps and they fell into his hands ;³³¹⁾ and" continues Rashi "concerning them the Bible says: 'Why do the nations rage'" etc. If Rashi really preferred his interpretation for the reason given by Formstecher, he would certainly have avoided to mention the fact that rabbis in the past had interpreted the verse as alluding to the Messiah.³³²⁾

Chapter 2

SOURCES PROVING THE OPPOSITE OF THE AUTHOR'S CONTENTION

"No heavenly body, no creature of nature is to inform the Jew as to the will of God, only the prophet's mouth, Divine dreams, or the high priestly Urim (I Sam. 28.6) are recommended to him as the sources proclaiming Divine decrees, and only when these purely spiritual sources had become dry"³³³⁾ As to the interpretation of the verse, there is no mention of "Divine" dreams³³⁴⁾, but the verse speaks only of dreams. But we may concede that the addition does not do violence to the verse, since God is supposed to speak in these dreams. But it is entirely incomprehensible how the "Urim" can be called "spiritual" sources by the rationalist Formstecher. According to Gesenius³³⁵⁾ the "Urim" are "the holy lot of the Hebrews". Although Gesenius does not know of what they consisted, he quotes Josephus and the Rabbis as stating that they consisted of the stones in the breast-plate of the High Priest. No matter of what they consisted, no matter how much the subject was investigated, at the time Formstecher wrote his book³³⁶⁾, he must have been aware of the fact that the Urim were not exactly a spiritual source for Divine information. This seems to be one of the places where he does not impress us as keeping his promise to work with an "un-biased mind".²⁷⁷⁾

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Ez. 22.26 does not prove that the prophet "severely

rebukes the priest, who - with his outdated and dead teachings - did not know his (own) time."³³⁷⁾ The verse proves much rather that the prophet rebukes the priest for not having clung to his "outdated and dead teachings", for having defiled YHWH's holy things, for having neglected to put a difference between the (ritually) holy and the (ritually) profane, between the (ritually) unclean and the (ritually) clean. In other words, the prophet in our case shows a greater interest in ritual³³⁸⁾ than the priest, and it was Formstecher's intention to prove that the contrary is always the fact. We can easily see why he quoted the verse at all in this context. He obviously regarded only the opening words: "The priests have done violence to my law", but he disregarded Ezekiel's interpretation as to what this violence consisted of.

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Ps. 14.1 is to substantiate the statement: "According to the teaching of Judaism, the evildoer does not doubt the existence of God, but only His omniscience and justice."³³⁹⁾ But in this very verse the fool or the evildoer is quoted as saying: "There is no God", and in the second half of the verse he does not doubt God's justice, but he denies that there is any one who does good, who deals justly with those who "have dealt corruptly", who "have done abominably". Even if the verse was not clear to Formstecher for some

reason or other, he could have found in Ibn Ezra that the evildoer "imagines that there is no God". Metzudat David adds to the phrase "there is no God" the words "everything is chance." The only way we can explain why Formstecher may have quoted this particular verse here is to assume that the word "Elohim" used in this verse for God may have connoted for him the "Middat Haddin", since the Rabbis made this distinction of "Middat Haddin" and "Middat Harahamim" between "Elohim" and "YHVH", respectively.³⁴⁰⁾ Although we can hardly assume that Formstecher really believed that the Biblical authors actually referred to the "Middat Haddin" and "Middat Harahamim" when they used the different designations for God, it is very well possible that this idea has influenced him in interpreting this verse as meaning that the evildoer³⁴¹⁾ denies only the justice of God, but not His existence.

Treating of the invisibility of God, Formstecher quotes Ex. 33.23 as a proof for the statement: "God, according to His own utterances, cannot be seen."³⁴²⁾ The verse, however, tells us, that although God's face cannot be seen, Moses is promised to see the back of YHVH's. The verse proves, therefore, the opposite of Formstecher's contention, or, since God's face cannot be seen, at least half of our author's contention is refuted by his quotation. Rashi, like Formstecher, wants to minimize this anthropomorphism to a certain extent and says that God showed Moses the knot

of the phylacteries.³⁴³⁾ By this interpretation Rashi wants to counteract the idea that any part of God Himself can be seen.

On the same page³⁴⁴⁾ Formstecher refutes his own statement just quoted above. "It is true, Isaiah (6.5) sees God, but in the course of his presentation he describes only His throne (cf. Ex. 24.10)....."³⁴⁴⁾ No matter whether or not Isaiah describes God, the statement that He cannot be seen stands refuted by Js. 6.5 as well as by Ex. 24.10. In the latter passage, we are told that Moses, Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu saw the God of Israel. We cannot see any reason why the author should have made these mistakes. He obviously saw the difficulty that these verses somehow conflicted with his idea of the invisibility of the Biblical deity, and we must assume that he believed to have resolved this difficulty. But he does nothing except quoting the difficult passages and confronting them with his contradictory statements.

The statement "the Jew's attention is at all times called to the fact that he is not punished for a sin inherited from his fathers, but for his own sin"³⁴⁵⁾ is accompanied by three quotations, two of which shall be dealt with here. The eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel is indeed the most important source for the doctrine of individual responsibility, but the careful reader of this chapter can hardly escape the

impression that it is not an old doctrine to which the Jew's attention has been called at all times, which is expanded here. On the contrary, in v. 2 the prophetic author mentions explicitly those who still in his time use the proverb:

"The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge." Group-responsibility and group-punishment must have been still prevailing ideas in Ezekiel's day, although Jeremiah (31.29/30), a generation previously had spoken out against this familiar notion. It would mean to go beyond the limits of this study to enumerate all those prophetic verses which imply the concept of group-responsibility as, e. g., Am. 3.1/2; therefore, may it suffice here to refer to the story in Gen. 18.20/23, which may very well be regarded as a transition from the concept of group-responsibility to that of individual responsibility.

A case of strange confusion is found in the discussion of the coming of the Messiah and the resurrection of the dead. The statement "according to Judaism a general world judgment precedes the Messianic era"³⁴⁶⁾ is backed with Js. 26.19, and the immediately following remark "but a connection between this and the resurrection of the dead enters only after it (Judaism) had attended the school of Paganism in Babylon" is followed by Dan. 12.2/3; 13.

Even the most thorough examination of Js. 26. 19 does

not show any connection with the statement the verse is supposed to support, but since it has such a striking bearing on the following contention, we must assume that Formstecher meant to place it together with the Daniel verses. But even this assumption leads us into an insoluble difficulty, for the verse expresses clearly the idea of the resurrection of the dead, which - according to Formstecher - did not exist in Judaism before the exile. May we assume that Formstecher means to imply a denial of the pre-exilic origin of this verse. ³⁴⁷⁾ Had he meant to do this he would most certainly have made a remark to this effect. Although he tells us in his introduction ³⁴⁸⁾ that ".....all critical investigations concerning its (Judaism's) religious sources.....will be omitted, partly because these will be considered as concluded", we are still not willing to assume that he would have suggested such a radical change of the traditional view without calling attention to it; for we cannot find any other place where Formstecher silently deviates so radically from the traditional view without any explaining remark; there may be one possible exception to this rule which shall be discussed in the next chapter. Here, however, we are inclined to believe that Formstecher considered the verse in question as Isaianic or at least wished to treat it thus, as he has done with other passages whose authenticity has been questioned by scholars

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repeatedly.

Not knowing exactly what to do with Js. 26.19 in this context, we can only say that if Formstecher meant to support with this passage his contention concerning resurrection, this quotation would prove the opposite of the author's statement, providing that he did not doubt the pre-exilic origin of Js. 26.19. We realize the hypothetical character of this conclusion, but this is the best we could do in this case.
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Chapter 3

MISCELLANEOUS

Ps. 10.4 is quoted in connection with "the evildoer does not doubt the existence of God, but only His omniscience and justice."³³⁹⁾ This verse is unclear and ambiguous. While we find in the King James version: God is not in all his thoughts, J. P. S., Luther, Zunz, and Bernfeld translate: "'There is no God' are all his thoughts." Whereas the Targum translates: "And he thinks that all his thoughts are not revealed before the Lord", Rashi says: "There is no judgment, and there is no judge"; and Metzudat David interprets: "All his thoughts are that there is no God in the world to punish him for his deeds." Ibn Ezra, on the other hand, informs us that the word "in" is omitted before "all his thoughts", i. e. he would translate: "And God is not in all his thoughts." The widely different interpretations of the passage show that it is hardly possible to draw any conclusion from it. If any statement concerning the problem of atheism in the Bible can be made, it ought to be based on Ps. 14.1, the meaning of which is clear.

Whereas Formstecher tells us that "the ideal of the spiritual individual life is not dependent on any climate"³⁵¹⁾, the apotheosis of the human form in Dan. 7.9; 13 and Job 1.6 are explained as not originating from "that sacred soil, on which Israel's older prophets uttered their visions."³⁵²⁾

This excuse is poor, since throughout Formstecher's book we find expressions of the idea that Judaism in its purity does not depend on any territory and since the expressions of YHWH's visibility treated above certainly did originate on "that sacred soil etc....."³⁵³⁾

Stating that Judaism does not acknowledge the reality of the Pagan deities,³⁵⁴⁾ Formstecher quotes three passages of which only one proves his point rather clearly. The expression "Hevel" used in I Ki. 16.13 justifies the author's contention. Much more dubious is the passage in I Ki. 11.1-10, where the expressions "their gods", "other gods", "Ashtoreth, the goddess of the Zidonians", "Milcom, the detestation of the Ammonites", "Chemosh, the detestation of Moab", "Molech, the detestation of the children of Ammon" are used. None of these expressions, except possibly "Shikkutz" gives a basis for the assumption that the Biblical author thought of Pagan deities as non-existent. Ex. 34.12-16 contain neither the expression "Hevel" nor "Shikkutz", but speak of "other god" and "their gods" only. The phrases do not exclude the possibility of acknowledging the foreign deities as real beings, the fact notwithstanding that mediaeval commentators have attempted to give us the impression as though these verses do not imply the existence of these other gods.³⁵⁵⁾

In a discussion concerning the destiny of the soul after

death, Formstecher calls our attention to two contradicting verses in Ecclesiastes (12.7 and 3.20). One verse states that the soul returns to God and the other one that "everything returneth to the dust." He ascribes these contradictions to the late origin of the book, which constitutes "a critical investigation of religious sources"³⁴⁸⁾, which the author promised to omit at the outset. Furthermore, this statement is misleading, since it gives the impression as though contradictions in Biblical literature occur only in books of late origin, which, of course, is not the case.³⁵⁶⁾

Jer. 48.8 is in no way related to the subject of hereditary sin.³⁵⁷⁾ We assume that Js. 48.8 is referred to by the author, who says that this passage can only be taken as an affirmation of hereditary sin by a "verschrobene Exegesis." The verse refers obviously to the nation and cannot be taken as an expression of hereditary sin. However, the author's contention, that this concept has never influenced the folk-life can be refuted by the interpretations of the mediaeval commentaries. Redak gives the following as an alternative: "Some of the evildoer's attributes are in the nature of his creation." As an illustration Kimchi quotes Ps. 58.4, to which Rashi adds: "From their mother's womb they become backsliders from the Holy One, praised be His name." Similar statements are found in Ibn Ezra and Metzudat David to the same verse.

Jer. 3.10 and 57.20 are interpreted as reminding man of his freedom of will.³⁵⁸⁾ The verses speak of the reward

of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked. Philosophically speaking, such a statement must be based on the premise of free will. But philosophical reasoning cannot always be applied to religious sources. According to our author, the concept of freedom of will belongs to Judaism only, whereas all non-Jewish - Pagan - religions did not know this concept.³⁵⁸⁾ Yet, he informs us that even in Teutonic mythology the righteous will go to "Gimlir" and the wicked to "Hel".³⁵⁹⁾

Ez. 34.23 does not say anything about those highest human qualifications of the future "shepherd", which are ascribed to him by Formstecher.³⁶⁰⁾ The same is true also of Ez. 37.24 to a certain extent, for the phrase "they shall also walk in mine ordinances and observe my statutes, and do them" refers to the people and not to the "shepherd." But in this case, Formstecher is justified to infer that it is the shepherd who makes the people obedient to the word of God and that he, therefore, must have these qualifications himself.

The story of the burning bush³⁶¹⁾ is not directly quoted but interpreted by our author when he says: "He (Moses) recognized that only the external form of the burning bush was changed, but that it in its essence could never become non-existent."³⁶²⁾ Moses, "the keeper of the flock of Jethro,

his father-in-law, the priest of Midian" becomes suddenly the philosopher pondering about the possibility of a change of the existent into the non-existent. But even if we grant the author the right of interpreting the story in such a way, we must at least require that that interpretation keeps in line with the words of the text. But the text does not say that the external form of the bush changed, on the contrary, it says: "and the bush was not consumed."³⁶³⁾, which can only mean that the external form of the bush did not change but remained unchanged in spite of the burning flame. Therefore, Formstecher's expression "consuming flame" is wrong, since the Bible tells us that this particular flame had the peculiarity of not being consuming. The assertion that Moses recognized "in the consuming flame only a messenger of God" appears to be correct when we judge according to v. 2. But do we have the right to overlook all the other passages in this story, from which we can clearly see that God Himself spoke to Moses on this occasion?³⁶⁴⁾

Num. 16.3 is an extremely poor proof that "the whole people is a congregation of God"³⁶⁵⁾, for this affirmation does not come here from any accredited Jewish person or group of persons; it is expressed by Korah and his rebellious group as an argument against the leadership of Moses and Aron.

Formstecher takes Deut. 4.29/30 as an inkling that Palestine will be a transitory dwelling place of Israel only.³⁶⁶⁾

This passage, which must be read together with the preceding verses³⁶⁷⁾, speaks of exile, indeed. But still, Palestine is not described here as a temporary dwelling place; the exile much rather is hinted at as a temporary phenomenon, for the phrase "and thou wilt return to the Lord thy God" may very well mean the return from the exile.³⁶⁸⁾ Furthermore, the exile in this passage is not described as a means by which Israel is led "to recognize God as the universal father of the human race"³⁶⁶⁾ but as a punishment for idolatry.³⁶⁷⁾

"Although he (the priest) takes the place of the first-born (Num. 3.12; 40/41) and although he becomes thereby priest by birth, he appears only as a representative of the people, who has to be acknowledged in his office by the people."³⁶⁹⁾ Attention must be called to the fact that the quotations here as in most places prove only the preceding phrase, but do not lend any basis to the following conclusion. It is rather obvious that our author could not prove the main point in this sentence, namely, that the priest must be approved of by the people in order to function in his office.

"The unlawful element in it (the request of the people for a king) was the motif, i. e., to become similar

to the other nations"³⁷⁰⁾ Deut. 17.14 contains the phrase "and shalt say: I will set a king over me like all the nations that are round about me." But v. 15 makes it evident that our passage does not consider this request as sinful; on the contrary, v. 15 states clearly: "Thou shalt certainly set a king over thee, whom the Lord thy God will choose." This shows clearly that the phrase "like all the nations" is by no means looked at disparagingly in this context, which seems to make the institution of a kingdom almost mandatory. I Sam. 12.19, however, is a clear indication that Samuel according to this passage was believed by the people not to have looked with favor at the people's request, and this discrepancy puzzled the Rabbis as well as modern Bible scholars.

Sanhedrin 20b quoted by Formstecher in this context contains a statement by R. Eliezer saying that it was all right for the elders to ask for a king who is to judge the people. R. Eliezer quotes here the phrase "give us a king, so that he may judge us."³⁷¹⁾ He then continues: "but the 'Amme Haaretz' were corrupt, for it is written: "That we also may be like all the nations; and that our king may judge us and go out before us."³⁷²⁾ This statement contains three difficulties. First of all it is not entirely clear, whether R. Eliezer sees the corruptness of the people in the fact

that they want to be like the other nations or that they want their king to go out before them and fight their battles. Secondly, the phrase quoted to the credit of the elders is taken out of its context. The whole verse reads: "But the thing displeased Samuel when they said: Give us a king to judge us." In other words, the phrase here is only a paraphrase from the preceding verse which says: "And they (the elders of Israel) said unto him:.....now make us a king to judge us like all the nations." This verse leads us to the third difficulty: If R. Eliezer meant to say that the corruptness of the people consisted of wishing to become similar to the other nations, the elders are guilty of the same offense and - at least this passage tells us that Samuel resented their request. No matter what R. Eliezer meant by his statement, we can easily see that his way of interpretation, which may well have satisfied his contemporaries, is entirely deficient for our purposes.

A more acceptable view ³⁷³⁾ is that originally there was no opposition to a king at all, and Samuel himself saw no wrong in it. Only when the abuses of the monarchy had become apparent and when the prophetic party wrote the opposition to the monarchy on their banner, did the anti-monarchistic passages of the Bible originate.

The passage in Deut. 17.14 was considered as an obligation even by some of the Rabbis in Mishnaic times, for the passage

in Sanhedrin treated above contains statements by R. Jehuda and R. Jose as follows: Three commandments were given to Israel when they entered the land: the institution of a monarchy, the extermination of Amalek and the building of the Temple.³⁷⁴⁾ As to Formstecher's treatment of this rather difficult and complicated problem we may say that we do not know how far this question was scientifically investigated at the time of his writing. It must be said, however, that even if he did not have any scientific results at his disposal, that he utilized the obvious confusion of the sources to fit the contradictory material into his scheme of history.³⁷⁵⁾ Strangely enough, Formstecher quotes even Deut. 17.15 but not - as the Rabbis did - in order to conclude from it that the institution of the monarchy is a Divine command. He naturally emphasizes the second half of the verse stating that "the Lord thy God shall choose" the king. Only on the next page³⁷⁶⁾ he states that "the relationship of theocracy to monarchy" - "is hinted at in Mosaic Law as a commandment (Deut. 17.14-20)."

Ex. 19.6 receives a rather confusing and obviously inconsistent treatment. "There (in the wilderness) the ideal height of his (Israel's) future was placed before his soul (Ex. 19.5/6)."³⁷⁷⁾ "As Israel at the time of his birth of a people heard that he was to be a kingdom of priests, a holy nation..."³⁷⁸⁾

These two passages are consistent with themselves and cannot be attacked by anyone who grants the author his belief in the Mosaic authorship of the passage. "The important task: that Israel as priestly kingdom and as holy nation take his place in humanity did finally enter clearly the consciousness of Judaism by means of its prophecy."³⁷⁹⁾ This statement refers to the time of Malachi, and could possibly be harmonized with the previous two passages implying the Mosaic authorship of Ex. 19.6. Formstecher may have meant that it took all these centuries for this great idea to take root in the consciousness of Judaism. However, in a discussion concerning the character and meaning of the Northern Kingdom we find the following sentence: "Hardly had Judah climbed to the height, hardly had the prophet said: that Israel should be a kingdom of priests for all nations and a holy nation, which recognized the mission of its existence not in earthly, but in heavenly rulership; then Israel (the Northern Kingdom) as the negative element appeared to be entirely superfluous..."³⁸⁰⁾ This statement cannot so easily be harmonized with the preceding ones. Although in both of these last expressions Ex. 19.6 is not quoted, they can refer to no other Biblical passage, since there is none other in the Bible speaking of Israel as a "kingdom of priests and a holy nation." Formstecher's phrase "Hardly had the prophet said" can have no

other meaning but that as soon as the prophet had uttered these words, the Northern Kingdom became superfluous. Although our author calls Moses a prophet³⁸¹⁾, we can hardly assume that he referred to Moses, for then Formstecher would not have a case for the existence of the Northern Kingdom in the first place, since Moses preceded the division for centuries. Neither can we assume that the addition of the words "for all nations" and "which recognized the mission of its existence" etc. means that he does not allude to Ex. 19.6 but to an utterance of a prophet who lived shortly before the destruction of the Northern Kingdom. For, if there be such an utterance, there would be no reason for him not to quote it. The only conclusion we can draw from this passage is that he did not believe in the Mosaic authorship of Ex. 19.6, that he found it convenient and fitting into his system to date it around the period of the destruction of the Northern Kingdom, and that he was, nonetheless, forgetful or inconsistent enough to make those other statements according to which it appears as though he does not doubt the Mosaic authorship of the passage.³⁸²⁾

Js. 61.1-3 is quoted following a statement saying that the prophet in his visions appears in a twofold relationship, in the relationship to himself and in that to the people. In that first relationship he is separated from all local

and temporal elements, he sees the ideal of Judaism in its purity and absolute truth. In that second relationship, however, he expresses the emotions, desires, and hopes of his people. We should expect to find in these verses an expression of this twofold relationship, but there is nothing in them which would suggest that relationship to himself, in which he sees the absolutely true ideal of Judaism. All through these verses the prophet speaks of the "tidings unto the humble", "liberty unto the captives", "day of vengeance of our God" etc., i. e., he expresses "the emotions, desires, and hopes of the people."³⁸³⁾

"Absolutely true ideas and relatively true temporal ideas are perceived by the prophet on the level of the future in an equally great distance, wherefore he interweaves them strongly in his pronouncements (Js. 56.3/7, Jer. 31.31-37, Mal. 1.11 etc.) and expresses the first ones frequently under the mantle of the latter ones (Js. 25.7-9; Ez. 16.60; 37.26-28; Joel 3.1/2 etc.)"³⁸⁴⁾ In the following we shall analyse some of the quotations accompanying this passage in order to show which according to our author are "the temporal ideas" and which are "the absolutely true descriptions."

In Js. 56.3/7 the expression of the full acceptance of the aliens is certainly an absolutely true idea, whereas the mentioning of the eunuchs, the Sabbath, and the sacrifices

are only of temporal significance. The phrase in v. 7 :
"My house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples"
can in this context naturally refer only to the sanctuary in
Jerusalem, in which case it is only of temporal value. But
Formstecher takes it out of its context, so that it refers
to any house in which God is worshipped and evaluates it,
therefore, as absolute truth.³⁸⁵⁾

A rather complicated mixture of these absolutely and
relatively true ideals is found in Mal. 1.11. "From the
rising of the sun even unto the going down of the same My
name is great among the nations" is universalistic and, there-
fore, absolutely true. "And in every place offerings are
presented unto My name, even pure oblations" refers to the
sacrificial cult and is, therefore, only relatively true;
and "For My name is great unto the nations, saith the Lord
of hosts" is again an absolutely true expression of uni-
versalism.

The inclusion of Jer. 31.31-37 into this group of verses
is a mistake. For the "new covenant" mentioned in this
passage applies to Israel only and is, therefore, of no
universalistic character. We assume that Formstecher meant
to quote this passage together with the following group of
quotations, which contain universalistic kernels under the
mantle of particularism. In order to uncover the universal-

istic kernel we have to apply - so it seems - some of the things which are said in regard to Israel to all of mankind, as e. g. "I will put My law in their inward parts, and in their heart will I write it; and I will be their God and they shall be My people."³⁸⁶⁾ Using the same method as applied to the Jeremiah Passage, we can uncover the universalistic element in Ez. 16.60 and 37.26/28.

Leaving Formstecher's line of thought for a moment and speaking in our own language, we may say that one has to do more than a little violence to the text in order to interpret these passages universalistically. With the same logic we could take any particularistic statement, apply it to the human race instead of to the group for which it was meant and say it has a universalistic kernel.

Formstecher has a somewhat better case in the following two passages. For, Js. 25.7/9 although speaking of "this mountain" (Zion), states that "all nations" will benefit from God's benefactions, that "God will wipe away tears from off all faces."

The application of Joel 3.1/2 to mankind seems to be justified, since God promises to pour His spirit "upon all flesh", which may well mean humanity. The mediaeval commentators, however, insist that a wonderful event as that described here can only take place in Palestine since "that is a place fit for prophecy"³⁸⁷⁾, and that "all flesh" refers to Israel, "for they are fit for the Holy Spirit to dwell upon them".³⁸⁸⁾

N O T E S

- 1) Julius Guttman: Die Philosophie des Judentums, p. 321
- 2) Kayserling: Bibliothek juedischer Kanzelredner, 1872, p. 137
- 3) Literaturblatt des Orients, 1842, p. 562
- 4) Juedische Religion im Zeitalter der Emanzipation, 1933, p. 120
- 5) o. c. p. 321 f.
- 6) MGWJ, vol. 71 (1927), p. 89
- 7) Geschichte der juedischen Religionsphilosophie in der Neuzeit.
- 8) o. c., p. 71, note 2
- 9) "dass Formstecher auch noch stark hegelisch orientiert war."
- 10) Hirsch's "Religionsphilosophie der Juden" is based on Hegel's philosophy. (Guttman, o. c., p. 328)
- 11) Literaturblatt des Orients, 1842, p. 442
- 12) A History of Jewish Literature, vol. iii, p. 649 f.
- 12a) ibid. p. 658
- 13) Formstecher: Die Religion des Geistes, p. 21
- 13a) p. 51 ff.
- 14) Literaturblatt des Orients, 1842, p. 439
- 15) Das Judentum und die geistigen Stroemungen des 19. Jahrhunderts, 1935, p. 414
- 16) Die gottesdienstlichen Vortraege der Juden, 1832
- 17) Rel. d. G., p. 4
- 18) ibid. p. 12
- 19) ibid. p. 436
- 20) ibid. p. 303 f; p. 365 etc.

Face note!

- 21) cf. Protokolle der ersten Rabbinerversammlung (Braunschweig), 1844, p. 3; Protokolle der zweiten Rabbinerversammlung (Frankfurt am Main), 1845, p. 3; Protokolle der dritten Versammlung deutscher Rabbinen (Breslau), 1846, p. 1
- 22) He also attended the meeting in Cassel in 1868 (cf. Philipson: The Reform Movement in Judaism, p. 404)
- 23) Protokolle der zweiten etc., p. 30
- 24) Protokolle der ersten etc., p. 54
- 25) Rel. d. G., p. 9 f.
- 26) Protokolle der zweiten etc., p. 101 f.
- 27) *ibid.* p. 104
- 28) *ibid.* p. 110. This debate refers to all occasions where Mussaph is recited and not only to Yom Kippur, where even the Union Prayer Book mentions the sacrificial cult. (U. P. B., Part ii, 1936, p. 245 ff.)
- 29) Protokolle der dritten etc., pp. 145 - 150
- 30) *ibid.* p. 146.
- 31) *ibid.* p. 147
- 32) *ibid.* p. 149
- 33) Philipson, o. c. p. 299
- 34) Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, Leipzig, 1867, vol. iv, p. 7 f.
- 35) Ueber Emanzipation der Juden etc., Siegen und Wiesbaden, 1845
- 36) *ibid.* p. 79
- 37) Rel. d. G., p. 422
- 38) Carove, o. c., p. 112
- 39) *ibid.* 101 ff.
- 40) *ibid.* 102
- 41) *ibid.* 156

- 42) Rel. d. G., p. 4
- 43) *ibid.* p. 433
- 44) *ibid.* p. 2
- 45) *ibid.* p. 5
- 46) *ibid.* p. vi
- 47) *ibid.* p. vii
- 48) *ibid.* p. 10
- 49) *ibid.* p. 18
- 50) *ibid.* p. 19
- 51) *ibid.* p. 20 f.
- 52) Formstecher obviously deviates here from the concept expressed in the opening verse of the Bible, according to which God did exist without the world.
- 53) Rel. d. G., p. 22
- 54) *ibid.* p. 23
- 55) *ibid.* p. 25
- 55a) *ibid.* p. 48; cf. also p. 156 f.
- 56) *ibid.* p. 27
- 57) It seems as though the author forgot this characterization of nature when he said on p. 113: "The revolutions of the earth are not accidental rebellions of independent, deified natural powers, but effects of a freely working Providence, well thought out and aiming at the morally good." Do not the evolutions of the earth belong to nature? And does not this statement imply the existence of a physical good, which in turn would make possible the existence of a physical evil? If nature as a whole is unconscious, none of its manifestations can have an aim, a pre-requisite of which is will and consciousness. Maybaum notices this inconsistency and remarks that it almost seems as though Formstecher attempts a theodicee of nature. Maybaum holds, however, that this passage is not really a part of Formstecher's system (o. c., p. 98). Maybe, we could explain this apparent in-

consistency of Formstecher's by assuming that he really does not express his own opinion here, but that he merely presents what he considers to be the Biblical view on the subject. If this be so, Formstecher failed to indicate that he does not agree with the Biblical view.

- 58) Rel. d. G., p. 34 f.
- 59) ibid. p. 64
- 60) ibid. p. 43 f.
- 61) ibid. p. 46
- 62) ibid. p. 63
- 63) ibid. p. 64
- 64) ibid. p. 157
- 65) ibid. p. 71
- 66) ibid. p. 53
- 67) MGWJ, vol. 71 (1927), p. 91
- 68) Waxman, l. c. p. 657. How "real factors" are frequently neglected, may be demonstrated by Formstecher's casual remark about the Inquisition, "which created most powerful organs for the defeat of Pagan life." (Rel. d. G., p. 379). Recognizing that Formstecher does not mean to give a full description of the Inquisition, we should, nevertheless, expect from any Jew to see more in it than a force destroying Pagan life; but this is all Formstecher is interested in here, and thus he does not hesitate to be silent regarding the havoc the Inquisition has wrought not only to the Jews, but also to Judaism: for the Marranoes - creatures of the Inquisition - have to a certain extent diluted the purity of Jewish monotheism on account of the Catholic influence exerted on them.
- 69) Rel. d. G., p. 201
- 70) ibid. p. 269
- 71) ibid. p. 330
- 72) ibid. p. 199

- 73) *ibid.* p. 94
- 74) *ibid.* p. 12
- 75) *ibid.* p. 184
- 76) *ibid.* p. 249
- 77) Jerem. 31.36; 38
- 78) *Rel. d. G.*, p. 258
- 79) *ibid.* p. 262
- 80) *ibid.* p. 315
- 81) *ibid.* p. 331 f.
- 82) *ibid.* p. 332
- 83) *ibid.* p. 351 f.
- 84) *ibid.* p. 357
- 85) *ibid.* p. 195
- 86) *ibid.* p. 2
- 87) *ibid.* p. 231
- 88) *ibid.* p. 232. This passage is also dealt with in our discussion of the sources.
- 89) *ibid.* p. 339
- 90) *ibid.* p. 340
- 91) *ibid.* p. 196
- 92) *ibid.* p. 204
- 93) *ibid.* p. 205
- 94) Gen. 27.5-29
- 95) *ibid.* 27.28
- 96) *Rel. d. G.*, p. 36

- 97) *ibid.* p. 205 f.
- 98) *ibid.* p. 87 f.
- 99) *ibid.* p. 217
- 100) *ibid.* p. 220
- 101) *ibid.* p. 219
- 102) *ibid.* p. 226 f.
- 103) *ibid.* p. 227
- 104) The same difficulty was noticed by the reviewer in Dr. Jost's *Israelitische Annalen*, 1841. We read there on p. 344: "Ausserdem ist das innere Staatsverhaeltnis (219) aus der Darstellung nicht klar."
- 105) *Rel. d. G.*, p. 224
- 106) *ibid.* p. 229
- 107) *ibid.* p. 230
- 108) *ibid.* p. 232
- 109) "Den Beruf seines Daseins"
- 110) *Rel. d. G.*, p. 233
- 111) Philipson, o. c., pp. 115, 248; cf. pp. 163, 168
- 112) The change of this idea in the life of one of the leaders of Reform can be interestingly observed in the utterances of Felsenthal (Emma Felsenthal: Bernhard Felsenthal, Teacher in Israel, 1924). In 1872 he says (o. c., p. 198): "Not only that we do not look upon this dispersion as a curse; on the contrary, we regard it as a blessing - a blessing for you (the Christians) and all mankind. God said to the Jew.....so I have now selected thee to go forth to the nations, to thy brothers in the Gentile world, and to bring them, in My name, gifts and treasures of the highest value, and thereby thou wilt become their benefactor, their Messiah, their Saviour and Redeemer." -- In 1897, the same man says in *An Open Letter On Zionism* (o. c., p. 260): "It is my conviction that that which some Jewish doctrinaires call 'the mission of the Jews' can be fulfilled just as well,

if for the Jewish nation....., yes that the mission of Israel can be better served if a center for the dispersed nation exists in their old Palestinian home." -- Similarly he says in 1902 (o. c., p. 264): "Israel's 'Mission' can be better fulfilled by a Jewish Model State than by a million disconnected individuals."

113) Rel. d. G., p. 296 f.

114) *ibid.* p. 368

115) *ibid.* p. 365

116) *Hauptlebensform*; *ibid.* p. 368

117) *ibid.*

118) Formstecher sees the absolute truth of Christianity in its striving for "elevating the spirit from nature-life to itself" (*ibid.* p. 369), and since he speaks of "reconciliation of the spirit with itself" (*ibid.*), in which the mission finds its task, we must consider this as a contradiction to the following: "Only when Christianity has recognized that it is to reconcile man, not with God.... but with his own spirit with which he fell out by his deification of nature" (*ibid.* p. 394). This latter statement shows clearly that Christianity teaches the necessity of man's reconciliation with God and does not find its task in reconciling the spirit with itself.

119) Rel. d. G., p. 369 f.

120) *ibid.* p. 369

121) *ibid.* p. 386

122) *ibid.* p. 387 f.

123) *ibid.* p. 378

124) *ibid.* p. 381

125) *ibid.* p. 387 f.

126) *ibid.* p. 422

127) *ibid.* p. 393; since the facts of present-day history refute this even otherwise untenable theory, we need not elaborate on it at all.

128) *ibid.* p. 397

129) *ibid.* p. 6

130) *ibid.* p. 400

- 131) *ibid.* p. 187
- 132) It does not seem fair to the Koran to speak of the reward - punishment principle as though it played no role in Jewish literature. Formstecher states on p. 37 in a discussion of the Good and the Evil: "The idea of punishment must be banned from the motivation of morality and of virtuous life, although it may be stated as an immediate consequence thereof." In the same discussion he quotes Ab. 1,3. But nowhere does he admit that this idea of reward and punishment plays an important role in the Bible, even in those prophets who consider the impending doom of the nation as a consequence of the people's sins, and some of whom state that the doom can be averted by Israel's mending of their ways (Am. 2.4/5; Jer. 7.3/15). Never does Formstecher mention Deut. 27.15 ff., and when he quotes Deut. 28 (p. 284), he places this chapter into a context where it is irrelevant: "This period of bliss appointed by God (according to Lev. 23; Deut. 28) is preceded by a period of curse and terrible misery; the people are morally entirely degenerated and suffer most terrible moral and physical evils." Whereas Lev. 23 must be an error here; for, dealing with festivals and sacrifices it has nothing to do with the matter at all, Deut. 28 does not refer to a period of bliss and a period of curse preceding it, but vv. 1-14 are a description of what will happen if Israel will listen to the voice of God (v. 1); and vv. 15-68 describe the terrible consequences of disobedience (v. 15). Recognizing that these verses were written many centuries previous to the origin of the Koran, and that the reward or punishment according to Deut. 28 are to come about in this world, it must still be said, that ethics here appears to be also "a strict edict of a despotic police." -- As we said before, Formstecher ignores the entire principle of retribution in Biblical and later Judaism.
- 133) *Rel. d. G.*, p. 404 -- Here, Formstecher forgets that the prophets, too, were Orientals; but their phantasy seems to be able to work differently: "In most beautiful colors does the prophetic feeling paint the heavenly picture of the future; true, it also mixes temporal ideas with the absolutely true descriptions, but they do not impair the beautiful picture of the Golden Age of humanity:" (p. 245 f.) If we would take the statement on p. 404 seriously, we should infer that the prophets are not to be considered as Orientals; which, of course, makes no sense. Hence, we assume that Formstecher's "bestochenes Herz" (p. 6) led him to make the rather untenable statement on p. 404.

- 134) Rel. d. G., p. 417
- 135) *ibid.* p. 254
- 136) *ibid.* p. 249 f.
- 137) *ibid.* p. 248
- 138) *ibid.* p. 249
- 139) The only expression which possibly points ~~into~~ the opposite direction is: "The prophet sees absolutely true ideas and relatively true temporal ideas on the level of the future in an equal distance; wherefore, he mixes them closely in his utterances." (p. 249) This may mean that the prophet does not see the difference between absolute and relative truth.
- 140) Rel. d. G., p. 248 f.
- 141) *ibid.* p. 260 f.
- 142) *ibid.* p. 263
- 143) *ibid.* p. 321
- 144) *ibid.* p. 319 f.
- 145) *ibid.* p. 277 f.
- 146) *ibid.* p. 279
- 147) *ibid.* p. 280; p. 284 f.
- 148) *ibid.* p. 287
- 149) *ibid.* p. 293
- 150) *ibid.* p. 294
- 151) *ibid.* p. 295
- 152) *ibid.* p. 296
- 153) *ibid.* p. 301
- 154) *ibid.* p. 306
- 155) *ibid.* p. 325
- 156) *ibid.* p. 329

- 157) *ibid.* p. 333
- 158) *ibid.* p. 415
- 159) *ibid.* p. 425
- 160) *ibid.* p. 435
- 161) *ibid.* p. 436
- 162) *ibid.* p. 492
- 163) *Jahrbuch fuer juedische Geschichte und Literatur*, 1904, p.141
- 164) *Rel. d. G.*, p. 433
- 165) *ibid.* p. 451
- 166) *ibid.* p. 448
- 167) *ibid.* p. 444 f.
- 168) *John* 18.36
- 169) *Rel. d. G.*, p. 242
- 170) *ibid.* p. 353
- 171) *ibid.* p. 390
- 172) *ibid.* p. 138
- 173) *ibid.* p. 297
- 174) *ibid.* p. 218
- 175) *ibid.* p. 138
- 176) *ibid.* p. 216
- 177) *ibid.* p. 349 f.
- 178) *ibid.* pp. 98, 103, 158, 311, 317, 321, 322, etc.
- 179) *ibid.* pp. 262, 283, 290
- 180) *ibid.* pp. 131, 329

- 181) *ibid.* p. 262
- 182) *ibid.* p. 345
- 183) *ibid.* p. 350
- 184) *ibid.* p. 342
- 185) *ibid.* p. 348
- 186) *ibid.* pp. 166, 348, 368
- 187) *ibid.* pp. 98, 171, 278, 311, 313, 314, etc.
- 188) *ibid.* pp. 113, 328, 329
- 189) *ibid.* pp. 113, 124, 297, 322, 323, 328
- 190) *ibid.* pp. 104, 328
- 191) *ibid.* pp. 167, 172, 326, 328
- 192) *ibid.* p. 321
- 193) *ibid.* p. 326
- 194) *ibid.* p. 328
- 195) *ibid.* pp. 88, 328
- 196) *ibid.* pp. 314, 322
- 197) *ibid.* pp. 286, 294, 317
- 198) *ibid.* pp. 327, 328
- 199) *ibid.* p. 98
- 200) *ibid.* pp. 103, 171, 327
- 201) *ibid.* p. 321
- 202) *ibid.* p. 113
- 203) *ibid.* pp. 322, 326
- 204) *ibid.* pp. 312, 343

- 205) *ibid.* pp. 11, 93, 136, 313, 322, 327, 343, 349
- 206) *ibid.* p. 152
- 207) *ibid.* pp. 90, 166, 170, 322
- 208) *ibid.* pp. 11, 337
- 209) *ibid.* p. 124
- 210) *ibid.* pp. 124, 279
- 211) *ibid.* pp. 218, 280, 289, 290
- 212) *ibid.* pp. 279, 290
- 213) *ibid.* pp. 279, 280, 289
- 214) *ibid.* p. 289
- 215) *ibid.* p. 280
- 216) *ibid.* pp. 285, 286, 293, 295, 299
- 217) *ibid.* pp. 286, 287, 293, 294, 295
- 218) *ibid.* p. 286
- 219) *ibid.* pp. 345f.
- 220) *ibid.* pp. 344, 348, 350
- 221) *ibid.* pp. 346, 348
- 222) *ibid.* pp. 337, 344, 345, 350
- 223) *ibid.* p. 346
- 224) *ibid.* p. 172
- 225) *ibid.* pp. 262-264; 308, 310, 316, 347
- 226) *ibid.* p. 313
- 227) *ibid.* pp. 347, 400, 431
- 228) *ibid.* pp. 442 f.
- 229) *ibid.* p. 430

- 230) *ibid.* p. 372
- 231) *ibid.* pp. 124, 152
- 232) *ibid.* p. 431
- 233) *ibid.* pp. 172, 347, 394
- 234) *ibid.* p. 350
- 235) *ibid.* pp. 308, 344
- 236) *ibid.* pp. 399-405
- 237) *ibid.* pp. 148, 292, 369-371, 373, 375-378, 383-384, 428
- 238) *ibid.* pp. 90, 100, 102, 118, 123, 148, 181
- 239) *ibid.* pp. 100, 115, 118, 123, 181
- 240) *ibid.* pp. 105, 178, 183, 323
- 241) *ibid.* pp. 148, 178
- 242) *ibid.* p. 178
- 243) *ibid.* p. 95
- 244) *ibid.* p. 94
- 245) *ibid.* pp. 100, 147, 322 f.
- 246) *ibid.* pp. 94 f., 148, 169
- 247) *ibid.* pp. 123, 183
- 248) *ibid.* p. 148
- 249) *ibid.* p. 178
- 250) *ibid.* pp. 164, 169
- 251) *ibid.* pp. 169, 180, 183
- 252) *ibid.* p. 181
- 253) o. c., p. 87, note 1
- 254) *Rel. d. G.*, p. 373

- 255) *ibid.* pp. 369, 374, 376 f., 383 f., 368, 388, 428
- 256) *ibid.* pp. 372, 377
- 257) *ibid.* p. 383
- 258) *ibid.* p. 398
- 259) *ibid.* pp. 374, 377, 383
- 260) *ibid.* pp. 388 f., 408, 443-446
- 261) *ibid.* pp. 322 f., 346, 382 f.
- 262) *ibid.* pp. 407 f., 410 f.
- 263) *ibid.* pp. 409-411
- 264) *ibid.* p. 446
- 265) *ibid.* p. 10
- 266) *ibid.* p. 91
- 267) *Mal.* 1.1; 1.2; 2.2 etc.
- 268) *Rel. d. G.*, p. 253
- 269) *ibid.* p. 96
- 270) *ibid.* p. 288
- 271) *ibid.* p. 91
- 272) *ibid.* p. 95
- 273) *Yalkut Vayyera*, par. 88, *Balak*, par. 765
- 274) An ethical term cannot be applied to Paganism since its field is aesthetics according to *Rel. d. G.*, p. 66
- 275) *Rel. d. G.*, p. 95
- 276) *ibid.* title page
- 277) *ibid.* p. 6
- 278) *II Chron.* 35.18; *I Sam.* 3.20

- 279) Rel. d. G., p. 225
- 280) I. Sam. 3.1-15
- 281) ibid. vv. 3, 5, 6, 9
- 282) ibid. v. 15a
- 283) ibid. ad v. 3
- 284) Although, as a rule, we abstained from introducing into our discussion any sources not quoted by the author, we deemed this necessary here and in a few other places in order to demonstrate Formstecher's deficiency in using his sources. Single verses of this chapter are quoted, however, in different contexts: p. 89 (v. 1); p. 117 (v. 18); p. 225 (v. 20)
- 285) Rel. d. G., p. 95
- 286) ibid. p. 288
- 287) ibid. p. 95
- 288) Elias Auerbach: Die Prophetie, Berlin, 1920, p. 61; 63. cf. also p. 65
- 289) Rel. d. G., p. 116
- 290) ibid. p. 139
- 291) "Nichtig und eitel"
- 292) Rel. d. G., p. 144
- 293) ibid. p. 158
- 294) We do not have to make a clear distinction between the two, since the crux of the question is whether or not man is born pure.
- 295) ad Ps. 51
- 296) Rel. d. G., p. 159
- 297) ad Gen. 8.21
- 298) "Durch seine Jugend"

- 299) Rel. d. G., p. 158
- 300) ibid. p. 159
- 301) ibid. p. 25
- 302) ibid. p. 160
- 303) ibid. p. 26
- 304) o. c., p. 656
- 305) The picture in Is. 11.6 - quoted on p. 252 - shows still more clearly that even nature did not seem to be imperfectible to the prophetic writer. Formstecher must have recognized this from his own statement: "Everything ignoble in the realm of minerals and plants is substituted for by the noble" etc.
- 306) Rel. d. G., p. 167
- 307) Lev. 7.15; 22.29
- 308) Rel. d. G., p. 170
- 309) ibid. p. 190
- 310) ibid. p. 138
- 311) ibid. p. 206
- 312) ibid. p. 218
- 313) I Chron. 13.2
- 314) Rel. d. G., p. 227
- 315) I Ki. 1.27
- 316) ibid. vv. 29 f.
- 317) Rel. d. G., p. 232
- 318) ibid. p. 231
- 319) I Ki. 12.28; 12.32
- 320) i. e. assuming that the centralisation of the sacrificial cult by the Deuteronomic Reformation took place in 621 B.C.E.

- 321) Rel. d. G., pp. 240 f.
- 322) ibid. p. 241
- 323) ibid. p. 240
- 324) Quoted in a different context on p. 246. On this page he cites also Is. 25.7, the translation of which is interrupted by..... The omitted words are "on this mountain", obviously referring to Mt. Zion. Redak says ad l.: "On this mountain (means) on Mt. Zion." Rashi remarks: "When they (the nations) will come to fight against Jerusalem." -- This omission shows the author's attempt to minimize the importance of Zion in the Bible and in Judaism.
- 325) Rel. d. G., p. 341
- 326) Orach Chayyim, par. 606
- 327) lit. "unless he has reconciled him"
- 328) cf., e. g., the repeated confessions of sins
- 329) Lev. 16.30
- 330) Rel. d. G., p. 348
- 331) This sentence is not found in the Bible; it may be a quotation from memory or a paraphrase on II Sam. 5.17 or I Chron. 14.8
- 332) To refute Formstecher's contention still more convincingly it would be necessary to investigate whether or not Rashi interprets any verses as referring to the Messiah; this, however, would be beyond the scope of this study.
- 333) Rel. d. G., p. 94
- 334) "Gottestraume "
- 335) Hebraeisches und chaldaeisches Handwoerterbuch ueber das Alte Testament, Leipzig, 1878, p. 23
- 336) anno 1841
- 337) Rel. d. G., p. 97
- 338) We believe to be justified to assume that Formstecher means ritual when he speaks of "veraltete und abgestorbene Lehren."

- 339) Rel. d. G., p. 102
- 340) Rashi ad Gen. 1.1
- 341) The same hypothesis may also be applied to his use of Ps. 10.4 in this context; for treatment of this verse see below p. 80.
- 342) Rel. d. G., pp. 102 f.
- 343) Rashi's source is obviously Targum Jonathan
- 344) Rel. d. G., p. 103
- 345) ibid. p. 157
- 346) ibid. p. 190
- 347) This statement "...they (the Jews) recognized in Cyrus, who according to prophetic utterance attained to his power only because of his loving treatment of Israel, the saving Messiah (Is. 44.28; 45.1)" (pp. 270 f.) seems to be a recognition of the exilic origin of these passages.
- 348) Rel. d. G., pp. 4 f.
- 349) e. g. Is. 35.8/9 (Rel. d. G., p. 160); Is. 2.3/4 (ibid. p. 241)
- 350) Since the text of Is. 26.19 is not so clear, we wish to add Kimchi's interpretation here, which seems to state correctly the idea expressed in the verse: "Then, at the time of salvation shall your dead ones live; for the Holy One, blessed be His name, is going to resuscitate the dead in the future, at the time of salvation; and thus He says in Daniel's prophecy: Dan. 12.2."
- 351) Rel. d. G., p. 67
- 352) ibid. p. 131
- 353) Note that the "sacred soil" of p. 131 becomes later the "narrow cradle of his (Israel's) childhood." Did not Ezekiel and the universalistic author of the mission idea - Deutero-Isaiah - most likely live outside of Palestine?
- 354) Rel. d. G., p. 136

- 355) cf. Rashi ad Ex. 20.3
- 356) Compare Gen. 1.27 with Gen. 2.7; 20/23
- 357) Rel. d. G., p. 158
- 358) ibid. p. 189
- 359) ibid. p. 181
- 360) ibid. p. 190
- 361) Ex. 3
- 362) Rel. d. G., p. 210
- 363) Ex. 3.2
- 364) ibid. vv. 4, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18 etc.
- 365) Rel. d. G., p. 213
- 366) ibid. p. 215
- 367) Deut. 4.25 ff.
- 368) "And this is a hint at the redemption from Babylon."
(Nachmanides ad Deut. 4.30)
- 369) Rel. d. G., p. 219
- 370) ibid. p. 226
- 371) I Sam. 8.6
- 372) ibid. v. 20
- 373) As presented by Doctor Morgenstern in one of his lectures
- 374) Kimchi, in commenting on I Sam. 8.5 (quoted in Rel. d. G.,
p. 225) makes use of R. Jehuda's statement, incorporating
in his comment the statements of R. Nehorai and R. Eliezer
in his words. It seems as though the Biblical contradiction
presented a greater problem to the Rabbis than to Formstecher.
- 375) Rel. d. G., p. 227
- 376) ibid. p. 228
- 377) ibid. p. 354

378) *ibid.* p. 256

379) *ibid.* p. 253

380) *ibid.* p. 232

381) *ibid.* p. 91

382) On p. 413 we find the statement: "...thus said the... prophetic watchman" following a quotation from Ps. 22, which - according to v. 1 - is a song by David. Also in this instance, then, Formstecher does not believe in the Davidic authorship of this passage, since he would hardly call David a prophetic watchman.

383) *Rel. d. G.*, p. 238

384) *ibid.* p. 249

385) *ibid.* p. 246

386) *Jer.* 31.32

387) *Ibn Ezra ad Joel* 3.1

388) *Kimchi ad Joel* 3.1

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