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Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein and the Jewish Displaced Persons

by

Thomas Philip Liebschutz

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts in Hebrew Letters and
Ordination

Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion

May, 1965

Referee

Professor Stanley F. Chyet

I dedicate this thesis to Philip S. Bernstein, Rabbi of Temple B'rith Kodesh, Rochester, New York, who as Adviser on Jewish Affairs to the United States Military Commanders in Europe from May, 1946, to August, 1947, was responsible, in no small measure, for the rescue and care of the Jewish Displaced Persons.

In his official position, Mr. Bernstein worked directly with the American Military Commanders in the Central Europe of Germany and Austria; he was responsible for the rescue and care of the Jewish Displaced Persons.

Digest

The contributions of uncommonly creative individuals to the course of human events is frequently overestimated, particularly by those who have grown up under the influence of such individuals. Though generally this be found true, it is not true in the case of Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein. From May, 1946, to August, 1947, he served his country and his people as Adviser on Jewish Affairs to the United States Military Commanders in Europe. This office was established by General Eisenhower to aid in the tragic and complicated problems presented by the surviving Jews of Europe under the care and custody of the United States Army. The Nazis had destroyed the entire structure of Jewish life in Europe. They had slaughtered six million men, women and children. The Jewish survivors were homeless, hopeless, possession-less and without legal rights. As the Army had no special understanding of these delicate and complex problems, it was felt that guidance should be offered by American Jews experienced in Jewish affairs. Eisenhower selected Judge Simon H. Rifkind to become the first Jewish Adviser. Rabbi Bernstein was his immediate successor.

In his official position Adviser Bernstein dealt directly with the American Theater Commanders of the Occupied Zones of Germany and Austria: Generals McNarney, Clay, Clark and Keyes; he met with responsible heads of the American Forces of Occupation to discuss the Jewish situation.

of the American government including President Truman, Acting Secretary of State Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State Hildring, and Secretary of War Patterson; he conferred with the leaders of various European governments such as the Prime Ministers of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Italy; he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Britain's Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, to allow some of the Jewish displaced persons to immigrate to Palestine; he was given a private audience with Pope Pius XII, who promised to assist Polish Jewry; he testified before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Immigration on behalf of the Stratten Bill to admit 100,000 D.P.'s a year over a four-year period into the United States; he appeared before the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in Munich, Germany.

Most important of all, Rabbi Bernstein came to know the displaced Jews themselves. He personally talked with tens of thousands of them and visited most of the camps in which they lived. Consequently he was able to hear their complaints and respond to their needs. Among his many contributions to their lives, the following are to be included: the assistance he rendered in obtaining official recognition of the Central Committee of Liberated Jews, his action initiated in the Jewish property restitution program, his aid in helping to keep open the borders of the American zones of occupation to over 100,000 Polish

and East European Jews fleeing from pogroms, his interpretation of the needs of the Jewish D.P.'s to the Army, to the State and War Departments, and to the American and world Jewish community, and his service to the process which led to the American underwritten publication of the Talmud by the Central Committee of Liberated Jews.

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I decided to write my thesis under my close personal friend and beloved teacher Stanley F. Chyet, Assistant Professor of American Jewish History at the Hebrew Union College and Assistant Director of the American Jewish Archives. I informed him of the conclusion I had arrived at with Rabbi Bernstein in Rochester. Dr. Chyet warmly urged me to commence the task, provided that I had

Preface

It is altogether fitting to indicate the manner in which this paper came into being. The writing of a Senior Thesis is mandatory for students seeking rabbinical ordination from the Hebrew Union College - Jewish Institute of Religion. I sought to fulfill this requirement by writing on a subject which would be deeply meaningful to me. I immediately thought of my Rabbi, Philip S. Bernstein.

I spoke to Rabbi Bernstein of my intentions in December, 1963. He greeted them with enthusiasm and agreed to cooperate in my venture in any way possible. He suggested that, rather than doing a biography of his entire life, I might concentrate on the fifteen-month period in which he served as Jewish Adviser to the Theater Command of the American occupied zones of Germany and Austria. So that I might discover whether this idea appealed to me, he let me borrow several pertinent documents on the period. A reading of this fascinating material convinced me of the merit of his idea.

I decided to write my thesis under my close personal friend and beloved teacher Stanley F. Chyet, Assistant Professor of American Jewish History at the Hebrew Union College and Assistant Director of the American Jewish Archives. I informed him of the conclusion I had arrived at with Rabbi Bernstein in Rochester. Dr. Chyet eagerly urged me to commence the task, provided that Rabbi Bernstein for me to meet and question Abraham Hyman.

Bernstein's Advisership could be adequately documented. I assured him that sufficient material was available. I told Dr. Chvat that Rabbi Bernstein had agreed to turn over to me for as long as I required his enormous files on the period. He would permit me to make copies of the papers I needed for reference in Cincinnati. Furthermore, Rabbi Bernstein had suggested that, when in Rochester, I should contact him for tape-recorded interviews on problems arising in my investigations. These assurances settled the matter.

During the summer of 1964 I began my research in Rochester. Rabbi Bernstein and I had many long conferences at that time, and subsequently in December, for which I am extremely grateful. The substance of these discussions was recorded and subsequently transcribed by my wife, Marilyn, whose untiring efforts as copyist, typist, proofreader and critic have enabled this thesis to assume physical dimension. To a large extent, the material found in chapters III through IX was taken from these taped interviews.

Though my taped interviews with Bernstein served as a primary source in the writing of this thesis, it was felt necessary to contact other men connected with the Jewish Adviser in order to achieve as high a degree of objectivity as possible. Interviews were arranged by Rabbi Bernstein for me to meet and question Abraham Hyman,

Moses Leavitt, Herbert Fierst, I.L. Kenen and Dr. Joseph Schwartz, all of whom have firsthand knowledge of the period and its problems. In August, 1964, I went both to Washington and New York to confer with these people and found their comments and opinions extremely valuable. They helped me to put in proper focus the many intricate problems involved in the care of the Jewish displaced persons and the relations between the Jewish relief agencies and the Army, the State Department, the War Department, and finally, the Jewish Adviser himself.

In addition to personal interviews, I relied, to a considerable degree, on the papers supplied by Rabbi Bernstein from his files. These files I found to be a veritable archives of published and unpublished documents on events pertaining to the Jewish D.P.'s. From his official correspondence and reports with the Theater Commanders, the Secretary of the Army, the representatives of the Jewish welfare organizations, and his military aides in the G-5 Division of the military government, I was able to reconstruct and give evidence for many of the conclusions drawn in this paper. From his sermons and addresses given to either the Jewish D.P.'s in Germany or to American Jews in this country, I was able to reconfirm these conclusions and accumulate valuable descriptive material. From his written accounts and recollections of personal conferences

the Jewish D.P.'s which were helpful in writing this

with important personages such as Truman, Sevin, and Pope Plus XII, I received vivid impressions of the people with whom he had dealt. Abraham Hyman's help to me should not be forgotten in this regard. After our interview he presented me with a large assortment of documents which supplemented the material Bernstein had given me in no small measure.

Copies of all this material -- both the taped interviews and the papers from Rabbi Bernstein's and Abraham Hyman's files -- have been turned over by me to the American Jewish Archives, where they are available for inspection and further research.

My thesis does not rely heavily upon secondary sources. I found more than enough material for the writing of this paper in the other categories already mentioned. Nevertheless, I have drawn on some of Rabbi Bernstein's published accounts in various yearbooks, periodicals and journals. While these, strictly speaking, are not secondary sources, they are non-documentary in nature. The reader also will observe that Chapter II contains a lengthy historical introduction to Hitlerism and the whole problem of European anti-Semitism. Several volumes were utilized in its preparation. Among them were: W.L. Shirer, The Rise And Fall of The Third Reich; R. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews; and J. Tenenbaum, Race and Reich. Two of the Jewish texts which were helpful in writing this

chapter were: S. Grayzel, A History of The Jews; and volume III of H. Graetz, History of the Jews. There is one book which should be singled out for special praise. Leo W. Schwarz, in The Redeemers, has managed to capture the vigor and spirit of the Jewish displaced persons particularly well.

Finally, my enduring thanks must go to Professor Stanley F. Chyet for his not insignificant contribution to this thesis. From the first chapter to the epilogue, he has guided me with his sound judgment and effective usage of the English language. However numerous the faults of this paper may be, they cannot be attributed to him.

TPL

Cincinnati, Ohio
March 3, 1965

Chapter I

Introduction

World war brings upon mankind many tragedies: nations and economies are disrupted, industries and cultures are destroyed, fierce hatreds and guilt feelings are let loose and inflame the human heart -- even though hostilities have officially ended, populations are left homeless and rootless, tens of millions of innocent people are needlessly slain. Once war is concluded these tragedies and their effects do not swiftly disappear. In many ways the real problems of any war have yet to be solved when the war is over. How are the conquered nations to be treated and how can their citizens and economies be revived? What is the method by which one treats the chief victims of persecution so as to make them useful productive citizens once again?

These are delicate questions. To those upon whom such responsibility rests there is need for sober judgment and sensitivity. The governments which undertake to solve these problems need to call upon all the human and financial resources at their disposal if the solutions they undertake are to be effectively resolved.

Shortly after the conclusion of World War II it became apparent that not all the Jews of Europe had been destroyed by the Nazis. With the passing of each month during the late fall and winter of 1945-1946 an increasing number of European Jews came out of hiding, out of the concentration camps, and out of Russia -- where they had

fled to safety before the advancing German armies. By May of 1946 "there were approximately one hundred thousand Jewish displaced persons in all zones of Germany and Austria."¹ Many more were expected to follow. These Jews required immediate attention. They had to be provided for, housed and fed, clothed and medically attended, schooled and rehabilitated. Eventually they had to be transferred to some other location, to some other country, where they could attempt to renew their shattered lives and fortunes.

The major responsibility for the care and treatment of the Jewish displaced persons during the years immediately following the war fell upon the United States government and, more specifically, its military command in the occupied zones of Europe. Faced with tremendous burdens the State and War Departments realized they would require all the help they could get in administering their task. Immediately they called on the world's existing relief organizations to help them. Among the many groups which answered their call, giving weighty and admirable assistance to the United States at this crucial time, were the Jewish relief agencies both in this country and abroad. These Jewish volunteer organizations contributed huge sums of money to the relief and resettlement of the Jewish displaced persons. They also sent thousands of their people to Europe to render direct assistance where

it was needed. .

Besides working with the Jewish relief organizations for the care and sustenance of the Jewish displaced persons, the United States government, recognizing the urgency and uniqueness of the Jewish problem, created the official office of Special Adviser on Jewish Affairs. The responsibility for the creation of this new, quasi-military office of the Jewish Adviser can be largely attributed to the insistence and foresight of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was the first in a series of supreme commanders of the United States Army of Occupation in Europe.²

The establishment of the position of the Jewish Adviser was significant in many respects, the most important being that it gave the Jewish displaced persons a man to represent their interests in court. From October 20, 1945, the day in which the first Jewish Adviser, Judge Simon H. Rifkind, United States District Judge of New York, arrived in Germany to take up his responsibilities, through the succession of the six men who followed him in that position culminating with Major Abraham S. Hyman, the Jewish displaced persons as well as world Jewry were in possession of a direct channel to the top-level echelons of the United States government. In that the Jewish Advisers were in a position to influence and help formulate American policies and attitudes towards the Jewish displaced persons, their office was of an

incalculable importance.

Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein was the man who held the position of Jewish Adviser for the longest period of time. The purpose of this thesis is to describe and examine his career and contribution to Jewish life and survival. For fifteen months, from May, 1946, until August 1947, Philip S. Bernstein, Rabbi of Temple B'rith Kodesh, Rochester, New York, served in Europe as the second Jewish Adviser to the American Military Commanders of Occupied Germany and Austria. While he held this position Adviser Bernstein did much to improve and facilitate the life, the status, and the dignity of the Jewish displaced persons. He was their friend, their adviser, their "man in court," their guardian angel. In the process of becoming their champion, Rabbi Bernstein came into close, and in some cases even intimate contact, with most of the important personalities of the time. He met with the heads and representatives of the European governments including Britain's Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and Pope Pius XII. Harry S. Truman, the American President, sought his advice and counsel as did General Eisenhower's successors, Generals Joseph T. McNarney, Mark Clark and Lucius D. Clay. During this period Adviser Bernstein also met with the leaders of world Jewry. In many ways it was he who represented their interests and hopes in regard to the future permanent

resettlement of the Jewish displaced persons.

The focus of this thesis is now clear. It intends to dwell on the life of one man, Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, in his performance of the job of Jewish Adviser. But before this fascinating career can be examined more fully it would be well for us to consider the factors which led to the creation of the Jewish displaced persons. As we are well aware, their painful and trying predicament in the immediate post-war era was caused by the most catastrophic events ever to befall the Jewish people. The German nation had deliberately set out to destroy them from the face of the earth.

The Jewish displaced persons, a wretched and pitifully small group at the conclusion of World War II, were nearly all that remained of a once proud and thriving continental European Jewish community. On May 7, 1945, when the German nation unconditionally surrendered to the Allied Military Forces, European Jewish life was seemingly dead.

In the late 1930's Hitler had declared that he would destroy the Jews. Less than a decade later it appeared as though his then fateful prediction had come true. Perhaps, "the most saddening aspect of this situation," said Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, was that the Nazi regime "was not an aberration but the logical culmination of the whole history of the Jews in Europe."⁵ Hitler's fanaticism was not the cause of German and European anti-Semitism, but its product.

For two thousand years down to the present century, Europe's Jews had managed to survive despite repeated pogroms and generally trying circumstances. The modern age, however, provided obstacles and situations which even two thousand years of Jewish survival experience could not hope to overcome. The Europe of the twentieth century had new methods and equipment with which to handle its Jewish problem. In Hitler's Germany these modern techniques were linked to the old anti-Semitic ideologies, the residue of approximately fifteen centuries of Christian

indoctrination. This ideological and technological union spawned a monster with an insatiable appetite for destruction. During the short twelve-year span of Nazi dominance in Germany, "five million [European Jews] were killed as a result of an organized undertaking....The operation was over before anyone could grasp its enormity, let alone its implications for the future."

On November 11, 1918, the carnage of the First World War ended with the signing of an armistice at Compiègne. Few people would then have expected Germany to conduct another war of aggression in their life-time. World War I had been the war fought to end all wars, and peace was now to reign for the millennium. Within six months, in the late spring of 1919, the Allies dictated the terms of the Versailles Treaty to the vanquished German nation. These conditions were to guarantee a lasting peace. The disarmament provisions rendered Germany virtually powerless to wage wars of aggression and destruction. German opportunities for hegemony in Europe were now removed. On June 28, 1919, the treaty of peace was signed at Versailles. The passing of two more months produced a constitution for the newly created Weimar Republic. It was reputed to be the most liberal democratic document of the century protecting the rights of every citizen and group. The process of creating a mass, political, movement for the purposes of obtaining the Reich Chancellery. The Third Reich was born on January 30, 1933.

Only thirteen years had elapsed since the Treaty of Versailles, yet in that time, the triumphant hopes of a tired world for a millennium of peace underwent a fantastic metamorphosis. The German people willingly exchanged their freedom and independence for the "Thousand Year Reich" of Adolf Hitler.

Hitler's "power grab" in Germany was not a chance occurrence. He was entrusted the chancellorship by President Hindenburg as the result of deliberate, calculated policies which Hitler had embarked upon shortly after the conclusion of the First World War. His specific aims were to create a mass political movement, and to convince the established cliques of military and industrial power that by patronizing the Nazi party their own social and economic positions would be maintained. Yet no contemplated task of Hitler's was of greater importance than receiving the blessing of the aged Von Hindenburg. Though Von Hindenburg was the President of the Republic, in reality he symbolized all of the forces of the Second Reich which Bismark had created. Only Von Hindenburg could link Hitler's Third Reich to the old one, and Hitler knew it. Once this goal and the others were accomplished the Austrian corporal modern Germany, the Army. As a result, the German military could ruthlessly do as he pleased in Germany without active opposition.

The process of creating a mass, political, movement within a state it possessed vast influence and power. for the purposes of obtaining the Reich Chancellorship Hitler realized that if he could bind the leaders of this

was not easy for Adolf Hitler. Still it took him only about thirteen short years to obtain his end. This would have been an amazing attainment even for a master organizer and spellbinder like Hitler, were it not for several important considerations which played into his hands.

First, the old powers which had supported the Hohenzollern Empire never lent their support or loyalty to either the creation of or the perpetuation of the new Weimar democracy. This was principally because the Republic threatened to dislodge these groups from their privileged economic, political, and social positions. Consequently the German civil service, industrialists, Junker landlords, and, most significant of all, the German Army, refused to cooperate in any appreciable measure to keep the Republic from tottering into the abyss.

The Social Democratic Party, which held absolute political power in November, 1918, could have suppressed the traditional repositories of German authority, but failed to do so. "Instead they began by abdicating their authority to the force which had always been dominant in modern Germany, the Army."⁷ As a result, the German military caste was able to maintain an autonomous position throughout the short lifespan of the Weimar Republic. As a state within a state it possessed vast influence and power. Hitler realized that if he could bind the leaders of this

faction to himself and the National Socialist cause, he could control the most important single element in Germany. During the intrigue-filled days of 1932 and 1933 he was to fulfill this ambition.

Second, the magnates of German industry and finance eventually came to believe that a national government under the leadership of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor, would best protect and advance their interests in private enterprise. These men were primarily concerned with priming the German industrial machine whose progress had been abruptly halted by the terms of the Versailles Treaty. The great depression of 1929 had also severely disrupted the German economy, leaving the country in a desperate crisis with millions of people unemployed. In 1930 the Communists, the Socialists, and the trade-unions were all making serious bids for political power. The Communists had gone so far as to introduce a bill in the Reichstag which threatened to impose severe restrictions on the influential business and banking classes. Horrified and despairing at their fate if the Communists were indeed to achieve a political victory, these men turned to the emerging Nazi Party and its leader, Adolf Hitler. Here was a man who could offer them hope. "They might not like the party's demagoguery and its vulgarity, but on the other hand it was arousing the old feelings of German patriotism and nationalism which had been so muted during the Weimar years. Then the National Socialists stated that

the first ten years of the Republic."⁸

Hitler was extremely eager to accept the support of the men who represented Germany's moneyed interests. His party's financial coffers were in a distressingly poor state due to the large sums of money required "to finance election campaigns, pay the bill for its widespread and intensified propaganda, meet the payroll of hundreds of full-time officials and maintain the private armies of the S.A. and the S.S., which by the end of 1930 numbered more than 100,000 men -- a larger force than the Reichswehr."⁹ Therefore, without hesitance, the Fuehrer devoted himself to cultivating the influential industrial tycoons. With most of these men he encountered more enthusiasm than resistance, for they realized Hitler's ideas, however fanatical, would swell their shrunken purses. Privately he met and won over Emil Kirdorf, a leading coal industry figure; Fritz Thyssen, spokesman for the steel producing interests; Georg von Schnitzler, a director of the ^{during} chemical cartel known as I.G. Farben, and many other powerful representatives of the German economy. Finally, in 1933, Gustav Krupp, the munitions king, happily swore his oath of fidelity to Hitler. These businessmen were promised that the Marxists would be eliminated and the German Wehrmacht would be restored by the Nazi party in return for their financial sponsorship and industrial backing. Then the National Socialists stated that

when they came to power political parties other than Hitler's would cease to exist in Germany for ten or possibly even one hundred years; that democratic elections would no longer be held; that the despised disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles would be abrogated, and thereupon the industrialists and financiers enthusiastically and joyfully endorsed the party's policies. In the end "the political ineptitude" of these industrial barons, like that of the generals of the German Army -- who thought they could control Adolf Hitler if he ever came to power -- was to prove the undoing of them and their country.

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Third, Hitler was able to capitalize on age-old German authoritarian traditions, a malignant European anti-Semitism and Aryan racial myths, all of which were deeply imbedded in the very fabric of the German people. These powerful forces for evil were vigorously espoused by the many discontented elements in German society during the stormy days of the Weimar Republic. Hitler and his Nazi party were to take full advantage of these odious and repulsive hangovers of an earlier period to achieve political power in our time.

From the Middle Ages until the middle of the nineteenth century the German nation remained a fragmented, heterogeneous assembly of peoples. National consciousness of any sort was almost nonexistent, and it was not until the birth of

was practically absent. In marked contrast to this vacuum in German national development was the rapid rise to power in Western Europe of highly unified, homogeneous nations such as Holland and Spain. Germany's inability to develop nationally along lines similar to her Western neighbors was to have a decided effect upon her own subsequent growth and European history.

When the Thirty Year's War ended Germany was divided into some 350 independent states. Each of these principalities was governed by a German prince -- given absolute authority by the terms of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. This mosaic-like partitioning of Germany in the seventeenth century was to prove disastrous to the nation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. "Acceptance of autocracy, of blind obedience to the petty tyrants who ruled as princes, became ingrained in the German mind."¹¹ Unlike France, England, and the United States, where the idea of democracy blossomed forth bestowing benefits on all their citizens, Germany remained politically backward.

With the rise of Prussia as a major military power in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Germany's destiny continued to be shaped along autocratic lines. In Prussia, the army, under the unqualified control of the King, constituted the very heart of the state. Her people, and the Slavs who farmed the large Junker estates as landless serfs, were taught from birth that

they were only accountable, in life to be dutiful and obedient. In effect, the State was the master and the people were slaves. Slowly but inevitably this doctrine permeated the Germanic peoples. Finally between 1866 and 1871, Otto von Bismarck, the epitome of the successful Prussian Junker, succeeded in replacing a divided Germany with a Prussianized Germany as the result of his "blood and iron" nationalism.

Bismarck's unique creation is the Germany we have known in our time, a problem child of Europe and the world for nearly a century, a nation of gifted, vigorous people in which first this remarkable man and then Kaiser Wilhelm II and finally Hitler, aided by a military caste and by many a strange intellectual, succeeded in inculcating a lust for power and domination, a passion for unbridled militarism, a contempt for democracy and individual freedom and a longing for authority, for authoritarianism.¹²

According to the noted author of The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, William L. Shirer, "from 1871 to 1933 and indeed to Hitler's end in 1945, the course of German history as a consequence was to run, with the exception of the interim of the Weimar Republic, in a straight line and with utter logic."¹³ Both the German middle and working classes exchanged whatever political independence they possessed for the transient hope of material success.

They accepted the Hohenzollern autocracy. They gladly knuckled under to the Junker real bureaucracy and they fervently embraced Prussian militarism. Germany's star had risen and they -- almost all of the people -- were eager to do what their masters asked to keep it high.¹⁴

The psychological attitudes and conditioning of the majority of the German people forced them to look upon their defeat in the First World War, and the Republic born of its outcome, as an aberration. Hitler, shrewdly realizing this innate weakness in the German national character, used it to the best political advantage. Thundering forth at every opportunity, he used his oratorical brilliance to assure the Germans not only that he would restore the lost splendor of Bismarck's Second Reich but that National Socialism would eliminate the mistakes which had led to Germany's recent downfall. In Mein Kampf Hitler discoursed at great length on what he believed were the reasons for the Second Reich's demise:

its tolerance of Jews and Marxists, the crass materialism and selfishness of the middle class, and the nefarious influence of the 'cringers and lickspittles' around the Hohenzollern throne, the 'catastrophic German alliance policy' which linked Germany to the degenerate Hapsburgs and the untrustworthy Italians instead of with England, and the lack of a fundamental 'social' and racial policy.¹⁵

Anti-Semitism was one of the fanatical foundation-stones of the entire Nazi program. To it Hitler added grotesque, bizarre racial theories and achieved what can be considered all but instantaneous success among the German people. That Germany succumbed to these infernal, chaotic forces of destruction should come as no real surprise. Jew hatred and German racial superiority were not new doctrines in the twentieth century but almost as

old as European history itself. During the difficult days of the Weimar Republic, a vast segment of the German population required little prodding from Hitler in order to embrace policies of race enslavement and obliteration.

The inhabitants of Europe were first exposed to anti-Jewish policies in the fourth century of the Common Era. From the time of Constantine the Great, the first Christian emperor, the Jewish legal status in Europe was generally second class. Throughout the next fourteen hundred years, the Catholic Church and the feudal nobility conditioned Europeans to the role Jews were to occupy in their midst. This role was never uniform; the Jews were not always subject to persecution. To a large extent the treatment of the Jew in medieval Europe depended on the prevailing socio-economic conditions of the societies in which they lived. When these conditions were good the Jew prospered; when they were bad he was made the target of vicious anti-Jewish propaganda. Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein commented on this phenomenon quite succinctly when he said,

It has been the crucial and tragic role of my people to reflect the health of world society. When the body politic was sick, the Jews were persecuted; when man lived in peace and freedom, Jews shared in the common blessings.¹⁶

The "health" of the "body politic" as it affected the Jews of medieval Europe was intimately connected

with the success of the feudal system, initiated in the sixth century. Under this arrangement the feudal nobility and the Catholic Church achieved immense wealth and power. At first the Jews were indispensable to the functioning of these favored groups within the feudal system. As moneylenders, merchants and traders they were a ready source of credit and provided the nobility with many of the amenities of life in the form of luxury goods from the East. But when the economic foundations of feudal society were overextended between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries the Jews were among the first to feel the consequences. Though they had known sporadic persecution before this time in Europe their previous situation had generally been secure. Now, however, all this was to change. Pogroms occurred and anti-Jewish laws were promulgated with increasing intensity and rapidity so that by the thirteenth century the Jewish position throughout the greater part of Europe was rapidly deteriorating. From this time forth until 1789, when the French Revolution once again thrust Jews back into the mainstream of western European life, they were treated as a pariah class. This view was propagated among the masses by the feudal and ecclesiastical nobility who found the Jews a convenient scapegoat for the social and economic ills which they themselves had originated some of the most vile anti-Jewish laws the brought about.

The Church's position towards the Jews was rarely, if ever, based on racial grounds alone. But, contrary to popular opinion, theological differences were not the crux of the matter either. To be sure, one of the historical objectives of the Church has always been to convert non-believers to their one true faith, but Jews have always been contemptuous of the doctrine of Jesus elevated to Godhood as Christ. On this and other issues the two religions have remained historically irreconcilable. What is most interesting, however, is that beginning with the thirteenth century the Catholic Church used their theological disagreements with the Jews as a cloak to hide the sorely pressing economic conditions of a rapidly decaying feudalistic social system. The secular Christian nobility, confronted with the same serious problems, appropriated the Church's *modus operandi* in regard to the Jews to protect their own vested interests.

In 1214, Innocent the III, one of the strongest and most rapacious Popes in all Church history, convened in Rome an ecumenical meeting of the representatives of entire Latin Christendom. This convocation, which included twelve hundred Churchmen and laymen, was known as the great Fourth Lateran Council. The gathering shall always remain infamous in Jewish history. From it originated some of the most vile anti-Jewish laws the Council, or, in Papal Bulls issued subsequent to that

world had yet known. They soon contaminated medieval Christian life so that the nobility and common people learned to become bitter enemies of the Jews. The amazing thing to notice about these laws is that very few of them had anything to do with theology. Most of the canons were specifically designed to replenish the Church's shrunken coffers which were severely reduced as a result of the declining feudalism of the period.

The legislation passed by the Church at its Fourth Lateran Council left a legacy of hatred and ill-will which the intervening years between the thirteenth and twentieth centuries never managed to eliminate completely. The extraordinary amount of bad sentiment which set in during the pontificate of Innocent the III was soon evidenced in many places.

In France, as the cost of living had enormously spiraled, there was a growing need for money among the nobility. By this time the barons and feudal lords were inextricably indebted to the Jewish financiers. The serfs, who farmed the estates of the privileged classes, could no longer increase the land's yield of agricultural goods. Consequently the feudal nobility had little hope of repaying the borrowed sums they owed the Jews. This did not phase the debtors. They had only to invoke some of the decrees laid down in 1214-1215 at the Fourth Lateran Council, or, in Papal Bulls issued subsequent to that

time. Thus, as the Catholic clergy considered themselves lords to whom their Jewish subjects were to bring tribute, so did the secular princes. Debts were thereby liquidated by forcing Jews to pay enormous tithes on all they possessed. Even the right to live within the country was subject to a high assessment. In 1298 a comparatively small Jewish population was contributing forty percent of all tax revenues in France. Soon the Jews could no longer be of service to the nobility as they were reduced to utter poverty. When this occurred they were expelled en masse from the country.

The monumental and heinous achievement of the Catholic hierarchy and feudal nobility during the Middle Ages was to cast the Jews in the role of scapegoats for all the economic, social and political misfortunes of mankind. After the thirteenth century the Jews were branded as outcasts. The Church was extremely astute in propaganda of this kind. Though her real aims were economic and political in nature, she used theology to convince the ignorant masses that the Jews were a social cancer among them. Populaces were led to believe that because Jews would not accept conversion they were a special group of people dangerous to Christendom and in league with the devil. To these excoriating cries were added so-called defensive measures designed not only to protect Christians from harmful fraternization with Jews,

but to divert the attention of the multitude from the real sources of their collective destitution and poverty -- the Church itself.

As theology the anti-Jewish propaganda worked. Jews were burnt, tortured and killed in the name of Christ while those who called themselves Christians looked happily on. By the sixteenth century the Jews had been expelled -- at one time or another -- from England, Spain, Italy, portions of Germany, and, of course, France. Their choice had been conversion or expulsion. In every one of these instances the Jews had initially served the upper classes as a prop, and later, when the economic and social conditions deteriorated, as a shield. The "ghetto Jew," as the phrase is known today, was not originally a free product of his environment. Rather he was forced into existence as the result of prohibitive decrees laid down by high and late medieval Christianity.

Ultimately the post-ecclesiastic Nazis were to utilize the accumulated treasure of anti-Jewish propaganda and laws historically rooted in feudalism and the Catholic Church to exclude and eventually to butcher the Jews of Europe during the 1930's and 1940's. The Nazis became experts in applying these classic lessons, with one unprecedented exception -- Hitler was more systematic than the Church. He envisioned and undertook a "final solution" to the Jewish problem; he controlled an

organized, well-disciplined, efficient bureaucracy which methodically and dispassionately executed his orders.

In his highly informative book, The Destruction of the European Jews, Raul Hilberg summarizes the Nazis' extermination plans in the following manner.

Since the fourth century after Christ, there have been three anti-Jewish policies: conversion, expulsion, and annihilation. The second appeared as an alternative to the first, and the third emerged as an alternative to the second.

The expulsion and exclusion policy was adopted by the Nazis and remained the goal of all anti-Jewish activity until 1941. That year marks a turning point in anti-Jewish history. In 1941, the Nazis found themselves in the midst of a total war. Several million Jews were incarcerated in ghettos. Emigration was impossible. A last minute project to ship the Jews to the African island of Madagascar had fallen through. The 'Jewish problem' had to be 'solved' in some other way. At this crucial time, the idea of a 'territorial solution' emerged in Nazi minds; the 'territorial solution,' or 'the final solution of the Jewish question in Europe,' as it became known, envisaged the death of European Jewry. The European Jews were to be killed. That is the third anti-Jewish policy in history.¹⁷

No history of European anti-Semitism and German racial theory would be complete without mentioning the name of Martin Luther. This "towering but erratic genius, this savage anti-Semite and hater of Rome...combined in his tempestuous character...many of the best and the worst qualities of the German [people]...." ¹⁸ Luther wrote a book entitled About the Jews and Their Lies.

In it he characterizes the Jews in the most contemptuous

language imaginable. Thus he said:

Herewith you can readily see how they understand and obey the fifth commandment of God, namely, that they are thirsty bloodhounds and murderers of all Christendom, with full intent, now for more than fourteen hundred years, and indeed they were often burned to death upon the accusation that they had poisoned water and wells, stolen children, and torn and hacked them apart, in order to cool their temper secretly with Christian blood.

And:

Now see what a fine, thick, fat lie that is when they complain that they are held captive by us. It is more than fourteen hundred years since Jerusalem was destroyed, and at this time it is almost three hundred years since we Christians have been tortured and persecuted by the Jews all over the world...so that we might well complain that they had now captured us and killed us -- which is the open truth. Moreover, we do not know to this day which devil has brought them here to our country; we did not look for them in Jerusalem.¹⁹

Until the advent of Adolf Hitler, the Jew had not experienced diatribes more vituperative or execrating than those so passionately enunciated by Martin Luther. He portrays the Jews as wanting "to rule the world"; "arch-criminals, killers of Christ and all Christendom"; a "plague, pestilence, and pure misfortune."²⁰ Though these charges have frequently been repudiated, Luther's stereotyped, medieval Jewish image was an easy one for Hitler to resurrect. But this twentieth-century madman went far beyond the limits which Luther and the Catholic Church had imposed upon themselves. Hitler spoke of race as well as Jew.

Hitler's racial theories were not original. Coinciding with the resurgence of Prussia in the nineteenth century, an army of ranking philosophers, important personalities, and eccentric crackpots espoused either a militant German nationalism or a pagan Aryanism. Hitler needed only to borrow their ideas to strike a responsive chord in the hearts of the German people.

Among the philosophers there were three men -- Fichte, Hegel, and Nietzsche -- whose highly original teachings and thoughts profoundly influenced the masses and the leaders of the country, psychologically preparing them for two terrible onslaughts on western society in the twentieth century. In his Addresses to the German Nation, Johann Gottlieb Fichte "used all the fire of his patriotic fervor to inspire the nation to ever greater sacrifices for the divine trinity of race,
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language, and nation." He was followed at the University of Berlin by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who in his Philosophy of Right placed the "State" on a divine pedestal next to patriotism, nationalism, and race. Finally there was the frequently misunderstood Nietzsche, who, though never an anti-Semite, exclaimed in his The Will to Power, "a daring and ruler race is building itself up....The aim should be to prepare a transvaluation of values for a particularly strong kind of man, most highly gifted in

intellect and will. This man and the elite around him²² will become the 'lords of the earth.'" Clearly Hitler saw himself as Nietzsche's "superman."

In the realm of the arts, the celebrated -- and anti-Semitic -- composer Richard Wagner provided the Nazis with a "primitive Germanic mythos" which captured²³ the imagination of the people's minds and spirits.

Tristan und Isolde and the Niblungen Ring were stirring, powerful operas which vividly recalled, "the world of German antiquity with its heroic myths, its fighting pagan gods and heroes, its demons and dragons, its blood feuds and primitive tribal codes, its sense of destiny,
[its] splendor of love and life and the nobility of death."²⁴ Hitler took the motifs of these towering Wagnerian operas and transformed them into inspiring myths for his modern Germany.

But of all the sources from which Hitler -- the arch-apostle of Aryanism -- drew, the most instructive were the four-volume Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines by the French aristocrat Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau and the two-volume Foundations of the Nineteenth Century by the poet-philosopher and musician Houston Stewart Chamberlain. The ideas of these two men created an immediate sensation when they appeared and seduced countless Germans.

Perhaps the anti-Semitic theses disseminated by Gobineau and Chamberlain, as well as many other men during the latter half of the nineteenth century, would have had little impact on German society had not Europe's aristocracy and privileged classes once again been beset by economic difficulties reminiscent of an earlier age. The revolutionary movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had released the spirits of liberalism and democracy in Europe. The rise of industrialism and capitalism was destroying the power of wellborn people of courtly rank. These powerful forces caught up the masses in their embrace giving them undreamed of rights and liberties. The Jews also felt the effects of the new freedoms. For the first time in what seemed like an eternity they were in theory no longer second class citizens. Gradually the medieval restriction imposed on them in the trades and professions and on their right to own land were removed. Within a generation many of Germany's Jews achieved positions of influence. Their rapid rise was bound to cause envy and animosity.

To Europe's aristocracy the newly won rights acquired by Jews and Christians alike in the age of emancipation presented serious and alarming problems. Their traditional position of power, influence, and wealth was rapidly slipping from their control. In light of these developments

and considering the economic and social catastrophes with which they were threatened, it is not surprising that the upper classes sought out reactionary, radical elements and endeavored to support them. Neither does it seem strange to find men like Gobineau and Chamberlain arising from within the very ranks of the discontented of high descent. These men, and the elements that supported them, provided Europe with an old scapegoat for their new problems. But this time the perpetrators of anti-Jewish propaganda clothed their victims in a mantle of evil which was supposedly based on nineteenth-century scientific research. They realized that the day had passed when anti-Jewishness could be solely grounded on a religious basis. Therefore the favored classes, who were either already dispossessed or who saw their future with ominous foreboding, joined the traditional residue of Jew-haters found in every age to coin a new word -- anti-Semitism. It soon became an articulate force during the emergence of German nationalism in the 1870's under Bismarck. In their indiscriminate attacks upon the entire Jewish group these anti-Semites utilized pseudo-science and warped history to build new arsenals for old hatreds.

Gobineau's work was published in 1853. Its major thesis was quite simple. Race was the key to history. His exact conception of the master race, are

and civilization. How Hitler's heart must have pounded when he read that of the "three principal races, white, yellow and black...the white was the superior"; that even the white race had its gradations with the most exalted strand being the Aryan; that among the Aryan family the Germans "were probably the best of all the Aryans."²⁵ But, Gobineau declared, even "the Aryan German," that "powerful creature," must beware of contaminating his blood purity, for this would lead to his degeneration.²⁶

Chamberlain's thesis, like that of his forerunner Gobineau, was also established on the basis of race as a key to history and civilization. It first appeared in 1899 and "soon became the Bible of the racists and their anti-Semitic cohorts."²⁷ Chamberlain's primary assertion which so endeared him to Hitler was that "the Germans were the elite of the Teutons."²⁸ This "'moral Aryan'... was responsible for all the important contributions to civilization, in contrast to the alien, disrupting influence of the Jews."²⁹

How Hitler appropriated the racial theories of a Gobineau or a Chamberlain for his own chaotic designs can be readily seen by turning to the pages of Mein Kampf. The Third Reich and the New Order of Europe, which the young Nazi leader dreamed of in those early days when from inside a prison he warned an unbelieving world of his exact conception of the master race, are

now more frightening than ever because he almost accomplished what he set out to do. Here are Hitler's own words.

All the human culture, all the results of art, science and technology that we see before us today, are almost exclusively the creative product of the Aryan. This very fact admits of the not unfounded inference that he alone was the founder of all higher humanity, in representing the prototype of all that we understand by the word "man." He is the Prometheus of mankind from whose shining brow the divine spark of genius has sprung at all times, forever kindling anew that fire of knowledge which illumined the night of silent mysteries and thus caused man to climb the path to mastery over the other beings of this earth...30

First Hitler praises the accomplishments of the Aryans and then he tells how this was done -- by trampling others.

Thus for the formation of higher cultures the existence of lower human types was one of the most essential preconditions....It is certain that the first culture of humanity was based less on the tamed animal than on the use of lower human beings. Only after the enslavement of subject races did the same fate strike beasts. For the first conquered warrior drew the plow -- and only after him the horse. Hence it is no accident that the first cultures arose in places where the Aryan, in his encounters with lower peoples, subjugated them and bent them to his will....As long as he ruthlessly upheld the master attitude, not only did he remain master, but also the preserver and increaser of culture.31

Then Hitler warns of the dangers that had heretofore befallen the German Aryans. These cardinal errors were to be eliminated in the Third Reich. The master's language must not be contaminated. ways to catapult Hitler into power in Germany. The

As soon as the subjected people began to raise themselves up and approach the level of their conqueror, a phase of which probably was the use of his language, the barriers between master and servant broke down.³²

More importantly the blood of the Aryan must remain absolutely pure.

The Aryan gave up the purity of his blood and, therefore, lost his sojourn in the paradise which he had made for himself. He became submerged in a racial mixture and gradually lost his cultural creativeness....Blood mixture and the resultant drop in the racial level is the sole cause of the dying out of old cultures; for men do not perish as a result of lost wars, but by the loss of that force of resistance which is continued only in pure blood. All who are not of good race in this world are chaff.³³

The "chaff" of Mein Kampf was undoubtedly meant to be the Jews. Hitler planned to exterminate them along with all the other so-called undesirables of "impure" blood.

Adolf Hitler had learned from his spiritual mentors with an uncanny ability. He understood the true nature of the German people better than any person since Martin Luther. Indeed the vitriolic attacks of Luther on the Jews; the anti-Jewish policies of the Catholic Church; the authoritarian traditions of Prussian Germany; the fervent nationalism of Fichte, Hegel and Nietzsche; the pagan myths revitalized by Wagner's operas; and the fanatical racial and anti-Semitic theories of Gobineau and Chamberlain all served in their strange and diverse ways to catapult Hitler into power in Germany. The

immediate cause of his success was, however, the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic. Its decadent political, military, and industrial leadership, and its complete economic collapse during the great depression of the late 1920's and early 1930's, provided Hitler with his great opportunity and he seized the advantage without hesitation.

Once Hitler secured the reigns of the German government in 1933 he lashed out at the Jews with all the fury he had promised them in his pre-victory pronouncements. Hundreds of years of ghetto history dictated the Jewish response and with rare exceptions this excluded attack, resistance, or revenge. Instead the majority of Jews chose the reaction pattern which had assured their survival "during the Church's massive conversion drive."³⁴ This decision was designed to secure them "a chance for survival during the period of expulsion and exclusion."³⁵

First the Jews tried the alleviation method.

Under the heading of alleviation are included petitions, protection payments, ransom arrangements, anticipatory compliance, relief, rescue, salvage, reconstruction -- in short, all those activities which are designed to avert danger, or, in the event that force has already been used, to diminish its effects.³⁶

When alleviation failed, the Jews attempted a second response pattern, that of evasion or flight. But the fact remains that only a few Jews migrated from Nazi Germany during the 1930's.

list of Jews who waited for extermination
own life. The resistance of the Jews of the Warsaw
ghetto almost with their bare hands had not been

Jews have rarely run from a pogrom. They have lived through it. The Jewish tendency has been not to run from, but to survive with, anti-Jewish regimes. It is a fact, now confirmed by many documents, that the Jews made an attempt to live with Hitler. In many cases they failed to escape while there was still time, more often still, they failed to step out of the way when the killers were already upon them.³⁷

When evasion or flight are no longer possible the third and final stage in the Jewish reaction to immanent danger occurs. It is known as paralysis. It takes place only when all efforts at alleviation or compliance with the oppressing regime have failed and there is no hope left. Though this reaction has rarely come to pass in Jewish history, it was experienced in Nazi Europe, once "the German bureaucracy made its weighty and drastic decisions to destroy, utterly and completely, the Jews of Europe."³⁸

There are many people today who radically disagree with the foregoing picture of Jewish "collaboration" with the Nazis as being the only response of these victims of Hitler's aggression. Among them Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein is to be included. He has vividly recalled the great tradition of Jewish martyrdom and sacrifice which he takes to have begun with Isaac and continued throughout World War II. In Poland, Adam Cerniawski, refused to give the Nazis a list of Jews whom they wanted for extermination knowing very well that it meant the loss of his own life. The resistance of the Jews of the Warsaw ghetto almost with their bare hands has not been

surpassed in all the history of their human bravery. The Palestine underground dropping by parachute behind the German lines during the war and risking everything to save Jewish lives after the war is in the same great tradition.³⁹

Therefore he has taken to task Hannah Arendt for her "non-objective account" of the Jewish victims of Hitler's aggression contained in her book Eichman in Jerusalem. He has criticized Bruno Bettelheim for his "shocking speech" made before the American Council for Judaism in which he stated, "that the ghetto mentality of the Jews of Europe contributed to the destruction."⁴⁰ He has countered their accusations by charging,

What a wicked distortion. How many of the six million Jews died because the doors were closed to their escape? How vile it is to blame the victims for the deeds of the murderers and for the indifference of the bystanders, who did not lift a hand and who refused to open the doors to those who were locked behind ghetto walls.⁴¹

Bernstein's passionate condemnation of Arendt's and Bettelheim's views would apply with equal force to Raul Hilberg's presentation of the threefold Jewish reaction pattern of alleviation, evasion, and paralysis. Hilberg has claimed that by 1941 and 1942, "just when the destruction process in Europe entered into its killing phase,"⁴² paralysis had afflicted the victims of the Nazi onslaught. But Rabbi Bernstein has said that not the Jews but the western countries, were paralyzed. They are the ones, protests Bernstein, who must bear the responsibility for the death of the Jews.

Innumerable men, women and children who went to their death could have been saved if the western powers had simply opened their doors to them.⁴³

What might have happened to Europe's Jews had the "western powers" chosen to help them is difficult to answer. Certainly many beleaguered Jews left helpless and friendless by a world indifferent to their fate would have survived. But this was not to be. Instead the Nazis were left free to operate in the following manner: first, the Jews were excluded from German and European society by laws and definitions; second, their property was expropriated; third, they were placed in concentration camps; fourth, mobile killing operations took place in Nazi-occupied portions of the USSR; and finally, they were deported to killing centers in the rest of Axis Europe.

Thus did Hitler achieve power in Germany and use it to annihilate the European Jews. But the consequences of Hitler went far beyond the Jewish problem. As Rabbi Bernstein has said, "the Nazi assault upon the Jews... was the prelude that contained the pattern for the attacks upon and for the catastrophe that would yet befall the entire family of nations. It was all there in what happened in the early 1930's to the Jews of Germany."⁴⁴

generously fulfilled. Throughout grade school, high school and college he always managed to stay two years ahead of himself, completing East High School in 1917

Chapter III

Philip S. Bernstein's Career Before 1946

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Philip Sidney Bernstein's career as Adviser on Jewish Affairs to the United States Military Commanders in Europe was a truly fascinating one. However, before examining this phase of his life in detail, the significant events of his earlier years should be reviewed. Not only will they reveal the factors which coincided to bring him into the fertile field of Jewish education and community life as a Rabbi, but they will indicate the reasons for his being selected to represent the American Jewish community in its desperate post-war effort to save and protect the surviving Jewish remnant of Hitler's Nazi holocaust in Europe.

Rabbi Bernstein was a native American son born of Jewish immigrant parents in Rochester, New York, on June 29, 1901. His mother and father, who were Orthodox in the liberal sense, kept a traditional kosher home -- although it was not overly devout. From his home life and particularly from his mother, who was a deeply religious woman, he inherited a sincere, sensitive appreciation of Jewish life and values.

At school the young Bernstein showed great academic and intellectual promise -- which over the years has been generously fulfilled. Throughout grammar school, high school and college he always managed to stay two years ahead of himself, completing East High School in 1917.

at the age of sixteen, and graduating from Syracuse University in 1921 when he was only nineteen.

During his formative years in Rochester the Leopold Street Synagogue undoubtedly exercised a profound influence on the future Rabbi's religious development. Congregation Beth Israel, as it was also known, had a remarkable man by the name of Dr. Paul Chertoff, who was Rabbi of this comparatively modern Orthodox synagogue for just a short period of time. He was a person of sensitivity and genuinely deep Jewishness; his lovely personality ingratiated him with youngsters -- in whom he had a great interest; and he organized a good religious school. The combination of an inspiring Rabbi, a new type of intelligible religious program in a modern Sunday School, and a well-organized Young Judean club gave Philip Bernstein direction in his life.

It was the Young Judean organization -- of which this youthful American Jew from Rochester, New York, who had just completed Bar Mitzvah was President -- that led him to Zionism. Soon the Zionist movement was to become an abiding interest which Bernstein has warmly embraced ever since. At this crucial period in his life the great Zionist convention of 1914 was held in Rochester. Phil Bernstein and his fellow Young Judeans were active and attended the meetings. They had contact with many of the celebrated early Zionist leaders in this country like

Judge Julian W. Mack, Louis Lipsky, Nathan Straus, Shemayah Levin, Louis Brandeis, and Stephen S. Wise.

The impact of these men and these meetings upon the gifted and impressionable Bernstein was momentous. They made him into a lifelong Zionist; they gave him a feeling of Jewish dignity and self-respect; they moved him in the direction of Hebraic culture and the Hebrew language.

Upon the completion of his four year program at East High School Rabbi Bernstein departed for Syracuse University where a new development occurred in his life. While at Syracuse he was very much pressed for funds, having actually commenced his career with only forty dollars of borrowed money in his pocket. As a result he had to work his way through the University. Somehow he managed to pay tuition, room, board, fees and everything else, chiefly by picking up dishes at the Greasy Spoon restaurant, waiting on table at the Cosmopolitan Club, running the candy stand for his fraternity brothers at the Sigma Alpha Mu house; by securing a job as a professional assistant secretary at Syracuse's Jewish Community Center, and by receiving a few dollars from the Zionist organization. But necessity also dictated that this young journeyman-scholar seek Sunday School employment. At the age of sixteen the hard-pressed Bernstein found this employment at a Reform Temple -- the Temple Society of Concord in Syracuse. There, for the first time, he came under the influence of Reform Judaism.

In the fall of 1919 Dr. Adolf Guttman was succeeded by Benjamin Friedman as Rabbi of Syracuse's Reform Synagogue. Philip Bernstein was swiftly attracted to this fine, warm person who had a deep interest in people, a sensitive appreciation of the Hebrew language and Hebrew culture, and a remarkable way of winning a community. The mature Rabbi and the rapidly developing young man were soon working close together. At first, Bernstein taught in the Sunday School, but when it developed that the Rabbi needed a secretary, he asked the young Rochesterian to accept the job. Bernstein immediately gave his consent and for his last two years at Syracuse continued to serve Rabbi Friedman in this capacity. The effects of this union were to shape Philip Bernstein's destiny. Not only did the two men become close friends but subsequently Bernstein was to marry the Rabbi's niece. This, however, is only part of the story.

In the Temple in Syracuse Philip Bernstein had his first contacts with a vital, modern Reform Judaism which made quite an appeal to him. An idea that had been germinating in his mind for some time, that of entering the Rabbinate, now came to fruition. At the same time, however, he had aspirations of becoming a lawyer and by the year of his graduation in the spring of 1921, he had been admitted to Harvard Law School. At this crucial juncture in Bernstein's life his father took sick and

required family assistance in order to maintain his wholesale and retail pants business. The newfledged college graduate returned to Rochester where for about a year he took over certain aspects of his father's store. During this period he spent a considerable amount of time working in the Jewish community. He taught in Temple B'rith Kodesh's Sunday School and conducted "the Sunday afternoon settlement for poor children" which was also under the auspices of the Gibbs Street Temple; he led Young Judean Clubs and was also active in Rochester's Jewish Young Men and Women's Association. At the age of twenty he was "a veteran Sunday School teacher."

The year in Rochester, during which he so completely immersed himself in various aspects of Jewish communal life, led Philip Bernstein to the conclusion that he truly desired to become a Rabbi instead of a lawyer. Really what he wanted was to serve his people. He felt that as a Rabbi he could do this on a full-time basis rather than on the margins of his life as a lawyer.

At that time I met Doctor Morgenstern of the Hebrew Union College, who gave me such a strange notion as to the saintliness that was required of a Rabbi that it worried me. But shortly thereafter I met Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, who utterly captivated me and whose point of view was similar to my own. He was just about to open a new school for Rabbis in New York City and I realized this was it. So contrary to the advice of Horace Wolf, Bernstein's mentor in Rochester and the rabbi of B'rith Kodesh, who had an unpleasant argument with Stephen Wise, I went to the New York school in the fall of 1922 and entered the rabbinate; my rabbinical career was begun.

Philip S. Bernstein chose to attend the Jewish Institute of Religion because of two reasons. First, in the magnificent Stephen Wise, he saw everything he "wanted to be -- an intense and catholic Jew, a Zionist, and a social idealist. By his life he taught [him] the compatibility of Judaism, Zionism and social idealism." 49 Second, at the time he was seriously considering the Reform rabbinate, upon his graduation from Syracuse, the Hebrew Union College was denominational and anti-Zionist. 50 These policies were irreconcilable with his basic beliefs and he could not commit himself to them.

While a rabbinical student at the Jewish Institute of Religion, Bernstein was, in the words of Dr. Stephen S. Wise, a "perfect student." 51 Still, despite the influence of Wise's personal magnetism on the Rochesterian, he was in no way exempt from feelings of serious spiritual doubts while at the seminary. During the second year of his studies in New York, after thoroughly questioning his religious attitudes for the ministry, he turned for advice to John Haynes Holmes, the great liberal minister of the Community Church. This preacher par excellence and noble human being was of great help to Bernstein in this trying period of his life.

He helped me to understand that often the right questions were more necessary than the right answers. He influenced me to appreciate that my values, my attitudes, were more important at that stage of my life than formalized beliefs. Theology, he assured me, would come later. It was this non-Jewish clergyman who more than any other helped me to remain in the rabbinate. 52

In 1926 Philip S. Bernstein graduated from the Jewish Institute of Religion. Immediately he and Mrs. Bernstein embarked for Europe and Palestine where the newly ordained Rabbi planned to continue his studies first at Cambridge and then at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. However, tragic circumstances developed in Rochester which were to change his plans radically. He received a cablegram from Temple B'rith Kodesh informing him that Rabbi Wolf had taken seriously ill. The congregation in which he had but recently been a Sunday School teacher, was now asking him to come back home as an assistant rabbi. The young man accepted the Temple's request for help and in September, 1926, at the age of twenty-four, he began his active ministry.

In February, 1927, when Rabbi Wolf died, Philip Bernstein became the spiritual leader of Temple B'rith Kodesh. During the late 1920's and 1930's he distinguished himself as an inspired servant and dedicated Rabbi. His keen mind and forceful personality; his remarkable ability to see the essential elements of trying problems; his wonderful sense of humor and warmth, and his quiet, dignified manner completely devoid of any traces of pomposity, won him a large following. As a writer he used his amazing facility with the English language to express his timely ideas clearly and simply. As a speaker few were his equal. He spoke from out of the depths of his being and people could not help but become emotionally

and intellectually involved in his train of thought. But perhaps it was his talent as an activist which did the most to enhance his reputation. He tirelessly devoted his energies to the social improvement of the community by serving numerous civic enterprises. He founded and led Rochester's Interfaith Goodwill Committee. He became the president of the City Club. He championed the city's movement for better housing. He encouraged the birth control advocate, Margaret Sanger, to lecture at his Temple as well as the Socialist party's spokesman, Norman Thomas. 53

Within Rochester's Jewish community, and particularly his own Temple, Rabbi Bernstein worked diligently to rejoin his people to what he conceived as being the major orbit of current Jewish life. His passion for Zionism had convinced him that all of Israel must stand together to achieve Jewry's common concerns. Therefore he geared his congregation towards the practical philosophy which his teacher and idol, Stephen S. Wise, had demonstrated to be compatible. He saw no conflict in being a good Reform Jew and an active Zionist. Though at the time this was a courageous and controversial position for him to take he soon convinced his congregants of its merits and its necessity. Within a comparatively short period Temple B'rith Kodesh was supporting him in his active Zionist role in Rochester, where he was instrumental in forming the local Jewish chiefs of chaplains office in Washington. The contacts

Community Council, and in the American and world scenes. 54

When World War II shockingly awakened America from its lethargy created by the depression of the 1930's, Rabbi Bernstein was called by his nation to serve as executive director of the committee on army and navy religious activities of the National Jewish Welfare Board. Though he had been a pacifist between the First and Second World Wars, Hitler's invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 and his threat to destroy the Jews of Europe convinced him there were evils worse than war. ⁵⁵ The rabbi from Rochester had by this time achieved a firm, broad reputation as a leader in Reform Judaism and as a bitter enemy of prejudice and intolerance wherever it arose. With the blessings of his congregation he and his family moved to New York City, where the Jewish Welfare Board's Offices were located, to assume the responsibilities of his new position. Thus, from December 1942 to February 1946, he was in charge of the work of the 311 American Rabbis who served as chaplains in the United States armed services. In this capacity he covered as many of the warfronts and military camps as he possibly could, visiting the theaters of operation in Europe, the Pacific and Alaska. There was hardly an island in the Pacific from Attu to Guadalcanal, where American troops were stationed, to which his duty did not take him. At the same time he was in close, constant touch with the chiefs of chaplains offices in Washington. The contacts

and prestige he established throughout this period were to prove invaluable in the immediate post-war years when he became the second adviser on Jewish affairs in Europe.

The period during which Rabbi Bernstein discharged his duties as chief of Jewish chaplains in the Second World War did not see him cease to be an active loyal Jew and particularly to be a strong, intense Zionist. Now that he was in a position of national Jewish leadership he found he could use his newly acquired influence to attract larger numbers of people to work unremittingly for Zionism and the establishment of the Jewish Commonwealth. In pursuit of this purpose he rendered a number of services. One was writing.

In December 1942 and early 1943, Rabbi Bernstein had a series of articles published in The Nation under the title "The Jews of Europe." They had quite an impact. Three factors had compelled him to publicize his views. First, he hoped "to impress on the conscience of free men the vastness and the ghastliness of the Jewish tragedy in Europe."⁵⁶ Second, he felt it imperative for others "to perceive that what is happening to the Jews is but the foreshadowing of the fate of other peoples under Nazi rule."⁵⁷ Finally he desired

that men of vision should at last realize that the solution of the Jewish problem in Europe is not the concern alone of the Jews or of the Christian conscience. Tough-minded statesmen must understand that the future peace of the world is bound up with

it. For centuries the Jews have been the scapegoats for Europe's frustrations. They have been the easy prey of ruling classes under attack, of rulers defeated in war, of impoverished, embittered masses. They have been an ever-present temptation to demagogues in quest of power. Unwittingly, they were an obstacle to the genuine solution of Europe's problems; it was easier to attack the Jews than the basic causes of those problems.... Attacks upon the Jews and their expulsion from various countries have been an unsettling force in Europe. A peace treaty which does not include provisions for solving the Jewish problem will be incomplete. A normal secure status for the Jews of Europe is a prerequisite for the establishment of the Four Freedoms for mankind. 58

What Bernstein meant when he referred to "tough-minded statesmen" and "provisions for solving the Jewish problem" in "a peace treaty" which would provide "a normal secure status for the Jews of Europe" became quite clear as he spelled out his argument in The Nation. His long-range solution of the Jewish problem at the war's end foresaw the necessity of establishing the Jewish National Home in Palestine. Eloquently and with forthrightness he stated in "Alternatives to Zion" -- the third of his articles in The Nation -- that such a "Home" could not reasonably be created in Alaska, Argentina, Australia, Biro-Bidjan, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Madagascar or the United States because none of these territories or countries desired or were able to absorb a mass migration of Jewish emigrants. This left only one practical answer to the Jewish problem in Europe, claimed Rabbi Bernstein -- the Zionist solution. Though he did not

thereby mean to exclude other alternatives for alleviating the condition of the Jews, such as a new, liberal post-war change in the immigration policies of the United States, he strongly believed that the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine would "solve the world's most persistent problem and...enable a gifted people, once more on their ancient sacred soil, to enrich man's spiritual life."⁵⁹

But besides writing about Palestine as the hope of Jews that were then driven and desperate for a safe refuge in a brutal world, Rabbi Bernstein was able to render other important benefits to the Zionist cause and to his people while Director of the Jewish Chaplaincy program in World War II. While living in New York City he regularly invited to his home small but influential groups of liberal and literary figures whom he tried to influence toward a realistic understanding of the Jewish problem and the role of Palestine. At various times he had people like Norman Cousins of the Saturday Review of Literature, Freda Kirchway of The Nation, and Max Lerner of PM, for evenings of discussions with personalities like the late Gershon Agronsky, who later was to become the publisher of The Jerusalem Post and the mayor of Jerusalem.

The third thing Rabbi Bernstein did to try to improve the Jewish position at this time was to become deeply involved in America's Zionist leadership. He became a member of the Zionist Emergency Council which was then

planning the entire program for the implementation of the Zionist dream. In this capacity Rabbi Bernstein became deeply involved with the American Jewish community, officials in Washington, the Zionist leadership in Palestine and Europe, as well as many non-Jews. One of the assignments which he had and carried out with his late cousin Rabbi Milton Steinberg was to organize the American Christian Palestine Committee. Together they got men like Henry Atkinson and Carl Hermann Voss to take the leadership in organizing a group of sympathetic Christians, including such personalities as Reinhold Niehbur and Howard LeSourd of Boston University, and political figures like the late Robert Taft, to influence, organize and channel non-Jewish opinion toward Zionist objectives.

After three and one-half years of service to his country and the Jewish chaplaincy program Rabbi Bernstein returned to Rochester and his congregation in February 1946. It was his firm intention at the time to remain there permanently. Temple B'rith Kodesh had just purchased a home for him and his family, and now he was anxious to attend to the needs of this large Temple whose congregants he had been forced to neglect by his absence during the war. Then, unexpectedly, he received an invitation from the White House, from David Niles, to leave within two or three months for Europe to serve as Adviser on Jewish Affairs to the United States Army. A post-war breakdown

had occurred in the relations between the Jewish displaced persons, the American military authorities and the German people after Judge Simon Rifkind had left the office of Jewish Adviser in Germany in March of 1946. The State and War Departments were anxious, as were the five major Jewish organizations dealing with matters affecting the Jewish displaced persons in Europe -- the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Conference, the American Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and the World Jewish Congress -- to send an experienced Jew over to guide the Army in handling the delicate problems arising in connection with the survivors of the Nazi extermination policies. There was also pressure emanating from the displaced persons themselves to have somebody in Europe once again who would look out for their interests on a higher level. All of these groups agreed that Philip Bernstein was the man best suited for the difficult job.

Rabbi Bernstein viewed the offer from the White House with mixed feelings. On one hand he was reluctant to accept because it meant leaving his congregation again; he felt they were entitled to his services after his three and one-half years of absence during the war. On the other hand he felt this was the culmination of his whole experience; that he was singularly well prepared to take this job. First, he was devoted to his people and to

the Zionist cause. Second, he had the best possible contacts with the wider Jewish groups, and these included not only those that were Zionist, but the Reform ones as well. Third, he possessed unique government and military experience. He knew how the Army worked, and it was the Army that was in control in Europe, especially in Germany and Austria. Nobody else had these qualifications. They would, he hoped, enable him to be helpful in a historic way. Indeed they did.

Ultimately there seems to have been no question in Rabbi Bernstein's mind, nor in the minds of those who sent him to Germany, that he was the man best equipped to become the next Jewish Adviser. But before he accepted the position tendered to him by the United States Government he called together the heads of the five principal Jewish organizations, whom he would also be representing in Europe, for an historic, precedent breaking meeting. He told them he would not deal with separate Jewish groups; he told them he wanted one address and one unified action in this country, if he were to take this responsibility in Germany.

There will be occasions when I will need the help and guidance of the organized Jewish community. There may be times when I will need to convey information and council to the Jewish community. I cannot and will not deal with disparate and perhaps conflicting groups on such delicate and urgent matters. In this at least there must be unity.61

And the miracle was performed. There was unity, and

there was a single address, and I.L. Kenen, who was then on the executive of the American Jewish Conference, was the contact man. Thereafter Rabbi Bernstein was to inform the Secretaries of State and War and subsequently the Theater Commanders in Europe of his working agreement with these Jewish organizations. He was told in reply that

They agreed that full consultation and cooperation were necessary to sustain the morale and the physical well-being of the Jewish Displaced Persons. They appreciate the understanding, the assistance and the functioning unity of these Jewish organizations and trust that it will continue at least as long as the need exists.⁶²

But Rabbi Bernstein went beyond the government's hope for continued Jewish organizational unity when he said at that time, "I trust that this unified effort is the promise, the symbol and the pattern of a united Jewry in the years to come."⁶³

Before Bernstein began his new job as Jewish Adviser he prepared himself for his responsibilities by spending one month in Europe. During this time he sought and received clear impressions of the problems faced by the Army in post-war Germany and by the Jews in the displaced persons camps. In this country he readied himself by spending time with Judge Simon Rifkind, his predecessor, whose sound policies throughout his incumbency were to make it considerably easier for his successor in the months that lay ahead.⁶⁴ Further provisions for his forthcoming

obligations were made when he met with the Jewish organizational leadership in New York City, and by his subsequent trip to Washington to present their points of view to the President, the Secretary of War, Robert Patterson; the Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and the Director of the Civil Affairs Division of the Army, General John J. Hilldring. Bernstein found the general attitude of these men at the high levels of the United States government to be cordial. They were anxious to maintain firm relations with the American Jewish community. While in the capital he also received helpful briefings from Herbert Fierst, a remarkably able and successful attorney who represented the War Department's responsibilities for Germany so far as the refugees and displaced persons were concerned, and from David E. Wahl, a representative of the American Jewish Conference. Finally Rabbi Bernstein felt he had gathered together all of the loose threads that he could. He had laid the foundations for his job and he felt his whole life-experience had equipped him to handle it. In May, 1946, he assumed his duties in Germany as the Jewish Adviser, with the hope of completing them in four months.

ated victims of Nazi brutality. All that was now left of the once proud, thriving cultural and spiritual centers of Jewish life in Europe was a small scattered and forlorn remnant of beaten people -- the Jewish displaced persons. Approximately

Chapter IV

Stuttgart and Landsberg

Adviser Bernstein was to find the situation in Europe tense and chaotic when he arrived there in May, 1946. A grim atmosphere prevailed over the entire continent. People were caught up in a fierce struggle simply to exist. They were hungry and cold. They had suffered degradation and knew despair. Throughout Europe men had only blasted memories over which to brood. On one occasion this led Rabbi Bernstein to remark,

Germany...the cities are like shells, the heart burnt out of them, people living like groveling beasts in caves beneath the ruins, in heatless shacks built of rubble, in the three walled rooms of sheared off buildings like a scene in a play. You toss away the butt of a cigarette and ten people dive for it including women and children and students and professors. With five or six cigarette butts, one can roll a cigarette and with a cigarette one can buy bread.⁶⁵

But out of humanity's countless memories of suffering, degradation and despair during those early post-war years in Europe, Rabbi Bernstein found the plight of the Jews to be the deepest, most numbing tragedy brought on by the Nazi war. Hitler and the Germans had systematically despoiled them and decimated their families. They were the first and most severely treated victims of Nazi brutality. All that was now left of the once proud, thriving cultural and spiritual centers of Jewish life in Europe was a small scattered and forlorn remnant of beaten people -- the Jewish displaced persons. Approximately

6,000,000 of their brethren had been slaughtered between 1939 and 1945. When the victorious Allied armies liberated them from the German concentration camps in the spring of 1945 only 30,000 were found alive. To this number were added Jews who emerged from hiding in woods and basements as well as those who left the underground fighting units to search for their relatives in the displaced persons camps. But the majority of the displaced Jews who swelled the population of the camps from 1946 to 1948, came in as infiltrates fleeing renewed persecution in Poland. The condition of all of these Jewish groups was desperate, as Rabbi Bernstein testified before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization on June 20, 1947, when he said,

The cries from the gas chambers still echoed in their ears. They had no homes; no jobs, no property, no business. There had been no education of the young; no religious exercises, no family life. Each individual had personally suffered agonizing persecution. All found themselves in an atmosphere poisoned by a decade of Nazi propaganda. 66

But despite their desperateness, despite the fact that they were beaten, the majority of the Jewish displaced persons were not without some measure of hope. Thus

Bernstein commented,

[Their] situation would have been enough to crush almost any group of human beings. But not these. With the help primarily of the American Army they made a quick physical comeback. Flesh was restored to living skeletons. Vitality surged through their blood again. 67

Considered in Europe. Rabbi Bernstein came to Germany

The cumbersome responsibility for the care and supervision of the Jewish survivors of the Nazi concentration camps did fall primarily on the American Army of Occupation in Germany and Austria. As most of the Jewish displaced persons were either unwilling or unable to return to the lands of their origin because of renascent anti-Semitism or vast political differences with the newly created Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, the United States Army had no alternative but to establish displaced persons camps and assembly centers in which their charges might find some security amidst the impoverished and hostile German population. Though most of the camps were drab, overcrowded and hardly suitable for family life; though in most instances the displaced persons had already been severely overexposed to camps by the Nazis; they soon learned to make the most of this cruel dilemma which a shattered post-war world had imposed on them.

To help the Jewish displaced persons adjust to a renewed existence of regimented camp life, an existence which left them unable to determine freely the course of their lives because no country -- including the United States -- was willing to accept large numbers of them in the foreseeable future, General Eisenhower set up the office of Jewish Adviser to the United States Military Commanders in Europe. Rabbi Bernstein came to Germany

as the second person to hold this unique position of trust and influence which the military commanders had given to their Jewish Advisers. He came because of the steady deterioration in the morale of the Jewish displaced persons since Judge Rifkind had relinquished that post in March, 1946. He came because the American soldiers in the field (the average G.I.) had no understanding of the Jewish displaced person's background or current problems and was therefore extremely critical of him. He came because the relationship between the Jews and the Germans was not good and this was leading to sharp conflicts between them. He came because conditions were worsening in Communist-dominated Poland and Jews were beginning to leave that traditional repository of anti-Semitism in ever increasing numbers for the United Zones of Germany and Austria. Finally he came because,

on the physical level, the Army is trying to do a decent humane job. In the American zone the displaced persons have enough food, clothing and shelter for their survival. But there is a painful lack of sympathy and understanding. The military are not equipped by training or function to handle the delicate problems of displaced persons. Lacking this understanding, the Army increasingly finds the D.P.'s, especially the Jews, an irritant and a nuisance. These people are not easy to understand or live with. All of them (I encountered no exceptions) have lost part or all of their families in the pogroms. They have endured unmentionable tortures. They have known no security for a decade. Having found no one to trust, they trust no one. Having been taught to survive by any method, they will employ any method for survival. They spurn all offers to remain or return, for Europe is the graveyard of their loved ones and their hopes.68

Two incidents, the Stuttgart and Landsberg affairs, served to illustrate the inability of the American soldiers to understand and cope with the problems of the Jewish displaced persons. These incidents served dramatic notice on the leaders of the American occupation forces that conditions in the displaced persons camps were far from acceptable or stable. They demonstrated the fierce hatred of the Jews for the Germans and their complete refusal to cooperate with them in any way. They underlined the necessity of securing another Jewish Adviser.

The Stuttgart case occurred at 6:00 A.M. on March 29, 1946, when suddenly and without forewarning two hundred German police surrounded the Jewish D.P. camp, Number 664, outside of Stuttgart. According to Bernstein, who wrote of this dramatic and unfortunate incident in his article entitled Retreat In Germany,

[The Germans] came with the approval of the American military authorities and were accompanied by a handful of M.P.'s who left when the trouble began, either to avoid injury or secure reinforcements. Neither the responsible camp authorities nor the UNRRA Director had received any advanced notification of the raid which was to investigate alleged black market activities. Black market operations...are universal in Germany, far more serious among the G.I.'s and German civilian population than among the impoverished D.P.'s who may, at worst, be exchanging a package of cigarettes for a can of salmon. Nevertheless, permission was granted for a raid which developed all the characteristics of the former Nazi pogroms. It took place in the early morning before the people were fully awakened and began with the shrieking of sirens and the blaring of loud speakers. The German police did not rap on the doors of the Jews but kicked them open. They shouted and

became abusive. Many of the Jews were in a highly emotional state to start with because they had been informed on the day before that because of overcrowding they were to be moved to another less desirable camp. It was no surprise that with fresh memories of pogroms, they became panic-stricken and hysterical at the German assault. Lacking arms, they threw bottles, cans, utensils at the German police. The latter, enjoying the opportunity, given them by the American authorities, began to shoot. One Jew was killed several were wounded. The police withdrew.69

In subsequent remarks Bernstein was to lay the responsibility for this shameful pogrom-like raid squarely on the shoulders of the American military authorities. Certainly Germany's black market problem would never be solved by using Hitlerian techniques. Until the basic necessities of life could once again be obtained with ease in Germany's post-war economy, the black market would continue to exist. If investigations were to be carried out in the future Bernstein suggested that they be aimed at all offending members of society, not just the Jews.

The Landsberg affair took place on April 28, 1946, in the very shadow of the prison in which Hitler had dictated Mein Kampf to Rudolf Hess. When Bernstein arrived in Germany in May, the incident was still making newspaper headlines. Again there had been disturbance in a displaced persons camp. Again Jewish D.P.'s had attacked the German police and resisted the American military authorities when together they entered the Landsberg Camp. This time, however, nineteen young Jewish men had been arrested and

brought before an American military tribunal. They were ably defended by Dr. Samuel Gringauz, the eloquent jurist and one of the leaders of the Central Committee of Liberated Jews in the United States Zone of Germany, and Major Abraham Hyman, a brilliant lawyer soon destined to join Bernstein in the Jewish Adviser's headquarters in Frankfort. They maintained that the prisoners had not meant deliberately to flaunt United States military authority. The incident was due, the defense exclaimed, to the presence of the Germans in the Landsberg Camp. The defendants had not forgotten the torture which they had recently suffered at the hands of the Germans and were determined not to let their former tormentors persecute them again. The court listened with some measure of sympathy. It found that "in the eight days of this trial there has been no conclusive proof that the defendants tried here were the ones who participated in the beating, stabbing or actual destruction of property." ⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the court felt that some degree of punishment should be meted out in order to warn others of the inviolability of American military law. Though these nineteen men were innocent of the violence which had occurred; though they were sentenced for crimes which took place elsewhere in the camp approximately an hour and a half after the restoration of order; though fourteen of the nineteen men could have exonerated themselves completely due to a lack of concrete evidence but chose

rather to cast their lot with the others, the military tribunal still decreed imprisonment in order to show that unlawful acts of retaliation would not be tolerated even in the case of provocation.

Both the Stuttgart and Landsberg cases could have been avoided if the American military authorities had refused to permit German police to be used in or near the Jewish D.P. camps. Before either outbreak took place and before his departure for home, Judge Rifkind had formally presented this recommendation to the commanders of the occupation forces. Unfortunately his request went unheeded. The Army claimed they could not meet it because of their limited military personnel. Yet the continued presence of and pressure from a Jewish Adviser might have changed official policy before the irreparable damage developed. We do know that eventually this abusive situation was corrected during Bernstein's incumbency. He also recommended to the military that no German police be permitted to come into the areas adjacent to Jewish camps. Then, as a sequel to the disturbances, Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay, the Deputy Military Governor of the United States Zone of Germany, requested the newly appointed Jewish Adviser to make recommendations on the Landsberg case. On July 15, 1946, Bernstein sent General Clay a memorandum based on his study of the record, his visit to the Landsberg Camp, and his consultations with attorneys

Gringauz and Hyman who participated in the trial.

The obligation to justice is absolute, but the application is relative. "Do not judge another until thou hast stood in his place" is an ancient Hebraic teaching. Its application is as valid in the Landsberg Case as it was in the time of Christ. The guilt or innocence of these men cannot be justly determined apart from the circumstances of their lives and the particular incidents of 28 April 1946, for which they are being held accountable.

These are young men. They were hardly more than boys when the Nazis descended upon them and destroyed all that was precious in their lives. Their parents, brothers and sisters were seized before their eyes and killed. They suffered torture, hunger and debasement in concentration camps for years. That they survived at all is a miracle. That they survived without utter degradation of soul is an even greater miracle.

A year after liberation these men still found themselves in a camp in Germany. Their lives were abnormal; their basic problems were unsolved. They were in the midst of a growingly assertive German population whom they held guilty of perpetuating, abetting or tolerating the slaughter of their families, and their own tragic plight.

...It is against this background of understandable desperation and resentment that the events of 28 April 1946 must be viewed.

...But the purpose of the arrests and imprisonment has already been amply served. These men who are not and never have been criminals, but have been the victims of criminals, these men who intended no rebellion against United States military authority and who were not identified as having committed any acts of violence against Germans, have already served three months of imprisonment. It is enough.

...Not only the larger concept of justice but compassionate understanding should justify their release at this time.

...It is recommended that the Deputy Military Governor exercise clemency toward the nineteen men found guilty in the Landsberg Case and suspend their sentences.71

This stirring and positive memorandum exemplifies the courageous and dedicated manner in which Rabbi Bernstein was to fulfill his duties as Adviser to the Theater Commander on Jewish Affairs. No event touching the Jewish D.P.'s was to escape his considered attention. His good judgment and tact soon earned him the complete respect of the Military Commanders in the American zones. His devotion to the interests of the displaced Jews won their hearts and in a very real sense he became one of them. He was ever mindful that until the final disposition of the D.P.'s was effectively resolved, their problems would not get better, but get worse. Therefore he worked tirelessly and unremittingly to improve his people's lot.

Along in the Polish zone of Elblag. The pogrom was perpetrated by men, women and children who apparently, according to Bernstein, committed their bestial acts with the acquiescence of the local authorities. The reports of the atrocities spread rapidly throughout the rest of Poland. The Polish Jews were terrified. The impact of this event vividly reminded them of the hazardous position they had traditionally occupied in Polish history for centuries. Now they realized that the new Communist Polish government was no more able to control the country's age-old anti-Semitism than preceding regimes had been. With all desires for creating a new life for themselves

Chapter V

Poland Presents A Problem

With the approach of the summer months of 1946, the camps in the United States Zones of Germany and Austria were once again becoming highly overcrowded. Small groups of half-starved, torn, threadbare Polish Jews were beginning to trickle in from their Communist-ruled country. All reports seemed to indicate that the movement would increase as the summer progressed. The United States military authorities were coming to a crossroads. What would their future policy in Germany dictate? Would they continue to allow their camps to become a haven for Jews who found conditions elsewhere intolerable?

On July 4, 1946, forty-two Jews were murdered in cold blood in the Polish town of Kielce. The pogrom was perpetrated by men, women and children who apparently, according to Bernstein, committed their bestial acts with the assent of the local authorities. The reports of the atrocity spread rapidly throughout the rest of Poland. The Polish Jews were terrified. The impact of this event vividly reminded them of the hazardous position they had traditionally occupied in Polish history for centuries. Now they realized that the new Communist Polish government was no more able to control the country's age-old anti-Semitism than preceding regimes had been. With all desires for creating a new life for themselves

in a free decent post-war Poland now utterly shattered, approximately 100,000 Polish Jews began to push toward the Czechoslovakian border in the summer and fall of 1946. The ultimate destiny for most of these people was Palestine. However, spurred on by the April, 1946, report of the Anglo-American Commission -- unanimously recommending that 100,000 displaced persons be admitted into Palestine -- the fleeing Polish Jews were hopeful that the United States Zone of Germany only represented at the most an intermediate station for their subsequent emigration to the Holy Land.

The vast majority of Poland's post-war Jewish population consisted of people repatriated from Russia. When the German armies had overrun Poland in 1939 these Jews had fled eastward to the Baltic countries and White Russia where they sought temporary shelter. Subsequently the Russians sent them deep into the interior of their country where in middle Asia and Siberia they worked to support the tottering Russian war machine. In the late fall of 1945 and the spring of 1946 the Soviet government gave these Jews the option of either remaining in Russia or returning to Poland -- providing they could establish their Polish citizenship. Few elected to stay. Nearly 150,000 people were anxious to contact their families and reclaim their former possessions. Furthermore, they wanted to help rebuild a strong, new, free Poland. Upon their return these repatriates were doomed to disappointment and

frustration; they were subjected to terror. Few, if any, found their families alive for they had been exterminated by the Nazis. Few, if any, were permitted to secure title to their old property which had either been destroyed or confiscated by the Poles. Few, if any, dared to insist on the legal enforcement of their rights which according to an official decree of June 13, 1946, made it a particularly dangerous crime for anyone in the Communist Republic of Poland to violate a person's bodily immunities because of his membership in a nationality, religion or race. But despite the government's efforts to eliminate anti-Semitism in the country, the vicious attacks on Poland's Jews continued to increase at an alarming rate. When occasionally Jews did attempt to recover their property within the limits of the restitution laws, they received hostile letters threatening their lives from the British-supported Polish Fascist forces of Lieutenant General Wladislaw Anders, the émigré army commander of the Second Polish Corps in Rome, Italy, who with over 120,000 of his men had taken an oath to liberate Poland from Russian occupation. Anders' army was a notorious, reactionary, anti-Semitic underground group. "It is an established fact," said Rabbi Bernstein, "that his officers have been filtering back into Poland to stir up trouble in the present regime and they have been found to be responsible for inflaming anti-Semitism and organizing the bands which

perpetrated the pogroms."⁷² Finally the deep breach which had opened between the non-Communist Polish masses and the Catholic Church on the one hand, and the Communist political hierarchy on the other, only served to make the Jewish position more precarious. Once again the Jews of Poland were made the scapegoats for the economic, social and political unrest which had haunted the country for hundreds of years. Once again the Jews were caught in the middle by circumstances over which they had no control. The Kielce pogrom was the inevitable outgrowth of these conditions.

In a Rosh Hashanah sermon which he delivered in Temple B'rith Kodesh, Rochester, New York, on Wednesday evening, September 25, 1946, Rabbi Bernstein tried to capture the essence of Poland's anti-Semitic spirit which had led to the Kielce pogrom on that fateful day of July 4, 1946. "Polish anti-Semitism was as old as Polish history,"⁷³ he preached.

At regular intervals, it erupted into pogroms. The Easter season left no Jews free from a sense of fear. The old lies of Christ-killing and blood-letting were inculcated in the churches and disseminated therefrom. Then the Poles learned some new things from the Nazis. They were given instructions and authorization to exterminate Jews. The more than ninety percent of Polish Jewry [over 3,000,000 Jews had lived in Poland in 1939] who were murdered during the Nazi regime actually perished, for the most part, at the hands of Poles working under German orders, rather than at the hands of the Nazis themselves.⁷⁴

The Kielce pogrom presented the American military

authorities in Germany with a critical problem. A decision had to be made in light of the large numbers of Jewish persecutees who were now streaming into their zone of occupation from Poland. The Jewish relief organizations through their designated agents in Washington were pressuring Congress, the State and War Departments, and even the President to pursue a continued open border policy for Jewish infiltrtees. At the same time the Jewish Adviser was doing everything in his power to influence the commanding generals in Germany along the same lines. Ultimately the borders were kept open and on September 14, 1946, Rabbi Bernstein could happily inform the Jewish displaced persons in his New Year's message that they had many things for which to be thankful. Foremost among them was the fact that,

the United States Army is keeping the borders open to save our people, fleeing from anti-Semitism in Poland. In a world from which persecution and intolerance have, alas, not yet been eradicated, this is a shining example of practical humanitarianism. 75

What Rabbi Bernstein told the Jewish D.P.'s was true, but by no means did he intend to relate to them the grave concern which the mass infiltration of Polish Jews into the American zone had produced in the highest quarters of the American government. The precise seriousness of this matter can be calculated from a memorandum of the American Jewish Conference which their Washington representative, David R. Wahl, sent to Meir Grossman of the home office

in New York City, on July 22, 1946. It tells of a meeting which took place on that date between the officials of the State and War Departments and the Jewish organizations on the border situation. Present at the gathering, for the State Department were Dean Acheson, General Hildring and Herbert Fierst and, for the War Department, Secretary Patterson and two unnamed colonels. The Jewish organizations were represented by Messrs. Blaustein and Siegel, of the American Jewish Committee; Moses Leavitt, of the Joint Distribution Committee; Drs. Dwork and Schwarzbart, of the World Jewish Congress; Dr. Akzin, of the Emergency Zionist Council; and Judith Epstein and David R. Wahl, of the American Jewish Conference.

Secretary Patterson opened the meeting by stating the inability of the theater command "to cope with infiltration beyond a given number." ⁷⁶ Then one of the colonels observed that there were currently 80,000 Jews in the D.P. camps of the American zones of Germany and Austria. The total cost of operating the Jewish and non-Jewish D.P. camps for the military government was amounting to \$1,987,000 a month. The War Department felt that because Jewish infiltration would now be increased from 5,000 per month to 20,000 for the month of July, a saturation point would have to be established for the American zone. When the Theater Command felt that the limit of 110,000 Jewish D.P. camp inhabitants had been reached

reached the border would be closed. The implication was left that Jewish D.P.'s living in German communities outside of the camps would not be included in the 110,000.

The contemplated plans of the War Department met firm opposition from the representatives of the Jewish organizations. By previous arrangement they had decided to let Messrs. Blaustein and Leavitt do most of the talking. According to Wahl they performed splendidly.

The substance of our discussion was...that we could, under no circumstances, accept as an accomplished fact the closing of the border. We asked for an opportunity to appeal to the President, and we were assured that nothing would be done... and no decision announced without the complete approval of the President....We also pointed out that in their estimates they were exaggerating the Jewish population of Poland, both present and potential....The meeting closed with the assurances from both Secretaries that every step would be taken to delay the closing of the border, but that, if the present facts remain as reported, there would probably have to be a closing in September and that we would be informed in advance of such a step.77

On the same day Wahl was to notify the majority leader of the House of Representatives, John W. McCormack, of the results of this meeting. Immediately McCormack dispatched a letter, dated July 22, 1946, to the President of the United States, urging him to maintain an open border policy. Part of this letter reads as follows:

...The impression left with most of the representatives of the various Jewish organizations attending the meeting was that tremendous pressure was being exercised by the American military authorities in the American Zone in Germany to stop, sometime in the near future, the unfortunate refugees from entering the American Zone, and there

was fear that such an order would be promulgated in the near future.

...It is my opinion that it would be most unfortunate if the border of the American Zone was closed to these unfortunate people who are trying to flee to safety.

I am taking the liberty of writing you...in the hope that if this matter is called to your attention, action will be taken by our Government which will result in the border not being closed, and that these people will not be barred from fleeing to safety.⁷⁸

In a letter which Meir Grossman sent to Rabbi Bernstein on July 24, 1946, he informed him of all that had transpired in Washington, including the active measures immediately taken by the Jewish groups to bring the whole affair to the attention of the President. Grossman also told Bernstein that representatives of the five cooperating Jewish organizations were in Paris and would be communicating with him on the matter.

Both Wahl's memorandum on the Washington meeting of July 22, 1946, and Representative McCormack's letter addressed to the President, give ample support to the argument that the Theater Command in Germany was determined to terminate Polish Jewish infiltration into the United States Zone before a substantial number of persecutees could reach the D.P. camps. They had been subjected, of course, to severe pressures from the British to this effect. Had the Theater Command succeeded in issuing this decree it would have had a disastrous effect not only on the morale of the Jewish D.P.'s who were already in the camps,

but on the Polish infiltrates themselves. Certainly it would have meant confining them to lands in which they were bound to undergo further anti-Semitic persecution as well as severely restricted economic opportunities. Therefore the question must be raised as to who and what changed the Theater Command's contemplated action in the late summer of 1946. The all too obvious answer to this problem is, of course, that a directive came from Truman. But aside from the obvious, consideration must be given to Adviser Bernstein's relations with the American Theater Commander of Germany, General Joseph T. McNarney. Admittedly this matter will remain, to some degree, in the realm of conjecture, but Bernstein's influence on McNarney must not be underestimated. He was his trusted Adviser on Jewish Affairs. He had traveled to Poland as a representative of the United States government and the major Jewish organizations. He had returned to Germany with an eye-witness report and recommendations which gained the attention, sympathy and good will of the Theater Commander. In Germany, Bernstein brought the matter to the attention of General McNarney, who arranged for him to be flown to Warsaw. McNarney also granted Bernstein's request to have Chaplain Herbert L. Friedman, of the Berlin District Headquarters, accompany the Adviser as his military aide. Major Emanuel Bateman, Bernstein's permanent aide in the

Within two or three days after the Kielce pogrom Adviser Bernstein received a telephone call from Henry Montor in Berlin. This man -- who transformed the United Jewish Appeal from an organization raising piddling funds into one of the biggest fundraising apparatuses in all history, and whom Bernstein has called one of the most interesting, colorful, remarkable, dynamic personalities that arose on the American scene -- had just come out of Poland and was there when the events of Kielce took place. Montor told Bernstein of this terrible thing which had happened and of the wave of panic engulfing Polish Jewry. He urged on Bernstein the necessity of doing something to get these people out. He importuned the Jewish Adviser to get into Poland immediately; to try to be helpful; to get the Army to be helpful. Montor spoke with a tremendous sense of urgency growing out of the horrible pogrom whose aftermath he had just witnessed and whose surviving victims he had just seen. Recognizing the seriousness of the Kielce affair and the implications it would have for the military in Germany, Bernstein brought the matter to the attention of General McNarney, who arranged for him to be flown to Warsaw. McNarney also granted Bernstein's request to have Chaplain Herbert L. Friedman, of the Berlin District Headquarters, accompany the Adviser as his military aide. Major Emanuel Rackman, Bernstein's permanent aide in the

G-5, Displaced Persons Branch, was to remain in Frankfurt to cover the Adviser's office during his absence.

It was Bernstein's intention at the time to see with his own eyes

the conditions which the refugees were reporting to me. I desired to exercise, if possible, some restraining influence on Polish anti-Semitism, and officially I was interested in bringing back to General McNarney a realistic analysis of the problems and needs that were likely to confront him as Commander of the United States Forces in Europe.⁸⁰

Though Rabbi Bernstein forthrightly stated the purposes for his contemplated visit to Poland to McNarney's Chiefs of Staff, Generals Clarence R. Heubner, Stanley R. Mickelsen, Miller G. White and Harold R. Bull, in an official memorandum of July 17, 1946, he did encounter some difficulty in securing permission to go to Poland at that tense time. Apparently, "no one seemed interested in having a Rabbi around with that particular mission."⁸¹ Consequently he was told that his life would be endangered. If he must enter Poland, he was advised to take along protection in the form of American military police and an armored car in which to drive. Despite these protestations Bernstein persisted in the role he now felt duty-bound to fulfill. He and Friedman entered Poland without the military safeguards offered them.

On July 23, 1946 the Jewish Adviser took the short plane ride from Berlin to Warsaw. Later he was to remark that, though it only took two hours, "it was a long ride

in human history, for it marked the end of the world. It was the journey that the Nazis took on September 1, 1939,⁸² which brought the whole world crashing down. He returned to Germany one week later on July 30, 1946. In that brief period of time he visited Warsaw and the remains of the Polish Ghetto; Lodz, where he talked to the survivors of the Kielce pogrom; and the repatriation centers of lower Silesia. What he saw deeply affected him, and later he gave sound advice to the American Theater Command and the outside world as to why the borders of the occupied zone of Germany should be kept open. To what extent he directly influenced General McNarney and the State Department to reach a favorable decision cannot be measured with precision. Undoubtedly a combination of many factors played a role in keeping the borders open. First, there was the sympathetic personality of the American President. Second, on the State Department level General Hildring heavily relied on Herbert Fierst's guidance. Third, there was actual or implied pressure from the five major Jewish organizations. Fourth, there was Philip S. Bernstein, who acted as a catalyst in Europe by enlisting the sympathy of General McNarney, and by sending stirring, firsthand accounts of Polish Jewry's suffering to his channel in Washington, I.L. Kenen, who subsequently⁸³ publicized his reports in the American press. Finally, the State Department had to weigh all of these considerations

as well as the country's political policies and commitments to the other major powers, and arrive at a decision.

At this time, it must be borne in mind, the British government was vigorously opposed to the United States keeping the borders open because it realized that the uprooted Polish Jews who would be coming into the zones of occupation desperately wanted to enter Palestine. In Germany they would command a better position to arouse favorable world opinion for their cause than if they remained hidden away behind the Iron Curtain. Adding 100,000 Jewish displaced persons to the more than 80,000 who were already in the zones would certainly increase the efforts of the United States government and the Jewish relief organizations to resettle the Jews in other countries. This would serve to harden the tremendous pressure which was constantly being applied on Britain by the Zionist groups not only to repeal the White Paper, which had almost totally suspended immigration to the Jewish Homeland in 1939 when it was issued by the British Foreign Office in violation of the Balfour Declaration, but to fulfill her pledge and mandate to create a Jewish National Home in Palestine. This the British, and to a certain extent the United States, were unwilling to do. For reasons of military expediency, neither country had wished to upset the Arabs in the Middle East during World War II.

Now, in the post-war period, neither country desired to disturb the precarious balance of power in that region of the earth for fear of throwing the Arabs into the Communist camp. This would be disastrous, the British felt, as it would cut them off completely from one of their major sources of oil as well as the Suez Canal. ⁸⁴

Of one thing there can be no doubt. Rabbi Bernstein had deeply touched General McNarney's heart by appealing to him on humane grounds to let his people go. His official "Report on Poland," submitted to the General on August 2, 1946, in which he clearly stated all the facts touching on the Polish situation; his numerous conversations with the General, in which he movingly related the incidents and the consequences of the Kielce pogrom; his concise recommendations advising the General to take swift, positive action to keep the borders open, led McNarney to cooperate and support the proposals of his Jewish Adviser and the major Jewish organizations whom Bernstein represented.

In all fairness to General McNarney, it should be stated that Rabbi Bernstein never felt him to be personally opposed to keeping the borders open. Bernstein is convinced that the General's readiness to do all in his power to help Polish Jewry's cause, once he was fully informed of their plight, was a major factor in admitting Jewish persecutees into the American zone. On the whole he found

the commanding general to be a fine, kind-hearted, warm-hearted human being.

On May 21, 1947, at a testimonial luncheon for General McNarney in New York City's Waldorf Astoria hotel, sponsored by the five Jewish organizations, Bernstein was to recall some of the impressions he had used to bear the heart of his former commanding officer merely ten months before. "I can never forget what I saw in Poland in the summer of 1946," he said.⁸⁵ "The still surviving victims of the Kielce pogrom pleaded with me through bloody bandages and broken jaws to save the balance of Polish Jewry from the fate of their own murdered loved ones."⁸⁶ Then Bernstein was to address McNarney with these words, "Jewish history should have a special place for General McNarney. He is the saviour of one hundred thousand Jews."⁸⁷

By August 1946, the big push had reached its peak with 3900 Jews crossing into Czechoslovakia in one night alone to follow what became the established path to safety for the majority of the persecutees. It led from Prague to Bratislava to Vienna to the United States Zone of Austria, and eventually to Germany. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (better known as JOINT) rendered substantial aid in assisting the refugees to reach the United States Zones. The Czechoslovakian government, after first overcoming pressure applied by the British to restrict all transit through the country, also lent

their support to the mass movement. For more than six weeks Jews infiltrated into American territory at a rate exceeding a thousand per day. By the end of October over 100,000 refugees had been evacuated from Poland.

People who observed this modern exodus of Polish Jews, occurring in the late summer and early fall of 1946, could not help wondering about the incident which had given it momentum. Generally it was agreed that the Jews of Poland were living under miserable conditions, but, everyone wanted to know, had the Kielce pogrom really been that bad? Rabbi Bernstein could readily answer this question by telling the Kielce story as it had been told to him by the Jewish survivors. And tell it he did: to General McFarney, to the Theater Commanders of the American zones of occupation, to the officials of the State and War Departments, to the representatives of the Jewish organizations, to the American and European press, to Harry S. Truman, to Pope Pius XII, to Jewish fundraising meetings at home, and to his congregation in Rochester, Temple B'rith Kodesh. If they closed their eyes as the Rabbi poured forth his tale, they could have sworn they were living in 1648 when Bogdan Chmelnitzki led his Cossack and Tartar hordes out of the Ukraine into Poland to maraud and slaughter hundreds and thousands of innocent Jews. "Let us begin with the fourth of July," he exclaimed.

Early that morning a maddened mob of Poles

gathered outside the Jewish Community House in Kielce. A little Christian boy had returned from a three day's unexplained absence from home and told his family the Jews had detained him in a house in the woods. He said that he saw in the cellar of that house bodies of Christian children who had been slaughtered by Jews for ritual purposes. Later it was found that the boy had simply visited a Christian peasant in the country; that his entire story was a lie for which he had been coached by some fanatical anti-Semites.

The blood accusation spread like wildfire, fanned of course by those who were deliberately exploiting it either through sheer, elemental anti-Semitism or in order to embarrass or discredit the government of which three Jews were members. The crowd streamed for the blood of the Jews in the Community House. These included a kibbutz, a collective group of fine young people who were not even natives of Kielce but had been assembled there after repatriation from Russia and who were that very night scheduled to move on to the United States Zone in Germany, ultimately hoping to arrive in Palestine.

The Jews showed signs of resistance. Then a hoax was perpetrated. Some officers of the local militia knocked on the door and promised safe conduct to the Jews if they would come out and entrust themselves to the military for transfer to promised safe headquarters. Some of the Jews, including Dr. Kahan, the President of the Jewish community, put down their arms as requested and were led out by the officers. The latter thereupon turned them over to the crowd and they were beaten to death on that very spot before the eyes of their families and friends who were watching out of the Community House windows. The mob broke into the house to the others and clubbed them or stoned them to death -- women and children joining with the men in a sheer orgy of bestiality. They seized Jews on trains, took them off and pounded them into pulp on the very platforms of the stations.

No one protected the Jews. No one helped them. The church authorities refused to lift a finger. The police either turned their backs or participated with the mob. The local government was either helpless or indifferent, and it was only after forty-two of these people, many of them the fine, young, sweet comrades of the Kibbutz, had been beaten to death and many

more, severely, some fatally wounded that the national government effectively intervened and put a stop to the pogrom.⁹⁰

With the conclusion of this horrible drama all suspicions concerning the motivations of the Polish Jews for leaving their medieval home were allayed. But the Rabbi was not finished. He went on to speak of more tragedies which further compounded the miseries of his suffering people. He told of how he had seen them on the move in Polish-occupied lower Silesia where they were forced to flee the country like thieves. At the embarkation points for Czechoslovakia and the United States Zone in Germany, Polish anti-Semites again beat, robbed, and even killed some of them. Close to the border they were collected in primitive shacks, barren of furniture, beds, and in some instances food, their possessions removed from them by the Polish authorities, who now forced them to sit and wait. "Like criminals they had to steal out at night. As one of them said to me, 'Apparently we are criminals. Our crime is that we are Jews.'⁹¹"

Before he left Poland, the Jewish Adviser accomplished two things for these downtrodden people. From the Jewish Agency for Palestine he received a commitment that at the earliest possible moment it would undertake to transport the survivors of the Kielce pogrom to Eretz Yisrael. The Prime Minister of Poland, Edward Osobka-Morawski, who

stated his government's genuine concern over the well-being of the Jews and its stand against anti-Semitism, promised Bernstein that the regime would correct the abuses of its petty officials and soldiers who were robbing, beating and extorting bribes from the departing refugees. To the best of Bernstein's knowledge the Prime Minister kept his word, for later reports called attention to the government's protection of the escape operations. From this time on the persecutees left Poland during daylight hours and not under cover of darkness. At least for the moment they could be reasonably secure in their intermediary flight to safety. ⁹²

Thus Rabbi Bernstein's trip to Poland ended on a very successful note. He had fulfilled beyond all expectations the challenge which Henry Montor had laid at his feet. True, he had found conditions in Poland depressing, but the situation was not hopeless. The Polish government had promised to try and suppress virulent anti-Semitism to the best of its ability. Therefore, he recommended that "no panic psychology 'to save the Jews of Poland' should be encouraged." ⁹³ The Jewish Adviser and the officers of the Jewish organizations working in Poland with whom he spoke, including JOINT Director William Bein, unanimously concurred that a calculated public program to remove every Jew from the country would arouse the resentment of the Communist political leadership by reflecting on their capacity and

intentions to keep the peace and protect their citizens. Such an effort might even prompt them to cut off Jewish immigration completely. This could lead to further restrictions and measures specifically aimed at an ensnared Jewish population. Therefore, in his specific recommendations to the Theater Commander contained in his August 2, 1946, "Report on Poland," Bernstein stated,

It is recommended that under the auspices of and at the initiative of the Commanding General, USFET [United States Forces, European Theater], plans be explored and undertaken for the accommodation of 60,000 additional Jewish displaced persons in the coming three months and of an additional 40,000 over the winter months; that these plans include the expansion of facilities for such care in the U.S. Zone in Austria, the British and French Zones, France, Italy, and other countries, and that the resources of such private agencies as the American Joint Distribution and the Jewish Agency for Palestine be fully utilized in the extension of this program; that the Commanding General, USFET, undertake to prepare accommodations for such incoming Jewish persecutees as cannot be cared for in other places.⁹⁴

The question that was previously raised concerning Rabbi Bernstein's role in keeping open the borders of the American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria can now be answered with a reasonable degree of assurance. The heartrending stories of Polish Jewish persecution which General McNarney heard from his Jewish Adviser could not be treated lightly. Consequently, he fully endorsed the humane policies which Bernstein had recommended to him.

Early Attempts at Resettlement

The addition, both actual and prospective, of vast numbers of persecutees to the already overcrowded Jewish D.P. camps of the American zone in Germany was to stimulate Rabbi Bernstein's efforts, upon his return to Frankfurt on July 30, 1946, to resettle his people elsewhere. For this purpose, and because it was clear that the Jewish situation in the United States zones had become exceedingly more complex since his arrival in May, General McNarney urged his Jewish Adviser, in August, 1946, to stay on his job. ⁹⁶

McNarney's request was an important one. Bernstein was now an experienced man, completely familiar with the problems of the Jewish D.P.'s. He knew what had to be done. He had earned the complete respect not only of the Theater Command, but of the State Department, the Jewish organizations, and -- most important of all -- the Jewish D.P.'s themselves. ⁹⁷ These oftentimes hostile and embittered displaced Jews were willing to listen to him; they did not want to see him go. Substantial evidence of their feelings can be obtained from the stirring appeal which Dr. Samuel Gringauz made to Rochesterians from Europe on the very eve of the Jewish New Year when Bernstein was back home appealing to the generosity of his congregation to let him return to Germany for another year. On September 25, 1946, the chairman of the Council of the Central Committee of Liberated Jews wrote in the Jidische Caitung /Juedische

Zeitung 7,

A composition [composite] of Don Isaac [Isaac] Abrabanel and Moses Mendelssohn, Bernstein represents the spiritual link between traditional Judaism and secular knowledge, between moral philosophy and [the] practical art of handling people. He is warmly devoted to his own people and enjoys the esteem of the outward world. And we say to the Community of Rochester -- we fully realize that the war is over and you want your Rabbi back. But for us the war is far from being ended. As far as we are concerned the struggle is still going on. In this war Bernstein is our spiritual officer. We need him and cannot demobilize him. Send him back to us, for he has become one of ours. 98

Before returning to the United States and Rochester to secure permission from Temple B'rith Kodesh to remain on as Jewish Adviser, Bernstein, with the assistance of the Jewish organizations, participated in several important negotiations which helped to disperse some of the Jews flowing out of Poland into other countries and away from the congested D.P. camps in the United States Zone of Germany. General McNarney, as the United States Military Commander, could not prevent Polish persecutees from coming directly into his zone, but his Adviser on Jewish Affairs, representing the interests of the major Jewish organizations, could undertake this project. In this matter there was no conflict of interest as both the Theater Command and the Jewish leadership considered this action highly desirable and necessary. 99

The placing of Jewish D.P.'s in temporary camps in countries such as Czechoslovakia, Italy and France meant,

from the Jewish point of view, that legitimate visas to Palestine and to other nations willing to take them in, as well as illegal emigration sponsored by the Jewish underground known as the Brichah, could move large numbers of refugees out of Europe with comparative ease. In Germany legal immigration or, as Bernstein put it, "exfiltration" presented considerable difficulty. ¹⁰⁰ Once again the British were responsible for creating barriers. Following the Bevin point of view on the functional level, Britain was insisting that there could not be any official movement of displaced persons outside of Germany without quadripartite approval. This meant that, if a Jew wanted to leave the American Zone in Germany to go to Italy, he could not do it unless his request was approved by Russia, France, Britain, and America -- the four governments involved in occupying the defeated nation. With the British saying no to everything, the Jews were totally restricted. This is why there was so much unauthorized movement out of the American Zone. It is also why Bernstein and the Jewish organizations were eager to divert as many Polish Jews as possible to assembly centers and UNRRA ¹⁰¹ (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency) camps.

The American military people and President Truman resented Britain's policy of "no immigration" -- that worked all up and down the line and not merely in Germany -- almost as much as the Jewish groups. At a meeting in

Washington at which, according to Rabbi Bernstein's recollection, Truman had determined to keep the borders open to persecutees from Poland, someone said to him, "Bevin won't like this," to which the President replied in his typical fashion, "to hell with Bevin!"¹⁰² But the Theater Command's resentment of the British for their unwillingness to cooperate in any way to help alleviate the Jewish D.P. problem in Germany went far beyond Truman's colorful remark. With the winter of 1946-1947 soon approaching, grave problems faced General McNarney. In Germany there were acute shortages of housing, food and fuel. Any successful attempts by Bernstein and the Jewish organizations to resettle the Polish Jews in other countries would be deeply appreciated. Any efforts by Bernstein and the Jewish organizations to remove Jewish D.P.'s already settled in the camps would be doubly appreciated. Therefore, despite all British efforts to curtail Jewish "exfiltration," the Army

quietly, unofficially cooperated in unauthorized movements out of the Zone. They did it to some extent because it relieved them of their problem. Every Jew that could leave the American Zone to go on his way toward Palestine was one less mouth to feed and one less person to care about. But also they did it because they sensed the need of it.¹⁰³

Had the Americans, who had anywhere from eight to ten times as many displaced Jews in their zones of Germany and Austria on October 1, 1946 as did the British, found their Allies to be less obstinate in permitting some authorized flow

out of the country, they might not have condoned the efforts of the Brichah. ¹⁰⁴ This, however, was not the case.

On August 7, 1946, Bernstein flew to Paris to make his recommendations on Poland known to the Jewish Agency and the other cooperating Jewish organizations. There he met with Stephen S. Wise, president of the World Jewish Congress, and Nachum Goldman, chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, among other Jewish notables who had gathered to attend the Paris peace conference. Together they formulated a program of action for distributing Poland's Jews to different European countries. ¹⁰⁵

First, Bernstein travelled to Vienna for talks with General Mark Clark, the Commanding General of the United States Forces in Austria, whose adviser on Jewish affairs he had recently become. He found Clark possessed of a charming personality. Unlike McNarney, who in many ways was the warmest hearted and most humanitarian of the many generals with whom he came in contact, Clark was politically minded. He often acted in terms of what he thought the effects of his policies would be in Washington. After cordial discussions in which Bernstein felt Clark to be "willingly cooperative," Clark agreed to accept 25,000 additional Jewish D.P.'s into his zone. His previous quota had been 5,000. This understanding, however, was entered into with the stipulation that, when the D.P.'s totaled over 30,000, the surplus would be returned to Germany. ¹⁰⁶

Second, in early September Bernstein flew to Prague, with McMarney's approval, in an attempt to persuade the Czechoslovakian government to take some of the Polish Jews into their country on a temporary basis. The good general even put a small American plane at his Adviser's disposal. Since the Kielce pogrom the Jews had been pouring through the land of Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes at the rate of a thousand per day. Now Bernstein hoped to induce Premier Klement Gottwald to accept 10,000 persecutees into Czechoslovakia until Palestine opened up for further immigration.

The Adviser on Jewish Affairs found Gottwald to be an unimpressive personality, rather like Prime Ministers Osobka-Morawski of Poland, Attlee of England, and de Gasperi of Italy, all of whom he had either met before or was to encounter in the near future. He seemed to feel that the presence of these mediocre, mild men -- far removed from the dynamic leadership provided by Roosevelt and Churchill during the war -- at the head of their respective governments was not coincidental, but reflected the desire of their constituents for moderate, bland leadership in the unsettled post-war period.

Bernstein discovered the Czechoslovakian Premier somewhat sympathetic to the circumstances of the harassed Polish Jews. Gottwald told him of the pressure the anti-Zionist British forces had tried to use on his

government to prevent them from allowing the Jews to move through the country. His government had resisted these pressures. But when the two men finally discussed the purpose for which the American Rabbi had come to Prague, the leftist Prime Minister of what had formerly been one of the most liberal, democratic republics in all of Europe informed him that the Jews could be given temporary shelter in Czechoslovakia only if someone would guarantee the government that after a pre-arranged period of time they would be removed. Bernstein was greatly disappointed. Here was a country -- which had recently expelled millions of Germans and which was short of labor -- completely unwilling to give 10,000 Jewish refugees a provisional home unless some other organization or nation would guarantee to evacuate them.

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In this matter as in the border situation the Jewish Adviser found his Theater Commander extremely helpful. After Bernstein had revealed to McNarney Gottwald's reply, the General authorized him to contact the Czechoslovakian Premier to the effect that on July 1, 1947, the American army would remove 10,000 Jewish D.P.'s upon the request of his government with thirty day's notice. But even McNarney's personal guarantee was not enough for Czechoslovakia. On October 4, 1946, Bernstein was to tell his Rochester congregation in a Kol Nidre sermon denouncing the British for their long record of Jewish betrayal:

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it was reported last week and confirmed to me in a telephone conversation with Germany on Monday that following a second British protest the Czech borders were closed. Now it is my conviction that no one can prevent the flight of Jews running for their lives. Their flight can be made very difficult, and even more intolerable hardships can be imposed on them, but I am certain that if they cannot cross the border in an organized way, they will cross the border in an unorganized way. If they can not enter legally, they will enter illegally. If they must take the chance of being shot down, they will take the chance of being shot down. But those who feel they must move, will move. However, I am pointing to a terrible moral guilt of the British Government of giving direct aid and recognition to those who are known to be pogromists and at the same time of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries in order to prevent the escape of the intended victims of the pogroms.111

Three months after his September meeting with Gottwald, Bernstein, McNarney and the Jewish organizations were still awaiting a definite commitment from the Czechoslovakian government concerning the 10,000 Jews. On December 11, 1946, the Adviser on Jewish Affairs received a letter from M.W. Beckelman, Vice-Chairman of the European Executive Council of the American Joint Distribution Committee in Paris, which contained a telegram from Israel Jacobson, the director of JOINT operations in Prague. It contained information pertaining to Jacobson's "most recent discussions with the Czechoslovak Government on the proposal to admit 10,000 refugees to that country": 112

Prime Minister replied regarding Bernstein negotiations for McNarney accommodations ten thousand Jewish refugees from Poland until McNarney able to accept them stop reply quote the office of the Prime Minister finds no objection to temporarily putting up ten thousand Jews from Poland in Czechoslovakia

stop it will be necessary for the American Government to bring the request through diplomatic channels to the Czechoslovak Government we assume Polish Government will give permission for these people to leave Poland it will also be necessary to settle the financial question which will arise from their stay here stop details are left to further diplomatic negotiations unquote discussed with Ambassador Steinhardt who today sent letter to Czechoslovak Ministry Foreign Affairs based on instructions to him from U.S. Dept. of State he told of U.S. government's strong interest in project and urged Czechoslovak Government accept on basis McNarney proposal stop he asked them to continue discussion regarding finances with me stop he believes that if ten thousand include three four thousand able bodied workers then practically complete cost can be met as shortage of labour exists here and left to our negotiations with CSR Government all screening potential refugees in Poland stop leaving tomorrow morning as previously mentioned telephonically to you for Warsaw to discuss this and other matters with Bein stop will keep you informed as to developments and will make no commitments without your advance approval regards Jacobson.113

Efforts continued to negotiate a temporary resettlement of 10,000 Jews in Czechoslovakia for many months after Jacobson's December communiqué to Beckelman. However, in August, 1947, Bernstein was to state in his "Final Report" to Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army, that negotiations for the resettlement of these Jewish D.P.'s in Czechoslovakia were still being pursued.¹¹⁴

The third trip the Adviser on Jewish Affairs made in his attempt to divert a substantial number of the 100,000 or more persecutees coming out of Poland away from the American zone of Germany was to Italy. In Czechoslovakia he had encountered difficulties about resettlement; in Italy, too, he had to combat obstacles. Again the British

were pressing the Italian government to deny the uprooted Jews admission into their country. Again Britain's representatives advanced the argument that an increased number of Jewish D.P.'s in Italy would raise the pressure to open Palestine's doors. Fortunately Italy rejected Britain's requests.

But apart from the active opposition of the British government the proposals of Bernstein and the five major Jewish organizations, for a temporary resettlement of 25,000 Jewish D.P.'s in Italy bogged down due to the confusion created by the diverse requests made upon the Italian government. In an official memorandum dispatched to his Chief of Staff on September 13, 1946, the day after his return to Frankfurt from his Italian visit of September 9, 1946 to September 12, 1946, the Jewish Adviser gave the following reasons for the stalemated negotiations:

USFET, in its cable of 15 August 1946, had recommended the settlement of 50,000 [Jewish D.P.'s] in Italy, which was regarded there as so ill conceived and far-fetched, in light of the poverty of the country and the reduction and imminent withdrawal of U.S. forces, as not to warrant serious consideration. At the same time, there was a cable from the State Department, recommending settlement of 25,000 from Austria, which the American military resented because it did not come through military channels. Most of all, Mr. La Guardia [Fiorello La Guardia was the director general of UNRRA at the time] confused the situation by committing UNRRA to an arrangement contrary to accepted UNRRA practice and by attempting to make unilateral arrangements with the U.S. Government, which seemed to circumvent the existing UNRRA apparatus....Also, the Italian Government, not basically unsympathetic, is confronted...with grave, unsolved economic problems, internal dissension,

and a colossal impending bill of reparations. As a result I found that, apart from the Italian Jewish groups who were advocating the plan and the United States Charge d'affaires [the Honorable David N. Key, assigned to the American Embassy, Rome] who, acting under State Department instructions, was conducting negotiations on its behalf, all other important elements seemed hostile to it, including the United States and allied military, the British Government, UNRRA and, in terms of action, the Italian Government. 116

In the light of these difficulties the Jewish Adviser and the Jewish groups agreed to concentrate on the August proposal of the State Department recommending the resettlement of 25,000 Jews in Italy from Austria. Even this plan was eventually to meet defeat, due in part, according to Bernstein, to the failure of Jewish relief agencies such as JOINT "to make commitments concerning the care and feeding of these people." 117 In a letter to Joseph C. Hyman, the executive vice-chairman of JOINT's New York office, dated September 8, 1946, Bernstein was to express his thorough dissatisfaction with that organization's position in light of the emergency created by the movement of Jews out of Poland and into the United States Zone of Germany. The Rabbi knew, of course that this world-wide rescue organization was dealing with Jewish emergencies from Rumania to Shanghai and was sorely pressed for funds; he knew first-hand that JOINT had rendered invaluable service in Germany and throughout western and eastern Europe during the war and in the post-war period;

Frank Langford was assigned purposely to operate the

he knew of his own indebtedness to JOINT for the cooperation they had given him in the past in his official capacity as Jewish Adviser and which cooperation they would continue to give him in the future; he knew of the untiring and dedicated efforts of the operation's leadership and the men in the field to save and resettle international Jewry. Yet he was indignant and even threatened JOINT at this time because it seemed to him so urgent that they should find a way to agree to support these people coming out of Poland by sending them to Italy -- a staging area for direct movement to Palestine. ¹¹⁸ Therefore it is understandable why Bernstein's missive to Joseph Hyman bristled. Speaking to the point he warned,

...you will understand the day to day urgency of these problems, the increasing pressure on the U.S. Army, and the obvious necessity for a thorough-going program of Jewish cooperation. You will realize, I trust, that the U.S. Army is the only friend the Jews have in Europe; that, if the Army should close down on its Jewish program, the situation would immediately become desperate and hopeless. These are conditions which should move responsible Jews to offer every possible help and to make extraordinary efforts and commitments.

This is precisely what JDC [Joint Distribution Committee] is not doing. It is my sober conviction that JDC is rendering the minimal assistance in dealing with this current crucial situation.¹¹⁹

After this scathing attack on the JDC the Jewish Adviser went on to relate the deleterious effects the "minimal assistance" policy was having on the Theater Command in Germany. Perhaps the Rabbi's impassioned, frank language was designed purposely to overstate the

direness of the situation, but he was not a man to "pull punches" unless the situation did, in truth, call for them. Thus he went on to inform Hyman,

At present, I am sorry to state, those officers in USPET Headquarters who are closest to the D.P. problem do not have a particularly high regard for JDC. In this present emergency, during which we have been telling the Army that the acceptance of the Polish Jewish refugees is a matter of life or death, the constant refrain is 'Where is JDC? What is JDC doing?' In these matters, JDC is Jewry and, when all that JDC offers is not commitments, but excuses and rationalizations and a sanctimonious reaffirmation of established precedents, there is the inevitable tendency for the Army authorities to feel that the Jews are simply dumping the problem on the Army. Although I have tried to protect the interests of JDC in these current negotiations, the truth of its lack of active cooperation must inevitably become known and will result in a further deterioration in its position vis-a-vis the Army.120

Here, of course, Rabbi Bernstein was referring not only to the combined efforts of himself and the Jewish organizations to congregate Jewish D.P.'s in Italy, but to the entire program of resettling Jews throughout the countries of western Europe. But despite external as well as internal impediments he unyieldingly continued in his labors. This led him along several paths.

Mr. La Guardia had originally refused responsibility for establishing D.P. camps of 25,000 Jews in Italy.

Bernstein and representatives of the Jewish organizations called on him, and subsequently he agreed conditionally to let UNRRA set up camps, providing food would be furnished by the War Department and consent would be given by the Jewish Advisory on every level, the United States appealed Italian government to the presence of these assembly centers

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in their nation. As late as April 11, 1947, the Jewish Adviser was to write Leavitt, who had now replaced the retired Hyman as the executive vice-chairman of the JDC, of his disappointment over that agency's failure to initiate plans to resettle 10,000 Jewish D.P.'s in Italy (by this time it was apparent that in accordance with UNRRA's established procedures no more than that number could possibly be brought into the existing camps and installations). This correspondence again showed Bernstein to be indignant with JOINT. Concerning the matter of finances he advised Leavitt that

Any project is a good investment which takes our people out of Germany-Austria. Certainly, this is true in terms of demoralization which proceeds apace here and may become catastrophic next winter. It is, also, true in terms of dollars and cents. In Italy, people move on. Here, they remain indefinitely. You cannot compare costs on a month to month basis. Any Jew who remains in Germany will represent a growing and indefinite cost to JDC. Facing reduced public resources, you will have to spend more on each individual left here than you did in the past. Much of the money spent here simply goes down the drain. God alone knows how much is necessary for survival and how much is a result of circumstances and pressures. And when you are all through, the people are just where you found them -- no better off, probably worse. One dollar invested in movement is worth ten dollars spent on relief.122

On September 9, 1946, Bernstein had flown with McNarney to Italy. There they discussed the difficulties impeding the Italian project with as many important personalities and groups as was possible. Supporting his Jewish Adviser on every level, the Theater Commander appealed

directly to Lieutenant General Sir Frederick D. Morgan, Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Forces, and to the United States staff of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, to back all attempts to resettle Jewish D.P.'s in camps in the country. It was Bernstein's opinion "that this appeal liquidated whatever military opposition had existed." ¹²³ At the same time he met with Sam Keeny, director of the UNRRA mission in Italy, and his staff. Keeny was the man who informed him that the addition of 10,000 Jewish refugees in their camps, instead of 25,000 would ¹²⁴ be a realistic and feasible view under the circumstances. The consent of the Italian government was still necessary if the operation was to be a success. To accomplish that purpose Bernstein met with Vitterio Zoppi, Chief of the Political Bureau of the Italian Government. Zoppi reflected Italy's sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the Jews and also explained the difficulties his government was currently confronting. He told the Rabbi if assurances were provided his government that eventually the displaced persons would be removed from his country, which was already overcrowded, substantial numbers of them might be settled in Italy. However, agreeing in substance with Keeny, he suggested reducing the estimated figure of 25,000. This information was subsequently submitted by Bernstein to David Key, of the American Embassy in Rome, ¹²⁵ who was to transmit it to Washington.

The highlight of Bernstein's Italian visit occurred on Wednesday morning, September 11, 1946, when he was given a private audience with Pope Pius XII at Castel Gandolfo, the papal summer residence. The Rabbi later called his forty-minute interview, in which they discussed the problems stemming from the recrudescence of anti-Semitism in Poland, a "satisfying talk." This is how he described it:

...I was almost taken off guard by the informality of the proceedings. Behind a small desk sat a white-robed man who rose as I came forward and offered his hand, which I shook. This was so informal and seemed to be on such a man-to-man basis that, for an instant, I thought that he must be the secretary to the Pope. However, I realized quickly that I was in the presence of the head of the Catholic Church.

...He told me that he does grant 'important' audiences during this period [of his summer holiday] and indicated that he considered the purpose of my visit as important. He had been informed that I am adviser to General McNarney and General Clark on Jewish Affairs.

...I then expressed appreciation for the great assistance the Church had rendered in saving persecuted Jews during the period of Nazi domination, particularly in Italy, France and Belgium.

...He said the persecution of the Jews was dreadful. He used that word 'dreadful' again and again in the conversation, as he referred to the martyrdom of the Jews. The word seemed to have some special significance to him, as if connoting something vile and unholy. He also used the word 'pity' often in referring to what had happened to the Jews, i.e., 'It was a great pity.'

At this point I reminded him that the persecution had not ended, and I told him that I was particularly concerned about what was happening in Poland. I briefly recapitulated the sad story of current Polish anti-Semitism, culminating in the Kielce

pogrom. He said that the pogrom was 'dreadful; that the Church had condemned such violence.'

I replied that a general condemnation of violence would not meet the urgent needs of the crucial situation in Poland, that there ought to be issued on the part of the Church, and particularly the Polish Hierarchy, a specific condemnation of anti-Semitism.

...He responded that the Church itself is in difficulty in Poland and that Catholics are being persecuted by the present government. 'They too, do not have freedom from fear,' he said, in the words of the Atlantic Charter....He commented on the hostile attitude of the Soviet government and its satellites.

...'As you know,' he said, using Mr. Churchill's phrase, 'there is an iron curtain around Poland, and communication with the Hierarchy is very difficult.' Nevertheless, he assured me that he would find a way to communicate with the Catholic authorities in Poland, instructing them to take positive action against anti-Semitism in that country.

I then proceeded to the immediate purpose of my visit to Italy; namely, the temporary settlement in that country of [a substantial number of] Polish Jewish refugees to await their ultimate resettlement elsewhere....I took the liberty of suggesting that he might be helpful in influencing the Italian government toward a favorable consideration of this project. He then agreed to get in touch with the Italian government for this purpose.

We went on to a general discussion of the fate of these Jewish-displaced persons. He suggested that, ultimately, most of them might be settled in the United States which, in his judgment, was best equipped to absorb them. I reminded him of the difficulties of acceptance and, also, of the wish of most of them to go to Palestine. 'Yes, I recognize that as their desire,' he said.

...I thanked him for his kindness and again, for his helpfulness. He ended the audience with another handshake, not firm but with enough pressure to suggest a positive clasp, and he pronounced a Latin benediction as I moved away, 'God bless you.'

In his official memorandum of September 14, 1946, in which he summarized his interview with Pope Pius XII to McMarney, Bernstein mentioned the deep, favorable impression the pontiff had made on him and how he trusted the head of the Catholic Church to implement his promises. He had no way of knowing, of course, what precisely the Pope did do as he never reported to him. However, the Jewish Adviser had reason to believe Pius XII had kept his word, for subsequent reports out of Poland indicated that Jewish harassment subsided. He also informed his Theater Commander that, following the advice of the acting Papal Secretary of State -- who had spoken on the subject of Bernstein's audience to Franklin C. Gowen, Assistant to the Honorable Myron C. Taylor, the personal representative of the President of the United States of America to his Holiness the Pope -- it was decided not to give publicity on the pontiff's two specific commitments to the Jewish Adviser lest a hasty announcement of the Pope's intentions disadvantage papal efforts in Italy and Poland.

Concurrent with their efforts in Italy, Bernstein and the leaders of the Jewish relief organizations worked zealously to secure five to ten thousand temporary French visas for Polish Jewish persecutees to come to France. As before, the Adviser on Jewish Affairs experienced some difficulties in receiving the full cooperation of JDC. He had received a telephone call from Nathan Goldman

to be provided for under the auspices of the JDC.

informing him of his efforts to persuade French President Bidault to have his country accept 10,000 Jewish D.P.'s. Bidault had been sympathetic, but, as of September 8, 1946, not a single Polish refugee had reached Paris. Therefore, in his letter to Hyman of the JDC, written on that same day, Bernstein had recommended that the New York headquarters instruct their Paris office to undertake whatever project was necessary to accomplish the movement of Jews into France. As the French authorities had also shown some receptivity to admitting 5000 more Polish Jews into their zone of Germany, the Jewish Adviser suggested additionally that JOINT's Paris office negotiate a positive program which would in some measure relieve the government of France of the financial burdens involved in such an enterprise. 129 Apparently JOINT listened to him because on September 25, 1946, Bernstein could tell Temple B'rith Kodesh from the pulpit: 130

In France, we secured temporary visas for a large number of Jews from Poland. They are to be supported by JDC until they can be moved to their ultimate destination. Similar arrangements are being made for Belgium, Holland and Sweden. 130

Finally, before his departure from Europe to return to his Rochester congregation for the High Holydays, Bernstein and his colleagues were in the process of establishing a plan to move 2,000 Jewish refugee children to an ex-German military camp in Norway. There they were to be provided for under the combined auspices of the JDC,

UNRRA, the United States Army, and the Norwegian government. 131
Bernstein found Norway's hospitable attitude towards acceptance of the Jewish D.P.'s unique among the various countries he had been dealing with in Europe. During the forthcoming terrible winter of 1946-1947, when he traveled up and down the continent trying to peddle his unwanted people -- with very poor results -- to any nation that would offer them a temporary haven, the only country that opened up its doors to them was Norway. The Norwegians said they were ready to replace their pre-war Jewish population destroyed by the Nazis. That population was, of course, just a few thousand, so that, while their assistance was appreciated, it did not alleviate the terrible pressures on the United States Army to continue to house, feed and clothe approximately 165,000 Jewish D.P.'s in the American zones of Germany and Austria. Unfortunately the world had turned xenophobic. 132

Rabbi Bernstein returned to the United States on September 14, 1946, to tell Americans, Jews and Gentiles alike, as well as the State Department and the President of the terrible conditions the Jews were facing in destitute, war-ravaged Europe. He also came back to be with his family and congregation and to ask them to let him complete his duties in Germany as General McNarney had requested. He was to spend one month in this country before returning to his job as Jewish Adviser. During

this month he was to describe the Jewish displaced persons: their needs, their problems, their hopes.

After service in Temple Beth-Eden with the singing of "Hallel" and "Kaddish" for the victims of the Holocaust, Rabbi Bernard spoke. "Out of the depths, I cry out, O Lord," he began. Of course, many times before, but on this night of Kaddish it seemed to penetrate him. In the past few months he had been personally witness to the suffering of Jewish people in displacement camps throughout Europe. In the past five months he had seen many men and women suffer and die. He spoke of the "Day of Atonement," as he called it, and of the Jewish people by crying out of the depths of his own deep sorrow to the God of his salvation. Ten days previously, on Rosh Hashanah, he had commenced a series of High Holiday services by telling his congregation,

Fate has lifted me up and placed me in the center of the greatest catastrophe of all Jewish history, and the same fate has given me an opportunity for service unparalleled in my lifetime. It would be unworthy of this hour of history, unworthy of the needs of the Jewish people, unworthy of the sacrifice which this congregation has made if I did not share my experience with you. 131

Therefore, on this occasion, and at every opportunity that presented itself between September, 1946, and August, 1947, when he retired as Jewish Adviser, Bernstein spoke out on what he considered to be salient aspects of Jewish D.P. life and his acquaintance with that experience.

Frequently Bernstein would exclaim,

Chapter VIII

The Jewish Displaced Persons and the Army

On October 4, 1946, Rabbi Bernstein began the Yom Kippur service in Temple B'rith Kodesh with the moving one hundred and thirtieth psalm, "Out of the depths, I cry unto Thee O Lord." He had read it, of course, many times before, but on this night of Kol Nidre it seemed to consume him. In the past five months he had been personal witness to the depths of his people's degradation in the D.P. camps of Germany and throughout Europe. In the past five months he had heard them cry out to their Creator in despair. Now, during the "Days of Awe," he too was spiritually joining his suffering people by crying out of the depths of his own deep sorrow to the God of his salvation. Ten days previously, on Rosh Hashanah, he had commenced a series of High Holyday messages by telling his congregation,

Fate has lifted me up and placed me in the center of the greatest catastrophe of all Jewish history, and the same fate has given me an opportunity for service unparalleled in my lifetime. It would be unworthy of this hour of history, unworthy of the needs of the Jewish people, unworthy of the sacrifice which this congregation has made if I did not share my experience with you.¹³³

Therefore, on this occasion, and at every opportunity that presented itself between September, 1946, and August, 1947, when he retired as Jewish Adviser, Bernstein spoke out on what he considered to be salient aspects of Jewish D.P. life and his acquaintance with that experience.

Frequently Bernstein would exclaim,

Thank God for the United States Army. An army is not a social welfare agency and it can make mistakes...and has done so, but these are... definitely secondary. The primary fact is that the United States Army alone has given shelter and care to the [sic] great numbers of our people.... 134

The army's fundamental policies for D.P. care had been formulated by General Eisenhower shortly after the conclusion of World War II. At that time the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces had announced, "The liberation, ~~care~~ and repatriation of United Nations displaced persons is a major Allied objective and I enjoin the use of all available forces at the disposal of the military commanders to accomplish this aim." 135 During Bernstein's incumbency he felt that the Army, within the confines of its limited resources, had effectively performed the functions of Eisenhower's humane directive. These functions included: law and order, security, feeding, clothing, shelter, medical care, and cultural activities.

Law and order in Germany and among the Jewish displaced persons presented difficult problems. Stuttgart and Landsberg had demonstrated the necessity of providing Jews, living in the midst of a hostile German population, with protection. Consequently, eighty percent of the people chose, though it was optional, to live in the D.P. camps. Only one-fifth of them elected to dwell in German communities. 136 The reason for this pattern, according to Bernstein, was the ubiquitous anti-Semitism of the German

people in the post-war era. In countless documents written during his fifteen months of service as Jewish Adviser, he commented on this fact. Underscoring it in his "Final Report" to the Secretary of the Army, Royall, in August, 1947, he said,

It is the opinion of most observers, confirmed by my own experience, that the Germans bitterly resent the presence of Displaced Jews in their midst. Only a student of abnormal social psychiatry could explain the perverse convolutions in the minds of the Germans, who, after having decimated the Jews, stolen and destroyed their possessions, deprived them of their rights, driven them from their homes, now blame them for the Germans' privations. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Germans do blame these Jewish D.P.'s for the current shortages of housing, food, clothing, and fuel. That this has no basis in fact does not disturb those who again are seeking a scapegoat. Recent Army studies of German attitudes [the fascinating restricted report entitled "Anti-Semitism in the American Zone," published on March 3, 1947, by the Opinion Surveys Headquarters] indicate that six out of every ten Germans would condone overt acts against the Jews. Until the present time the Army has pretty well kept such acts under control. But in the camps and cities, Jews are reporting sharper tensions, abuse in public places, snatches of Nazi songs, an occasional rock thrown in the window of a Jewish home. With the utmost sobriety, I predict that the withdrawal of the American forces would again lead to pogroms. There must be no such withdrawal until the Jewish D.P.'s leave Germany, as all of them wish to do. It is perfectly clear that their early removal is imperative.137

Bernstein's "Final Report" to Royall reflected the precarious position in which the Jews of Germany found themselves situated. On another occasion he stated,

The Germans do not regret having started the war, only having lost it. There is little resentment against Hitler except for defeat. Devices have been found for keeping the Nazi tradition alive....Increasingly

the Germans are cynical, assertive, even defiant 138
which sometimes they mask in an arrogant sycophancy.

Even the Christian leadership of the defeated country which had embarked on two world wars in the twentieth century did little to effect a post-war moral regeneration among the nation's seventy million inhabitants. Bernstein had an interesting experience in August, 1947, which testified to their lack of remorse for what had been done during the war. A trip up the Rhine on Hitler's yacht had been arranged for him and Judge Louis E. Levinthal -- the fine public servant and outstanding Jew who took time off from his responsibilities on the "bench" in Philadelphia to succeed Bernstein as Jewish Adviser in early August, 1947. They were to accompany a group of American clergymen who had come over to make contact with the German clergy. After eating at a little village in the wine country, the Christian clergy made speeches. Both Jews were struck by the fact that the Germans whined so. The clergy, instead of talking about their guilt or responsibility, were complaining about what the Allies had done to their country; they made requests for what they needed and expected from the rest of the outside world. The Jewish Adviser and his warm, personal friend, Levinthal, were amazed that these so-called moral leaders and religious guardians of the conscience of the German people did not really have a sense of guilt -- some Americans believed the Germans and their external visitors, and were attracted by the hospitality and seduction of the German

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happened.

In Bernstein's opinion, a large portion of the responsibility for the powerful, demoralizing forces found in Germany after the war, forces which threatened the very life of the Jewish D.P.'s living in the camps, had to be borne by the American Army of Occupation. In November, 1945, the Army initiated a redeployment program which by April, 1946, cut their military forces stationed in Europe from a million to approximately 330,000 men.¹⁴⁰ The Jewish Adviser felt the consequences of this policy to be disastrous. When he was in Germany in April, 1946, he had not met "a single American officer or G.I....who, however much he himself...wished to return home, did not regard our too-rapid demobilization as disastrous. There was simply no relationship between the pressure for bringing the boys home and our continuing responsibilities in Europe."¹⁴¹ Yet the Army yielded to the pressure exerted on them by the United States Congress, whose members had in turn been swayed by their constituents, the American taxpayers.¹⁴² Substantial numbers of men who had fought the war returned home. They were replaced, in part, by a group of eighteen- and nineteen-year-old youngsters who had no orientation on the purposes of the war; who had no real knowledge of what the Nazis had done and stood for; who were very easily allured by the orderliness of the Germans and their external virtues, and who were attracted by the hospitality and seduction of the German

girls. Frequently these new G.I.'s were misled by the
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Germans with regard to the Jewish D.P.'s. Bernstein
commented on this phenomenon in his "Final Report" to
Royall, in which he said,

The average young American G.I. has neither the background nor the training to understand the D.P. He has nothing in common with him; he does not understand his language. The D.P.'s on the other hand, because of all they have suffered and the present abnormalities of their life, are not easy to handle. The more responsible elements on both sides have found it possible to iron out difficulties as they developed. But ugly incidents have been occurring with greater frequency, between the rank and file of the G.I.'s and the D.P.'s. Education has been necessary on both sides and has been undertaken from time to time. However, the underlying irritations remain and are likely to get worse as times passes. 144

One of Bernstein's important contributions initiated as Jewish Adviser was, indeed, in the field of education. He undertook to influence the attitude of the Army on both the top and grass-roots levels toward a more sympathetic understanding of the Jewish D.P.'s. One night, at the request of General Heubner who had invited to his home the ranking officers of the European Command, he gave a lecture on Jewish history and Jewish problems; he interpreted for them the thinking, the needs and the emotions of the displaced Jews. Later he was to call this discussion the most interesting and important class of its type he had ever held in his life. It was an eye-opener for the generals because they did not possess even an elementary
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knowledge of Jewish life. At the same time Bernstein

commenced a vast orientation program utilizing the facilities of the Army newspaper, the Stars and Stripes, and other publications to help give the average G.I. an understanding of the Jews who were living in their midst. He contributed to this project personally by writing a series of articles, including a list of "Do's and Don'ts," for the military journal. As the result of this educational process every G.I. who went into Germany received some knowledge and briefing with regard to the Jewish D.P.'s. 146 Ultimately Bernstein recommended to General Lucius D. Clay, who succeeded McNarney as Theater Commander of the American Zone of Occupation in Germany in March, 1947, that a comprehensive program be designed to diminish the threat of anti-Semitism in Germany. In his report to Royall, he suggested an outline of the measures he felt should be taken.

1. Swift, severe punishment of offenders including German officials who indulge in anti-Semitic statements.
2. Public reassurances by top-level authorities concerning the rights of...Jews and their determination to safeguard them.
3. The setting up of a German committee representing the Church, press, education, labor, etc., which would initiate a German program against anti-Semitism.
4. A more intensive orientation of G.I.'s designed to counteract the influence of the Germans, particularly German girls, on the D.P. question.
5. An intensive orientation of Jewish D.P.'s by the American military authorities, they released the Army's

Jewish chaplains, the Central Committee of Liberated Jews and Jewish voluntary agencies in the policies and procedures of the U.S. Army. 147

Another area in which security problems were occurring was on train-runs from Austria to Germany which brought substantial numbers of Jewish persecutees fleeing from Poland into the American zone. In early August, 1946, McNarney had authorized General Clark, Commander of the USFA (United States Forces Austria), to transport 19,000 Jewish infiltrates to Heilbronn, Cham, and Landshut, three newly established assembly centers in the Theater Commander's zone. These camps were specifically created to handle the Polish emergency created by the Kielce incident. Initiated on August 22, 1946, this program was accomplished by permitting one train per day, carrying 1,000 Jewish refugees, to leave Linz and Salzburg in Austria. Unforeseen incidents had developed on these trips due largely to inadequate communication between the English-speaking American military personnel and the Yiddish-speaking Jewish D.P.'s. Sometimes the Polish Jews failed to obey orders as a result of the language barrier. Consequently Bernstein and his aides, Major Abraham Hyman and Chaplain Herbert Friedman, arranged for eight Jewish chaplains to accompany the special D.P. trains. These chaplains provided for both the spiritual and physical needs of the Jewish travelers. At the points of embarkation they explained in Yiddish the policies and procedures of the American military authorities; they related the Army's

contribution toward saving Polish Jewry; they journeyed with the people, sharing the two to three day hardships of their boxcar trips until they reached their destinations, and upon arrival, they helped to orientate their charges to their new camp life. ¹⁴⁸

In the realm of Jewish property restitution and indemnification, Bernstein played an extremely active role. Though as a Rabbi he did not have an adequate background to handle the complex legal problems involved in restitution; though the Jewish organizational leadership had given restitution serious consideration long before he came to Germany and probably had ideas and plans which they hoped ultimately to implement, it was Bernstein who initiated the action taken subsequently to protect Jewish legal rights. One day he went to Stuttgart where he was driven about the city. A companion showed him a beautiful house on a hill which he said had belonged formerly to a Jewish family which had been killed by the Nazis. Bernstein asked the man who it was that currently owned the property. The same German, he was told, the same Nazi who had gotten it earlier. This incensed the Jewish Adviser. He thought that the Nazis not only killed the Jews but still were keeping stolen Jewish property produced in him so strong a reaction that upon his return to Frankfurt he discussed the whole question of restitution with McMarney and several other prominent military officials, the State

and War Departments as well as the Jewish agencies. Then he asked the Theater Commander for permission to bring over a prominent Jewish attorney, someone who would represent the major Jewish groups, to act on the problem of restitution. Bernstein was surprised to find a good deal of resistance to his idea. It came not so much from McNarney as from his military advisers and the State and War Departments in Washington. There was something about the idea of a Jewish lawyer coming over and looking into things which these quarters seemed to think would lead to trouble. However, after various delays and difficulties and after the Jewish Adviser channeled his concern to the American Jewish groups who exerted pressure on the White House and on the State Department in Washington, an attorney by the name of Max Lowenthal was selected and approved unanimously by all parties.

Lowenthal, a prominent New York corporation and business lawyer who had formerly been associated with Judge Julian Mack and Robert Szold, had considerable experience with economic problems. He also had been the council for the Truman Commission when Harry Truman was a Senator investigating war and military expenditures. He came to Germany in the summer of 1946 and made preliminary investigations into Jewish restitution and indemnification on the basis of which further action was subsequently taken. Upon his arrival Bernstein spent considerable time with

Lowenthal, helping him with his orientation.

One of the American Army's primary responsibilities for the Jewish D.P.'s was, according to Eisenhower's directive of 1945, to provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care. This the Army proceeded to do, recognizing fully the special suffering the Jews had undergone at the hands of the Nazis.

The Jewish D.P.'s as members of the Persecutees group received a basic ration of twenty-two hundred calories. This was two hundred calories more than other categories of D.P.'s received....D.P.'s were housed in a variety of establishments. Some...were given fairly good German housing....Most lived in casernes, former German military posts. These were usually large, grim, dreary shacks of buildings but they provided solid shelter....Clothing was inadequate. The Army provided what they could out of captured enemy materials and surplus stocks. It gave cloth to D.P. tailor shops to manufacture garments.151

In their social service capacity the military authorities were ably assisted by the various secular, international relief organizations which either were in existence, or came into or out of existence in the years 1946-1947. Bernstein summarized his impressions of these agencies in his report to the Secretary of the War, Royall, in August, 1947, when he said:

UNRRA provided a necessary service with a reasonable degree of satisfaction. The Army was wise in utilizing this international civilian humanitarian agency to administer the [D.P.] camps. The Army had neither the preparation nor the personnel for this specialized function. At the height of activity, UNRRA had four thousand employees operating in Germany....Particularly in the field of operation the UNRRA service was good and helpful.

...In view of previous criticism, I wish to go on record as commending UNRRA for the performance of a good job under extremely difficult circumstances. I wish to add my impression that the military authorities were also appreciative of UNRRA's role and wished it to continue as long as possible. The late Mr. La Guardia, as Director General, was wrong in thinking that the Army desired to take over the functions of UNRRA in the summer of 1946. It was simply planning ahead in light of UNRRA's announced intention of retiring from the field at the conclusion of the year, 1946. From my conversations with General McNarney I know that he was eager to have UNRRA remain as long as possible.

I.R.O. [International Refugee Organization] was coming into the picture as I left [the summer of 1947]. It had neither the staff nor the funds to take over the major responsibilities as the Army hoped. As a result, the Army was continuing 152 to perform its principal functions for the D.P.'s.

After characterizing the secular relief agencies the Jewish Adviser informed Royall of his overall evaluation of the work of the Jewish relief organizations.

The need for supplementary services by Jewish voluntary agencies was recognized not only by American Jewry, which contributed the largest sums in the history of philanthropy, but also by the Army and UNRRA. The American Joint Distribution Committee steadily built up a program of usefulness, providing supplementary food and clothing, amenities and medicaments, educational and religious equipment, as well as immigration and other services. The Jewish Agency for Palestine not only participated in activities designed to prepare Jews for migration to Palestine, including the establishment of... agricultural training centers, but assumed responsibility for instruction in the camps. The children were given a Zionist orientation, which reflected the outlook and the wish of the camp communities. The Hebrew Immigration Aid Society [HIAS] offered various immigration services. The World Ort Union [ORT] conducted occupational training schools. The Jewish chaplains in the United States Army, who rendered yeoman service in the early days of liberation, continued to render special, though more limited, services as time passed. 153

The last organization which Bernstein mentioned in his report to the Secretary of War was the Central Committee of Liberated Jews. This was an agency, working with the army for the welfare and rehabilitation of Jewish D.P.'s in the United States Occupied Zone of Germany, of which the Jewish Adviser was particularly proud. Founded on June 15, 1945, through the initiative of Chaplain Abraham J. Klausner and the displaced Jews themselves, General McNarney had given the Central Committee official recognition on September 7, 1946. Bernstein was in part responsible for McNarney's decision. Throughout the summer of 1946, he had used all of his influence with the Theater Commander to make him realize the necessity of this act. Despite opposition of considerable proportions from the American military command in Germany to any decree which would give official legal status to the displaced Jews, Bernstein finally impressed the Army, the Jewish organizations and UNRRA with the argument that beyond what they could do for their charges there were many things which their charges could and should be doing for themselves. This line of reasoning, propounded by the Jewish Adviser, traveled far in official circles and eventually was accepted by McNarney.¹⁵⁴

Bernstein was extremely eager for the Central Committee to receive official recognition from the Army for several reasons. In the first place he considered the act to be

of historical significance. Now, in the very country in which Hitler had declared he would destroy Jewry forever, there was an organized, recognized Jewish community. Second, it was of enormous, positive value to give legal status to the Central Committee because it restored their faith in themselves. Though their recognition was limited in that Germany was a land of occupation and not a free country; though the Jewish D.P.'s were not technically free men but temporarily awaiting resettlement while under the care of the Army, they now had a feeling of conducting their own affairs. This was a great step forward. On an official level the Jewish D.P.'s, through the Central Committee, had an outlet for releasing their pent-up energy and frustrations to the Army. On the local level the Jewish D.P.'s democratically elected the members of their camp committees which in turn designated their delegates to regional committees and finally to the Central Committee of Liberated Jews, representing the inhabitants of all the D.P. installations.

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Despite the fact that the Central Committee of Liberated Jews was frequently the object of much adverse criticism, Bernstein felt that it rendered a remarkable service to the morale and life of the displaced Jews. He could not deny, of course, that some of the charges against the leaders of this organization were true. Occasionally the men whom the people elected to represent them were smart,

tough politicians who used their power to further themselves. In so far as they had partial economic control of life in the camps -- the Central Committee was permitted eventually to take over various phases of JOINT's and UNRRA's administrative and relief activities such as the distribution of food, clothing and general supplies -- unscrupulous individuals were able to profit in the black-market Germany economy. But when it is remembered, as Bernstein observed, that the black market was omnipresent in Germany at that time; that it was worse among the Germans than among any other group living in the land, criticism of the marginal illegitimate activity of a small percentage of the Jewish displaced persons was unjustified. On the whole, therefore, the Jewish Adviser considered the creation of and the legal recognition given the Central Committee of Liberated Jews to be a very constructive event.

After its official recognition on September 7, 1946, by McNarney, the Central Committee was to grow with amazing rapidity. Serving as spokesman for the D.P.'s interest it helped to handle tense situations that developed in the camps. When camp movements occurred, it interpreted Army policy to the D.P.'s. When mass demonstrations occurred, it interpreted the D.P.'s needs to the Army.¹⁵⁶ By 1947, Bernstein could write of the organization in The American Jewish Year Book that it had

a highly organized political apparatus which employed...about 1,000 persons in its various bureaus. At first the various committees were chosen, regardless of party affiliation. Most of the top leadership seemed to be of Lithuanian descent. In time, and reflecting the heightened Zionist tensions, party alignments played a greater role. At the Congress of Liberated Jews in February, 1947, the Central Committee was elected entirely on a party basis. The Zionist parties, reflecting the structure of Palestine politics, were: Hashomer Hatzair, both branches of the Poale Zion, Pechach, 158 Mizrachi, General Zionists, Revisionists and Aguda.

With the passage of time conditions in the D.P. camps tended to normalize. This led the displaced Jews to undertake remarkable cultural and religious programs. Frequently the people attended lectures and concerts given either by themselves or visiting celebrities. Often they established their own people's universities. Even theatrical groups were founded.

The Jewish Adviser indicated that not all of the people were interested in religion. In this respect they were very much like any normal community of Jews. Nevertheless religious institutions could be counted among the first creations of every D.P. camp. Usually these included synagogues, mikvahs and kosher kitchens.

Bernstein, throughout the period of his service to his people in Europe, was cognizant of the religious and spiritual needs of the Jewish D.P.'s. Out of his firm commitment to Judaism, the Rabbi cooperated with the many individuals endeavoring to establish an organization which would safeguard and distribute

substantial treasures of Jewish cultural objects which the Nazis had frequently preserved for their own foul ends. Men like Alfred Rosenberg -- one of the arch apostles of Hitlerian anti-Semitism who established and directed the so-called Research Institute on Jewish Problems (Institut zur Erforschung der Judenfrage), at Frankfurt am Main for the specific purpose of providing a pseudo-scientific basis for anti-Semitic propaganda -- had unwittingly enabled the Army to expropriate huge caches of Jewish religious books and cultural objects which the Office of the Military Government of the United States stored in the Offenbach am Main Archival Depot. Adviser Bernstein worked with the noted historian Salo W. Baron, chairman of the newly created Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, in distributing Torahs, prayerbooks and haggadahs not only to the Jewish D.P.'s but to other Jewish organizations throughout the world, including the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 159

At the same time the Jewish Adviser was approached with an important request from the Central Committee's bureau on educational and religious affairs, headed by Rabbi Samuel Snelg. Snelg, formerly a scholar at the famous Slobodka Theological Seminary in Lithuania which was destroyed by the Nazis during the war, told Bernstein of his plan to get the Talmud republished in Germany with the support of the German economy. This idea captured

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the Adviser's imagination, even though he knew he and the Jewish agencies would have to exert tremendous pressure on the Army to issue critically needed supplies of paper and printing originally budgeted for the Germans. The Talmud had been singled out as a special object of German venom and hatred. Now, if the American military authorities agreed to authorize its publication by the Jewish D.P.'s, Bernstein felt this would be a tremendous gesture to Jewish tradition. Not only would this act indicate a measure of spiritual justice, but it would be a reaffirmation of the Jewish spiritual will to live. Consequently he went to McNarney and got his official consent for the project. Arrangements were made for securing paper and printing. Technical implementation was offered by and accepted from the JDC, which played a major role in the entire process. Finally, on September 10, 1948, Snelg spoke for all the Jewish D.P.'s when he said,

We appreciate...the efforts of the Adviser on Jewish Affairs, Rabbi Dr. Philip Bernstein, of his assistants Chaplains Emanuel Rackman and Herbert Friedman, [and] of his executive officer Major Abraham Hyman who helped to bring our request to the attention of the military authorities....

...This is the first time in the history of Israel that a government has printed these holy books for the Jews. It is altogether fitting that it was the United States of America, the world's greatest democracy, who should do so.161

Chapter IX

Conclusion

On October 14, 1946, Rabbi Bernstein returned to Frankfurt from the United States to resume his duties as Adviser on Jewish Affairs to General McNarney and subsequently General Lucius D. Clay, Theater Commanders of the American Zone of Occupation in Germany. Though it is not within the purview of this thesis to elaborate on the many important details with which the Jewish Adviser was involved during the next ten months of his office, events of major significance will be briefly alluded to in the epilogue following this chapter.

Bernstein accomplished many things in his short one-month visit to the United States in mid-September and October. From the practical point of view, he arranged with his congregation for a prolongation of his European service. He explained to Temple B'rith Kodesh that he felt it was morally necessary for him to stay on his job in light of the pressing, unsolved problems created by the mass influx of Polish Jewish persecutees into the American zones of Germany after the Kielce pogrom. He even offered to renounce his salary from the Temple -- a congregation that, in his words, "had been neglected too long." ¹⁶² Bernstein encountered no problems. The members of Temple B'rith Kodesh understood fully what their Rabbi was trying to accomplish for their oppressed brethren. They also felt it was necessary that he stay.

on in Europe and try to complete his task.

After the conclusion of the High Holydays in early October, the Jewish Adviser went to Washington. In the nation's capital he had high level conferences with Acting Secretary of State Acheson and Assistant Secretary of State Hildring. He met with Secretary of War Patterson and Assistant Secretary of War Peterson. He conferred with Director General La Guardia of UNRRA. Bernstein presented all of these men, directly responsible for the United States policy in the Occupied Zones of Germany and Austria, with lengthy, detailed personal reports. He found them interested and willing to help improve the trying conditions of the Jewish D.P.'s in Germany. The State Department agreed to "inject a dynamic personality into the immigration program."¹⁶³

The climactic highlight of Bernstein's one-month visit home came when he was summoned to the White House "by the direct request of the President to Secretary Patterson. The President desired a first-hand report on the condition of the Jewish displaced persons."¹⁶⁴

For a half hour the two men talked with each other. Later the Jewish Adviser was to state that the President showed an "obvious concern over the [Jewish] problem and a sincere determination to help."¹⁶⁵

The following is a summary of their conversation which took place on Friday morning, October 11, 1946:

Bernstein: I wish to express appreciation for this opportunity to give you a direct report. If I had only another minute, I would use it to thank you, on behalf of the displaced Jews and the entire Jewish community, for the policy which kept the borders open for the victims of persecution, particularly in Poland.

Truman: I just can't understand this post-war persecution. Having suffered together at the hands of the Nazis, one would not expect any group to persecute another.

How are the displaced persons getting along? Are they getting good care?

Bernstein: On the whole, the health of the Jewish displaced persons is reasonably good. Their rations although adequate for survival, are limited and monotonous. In one camp, for example, which I visited recently, the menu consisted of the following:

Breakfast -- Bread, margarine, coffee.

Dinner -- A stew (sometimes with meat; most of the time without meat).

Supper -- Coffee, crackers and a small piece of cheese.

Truman: That is little enough. It should never be permitted to go below that.

Bernstein: As to housing, until recently the housing has been reasonably satisfactory, although spotty. However, the swift mass influx from Poland made it necessary for the Army to use some substandard housing. This has created some difficulties. However, I have been assured by the appropriate military authorities that these accommodations will be improved and made habitable over the winter. The Army is trying to do the right thing.

Truman: I am sure they will. I have instructed Secretary Patterson to do everything possible for these unfortunate people, and I have the fullest confidence in him. Now, what about the morale of the people?

Bernstein: They have not cracked under the strain. This is testimony to their character, resiliency, the

care they are receiving and the hope of resettlement in Palestine. I am afraid to think of what would happen if this hope were to be removed. I must add that they are becoming increasingly discouraged over the long delays in their resettlement. They see no need for all these investigations and conferences. They grow increasingly restive as they find themselves, so long after liberation, still in DP centers in Europe.

Truman: I am doing whatever I can toward their resettlement. I assure you I am not doing it for political reasons, as has been charged, but because of my sympathy for these people. Ever since I saw them in Germany and ever since Mr. Harrison's report to me [in 1945 Truman sent Earl G. Harrison, the United States representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, to Germany as his special emissary to report on the situation of the displaced persons and in particular the Jewish D.P.'s], I have been determined to help them. Immediately after the Harrison report, I recommended the resettlement of 100,000 Jewish displaced persons in Palestine. The British insisted that there must first be an investigation. I reluctantly consented and then, when the investigation was completed, it was found that the Commission [the Anglo-American Commission] made precisely the same recommendation that I did; namely, the movement of the 100,000 to Palestine. It was my judgment, and it is still my judgment, that the movement of these people does not need to await the long range political settlement. Now, Mr. Attlee is angry because I have said this again. But I still think they can be moved now without international complications.

Bernstein: I would have more faith in the sincerity of the British protestations if they were not attempting to block our program even for temporary resettlement in Europe of some Polish refugees.

Truman: And, yet, they have many excellent qualities, including their stubbornness. They were stubborn enough to hold off the Germans.

Bernstein: May I take the liberty of suggesting, Mr. President, that on this issue you must be equally stubborn. There are two inescapable facts:

1. Over ninety percent of these displaced Jews want to go to Palestine. They are tired of being pushed around. They insist upon starting life again

in their own land and on their own terms, despite hardships and dangers.

2. I am sorry to report that no government in Europe with whom I have dealt on temporary settlement projects is prepared to accept these Jews on a permanent basis.

Truman: I can't understand it. The Jews have been good citizens in the United States. I intend to ask Congress to liberalize our immigration laws so as to admit more of these people. These people would be assets to any country. I can't understand the attitude that the others take.

Bernstein: The world is sick, Mr. President. This is a symptom of it.

Truman: I believe you are right, Rabbi. The world is sick. 166

In his White House conference Bernstein had informed the President of the overwhelming desire and determination of ninety percent of the Jewish D.P.'s living in the American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria to be resettled in Palestine. This was not a haphazard guess; it was based on a realistic evaluation of the facts. In his official capacity as Jewish Adviser, he had not met a single displaced Jew who was anti-Zionist. Even those who planned to come to the United States to join relatives saw the need for the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine. 167 Hitler had convinced them of their ultimate need to be responsible for their own fate; the British by their shabby efforts to impede movement to the Holy Land had taught them to be suspicious of so-called friends; the international conferences and committees would the immigration laws be liberalized. Seventy-five

on refugees that met after the conclusion of the Second World War forewarned them of their unacceptable status in the eyes of the world, and even the United States, though it had reestablished its pre-war immigration laws, showed little willingness to liberalize its quotas so that large numbers of Jewish D.P.'s who were originally from East European countries could come to its shores. ¹⁶⁸

The Jewish Adviser had personally experienced the tragic refusal of the Christian nations to open up their doors to Jewish immigration. In his many dealings with the various governments of western Europe and the world, he inevitably found his attempts to resettle Jews rejected. Consequently, in innumerable articles and sermons he called attention to "the heavy burden of guilt [which] rests on the Christian conscience." ¹⁶⁹ This conscience "will have no peace until justice is done to the surviving Jews," he said. ¹⁷⁰ What he was calling for, of course, was that the Jewish survivors of Hitler's maniacal race policies now be given "an opportunity to work out their own destiny, to lift their heads as human beings and to rear their children in decent conditions...." ¹⁷¹ This feeling ultimately led Bernstein to conclude that only two realistic possibilities for immigration were open to the Jews -- Palestine or the United States. It was his firm conviction that twenty-five percent of the Jewish D.P.'s would choose to come to America, should its immigration laws be liberalized. Seventy-five

percent of the people, however, would still prefer to go
172
to Palestine.

In Bernstein's final official report as Jewish Adviser, he was to call attention once again to the urgency and justice involved in getting the Jewish D.P.'s out of Germany to a land of their own choosing. Thus he importuned Secretary of War Royall in making one last effort to fulfill what he had come to consider his primary responsibility to his people -- resettlement.

The opening of Palestine to large-scale immigration is indispensable to the solution of the D.P. problem. We will continue to face indefinitely the costs and the dangers of this unsettling situation in the heart of Europe until they are permitted to enter Palestine. It is hoped, therefore, that the U.S. Government, not only out of self-interest, for it carries the largest burden of responsibility for the D.P.'s, but also out of consideration for their suffering, needs and wishes, will give its support to such a solution of the problem of Palestine as will enable these displaced Jews to go there.173

Throughout his incumbency as Adviser on Jewish Affairs, Rabbi Bernstein rendered many notable contributions to the over-all welfare and status of the Jewish displaced persons. It is not possible to mention all of them. The day-to-day influence of his personal contact with tens of thousands of Jews who had lost everything they ever held of value -- their families, their friends, their homes, their possessions -- is incalculable. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to delineate some of the important

the same time he was instructed in diverting substantial

he bestowed upon his suffering people in 1946-1947.

First, as an official representative of American and world Jewry, he influenced the American Theater Command to treat the Jewish D.P.'s with respect. As their man in court, he not only protected their interests but he helped immeasurably to restore their dignity through his successful efforts to obtain legal status for their democratically elected body, the Central Committee of Liberated Jews.

Second, he initiated action in the Jewish property restitution and indemnification programs by bringing to Germany a qualified attorney representing American Jewish interests to make recommendations to the American military, the State Department and the War Department. This program was eventually to have tremendous beneficial effects on both the individuals who received restitution and on the State of Israel.

Third, he made an historic contribution by helping to keep open the borders of the American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria to over 100,000 Polish and East European Jews who were fleeing from anti-Semitic persecution and pogroms in their native lands. He accomplished this by building sympathetic attitudes in high American military and governmental circles despite substantial pressures to have the borders closed. At the same time he was instrumental in diverting substantial

numbers of infiltrates out of the American zones and into other European countries willing to accept them on a temporary basis.

Fourth, he interpreted the needs and desires of the Jewish D.P.'s to the Army, the American governmental authorities, and the American and World Jewish community. In this capacity he helped the displaced Jews to become the recipients of the largest fundraising campaigns ever undertaken up to that time.

Fifth, he contributed to the establishment of religious and cultural enterprises in the D.P. camps. These were deeply appreciated by the displaced Jews who had been cut off by the Nazis from all contacts with spiritual life for such a long time. He offered valuable assistance to the process which led to the publication of the Talmud.

Subsequently he reported to Hohenstein on the conditions of these camps. When, for example, at Herta and Pauline, the housing conditions were inadequate to protect the Jewish D.P.'s throughout the forthcoming winter, he recommended that these people be transferred to other camps with better accommodations.

Frequently the Theater Commander acted favorably on his proposals.

On January 25, 1947, Bernstein officiated at the bar mitzvah of his son Shimon in Frankfurt, Germany. It was the first such occasion held for a Jewish boy in

Due to the extensive documentation found in Rabbi Bernstein's files on the fifteen-month period in which he served as Jewish Adviser, the author has simply lacked the time to reconstruct many of the significant events of his life between October 14, 1946, and August 11, 1947, in great detail, if at all. I have thought it necessary, therefore, to outline briefly within the confines of this chapter several of the memorable highlights of his career which took place during these ten months. It is my sincere hope that future writers will one day treat these occurrences more fully, if indeed I am not privileged to do so myself.

1. Shortly after his return to Europe, from October 28, 1946, to October 30, 1946, Bernstein, in the company of Chaplain Friedman, made a field trip to many of the D.P. installations. Subsequently he reported to McNarney on the condition of these camps. When, for example, at Babenhausen, he found the housing conditions to be inadequate to protect the Jewish D.P.'s throughout the forthcoming winter, he recommended that these people be transferred to other camps with better accommodations.

Frequently the Theater Commander acted favorably on his proposals.

2. On January 25, 1947, Bernstein officiated at the bar mitzvah of his son Stephen in Frankfurt, Germany. It was the first such occasion held for a Jewish boy in

that city since 1940. The Jewish Adviser speaks movingly of this blessed event in his book, What the Jews Believe.¹⁷⁵

3. One of the toughest talks of Bernstein's life occurred on February 13, 1947, when he went to England for a conference with Britain's Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. Overcrowded conditions in the D.P. camps as a result of the vast numbers of newly added Polish infiltrates and because of the coldest winter in European history had reduced the morale of the Jewish D.P.'s to a new low. The Jewish Adviser hoped to influence Bevin to permit larger numbers of Jews to immigrate to Palestine. An interesting account of his impressions of this meeting can be found in his paper entitled, "Bevin Says No."¹⁷⁶

4. From March 31, 1947, to April, 1947, Bernstein met with authorities of the French government to see if he might persuade them to increase their Jewish D.P. transient visa quota, then fixed at 8,000.¹⁷⁷

5. In May, 1947, Bernstein and his aide Hyman made recommendations to the military authorities requesting that Army-UNRRA proposals to liquidate the Zellsheim D.P. camp be abandoned. Zellsheim was one of the first assembly centers created for the Jewish D.P.'s after World War II and had an extremely active camp committee and cultural life. It was felt, among other reasons, that the closing of this installation would have a disastrous effect on the morale of the Jewish D.P.'s.¹⁷⁸

not be moved from Vienna into the D.P. camps. The Jewish

6. At the request of the War and State Departments, Bernstein was flown to the United States on June 5, 1947, to testify before the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization in behalf of the Stratton Bill. This bill proposed that America admit 400,000 displaced persons -- Balts, Poles, Jews, Ukrainians and Yugoslavs -- over a four-year period. Despite Bernstein's eloquent testimony, the Stratton Bill was defeated. 179

7. In early July, 1947, Bernstein went to Vienna, Austria, to deal with some difficult problems which arose out of the build up of Roumanian Jewish infiltrates in that city. He tried to induce General Keyes, Clark's successor as the Supreme Commander of the American Zone of Austria, to transfer these Jews into his zone (Vienna itself was not in the Zone). Keyes refused Bernstein's request primarily on account of the Army's decree of April 21, 1947. The American military authorities issued this order which stated that no future infiltrates would be received in the D.P. camps or receive D.P. care -- though the borders were not closed to them -- because the United States Congress was imminently threatening to cut off their appropriation for the displaced persons. This actually occurred on July 1, 1947. At the same time UNRRA was being replaced by the I.R.O., whose resources were extremely limited. Consequently the Roumanian Jews, numbering slightly over 9,000 when Bernstein was in Austria, could not be moved from Vienna into the D.P. camps. 180 The Jewish.

Adviser personally visited these destitute infiltrates, fleeing from hunger and anti-Semitism in their native land, and described the appalling conditions under which they were living:

There were no facilities to take care of such numbers in Vienna. Our buildings were sufficient to maintain a total of two thousand and we already had eight thousand and they continued to come in over one hundred a day. They were sleeping three and four in a bed and in shifts. They were sleeping in corridors, in the alley ways, out in the yards. The lavatory facilities were utterly inadequate. All sorts of health and social problems were developing. 181

8. On August 7, 1947, just one week prior to his departure for the United States, Bernstein testified before UNSCOP (the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine). In his remarkable book, The Redeemers, Leo W. Schwarz dramatically captured the spirit of this moment:

The first session was held at the magnificent House of Art [in Vienna]. . . . Adviser Bernstein stated the case for the people [the Jewish D.P.'s]. Though not a full-chested orator, his powerful personality engrossed his listeners. He gave a thirty-minute presentation of the status, background and aspirations of the Shearith-Hapletah [the Saving Remnant], speaking not only as an adviser to General Clay but also as a rabbi and warm-hearted Jew, who identified himself with his people's plight and aspirations.

...All the delegates were busy making jottings in their notebooks. One of them noted: 'E. talks like Father Abraham pleading with the Lord not to destroy Sodom.' It was Bernstein's farewell gift to the people. Having welcomed his successor, Judge Louis E. Levinthal of Philadelphia, he flew to the United States to the bedside of his dying mother who held onto life by sheer will just long enough to be sure he was back safe. 182

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Footnotes

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2. Leo W. Schwarz, The Redeemers: A Saga of the Years 1945-1952 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953), pp. 43-44.
3. Ibid., p. 44.
4. The author has either directly quoted or drawn upon the following published sources in writing chapter II: Bernstein, The Jews of Europe (N.Y.: The Nation, 1943) [Reprint]; Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961); William L. Shirer, The Rise And Fall of The Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960); Heinrich Graetz, History of The Jews (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1956), Vol. III; Joseph Tenenbaum, Race And Reich: The Story of An Epoch (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1956); Solomon Grayzel, A History of The Jews: From the Babylonian Exile to the end of World War II (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1947); Jewish Ledger (Rochester, N.Y.), June 7, 1963.
5. Bernstein, The Jews of Europe, p. 26.
6. Hilberg, p. 3.
7. Shirer, p. 53.
8. Ibid., p. 141.
9. Ibid., p. 143.
10. Ibid., p. 142.
11. Ibid., p. 92.
12. Ibid., p. 94.
13. Ibid., p. 95.
14. Ibid., p. 96.
15. Ibid., p. 97.
16. Bernstein, "Addition to Rosh Hashona Sermons for talk at Eastman Theater [Rochester, N.Y.], Sept. 29, 1946" (Ms.), p. d.

17. Hilberg, p. 9.
18. Shirer, p. 91. (Chicago, Ill., Jan. 7, 1953.)
19. Hilberg, p. 9.
20. Ibid., p. 10.
21. Tenenbaum, p. 6.
22. Shirer, pp. 100-1.
23. Ibid., p. 102.
24. Ibid., p. 101.
25. Ibid., pp. 103-4.
26. Ibid., p. 104.
27. Tenenbaum, p. 10.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Shirer, pp. 86-87.
31. Ibid., p. 87.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Hilberg, p. 17.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 14.
37. Ibid., p. 16.
38. Ibid., p. v.
39. Bernstein, "Yes We Have No Bananas" (Ms., Sermon), Sept., 1947, p. 5.
40. Jewish Ledger (Rochester, N.Y.), June 7, 1963.
41. Ibid.

42. Hilberg, p. 16.
43. Jewish Ledger (Rochester, N.Y.), June 7, 1963.
44. "Address by Bernstein to Five Major Jewish Organizations, Biltmore Hotel, New York City, Oct. 1, 1946" (Ms.) p. 27.
45. Much of the material found in Chapter III, pertaining to Bernstein's early life, was recorded by the author in a taped interview with him at Rochester, N.Y., in August, 1964.
46. Bernstein, "Stephen S. Wise - Some Personal Recollections," C.C.A.R. Journal, April, 1963, p. 6.
47. Ibid.
48. Taped Interview with Philip S. Bernstein, Rochester, N.Y., August, 1964.
49. Bernstein, review of C.H. Voss's Rabbi And Minister, in Congress Bi-Weekly, June 15, 1964, p. 19.
50. Ibid.
51. "Northeastern Regional Chaplain's Conference, held at Henry Hudson Hotel, New York City, February 4, 5, 6, 1946," (Typescript), p. 720.
52. Congress Bi-Weekly, June 15, 1964, p. 19.
53. Temple B'rith Kodesh 1848-1948 (Rochester, N.Y., n.d.), p. 15.
54. Ibid.
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61. "Address by Bernstein to Five Major Jewish Organizations... Oct. 1, 1946," p. 27.
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64. Ibid., p. 1.
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73. Bernstein, Untitled Sermon (Ms.), Sept. 25, 1946, p. 4.
74. Ibid.
75. Bernstein, "Rosh Hashonah Message To My Fellow Jews," Sept. 14, 1946 (Ms.), p. 1.
76. Wahl to Grossman, July 22, 1946 (Ms., American Jewish Conference Memorandum on meeting with State and War Department on Border Situation), p. 1.
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79. Large portions of the material found in Chapter VI were taken from the author's taped interviews with Philip S. Bernstein at Rochester, N.Y., both in August and December, 1964. The author also utilized a transcript of a taped interview with Rabbi Bernstein

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81. Ibid., p. 5.
82. Bernstein, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, to Temple B'rith Kodesh, Rochester, N.Y., August 6, 1946, p. 1.
83. For the nature of Kenen's role, see Chapter III, pp. 49-50.
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85. "Address by P.S. Bernstein at McMarney Luncheon by 5 organizations, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York City, May 21, 1947" (Ms.), p. 1.
86. Ibid.
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88. "Article on Jewish Displaced Persons for the Palestine Year Book by Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, Temple B'rith Kodesh, Rochester, New York," 1947-1948 [7] (Ms.), p. 3.
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91. Ibid., p. 10.
92. "Address by Bernstein to Five Major Jewish Organizations... Oct. 1, 1946," pp. 16-17.
93. Bernstein to McMarney, August 2, 1946 (Ms., Memorandum on Poland), p. 7.
94. Ibid., p. 9.
95. Chapter VII relies to a considerable degree on data recorded by the author in taped interviews with Rabbi Bernstein at Rochester in both August and December, 1964. Dr. Bauer's transcribed tape was also very helpful in compiling material for this chapter.

96. "Final Report to...Royall," p. 1.
97. Ibid.; "Address by Bernstein to Five Major Jewish Organizations...Oct. 1, 1946" pp. 2-3.
98. Gringauz, "Untitled Address to Rochester Jewish community, 1947-1948 [7] (Ms.), pp. 1-2.
99. "Address by Bernstein to Five Major Jewish Organizations... Oct. 1, 1946," p. 18.
100. Though the word "exfiltration" does not technically exist in the English language, Rabbi Bernstein frequently used it to refer to illegal movement of the Jewish D.P.'s out of the American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria.
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112. Beckelman, Paris, France, to Bernstein, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Dec. 11, 1946, p. 1.
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