

F R E E D O M O F T H E W I L L

in

Talmudical Literature.

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| Sifre | Weber: Theologie, etc. |
| Mechilta | Tennant: Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin. |
| Tanchuma | Porter: Yezer tob and yezer hara in Rabbinic Literature. (Yale Studies) |
| Midrash Tehillim | Montifiore: Repentance in Rabbinic Theology (J.Q.R. Vol. XVI) |
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| Pesikta de R. Kahana | Hamburger Real Encyclopedia |
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I N T R O D U C T I O N .

The problem of free-will like the problem of "The poor is with us always". It has proved to be an unsolvable problem. There are, however, certain contentions for freedom which are taken as ~~✓~~ true, and equally as many against freedom which seem to be axiomatic. Philosophers in every generation arise and defend one or the other side of the problem with all their learning and ingenuity, yet their argument is little more than an emphasis of the well known arguments for one side at the expense of the arguments of the other, which are consciously or unconsciously overlooked. The problem is an old one; yet it is and probably will remain ever new. It is found in the literatures of all people. In Judaism it is found in the Bible, in Graeco-Jewish Literature, in Talmudic Literature and in the works of the Jewish Philosophers of the middle ages--in fact there is no phase of Jewish Literature from the earliest times until the present day in which the problem of free-will does not appear.

The problem is an important one for human conduct--in fact a man's ~~alt~~itude toward the most complex problems of human life depends upon his solution of the ubiquitous problem of "liberum arbitrium". From one point of view he may think himself a mere tool in the hands of the master-work man, or the result of accident, and circumstances having no more freedom to guide his destiny than has the nature-painted leaf at the mercy of the Autumn winds. Volitions, ideas, thoughts, character may be the inevitable outcome of circumstances, environment, and heredity, or they may be inexorably predetermined or predestined in every way, so that man becomes little more than an inanimate instrument in a great machine; goodness,

reward and punishment, and the like, ^{have} no meaning where there is no choice, and the incentive for human aspiration and achievement disappears. On the other hand, man may feel himself to be master over his own destiny, so much so as is the potter over the soft clay in his hands; he knows that there are difficulties, but he also knows that he can overcome them; he realizes that there are obstacles in the path of duty and achievement, but he also realizes that he has a will which can be directed against any barrier and come to his rescue in any emergency. These are the two sides, the obverse and the reverse of one and the same problem of human experience--the problem of the freedom of the will.

Theology must reckon with this problem when it postulates the Providence of God, His omniscience and prescience and other factors, which seem to have prescribed limits for man's conduct before he has come to the scene of activity. Philosophy must cope with the problem in various ways. For in ethics the basis and sanction for moral acts, and the meaning of duty and responsibility, and the like become mere verbiage rather than a dynamic power for action, if freedom is not a reality. These terms would then become mere figments of the imagination, if the choice of alternatives and the formation of habits and the mastery over the self are all predetermined. The problem is also metaphysical and cosmological in that a will that is free cannot easily be harmonized with the conception that causality and movement lie at the root of all existence; and psychology also is involved, for freedom depends upon an interpretation of volition and voluntary acts in general, which may or may not be compatible with the results of the scientist's analysis of voluntary actions.

The problem of freedom in Judaism differs very little, if at all, from the problem of freedom in general. The problem is thoroughly non-sectarian. The object of this thesis is to discuss the problem of the freedom of the will in Judaism, as it is found in Talmudical literature. This presupposes a knowledge and a discussion of the problem as found in Biblical and Graeco-Jewish literature, for the problem in Rabbinical or Talmudical literature is but an outgrowth of the problem in Biblical literature and verses from the Bible are taken as evidence to verify the contentions of the Rabbis. Though the problem of freedom in Talmudical Literature is closely and perhaps inseparably bound up with Biblical literature, which ought to be treated by way of introduction, yet the discussion of this thesis will be limited altogether to Talmudical Literature; the writer hopes some day to complete the study by beginning with Biblical Literature and bringing it down to modern times.

The problem of free-will presupposes the reality of such a thing as good, of such a thing as evil; furthermore presupposes in man a power to discriminate between the two, his desire for one or the other, and finally, power to put his desire into effect. All of these aspects of the problem are found, it will be seen, in Talmudical Literature.

No doubt there are some who would take exception to a treatment of a philosophical problem, as found in the Talmud. The Rabbis of the Talmud it is true were not philosophers. They had no systems of thought, such as are associated with the names of Plato, Spinoza and Kant. This need no proof even to one who is but slightly acquainted with Rabbinic Literature, yet this does not exclude the fact that they had philosophic notions. A "Weltanschauung" they had, and a "Weltanschauung" implies a philosophic outlook in at least

some sense of the word. The Rabbis of the Talmudic Period in Judaism do not agree on any particular world-view, though they have many elements in common. It would be as unnatural for them to agree as it would be for all philosophers in America in the twentieth century to agree. The Rabbis were individuals with individual experiences to color and influence their conceptions of life. The Talmud is a vast store house, which contains all of their views and we look for agreement equally as in vain as we would in America of today, when the realism of one school and the idealism of another, and the positivism of a third, and a pluralistic pragmatism of a fourth, all find advocates and opponents. Nor are we to expect that the Rabbis of one century or of one school had the same views any more than we should find this today, when a few years ago two good friends and colleagues of the largest American University held diametrically opposed views.

The Rabbis possess the distinctly human trait of differing with one another on important questions of theoretical import that have a direct bearing on human life. Whether or not their interest was primarily theological--which it no doubt was --or philosophical makes very little difference to us, Who are to look into and examine their words and produce, as clearly as possible, one phase of their weltanschauung--a phase which is both philosophical and theological -- the problem of the freedom of the will.

Owing to the fact that the Rabbis were looked upon as theologians rather than as philosophers, no attempt has so far been made to present the philosophical problems with which the hundreds of Rabbis from the third century B.C. to the fifth century A.D. busied themselves. Though theology differs from philosophy, the former is impossible without some sort of philosophical basis, conscious or un-

conscious. The object of this thesis is to present the problem of the freedom of the will as felt and taught and explained and grappled with by the various Rabbis extending over a period of eight hundred years. Each saying is given in the name of the Rabbi who lived within the period we have mentioned, though his words are found in a later collection. It is intended whenever brevity permits to quote the Rabbis' own words, which have been translated from the original, and permit them, as it were, to speak for themselves.

It was intended at first to give a strictly historical presentation of the problem, but this was abandoned in as much as the pros and cons of the problem of one century differ very little from that of another. If time permits a chapter devoted to an historical classification of the material that has been gathered for this work will be added. This will be divided into various periods: 1st-the pre-Tanaitic Period 300 to 30 B.C., 2nd-the Tanaitic - pre-Christian Period 30 B.C.--80 A.D., 3rd- the Tanaitic-Christian Period 80 A.D.-200 A.D., 4th-the Babylonian Amoraic Period from 200 to 500. 5th-The Palestinian Amoraic Period from 200 to 500. The object of this classification is evident; part two and three make possible to discern any influence due to the rise of Christianity, and part four and five made it possible to discern whether or not Persian dualism influenced the Babylonian Amora^u~~er~~ and the disputations with Christianity, the Palestinian Amora^u~~er~~.

The outline shows clearly the method of presentation to be followed in this thesis. The problem of freedom is to be presented from the point of view of philosophy and theology. We have made this the main point of division beco^{me}~~as~~ the methods of philosophy and theology are entirely different, in that philosophy attempts to prove

its contentious by syllogisms and scientific method, whereas theology is dogmatic and asserts and maintains and postulates what philosophy cannot prove. In many cases, such as faith, theology begins where philosophy ends. In dealing with the philosophical aspect of the problem it was thought best to consider it first from its cosmological point of view. Is free-will a cosmological possibility? How far were the Rabbis conscious of the problems that arise? Is there room for the freedom of the will? This involves both the natural and the theistic phases of both freedom and determinism. Under the natural phase such conceptions as natural law, causality, heredity and psychology group themselves; under the theistic phase of freedom and determinism as cosmological factors, we must consider the far reaching consequences of such ideas as omnipotence, omniscience, prescience.

But the philosophical phase of the problem of free-will is not exhausted by its cosmological considerations, because freedom after all is primarily an ethical problem. It becomes necessary then to weigh all the evidence and come to a conclusion as to how far free-will as a philosophical-ethical postulate is possible irrespective of what it may or may not be from a cosmological point of view. Is man a part of nature subject to the rigid and immutable laws of cause and effect or has he power to perfect himself. Can he turn from the evil of his ways and become good? Or if good can he become evil? Is the "Imitatio Dei" merely an illusion or an ideal that may in some measure be realized by man? Is man a responsible being and therefore worthy to be rewarded or punished or is he a puppet in the hands of a blind fate to which even God is subject? Is there a Providence guiding the destinies of man and the universe? These are questions which must be considered under the ethical aspect of freedom as a philosophic problem.

The theological aspects of the problem are somewhat simpler

in that the difficulties which philosophy is called upon to solve and prove are bridged over in theology by a dogmatic assertion or postulate. Theology may be non-philosophic and anti-philosophic. In our problem such conceptions or vicarious atonement, original sin, and the merit of the fathers,-- of which the latter two from the theological aspect of heredity--naturally group themselves ~~as~~ as non-philosophic while such conceptions as grace, and the Toray, (as a law which should harmonize with natural law), and predestination are clearly anti-philosophic.

As every shade of freedom and determinism are reflected in Rabbinic thought, it becomes our duty to point out which is the predominant thought, and to differentiate between the high-way of Talmudical thought on the subject and the by-ways, to see what represents the trunk of the tree of the problem of freedom of the will, and what represents merely its branches. Otherwise a conclusion of any kind would be impossible.

NATURAL-COSMOLOGICAL ASPECT.

Natural Law.

The Rabbis were not scientists, yet they made allowance for the reign of natural law in the universe, and realized that cause and effect are reciprocally inevitable. However these phenomena did not make as deep an impression upon the Rabbis as did other elements which are more directly connected with human conduct. The immutable laws of nature represented the expression of the Divine will, whose continuity and omnipresence could not be interfered with. The miracle therefore presented a problem, for the miracle interfered with the course of nature. Their solution was thoroughly theological rather than cosmological or scientific, in that they claimed that miracles such as the dividing of the Red Sea, the solstice at Gibeon, the Jonah miracle, etc., were all in accord with the Divine stipulation made before creation.¹ This made the miracles themselves a part of the unchangeable laws of nature.

Natural law limits freedom of the will, for it is beyond the power of man. This is true only from the cosmological point of view, for from an ethical point of view this above-and-beyond the power of man is not considered; man is free according to his mastery over, or submission to the powers that may be turned by his will. This cosmological limitation of the will finds brief expression in the typical statement. "Three keys are in the hands of the Holy One which he has not handed over to any of his messengers. The key to rain, (Deut.28:12), the key to the secret of life, (Gen.30:22) and

(1) Gen. R. Ch. 5 on Gen. 1:9. R. Jochanan P. Amora 3rd C. and others.

the key to resurrection (Ezek. 37:13)"¹ Death also according to some Rabbis is beyond the power of man. We have the interesting statement of Resh Lakish: "Death also comes to the righteous in order that the wicked should not say 'why do the righteous live'? It is because they do good. Now we too shall do good and live forever'." ² This is a clear recognition of a cosmological limitation of man's freedom for ^{his} contrary to the idea found more frequently in Talmudical literature to the effect that God decrees and the righteous annul it. We have here a statement which deals with natural law, which makes no distinction between righteous and wicked; a flood will drown a prophet as easily as a rat.

Man's freedom also has physical limitations, and the Rabbis become rather theological in their expression of this idea. "Six organs serve man; three of which are in his power and three of which are not. Eye, ear and nose are not in his power, for he must see, hear and smell, what he does not wish; mouth, hand and foot, moreover, are in his power, for with his mouth he may speak on learned subjects, and if he wills, scold and degrade; with his hand he can accomplish good deeds, but he can also if he wills, steal and kill; with his foot he can go to the theatre and circus, but he can also if he wishes visit the assemblies (of learned men) and schools."³

HEREDITY - "The Sins of the Fathers".

Heredity as a fact of natural law was for the most part unknown to the Rabbis of old. This will become evident in the Chapters devoted to the discussion of the good and the evil inclinations, original sin, and the merit of the fathers, in which, all that we mean by heredity, including atavism and the like are construed theologically by the Rabbis. Heredity, therefore, as an obstacle -- an overtowering obstacle to the freedom of the will was never touched

upon by the authors of Talmudical literature. The possibility of

(1) Taanith 2 ab. R. Tachanan P. Amora 3rd C.

(2) Yalkut to Job 895

(3) R. Levi P. Amora 3rd C. Gen. R 67 to Geh. 27:33; Tan.(B) Toledoth 21.

12.
being dragged down because of physical traits inherited from the fathers never finds expression in the literature with which we are dealing. When they spoke of "The sins of the fathers" they meant something altogether different from that which the phrase conveys to us.

"The father's shall not be put to death for the children," etc. What does this teach? That the fathers should not be killed because of the guilt of the children and the children should not be killed because of the guilt of the fathers. *'Every man shall be put to death for his own sin'*, The words 'the fathers shall not be put to death for the children' signifies, upon the testimony of (their) children and the words 'the children should not be killed because of the fathers' means upon the testimony of the fathers. 'And children shall not be killed because of the sins of the fathers' yet it says in Ex. 20:5; 'visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children', this is the case when with their own hands they hold fast (follow) to the work of the fathers as was taught in Lev. 26:39. 'In the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them'. This is as soon as they cling to the works of their fathers, you say as soon as they cling to the works of their fathers --- for Deut.24:16: 'Every man shall be put to death for his own sin'-----
How about it when they do not cling to it? Does not Lev.26:37 apply? 'And each one stumbles for his brother', i.e. each one for the guilt of his brother, and that teaches, that all are responsible for one another. Yet it deals with a case where they were [empowered] in a position to hinder (sins) and they did not do it?¹ The fact that the idea that the sins of the children should be visited upon the fathers, was made parallel to the idea of "the sins of the fathers

(1) Ber. 7^a San. 27^b. R. Jochanan in name of R. Jose 2nd C. Tana
Parallels and variations found Pesikta (K) 167^b - 168^a
R. Abahu P. Amon 3rd C.
Mechilta to Ex. 20;5-6; Sifra 112^b.

are visited upon the children" shows how little of natural law and heredity they had in mind when they used these words. Their whole purpose here was to save the conception of the freedom of the will. In this light only can we understand the explanation that the "sins of the fathers are visited upon the children only when they hold fast to (as a result of choice) the actions of their fathers". This same motive underlies the statement of R. Jose bar Chanina: "Moses formulated four institutions and four prophets arose and annulled them ----- (among them) Moses said: 'God visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children' (Ex. 34:7) and Ezekiel came and annulled it by saying: 'The soul that sinneth, it shall die' " (Ezek. 18:2)¹ The Rabbinical treatment of heredity, then rather than limit and prescribe bounds for the freedom of the will, has just the opposite effect, for by ignoring or mere overlooking the real issue they give to freedom a nearly unrestricted field of activity.

(1) Maccath 24^a; Mid. R. Num. 19 (end) P. Amora 3rd C.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT.

Though Psychology has been a science but fifty years, the principles of psychology were known to, and applied by the Rabbis of old. This becomes clear in their appreciation of habit as a factor of human conduct, and in the allowance they were prepared to make for it. There is hardly an aspect of habit that has been treated by modern psychology, with the possible exception of the physiological aspect, that the Rabbis of old did not comprehend and comment upon in their simple and naïve way.

Growth of Habit.

All habits, whether good or bad, grow; at first they seem and are insignificant and can be changed with but little effort, but after they are deeply rooted, this becomes almost impossible. In striking contrast to the technical language in which statements of this kind are usually clothed, the Rabbis speak in language simple enough for a child to comprehend, yet they do full justice to the subject: "at first", say various Rabbis from the second to the fifth century, "the evil inclination is like the thread of a spinning wheel (some say like a spider's web), finally, however, it becomes as strong as the cable of a ship".¹

Habits are easily formed; this is especially true of bad habits. "At first the evil inclination (is called) appears as a wanderer, then as guest and finally, as master of the house", based on 11Sam. 12:14.² "The evil inclination is sweet in the beginning but

(1) R. Akiba 2nd C. Tana Gen. R. 22,
R. Asi 3rd C. P. Amora Succ. 52^a,
R. Abin 5th C. B. Amora (sura) Ter. Sabb. 14c; Lev. R. 16⁸

(2) Raba. B. Amora 4th C. Succ 52^b; R. Isaac P. Amora 3rd C. Gen. R. 22.

bitter in the end, the way of virtue appears to man full of thorns but finally becomes even and smooth," ³ "If a man has committed a sin and repeats it, it then appears to him as if he had a license to do it." ⁴ R. Berachja, interprets Ps.32:1 to mean: "Happy the man who is above his sins, whose sin is not above him (i.e. not stronger than he is), for it says 'sin croucheth at the door'. It is not written *חטאת לי כבדת* but *חטאת לי כבדך* ; at first the evil inclination is as weak as a woman, but it grows and becomes as strong as a man" ⁵ It is therefore easy to understand the famous saying of Ben Azzai: "run to do even a slight precept and flee from transgression, for every virtue causes another virtue and every transgression another transgression" ⁶ Hence, "He who indulges his inclination ^{in his youth will have his inclination} (become so habituated so as to) rule over him in his old age, for Pr. 29:21, 'He that delicately bringeth up his servant from a child shall have him become his son at length'." ⁷

Formation and Cultivation of Habit.

Professor James laid down the following principle in regard to the formation and cultivation of habits: "In the acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving off of an old one -----never suffer an exception to occur till the new habit is securely rooted in your life." ⁸ The same thought was given various forms of expression

(3) Tan. to R'eh; R.Abin B. Amora (Sura) Jer.Sabb.4^c, and Lev.R.16.

(4) R.Huna B.Amora 3rd ^c Yoma 86^b; R.Ula.P.Amora 3rd^c Kidd.40^a.

(5) R. Berachya P.Amora Gen.R.22 (in name of R.Simeon B.Ami 3rd^c)

(6) Aboth 4:2 (2nd C.Tana)

(7) R. Abin, B. Amora 5th^c Gen. R. 22; R. Jonathan, Succ. 52^b.

(8) James: Principles of Psychology.

by the Rabbis. "It was taught that R.Meir said: 'great is repentance, for if a single person does repent, the whole world is forgiven' (see Hosea 14⁵) who is such a one? R. Jebuda said: 'The one who has the opportunity to sin once, or twice and he overcomes it happily; however it must be the same woman, the same time and at the same place.' ⁹ If a man had an opportunity for one particular sin, once or twice and did not sin, then he will never commit it for 1 Sam. 2:9. "God guards the feet of his righteous ones." ¹⁰ "Continuity of training", maintained James, ¹¹ is the great means of making the nervous system act infallibly right". R. Simai a Tana of the second century expressed this same thought and give a Biblical sanction for it." In reference to Hosea 14:1: 'Oh Isreal return unto the Lord thy God, for thou hast stumbled by thine iniquity', The Rabbis remark that it is to be compared to a huge rock that was placed on the cross ways, on which men used to stumble; whereupon the king said unto them: 'Clip it off little by little until the hour comes when I shall remove it altogether.' ¹² The "Rock" here is clearly the habit of wrong doing and the "king" is God who asked man to diminish his wrongful acts, and man's freedom is invoked and is to become effective through reiterated action.

This continuity of training for any purpose, good or bad is given an interesting turn in connection with the "hardening of Pharaoh's heart," which in the Bible seems to point to a plain case of predestination. In commenting on the verse: "But God hardened the heart of Pharaoh", the Rabbis says: "When God saw that the first five plagues did not bring him to an improved state of mind, he said that Pharaoh may from now on persist in it, except if he repent, in order that God may punish him with full justice, 'As God spoke to Moses

(9) Yoma 86^b (2nd C.)

(10) Yoma 38^b R. Schila B. Amora 3rd C; Ter. Peah 1^a in the name of R. Isaac.

(11) Principles of Psychology

(12) Pesikta (K) 165^a; another version Num.R.15; Tan.(B) 4. R.Simai, Tana Yolkul to Hosea Ch. 14 (532 end)

and it says 'I will permit Pharaoh's heart to become hard'. R. Ismael expressed the same idea somewhat differently by saying: "Sin makes dull the heart of man, as Lev. 11:43 says: 'Ye shall not make yourselves abominable ---- neither shall you make yourselves unclean with them'----- Do not read אֲנִי קָדוֹשׁ 'And ye will be made unclean', but אֲנִי דוֹשׁ 'and you will become dulled.' "R. Pinchas express a similar idea more briefly by saying: "He who is confirmed in transgressions (*that is* he who is an inveterate sinner) cannot repent and there is no forgiveness for him." 13 ?

Results of Habit.

Though the acquisition of habits and the cultivation of them are a matter of choice and tend to enlarge one's volition and to strengthen it, yet the results of habit tend to detract from man's freedom. This does not imply that he can not become or remain good, but it simply means that a certain amount of inertia comes into play: if a man is accustomed to do what is right, he becomes less free to do what is wrong than one whose actions have been evenly balanced, and *vica versa*. "The wicked are in the power of their hearts, (Ps 14:1; Gen. 27:41; I.K. 12:26; Est 7:6.) but the righteous have their hearts in their power" 14 (1 Sam. 1:13; 27:1; Daniel 1:8) The statement is written with the supposition that righteousness and self-mastery are inseparable. Though another Rabbi follows the principle we have stated above, more closely and defines righteousness and wickedness in terms of habit. "All men are divided into three classes: the righteous who are under the rule of the good impulse (Ps 109:22 "My heart is wounded within me" i.e. my 'yezer' is slain); the wicked who are ruled by the evil

(13) Ex. R. 11 to Ex 9¹² ? ?

(14) Tana 2nd C. Yoma 39^a (Similar ideas in Mechilta 98^a; Sifra 35b; Sifra 91d.)

impulse (Ps 36:2 "Sin speaks to the wicked" etc) and a middle class ruled now by one and now by the other" (Ps 109:31 "Those who judge their soul" i.e. the two inclinations) ¹⁵ we may become in the language of Goethe "accomplices of our own destiny", the accessories of our own deeds before the fact, for "as long as the righteous ~~to~~ the will of God they acquire strength and power to perform further acts of righteousness ¹⁶ This is a naïve expression for the psychological process known as the "inertia of habit", and not as it may appear or first thought an appeal to a shallow rationalization of a theological idea. The mere doing of a thing help to establish a habit, for "A man should always busy himself with the Torah and the fulfillment of commands, even if not the result of pure intention (i.e. for the thing itself) for through the mere doing, even if it be not for the thing itself, at first, he will finally come to the point where he will do it out of pure intention" ¹⁷ This is clearly also the meaning of R. Eleazar G. Azariah's famous dictum: "To what may he whose wisdom exceed his good works be compared? To a tree whose branches are many but whose roots are few, and the wind comes and plucks it up and overturns it upon its face, as it is said, And he shall be like a lonely juniper tree in the desert, and shall not see when good cometh; but shall inhabit the parched places in the wilderness, a salt land and not inhabited", (Ter. 17^b) but he whose works exceed his wisdom to what may he be compared? To a tree whose

(15) Yalkut. Gen. 8 ²⁵; Gen. R. 34 to Gen. 8:21.

(16) R. Jose Galilean 2nd R. Tana Ab, J.R.N. 32, Ber. 61^b Yq1 to Ps36

(17) Yalkut to lamentations. Also R. Chanina T 1st C. Pesek (K) 166^a P. Amora Ex. R 12 to 91³ 3rd and 4th C.

branches are few, but whose roots are many, so that even if all the winds come and blow upon it cannot be shaken from its place, as it said: "And he shall be like a tree planted by streams of water that spreadeth out its roots into the river" etc." 18 For "wisdom" here represents the theoretical side or knowing what ought to be done, while "works" on the other hand represent the practical side as to what has been and is being done. The question here is whether or not one is free according to one's theory of right or wrong. And the answer is that one's theoretical freedom is limited or enlarged by one's habit of action depending upon whether theory and practice were out of harmony or in harmony.

The inertia of habit is so well recognized that it became a factor in the Rabbinical theory of retribution. If one had been altogether pious all his life and at the very end became rebellious he deprives himself of earlier reward, for it says in Ezek. 33:12 'The righteousness of the righteous will not save him in the hour of his falling away', and similar to this is the case of a completely wicked person, whose whole life was filled with sin and who at last repents; his earlier wickedness will no longer be remembered for it says in Ezek. 33:12 'And the wickedness of the wicked' etc., etc.," 19 The reward is greater when a person triumphs against the whole course of his past life for good and the punishment is sever^{er} when he turns his back upon the whole course of his past life for evil, for it is comparable to swimming against the current. So well recognized is the power of habit.

The inertia of habit brings victory or defeat depending upon its own past. For a good habit no evil is too great to conquer and for a bad habit no evil too small to bring it to defeat. There are many parallels to the following passage which is illustrative of the principle we have first stated. "The mourning in Zech. 12:12 was

(18) ~~Sota~~ 47^a R. Jehuda in name of Rab. P. Amora 3rd C. } ?
 (19) Aboth 3 Tana 1st C.

said by some to be for the Messiah ben Joseph, who was slain; by others for the evil inclination that was slain. ~~Why~~ should there be mourning and not rather joy when the evil inclination is slain? R. Juda b. Ilai said: 'Therefore in the time of the Messiah the Holy One will bring the evil inclination and slay it before the face of the righteous and the wicked. It will seem to the righteous like the high mountain, to the wicked like a hair. Both will weep. The righteous will weep saying: 'How were we able to conquer this high mountain'? The wicked will weep saying: 'Why were we not able to conquer this hair'? And the Holy One also will be astonished with them, according to Zech. 8:6 'Also in my eyes will it seem wonderful' " 20

But one aspect of the psychological phase of freedom closely to that habit remains to be treated, and that the psychology of suggestion. We shall quote typical example. "When a man sees that his 'Yezer' has the mastery over him, he should go to a place where he is not known, clothe himself in black, veil himself in black and do that which his heart desires (secretly) and not profane the name of Heaven openly. This applies only to one who cannot bend his yezer, not to one who can.²¹ The idea in the mind of one who is responsible for a statement of this kind, is clearly influenced by the power of suggestion. This is due to the fact that a sin committed publically is often equivalent to a sin committed presumptuously, and at the same time becomes more deeply ingrained by virtue of the fact

(20) .Succa 52^a, Tana 2nd C.Gen. R 48:11; 89:1; Ex.R.41:7; 46:4; Num. R. 17:6; Deut. R. 2:30; 6:14 Pesik.(R) 29^a.

(21) Chaggigah 16^a, Kidd. 40^a; San. 74^a; M.K. 17^a, R. Ilai the Elder, Tana, also Abahn P. Amora 3rd C.

that everyone knows it. To retract becomes more difficult under such conditions, and the power of freedom to change one's reputation and the course of one actions less potent.

Habit then as a psychological factor does not prevent the freedom of the will, though it does somewhat infringe upon it. A habit formed and fixed for good makes a human being less free to do evil and a fixed habit for evil makes one less free to do good than if there were no habit and one's past was evenly balanced ^{between} intermittent good and evil actions. But all this is merely pointed out by way of admonition that one should control one's actions before they have become fixed habits and mould them while they are still as thin as thread and not as thick as rope. But even if a habit has been formed it can be broken and a new one formed by reiterated action. Though habit impairs freedom, it does not limit a man's free-will for he has the power to be master over his habits, and though "sin croucheth at the door", he can and he should conquer it.

REALITY OF 'YEZER TOB' AND 'YEZER HARA' AS PRECONDITIONS
OF MORALITY.

The good and the evil inclinations (the "yezer tob" and the "yezer hara") may be looked upon as two faculties of the soul, active for and against the freedom of the will. As such they have been classified under the psychological phase as a natural cosmological aspect of the philosophical consideration of our problem. However, there is hardly a phase of the whole problem of the freedom of the will with which some aspects of the "yezer tob" and the "yezer hara" are not coextensive. This is true of the smallest details of both the philosophical and theological aspects of the problem. Classifications of any kind for the sake of clarity and convenience must be more or less arbitrary, and we treat the good and the evil inclinations here, because it is primarily psychological. This portion of our discussion naturally divides itself into four parts: 1st The existence of both the good and the evil inclinations as preconditions for morality; 2nd, The nature, function and purpose of the inclinations; 3rd, May the evil and good inclinations be mastered? 4th, The ways in which the inclinations may be mastered.

The existence of both good and evil impulses, or rather impulses for good and evil, is a precondition for moral speculation. If one could not commit a wrong, a command to do right would be as superfluous as a command to obey the laws of gravity. A natural law must be obeyed, a moral law may be obeyed. Obedience in the sphere of morality is a matter of choice, and choice involves alternatives. These alternatives grow out of the very nature of man; according to

the literature of the Talmud. Man is the possessor of an inclination for good and an inclination for evil. "Why is **יצר** written with two 'yods'?" asks R. Nachman b.R. Chsida. "That points to the good and the bad 'yezer'; were the animal endowed with both, it would be endowed with fear and die when it would behold the knife for slaughter in the hand of man. Man Alone possesses both impulses."¹ "Man is duty bound, says another Rabbi," to bless God for the evil as well as for the good 'yezer' for we read in Deut. 6:5. 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart' etc., etc.,

לבבך with two letters **ב** means with thy two inclinations the 'yezer tob' and the yezer hara."² Man is a moral being because he must choose between alternatives, not so with the angel or the animal "Angels have no evil inclination and are therefore spared from jealousy, covetousness, lust and other passions, but those who dwell below are under the temptation of the evil 'yezer' and therefore require a double guard of holiness to resist it. It is to be compared said R. Berachya in the name of R. Levi to an Isrealite and a priest, who were epileptics, an experienced physician came to them and prescribed for the Isrealite and paid no attention to the priest whereupon the priest spoke to him: 'Why do you prescribe for the Isrealite and leave me out of consideration?' The physician answered: 'Because the Isrealite has need to go among graves, but you do not, therefore, I prescribe for the Isrealite and not for you So also the higher spirits! Because no evil inclination is present in them, only one word is needed for them (**מאמר** Dan. 4:14) but with those below (human beings) The evil inclination is present, therefore it is in need of impressive words (or two words: root **מכ** used twice in Lev. 21:1) and may they ever conquer." ³ *Abaye, a*

- (1) 4th C. Pal. Amora Gen. R. 14 (to 27) Ber. 61^a,
 (2) Mish. Ber. 9:5 also Sifra to Deut. 6:5, Tanaitic,
 (3) Lev. R. 26; Gen. R. 48; Lev. R. 24; Sabb. 89^a.

Babylonian Amora of the fourth century has the statement which briefly shows man to be a moral being by virtue of the existence of both inclinations. "The man who is greater than his contemporaries ^{finds that} his inclination is also greater."¹ Rabbis of all periods join in calling the 'yezer hara' evil. "Evil is the 'yezer hara' for even its creator called it evil, for 'the inclination of a man's heart are evil from his youth'"² The evil inclination is synonymous with Satan and the Angel of death. R. Simeon b. Hakish, a Palestinian Amora of the third century and many others say "Satan, the evil 'Yezer' and the angel of death are one and the same".³ Evil is not only a temporary reality but as permanent, as good and coextensive with life itself. "Every day a man's 'yezer' renews itself against him for 'the imaginations' etc. Gen. 8:21".⁴ Though the existence of evil is a precondition of morality many Rabbis say that God regrets having made the evil inclination. "I regret (says God) that I have so created them with the evil 'yezer' in man alongside of the good 'yezer', for if I had not created the evil 'yezer' in him he would not have rebelled against me."⁵ Yet there are many passages which indicate that the world could not exist without the evil 'yezer'. We shall consider these under the caption "the purpose of the evil 'yezer'". The Rabbis lay more stress on the existence of evil than they do on the existence of the good, which they take for granted. This unconscious testimony speaks more eloquently than words. Furthermore, evil is impossible without good; either both exist or neither exists.

(1) Succ. 52^a

(2) Ex. R. 30 to 22:1 R. Simeon Tana; Gen. R. 34; Num. R. 13, R. Chya, P. Amora 3rd C; Kidd 30^b; Gen. R. 34 to 8:21 R. Jose P. Amora 3rd C.

(3) B.B. 16^a.

(4) R. Isaac Tana 2nd C. Kidd. 30^b.

(5) Gen. R. 27 R. Abo P. Amora 4th C; Chana b. Acha & Rab. Succ. 52^b. Ter. Taaneth 66^a, Pinchas b. Yair Tana 2nd C.

NATURE, FUNCTION AND PURPOSE OF 'YEZER'.

The nature, function and purpose of the evil 'yezer' can be gathered from the various names it has been called. Contrary to Shakespeare's idea, we find that there is much in a name. "The evil 'yezer' has seven names. The Holy One, blessed be He, called it 'evil' (Gen. 8:21); Moses called it 'uncircumcised' (Deut. 10:16); David called it 'unclean' (Ps. 51:12); Solomon called it fiend (or enemy Pr. 15:31); Isaiah called it 'stumbling block' (Isa. 57:14); Ezekiel called it 'stone' (Ezek. 36:26); Joel called it 'the hidden one in the heart of man' (Joel 2:20)"¹ In another passage it is pictured or the "spoiler" sparing none.² And it is also known as a "foolish old king who accompanies man from his earliest youth to his old age, to whom all the organs of man show obedience".³ And R. Abin compares it to a "strange God". "What does Ps. 81:10. 'Let there be no strange God within thee, and do not fall prostrate before a strange God' mean? What strange God is in the body of man? It is none other than the evil 'yezer'!"⁴ It is also compared to a robber. Rabbi Jehuda ha-Nasi said: "the evil yezer' may be compared as follows: 'Two men enter a hostelry and one of them was seized for robbery. When asked for an accomplice, he said that he had one, though he could easily have denied it, yet he did so in order to implicate his companion and make him share his fate. This applies to the evil 'yezer'; it is not satisfied with the destruction of the soul, it also destroys the body."⁵ The evil 'yezer' is treacherous

(1) Succa 52^a R. Joshua b. Levi P. Amora 3rd C.

(2) Pesikta (k) 80^b.

(3) Mid T. 9:5 Also Ecc. R. to 4:13-14.

(4) Sabb. 105^b; Jer. Nedarim 41^b.

(5) Ab. b. R. Nathan 16.

as many passages testify. R. Joshua b. Levi basing his remarks on Pr. 16:7 says that the enemy refers to the evil 'yezer'. "If one lives with his neighbor two or three years they become friends, but the evil 'yezer' lives with man from his earliest youth and will destroy him even in his seventieth or eightieth year if it finds an opportunity or is proved by Ps. 35:10¹.

The evil 'yezer', however, serves a good function. "In explaining the verse, 'and behold it was very good' (Gen. 1:31) Rabbi Samuel b. Nachmani refers 'behold' to the good 'yezer' and 'behold' to the evil 'yezer'. Is the ~~evil~~ ^{evil} 'yezer', then, very good? Certainly, for without it man would not build a house, nor marry, nor beget children nor engage in trade, as it says in Ecc. 4:4. 'Then I saw all labor and every skillful work, that for this a man is envied of his neighbor'.² The evil yezer here clearly refers to passion. The purpose of the evil 'yezer' is to increase the reward for those who overcome it. "I (God) have created the evil 'yezer' in order that people may receive reward for overcoming it."³

HAS MAN POWER TO OVERCOME THE EVIL 'YEZER'?

The Rabbis speak of overcoming the 'evil' yezer rather of overcoming the good 'yezer', for their ethical conscience had interest in the good rather than in the fact as to whether the yezer as such could be overcome. Furthermore the Rabbis always imply and take for granted that the good can all too easily be changed into evil. The Rabbis believed that the evil yezer can be overcome and quote examples from history to substantiate their belief. R. Eleazar

- (1) Gen. R. 54; similar statement by Samuel b. Nachmani P. Amora 3rd and 4th C., in Mid. T. 34:2; also by R. Tanchuma bar Marjon who compares it to a Roman dog. Gen. R. 22 on Gen. 4:6.
- (2) P. Amora 3rd and 4th C. Gen. R. 9 on Gen. 1:31; Ecc. R. to 3:11. Also Yoma 69^b-70^a.
- (3) Jer. Berachath 14^b.

said: "Abraham, our father made the evil 'yezer' good, as it is said: 'And thou shalt find his heart faithful before thee'." "But David," according to R. Acho, "could not withstand it and therefore he killed it in his heart, as it is said 'and my heart is slain within me.'"¹ Abraham is also made the conqueror of the evil 'yezer' by R. Abba b. Kahana: "The evil 'yezer' is like a robber standing at the cross roads, and as often as a timid wayfarer goes by, he says: 'Give me what you have with you'. A clever wayfarer goes by. When the robber realized that he could not procure anything from this one, he began striking him and knocking him to the ground. Similar to this is the evil yezer, who destroyed so many generations like the generation of Enoch, the confusion of languages, the flood until finally Abraham arose, who knowing the impotency of the robber, began to strike him and throw him to the ground, as Ps. 89:24." The Rabbis in general assume that the yezer can be overcome. The following quotation is typical: In interpreting Ps. 50:23 R. Joshua ben Levi said: "He who sacrifices his 'yezer' and makes confession upon it, Scripture reckons it to him as if he had shown God double honor, in this world and in the world to come".² R. Chama bar R. Chanina admonishes man to be master over his yezer: "If man has to make a goad to direct the animal (which he uses for the purpose of plowing, etc.) how much more should he be careful to use the goad for the purposes of directing his yezer, which can by seduction remove him from this world and the world to come."³ Just as one's enemy may be turned into a

(1) Gen. R. 22 to 4:6. P. Amora end of 4th C.

(2) San. 43b; Lev. R. 9:1

(3) Lev. R. 29; Ecc. R. 2:11, P. Amora 3rd C.

friend, so the evil 'yezer' may be turned into a good one, claims R. Simeon b. Eleazer. "The evil 'yezer' is like iron; from iron one may make all sorts of vessels, if only he cast it into the fire. Likewise one may make the evil 'yezer' useful by the words of the law. This is proved by Pr. 25:21 'If thou soothe thine enemy (the yezer) with bread and water (the law) God will make him thy friend.'¹ In the struggle of the good yezer against the evil one (see Pesikta (k) 158^a and Ber. 5^a) man is not to play the part of an idle spectator. It is not only his duty to help the good 'yezer' and save him from his opponent, but he should also make an effort to establish the kingdom of the good 'yezer' over the evil one. Said R. Abba b. Jeremiah in the name of R. Meir: "Blessed is the man that considereth the poor' (Ps. 41:2) The poor is the good 'yezer' in man which is poor and weak over against the evil 'yezer'. Blessed is he who makes the good yezer rule over the evil one."² This same thought is brought out in an interesting legend told about the Saint Abba Tachna³, and there are many other passages showing that the Rabbis believed that man has the power to overcome even the evil yezer.⁴

There are comparatively few passages which seem to indicate that the evil 'yezer' is too strong and too deeply rooted to be overcome. Rabba bar bar Chana in commenting on Is. 26:26. "For his God doth instruct him to discretion and doth teach him," said: "The prophet said to Isreal; 'return in penitence'. They said: 'we cannot for the evil 'yezer' rules over us'. He said 'chasten your inclinations'; they answered: 'his God (i.e. the 'yezer's God) teaches

(1) Pesikta 80^b; Tan (B) חכמים 3; Gen. R. 56 Tana 2nd C.
(2) Lev. R. 34; Mid. T. (B) 41². Tana 2nd C. Acc. to Mid. T.R. Abba.
(3) Ecc. R. to 9:7
(4) see next page

us (this cannot be)' "1. R. Simeon b. Yochai also thought that man can hardly be held responsible for his actions because of the strength of the evil 'yezer.' "It is to be ~~inferred~~ from the following," said he, "that Isreal will never experience 'Gehinom'. To what may this be compared? To a king who had a barren field, rented it to some persons at a yearly rental of ten measures of wheat. The land was fertilized, watered and surrounded with a ditch and taken care of in general. Yet at the end of the years, the tenants paid the king only one measure of wheat, instead of ten. When the king called upon them for an explanation, they said: 'Oh Lord, our King, thou knowest well that the land is barren and brought thee no income. Now even after so much of our labor it produced only this measure'. The Isrealites will make a similar plea before the Holy One, blessed be he, in the future. 'Lord of the Universe! Thou knowest how the evil 'yezer' allures us' ! Ps. 103:14 'He knoweth our frame'

(175) ----- It is said that the evil 'yezer' is thirteen years older than the good 'yezer' From the womb of his mother it grows and comes with him. It begins to desecrate the Sabbaths and there is no pardon in its power; it kills souls and there is no pardon in its power; it commits transgressions and there is no pardon in its power. After thirteen years the good yezer is born. As soon as he desecrates the Sabbath it says to him: 'Thou fool, the one who desecrates the Sabbath shall surely die'; (Ex. 31:11) s

(4) B.B. 17^a; Song of Songs R. to 2:4; Sota 47^a; San. 107^b.

(1) San. 105a P. and B. Amora 3^d C.

soon as he murders it says: 'who shed man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed'; As soon as he commits transgressions it says: 'Thou fool, the adulterer and the adultress shall surely die'. (Lev.20:10). When a man becomes excited and goes to commit lewdness, all the members of his body are willing, for the evil yezer reigns over all the two hundred and forty-eight members, but when he is about to perform a meritorious deed, all his members begin to pain him, for the evil 'yezer' within him reigns over the two hundred and forty-eight members of his body, and the good 'yezer' is compared to one who is imprisoned, as it says, Ecc. 4:14: 'For out of the prison cometh the one to reign', which refers to the good yezer."¹ Yet thoughts of this kind in which the yezer is portrayed as too powerful for mastery are few and ~~far~~ between and the predominant thought is that "God has made statutes not only for Heaven and earth, the sun, moon, stars, etc., but also for the evil 'yezer' prescribing its bounds."²

HOW TO OVERCOME THE EVIL 'YEZER'.

First. If we are told that a man has power to become master over his inclinations, it is only natural for us to inquire as to how he may do so. The evil yezer may be overcome through prayer and the Grace of God. "Lord of all the worlds! It is revealed and known to thee that it is our will to do thy will, And what hinders? The leaven in the dough (i.e. the 'yezer' in man) and servitude under the world kingdoms. May it be thy will to humble these before us and to remove the evil 'yezer' from us and humble it out of our heart

(1) Ab. b. R. Nathan Ch. 16. Schechter Ed. 31^b - 32^a version 1.

(2) Chama b. Chanina P. Amora 3rd C. Lev. R. 35.

that we may fulfill thy will again with a perfect heart.¹ Throughout the entire Talmudic Period we find statements of this kind which differ but little in content.²

Second. The evil yezer may also be overcome by taking an oath against it. R. Josia a Tana of the second century interprets Deut. 6:6. "Let these words be for an oath against thy heart" to mean "against thy evil yezer. Man is to expel his yezer by an oath (i.e. adjure it) as did Abraham (Gen. 14:22 f) Boaz (Ruth 3:13) Elisha (II K. 5:16), while the wicked by an oath strengthen their evil yezer as did Gehazi (II K. 5:20)"³ It is interesting to note that in this example which is typical of many others, revenge and avarice appear by the side of lust and passion as deeds of the 'yezer'; said R. Judan in referring to Ruth 3:13: "That whole night his evil 'yezer' persuaded him and said, 'you are unmarried and she is unmarried, she is seeking a husband and you are seeking a wife', but he took an oath against his evil 'yezer' (and conquered it)." R. Chanina says that Pr. 24:5 "A wise man is strong; a man of knowledge increases strength", refers to Boaz because he conquered his evil 'yezer' through an oath.⁴ The efficacy of the oath in conquering the

(1) Ber. 16^b R. Alexandri

(2) The following passages from various historical periods show how difficult an historical presentation would be. Passages of similar content are found in the name of Jehuda-ha-nasi. Tana 2nd C. ~~Tana 2nd C.~~ Ber. 16^b; R. Isaac Tana 2nd C. Sifre to Num. 6:24: another Tanaitic statement, which has been adopted by the liturgy in Ber. 60^b; R. Eleazer (200-220 J.) Ber 16^a, a similar statement, but of late date. Ber. 17^a; another by Mar. b. Rabina of the 5th C. Ber. 17^a and many others,

(3) Sifre Deut. 6:6; Gen. R. 87;

(4) Lev. R. 23 (end) Ruth R. 6 to 3:13 R. Jose b. Chalafta. Num. R. 15. R. Joshua b. Levi R. Amora 3rd C. and others.

Half-Tanna

'yezer' is well illustrated by the story told of Simon, the just. He once asked a Nazarite of stately appearance, beautiful eyes and curly hair, "my son why didst thou choose to have thy beautiful hair destroyed?" He answered: 'I acted as my father's shepherd in my town, and once I went to fill the casket from the well, when I saw the image reflected in the water, my 'yezer' grew upon me and sought to turn me out from the world. Then I said to him: 'Thou wicked one! Why dost thou pride thyself with a world that is not thine? Thou whose destiny it is to become worms and maggots? I take an oath that I will have thee shaved in the service of heaven.¹

Third. The Torah is an antidote for the evil 'yezer' in numberless ways do the Rabbis express this thought. R. Simeon b. El-azer said: "To what may the evil 'yezer' be compared? To a piece of iron, which is placed in the midst of a fire. So long as it is there, various vessels can be formed of it. The same may be said of the evil 'yezer'. There is no other preventive but the Torah which is called a fire. Pr. 52:21-2 'If thy enemy be hungry give him bread to eat, and if he be thirsty give him water to drink, for though thou gathereth coals of fire upon his head, yet will the Lord repay it unto thee'. Do not read וְשָׁלֵם but וְשָׁלֵם make thee at peace."² Some of the Rabbis interpret Deut. 11:18 "Ye shall take these my words to your heart" to mean that the law, the Torah is a remedy for the evil 'yezer' וְשָׁלֵם say they, means אֵת-הוּא הַתּוֹרָה ^{perfect remedy.} It is to be compared unto a father, who smote his son severely, and then put a plaster on the wound and said to him. 'My son, as long as the plaster is on your wound you may in warm water or in cold, and need have no fear. But

(1) 3rd C. B.C. Ned. 96; Sifra כ"ג 22; Jer. Ned. 36^b; Sifre 96; Num. R. 10:7; Yoma 35^b.

(2) Ab. D.R.N. 16 Schechter Ed. Version 1, 32^b.

if you take it away, an evil ulcer will come forth'. So God said to the Isrealites, 'my sons, I created the evil 'yezer'; I also created for it the law as a remedy. If you are occupied with the law, you will not be delivered into its hand; but if you neglect the Torah, you will fall into its power, yet if you will, you can rule over it,' as Gen. 4:7 "If thou dost well thou wilt be lifted up" etc. and if you do not busy yourself with the Torah, then ye are delivered into its hand, as it is said Gen. 4:7 'Sin croucheth at the door'. And not only that, but its (the Yezer's) whole care is for thee alone, as it is said, 'for three is its desire'. However, if you wish (i.e. will) you will be able to rule over it as it is said, 'but do thou rule over it.'"¹

Fourth. Closely associated with the idea of overcoming the evil 'yezer' by the Torah is the idea of overcoming it by the school. The following quotation is typical of this line of thought: "My son if this שנוא (i.e. the evil 'yezer') meet thee, drag it into the Beth ha-Midrash (i.e. the School); if it is stone it will be ground to pieces; if it is iron, it will be broken into shreds as it says in Jer. 23:29 'Is not my word like fire, saith the Lord and like the hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces?' If it is stone, it will be ground to pieces, as it says in Is. 55:1. 'Ho, everyone that is thirsty go to the water' and further on it says 'water grinds stone'. (Is. 14:19)"²

- (1) Kidd. 30^b; B.B. 16^a. Tanaitic. Similar statements concerning the Torah and the evil yezer are to be found; Sifre Deut. 45; Gen. R. 70 in the name of R. Chama b. Chanina P. Amora 3rd C. Gen. R. 89, Succ. 52^b in the name of R. Simeon b. Abba; Ab. d. R. Nathan 15^b Ch. 3 version 1. Schechter⁶; also Mid. Pr. 24 in the name of R. Akiba Tana 2nd. C. Num. R. 17 (end) R. Simeon b. Yochai T. 2nd C. Ex. R. 41 to 31:2; Gen. R. 54. R. Joshua b. Levi P. Amora 3rd. C. Sota 21^a; Ber. 31^a; Pes. 8^a; B.B. 16^a; Raba P. Amora 3rd C. Ab. b. R. Nathan 35^b version 1. Sch. Ed. Ch. 20 R. Chana Seganhokohanim, 1st C. R. Nehunya b. Hakanah 1st & 2nd C. Tana Aboth 3:6. Rabbi 2nd C. Tana Temura 16^a; Me-chilta on 18:27 R. Bana'ah Ab. Z. 5^b. Also Sifre 82^b; R. Levi P. Amora Lev. R. 35; Cant. R. 6:11, Num. R. 14. R. Joshua of Sichnin Gen. R. 17 on Gen. 2:19.
- (2) School of R. Ismael 2nd C. Tanaitic Kidd. 30^b; Succ. 52^b; Mid. T. (B) to v119:113.

Fifth. Man has a good 'yezer' as well as an evil one and the good one can become master. A Palestinian Amora of the Third Century asks "What does Ecc. 9:14-15 mean? There was a little city, and a few men within it; and there came a great king against it and besieged it and built great bulworks against it. Now there was found in it a poor wise man, and he by his wisdom delivered the city, yet no man remembered that same poor man.' 'A little city,' that refers to the body; 'And few men within it; that refers to the members (limbs) of the body; 'And there came a great king against it and besieged it,' that refers to the evil 'yezer'; 'and built great bulworks against it', refers to sin; 'now there was found in it a poor wise man', that refers to the good 'yezer'; 'and he by his wisdom delivered the city,' that refers to repentance and good deeds; 'yet no man remembered the same poor man', for in the hour in which the evil 'yezer' rules, he does not remember the good 'yezer'.¹ A more strikingly naive account as to how the good 'yezer' may overcome the evil one is given in a tradition that has come down in the name of R. Chana b. Abahu. "A man had two cows, one meant for plowing, the other not. If he wants the latter to plow, he puts the yoke on both. Should you not also join the evil impulse to the good, and so be able to turn it whither you will. So prayed David, 'unite the (double) yezer of my heart (לבי with two ב makes it double) to fear thy name'. (Ps. 86:11) We are to praise God with the evil yezer as well as with the good."² The Torah did not, as it has often been pictured by those who declare Rabbinic Judaism legalistic, take the place of the moral and religious

(1) R. Ami bar Abba. Ned. 32^b; Ecc. R. to 9:14-15.

(2) Sch. Tob to Ps. 86:11 (Bacher A. III 290) Chanina b. Abahu P. Amora 4th C. Other statements showing that good yezer may be victorious, Ecc. R. to 4:14; Ecc. R. to 4:15.

struggle necessary in overcoming obstacles. This is clear from a statement of R. Simon b. Lakish. In commenting on Ps. 4:5 he said: "Let a man always bring the good 'yezer' in wrath over the evil 'yezer' (that ye sin not). If he conquers it well and good, if not let him occupy himself with the Torah ('speak in your heart'); if he conquers it, well and good, if not let him read the 'Schma' [✓]; if he conquers it, well and good, if not let him remind it of death." ('and be still, Selah!')¹.

As on other subjects, the Rabbis differ among themselves on the subject of the "yezer tob" and "yezer hara". However most of them agree that God is responsible for the evil "yezer" as well as for the good "yezer", and out of this dual possibility arises the problem of freedom. It is this unpredictable future, which gives freedom to the will. Man becomes responsible for his choice, for whatever the evil 'yezer' may be in its origin and however specific be its function, one thing remains a fact: --- man can if he wills, overcome it. Prayer, the study of the Torah, Divine Grace, the oath, the school, the good 'yezer' and especially faith in a future world in which the evil "yezer" does not exist² -- all serve as antidote and help to ~~turn~~ the evil into good. The subject of the "yezer hara" and the "yezer tob", as understood by the majority of the Rabbis brings out clearly three facts: 1st, evil is a reality; 2nd, good is a reality; 3rd, man has power to choose.

(1) Palestinian Amora 3rd C. Ber. 5^a; Pesikta (k) 158^a.

(2) Tan. to Gen. Par. 1:40.

THEISTIC-COSMOLOGICAL ASPECT.

God, according to the teachings of the Rabbis is omnipotent, omniscient and ~~even~~ prescient. It is clear, then, that if God knows what I am going to do in a month from now and knows, which alternative I shall embrace and which I shall reject, there is no semblance of freedom that I may exercise in the matter; my choice must be God's choice and God's choice, or rather, his knowledge of my choice, is already sealed and hence no real alternative are presented to me. If I am enabled to choose an alternative other than that God knows will be my choice, and which he knew to be my choice aeons before my birth and the creation of the world, God is not omnipotent. From a strictly rational or philosophical point of view God's omnipotence, omniscience and prescience on the one hand and man's freedom of the will on the other, are utterly incompatible.

One not acquainted with Rabbinical Literature would here expect to find the Rabbis struggling to decide as to which alternative to embrace. The decision is comparable to the actions of a loving child which is asked "whom do you love the best, father or mother?" And the answer is "both". Similarly the Rabbis loved to think of God as an omnipotent, omniscient and prescient Being, yet they also loved to exalt man as a moral Being, and morality is impossible without freedom of the will. And like the proverbial child, they too answered "both". Akiba's statement is typical of all Rabbinic speculation on the subject. "Everything is foreseen by God, yet freedom of the will have been given.¹ Of course, this

(1) Tana 2nd C Aboth 3:15 Middah 16.

can hardly be considered philosophy, for philosophy cannot dogmatize, yet it must be treated here as philosophy because it deals with what is primarily a philosophical subject.

Although we had already stated the essence of the Rabbinic conception in regard to prescience and omniscience, it may be well to give a few examples showing how inconsistent they were and of necessity had to be ^{as} a result of solving a real problem ^{by} dogmatism. The righteous are held in such high regard by the authors of the Talmud that in many places they have expressed statements to the effect that "God decrees, but the righteous charge it" ¹.

When emphasizing the freedom of the will omniscience has to suffer and when emphasizing omniscience, freedom has to suffer. The Talmud represents the "yezer hara" as a creation of God and represents it as one of the two innate tendencies which influence the conduct of man. Of course, an omniscient and prescient deity knows beforehand the effect that this will have and the use to which finite man will put it. The Rabbis, in declaring the fact that man has not made proper use of the "yezer hara", by which they emphasize the fact that man has free will -- make it appear as if God himself did not foresee its consequences for He is continually pictured as "regretting" and "repenting" the fact that He created the inclination to do evil". I regret that I so created them, (i.e. the evil "yezer" alongside the good "yezer" in man) for if I had not created the evil yezer in him, he would not have rebelled against me." ²

- (1) Ecc. R; also Tan. to Deut; Meg. 13^b R. Jochanan ¹ Amora 3rd C. Tan (B) Beshallah 10, Berachya hakohen 3rd and 4th C. P. Amora.
- (2) Gen. R. 27 R. Ibo P. Amora Yalkut Gen. 90 R. Berachya P. Amora 3rd & 4th C. Similar regrets including the Arabs and the Chaldeans and the Diaspora are to be found Ter. Tanith 66^a; Pinchos b. Jair Tana 2nd C. and Succa 52^b Chana b. Acha in name of Rab. E. & P. Amora 3rd C.

In many passages the Rabbis attempt to do just what later the Jewish Philosophers of the middle attempted to do and they were equally as unsuccessful, when they claimed that God's fore-knowledge is not causative. In this way they attempted to save both the free of the will for man and omniscience for the Deity, a typical passage to this effect is that given in the name of R. Berachya: "God saw in the hour in which he was about to create the first man that righteous and wicked would issue from him. Thereupon God spoke: 'If I create him, wicked people will issue from him; if I do not create him, how can the righteous issue from him? What did God do? He separated the conduct of the wicked far from his presence, associated himself with the **מרת הרחמים** and created man, as it says "The Lord knoweth the way of the righteous" (Ps. 1:6)¹ A clearer example of this, though also very vague is that of Resh Lakish: "Thus said the Lord, where is the bill of your mothers divorcement, whom I have put away? Of which of my creditors is ^{it} to whom I have sold you? Behold for your iniquities have ye sold yourselves, and for your transgressions is your mother put away". And this is what Resh Lakish said: "What is it that Jeremiah 33:21 says 'my servant David' and 25:9, 'my servant Nebuchadnezzar'? Revealed and known it was before Him, who spoke and the world came into existence, what in the future the Israelites would say (Ezek. 20: 32-3); Therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, anticipated them and called him 'servant'" ².

Omniscience makes for a kind of historical determinism, but the Rabbis never looked upon this as infringing upon man's freedom.

(1) Gen. R. 8 to Gen. 1:26. P. Amora 3rd and 4th C.

(2) P. Amora 3rd C. San. 105^a; Ab. Z. 5^a.

"God showed to Job, Abraham and how his descendents moved to Egypt, and how they will be slaves in Egypt, how Moses would free Isreal, how Joseph provided for the tribes, how Moses annoints Prophets, how Samuel annoints Kings, how Joshua will lead Isreal into the promised land, how David would lay the foundation for the Temple, how Solomon would build it, how Athalya and her children would pull out the golden nails from the Temple, how Jehoiada would improve everything, Amon serve idols, how Josiah would uproot them, how Nebuchadnezzar would destroy the Temple and how Darius would re-built it, and finally he showed him Bezaleel who would complete the building, as it says "see I call Bezallel" etc.¹

The ideas of omnipotence, omniscience and prescience, far from infringing upon man's freedom give the Rabbis a pretext to emphasize it all the more strongly and to harmonize all contradictions and inconsistencies in their own theory by dogmatic methods.

- (1) Ex. R. 40 to Ex. 31: 1-2. Resh Lakish P. Amora 3rd this is interesting in that, it represents Job to have lived before most of the Biblical characters. Similar references are Tan. on Ex. 3:1 Gen. R. 9 on Gen. 1:31 (in name of R.Chaggi, R.Isaac & R. Judan) etc.

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ETHICAL ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM.

Perfectibility of Man.

Freedom, after all, is primarily an ethical concept, though it cannot well stand without a cosmological foundation. Inasmuch as ethics is a guide for human conduct, it cannot be of value unless the human being has power both to discern between good and evil and to make his choice effective. The ethical aspect of the problem of freedom limits itself, then, solely to the problem of conduct, or moral freedom, which involves the idea of man's perfectibility, and responsibility for his actions. It does not involve a choice over the conditions of birth and death, and the like, and hence represents but one limited phase of the whole problem. This is brought out in one of the most frequently used and often misused passages of Talmudical literature. The angel that presides over pregnancy addresses God: "'Lord of the universe! What shall come forth? A strong or a weak one, a wise one or an ignoramus, a rich man or a pauper'? But whether he is to be righteous or wicked that he (the angel) does not ask, as R. Chanina said: 'Everything is in the power of heaven (i.e. to be determined beforehand in heaven) with the exception of the fear of heaven', (this means conduct or it is seen from the scriptural authority chosen to substantiate it) for it says Deut. 10:12; 'And now, oh Israel, what does the Eternal, thy God ask of thee, but that thou shouldst fear the Eternal thy God, to walk in all his ways, to love him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul.'"¹ A similar statement, which is too long to quote brings out

(1) Nidd. 16^b; Ber. 33^a; Meg. 25^a; R. Chanina b. Papa; Tana 2nd C.

Shoma

the fact that "fear of heaven" means conduct, all the more strikingly, by using as its Scriptural sanction. Deut. 30:15. "See I have set before thee this day life and good, death and evil", &c.¹ Man is responsible for his actions. In commenting on Ecc. 7:29: "So this only have I found that God made man upright," Rabbi remarks: The Holy One, blessed be He, who is called righteous and upright and who created man in his image, did this only with the intention that man should be as righteous and upright, as He himself is. If man will argue, why then did He create the evil 'yezer' of whom it is written that he is evil from the very youth of man? If God desired him as evil, who then could make him good? God's answer is: 'Thou, man has made him evil'.²

Man is a perfectible being. This represents the essence of Rabbinical teaching on the subject of man's freedom from an ethical point of view. The Rabbis ask whether a wicked person may be considered a Son of God, and the answer is that in so far as he has within him the power to become righteous, he is a son of God.³ For "in the way in which a man chooses (wills) to walk, his feet guide him. This is to be derived from the Torah it is written (in regard to Balam) first, 'Thou shalt not go with them' (Num. 25:12) and then 'Rise up and go with them' (Num. 25:20) from the Prophets where it is said, 'I am the Lord thy God, who teacheth thee to profit, which leadeth thee by the way that thou shouldst go'. (Is. 48:17); and

(1) Tan. Pikkude and partly in Yalkut Gen. 38; in name of R. Jochanan, P. Amora 3rd C.

(2) Tan. Gen. ^{old} 7; ⁴⁰ see also Gen. R. 67.

(3) Sifre

from the Hagiographa, where it is said, 'Svrelly he scorneth the scorn-
ers, but he giveth grace unto the lowly.'¹ In the hour in which
Moses wrote down the Torah, he recorded the work of every day's crea-
tion; when he came upon the verse 'God spoke, let us make man', he
said: 'Master of the Universe, what an opportunity do you here give
to the heretics? (to say that there are many Gods) God answered
him, 'who wishes to err, may do so'.²

Possibly the most interesting statement in which man's power
over his own will is brought out, is that in which the very thing to
be proven is first naïvely denied in support of its proof. "David
by his nature (moral stamina) was not capable of committing such an
act with Bath Sheba, and the Isrealites also were by nature not cap-
able of committing such a deed, (as making the Golden Calf). David
was not capable of such an act, for we read in Ps. 109:22. 'My heart
is wounded within me' and Israel was not capable of such an act for
we read in Deut. 5:29 'Oh that there were such a heart in them
that they would fear me - - - forever'. Why then did they commit
such acts? In order to tell you that if an individual sins, one
may say to him, 'Go to an individual (to David) for an example of
how he repented, so also should you repent;' if, on the otherhand
a group of people sins, one may say to it: 'Go to Israel to look
for an example as to how a whole people repented, so also should you
repent.' It was necessary for Scriptures to mention both of these
cases, for if God had only given us the example of the one (David)

- (1) R. Huna or Eleazer Macc 10^b; Num. R. 20; R. Jochanan P. Amora
3rd C. Succ. 53^a; also Kilayim 32; Yalkut to Is. 48 p. 79;
Yalkut to Num. 22. In Kethuboth 35^b the same idea is turned
from freedom into predestination. *→ 30^{ab}?*
- (2) Samuel bar Nachman in name of R. Jonathan, Tana 2nd C.; Gen.R.
8 on Gen. 1:26. *→ ?*

The teacher of R. Jochanan.

I could have inferred that it was because his sin was not publically known. Furthermore, it was necessary that scriptures mention the transgressions of the one (David) for if only the deed of the group and its pardon would have been mentioned, I could have inferred that it happened because its collective merit was large, but that the individual could not find pardon because his individual merit is not large."¹ These things happened to David and Israel not because of an act of choice but against their will and contrary to their moral natures, as acts of Providence to show that all may repent. This may well be compared to people who believe in Universal Peace so firmly that they are willing to go to war for it, for, in like manner, the Rabbi was so intent upon proving that man is free to repent, that he determined him in the very conditions from which he was to free himself. A method somewhat similar is used in the following passage in which the analogy chosen would exclude the idea of man's freedom and yet it upholds man's freedom in that it departs from the analogy. In commenting on the Biblical phrase, "Hear the word of the Eternal," the Rabbis say: "This is to be compared to a King who says to his servants: 'Be careful with these two cups for they are made of fine filigree.' As he (the servant) went into the palace there lay a calf at the door, knocked into the servant and broke one of the cups. The servant stood tremblingly before the King. 'Why are you trembling', asked the king? 'Because a calf ran into me and broke one of the two cups.' 'Mark you', said the King, 'and be

(1) Ab. Z. 4^b - 5^a. R. Jochanan in name of R. Simeon b. Yochai; Sabb. 65^a.

careful for the second.' So also did God speak: 'Two cups have you mixed. (i.e. poured out at Sinai viz. "we will do and we will hear") The one ("we will do") have ye broken in that ye made a Golden Calf; be careful with the second ("we will hear") So also says Jeremiah: 'Hear the word of the Eternal, Oh house of Jacob'"¹

In numberless ways do the Rabbis impress upon man that he is master of himself. "If the evil 'yezer' comes to make you frivolous repel it (לִפְנֵי may come from לָרֹץ "to repel" as well as from

לִשְׂמֹר to guard") with the word of the law; if you do, as I (God) will reckon it to you as if you had created peace in this world, and peace in the world to come. But say not the 'yezer' is not in your power, for I have already written in the law 'toward thee is its desire, but thou shalt rule over it.'" ² "Which is the right course that

a man should choose for himself? That which he ~~feels~~ feels to be honorable for himself, and which brings him honor from mankind. Be as careful in the observance of a light precept as of a grave one, for thou knowest not the reward for each. Calculate the loss incurred by the non-fulfillment of a precept, over against the reward for its observance, and the gain gotten by a transgression against the loss it involves".³ Wherever there are alternatives, there is choice.

In commenting on Ps. 36:3 the Rabbis say "What is the meaning of 'he setteth himself in a way that is not good'? There are before them two ways, one for good and one for evil, and they forsake the way of good and they walk in the evil way".

(1) Ex.R. 27 to Ex. 18: 1.

(2) Gen. R. 22 to Gen. 4:6; R. Simeon and Chanina b. Papa.

(3) Rabbi Jehuda-ha-Nasi. 2nd C. Aboth 2:1.

Man cannot find a mitigating cause or an extenuating influence for his actions; he alone is responsible for them. "Man", say the Rabbis, "was created alone (i.e. there is but one ancestor for the whole human race) in order that the heretics should not say there are many principles in Heaven. According to another explanation, because of the righteous and the wicked in order that the righteous should not say 'we are descended from a righteous person' and the wicked should not say 'we are descended from a wicked person'".¹ The purpose of this passage is to assert that neither heredity nor environment can hinder or in any way infringe upon man's freedom, which depends solely upon himself.²

The whole subject of man's power over himself could have been treated under two aspects; one in which the direct statements for and against freedom could have been weighed, and a second in which the unconscious testimony on the subject could have been brought to a focus by innumerable passages in which freedom or determinism in implied and taken for granted. Under the first of these, statements concerning the method and the procedure for overcoming the evil yezer, which already treated in the chapter on "the good and evil 'yezer' as preconditions of morality", would be considered. For whether one overcome his inclination to do evil, by prayer, or by an oath, or by occupying oneself with the words of the Torah, or by strengthening the good impulse, or by the grace of God, it implies that man is a perfectible being.

(1) Tanaitic, San. 38^a.

(2) Passages with varied aspects of this thought found in: Kidd. 40^b; Yalkut to Is. 48 p. 798; Yalkut to Haazinu 672; Erubin 13^b; Mechilta 46^b to Ex. 15:26; Gen. R. 14 on 2:7; 8 on 1:27; Mish Eduyoth 5:7; freedom over environment also exemplified by Gen. R. 22 to 4:6. R. Ami P. Amora 3rd & 4th C.; Aboth 3:17 Akiba; Aboth 3:5 Chanina b. Chachinai, Tana 2nd C; Ber. 29^b; Kidd 40^a; Aboth 1:5; etc.

Man can perfect himself through meditation. "One who bears in mind the following four things, and never loses sight of them, will never sin; namely, whence he came and whither he is going, who is his judge and what will become of him. Whence he came? From a place of darkness; and whither he is going? to darkness. Whence he came? from a dirty place; whither he is going? To make unclean everyone, who will touch him. Whence he came? From a foetal secretion and from a place which is invisible to a human being; whither he is going? To Sheol or Gehenna to be burned in fire. And who is his judge? Remember that his judge is not of flesh and blood, but the Lord of all creation, blessed be he, before whom there is no iniquity, no oblivion, no consideration of persons and no bribery. And what will become of him. Worms and maggots, as it is written Job 25:6. 'How much less the mortal, the mere worm, and the son of earth the mere maggot?'¹ Furthermore "a man should always consider himself as half guilt and half innocent; if he fulfills a command, he is blessed for he gives himself a weight in the scale pan of innocence (or virtue); but if, on the other hand, he commits a sin, woe unto him, for he gives himself a weight in the scale-pan of guilt as it is written Ecc. 9:18; 'One single fault can destroy much good'. (i.e. because of one sin which he committed he may bring down the scale pan of guilt, which before that one act was evenly balanced with the scale pan of virtue). R. Eleazar bar R. Simeon said: 'Because the world is judged according to the majority (i.e. the predominance of one or the other kind of deeds) if therefore, he fulfills

(1) Ben Azzai Tana 2nd C. Derech Erez Ch. 3.
 Similar statements Akabia b. Mahalallel; 1st C. Tana Ab. b.
 R.N. 35^a; Derech Erez. R. 3; Ber. 5^a; Aboth 2:1; 3:1

one command, happy is he, for he gives himself and the whole world an impetus to the scale pan of virtue; ~~if~~ he commits one sin, he gives himself and the world an impetus for guilt, based upon ECC.9:18^{"1}

Even environment and association are not obstacles to man's power of choice, because man is free to choose both his physical environment and mental attitude, which influence his actions, and he may choose such as will influence him in the way he wills. "Keep far from a bad neighbor, associate not with the wicked, and do not abandon the belief in retribution".²

If "experience is the best teacher", then history is the best text-book. The best proof that man is master of himself can be gleaned from a study of the biographies of the men, who made history. The experience of a few Biblical and Rabbinical characters may well serve as illustrations. Adam's sin was an act of free-will. The following passage is typical: "To whom may the first man be compared? To a sick person, whom the Doctor visits and says: 'This he may eat and that he may not eat'. When he acted contrary to his words, he approached death; his relatives visited him and said to him: 'Do you perhaps think that the doctor has over stepped the line of strict justice?' 'God forbid!' answered the sick one, 'I, myself drew death near unto me, for he commanded me. ("This you may eat and this you may not eat.") Since I have acted contrary to his words, so have I subscribed myself for death'. In like manner when the first man ate from the forbidden tree, all gen-

(1) Kidd. 40b. 2nd C. also Ecc. R. to Ecc. 10:1.

(2) Aboth 1:7; Nittai the Arbelite 2nd C.; Aboth 3:14 R.Dosa b. Horkinas 80-120 A.D.

erations (in a vision) came to him and said: 'Do you perhaps say that, God has overstepped strict justice with you?' 'God forbid'. said he, I, myself have brought on death, for he commanded Gen.2:16. ("From all the trees of the garden", etc.)".¹

Cain also was given freedom of the will. In commenting on Gen. 4:7: "God spoke to Cain, if thou dost well, shalt thou not be accepted? And, if thou dost not well, sin lieth at the door", etc., the Rabbis remark that it means. "Is it not a fact that if you conduct yourself well, you will receive a blessing, (Lev. 9:22) but if not you will receive a curse. (Lev.22:16) Or if you conduct yourself well, I will forgive your sins, if not your measure will overflow with sin."²

Joseph, too is often cited as one who made use of his freedom of the will. There is a very interesting, though unfortunately too lengthy account of this for us to quote, in several places in the Midrash; the conclusion of which reads: "He (Joseph) ruled over his 'yezer' and did not touch Potiphar's wife, therefore, he became a ruler."³

Obadiah and Esau, too, ruled over themselves though for diametrically opposite purposes. Freedom, it must be borne in mind, does not only refer to power to withstand evil, but can equally well apply to power to withstand the good as the following passage shows: "A righteous person lived among two wicked ones and didn't imitate their works, and a wicked person lived among two righteous ones and didn't imitate their works; The first case of a righteous person refers to Obadiah, and the second of a wicked person to Esau."⁴

(2) Gen. R. 22; to 4:6

(3) Num. R. 14; Deut. R. 2:33.

(4) R. Eleazer 80-120 A.D. Yoma 38^b.

(1) R. Isaac P. Amora 3rd. C. Pesikta (k) 118^a; Similar statements R. Akiba 2nd. C. Tana Gen. R. 21 to Gen. 3:22; R. Simon P. Amora 3rd C. Gen. R. 16 to 2:10; Resh Lakish P. Amora 3rd C. Gen. R. 21; R. Ammi P. Amora 3rd C. Sabb. 55 a. and b.

The story as to how Boaz overcome his evil 'yezer' with regard to Ruth serves as another illustration from history. This story has already been quoted in the chapter dealing with the 'yezer'. But Biblical characters have no monopoly on freedom. "R.Chanina and R. Jonathan happened to be on a journey and came to two roads, one of which led to the entrance of a heathen temple and the other to the entrance of a house of prostitution. Whereupon one spoke to the other: 'We ought rather to choose the one which leads to the heathen temple, for the evil 'yezer' for idolatry has been killed.' The other one answered: 'Let us rather turn in here to the house of prostitution and overpower our evil 'yezer' and receive reward from God? When they came and saw the prostitutes bow (and recede) before them, the one spoke: 'How did you know that?' (You could control yourself.) He answered in the words of Pr. 2:11: 'Discretion shall preserve thhe, understanding shall keep thee'"¹

Reason, experience and history alike affirm that man is a perfectible being.

(1) Ab. Z. 17 a & b.

FREEDOM TAKEN FOR GRANTED AND IMPLIED.

A man does not constantly say to himself "I'm alive, I'm alive!", but he simply takes this for granted. Only when he is at the brink of death^{does} he wonder whether his life is ebbing away. In a like manner one who believes himself to be a free agent need not necessarily go about the streets shouting: "I'm free! He simply takes it for granted and acts as if he were free. Testimony of this kind more eloquent by its silence than by its speech, may be gathered almost without limit from Talmudical Literature giving support to the idea that the Rabbis of old, were for the most part, firm believers in the idea that man's will is free. One of the earliest statements typical of this unconscious, and therefore all the more significant arguments for the freedom of the will comes from the fourth² century B.C.: "Be deliberate in judgment, train up many disciples and make a fence around the Torah."¹ Only he is master of himself", said another Rabbi, "who lives for God and men; he is free from the power of sorrow, free from the oppressive yoke, and free from death".² The fact that sayings of this kind do not enter directly into a consideration of freedom does not exclude them. "The Holy One blessed be he, said, 'See what this wicked people do. When I created them, I gave to each of them two servants, the one good and the other evil. But they forsook the good servant and associated with the evil one".³ It here seems as if the writer

- (1) Aboth 1:1. Men of Great Synagogue. Other statements of this kind from various Rabbis: Aboth 1:9; 1:2; 1:10; B.B.8; Ber.9:5; Jer. Ned. 41^b; San. 102^a; Gen. R. 8 to 1:26; Sifra 91^a; Aboth 1:12,14; Aboth 2:17; 5:20.
- (2) Lev. R. 18 to Lev. 15:2; Ab. Z. 5^b.
- (3) Tan. (B.) 1:13^a.

wished to imply that God himself did not know what man would do. This of course infringes upon God's prescience, which the Rabbis upheld equally as firmly, though, since freedom and prescience in the absolute sense are contradictory, the Rabbis always uphold either one at the expense of the other. This same difficulty may be discerned in the following passage from which it appears that God himself didn't know what the judge would do? "When the judge sitteth and delivereth a just judgment, the Holy One, blessed be he leaves, - - - if it were possible to say so - - - the heaven of heavens and makes his Schechinah dwell on his side as it is said: 'And when the Lord was with the judge' (Judges 2:18) but when he sees that the judge is a respecter of persons, he removes his Schechinah and removes to heaven. And the angels say unto him: 'Master of the Universe! what hast thou done?' (What is the reason for this removal?) And the answers: 'I have found that the judge is a respecter of persons and I rose from there.'"¹ The famous saying of Ben Zoma implies freedom in an almost absolute sense of the word for it puts at man's disposal wisdom, wealth, honor and strength. "Who is wise? He who learns from all men, based upon Ps.119:99. Who is mighty? He who subdues his passion based on Pr.16:32. Who is rich? He who rejoices in his lot based on Ps. 128:2. Who is honored? He who honors others based on 1 Sam. 2:30."² There are many parallels to the passage that "man is judged at any moment according to his moral standing at that moment."³ The implication here is that man can and should

(1) Ex. R. 30. R. Joshua 1st & 2nd C. Tana.

(2) Ben. Zoma, Aboth 4:1.

(3) R. Simon Tana Gen. R. 57 to Gen. 21:17.

since he has freedom to do so, keep the predominance of his actions on the side of merit, since "man is judged by the majority of his deeds."

There is practically no limit to the number of "implied" and "for-granted" free-will passages in the ^{to} musical literature.

COMMANDS AND ADMONITION IMPLY FREEDOM.

As has already been stated a command to obey the law of gravity is superfluous, for man has no freedom in the matter; he simply must obey it. As a result we have no such law in any text-book on Ethics. Commands and admonitions are given only when there are various course of action possible and where man is empowered to choose. The fact that the Bible is full of "Thou shalt" and "Thou shalt not" implies that man has power to embrace or to reject them. And the fact that the Rabbis of the Talmudical Period of Judaism multiplied these commands and admonitions of the Bible ten-fold, pleads eloquently for their belief in man's freedom. Not only as the giving of commands imply freedom, but also the acceptance of them. As the following famous legend bears witness: "When God was about to give the Torah to the world, he first offered it to the children of Esau (Rome) and said to them: 'Will you receive the Torah?' And they answered, 'Master of the Universe, what is written therein?' And God said: 'Thou shalt not kill, to which they answered: 'Inasmuch as all our strength lies in the fact that our fathers ~~put~~ put their confidence in the sword, we cannot accept the Torah.' The story goes on and tells how it was then offered to the Amorites, Ishmaelites and others in a similar way and how all refused it, until finally God came to Israel and they answered: "We will do and we will harken".¹

The most striking command of the Bible involving

(1) Pesikta R. Ch. 21; pupils of Rabbi 2nd C.

freedom of the will is sued over and over by the Rabbis: "I set before you life and death, blessing and curse" (Deut.30:19) In commenting on this the Rabbis say: "Israel might say: 'Considering that the Holy One, blessed be he, placed before us two ways, the way of life and the way of death, we may go in any of these we like.' Therefore it is further said, 'Choose life that both thou and thy seed may live.'¹ The following also throws light on the subject of implied freedom through the existence of commands. "Moses spoke unto the Israelites, 'See God has given you his Torah, but if you do not act according to the judgments therein contained, then he will take away the Torah from you. Why? Because he has given it to you only on condition, that you practice the judgments as it says Ps. 99:4. But if ye obey the judgments, then God will again restore the houses of judgment (בתי דינין) as it is said in Is: 1:26: 'Zion will be redeemed in righteousness'.² A somewhat similar expression implying man's freedom is that of R. Judah's, in reference to Deut. 14:1: "Ye are children of the Lord your God", says: "If you conduct yourselves as Sons, then you are sons of God, if not, ye are not".³ The fact that there are those "who have thrown off the yoke of heaven and have loaded themselves with the yoke of men," like the respecter of persons, and like Nimrod, who made men rebel against God, and like the people of Sodom and Gemorah, the generation of Enosh, Noah, and the people of Egypt, bears ample testimony to the fact, that laws may be obeyed or disobeyed and out of this alternative arises freedom.⁴ The distinction between the sins done presumptuously (מזיד) and those done in ignorance (שגגה) also implies freedom.⁵

- (1) Deut. Sifre 86^a; Tan. to R.'eh 3. Deut. R. 4. Tanaitic.
- (2) R. Josua, Ex. R. 30 to 22:1. (3) Tana 2nd C. Sifre Deut. 96.
- (4) Some of the most significant פירוק עול "Throwing off the yoke" passages are: Sota 47^b; San. 103^b; Gen. R. 27; Sifre 136^a; Mechilta 35^b; 36^a; Num. R. 9; Ex. R. 30; Sifre 93^a; San 111^b; Sifre 31^b; Jer. Peah 16^b; Jer. San. 27^c.
- (5) There are hundreds of passages such as B.B. 9^a; Aboth 4:4; Deut. R. 5; Sifre 32^b; Sifra 15^b; Kerithoth 9^a, etc., etc.

Admonition of all kinds takes the freedom of the will for granted. "Do not search for evil, and evil will not remain with you, for it is written in Psalms: 'Evil shall have no place among you'".¹ The famous saying of Antigonos of Socho also comes under this category: "Be not like servants who serve their master upon the condition of receiving reward, ~~(but be like servants, who serve their masters upon the condition of receiving reward)~~ but be like servants, who serve their masters without the condition of receiving reward, and let the fear of heaven be upon you".² In commenting on Pr. 24:6: "For by wise counsel thou shalt make thy war", Rabbi Simon says: "If you have committed a heap of transgressions, then counterbalance it, with a heap of commandments fulfilled."³ The Jew is admonished to undergo martyrdom rather than commit any of the cardinal sins. It was voted upon and agreed to in the house of Nithsa in Lydda that of all the transgressions, which the Torah names, one is not guilty if done in response to: 'Commit a transgression or you will be killed', and one may (under these circumstances) in order not to be killed commit them all with the exception of idolatry, adultery, and murder".⁴

Some Rabbis present the idea of implied freedom by means of a forced alternative. "My Torah", says God, "is in your hand, and your soul is in my hand; if you preserve what is mine, I shall preserve what is thine: if you lose what is mine, I shall lose what is thine".⁵ Another variation of this idea is found in the same pas-

- (1) R. Jochanan P. Amora 3rd C. Yalkut to Kings p. 763 par 231.
- (2) 200 B.C. Aboth 1:3.
- (3) Lev. R. 21.
- (4) San. 74a.
- (5) Deut. R. 4. R. Simeon. Tanaitic.

sage: "The sword and the book (the Bible) came down from heaven bound together. God spoke to the people: 'If you do ~~do~~ according to what is written in the book, then you will be slaughtered by the sword.'" ¹ In commenting on, "but if you refuse and do not harken", R. Levi said: "This relation is the same as that of a servant to whom his master said: 'Here is a golden band for the neck if you do my will, if not here are iron fetters.' So God spoke to the Israelites: 'If you do my will, see, here is the good and the blessing, if not, here is the curse. Behold there are two ways before you. See I set before you today blessing and curse.'" ²

(1) Deut. R. 4. R. Eleazar.

(2) Same. R. Levi. P. Amora 3rd C. Similar statements to those above in name of Resh Lakish, P. Amora 3rd C. Sabb. 88^a; R. Simlai 3rd C. Nidd. 30^b; Lev. R. 14; Sifre 132^a; Gen. R. 14; 27; Chag. 16^a; Ab. d.R.N. 55^a.

"IMITATIO DEI" IMPLIES FREEDOM.

Closely associated with or perhaps ^{a species} of command and admonition, which implies man's freedom of choice is what is technically known in theological and ethical literature as "imitatio dei". God is the ideal and man made in his image should strive to become perfect. The most familiar Biblical expression of this idea is "Thou shalt be holy, for I the Lord am holy". In commenting on these words one of the Rabbis of old said: "Israel is the bodyguard of the King (God) and hence they are duty bound to imitate the King."¹ According to another Rabbi: "God spoke to Israel, even before I created the world you were sanctified into me, therefore, be ye holy as I am holy, - - - the matter is to be compared to a King who married (שָׁדַךְ) a woman and said unto her: 'Since thou art my wife, what is my honor is thy honor, therefore, be thou holy even as I am holy'"² "As God is merciful and gracious so be thou merciful and gracious"³ One of the most striking passages of "imitatio dei" is that which departs from mere theory and makes it applicable to daily life. R. Chama b. Chaninah in commenting on the verse "walk in the ways of God", says that it means "walk ^{according to the attributes of God; as he clothes the} naked (Gen. 3:21) so do thou clothe the naked; as he cares for the sick (Gen. 18:1) so do thou care for the sick; as he comforts the mourners (Gen. 25:11) so do thou comfort the mourners; as he buries the dead (Deut. 34:5) so do thou bury the dead."⁴ Whether the relation of man to God be that

- (1) Abba Saul, Sifra 86^c (Bacher Ag. T. II 367.) Similar idea by another Rabbi Tan.(B) 3:37^b, also Pesikta K. 16^a.
- (2) Tan (B) 3:37^a.
- (3) Ab. Z. 20^b, also Sifre 85^a.
- (4) Sota 14^a, P. Amora 3rd C.

of child to father¹ or of wife to husband, or of body-guard to a king, the imitation, the example par excellence remains the same, and this would be impossible without freedom. Only a free-man - - one who can obey or disobey - - can be commanded, and the existence of manifold commands and admonitions and of "imitatio dei"² plead eloquently for the conception of freedom.

(1) Lev. R. 24.

(2) Other passages on "Imitatio Dei" are:
 Num. R. 9:4; 17:6; Mechilta 59^a; 37^a D. Erez. 5; Ab. d.R.N. 56^a;
 Tan. (B) 1:28^b; Succ. 30^a; Sabb. 133^b; Gen. R. 8.

REPENTANCE IMPLIES FREE-WILL.

The subject of repentance, like so many other subjects touched upon in the development of this thesis, needs have a thesis devoted to it alone for a full treatment. All that is here intended is ^{to} give a general view of the subject and point out what relation it bears to the subject of man's freedom of the will. Repentance in Hebrew comes from the verb נָשׁוּב which means "to turn" or "to return" or "turn back". There are hundreds of passages in Talmudical Literature in which man is admonished to do penance, to return to a good life, and forsake the evil way. It is particularly ⁱⁿ its teachings concerning repentance that Rabbinic thought shows itself to be a strong foe of determinism. "Even before the world was created, repentance was called into being."¹ This simple statement has deep and far-reaching implications. It implies that the foremost act of creation was to enable man to change his attitude for the better. It emphasizes not only that man has freedom, but also that this freedom was and is an indispensable element and precondition of the existence of the world. Of course, it also implies that man has equally as much freedom to refuse to follow the better way and to choose the way of evil, but for better or for worse, it has no meaning if freedom is not a reality. In numberless ways did the Rabbis show how important an element Repentance is. He who truly repents "is regarded by God as if he had gone to Jerusalem, rebuilt the Altar, and offered all the sacrifices recorded in the Torah".² David sinned with Bath Sheba and the Israelites with the Golden Calf not because of choice, but because of destiny in order to prove for eternity that repentance is

(1) Pes. 54^a; Ned. 39^b; Gen. R. 1; San. 98^b; The sayings are in the name of various Rabbis of various periods.

(2) Lev. R. 7

possible not only for the individual but also for a whole people, whether the sins were committed secretly or openly.¹ This rather contradictory statement on the subject of man's freedom becomes all the more significant because it is contradictory, in that it shows psychologically, how intent the Rabbis were, on claiming that man can perfect himself. — *repent. Lion*

The chapter devoted to the "Psychology of Habit and Free-Will" shows that for some there is no repentance, according to some Rabbis. Typical of this trend of thought is such a statement as: "He who is wholly given over to sin, is unable to repent, and there is no forgiveness for him forever."² Somewhat more decisive is a statement of similar import: "Five are exempt from forgiveness: he who repeatedly sins; he who sins in a righteous generation; he who sins with the intention of repeating his sin; and who has in his hands (i.e. on his conscience) the sin of the profanation of the name of God"³ The real significance of such statements, which can be multiplied at ease, does not point to the question of Grace, or the lack of Grace, but to the question of Habit, as an important factor of human conduct. As this phase of the subject and its bearing upon human freedom has already been dealt with elsewhere, there only remains to be stated the fact that there is also another tendency found in Rabbinic thought, to the effect that it is never too late to repent, be the previous conditions what they may, for "the gates of repentance are always open." The much abused passage "repent one day before thy death" shows that man's power over himself and choice over the alternatives of life, are co-extensive with life itself.⁴

(1) Ab. Z. 4^b - 5^a R. Joshua b. Levi P. Amora 3rd C.

(2) Mid. T. Ps. 1. (end)

(3) Ab d. R.N. 58^b (Schechter Ed. p. 39 version 1.)

~~(4) Ber. 23^a.~~

~~(5) R.H. 16^b - 17^a; Pesikta (K) 157^b; Ex. R. 15; and many other parallels.~~

(4) Aboth 2:14; Sabb. 153^a; Mid. T. 90:16; Ecc. R. 9:8; Ab. Z. 19^a, etc

Repentance implies human perfectibility. It cannot stand without it, and this is significant for our subject. Repentance implies a change in conduct as a result of the force of the human will which is a servant in the hands of the master, a tool in the hands of the workman. Hence the vast significance of such an apparently simple statement: "Be not like fools who bring a sacrifice for their offenses, but turn not from the evil deeds which they have in their hands"¹ etc. The idea of human perfectibility is brought out even more strikingly in the familiar story of the three books and Rosh Hashona. "Three books lie open on New Year's Day; one for those altogether wicked, one for those altogether righteous and one for those 'in-between'. In the first the altogether righteous ~~are~~ enrolled and sealed for life; in the second the altogether wicked are enrolled and sealed for death; the 'ones-in-between', on the other hand, remain suspended from New Year's Day until the Day of Atonement. If they become worthy (through repentance) they are enrolled for life, if not, (that is, if they choose to continue in their evil way) They are enrolled for death."² On the otherhand there are many passages which hold out hope even for the "altogether wicked" who can cancel the decree inscribed against them.³ Most of the passages usually quoted in explaining the Rabbinic conception of repentance bring out only the idea that man may improve; of course this is the predominant thought, yet there are many passages which bring out clearly that man may also refuse to do so, and out of these alternatives freedom becomes an unquestionable fact." After Adam had transgressed the commandment and eaten of the tree, God wanted him

(1) Ber. 23a.

(2) R.H. 16^b - 17^a; Pesikta (k) 157^b; Ex. R. 15; and many other parallels.

(3) R.H. 17^b; Yebamoth 105^a; Pesikta K. 163^a. Ex. R. 31 to 22²⁵

to repent and opened a door for him to do so, but Adam wouldn't listen to it. Abba bar Kahana said: 'And what is the meaning of ✓ God spoke unto him: 'Even now do penance and I will accept you'. But Adam said, 'it is impossible'".¹

That both righteous and wicked may annul the decree against them may be seen from the following: "Through four means may the Divine verdict in regard to man be torn up, viz; by deeds of beneficence, prayer, change of name and change of conduct." (There are Scriptural sanctions for each) It is worthy of note that all of these are in the power of man.

Maimonides has well summarized the essence of the Rabbinic conception of repentance in his "Mishneh Torah", as follows: "Repentance means that the sinner gives up the sin, removing it from his mind, and determining in his heart not to repeat the evil action again; so also must he regret his past - - - - - and confess it with his lips and give expression to the thoughts he has determined in his heart".

Inasmuch as the essence of repentance points to a change of actions on the part of man, and inasmuch as the frequent admonitions on the part of the thinkers and teachers of all periods of Jewish thought call for repentance, they imply that man has power and is free to mould his own actions. Without freedom, repentance is impossible.

(1) Num. R. 13.

RETRIBUTION IMPLIES FREE-WILL.

One who searches for the correct answer to, or the final word on the subject of retribution must in the end answer as did the son of man in Ezekiel's vision of the dry bones: "Thou knowest oh Lord". For finite man cannot comprehend the plan of Divine, of which he himself forms a part; he cannot get out of himself and pass judgment upon himself and the universe, even if his intelligence were not as limited as it is. In vain therefore do we look for consistency or unanimity on this subject among the Rabbis. As this subject alone would need more than the limits of this thesis for an adequate treatment, we can do little more than give an outline of the more important doctrines, as found among the Rabbis and point out what relation they have to the subject of man's freedom.

Retribution implies responsibility and responsibility implies freedom. An eclipse is not a phenomenon that involves retribution, for, as far as we know, no man is responsible for it; he has no freedom in the matter. Retribution even in its widest sense extends only to acts that were under our control, or under the control of those from whom we are descended. The "sins of the fathers" are visited upon the children; this is a part of the law of the universe. We inherit the good from our parents, why should we not inherit the bad also? And we do suffer for and because of one another whether we will or no. The subject of retribution therefore involve a conception of Providence and of vicarious atonement. It was thought best to treat the latter under the theological aspect of our problem though logically it is an aspect of retribution.

Man is a responsible being, and is called to account both

for sins or virtues of commission and of omission. The frequently quoted saying of Akiba illustrates man's responsibility for acts of commission. "Everything is given on pledge, and a net is spread for all the living; the shop is open, and the dealer gives credit; the ledger lies open and the hand writes; and whosoever wishes to borrow may come and borrow; but the collectors make their daily round regularly and exact payment from men whether they be content or not. And they can rely upon getting what they demand, and the judgment is a judgment of truth, and everything is prepared for the feast."¹

Man is also responsible for the sins of omission as the following passage illustrates: "Whoever is in a position to prevent sins being committed by the members of his household and refrains from doing so, becomes liable for their sins; whoever could warn (and thus ^vprevent) the inhabitants of this city from sin and neglects to do so, he is responsible for their sins; and whoever, in like manner does not warn (and thus prevent) the world from sin, is responsible for the sins of the world. This is in the name of R. Papa but R. Chanina said: 'What does Is. 3:14 ("The Lord will go into judgment with the elders of his people, ~~And~~ with his princes") mean? If the princes sinned, what blame have the elders'? Because they did not prevent them"² The individual's obligation to his community "is to be compared to people sitting on board a ship one of the passengers of which took an awl and began to bore holes in the bottom of the vessel. When he was asked to desist from his dangerous occupation, he answered, 'why I am only making holes under my own seat', forgetting that when the water came in, it would sink the whole ship".³

(1) 2nd C. Tana Aboth 3:16.

(2) R. Jonathan, Tana 2nd C. Sabb. 54^b.

(3) R. Simeon b. Yochai.

These three examples at the same time bring out the fact that retribution in Rabbinical Literature is at times distinctly individualistic as in the case of the first passage, quoted above and at other times social as in the second and third; each of these passages is chosen because it is typical of many others. Retribution, therefore, may be individualistic, tribal, national or universal.

Some of the Rabbis were intent upon holding to the justice of God, forgetting that they were subjecting that attribute to human standards, and declare as did R. Ammi and perhaps some before him: "There is no death without sin and no suffering without transgression".¹ Concrete results for specific crimes are enumerated in many passages in Talmudical Literature and pestilence, wild beasts, captivity and misfortune of various kinds are but effects of various causes, such as neglecting the study of the Torah, idolatry, perjury, etc. Of course, this is naïve but that does not detract one iota, for the psychological motive is just the same as if their explanation were thoroughly scientific. A similar idea is that of R. Hamnuna, a Babylonian Amora of the third century, who believed that "the Holy One, blessed be he, does not exact punishment from man until his measure of sin (committed by his own choice) is filled."² As early as the first century R. Eleazer said that "after God had spoken 'behold I set before you today life and death' etc. (Deut.30:15) the words 'does not the evil and the good come from the mouth of the Most High' (Lam.3:38) were confirmed, but evil comes only over the evil-doers and the good only over those who do good."³

(1) 3rd C. Sabb. 55^a;

(2) Sota 9^a.

(3) Deut. R. 4.

One of the most popular ideas connected with the conception of retribution in Rabbinic Literature is that of "measure for measure" ("Middah K'Neged Middah") There are many variations of this idea. R. Meir said: "With the measure where with man measures (for others) others will measure for him".¹ God realized this before creation and incorporated it as it were, in his Divine plan² "Whoever honors the Torah will himself be honored by mankind, but whoever dishonors the Torah will himself be dishonored by mankind."³ As early as the first century R. Simeon ben Gamliel applied the "measure for measure" to Joseph. "'And Pharaoh took off his ring'. R. Simeon ben Gamliel said that Joseph here became only what he deserved to be. In regard to his mouth, which did not kiss sin it says 'My whole people shall kiss him'. In regard to his body, which did not touch sin, it says, 'And he clothed him with garments from Byssus'. In regard to his neck, which did not stretch itself for sin, it says, 'And he laid a golden chain about his neck'. In regard to his hands, which did not serve sin, it says, 'thereupon Pharaoh took the ring from his hand and put it upon the hand of Joseph'. In regard to his feet, which did not go toward sin, it says, 'He permitted him to ride in the second carriage', and the thought which thought no sin was called 'wisdom'".⁴ There are many others, the most important of which may be found in the footnote.⁽⁵⁾

Retribution may be material or spiritual, or both and the former may come here in this world and the latter, ^{here} or hereafter, or both. After all every problem depends upon the attributes that are

(1) Tan. 2nd. C. Sabb. 100^b. *Mish. Patah*

(2) R. Jose. P. Amora Gen. R. 9. *on* Gen. 1:31.

(3) R. Jose. etc. Aboth 4:6 (4) Gen. R. 90 to Gen. 41:42; Num. R. 14.

(5) The story of Nahum of Gimzo, Taanith 21^a; other "measure for measure" measure passages: Gen. R. 48; Yoma 39^a; B.B. 9b; Aboth 4:5; Mechilta 25^a; 32^b; etc.

ascribed to God, for a proper treatment. As God is a God of justice, reward and punishment follow strict justice and are bestowed in accordance with man's deeds. If God is also merciful, then man is given an overflowing measure of reward and but a scanty measure of punishment. The whole subject of "measure for measure", which was treated above may well be called material retribution. As an additional example we quote the following typical example: "Everyone who fulfills one command will fare well; his life will be lengthened and he will inherit the land. Everyone who does not fulfill one command will not prosper; his life will not be lengthened and he will not inherit the land."¹

Retribution may be of a spiritual nature, even in this world "great is faith, for the Israelites believed in the One 'who spoke and the world was created'. As a reward for this the Holy Spirit rested upon them".² But retribution of a spiritual nature is primarily a concern of the future world. The suffering of the righteous and the prosperity of the wicked could not be easily reconciled with the justice of God -- at least not with God's justice on this earth. So it was assigned to the world to come and those below could as little refute it, as those who elevated it to the future world, could prove it. The righteous suffered in this world to atone for any wrong they have done in order to enjoy undisturbed and unalloyed the bliss of the future world and the wicked prosper here as a reward for the little good they have done in order that they shall receive only punishment in the future world. The justice of God demands

- (1) Kidd 39^b (mishua 10:1) other examples of this kind Mechilta Beshallah 6 on Ex 17:1; Kidd 40^a; 39^b; Sota 127^a; Ber. 35^b.
- (2) Mechilta Beshallah 6 to Ex 14:31.

that the righteous suffer for the least transgression of, and the wicked prosper for the least act of obedience to God's law.¹ There are passages of every kind depicting the reward in the future world. Akiba's martyrdom (an act of free-will) causes the "Beth Kol" to announce his reward of life eternal in the future world.² "Everyone who blackens his appearance in the world because of the worlds of the Torah, in the future world the Holy One, blessed be he, will brighten his appearance".³ In like manner God's justice does not overlook any of the acts of man. "Everyone who under-goes hunger in this world because of the words of the Torah, in the future world, the Holy One blessed be he, will satisfy him."⁴ In fact "all the commandments, which the Israelites fulfill in this world will come and bear testimony for them in the world to come".⁵ Not one is overlooked for "if Esau had fulfilled only one command (honoring his father in burial jointly with Jacob) and kingdoms and rulers wished to join him, how many more would wish to join themselves with Jacob, our father, the righteous one, who fulfilled all the commandments of the Torah."⁶

The relation of all that has ^{so} far be said on the subject of retribution, to the problem of freedom may well be summarized in the following passage, which shows clearly that retribution is a correlary to man's freedom: "Because I (God) have given you so many commandments, therefore I also increase your reward for you and place

- (1) San. 100^a b. Horayath 10^b; Taanith 11, etc. San. 105^b; Gen. R. 33 to 8:1.
- (2) Ber. 61^b Akiba; similar thought of R. Abahn P. Amora 3rd C. B.B. 10^b.
- (3) San. 100^a b. R. Jehuda bar Simon P. Amora 4th C.
- (4) Same. R. Tanchum bar Chanili P. Amora 3rd C; R. Jonathan Aboth 4:9.
- (5) R. Josua b. Levi. P. Amora 3rd C. Ab. Z. 4^b; Kidd 39^b; Kidd 40^a; Lev. R. 35 to Lev. 26:3; and same Tan. to Deut. 26:16 R. Chama b. R. Chanina.
- (6) Gen. R. 82.

upon your fulfillment of every command your term of life, as it is said in Ecc. 8:5: 'Who fulfill the law will experience no evil'--- with every command have I set the punishment for its transgression and the reward for its fulfillment. It is to be compared to a king who made two paths, the one full of thorns, thistles, etc., and the other full of spices. The blind turn in at the road and they receive from the thorns many wounds; the wise, on the other hand go over the good road, and they and their children enjoy the fragrance. Likewise has God prepared two ways; one for the righteous and one for the wicked; he who has no eyes goes on the road of the wicked and is smitten; he has no stability like the ruthless Bileam, who was plucked out of the earth, and like Doeg and Achitophel, who were thrust out of life, and like Gehazi, who left the world with nothing. — The righteous, on the other hand, who wander in their innocence, will be blessed and their children after them, as it says in Pr. 20:7; 'The just man walketh in his integrity; his children are blessed forever.'¹

But all this knowing, as it were, the inner workings of Providence, represents but one tendency of retribution, the offspring of the attribute of God's ^{justice. But there is another important one that needs to be mentioned, that which is the offspring of the attribute of God's} unfathomable infinitude. In opposition to R. Ammi, who declared that "there is no death without sin", the Rabbis say that "when the ministering angels asked God if Moses and Aaron had not kept the whole law (because they too died) God answered in the words of Ecc. 9:2, 'All things came alike to all; there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked.' (Acc. to R. Ammi Moses and Aaron also died because of their sins, which are recorded in Num. 20) But Simeon ben Eleazer added: 'There is also a death without sin and suffering without guilt.'² This represents the

(1) R. Joshua 80-120 Ex. R. 30 to Ex. 22:1.

(2) Tana 2nd C. B.B. 17^a.

mystery of retribution; man finite and limited after all cannot understand the ways of the Divine. So also thought R. Yannai: "Neither the prosperity of the wicked, nor the suffering of the righteous is in our hand"¹; it is part of the ever unexplained mystery of life, and man cannot fathom it. "When Moses ascended to Heaven, God showed him all the great men of the future. R. Akiba was sitting and interpreting the law in a most wonderful way. Moses said to God: 'Thou has shown me his worth, shown me also his reward,' whereupon he is bidden to look back. There he perceives him dying the most cruel of deaths and his flesh being sold by weight. Moses now asks: 'Is this the reward of such a life'? Whereupon God answers: 'Be silent, I have determined.'² As further proof that the ways of Providence are a mystery, we quote a saying of R. Meir, in which he refutes the idea of R. Jochanan, who claims that prosperity depends upon righteousness and adversity upon wickedness. In commenting on Ex. 33:19. "I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious", he adds "even though he is unworthy" and in regard to the words "and I will show mercy to whom I will show mercy", he again adds, "even if he is not worthy of it."³

The whole subject of retribution, with the possible exception of that phase which considers it an unfathomable mystery, not only implies freedom of the will, but cannot stand without it; the mystery of retribution argues neither for nor against man's freedom. There are moreover hundreds of sayings on the subject of retribution which directly as well as indirectly assert that man is free. Freedom makes for responsibility and responsibility is the foundation for retribution.

(1) P. Amora 2nd and 3rd C. Aboth 4:15.

(2) Menachoth 29^b; R. Jehuda in name of Rab. 2nd C.

(3) R. Meir 2nd C. Tana; Ber. 7^a. A similar statement depicting the mystery of Providence is that of R. Asi P. Amora 3rd C. Ex.R. 45 to Ex. 33:12.

a cond. b, b cond. c, but c does not depend on a. as there may be other factors bringing about the same results.

PART TWO: THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PROBLEM OF THE FREE-WILL.

The difference between the philosophical and theological aspects of our problem has already been indicated. The method of philosophy differs from that of theology; philosophy is called upon to bring as evidence the results of careful thought and base all of its conclusions upon cold reason. Theology, on the other hand, comes from the heart rather than the head, and is bound up with sentiment and hence often "just feels" that certain things are true though it cannot prove them by reason. Philosophy and ratiocination go hand in hand, and likewise do theology and dogmatism. Theology may, therefore, be non-philosophic, that is, neither assert nor contradict any philosophical principles, or it may be anti-philosophic and freely go in opposition to well established principles of philosophy, in its dogmatic method. Among the non-philosophical postulates of the theological aspect of the problem of free-will we shall consider the subjects: vicarious atonement, original sin, and the merit of the fathers. Among the anti-philosophic postulates we shall consider the subjects; grace, Torah and predestination.

VICARIOUS ATONEMENT.

From the time of Deuter^o-Isaiah, who pictured Isreal as the suffering servant of humanity who "bore the sins of many" and the time of the scape goat in the priestly legislation, the idea of vicarious atonement has found its way into all theologies to a greater or lesser degree. Again we must bear in mind that nearly all classifications are to some extent arbitrary; vicarious atonement could, perhaps, better have been considered as an aspect of retribution. It has been thought advisable to treat it here, because it forms, as it were, the link between two extreme doctrines with which the non-phil-

sophical postulates of the theological ^{aspect} of our problem are presented. Original sin on the one hand, and the merit of the fathers, which may well be called original virtue, on the other hand, together form the theological aspect of heredity, and vicarious atonement forms, ~~this~~ means between these two extremes. It is a kind of a forced "power of attorney" in religious affairs. It is a distinct infringement upon the freedom of the will. It is found in various phases in Talmudical Literature, but does not represent the trunk of the tree of Jewish thought, but merely a few of its branches and offshoots.

There are many passages in which the death of the righteous is considered to have atoning power. Characteristic of this trend of thought R. Eleazar says: "Why does the portion relating to the garments of the priests follow the portion relating to various death? To teach that equally as much as do the garments of the priests atone, so also the deaths of the righteous atone".¹ R. Ami uses another example to bring out precisely the same thought. "Why are the portions relating to the red heifer (Num. 19) and to Miriam's death read in succession? In order to teach that just as the red heifer atones for sins, so also do the deaths of the righteous atone."² The good and evil deeds of each generation, it seems, should remain at least evenly balanced. When the scale pan containing the evil deeds is the heavier, "The righteous are summoned (to death) for the sins of their generation".³ But "at a time in which there are no righteous people in a generation the innocent school-children are taken away to atone for the sins of their generation".⁴ The sins for which

- (1) R. Eleazar 80-120 A.D. M.K. 28^a; Erachin 16^a; Taanith 9^a
- (2) P. Amora 3rd C. M.K. 28^a. Similar ideas Succa 52^b; San. 39^a; Pesikta (k) 174^b. R. Chéya b. Abba P. Amora 3rd C. R? Samuel b. Nachman in the name of R. Jonathan D.K. 60^a. Tana 2nd. C.
- (3) Lev. R. 15.
- (4) Sabb. 33^b.

Am. 3rd C.

the lives of innocent children must atone are enumerated by some of the Rabbis. According to R. Jehuda ~~la~~ Nasi "Children die on account of annulling the learning of the Torah". According to Rabbi Nathan "children die because of vows left unfulfilled"¹. A great man may atone for many sinners according to R. Simlai, who applied the words of Is. 53:12, "who bore the sins of many" to Moses "whose death atoned for the sins of many in regard to the Golden Calf"². The doctrine of vicarious atonement in its retributive phase also looks upon suffering as means for atonement. R. Nehemiah of the third century maintained: "Acceptable is suffering, for just as the offering atones, so also suffering atones. Yea suffering atones more than an offering for an offering can be bought with money, but suffering strikes at life itself".³ A thought somewhat similar is that expressed by Resh Lakish: "The salt in the offering is called 'berith', (Lev. 2:13) and in regard to suffering there is also mention of ~~of~~ 'berith'; (Lev. 26:42) just as the salt affects the meat (i.e. purifies it) so does suffering destroy the sins of mankind."⁴

And just as we have seen in the case of Moses that the death of a great man atones for the sins of many, so do we find that the suffering of a great ~~man~~ serves a similar purpose. The following account of Job's suffering is illustrative of this: "When the Israelites marched out of Egypt, the angel Samael arose to ~~put~~ charges against

(1) Sabb. 33b

(2) Sota 14a

(3) Sifre to Ethhanan

(4) P. Amora 3rd C. Ber. 5a

them. This may be compared to a shepherd (as R. Chama b. Chanina explained in the name of his father) who led his flock over a stream and met with a wolf who fell upon them. The shepherd was experienced and hence what did he do? He took a large goat, and gave it to the wolf, and thought while the wolf is busy with this one, I shall lead the flock over the stream and later I shall reclaim the goat. Likewise the angel Samael arose, as the Israelites marched out of Egypt, in order to indict them. He (the angel) spoke before God: 'Master of the world! The Israelites until now have been idolaters and you are about to divide the Red Sea for them? What did God do? He turned over Job to him, one of the advisers of Pharaoh of whom it is said. 'He was a pious and just man' (Job 1:1) and he said unto him. 'He is in your power'. God thought while he is busy with Job, Israel will go into the ocean and go out again and afterward, I shall rescue Job. That also is the meaning of what Job said: 'I was at ease, but he has broken ~~me~~ asunder.' (Job 16:12) Job spoke: 'I was in the world and he broke me asunder and seized me by the neck and broke me asunder, in order to make me the target for his people, as it is said: 'And he made me a target for himself and he delivered me to a perverted God', that is he gave me into the power of Satan in order that Israel, if judgment is taken over them, shall not go forth as wicked. Therefore, he plunged me into his power, for such is the meaning of 'he gave me into the hand of the wicked' etc." (Job 16:11)¹ The same Rabbi asks: "Why was Moses buried opposite to Beth Pe' or? In order to atone for the wickedness of Beth Pe 'or."²

(1) P. Amora 3rd C. Ex. R. 21 to Ex. 14:6.

(2) Sota 14^a.

ORIGINAL SIN.

The picture of the potter working with soft clay serves as an excellent analogy to an ideal state of the freedom of will, if the potter represent man's will and the soft clay, the self to be moulded. If, however, the clay be in the shape of a vase and has become comparatively hard, and it was the potter's intention to fashion it into a jug, there arises a difficulty which cannot be altogether overcome. The latter analogy may also be applied to man. If he is neutral by birth, that is, neither good nor wicked, he may fashion his conduct without much difficulty, but if he brings with him into the world an "inherited or inborn sinfulness, or a state of disharmony or corruption produced once and for all in human nature by the first transgression (of Adam) and transmitted by inheritance to all the human race," then he finds himself in the position of the potter attempting to fashion or rather refashion clay which has lost some of its plasticity. This is the state of affairs which we must now consider, for there is in Talmudical Literature, contrary to much that has been said on the subject, a trend of thought which may well be called "original sin". Were it not for the fact that this idea is also found in Graeco-Jewish Literature, we would be tempted to say that it is due altogether to the idea of original sin and total depravity in early Christianity, for unlike many of the other ideas with which we are dealing, this idea is seldom found before the second century A.D. and found most frequently in the third, when the influence of rising Christianity came to be felt. There is no doubt in my mind that there is Christian influence in the Rabbinic conception of the original sin.¹ This hypothesis is strengthened by the

(1) P. Amora 3rd C. Deut. R. 9 to Deut. 31:14. (See note one - next page)
Bacher etc.

fact that all sayings on this subject are found in the name of Palestinian Amoraer, who came into contact and held disputations with the early Christians, while the Babylonian Amoraer of whom we have few or no original sin passages, did not come into contact with the early Christians. (Rabbi?)

The sin of Adam -- an act of free-will -- brought death not only to him, but unto the world. This is the substance of the doctrine of original sin, as it is found in Talmudical literature. A most characteristic statement is that of R. Levi: "Moses said: 'Master of the world! There are thirty-six sins which are punishable by excision ("Kareth") of which if a man transgress one of them, he is guilty of death; have I perhaps transgressed one of them? Why then do you bring death upon me? 'God answered: Because of the sin of the first man you are to die, because of him who brought death into the world.' "1 A statement of similar import is that of R. Jose: "If thou wishest to know the reward of the pious in the world to come, go and learn it from the first Adam, who had only been commanded one single law, which he transgressed. See how many deaths were decreed against him, and his generations, and against generations of his generations, to the end of his generations."2 Even the course of the planets was changed by Adam's sin. "Before Adam sinned the stars moved in a short course and with rapidity, but after he had sinned God directed them in a long course and with slowness."3

- (1) ^{Gen. R. 9} Bacher shares this view to some extent. Agada der Amoraer Vol. 11 p. 140.
- (2) Yalkut I 479. Similar statements by various Rabbis found Ex. R. 30 to Ex. 21:1. R. Abahy P. Amora 3rd C; R. Akiba 2nd. C. Gen. R. Gen. R. 19 on Gen. 3:7; Ex. R. 38 to Ex. 29:1; Sifra 27^a R. Jose 4th C. P. Amora; Tan. Gen. 1 (40); Gen. R. 16 to Gen. 2:16 R. Jacob of Chanin P. Amora 3rd and 4th C.
- (3) Gen. R. 10 on Gen. 2:1. R. Hosaya 3rd C.

A very unique statement is that which associates the original sin with the serpent: "Four died through the decrees of the serpent, Benjamin, the son of Jacob, Amram, the father of Moses, Jesse the father of David and Kilab, the son of David."¹ They themselves did not sin, but died because of the sin of Adam.

There is also a suggestion of inherent damnation in the following story told of R. Akiba: "Titinius Rufus said to R. Akiba: 'If your God loves the poor why doesn't he care for their sustenance'? In order that through our deeds toward them we may be saved from Hell,' he answered. 'but', said he, 'in this way you will all the more certainly fall therein, for if a King put the penalty of death over his slaves, and someone attempted secretly to save them, would he not be punished'? 'But we are not slaves, but sons of God', answered Akiba, 'and if a King put the penalty of death by hunger over his son, and someone secretly put some food near him and saved him from death, would the King punish him? Certainly not! So it with the Isrealites'" (Deut. 14:1 "Children are ye to the Eternal your God.")²

In addition to the original sin due to Adam, there is another due to the Golden Calf. In the Midrash the Revelation at Sinai is regarded as having heralded a new era of innocence.³ The sin of the Golden Calf, in this light, becomes very significant in that it is the first blot on the second age of innocence and becomes a renewed cause for death. There are many parallels to the statement: "There is not a misfortune that Isreal has suffered which does not

(1) B.B. 17^a; Sabb. 55^b

(2) B.B. 9,

(3) Gen. R. 21 (end) to Gen. 4:24; Sabb. 146a; Yeb. 103b; Ab. 2.22b.

contain a small ingredient (literally 1/24 of a litra) of retribution for the sin of the Golden Calf.¹ There are, on the otherhand, a larger number of statements to the effect that man does not come into the world with an original sin, that is, as a moral bankrupt. "The Rabbis in the name of R. Chanina bar Idi and R. Pinchas and R. Chilkia in the name of R. Simon understand $\aleph \kappa \nu$ in Gen. 1:31 "God saw all that he had made and behold it was very good to mean that man is good (by birth) for $\aleph \kappa \nu$ and $\aleph \kappa \nu$ have the same letters and hence the same value numerically." ² R. Chanina bar Dosa also refutes any original sin idea by the laconic statement: "It is not the serpent that kills but the sin in us"³ (i.e. the sin we ourselves commit) There is a statement in Tanchuma to the effect that "when all the pious are permitted to behold the Schechinah before their death, they reproach Adam (as they pass him by at the gate) for having brought death upon them; to which he replies: 'I died with but one sin, but you have committed many; on account of these you have died, not on my account'." The idea underlying this is that often expressed "there is no death without sin."⁴

The original sin, according to some Rabbis, who admit its reality, is not universal or all-inclusive for "over six the angel of death had no power. Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Aaron and Miriam, who died by the death kiss," ⁵ Furthermore, the original sin has been overcome and therefore can be overcome. "The effect of the passion (with which Eve was infected by the serpent) came to an end with the Israelites who stood at the foot of Mount Sinai at the Revelation; with the heathen who did not stand at the foot of Sinai, the effect is not yet nullified."⁶

- (1) R. Isaac San 102^a Ex. R. 32; Ecc. R. to 9:11.
- (2) Gen. R. 8 to Gen. 1:26.
- (3) Ber. 33^a; Ex. R. 3 on Ex. 4:3.
- (4) Sabb. 55^a.
- (5) B.B. 17^a.
- (6) Yeb. 103^b; Ab. Z. 22^b, Sabb. 146^a. R. Jose P. Amora 4th C. Gen. R. 21 (end) to Gen. 4:24.

The result of our investigation of the idea of original sin has shown it to be present in Talmudical Literature in a small degree, "but like an unfinished railway track, it was brought to an abrupt and untimely end in a siding on the very brink of a precipice, which led to loss of self control and moral disaster". The only result of Adam's sin found in this realm of Jewish thought, and which was possibly influenced by Christian teaching, is death for the whole human race, not a diminished freedom of the will in any matter save death; not even the evil "yezer" was given a permanent superiority over the good "yezer" by Adam's sin and the worship of the golden calf.

"MERITS OF THE FATHERS".

The optimism of the Rabbinic spirit becomes manifest in a study of the "Merit of the Fathers". While original sin in Judaism is confined to the sin of Adam and the generation of the Golden Calf and a few other isolated persons, it is more than counterbalanced by the "Merit of the Fathers", which could equally as truly be called, original virtue, and which has its source not only in the virtues of the past, but also in the virtues of the present, and furthermore draws upon those of the future. A virtuous ancestor, a virtuous contemporary, or even a virtuous descendent, because for the Omniscient One, The future is as real as the past or present - - may become the source of present blessing. Sin imputed virtue, as also does its opposite imputed sin, theoretically limit man's freedom to a certain extent, but one cannot read much of Rabbinic Literature dealing with this phase of our problem without realizing that the Rabbis felt that original sin and original virtue do not disturb or infringe upon man's freedom.

The merit that falls to the lot of a human being because of a virtuous ancestor is by far the most popular. Especially is this so of the three patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. "Because of the merit of Abraham, God created the world. - - - Because of the merit of Isaac, since he willingly offered himself on the Altar, God in the future will resurrect the dead"¹, etc. The covenant made with Abraham and renewed with Isaac and Jacob is frequently referred to. "Even though the Israelites in this generation have not con-

(1) Pesikta K. 100^b.

ducted themselves as is proper, yet have I heard their sighs because of the covenant I made with their fathers, as it says, 'And I remembered my covenant'".¹ The mere mention of the "merit of the fathers" (the patriarchs) on Rosh Hashona will clear Israel from all guilt.² Though Moses was, as we shall see, sufficiently worthy for later generations to receive blessing through him, yet he too was dependent upon the merit of Abraham. "The Torah was given to Moses as a present. At that time the ministering angels wished to get at Moses, but God made his features similar to Abraham's, and spoke to the angels: 'Are you not ashamed in his presence? Is he not the one to whom you condescended and in whose house you have eaten?' 'God spoke to Moses: 'The Torah is given to you only because of the merit of Abraham'".³

There is also such a thing as the "merit of the mothers"; this includes Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel and Leah.⁴ If both the merit of the fathers and that of the mothers is on the decline, people are admonished to hope for the Grace of God.⁵

Moses, Aaron and Miriam also left blessing behind them. The following passage has reference to the former two. In commenting on the verse "This month shall be for you the beginning of months" (Ex. 12:2) in connection with the verse: "They are the two appointed ones who stand before the master of the whole earth" (Zach. 4:14) R. Levi said: "From this it may be inferred that God thought the matter over, where with Israel is to be redeemed, until finally he found the merit of Moses and Aaron, which stood by them; that is the significance of the "two appointed ones". To what may this be compared? To a king who wished to wed, and to whom the chosen maiden was introduced as poor, possessing only two nose-rings. In like manner God spoke: 'It is already sufficient for

(1) Ex. R. 6 to Ex. 6:4.

(2) Lev. R. 29

(3) Ex. R. 28 to Ex. 19:3.

(4) Sifra 112 C.

(5) Lev. R. 36; Jer. San. 27^b

Israel that they will be redeemed in looking back to the merit of Moses and Aaron; therefore we read: 'And the Eternal spoke to (that is, in consideration of the merit of) Moses and Aaron.'¹

The merit of a virtuous contemporary is well illustrated in a passage we have already quoted. Since no man is completely pious or complete wicked, he is to be judged according to the majority of his deeds.² So also must the world be judged; since the whole world is neither altogether pious or altogether wicked, it is judged according to the moral status of the majority of people. And if the world should chance to be evenly balanced - - and man should always so consider it - - then one righteous man, that is one man whose righteous deeds are in excess of his wicked ones, may save the whole world. In this way a righteous contemporary brings blessing to all in his generations,³ for "all Israel are responsible for one another."⁴

The fact that a virtuous descendant will arise from a person is sufficient to plead in his favor. The Holy One, blessed be He, dealt kindly with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the patriarchs or fathers because of the merit of their descendants. In like manner Noah was saved, because of his childrens' merit.⁵ The inter-dependence of the past upon the future and of the future upon the past is strikingly brought out in many passages. We have seen above that Moses was given the Torah because of the merit of his ancestor Abraham, and now it is interesting to note that Abraham was given possession of the land because of the merit of his descendants, who in the future would bring the first sheaf of their harvest before the Lord.⁶ The

(1) Ex. R. 15 to Ex. 12:2 R. Levi P. Amora 3rd C. Passages of this kind may be multiplied with ease.

(2) Kidd. 40^b and Ecc. R. to Ecc. 10:1.

(3) The following are a few of the more important passages of this kind: Gen. R. 49; Chulin 92^a; Sifra 88^a. Yoma 38^b.

(4) Lev. R. 4; Tan. (B) 5:25 A Tan. 3:21^a; Shebuoth 39^a & b.; Sifra 91^c; Sabb. 55^a; Jer. Sota 21^b; Ex.R. 27.

(5) Gen. R. 29.

(6) San. 104^a.

interesting passage in connection with the giving of the Torah also bears testimony to this somewhat peculiar phenomenon. God asked the people what they would give as pledge for the Torah. And one thing after the other was refused until they offered their children and their the Torah was given.

The merit of the fathers and its opposite original sin both infringe upon freedom in like manner and in like degree. But in so far as this belongs to the purely theological aspect of the problem of freedom, and may be and has been solved theologically by the dogmatic statement, "yet freedom is given". In discussing these subjects, the Rabbis were not conscious of any obstacle these put in the way of freedom and in their truly human and inconsistent was declared that above all man is free.

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Grace.

The idea of grace has much in common with the "merit of the fathers" in its bearing on the subject of the freedom of the will. It too represents an "unearned increment," for it is an act of kindness on the part of God toward man who is unworthy of it. Grace, must therefore, not only be classified under the theological aspect of the problem of freedom, but also as an anti-philosophic postulate. Dogmatism and dogmatism alone can account for its existence.

The question of "justification by faith" played a very insignificant role in Rabbinic thought. The often quoted saying of R. Akiba: "The world is judged by grace, yet all is according to the amount of the work," may have read according to some of the Mss. "and not according to the amount of the work."⁽¹⁾ The second reading makes this passage altogether different from the first, and a clear example of grace, which infringes upon man's freedom. For individuals or nations are mysteriously chosen without merit or effort on their part. Even though a few Rabbis, like R. Jose b. Chalafta, claim that God chooses and brings near unto him those who are worthy,⁽²⁾ the majority of Rabbis say nothing about merit and attribute the act of election or selection on the part of God as an act of grace. In this way is the election of Israel usually explained.⁽³⁾ Even Revelation is an act of grace; the Torah was given by God as an act of mercy,⁽⁴⁾ to a world totally unworthy of it yet altogether dependent upon it.⁽⁵⁾

(1) See Taylor: Sayings of the Jewish Fathers. Appendix 152.

(2) Num. R. 3 and parallels.

(3) Tan. 8.

(4) Mechilta 66 b.

(5) Gen. R. 6.

According to many Rabbis the evil 'yezer' can be conquered through words of the Torah, yet between the lines we can feel that these are not sufficient; man needs Divine help as the following prayer shows: "Lord of the worlds: it is open and known to thee that it is our will to do thy will. And what hinders? The leaven in the dough (ie. the 'yezer' in man) and servitude under the world kingdoms. May it be thy will to humble these before us (and that thou remove the evil yezer from us and humble it out of our heart) that we may fulfill thy will again with a perfect heart."⁽⁶⁾ The idea underlying this is that the words of the Torah without God's Grace are insufficient to overcome the evil yezer, while the words of the Torah with grace are sufficient to overcome the evil yezer.⁽⁷⁾ This need of grace to overcome the evil 'yezer', implies that God is responsible for the evil yezer, which fact has already been brought out in the chapter dealing with the 'yezer'. Some Rabbis make even repentance dependent upon the grace of God.

The most significant point for our interest in the subject of Grace is that many Rabbis held that man must show himself worthy of God's grace before it is bestowed upon him. This emphasizes man's power of perfecting himself and is very little less than a declaration for freedom. "Every day," said Simon b. Lakish, "the 'yezer' of man assaults him and endeavors to kill him, and but for the Holy one, blessed be He, who helps man he could not resist him."⁽⁸⁾ The general atmosphere about passages of this kind tends to point to the fact that man must show himself worthy of this Divine interference which grace undoubtedly is. This is more clearly brought out in such sayings as: "He who draws near to God is helped by God to draw near."⁽⁹⁾

(6) R. Alexandri. P. Amora 4th C. Ber. 16 b.

(7) See also Mid. T. 119:27; Deut. R. 4 to 12:20 (Resistance of Joseph due to God's grace.)

(8) Suce 52 b.

And such as that of Simeon b. Lakish: "For one who wishes to become defiled, the gate is opened, but one who wishes to be purified, is helped."⁽¹⁰⁾ "If a man resists the same temptation, twice, God helps him the third time," after he has shown himself worthy of God's Grace.⁽¹¹⁾

The following story which further illustrates the idea of Grace is told both about R. Meir and R. Akiba, with but slight variations in the details. Each "mocked at the idea of one's incapacity for self-mastery. One day Satan appeared to him in the form of a woman upon the top of a palm-tree. R. Akiba was about to climb upon it. Thereupon Satan said: 'Were it not that in Heaven it was decreed concerning you: Be careful with Rabbi Akiba and his Torah (learning) I would not have given anything for your life'." ⁽¹²⁾ These stories also have the idea of predestination in them, and both elements, grace and predestination limit man's freedom. The Rabbinic treatment of grace, however, limits it very little in that man must for the most part prove himself worthy of God's grace, which in a way is self-contradictory. This very contradiction or inconsistency, ~~and~~ moreover, is significant in that it ^{paves} ~~paves~~ the way for freedom and responsibility, in what would otherwise be a rigid determinism or an inflexible predestination.

(9) Sifre Num. 78.

(10) Yal. to Pr. 3: Yoma 38 b;

(11) Sabb. 104 a; Sifre 91 a; Jer. Kidd. 61 d; Pesikta 161 a; ab.Z. 55 a Jer. Peah 1 a.

(12) Kidd. 81 a.

Torah and Free-Will.

The place and the influence of the Torah in Jewish life and thought is beyond estimation. It is here intended to give only such examples of this vast store house of thought as are connected with the subject of free-will. It has been deemed best to place it among the anti-philosophic postulates of this treatment, because many of the Rabbis of old felt that the law of the Torah and the natural law should be in harmony. This is clearly theological rather than philosophical. "There is no freedom except through the Torah,"¹ say the Rabbis again and again. As an amplification of this thought we have the saying of R. Nehunya in the name of R. Jochanan b. Zakkai: "who-soever receives upon himself the yoke of the Torah, from him the yoke of the kingdom and of worldly care will be removed; but whosoever breaks off from him the yoke of the Torah, upon him will be laid the yoke of the kingdom and the yoke of worldly care."²

The Torah may well be called an antidote for sin. In commenting on the words. "That ye remember and to all my commandments and be holy unto your God" (num. 15:40) the Rabbis say: "Heart and eyes are two middle-men of sin in the body leading man astray. The matter is to be compared to a man drowning in water, to whom the ship-master threw out a rope, saying unto him: 'Hold fast to this rope, for if you permit it to escape thee, there is no life for thee.' Likewise, the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Israel: 'As long as you cling to my laws, you cleave unto the Lord your God. (which means life)

- - - - - Be therefore holy for as long as you fulfill my commandments, you are sanctified, but if you neglect them, you will become profaned.'" (3) Rabban Gamaliel modifies the idea that the

(1) Lev. R. 18; Song of Songs R. 37; Aboth 6:2 Joshua 6 Levi P. Amora 3rd c: see also Ex. R. 41 to Ex 31:2
(2) Aboth 3:6; Statements of similar kind and bearing on the subject of freedom: Raba B. Amora 4th C; Sota 21a; Ber. 31a; Pesi 8a; Kidd 1:1
(3) R. Simeon b. Yochai, Tana 2nd C. Num. R. 17 (End); similar passage Ex. R. 41 (end)

Torah is an antidote to sin and insists that the Torah and work together are necessary to accomplish this end. "An excellent thing" said he, "is the study of the Torah combined with some worldly occupation, for the labor demanded by them both makes sin to be forgotten. All study of the Torah without work must in the end be futile and become the cause ~~for~~ sin." (4) But most of the Rabbis do not so qualify their statements in regard to the power of the Torah. Torah and sin are incompatible; where there is Torah, there can be no sin and where there is sin there can be no Torah. In fact "the beginning of sin comes during sleep, for when one is asleep one is not occupied with the words of the Torah." (5) This represents a deep psychological truth and the freest man is the man who is busiest and who has most responsibilities. The lazy man or the idler is not truly free because only "he whose heart is absorbed in the words of the Torah removes thereby from himself the thoughts (insinuated by the evil inclination), such as sword, famine, folly, adultery," etc. (6) As a further proof that the Torah and the evil 'yezer' are incompatible, the Rabbis say: "the law (ie. the Torah) is called a stone (Ex. 24: 12) and the evil 'yezer' is called a stone. (Ezek. 36:26) One stone shall guard the other stone. (7)

Possibly the most interesting phase of this aspect of the subject under discussion is that already touched upon in the treatment of the evil inclination. Evil, it will be remembered, is a reality as well as good, and both are preconditions of morality. One of the ways in which the evil 'yezer' may be overcome is through the Torah.

(4) Aboth 2:2 Tana 3rd C. 1st part.

(5) Sifre 82 b; Gen. R. 17 on Gen. 2:19 R. Joshua of Sichnin in the name of R. Meir.

(6) Ab. d. R. N. 35 b. (Schech. Ed. version 1. Ch. 20) R. Chaninah 1st C.

(7)

"God said to Israel: 'My children I have created within you the evil yezer, but I have also created the Torah. As long as you are busy with it, the yezer will have no power over you.'" (8) In fact "as often as the words of the Torah find the chambers of the heart empty, they enter and dwell therein. And the evil 'yezer' has no dominion over these, and no man can remove them (the words of the Torah) from its midst. It may be compared to a king who was walking by the way and found some empty rooms and took possession of them and no man was able to get him out. In like manner as often as the words of the Torah find the rooms of the heart empty, they enter and dwell there and no man can get them out." (9) And finally the law or the Torah as a remedy for the evil 'yezer' is most interestingly brought out by a Tanaitic explanation of the words "ye shall take these my words to your heart" (Deut. 10:6) which are interpreted to mean that "the law is a remedy for the evil inclination. (אשר יקח "ye shall take" is broken up into אשר אשר "a perfect remedy"). It is comparable to a father who smote his son severely and then put a plaster upon the wound and said to him: 'My son, as long as the plaster is on your wound, you may eat and drink what you please; you may wash in warm water or in cold, and need have no fear. But if you take it away, an evil ulcer will come forth.' So God said to the Israelites: 'My children I created the evil 'yezer,' but I also created the law for it as a remedy. If you are occupied with the law you shall not be delivered into its hands, but if you neglect the law, you will fall

(8) Sifre Deut 45; Kidd. 306; In B. B. 16a Raba B. Amora 4th C.

Similar passages Erubin 64 a; Rabbi, Temura 16a, Mechilla on 18:27 (60a); R. Jochanan in name of R. Bana'ah Ab.Z. 56. End of 2nd C and beg. of 3rd.

(9) Ab. d. R. N. 15b. Ch.3 (Schechter Ed. ver.2); also Mid. Mistle 24.

into its power. Yet if you will you can rule over it.'" (10)

(Gen. 4:7) The study of the Torah may also serve as a means of atonement. 11

These statements are all very significant for the subject of freedom, for whether the Torah be a kind of a "Logos," or the work of a Divine Being or a human product, its power becomes manifest only through the human being's freedom in "laying hold of it."

(10) Kidd. 30 b; B. B. 16 a.

(11) Sifre. Deut 30 b, Sifre 1 B 1 b etc.

P R E D E S T I N A T I O N .

It has been deemed best to treat the subject of predestination under the theological aspect of the problem of freedom. Though it might have been equally well treated under the theistic aspect of determinism as a cosmological problem. In bringing this thesis to a close with a subject such as this, it must be borne in mind that predestination represents not the trunk of the tree of Rabbinic thought, but merely an offshoot from one of its branches. Predestination should not be confused with the idea of fate, for the latter represents a blind force to which both God and men are subject, while the former postulates the infinite mind of God as the source from which all things flow. Man cannot alter this Divine plan to which he must submit willingly or unwillingly. This helplessness on the part of man is clearly brought out in the comment of Rabbis make on the verse. "Oh Lord, why hast thou made us to err from thy ways and hardened our heart from thy fear". (Is.63:17) They plead in favor of the brothers of Joseph in the word: "When thou Oh God didst choose, thou didst make them love; when thou didst choose thou didst make them hate".¹ Ben Azzai expressed a similar thought: "By thine own name will they call thee, in thy place will they seat thee, of Thine own will they give thee. No one can touch anything that is destined for another; no kingdom can extend a hair's breadth against another".²

(1) Gen. R. 18.

(2) Yoma 38^a. Tana 2nd C.

More interesting, however, is the re-interpretation given to a saying found in various places in the Talmud: "The feet of man lead him where he ~~wills~~ to go".¹ This is a clear statement of freedom, and a late Palestinian Amora makes it read: "The feet of man lead him where he is destined to go, as is seen in the case of Ahab, who was destined to die not in his own house, but in Ramoth Gilead, (I.K. 22:20) went in spite of the warning of the prophets and fell there", etc.² Man is helpless before the predetermined will of God, as the following saying of R. Isaac illustrates: "God said to Abimelech: 'For I also withheld thee from sinning against me, therefore suffered I thee not to touch her. It is to be compared to a strong man riding on a horse. But there was a child lying on the road which was thus in danger of being run over. But the man drove the horse, so that it avoided the child. The praise in this case is certainly due to the rider, not to the horse. In a similar way, Abimelech claimed a special merit for not having sinned.. But God said to him: 'The yezer who cause you to sin is in my power, and it was I who drew thee away from sin, hence the praise is mine not thine.'³" As the rider of the analogy represents God and the horse, man, this is a clear case of predestination. Similarly in all passages, where man charges God with having been responsible for his crimes. We have evidence of predestination in Talmudical Literature. "It is a thing hard to say and impossible for the mouth to utter it," said R. Simeon b. Yochai in regard to Cain's murder of Abel, for "it is to be compared to two athletes, who were wrestling in the presence of the King. If the King wills, he can have them separated; but the King does not will so; (in the end) one overwhelm-

(1) Succ. 53^a; Macc. 10^b; Jer. Kilayim 32^c, etc.

(2) R. Jona 4th C. Kethuboth 35^b. *Jerush. = Kil. 32^c !*

(3) Gen. R. 20; 52; Pesikta (K) 176^b P. Amora 3rd C.

ed the other and killed him, and the dying man shouted: 'Who can now demand justice for me, since the King himself was present and could have prevented it.'¹ In like manner God and not Israel is responsible for the Golden Calf sin.² God is in the arbiter of human fate and fortune. In many passages he is pictured as making ladders on which he causes some to ascend and others to descend.³

According to R. Abdimi b. Chama b. Chosa, even revelation was not due to an act of free-will, but was forced upon Israel. In commenting on: "And they stood at the foot of the mountain," (Ex. 19:7) he says: "From this is to be inferred that the Holy One blessed be he, held the mountain over them like a pail and said: 'If you accept the Torah, well and good, if not then, here is your grave.'"⁴

"There is no great and no small" before the infinite mind who is the sole arbiter of the universe. From the smallest and most insignificant to the largest and most far-reaching of events, all happens according to his will. In fact "no man even injures his finger here below unless predetermined from above".⁵ And "even if a plague rage for seven years, yet no one will die before his appointed hour."⁶ Referring to the first day of the seventh month Rab says in prayer: "This day is the beginning of thy work recalling the first day, 'for it is a statute unto Israel', etc. On this

(1) Gen. R. 22 to Gen. 4:9; an extremely interesting variation of this is found in Tan. on Gen. 4:9.

(2) Yoma 86^b, R. Jannai, P. Amora 2nd and 3rd C.; San. 102^a; R. Chama b. Chaninah P. Amora 3rd C.

(3) Gen. R. 68 on Gen. 28:10. R. Jose b. Chalaphtha T. 2nd C.; Num. R. 22; Pesikta 11^b; Tan. Num. 18.^a

(4) B. Amora 3rd & 4th C. Sabb. 88^a; Ab. Z. 2^b.

(5) Chulin 7^b; Ab. Z. 54. R. Chanina T. 1st C.

(6) San. 29^a; Yeb. 114 b. R. Asi, P. Amora 3rd and 4th C.

Hal. - T. 2+3 P.

day it is decreed over all lands: Who are to fall by the sword, and who shall enjoy peace, who shall become prey to famine, and who shall enjoy plenty; and on the same day the people are considered for enrollment for life or for death, etc."¹ Certain times and places are predetermined for good or for evil and man partakes of it while there without having known beforehand, what the time and place would have in store for him so that he could have remained away from that place; from time, of course, there is no escape. This is given a concrete setting in the case of Jeroboam and Rehoboam by R. Jose.² "Even the serpent does not bite, the lion does not tear to pieces, and the government does not declare war, unless whispered from above."³ In another passage the serpent apologetically says: "Is it possible that I do anything that I am not commanded from above."⁴

Probably the most familiar saying in connection with predestination is that of R. Eleazar Ha-Kappar: "Those who are born are destined to die, the dead to revive, and the living to be judged; to know and make known that he is the framer and he the creator, and and discernor, and the judge and the witness and the plaintiff, and that he is about to judge; with him there is no iniquity, no forgetfulness, no respect of persons, no taking of bribe for all is his and know that all is according to the reckoning. Let not thine 'yezer' assure thee that the grave is a place of refuge for thee,

(1) Lev. R. 29 to Lev. 23:24. Also Tan. Ex. 38:21.

(2) See passage San. 102^a.

(3) Ecc. R. 10:11 Abba b. Kahana F. Amora 4th C.

(4) Lev. R. 26 to 21:1; R. Simeon b. Yochai T. 2nd C.

for perforce wast thou framed and perforce wast thou born, and perforce thou livest and perforce thou diest, and perforce art about to give account and reckoning before the King of Kings, the Holy One, blessed be he".¹

Possibly, the most striking passage of predestination in Talmudical Literature is that told of R. Eleazar b. Pedath who "was in straightened circumstances. He once bled and had nothing to eat with the exception of garlic, which he put into his mouth. He became weak and fell asleep. When the Rabbis came to visit him, they saw him cry and laugh in his sleep and a beam of light came forth from his forehead. When he awoke they asked him: 'Why did you cry and why did you laugh?' He answered: 'The Holy One, blessed be He, sat with me and I asked him how long I shall have to suffer in this world?' 'My son, Eleazar', he answered, 'is it right that I should overturn the world, that perhaps you might be born in a more favorable hour?'"² Somewhat similar to this is the astronomical predestination of Raba who said: "Duration of life, progeny and subsistence are dependent upon the constellations."³ In this way the prosperity of the wicked and the suffering of the righteous were often explained.

Similarly, death is not due to the sin of Adam but is one of those things which were predetermined. "Death was predetermined for human beings, therefore, the serpent was of necessity bound to come entice the first people to sin; the flood had to come since Noah was destined to be a rescued one; Isaac's eyes became dim as Jacob was destined to have the blessing and as Jacob was destined for exile in Egypt it was necessary for Joseph to go before." etc.⁴ This leads

(1) Abath 4:22.

(2) Taanith 25^a.

(3) B. Amora 4th C. M.K. 28^a.

(4) Tan. to Ex. . .

most naturally to the subject of historical determinism which is frequently found in Rabbinic Literature. In looking back over the course of history, the Rabbis often felt that history followed a pre-determined plan. This is true of individuals as well as nations.¹ In commenting on Ecc. 1:5. "And the sun rises and the sun sets", R. Abba b. Kahana said: "Do we not already know that the sun rises and sets? This means to say, before God permits the sun of the righteous one to set, he permits the sun of another righteous one to arise; on the day in which R. Akiba died, Rabbi was born, and on the day Rabbi died, R. Ada B. Ahaba was born; on the day he died R. Abun was born and on the day he died his son R. Abin was born, on the day he died R. Abba Hosaja from Tirga was born. Before the sun of Moses set, the sun of Joshua arose (Num. 27:18); before the sun of Joshua set, the sun of Othniel b. Kenas shone (Judge 1:13); before the sun of Eli set, the sun of Samuel shone; (1S.3:3) and before the sun of Sarah set, the sun of Rebecca arose in heaven."² (Gen.22:1). Nations also are subject to this Divine predestination, as shown by the fact that "God showed to Jacob the princes of Babylon rising and falling, similarly those of Media, Greece, and Edom. He spoke to Jacob: 'You also will rise.' In this hour our father Jacob feared for he thought, perhaps I shall fall as they did. Thereupon God spoke to him: Fear not, for when you arise, you shall not sink forever.'³ He, however, had no faith in it and therefore did not arise."³ In like manner Israel's election was decreed from eternity.⁴

The Rabbis did not believe as do many people today that marriage is a result of chance, but believed that God arranged matches during his leisure hours. "A lady asked R. Jose b. Chalaphtha: 'In

(1) A most excellent illustration but too long to quote in found in Semachath Ch. 8 (end) Tanaitic.²

(2) Gen. R. 58 to 23:1 R. Abba b. Kahana P. -mora 4th C., also Yoma 38^b

(3) Lev. R. 29 Tanaitic also Mid. R. on Ex. 31.

(4) San. 97 b - 98 a.

how many days did God create his world'? He answered: 'In six days as it says in Ex. 31:17 ("for in six days God created heaven and earth") She answered: 'What did and what does he do from then until now?' He answered: 'He arranged matches; (marriages) he destines the wife of so and so for so and so, the daughter of so and so for so and so, the property of so and so for so and so.' 'That I too can do', she continued. 'How many man-servants and how many maid-servants have I? I can (marry them one to another) tie them all up in an hour.' The Rabbi answered: 'even if it is a small matter in thine eyes, before God it is as difficult as dividing the Red Sea.' He departed from her and went on his way. What did she do? She had her thousand man-servants and thousand maid-servants come before her, placed them in rows and spoke: 'This one marry that one and that one marry this one'. In short she married them off in one night. In the morning they came to her, the one was wounded, the other had his eye knocked out, the third had his shoulder crushed, the fourth had his knee broken and said: 'I do not want that one', and that one said: 'I do not want this one?' The lady immediately sent for R. Jose and said to him: 'Rabbi, your learning is true, beautiful and excellent and all you said has proved true."¹ etc., etc.

Predestination is a mere by-way of Rabbinic thought, not the high-way for there is in general a decided stand against predestination as has already become evident again and again through the course of this thesis. Yet we cannot, however, resist the temptation of quotating a very striking and clear cut and typical refutation. "The women who say: 'Our children need not go to school, for to whom God has predestined for knowledged will have it anyway', make a mistake for it says in Is. 28. 'According to justice shall he be taught, his God will inform him.'"²

(1) Lev. R. 8 to Lev. 6:8; Num. R. '3 P. -mora 3rd C. Also M.K.18^a.

(2) Jer. Challah 1^a.

CONCLUSION.

The results of this study have shown that free-will was as much ~~as~~ a problem to the Rabbis of old as it is to us today. They were conscious of the limitations of man's freedom, yet by emphasizing those elements, which are in the power of man, and modifying those which are above and beyond his reach, The Rabbis showed that they believed in the freedom of the will. Heredity, an obstacle to freedom, they treated theologically and ignored the difficulty; habit they treated more scientifically than any other subject. The Rabbis' belief in freedom stands out clearly when they assert it alongside of God's prescience and claim the latter is not causative. The fact that man can improve upon his past argues strongly for his freedom. Repentance, "imitatio dei", commands, admonition and retribution, all have no meaning without freedom, and these play by far the most important role in Rabbinic thought. Contrary to what one would expect, freedom of the will in Rabbinic Literature finds most of its support from the philosophical rather than from the theological aspect.

An historical classification of the material collected for this thesis brought out nothing but what has already been indicated in the foregoing pages. The pros and cons of the problem differ but little in the various periods of history from which the sources are derived. —

(See Appendix next page).

The following represent the most important passages on which the conclusions of this thesis have been based. Some single references contain as many as ten passages.

Aboth 1:1	Gen.R. on 70 (several passages)
" 1:2	Ex. R. 3 " "
" 1:5	" " 4:13 - 14
" 1:7	" " 6
" 1:9	" " 11
" 1:10	" " 12
" 1:12 - 14	" " 13
" 1:12 - 22	" " 13:4
" 2:13	" " 15
" 2:14	" " 21
" 2:16	" " 27
" 2:17	" " 28
" 3:1	" " 30 (several passages)
" 3:5	Ex.R.onEx.31
" 3:6	" " " 32
" 3:13	" " " 38
" 3:14	" " " 41 (end)
" 3:15	" " " 43
" 3:16	" " " 45
" 3:17 (Several passages)	" " " 46
" 4:1	" " " 46:4
" 4:2	Lev.R. 8
" 4:4	" " 9
" 4:6	" " 14
" 4:9	" " 15
" 4:13	" " 16
" 4:15	" " 18 (several passages)
" 4:22	" " 19
" 5:20	" " 21
" 6:2	" " 23
Men. 29b	" " 24 (several passages)
Chulin 7b	" " 26 " "
Biddah 16	" " 27 " "
" 16b	" " 29
" 30b	" " 35
Semach 8(end)	" " 36
Gen.R.on 1:9	Num.R. 3 (several passages)
" " 8 (several passages)	" " 9
" " 9:7	" " 10
" " on 1:9	" " 10:7
" " 9	" " 13
" " 9:7	" " 14
" " 6	" " 15
" " 10	" " 16 " "
" " 14	" " 17 " "
" " 16	" " 18
" " 17	" " 19 (end)
" " 18	" " 20
" " 19	Deut.R. 2 (several passages)
" " 21 (several passages)	" " 4 " "
" " 22 " "	" " 5 " "
" " 27 " "	" " 6 " "
" " 29 " "	" " 9
" " 30 " "	" " 32
" " 33 " "	Ecclec.R. 2
" " 34 " "	to 3:11
" " 48 " "	4:13-14
" " 49 " "	4:15
" " 52 " "	6:7
" " 53 " "	9:8
" " 54 " "	9:11
" " 56 " "	9:14-15
	10:1
	10:11

Ber. 5a (several passages)
 " 7a " "
 " 9:5(Mishnah)
 " 16a
 " 16b
 " 17a
 " 23a
 " 29b
 " 31a
 " 32a
 " 33a
 " 33b
 " 35b
 " 40a
 " 61a (several passages)
 " 61b " "
 Kil. 32a
 " 32b
 " 44
 " 54b
 " 55a
 " 55b
 Sabb. 65a
 " 78a
 " 88a (several passages)
 " 89a
 " 100b
 " 104a
 " 105b
 " 133b (several passages)
 " 146a
 " 153a
 Erub. 13b
 " 54a
 Pes. 8a
 " 54a
 Yoma 35b (several passages)
 " 38b " "
 " 38a " "
 " 39a " "
 " 69b
 " 69b-70b
 " 86b (several passages)
 " 87a
 Succ. 29a
 " 30a
 " 52a
 " 52b (several passages)
 " 53a " "
 Bezah 15b 216a
 Taanit 2a - b
 " 9a
 " 25a
 " 11 Ho
 Hor. 10b
 Meg. 13b
 " 25a
 M.K. 16b
 " " 17a
 " " 18b
 " " 28 (Several passages)
 Chag. 5a
 " 15a
 " 16a (Several passages)

Chulin 92a
 Temura 16a
 Shevuoth 39a- b.
 Yeb. 103a
 " 105a
 Kethub 30b (Several passages)
 " 35b
 Ned. 9b
 " 32b
 " 39b
 Sota 1a
 " 3a
 " 8a
 " 9a
 " 14a
 " 21a
 " 47a
 " 47b
 " 127a
 Kidd. 1:10 (Mishnah)
 " 30b
 " 39b (several passages)
 " 40 " "
 " 40a " "
 " 40b " "
 " 61a " "
 B.K. 60a
 E.B. 8
 " 9
 " 10b
 " 16a
 " 17a
 San. 22a
 " 27b
 " 29a
 " 37b
 " 38a
 " 39a
 " 43b
 " 57
 " 64a
 " 74a (several passages)
 " 90a
 " 97b -
 " 98a
 " 98b
 " 100 a - b
 " 102a
 " 103b (several passages)
 " 105a
 " 111b " "
 Macc. 10b
 " 24a
 Ab.Z. 2b
 " " 4b
 " " 4b - 5a
 " " 5a
 " " 5b
 " " 19a
 " " 17a - b
 " " 22b (several passages)
 " " 54
 " " 55a

Ruth R. 6
 S.ofS.R to 1:2
 Song of S. R. to 2:4
 " " " " 16
 " " " " 37
 " " " to 6:11.
 Mid. T. 1:22
 " " 9:5
 " " 34:2
 " "to 36:3
 " " 41:2
 " " 90:16
 " " 119:27
 " " to Ps: 119:113
 Mid. Pr. 24
 Yal.Deut. 1
 Yal.Deut.11:26
 " " 333
 Yal. Gen. 90
 " to Gen. 825
 " " Kings (p) 763
 " " Is. 48
 " " Ps. 890
 " " Hosea 14
 " " Hosea 14 (532 End)
 " " Haggim 672
 " Job. 895
 Sifra 15 b
 " 35 a
 " 57 b
 " 86 c
 " 88 a
 " 91
 " 91 a
 Sifre 9 b (several passages)
 " 24 a
 " 30
 " 31 b
 " 32 b
 " 32(Ethanan)
 " 45
 " 73 a
 " 78 (Num)
 " 82 b
 " 85 a
 " 86 A
 " 93 a
 " 131 b
 " 132 a
 " 136 a
 " 143 b (several passages)
 749
 " to Num 6:24
 " Deut 1
 " " 6:5
 " " 6:6
 " " 53-4
 " " 80 b
 " " 96
 " " 136 a
 Mechilta to Ex. 13:2
 " " " 14:29
 " " " 14:31--15:1
 " on Ex. 17:1
 " to Ex. 20:5-6
 Mechilta to 35 b

Mechilta 37 a
 " 46 b to Ex 15:26
 " 59 a
 " 60 a
 " 66 b
 " 98 a
 Tan. Gen. 3:22
 Tan.on Gen. 4:9
 " to Gen. 6:6
 Tan. Gen. 7
 Tan. on Ex 38:21
 Tan. (B)to Ex. 20:5-6
 Tan. to Deut. 26:16
 Tan. R'eh
 Kisisso 8
 Tan. (B) Toledoth 21
 " " 4:28
 " Pikkude 3
 " R'eh 3
 " 1:13 a
 " 1:28 b
 " 3:21 a
 " 3:37 a
 " 3:37 b
 " 3:3-b-4 a
 " 5:25
 Jer. Ber. 7 d
 " " 14 d
 " Sabb. 5 b
 " " 14 c
 " Taanith 66 a
 " Ned. 36 d
 " " 41 b (several pass).
 " San. 27 c
 " " 27 d
 " Pesah 1 a
 " " 16 b
 " Challa 1 a
 " Kidd. 61 d
 " Sota 21 d
 Derech Krez 5
 Erabh. 16 a
 Lam. R. 3:38
 Kerithoth 9 a
 Yeb. 103 b
 " 114 b
 Pesikta R. 2a
 " 21
 " K. 80 a
 " " 80 b
 " 100 b
 " 118 a
 " 150 a
 " 161 a
 " 163 a
 " 165 a
 " 167 b
 " 168 a
 " 174 b
 Ab. d. R. N. 15 b; 35a; 35b;
 55a; 56a; 58b; 60a; 62a;