

M.A. THESIS.

TITLE: DIASPORA REACTIONS TO ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY CRISES,  
1956-1973. THE CASES OF AUSTRALIA AND BRAZIL.

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## Preface.

When one looks for a common denominator or an element that unifies the Jewish Diaspora of our time beyond ideological rivalries of a political and religious nature, that element is concern and support for the state of Israel. However, this concern and support have been punctuated by a long process, not lacking in virulent disputation among different factions of European and American Jewry related to the Zionist ideal of a homeland for the Jews.

For almost a decade now, a slow but increasing wave directed to reevaluating the relations between Israel and the Diaspora has been occurring starting with the controversial Operation Peace for the Galilee in 1982 and followed by the Intifadeh towards the end of the decade. Since it seems clear that a severe, growing polarization among Jews living in the Diaspora—as in Israel—is taking place with unpredictable consequences, it is necessary to examine the nuances of the relations between Israel and the Diaspora up to the last uncontroversial military crisis between Arabs and Israelis. Uncontroversial meaning that the security of the state of Israel was at stake and no other choices than the military option were possible. To understand the previous relations between Israel and the Diaspora would enable us to better understand the reactions from Diaspora communities to the present Arab-Israeli conflict. However, to present a thesis on the entire Jewish Diaspora reactions would be beyond the possibilities of the scope of this thesis. I have chosen two Jewish communities which are part of the Diaspora: Brazil and



Australia. Why these two countries? The election of Brazil came first: taking into account the small literature available about that community this study will come to present for the first time a short—then incomplete—but coherent description of Brazilian Jewry since its beginning until the 1950s; second and most important, to attempt an understanding of its Jewish identity as a Jewish community in the Diaspora and its responses to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Having chosen for the purpose of this thesis Brazilian Jewry it was more interesting to compare it not with another South American Jewry but with another Jewish frontier society inserted in a different non-Jewish cultural environment. Thus, Australia was chosen so that one may see two geographical and culturally different Jewries reacting to the same issues.

Some of the questions that are considered are: To what extent was the Zionist Movement accepted before the creation of the state of Israel and what relation exists, if any, between the level of acceptance and the origins of the Jewish immigration to each of the countries under consideration? What is the relation between that level of acceptance—of the Zionist ideal first and of the state later—of the Jewish community and the official policy of the country? How was this relation reflected in the Jewish communities' response to the Middle East conflict? Do we find criticism of Israel by a Jewish leader, institution, or press? Do we find criticism of the country in which Jews live because of its stand on the Middle East conflict? Do we find any elements that indicate the formation of a Diaspora ideology in relation to Israel, as a result of the military crises? What are the forms assumed by the Jewish communities' reactions? When

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we come to compare both Australian and Brazilian communities, what are the elements that they share and that separate them regarding their reaction to Arab-Israeli military crises?

The presentation of this thesis will be done through the following distribution of chapters: two chapters, each of which will focus on the origins of the country's Jewry, its difficulties, progress, and development until the 1950s. From then on the thesis will be divided in three chapters each of which will focus on a military confrontation, the three chapters corresponding to the Sinai Campaign, the Six-Day War, and then Yom Kippur War. Every chapter will begin with a short introduction of world affairs related to the Middle East conflict. Following this introduction, each Jewry's reaction will be presented separately with a conclusion for each one. A final conclusion and a bibliography conclude this thesis.

Finally, a word regarding sources. Primary sources of investigation were local Jewish newspapers and magazines of the countries under consideration. A small amount of material ~~were~~ also found in the Archives of the HUC in Cincinnati. In the case of Australia, there was only one newspaper available though its Yiddish edition many times brought comments not included in the English, larger edition. In the case of Brazil there was plenty of primary sources. Regarding secondary sources I had to overcome the lack of material related to Brazilian Jewry and to do that I put together, as in a puzzle, different moments and aspects of that community which were scattered in a variety of secondary sources, some of which were not always accurate.

CHAPTER 1.

THE JEWS OF AUSTRALIA. FROM 1788 TO THE 1950s.

## The Beginning. 1788-1850

The history of modern Australia began in the seventeenth century when the Dutch explorer W. Jantszoon discovered the Cape York Peninsula in 1606. The Dutch East India Company supported a few other voyages to the South Seas and in 1642 the Dutch navigator Abel J. Tasman discovered New Zealand and Tasmania, which he named Van Diemen's Land. However, during the last two decades of that century English navigators and buccaneers began to explore Australia's coasts. One of those explorers was W. Dampier who, after returning to England from one of his trips, published an account of his experiences. In relation to Australia, he wrote about the miserable conditions in which the aborigines lived and their brutal manners.<sup>1</sup> Interest in Australia arose again many decades later when Captain James Cook came on the scene. He had joined the Royal Navy in 1755 and in 1770 landed at Botany Bay, near what today is Sydney. He landed three more times on the east coast and claimed the land for King George III naming it New South Wales.<sup>2</sup>

During the 1770s England continued to face the problem of overcrowded jails by transporting prisoners to British colonies or by selling them to shipping companies who would then sell them again in America as plantation laborers. But once the Americans revolted against British rule in 1776, a new solution was sought to resolve the problem of the large population of unwanted convicts living in England. In 1779 Sir Joseph Banks recommended to the British House of commons that a colony be founded at Botany Bay for the purpose of sending convicts there.<sup>3</sup> Eight years later Arthur

Phillip was appointed Captain-General and Governor in Chief of New South Wales and the first group of convicts was sent.<sup>4</sup>

The First Fleet, with seven hundred and fifty-one convicts arrived at Sydney Cove, Port Jackson, in January 1788.<sup>5</sup> Among the convicts at least eight and perhaps as many as fourteen were Jews. The crimes committed by these convicts were mostly petty, such as stealing a pair of shoes or lace.<sup>6</sup> Between 1788 and 1852, when transportation finally ceased, out of an estimated 145,000 convicts transported to Australia, at least 1,000 were Jews.<sup>7</sup> Most of these Jews were from London and were second or third generation immigrants to England,<sup>8</sup> whose Jewish population numbered 12,000 by 1790. Over ninety percent of the Jewish convicts were males, which meant that unless free female Jewish settlers would arrive there was little possibility of maintaining a "normal" Jewish community. In addition to the convicts and soldiers, the free settlers who began to arrive in the colony were mainly relatives of those who went to Australia involuntarily. Esther Isaacs was the first Jewish free settler to arrive in January 1816, following her convicted husband.<sup>9</sup> The first Jewish male free settler was Barnett Levy who arrived in December 1821.<sup>10</sup> By 1830 an estimated fifty-two Jews had come voluntarily to Australia.<sup>11</sup>

By 1815, the negative impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Britain's economy served as a catalyst for the emigration of various groups of people. Further exacerbating this situation was the increasing crime rate, which resulted in the mass transportation of prisoners to Australia. It took twenty years for the Colony to accumulate a population of ten thousand, but by 1820 there were 40,000 inhabitants. From a summary given in the 1845 York Synagogue report, we learn that in 1817 there were some twenty Jews in the Colony and

that they founded a society and raised a subscription for the internment of the dead.<sup>12</sup> In 1828, Philip Cohen arrived from London with authority from the British Chief Rabbi to perform marriages.<sup>13</sup> In the 1820s free settlers started to make their way from England to Australia in greater numbers than before. Between 1820 and 1830 about 8,000 immigrants arrived at New South Wales, including thirty-six Jewish adults and twenty-five children. They are regarded as the beginning of the Jewish community in Australia. By the end of 1830, a small number of wealthy Jewish families came to Australia: J. Montefiore, D. Ribeiro Furtado, H. Samuel and Mrs. M. Phillip.<sup>14</sup> However, an organized Jewish community was not officially established until 1832, and with it a Jewish corner of the general cemetery became its responsibility.<sup>15</sup> In 1837, the adult Jewish population of Sydney, capital of New South Wales, numbered between three to four hundred people.<sup>16</sup> During that year a place of worship, Beth-Tephila, was established at Bridge Street; this is usually considered the first synagogue in Australia.<sup>17</sup> Because of the increasing number of Jews, a more suitable synagogue was needed, and in 1845, the York Street Synagogue—which served Sydney's Jews until 1877—was consecrated.<sup>18</sup> That over a hundred Christians contributed to the Synagogue's appeal for construction funds is a significant indication of the openmindedness of the society residing in Sydney at that time. The official government census of 1841 indicates that a total of 856 Jews lived in Eastern Australia, of whom 462 lived in Sydney and the rest outside the metropolis. By 1846 there were 1086 Jews, and in 1851 they numbered 1334. In 1845, with the arrival of Moses Rintel, the first Jewish school was opened, giving instruction to a total of forty-five children who were divided in three groups: boys, girls, and those paying for private lessons.



Because of the geographical position, far away from other centers, and probably because of the lack of almost any form of anti-Jewish expression, the Australian Jewish community prior to the 1850s remained isolated from mainstream Judaism. This isolation along with the imbalance of sexes—Jewish males outnumbered Jewish females eight to one at times—produced a high rate of assimilation by intermarriage.

Almost all Jews living in Australia during the first four or five decades of the Colony were English, which meant that they looked to England for religious leadership and soon placed themselves under the jurisdiction of the British Chief Rabbi.<sup>19</sup> Again, due to the enormous distances, the actual influence of the Chief Rabbi was relatively minor and the controlling power was in the hands of laymen. Because of the small size of the community, the synagogue undertook supervision over the different aspects of Jewish life such as education, dietary laws, charity and funerals. In 1833 the Hebrew Philanthropic Society was formed,<sup>20</sup> becoming the first of many charitable institutions that were to appear in the Jewish Australian scene.

In the 1840s, as free settlers continued to arrive from England, and as a result of inner migration in the Colony, new Jewish congregations were established in Hobart and Launceston in Tasmania, and in Melbourne and Adelaide, capitals to be of the states of Victoria and Southern Australia respectively.<sup>21</sup> From the census of 1841 we learn that there were fifty-seven Jews living in Victoria, increasing their number to 117 in 1846 and to about two hundred in 1851. Most of them were involved in clothing and drapery trades, owning more clothing shops than

their non-Jewish neighbors.<sup>22</sup> During the 1840s, the Jewish congregation of Melbourne was organized. In relation to Western Australia, the first Jewish settlers there were the Samson brothers who arrived in 1829, only two months after the Colony was founded there.<sup>23</sup> Due to geographic isolation and economic problems in those days, few Jews chose to settle in Western Australia. An organized Jewish community did not develop there until close to the end of the nineteenth century.

The Jewish free settlers who arrived from England between 1830 and 1850 imposed their organizational structure on the local congregational life that started to flourish in Australia. Executive positions were held by a select group of wealthy and influential families. As Elazar and Medding stated, this division "was a sign of the still rather aristocratic nature of Australian society, which was divided between the sons of English aristocrats and the convicts or their descendants."<sup>24</sup> The general patterns set up by those early free Jewish immigrants from England did not change until large number of Jews, arriving from Eastern Europe, altered the profile of Australian Jewry well into the twentieth century.

Almost no reports can be found in colonial Australia concerning physical attacks against Jews. The only incident recorded took place in 1832, when the gravestones of the children of Michael Phillips and Vaibeh Solomon were destroyed in Sydney's Jewish cemetery. The reaction by the newspapers was one of firm opposition and disapproval. The Gazette, in an article on July 2, said that it was "one of the most infamous and inhuman outrages that has ever disgraced this Colony."<sup>25</sup> However, anti-Jewish prejudice did exist, as can be seen in Bent's News of July 20, 1839 in an article



stating that "certain members of the legal profession, for reasons best known to themselves, are much given to abuse the members of the Jewish persuasion, which is most unfair, for they are as a body, as respectable and reputable a class as any other of the community..."<sup>26</sup> We may say that anti-Jewish expressions sometimes appeared in the press, both in writing and in the form of cartoons but it is also true that liberal non-Jews often criticized those insults against Jews.

1850-1880.

In 1850, the first edition of The New York times appeared; in Venice, Verdi's "Rigoletto" was heard for the first time, and in New South Wales gold was discovered. During the next decade, Australia's population grew from 400,000 to over 1,000,000 people with half of the population settling in the epicenter of the discovery, Victoria. Precipitated by the gold rush, the first massive immigration of non-British Europeans occurred. During the next three decades, three out of four non-British Jews who chose to settle in Australia, came from Germany, while the remaining twenty to twenty five percent came from Eastern Europe, mainly Poland.

By 1851, the Jewish population of Australia totaled 1887, or 0.47 percent of the total population. Ten years later, Victoria and New South Wales had almost 5,000 Jews. Many Jews also settled in country areas because of the gold rush, although, with few exceptions, they did not become prospectors in the gold fields; they became the providers of services for the prospectors.<sup>27</sup> The three decades that followed were characterized by a strengthening of

Jewish life in Sydney and Melbourne accompanied by the bitter, although not unusual, pattern of schism: a new congregation was formed, separating from Sydney's York Synagogue. The new congregation was established in June, 1859, and it was regarded as the aristocratic congregation. The separation eventually ended, however, when a merger occurred in 1878 which led to the forming of the Great Synagogue on Elizabeth Street. This synagogue, which accommodated over a thousand worshippers, was the only synagogue in Sydney until 1913, and the center of Jewish life until the 1930s.<sup>28</sup> In Melbourne, in 1835, the first Jewish day school was established by the Melbourne Hebrew Congregation, and two years later schism occurred that led to the formation of a new congregation. In the next few years, new congregations were established, usually gathering Jews according to their origin: the East Melbourne Hebrew Congregation (1859) for Polish Jews and the St. Kilda Hebrew Congregation (1871) for German Jews.<sup>29</sup>

After a few unsuccessful attempts, the first permanent Jewish newspaper, the Jewish Herald, was established in Melbourne in 1879, guided by principles of Orthodox Judaism.<sup>30</sup>

The period subsequent to the gold rush of the 1850s was one of increasing economic growth for the Jews. Although new congregations were established, the level of religious observance was low and the pressure to become a non-distinctive group within Australian society was an important element that resulted in numerous inter-marriages.

Australian society, still in its infancy at that time, was a progeny of the British Empire. Jews of British origin tried to maintain some distance from non-British Jews. Reflecting this

attitude to an extreme in 1855, the Melbourne Hebrew Congregation asked London to allow only British born Jews to settle in Australia.<sup>31</sup> The tension between "foreign Jews" and Anglo-Jews remained unchanged until the 1920s. An alteration of Australia's White British policy during and after World War II brought those tensions to an end. Although the tragic events which befell to Jews during the Nazi regime lessened the rather contemptuous behavior of the Jews of British origin, it did not erase completely their feeling of superiority nor their fear of becoming a distinctive, even suspicious group, in the eyes of non-Jews.<sup>32</sup>

1880-1920.

By 1881, the Jewish population of Australia had reached 9,000. In the same year, Tsar Alexander II of Russia was assassinated and succeeded by Alexander III who promulgated anti-Jewish measures. One of his goals was the destruction of Russia's Jewry, and in line with that policy Pobiedonosztev, procurator of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church during the reign of Alexander III, is believed to be the one who suggested that one third of the Jews would emigrate, one third would die, and one third would convert to Christianity. The year 1881 marked the beginning of a massive migration of Jews from Eastern Europe. A few went to Australia, while the majority went to the United States, England, Canada, South Africa, and Argentina. The established British-born Jews or Jews of British descent of Australia were rather ambivalent towards the Eastern European Jews and particularly wanted to avoid the embarrassment of being associated with those "shtetl looking" Jews. The

newcomers criticized the unfriendliness of the local Jews while the local Jews criticized the exceedingly emotional behavior of the newcomers. Without any doubts that they were being rejected by their brethren, the Eastern European Jews established their own institutions.

In general, Jews became more prosperous economically and some became actively involved in politics. Welfare and philanthropic organizations continued to grow.<sup>33</sup> However, the pattern originally observed from 1850 to 1880 was more evident: low levels of religious practice and education, with high rates of intermarriage. The non-British Jewish immigration from 1880 to 1920 was composed of sixty percent from Eastern Europe and thirty percent from Germany, almost the complete reverse of the population arriving from 1850 to 1880.<sup>34</sup> In 1921, the Jewish population of Australia was over 21,000, representing 0.40 percent of the total population. The imbalance of sexes that was one of the causes of mixed marriages improved by 1921, with more than 11,000 males and more than 10,000 females.<sup>35</sup> However, reports of that same year indicated that mixed marriages climbed to thirty percent for Jewish men and half of that number for Jewish women. This situation was further exacerbated by the religious leaders, who discouraged conversion to Judaism.

Antisemitic feelings in Australia were increasing particularly as a result of both the depression of the 1930s and the surge of nationalism by the end of the century.<sup>36</sup> The nationalistic, even racist manifestations of Australian policy were not uncommon in some European countries at the turn of the century. In Australia, the Jewish reaction was an increasing attempt to minimize distinctiveness. More than ever, Jews saw their heritage only as a religion

without any nationalistic claims. With the current racial and national sensitivity, the Jewish establishment saw the time as most inopportune for Australian Jewry to embrace the Zionist ideology. Their negative attitude towards Zionism did not reflect an ideological opposition to Zionism per se but it rather reflected their fear of endangering their own position in nationalistic Australia.<sup>37</sup> The endeavor by Australian Jews to present themselves as more Australian than non-Jewish Australians is comparable to the attempt by non-British Australians to present themselves as more British than the British. On the other hand, this was a period when individual Jews achieved prominence in political and other public activities. The most eminent two examples of this kind of achievement were Sir Isaac Isaacs and Sir John Monash. Isaacs, the son of Polish-born immigrants, became Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia and later the first native-born Governor General. Monash, whose parents were Viennese immigrants of Polish descent, was the Commander in Chief of the Australian Forces in World War I. Both leaders were involved in Jewish affairs, and while Isaacs was strongly opposed to Zionism, Monash became the first president of the Zionist Federation of Australia.

Although the official inauguration of the Commonwealth of Australia took place on January 1, 1901, the question of national identity was still not resolved. The situation of Australia at the beginning of the century was one of isolation and perhaps this circumstance sustained the Commonwealth effort to copy everything that reflected the pattern and model presented by England. Eventually, it was World War I that ended Australia's isolation. During that war Australian forces occupied the German colonies on New Guinea and fought together with the British on different battle



fronts. The same place that was conquered by the Turks in 1354, Gallipoli, was the site of Anglo-French landings in 1915, and in that campaign some 7600 Australians were killed and almost 20,000 were wounded.

I have mentioned briefly the negative impact of the Zionist Movement at the beginning of the twentieth century in Australia. Zionism made its first appearance on Australian soil at the end of the nineteenth century when Rabbi Freedman established a society that was joined by a few Eastern European Jews living in the small community of Perth, in Western Australia. However, since Zionism was viewed as a hazardous risk, given the political reality of the time, it wasn't until the influx of more Eastern European Jews and the gradual loss of power of the British Jews a few decades later that the face of Australian Jewry would change. It was due to the newcomers from Eastern Europe that the Australian Zionist Federation came into existence in 1920 with Monash as president. Due to the Balfour Declaration in 1917, Zionism was no longer rejected by those who, until that moment, saw Zionism as an utopian dream. Again, when the British Mandate for Palestine was approved at the San Remo conference in 1920 and later confirmed by the League of Nations in 1922, supporting Zionism became more acceptable for Australian Jews. Clearly, political factors were more of an influence in Australian Jewry's approach to Zionism than strong sympathetic ideologies for a Jewish homeland. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that when British and Jewish interests in Palestine clashed after 1929, the old problem of national conflicting interests reappeared for Australian Jews.

1920-1933.

In general the 1920s was a period of decline and growth at the same time for the Jews of Australia. Unlike the United States <sup>h</sup> where Jews did not assimilate structurally, the absence of antisemitism in Australia was a main factor of structural assimilation.<sup>38</sup> The lack of proper religious and educational facilities were other elements that contributed to assimilation. The pattern of "non-distinctiveness" that was apparent during the nineteenth century continued in the twentieth century until Hitler came to power in 1933, forcing Jews to evaluate their identity during the 1940s. On the other hand, Eastern European Jews with a strong traditional background began to arrive on Australian shores in relatively important numbers. After World War I, and particularly after the antisemitic restrictions of the 1920s in Poland, an increasing number of Jews sought to leave Europe and of these, a few chose Australia as their destination. However, after the United States closed its doors to Southern and Eastern European immigrants in 1924 and, after Josef Pilsudski staged his coup d'état in Poland in 1926, Australia appeared on the horizon as a promising star. Authors differ about the number of Jews who entered Australia during those years: S. Rutland says that between 1926 and 1928, "...up to two thousand Jews entered Australia,"<sup>39</sup> P. Medding says that "Australian Jewry grew by some two thousand persons between 1921 and 1933."<sup>40</sup> The newcomers influenced Jewish life, creating an upsurge in Jewish cultural activities by becoming involved in the formation of new institutions that reflected their diverse interests: Yiddish theatres, extension of synagogue membership, sports organizations, etc. Their composition

reflected Orthodox, Bundist, Poalei-Zion, Socialist, and Communist Ideologies. In 1923 the Council of Jewish Women was created. In 1925, The Australian Jewish Chronicle, created in 1922, was taken over by a group of Zionist leaders but was forced to cease publication in 1931 because of the Depression.<sup>41</sup> Other Jewish newspapers began publication during those years; however, the oldest existing journal was The Hebrew Standard, which maintained a conservative position and was openly anti-Zionist, reflecting the opinions of the established British Jewish community. As Medding explains it, "to oppose British actions, to criticize British policies, and to advocate a Jewish state was still regarded by the Jewish establishment as disloyal to Britain and, therefore, highly unpatriotic for Australia."<sup>42</sup> During the 1920s, Australian Jewry was visited for the first time by an emissary representing the World Zionist Organization. But in spite of some positive developments, the force of Zionism in Australia was limited because the Eastern European Jews, who in general supported the movement, were far from being a majority at that time. Other reasons were the sparseness of antisemitism which still led to assimilation, and the concern of the establishment to avoid any sign that might be interpreted by the general population as conflicting with British citizenship and interests. The Eastern European migration of the 1920s was, numerically speaking, not so important that it would change the pattern of non-distinctiveness practiced by the established community. Moreover, there were restrictions imposed by the Australian Government concerning the number of non-British immigrants,<sup>43</sup> and the Jewish establishment was not at all opposed to those limitations. A situation of conflict arose once more for the Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews of Australia as a result of the restrictive policies imposed by Britain with the "White.



Paper" of 1930. A protest was held by the Zionists and then the anti-Zionists publicly criticized the protest as not representing the true feelings of Australian Jewry.

1933-1948.

As a result of Hitler's ascent to power in 1933, world history was changed and Australia, although for different reasons than Europe and the United States, was no exception.

Until the 1930s Australia was not an antisemitic country, not through its official policies nor in the feelings of its general population. However, it was knowingly discriminatory against non-British subjects who sought to settle there. Although the 1930s was not characterized by an antisemitic turn in Australia's internal and foreign policies, we do find for the first time organized groups of right-wing elements that supported fascist ideologies and that tended to be antisemitic. In this respect, Australia was just one more country among the Anglo-Saxon countries like the United States, Canada, England, and South Africa where antisemitism developed. Although Australian authorities were sympathetic to the problem of Jewish refugees, the usual immigration policies were not changed during the crucial years, and when those policies did change, it was already too late for the vast majority who tried to escape from Europe. Because of their acute sense of the necessity for political caution, Australia avoided forwarding any complains to the German authorities, maintaining the principle of non-interference in other countries' affairs. The general press of Australia openly protested the anti-Jewish legislation imposed by the Nazi regime and the

majority of the Australian people agreed with those protests. Nevertheless, when it came to the more personal level of accepting Jewish refugees in their land, the situation was seen quite differently, by some Jews and non-Jews alike. In addition to the antisemitic propaganda of right-wing groups, there was a very tangible fear of competition and unemployment produced by the Depression which strongly affected Australia.

The attitude of the Jews living in Australia did not reflect a united front. The non-British Jews, although still a minority group within Australian Jewry, tended to be much more outspoken than their brethren of British origin. Thus, conflicts between non-British Jews and the board of the Great Synagogue of Sydney were not unusual. The Synagogue's board tried to avoid publicity considering it to be harmful to the Jewish community. It sought to keep a low profile, in part because of the delicate economic situation. By 1934, however, a united delegation finally visited Canberra, Australia's capital city, and presented the Minister of the Interior a memorandum on German Jewish immigration to Australia. Although sympathetic consideration was promised, alien immigration laws were not relaxed. Due to an improvement in the economic situation, a more flexible position was instituted in 1936, after the Nuremberg Laws were promulgated.<sup>44</sup> Two years later, in July of 1938, at the Evian Conference called by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Australia's representative, T. W. White, the Minister of Trade and Customs, announced that his country would not further increase its quota for refugees. A new turn occurred again in November 1938, when the Australian Government of Prime Minister Lyons decided to review immigration policies. On December 1, a quota of 15,000 refugees over a period of three years was announced.<sup>45</sup> This signified an

increase of almost two hundred percent over the previous 1,800 quota per annum. As an outcome of the new policy, over 5,000 Jews arrived in Australia in 1939, representing more than twenty percent of the total immigration to Australia for that year and forty percent of the non-British immigrants. Despite the grave situation of European Jews, most Australian Jews favored a controlled immigration rather than an open influx. The recommendations of the Welfare Society, always backed by The Hebrew Standard, were presented to the persecuted German Jews at the moment of their arrival in Australia. The following lines represent one of the best examples of a fearful minority, unwilling to be recognized as a distinctive group by the general society:

"Above all, do not speak German in the streets and in the trams. Modulate your voices. Do not make yourself conspicuous anywhere by walking with a group of persons all of whom are loudly speaking in a foreign language... Remember that the welfare of the old-established Jewish community in Australia as well as of every migrant depends on your personal behavior. Jews collectively are judged as individuals. You personally have a grave responsibility."<sup>46</sup>

Needless to say, the established community also expected the refugees to adjust immediately to Australian ways of life, manners and customs.

The outbreak of World War II in September 1939, stopped the refugee immigration. The changes in Australia's policy, which produced more flexible laws increasing the numbers of refugees to be saved from Nazi persecution, came too late for millions of Jews.

As a result of the events that occurred during the decade of 1930 and of World War II, Australian society entered into a new era, and so did the Jewish community. For the latter, the unexpected impact of thousands of non-British Jews who arrived after World War II and the experience of antisemitism in Australia<sup>47</sup> were the main factors.

On December 17, 1942, it became public and official that the Germans were exterminating European Jewry. A simultaneous declaration was announced in London, Washington, and Moscow. The revelation that about three million Jews had been killed produced a shocking impact upon Australian Jewry and led to the "erosion of the traditional inhibited attitudes of the leadership."<sup>48</sup> More openly than ever before, most of the Jewish community asked for the abrogation of the McDonald White Paper of 1939 and for unlimited, free immigration to Palestine.

There are two important elements which aid in explaining the situation of Australian Jewry at that time. First, open criticism of the policies of the British Mandate for Palestine was, for many, a sign of disloyalty towards the Empire. Second, Zionism was presented for the first time as an ideology for which Jews in Australia should "Stand-up and be counted." During the last quarter of 1943 a notorious debate arose between Isaac Isaacs and Julius Stone, both of them Jewish, concerning Zionism. Isaacs was one of the most distinguished personalities of Australia and, as mentioned before, its first native-born Governor General. Stone was a highly recognized scholar who came from New Zealand in 1942 after being appointed Professor of International Law and Jurisprudence at the University of Sydney. The written debate that took

place between them symbolizes the final defeat of the old Jewish establishment. Isaacs' arguments were repudiated by the majority of the community<sup>49</sup> and the defense of Zionism made by Stone, together with the use of it made by Zionist organizations, brought about a more sympathetic attitude by the Australian Government to the Jewish claim of a homeland in Palestine.<sup>50</sup> That positive attention came to fruition when, in 1947, Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australia's representative at the UN, voted for the termination of the Mandate and in favor of the partition of Palestine. From being a fringe and usually rejected movement in the 1920s, Zionism finally became an important element for Australian Jewry only in the 1940s and even then only as a result of Hitler's exterminatory policies becoming widely known in 1942 and of the strong Jewish background of the pre-war European refugees. A. Crown's view is that by 1946 the whole of the Jewish community with the exception of three people "appeared to support the Zionist Movement wholeheartedly."<sup>51</sup> The three people were Sir I. Isaacs, Rabbi Dangelow of the Great Synagogue, and Sir A. Michaelis, who was a conservative member of the Victorian state Parliament from 1932 to 1952 and Speaker from 1950 to 1952.<sup>52</sup> Although it is true that by that time, anti-Zionism within the Jewish community was not the rule anymore, nevertheless Crown's assertion seems somewhat unrealistic. W. D. Rubenstein's research suggests that anti-Zionist feeling was strong enough to result in the publication of a newspaper as late as June 1947.<sup>53</sup> The list of people involved was larger than three people and most of them, if not all of them, were prominent, wealthy Jews. The important point, however, is that they represented the last attempt by a distinctive British oriented Jewish group to dictate the policies of Australian Judaism before it finally succumbed to



the overwhelming majority of Eastern European Jews who arrived in the tens of thousand after World War II.

As a result of pre-War and post-War arrivals of refugees and international meetings to solve their urgent requests, the Australian Jewish community was not isolated anymore. At the same time, Australian society was changing profoundly. The elitism of pre-War Australia gave way to an increasing policy of multiculturalism that is still the current official direction. One of the main reasons because of which the government was induced to reevaluate its selective policies in relation to immigrants was the bombing of Darwin in the Northern Territory by Japanese forces and the danger of invasion between 1941 and 1943. The major political parties agreed that a larger population was now a priority. Thus, in the twenty years that followed the end of World War II two million immigrants poured into Australia.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, Australia followed, although with some delay, a pattern that was not uncommon to other colonies: a move towards liberation from the Empire and a search for its own identity.

On May 15, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared Israel an independent state. Australia's recognition was delayed as the result of British pressure and official recognition came only on January 29, 1949.<sup>55</sup> Although Dr. Evatt was sympathetic to Israel even before its creation, the status of Jerusalem remained a problem. Australia's position, as expressed by Dr. Evatt, was that Jerusalem had to be internationalized as stated in the UN decision of November 1947. Internal political interests within Australia probably were taken into account since 1949 was a year of elections in Australia and the Catholic vote would be decisive. Needless to say, the Catholic Church followed

the Vatican position which was theologically, and then political-ly, against a Jewish state, and strongly opposed to Jewish control over the holy places of Christianity in the land of Israel. In 1949, elections in Australia were won by the Liberals and Sir Robert Menzies became Prime Minister. Jewish control over Jerusalem was not recognized.

During the early 1950s a process of democratization took place within the Jewish communities of Australia through constitutional changes implemented in the Boards of Deputies of the various Australian states where there was visible Jewish presence. In addition, an important development within the community for its long term consequences was the implementation of the day school system: it received a fairly positive response in Melbourne as opposed to Sydney where it was hard for it to be massively accepted. The rivalry between the two major Australian cities Jewry's find room to continue their disputes, this time regarding the funds to be allocated for the building and maintenance of the schools. The funds, which were given as a result of an agreement with the Claims Conference, were mostly directed to Melbourne.<sup>56</sup>

From a religious point of view, both the Orthodox and Liberal branches of Judaism grew and so did the conflicts between them. However, a more palpable consequence of this growth was the final decay of power of the well established congregations such as the Great Synagogue in Sydney and the St. Kilda Hebrew Congregation in Melbourne. This fact was further strengthened with the arrival of new Jewish immigrants, the vast majority of whom were not of English descent.

Finally, the situation generated in the early 1950s by the

Australian government's policies regarding the absorption of German immigrants in Australia should be mentioned, as well as a grave conflict within the Melbourne Jewish leadership. The Jewish community was certainly bewildered when in October of 1950 Sir John Storey, Chairman of the Immigration Planning Council stated that ex-members of the Nazi Party should not necessarily be excluded in the selection of immigrants from Germany. The plans of the of the Australian government had in fact started following the end of World War II and were since then opposed by the Jewish community. Thus, in 1949 the ECAJ launched a campaign opposing German migration to Australia, this representing the first time Australian Jewry publicly opposed official policies of its government. In 1950 and 1951 several rallies were held by the Jewish communities of Melbourne, Sydney, and Perth against the migration to Australia of Germans who might have still be indoctrinated with Nazi ideologies. With a few exceptions, members of the Australian political parties, as well as the general population and the media favored the government's program.<sup>57</sup> The arguments of the Jewish community, although understood, were rejected by the government. An agreement with West Germany was signed in 1952, and the following years a total of 50,000 Germans arrived to Australia.

While the Jewish leadership was trying to influence the government's decision regarding German immigration, a severe conflict exploded in Melbourne between M. Ashkanasy, president of the ECAJ and the VJBD, and the Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Anti-Semitism: Ashkanasy charged the Council with harming the position of the Jewish community due to its Communist links and ideologies. He proposed the creation of a new Public Relations Committee which would exclude representatives of the Jewish Council. Following the



defeat of his motion Ashkanasy resigned as president of the ECAJ and the UJBD. It was the year 1950. The next two years saw how Jewish Council representatives to the UJBD opposed any criticism against Communist countries. Thus, in 1951, a resolution to protest against persecution of Jews in Hungary, though approved, was opposed by the two Council representatives. Again, in 1952, the Council defended Soviet policies, denied tendencies of antisemitism in them and in the Prague Trials which were carried during the 1950s. As a result, Ashkanasy won back support for his plans and a new Committee which excluded the Jewish Council was formed. Furthermore, in 1952, the Council was disaffiliated from the UJBD. In Perth the Jewish Council suspended its activities in 1954, and in Sydney, where ideological battles were not as important as in Melbourne, it gradually vanished. It is plausible that the rift within the Melbourne Jewish community and the time and efforts spent in it by Ashkanasy might have helped to undermine any chances of success regarding the campaign to oppose German immigration to Australia. In addition, the rift must have harmed the stability and structure of the Jewish community, a community which, in any case, by the 1950s ended a long era of intentional non-distinctiveness urged since the early days of British-Jewish presence in Australia.

## Notes.

1. Eric Newby, A Book of Travellers' Tales (New York, 1987), 499-500.
2. Daniel Elazar-Peter Medding, Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies (New York, 1983), 236.
3. John S. Levi-George F. Bergman, Australian Genesis (Adelaide, 1974), 13.
4. Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 237.
5. I have followed Levi-Bergman. Suzanne D. Rutland, Edge of the Diaspora (Sydney, 1988), estimates that the number was 750. William D. Rubinstein, The Jews in Australia (Melbourne, 1986), mistakenly raised the number to 1800.
6. Rubinstein, The Jews, 23. See also Rutland, Edge, 9.
7. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 10. All authors agree with this number.
8. Rutland, Edge, 9.
9. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 27.
10. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 108.

11. Rubinstein, The Jews, 27.
12. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 218. However, as the authors mention, by 1820 there were more than 200 Jews in New South Wales.
13. Rutland, Edge, 26-27. See also Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 203.
14. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 199.
15. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 224-25.
16. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 228.
17. Rubinstein, The Jews, 30.
18. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 176. Rutland seems to date the consecration one year earlier, see Edge, 47.
19. Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 241.
20. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 318.
21. Rutland, Edge, 32.
22. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 296.
23. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 275-80.

24. Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 241.
25. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 190.
26. Levi-Bergman, Australian Genesis, 192.
27. Rutland, Edge, 52.
28. Rutland, Edge, 60-62.
29. Rutland, Edge, 63-65.
30. Suzanne D. Rutland, Seventy Five Years. The History of a Jewish Newspaper (Sydney, 1970), 2.
31. Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 271.
32. Hilary L. Rubinstein, "From Jewish Non-Distinctiveness to Group Invisibility: Australian Jewish Identity and Responses, 1830-1950," in W.D. Rubinstein, ed., Jews in the Sixth Continent, (Sydney, 1987). See also Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 271-74.
33. Rutland, Edge, 111-40.
34. Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 260.
35. Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 261.

36. For an account of antisemitism in Australia see Australian Institute of Jewish Affairs, ed., Anti-Semitism and Human Rights (Melbourne, 1985) and Michael Blakeney, Australia and the Jewish Refugees, 1933-1948 (Sydney, 1985), 1-22.
37. Alan Crown, "Demography, Politics, and Love of Zion: The Australian Jewish Community and the Yishuv, 1850-1948," in Rubinstein, Jews in the Sixth Continent, 216-46. See also Zelman Cowen, Isaac Isaacs (Melbourne, 1967), 232-46, and Rutland, Seventy Five Years, 52-59; Edge, 86-89.
38. Rutland, Edge, 145.
39. Rutland, Edge, 147.
40. Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 279.
41. Rutland, Edge, 141-63.
42. Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 285, 270-71.
43. Blakeney, Australia and the Jewish Refugees, 23-41.
44. Rutland, Edge, 174-75.
45. Rutland, Edge, 178-80.
46. A note containing these suggestions was given to the Jewish immigrants by the Australian Welfare Society. The quotation is

taken from Rutland, Edge, 186, and from Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 282.

47. Rutland, Edge, 197-201.

48. Blakeney, Australia and the Jewish Refugees, 238.

49. Blakeney, Australia and the Jewish Refugees, 240-41; Cowen, Isaacs, 236-38.

50. Blakeney, Australia and the Jewish Refugees, 289-90; Crown, "Demography..." in Rubinstein, Jews in the Sixth Continent, 242-46.

51. Crown, "Demography..." in Rubinstein, Jews in the Sixth Continent, 244.

52. Sir Archie Michaelis, who was a cousin of Rabbi Danglow's wife, was also the "spokesman of the St. Kilda Synagogue's 'Royal Family'." He did not hesitate to compare Zionism to Communists at a time when East-Europeans were suspicious of bringing leftist ideologies to Australia. See John Levi, "Doubts and Fears: Zionism and Rabbi Jacob Danglow," in Rubinstein, Jews in the Sixth Continent, 151-67.

53. William D. Rubinstein, "The Australian Jewish Outlook and the Last Phase of Opposition to 'Political Zionism' in Australia, 1947-1948," in Rubinstein, Jews in the Sixth Continent, 303-319. Apparently the newspaper ceased publication in August, 1948.

54. Howard M. Sachar, Diaspora (New York, 1985), 173.
55. Rodney Gouttman, "First Principles, M.V. Evatt and the Jewish Homeland," in Rubinstein, Jews in the Sixth Continent, 288.
56. Rutland, Edge, 338-39; 405-6.
57. Rutland, Edge, 331.

CHAPTER 2.

THE JEWS OF BRAZIL. FROM 1500 TO THE 1950s.



## 1500-1624. The Beginning.

During the XIV and XV centuries, the knowledge of a number of sciences (medicine, for example) was, if not forbidden, at least hindered for European Jews. As a result, Jews who were interested in expanding their horizons, looked for studies with easier access such as mathematics and cosmography, fundamental for mastering the art of sailing.<sup>1</sup> This resulted in a number of Jews becoming very important for some European powers in their maritime adventures.

When the Portuguese admiral Pedro Alvares Cabral arrived in the year 1500 at what today is known as Brazil,<sup>2</sup> at least one person of Jewish origin, Gaspar da Gama,<sup>3</sup> was part of the crew. Three years earlier he had been abducted in India by some of his fellow-countrymen and then forced to be baptized. He was highly recognized for his knowledge of navigation and soon became a favorite of Dom Manuel I, King of Portugal. The discovery of the new land was not given much importance by D. Manuel who was more interested in the precious merchandise of the Indies. However, he did not hesitate in accepting the proposal of another convert, Fernando de Noronha,<sup>4</sup> to lead a group of new Christians to colonize and explore the recently discovered land. Once there, the group began to export wood to Portugal from a tree known by the local aborigines as "Pau-Brasil" and which was particularly suitable to be used in the staining of textiles. The new land became known as Brazil ("Brasil" in Portuguese) after the name of this tree.

The period from 1500 to 1570 was a time of increasing emigration from Portugal to Brazil and of integration of new Christians into the economic life of the new land.<sup>5</sup> The religious persecution that was shaking parts of the European continent was a major motivating factor for Jews to search for another and more secure place to settle. The "Santa

Inquisição" (Holy Inquisition) had been influential in Portugal since the union between the crowns of Spain and Portugal with the marriage of Manuel I with the Infanta Maria, daughter of "the Catholic Kings" Fernando and Isabel. Manuel, who became King Manuel I in 1495 after succeeding Joao II, declared that Jews had to leave the country before 1497, otherwise they would be forced to convert.<sup>6</sup> In 1536, the "Tribunal del Santo Oficio" (Tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition) was established in Portugal. However, the first "auto da fe" in the colony took place only in 1573, in Bahia.<sup>7</sup> It seems that the establishment of the Inquisition in Brazil was absolutely unpopular. The new Christians had taken root in such a way that an anti-Jewish persecution could provoke animosity between the local inhabitants and the representatives of the Holy Office, whose "visits of inspection" continued until 1618.

By 1567, the flow of emigrants—presumably mostly conversos—from Portugal to Brazil became a concern for the Portuguese authorities because it created a lack of balance in the Portuguese economy.<sup>8</sup> This can be attributed to the fact that the conversos, and their families, were involved in many enterprises, such as the construction of ships, exportation, importation, and trade in general. Their departure resulted in a lack in manpower and problems in the fluidity of the national treasure. Fifty years later, by 1624, the population of Brazil had about 50,000 Europeans, of which a large percentage—if not the majority—appears to have been new Christians. Regarding their occupations, they owned sugar plantations, were importers, exporters, traders, poets, writers, and also priests.<sup>9</sup>

The Dutch presence in Brazil—restricted to the northern territories—made it possible to openly practice Judaism. Thus, Jews became an important part of the economy and began organizing themselves as a community.

Johan Maurits Van Nassau, who was appointed Governor General of Brazil in 1637, created a feeling of security for the inhabitants of the new land. The Jews were accepted as such everywhere, even in the army. Many new Christians were circumcised and returned to their original faith. In 1642, Rabbi Isaac Aboab da Fonseca and a scholar by the name of Moses Raphael d'Aguilar arrived in Brazil in response to a request from the Jewish community living in the northern territory.<sup>10</sup> At the time of their arrival there were already two synagogues in the area: "Zur Israel" in Recife and "Maguen Abraham" in Mauricia.<sup>11</sup>

In January 1654, the Dutch were defeated by the Portuguese. The Jews fought together with the Dutch and many of them died in battle. The terms of surrender, delivered on January 26, 1654, stated that the Dutch and the Jews were to leave the country in a period of three months. The expulsion included all Jews, even those living in cities which, prior to the Dutch defeat, were of Portuguese dominion; among these cities were Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Most of the Jews emigrated to Amsterdam, the Caribbean Islands, and the United States.<sup>12</sup>

#### 1654-1808. The Colonial Period.

After their victory against the Dutch, and the expulsions, the Portuguese began to persecute new Christians, who were viewed suspiciously. As an outcome of their expulsions and persecutions, the economy of Brazil was in a deplorable state. More than a Brazilian problem,

the economic issue was considered a problem for Portugal's power and economy. Thus—although it took some time—in 1773-4, under the influence of the Portuguese representative to Brazil, Marques do Pombal, a royal decree proclaimed equality between new and old Christians.<sup>13</sup> The decree's reforms were designed to improve the Brazilian economy, and to reestablish the commerce between Portugal and its South-American colony. With the end of persecutions, the last marranos who lived in Brazil assimilated completely and almost no clear trace can be found of their origin.

In 1807, France invaded Portugal and the dethroned Portuguese royal family fled to Brazil.

#### 1808-1889. The Imperial Period.

In 1815 Brazil declared itself an independent empire. However, it was not until 1822 that Brazil became independent of Portugal. In that year a new constitution, which among other things declared freedom of worship, was promulgated in Ipiranga, Sao Paulo.<sup>14</sup> From 1822 on, Jews began to arrive once more in Brazil. This time the "first" synagogue was established in Belem in 1824 and named "Sha'ar HaShamaim."<sup>15</sup> Another congregation, Israelite Association "Shel Guemilut Hassadim,"<sup>16</sup> soon followed in Rio de Janeiro. A few years later, in 1848, a new stream of European immigrants poured into Brazil, due to the state of insecurity produced by a number of revolutions in the European continent.

In 1889, with the abdication of emperor Pedro II, Brazil was proclaimed a republic.

From 1889 on. The Republic Period.

In 1889, a large immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe went to the United States, South Africa, Canada, Argentina, and some also found their way to Brazil. Two years later, in 1891, the first attempt to create a Jewish agricultural colony in Brazil occurred when the "Deutsches Central Comité für die Russischen Juden" sent Oswald Boxer, a Viennese Journalist, to negotiate the acquisition of land with the Brazilian government. The representatives of the government welcomed the project and Boxer sent positive reports to the "Comitée." However, the unexpected death of Boxer due to yellow fever in 1892, left the project truncated.<sup>17</sup>

In 1891, the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) was established in London. A philanthropic organization initiated with capital produced from Baron Hirsch, it oriented new Jewish immigrants in America and tried to help in the formation of agricultural colonies. In South America, the first JCA colonies were founded in Argentina; Brazil only came to the Association's attention in 1904,<sup>18</sup> when thirty-seven families from Bessarabia settled in Santa Maria, south of Brazil. The new colony, called Phillipson, was established near the railroad that was being built by the Belgians, but it met with difficulties from the outset. Even after the pogroms that razed Bessarabia in April of 1903, only a small number of Jews were interested in going to Brazil, and almost none had experience in agriculture nor financial means to support themselves. Also several other reasons seem to have contributed to the colony's failure, among them: rapid turnover of administrations, and a lack of proper instruction and planning in matters related to agriculture once the new immigrants were in Brazil, as well as inadequate



funds from the JCA. Despite the limited chances of success, Santa Maria offered good prospects for those who worked as peddlers and artisans and, as a result, less and less care was directed to the agricultural goals of the colony, which finally brought about its desintegration.

Despite the enormous difficulties of the Phillipson Colony, the JCA decided in 1904 to acquire more land; this time in an area known as Quatro Irmaos, located north of Rio Grande do Sul. Again, not many had much faith in Brazil. However, in 1915, a group of 1,678 people arrived at the Quatro Irmaos Colony. The problems the Phillipson Colony battled repeated themselves and as a result, the immigrants were put to work in the construction of houses or received money directly from the JCA. The continuation of World War I until 1918 brought to a final end any hope for the successful continuation of the colony. On the other hand, the JCA helped the immigrants find new possibilities in Rio Grande do Sul, Uruguay, and Argentina. Only a few families remained in the colony, working in the fields, raising cattle and other livestock.

While agricultural colony projects failed, life in the cities became more attractive. Jews settled mainly in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Porto Alegre and some in Bahia and other northern cities. The Jews who arrived before and immediately after World War I came from an organized Jewish life in Eastern Europe and wanted to continue that organization in the new land, among other reasons to avoid feelings of isolation in a land which seemed so distant from the rest of the world.

Regarding the number of Jews living in Brazil at the beginning of the XX century, there were slightly over 800, but immediately after War World I began we find about 5,000.<sup>19</sup>

Sao Paulo's Jewish community was established in 1897. Mauricio Klabin

(1860-1927) became one of the most important—if not the most important—Jewish personality in the city. A wealthy and involved Jew, appointed "Rosh-HaKahal", he was of vital importance in the establishment of Temple "Beth-El" and the Jewish cemetery in Vila Mariana.<sup>20</sup> In 1916, Ezra, a society to help the poor, was established by Jews from Bessarabia. It also assisted in registering immigrants, offered classes in Portuguese and, due to the high number of people coming from Europe with tuberculosis opened a hospital in Sao Jose dos Campos, in the suburbs of Sao Paulo.<sup>21</sup>

In the north of the country, in addition to the synagogue founded in 1824 by Sefardic Jews from North Africa, small communities were established by Jews who came from Morocco, and a second synagogue was established in Belem in 1889.<sup>22</sup> Before the 1920s, the Sefardic community of Belem had its own charity organizations and social clubs. A few, small, Sefardic communities were also founded in Amazonas by immigrants who came towards the end of the nineteenth century.

In Rio de Janeiro, the first indication of the community life of Jews who came from Western Europe was the foundation of their own cemetery in 1873.<sup>23</sup> However, there was no continuity in the development of the Jewish community at this stage, in part due to their small number—there were about 200 in 1890—<sup>24</sup> and because of their indifference to Jewish communal life.

With the end of World War I in 1918, there was a significant growth in the Jewish population of Brazil due to a new wave of immigrants. Most of the Jewish institutions which existed at that time could be categorized as organizations dedicated to assisting the poor ("Institucoes Assistenciais de Amparo"). They were run by members of prominent and wealthy families. Thus, for example, in Sao Paulo, M. Klabin founded the "Sociedade Cemiterio Israelita" in 1923.<sup>25</sup> This society was to become the



definitive organization for the burial of the dead in that city.

Activities related to helping the poor were also organized by women's leagues, the first being the "Sociedade Beneficiente das Damas Israelitas" (Charity Society of Jewish Women), which was founded in 1915-16. Among others, there was the "Sociedade Gota de Leite" (Drop of Milk Society), sponsored by the Bnai-Brith, and the "Fundação Lar da Criança Israelita" (Home for Jewish Children Foundation) for the care of orphans and children whose families were unable to offer them a proper environment."<sup>26</sup>

The first Zionist manifestation in Brazil dates from as early as 1901, when a letter—and 150 francs—from the "Hebrew Colony" of Manicoré, Amazonas, was sent to Dr. Max Nordau and read at the Fifth Zionist Congress. The Jewish community of Manicoré asked to be kept informed on all matters related to Zionism.<sup>27</sup> In the cities the Zionist movement initiated its activities in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo almost at the same time, 1913-14. However, it was in Rio de Janeiro—Brazil's capital until 1960—that the Zionist, although relatively few in number, were to be more organized and influential. In Rio it was through Jacob Schneider, who was born in Bessarabia and came to Brazil as an adolescent, that Zionism was organized. A self-taught Jew, he was one of the founders of the first Zionist group in Brazil, named "Tiferet Zion," in 1913.<sup>28</sup> The beginning activities of the group were mainly related to fundraising efforts in Rio de Janeiro and the inland cities on behalf of the "Keren Kayemet LeIsrael." However, when World War I began, the Brazilian government suspended all cultural activities which had foreign connections, among them Zionist meetings.

In 1916, representatives of the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) came to Brazil in order to collect funds from Jews for victims of the war. "Tiferet Zion" asked that part of the funds collected by the JDC

be given to the WZO since the Jewish community did not have the financial capabilities to contribute to two campaigns. After strong opposition from the JDC, the two groups came to an agreement and some funds were given to the WZO through "Tiferet Zion."<sup>29</sup>

Once the war was over, in 1918, Zionist activities were officially reinitiated. Once the "Balfour Declaration" was promulgated, Brazilian Zionists sent a note—through an English diplomat—to the English government expressing their recognition and gratitude.<sup>30</sup> By the time the "Balfour Declaration" was promulgated in 1917 and World War I ended in November 1918, it seems that the suspension of Zionist activities, although still official, was not strongly enforced. Furthermore, this conclusion seems to be strengthened by the fact that the Brazilian Congress approved a motion of sympathy and support for the Declaration;<sup>31</sup> although it is difficult to know to what extent, the "Tiferet Zion" group may be credited as having had a certain influence in that decision. However, "Tiferet Zion" was not the only Zionist active group. In fact, as Haim Avni suggests, "Zionism in Brazil gained an impressive public position in 1915 when two intellectuals, David Jose Perez and Alvaro Castillo, a Jew and a non-Jew, established an 'organ for the interest of the Jewish people in Brazil' in Rio de Janeiro named A Columna-Ha'Amud."<sup>32</sup> It appeared three times a year and carried, among other articles, contributions by world Zionist leaders and general information on Zionism. Although it lasted only two years, those were years in which the Brazilian government became aware, and then sympathetic, to the Jewish claims for a homeland in Palestine.

In other regions of Brazil Zionist groups were also founded. In Curitiba, state of Parana, "Shalom Zion" was established in 1917; in Para, north of Brazil, "Ahavat Zion" was established in 1918 by Major

Eliezer Levy, who also founded Kol Israel, a weekly Zionist newspaper written in Portuguese.<sup>33</sup>

It was during those years that Jewish schools were established: in Rio de Janeiro in 1916, the "Escola Judaica de Ensino Religioso" under the direction of S. Lozinsky, who was a member of the religious Zionist movement Mizrahi; during the same year the school Talmud-Tora was opened in Sao Paulo. In 1920, the school Maguen David was established in Rio de Janeiro and became the first full-time Jewish school in Brazil; one of its founders was R. Cohen, an ardent anti-Zionist, who insisted on directing the school in an anti-Zionist approach. However, one year after the school opened, the board was taken over by the Zionists who changed the name of the school to "Ginasio Hebreu-Brasileiro" and re-defined its philosophy as Zionist.<sup>34</sup>

During the 1920s some 30,000 East European Jews immigrated to Brazil.<sup>35</sup> Most came from Poland, the Ukraine, Bessarabia, and Lithuania, and settled in the southern states. During the early 1920s a number of significant "firsts" occurred. In 1921, Brazilian Zionism had a representative at the World Zionist Congress for the first time. The next year, the Zionist Organization of Brazil received for the first time an envoy with the task of helping in a fund-raising campaign for the "Keren Ha-Yessod", which was founded in 1919. Also in 1922, the first national meeting of the Zionist movement took place in Rio and, as a result, the Zionist Federation of Brazil was established with J. Schneider as its president.<sup>36</sup> In 1921 a visit to the north by Schneider and a "sheliach" resulted in the founding of the "Associacao Sionista Hertzlia" in Recife, the "Associacao Gueula" in Maceio, and the "Associacao Max Nordau" in Bahia.<sup>37</sup> In 1925, the director of Tel-Aviv's school "Hertzlia" visited Brazil in order to collect funds for the "Keren HaYessod" and to interest

more people in working for the Zionist cause.<sup>38</sup>

Until World War I, the overwhelming majority of Jews who migrated to the American continent went to the United States and Argentina. Only a small number went to Brazil before 1920. According to the census of 1900, 226 Jews lived in Sao Paulo, representing 0.01% of the total population, while in 1940 there were 20,379 representing 0.28%, and in 1950 there were 26,443, which represented 0.29% of the total population.<sup>39</sup> Between 1900 and 1939 2,215,000 immigrants settled in Sao Paulo alone.<sup>40</sup> In 1923, due to the pressure of the Argentinian syndicates, the Argentinian Government decided to close its frontiers to new immigrants, while similar measures were taken by the United States and Canada. As an obvious consequence, the Jewish population of Central and Eastern Europe that wanted to emigrate started to look to Brazil as a serious possibility. Jews from Eastern Europe who came during the 1920's were followed by Jews from Germany and Austria after 1933, and with the end of World War II, consecutive waves of refugees from the Nazi regime and from Egypt, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and North-Africa also found their way to Brazilian soil.

Among the new immigrants who began arriving in 1923, there were Jews who had been active Zionists in their native countries. This brought a qualitative and quantitative increase in the activities of the Zionist Federation, as well as more contacts with Zionist centers in London and Jerusalem, and better organized campaigns for the "Keren HaYesod" and "Keren Kayemet." However, it is important to notice that until World War II, the Zionist movement had only peripheral significance for most of the Jews living in Brazil. The majority maintained their commitment to Judaism mainly through social activities and, to a smaller extent, through religious ones. The possibilities of entering into a new financial sphere

caused most Jews to adopt the patterns of their new society and to avoid any nationalistic expression related to a Jewish homeland—particularly, when they were accepted by a Brazilian society in which antisemitism was almost nonexistent.

In 1926, the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO) opened its Brazilian branch.<sup>41</sup> The next year Aaron Bergman, of the "Poalei Zion", came to Brazil.<sup>42</sup> In 1928, a branch of "Mizrahi" was founded and in 1929, the Revisionist Party was organized.<sup>43</sup> The variety of Zionist parties confronted each other through public debates, articles in local Jewish newspapers, publication of pamphlets, and elections organized by the Zionist Federation.

The 1930's was a time of great agitation for both, the Jewish community and Brazil, which was severely affected by the world depression. For Brazil things began to deteriorate in 1928, due to an over-production of coffee. The price of coffee in the international market dropped drastically, a state of panic overtook the Brazilians and, taking advantage of the state of confusion, Getulio Vargas assumed the presidency through a coup d'état in 1930. Vargas, a millionaire owner of land and coffee plantations, was the Governor of the state Rio Grande do Sul. During the years that followed, Vargas silenced any opposition to his absolute power by torture, censorship, and assassination. Although not antisemitic, he tolerated antisemitic activities, which began to occur openly in 1931, with the establishment of "Ação Integralista Brasileira" (Brazilian Integralist Action) in Sao Paulo. In addition to a nationalistic spirit, this group tried to influence the masses by describing the supposedly ominous place of Jews in history. In 1933, it published the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in Portuguese.

By 1933 there were about 40,000 Jews in Brazil. In 1934, the Vargas



regime approved a resolution restricting immigration. However, a number of Jews continued to enter the country as tourists or through the petition of relatives already in Brazil. Exact numbers are not verifiable since many immigrants entered with baptismal certificates; in addition, throughout most of the 1930's, those who could deposit \$12,000(sic) in a Brazilian bank were admitted without regard to quota restrictions.<sup>44</sup>

By 1935, Vargas was politically suspicious of the AIB and their Nazi propaganda and suppressed the group. On the other hand, he declared illegal the use of languages other than Portuguese and cultural activities related to foreign countries or ethnic groups, his principal target being the German, Italian, and Japanese communities though other minorities were automatically included in the restrictions. As a result, Zionist activities were officially suspended until the end of World War II; however, by bribing authorities, Zionist groups continued to meet, though activities were sharply reduced.<sup>45</sup> In 1937, the Vargas government added further immigration restrictions, and this time it became increasingly difficult to obtain visas to travel to Brazil.<sup>46</sup> The timing was tragic for many Jews in Europe who looked to Brazil as a secure harbor.

Many of the refugees from Nazism had been employed in industry, commerce and the free professions. They brought with them their technical education and work experience which were more than welcome in a society which was taking its first steps towards industrialization. Meanwhile, the Eastern European Jews who preceded the German Jews were still struggling to gain economic stability. Socially, the German Jews tended to be completely separated from the "Ostjuden." The Brazilian naturalized German Jews tried—and succeeded—in helping the refugees by bribing immigration officers,<sup>47</sup> who would then often blackmail the new arrivals. It was not unusual for the police to threaten the refugees, but in those

instances, bribing usually resolved any situation. The refugees also had to deal with the problem of obtaining a card of residence before they could apply for a work permit. Because of these difficulties, a number of refugees were driven to suicide; among them was the writer Stefan Zweig, who died in 1942. Whenever possible, the Jewish community tried to provide housing and employment for the newcomers and, if the refugee had business experience, a line of credit was sought from banks.

In 1942, Assis Chateaubriand promoted a campaign for the development of a national air force. The Jewish community offered the funds for the purchase of five airplanes; the fund-raising campaign was conducted by Zionist leaders. December 22, 1942, was an important moment for the Jewish community; in addition to the funds, it presented a document of gratitude to President Vargas thanking Brazil for offering a secure harbor to the victims of persecution in Europe. Vargas expressed his gratitude to the Jews of Brazil, adding that "...Brazil is a country open to all races and religions. In Brazil, there never was and never will be racial discrimination and prejudice. We follow with sadness and indignation the Nazi persecution against Jews in Europe, which makes us remember persecutions against Christians in barbarian times. Brazil protests against these persecutions. I thank you for the homage you paid me and I see in the Jews honorable participants in the constitutional efforts of Brazil."<sup>48</sup>

Although activities related to foreign institutions continued to be officially forbidden, the Zionists tried to find ways to pursue their interests. Thus, with the help of the WJC, a Brazilian Jewish Committee for Victims of War was established, whereby the Zionists received half of the collected funds, which were then directed to the "Keren HaYesod."



With the deposition of Vargas in 1945, a liberal policy the following year, and an upsurge of the industrial force, a new and decisive era began for Brazil. Coinciding with this economic growth, successive waves of refugees from Germany, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and North Africa again brought their skills in the liberal arts, business, and education. Their contribution was particularly important because of the lack of skilled workers in Brazil. In the Jewish community, religious education was introduced in addition to general, secular education. Youth groups were also established in increasing numbers.

Also in 1945, following the lifting of the prohibition of activities related to foreign institutions and cultures, the Zionist movement officially returned to its activities. Thus, on October 23, 1945, a meeting to protest against British policies towards Palestine and, in particular, against the White Paper, was organized by the Zionist Organization. Among the speakers were Hamilton Nogueira, a prominent Catholic leader and Senator, and Ignacio Azevedo do Amaral, Dean of the University of Rio de Janeiro. This public demonstration, which took place in Rio, had the support of most of the Jewish community, who for the first time rallied behind the Zionist cause as one voice. An estimated 5000 people attended.<sup>49</sup>

At the beginning of 1946, the Brazilian Christian Pro-Palestine Committee was organized following the suggestion of Moshe Toff (later Tov), Director of the Latin-American branch of the Jewish Agency, who visited Brazil that year. Azevedo do Amaral assumed the presidency of the Committee, and Senator Nogueira became vice-president. Its task was to lobby among non-Jewish Brazilians, for a favorable solution regarding a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Thus, the Committee published reading materials which were distributed to politicians, students, newspapers, etc. In addition, it kept them informed of the latest news coming from the

United Nations Committee for Palestine. On July 9, 1946, Senator Nogueira delivered a speech at the Parliament describing the anomalous situation of the Jewish people and their right to self-determination in their historic land, Palestine.<sup>50</sup>

Towards the end of 1946, the "Federação Israelita do Estado de São Paulo" was established as the "umbrella" organization for the Jewish institutions of São Paulo, thus becoming the spokesman of the city's Jewry. However, many of the institutions it represented saw themselves as more valuable in human and material resources, and constantly acted to neutralize the tendencies of centralization proposed by the newly established Federation.<sup>51</sup>

1947 was an important year for Brazil's Jewry. In that year the first national convention of the Zionist Organization ("Unificada") took place in Rio de Janeiro, and a fund-raising campaign to help the "Hagana" was organized. However, the event of the year was the UN vote for the partition of Palestine. On April 28, 1947, the General Assembly of the UN elected Brazilian ambassador Oswaldo Aranha as its chairman, thus defeating the representative of Australia, Dr. Evatt, who was invited to join the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine in September of that year. A few days prior to that meeting, Nogueira addressed the Brazilian Senate supporting the candidacy of Aranha and, affirming once more Brazilian acceptance of the Zionist cause. In July, Nahum Goldman, President of the WJC, met with Brazilian Foreign Minister Raul Fernandes and with O. Aranha, who was on vacation in Rio de Janeiro. However, during the same month, an Arab League's delegation visited Brazil trying to convince the government to vote against the partition of Palestine.<sup>52</sup> Different approaches regarding the future of Palestine were also reflected in the press: O Jornal, whose president was A. Chateaubriand was pro-Zionist, while Correio da Manhã, was pro-Arab..

Following the British decision to send the ship Exodus, which was

full of Jewish survivors trying to reach Palestine, back to Europe, the Zionist Organization of Brazil and the religious movements, both orthodox and liberal, declared a day of fasting and prayers, which were followed by speeches given by Zionist leaders and/or rabbis.<sup>53</sup> Also in September 1947, the Zionist Organization began the publication of an official monthly organ, A Voz Sionista, which continued until December of 1948.

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted for the partition of Palestine. All Latin American countries, except Cuba, were part of the decisive vote which open the way to a Jewish state by a margin of 33 to 13, thus obtaining the two thirds vote required by UN's rules. In Brazil, the Zionist Organization convened the community to receive D. Aranha at the airport, upon his arrival from the US, as a demonstration of gratitude for the way in which he directed the meetings of the UN. After the declaration of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, various activities were organized to celebrate the historic event. However, a new diplomatic battle was to be fought by the Jewish, Zionist leadership: Brazil was reluctant to recognize Israel de jure. We know some of the aspects related to this issue from a Brazilian viewpoint, due to a meeting of the Committee of Diplomacy of the National Congress which took place on July 1948.<sup>54</sup> It was initiated by a letter sent from Uruguay, which had already recognized Israel de jure, and had asked other South American countries to follow its example. In addition to declaring the lack of fulfillment of the elements needed to express recognition according to international law, a more realistic explanation was stated: "... There are certain political considerations which contribute to delay the recognition of the State of Israel...the Zionist colony(sic) in Brazil is not very large, and, on the other hand, we have diplomatic relations with three Arab states directly involved in the fight: Egypt,

Syria, and Lebanon; in addition, there is a very large colony of Arab descent among us."<sup>55</sup> The explanation also noted that to declare recognition in a moment of instability and confusion, due to military confrontation between Israel and the Arab countries, would be premature and could be interpreted as taking sides in the dispute. As we see, then, already in 1948, the Brazilian official position regarding the Middle East conflict was one of studied reserve and political caution. In fact it was only in February 8, 1949, that the Brazilian ambassador to Washington, M. Nabuco, was asked to inform the Israeli representative, E. Eilat, that Brazil decided on de jure recognition of the state of Israel. The records of the UN indicate that the recognition of Israel by the Brazilian Government took place on February 7, the same day as Italy and one week before Argentina.<sup>56</sup>

After the creation of the State of Israel, the Jews of Brazil continued to follow with interest and concern the developments in the region. In addition, Brazilian Jews confronted another type of day-after-day battle. The first thing to remember is that the number of Jews significantly increased since the 1930's, and according to the official census of 1940, there were over 55,000 Jews in Brazil. Furthermore, the census of 1950, indicated that there were almost 70,000 Jews. By 1960, the number of Jews climbed to slightly less than 100,000.<sup>57</sup> As we can see, from the early 1930's until 1950, the Jewish population of Brazil doubled, and in the 1950's a new wave of immigrants added at least 30% to the Jewish community's population.

H. Rattner, professor at the University of Sao Paulo, made some interesting observations related to Brazil in the 1950s.<sup>58</sup> Acculturation is a complex process which calls upon the personality and cultural identity of the individuals touched by it. The more open the new society is for



the immigrant, the quicker the cultural changes happen; in other words, the need felt by the immigrant to learn new habits and patterns of behavior will obviously increase. Side by side with this situation, the second generation, born and educated in a new social environment, tends to have problems related to the ways in which the older, and still more traditional generation, approaches certain issues. Regarding Brazil, the most important waves of Jewish immigrants coincided with a time of deep transformations, in both the social and economic structures of the country. The constant expansion of industry, commerce, and services needed much more qualified personnel than that produced and provided by the local market. It was under these circumstances that an important wave of Jewish immigrants arrived, mainly from Egypt, Lebanon, and Eastern Europe in the 1950's. Most of these Sefardic Jews came with a profession, the knowledge of languages, and skills in financial matters, having very little difficulty adjusting to the Brazilian social and economic life. Although as individuals, Sefaradim and Ashkenazim faced similar problems adapting to a new language and culture, for many years each of these groups maintained separate organizations and a certain distance from each other. However, once the newcomers learned the language and customs of their new country, their negative attitude towards "other" Jewish groups became more flexible.

Under the double impact of changes in the social and economic Brazilian structure, and of transformations occurring as a result of the absorption of new immigrants into the Jewish community, organizational forms and activities of the various communal institutions were to change. Institutions that were originally created to meet the needs of specific geographic groups (Landsmannschaften), were slowly driven to adapt to the aspirations of an emerging Jewish population, which was the product of heterogeneous elements.

By 1950, the first generation of Brazilian-born Jews became increasingly important with regard to Jewish communal life. This was particularly so in Sao Paulo, whose Jewish community can be considered as the most dynamic in the country at the time. Thus, on April 27, 1950, 15,000 people attended a rally to commemorate Israel's second year of existence as an independant state.<sup>59</sup> The following year, also in Sao Paulo, the "Federação Israelita do Brasil" was established with the aim of being the spokesman of the Jews of Brazil. However, what was true for Sao Paulo's Federation when created in 1946, applied also for the Brazilian Jewish Federation: due to ideological and structural reasons, the Federation had—and still has—difficulties in planning and coordinating.<sup>60</sup> The only sector in which a certain coordination was possible was the one related to social service. In a situation that became more evident as time went by, most of the Jewish youth tended to be apathetic towards activities organized by Jewish institutions. (In relation to Israel very few even considered the possibility of going as volunteers for a short time.) As economic stability grew, so did the Jewish youth's acceptance of a society which offered comfort and relaxation for the wealthy, that is for about 5% of the Brazilian population, to which most Jews belonged. Another sector which experienced the lack of planning was the area related to communal finances: the Federation was not able to properly centralize fund-raising activities, again mostly due to the individualistic and centrifugal character of the institutions under the "umbrella" organization of the Jewish Federation of Brazil.

The 1950's was indeed a time of changes for the Jewish community of Brazil. External and internal factors brought a new dimension to Jewish life in Brazil. Regarding the first, the creation of the State of Israel carried with it a feeling of pride and admiration for Jews all

over the world; but it also led to a problem of identity for many Jews, as was the case with Brazilian Jews, in the sense that "dual loyalty" was a new reality to deal with. The great majority of Brazilian Jews, though not religiously involved, answered by defining Judaism as a religious community while, at the same time, declaring their sympathy for Israel based on emotional ties. In fact, "dual loyalty" was a concept to avoid rather than to discuss; I would say that "status quo" is a term that may very well define the attitude of Brazilian Jews regarding their Jewishness from the 1950's on.

In relation to new circumstances inside the Jewish community which came with the 1950's, the most noticeable were the gradual disappearance of the older generation of immigrants from the leadership scene, and its replacement by Jews who were born or educated in Brazil, and whose new leading positions in the Jewish community were directly related to their economic wealth and social influence in the general society. The "status quo Brazilian Jew", socially accepted, increasingly stable in economic terms, and not particularly exposed to intellectual challenges inside or outside the Jewish community, was in the making.

I will end this general introduction to the Jews of Brazil from its beginning until the 1950s, by considering some aspects regarding the attitude of the Brazilian Government in relation to Israel from its creation until the early 1950s.

Although Brazil voted for the partition of Palestine, which became UN Resolution 181(II) on November 29, 1947, when we consider the broader Brazilian position at UN votes involving Palestine/Israel we get a clearer and different "picture." Thus, considering the period 1947-52, in which 28 votes took place at the UN in matters related to Palestine/Israel, Brazil voted 6 times for resolutions favorable to Israel, 10



times against, abstained 11 times, and was absent or did not vote once.<sup>61</sup> This record of Brazil represents one of the worst—together with Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, and Haiti—of the twenty Latin-American countries voting at that time. Moreover, the clearest anti-Israeli position was taken in relation to the Jerusalem issue. This issue was voted on by the General Assembly of the UN 6 times between 1948-52. The only two Latin-American countries which voted against Israel on all occasions were Peru and Brazil. What or who was behind Brazil's vote against Israel? It seems that when we come to the Jerusalem issue, we have to add to the Arab lobby, heavy pressure from the Vatican.<sup>62</sup> In this sense, we have to remember that Brazil has, numerically speaking, the largest Catholic population of the world and that the Brazilian Government certainly had that in mind. As an example of the Vatican's position regarding Christian holy places—and for the Vatican Jerusalem is included among these—let me quote from L'Osservatore Romano, the official organ of the Vatican, which on September 15, 1950, wrote: "We do not know what the next session of the Assembly will or will not do, but we know that for Catholics, the only possible solution of the problem of the Holy Places would be their being placed under international administration in accordance with the conditions set forth by His Holiness Pius XII."

In spite of its low score for Israel at the UN votes, it would be a mistake to consider Brazil an antisemitic country. With the exception of a limited number of outbursts by extremist, nationalistic groups—which at first were tolerated by the Vargas regime—in the 1930's, and in 1964, Jews in Brazil were not discriminated against nor the object of violence. Although in general not supportive of Israel, Brazil was sympathetic towards Jewish non-Israeli issues, even when international in character. Thus, for example, as early as 1953, the Brazilian Senate condemned Moscow's anti-Jewish policies.<sup>63</sup>

One final observation regarding Israel. At the time of the vote for the Partition of Palestine and for the next few years, the Latin-American vote at the UN represented one third of the total vote, thus being of crucial importance for the creation of Israel. During that time the Israeli delegation to the UN included a special section which dealt with Latin-America, that being the only special section within the Israeli UN delegation. However, during the 1950s, Latin America was considered by Israel an area of peripheral interest, particularly when the limited budget and personnel of the new state came under consideration. In 1951, Israel opened its first legation in Brazil, which was soon reciprocated.<sup>64</sup> It was only in the early 1960s that the legation was raised to the rank of embassy.

## Notes.

1. Isaac Raizman, Historia dos Israelitas no Brasil (Sao Paulo, 1937), 1.
2. Rand Mc Nally, Atlas of World History (Chicago, 1989), map 36. Some changes regarding the name given to the new land occurred from the very beginning: Cabral thought that the new land was an island and gave it the name Ilha de Vera Cruz; when he realized his mistake he changed the name to Terra de Santa Cruz.
3. Elias Lipiner, Gaspar da Gama: Um Converso na Frota de Cabral (Rio de Janeiro, 1987).
4. Kurt Loewenstamm, Vultos Judaicos no Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, 1949), V.1 p.48-56. See also Raizman, Historia, 27-30.
5. Nachman Falbel, Estudos sobre a Comunidade Judaica no Brasil (Sao Paulo, 1984), 13.
6. Abraham Monk-Jose Isaacson, Comunidades Judias de Latinoamerica (Buenos Aires, 1966), 29.
7. Monk, Comunidades, 29-30.
8. On June 30, 1567, a law whose aim was to avoid the continuous "flight" of capital from Portugal was promulgated. Of course, the concern of Portugal anteceded that date, but since no clear date can be stipulat-

ed when Portugal became concerned, I opted for a more flexible way to express the matter.

9. Encyclopedia Judaica, V. p.1322.

10. Raizman, Historia, 76.

11. There is no agreement on this subject. Some tend to indicate that those congregations only came into existence after Rabbí Aboab da Fonseca arrived in 1642; however, there already was an important Jewish community at the time of Fonseca's arrival. Others tend to quote other unclear authors. I followed EJ, V. p.1323, because part of the bibliography which served as a basis for the Encyclopedia's conclusion when dealing with Brazil's colonial period is not available. For Recife and Mauricia as the first places of Jewish community life see also Falbel, Estudos, 13.

12. This is the origin of the Jewish community of the United States, when a group of Jews departed from Recife arrived at New Amsterdam in 1654.


13. Falbel, Estudos, 26-34.

14. Monk, Comunidades, 30.

15. David Kokhavi, התנועה היהודית בברזיל / תולדותיה, Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1982, introduction.

16. Falbel, Estudos, 14.

17. Falbel, Estudos, 41 n.8.
18. For this chapter in Brazilian Jewish history see Judith Elkin, Jews of the Latin American Republics (North Carolina, 1980), 64-5; Monk, Comunidades, 31; Falbel, Estudos, 41-7.
19. Harry Sandberg, The Jews of Latin America (Philadelphia, 1917), 22. For statistics from 1900 to 1980 regarding the number of Jews living in Brazil see Sergio DellaPergola, "Demographic Trends in Latin America", in Judith Elkin-Gilbert Merks ed., The Jewish Presence in Latin America (Boston, 1987), 101.
20. Alice Hirschberg, Desafio y Resposta (Sao Paulo, 1976), 22. See also Falbel, Estudos, 70-1.
21. Hirschberg, Desafio, 23.
22. Kokhavi, אשכנז, introduction.
23. Encyclopedia Judaica, V. p.1328.
24. The official census of 1900, indicated that 819 Jews lived in Brazil. See DellaPergola, "Demographic...", in Elkin-Merks ed., Jewish Presence, 101. From 1910 on the official census and the one provided by Jewish groups (not specified), differ considerably. For a comparison of numbers from 1900 to 1980 see Della Pergola, Ibid. See also Encyclopedia Judaica V. p.1328.

25. Bernardo Nebel and Hugo Lichtenstein were co-founders. See Hirschberg, Desafio, 225.
  26. In 1940 these three institutions were unified and became known as OFIDAS. See Hirschberg, Desafio, 225.
  27. Haim Avni, "The Origins of Zionism in Latin America", in Elkin-Merkx ed., Jewish Presence, 141.
  28. Samuel Malamud, Do Arquivo e da Memória (Rio de Janeiro, 1983), 25-6, n.5.
  29. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 26.
  30. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 26. See also Avni, "Origins...", in Elkin-Merkx ed., Jewish Presence, 142.
  31. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 26.
  32. Avni, "Origins...", in Elkin-Merkx ed., Jewish Presence, 141.
  33. Falbel, Estudos, 87. The first Yiddish newspaper in Brazil, "Di Menscheit", was published in Porto Alegre in 1915.
  34. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 29.
  35. Elkin, Jews, 90-1.
  36. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 27.
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37. Falbel, Estudos, 92.
38. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 28.
39. Henrique Rattner, Tradição e Mudança (São Paulo, 1977), 96.
40. Rattner, Tradição, 98. Elkin, Jews, 91 quoted the information given by Rattner who in turn got it from Olavo Filho Baptista, "Alguns Aspectos Demográficos na Evolução do Desenvolvimento de São Paulo", in São Paulo, Espírito, Povo, Instituições (São Paulo, 1968), 52.
41. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 30. Hirschberg, Desafio, 226 had given a wrong date for its establishment in Brazil; according to her the WIZO was established in Brazil in 1945 under the name "Escudo Vermelho de David-Comite de Socorro das Vítimas de Guerra da Palestina", and authorized by the Red Cross. It seems to me that once the Vargas regime prohibited foreign related activities, the WIZO re-opened in 1945 under the "protection" of the Red Cross.
42. The "Poalei Zion" group in Brazil was established in 1926 in Rio de Janeiro. Other branches were opened in Porto Alegre and São Paulo. In 1929, Bergman was the organizational leader of a public demonstration which brought together different Zionist groups. The rally was to protest against the passive attitude of the British in Palestine concerning Arab violence and riots against Jews, which assumed dramatic characteristics during August, 1929. The public rally was attended by 1,500 people and was the first public Zionist demonstration to take place in Brazil. See Malamud, Do Arquivo, 30.



43. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 30-1.

44. Monk, Comunidades, 31. See also Elkin, Jews, 90-91.

45. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 36. The bribing is not explicit in Malamud's book.

46. The High Commissioner for Refugees, James McDonald, met twice with then Secretary of the Vatican state, Cardinal Pacelli. Once in November 1934, and then in January 1935. Early during 1935, McDonald met with eight Latin American ambassadors in Washington. Among them the Brazilian ambassador, who was receptive to McDonald's plea for German refugees. McDonald arrived in Brazil in March 1935, trying to secure a quota for German refugees in Brazil. It seems that the petition failed because of lack of interest by the Brazilian Government but also because of certain lack of decision and organization by Louis Dunge, the JCA Director, who represented the Jewish refugees and who was at the time in Brazil. For a more detailed explanation and a list of documents see Avni, "Latin America and the Jewish Refugees: Two Encounters, 1935 and 1938", in Elkin-Merkx, ed., 46-50. However, towards the end of 1937, about 8,000 German refugees arrived to Brazil. In addition, in 1940, the Vatican was helpful in the acceptance of 3,000 German Jews who converted to Catholicism by the Brazilian Government. I could not find details about their conversion. See Monk, Comunidades, 31.

47. Howard M. Sachar, Diaspora (New York, 1985), 255.



48. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 37-8.
49. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 48.
50. Details about other members of this organization are found in Malamud, Do Arquivo, 48-50.
51. Rattner, Tradição, 81-2.
52. A close associate of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Ahmed Hassan Matar, came in May to prepare that visit.
53. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 58.
54. The debate is found in the Diary of the National Congress of July 13, 1948, p.5523 and was printed in the newspaper "Jornal do Comercio" in Rio de Janeiro.
55. Quoted by Malamud, Do Arquivo, 83-4.
56. In Edward Glick, The Policies of the Latin American Governments towards Israel in the UN, Ph.D. dissertation, 1955. (In microfilm at HUC.)
57. DellaPergola, "Demographic", in Elkin-Merkx ed., Jewish Presence, 101.
58. Rattner, Tradição, 15-20.

59. Malamud, Do Arquivo, 96.

60. This was particularly so in the areas dealing with education, religion and finances. Daniel Levy, writing on the Jewish school system in Latin America, stated in relation to Brazil: "...The Brazilian case demonstrates that the "vaad" does not always achieve much centralization. In fact, Rio de Janeiro's Jewish schools retain considerable autonomy despite the existence of the "Vaad Hachinuch" (Central Education Council)..." See Daniel Levy, "Jewish Education in Latin America", in Elkin-Merkx ed., Jewish Presence, 174-75. In relation to finances, every single institution has its own system and separate administration which deals with the collection of funds, thus unnecessarily raising operational costs. Considering that as an average every family contributes to four or five different institutions the high cost of maintaining the bureaucratic aspects of these institutions is evident. Still, every institution prefers not to be centralized, despite the financial costs. See also, Natan Lerner, נאמן ישראל ואמריקה הלטינית (Tel-Aviv, 1975), 30, 33.

61. Compiled by Glick, Ph.D. dissertation. Although Glick did not analyze the Brazilian voting behavior, I have used his clear description of the votes.

62. Edy Kaufman-Yoram Shapira-Joel Barromi, Israel-Latin American Relations (New Jersey, 1979), 51-5.

63. Kaufman-Shapira-Barromi, Israel-Latin, 216.

64. Kaufman-Shapira-Barromi, Israel-Latin, 97.

CHAPTER 3.

THE SINAI CAMPAIGN.

### A Conflict of Interests.

On July 23, 1952, a major event occurred in Egypt, an event that was to have a tremendous impact on the political map of the Middle East and major consequences for the African continent. On That date, Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser and other conspirators, one of whom was Anwar al-Sadat, executed a "coup d'etat" forcing King Farouk to step down, taking control of the government and appointing Gen. Mohammed Naguib as the new leader of Egypt. However, tensions soon developed between Nasser and Naguib until in March 1954 Nasser seized power becoming premier and then head of state. Although anti-British since his youth, Nasser was ready to negotiate the fate of the Suez Canal and the Sudan. So were the British. An agreement was reached in July 1954, which stipulated that the British would evacuate the canal within the next twenty months.<sup>1</sup> By early 1955, Nasser saw his dreams of becoming the leading figure in a Pan-Arab federation threatened on two levels: at home because of unresolved problems and, most important, abroad, because of the increasing importance of the "Baghdad Pact"<sup>2</sup> that was backed by Britain. To divert attention from these problems and to build his career as the recognized leader of the Arab nations, Nasser worked assiduously to arouse nationalistic Arab feelings, tried to undermine Western influence in the Mediterranean, and started a guerilla campaign against Israel. The arms needed to become a strong leader of a strong nation were clearly not to be found in the West—not because the West was not ready to compromise but rather because of Nasser's own decision to break with the Western imperialistic powers. He turned to the communist bloc that was equally eager to see the decline of the "Baghdad Pact." By August 1955, Nasser purchased modern weapons from Czechoslovakia while his partner, Syria, was buying its own arsenal from the Soviet Union.

At this point, Nasser was openly claiming that his country had the capacity to destroy Israel. In his campaign against Western imperialism, Nasser also sought recognition as a leader by Black Africa with his support of the rebel groups that fought against British and French influence in that region. Since France did not want Nasser undermining its influence in North Africa, and since Israel was concerned about the well-being of Jews in North Africa, in this area they shared a common interest. Thus, in 1955, large scale massacres of Jews in Morocco were averted by the efforts of moderate Arab countries and French forces. However, this expression of sympathy is not to be seen as an open gesture of friendship towards Israel—not at a time when, in spite of Nasser's policies, appeasement was the game played by both Paris and London.<sup>3</sup>

#### Australian Jewry's Reaction.

In Australia, in September 1955, Mr. Greameau, M.P., asked what appeared to be a somewhat naive question, whether buying arms from "Iron Curtain Countries" was an indication of Egypt's intention to launch a possible aggression against Israel.<sup>4</sup> But the question and the request to investigate the matter was not naive at all. The point was soon made clear to and by the Australian Parliament that Egypt was being armed by the communists and that whoever received communist ammunition ought not to be given Australia's support. The latter was the position that Australia's Jewry tried to convince its Government to adopt in order to ask for a favorable view on Israel in its conflict with Egypt. The Australian Jewish leadership did not view the Arab-Israeli conflict



only in terms of communism against Western democratic policies but it was indeed an element which played an important role in gaining Australian support for Israel. Anything considered too leftist was suspicious to Western European countries and so was the case in Australia. Thus, when Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda, usually considered pro-Soviet, anti-America and anti-West, entered the Israeli Government, some Western diplomats expressed their concern. In England, on the other hand, the workers within the Labor Party, then in the Opposition, sent their warm congratulations to the Mapai. However, this last information was published in Australia only in the Yiddish supplement of The Australian Jewish News but not in its larger English edition.<sup>5</sup>

By the end of October 1955, the Committee of Management of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, ECAJ, sent a telegram to Prime Minister Menzies, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the leader of the Federal Opposition, Dr. Evatt. After expressing their general concern about the situation in the Middle East, the danger of Russian communist expansionism through its new "puppet", Egypt, was stressed. In addition, the telegram continued, "Israel is the bastion of democracy in a vital area and remains pro-British."<sup>6</sup> Finally, the telegram asked that the British be requested to take action to stop Egypt's plans in the region. As we clearly see, in the opinion of the Jewish leadership it was of extreme importance to stress that Israel was on the side of England, Australia's mother country, independently of whether or not Israel was pro-British at that time.

In early November, the ECAJ asked the various boards that it represented to protest against the "red arms" sold to Egypt, this coinciding with the time the annual appeal for Israel was to start. At the same time, the editorials in the Jewish press stressed the isolation of Israel emphasizing that "...the only friends upon whom it can count...are the

Jews in their far-flung communities."<sup>7</sup> On November 18, the editorial of The Australian Jewish News was openly asking for an answer to the appeal. The newspaper statement illustrates that for a large number of Jews support for Israel was not part of their priorities: "...let us hope that the thousands usually unconcerned by appeals of any nature will...join the usual donors..." In addition to the appeal for financial support, the Victorian Board of Deputies, together with the State Zionist Council of Victoria, called for a mass rally in favor of Israel and the press reported that well over one thousand people attended that rally. Australian Jewry's contribution to the appeal for Israel came to slightly over £100,000 of which 65% was collected in Melbourne. Sydney's Jews gave a total of £22,000, reflecting their historically more reluctant position in matters related to Judaism.<sup>8</sup>


In the meantime Israel was unable to get arms from Britain, France or the United States. The British and the Americans, who had unsettled relation with the Jewish state,<sup>9</sup> were particularly reluctant to arm Israel. Although the reasons for such relations are complex, ranging from personal opinions of top advisers and ministers to policies of regional interests, the "affair Gibli"<sup>10</sup> did much to diminish the reputation of Israel in the eyes of both Americans and British. The Jewish press in Australia did not comment on the unfavorable answers of the Western countries to sell arms to Israel, not even when by the end of December, Britain handed over to Iraq £2,755,000 in installations. An attack on Britain's policies was not what the Australian Jewish press and leadership considered to be in their best interests, but the increasing isolation of Israel and the policies of appeasement towards the Arabs by Britain impelled The Australian Jewish News of December 16 to attack Britain's policies for the first time in a courageous editorial entitled "Eden Bias." It stated that "...the natural tendency of Sir

Anthony Eden...to befriend the Arab cause and isolate Israel derives from his many years of service in the Foreign Office, notorious for its pro-Arab bias since the days of Sir Ronald Stone..." Probably to calm down some voices of disapproval within the Jewish community of Australia, so eager to show their uncommitted loyalty to England, the words of R.N. Carvalho, president of the Anglo-Jewish Association in England, were quoted in the same newspaper: "With its present policy, Britain could not escape blame should open warfare break out in the Middle East, whatever country fired the first shot."<sup>11</sup>

In assenting that Australia had still not began to deviate from its advocacy of British interests, it is helpful to note that at the beginning of 1956, a visa to visit Australia for a lecture-tour was not granted to Menachem Begin because of his anti-British attitude during the mandatory period. Although this refusal might be interpreted as a pro-British stance rather than an anti-Israeli gesture by the Australian government, it indicates how sensitive the Government was in matters that affected or could affect England's honor. The caution with which the Jewish press treated Britain's policies towards Israel was clearly shown by The Australian Jewish News, whose covering of matters related to Israel always occupied the front and following pages of the newspaper, when on February 24, 1956, it announced that "Britain asked the US not to supply Israel with arms" in a tiny space on page 12. Up to this time Australia remained neutral in its approach towards the Middle East conflict probably because of Britain's decision to wait and see how its policy of appeasement towards the Arabs would develop. Australia's neutral position is further verified by Foreign Minister Casey's reply to the telegram of October 1955 sent by the ECAJ, which stated that "...you may be assured that...the Australian Government will lend its firm support to the efforts being made to resolve the present

deadlock."<sup>12</sup>

In March 1956, during a debate that took place in the House of Commons in London, Eden said that no important numbers of arms were entering into the Middle East. The position of the United States may be illustrated by President Eisenhower's remark, under the influence of Secretary of State John F. Dulles, to French Prime Minister Guy Mollet that there was no point in selling arms to Israel since the small state could not defend itself against the Arab nations. However, also in March, Britain admitted the danger of an Arab attack for the first time, although it repeated that no arms will be sold to Israel at that point, adding that the "situation may change." The situation started to change in the international arena and a visible proof occurred when the Executive of the Socialist International, meeting in Zurich, passed a resolution asking the Western powers to provide arms to Israel and blamed the Arabs for the tensions in the Middle East.<sup>13</sup> At the same time Egypt's increasing support of the Algerian FLN prodded France to remember her friendship with Israel and to deliver a dozen modern jets "Mysteres."<sup>14</sup> The Canadians, with the approval of the United States, also sent a squadron of jets. The English were still trying to reach an understanding with Nasser and since the last days of February, Selwin Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary, had been in Cairo. By the beginning of March, it was clear that no agreement was on the horizon. The French also tried their luck with Cairo during the middle of March with no better results than the English. In Australia, coinciding with the return of a furious Lloyd to England, the Israel Emergency Council was formed on March 15. Its aim was to provide material aid for Israel as well as to inform the public about the Middle East conflict. By April, Dr. Evatt concluded that if the UN failed Israel, "...it will mean the end of the



organization in the eyes of the world."<sup>15</sup> Although Dr. Evatt was interested in the fair treatment of Israel by the UN for personal reasons, his words were of great importance at a time when Australian Jewry was trying to get the open support of their country in favor of Israel, particularly at this critical time when ECAJ diputation was to meet with Prime Minister Menzies to discuss matters related to Israel.

Because of the multitude of historical ties uniting Australia and Britain and because of the equally close ties still uniting Britain's Jewry with Australia's Jewry, for the latter to openly criticize Britain's policies in the Middle East was tantamount to attacking Australia itself. But once the English Jewish organizations and leaders started to criticize their own government, once the opposition in England began to demand arms supplied for Israel, then Australia's Jewish leadership and the Jewish press felt they could more openly speak against those antagonistic British policies. This explains the incessant reporting by the Australian Jewish press of English Jewry's reaction to the conflict and crisis in the Middle East. Of course there were reports from England before the crisis, but now the focus was to demonstrate that to criticize England because of some of her foreign policies, was not an attack on Australia, not even against England. Thus, when, by the end of March, a meeting sponsored by the Zionist Federation of Great Britain openly demanded that the British government provide arms to Israel, the Jewish leadership in Australia could only rejoice and the Jewish community had the chance to avoid a feeling of antagonistic dual loyalties, or rather triple loyalties.

In April 1956, M. Ashkanasy, president of the ECAJ, opened the 1956 United Israel Appeal saying that Israel's enemies "...are encouraged and fortified with arms from East and West. Her friends among the



Powers are confused and hesitant..."<sup>16</sup> The target for the appeal was placed at £150,000. Coinciding with this campaign, Joseph Saphir M.K. arrived in Australia on May 8. A few days before his arrival, representatives of the ECAJ met with Prime Minister Menzies and urged him to support two points: an immediate armed intervention in the event of Arab aggression against Israel and supply of defensive arms for Israel. Menzies promised to bear in mind the petition during the meeting of Commonwealth's prime ministers scheduled for the following month. Soon after his arrival, Saphir expressed his conviction that the Australian Jewish leadership had the means to explain to the Australian government the importance of a change in British Middle East policies. In the meantime, the United Israel Appeal's solicitation for funds appeared in the Jewish press with the powerful legend, "the light must not fail...give now!! Tomorrow may be too late." The Haborim youth movements came up with their own way to help, a "Work-a-Day for U.I.A." idea. Young people were encouraged to participate in different kinds of work, from digging gardens and washing cars to baby sitting, and to donate their earnings to the U.I.A. On April 5, at the University of Melbourne, the Peace Club of that institution organized a symposium and some two hundred students went to hear the Arab, Israeli, and Communist accounts of the Arab-Israeli dispute. An interesting comment was later given by Isi Leibler who spoke for the Israeli standpoint and was at the time president of the National Union of Australian University Students. Leibler—who was to become one of the leading figures in the Jewish community—said that "... although many of the large numbers of non-Jews present were initially sympathetic to the Arab or Communist views, the atmosphere was noticeably pro-Israeli towards the end of the meeting."<sup>17</sup> One of the things we may infer from this comment is that although a good number



of students were ready to be fair in judging the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Jewish committees designated to explain their view to the non-Jewish population were a little bit late in their timing or ineffective in their approach. The need to promptly organized a Public Relations Bureau subsidized by the ECAJ, the Zionist Federation, etc. was insisted on by N. Jacobson, president of the State Zionist Council of Victoria, who wisely saw Arab influence making its way to Australia, particularly in terms of boycotts against companies that hold products to Israel.

If Australian Jewry needed any more support from their fellow brothers in England, this time the nourishment came from Israel Brodie, Chief Rabbi of the British Commonwealth. A cabled message sent by him and addressed to Australian Jewry read: "At this fateful time, Jews everywhere must rally to support Israel's morale, material development and security..."<sup>18</sup> The original target of the fund-raising campaign was nearly accomplished. The state of Victoria raised over £90,000, in Sydney, over 30,000 was collected, while Perth raised £14,000 in the first weeks of the appeal.<sup>19</sup>

By the middle of June, Eric Baume, a Jewish radio personality, announced on his show, "This I Believe," that "...it is obvious that the British position vis-a-vis Israel has changed a great deal since last year and Israelis should be satisfied. I see the general Australian attitude as being parallel with that of Britain..."<sup>20</sup> While his conclusion that Australia's policies were in accordance with Britain's was certainly true, his more than optimistic view regarding England's "change" was a bit premature. England's attitude changed a few months later because of its failure to come to an agreement that satisfied its own interests in the Suez Canal and other

areas that were already committed to the ideologies proposed by Nasser. By the time Baume made its comment on radio station 2GB, his credibility in the eyes of the Jewish community was not at its best, particularly after his highly critical comments in early March directed against Mr. Nurock, the Israeli representative to Australia. During that early March broadcast, Baume asked Nurock to "give the facts about the Middle East and forget the propaganda..."<sup>21</sup>

By August 5, France and England were considering a plan to land troops in Egypt. However, a diplomatic agreement was at the top of London's priorities in order to avoid an uncomfortable position within the Arab world and to continue to be the key player in the Middle East. President Eisenhower also wanted to avoid the use of force by France and England because that could jeopardize his campaign in that election year. However, it is possible that perhaps the United States did not dislike the idea of Britain losing control of strategic points in the Middle East.<sup>22</sup> Thus, an urgent meeting, the Suez Conference, took place in London at the request of the American government on August 16. The problem of Egypt's blockade against Israel was raised only by Pineau, the Foreign Minister of France. Although the powers involved reach an agreement, Nasser rejected the London resolutions.<sup>23</sup>

In Australia, Menzies once again assured Ashkanasy, now former president of the ECAJ, that he was working hard to find a peaceful solution. The sense of isolation felt by the Jewish community was illustrated by the editorial in The Australian Jewish News on September 28. This time the accusation was not against the leaders of the Western Powers but against the manipulative use of informat-

ion produced by the media: "...we...come to the conclusion...that there is still a bias against Israel in the daily press." The same feeling was expressed by N. Jacobson in relation to the back-and-forth attacks between Israel and Jordan on their border. He said that "...we regret that large sections of the Australian press consistently reported the retaliatory acts of Israel in a most unfavourable light without acquainting the Australian public with facts of aggressive Jordanian attacks that led Israel to adopt a policy of military retaliation in defence of its borders and peaceful citizens."<sup>24</sup> The sense of isolation, now compounded by the fear of impending international disaster, was again stressed by the editorial in The Australian Jewish News on October 26. The message was simple and prickling, "...Israel is indeed alone."

Although diplomatic efforts continued, it became clear to Britain and France that their armies would have to attack Egypt. Once the Americans retracted their offer of funds to help Nasser's most cherished domestic project, the Aswan High Dam on the Nile, Britain and the World Bank soon followed the same path in July 1956. After Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the Western countries and their allies gradually started to look suspiciously at Egypt's regime. A few days after the Suez conference in London failed to bring an agreement and after England, France and the United States openly avowed, for the first time, the right of Israeli ships to freely use the Canal, a debate on Israeli-Egyptian relations took place in the House of Representatives in Australia on September 27. R.G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs presented a "concise and factual" picture going back to the days of the armistice. He expressed the "...unjustified blockade of the Suez Canal to Israeli ships..."<sup>25</sup> and also mentioned the various protests, with no effect,

that the Australian government handed or verbalized to Egypt. He also mentioned Israel's early attempts to resolve its problems with its Arab neighbors through the United Nations and once more insisted that he <sup>just</sup> giving the facts and opinions of the UN Security Council. Dr. Evatt, who also spoke, agreed with Casey but directed his speech against the inefficacy of the Security Council to implement its resolutions. In an emotional tone he added that "...the Arab nations must face up to the fact that Israel is there to stay."<sup>26</sup> The statements of the debate indicate the shifting from a neutral position to one favorable to Israel. However, the timing seems to indicate not so much a commitment to Israel but a desire to align itself with what were now the more clearly perceivable tendencies of the allies against Egypt.

By the middle of October, two different views in relation to the Middle East crisis were expressed within the Jewish community in Australia. The ECAJ stated through its new president Eisenfeld, that it was not the moment for a public statement. On the other hand Lewis Wilks, president of the Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Antisemitism, said that only the UN should decide who was wrong in the Middle East and not the British. However, Wilk's organization was not representative of Australian Jewry and was actually looked upon with distrust because of its alleged communist and pro-Soviet tendencies.

In the meantime France had brought Israel onto the scene as an active participant in the plan to attack Egypt and together with Britain plans were worked out. On October 29, Israeli forces started the Sinai Campaign and two days later allied jets began to bomb Egyptian airfields near Suez. One week later the war was over. Israel had occupied the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza strip. Two days before

the end of the war the UN General Assembly approved a resolution for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all occupying forces from Egyptian territory. The resolution was proposed by the United States and accepted by a vote of sixty-four to five. An embittered and cornered Eden agreed to a cease-fire to start on October 6 at midnight. The French followed the British. Britain and France failed to accomplish their goals for the Suez Canal and Nasser's regime.

With the outbreak of hostilities the ECAJ and the Zionist Federation immediately handed a note of solidarity to the Israeli government, while in Melbourne the Beth-Din asked to observe the coming Sabbath as a day of "prayer and dedication" because of the events in the land of Israel. The same week a rally to support the Magen David Adom was organized. The Board of Deputies had scheduled an urgent meeting for November 6 because of grave financial problems of the United Jewish Education Board. In the meantime, on the afternoon of November 5, a cable arrived from Jerusalem asking for financial support. As a result of the cable the meeting focused its attention on Jerusalem's request and an emergency appeal was issued under the slogan "Call of Israel." The target of the appeal was £250,000 and was to be conducted within ten days starting November 8, with only cash accepted. The Australian Jewish News on the 9. of November, right after the war was over, accurately pointed out that although the military battle had come to an end, the diplomatic battle was only beginning: "Jews outside Israel may feel justifiable pride in the outcome of the Sinai Peninsula battle will have to face diplomatic and economic pressure that may spell ultimate defeat."<sup>27</sup> A harangue asking for an immediate answer to



the "Call of Israel" ended the editorial. The response of Australian Jewry was rather slow and did not come close to the original target.<sup>28</sup> The amount of money raised was about £100,000 and in December was still being collected. Once more the differences between Melbourne and Sydney were clear. With almost the same Jewish population, Melbourne's Jewry raised three times more money than Sydney's Jewry. In addition to the disappointing response to the "Call," a very small number of volunteers went to Israel. The first group of volunteers, organized by the Emergency Service Scheme, left Australia towards the end of December with nine people.<sup>29</sup>

Since the first aim of the United Nations was to effect a withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt, Israel was labeled as an aggressor. Yet the Western European countries maintained that Israel acted in self-defense. In accordance with this attitude, the Foreign Minister of Australia, speaking at the UN, expressed the opinion that "...to say that Israel's attack on Egypt was in response to 'long provocations' is a very moderate statement."<sup>30</sup> This occurred by the middle of November before increasing pressure forced Britain and France to announce their withdrawal from the Suez Canal. Once again the timing of the statement may be critical in understanding its meaning. Whether it was intended to support Israel or to help the British gain time in their political manoeuvres in the Middle East is, at least, an open question. By November 20, seven hundred UN forces were in Egypt and another three thousand were to arrive. On November 22, the British officially announced their withdrawal and one month later the last British and French soldiers left Egypt. The Soviet and Afro-Asian bloc's demands for the UN to immediately intervene were no surprise. The Western nat-



ion's now increasing pressure on Israel to withdraw behind the lines of the Rhodes armistice did not receive much notice in the Australian Jewish press while, on the other hand, the attitude held by the United States was highly criticized once more. For example, the editorial of The Australian Jewish News stated: "We now find Dulles punning because Britain has been forced out of the Middle East. We find him testy as ever about Israel (it is our view he would be a happier man if Israel did not exist), as blind as ever about Nasser and the whole set of conditions in the Middle East."<sup>31</sup> In addition, the sense of isolation so prevalent during the long months that preceded the Sinai Campaign, was felt again.

Towards the middle of December, less and less importance was given by Australian Jewry to the situation in the Middle East. It is true that the news, now mostly coming from Tel-Aviv and the United States instead of Tel-Aviv and London, were reported, but the activities that involved support for Israel in Australia were few. The public relations campaign for the "Call of Israel" was small and only the appeal for the Magen David Adom continued untiringly. There are two main reasons which explain the situation. First, as a result of the invasion of Hungary by Russia, large contingents of Hungarian Jews started to arrive in Australia and the focus was directed to them. Second, the 1956 Olympic Games, which were held in Melbourne, began: for the Australian people, including Jews, sports are a very important part of their lives and the Olympics seem to have been their main concern at that time.

After England's withdrawal from Egypt, it became clear that the United States was the new power gradually "entering" the

Middle East.<sup>32</sup> Even the Jewish press in Australia was anxiously awaiting the "Eisenhower Doctrine" for the Middle East.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, after a UN General Assembly resolution on January 7, 1957 again demanded instant Israeli evacuation without previous settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the ECAJ and the Zionist Federation asked Prime Minister Menzies to intervene with Eisenhower to secure free passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and to maintain UN forces until an agreement could be reached. This initiative, was welcomed by the South-African Jewish Board of Deputies and was interpreted as a call for action in Commonwealth countries regarding the Middle East situation. In accordance with this strategy of action, a public meeting in support of Israel was organized in Melbourne for February 6 and the request appeared in a three-quarter-page ad in the Jewish press. The meeting expressed support and admiration for Israel and appreciation to the Australian government for its policy expressed by Casey at the UN.<sup>34</sup> During the difficult months of debates that took place at the UN, and particularly during February and March when sanctions were proposed against Israel, the Australian government voted against any sanction. At the beginning of March an Israeli Cabinet Member expressed gratitude for Australia's attitude at the UN, adding that "...forces for justice and truth still exist in this world."<sup>35</sup>

#### Conclusion.

Towards the end of 1955, criticisms against England's position vis-a-vis Arab countries—particularly its policy of appeasement towards Egypt—were raised for the first time within Australian

Jewry. This criticism, however, was not approved by large segments of Australian Jews, not even when England's Jews openly criticized their country. England's honor was more important for Australian Jews than for many in England itself. Australian Jews also followed the cautious views of their own government, which opted to wait and see how England would decide to act regarding the Middle East conflict. However, the Jewish leadership and the Jewish press felt, feared, and knew of Israel's increasing isolation and tried—futile attempt at the time—to convince the Australian government to abandon its neutral position and to favor Israel. The Australian position changed in fact once England was definitively unable to come to terms with Nasser and the use of force was decided.

In spite of a positive response—financial but also through other ways—by Australian Jews to the 1956 regular UJA campaign held in April-May of that year the same answer was not to be repeated with the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East a few months later. Australian Jewry's reaction was slow and disappointing: approximately sixty percent of the Emergency Call financial target remained unfulfilled and the amounts pledged were paid sluggishly. The poor reaction was also reflected in the very small number of volunteers who went to Israel.

Although the general conclusion, a slow and disappointing reaction stands, it may have resulted in a growing, new identification with Israel gradually but increasingly in its center. A comment which best exemplifies this trend was expressed by Reverend John Alexander, leader of the Australian Student Christian Movement and sub-Dean of Ormond College Melbourne University: "Prior to the war Jewish students did not present a coherent unit as they do so successfully today."<sup>36</sup> The comment was made three months after the war was over.

### Brazilian Jewry's Reaction.

In the first part of this thesis, the importance of England's position concerning the Middle East and its impact on the Australian Government, its population, and its Jewry was discussed. The historic connections between England and Australia, which shaped the context of reactions of Australian Jewry, had no parallel in the case of Brazil. Portugal, the colonial power that had influenced Brazilian culture and institutions ceased long ago to be a military or political world influence. It had no interest in the Middle Eastern conflict and had no real voice in Brazil's foreign policies. Thus, the expectations and even anguish that were felt by Australian Jewry as a result of England's direct intervention as the mandatory power in Palestine and later on as an active partner in the invasion of Egypt were not shared by Brazilian Jewry, although they followed with great interest events related to the Zionist cause, particularly after World War II. Nevertheless, they were more distanced since their country was not under the tacit supervision of a colonial power directly involved in the conflict as was the case with Australia.

In spite of the lack of antisemitism in Brazil's society, its Jewry never developed a sense of Jewish consciousness nor a strong identification with Jewish causes. A low profile was maintained, not because the government required it, but rather because Brazilian Jewry felt comfortable that way since their interests were mainly social and economic, with the goal of further increasing their social and economic status.

The year of the Sinai Campaign, 1956, was notable for the Jews

of Brazil due to three occurrences in the Jewish community: the inauguration of "A Hebraica", a social and sports club in Rio de Janeiro, scandalous frauds involving major Jewish institutions in Rio, and the shameful reaction of Brazilian Jewry to the 1956 crisis in the Middle East.

In early January, the new and exclusive Hebraica Club opened, after construction expenses of Cr\$ 27,000,000. Celebration of the event included performances by various dance groups and speeches by members of different organizations.<sup>37</sup> Rio's Jewry was delighted to have a Jewish club to meet their increasing social needs. Far less pleasant were the fund management scandals that occurred in Rio involving the diversion of capital from Jewish institutions. Thus, the "Talmud Tora School", a highly respected Jewish school in Rio, was under pressure due to financial discrepancies. A general meeting was attended by more than 1,000 people who requested information about the school's finances. The board of directors was unable to give a detailed account of the use of funds and was also unable to give a coherent explanation of the school's balance sheet.<sup>38</sup>

Another difficult situation developed at the "Hevra Kadisha" of Rio. The Jornal Israelita of January 22, reported the resignations of four members of the "Hevra Kadisha's" board who wanted to keep their names clear behind any doubt. These members were: Bernardo Diamant, Alter Waitzman, Shlomo Cytryn, and Shmil Erlich. The problem at that institution involved the diversion of capital to private pockets. Allegations of fraud were made against the president of the organization, Moshe Zinguerovitch, who was accused of diverting Cr\$ 750,000 with the help of his brother who resided in Israel.<sup>39</sup> Months passed by and Zinguerovitch was still president of the "Hevra Kadisha", in spite of continuing accusations.<sup>40</sup> It was only in early May that a general



meeting was proposed to discuss Zinguerovitch's position. By then, the amount under investigation was established as being US\$ 10,000, slightly inferior to the former amount given in cruzeiros.<sup>41</sup> The date for the meeting was changed several times and, finally, new elections took place only in November.<sup>42</sup> Thus, during the Sinai Campaign, one of the major institutions of Jewish "life" in Rio de Janeiro, which was usually involved in the collection of money, was viewed with suspicion and anger by the local Jewish population.

Still another problematic situation occurred, this time involving the "Organizacao Sionista Unificada" (Unificada or OSU) of Rio. The OSU was another example of internal intrigues and a possible new case of embezzlement of collected funds.<sup>43</sup> This time, however, the victims were the "bona fide" donors and the State of Israel. By February of 1956, it was clear—and official—that the "Unificada" was having a difficult time when it announced an election for new board members and president. In March, a new president and board of directors were appointed and, following the elections, a motion to separate the funds of the OSU from funds collected by organizations such as "Magbit" and "Keren Ha-Yessod" was turned down.<sup>44</sup> The elections did not remove the continuous climate of suspicion within the "Unificada." Thus, on August 19, the General Zionists published a note addressed to the "Yishuv" which stated:

"...Since there is no possibility of serious Zionist activities within the present trends of the Unificada, and after all attempts to meliorate and to mend the situation had failed, we resolve to leave the Unificada, which has become an instrument in the hands of certain groups and is no more the expression of the responsibility and unity of its institutions."<sup>45</sup>

That the "Unificada" was not a unifying element anymore—if it ever



was— came as no news in October when this time the "Mizrahi" and "Hapoel Hamizrahi" reported the failure of the "Unificada" as an umbrella organization.<sup>46</sup> Although a state verging on chaos was evident, one may ask what triggered the crisis at this institution. If a single word could summarize the situation of Rio's Jewish organizations at the time, that word would be "fraud." A May 10 article at the Aonde Vamos magazine frankly stated its position on the situation at the "Unificada." While Jornal Israelita's aim was to give a generic picture of the Jewish community, in particular that of Rio de Janeiro, the smaller but more incisive Aonde Vamos became the center of the controversy regarding the "Unificada". The Aonde Vamos' article stated that sometimes only a sixth of the original amount of funds collected for Israel went, in fact, to Israel. The appointment of a new president and board of directors for the "Unificada" which took place in March was seen by the magazine as a fake, and from other written Jewish sources it was clear that at least the chaotic situation did not end with the change of its executive in March. Aonde Vamos' article continued by saying:

"...but what to do when Winterstein was imposed as president of the Unificada and the democratic process is now more offended (sic) than ever? How to accept that holy funds assigned to 'medinah' (sic) are being diverted and used to finance local policies and a great deal of expenses?..."

Aonde Vamos continued its attacks on the "Unificada" and many of the organizations it represented. Thus, by the middle of June it stated that some thirty people occupying executive positions at the "Unificada" made their living through the funds collected by "Magbit-Keren HaYessod", "Keren Kaiaemet leIsrael", etc.<sup>47</sup> The situation was indeed so chaotic

regarding the misuse of funds collected for Israel that, as Aonde Vamos reported, the establishment of a committee to supervise all these fund-raising activities was under consideration.<sup>48</sup>

One is compelled to ask what role the Federation had as a representative of Jewish institutions in this rather stormy situation. Although the headquarters of the Federation were in Sao Paulo, it also had offices in Rio de Janeiro and local matters were treated without open interference since a clear issue of rivalry existed between the two most important Brazilian cities and Jewries. As indicated in the introduction, a centralizing power did not have many chances of success due to the will for self-determination and the megalomania which were part of most Jewish organizations. The failure of the Federation as a legitimate representative of Brazilian Jewry was so obvious that the Jornal Israelita could openly write about the "pouquissimo prestigio" (very little prestige) earned by that institution.<sup>49</sup> In early February, before the "Unificada" situation became publicly acrimonious, Rio's Federation regretted that it was not asked to mediate the conflicts involving several institutions. In a note addressed to the "Yishuv," the Federation stated the following:

"The Federation came to know through organs of the local Jewish press, of accusations against leaders of Jewish institutions... the Federation deeply laments the occurrence, which has to do with the prestige and honor of our community and is surprised by the fact that issues of obvious public interest were not presented for the consideration of the Federation..."<sup>50</sup>

A sad note was added to the fragile record of the Federation when a few months later, and for unexplained reasons, it sought to clear the name of the Zeifman brothers, against whom a "herem" was estab-

lished years before--and ratified at the time by the Federation--for alleged collaboration with the nazis. As a result of the Federation's attempt angry protestations followed, thus creating a rotted image for the Federation's already poor performance as the centralizing voice of Jewish institutions.<sup>51</sup>

In Sao Paulo, a general overview of its Jewry at the time under consideration reveals a much calmer, more organized situation than the one offered by Rio de Janeiro, in a way reflecting the different character of these cities: Rio with its geographic beauty, celebrated beaches, and a relaxed atmosphere; Sao Paulo with its growing power as the financial center of Brazil, as a result more organized and, though as friendly as any Brazilian city, more "alert" than Rio. Although lacking the scandals that became part of Rio Jewry's everyday life, serious problems also affected and afflicted some of Sao Paulo's Jewish institutions. Thus, in January of 1956, a farewell meeting for young "madrichim" traveling to Israel failed to be successful because of the "lack of interest demonstrated by our leaders, whose relations with the youth had been of a theoretic character only."<sup>52</sup> An unexpected attack against the "Magbit" occurred during that farewell meeting when one of the speakers, Adalberto Corinaldi, a former president of Sao Paulo's "Unificada" accused people of using the "Magbit" for personal purposes. Apparently, his attack was directed against the general public and not against Jewish leaders or institutions. In fact, Corinaldi's diatribe had as its target those who used the "Magbit" and the "Unificada" to send their children to Israel for a greatly reduced price while they were wealthy enough to do so without the subvention of those organizations. Corinaldi's attack was criticized in the Jewish press as "...unelegant and inopportune..." and "...unjust..."<sup>53</sup> In addition, the next month the

Federation acknowledged some problems, which were reflected by the resignation and later readmission of its president. The only clue given "en passant" was a problem at the "Hevra Kadisha," which was accused of dishonest favoritism in the adjudication of grave-lots at the cemetery.<sup>54</sup> During the same month the Jornal Israelita of Rio reported that the "Unificada" of Sao Paulo was close to extinction due to the lack of leaders with an understanding of the needs of the community.<sup>55</sup>

Thus, in 1956, the Jewish community of Brazil was in a state close to chaos regarding important sectors of its leadership and, in any case, ill prepared to act in an organized way. This was particularly so in Rio de Janeiro where distrust of some of the most important institutions of Jewish life was an upsetting fact. In Sao Paulo, the problems were by far less notorious than in Rio, but still a strong Jewish leadership, able to forge a committed consciousness in matters related to Judaism and Israel, seemed to be lacking. The fact that Brazilian Jewry was unable to present a coherent internal front and to come to terms with its own diversity was best illustrated by a sermon given by Rabbi Lemle, of Rio de Janeiro, entitled "Salvemos o nosso Lar" (Let's save our home). It is interesting to notice the solution offered to save the disintegrating Brazilian Jewish home: the community was, according to Lemle, to be united in relation to Israel.<sup>56</sup> This is an outstanding example of a pattern of behavior by Jewish communities around the world which tended to focus on the cause of Israel as the best expression of Judaism they could come up with, thus neglecting creativity in their own circumstances in their respective diasporas. The exaggerated focus and dependence on Israel for their own spiritual survival created with time an uncomfortable situation

for most, if not all diasporas once the Palestinian issue became an increasing element of friction between Israel and the international community. The policies of Israel regarding the role of the diasporas is also a fundamental issue to be defined, particularly when for most representatives of the Zionist movement and Israel, the Jewish diaspora was and is peripheral to the centrality of Israel. In the case of Brazil, due to the generalized indifference to Judaism, no big push was needed for Israel to become the center of concern for Brazilian Jews. The still unanswered question is to what extent this concern was important for most Brazilian Jews.

The month of March brought an unusual movement regarding Brazilian Jewish leadership, most particularly those engaged in Zionist activities. In early March, a meeting of Latin American Jewish communities took place in Montevideo, Uruguay. Its main goal was to declare its support for Israel. The congress stated its vehement protest against the "dictatorial tactics" of United States' Secretary of State, John F. Dulles, for blocking arms sales to Israel. It also protested against against dubious Soviet policies of preaching peace at the UN while selling arms to the governments of the "feudal Arab world." England was also criticized for its policy of appeasement towards the Arabs and charged with trying to save its failure in the Middle East by risking Israel's security.<sup>57</sup>

Following the meeting, a number of non-Latin American Jewish representatives visited Brazil and other countries in the area. The most significant visit to Brazil was by Pinchas Sapin, Israel's Minister of Commerce, who arrived on April 8.<sup>58</sup> He stated that the aim of his visit was to interest Brazilian Jews in investing in Israel and to create a climate of economic cooperation with Brazil. Since



his visit coincided with the eighth anniversary of Israel's independence, he was the official representative of his country for the event. However, the organization of the popular celebration was criticized for being unusually elitist since it was switched from the "Estadio do Pacaembu" in Sao Paulo, where everyone could attend, to a private banquet in honor of Sapir and which was attended by prominent Jewish personalities of Brazil. The Jornal Israelita's correspondent in Sao Paulo, noted that Israel's Independence Day, which usually attracted between 10,000 to 18,000 people, was in 1956 an "elitist celebration" that left out the not so important donors and non-influential Zionists. On the other hand, added the newspaper, the leadership asked the entire community to contribute to Israel, each according to his means.<sup>59</sup>

On June 14, the Mayor of Tel-Aviv, Haim Levanon, arrived in Sao Paulo and declared the annual fund-raising campaign for Israel officially open. The Jewish leadership went out of its way to create an "aura of prestige" for Levanon's arrival: the Chief of Protocol of Sao Paulo's Administration and a representative of the government were part of the welcoming retinue.<sup>60</sup>

It appears that fund-raising campaigns for Israel were viewed with so much distrust by the Jewish community, whose hearts and pockets had been shamefully deceived by some leaders, that it was necessary to reestablish the community's confidence through well organized and serious activities. In addition, the state of the economy was not in good shape: almost coinciding with the beginning of newly elected president Juscelino Kubitchek's five year term, which occurred on February of 1956, the increasingly booming Brazilian economy suffered a slowdown largely due to a drop in the price of coffee in the international market; which



resulted in inflation and economic instability.<sup>61</sup> Perhaps it was the sum of these circumstances, distrust of the Jewish community regarding most of its leadership and the difficult times in relation to Brazil's economy, that brought about the publication of one of the most amazing advertisements ever published in order to attract attendance for a public rally in support of Israel, organized by the "Keren HaYessod-Magbit" of Rio de Janeiro in early June. After calling for the "Yshuv" to attend, it stated in large print: "NO FUND-RAISING ACTIVITIES."<sup>62</sup>

As for the fund-raising campaign, which began by the middle of June, four months later it was still underway. No amounts were made public, only lists containing names of donors. In addition, Cronica Israelita of Sao Paulo published on its first page, in the October 31 edition, information about how the money raised was to be used (agriculture, production and exportation of phosphate, etc.), which must have been a relief for some donors, though one wonders how the Israeli government would know how to distribute an amount of money not yet fully collected and, how it could give a rather unexpected, detailed explanation. In any case, it indicated the need for explanation felt by the Brazilian Jewish community to insure the credibility of fund-raising campaigns.

It should be noted that although some criticism was raised against "Magbit," it was never accused of mismanagement of funds. Furthermore, an editorial in the Cronica Israelita of October 31, pointed out that "Magbit" was one of the few organizations which deserved total confidence. In Rio, "Magbit" initiated a fund-raising campaign in August at the house of its president, Israel Saubel.<sup>63</sup> A pattern of meeting at private houses rather than at public places became increasingly popular<sup>64</sup> and negatively helped to create an atmosphere

of division among the members of the community. This was so because the meetings were organized within neighborhoods, every one of which created its own "Magbit" branch! The motto of Rio's campaign was "Kol HaMagbit" and, as in Sao Paulo, the amount of money collected was not made public.

Although the Sinai Campaign began on October 26, Jewish life in Brazil did not change very much. In fact, one may say that it was almost unaffected by the military crisis in the Middle East. No public rally was organized in support of Israel. No statements of the Federation or any other representative Jewish organization asking the Brazilian government to support Israel's cause were reported in the press. There were no particularly important activities by Jewish youth groups trying to deal with the events in the Middle East. Even at the end of October and the beginning of November, Jewish concerns in Rio revolved around the ongoing problems of fraud in the "Hevra Kadisha" and a heavily publicized visit by Nahum Goldman, which was finally cancelled because of the situation in Israel. Perhaps the only organization which continued to show active interest was "Magbit", which established an emergency fund-raising campaign towards the end of December.<sup>65</sup> The Jornal Israelita, in its edition of November 11, thought it was necessary to publish on the first page an explanation of the causes that led to Israel's invasion of Egypt. During the week that preceded that edition the "Unificada" declared its support for Israel, praised the efforts of the Israeli army, and invited the community to unite in supporting Israel.<sup>66</sup> Similar positive statements were also expressed by the third national meeting of the "Confederacao das Entidades Representativas da Colectividade Israelita de Brazil"

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the hand held out by Ben-Gurion. The influential O Estado de Sao Paulo declared that Israel's invasion was "lamentable." Perhaps the most extreme reaction was expressed by Loureiro Gama of the Correio Paulistano, who viewed the military crisis as the "official inauguration of World War III."<sup>72</sup>

A number of interesting observations were published by the magazine Aonde Vamos. Analyzing the Jewish community's reaction to the conflict, the organ concluded that, with the exception of a small number of communists, it was morally with Israel.<sup>73</sup> However, the emergency fund-raising campaigns revealed an identity crisis within the community as well as a general dissatisfaction with its leadership. This dissatisfaction does not completely explain the indifference it displayed in matters related to Judaism and Israel. Perhaps the crisis within the community became evident for Brazilian Jews themselves once the conflict of 1956 was over and they had a chance to see what their reaction was. Nevertheless, the response of the Jewish community regarding the Sinai Campaign was shameful and disappointing. Another effort in support of Israel that appears to have been neglected by Brazilian Jews—and Israel's representatives in Brazil?—was an organized public relations campaign to lobby government officials.<sup>74</sup>

The Jewish community of Brazil was certainly ill prepared to find a way to support Israel, and the moral support it offered was infrequently channeled into concrete activities that would have helped to build a Brazilian Jewish identity; even if that identity had to have a distant Israel as its center. It is interesting to note that the first appeal to the Brazilian government during this period did not occur until the middle of December, and it was relat-

ed to humanitarian causes. Thus, a public rally to protest against Egypt's treatment of Israeli prisoners of war, and against Nasser's regime's persecutions of Jews living in Egypt was organized in Rio for December 15. The rally, which was also attended by a number of politicians, ended with a plea to President Kubitchek, who was asked to mediate and to offer to accept some of the Jews still living in Egypt as refugees.

With the military end of the conflict, the General Secretary of the UN, following the recommendation of the General Assembly, asked Brazil, along with other countries, to send soldiers as part of a UN force which was to control the Gaza strip and the southern straits to assure "free and innocent" navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba. The National Brazilian Congress, after long debate, agreed to send 520 soldiers to the Middle East as part of the UN forces.

#### Conclusion.

The various frauds that affected the prestige of Jewish institutions added disappointment and distrust to the usual climate of indifference towards Jewish causes by Brazilian Jews. In addition to the problems regarding misuse of funds, many important Jewish organizations, particularly the Federation and the "Unificada" of both Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, were internally divided. In relation to the Jewish community's reaction to the war, one may say that it was indifferent and its leadership ill prepared to organize support for Israel. Social and sport activities were not suspended because of the war in the Middle East, and Jews sought to keep a low profile.

An emergency fund-raising campaign was organized towards the end of December; the amount of money collected was not made public but, according to the reports from "Magbit," which organized the campaign, it seems that a climate of indifference continued to be the mark of Brazilian Jewry.

## Notes.

1. Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel (New York, 1986), 473.
2. The "Baghdad Pact" was a defense arrangement signed by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Great Britain. This agreement surely played an important role in Nasser's decision to look for the Communist Bloc as an arms supplier of Egypt and as a way to undermine the strength of the "Baghdad Pact."
3. Appeasement was a policy not new to England, particularly since Lord Halifax's visit to Hitler in 1937.
4. The Australian Jewish News, October 14, 1955.
5. The Australian Jewish News, October 21, 1955.
6. The Australian Jewish News, November 4, 1955.
7. The Australian Jewish News, November 11, 1955.
8. According to some publications the number of people who attended the rally came to 1,500. The amount of money raised through the appeal was considered a positive response by the Jewish community in the eyes of the Jewish press and leadership. However, the poor results obtained in New South Wales were attributed to lack of well organized propaganda in that state.
9. Sachar, A History of Israel, 476. See also Theodor Draper, Israel



and World Politics (New York, 1968), 3-140.

10. In 1954, when the British announced their intention to evacuate Suez, Israel decided to bomb public places as well as American and British buildings in Egypt through undercover agents. The intention was to demonstrate, particularly to Britain, that it wouldn't be a good idea to leave Suez in the hands of an anti-Western country. Col. Benyamin Gibli, chief of army intelligence, was in charge of the plot. During July, 1954, various bombs exploded as planned but the plot came abruptly to its end when a weapon ignited accidentally in the pocket of one of the Israeli agents. The plan became public and a trial was held in Cairo.
11. The Australian Jewish News, January 6, 1956.
12. The Australian Jewish News, November 18, 1955.
13. That meeting took place during the first week of March.
14. Negotiations between France and Israel for the delivery of those jets had started long before as we learn from an official announcement by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated October, 1955. At that time the Ministry felt it "necessary to inform that no aeroplane of the type known as Mystere has ever been delivered to Israel." At that time the United States, as a member of NATO, vetoed the delivery. By March-April, 1956, the United States let it be known that, although they would not consider selling arms to Israel, they would not object arm deliveries by other countries.

15. Quoted by The Australian Jewish News, April 13, 1956.
16. The Australian Jewish News, April 27, 1956. The message appeared on the front page.
17. The Australian Jewish News, April 27, 1956.
18. The Australian Jewish News, May 18, 1956.
19. The figures of the Appeal appeared in detail in the Jewish press. Not only totals of the different cities and states but also of almost every meeting that was held for that purpose are found.
20. The Australian Jewish News, June 22, 1956.
21. The Australian Jewish News, March 16, 1956.
22. It is interesting to note that a few months later a piece of information was reported by The New York Times through the world renowned commentator James Reston. According to the information, Casey, Foreign Minister of Australia, and his colleague from New Zealand asked acting-Secretary of State Hoover, from the American government, whether the USA was really trying to establish the UN force in Egypt for the purpose of stability to reach a general settlement in the Middle East or whether the USA was merely trying to get the British and French out of Egypt whatever the cost.

23. Sachar, A History of Israel, 486-87.
24. The Australian Jewish News, October 19, 1956.
25. The Australian Jewish News, October 5, 1956.
26. The Australian Jewish News, October 5, 1956.
27. The Australian Jewish News, November 9, 1956.
28. Suzanne Rutland, Seventy Five Years. The History of a Jewish Newspaper (Sydney, 1970), 82.
29. The Australian Jewish News, December 28, 1956.
30. The Australian Jewish News, November 9, 1956.
31. The Australian Jewish News, December 7, 1956.
32. I do not mention Russia because that country was already directly involved in the Middle East through its ally Syria and was behind the arms deal of 1955 between Egypt and Czechoslovakia.
33. The Australian Jewish News, December 28, 1956.
34. The Australian Jewish News, February 8, 1957.

35. The Australian Jewish News, March 8, 1957.
36. The Australian Jewish News, February 7, 1957.
37. Jornal Israelita, January 8, 1956.
38. Jornal Israelita, February 5, 1956.
39. Jornal Israelita, March 4, 1956. The situation at the "Hevra Kadisha" became public in January of that year although, according to the Jornal Israelita's edition of January 8, an investigation of the institution's finances began three years earlier.
40. Jornal Israelita, April 15, 1956; *ibid.*, April 15 and October 28.
41. Jornal Israelita, May 10, 1956.
42. Jornal Israelita, October 28, 1956; *ibid.*, November 25.
43. Jornal Israelita, March 4, 1956; *ibid.*, February 19.
44. Jornal Israelita, March 11, 1956.
45. Jornal Israelita, August 19, 1956.
46. Jornal Israelita, October 28, 1956.

47. Aonde Vamos, June 14, 1956. The controversy between the "Unificada" and Aonde Vamos continued during the whole year of 1956; the accusations against each other reached their peak at the beginning of 1957, when the board of the "Organizacao Sionista Unificada do Brasil" sent a letter to the chief redactor of Aonde Vamos, Aaron Neuman, in which it stated the decision of the board to "prosecute" the magazine in an Ethics Committee ("Tribunal Social Israelita") to be formed for that purpose, under the supervision of representatives of the Federation and Zionist organizations. In the letter, the "Unificada" accused Aonde Vamos of using the organ in a personal fight against "...prominent Jewish and Brazilian organizations, against its important leaders, irresponsibly attacking them through distortion or adulteration of facts, thus hurting vital interests of Judaism, in general, and of the Brazilian "Yishuv" in particular." See Cronica Israelita, January 16, 1957.

48. Aonde Vamos, June 28, 1956.

49. Jornal Israelita, April 1, 1956.

50. Jornal Israelita, February 5, 1956.

51. Jornal Israelita, March 25, 1956; *ibid.*, April 1.

52. Jornal-Israelita, January 22, 1956.

53. Jornal Israelita, January 22, 1956.
54. Jornal Israelita, February 5, 1956.  
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55. Jornal Israelita, February 26, 1956.
56. Rabbi Lemle was the spiritual leader of the "Associacao Religiosa Israelita" (ARI) and the sermon was given during Passover. See Jornal Israelita, March 25, 1956.
57. Jornal Israelita, March 18, 1956.
58. Jornal Israelita, April 15, 1956.
59. Jornal Israelita, April 8, 1956.
60. Aonde Vamos, June 21, 1956.
61. Jornal Israelita, March 25, 1956.
62. Jornal Israelita, June 5, 1956.
63. Jornal Israelita, August 12, 1956.
64. Jornal Israelita, September 2, 1956.
65. The emergency fund-raising campaign had for its target all Brazilian Jewry, and committees were organized in several cities. See Jornal Israelita, December 2, and Aonde Vamos,



November 29, 1956.

66. Jornal Israelita, November 11, 1956. The declaration included the various Zionist organizations of Brazil represented by the "Organisacao Sionista Unificada" of Brazil.
67. Cronica Israelita, November 16, 1956.
68. Jornal Israelita, December 16, 1956. The statment was signed by the following groups: "Achdut HaAvodah," "Mapam," "Mizrahi," "Na'amat," "Poalei Zion," General Zionists, and Wizo.
69. Jornal Israelita, December 9, 1956.
70. Jornal Israelita, January 6, 1957.
71. Cronica Israelita, January 16, 1957. This information was given by the president of the "Magbit," Salo Weissman.
72. The reactions and quotations from the Brazilian press were taken from Aonde Vamos' edition of November 8, 1956.
73. Aonde Vamos, November 22, 1956.
74. Aonde Vamos, November 22, 1956.
75. Cronica Israelita, December 31, 1956; see also Jornal Israelita, December 9 and 23, 1956. No numbers regarding

the public attendance to the rally were mentioned by either of these two newspapers.

CHAPTER 4.

THE SIX-DAY WAR.

## Preliminaries of War.

As an outcome of the negotiations that followed the Sinai crisis of 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was supposed to take over the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh. Instead, once the Israelis evacuated the Gaza Strip, the Egyptians rushed into that area and appointed a governor on March 18, 1957. The UNEF did station forces in Sharm el-Sheikh, and the Straits of Tiran were thereby opened to Israeli shipping. Although the Israeli leadership decided that Nasser's occupation of the Gaza Strip was not worth a military action, Ben Gurion made it clear that any attempt to blockade Israeli passage into the Gulf of Aqaba would mean war.<sup>1</sup> From the Israeli point of view, the UNEF was not capable of assuring Israel's security nor fulfilling the tasks it had undertaken. Regarding the most important Western powers, England and France were not the most trustworthy friends: England's relations with Israel had been ambiguous, and France would not act alone. Regarding the United States, the promises made by Eisenhower in 1957, were not clearly defined and this uncertainty led the Israelis to "wonder what an American 'assurance' might be worth in the end."<sup>2</sup>

During the almost eleven years that passed since the Sinai campaign, Israel grew in terms of economic achievement and international support. It established firm economic ties with many African nations, and during the 1960s sought to expand its economic horizons even to Australia.<sup>3</sup>

In the Arab countries the situation was much more complex. By 1957, in Syria, the Ba'ath Party controlled the military government and the Communists were the strongest political force.

In Iraq, a coup d'état put General Abdel Karim Kassim in power in 1958, until he was overthrown in 1963. The new government led by Kassim advocated a program of Arab nationalism and anti-Westernism and asked the Soviet Union to be its supplier of arms and economic help. Also in 1958, Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic and their union lasted until 1961. In spite of their own internal problems, these "revolutionary" countries had a common cause against the "reactionary" countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Moreover, all of them were united in their ever-growing hatred of Israel. Syria and Egypt were the most outspoken for "liberating the Arab Nation from the peril of Zionism."<sup>4</sup> However, Nasser was not as eager as the Syrian leadership to launch immediate action against Israel. Instead, Nasser proposed the formation of a United Arab command and a fighting organization of Palestine Arab refugees. In 1964, the latter became known as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and was headed by Ahmed Shukairy, a former Saudi Arabian representative to the United Nations. The PLO was based in the Gaza Strip. A more extremist group, El Fatah, was based in Syria. As a result of the manipulative and unnatural creation of those fighting groups by Egypt and Syria, the old cycle of raids and reprisals started again. While the Egyptian-Israeli border was reasonably calm, the Syrian-Israeli border was not. Often, the terrorists would also attack from Jordan. The situation became more violent once a new coup d'état in Syria brought extremist Ba'athists—the Jadid faction—to power in 1966. In addition, Nasser was being pressured towards violence since Syria was urging Egypt to go to war against Israel, and Jordan's King Hussein continued to embarrass Egypt by accusing it of using the UNEF as an alibi not to attack Israel from its territory. Nasser's

hesitation may be attributed to Egypt's economy, which was in its usual state: near bankruptcy.

Of course, although it appears to be an understatement, threats against Israel coming from a variety of Arab nations were not new events in the Middle East. In fact, the war of June 1967, was much more unexpected than it was in 1956, when the "smell" of war was in the air for at least one year before the situation exploded. The most important battle since 1956 was fought on April 7, 1967, between Syria and Israel: Israeli fighter planes shot down six Syrian Mig-21s in Syrian territory and then flew over Damascus. It was important not only because of the size of the confrontation, but because of Egypt's rather uncomfortable position after it had failed to aid Syria. Nasser felt it was necessary to explain this and even more important to show Egypt's commitment to lead the war of liberation against Israel.

Since the early April episode, terrorist activities, particularly from Syrian territory, continued uninterrupted. The Soviets contributed to the belligerent atmosphere by charging Israel with preparing for war against Syria and with increasing the concentration of troops along its borders. The Soviet Union continued to support the regimes of Syria, Egypt and Irak through its right to veto in the United Nations, and to produce virulent anti-Israeli propaganda.

On May 16, Nasser ordered the UNEF to evacuate the Gaza Strip and U Thant, the Secretary General of the UN, unfortunately was not able to handle the situation as well as one might have expected, given the responsibility of his position. All too soon he capitulated to Nasser's demand. On May 14, a few days prior to Egypt's request, Nasser sent the first troops to the Sinai border, using



the fallacious excuse that there was a concentration of Israeli forces along the Syrian border. Demonstrating an astonishing lack of political skills, U Thant ordered the UNEF evacuation on May 18, and four days later he was on his way to Cairo.

More than once events have occurred not because of a planned strategy, but because rhetoric has gone too far to permit a retraction. Perhaps the Six-Day War is an example. It was a war that could have been averted, at least for a few years. That possibility evaporated sometime during the week of May 15 to May 22. Perhaps if Nasser did not feel that he had to prove something, he could have been satisfied with recovering the Gaza Strip without a military battle. At some point, however, he decided to go on. On May 22 1967, while U Thant was on his way to Cairo, Nasser announced the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba: a move not expected even by the Soviets, whose surprise is quite believable, even with their predictable reaction of support for the Arabs. Therefore it appears that although the situation in the Middle East was not at all calm prior to May 16, the twenty days that preceded the war were full of hostile, sudden, and unexpected moves by Egypt that finally forced Israel to act militarily on June 4.

#### Australian Jewry's Reaction.

In Australia, Jewish circles were not particularly alarmed at the events taking place in the Middle East. The feeling changed by the middle of May 1967. Towards the end of April the Jewish press criticized Syria's blind aggressions against Israel as well as

Russia's blind support of Arab nations. Jewish opinion also tended to sympathize with their own government and with the Western approach that favored a "status quo."<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps the most important event during the month of April was the preparation for the 1967 UIA campaign. The deputy Director of the British Commonwealth Division of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Mr. Rivlin, arrived towards the very end of April to conduct the campaign. One of Rivlin's speeches, delivered in Sydney, was particularly critical of part of the Australian Jewish community for not contributing as much as they could. Although this seems to be one of the eternal tasks of professional Israeli envoys for the UIA, it is interesting to note that he attributed the lack of generosity to the fact that "affluence and comfort tend to make people...forget that the future of their people is in the balance."<sup>6</sup> It can be assumed from that statement that Rivlin was confirming an increasing state of "affluence and comfort" in the Jewish community. This certainly helps explain the difference in the Jewish financial response in 1956 and in 1967. To illustrate this greater philanthropy in 1967, the Montefiore Homes Appeal set a goal of \$200,000 and it collected \$227,000.<sup>7</sup> Australia's generous answer to UIA's financial request was probably facilitated by Israel's sending Rabbi Shlomo Goren, then Chief Rabbi of the Israel Defense Forces, to Australia to attend celebrations in honor of Israel's Independence Day and to help with the UIA campaign. As part of this campaign, during the month of May, a number of public demonstrations in support of Israel were organized focusing on security. At this time, security did not have a military connotation: it referred to the need to provide for the well-being of the impressive number of new immigrants who were "pouring" into Israel. The

emphasis was being placed on the necessity to improve the quality of the young nation's manpower.<sup>8</sup> Although the UIA officially started the third week of May, almost coinciding with the sudden events that led to the Six-Day War, it may be concluded that military security was not an issue that preoccupied the Australian Jewish community yet. By the time news reached Australia informing it of Nasser's request to withdraw the UNEF from Gaza and later from Sharm el-Sheikh, and still later of Egypt's blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, the picture we are presented with is of a Jewish community which already had been prepared to support the cause of Israel and its security. Although the danger of war became clear all of a sudden, the community was already organized in terms of financial support. However, "security" now meant something different from two weeks before. A mass rally was organized for May 28, by the Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies and the State Zionist Council of Victoria. In addition, Jewish youth groups organized their own protest march for the same day. In Sydney, a mass rally was called for May 31. The response was impressive: in Melbourne, 7,000 attended the public rally while the youth groups added another 2,500.<sup>9</sup> Even in Sydney, the response was unusual considering its history of reluctance in matters related to Judaism and Israel. An estimated 6,000 gathered in and around the Central Synagogue.<sup>10</sup>

The establishment, the ECAJ and the Zionist Federation, reacted by expressing their concern that an armed conflict might be the result of Arab aggression and continued to call for a bilateral reduction of forces through the intermediation of the UN.<sup>11</sup> Even before the outbreak of hostilities, both institutions declared "emergency conditions," and asked the Jewish youth to accede to

the request of the WZO by taking the place of Israel's working youth, now engaged in Israel's defense.<sup>12</sup> The target of the emergency call was four times the usual annual contribution and a mobilization of all Australian Jewish's resources was recommended.<sup>13</sup>

The religious leadership of Australia proved to be in tune with the necessities of the hour. The Orthodox Rabbinate of New South Wales declared a "Day of Prayer and Fasting" for Sunday, June 4.<sup>14</sup> But perhaps one of the most significant reactions to the imminent danger faced by Israel was the agreement between Rabbi Porush, leader of Orthodox Jews, and Rabbi Brasch, leader of Liberal Jews, to share the almemor of the Central Synagogue of Sydney during the rally that took place on May 31.<sup>15</sup>

The Australian Government reflected Western opinion, which sought to avoid a conflict while at the same time emphasized that the Straits of Tiran were to be regarded as an international waterway. Thus, a few days before the war started, P. Hasluck, External Affairs Minister, stated that "...the Australian Government believes that redress of grievances should be sought in the first instance by making full use of United Nations organs and machinery."<sup>16</sup> This also was the opinion which had been expressed by the Jewish leadership.<sup>17</sup>

The Australian non-Jewish population's attitude in relation to the crisis of 1967 revealed much more open support of Israel than in 1956. Even before the beginning of the war on June 5, the Jewish press considered that mostX Australians were sympathetic to Israel's cause.<sup>18</sup> One Jewish Journalist said openly that contributions by non-Jewish would not come as a surprise.<sup>19</sup> In fact, non-Jewish contributions had occurred in 1956, but this time the generosity was to assume unexpected proportions. In June of 1967, even the

Church was involved in supporting Israel's cause. Rev. Rowe of the Central Baptist Church in Sydney announced special prayers for the safety of Israel and the "Churuch's Gazette" called for similar prayers."<sup>20</sup>

Further mobilization to aid Israel in the present crisis was occurring in the political "arena." In Melbourne, with the beginning of the war, nine Jewish "Labor" organizations formed an Emergency Committee for Israel.<sup>21</sup> Its task was political rather than economic because under the rules of "emergency conditions" established towards the end of May, fund-raising efforts were coordinated by the establishment and other campaigns were suspended for three weeks. The Committee included: Poalei Zion, Friends of Hashomer Hatzair, Bund, Progressive Centre, Jewish Council, Pioneer Women, Haviva Reik Group, Habonim and Hashomer Hatzair Youth. The main idea was to work in close cooperation with Australian Labor to secure solidarity with Israel. A few days later, the Australian Labor Party held a meeting in New South Wales and passed a resolution applauding Israel's "magnificent victory."<sup>22</sup> Of course the war was over by then but the diplomatic battle was starting. The Labor Party also urged the Australian Government to act through the UN to obtain guarantees for the permanent territorial integrity of Israel.

The favorable opinion towards Israel by the Australian population was also reflected in the way the media covered the Six-Day War, a very different<sup>23</sup> coverage from 1956. During the Sinai Campaign of 1956, Jewish circles were very critical of the Australian media's reporting of the events. In 1967, the opposite was the case: the press, radio and television were considered active and generous in their coverage of the Middle East developments. One radio com-



mentator, Rohan Rivett, speaking on June 7 on radio-station 3DB, even advised that, inspite of a UN cease-fire resolution, Israeli troops should keep on going until peace was assured.<sup>23</sup> In addition, a team of three reporters was sent to Israel by Channel 9 television of Melbourne to cover the events. It appears that the feeling of great victory<sup>24</sup>—sometimes even triumphalism—celebrated by the Jewish people around the world was shared by a significant number of non-Jewish people and institutions in Australia.

In the Jewish press in Australia, specifically, The Australian Jewish News, in comparison to 1956, the editorials tended to be more analytical, better structured from a political-military viewpoint, less emotional, and lacking any appeal for money as was frequently the case eleven years before. Accusations against the Soviets for the situation in the Middle East were usually included in the editorials. Perhaps the most noticeable change since 1956 was the openness with which the principal Western powers were criticized. Indeed, the Australian Jews were less prepared to criticize England in 1956 than they were in 1967,<sup>25</sup> although by 1967 England did not have a visibly prominent role in the area of conflict. The United States received the most criticism in the Australian Jewish press, which actually charged it with responsibility for the 1967 situation as a result of its unfortunate intervention in 1956. In addition, the US along with England and France, were accused of being bystanders.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, in sum, according to the Jewish press, both the Soviets and Americans were directly to blame for the 1967 crisis although for different reasons: the Americans, mainly for their poor diplomatic performance in 1956-57, and the Soviets as an instigator against Israel. England and France were criticized for their indifference. The



timing of the censuring comments against the Western powers and Russia, occurring after the first few days of the war and at its conclusion, seems to indicate the great sense of triumph and pride felt by the Jewish people after their total identification with the State of Israel and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Perhaps the smashing military victory of 1967 was psychologically a revenge against many decades, even centuries of Jewish powerlessness imposed by the non-Jewish world. When Israel went alone to fight its battle in 1967, many Jews outside Israel felt that it was their battle, and the military victory of Israel, their own victory. As in other parts of the world the Jews of Australia were deeply moved by the Six-Day War which was emotionally perceived by Jews as a threat to Israel's existence.<sup>27</sup> Not only did the identification with Israel increase but also Judaism in general. According to R. Taft's studies on the impact of the Six-Day War on Melbourne Jewry, fifty percent tended to have more social contact with their families and Jewish friends, fifty percent attended one public demonstration, while twenty-five percent attended two or more, ninety-six percent contributed financially to support Israel, and ninety-two percent gave more than usual.<sup>28</sup> The reaction among young people was particularly positive: in addition to the rally of May 28, 4,000 young Jews rallied in support of Israel on June 5, once the news of the outbreak of hostilities became known.<sup>29</sup> Regarding the number of volunteers ready to go to Israel, the Jewish press stated that hundreds were willing to go.<sup>30</sup> The official numbers indicate that by the end of June 150 volunteers were in Israel, while another 50 to 100 were ready to go in the near future.<sup>31</sup> Also, a number of non-Jewish Australians expressed their intention to go as volunteers to

Israel; some even offered to pay their own fares.<sup>32</sup> In addition to the younger volunteers, 14 Jewish doctors from Sydney left for Israel to help in the hospitals.<sup>33</sup> The number of volunteers who went to Israel in 1967 was, at least, ten times larger than in 1956.

Australian Jewry's reaction to fund-raising for the 1967 crisis differed from the previous reaction in 1956, perhaps because of the different approach of the Jewish leadership. While in 1956 the amounts raised were easily available and published in detail in the Jewish press, this was not true in 1967. After the 1967 UIA campaign began, approximately two weeks before the war, it was announced that new records had been established in relation to UIA campaigns of prior years, but no numbers were given. Once the war began, an "Emergency Call" was established. Melbourne Jewry's pledge was \$2,000,000 and Sydney's was \$1,000,000; this was in addition to the regular campaign which had been occurring until that moment. The lack of concrete figures may indicate that Australian Jewry, although openly supportive of Israel, sought to keep a low profile in revealing how wealthy it was.

Western Australia, with 3,000 Jews living in its capital Perth, gave a donation of \$100,000 reflecting, as in 1956, the support of its committed community.<sup>34</sup> Still without announcing real numbers, the UIA Directorate reported by the middle of June that the total amount of pledges and contributions was rapidly approaching the target. Again, it was not clear what target the Directorate was alluding to. Was it the regular campaign or was it the emergency campaign? Were they referring to all the states or to some in particular? While the Victorian leadership continued with their

policy of not giving figures to the public, towards the end of June, the New South Wales representatives decided to inform the public that they had already collected \$485,000 towards the target of the Emergency Appeal.<sup>35</sup> It seems clear then, that although until some point Victoria's and New South Wales' Jewries seemed to have decided not to speak openly in concrete numbers, the final approach and decision varied with the states. Perhaps the New South Wales' leadership decided to go public with the amount of money they raised because the state, or more accurately, its capital Sydney, had a history of a certain reluctance and caution towards Judaism and its financial support of Israel was rather small when compared to Melbourne (both cities having close to the same Jewish population),<sup>36</sup> and now it had an unmatched opportunity to show new commitment and to dissipate any doubts about Sydney's and New South Wales' position during that dramatic hour.

The reports from Adelaide, South Australia, indicate that the money raised in support of Israel greatly surpassed expectations. In a rally organized after the war began, the amount pledged was \$31,000, however, three weeks later, the total progress was \$45,000.<sup>37</sup> The state of Queensland, where at least ninety-three percent of the Jewish community contributed, collected over \$50,000.<sup>38</sup>

As we see, although we know to some extent the amounts of the contributions in some cities or territories, a final figure was not given. In the middle of July, H. Krongold, president of the Israel Emergency Appeal, said: "...I am not at liberty to reveal the amount collected."<sup>39</sup>

The Six-Day War had a unique importance in bringing Australian Jewry together, probably for the first time. This was demonstrated by public rallies massively attended, generous financial support by individuals and institutions, and volunteered work in Israel. It was viewed as such an important cause that it eradicated previous antipathies within the Jewish community, and "significantly changed the status of Israel and Zionism in the communal structure."<sup>40</sup> However, the war of June, 1967 can not be considered an event that changed the Jewish community suddenly and out of nothing. Certainly it was a tremendously powerful event that brought about a major shift in the whole Jewish world, in the directions of its institutions, and in the identity of individuals. Still, the hatred of the Arab world backed by the Soviet Union and its allies, the flagrant indifference of the Western powers, more interested in their own political additions and subtractions than in resolving the conflict while they could and, moreover, the incapability of the UN to give substance to its claims of justice and morality tended to produce a palpable feeling of isolation for Jews in Israel and, consequently, for many Jews around the world. The military victory of 1956 only consolidated those feelings once the diplomatic battle was over. Another factor was the always present memories of the Shoah and all the implications that go with them; although not always spoken about, the psychological wound was there. On the other hand, the persistence of the Israelis to survive and live, and the transformation of deserts into oranges groves, was a source of pride for Jews everywhere. In June, 1967, Israel's smashing victory became a vicarious resurrection for the Jews. At least for a while.

Another element that also influenced the new integration of the

Jewish community was the kidnaping of Adolf Eichmann in Quilmes, Buenos Aires, Argentina by Israeli agents. When Eichmann's capture became officially known on May 23, 1960, the Jewish world was shocked but proud of the deed accomplished by the Israelis. In addition, over one and a half years elapsed between Eichmann's capture and his hanging on December 15, 1961. That meant that for over one and a half years, newspapers around the world, and not only Jewish newspapers, indirectly reviewed the atrocities of the Shoah. The images of the past were surely very vivid when the Six-Day War began and, in a way, the Jewish response to the crisis of 1967 was partially to avert any thought of another massacre first, and then a yell of power, pride, and triumph.

With the end of the war, the diplomatic battle in the international "arena" began again. This time, world opinion was more divided than it was in 1956. The Soviet representative to the UN, Nikolai Fedorenko, pressed for an international condemnation of Israel and for their evacuation to the 1949 armistice lines. Since the Soviets were unsuccessful in the Security Council, Fedorenko requested that the General Assembly meet to resolve the issue, trying to bring the Afro-Asian vote against Israel: this in addition to the automatic Communist vote for any Soviet proposal.

Since the days of the 1956 crisis, the American position on Israel was gradually changing. This was due more to the particular approach of US presidents rather than because of an alteration in the policy of the State Department. During the weeks prior to the war the US tried to avert any military confrontation even after Nasser prevented the possibility of "free and innocent" navigation by Israeli ships in the Gulf of Aqaba. American promises of direct



intervention, given in 1957, in case such an event occurred appeared to be forgotten or, perhaps, not considered the wisest move for the US at the time. In the opinion of S.L. Manchanda, "The US policy of restraint was evidently dictated by its prolonged involvement in Vietnam, by the desire to preserve the good-will of oil-rich Arab states, and by the belief that any flare-up in West Asia might benefit Moscow. Above all, it was fortified by confidence in Israel's military capacity."<sup>41</sup> Whatever the reasons, the US was not fulfilling the promises given by Dulles and Eisenhower ten years earlier. Moreover, when consulted, the former President was quoted as saying that "none of us should be too hurried getting into this": "this" referring to a unilateral action by the US. Thus, the US position was one of neutrality, best expressed by a spokesman from the US State Department when he said, "Our position is neutral in thought, word and deed."<sup>42</sup> Nasser's accusations on June 9 that the US and Britain had fought together with Israel was an effort to excuse himself to his people rather than a true statement. Once the diplomatic battle began, the position of A. Goldberg, US representative to the UN, was that the Six-Day War should bring a final settlement in the Middle East to be achieved through negotiated arrangements. Those arrangements should include withdrawal of forces and recognized boundaries, although nothing was said to imply withdrawal to the armistice lines of 1949.

While France adopted a completely pro-Arab position, Britain together with the representatives of Denmark, Italy, and Belgium were in favor of Israel withdrawal, but linked it with international guarantees for the existence of all Middle Eastern states. It appears that no real differences existed between the American and the European—except the French—points of view.



Other proposals were offered by the "nonaligned" nations who supported the Arab cause and by the Latin-American countries. However, no proposal was able to win the two thirds vote necessary to pass a resolution in the General Assembly. It was only towards the end of November that an agreement was reached through the mediation of Lord Canadon, the British delegate. The agreement became known as Security Council Resolution 242.<sup>43</sup>

The Australian Government was, of course, in agreement with the Western world in its approach to the conflict. The Australian representative to the UN said at that forum in July that the task of the UN was to lay the foundation for a genuine peace in the Middle East, a peace that will guarantee tranquility for all parties involved.<sup>44</sup> There was no suggestion that the withdrawal of Israeli forces implied an evacuation to the armistice lines of 1949, as this was neither the position of the US nor Britain at that time. The question still is how did the Australian government interpret Resolution 242. One of the clearest answers came a few years later when in 1971 R.J. Hawke, Prime Minister-to-be, said, during a lecture sponsored by the Senator Cohen Memorial Foundation, that the Resolution referred to partial withdrawal. To support his statement, he brought the speech given to the House of Commons on December 9, 1968, in which the Foreign Secretary of Britain, Michael Stewart said, "...there is reference in the vital United Nations Security Council Resolution both to withdrawal from territories and to secure and recognised boundaries. As I have told the House previously, we believe that those two things should be read concurrently and that the omission of the word "all" before the word "territories" is deliberate."<sup>45</sup> However, it was very clear that Hawke's party was not the Australian Government. It was the

Liberal Party which secured the power from 1949 until 1972. The most that can be said is that the Liberal Party was sympathetic to the cause of Israel, followed the Resolution 242 in its approach to the Israeli-Arab conflict, and simultaneously sought good relations with the Arab nations. This balanced approach changed with the election, in 1972, of a Labor government led by Gough Whitlam. While public opinion and the media were overwhelmingly sympathetic to Israel in 1967, the Australian government tended to maintain a cautious and more balanced approach. The neutrality of the Australian government was further demonstrated when, in July 1967, it assumed the diplomatic representation for Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in Israel.<sup>46</sup>

For a period of one month or one and a half month at most, Australian Jewry continued to be actively involved in expressing its support for Israel, because of its own Jewish awakening as a result of the Six-Day War, and also because of the Israeli emissaries who came immediately after the war. Thus, in early July General Ariel Sharon and Morton Berman of the Keren HaYessod arrived in Australia. Public rallies were organized to pay tribute to the IDF and the people in Israel,<sup>47</sup> while Israel's ambassador Simcha Pratt asked the community not to demobilise its fund-raising for Israel.<sup>48</sup> Efforts to continue the support of the Australian public went on during the whole month of June and part of July, and started to decrease from then on. Among other events, Rabbi Sanger, from the Liberal congregation of Melbourne, explained the Middle East situation in a lunchtime address given to the members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce; and a debate was organized at Melbourne University on June 22, where the "final

vote was more than 12 to 1 in favor of the defender of the pro-Israeli view."<sup>49</sup> In the Orthodox religious sphere, the Melbourne Bet-Din asked to observe the 8th of July (Rosh Hodesh Tammuz) as a "Day of thanksgiving for the deliverance of Israel and the Holy City of Jerusalem."<sup>50</sup>

#### Conclusion.

The Jews of Australia were deeply touched by the Six-Day War. Not only did their identification with Israel reach its peak but Judaism in general was renewed. The war and its threat to Israel's existence brought Australian Jewry together as never before and, at the same time, marked the beginning of an era in which Israel was—and still is—the center of Jewish unity and interest. Australian Jewry's response to the crisis took the form of public demonstrations, positive financial support, and many young people, including a team of Jewish doctors from Sydney, volunteering to go to Israel.

The involvement of the Jewish youth, which began to be somewhat noticeable during the Sinai Campaign in 1956, became an important and enthusiastic element in 1967: youth rallies attracted large numbers of participants, particularly in Melbourne, and at least ten times more volunteers went to Israel in 1967 than in 1956. However, Australian Jewish authors and the press at the beginning of the conflict tended to see more volunteers than those who actually went to Israel.

Before the outbreak of hostilities on June 5, Jewish opinion was in agreement with their government's position, which was also the general Western approach that favored a "status quo"

and a peaceful resolution through the UN. This was also the official stand of the ECAJ and the Zionist Federation. After the war the Australian government continued to call for a solution of the Middle East problems through Resolution 242 of the UN, to maintain an officially neutral position, and to preserve good relations with both Israel and the Arab nations. There was no available information which would indicate how the government interpreted Resolution 242 or if the subject was ever officially discussed. In 1971, Hawke's clear-cut pro-Israel position on 242 was clearly influenced by the imminent election campaign—though he himself was a true friend of Israel—rather than reflecting the thought of Australian leadership, whether Liberal or Labor.

Jews within the Labor Party successfully lobbied for a motion of commending Israel's military victory, which demonstrated that Jews were not afraid of showing their loyalty towards a third country. On the other hand, the Jewish leadership never criticized the neutrality of the Australian government.

Even the Jewish media, rather than criticizing their government's neutrality, attacked the Western powers, particularly England—for its indifference—and the United States. Although France was occasionally criticized, Australian Jewry was not as interested in France, as it was in England, whose queen was Australia's head of state. Regarding the United States, the feeling was rather ambiguous: severe criticism and blame for the June crisis, but also a great respect for its world power and democratic society. While the Jewish media and public were generally critical of the West's attitude, the Jewish leadership tended to accept its political solutions to the crisis as their own. This could be interpreted as their way to

avoid any conflicts with the Australian Government itself—which stood with their Western friends—particularly when it was a reasonable, neutral position, and not morally hard to live with.

The religious leadership was in tune with the hour, declaring, as in 1956, days of special prayers, fasting, and/or meditation. However, their most praiseworthy step was putting aside religious differences when Orthodox and Liberal rabbis shared the pulpit of the Central Synagogue in Sydney, thus reflecting religiously what was a general feeling. Again, it was concern for Israel that brought Australian Jewry together in spite of their different approach to Jewish religion. At least for a while.

The fund-raising campaign for Israel was considered a success, and so it was. Although Australian Jewry's positive response was clearly the case in 1967, we have to remember that the emergency call for Israel almost coincided with the regular campaign, meaning that most people were not asked to contribute two and three times as in 1956, and that the Jewish population had been requested to give financial support for Israel for about two weeks before the crisis exploded on June 5. In addition, it is to be noticed that for an ever growing segment of Australian Jews, affluence and comfort began—for others it simply continued—to be part of their lives.

The Six-Day War, with Israel's smashing victory, was for Australian Jews their own victory. It brought together for the first time the whole community and, at the same time, filled them with pride for the state of Israel, which from then on, became the central and unifying element in Jewish life.

### Brazilian Jewry's Reaction.

In the 1950s, Israel began seeking economic partners and allies in Latin America and in 1959 Israel's Golda Meir and Brazil's Francisco Negrão de Lima signed a cultural agreement. Although it was soon ratified by Israel, the Brazilian ratification did not occur until the beginning of 1964, and by April, the agreement was in effect. This opened the door for even more significant cooperation by the two governments in the following years.

The climate of friendly relations being established between Brazil and Israel was augmented by the arrival of Zalman Shazar, President of the State of Israel, in July, 1966. He received favorable coverage by the Brazilian press and, in addition to other honors, a stamp commemorating Shazar's visit was issued by the Brazilian Post Office. A few weeks after Shazar's departure, the 1959 agreement, though in effect only since 1964, was enacted as decree 59.059. Thus, it appears that Shazar's visit consolidated relations between Brazil and Israel, further opening the way for mutual endeavors. In fact, during the first quarter of 1967, after a visit to Israel by Sergio Correia da Costa, representative of Brazil's Foreign Ministry (Itamarati), Aloisio Bittencourt, the Brazilian ambassador to Israel, declared a new era of cooperation was to begin.<sup>51</sup> This included bringing Israeli technology in the field of agriculture, particularly techniques of irrigation, to Brazil's poor northeastern territory. In addition, cooperation in the utilization of atomic energy for pacific purposes was part of the agreement.<sup>52</sup> By May, two Israeli experts in physics, Israel Dostrovsky and Efraim Katchalsky, arrived in Brazil for a short visit following an invit-



ation by the Brazilian government.<sup>53</sup> In Israel, the new era of cooperation between the two countries was demonstrated on May 4, when "Kibutz Bror Hail," most of whose population was of Brazilian origin, inaugurated the "Centro Cultural Oswaldo Aranha" named after the Brazilian politician who played a decisive role in the creation of the State of Israel.<sup>54</sup>

During the 1960s, Brazil endured a change of governments by means of force, that became the tragic mark of Latin American countries for a number of decades, and that only in recent years has changed with the slow returning of the democratic form of government. Jânio Quadros, who was elected president in 1961, resigned in 1964. Vice-president Goulart was prevented from assuming the presidency due to pressure from the military forces who considered him too leftist and accused him of being a communist. H. Castelo Branco became the new president, thus closing a period of sharp instability, which witnessed in the beginning of 1964 a number of antisemitic actions: swastikas were painted in Sao Paulo, Rio Grande and Belo Horizonte, and a bomb exploded in the "Instituto Feminino de Educacao e Cultura Beth Jacob."<sup>55</sup> These actions were completely uncommon in a society which was not antisemitic and in which large communities of Jews and Arabs lived on good terms.

At the beginning of 1967, an unexpected event shocked the usually dormant Brazilian Jewish community: one of the most wanted nazi criminals was found in Sao Paulo. Paul F. Stangl, the "angel killer," held an executive position at "Volkswagen." Stangl was arrested following pressure from abroad, but the Brazilian government was not sure whether to prosecute or extradite.<sup>56</sup> The position of the Jewish community, reflected in the press, was not

unanimous. Thus, the Jornal Israelita of Rio de Janeiro expressed two opposing views: on April 2, it stated that the criminal should be prosecuted in Brazil; however, in its editorial on April 30, it stated that he should be extradited. Finally, Stangl was extradited to Germany at the beginning of June.<sup>57</sup> Jewish institutions were accused of being slow to react to the Stangl affair by Aonde Vamos. According to the usually critical magazine Jewish circles only began to declare themselves publicly eleven or twelve weeks after Stangl's arrest.<sup>58</sup> In any case, during several months before the Six-Day War the Jewish community had a reminder of the tragic events that decimated one third of the world Jewish population and this at a time when Arab countries were threatening to destroy Israel.

Coinciding with the Stangl affair, at its peak of attention, during May, the Jewish community commemorated the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Warsaw ghetto uprising. In Sao Paulo, a crowd of 3,000 gathered at the Hebraica and were addressed by the city's governor, Abreu Sodre, the honorary consul of Israel, Leon Feffer, and Poland's consul, Adam Janowski.<sup>59</sup> However, the two events that received the most coverage by the Jewish press were the nineteenth anniversary of the creation of the state of Israel and the election of new officers for Sao Paulo's Federation. The latter took place on April 23, and it is interesting to notice some of the reactions it produced in the Jewish press. The Cronica Israelita reported that the "Assamblea Geral Extraordinaria" which preceded the election was unusually well attended, particularly by members of the younger generation whose participation even included becoming candidates for the election.<sup>60</sup> The newspaper also pointed out that most members of Hebraica and CIP, per-

haps the two single most powerful organizations of Sao Paulo's Jewry, were indifferent to the election. Thus, out of 7,000 members of the Hebraica only 359 voted, and the DIP, which listed almost 2,000 families as members of its congregation, was "completely indifferent."<sup>61</sup> This attitude was further stressed by Aonde Vamos, which described some of the "efforts" made to encourage people to vote: free transportation and ice-cream were offered to those who voted. The magazine added it was a "new and curious phenomenon."<sup>62</sup> However, ice-cream was not appealing enough to awaken the interest of Sao Paulo's Jewry. According to Cronica Israelita, in 1965, out of 5,000 registered voters—35,000 could have registered—only 2,568 voted in that years election, comprising 48% of the registered voters. In 1967, although there were 9,000 registered only 2,085 voted, comprising 24% of the registered voters.<sup>63</sup> As a result of the election, 96 delegates formed the Federation's Council; the Council elected its Executive Board, out of which the new president of Sao Paulo's Federation, Benno Milnitzky, was appointed. According to an editorial by Moises Kahan of Aonde Vamos, the general climate within this community was one of indifference and distrust,<sup>64</sup> although I must say it was not as prevalent as in Rio. Continuing in the same critical vein, the organ stated in its edition of June 1 that the lack of a real representation for the Jewish community of Sao Paulo was felt with greater emphasis when confronted with significant events.

The other event which attracted the attention of the public and the press was the nineteenth anniversary of the creation of the state of Israel. Celebrations, which were usually accessible to the public, had in 1956 become elitist. However, in 1967 both types

of functions were available, though with a clear preeminence of elitist celebrations. In Sao Paulo, Honorary Consul Feffer offered a reception at his house and among those present were leaders of the "KKL", "Magbit", the Federation, charity organizations, and military and civilian authorities.<sup>65</sup> In Rio de Janeiro the "Unificada" organized a rather selective meeting at the Municipal Theater. Those invited were "...the most representative elements of the society, authorities and distinguished members of Jewish institutions and clubs of the Guanabara area."<sup>66</sup> Also in Rio, the Hebraica of that city organized a dance-party which was attended by Governor Negrão de Lima and Israeli ambassador Shmuel Dizon among others.<sup>67</sup> Speeches in honor of Israel's anniversary were delivered at the Federal Chamber of Deputies in Brasília by Marcos Kertzman, a Jew, and Cunha Bueno, a long-time friend of Israel.<sup>68</sup>

The situation in the Middle East became explosive towards the end of May 1967. On May 23, the Brazilian Government, then a member of the Security Council of the UN, stated that it would support any measure that would ease the tension.<sup>69</sup> Brazil wished to avoid officially supporting any country involved in the conflict since it maintained good relations with Israel based on economic agreements including the use of atomic energy which was vital for Brazil's development and peaceful rivalry with Argentina, and with the Arab countries, some of which supplied 48% of Brazil's oil needs.<sup>70</sup> Thus, the Itamarati's position was of "...equidistance towards those involved and of loyalty to the principles of international law."<sup>71</sup> However, in veiled and diplomatic language, the Itamarati expressed reservations about Egypt's renewed blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba. Brazilian ambassador to the UN, Sette Camara, speaking

at a meeting of the Security Council, said that Brazil, in full agreement with the General Secretary, considered the RAU's decision to withdraw its consent for the presence of UN emergency forces as "...sudden and unexpected..."<sup>72</sup> In addition, Magalhaes Pinto, Brazil's Foreign Minister, after expressing his country's position favoring every effort to reach conciliation, went on to say: "...but we do not agree with disrespect regarding the principles of international rights and aims of the United Nations Charter."<sup>73</sup>

It is interesting to note that the Arab and Jewish communities in Brazil, both more concentrated in Sao Paulo, continued to enjoy amiable relations which often included business negotiations. Before the war, a newly formed "Arab-Jewish Committee for Peace in the Middle East", after collecting 3,000 signatures, sent telegrams to President Costa e Silva, Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto, ambassador Sette Camara, and to the leaders of Israel and Egypt, Levi Eshkol and Gamal Nasser, urging them to show restraint and to find peaceful means to resolve the crisis.<sup>74</sup> The only noted provocation in Brazil came from a Syrian representative, Hassan Sakka, who expressed doubts about Brazilian Jewry's loyalty to Brazil. In this instance, the "Confederacao," through its representatives T. Nigri and V. Winterstein, met with Claudio Garcia de Souza, Director of the East Affairs Department, and protested Sakka's statements.<sup>75</sup> Two telegrams were also sent by the "Umbrella" organization: On May 30, its president and vice-president, M. Kauffmann and S. Malamud, expressed to ambassador Divon the firm support of Brazilian Jewry for the Israeli government;<sup>76</sup> during the same week a rather insipid but formal telegram was sent to the Itamarati, praising the government for its tradition of peace and thanking it, in the name of the Jewish community, for its mediation



efforts in the Middle East conflict.<sup>77</sup>

Towards the end of May the reactions of other Jewish communities outside Brazil began to reach Brazilian Jews. They received information that increasing numbers of volunteers were presenting themselves to Israeli embassies, expressing their readiness to help in Israel.<sup>78</sup> In Brazil, support rallies were organized in the Hebraica and Macabi of Sao Paulo.<sup>79</sup> In the Hebraica club, a crowd of 3,000 young Jews gathered to express their opposition to war. The rally was organized by the Federation of Sao Paulo; one of the speakers was Jose Knoplich, general secretary of that institution. A telegram sent to President Costa e Silva informing him of the meeting was signed by the newly elected president of the Federation, Benno Milnitzky. The climate of the meeting as well as the content of the telegram were moderate. In addition, in the traditional Jewish neighborhood of Bom Retiro, Sao Paulo, banners against war in the Middle East were displayed in the streets.

With the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East on June 5, Brazilian Jewry's reaction was far less indifferent than in 1956. Reflecting the community's concern, the Hebraica from Sao Paulo suspended all festive activities during the war.<sup>80</sup> On the same day that the conflict exploded, a special prayer for peace in the Middle East was offered at the CIP by Rabbi Pinkuss, and June 8 was declared a day of fasting and prayers for the Jews of Sao Paulo.<sup>81</sup> Emotional and sometimes even sensationalistic news was reported by the Jewish press, particularly in Yiddish. Thus, the Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung of June 9, wrote the following story:

*הא אײַנעם וואָס האָט זיך געפֿונען אין ירושלים*



זאגט זי קינדער זאגט זי, אז זי איז אראפ געווארן געטראפן,   
 זאגט זי, אז זי איז אראפ געווארן געטראפן,   
 82 אז זי איז אראפ געווארן געטראפן, אז זי איז אראפ געווארן געטראפן.

(At the Sholem Aleijem School, when the teacher, Mrs. Janice, told the children that the Arabs invaded Israel(sic), two students fainted and the rest cried, and classes were forced to stop until the students calmed down.)

Then in a triumphant manner, the same newspaper announced the Israeli victories in East-Jerusalem by stating on its front page, that "זי וואלט געזען דאס אלטע ירושלים"   
 (The white and blue flag flutters over the old city of Jerusalem.)

The sensationalistic reporting that occasionally appeared in the Jewish press—the Yiddish Jewish press—was also found in the non-Jewish press dealing with volunteers for Israel. Lucien Calmanovitz of the Cronica Israelita expressed his concern about the way in which many Brazilian newspapers distorted the truth by stating that armed Jewish brigades, which included Brazilian Jewish volunteers were to be sent to Israel.<sup>83</sup> In fact, the volunteers were to replace the soldiers in their civil obligations. The number of volunteers from Brazil was significantly higher than in 1956. In 1967, a total of 173 Brazilian Jews, out of a population of about 110,000, went to Israel as volunteers.<sup>84</sup>

Other forms of support for Israel included the donation of blood, clothes, and medicines, which were sent through the Red Cross.<sup>85</sup> However, there was almost no trace of financial support or emergency campaigns appearing in the Jewish press, only some very brief remarks by Aonde Vamos. In August 1967, it stated that,

in general, the community responded positively as expected.<sup>86</sup> And on June 15 it actually denied the non-Jewish press's allegation that the Jewish community was collecting millions of dollars to send to Israel. In spite of this scarcity of information, the oral history of that period relates that fund-raising activities did occur in a very discreet manner, and that the totals collected were sent to Israel through a third country.<sup>87</sup> Other responses to the war by the Jewish community included a communique of solidarity with Israel from the Jewish youth of Rio.<sup>88</sup> Another source stated that large numbers of Jewish industrialists, professionals, traders, retailers, etc., instead of going to work during the first day or two of war, remained at home listening to the radio or watching television awaiting the latest news.<sup>89</sup>

Arabs and Jews living in Brazil were able to avoid confrontations regarding the Middle East crisis. In Sao Paulo and Rio, where the majority of both communities lived, relations remained calm. In Sao Paulo, the police sent patrol cars to neighborhoods where both Arabs and Jews lived to prevent any over hostility; however, the police did not have to intervene. In Rio, in the area known as Alfandega, where Jews and Arabs owned stores, plenty of radios were being listened to in the stores, but no confrontation between members of the two communities was reported.<sup>90</sup>

Immediately after the war, there was almost no indication of rallies in support of Israel or for peace in the Middle East after the ending of hostilities in June 1967.<sup>91</sup> It appears that the Jewish community, although much more active than the 1956 crisis, tried to keep a low profile. This reaction could have been due to the accusations made by some newspapers against the seemingly

enormous wealth and high number of "combatant-volunteers" sent by the Jewish community to Israel. However, a high profile was, in fact, never the case in any South-American country, not even in Brazil with its natural tolerance and "happy-go-lucky" ways. Money continued to be raised discreetly and unofficially, while blood, medicines, and clothes continued to be sent through the Red Cross. Then, by the middle of July, things were back to normal for the vast majority of Brazilian Jews. Social activities were resumed and, at that time, Rio's Hebraica organized a festival of Jewish food and an estimated 4,000 people attended.<sup>92</sup> Also in Rio, the "Hevra Kadisha" of that city invited the community to join in a ceremony of remembrance for those who fell while defending Israel. The ceremony was organized in July and, although no numbers regarding attendance were released, the Jornal Israelita wrote it did not have the expected public attendance.<sup>93</sup>

With the cessation of hostilities, the Jewish community in Brazil began to concentrate on the future. Sao Paulo's Federation expressed its hope for an agreement which would bring "...definitive peace and maintain the standards of International Law and the UN's Charter..." At the same time it stated the complete integration of Brazilian Jewry to the traditional principles of "...our great country..."<sup>94</sup> Thus, the Jewish establishment continued to feel the need to stress that the Jews of Brazil, although interested in matters that affected Israel, were primarily Brazilians. It seems, then, that during the Six-Day War, the Jewish establishment was afraid that charges of dual loyalty might be made by the media. While the Sao Paulo Federation's view of peace was a reflection of the Itamarati's—supervision by the UN and a negotiated agreement—Aonde Vamos took a more aggressive position. It stated that Israel should

emerge from the crisis strengthened if it avoided "...ruinous concessions..."<sup>95</sup> Apparently it was advising Israel not to return conquered land, although it did not specify whether the land should be used as a tool for negotiations later on. The magazine also pointed out that Israel should not count on the support of the great powers but only on Jews around the world.

In its typically critical attitude towards the Jewish establishment, Aonde Vamos attacked the Federation for not responding according to the circumstances: "Not even the great moments that are being lived by the people of Israel...managed to shake the weak Federation."<sup>96</sup> In the same edition, published on July 20, its adverse comments against the Federation assumed uncommon vituperation when it asked: "What is the Federation's foundation? Falshood? Fiction? Unreality and Deception?...The Federation is no more than a chimera." Alfred Hirshberg, chief editor of Cronica Israelita, was more supportive of the Federation; on June 30, he wrote that his newspaper continued to give credit to the Federation's new leadership and also stated the hope that they would soon present an idea of their goals and ways to accomplish it.<sup>97</sup> Continuing its criticisms, Aonde Vamos attacked the Committee for Public Relations, stating that it had been formed in a rush by people whose only concern was their personal aggrandizement, and its action, a complete failure.<sup>98</sup> The magazine also blamed the organ Brazil-Israel for failing to change the Brazilian government's neutrality regarding the Middle East conflict, or its support for the Vatican's position regarding the internationalization of Jerusalem. It reported that, in addition to Brazil-Israel, "...other similar institutions had shown themselves artificial and unprepared for a mission of enlightenment, long since needed."<sup>99</sup>

Although Brazil and most of the Latin American countries differed with Israel on the status of Jerusalem—and it is not unlikely that the Vatican's pressure in this respect had a hand in the position of these countries—this bloc of nations was more pro-Israel than any other bloc during the crisis of 1967. Thus, for instance, with the exception of Cuba, Latin American countries sponsored a resolution which made Israel's withdrawal conditional upon the cessation of belligerence.<sup>100</sup>

With the ceasefire on June 7, and a few days later with the end of the war, the Brazilian government asked for a meeting of the countries involved, the Security Council, and a group of countries considered to be representatives of the international community.<sup>101</sup> In addition, Brazil, Argentina, and Ethiopia asked the Security Council to approve a treaty which requested fair treatment for the prisoners of war.<sup>102</sup> Brazil's support for Israel's conditional withdrawal had to be balanced by other less zealous responses to maintain a form of neutrality since the last thing that the Itamarati wanted was to irritate the Arab countries. Thus, Brazil abstained on the Soviet motion to condemn Israel as the aggressor even though the Brazilian representative to the UN, Sette Camara, explained that there was no proof of Israeli culpability,<sup>103</sup> and clearly his country was not prepared to accuse Egypt of aggression either. In a letter dated June 7, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol requested Brazilian President Costa e Silva to denounce Egyptian aggression. The President's answer was short and clear: the forum to investigate the matter was the UN and he hoped that Israel would continue to act according to the regulations of that international organization.<sup>104</sup>



The careful balance maintained by the Itamarati did not necessarily reflect the more emotional attitudes of commitment from prominent Brazilians. Thus, for example, a former governor of the state of Guanabara, Carlos Lacerda, said that by talking about annihilating the state of Israel, Nasser became liable for the crime of genocide, and that Nasser's aggression was not only against Israel but against the UN and the Arab people as well.<sup>105</sup> Also in Rio, where the Arab community was not as influential as in Sao Paulo, Diario de Noticias quoted the president of the High Military Tribunal, Monon Filho: "...the right is on the side of the Jewish state."<sup>106</sup> Strong emotions were also expressed in the Brazilian Parliament although the majority of representatives favored neutrality and wanted to avoid having Brazil become a battlefield, as was stated when Israeli writer Yael Dayan came to Brazil to speak about the recent war.<sup>107</sup> The occasion of Moshe Dayan's daughter's visit was used by Deputy Salim Sadeh to accuse the Jews of unwillingness to assimilate to Brazilian life, which was the same accusation made by a Syrian representative before the war. Among those representatives defending Israel's position, the most vehement statements came from Deputy Kertzman. After blaming Nasser for the outbreak, he declared that "...Brazil would become a new Pilate if it remains neutral."<sup>108</sup> Deputy Israel Dias Novais, on the other hand, explained that the position of neutrality adopted by the government was due to the fact that Brazil enjoyed good relations with all the belligerent parties and that great contributions had been made by citizens of both communities.<sup>109</sup>

In spite of a small number of anti-Israeli articles in the non-Jewish press, most of that press was pro-Israeli or, at least



against the USSR due to its support of Arab countries. An example of this attitude appeared in Rio's Ultima Hora. This newspaper, known for its criticism against the United States, castigated the Soviet Union for its policies towards the Middle East, and criticized the UN for engaging in bureaucratic matters instead of seeking a just solution for the area.<sup>110</sup> In its July 27 edition, Aonde Vamos stated that a number of paid articles appeared in some inland Brazilian newspapers, accusing Israeli troops of mistreating Brazilians who were part of the UN forces. In addition, the magazine reported on the "free circulation of intrigues by the press, radio, and television" during the weeks that followed the war.<sup>111</sup> However, no other Jewish publication considered the media to be anti-Israeli. In fact, the Brazilianer Yiddisher Zeitung viewed the press, radio, and television as pro-Israeli,<sup>112</sup> and according to the Jornal Israelita "...almost all types of media, along with Brazil's intellectuals, are sincerely favorable to Israel's self-defense."<sup>113</sup> An example of the general position of the non-Jewish press can be seen in the highly respected O Estado de São Paulo, which on June 11 stated that Nasser's manoeuvres to remain in power were "grotesque;" and compared Nasser's intention to create an absolute power with the machinations of Fidel Castro and Janio Quadros. It concluded that the only solution to the conflict would start with Nasser's resignation.<sup>114</sup>

Although in general Brazilians do not have strong political convictions or interest in international matters and do not present an element of pressure on the decisions of the government, according to the Brazilianer Yiddische Zeitung, the open-minded (sic) were with Israel.<sup>115</sup> The newspaper did not elaborate further on this

statement. The only other source of information regarding public opinion stands came from a poll organized by the Jornal do Brasil of Rio, which reported that more than 96% of those interviewed responded that in case Brazil had to choose between Israel and the Arabs, it should support Israel.<sup>116</sup> However, it is possible that the result of the poll might have been somewhat different in Sao Paulo, where Arab influence was far more significant than in Rio.

#### Conclusion.

Brazilian Jews' reaction to the Six-Day War was far more significant than in 1956. Its leadership, although still divided and weak, was better organized. Sport and social clubs, such as Hebraica and Macabi, became increasingly important as meeting points where Jews expressed their concern and support for Israel. Young people attended rallies, and the adult population expressed its support by giving blood and sending clothes and medicines through the Red Cross. An emergency campaign was rapidly organized, although it was not officially and publicly conducted. In general, the rallies occurred before the war and expressed their opposition to war in the Middle East. With the beginning of hostilities and after them, only one rally in support of Israel, that I am aware of, was organized. Jews were emotionally involved and proud of Israel's military victory but, publicly, tended to keep a low profile, to reflect the positions of the Itamarati, and to stress their commitment to Brazil.

## Notes.

1. Theodor Draper, Israel and World Politics (New York, 1968), 23-24.
2. Draper, Israel, 24.
3. Sanford J. Ungar, Africa (New York, 1989). Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel (New York, 1986), 572-79.
4. Draper, Israel, 31.
5. The Australian Jewish News, April 21, 1967.
6. The Australian Jewish News, April 21, 1967.
7. The Australian Jewish News, May 5, 1967. This amount exceeded by 68% the previous record; at the same time the number of contributors rose 20%, and the average donation more than 46% when compared to the previous year.
8. The ad's focus included a reminder that 600,000 new immigrants must be helped.
9. Daniel Elazar-Peter Medding, Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies (New York, 1983), considered that the number of participants was over 8,000; see there p. 316. I have followed Taft's studies on the matter; see Ronald Taft, "The Impact of the Middle East Crises of June 1967 on Jews in Melbourne," in

Peter Medding, ed., Jews in Australian Society (Melbourne, 1973), 113. See also The Australian Jewish News, June 2, 1967.

10. Suzanne D. Rutland, Edge of the Diaspora (Sydney, 1988), 359.
11. The Australian Jewish News, May 26, 1967.
12. The Australian Jewish News, June 2, 1967.
13. The Australian Jewish News, June 2, 1967.
14. The Australian Jewish News, June 2, 1967.
15. The Australian Jewish News, June 16, 1967.
16. The Australian Jewish News, June 2, 1967.
17. To cite one example, before the outbreak of hostilities Canberra's Jewish community called on all diplomatic personnel in Australia's capital to press for easing the tension in the Middle East.
18. According to information collected during the rally held on May 31, "most onlookers queried were sympathetic to Israel's cause..." See The Australian Jewish News, June 2, 1967.
19. Pamela Ruskin, in her "Roundbout" section in The Australian Jewish News on June 2, wrote: "Australian sympathy is, by and large, firmly on the side of Israel. It wouldn't surprise me very much if the United Israel Appeal were to receive some

unexpected donations from non-Jewish sources."

20. The Australian Jewish News, June 9, 1967.
21. The Australian Jewish News, June 9, 1967.
22. The Australian Jewish News, June 16, 1967.
23. The Australian Jewish News, June 9, 1967.
24. For a military account of the Six-Day War see Israel Ministry of Defense, ed., The 6 Days' War (Israel, 1967); Sachar, A History of Israel, 639-61; Shabtai Teveth, The Tanks of Tammuz (London, 1969).
25. The importance of England and of England's Jewry for Australian Jews in their making of decisions had significantly diminished by the time of the Six-Day War; thus, for example, information from London stating that a special mass demonstration in support of Israel was to be held by the British Zionist Federation occupied a tiny little place at the right bottom corner of page 3 in The Australian Jewish News of June 2, 1967. In addition, most of ~~the~~ news about the conflict in the Middle East now came from Israel and the United States and not from England, as was the case in 1956.
26. The Australian Jewish News, June 9, 1967, editorial.
27. Rutland, Edge, 358-59; Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 295,

299, 316.

28. Taft, "Impact," in Medding, ed., Jews, 116.

29. The Australian Jewish News, June 9, 1967.

30. According to Taft, "Impact," in Medding, ed., Jews, 113:

"Altogether 700 young persons volunteered to go to Israel..."  
Rutland refrained from giving a specific number although she wrote that, both in Melbourne and Sydney, "...hundreds of Jewish youth volunteered to go to Israel;" see Rutland, Edge, 359.

31. The Australian Jewish News, June 30, 1967.

32. The Australian Jewish News, June 23, 1967. See also there, June 16, and July 21.

33. The Australian Jewish News, June 23, 1967.

34. The Australian Jewish News, June 16, 1967. In Perth, a rally at the Brisbane Street Shule attracted 800 people.

35. The Australian Jewish News, June 30, 1967.

36. That is about 30,000 people in each city.

37. The Australian Jewish News, June 30, 1967.



38. The Australian Jewish News, July 7, 1967. In addition, 6 volunteers from Queensland were already in Israel.
39. The Australian Jewish News, July 21, 1967. What we know, however, is that the highest Jewish individual contribution was \$25,000. The highest non-Jewish contribution was \$5,000 which came from a prominent businessman whose name was not made public.
40. Elazar-Medding, Jewish Communities, 316. See also The Australian Jewish News, June 30, 1967, where I. Leibler is quoted as saying that "The community had achieved unanimity never before seen" during a speech at the St. Kilda Town Hall. See also there, July 21, where we find the comment that the events in the Middle East have contributed to healing the rift between the UJBD and the Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Antisemitism, a conflict that had assumed large proportions during the 1956 Sinai Campaign.
41. S.L. Manchanda, "The United States and the Crisis," in M.S. Agwani, ed., The West Asian Crisis (Meerut, India, 1968), 41.
42. Draper, Israel, 111. Although the phrase could be explained as a "lapsus linguae" as proposed by Draper, when asked if the United States would reaffirm its neutrality, Robert McKloskey, the State Department's press officer, answered affirmatively before stating the quoted phrase. Perhaps the phrase was extreme after all, but the basic message was one of neutrality—no doubt can exist about that.

43. Sachar, A History of Israel, 661-66.
44. The Australian Jewish News, July 14, 1967.
45. Hawke's lecture was published by the mentioned Foundation and is found, together with other general documents, at the H.U.C. Library in Cincinnati.
46. The Australian Jewish News, July 7, 1967.
47. The Australian Jewish News, July 7, 1967.
48. The Australian Jewish News, July 14, 1967.
49. The Australian Jewish News, June 30, 1967.
50. The Australian Jewish News, July 7, 1967.
51. Aonde Vamos, May 4, 1967.
52. Brasil-Israel, April-May, 1967; Aonde Vamos, May 4, 1967; Cronica Israelita, May 15, 1967. The Israeli techniques of irrigation were to help an area of 60,000 hectares in the state of Piaui. Also during that year, tropical rains and cloudbursts inundated eastern Brazil.
53. According to Aonde Vamos, May 25, 1967 the two Israeli experts were invited to give a number of lectures in Brazil. Cronica Israelita reported in its edition of July 31, 1967 that

Dostrovsky who was referred to as General Director of Israel's Atomic Energy Committee, was soon to be in Brazil for talks with Uriel da Costa Ribeiro, president of Brazil's National Committee for Nuclear Energy (CNEN).

54. Aonde Vamos, May 4, 1967; Cronica Israelita, July 31, 1967.

55. Abraham Monk-Jose Isaacson, Comunidades Judias de Latinoamerica (Buenos Aires, 1966), 38.

56. Aonde Vamos, May 11, 1967; Jornal Israelita, April 30, 1967.

57. Aonde Vamos, June 8, 1967. The information was reported by the Jornal Israelita on July 23, 1967.

58. Aonde Vamos, May 25, 1967.

59. Jornal Israelita, May 22, 1967.

60. Cronica Israelita, April 15, 1967.

61. Cronica Israelita, May 15, 1967.

62. Jornal Israelita, April 30, 1967.

63. Cronica Israelita, May 15, 1967.

64. Aonde Vamos, May 18, 1967.

65. Jornal Israelita, May 22, 1967.
66. Jornal Israelita, May 28, 1967.
67. Jornal Israelita, May 22, 1967.
68. Cronica Israelita, May 15, 1967; Brasil-Israel, April-May, 1967;  
Jornal Israelita, May 22, 1967.
69. Cronica Israelita, May 31, 1967.
70. Aonde Vamos, June 1, 1967.
71. Aonde Vamos, June 1, 1967.
72. Cronica Israelita, May 31, 1967.
73. Cronica Israelita, May 31, 1967.
74. Cronica Israelita, June 15, 1967. The Committee had its  
headquarters in Rua Maria Figueiredo 350, Sao Paulo.
75. Jornal Israelita, May 28, 1967; Cronica Israelita, May 31, 1967.
76. Cronica Israelita, June 15, 1967.
77. Jornal Israelita, June 4, 1967.
78. The reports informed about public demonstrations against war

or in favor of Israel. Thus, demonstrations in Paris and Rome were attended by about 7,000 people, and 45,000 were reported attending a rally in New York.

79. Jornal Israelita, June 4, 1967; Aonde Vamos, June 1, 1967.

80. Aonde Vamos, June 29, 1967.

81. Cronica Israelita, June 15, 1967.

82. Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung, June 9, 1967.

83. Cronica Israelita, June 15, 1967.

84. Cronica Israelita, July 31, 1967. According to the same report, Uruguayan Jews, counting about one third of Brazil's Jewish population, sent 173 volunteers, and from Argentina 623 volunteers were in Israel by the middle of July.

85. Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung, June 16, 1967; Jornal Israelita, June 18, 1967. The latter published a picture of Israeli ambassador Divon setting the example by giving blood.

86. Aonde Vamos, August 3, 1967.

87. To have an account in foreign countries or to send money abroad for purposes other than business is illegal in most South-American countries, including Brazil. Apparently, the money collected was centralized by one of the "umbrella"

organizations, then it was taken to a third country where it was changed into dollars, and sent to Israel. The fact that almost no trace of the emergency campaign is found in the press could certainly be attributed to its secrecy. Another example of this discretion can be seen in the Jornal Israelita's edition of September 17, 1967, where the financial support of Jews around the world was described but no mention of Brazilian Jews' support was reported. Thus, the very few instances in which the Jewish press mentioned the existence of such campaigns could be seen as a "lapsus calami."

88. Cronica Israelita, June 15, 1967. The communique was issued on June 6.
89. Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung, June 9, 1967.
90. Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung, June 9, 1967.
91. The only exception that I am aware of was a public rally held in Rio de Janeiro which attracted about 5,000 people, non-Jews among them, and who expressed their solidarity with Israel's defensive reaction and Israel's peace cause. See Jornal Israelita, July 2, 1967.
92. Jornal Israelita, July 16, 1967; see also *ibid.*, September 4.
93. Jornal Israelita, July 9 and 16, 1967.



94. Brasil-Israel, June-July, 1967.
95. Aonde Vamos, July 6, 1967.
96. Aonde Vamos, July 20, 1967. The magazine sometimes assumed a witty and ironic position, as when it stated that "The Federation had tried everything, it even changed its designation in the belief...that by changing a dying person's name one would be able to mislead the angel of death..."; see *ibid.* The magazine referred to the fact that the Federation started to use the designation Confederation but it continued to be referred to a Federation in most instances, even by the Jewish press.
97. Cronica Israelita, June 30, 1967.
98. Aonde Vamos, July 27, 1967.
99. Aonde Vamos, June 29, 1967.
100. Edy Kaufman-Yoram Shapira-Joel Barromi, Israel-Latin American Relations (New Jersey, 1979), 4.
101. Cronica Israelita, June 15, 1967. Brazil's proposal was stated following the ceasefire of June 7.
102. Cronica Israelita, June 15, 1967.
103. During the same meeting, which occurred on June 14, Brazil

rejected the Soviet request for a meeting of the General Assembly.

104. Cronica Israelita, June 15, 1967.

105. Jornal Israelita, June 18, 1967.

106. Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung, June 9, 1967.

107. Cronica Israelita, July 16, 1967.

108. Cronica Israelita, June 15, 1967.

109. Cronica Israelita, June 15, 1967.

110. Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung, June 23, 1967.

111. Aonde Vamos, July 27, 1967.

112. Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung, June 23, 1967.

113. Jornal Israelita, July 23, 1967.

114. Quoted by the Jornal Israelita, June 18, 1967.

115. Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung, June 23, 1967.

116. Quoted by Cronica Israelita, July 31, 1967.

CHAPTER 5.

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR.

EEC, France and England, in less than twenty years went through a process which led from belligerency to neutrality and even to pro-Arab stands. Needless to say, a new imposing factor helped to further explain the European pragmatic stand: oil. Referring to Western European dependence on Arab oil, H. Sachar wrote: "This Western economic vulnerability was now to be exploited during the Yom Kippur War."<sup>1</sup> Sachar does not mention the fact, many times overlooked, that the oil weapon as an element of pressure had been put to work long before the 1973 war. In fact, during every single war against Israel the Arabs tried to pressure the international community through the oil weapons: in 1948, the embargo was ineffective because Western Europe used oil for only 10% of its energy requirements;<sup>2</sup> in 1956 the percentage climbed to 25 out of which 72% came from Arab nations, but the embargo was not successful because the United States implemented an emergency oil-lift to Europe by increasing its own production and that of the Caribbean.<sup>3</sup> However, by the mid-sixties oil replaced coal as Western Europe's primary source of energy and with the outbreak of hostilities in June 1967, Libya, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq imposed an oil embargo in which transportation as well as production were involved. With one half of its energy requirements depending on oil, Europe experienced the kind of problems a shortage would create. Since the 1956 embargo the boycotted nations had reserve stocks to be used in times of crisis and in addition to this, the United States again came to help Europe in 1967. Moreover, the Soviet Union saw a good opportunity to profit from the European needs and an increasing volume of oil was exported from the Soviet bloc. In addition, Venezuela and Indonesia also increased their exports to Europe. Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s, the United States was

a major element in breaking down the Arab nation's attempted pressures. But the EEC was not willing to depend on the United States to resolve its economic and political problems every time crisis in the Middle East developed. Furthermore, US oil needs increased more and more: by 1973, the United States' domestic production only met 65% of its needs.<sup>4</sup> While the US depended on Arab sources for about 6% to 8% of its total oil requirements in 1973, Western European dependence on Arab oil registered an average of 69% to 95%, while Japan's was close to 90%.<sup>5</sup> Thus, it appears that while the oil embargo of the 1950s and 1960s was basically a policy of "punishment" against pro-Israeli and even neutral nations, the 1970s was the beginning of an aggressive policy aimed at using the oil weapon as a threat to win over the Western nations in favor of Arab positions vis-a-vis the Middle East conflict. This policy was implemented during the Yom Kippur War and resulted in one of the most devastating world economic crises, for which the Arab countries were hardly blamed by the international community.

Another factor that might have influenced the shifting stand of Western Europe was the Arab-Palestinian terrorism that intimidated Europe from the end of the 1960s and on. It seems that the decision to attack targets beyond the limits of the Middle East came more as a desperate cry than as an elaborate plan of action. Although a crisis was highly visible only in 1970,<sup>6</sup> a few years before that date the PLO leadership or some elements within it sought to harden their fight and to directly include a world that according to them seemed insensitive to their plea. Among other things, the 1967 smashing Israeli victory brought about a much more aggressive tone to the PLO leadership: Ahmed Shukeiry was forced into retirement while Yasser Arafat was promoted, thus becoming with his Al-Fatah

group the most powerful—though not unchallenged—element within the PLO. Handliners within the PLO brought about the formation of new groupés and subgroups that demanded a still more violent attitude to liberate Palestine. Among these, the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was organized under the leadership of Christian born George Habash, followed shortly by the formation of the PFLP General Command which was headed by Ahmed Jibril. The handliners' idea of a more radical attitude was that Israel—in fact Jewish targets—should be attacked everywhere so that influential countries would pay attention and feel pressured to favor the Palestinian cause, whatever the cost. Following its philosophy, the PFLP struck for the first time on July 18, 1968: an El-Al plane en route from Rome to Israel was forced to land in Algeria.<sup>7</sup> From then on an international wave of terror, involving the killing of civilians of different nationalities—sometimes with the tacit consent of governments—and detonation of bombs in private and public places, became the new mark of a twentieth century world gone insane. Insane because it consented to be blackmailed. Insane because it consented to be hit again and again. Besides Israel, Europe became the main target of terrorist activities and perhaps its shameful—though not new—reaction triggered a new and unexpected field of action for the Palestinian guerillas. As a result of every European airport and city being a likely aim of terrorism, the most bizarre agreements were made: West Germany's Lufthansa paid blackmail money to guerilla organizations to ensure the safety of its flights, while France committed itself to maintain its anti-Israeli diplomatic stance in exchange for similar assurances.<sup>8</sup> And the list could probably be enlarged. Still, Europe could not avoid being attacked. What was



clear was the fact that Europe could be manipulated.

In addition, the radical left tended to be sympathetic to Arab violence, which was seen as part of the Third World struggle against Imperialism, and Israel, due to its alliance with Britain and France against Egypt in 1956, and its securing of territories after the June 1967 victory was seen as a colonialistic oppressor, an expansionist power. The same tendency existed in the United States—Israel's firmest supporter—New Left, particularly among black students, and among some Christian leaders.

In Latin America, militant left groups were clearly sympathetic to the Arab-Palestinian cause which, again, was seen as part of a Third World liberation movement against Imperialism. Many military governments, at the peak of their power in the 1960s and 1970s, tended to have a circumspect ~~and~~ sympathy for Israel because of their admiration for its military intelligentsia and capabilities, as well as great respect for the Israelis as an embodiment of what the military perceived was a Spartan way of life. On the other hand, within the military forces, clergy, and members of the high society antisemitism—so close to their hearts—could also be translated as anti-Israelism if not pro-Arabism.

In relation to the African nations, after a major Israeli presence in the early days of African independence within a period of fifteen years the situation was reversed in favor of Arab presence. During the 1950s Israel worked diligently to win the friendship of many African nations building hotels and government quarters, training military units and guards, and sharing agricultural expertise. Unfortunately for Israel, however, its conflict with the Arab nations was to have a negative impact on its relations with Africa. Its alliance with France and England in 1956 was already a dubious

note for African nations but Israel was politically and diplomatically badly hurt in 1967 when it seized the Sinai Peninsula—officially regarded as African soil. Moreover, African states with large Islamic populations, became increasingly supportive of the Arab and Palestinian cause with expectations of receiving extensive aid from Arab oil-producing countries.<sup>9</sup>

Thus, for diverse reasons, in different parts of the world, and for an increasing number of nations, blocs, and people, Israel was not that courageous little country whose people were resurrected from the ashes and had turned deserts into orange groves any more. It was no longer what J.L. Borges in one of his poems called "[Israel] hermoso como leon de mediodia." Instead, by 1973, Israel allegedly became an imperialistic, cruel ruler of a land which was not its own, to say the least.

On September 1970 Nasser died and Vice-President Anwar al-Sadat was established as the new leader of Egypt. Unlike Nasser, Sadat favored a more liberal economy and a more nationalistic Egypt as opposed to the idea of pan-Arabism so eagerly launched by his predecessor. His policy towards the Jewish state was stated quite soon and in part was an answer to the increasing pressure of the powerful military class; however, it basically came as an Egyptian response to the shameful defeat of June 1967. From the very beginning it was not a question of "war or not war," but rather of when to attack. Sadat declared his intention to strike against Israel on several occasions but in Israel these menaces were interpreted as nothing more than empty rhetoric to inflame Arab hatred towards Israel. His removal of Soviet advisors from Egyptian territory in July 1972 further increased Israel's belief in Sadat's inability

to attack. However, Sadat continued to build a common strategy with other Arab nations: in March 1973, an agreement for joint military action was reached with Syria, now equipped with some of the utmost modern weapons the Soviets could provide. In August Sadat visited Saudi Arabia and succeeded in winning assurance from Riyadh that an oil embargo to the West would be utilized if required. By September 10, Hussein had agreed to be part of the Arab front against Israel, although in a more indirect way than other Arab nations. By then Sadat asked the Soviets to renew their ties, and as a result a massive delivery of new and sophisticated equipment began to arrive in Egypt again while the Egyptian leader allowed reports to be circulated of growing tensions between Egypt and the Soviet Union. An additional step in Sadat's campaign of deception included leaking the false information to the official newspaper al-Ahram that Egyptian officers were planning to make a pilgrimage to Mecca because of the celebrations related to Ramadan and that the Rumanian defense minister was scheduled to visit Cairo on October 8. Sadat's campaign of deception had for its purpose to cover up the date in which Israel would be attacked.

In relation to Israel, after the war of attrition that lasted from 1968 to 1970, the borders were relatively calm. Israeli attention was focused on avoiding acts of terrorism, which were carried out mostly abroad. There are several reasons which explain the Israeli lack of preparation when the War of the Day of Atonement began. Among them, a false alarm in May 1973 which cost the Israeli economy dearly, and the proximity of elections which were scheduled for October 31 for which the Labor Party had been congratulating itself for maintaining calm and secure borders. Moreover, after the Six-

Day War victory, Israelis felt a sense of self-assurance, and even a certain degree of invincibility. No one gave serious consideration to the possibility of the Arabs <sup>becoming</sup> willing to risk a new defeat ~~the~~ ~~Arab nations were willing to risk a new defeat~~ and humiliation. This sense of invincibility operated as a boomerang during the first days of the Yom Kippur War: although Israeli intelligence had the necessary data on Arab activities and deployments, by failing to properly evaluate them, Israel was caught by surprise when the Arab attack started on October 6, 1973.

#### The Situation in Australia. Australian Jewry's Reaction.

In Australia, after more than two decades of Liberal government the Labor Party came to power after winning the 1972 elections. The new government led by Gough Whitlam had a new, "neutral" approach towards the Middle East, something unexpected by the Jewish community which had a long history of voting for Labor.<sup>10</sup> Whitlam's government pushed forward a foreign policy which seemed to be directed to winning an important if not leading role in the Third World. Thus, among other things, his government became very critical of the United States while emphasizing the role of the UN, by then a shadowy organization manipulated by the votes of Afro-Asian and Third World countries which, in turn, needed the financial aid of greater powers in order to survive. In such conditions Israel was of little importance to the new Australian regime. The unprecedented tendencies of Whitlam's Australia vis-à-vis the Middle East became public in October 1973, but by then it

was not shockingly unexpected by the Australian Jewish leadership. In fact, well before the Yom Kippur War, the ECAJ expressed its concern at the stand Australia had been taking at the UN since Labor had assumed government.<sup>11</sup> In addition to this concern, towards the end of August and beginning of September, the possible presence of an Arab terrorist cell in Australia was reported by the press. Communal leaders, while trying to avoid a wave of panic, said that the matter should be left to the police.<sup>12</sup> One week later the walls of Yeshiva College in Melbourne were vandalized with inscriptions such as "Adolf is back" and "R shower time."<sup>13</sup> It is hard to say whether this act had a link to the possible presence of Arab terrorists in Australia or if it was perpetrated by radical right-wing Australian elements. In any case the presence of terrorists was confirmed when the Federal Government charged Abdul Azzam with attempting some kind of terrorist activity in Australia.<sup>14</sup> Still, instead of the expected six months prison term, Azzam was simply deported probably because the government feared reprisals. The government's attitude was criticized by the president of the ECAJ, Louis Klein, who warned that the security of Australian citizens, Jews and non-Jews, "...has not been well served by the government."<sup>15</sup> Confirming the fears of the Jewish community regarding this new climate in Australia, The Australian Jewish News reported growing evidence that Israel's image in Australia had declined since the Six-Day War, helped by hostile propaganda of anti-Israeli nature.<sup>16</sup> But a decline in interest vis-a-vis Jewish and Israeli matters was also clear within the Australian Jewish community itself, only five years after a revival produced by the Six-Day War. Illustrating this fact, Isadore Magit, president of the UIA, stated: "More than one third of the community is not involved in either

Israeli related activities or anything Jewish whatsoever."<sup>17</sup> Further illustrating that point was the fact that a descent curve was noticeable regarding the number of families pledging for the UIA over a period of four years:<sup>18</sup>

1970 - 13,544 families

1971 - 12,393 "

1972 - 11,895 "

1973 - 11,360 "

After the outbreak of hostilities on October 6, L. Klein reported that representatives of Australian Jewry had called upon the Australian government to condemn the Arab aggression and to mediate for a peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis.<sup>19</sup> However, Whitlam's government was not prepared to take such a step simply because it was not in its best interest. The excuse given by Whitlam was that since the Australian ambassador to the UN, Sir Lawrence McIntyre, was president of the Security Council at the time it would not be appropriate to make any statement criticizing either side.<sup>20</sup> When he finally did break his silence more than one week after the battle began the Prime Minister stated that he deplored the hostilities and called for an early end, but he was not ready to point out the aggressor.<sup>21</sup> In addition, to make matters worse, Australia's leader was reluctant to meet with Jewish representatives during the first stages of the war. When he met in Canberra with L. Klein and Sam Lipski, the Communal Director of the UJBD, Whitlam once more affirmed that Australia's position was of "evenhanded neutrality."<sup>22</sup> The Jewish community through most of its representatives and press expressed its disappointment in Australia's stand and vehemently criticized the Whitlam government.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, it coined an ironic new word to refer to the government's policies towards the Middle East con-



flict: "neutrOILity." The accuracy of the slang was demonstrated before the end of the conflict when the Australian government appointed an official representative to go to several Arab nations in order to discuss some sort of oil rapprochement, a fact almost completely overlooked by the Jewish press.<sup>24</sup>

The fact that Whitlam opted for a neutral stand vis-a-vis the military crisis, and perhaps even a pro-Arab stand, does not mean that a Liberal government or another Labor PM would have acted in a different manner. Because of the general political situation it was most likely that other political leaders or parties would have reacted similarly. Among those who seemed to think otherwise, Elazar and Medding wrote:

"The federal Liberal opposition seemed to be better disposed to Israel, which also received the absolutely unequivocal, deep, and outspoken support of Mr. R.J. Hawke, President of the National Executive of the Labor Party and of the Australian Council of Trade Unions..."<sup>25</sup>

Also in the same vein, John Levi, rabbi of Temple Beth Israel of Melbourne, said in an interview that Whitlam's

"...approach to the Middle East crisis was completely new. He did not support Israel, as all Australian Liberal governments have done to date."<sup>26</sup>

On October 21, the spokesman for Labor and Immigration for the opposition, M. Fraser, said that most Australians would be sympathetic to the cause of the state of Israel in relation to the Middle East war. However, the fact that Fraser's observation was

expressed in an electoral political statement greatly diminishes its importance.<sup>27</sup> The fact that other political parties or politicians would have probably followed the line of pseudo-neutrality put forward by Whitlam, is further illustrated by the controversy involving both Labor and Liberal parties dealing with the Yom Kippur War. Senators Kane and Byrne of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), wanted Australia to take a firm stand in support of Israel and introduced a motion calling for the government to condemn Egypt and Syria for attacking Israel,<sup>28</sup> which would have labeled the two countries as aggressors. Not only Whitlam was not prepared for such declaration but the motion was blocked even by the closely allied Liberal and Country parties. The reluctance of these two parties to support the two senators' motion was further apparent when Senator Kane sent a telegram to L. Klein asking for his assistance in lobbying all Liberal and Country Party senators to vote with the DLP on the pro-Israel proposal.<sup>29</sup> But, again, it was political considerations rather than a sense of justice that for the most part, guided Australian political life. Confirming the viewpoint that either party would have followed to some extent Whitlam's policy, Isi Leibler stated that no party's policy was really satisfactory from an Australian Jewish and Israeli standpoint.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, the firm stand taken by Whitlam did not prevent twenty-seven Labor parliamentarians from expressing support for Israel.<sup>31</sup> And Robert Hawke, who had always been considered a friend of Israel—as had been Whitlam just before assuming Australia's leadership—may have received more praise from Elazar and Medding than he deserved. Illustrating this point, a pro-Israeli speech by Hawke to the UJBD in early November was highly criticized by Pamela Ruskin's longtime "Roundabout" column in The Australian

Jewish News. Though not a political expert, she courageously observed:

"It is a pity you were preaching to the converted at the Board of Deputies. It would have been good to hear it over 'This Week' or some other television programme or read it as a statement in the daily press."<sup>32</sup>

In fact, it took Hawke three weeks to make his declarations to the UJBD public, a delay which was criticized by The Australian Jewish News on November 23 but only after his position became public. In any case, probably to balance Hawke's support of Israel, a senior Labor official attended a pro-Arab rally in Melbourne.<sup>33</sup> Then it was clear that the Labor Party was divided on the Middle East crisis, or more accurately perhaps that Whitlam and Hawke were political contenders within the same party. Thus, when in early November Whitlam criticized both the United States and the Soviet Union for supplying arms to the Israelis and the Arabs, thus indirectly further promoting military conflicts in the area, the Prime Minister took the opportunity to also criticize his party enemy Hawke by accusing him of lack of knowledge in matters of economy.<sup>34</sup> It was also at that time that the Jewish press further promoted Hawke: for example, the Yiddish press published an article titled "Salute to Mr. Bob Hawke" in which it called him a "...sincere friend of Mankind and Israel."<sup>35</sup> The Yiddish press was not the only media to express open support for Hawke's stand on the Middle East. The Melbourne Herald, for instance, published a pro-Israeli article titled "Hawke is Right on Arabs."

The Australian government's lack of support for Israel created a certain amount of cautious behavior and even some distortion of facts related to the war by some Jewish circles and representatives, at least until non-Jewish political figures and other important Jewish circles and representatives stated their clear disappointment regarding the government's stand and expressed their support of Israel.<sup>36</sup> Sam Lipski's comments illustrate the kind of distortion being practiced. On the second week of the war, in the midst of the fight, he diminished the tremendous impact of the war by saying that:

"In the Six-Day War everyone felt it was a war of survival... this time, it is a war of survival in that sense, but a war for the fundamental security interests of the State of Israel."<sup>37</sup>

Lipski's partial reading of events became noticeable once again on October 21 when, addressing a youth rally, he stated:

"France and England have proclaimed their neutrality and yet at the same time are training Arab pilots in secret to fly French and English made aeroplanes and helicopters...Australia has announced neutrality—which is better than one sidedness."<sup>38</sup>

Lipski's remark was all the more curious at a time when Australia's neutrality had been questioned as to whether it was right to be neutral, and whether Whitlam's stand was in fact neutral. P. Ruskin, who clearly expressed her views throughout the war, cynically wrote

about the "...so called policy of complete neutrality..." of the Australian government.<sup>39</sup> Because of her open criticism there was an unusual example of caution by the editor in a note following Ruskin's words which stated that the newspaper was not to be held responsible for opinions written other than in its editorials.

There was only one editorial by The Australian Jewish News written during the war or immediately after the second cease fire on October 24—the first and unsuccessful cease fire began on October 22—which had something to say about Australia's stand. This editorial, after criticizing France and England for their continuous supplying military aid to Egypt, went on to condemn the United States for imposing cease fire conditions on Israel. In relation to Australia, not a single word of disapproval was stated. In fact, according to the editor's "poetical" view: "...Australia managed some noble sound of neutrality..."<sup>40</sup>

Reacting to the War of the Day of Atonement, the Australian Jewish community organized several rallies and an emergency campaign for the collection of funds. In addition, a number of volunteers went to Israel and a number of youth activities were scheduled.

Because of the time difference, the news about the war reached Australia the day after Yom Kippur was over. However, before the Jewish press even had time to announce it, a demonstration in support of Israel was promptly organized for October 9 at the St. Kilda Town Hall in Melbourne and attracted 2,500 people. One of the speakers, R. Zablud, president of the State Zionist Council, asked the Australian government and the UN to condemn the Arab

attack while I. Leibler took a more aggressive approach, criticizing the government for not taking any action especially because Australia was a member of the Security Council and its chairman at that time.<sup>41</sup> Despite the haste in organizing the rally, it was the most well attended. It was followed by several smaller demonstrations on October 21 and 22 when also an emergency campaign which included a fund-raising appeal was launched.<sup>42</sup> One of these rallies, which had for target young people between the ages of twenty and thirty years, attracted 450 at the orthodox St. Kilda Congregation.<sup>43</sup> The following week there was another demonstration, this time younger people from different youth movements which took place at the liberal Temple Beth Israel and which was attended by 250 youngsters.<sup>44</sup> Other rallies were organized in Queensland, Canberra, Adelaide, the Gold Coast, and Perth.<sup>45</sup> The situation in Perth was particularly remarkable because of the continuous commitment demonstrated by its Jewish community: out of a Jewish population of slightly over 3,000, 2,000 attended a public rally in support of Israel. The Australian Jewish News did not report any rally being organized by Sydney's Jewish community.<sup>46</sup>

In addition to the meeting organized for Jewish youth at TBI, students at Jewish schools were deeply involved. However, the time when youngsters used to wash cars and cut the neighbor's grass for small change to give to the UIA campaign had indeed passed. By 1973, young students came with hard cash. Illustrating the point, the students of the Bialik School donated \$3,000 to the funds being collected for Israel,<sup>47</sup> while the students of Mount Scopus came up with \$5,000.<sup>48</sup> Commenting on this new situation, Rabbi Levi observed: "...a lot of young people gave more money than their parents!"<sup>49</sup> Moreover, referring to the rally at TBI, at which a kind



of mid-appeal was held, he said: "We raised \$5,000-6,000 from the kids; we thought we'd raise about \$1,000."<sup>50</sup> At the college level, Jewish students opened an Israeli Information Center at Monash University in Melbourne.<sup>51</sup> Recognizing the significant co-operation of Jewish youth, I. Magbit stated that "...the youth has been the most heartening feature of the campaign."<sup>52</sup>

At the St. Kilda Congregation meeting which was held on October 21, a first call for volunteering to work in Israel was issued. The intention was to gather fifty people who would be able to stay in a kibbutz for no less than six months, and pay their own fare.<sup>53</sup> Although the original goal was not reached, twelve volunteers left for Israel at the end of October and The Australian Jewish News reported that another group would leave on November 14.<sup>54</sup> It seems clear that it was somewhat hard to get volunteers. In early November the call continued, this time only requesting a three months stay in Israel;<sup>55</sup> however The Australian Jewish News did not report that any other group of volunteers left for Israel, only that more appeals were issued. Thus, by the middle of November, A. Roth, president of the Australian Union of Jewish Students, called once more for volunteers further reducing the minimum stay to ten weeks.<sup>56</sup> In addition, on November 30 an advertisement "Open Letter to all Young Jews" and signed by a youth committee from all the major Jewish youth groups requested attendance at a meeting where information on volunteering to go to Israel would be provided.<sup>57</sup> Still, on December 10, N. Jacobson, chairman of the UJBD, speaking at the headquarters of the UIA at Beth Weizmann, reiterated the need for volunteers.<sup>58</sup> Surprisingly, a report published on November 9 indicated that the more than one-hundred volunteers asked to go to Israel.<sup>59</sup> It is possible that approximately one-hundred

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people did seek information about going to Israel but the continuous request for volunteers and the lack of information about any departure besides the one which occurred towards the end of October apparently indicates that even the original target of fifty volunteers was not fulfilled, at least until December. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the most desirable age groups, the college students, were in their last two months of study for the academic year.

Jewish religious leadership expressed its complete support of Israel. In addition, it was strongly involved in public rallies by offering synagogues as meeting places to support Israel and by providing rabbis—liberal and most orthodox—at public meetings. Furthermore, its involvement was expressed in other ways. Thus, with the outbreak of the war, a note of support was sent to Israel's ambassador in Canberra by the Melbourne Beth-Din.<sup>60</sup> It also urged those who had pledged, in that year's regular UIA appeal—which had finished shortly before the beginning of the war—to fulfill their belated obligations and added in a rather unexpected and triumphant manner:

"The Jewish State is a unique blessing for all of us. Let us pay for that blessing. Under God's providence, we can thus speed up the day of the new Jewish victory."<sup>61</sup>

Within a week of this statement, an emergency campaign was launched, and once again, Rabbi I. Porush, president of the Association of Jewish Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, expressed absolute solidarity with Israel and called for support of the emergency appeal.<sup>62</sup>

Once the war began, it took the Australian Jewish leaders one week to launch an emergency campaign. The regular UIA campaign named "Involvement" for 1973 had officially ended slightly over one month before Yom Kippur. The "Involvement" campaign brought a total pledged of \$3,164,000 which had not yet been fully collected by the time war in the Middle East erupted.<sup>63</sup> A highly publicized appeal was also conducted in Melbourne—in conjunction with London—on Yom Kippur, for the benefit of Russian Jews.<sup>64</sup> Until the emergency campaign was organized, the others, along with a Welfare Appeal for local needs continued.<sup>65</sup> Thus, Australian Jewry—and particularly Ms. [redacted]—had already been asked to contribute to several important appeals.

During the weekend of October 12-14, the emergency campaign was organized and began the following week. Although no specific amount was set as a target I. Magit asked to collect three times the regular UIA total, and I. Leibler predicted that the 1967 emergency campaign amount would be, at least, doubled.<sup>66</sup> Since the amount pledged for the 1973 UIA fund-raising campaign was over \$3,000,000 the amount that Magit had in mind must have been about \$9,000,000. Although official numbers were not provided for the total of the 1967 emergency campaign, the amount pledged was in the neighborhood of \$3,500,000 and a final total slightly less than \$3,000,000. Thus, Leibler was less optimistic than Magit and thought that over \$6,000,000 was a feasible sum.

Continuing the policy of stealth that was employed during the emergency campaign of 1967, the Jewish leadership did not want to disclose amounts pledged or collected and a statement to that effect was expressed by the leaders of Beth Weizmann.<sup>67</sup> At the same time

there was a highly publicized \$100,000 donation by H. Krongold, former chairman of the UIA—filling the two central pages of The Australian Jewish News of October 26,—to build a child training center for use in special education at Monash University. The timing seems to indicate the wish to demonstrate that Australian Jews were still concerned with the welfare of Australia and that there was no interference whatsoever between it and Jewish contributions to Israel.

One week after the appeal was launched, I. Magit expressed the view that there was an overwhelming response from Jews and non-Jews which he believed was an indication of the general mood.<sup>68</sup> But, on the other hand, he also noted the setting up of a special committee in order to receive contributions that were "... totally inadequate in the face of Israel's unprecedented requirements."<sup>69</sup> In accord with Magit, Rabbi Levi said that some Jews, "... very assimilated and not particularly pro-Israel gave token sums of money..."<sup>70</sup> Then again, with the ending of the campaign on November 9, Magit reported that:

"Although the goal set out to be achieved has not been reached, the Jewish community of Australia has excelled itself in coming very close to it."<sup>71</sup>

Magit stated that there was greater concern in 1973 than in 1967.<sup>72</sup> This view, however, was contradicted by R. Taft and G. Solomon in their study of Melbourne Jewry's reaction to the 1973 war. According to that study, the level of involvement in 1973, though significant did not surpass the emotional levels of 1967.<sup>73</sup> No indication of the total amount of money collected was given by the Jewish press, and

the only speculation came from the non-Jewish press which reported that an average of \$50 per head out of a community of 70,000 was given.<sup>74</sup> This would indicate a figure of \$3,500,000 as the lowest amount possibly donated, particularly when compared with the sums Magit and Leibler had in mind. Although officially Magit expressed a sense of fulfillment regarding the results of the emergency campaign,<sup>75</sup> N. Jacobson's believed that the community should not "labour under false illusions" about their contributions to the cause of Israel since other communities with fewer means gave more per capita.<sup>76</sup>

During the entire crisis the Church remained silent. High expectations were aroused when it was announced that Cardinal Knox would speak at the Melbourne Y Club on October 30. The Australian Jewish News later reported without further comment, that the Cardinal spoke about "Australian aborigines."<sup>77</sup>

Conclusion.

The Labor government led by G. Whitlam and elected in 1972, proved to be a traumatic experience for Australian Jewry. The newly elected government introduced a "pseudo-neutrality" regarding the Middle East conflict, which was more pro-Arab than any other Australian government since the creation of the state of Israel. In addition, for the first time, there was concern among Jews because Arab terrorist activities were detected in Australia, and also a few antisemitic slogans were sprayed on Jewish properties. The Australian government's attitude seemed to have had consequences in the way Australian

Jewry reacted to the Yom Kippur War. Although in general it supported Israel through rallies, answering to fund-raising activities, and a number of volunteers who went to Israel, there was some vacillation even among a few of its leaders. However, once influential politicians publicly stated their support of Israel—which took three long weeks—the vacillation among Australian Jews seemed to have stopped. The relatively cautious public reaction of Australian Jewry can be also seen in the fact that, even in Melbourne, the best attended rally attracted no more than seven percent of its Jewish population. On the other hand, smaller communities which also had a history of strong support for Israel, such as Perth, responded overwhelmingly. Perhaps the most salient fact to single out was the positive, open-hearted reaction of Australian Jewish youth. Interesting to note, however, is the fact that unlike other occasions when Australian Jewish youth used to contribute with small amounts of money earned through jobs such as washing cars or cutting the neighbor's grass, in 1973 large parts of this youth came with substantial cash as was reflected in the totals donated by Jewish schools and youth groups. Obviously this reflected a new situation of increasing wealth for an always growing segment of Australian Jews, and probably a more relaxed view by the Jewish youth regarding the forms through which ideals could be accomplished.

Regarding the emergency campaign, although it did not achieve the original target, the financial response given by Australian Jewry proved to be an incontrovertible positive answer to the Yom Kippur crisis.



# The Situation in Brazil. Brazilian Jewry's Reaction.

For a short period between 1961 and 1964, Brazil attempted to adopt a new neutral stand in its foreign policy. However, the United States opposed Brazil's stance, and still wanted to retain its commanding voice in Brazil's economy. Political power was ultimately in the hands of the military, who sharply differed on economic issues: while some were not bothered by the impositions of the US-International Monetary Fund (IMF), others favored a more nationalist oriented economy and a more independent foreign policy than the established Washington-Brasilia alliance. However, since all factions in the Brazilian military were united in their strong anti-Communist stand, it was basically the economic factor which created frictions with the US, and as a result further affected other areas. Thus, for instance, a US-IMF plan for a noninflationary export-oriented economy which stressed agriculture and minerals rather than industry badly offended Brazil's rulers—the same situation was repeated during the 1980s when the US tried to avoid Brazil's production and exportation of software.<sup>78</sup>

Washington's concern about Brazil's policy of neutrality, especially during the Quadros regime and to a lesser extent during Goulart's presidency, was no longer a factor during Castelo Branco's rule—a fact which certainly was no surprise to the US since Castelo Branco was "its man" to lead a coup against Goulart.<sup>79</sup> However, nationalistically oriented military personnel and conservative industrialists—eager to profit from business with the state—promot-

ed a successful coup d'état which by January 1967 put the more nationalistic Costa e Silva in power. Washington's concern was again evident, both in terms of Brazil's economy and foreign policy. US economic hegemony over Brazil had been in decline even before the 1967 coup. In fact, Brazil's integration into the world economy proved profitable but accelerated the US decline in that country: heavy US investment in the second half of the 1960s could not surpass the flow of capital coming from Western Europe and Japan, thus decreasing its share of foreign investment in Brazil from 48% in 1950 to 33% by 1974.<sup>80</sup> As a result, at least during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Washington had far less influence than it craved and expected. This does not imply that Brazil adopted strong anti-American positions, as was the case with other Latin American countries which were long lost from the US range of influence.<sup>81</sup> Although true, the alliance between the two nations was alive and the frictions were more related to matters of economy than to foreign policy—though indirectly those could also be affected.

Interdependence between economy and foreign policy became distinct during the 1970s due to the oil crisis triggered by the Middle East conflict—though oil prices began to jump before 1973 and the Arabs tried to use their oil as an element of pressure well before that date.<sup>82</sup>

The fact that the Washington-Brasilia axis was "alive", particularly in matters of foreign policy, may be illustrated by the fact that in early 1974 Brazil, an oil-deficient country, was making arrangements with Iran and Nigeria rather than with the anti-Israeli Arab countries. Iran was backed by the US through a strong support for Shah Reza Pahlavi's monarchy, and Nigeria, which by 1973 was moving from third to second place in the ranks of

foreign oil suppliers to the US, decided not to participate in the Arab-led embargo by OPEC—of which Nigeria was a member since 1971.<sup>83</sup> Nevertheless, The New York Times on February 3, 1974, reported that Arab countries were engaged in a "discreet courtship" of Brazil but required an official pro-Arab stand in exchange for their "friendship." Thus, although Brazil was still under the "umbrella" foreign policy of the United States, at least in relation to the Middle East, attempts to change its stand existed from abroad.

In Brazil some people thought that securing Arab oil was important to the nation and that perhaps a pro-Arab stand deserved closer consideration. This opinion becomes even more important since it was expressed before the outbreak of hostilities in October 1973. Such a view was stated in one of Sao Paulo's leading newspapers, Folha de Sao Paulo, in early August 1973 in an editorial by Flavio de Almeida Salles entitled, "Can Brazil Adopt Another Position on the Middle East Conflict?" A voice of dissent from the official Brazilian position of neutrality, it claimed that an alternative pro-Arab stand was being considered by Brazilian diplomats:

"Every day it becomes more difficult to sustain Brazil's equidistance on the Middle East conflict because the economic and commercial interests—especially in the oil sector—that are emerging between Brazilians and Arabs started to be noticeable in the formulation of policies to be followed vis-a-vis the problems in that area... The impression one has is that eventually—rather sooner than later—Brazil will have to reformulate its policy...

to secure Brazilian supply at this time of international energy crisis...and if plans already under way are realized, which predict large investments of money in Brazil...

Until this moment it is still possible to separate economic-commercial interests from political interests. However, difficulties do exist and the example of the creation of a UN Committee in Lebanon, with the exclusion of Jews, approved last Friday by the Economic and Social Committee of the UN under the leadership of Brazilian Sergio Armando Frazao showed the kind of "gymnastics" the Itamarati has to do in order to maintain its equidistance."

According to the article the Committee's function was to promote economic development in Western Asia, and Brazil's favorable vote was a difficult decision because of its policy of neutrality (officially referred to as 'equidistance'), and it came only after a three-points consideration:

1. Brazil would not be opposed to the development of any area.
2. The Arab position was not discriminatory because it admitted that in the future other members might be accepted to the bloc.
3. A transitory circumstance, that is war, is not to be allowed to damage permanent initiatives, that is the search for development.

However, as the writer also observed, these points were only an

official justification for Brazil's favorable vote which, in fact, seemed to have been based on the increasing mutual "... interests between Arabs and Brazilians which... was admitted by Brazilian diplomats in informal talks."

For the time being, however, relations between Brazil and Israel remained cordial. An agreement for mutual cooperation beginning in 1959 as a cultural bond, developed during the 1960s into a more significant agreement including matters related to agriculture and atomic energy. Particularly after Israel's smashing victory over the Arabs in 1967, many Latin America countries along with Brazil were very interested in acquiring Israeli military equipment.<sup>84</sup> Confirming the continuity of the closer relationship existing between the two countries during the 1960s, Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel, arrived in Brazil in August 1973, to discuss

scientific cooperation, cultural exchange, nuclear energy, and the presence of Israeli military equipment at an International Aerospace Show in Sao Paulo.<sup>85</sup> Eban's visit was considered significant since he met not only with his Brazilian counterpart Gibson Barboza, but also with President Garrastazu Medici, several ministers and cabinet members who attended a banquet in his honor, governors, and also with the presidents of the National Congress and the Supreme Tribunal. Barboza and Eban also included in their agenda discussions about the Middle East, according to a joint statement.

However, both countries held divergent views: while Brazil continued to believe in an agreement through the sponsorship of the UN, Israel favored direct talks without pre-conditions with the Arabs.<sup>86</sup> Despite the many Eban visits and the high respect shown

to him by Brazilian representatives, Rolf Herzberg of Resenha Judaica—a Sao Paulo based newspaper which had replaced Cronica

Israelita—stated that Brazilian newspapers had, in general, been "cautious" about Eban's visit.<sup>87</sup> Confirming the good business ties between the two countries, Interior Minister Costa Cavalcanti stated that out of forty-one foreign agreements Brazil was working on, ten percent were signed with Israel.<sup>88</sup>

The International Aerospace Show was inaugurated in San Jose dos Campos, near Sao Paulo, in September 1973. For the occasion, Israeli Industry and Commerce Minister Haim Bar-Lev, a highly respected military leader, arrived in Brazil.<sup>89</sup> At the exhibition, Israel presented the Gabriel missile, and the Arava and Westwind 1123 airplanes.<sup>90</sup> The presence of Bar-Lev indicates the importance that Israel attributed to Latin America as a buyer of its military equipment. Bar-Lev and the Brazilian Minister for Industry and Commerce, Pratinho de Moraes, met in Brasilia;<sup>91</sup> although officially the meeting took place to increase economic cooperation between the two nations, it is plausible that Brazil's acquisition of Israeli military equipment was part of the conversation. The products offered at the exhibition by Israel were positively reviewed by the Brazilian press: Ultima Hora, for instance, expressed the view that "Israel presented the most outstanding booth of the whole show."<sup>92</sup>

During the months of August and September, the two largest Jewish communities of Brazil, Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and particularly their leadership had a good opportunity to do what they do best: socialize. Thus, Eban's visit included a number of private eating/meetings with Jewish leaders, and more accessible visits to the Hebraica of Sao Paulo and Rio.<sup>93</sup> During the same period Jewish institutions organized farewell activities for Israeli ambassador Itzhak Harkavi who was about to return to Israel after five



years of representing his country in Brazil. Again, in the Hebraica of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, Jewish leaders offered a special dinner in honor of ambassador Harkavi.<sup>94</sup> In addition, Jewish schools and other institutions, such as CIP and the Sephardic Philanthropic Congregation of Sao Paulo, also honored Harkavi.<sup>95</sup>

By 1973, the patterns of behavior of the Jewish community observed in 1967 continued the same: apathy in matters related to Judaism and Israel, increasing importance of sports and social clubs as the new centers of Jewish "togetherness," and a search for more of the wealth and comfort which was common to the wealthy 5% of Brazil's population. Again, as during the 1960s, Sao Paulo's Jewish community was in better shape than Rio de Janeiro's. Confirming this view, in September, problems in the KKL of Rio de Janeiro resulted in the resignation of its president Jose Katz.<sup>96</sup> This time, however, the Jewish press of that city devoted a number of articles to the long time crises within the community, something that was scarcely done during the 1960s. On August 12, Jornal Israelita wrote:

"...We have more than forty Jewish organizations in Guanabara. Why is it that these organizations don't look for new leaders? ...Fortunately, there are old activists [still working] with their remaining strength..."

It also accused Jewish organizations of "discrimination" in deciding who will be chosen to receive invitations to assist at the different celebrations organized by those institutions since friendship, not protocol, was usually enough to be part of major events.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, in the midst of the Yom Kippur War, the newspaper also criticized the Federation's weakness and declared it a cause for

the "Yishuv"'s general apathy.<sup>98</sup> Although the newspaper's attacks could have triggered the Federation's reaction, it is most likely that its appeal to the community to support it and attend events was actually caused by its overall lack of respect within the community. The Federation attempted to refresh memories, explain its mission, and—somewhat menacingly—show its credentials:

"Be assured that the Federation is not...just one more Jewish entity. It has the responsibility of representing Brazilian Jews here in Rio, and only the Federation has the legal mandate to speak in the name of the "Yishuv." Either the Federation is respected or we are heading into chaos..."<sup>99</sup>

With the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, "umbrella" Jewish organizations expressed themselves by sending telegrams. M. Kauffmann, president of the Confederation, sent one to the General Secretary of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, asking that the aggressors against the state of Israel, Egypt and Syria, be sanctioned.<sup>100</sup> On behalf of the Confederation, Kauffmann also sent a telegram of support to the Israeli embassy in Brasilia, expressing "...our complete solidarity with our brothers in Israel..."<sup>101</sup> In addition, telegrams of support were sent by Rio de Janeiro Jewry's representatives and the Sao Paulo's Federation to Golda Meir.<sup>102</sup> The Sao Paulo's Federation telegram contained 6,000 women's signatures and stated:

"We, Jewish women, share your grief for the bloodshed

in this moment of angst for the Jewish people and for mankind in general. Accept our comfort and solidarity, as an incentive for a battle for an enduring peace and fraternal coexistence between people."<sup>103</sup>

A few public rallies in support of Israel did occur. Jewish clubs expressed their solidarity by cancelling their usual activities.<sup>104</sup> However, in Latin America countries, this suspension could be intended to avoid "Jewish movement" and the chance of any isolated antisemitic outburst against Jewish people or property, but also the maintenance of a low profile. Jewish clubs were a few times used as meeting points for rallies. Again, Sao Paulo appeared far more active and better organized than Rio de Janeiro. In fact, only one rally in support of Israel was reported to have taken place in Rio, organized by Rio's Zionist Organization ("Unificada") and by a Jewish Youth Committee(?) at the Hebraica. According to Resenha Judaica's report from Rio, the demonstration was attended by young people who filled the facilities.<sup>105</sup> In Sao Paulo, the Hebraica proved to be the favored—and seemingly only—meeting place. On Monday, October 15, "thousands of people" attended a meeting in which an explanation of the situation in the Middle East was given by leaders of the Jewish community.<sup>106</sup> Another rally, in the second half of October, was attended by approximately 2,000 people, who heard the usual speeches, and were also shown a documentary about Israel's life and progress since the 1967 war.<sup>107</sup> Another demonstration, organized immediately after the end of hostilities, not only attracted the most people, 4,000 to 6,000,<sup>108</sup> but was the most unique: it was publicized as "Festa da Paz" (Celebration for Peace) and was a remarkable event because for the first time a rally related to the Middle

East conflict was attended by both, Jews and Arabs. It was organized by Sao Paulo's Federation and a number of politicians, officials, intellectuals, and actors—"no remuneration was paid"—  
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 were present.

In addition to the telegrams and rallies, a number of volunteers went to Israel, and financial support was organized. Although the Jewish press did not record or publish any petition for volunteers, Brazilian Jews did go to Israel as a result of the Yom Kippur War. Some of the inside circumstances surrounding these volunteers are known due to a project realized under  
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 the auspices of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. As part of the project, Moshe Nes-El interviewed two Brazilian volunteers: D. U. seems to have done volunteer work in Israel prior to 1973 and to be working for the Jewish Agency either before the war or immediately after it began; D. G., was a first time volunteer. According to D. U., as early as October 8—October 6 was a Saturday—there were people at the "Sochnut" asking about volunteer work, and there were more people interested as the war continued. D. U. stated that

"Prospective volunteers who came to the "Sochnut"  
 did so individually, particularly college students;  
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 nothing occurred in terms of groups..."

It is curious that individuals who apparently lacked the ideological factor were moved enough to decide to go—or at least to inquire about going—to Israel. D. U. continued:

"...In the college, there was pro-Arab propaganda.

On the other hand, there were no organized groups of Jewish students to argue against [that propaganda] <sup>112</sup>

As a reaction to their unpreparedness to explain the Israeli cause, considered by some to be indivisible from their being considered a Jew, at least some could not keep a low profile, and decided on some action. Thus, as a result of negative propaganda which somehow affected them, a number of student of students volunteered to go to Israel. A less ideological reason for going was reported:

"Most of the volunteers did not have ties with Israel; they volunteered to solve personal problems..." <sup>113</sup>

Thus, although an unspecified number of young Brazilian Jews volunteered to go to Israel as a result of the Yom Kippur War, the vast majority remained apathetic.

There was financial support for Israel from the Jewish community of Brazil. However, it is difficult to ascertain how well organized and productive it was since, as on other occasions, a shadow of secrecy surrounded the emergency campaign. It was not announced nor followed up in the Jewish press. Nevertheless, in a report published only in The Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung, Eliezer Burla, president of Rio's Federation, when asked by a reporter if Brazilian Jews were collecting money for Israel, stated that there was a fund to collect money for Israel, and that it would be sent in dollars through and with the permission of the Central Bank. <sup>114</sup> Oral history has it that a fund-raising campaign took place following

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the same specifications as in 1967. But this time, the source said, its organization was done by a "sheliach" to the "Magbit." In addition a number of ambulances were sent to Israel by Sao Paulo's Jewry through the Red Cross.<sup>115</sup> There were no amounts nor opinions about the success of the campaign reported in five different newspapers and magazines: Resenha Judaica, Jornal Israelita, Brazil-Israel, Aonde Vamos, and The Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung. However, a comment by Ezra Shapiro, world chairman of the "Keren HaYessod"-UIA, who briefly visited Brazil, gives an indication of the lack of achievement of the campaign. Shapiro stated:

"...We were in Rio and in Sao Paulo, and I want to be honest, for the record, I hope it's changed since my being there. Brazil was the country in which the results and reactions were in no way equal to the feelings of warmth and unity experienced in all the other countries...

Brazil is enjoying economic wealth and the Jewish community is enjoying it along with the non-Jewish community. Their reactions and response did not measure up to what was expected, to what should come from that community...

The Jewish community in Brazil is simply not responding to the needs of Israel and even to the needs of the Jewish community in Brazil proper..."<sup>116</sup>

Jews and Arabs in Brazil usually enjoyed good relations, and even during previous critical periods in the Middle East, they



managed to maintain them. But in 1973, there was a greater potential for tension due to the fact that the war lasted longer than the last two crises, and to the emotional difficulties that the changing Middle East military situation must have created. When a Jewish reporter walked around Rio's Alfandega St. neighborhood, where many Jews and Arabs had stores, he found the area relatively calm though less openly friendly than during the 1956 and 1967 crises. Thus, for instance, a Brazilian Arab quickly responded that everything was reasonably calm with their Jewish neighbors but, annoyed, added that he could not further discuss the issue.<sup>117</sup>

The general impression was that relations continued to be good and that the war was a subject to avoid. Although no polls or interviews were reported in Sao Paulo, where both communities are larger—particularly the Arab—and more influential than in Rio, Sao Paulo's based Aonde Vamos' proposal to create a Brazilian Arab-Jewish League whose aim would be to share the Brazilian experience where Jews and Arabs live side by side in peace, would seem to indicate that reasonably friendly relations were being maintained.<sup>118</sup> As an example, Aonde Vamos mentioned the Celebration of Peace.

The Jewish press did not report any official announcement by the Brazilian government regarding the Middle East war. Natan Lerner,<sup>119</sup> who wrote a very brief overview of South American Jewry's reaction to the Yom Kippur War, stated that "Brazilian support for Israel was expressed in the Congress..."<sup>120</sup> The interesting distinction is: "in" the Congress but not "by" the Congress. The Federal Deputy for Guanabara expressed his support for Israel at Brasilia and Deputy Nina Ribeiro charged that the Arab attack of Yom Kippur was "treacherous."<sup>121</sup>

The media were not unanimous. Some newspapers and TV channels tended to be pro-Israeli, such as O Estado de Sao Paulo and TV Manchete, and others pro-Arab such as radio and TV channel

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Bandeirantes. The usual criterion was simply Arab or Jewish ownership of the newspaper or TV channel, many of which did belonged to Arabs and Jews. In addition, there were some leftist oriented—therefore pro-Arab—media. However, by then, military and mostly para-military organizations had almost completely destroyed any clear Left expression in Brazil. Finally, one cannot disregard the possibility that pro-Arab expressions could have also come from certain nationalistically oriented groups.

#### Conclusion.

By 1973, the pattern of behavior of the Brazilian Jewish community continued to be one of general apathy in matters related to Judaism and Israel. Sport and social clubs became the definitive center of Jewish "togetherness" though not of strong Jewish identity. Rio's Jewish community continued to show problems in its major institutions and, whether because of that situation or independent from it, the community was less responsive than Sao Paulo's Jewry.

With the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East on October 6, "umbrella" Jewish organizations sent telegrams to the UN, Prime Minister Golda Meir, and Israel's embassy in Brazil. Lobbying activities by Jewish leaders in Brazil were not reported in the press, although a few Deputies expressed support for Israel. A number of rallies, particularly in Sao Paulo, were organized but the attendance never surpassed ten

percent of the Jewish population, at the most. The one event which deserves to be singled out is a public demonstration at the end of the war in which Jews and Arabs—it is not clear whether Arabs or Arab representatives—were present; even in this case, however, the attendance did not surpass ten percent of Sao Paulo's Jewish population. Fund-raising activities took place but amounts collected were not revealed. However, a report by the world chairman of the UIA, indicated that Brazilian Jewry's response was upsetting, if not shameful. In addition, an unspecified number of volunteers went to Israel.

The Brazilian government maintained a policy of "equidistance" regarding the Middle East crisis. Although still under the general influence of the United States in some matters related to foreign policy, the importance of Arab friendship in a world based on economic interests was beginning to be noticeable in certain very influential circles.

## Notes.

1. Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel (New York 1986), 791.
2. Farouk A. Sankari, "Western Europe: From Belligerency to Neutrality", in Naseen H. Aruni ed., Middle East Crucible (Illinois 1975), 274.
3. Sankari, "Western Europe," in Aruni ed., Middle East, 273-280.
4. Sankari, "Western Europe," in Aruni ed., Middle East, 278.  
Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (New York 1974), 223-52.
5. Laqueur, Confrontation, 236. Sachar, History, 791.
6. In September 1970, King Hussein of Jordan expelled at least hundreds of Palestinian guerillas from its territory.
7. Sachar, History, 699.
8. Sachar, History, 700. All Western European countries accused of such behavior have officially denied it.
9. Sanford J. Ungar, Africa (New York 1989), 466.
10. Daniel Elazar-Peter Medding, Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies (New York 1983), 324.

11. The Australian Jewish News, September 7, 1973. Apparently just before the 1972 elections some leaders of the ECAJ expressed disquiet over Whitlam's foreign policy views but were disregarded by Jewish Labor supporters. See Elazar-Medding, Communities, 324.
12. The Australian Jewish News, September 7, 1973.
13. The Australian Jewish News, September 14, 1973.
14. The Australian Jewish News, October 5, 1973.
15. The Australian Jewish News, October 5, 1973.
16. The Australian Jewish News, September 7, 1973.
17. The Australian Jewish News, September 21, 1973.
18. The Australian Jewish News, September 21, 1973. The information came from the treasurer of the Zionist Federation, S. Stock.
19. The Australian Jewish News, October 12, 1973.
20. The Australian Jewish News, October 26, 1973.
21. The Australian Jewish News, October 19, 1973.
22. The Australian Jewish News, October 26, 1973.

23. The Australian Jewish News, October 19, 1973. See also *ibid.*, October 12, and 26. The most outspoken Jewish leader to express criticism against Whitlam was I. Leibler. According to R. Taft-G. Solomon only 8% of Melbourne Jews had a favorable view of Whitlam's government on the Yom Kippur War. See R. Taft-G. Solomon, "The Melbourne Jewish Community and the Middle East War of 1973," Jewish Journal of Sociology 16, June 1974, 58.
24. Mentioned by P. Ruskin in The Australian Jewish News, October 26, 1973.
25. Elazar-Medding, Communities, 325.
26. Moshe Davis ed., The Yom Kippur War. Israel and the Jewish People (New York 1974), 311.
27. The Australian Jewish News, November 2, 1973. Federal elections were due in 1974 and 1975.
28. The Australian Jewish News, November 2, 1973.
29. The Australian Jewish News, November 2, 1973.
30. The Australian Jewish News, November 9, 1973.
31. The Australian Jewish News, October 19 and 26, 1973.



32. The Australian Jewish News, November 16, 1973.
33. The Australian Jewish News, November 23, 1973.
34. The Australian Jewish News, November 23, 1973.
35. The Australian Jewish News, Yiddish edition, November 30, 1973.
36. I am referring to Hawke, Kane, and Byrne. Isi Leibler was outspokenly critical of Whitlam from the very outset of his "evenhanded neutrality" once hostilities broke out.
37. The Australian Jewish News, October 19, 1973.
38. The Australian Jewish News, October 26, 1973.
39. The Australian Jewish News, October 26, 1973.
40. The Australian Jewish News, November 2, 1973.
41. Other speakers were Rabbi Sanger and Rabbi Gutnik. The Jewish prayer in memory of those who had died, "El Maleh Rahamim," was intoned. See The Australian Jewish News, October 12, 1973.
42. The Australian Jewish News, October 19, 1973. In addition to the call for public rallies on October 21 and 22, the fund-raising appeal was openly publicized in the Jewish press.
43. The Australian Jewish News, October 26, 1973.

44. The Australian Jewish News, November 2, 1973.
45. The rally in Queensland took place on October 16 at the St. Margaret Memorial Hall and was attended by 600 people. The speaker was Rabbi Fabian from Sydney. Canberra's rally was held on October 15, and about 200 people were present. Adelaide's Jewry gathered at the Synagogue for a rally in support of Israel on October 15. 500 attended. On October 16 the small Jewish community in the Gold Coast also demonstrated its support of Israel. A fund-raising campaign was launched on every occasion; amounts collected were not revealed.
46. According to S. Rutland: "Studies of both Melbourne and SYDNEY Jewry indicate that reactions were similar to 1967: a deep, personal involvement, an obsession with news reports, ATTENDANCE AT RALLIES..." (capital letters mine), see Suzanne Rutland, Edge of the Diaspora (Sydney 1988), 359. Rutland indicated that she picked-up the information from R. Taft-G. Solomon, "Melbourne...", in JJS, 58. However, there is no such information about Sydney in the Taft-Solomon article, not on the page pointed out by Rutland, nor in the rest of the article.
47. The Australian Jewish News, November 2, 1973.
48. The Australian Jewish News, October 26, 1973.
49. Davis, Yom Kippur, 313.

50. Davis, Yom Kippur, 313.
51. The Australian Jewish News, October 12, 1973.
52. The Australian Jewish News, November 9, 1973.
53. The Australian Jewish News, October 26, 1973.
54. The Australian Jewish News, November 2, 1973.
55. The Australian Jewish News, November 9, 1973..
56. The Australian Jewish News, November 23, 1973.
57. The Australian Jewish News, November 30, 1973.
58. The Australian Jewish News, December 14, 1973.
59. The Australian Jewish News, November 9, 1973.
60. The Australian Jewish News, October 12, 1973.
61. The Australian Jewish News, October 12, 1973.
62. The Australian Jewish News, October 19, 1973.
63. The Australian Jewish News, September 14, 1973.

64. During September and half of October entire page ads were devoted in the Jewish press to promote that campaign.
65. The Welfare Appeal appeared on The Australian Jewish News edition on October 12, 1973. The following week it was informed that because of the emergency campaign for Israel all other appeals were cancelled. The emergency appeal was considered finished on November 9.
66. The Australian Jewish News, October 19, 1973.
67. The Australian Jewish News, October 26, 1973.
68. The Australian Jewish News, October 26, 1973.
69. The Australian Jewish News, November 2, 1973.
70. Davis, Yom Kippur, 313.
71. The Australian Jewish News, November 9, 1973.
72. Davis, Yom Kippur, 315.
73. Taft-Solomon, "Melbourne Jewish...", in JJS, 61.
74. The Australian Jewish News, November 16, 1973.
75. The Australian Jewish News, November 9, 1973.

76. The Australian Jewish News, December 14, 1973.
77. The Australian Jewish News, October 26 and November 9, 1973.
78. Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World (New York 1988), 160.
79. Thus, when General Vernon Walters was sent by the United States as military attaché to Brazil, he immediately established contact with many Brazilian officers, but seems to have had particular interest in Castelo Branco.
80. Kolko, Third World, 160-61.
81. Basically, two structures of power or alliances were noticeable in Latin America: the US-Brazil and the Cuba-Peru axis.
82. See Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (New York 1974), 223-235; Farouk Sankari, "Western Europe: From Belligerency to Neutrality," in Nasser Aruri ed., Middle East Crucible (Illinois 1975), 273-80.
83. Sanford Ungar, Africa (New York 1986), 130.
84. Edy Kaufman-Yoram Shapira-Joel Barromi, Israel-Latin American Relations (New Jersey 1979); Bishara Bahbah, Israel and Latin America: The Military Connection (New York 1986).

85. Jornal Israelita, August 19, 1973.
86. Resenha Judaica, September 1w., 1973. Resenha Judaica was published biweekly; 1w. indicates first half of the month while 3w. indicates second half of the month.
87. Resenha Judaica, September 1w, 1973.
88. Resenha Judaica, August 3w., 1973.
89. Jornal Israelita, August 26, 1973.
90. Resenha Judaica, August 1w., 1973.
91. Resenha Judaica, September 1w., 1973.
92. Aonde Vámos, September 28, 1973.
93. Jornal Israelita, August 12 and 19, 1973. Resenha Judaica, September 1w., 1973.
94. Resenha Judaica, August 3w., 1973; Jornal Israelita, August 12, 1973.
95. Resenha Judaica, September 3w., 1973.
96. Resenha Judaica, September 3w., 1973; Jornal Israelita, September 9, 1973.



97. Jornal Israelita, September 9, 1973.
98. Jornal Israelita, November 4, 1973.
99. Jornal Israelita, December 2, 1973.
100. Jornal Israelita, October 21, 1973.
101. Jornal Israelita, October 21, 1973.
102. Resenha Judaica, October 3w., 1973. Sao Paulo's Jewish, as on other occasions and matters, seemed to have been better organized in matters of information. Thus, according to an information reported during the first week of October by Resenha Judaica, Sao Paulo's Federation daily published a bulletin with informations about the war.
103. Jornal Israelita, November 4, 1973.
104. Jornal Israelita, October 21, 1973.
105. Resenha Judaica, November 1w., 1973.
106. Resenha Judaica, October 3w., 1973.
107. Resenha Judaica, November 1w., 1973.
108. Jornal Israelita, October 28, 1973; Resenha Judaica, November 3w., 1973.

109. Resenha Judaica, November 3w., 1973.

110. The project had for its aim collecting information about Diaspora reactions to the Yom Kippur War. A total of 69 interviews were made and the interviewed included volunteers and leaders of Jewish institutions in the Diaspora and Israel. Selections of the gathered material were edited by Moshe Davis and published under the title The Yom Kippur War. Israel and the Jewish People, already quoted in this paper. A microfilmed copy of the original, complete interviews is found at the library of the HUC, Cincinnati, under code M 1446.

111. Interview No. 64 of Hebrew University project.

112. Interview No. 64 of Hebrew University project.

113. Interview No. 64 of Hebrew University project.

114. Brazilianer Yiddishe Zeitung, October 19, 1973.

115. Canal Israelita, November 18, 1973.

116. Interview No. 54 of Hebrew University project. Shapiro went to Brazil after visiting South Africa, and then continued to Argentina and Venezuela. Shapiro excluded from his critical opinions the leaders of Brazil's Magbit, whom he praised. As for the general apathy to which he referred, the failure

of certain activities seems to give credence to Shapiro's observations. Thus, on October 30, in the Tenente Passalunghi St. synagogue in Rio de Janeiro, a religious remembrance service ("Izcor") for those who died in the Middle East war was not well attended. In addition, the same situation occurred in Sao Paulo when the Newton Prado St. synagogue, located in the populous Jewish neighborhood of Bom Retiro, organized a memorial service ("Hazkara") in honor of the recently deceased Israeli leader David ben-Gurion. On the other hand, however, a debate about the perspectives of peace for Israel after the Yom Kippur War, organized by the Congregacao Israelita Paulista (CIP) of Sao Paulo, was reportedly attended by "hundreds of people." See Resenha Judaica, November 3rd., 1973, and January 1st., 1974.

117. Brazilian Yiddish Zeitung, October 19, 1973. The newspaper also wrote an interesting observation made by a Lebanese-born Brazilian who said that "...most of the traders who come from Arab countries are Christians. There are almost no Muslims. And we Christians are not interested that the Muslim Arabs win the war because then we, as Christians, will suffer more than the Jews.

118. Aonde Vamos, November 1, 1973.

119. Lerner was Director of the World Jewish Congress Executive.

120. Davis, Yom Kippur, 132.

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121. Jornal Israelita. October 28, 1973.

122. Resenha Judaica, November 1w., 1973.

Final Words.

The increasing centrality of Israel for the Diaspora is the most obvious conclusion of this thesis. However, the reasons behind that situation are various and so are the historic times which this element of centrality is find. The creation of the state of Israel was not not in itself the decisive reason it became the center of Jewish identity in the Diaspora, in spite of all the joy it brought to the Jewish people wherever it was established around the globe. Yes, it was the beginning. But the centrality of Israel and its condition of being the common element of interest shared by the Diaspora was a gradual process. In this process the psychological needs of Jews living in that Diaspora, as well as their reflections on the seemingly always recurrent factor of isolation, had an important part. The essence of these people who dwell all over the world could only be grasped in an impersonal way until they acquired a name and became personalized in the state of Israel. Then they came to be a concrete existence who live, grow, develop, spend money, defend themselves and attack others, and as a result created in their Diaspora brothers the need for, a reaction, a definition. In 1948 it was joy for the newborn brother. But following his birth the newborn needed to be cared for and to be assured of this care.

This paper tries to present the reactions of two Diaspora Jewish communities vis-a-vis crises which could have ended the life of the new creation that is one of the personifications of the Jewish people. These reactions by Brazilian and Australian

East was, without a doubt, the Six-Day War in the case of Australian Jewry. The community was finally brought together and its answer was overwhelming. With Brazil it is difficult to say that there even was a turning point, although in 1973 the Jewish community's response was better organized, faster, and more positive even in terms of rally attendance than on prior occasions. One may conclude then that the Brazilian Jewish community is still searching for its own identity, an identity that seems evasive and hard to build.

Two Jewish frontier societies which emerged under very different circumstances and cultural environments have reacted quite differently regarding the wars of modern Israel between 1956 and 1973. Still, when asked what they have in common the answer will be the same: the State of Israel.



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