THE TREATMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON IN THE ISRAELI NEWSPAPER HA'ARETZ

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Introduction

Israel's relationship to the United States is of critical importance to her survival as a sovereign entity in the Middle East. The United States served as Israel's major source of support during its first twenty-seven years of existence and will most likely continue to be Israel's strongest ally. Israel depends on the United States for political support in the United Nations and in the Western countries where Israel seeks to gain acceptance and recognition of her policies. Israel's remarkable record of economic growth has been aided substantially by economic grants and loans from the United States. The steady flow of United States military hardware and technology to Israel guarantees her physical security.

The role of the president of the United States in the relationship between the two countries is pivotal. The president sets the tone of the relationship through the exercise of his domestic and foreign policies. As the person responsible for the formulation of United States foreign policy, he determines the nature of United States actions vis-a-vis Israel. His evaluation of a given situation will influence the timing and intensity of action. These factors can be of critical importance to Israel. The president may also utilize his powers by exerting direct pressure on Israel to act in a particular manner. This may have the effect of narrowing Israel's foreign policy options.

Richard M. Nixon's presidency came at a critical moment in Israel's history and therefore possessed special significance. The events in Southeast Asia and the political atmosphere of Western Europe represented a serious challenge to the role of the United States in world affairs. The possibility of dramatic changes in the United States perception of its overseas obligations posed grave dangers to Israel. The delicate political and military balance following the 1967 June War depended on the continued United States support of Israel.

Israel's evaluation of Nixon's role during that period is difficult to ascertain since it is not available from any one source. One of the outlets for gleaning Israel's perception of Nixon is the Israel newspaper Ha'aretz. Ha'aretz, unlike other Israeli newspapers, is not controlled by a political party. It can, therefore, examine issues from any perspective it chooses. However, Ha'aretz' political tone reflects the general progressive Zionist position that it adopted when it first began publishing on June 18, 1919. Ha'aretz continued to retain a moderate political perspective even after its purchase by S.Z. Schocken in 1937. Ha'aretz' success in attracting prominent literary and political writers earned it a reputation of having a high standard of journalism. As a result, Ha'aretz became a forum for the views of influential citizens and the government. Since its positions are often similar to that of the Israeli government, Ha'aretz serves as a barometer of government thinking. An analysis of Ha'aretz' articles will most often produce an accurate

picture of how both the Israeli government and moderate Israelis perceive a given situation.

Chapter I - Richard Nixon's 1968 and 1972 Presidential Campaigns

One important source for understanding the complexities of political campaigns and the political make-up of candidates is the newspaper. The composite picture of a candidate presented to the public reflects the newspaper's examination of campaign promises, policy positions, and past political records. It is also determined by considerations unconnected to the candidate, such as the newspaper's political orientation. The coverage of Richard M. Nixon in the 1968 and 1972 presidential election campaigns by the Israeli newspaper, Ha'aretz, is one example of these factors influencing the treatment of a candidate and his campaign.

The reportage of Nixon was considerably easier than that of other candidates since he was an "old" politician, one familiar to the Israeli press.[1] He had previously been the subject of Ha'aretz news stories during a long and extensive career dating from his vice-presidency through his race for the governorship of California in 1962. These years revealed valuable insights into Nixon's political behavior. Definite impressions were formed that were to shape analysis during the 1968 presidential campaign.

Ha'aretz viewed Nixon as a hard liner on foreign policy questions. He established a reputation as a cold warrior and, more recently, as a hawk on the Vietnam war. Nixon's credentials on Israel were generally considered to be favorable

although there were some questions raised about his vice-presidential involvement in the 1956 Sinai War. Israeli's offered diverse opinions as to whether he had, in fact, backed the Eisenhower demand of an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula.[2] Ha'aretz, however, never considered this issue.

These general impressions were to play a significant part in Ha'aretz' assessment of a potential Nixon presidency. He was judged primarily on expectations in the area of domestic and foreign affairs. Ha'aretz considered personality of secondary importance. They thought the possibility of a United States president acting according to personal predeliction and in disregard of such restrictive influences as re-election concerns, party demands and ideology, and interest group pressures was minimal. Gauging a candidate's personal qualities was a useful tool only insofar as it signaled a political tone for the conduct of government and set the mood for public participation in the political process. Thus, personality considerations did not play a significant role in the anticipation of Nixon's role as a policy maker and leader.

Ha'aretz' interest in the choice of an American president emanated from a grave concern about the involvement of the United States in world affairs. Vietnam remained the major testing ground of United States resolve to have its own way on the international scene. The Middle East presented still another source of confrontation as it lay smoldering from the

ruins of the 1967 Six Day War. The type of United States president Ha'aretz determined to be most able to meet the challenges of the day would have to be an activist president with a hard line foreign policy approach. This would guarantee the fulfillment of obligations to United States treaty partners and allies and, specifically, insure the continued flow of economic and military aid to Israel.

Yet, Ha'aretz recognized that success on the foreign policy plane rested upon the next president's ability to effectively manage the United States domestic situation. A decipherable and dangerous trend to the right progressed due to the chaotic state of affairs in the United States. Robert F. Kennedy's assassination brought home to presidential hopefuls the lesson that the United States must be concerned with how it rules itself at home before it looks to rule elsewhere.

How, then, did Ha'aretz assess Richard Nixon in the 1968 Presidential Campaign and did this coincide with the model of president that it desired? They viewed Nixon, first and foremost, as a staunch member of the Republican party. His very being was Republican and in turn the Republican Party bore his imprint.[3] The Israeli cartoonist Gal, whose works appear on the editorial page of Ha'aretz, depicted a Republican elephant with Nixon's face. The cartoon was entitled: "The Skin of the Elephant."[4] Perhaps, the key to this mutual identification lay in the fact that Nixon appeared to Ha'aretz reporters as a stereotyped politician. He never

seemed to stir the imagination of his supporters but had a tranquil effect upon them. His speeches lacked inspiration but were intelligent. He followed after public opinion and rarely helped to shape or define it. The naivete shown by this reporting led it to conclude that 'everyone was able to find shelter under the Nixon umbrella. Few admired him but then few hated him."[5] Such a statement appears to reflect the feelings of the Israeli public more than that of the American people from whom Nixon evoked intensely opposite emotions.

Nixon brought to the 1968 presidential campaign a history of aggressive reactions to Soviet and Communist expansionist attempts. He had dealt strongly with them in the past, and continued to express hawkish views on East-West relations.[6] Nixon's position had shifted somewhat by 1968 to a more moderate stance which he attributed to the changes in international relations. Nevertheless, Ha'aretz continued to portray him as a fighter against communism and one who engendered the dislike of the Soviet Union. The Soviets had labelled him a "pursuer of Communists" and voiced their preference for a Democratic president.[7]

The image of Nixon emerged in Ha'aretz' analysis of his 1968 campaign strategy. He adopted his previous tactic of attempting to create a political base composed mainly of voters in the center of the ideological spectrum.[8] Since Wallace had increased the importance of the South as a primary campaign target, Nixon needed to shift his political position in order to pick up more support. He abandoned his middle of

the road strategy and moved slightly to the right.[9] This also served to solidify conservative Republican support.

Nixon accomplished this shift to the right by focusing much of his domestic strategy on "law and order." This key issue played into the fears of middle class Americans who were frightened by ghetto rioting and concerned about the general moral decay of society. Nixon's tough stand on crime forged a coalition of voters who sought to reverse these developments through the election of a strong leader committed to the interests of "middle America."

Voters perceived economic issues and the need for public stability to be inextricably linked. In their estimation, Nixon enjoyed an advantage over his Democratic rival in this area as well. His pledge to fight inflation and a promise to remove some restrictions on the Securities and Exchange Commission generated confidence in his economic plans. Ha'aretz quoted the New York Times reportage that eighty three percent of industrial presidents preferred Nixon for president.[10] Nixon attracted voters dissatisfied with large government spending and high taxes by de-emphasizing social welfare programs.

The cause for these economic troubles and societal unrest lay largely in the involvement of the United States overseas. The anti-war movement created a serious challenge to United States policy in Southeast Asia and fermented a general dissent on the domestic scene. These developments necessitated foreign policy positions from the presidential

candidates defining their philosophy about the role of the United States in world affairs. The arena for testing a particular philosophy's validity was Southeast Asia. Many considered Vietnam as the barometer for judging a candidate's foreign policy orientation. In the view of Ha'aretz, Nixon enjoyed a tactical advantage on the Vietnam issue since he, like Eisenhower during the Korean War, didn't have to defend the past.[11] Nixon allowed Humphrey to bear the wrath of the anti-war movement. He refused to commit himself to any concrete course of action, maintaining that to do so would jeopardize delicate negotiations in progress.

Nixon looked to safer foreign policy areas to reap political benefits. He gave strong support to the United States defense establishment and maintained that United States nuclear superiority was essential for the survival of the West.[12] Nixon criticized the defense posture of the Johnson administration as weak but softened his attack in the face of emphatic denials by the Secretary of Defense.[13] Nevertheless, Nixon continued to advocate the conduct of United States foreign policy from a position of strength.

The need to differentiate himself from the Johnson government on foreign policy prompted Nixon to stress the desireability of creating new relationships abroad.[14] This was interpreted by him to mean increased cooperation with France and an end to the cool interaction between De Gaulle and United States presidents. Nixon proposed general improvement in the relations between Western Europe and the United

States through the upgrading and strengthening of the N.A.T.O. alliance. He also promised "direct and private" negotiations with Russia in order to limit nuclear arms proliferation and ease tensions by means of mutual understanding.

Nixon's campaign statements on the Middle East held the greatest importance to Israel. Following his nomination, Nixon promised that he would establish an arms balance in Israel's favor, and prevent the flow of weapons from the West to the Arab nations.[15] This position provoked adverse reactions from the generally pro-Israel newspapers in the United States. Ha'aretz cited the objections of two prominent United States newspapers, perhaps to utilize them as targets for the anger of Israeli citizens. The Washington Post was quoted as criticizing Nixon for his lack of imagination regarding the Middle East crisis. It held that tipping the balance of arms to the advantage of Israel would only prompt a dangerous arms race.[16] Similarly, the New York Times claimed that Nixon's policies translated into action would endanger peace in the Middle East by encouraging the Soviets to retaliate with massive arms shipments.[17]

While Arabs reacted to Nixon's pronouncements with hostility, Israel, in Ha'aretz' opinion, responded with enthusiasm at the prospect of an ardent supporter in the White House. As a hard liner on foreign policy, Nixon could be expected to insure the sovereignty of the State of Israel as a bastion of democracy in the Middle East. His anti-Communist past assuaged the Israeli fear of Soviet penetration

into the region. Nixon's presence in the White House would force a more cautious attitude from the Soviets who were "greedy" after their invasion of Czechoslovakia.[18]

Ha'aretz felt so secure about these vows of support from Nixon that its reporters ignored an important condition attached to the sale of phantoms. Nixon had stated, following his nomination, that the sale of phantoms would guarantee Israel's security in relation to its neighbors. His later stipulation that a need must exist to warrant the sale of the phantoms did not detract from the force of his promise. Nixon's comments were interpreted by Ha'aretz as binding in the event of his election and not as an election lure for Jewish votes.[19]

Nixon's desire to capture a larger segment of the Jewish vote was matched by his realization of the difficulty of such a feat. On this issue, Ha'aretz correctly noted that American Jews displayed a deep seated distrust of him which was far greater than that expressed by other minorities.[20] This animosity was in part due to the claims of anti-Semitism that had stuck to Nixon throughout his political career.[21] Those peoople who purported to know him denied these charges and pointed to Nixon's resignation from a country club that had excluded blacks and Jews. Yet, Jews seemed firm in their opposition to Nixon; they were therefore not expected to crossover in significant numbers from their traditional ranks in the Democratic party. However, some increase in Jewish support for Nixon was anticipated by Ha'aretz due to the appeal

of his "law and order" policies and his strong support for Israel.[22] The tension between the American Jewish community and the Nixon camp increased as Nixon's chances for a victory in the election grew brighter.

In the brief period preceeding the Republican convention, Ha'aretz considered Nixon the strongest candidate vying for the nomination. He had mobilized local Republican support and had the qualities to secure a victory over his Republican rivals.[23] Nixon planned and calculated each step of the way. From the party's perspective, Nixon deserved the nomination because of his hard work, perserverance, political intelligence, and cautious organization preparation.[24] Nevertheless, some people in the Republican Party felt that a liberal Republican such as Nelson Rockefeller would more easily beat a Democratic opponent in the election. Rockefeller possessed a colorful style and lacked the Nixon image of a professional politician from the old guard.[25]

After Nixon had secured the Republican nomination, the presential race tightened and Ha'aretz predicted a close outcome in November.[26] Momentum was increasing behind the Democratic candidate as fears grew among voters that Nixon was too reactionary. Previously uncommitted liberals began moving towards Humphrey[27] after President Johnson's decision to stop the bombing of North Vietnam. According to Ha'aretz' interpretation of the liberal mentality, the change in Johnson's policy was regarded as a sign of repentence and as a hint that a settlement might be near.[28]

The deadlock between the two presidential candidates prompted speculation in Israel about the possibility of an electoral college draw.[29] Nixon by most accounts had a majority of the votes but it was uncertain if he had the necessary two hundred seventy electoral college votes to become president. Should Nixon fall short of the majority requirement, then the House of Representatives would decide upon a president. Nixon's chances in a Democratic House were not considered good.[30]

Ha'aretz foresaw harmful consequences for Israel if an electoral college draw occurred. Such an event would heighten the crisis of authority in the United States and undermine the legitimacy of any president. A dark horse or compromise candidate would make for an even weaker president. Thus, his ability to formulate foreign policy would be severely impaired. Ha'aretz was concerned that Nixon might be forced to move too far to the right in order to capture a larger segment of Wallace's supporters. This, in turn, would probably result in Nixon adopting harsher domestic policies, exacerbating the disorder and dissent in society.

However, there was unanimity among Ha'aretz reporters that Nixon would win. Gallup polls were cited during the months of September, 1968 through November, 1968 indicating a narrow victory for Nixon.[31] Columnist Joseph Alsop and a Washington Post opinion poll appeared in Ha'aretz as additional examples supporting the opinion that Nixon would win.

The characterization of Nixon, the analysis of his

campaign strategy, and predictions of victory were the major factors influencing Ha'aretz' choice of Nixon for president. Several important assets were expected from a Nixon presidency. On the domestic scene, Nixon would provide the American people with the strong hand they desparately desired. His tough policies seemed to serve as a deterrent to further race riots and anti-war protests. The result might be a more stabilized society which would allow Nixon to implement his foreign policy skills. As a tested statesman, Nixon would honor United States obligations abroad and, in particular, those commitments to Israel.

However, Ha'aretz was somewhat sensitive to the political liabilities attached to Nixon. His integrity and reliability were at times questionable. He appeared to submit to numerous pressures exerted upon him. Nixon's role as a faithful member of the Republican Party opened him up to the wishes of the party machine. This fact increased Nixon's vulnerability to the special interests that lay at the heart of the party machine. This inner Republican core was associated with the elite that controlled the financial community and the oil companies.[33] Nixon had made promises to bankers and securities brokers which were written in unpublished letters. Similar letters were sent to officials of the aircraft industry and other "narrow audiences."[34] Under a Nixon presidency, there could be anticipated a greater echo from these voices, a portion of whose views contradicted those of the Israeli government.

Another liability was that Jews were peripheral to the

workings of the Republican party. Their numbers were few and their influence minimal.[35] One influential Jew, Max Fisher, did occupy a place of prominence in the Nixon camp. However, their relationship cooled after Nixon adopted a position calling for the removal of Abe Fortas from the Supreme Court. The lack of Jewish involvement in both the Republican Party and the Nixon campaign organization coupled with the low numbers of Jews supporting Nixon were seen by Ha'aretz as creating a potentially dangerous situation.[36] Nixon might ignore the Jewish community during his administration and allow their requests for aid to Israel to occupy a position of low priority.

The selection of Spiro Agnew as the Republican vice-presidential running mate was yet another of Ha'aretz' examples of Nixon acceeding to the demands of a particular group interest.[37] Agnew was chosen to maintain Nixon's conservative image and woo the Southern vote into the Nixon camp. His selection also appeased those "law and order" proponents who urged a strong hand against black rioters.[38] It strengthened reactionary tendencies already surfacing in the presidential race and highlighted Nixon's dubious record on school desegregation and civil rights. In accepting Agnew as his running mate, Nixon contradicted his own criteria, namely, "a man of presidential caliber."[39]

Perhaps as troublesome as these liabilities were to Ha'aretz, they were overshadowed by a persistent feeling that Nixon hadn't revealed enough about his policies to draw any

definite conclusions.[40] Despite the long awareness of Nixon's policies, Ha'aretz' reporters were still unable to decipher where his philosophies would lead once he became president.[41] Nixon had publicly demonstrated a concern for the danger from the Communist world and with this an understanding and sense of restraint in his attitude towards the Vietnam war. But in private conversations with various political officials, Nixon had displayed a lack of consideration for the essential principles behind the Vietnam war, the Supreme Court, housing, arms control, and other subjects. From this perspective, Nixon remained a smooth page. His words about new paths to peace did not commit him to any particular course of action. Friendly words were to be differentiated from acknowledged obligations. Ha'aretz hope for more detailed information on Nixon's policies.

The concern about Nixon's liabilities was emphasized less in Ha'aretz' coverage in the period prior to both the Republican and Democratic conventions. Nixon was assessed to be the strongest candidate with the best chance of defeating the other presidential hopefuls. He was also considered to be the most comfortable candidate for Israel as a result of his foreign policy positions.[42]

Ha'aretz' enthusiasm for Nixon entered into a period of reappraisal following the selection of the two parties' presidential nominees. Greater attention was paid to Nixon's faults as the race tightened and Nixon's chances for victory were only slightly better than Humphrey's. Nixon remained

the unacknowledged choice of Ha'aretz but was presented in a more balanced perspective for the duration of the campaign. This was accomplished by having their news coverage reflect the prevalent feeling among American voters that they had been given the opportunity of choosing the better of two poor candidates. The facade of neutrality by Ha'aretz was intended to maintain cordial relations with both parties and to avoid the consequences of supporting a losing candidate.

Fears about alienating the newly elected president proved to be unfounded. Nixon's victory had been hoped for by Ha'aretz. Now Ha'aretz had to wait and see if its expectations about a Nixon presidency would materialize. Its cautious and reserved reaction to the Nixon election testified to the tension and suspense that accompanied the wait.

Nixon's victory was viewed by Ha'aretz as a credit to his political skill and as a political miracle following an unprecedented comeback.[43] It was hoped that a new administration would bring with it a new mood and generate a sense of resiliency lacking under the Johnson government.

Optimism characterized Ha'aretz' expectations of Nixon's policies in the Middle East. It believed that Nixon understood Israel's regional importance and felt a moral obligation to her that was independent of any relationship to American Jews. Nixon had upheld the fundamentals of Israel's position in the past and he stated that he would reject any suggestions to pressure Israel into withdrawing from occupied territories until a peace treaty was signed.[44]

Underlying this optimism was an uneasy sense of caution and suspicion that all might not be as positive as it appeared. One could never predict the future nor always accurately calculate the role of a new President or Secretary of State.[45] It would be difficult to know precisely what type of initiatives the United States would propose in the coming months. There was a feeling among Ha'aretz' staff that Nixon was interested in a rapproachment with the Arabs in the wake of the cessation of diplomatic relations following the Six Day War. Hopefully, however, these tendencies might be checked by factors that were certain to influence Nixon. Since the Congress remained Democratic, Nixon would have to gain their cooperation if he was to succeed in any serious policy overseas.[46] Cooperation would be gained through compromise which would moderate any of Nixon's proposals. He would also have to appease influential Jewish interests that were part of the Eastern establishment. This would be crucial for the success of his domestic policies as well as for his re-election chances in 1972.

When all factors were considered, Ha'aretz was generally thankful for the outcome of the election. They saw Nixon's victory as having prevented the House of Representatives from choosing the president and having strengthened the vitality of the democratic process in the United States. To Ha'aretz, the election had demonstrated that the American voter was willing to act according to personal opinion and not party line.[48] Israel respected the United States choice for president and was not interested in seeing the Democrats drive Nixon out of the

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White House.

This balanced reaction to the Nixon election partially reflected a desire by Ha'aretz not to antagonize the leaders of the American Jewish establishment with whom it had disagreed over the choice of president. Ha'aretz understood the depth of Jewish opposition to Nixon which was attributed to his domestic policies rather than his position towards Israel. It wished to avoid the dangerous consequences of a confrontation with American Jews over its involvement in their domestic political scene.

Nevertheless, Ha'aretz felt confident about the correctness of its choice to offer American Jews some post-election advice. In an article appearing on Ha'aretz' editorial page, Mem M.K. Abramov admonished American Jewry to review its political direction in light of the Nixon victory. He believed that American Jews had misjudged the real dangers present in American society and had been misled into believing that the Republican party was its foe. From his perspective, Jews had no more to fear from the Republicans than from the Democrats. Instead, he felt they should focus their attention upon conditions developing in American that might bring about a wave of reaction from the right of a surge of radicalism from the left. He viewed American Jews as having become too liberal and too preoccupied with seeking social change. Abramov concluded that they had drifted far from the heartbeat of the American people and only through a process of redefinition and redirection would they assure the position of the

Jewish minority.[51]

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The treatment of Richard Nixon in the 1972 presidential campaign must be seen from the perspective that his re-election appeared certain from the start. This important factor influenced Ha'aretz' evaluation of Nixon's first term and his attitude toward his suitibility for a second term. It affected as well the treatment of the Democratic attempt to prevent Nixon's re-election.

Ha'aretz never swayed from its conviction that Nixon would win the chance for a second term as president. As early as February, 1972, Ha'aretz was convinced that the Democrats would fail in their attempt to unseat the Republican incumbent. A cartoon on February 6, 1972 depicted the presidential candidates as runners at the starting line of a foot race. Nixon was seated on a motor scooter, indicating that he possessed a seemingly insurmountable advantage over his opponents.[52] Following the Democratic convention in July, 1972, another cartoon appeared that reflected the same theme. Nixon was portrayed as a chess player analyzing the situation on the board. His opponents' pieces bore the faces of the Democratic hopefuls. The Humphrey and Muskie pieces were lying on their sides while only the McGovern and Wallace pieces remained standing. The message of the cartoon was unmistakeable; checkmate against the Democrats was rapidly approaching.[53]

Ha'aretz based its predictions of a Nixon victory upon several factors. He enjoyed the natural advantage of an

incumbent president and broad bi-partisan support.[54] Nixon's accomplishments in both the domestic and foreign policy areas were considered impressive. He had filled many of Ha'aretz' expectations since his 1968 election as president. They felt his "law and order" program calmed the unrest in society to a noticeable degree. There were no race riots and violence on campuses had declined.[55] There was progress in solving the economic problems that arose during Nixon's four years in office. He had exhibited "liberal enough" welfare proposals, established wage and price controls, and had attended to the problems besetting the dollar.[56] Further, they anticipated domestic stability under the Nixon administration in a second term.

In the foreign policy realm, Nixon had earned a distinguished reputation as an able statesman. He had begun the systematic withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam.[57] Nixon had done so while pledging to secure the release of the P.O.W.s before any peace settlement was signed.[58] Ha'aretz thought there existed in the minds of the American voter a confidence in Nixon's ability to end the war.[59]

Nixon had also removed the barriers between the United States and China and ushered in a new era of dialogue with the Soviet Union. He had eased tensions with both giants of the Communist bloc and reduced the threat of nuclear war by signing the S.A.L.T. agreements.[60] Ha'aretz noted that, "Nixon, who in the past was 'slandered' by the Soviets as an imperialist aggressor, had succeeded in conquering their hearts

and was their choice for president. Now Nixon is considered to be a 'realist,' one with whom they can do business."[61]

During his four years as president, Nixon had earned the largest measure of trust and agreement from Israel of any prior president. Ha'aretz applauded Nixon as the greatest arms supplier that the nation had ever known.[62] His sensitivity to Israel's security needs was unmistakeable and he had played a significant role in establishing a cease-fire during the war of attrition. Nixon's resistance to the spread of Soviet influence in the Arab world had brought stability to the region.[63] The high level of support for Israel could be expected to continue if Nixon were to be re-elected.

Several developments on the United States domestic scene also reinforced Ha'aretz' belief that Nixon would win in November. The attempted assassination on the life of George Wallace had given immediacy to Nixon's law and order programs.[64] It had brought to an end the possibility of a serious threat to Nixon's conservative support. Wallace voters were expected to shift to the Nixon camp.

The Democrats were experiencing defections from their traditional areas of support. The Teamster's Union had rejected labor's democratic affiliation and joined the Nixon forces.[65] Rank and file Democrats were bolting from their party and forming committees for Nixon.[66] Wealthy Democrats were disregarding party loyalty to provide contributions for the Nixon re-election organization.[67] Ha'aretz attributed much of

this dissatisfaction to McGovern's association with the anti-war movement which they thought alienated more moderate members of the Democratic party.

Finally, Ha'aretz pointed to the continuing predictions in the opinion polls to support its contention that the Republicans would occupy the White House for another four years. The Gallup, Harris, and Newsweek polls, appearing in Ha'aretz, differed only in the estimated margin of Nixon's victory.[68] The chances of a political reversal seemed quite remote.[69]

Ha'aretz believed that Israel was also convinced that Nixon would be re-elected and that an endorsement of his candidacy would reap political benefits. Accordingly, Israel's official position towards the American election was little more than a facade of neutrality. Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli ambassador to the United States, traveled the Washington cocktail circuit openly advocating Nixon's re-election. In an interview in Jerusalem, Rabin was quoted as saying, "We must see to it that Israel expresses its gratitude to those who have done something for Israel and not just spoken on behalf of Israel." Only when the Democrats complained that such remarks by Rabin were tantamount to Israeli support of Nixon did Prime Minister Golda Meir reiterate Israel's position of non interference in United States domestic affairs.[70] While it is difficult to assess whether Israel actually adopted a neutral attitude, it is clear that Ha'aretz pursued a pro-Nixon stance. It refrained from any major criticism of Nixon during

the election campaign. When Ha'aretz found fault with Nixon it was usually on personal grounds as on October 22, 1972, when Ha'aretz published a sensationalist story describing the Cox family's acquisition of two pornographic movie houses in the Times Square area of New York City.[71]

Ha'aretz' attitude towards Nixon was also influenced by the realism that he was seeking re-election virtually unopposed. The Democrats seemed to have conceded defeat even before the presidential campaign began.[72] They lacked a strong candidate to compete with Nixon and their party was deeply divided. The democratic campaign was weak, poorly financed, and greatly disorganized.

In Ha'aretz' judgement, the Democrats would have to mount a strategy that could tarnish Nixon's image and discredit his presidential record. This they attempted by describing Nixon as a representative of special interests and as a dirty political fighter.[73] However, memories of ugly campaigns in the past and the allegations of inter-party spying stemming from the Watergate burglary had little effect on either the American voters or on Israeli attitudes towards Nixon.[74] This was so because Ha'aretz concluded that American voters were like voters in other nations who see political sabotage and illegal contributions as perennial features of political life.

Ha'aretz felt the Democratic attack on Nixon's domestic record had some legitimate basis, but not enough to warrant Nixon's defeat in November. Unemployment and inflation had increased and there had been minimal progress towards alleviating

urban problems.[75] Nixon had not paid attention to the plight of minorities nor had he been overly concerned with upgrading the social welfare system. Nevertheless, Ha'aretz saw the success of Nixon's "law and order" program and its stabilizing effect on society as countering any significant voter dissatisfaction with his domestic record.

Nixon's foreign policy would be much more difficult for the Democrats to attack since, in Ha'aretz' opinion, it enjoyed both success and support from Americans. The Democrats saw as Nixon's chief weakness the continuation of the Vietnam war. It was beyond dispute that Nixon had failed to fulfill his 1968 campaign promise to end the war in Southeast Asia.[76] The bombing of North Vietnam and the process of Vietnamization were policies the Democrats could argue would lead to the prolongation and possible re-escalation of the war.[77] However, Ha'aretz remained unconvinced by these arguments since it approved of United States involvement in Vietnam as a means of halting Communist expansion..

Similarly, the Democratic criticism of Nixon's support of Israel failed to strike a responsive note in Ha'aretz' editorials. McGovern sought to emphasize the danger to Israel that had been caused by the 1969 Roger's Plan.[78] As sympathetic as Ha'aretz might be towards these charges, it was not prepared to endorse Democratic promises for Nixon's proven record of military and economic aid to Israel.

George McGovern, the man who was chosen to implement the weak Democratic strategy against the Nixon re-election organization,

was viewed by Ha'aretz as being an ineffective politician. He was for them a symbol of domestic chaos and the representative of the liberal movements that advocated woman's rights and abortion, and condoned the use of drugs.[79] McGovern's involvement in the anti-war movement was perceived as legitimizing leftist elements and providing them with an avenue to disrupt the political system.

McGovern's dovish foreign policy was considered to be even more dangerous to the interests of Israel than his domestic policy. His position on defense issues was typified by opposition to the A.B.M. system and support of defense department cuts.[80] Ha'aretz believed these policies, if implemented, would impair United States military strength and jeopardize its ability to respond to crisis situations. Vietnam was one such area in which Ha'aretz maintained that McGovern's policies would bear disastrous consequences for the United States and her allies.[81] They felt that his promise during the campaign to unconditionally withdraw all United States troops from Southeast Asia within ninety days of his election had caused Hanoi's intransigence in the Paris peace talks.[82] Ha'aretz feared to predict what might happen should McGovern become president.

Ha'aretz' assessment of McGovern's Middle East position provoked even more alarm than did his Vietnam policy. They saw in McGovern a potential leader unwilling to incur the type of detailed economic and military obligations as those of the Nixon administration.[83] McGovern spent too much time talking

about "balanced" policies which in Israeli parlance meant that he was sympathetic to Arab demands for return of occupied territory and recognition of the P.L.O.[84] Israel could hardly have been expected to accept McGovern's promise that he would supply Israel with the same quantity of weapons as had Nixon.[85]

Ha'aretz' overall evaluation of McGovern's foreign policy was anything but positive. His policies reflected a trend of neo-isolationism brewing among an American public exhausted by the protracted United States involvement in Vietnam. The election of McGovern as president would translate these ideas into concrete policy. It could possibly lead to a diminution in the role of the United States in world affairs. Ha'aretz commented that McGovern's policies would "endanger the smaller nations, especially in the Middle East."[86]

The intensity of opposition to McGovern's views from foreign nations and from the American public forced him to moderate his positions.[87] Ha'aretz responded to this shift with skepticism. McGovern's campaign strategy was predicated upon his attachment to liberalism and any move to the right would compromise his effectiveness. Nevertheless, Israel respected McGovern's determination and diplomatically referred to him as a serious challenger to Nixon. The Democratic nominee did serve an important function as he created an atmosphere of competition for support from Israel which forced Nixon to reaffirm and broaden his committments.[88]

Nixon, on the other hand, had all the necessary

ingredients to insure his re-election. The majority of the Republican party endorsed Nixon's drive for a second term.[89] They were so confident that he would win that they were looking ahead to the 1976 elections.[90] The Republican convention resembled a coronation characterized[91] by an atmosphere of harmony[92] and tranquility.[93] Although there was internal dissension within the Republican party, its effects upon Nixon were minimal. Nixon was subjected to the pressures of both extremes in the party. However, the liberal faction, led by Paul McClosky, expressed the sentiments of the anti-war movement and therefore gained little sympathy from the majority of Republicans who supported the Vietnam war.[94] Senator Ashbrook, the spokesman for the ultra conservatives, denounced Nixon's dealings with China and the Soviet Union as representing appeasement. He accused Nixon of being a traitor to the Republican philosophy and of not upholding his 1968 campaign promises which did reflect conservative views.[95]

The charges by the ultra conservatives were serious enough to force Nixon to reaffirm his conservative image within the Republican party. He supported and labored for the adoption of conservative planks in the party platform.[96] Nixon pleged to help Republican candidates running for Congress in the hopes of increasing Republican influence. Furthermore, he dispelled any rumors that either Connally or a liberal would replace Spiro Agnew as his running mate. Seeking to benefit from Agnew's conservative appeal, Nixon stated that a change in the vice-presidential nominee without good reason

would damage the Republican chances in the election. Besides, Nixon thought, "You don't change the players on a winning team."[97] The effect of Nixon's strategy within the Republican party was to silence all opposition and present the image of total unity behind his candidacy.

With the solidification of the Republican support behind Nixon achieved, Ha'aretz focused its attention on Nixon's efforts against his Democratic opponent. He opened his campaign with an aggressive speech that emphasized his impermeability.[98] It was somewhat uncharacteristic of Nixon's style, as he normally didn't exude a sense of confidence and strength. But Nixon revealed the wisdom of an experienced politician as he disarmed the Democratic camp with his accouncement about plans to visit China. His conservative economic plans detailed in the speech were skilled and energetic and refuted the Democratic charge that he had an inactive record on economic issues.[97]

The aggressive tone set by Nixon's campaign announcement was to be short lived. Nixon shifted to a low-key political style intended to minimize public interest in the election.[100] This would reduce the Democratic voter turnout in November and stifle controversial issues generated by the McGovern campaign. Nixon's tactic of ignoring McGovern's attacks demeaned their seriousness and maintained the appearance of a "presidential" Nixon.[101] Nixon was concerned that being forced into a political struggle would revive memories of the "Tricky Dick" of past campaigns. Therefore, Nixon conducted his re-election

bid from the White House and only ventured out to assist Republican candidates for Congress.[102]

During this inactive period of his campaign, Ha'aretz' coverage centered upon Nixon's emphasis on his foreign policy achievements and his goals for the next four years. United States involvement in Vietman was to be terminated by Nixon in accord with three conditions: 1) all P.O.W.s must be released, 2) Saigon's political integrity must be upheld, 3) the United States must receive an honorable peace.[103] Nixon maintained that under his direction, United States policy had succeeded in supplying Israel with desparately needed military hardware, in establishing a cease-fire, and in indirectly causing the expulsion of Soviet personnel from Egypt. The aggressiveness and wisdom of United States policy had brought new stability to the Middle East.[104] In order to counter the ill feeling generated by the 1969 Roger's Plan, Nixon made a public stand more sympathetic to Israel's notion of secure borders. He also hinted at the sale of more phantoms to Israel and the possibility of moving the United States embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.[105]

As the final month of the campaign approached, Nixon again shifted his election tactics. This time, Nixon again adopted the aggressive style that characterized his campaign announcement.[106] He attacked McGovern with hostility, describing him as a tool of Hanoi.[107] Nixon repeated frequently the theme of McGovern's foreign policy being reckless and dangerous to the Free World.[108] Ha'aretz attributed Nixon's

new campaign direction to personal motivations. He sought not merely a victory but a landslide in both the presidential and Congressional elections. This would allow him to end his second term with accomplishments that would fill the history books.[109]

One of the ways in which Nixon sought to insure a landslide victory was to solicit a larger portion of the Jewish vote. Nixon brought Jews into prominent places in his re-election campaign as part of a "Jewish strategy."[110] Henry Kissinger began making appearances in the election campaign with emphasis placed on his Jewishness.[111]

Nixon's appeal to the Jewish community dramatically increased the support he had received in 1968. Professor Seymour Lipsett, a Harvard sociologist, predicted that Nixon would double the fifteen percent of the Jewish vote he had received in 1968.[112] Larry Goldberg, head of the Nixon campaign's "Jewish" section, predicted that thirty-seven percent of the Jewish vote would be cast for Nixon. Goldberg based this upon the belief that Jews would vote according to their own personal self interest.[113] While Nixon's record of support for Israel was impressive and stirred up feelings of gratitude among Jews,[114] it was not the overriding consideration in their choice for president. American Jews were more concerned with domestic problems. Ha'aretz said that Nixon's conservatism calmed many of their fears about "blacks, taxes, inflation, and anti-Semitism."[115] He could therefore expect greater Jewish campaign contributions and a higher vote percentage in the election.

However, Ha'aretz recognized that the majority of Jews still harbored a deep sense of animosity towards Nixon.[116] They saw him as a politician who regularly engaged in questionable financial and political deals. Nixon was an opportunist in the minds of most Jews. In addition, his civil rights record was less than acceptable, especially in light of the Pentagon Papers revelations and the May Day anti-war arrests.[117]

The state of affairs heightened the tension between the Jewish community and Israel over the desireability of Nixon as president. Israel had begun to endorse presidential candidates. It attempted to protect an important source of support in Nixon who had "proven himself to be a loyal arms supplier."[118] McGovern, by comparison, could hardly compete with Nixon's proven record. Therefore, Israel decided to lobby for Nixon's re-election at the risk of a confrontation with the American Jewish establishment. Israeli officials praised Nixon's achievements. However, Israel directed most of its efforts at persuading Jews that Nixon was really the best choice for president.

The Israeli argument centered around its assessment that liberalism was a dangerous indulgence that only served to weaken the Free World. Israel had for some time opposed liberal tendencies in the United States and dimly viewed threats to the center of the polical spectrum such as Allard Lowenstein's anti-Nixon movement in 1970.[119] Nixon had been, after all, a better president than most people had expected. Besides, Ha'aretz viewed the Jewish rejection of Nixon as primarily based upon emotional factors. Charles Fenyvesi, Ha'aretz

correspondent in the United States, wrote:

> "In truth, why not join Nixon who has the best chances of being re-elected? The reason is that the reaction of Jews tends to be emotional: I can't trust him; I don't know what he is thinking; he hasn't principles, compassion, morals. Simply, they don't accept him because they don't love him. There is something in his style that adversely affects them - the way he speaks, the way he tries to smile; he speaks in cliches, he hasn't a spark of humor; he arouses the feeling that he is trying to sell something. Most Jews aren't comfortable with him because he is a gentile to his bones, and comes from a middle class background where there wasn't any contact with Jews."120

The landslide election in November was a victory for Nixon and, in Ha'aretz' opinion, a victory for Israel as well. Continued support of Israel by Nixon was hopefully assured for another four years. Ha'aretz was pleased by the outcome of the election but minimized the expression of its satisfaction in order to avoid creating further ill feelings in the American Jewish community. Ha'aretz presented its analysis of the Israeli reaction to the election in a very balanced manner. While the election was the sweetest personal victory for Nixon in twenty-six years of political life, it had the smallest percentage of voter turnout since 1948.[121] While the election erased Nixon's bitter memories of past political defeats, it was in large measure due to negative factors. Ha'aretz commented that extraordinary love or popularity did not return Nixon to the White House for a second term. Nixon

owed his victory more to McGovern's mistakes than his own success. McGovern had identified with the blacks and scared the whites. He proposed "bringing the troops home" without explaining how he would maintain United States obligations throughout the world. His economic policies were confused and he was unable to communicate his domestic programs due to a poorly staffed campaign organization.[122] The scope of the Nixon sweep and the failure to win more Republican seats in Congress strengthened the impression that the vote was more a rejection of McGovern than a vote of confidencd for Nixon.[123] McGovern's defeat was a defeat for the political extremes (as had been the case in the 1964 election)[124] and a victory for the center.

Whatever the reasons for Nixon's victory, Ha'aretz had high expectations for the coming four years. On the domestic scene, Ha'aretz saw Nixon as proceeding to unify the American people by closing the gap between the political extremes and widening the governmental base.[125] Nixon would consolidate the strength of the Republican party by moving it back towards the center.[126] This would also increase its appeal among Democratic moderates and Jews. A Ha'aretz editorial noted that, "Nixon's victory and mandate will make an impression on Congress."[127] It was hoped that he could make inroads into the problems that beset American society. Ha'aretz anticipated that Nixon would focus upon the black minority and alleviate their plight.[128] Nixon would, undoubtedly, continue to seek additional success in the area of his greatest expertise, foreign affairs. His election seemed to imply the approval of

United States involvement in international politics and, specifically, its invovlement in bringing stability to the Middle East.[129]

This mood of optimism led Ha'aretz to reject the reaction of American Jews that the Nixon victory would cause serious harm to Israel. It stated that, "American Jews are convinced that Nixon will abandon Israel as he did with Nationalist China. They are sure that the 'Dr. Jeckyl' period is over and now 'Mr. Hyde' will bring with him four years of bad relations with Israel. American Jews fear the possiblity of a renewal of the Roger's Plan or of the oil crisis pushing the United States towards a more pro-Arab stand."[130] Ha'aretz countered with an observation about American presidents; "they basically act the same in their second term as in their first due to personal considerations about their role in history and because of obligations to party and special group interests."[131]

Chapter II - Richard Nixon and Domestic Affairs

Israel's assessment of United States' domestic affairs influences the formation of her foreign policy towards the United States. Although American foreign policy is the most direct and visible expression of United Staes attitudes about Israel, it does not explain the motives for the adoption of specific policies. Israel's ability to understand the operative forces in American political life helps define the orientation of her foreign policy and shapes the nature of her lobbying efforts in the United States.

A key aspect of Israel's evaluation of the American domestic scene entails an accurate perception of the role of the president. He symbolizes societal aspirations and the national mood of the people. A president's elections signals the ascendancy of certain interests and concerns among the American public. In more tangible terms, the president directly influences the course of domestic events and the extent of United States involvement overseas.

Ha'aretz' evaluation of Richard M. Nixon's domestic leadership qualities centered upon two issues: a) "law and order" and b) the state of the American economy. Nixon's ability to fulfill his campaign promises with regard to "law and order" and to stabilize the economy would indicate to Ha'aretz whether Nixon would be an effective leader.

Ha'aretz viewed the drug crisis in America as a key part of the "law and order" issue. The growing use and

acceptance of drugs by Americans represented for Ha'aretz a moral degeneration in society. Drugs symbolized the counter culture and the leftist, anti-war movement. It posed a direct challenge to the authority of the government. A lenient governmental response to the drug crisis would, in the opinion of Ha'aretz, embolden the forces of dissent in American society.[132] This in turn could impair the president's ability to effectively concentrate on pressing foreign policy matters.

Ha'aretz hoped for a firm stand by Nixon against drugs. They found evidence of his toughness in a speech delivered by Nixon prior to his inauguration. Nixon called for a war on drugs and justified it through the enumeration of the harmful effects of drugs upon users.[133]

Only one additional article appeared in Ha'aretz during Nixon's first term that dealt with the drug issue. The article, which appeared in Ha'aretz on June 18, 1971, outlined Nixon's proposal to Congress for the allocation of one hundred fifty-five million dollars to fight drug addiction.[134] He also requested the authorization to delay the release of American soldiers from active duty in order to provide them with treatment for drug addiction. Nixon also announced the creation of an office in the White House for the coordination of all matters relating to the sale, treatment, and education about drugs.[135]

Nixon's anti-drug program elicited approval from Ha'aretz' editorial board.[136] They anticipated Nixon receiving broad

public and congressional support. He vociferously rejected all pressures to exclude marijuana from the list of illegal drugs. In reporting Nixon's refusal, Ha'aretz noted that "Mr. Nixon warned- and his warning is good not only for American youth- that the use of soft drugs leads in the end to the use and addiction to hard drugs."[137] Satisfied by his position on drugs, Ha'aretz covered only one additional article during Nixon's second term. During March, 1973, Ha'aretz reported that Nixon recommended severe and mandatory sentences for drug pushers.[138]

The epidemic of air hijackings in the United States introduced another aspect of "law and order" into Ha'aretz' coverage of Nixon. Ha'aretz viewed the hijackings as disrupting public order and encouraging lawlessness.[139] It also posed a threat to international air communications. Nixon's response, as reported by Ha'aretz, was swift and firm. He characterized the hijackers as "political fanatics, the majority of whom are young criminals with romantic notions about revolution. We must treat them as murderers."[140] Nixon proceeded to outline a number of anti-hijacking measures. He ordered the inspection of all passengers' hand luggage, and instructed the Federal government to employ all available means to thwart hijackings.[141] Nixon advocated the reinstitution of the death penalty as a criminal deterrent.[142] Congress received Nixon's request that United States foreign aid be cut off for those countries that harbor hijackers.[143] Immediately prior to the 1972 presidential election, Nixon

signed the Montreal Treaty that provided for the international extradition of hijackers.[144]

Although in basic agreement with Nixon's anti-hijacking campaign, Ha'aretz maintained a restrained position.[145] Nixon's characterization of hijackers accurately reflected Ha'aretz' description of the P.L.O. and its terrorist tactics. However, it found a flaw in the way Nixon handled hijacking situations. During his second term in office, Nixon had condoned the payment of ransoms which ran counter to Israel's policy of refusing to bargain with terrorists. A Ha'aretz editorial commented that "despite the learned experience that submitting to criminals only encourages others to follow their path, the President did not demand that the aircraft companies desist from paying ransoms."[146]

One other aspect of the "law and order" issue earned the attention of Ha'aretz. The frequency of employee strikes in America had increased and posed a danger to the economy. It also challenged the government's authority to implement its economic policies.

Ha'aretz covered two labor strikes in which Nixon played a significant role. The first strike involved the postal workers during March, 1970. Nixon adopted a firm position by declaring the strike illegal and refused to hold negotiations until the postal workers returned to their jobs.[147] After minimal progress had been made towards ending the strike, Nixon authorized the National Guard to distribute the mail.[148]

Although Ha'aretz never reported the outcome of the strike, its coverage of Nixon's actions indicated an approval of an aggressive policy towards strikes. Nixon's personal intervention during the harbor strikes of 1971 reiterated his firm stand against labor unrest. His reputation as a tought negotiator helped bring both parties to an agreement.[149] In Ha'aretz' opinion, Nixon had reaffirmed in both cases his commitment to "law and order" and to strengthening governmental authority.

Nixon's economic policies did not receive Ha'aretz' attention until early in 1970. Foreign policy issues overshadowed the coverage of the American economy which appeared basically healthy to Ha'aretz' analysts. The Vietnam crisis and the war of attrition in the Middle East represented, in the opinion of Ha'aretz, more severe tests of Nixon's leadership skills. Besides, Ha'aretz' United States correspondents had not yet become alarmed by the danger of inflation nor did they foresee any controversial economic issues in the immediate future.

Ha'aretz' first report of economic news during the Nixon presidency came at the time of the presentation of the 1970 budget to Congress. Although it was the largest budget in United States history, Nixon's two hundred billion dollar budget entailed cutbacks in several areas.[150] The space program received a portion of the reductions in the hope that international cooperation could reduce the exorbitant costs of space exploration.[151] Other areas targeted for cuts

included the military budget and the foreign aid allocations. Nixon explained that the reductions played a significant role in his anti-inflationary program. Some portions of the domestic budget such as anti-crime, anti-pollution, and welfare programs were designated to receive financial increases.[152]

A Ha'aretz editorial responded to the Nixon budget proposal with mixed feelings. It noted that:

> "The reduction expresses not only an attempt to slow inflation but shows a change in the ladder of priorities. For the first time since the Korean War, social services have received more money than defense, 41% versus 36%.
> Nixon's financial advisors see a balanced federal budget as stopping inflation and point to Nixon's slowing the severe anti-inflationary measures of the government. They say the results will be unemployment and a rise in prices.
> From an international perspective, there are serious implications to these cutbacks for they are based on troop reductions in Vietnam. This could have its effects on the American presence in other parts of the world."[153]

Ha'aretz' major objection to Nixon's economic reorientation centered upon its projected effects on United States overseas military strength. Continued cutbacks might jeopardize N.A.T.O. preparedness and limit the ability of the United States to resist Soviet military encroachment in the Middle East.

The frequency of Ha'aretz' economic coverage increased

during the six month period preceeding the 1970 Congressional elections. Voter anxiety about inflation and unemployment cast economic issues into the political spotlight. Nixon redirected much of his attention to these issues in order to prevent an erosion of voter confidence in his domestic leadership. He set about gaining support for his economic policies by meeting with senior members of the business community. Ha'aretz reported that Nixon succeeded in imbuing hope and that swift action would be taken to strengthen the economy. The initial response of business leaders appeared to be positive based upon a rise in the stock market averages.[154]

Several weeks later, Nixon renewed his efforts to fight inflation and unemployment. He stressed that the American economy remained healthy but was undergoing a period of adjustment from wartime to peacetime. Responsibility for economic difficulties lay, according to Nixon, in the policies of the previous Democratic administrations of Kennedy and Johnson.[155]

Nixon proposed two plans for remedial action. The first was the establishment of an office that would deal with the inflation problem without imposing compulsory controls.[156] The second program entailed legislation designed to guarantee a minimum income of two thousand, four hundred dollars for every American family. Congressional opposition to the latter plan dimmed its chances for passage. Senate conservatives

rejected the plan as too extreme while liberals argued that it was insufficient.[157]

Following the 1970 Congressinal elections, Ha'aretz analyzed the Republican's failure to gain seats in the House and Senate as a failure in their economic policies. The American voters lacked confidence in the Republican politician's ability to restore the economy to a position of strength. Nixon's own efforts from the White House had little effect on preventing increased interest rates and higher prices. Ha'aretz believed that the voters would make the economy a major election issue in 1972 if financial relief did not occur.[158]

Nixon responded to the economic lessons of the Congressioal election by appointing John Connally as Secretary of the Treasury.[159] Ha'aretz viewed this as the most surprising move in domestic affairs since Nixon took office. It revealed the extent of Nixon's concern about the reaction to his economic policies. Although too unsure to comment on the eventual effects of the Connally appointment, Ha'aretz did comment on the motivations behind it:

> "Through the appointment of an energetic Democratic businessman- conservative in the Nixon spirit but identified with the American memory of the Kennedy assassination- Nixon hopes to advance the treatment of economic problems and take out some of the spirit of the Democratic critics." 160

A substantial increase in the amount of time Nixon devoted to economic affairs marked 1971. With the bitter

Republican Congressional defeats still fresh in his mind, Nixon began an aggressive attack on inflation and unemployment. He called upon the public to display optimism about the future and reject the gloomy prophesies of some economists.[161] In his January State of the Union Address, Nixon called for a "new American revolution in government and society." He described six points as part of a comprehensive program to stabilize and revitalize the economy. They included: 1) changing the welfare system to a minimum income system, 2) stopping inflation and unemployment by a federal budget increase, 3) waging war on pollution and environmental damage, 4) improving health care and allocating one hundred million dollars for cancer research, 5) giving a larger percentage of Federal tax dollars to the states, 6) reforming governmental bureaucracy.[162]

Ha'aretz' reaction to the Nixon proposal concerned itself less with its anticipated impact on the economy than its possible effect upon Nixon's 1972 re-election chances. The Nixon economic plan signalled a moderate trend to the left which was calculated to deflate the criticism of liberal Democratic opposition in 1972. Nixon, in Ha'aretz' opinion, decided to risk the loss of some conservative support in order to increase his appeal among moderate voters.[163]

At the same time that he offered new economic remedies, Nixon rejected any reductions in the military budget for 1971. In fact, he planned to request an increase to help finance the anti-ballistic missile system.[164] Ha'aretz

reacted with satisfaction and relief. An editorial on February 2, 1971 said: "The most important fact about the military budget is that despite the reduction of direct United States involvement in Vietnam, Nixon is not reducing the budget but increasing it. Equally important, from the perspective of treaty partners and friends of the United States abroad, is the decision to increase the NAVY."[165]

Nixon maintained the tempo of his economic activities for the remainder of 1971. He rejected minimum wage proposals because "he opposed all programs that made it more worthwhile to sit at home than to go to work."[166] In August, 1971, Nixon added a list of new policies to those articulated in his State of the Union Address. Among these, Nixon included a cancellation of gold conversion at thirty-five dollars an ounce, a ten percent tax on many imports, a five billion dollar budget cut, a ten percent reduction in foreign aid, and a ninety day wage and price freeze.[167]

The wage and price freeze precipitated an immediate controversy. Raphael Rothstein, Ha'aretz' correspondent in the United States, reported that "the American reaction was confused and divided. Leaders of professional unions denounced the wage freeze. Strikers remained on strike. Some will benefit while others won't. All Americans are adjusting to it."[168] The Democrats criticized the Nixon plan as giving priority to business rather than labor.[169] The most vociferous opposition came from George Meany and the labor unions.

Ha'aretz reported Meany's testimony before a House Ways and Means Committee in which he rejected Nixon's economic policies as "amounting to plunder of the national treasury for the sake of big business."[170] Meany's chief complaint centered upon the absence of controls on earnings during the wage and price freeze.[171]

Nixon swiftly and aggressively defended his economic policies. He reiterated the goal of creating one hundred million jobs over the next ten years and restoring the United Stated economy to a properous state.[172] While pledging not to prolong the wage and price freeze past the ninety day limit, Nixon advised Congressional leaders of his intent to seek a new mechanism to stabilize the economy.[173] This promise became reality in October in the form of a civilian council designed to regulate prices and wages. The council's term would run indefinitely and could rely on presidential sanctions if necessary. Nixon also approached the Congress for authority to restrict interest rates and dividends and to establish courts to handle violations of the economic council's decisions.[174]

During this period, Nixon also formulated economic policies to deal with international commerce. On September 12, 1971, Nixon delivered a speech before Congress in which he analyzed the economic outlook for America.[175] Ha'aretz interpreted one of the key points to be Nixon's prediction that "in a short time the United States will become the world's chief provider. The time has come when she should worry

about herself." The speech so alarmed Ha'aretz that it commented: "One who sees a phenomenon of United States 'Gaullism' need not search for any better evidence than the Nixon speech. The source of this may be domestic needs but Nixon seems to awaken the feelings that now is not the time for American altruism. America will worry about herself- this is the news of Nixon. The slogan is competition, self defense, but the essence is that everyone is for themselves.... This development cannot be exxagerated in its importance. Nations, small and large, will have to adjust to this reality. It isn't a reality that will create enthusiasm for United States policy but sorrow and disappointment will not change the situation."[176]

Investment circles in New York also voiced their disappointment with Nixon's speech. Their anticipation of positive policies drove the stock market up 9.27 points. However, it lost most of the gain following Nixon's speech due to fears that it would create a disastrous commercial war in the West.[177]

With the arrival of 1972, many political observers believed that the economy would remain the number one domestic issue. The steady rise in inflation and unemployment during an election year almost guaranteed the exploitation of voter dissatisfaction with Nixon's economic record by the Democratic candidates. However, Ha'aretz reported only two items of economic news, both of which appeared at the

end of January, 1972.

The first article covered Nixon's two hundred forty six billion, three hundred million dollar budget request. It represented the largest deficit since World War II but Nixon termed it "stiff but necessary."[178] The proposal reflected Nixon's attempt to expand the range of federal expenditures in the hope of stimulating the economy. It included a warning to Democrats that any further allocations would result in higher taxes for the American people. Nixon also requested eighty one billion, seven hundred million dollars for defense needs and urged Congress not to cut that amount or the United States would have to pay the "price of weakness."[179]

Three days later, the second article on economics appeared in Ha'aretz. It presented Nixon's economic forecast for 1972. The United States economy, according to Nixon, stood to experience a decline in the numbers of unemployed and a rise in the G.N.P. Increased agricultural exports were expected to even out the United States balance of payments. Despite the slowdown in the growth of the economy, in the prior two years, Nixon predicted a process of recovery for 1972.[180]

Ha'aretz departed from its normal pattern and did not comment on either the Nixon budget or his economic forecast. This reflected Ha'aretz' pursuit of a highter priority. Ha'aretz favored Nixon's re-election and desired to avoid antagonizing his administration by covering its most vulnerable area. Economic coverage would also support the contention of

many leaders of the American Jewish community that Nixon did not deserve re-election.

There may have been other less politically motivated reasons for Ha'aretz' silence on economic issues. The controversy surrounding Nixon's policies in Southeast Asia continued to command the attention of the American public. Nixon himself sought to play down the seriousness of the economic crisis and to divert the focus of the campaign to other issues. In addition, a major voice of opposition to Nixon's economic policies remained silent during the election campaign. The labor union adopted an officially neutral position towards the candidates. All these factrs resulted in the absence of United States economic news in the pages of Ha'aretz during 1972.

However, Ha'aretz' coverage of Nixon's economic policies immediately resumed following the election. With the rate of inflation rising to nine percent annually, the state of the economy became the number one domestic issue for Ha'aretz.[181] A Ha'aretz cartoon conveyed the message that the American people were tiring of Nixon's foreign policy exploits and wanted domestic reforms. It showed a hippie next to a portrait of Nixon and a oriental woman discarding a sign labelled "make love, not war" and carrying one that read "bread, work."[182] Charles Fenyvesi, Ha'aretz' United States correspondent, believed Nixon would devote a substantial amount of his time to the problems of inflation and unemployment, welfare reform, reduction of the federal bureaucracy, and local

control of federal programs.[183] According to Ha'aretz' observations of American financial leaders, the intensity of Nixon's involvement in the economy would depend on whether Nixon sought a historical image as the president "who not only ended Vietnam but also made significant social progress."[184]

Nixon's response was twofold. He assured the American public, as he had done in the past, that the rate of inflation would decline,[185] and that the prices of such items as food would drop.[186] In addition, he proposed a general freeze on prices for two months.[187] Ha'aretz interpreted the price control policy as a great effort by Nixon to end the inflationary spiral.[188] It received the general support of Congress although several Congressmen expressed their disappointment that "it was too little too late."[189] Several other sources of criticism earned Ha'aretz' attention. George Meany renewed his opposition to Nixon's economic policies as "destructive of the quality of life" and warned that "the sacrifices that the workers have been asked to bear are unnecessary."[190] The Senate Finance Committee released a report accusing the Nixon administration of misleading the public about the rate of inflation.[191]

For the remainder of his presidency, Nixon's economic policies gained only peripheral treatment in Ha'aretz. Nixon's annual budget proposal and his economic forecast were covered. The budget for 1974 amounted to three hundred four billion, four hundred million dollars and represented

Nixon's concern for strengthening the economy, protecting United States defense capabilities, and developing an energy plan to decrease dependence on foreign sources of energy.[192] The Nixon forecast offered encouraging economic signs and noted that "the worst is behind us."[193] Ha'aretz failed to present any editorial comments on these two articles nor did it appear alarmed at the state of the United States economy. Ha'aretz' focus had gradually shifted from "law and order" and the economy to the Watergate affair.

Chapter III - Richard Nixon and Watergate

Ha'aretz' coverage of the Watergate scandal signalled a dramatic reversal in its attitude towards Richard Nixon. Ha'aretz had previously supported Nixon during his 1972 re-election bid and later held high expectations for his second term in office. However, the unfolding crisis of Watergate forced Ha'aretz to reassess its evaluation of Nixon and ultimately see grave danger for Israel in his presidency.

Ha'aretz reported the developments of the Watergate affair in four distinct stages. The first period included news leading up to the creation of the Senate Watergate Committee on February 7, 1973. Ha'aretz' coverage concerned itself with reporting the break-in into the Democratic campaign headquarters on June 17, 1972, and accusations of Republican political sabotage on October 11, 1972.

The Ha'aretz articles detailing the Watergate break-in mentioned the connection between James McCord and the Committee for the Re-election of the President.[194] "CREEP" denied any involvement with the burglars, while the White House refused any comment on the matter. Although the F.B.I. corroborated the activities of the burglars, later known as the "Plumbers Squad", sources close to Nixon called the spying charges a "collection of nonsense"[195].

In both articles, Ha'aretz refrained from any editorial comments. It rewrote the Reuters and U.P.I. news dispatches without any attempt at probing those responsible for authorizing

the break-in. Although Ha'aretz implied that the scandal might threaten the Republican party, it did not elaborate how or analyze the possible effects of Watergate upon the outcome of the elections.[196]

Several reasons prompted Ha'aretz' silence during this first period in its Watergate coverage. Ha'aretz' initial perception of Watergate did not lead it to believe that the affair represented anything more significant than the normal underhanded tactics employed in political campaigns. In fact, political scandals occurred fairly frequently, and, by comparison, Nixon's involvement in Watergate evoked less interest than scandals in other countries.[197] A Ha'aretz cartoon entitled "trade fair" depicted a crowd viewing two separate stages. One showed Nixon standing in front of a display of electronic equipment while the other portrayed Heath opening a curtain in front of a bed. Heath's stage attracted the attentions of the majority of the crowd, indicating his scandal received the most interest.[198]

A more plausible reason for Ha'aretz' silence might be that it viewed the Watergate scandal as having little impact upon the elections.[199] Nixon had not been linked by anyone to the break-in. There had been no discernible influence expressed by Ha'aretz upon Nixon's control of foreign policy. Domestic reaction to Watergate had not reached anywhere near the significant level that finally toppled Nixon from office. Finally, Ha'aretz did not wish to antagonize Nixon and risk the benefits of his friendship by covering an embarrassing

scandal.

This situation dramatically changed with the creation of the Senate Watergate Committee. Ha'aretz now recognized the serious proportions of the Watergate episode. Accordingly, the number of articles pertaining to developments in the affair rose sharply. Many of them concluded that Nixon's popularity declined as the American public's confidence in his leadership wavered.[200]

From the outset of the second period, Ha'aretz conveyed an anti-Nixon bias in its treatment of Watergate. It's articles cast a critical tone and implied a notion of Nixon's guilt. The only question that seemed unanswered was the extent of Nixon's involvement. Articles appeared in Ha'aretz that personally attacked Nixon; a phenomenon generally uncharacteristic of the newspaper's journalistic style. One such article related Pat Nixon's description of her husband's purported insecurity. He allegedly woke up during the middle of the night and spoke into tape recorders laying beneath his bed. Other times Nixon wrote lists.[201] A Lurie cartoon appeared in Ha'aretz in which Nixon, seated behind his desk, said: "Regarding Watergate: it is my intention to say this in a style that is most unclear"[202].

The voluminous number of articles that began appearing in Ha'aretz overwhelmingly reinforced the notion of Nixon's guilt. Each additional article seemed to build another point for the case against Nixon. These articles began with John Dean's charges published in Time and Newsweek that Nixon knew

of the break-in and authorized the coverup.[203] Dean testified that he met with Nixon fifty-three times and that Nixon was involved "up to the knees" in obstructing the Watergate investigation.[204] According to Dean, Nixon also authorized the payment of hush money to the Watergate burglars. Ha'aretz viewed Dean's statements as personally implicating Nixon and increasing the pressure upon him to explain his role in Watergate.[205] The contradiction between Dean's charges and the White House denials led Ha'aretz to conclude that "one of the two must be a liar"[206]. The general credibility attached by Ha'aretz to Dean's testimony cast the impression that Nixon faced a tough struggle to extricate himself from the scandal. Ha'aretz viewed the accusations against Nixon as damaging but possibly lacking in sufficient evidence to lead to any serious consequence.[207] The case against Nixon would require additional corroboration from other sources.

The growing demands for a special prosecutor provided the vehicle for attaining new evidence in the Watergate case. Ha'aretz favored such a method of investigation since it prevented any interference by the White House. It also lessened Senate pressure upon Nixon and restored a measure of the government's credibility.[208]

Following the appointment of the special prosecutor, Ha'aretz reported a series of articles implicating the President in the Watergate cover-up. Egil Krogh testified that he conducted his illegal activities out of a "personal connection" he had with Nixon.[209] F.B.I. director Patrick Grey said he

warned Nixon in July, 1972, that members of the White House staff were involved in Watergate.[210] This directly contradicted Nixon who said he learned of it in March of 1973. Senator Symington believed Nixon knew of the cover-up based upon secret documents he saw that bore the stamp "copy to the President."[211]

Gordon Strachan, Halderman's political aide, supported Symington's statements by admitting that he destroyed two memos documenting political activity after showing them to Halderman.[212] Some of this questionable illegal activity included Herbert Kalmbach, Nixon's personal attorney, collecting hush money to retain the silence of Watergate burglars. However, Kalmbach refused to corroborate Dean's testimony that Nixon knew about the steps taken to obstruct the Watergate investigation. Lastly, Ha'aretz reprinted a Washington Star News story that the Nixon re-election campaign hired a woman disguised as a reporter to spy on the McGovern camp for one thousand dollars a week.[213]

Ha'aretz' portrayal of Nixon's guilt and illegal activities went beyond the boundaries of the Watergate investigation. According to a Ha'aretz report, Egil Krogh's supervision of the Ellsberg break-in originated out of instructions from the White House Staff and possibly even from Nixon himself.[214] The New York Times concluded that Nixon authorized the wiretaps on members of the National Security Council. Nixon's desire not to reveal C.I.A. operations during the Watergate investigation prompted news reports that this included wiretaps on foreign

embassies.[215] John Dean mentioned in his testimony that Nixon prepared in 1971 a secret list of twenty personal enemies to be harassed by the I.R.S. He also hinted at improprieties in the use of campaign funds to improve Nixon's home in San Clemente and Key Biscayne.[216] Some of these funds were allegedly obtained through illegal contributions solicited by Herbert Kalmbach and Maurice Stans, Secretary of Commerce. The Senate Watergate Committee intended to investigate these charges in addition to a possible illegal agreement between I.T.T. and the Republical Party, regarding the Republican Convention.[217] Ha'aretz' list of Watergate related activities even included the Nixon pardon of organized crime figure Angelo DeCarlo in 1972, which attracted the concern of a Senate crime committee's investigation.[218]

Ha'aretz' anti-Nixon bias in Watergate was also discernible from the quantity and substance of pro-Nixon comments. Less than half a dozen articles earned the attention of Ha'aretz and the majority of these reports merely demanded that justice be applied in determining responsibility for Watergate. Senator William Proxmire defended Nixon against McCarthy style justice.[219] Rabbi Maurice Eisendrath, President of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, urged in a speech that Nixon not be tried by the American press, but rather through due legal process.[220] Columnist Jack Anderson stated his belief that as of May, 1973, no concrete evidence existed to prove Nixon's involvement in Watergate.[221] Senator Harman Talmadge rejected impeachment moves since, in his opinion,

they relied solely upon the testimony of John Dean. Unconvinced of Nixon's innocence, Talmadge suggested the matter could be resolved if Nixon handed over the tapes on White House conversations.[222]

Nixon's most energetic defense came from two of his subordinates, John Mitchell and John Ehrlichman. Mitchell testified that he rejected suggestions to bug the Democratic Campaign Headquarters and never delivered details of the plans to Nixon. This supported Nixon's contentions that he did not know of Watergate cover-up until March, 1973.[223] Ehrlichman basically offered the same version of Nixon's innocence. Nixon had ordered a full report on the break-in during September, 1972, but did not receive it until March, 1973. On that basis, Ehrlichman rejected accusations of Nixon's involvement and praised the president's record on foreign and domestic affairs.[224]

The reaction of Nixon to the growing pressures of Watergate did not receive the sympathy of Ha'aretz. His proposal that a joint congressional committee examine ideas for election reform was interpreted as a diversion from the attention focused on Watergate and as an inadequate attempt to demonstrate sincerity in bringing justice to bureaucratic wrongdoing.[225] Anger quickly replaced Nixon's legislative recommendations when it appeared that the Senate Watergate Committee would accuse the White House staff of complicity in the cover-up. Ha'aretz reported that Nixon threatened to fire his aides if they did not resign.[226] This development signalled

a deterioration in the relationship between Nixon and his staff and led Ha'aretz to note the growing isolation of Nixon. After his aide resigned, Nixon assumed personal management of his Watergate defense. He appointed Eliot Richardson as Attorney General and brought in Leonard Garment for legal counsel.[227] William Rogers and Melvin Laird provided Nixon with suggestions for reorganizing the White House staff. In his effort to prevent the release of damaging testimony, Nixon forbid the White House staff from discussing any conversations they may have had with the president on the subject of Watergate.[228] Nixon emphasized his intention to enforce this ban when he fired Herbert Kalmbach in May for cooperation with the Senate Watergate investigation.[229]

Ha'aretz reported several of Nixon's major Watergate speeches without ever being persuaded by his plea of innocence. Nixon delivered an emotional twenty-seven minute speech following the resignation of his top three aides. He personally assumed responsibility for Watergate and refused to place any blame on men whose "enthusiasm overpowered their sense of right and caused them to err in their acts in the interest of justice."[230] Although Nixon received support for his campaign of "purification", many members of Congress expressed their dissatisfaction that the White House had not relinquished the investigation to a special prosecutor.

Three months later, Nixon made a major address which Ha'aretz interpreted as the most decisive of his career.[231] Nixon appealed to the American public for support and released

a lengthy text of his Watergate defense. Besides denying knowledge of the break-in or cover-up, Nixon launched an attack upon the credibility of testimony by John Dean and Jeb Magruder, deputy director of "CREEP" and former assistant to Haldeman. He made only a single concession; "looking back he should have paid more attention to hints about the cover-up several months before it became known and that he should have more closely supervised his staff."[232] Despite the aggressiveness of Nixon's speech, Ha'aretz concluded that it failed to convince Congress or the American people of his innocence.[233] The Nixon speech raised questions but gave no answers. The overall negative reactions prompted a Ha'aretz cartoon to portray Nixon as desperately rowing upstream trying to avoid falling over the edge of a waterfall labelled "Watergate."[234]

The last of the three major addresses during this second period of Ha'aretz' Watergate coverage came at the end of August, 1973. Nixon exploited a news conference to defend his Watergate position. Ha'retz noted various reporters' reactions to Nixon's handling of questions. A Reuters reporter stated Nixon received the questions with a good spirit and responded with humor.[235] A U.P.I. report observed that at times Nixon appeared nervous and the manner in which he grasped the podium revealed the anger built up inside of him over the past few months. After thirty minutes of intensive probing by reporters, Nixon's position appeared unscathed and even strengthened. However, as the end of the news conference

approached and no non-Watergate issues had been raised, Nixon no longer joked with reporters but turned his shoulder and left the room.[236]

Ha'aretz perceived other major obstacles lying in the path of a successful Nixon recovery from Watergate. His continued rejection of suggestions for appearing before the Senate Watergate Committee increased public and congressional hostility towards him.[237] Nixon's firm belief that such an appearance would violate the constitutional powers of the presidency also became the cornerstone of his defense for refusing to deliver presidential papers and tape recorded conversations. After initially agreeing to a private conversation with Senator Sam Ervin, Chairman of the Senate Watergate Committee, Nixon cancelled the meeting on the grounds that it offered no benefit to either party. Amid the growing pressures to hand over the tapes to the Congressional Watergate Committee or resign, Nixon remained adamant about his intent to remain in office and fulfill the presidential responsibilities.[238]

Ha'aretz' treatment of Watergate during this period conveyed the depth of the crisis and the foreboding nature of the threat to the continuity of Nixon's presidency. Already, numerous polls indicated Nixon's popularity declined dramatically.[239] His prestige suffered from Watergate and 84% of Congress polled in a survey stated their belief that Nixon's historical image had been blemished by Watergate.[240] A Ha'aretz cartoon carried the same message as it showed Nixon tip toeing from a door labelled "Watergate" to a door

marked "History."[241]

In Ha'aretz' opinion, Watergate severly impaired the leadership capabilities of Nixon. Watergate captured the attention of the American public who showed only minimal interest in major foreign policy affairs such as the U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit conference.[242] The Senate Watergate Committee recognized the danger of this development and agreed to postpone its hearings until after the Brezhnev visit to the United States.[243]

Despite the Senate Watergate Committee's attempt to bolster the strength of the United States' foreign policy, Ha'aretz believed it would have little major significance.[244] Major problems beset the western heads of state; poor health threatened Pompidou, sex scandal faced Heath, and Watergate confronted Nixon. A Ha'aretz editorial expressed concern about "the ability of these leaders to govern and presumably resist Soviet expansion."[245] It's apprehensions were reinforced by the growing demands for Nixon's resignation and by Congressional fears that Watergate might indeed force Nixon to resign, face impeachment, or remain inactive if he stayed in office.[246] Whether or not any of the three possibilities became reality, Ha'aretz noted the impact on foreign policy. In Germany, the normally pro United States newspapers criticized Nixon's leadership.[247] A Ha'aretz cartoon pictured Nixon, smiling sheepishly and motioning Chancellor Willy Brandt past a door labelled "Watergate."[248] United States relations with the Soviet Union also reflected the influence

of Watergate upon United States foreign policy. Kissinger found it necessary to publicly state that Watergate had no effect on United States policy with the Russians.[249] Even Brezhnev proposed that Watergate would not interfere with his trip to the United States. Other Communist diplomats claimed not to exploit Watergate for fear of damaging relations with Nixon.[250] Yet, the frequency of such denials by both the United States and the Soviet Union only emphasized to Ha'aretz the utilization of the Watergate scandal as a factor in negotiations.

The effect of Watergate on international affairs played a considerable role in Ha'aretz' treatment of Nixon immediately prior to and after the Yom Kippur War. The coverage of Nixon vis-a-vis Watergate declined dramatically as articles about the Arab-Israeli War occupied top news priority. This shift in reporting reflected a temporary attitude of restraint towards Nixon. Ha'aretz feared further damage to Nixon's position might jeopardize the United States' role in the Mid-East, and, in particular, the effectiveness of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In addition, Ha'aretz sought to avoid the personal antagonization of Nixon whose friendship was more vital than ever to assure the flow of weapons to Israel. Ha'aretz also sought to prevent Israelis from harboring negative views towards Nixon so as to curtail feelings of isolation and raise hope that United States arms would continue to arrive in Israel.

Nevertheless, the Watergate-related articles appearing

in Ha'aretz during the "Yom Kippur War" period continued to reflect assumptions from previous coverage. Ha'aretz still worried about the effects of a protracted investigation and possible impeachment proceedings. It also persisted in conveying the impression of Nixon's probable involvement in Watergate. This became evident as Ha'aretz compiled additional accusations against Nixon.

These charges began with the Senate Watergate Committee's decision to investigate the possible commission of a crime by Nixon. Reports of illegal campaign contributions resulted in the convictions of Herbert Kalmbach and the revelations of a one hundred thousand dollar gift from Howard Hughes to the Nixon campaign. Questionable deductions on Nixon's vice-presidential papers gave rise to allegations of tax evasion.[251]

Ha'aretz even insinuated complicity by Nixon in the Agnew bribery scandal. According to a U.P.I. dispatch, printed in Ha'aretz, Nixon knew of Agnew's troubles prior to the 1972 convention and expected an investigation. However, Nixon did not want to hurt his re-election chances, alienate conservative support, or arouse the curiosity of the press in his campaign. Instead, he stripped Agnew of most of the vice-presidential responsibilities and held Agnew as a political diversion should the need arise.[252]

Ha'aretz' coverage of the tape recording controversy revealed another example of its belief that Nixon participated in the Watergate scandal. Following Judge Sirica's order

for delivery of the presidential tapes, Nixon appealed the decision on the basis of executive privilege and national security considerations. The court of appeals suggested a compromise settlement by which Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox would listen to the tapes and decide upon the material relevant to the Watergate investigation. Nixon refused to accept the compromise or any attempts to examine the tapes. His inflexible position created strong opposition and caused Ha'aretz to comment in an editorial that "Nixon has lost sympathy due to his refusal (to deliver the tapes) and will continue to lose prestige...."[253] Ha'aretz even sided with Senator Ervin who disputed Nixon's argument by saying that "nowhere in the Constitution does it say a president can prevent the flow of information on political activities or illegal acts."[254]

After the tape controversy ignited public hostility towards Nixon, Ha'aretz reported the growing calls for Nixon's impeachment. Among those favoring impeachment or resignation were George Meany and the Executive Committee of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the New York Times, economist John Galbraith and many members of the business community, and Ralph Nader.[255] Increasing numbers of influential Congressmen also demanded Nixon step down from the presidency. They included prominent Democratic and Republicans such as Senator Harold Hughes, Senator Edward Brook, Senator Aiken, Representative Thomas Legett, Representative Wilbur Mills, and Senator James Buckley.[256]

Other Congressmen joined the pro-impeachment camp following Nixon's firing of Archibald Cox for refusing to curb his request for the presidential tapes. They interpreted the Nixon move as obstruction of justice and as a direct challenge to the authority of the Congress.[257] The resulting animosity pressured the House Judiciary Committee to favor impeachment regardless of the existence of any evidence indicating criminal wrongdoing. (Ha'aretz even quote a Jewish Telegraphic Agency dispatch which maintained that the majority of United States Jewry favored Nixon's impeachment).

Nixon maintained his hard line position on Watergate issues despite the intensification of the opposition. He continued to profess complete innocence and predicted he would be cleared on all accusations. Even though his popularity had dramatically declined, Nixon expressed confidence in his leadership abilities and refused to resign. Ha'aretz reported one explanation given by Nixon for his refusal to resign; "Resignation is an easy solution. From an impartial point of view, the resignation of this president because of a lack of popularity in the opinion polls is liable to change the nature of our government. I will not be part of the destruction of the presidency."[258] Even if tried in the House of Representatives, Nixon stated that he would not resign.

Nixon's Watergate defense failed to either win support for his position or lessen the damage from those advocating

impeachment. As a result, Nixon's strategy became confused and shifted from tactic to tactic. At the beginning of January, 1974, Ha'aretz reported Nixon's decision to return to the former strategy of ignoring his attackers while quietly frustrating impeachment efforts.[259] Less than a month later, Nixon abandoned the passive styled defensive and replaced it with a series of aggressive speeches. The most important of these speeches was the State of the Union Address. Nixon attempted to prove to the American public that despite Watergate and the danger of impeachment, he still remained fit to govern.[260] He reiterated both his refusal to resign and an unwillingness to deliver the tapes to Watergate intestigators. In addition, Ha'aretz reported that Nixon ordered the compilation of dossiers on political spying during the Kennedy and John administrations.[261]

Ha'aretz reacted to the Watergate crisis with a clear assessment about the future of Nixon's presidency. The United States was experiencing its most severe leadership crisis in many years. Although Nixon's response during the Yom Kippur War merited the praise of Israel, Ha'aretz viewed Nixon as an ineffective president.[262] His relationship to the Republican party became so strained that many Congressmen considered Nixon a political liability to their re-election chances in 1974. Ha'aretz believed Kissinger's role in foreign policy suffered from Nixon's involvement in Watergate and his effectiveness would cease entirely upon Nixon's resignation of impeachment.[263] Even Nixon's emotional health

came under the scrutiny of Ha'aretz. A Reuters article appearing in Ha'aretz reported Nixon seeking psychiatric help to overcome the frustration of Watergate and the pressures of foreign and domestic affairs.[264]

Ha'aretz concluded that Nixon's impeachment seemed imminent. It reported the prediction of Israeli officials that Nixon would either resign or be impeached.[265] The appearance of Gerald Ford as the successor to Spiro Agnew calmed Ha'aretz' anxiety about the dangers of an impeachment proceeding upon United States foreign policy. In an editorial prior to his confirmation, Ford received positive comments from a Ha'aretz editorial: "He had many of the attributes of Truman who turned out to be a great United States president.... All agree that Ford is honest (not said lightly in Washington) and is a figure that generates trust.... Observers say the Ford nomination will help Nixon's position and diminish the fears of those who seek impeachment."[266]

The underlying motif for the fourth and final period of Ha'aretz' coverage of Watergate centered upon the certain removal of Nixon from office. From Ha'aretz' perspective, all that remained in doubt was the question of when it would occur and by which means, impeachment or resignation.[267] The growing number of daily revelations about Nixon and Watergate precipitated a rise in pleas for Nixon's resignation. Prominent Republican Senators such as Rhodes, Schweiker, Griffin, and Scott joined Democrats urging Nixon to step down in the best interests of the United States.[268]

Accusations against Nixon continued to increase. Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworsky acknowledged expanding the scope of his investigation to include allegations that Nixon sold diplomatic posts in exchange for campaign contributions in 1972.[269] Jaworsky still pursued Nixon's use of the I.R.S. to harass personal enemies as well as receiving illegal contributions in exchange for influencing the Federal Trade Commission in an anti-trust case involving A.T.T.[270]

The refusal of Nixon to deliver the tapes threatened to escalate the controversy into a direct confrontation between Nixon and both the Congress and the Supreme Court. Ha'aretz shared the growing belief among Americans that the tapes included information damaging to Nixon.[271] Incriminating evidence already appeared on the edited transcripts of the tapes prepared by Nixon and released to the public on April 29. 1974. Ha'aretz quoted one such piece of evidence regarding the payment of hust money for E. Howard Hunt:

> "Nixon - Do you agree with me that this is most important and that you must exercute it well?
> Dean - We must give him some sign."[272]

Nixon said he was thinking out loud about different approaches for answering Hunt's demands.

A further contradiction existed regarding the date on which Nixon claimed he became aware of the Watergate cover-up. Nixon publicly stated that the date was March 21, 1973, while the transcripts indicated the correct date as March 17, 1973. Ha'aretz responded that from a legal perspective, the discrepancy had little significance, although the contradiction

did cast doubt among the public as to the validity of Nixon's more recent statements.[273] Some suspicions has been expressed that should the Supreme Court rule against Nixon on the tape controversy, he would circumvent the order by claiming the disappearance of several key tapes.[274]

Ha'aretz interpreted Ford's attitudes towards Nixon and Watergate as another sign of the impending removal of Nixon from the presidency. Ford originally represented one of Nixon's staunchest supporters, believeing that Nixon would be exonerated from the accusations against him.[275] On the basis of conversations with Nixon, Ford did not believe that Nixon had transgressed any laws that warranted his impeachment. The controversy surrounding the delivery of the tapes prompted Ford to adopt a more pessimistic assessment of Nixon's future. In fact, Ford disagreed with Nixon's refusal to turn over the tapes to the special prosecutor. Several months later, Ford foresaw the distinct possibility of the House initiating impeachment procedures against Nixon. Towards the end of Nixon's presidency, Ford appeared certain of Nixon's impeachment.[276] Ha'aretz reported rumors circulating in Washington that a transfer of authority would begin at the onset of impeachment proceedings.[277]

With the magnitude of opposition steadily increasing, Nixon again changed his defense strategy. He abandoned his tactic of professing innocence but at the same time only offered limited cooperation with Watergate investigators. Ha'aretz noted that this approach failed since it aroused

public and Congressional hostility and cast an impression of guilt upon Nixon.[278] The new strategy adopted by Nixon called for an aggressive counterattack through the demonstration of cooperation with the Watergate investigations. Ford and Laird had advised Nixon to accept this tactic for some time. In their opinion, Nixon could squelch Congressional criticism by deluging them with a great quantity of documents and then press for a short period to conclude the investigation. The strategy was designed to show Nixon had nothing to hide and that political bias delayed the completion of the Watergate investigation. Nixon utilized the principles behind the strategy but refused to deliver the tapes. Instead, Representative Peter Rodino received an invitation to listen to the tapes and check the accuracy of edited transcripts prepared by the White House. Ha'aretz reacted to the new Nixon strategy by noting in an editorial that "the trust in the president has reached such a low point in the past two months that it is certin the House Judiciary Committee will not accept his tape compromise nor will his counterattack delay their actions."[279]

The unwillingness of Nixon to release the tapes virtually eliminated any chances of success for his new Watergate strategy. Opinion polls revealed the dissatisfaction with Nixon had reached an all time high and the majority of the American public favored Nixon's impeachment.[250] The pressure became so overwhelming that Nixon made a last-ditch effort to prevent his removal from office.

Nixon began admitting incriminating evidence to the Watergate investigators. First, he acknowledged instructing his advisors to conceal facts during testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee. Then, on August 5, 1974, Nixon released three tapes of conversations held on June 23, 1972, which contained damaging evidence about the Watergate break-in and cover-up.[281] He claimed not to have realized the full significance of the tapes but did not believe they warranted impeachment. A Ha'aretz editorial offered an explanation of Nixon's motives for releasing this evidence: "The president's attitude is that resignation would create a dangerous precedent of a president being driven from office by the press and opinion polls. But there are other more likely reasons: 1) the president is still weighing what Congress is willing to exchange in return for his resignation (immunity), 2) Nixon wants to accelerate the process of impeachment for he believes there isn't a two-thirds majority against him in the Senate, 3) Nixon feels the Senate might be satisfied with an expression of denunciation and not impeachment."[282]

The real motivation for Nixon's admission of incriminating evidence may have been to gain time to negotiate immunity. Three days after the Ha'aretz editorial, Nixon resigned from the presidency. Ha'aretz treated Nixon's resignation with disappointment.[283] In the role of president and national leader, Nixon commanded Ha'aretz' respect for his foreign policy achievements. Ha'aretz believed Nixon deserved the appreciation of Israel for the massive quanitities of arms he

provided Israel.[284]

Ha'aretz attributed the failure of Israel to realize its high expectations for Nixon's second term to personality of Nixon. In the view of Ha'aretz, Nixon the individual mocked honesty and relied upon corruption to achieve political goals.[285] Nixon also appeared emotionally unbalanced at times. Nixon became so enraged at the discovery of leaks from the nuclear non-proliferation talks that he ordered polygraph tests for four hundred thousand government employees with security clearances.[286] In 1972, Nixon threatened to fire Secretary of the Treasury George Schultz if he opposed Nixon's methods of dealing with political enemies.[287] When Charles Colson reported the arrest of the Watergate burglars, Nixon reacted by angrily throwing an ashtray across the room.[288] In addition, the Watergate tapes revelaed anti-Semitic slurs by Nixon.[289]

In spite of Ha'aretz' enthusiasm for Nixon's foreign policy positions, they believed that the Watergate scandal impaired his effectiveness as a leader. The possibility of impeachment proceedings would divert Nixon's attention from the crises in Cyrus, Southeast Asia, and on the Golan Heights.[290] Ha'aretz' concern about the international paralysis of the United States led it to state that "there is room to fear the until the drama ends, the United States will be seen by the Soviet Union and smaller nations, both friendly and hostile, as a silent power with limited decisive ability and influence."[291] Ha'aretz pointed to Nixon's failures in the

Soviet Union and the Middle East to support the notion of his ineffectiveness. Even Kissinger's influence suffered from the growing complications surrounding Nixon's future.[292] Ha'aretz' final portrait of Nixon reflected the personal tragedy of his disgrace and the hope that the transition "is swift so that the United States can continue the role that the world places upon it."[293]

FOOTNOTES

1. Ha'aretz, June 14, 1968, page 3, col 4
(all following citations from Ha'aretz will be listed by date, page, and column)
2. 8/5/68, 2:3
3. 11/5/68, 2:3
4. 8/9/68: 2:6
5. 8/9/68, 2:6
6. 8/5/68, 2:3
7. 8/9/68, 1:1
8. 9/27/68, 18:4
9. 11/6/68, 2:1
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