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THE THEOLOGY OF SAMUEL ALEXANDER

David Elliott Powers

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Hebrew Letters and Ordination

Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion

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DIGEST

This work is an exposition of the philosophical theology of Samuel Alexander. It begins with a discussion of his metaphysics, on which his theology is based, and continues with a presentation of religious propositions concerning God, deity and man's relation to the divine.

The universe, according to Alexander develops constantly through the process of emergent evolution by which ever newer qualities come into being. That quality which is yet to emerge, the next member of a hierarchical series, is deity or godhead. God's body is the universe straining to realize the ever-potential quality of his deity that looms ahead of mind, the highest actual quality known in the universe of Space-Time. Alexander regards such a theological framework as pantheistic, with respect to God's immanent body, and theistic, with respect to the temporally transcendent quality of deity.

Man relates to the divine by virtue of being a part of God's body and by virtue of being part of the process of emergent evolution (strikingly similar to Darwin's natural selection) by which deity may be realized in a future birth of Time. In a sense we may say that God is responsive to man, for the quality of deity is dependent for its existence and its nature on the being and character of the levels qualitatively below it.

Man becomes aware of divine existence both by the speculative deliverances of philosophy and by the power of the religious emotion. The one without the other is, from the point of view of religion, insufficient. Alexander, we note, claims that his system is a kind of empiricism, based on man's knowledge of the physical world and his emotional reaction to that world. То Јоусе

ויאסר משה אל האלהים, "הנה אנכי בא אל בני ישראל ואסרתי להם יאלהי אבותיכם שלתני אליכםי ואסרו לי יסה שסו?י סה אסר אלהם?" ויאסר אלהים אל משה, "אהיה אשר אהיה," איסר, "כה תאסר לבני ישראל: יאהיה שלהני אליכם.י"

--סמות נ

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INTRODUCTION

Samuel Alexander was a British Jewish philosopher, born in Sydney, Australia, in 1859. In 1877 Alexander went to Oxford where he came under the influence of Green and Bradley and was later stimulated by the realism of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. He was elected as a fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford, and was granted a professorship of philosophy at the University of Manchester in 1893. From 1916 to 1918 he delivered the Gifford Lectures at Glasgow; subsequently the lectures were published in the major two-volume work, Space, Time and Deity (1920).

Details of Alexander's personal life are few; rarely did he write on private matters. We do discover that he remained committed to some form of Judaism even into his later years because Judaism "contains less nonsense than the other religions known to me."¹ There is evidence that his Jewish commitment was somewhat deeper than he himself described: Alexander was among the leaders in the establishment of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, then under British mandate.

His place in the history of philosophy is both unusual and unhappy. Alexander based his elaborate metaphysics on the suppositions of an Einsteinian universe rather than on the patterns of a Newtonian one. He appropriated the mathematical formulations and the physics of Minkowski, Lorentz and Einstein as his own, but advanced beyond the strictly scientific treatment that they and Whitehead gave them. <u>Space, Time and Deity</u>, Alexander's most important work, represents in this regard one of the

last great metaphysical systems before the overwhelming influence of the Vienna Circle and the schools of linguistic analysis. Regrettably, therefore, his fruitful and monumental system has become lost among a myriad of philosophical works of both more limited scope and further-reaching consequences.

While Alexander was rarely in whole-hearted agreement with other thinkers, he drew freely on the works of his great predecessors. Critics have found in his philosophy elements of classical Greek metaphysics (both Plato and Aristotle), and influence from Spinoza, Hegel, Marx, Bergson, Whitehead, Otto, James, Darwin and no small number of others. In many respects, Alexander's system is an outgrowth of the works which he inherited from others. But--more importantly--he rearranged, reinterpreted and supplied creative flair to sometimes sterile or incomplete philosophical conceptions.

Essentially, his work may be described simply as emergent evolution. His cosmology and cosmogony present a progressive world in the process of becoming, as new qualities arise out of the substrata of prior existents. Driven by a nisus and compelled forward by the restlessness of Time, the universe, a union of Space and Time, straiger toward the realization of deity, the highest empirical quality and beyond those that are known to man. Deity is the quality of God whose body is the whole of Space-Time with its nisus toward ever higher empirical realities. Deity is forever potential so that the universe of Space-Time is always pregnant, big with deity.

This much Alexander gains through speculative philosophy. But edded to the rational assurance of metaphysics is the knowledge of the

divine, attained in the numinous character of religious experience in which man feels the presence and reality of a worship-inspiring God and is assured of the infinite potentiality which the quality of deity represents.

Our method here in dealing with Alexander's enormous work shall be to consider briefly the essential details of his metaphysics--his epistemology, cosmology, cosmogony and empiricism--in the first chapter of this work. Our presentation of his system in that regard shall be limited by the extent to which the metaphysical system provides a basis for the understanding of his theology, the capstone of his system. In chapters two through five we shall examine that theology in further detail. Criticism and comparative material appear in this work only insofar as they are helpful in aiding to a comprehension of Alexander's intricate and subtle philosophy. Our purpose is not to criticize but to explain. To that end we shall quote extensively from Alexander's own works and from secondary sources, supplying appropriate commentary and, hopefully, helpful organization which will assist the reader on to a clear understanding of the difficult system which Alexander's writings embody.

CHAPTER I

METAPHYSICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL ALEXANDER

The beginning section of exposition of Samuel Alexander's philosophy will necessarily be unjust, for his system must be viewed as a whole. At times it is difficult to discover progression in the development of his ideas, and only after one has considered the entire and unified system can he hope to comprehend the subtlety of each of its parts and the significance of the relationships which obtain among them. Yet, if one segment of Alexander's philosophy is to stand alone, it is his epistemology, because in large measure it is incidental to his metaphysics. Epistemology in Alexander's scheme best illustrates the realism that is so characteristic of his philosophical system. Moreover, a consideration of Alexander's epistemology prepares the reader for the the kind of inquiry that the other elements of his philosophy require: the role of the knowing mind is crucial to his work. Alexander begins his work with epistemology. We begin there with him, not only to payhim due homage and respect, but with the conviction that if there is any precondition to a proper understanding of his intricate system, it is an equally proper understanding of the place of mind in the universe of things.

A. Epistemology

Samuel Alexander presents us with a metaphysics of realism, by which all forms of being are treated equally, a technique in which no particular kind of existence is given undue prominence in the scheme of things. 1 Specifically, Alexander wishes to place man and mind into "their proper place among the world of finite things."2 Mental objects and material objects are, from a dispassionate and duly objective viewpoint, existentially indistinguishable, 3 so that "the mental process and its neural process are one and the same existence, not two existences."4 Dorothy Emmet, in her preface to the new impression of Space, Time and Diety, notes that Alexander has fought idealism unflaggingly, that he has developed an "approach to philosophy through studying neurological psychology," and whatever the relationship of mind to body, it is more than a special case of the same kind of relationship which obtains between two obviously less exalted physical objects. 5 It is contrary to the spirit of realistic metaphysics, Alexander tells us, to attach presumably favored existence to mind or to mental process. It is a serious metaphysical error to denigrate physical existence or materiality as appearance or unreality. Mental and physical qualities are equally real. Alexander's metaphysical purpose, if one can rightly be attributed to him, is "on the one hand to divest physical things of the colouring which they have received from the vanity or a rogance of mind; and on the other to assign them along with mind their due measure of self-existence."

Idealistic philosophy, insofar as it has insisted upon the preeminence of mind over the sensory world has given modern philosophy the burdensome heritage of a "fanciful antagonism of nature and mind."⁷ Also, according to Alexander, Descartes and Newton are responsible for an abstract conception of matter, useful to the physical sciences, but an unreal conception, nevertheless, which reduces physical nature to a

"complexity of pushes and pulls." Mind, at the same time, regarded as "an inscrutable existence altogether unfounded on matter,"⁸ can have no direct relation to the abstract view of the physical universe.

More recent philosophy has regarded the alloged mind-body disjunction somewhat more sceptically, unhappily, for some, at an imagined degradation of the value of mind. Alexander notes that realism, it is true, debunks the supposed special or superior reality attributed to mind, but realism does so without robbing mind of its due preeminence, greatness or value.⁹

On the contrary, in leaving to other things their rights mind comes into its own. . . . Realism is the democratic spirit in metaphysics, and if it dethrones mind, it recognizes mind as chief in the world it knows.¹⁰

But that preeminence of mind, as Alfred Stiernotte points out, is only a distinction of quality without any necessary distinction of reality in the "democracy of things."¹¹ Indeed, everything that exists in the world is an organism and differences of quality are more rightly understood as the differences of complexity¹² from which they arise. Mind and body do not run parallel but distinct courses. They are aspects of the same unity.¹³

Still, it is--in a non-technical sense --unrealistic to pretend that body and mind are at the same level in the democracy of existence. But what differences obtain between mind and materiality are differences of perfection and not differences of reality. Mind is more perfect than matter because it is more developed, but that which is less developed (matter, that is), is not accordingly less real. "The reality of consciousness though more perfect does not interfere with the reality of

the material constituents on which it is built."14

Mind and matter, parts of the same world and existences of equal reality, do enter into an important relationship with one another, a relationship whereby knowledge becomes possible. There is a natural connection between the foundation of Alexander's realism and the epistemology which is based in it. Mind and matter, we recall, are equally real constituents of the physical universe, and the togetherness or <u>compresence</u> of mind (a knowing subject) and matter (a known object) is the fundamental relationship which exists between them. The relationship, which Alexander regards as fundamental, occasions him to treat the theory of knowledge as an incidental--albeit significant--chapter of his metaphysics.

The first and simplest relation is that all finites are merely connected together within the one Space-Time. They may be successive or co-existent with one another, but they all belong together. In order to use a word which covers both cases, I shall say that they are compresent.¹2

Knowledge derives out of that togetherness in the one continuous Space-Time. Compresence, it must be stressed, is a relation between any two real finites in Space-Time.

Here a problem arises, one which trapped so noted an historian of philosophy as Rudolf Metz. Metz regards compresence as the "simultaneous presentness of the two components of knowledge."¹⁶ Yet Alexander is cautious to avoid the requirement of contemporaneity for compresence, as is clear in the section we have quoted above.¹⁷ For Alexander's disclaimer that compresent physical objects need not be together at the same instant of time (but may be successive) is the root of our knowledge of history. Metz's understanding of Alexander has virtually closed the door to historical knowledge before it has been opened. Alexander is assured of the veridity of the relation of compresence by experience, declaring that is not a fact which can be proved by argumentation. Our awareness

of the existence of a mind, an object, and a relation between them . . . is a philosophic intuition, but not in the bad sense of that word as due to some unexplained faculty within us. It is a fact which cannot be proved by argument. Like the use of a microscope, it puts us in a better position for seeing. We judge the success of our intuition by how well it integrates all relevant data.¹⁸

Out of Alexander's intuitive understanding of experience flows his theory of knowledge "with startling simplicity."¹⁹

Again, the knowledge relationship is composed of two partners which belong to the single world of experience. "The mental partner is the act of mind which apprehends the object,"²⁰ and that act of mind is constituted of the entire mental process, in all of its physical ramifications and from all of its physical sources within the material seat of the mind, which ramifications, sources, and seat, taken together, constitute the mind. "The object is what it declares itself to be,"²¹ whether a table, a chair, a color, a living entity, or a geometrical pattern. The conscious mind, therefore, discovers its object and there is in no sense a mental creation of the object.²² That is, the object has existence independent of the contemplating mind, and the compresent mind, moreover, objectively understood, is but another real entity in the universe of finite things.²³ Hence, as Father Copleston observes, "Alexander rejects all forms of representationalism."²⁴ He assigns reality to the data of experience, that same reality which minds appropriate to themselves.

The relationship of compresence or togetherness of mind and physical object is one in which the mind contemplates its object, but has a

special intimate²⁵ relationship with itself, that of enjoyment.²⁶ That is, the mind has a kind of awareness of itself which Alexander terms the mind's "enjoyment" of itself. He admits that the term is "not . . . particularly felicitous"²⁷ insofar as the mind is understood to "enjoy" some especially painful states. Alexander seems to fear, however, that other terms might mislead his readers, encouraging them to misconstrue his intention by supposing that the mind's awareness of itself is antithetical to understanding. Although the mind does not experience itself as an object,²⁸ its enjoyment of itself is not antithetical to understanding.²⁹ Rather, the mind enjoys itself as a spatial entity³⁰ which is absolutely distinct from the physical object which it contemplates.³¹ Knower and known are related by their compresence.³²

9.

We have, then, an acquaintance with the real sense of the physical world which is inessentially different from acquaintance with our own minds. But the data of the physical world, while equally real with minds, cannot rightly be called sensa unless there is a percipient which experiences them. "To call them sensa or thoughts is to speak of them in their compresence with a percipient."³³ And knowledge of the things with which one is compresent is dependent jointly upon the momentary reciprocity of mind and upon the relative positions in Space-Time of subject and object.³⁴ The point just made may seem clear, but it is crucial to a proper understanding of Alexander's epistemology. As Arthur Murphy asserts,

the curse of epistemology, the "real" object which is not relative to its appearances but remains self-complete beyond them, is quite definitely eliminated. The thing known is the synthesis of its appearances and contains no element not given in experience.³⁵ While we may argue that Alexander does not really eliminate the elusive "real" object, Murphy, we feel, is quite correct in noting the relativity of knower and known. That relativity guarantees that both are equally real and that knowledge depends upon hard experience.³⁶ Knowledge is therefore limited by experience, because it is limited by the reciprocity of the knowing subject and its spatio-temporal compresent relationship with the object known.

If we appear to belabor the obvious, it is because of the cogent insight of G. Dawes Hicks, expressed in his review of <u>Space</u>, <u>Time and</u> Deity. Hicks questions the reality of the object of knowledge:

It is apparent, I think, even on his Alexander's own showing, that the mere compresence of a finite existent with the mind does not account for the mind's consciousness of that object (cp. ii. p. 90). For notoriously a mind is all the while in a relation of togetherness with any number of things without being the least degree cognisant of them. And it turns out, in fact, that the togetherness must be of such a nature that the one term is not merely a mind but a mind that is enjoying its act of contemplating the object, and the other term is not merely something along with the mental term in Space-Time but "what in relation to that enjoyment is a contemplated object" (ii. p. 87). . . . If, then, knowing involves that the one term is an act of contemplating and the other term is something contemplated, how can it be legitimate to refuse to recognise as essentially belonging to the cognitive relations the concrete set of circumstances which the situation comprises?37

Hicks has raised a serious objection, one which calls the legitimacy and scope of Alexander's realism into question. For if the reality of the physical object is to be secured, then that reality must be granted independently of the relationship of the physical object to a mind which contemplates it.

Alexander's realism, insofar as it is relative (if not representational) realism, seems to be mitigated. We call it relative realism here,

for although Professor Alexander has secured a real place in the spatiotemporal reality-scheme for the objects of perception, knowledge of those objects remains dependent upon the empirical method, founded on the receptivity of the enjoying mind to the various (shall we call them capricious?) presentations of the contemplatible object. Our author's realism is not quite as thorough-going as he himself might contend. But realism it remains.

We are not quite content, therefore, with the objection raised by G. F. Stout that Alexander has mistaken two kinds of existence for two kinds of knowledge.³⁸ The distinction between contemplation and enjoyment is not a disjunction, but a convenience, that "contemplation" may be used univocally, and not be assigned to the mind's knowledge of itself.

It is this peculiarity of mind, that it enjoys and does not contemplate itself, which conceals from us if we do not keep careful guard against prepossessions, the experienced fact that a common world unites us both--the one, the thing contemplated; the other, the thing enjoyed. We still imagine a mind which contemplates both and may be thought to be the source not merely of its knowing of things, but even of their existence.³⁹

In point of fact, moreover, Alexander specifically states that the existence of mind is qualitatively different from the existence of the physical objects that it contemplates.⁴⁰ As we have already noted,⁴¹ mind is more perfect than tables, chairs, circles, squares, dogs, and cats, and the other objects that it can contemplate.⁴² But mind and its objects share equally in reality.

Alexander summarizes his epistemology best:

Berkeley said that you have only to open your eyes, and you will see that to be is to be perceived. Bury yourself, we say, in the fact of experiencing an object like a table, feel yourself into the whole situation, and you will realize that this situation is the compresence of two things of which one, the act of mind, enjoys itself and, in the act of enjoying itself, contemplates the other. To be aware of a thing is to be caught in the common web of the universe, to be an existence alongside the other existences; peculiar in so far as this empirical character of awareness is distinctive of a certain order of 43 existence, but otherwise not peculiar, at least for metaphysics.

Alexander's poetic affirmation that the relationship of mind to the objects of its knowledge is nowise metaphysically peculiar is, in the words of Professor Stiernotte, "an extreme position . . . in which he seems to find ro difference between our compresence with physical things and the compresence of physical things with one another."44 Why Stiernotte finds objectionable or extreme this simplicity and universality of "the knowledge relation . . . [which] has no special dignity or peculiarity"45 is hard to determine. We take it as crucial to Alexander's realism as the second and more important affirmation of his realism. First, his system is realistic because it neither charges mind with special reality nor denigrates matter to mere appearance or the creation of mind. Now, we discover his system is exponentially realistic insofar as it does not elevate knowledge to an undue position of superior dignity. Instead, Alexander recognizes that "there is nothing in the compresence between the mind and its object to distinguish the relation from the compresence between any two objects which it contemplates, like the tree and the grass."46 Knowledge is a special case of the relation of compresence, and if we find it more dignified than other instances of compresence, it is only because of the arrogance of mind by which we, as self-conscious contemplating entities, assign to ourselves superior reality.

"My consciousness of a physical object," Alexander informs us, is only a particular case of the universal compresence of finites.... Of two compresent things A and B, let A

be a mind, and suppose both to be contemplated by a being higher than mind. For such a superior being (say God) they would be separate things, and if A is perceiving B, he [the superior being] would see in this nothing but a state of things in which B stirs A to a conscious action and A becomes conscious of B, but B does not owe its character as B to its being perceived by A. Now consider A himself. He would be for himself only an enjoyer and B would be contemplated. But the fact is unaltered. It is still the fact that B is compresent with A, B is experienced because A is experiencing. But that does not make B any less a distinct existence from A.47

Here we learn that the "extreme" view of compresence which seemed to trouble Stiernotte is inseparable from the realism which Alexander maintains. It is precisely because mind and matter share equally in reality that the relation of compresence between them and the compresence of any two contemplated objects "are so far forth as togetherness is concerned identical."⁴⁸

All compresences of finite existents, then, are metaphysically identical, equally real. But Alexander does acknowledge a characteristic difference between a mind's compresence with a tree and a tree's compresence with grass. That difference is "not in the nature of the relation, but of the terms related."⁴⁹ An objective observer, a higher being, would judge all relations of compresence to be identical with respect to relationship (<u>i.e.</u>, simple togetherness) and different only with respect to the terms related. Knowledge, therefore, derives not from a special or unique relationship, but from a common feature of existence, "the simplest of all relations, the mere togetherness of two terms, their belonging together to a world."⁵⁰

We come to know things as they reveal themselves to us in the relation of compresence, in our intercourse with the world.⁵¹ But our knowledge of things is not a peculiar or exalted type of relationship. It is fundamental to the finites of the world. Such an epistemology which Alexander

enunciates stresses--and for our purposes this is the most important point--"the integrity of the independent object and its qualities."⁵² That integrity is the foundation of Alexander's realism. It is fundamental of his philosophy.

B. Cosmology: the union of Space and Time

Alexander begins the main body of his extensive metaphysical tract, <u>Space, Time and Deity</u>, with a consideration of Space and Time which Stiernotte regards as "the ultimate metaphysical realities"⁵³ in Alexander's system. We have knowledge of Space and Time, not through any kind of sensation, but through an apprehension which Alexander tells us is intuition.⁵⁴ Space, for example, cannot be known by sensation for it is not, according to Professor John Laird, "an assemblage of crude perceptual data."⁵⁵ Similarly, Laird continues in his interpretation of Alexander, Space is also not an "inference from such data. On the contrary, it is ascertained by a unique sort of apprehension that is present in perception although it does not exhaust that process."⁵⁶

Through that intuition Alexander discovers what Stiernotte calls "the characteristic and fundamental feature of Alexander's [cosmological] system,"⁵⁷ the recognition that Space and Time are indissolubly united, that "they are interdependent, so that there neither is Space without Time nor Time without Space, any more than life exists without a body or a body without life; that Space is in its very nature temporal and Time spatial."⁵⁸ Appealing to a somewhat similar analogical method,⁵⁹Alexander argues elsewhere that like a work of art, a fusion of spirit and matter, Space and Time are fused, one element corresponding to matter and another to mind.⁶⁰ The world must not be regarded as merely three-dimensional, because Time, insofar as it enters "into the very constitution of things," requires us to regard the world as four-dimensional.

Space, Alexander informs us, is essentially necessary to Time, for the apparent continuity of Time would become nothing more than a series of vanishing instants were there no Space to be the continuous element in Time's progression, or, more rightly, in Space-Time. Space provides Time with its continuum, and thereby guarantees "the togetherness of past and present, of earlier and later." Similarly, Time must be indissolubly wedded to Space, or Space becomes a mere blank.

without distinguishable elements, . . . not a continuum at all. . . There must therefore be some form of existence, some entity not itself spatial which distinguishes and separates the parts of Space. This other form of existence is Time.⁶³

We see that Space and Time must be united if either is to preserve its character. Time without Space is discontinuous; Space without Time is undifferentiated.

The union of Space and Time requires us to realize that Space-Time, in its parts, is equally unified. Every instant of Time has a spatial position and every spatial point has a temporal position, so that "there are no such things as points or instants by themselves. There are only point-instants or <u>pure events</u>."⁶⁴ Space-Time becomes a combination of the static and the dynamic.⁶⁵ Spaceless instants, timeless points, Spaceless Time and Timeless Space have no real existence but are "abstractions from Space-Time.... The real existence is Space-Time, the continuum of point-instants or pure events."⁶⁶

Alexander has advanced a novel position, for while the union of Space and Time was not new to mathematics and physics, it was new to

metaphysics.

Minkowski had suggested as early as 1908 that our description of physical events must be four-dimensional, i.e., in terms of space-time. The same idea has been elaborated in the theory of relativity. But what for Minkowski and Einstein is a descriptive device becomes for Alexander a metaphysical postulate. . . No doubt exists in Alexander's mind that the abstract concepts of mathematics are attributable to the real world. They are not for him, as for Henri Poincare, pragmatic conventions contributed by the human mind and relative to the needs of description. . . They are legislative to reality, and constitutive of reality.67

Others came to the same conclusions as Alexander through physics, but Alexander developed his conception of the unity of Space and Time by metaphysics on speculative grounds.⁶⁸ Moreover, Alexander has not blindly followed the lead of physics and mathematics, but has taken their suggestion and transferred it, adding his own creativity, to metaphysics.⁶⁹ His argument may be grounded in relativity, but it extends beyond the special ⁷⁰ sciences.⁷⁰

For while Minkowski regards Time simply as a fourth dimension, added to the three of Space, yielding a four-dimensional Space-Time, Alexander does somewhat more with Time than superadd it to Space. While in other works he regards Time as a fourth dimension,⁷¹ in <u>Space, Time and</u> <u>Deity</u> he is careful to regard Time more critically and discovers a "correlation between the three dimensions of space and the three empirically ascertainable characteristics of time succession, irreversibility and transitiveness."⁷² This is not to say that Alexander regards Time as three-dimensional. Rather, he tells us that

Time does with its one-dimensional order cover and embrace the three dimensions of Space, and is not additional to them. . . . Metaphysically, (though perhaps mathematically), it is not therefore a fourth dimension in the universe, but repeats the other three.⁷³

It is not within the scope of this work to develop the correlation between the characteristics of Time and the dimensions of Space. It is sufficient to note that Space and Time are so intimately related that the one may depend for its nature upon the other.


But while Space and Time are equally real partners of the one unity of Space-Time, Alexander does attach a certain preeminence to Time. which preeminence we shall regard partially here and partially in the next section of this chapter. Everything real is subordinate to Time, and "Space must be regarded as generated in Time, or, if the expression be preferred, by Time. For Time is the source of movement," and "Space-Time is a system of motions."⁷⁶ Alexander here does not mean to say that static points move among the other points in Space, but that points move through Time. changing their time-coefficients with the successiveness of Time. Points acquire different time values, and in this sense we may regard the universe of point-instants as being in motion. Clearly. then. Space-Time is a combination of the static (points) with the dynamic (instants). We have, however, a jaundiced view, conditioned both by our ability to remain at relative rest in Space and our inability to remain at rest in Time. A creature which did not move in Time but in Space (impossible or unreal in Alexander's metaphysics) might have a view of Space-Time as a combination of the static (instants) with the dynamic (points). Still, such a creature would see the universe of Space-Time as a system of motion.

For Alexander takes Time seriously, as his fond expression goes, and "this means that he considers Time in its irreversibility, its

continuity, and its succession,"⁷⁷a Time which is ever generating movement in Space-Time. And time-coefficients cannot be removed from spacecoefficients, ⁷⁸pure events being simple entities, requiring for their reality both their spatial and temporal localizations. "Total Space-Time is through and through historical because Space is occupied by Time of various dates and in no instances can these various dates be ignored."⁷⁹

The historicity of Space-Time derives from the motion of Time through points, or rather, of Space-Time through point-instants. "In this way we conceive of growth in Time, or the history of the Universe as a whole, or any part of it, as a continuous redistribution of instants of Time among points of Space."⁸⁰ Alexander calls such displacements of instants of Time over points of Space "lines of advance" a difficult notion to conceive in which "points become different point-instants and instants become also different point-instants."⁸¹ Professor Stiernotte has provided us with a helpful diagram which we reproduce here. It represents a concrete picture by which we may understand the distribution of Time over points and Space over instants. The observer stands at the present, at 0.

 $\begin{array}{c} --\mathbf{A}_{1}\mathbf{t}_{-3}--\mathbf{A}_{2}\mathbf{t}_{-2}--\mathbf{A}_{3}\mathbf{t}_{-1}--\mathbf{A}_{4}\mathbf{t}_{0}--\mathbf{A}_{5}\mathbf{t}_{1}--\mathbf{A}_{6}\mathbf{t}_{2}--\mathbf{A}_{7}\mathbf{t}_{3}--\\ --\mathbf{B}_{1}\mathbf{t}_{-3}--\mathbf{B}_{2}\mathbf{t}_{-2}--\mathbf{B}_{3}\mathbf{t}_{-3}--\mathbf{B}_{4}\mathbf{t}_{0}--\mathbf{B}_{5}\mathbf{t}_{1}--\mathbf{B}_{6}\mathbf{t}_{2}--\mathbf{B}_{7}\mathbf{t}_{3}--\\ --\mathbf{C}_{1}\mathbf{t}_{-3}--\mathbf{C}_{2}\mathbf{t}_{-2}--\mathbf{C}_{3}\mathbf{t}_{-3}--\mathbf{C}_{4}\mathbf{t}_{0}--\mathbf{C}_{5}\mathbf{t}_{1}--\mathbf{C}_{6}\mathbf{t}_{2}--\mathbf{C}_{7}\mathbf{t}_{3}--\\ \\ \\ M\end{array}$



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As we picture the advance of Time by movement of the line of the present LM from time t₀ to time t₁, the time-coefficients are redistributed since all the points in the past have now become older by one unit, and all the points in the future have decreased in temporal distance from the present by one unit. The irreversible flow of Time implies this constant redistribution of instants among points and points among instants. But it is important to note that every point has its instant and every instant has its point. We may imagine the point-instants multiplied to infinity in the Past and in the Future, as shown on the diagram and in this infinite multiplication of points and instants, it still remains true that every point has its instant or time-coefficient and every time-coefficient has its point.⁸²

In the diagram we note, for example, that on line $(A_1t_{-3}, A_2t_{-2}, \ldots, A_7t_3)$ the point A moves through Time by virtue of the redistribution of instants. Moreover, line $(A_1t_{-3}, B_1t_{-3}, C_1t_{-3})$ is indicative of a redistribution of points of Space over the instant t_{-3} . In this sense we may understand how Space is temporal and Time spatial and how a line of advance represents motion (or change or coefficients) in Space-Time.

Note also that we may understand how "space at any moment is full of memory and expectation,"⁸³ for the present, line IM ($A_{4}t_{0}$, $B_{4}t_{0}$, $C_{4}t_{0}$) or, more simply, one point-instant in the present ($A_{4}t_{0}$, for example) is composed of the continuous element, A, that advances from past to future, from t₋₃ to t₃ in our diagram. In this way Alexander affirms the reality of past and future, asserting that both past and future really exist, so long as existence is not understood rigidly and wrongly to mean present existence.

If we avoid this error and take time seriously, the past possesses such reality as belongs to the past, that is, to what is earlier than the point of reference; it does not exist now but it did exist then, and its reality is to have existed then. As to the later or the future, there is at bottom no greater difficulty in speaking of the future as being real and existing really than there is in respect of the real existence of the past.⁸⁴ A dispassionate appraisal of Time, perhaps the appraisal of the mathematician, regards the distinction between future and past as nothing more than the distinction between "+" and "-." A difference of sign is no essential difference.

If the universe is to be regarded as continuous, then we should recognize that "at any one moment the universe is the whole of its parts which happen to exist at that moment. But the universe at one moment is merely a section of the universe of Space-Time extending to the infinite past and also to the infinite future."⁸⁵ A view of a section of the universe is not a view of the universe in its totality. It is a narrow view. According to Alexander, we would more rightly view the universe not at a single instant but should recognize our instant as a dividing point, segmenting the universe into earlier and later, each of which is equally real.⁸⁶ Moreover, some events of an earlier time-coefficient, events at distant stars, for example, are observed in the present while possessing the reality of the past. Our perspective of Space-Time is therefore a view of the universe, of different points occupied by various instants and different instants occupying different points. "Now," naively understood, is an arrogance of the observer. "Now," when we take time seriously. is a compilation of instants distributed over Space.

If it appears that we have been representing Alexander as holding Space-Time to be a category of existence, we should clarify the matter now. Space-Time is the "ultimate reality, the basic matrix of all things."⁸⁸ Space-Time is neither a category, nor a substance, "but it is the stuff of substances."⁸⁹ As Stiernotte understands Alexander, "all existents are

not merely immersed in the fullness of Space-Time, but are made of it. . . . All existents from the simplest electron or proton to the most complex, man himself, are configurations of Space-Time, complexities of Space-Time."⁹⁰ Metz enlarges on this view, understanding Alexander to mean that Space-Time is the "logical presupposition" of all existents, a sort of "framework of the world."⁹¹ Alexander himself would concur with those physicists who declare Space-Time to be a quasi-physical entity from which the universe is made.⁹² In a like manner Sir Arthur Eddington regards finite existents as contours or singularities of Space.²³

Although quasi-physical, Space-Time should not be regarded as finite, for we have come to know by experience that Space-Time is infinite. Each finite space which we encounter is part of a wider space, all of which are part of self-contained infinite Space.⁹⁴ Alexander takes the infinity of the universe to be an empirical fact, and one which we can gather from mathematics.

Now the mathematician means by an infinite whole that which contains within itself, as a part, something which can be obtained from it by a process in which all its various elements are represented or transformed. I will illustrate this abstract and abstruse statement by the simplest case of infinity we have -- the system of numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc. This system is not infinite merely because we can never get to the end of it, but for quite a different reason. Perform on each number of the system an operation. . . . Double each number; the resulting infinite series, 2, 4, 6, 8, etc., is already contained in the original. An infinite thus is not merely a magnified finitude. On the contrary, the finite is just that which, when an operation is performed on its members like that, described above, yields, as a result, something which is not contained in the original. Take the finite series 1, 2, 3. 4. 5. Double each number; we have 2, 4, 6, 8, 10; and some of these numbers do not form part of the original, and by no operation can you get a result entirely contained in the original. This simple but illuminating conception shows us that finitude is thus a defective infinitude. 95

In such a way the universe is finite, not as a fine grown big, but as a self-contained whole of infinite parts, as well. How this infinite matrix relates to the finites within it becomes now the subject of our discussion.

C. Cosmogony: a formula for Space-Time

It follows that "the universe may be expressed without remainder in terms of Space-Time." We have now to determine how the undifferentiated universe of Space-Time is resolved into the physical qualities and configurations which are the empirical finites known to man. We recall that Alexander holds Space to be "generated in . . . or by Time."97 sc that "Space may . . . be imaged as the trail of Time." Time. we will discover now. is preeminent over Space as "an efficient Agent ..., conceived as the principle of motion and change." which acts on the finites of the universe. Where Platonic and standard theistic philosophy regard Time as a creature, Alexander ascribes creativity to 100 Time, so that the "infinite which is Space-Time . . . is not a creator but is subject to the ongoing creative process which is Time." Erich Frank interprets Alexander's notion of Time as an "elan vital of the universe," for Alexander speaks of phases of existence within the universe passing into each other with motion in Time. Moreover. Space-Time possesses potentiality, discharged as various kinds of existents unfold with the passage of Time.

Stiernotte, understanding Alexander's view of Space-Time as a

universal matrix, comments that

Space-Time is a creative <u>[sic]</u> being, a matrix containing whirlpools of motion, groups of motion within the finite elements of space and time, but sustained by the all-encompassing total Space-Time and intimately connected with it. These structures of motion are not all alike, obviously. They vary from the simple "lines of advance" among the point-instants in primordial Space-Time to the complex motions associated with mind.¹⁰⁵

By a mysterious process there emerge, from these whirlpools of motion within Space-Time, qualities, the finites of empirical existence.¹⁰⁶ Time is creative, for it is the principle of motion, the ultimate creative agent of finite existents.

To comprehend the creation of the world is no simple task, Alexander admits, and it is a frequent habit of mind to attribute such creation to a purposeful mind:

The creations we know are finite predicates of nature or manufacture of art. But when we ask ourselves about the creation of the world we stumble, because we carry these pictures about with us and we try to interpret by their help what is beyond the reach of pictures. Thus because for us a statue or a picture or a scientific theory or a steam engine is brought into being by a mind or spirit operating upon matter, or a great and beautiful fancy comes or seems to come out of our minds, we imagine a spirit which is an indefinite enlargement of ours, which educes the world from we know not where by the fiat of his will. Strictly speaking, we cannot ask of the whole how it came into being, for all these conceptions, coming into being, production, causation, willing, decrees, belong to the parts of the world and not to the world as a whole.¹⁰⁷

Initial cosmic creation, then, is beyond man's knowledge, and questions of the creation of Space-Time are futile questions,¹⁰⁸ creation rightly belonging only to the empirical finites of the universe. To speak of the genesis of the world is to traffic in the unknown and unknowable. Still more, it is to bow to a misleading habit of mind.

At best, we can speak of the whole of the universe as self-created,

the cause of itself, and therefore uncreated. Still, the universe is <u>creative</u> and accordingly must contain "some principle or character"¹⁰⁹ of creation, manifested in the growth of crystals, for example. Though creation appears to be without purpose, the creation of purposive finites apparently gives purpose to the universe itself.¹¹⁰ By its creative power the universe gives birth to a "whole hierarchy of things," ranging from "what appears as mechanical action at one end," to "true purpose at the other."¹¹¹ For the universe is in process, and it is also, therefore, in progress, progress that is guaranteed by the "historicity of things," 112 and based upon the "restlessness of Time." The restlessness of Time

became a progressive <u>nisus</u>, and the form that this <u>nisus</u> had taken was open to observation in common life and in the sciences . . [as] cosmic and metaphysical evolution . . . of the "emergent" type . . . , each [evolutionary] stage . . . novel in kind.¹¹³

The same impulse which produces science and art are unified in the nisus of the universe: we observe the tendency of all things to progress. "The power of Time to create new existents becomes in the artist the creative urge to produce a work of art."^{11/1} On a primary level Space-Time is the ground of all development, and from the motion of Space-Time, "Time sweeps out into Space ever more complex configurations of finite existence."¹¹⁵ Alexander takes Time seriously; he has an historical conception of nature, and that conception compels him to view the world as selfcreated.¹¹⁶ "Novelty is of the essence of history and so it is of the world of things. Every event is, considered strictly, new; there is in particular an 'emergence' of novel characters in things."¹¹⁷

Emergence is the process whereby new finites come into being. They

are pieces of Space-Time, formed of the primordial matrix,¹¹⁸ but ex-¹¹⁹ actly how such novelties emerge Alexander cannot explain.¹²⁰ Bertram Brettschneider regards it as a weakness¹²⁰ that Alexander seeks to de-¹²¹ scribe emergence rather than explain it.¹²¹ Nevertheless, he is sure that things do come into existence in Time, the finites of the world we know developing from the spatio-temporal matrix which of its own possesses only the quality of motion. New qualities rise out of new complexities, new levels of existence emerging from lower levels as new collocations or constellations of motion subvene upon the lower level. From a lower level emerges a next higher level with a new quality, different in kind from the quality immediately below. That new quality is

distinctive of the higher complex. The quality and the constellation of motions to which it belongs are at once new and expressible without residue in terms of the process proper to the level from which they emerge.¹²²

Professor Laird objects to Alexander's notion that a universe in process must be, as well, a universe in progres. "If we accept the premise (which I am personally unable to reject)," Laird states,

that process belongs to the marrow of all existence, including God's, we might boggle at the further premise that process must be progress, and again at the gloss that such progress is quite clearly and specifically along the emergent ladder of the nisus. If Space-Time in its early career was a fluid fi.e., changing sub-material magna the emergence of materiality would seem to be a universal cosmic step. But what of "life?" According to many ... "life" does not differ in kind from the non-living chemical configurations. There is no such rung on the ladder.¹²³

The objection simply stated is this: how can we know that the emergence of life is a progressive step beyond the emergence of chemical process? If life is not different in kind from the level putatively below it, then life represents merely a variety of chemical process. But Alexander may retort that surely life is not different in kind, for life and chemical processes are both finite physical entities. Notwithstanding that similarity, life differs in complexity and organization and represents a progressive step in that regard. It differs "in kind" only where "kind" means "quality" and "quality" is reducible to "complexity."

Increase in complexity is the source of progress in the emergence of finites in the universe. The infinite world of primordial Space-Time, which has no quality other than that of motion, "breaks up,"¹²⁴ "of its own nature,"¹²⁵ "into parts held together within the stuff of the world which I must call the <u>one</u> stuff."¹²⁶ The infinite Space-Time gives birth to finite emergents, which, on the primary level, beyond that of primordial Space-Time, are "simple motions of different velocities or intensities of motion and different extents of it."¹²⁷ The interaction of Space and Time with one another causes the emergence of finites.

Time and Space, either of them, creates differences in the other or breaks it up. But in a special sense Time is the author of finitude, for it is the transition intrinsic to Time which in the first place makes motion possible, and secondly provides for the ceaseless rearrangements in Space through which groupings of motion are possible.¹²⁸

The process of emergence continues beyond the first breaking of infinite primordial Space-Time into finites, so that the matrix "generates into the infinite variety of things in all their grades of development."¹²⁹

But Space-Time, because it is infinite, is not used up in the process.

John W. McCarthy characterizes Alexander's view of creation or emergence as Platonic:

When a new class of finites is created a previous unity is shattered. Apparently, too, it is always a class and not an individual which is born. And the great original keeps forever cracking up and exploding into ever more pluralistic forms as the creative process goes on. Creation, in this sense, is similar to the descent of the ideal forms into a world of concretions.¹³⁰

But the shattering of Space-Time is not exactly the "descent of the ideal" into the concrete world. It might be better to represent Alexander's view as an ascent toward an ideal, but that ideal should not be regarded as a pattern of the universe.

Emergence continues beyond the appearance of variety of motion, giving birth to a hierarchy of qualities, "a series of finites growing in complexity,"¹³¹ differing from one another in their degree of complexity and organization. The process is altogether natural.

Material things have certain motions of their own which carry the quality of materials. In the presence of light they are endowed with the secondary quality of color. Physical and chemical processes of a certain complexity have the quality of life. The new quality of life emerges with this constellation of such processes, and therefore life is a physico-chemical complex and is not merely physical and chemical, for these terms do not sufficiently characterise the new complex which in the course and order of time has been generated out of them. . . . The higher quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its roots therein, but it emerges therefrom, and it does not belong to that lower level, but constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with its special laws of behaviour.¹³²

Each level of finite existent bears its own "characteristic empirical quality."¹³³ Mind is the highest level of emergence known to man and Alexander calls the next higher empirical quality beyond the highest

known "deity."¹³⁴ Also, note that Alexander regards increasing complexity of the emergents as increasing perfection, but not as increasing reality. The higher levels are more perfect than the lower levels from which they emerged, as mind is more perfect than matter, but the reality of the lower levels on which the higher levels are built is in no way impugned.¹³⁵ In fact, since the higher level is dependent on the lower level for its existence, the lower level's reality is preserved in the higher level. We noted, for example, that life, although it is not merely physical and chemical is <u>also</u> a physico-chemical process with greater complexity than mere physico-chemical processes.

A hierarchy of qualities is

the cardinal doctrine of emergent evolution, the theory that nature is stratified, for at critical points in the history of nature, a new quality arises, such as 1', and the existent previously characterised by 1 processes and the correlated quality, is now characterised by both 1 and 1', and the existent is now on level L'. The existent on this level may emerge on a higher level L' through the addition of a higher quality L' [sic] which now characterizes the existent in question. But it is to be noted that the quality 1'' in no sense destroys qualities 1 and 1' so that the object--no less than nature--is stratified along these qualities. 136

The higher emergent preserves and grows out of the lower,¹³⁷ and, as John Elof Boodin observes, "the future somehow is an outgrowth of the past and therefore the order of the past cannot be indifferent to it."¹³⁸ Alexander would say that the view of emergence which he and Boodin share takes Time seriously for it recognizes that the universe is historical through and through.¹³⁹ Within the historical universe we observe the development of the hierarchy of qualities.

These levels are, in Alexander's system, first the level of Space-Time itself during the part of history which lies before

any qualitied emergents have arisen; the level of matter; the level of physico-chemical changes including the simplest chemical change as well as the most complex reaction of highly organized molecules, such as the proteins; the level of life; the level of mind, and finally the level of deity, which is the quality next in order of emergence and complexity to that of mind. Each level is characterized by its specific quality, and the quality is not merely added but depends upon the complexity . . . of the lower levels.¹⁴⁰

But Professor Laird objects to Alexander's doctrine of emergence within the historicity of things. He admits himself unable to determine anywhere from Alexander's own writings what might be meant by "higher" in the hierarchy of emergent evolution. Laird himself suggests a solution to this problem:

We should have to say that "higher" means whatever is common to the superiority of life over matter and of mind over life. But what is it that is common to these? The answer, so far as I can see, would have to be given in terms very similar to Herbert Spencer's "definite coherent heterogeneity." It would be an affair of efficient complexity, somewhat darkened by the reflection [sic] that each rung in the ladder differed in kind from its predecessor.¹⁴²

Laird's suggestion amounts to the standard interpretation of Alexander that being <u>higher</u> within the hierarchy of actual finite emergents amounts to being greater in integrated complexity than the immediately preceding level. This greater integrated complexity, however, is also new simplicity.

The new creation inherits the ancient ways out of which it grows, but it simplifies the old complexity. [In the historical development of democracy, for example,] there was a chaos of conflicting forces; men's minds were groping confusedly in a tangle of divergent and intercrossing interests; there was a vast unrest; the old habits were lingering on though they had lost their convincingness and bred dissatisfaction; experiment after experiment upon the traditional lines had failed. . . Suddenly, at the bidding of some great single mind, or oftener perhaps of some conspiration of many minds, stirred to their depths with obscure foreboding of the future birth of time, and finely if still vaguely troubled . . . a light had arisen; the discordant elements fall into their places, and the complexity gives way to simplicity. The synthesis is no mere reconciliation; it is creative.¹⁴³ While emergence seems purposive, we take care not to press our analogy-for we have seen that it might be inappropriate to look for an analogue to "some great single mind" in the historical development of the universe (if that mind be God) --and we observe in our comparison of social emergence (revolution) with existential emergent evolution that the matter of <u>integration</u> of complexity is vitally important. For "nature is . . . history of organic growth in which the new type . . . is . . . at once more complex and more highly simplified."¹⁴⁵ Professor Laird has not led us astray.

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A further feature of Alexander's emergent evolution is that it ascribes infinite potentiality to Space-Time. "Space-Time in its intrinsic character of infinitude and continuity is not exhausted by any of its predicates."¹⁴⁶ At least, there is no justification or reason for the belief that the infinitude of Space-Time has exhausted itself with the emergence of mind. ¹⁴⁷ Mind may be the highest empirical quality we know, but it is unnecessary to suppose that creative Time would cease with mind.¹⁴⁸ If nature is historical, a growing nature which presents us with a series of finite existents in a hierarchy of qualities, then there is indeed no reason to expect that mind is the last possible emergent quality. The process of emergence itself suggests that it will not stop. Accordingly Alexander postulates a quality beyond mind and assigns it emergent potential: that quality is deity.¹⁴⁹ The "humanization of man," as Rabbi Jacob Kohn calls the emergence of mind, "would then prove only <u>one</u> of the ends of the evolutionary process."¹⁵⁰

A number of objections may be brought against Alexander's view of

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cosmogony. For example, Bishop Fulton J. Sheen voices the predictable Thomistic criticism:

The acceptance of Professor Alexander's theory depends upon the rejection of two elementary laws of being: first, that there can never be movement without a thing that moves; and secondly, that the greater can never come from the less.¹⁵¹

Eishop Sheen is troubled that Alexander understands Space-Time as in motion of its own nature, without a mover to set it in motion. Secondarily, the entire doctrine of emergence requires the renunciation of causation as generally understood by the Thomists. But Sheen and Alexander clearly interpret the data of experience somewhat differently. We doubt that Alexander would be especially moved by the Bishop's objections. Moreover, we cannot help but suspect that Sheen's criticism is tendentious. His real objection seems to be that Alexander's analogue to the prime mover is not the Being of Whom the Bishop would approve.

But more serious objections to Alexander's metaphysics derive from the empirical sciences which he, himself, holds deaw. The doctrine of emergence appears to be at odds with the common scientific view of a degenerating universe. McCarthy considers the problem "a great strain on his [Alexander's] reasoning,"¹⁵² and Stiernotte finds Dean Inge's criticism a "forthright attack,"¹⁵³ that Alexander's system violates the second law of thermodynamics.

Inge's objection is a matter of physical law. We have a view of 154 the universe, he tells us, that suggests entropy, a "running down like 155 a clock," so that the universe, taken as a whole, is passing from a state where energy is concentrated to a state where energy is evenly distributed.

The Platonists hold that there is a nisus toward the spiritual life, unconscious in the organic world and partly conscious in all the varied forms of living creatures. It is extremely doubtful whether such a nisus can be admitted as a general law of nature. The so-called higher forms . . . are superior, from the point of view of the evolutionists, only as long as the environment gives them a superior survival value. . . And the time will almost certainly come when only the simpler and less differentiated forms of life will survive, for a time, amid the rigours of a dying world. The triumphs of evolution, as we consider them, will then vanish, and man will follow the dinosaurs and the dodo into extinction.¹⁵⁷

The criticism is significant, yet it is not fatal to Alexander's metaphysics of emergence. Stiernotte cites the speculative astronomy of Fred Hoyle which supports, but does not prove, Alexander's system. Hoyle (in a later and revised edition of his work, published after Stiernotte's book) postulates atronomical principles which suggest a continuous creation of matter out of an interstellar gas of inexhaustible supply. 159 an entity akin to Alexander's notion of primordial Space-Time as the matrix of all existence. The universe, as Hoyle understands it, is neither in decay nor in progressive growth, but is in equilibrium; the availability of matter-energy is a constant. William Pepperell Montague also lends support to Alexander. Montague declares that the second law of thermodynamics does seem all pervasive, that there is a "one-way tendency of energy to flow from the more concentrated, differentiated, and organized conditions to the more dissipated, more uniform, and more random conditions." Nevertheless, we find that life seems to viclate the law, for "protoplasm presents us with concentration rather than dissipation of energies, and with an increase of differentiation and organization and thus with at least temporary and local decreases of entropy."

A. S. Eddington is rigidly committed to the second law of

thermodynamics, yet his interpretation of entropy is somewhat in consonance with Alexander's formula of emergence. Eddington observes that with the movement or progress of time the degree of randomness in the universe increases. As the random element increases, so does the chance that a "fortuitous concourse of atoms, . . . <u>a much prized rarity</u>,"¹⁶⁴ might come into existence, thermodynamical equilibrium, for example, in which entropy cannot occur as there is already a maximum of possible randomness.¹⁶⁵ And it is Eddington's interpretation of the second law of thermodynamics that the whole universe can potentially attain thermodynamical equilibrium "at an <u>infinitely remote</u> [italics ming] date in ¹⁶⁶ The universe, as it were, is striving after such an equilibrium and as equilibrium approaches from the infinite future entropy and randomness increase.

Moreover, the increase of randomness occasions greater chance and time thereby takes on a dynamic quality which is irreversible.¹⁶⁸ It is a dynamic quality which is ingrained in human reason.¹⁶⁹ Deny it and Eddington issues this challenge:

Show your good faith by reversing the dynamic quality of time (which you may freely do if it has no importance in Nature), and, just for a change, give us a picture of the universe passing from the more random to the less random state, each step showing a gradual victory of antichance over chance. If you are a biologist, teach us how from Man and a myriad other primitive forms of life, Nature in the course of ages achieved the sublimely simple structure of the amoeba. If you are an astronomer, tell how waves of light hurry in from the depths of space and condense on to the stars; how the complex solar system unwinds itself into the eveness of a nebula.¹⁷⁰

The second law of thermodynamics holds true, but Eddington sees it as no threat to the belief in the emergent evolution of the universe. Rather,

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he develops his own evolutionary system in which entropy, productive of randomness and chance, of a "shuffling"¹⁷¹ of the matrix, underwrites evolutionary progress.

Alexander's system is strikingly similar. For "increase of randomness" in the one, read "increase of complexity" in the other. For "thermodynamical equilibrium 'at an infinitely remote date in the future,'" substitute "deity." <u>Mutatis mutandis</u>, Alexander's metaphysics is rescued from Dean Inge's criticism.

Yet Inge raises another objection, one which he considers more serious. He admits that evidence requires us to affirm the reality of evolutionary process in our experience of the universe.

The theory of evolution is legitimate when applied to certain parts of the universe, such as the recent history of the species to which we happen to belong. To assume that this local and temporary phenomenon is the primary law of the macrocosm is the extreme of provincialism.¹⁷²

The objection, simply stated, is that we may discover by observation of the sector of the universe which we know that emerger: evolution is indeed taking place. Nevertheless, we have not the right to postulate emergent evolution as the law applicable to Space-Time throughout the entire universe, both known and unknown. "The limited evidence of life on this planet is too weak to infer a similar evolutionary series for the universe with its millions of galaxies."¹⁷³ Nevertheless, Alexander might (but does not) reply that the principle of relativity requires that those laws which hold good for that perspective of Space-Time which we have must hold good for all of Space-Time in its entirety. "For the principle of relativity is simply a statement that our local results do indeed have universal validity." Alexander reasons analogically from the portion of the universe of which we have direct knowledge to the whole of the universe. Explicitly and implicitly he declares an analogical principle in his work, and "the 175 we have seen already, for example, how Alexander declares that there is a nisus in the universe akin to the artistic impulse in man,¹⁷⁶ but the highest and most important use of analogy in Alexander's metaphysics is found in his declaration of monism in Space-Time. In brief, as McCarthy sees it,

Time is the mind of Space. Materiality is the mind of matter. A secondary quality is the mind of certain primary motions. Life is the mind of an organic being. Thus every finite is constructed on the basis of this metaphysical formula which we discover in ourselves . . . , 177

that we ourselves are unions of body with mind. Alexander discovers the very principle of emergence by analogy, reasoning from what we do know of the world to what we do not know, even to levels beyond our own place in the hierarchy of existents.¹⁷⁸

He wishes to be careful in the use of analogy; "Now the use of analogy lies in its relevance; it misleads if it is not adapted to the new situation in which it is employed."¹⁷⁹ But cautious though he be, Alexander specifically recommends the use of analogy when trying to discover the nature of the universe. Creation of the universe, for example, may be beyond our knowledge, but creation in art certainly is not.¹⁸⁰ Art, as Alexander understands it, is a "fusion of spirit and matter in finite ingredients." Similarly, in Space-Time, we find the same kind of fusion: "Time is, as it were, the mind to the body which is space."¹⁸²

And, further, reasoning from the union of body and mind which we

find in living conscious man, Alexander discovers that "there neither is Space without Time nor Time without Space; any more than life exists without a body."¹⁸³ The union of mind and body in man provides Alexander with a "clue to the interpretation of the lower levels of existence,"¹⁸⁴ and with an insight into the nature of the totality of the universe.¹⁸⁵

Time as a whole and in its parts bears to Space as a whole and in its corresponding parts a relation analogous to the relation of mind to its equivalent bodily or nervous basis; or to put the matter shortly that Time is the mind of Space and Space the body of Time. According to this formula the world as a whole and each of its parts is built on the model with which we are familiar in ourselves as persons, that is a union of mind and body, and in particular as a union of mind and brain. But as this may lead to the misapprehension that we are the standard and exemplar of things, the statement is better made in the reverse and truer form that we are examples of a pattern which is universal and is followed not only by things but by Space-Time itself. In any point-instant the instant is the mind or soul of its point; in a group of points there is a mind of those points, which upon the primary level of Space-Time itself is the corresponding time of the complex. Qualities will be seen to be the special form which on each successive level of existence the mind element assumes. . . . The relation of Time to Space is not absolutely identical with that of mind to its body . . . but analogous to it, or rather that which corresponds to it under the simpler conditions of the case.

Although Space and Time are equal partners of the universe, we see here that Time assumes a certain preeminent function, being the mind of Space-Time.¹⁸⁷ But this does not give Time greater reality than Space. Mind and matter are equally real; if we apply the analogy, Time and Space are equally real.

For Alexander, man becomes the "<u>pattern</u> of all things rather than 188 the <u>measure</u> of all things," as Professor Stiernotte puts it. But we must exercise care not to regard man as a prescriptive pattern. He is a pattern only insofar as he participates in the universe of Space-Time which is constructed in its totality and in its parts along the lines of

a mind-body monism. The pattern of the universe "is not based on us, but rather . . . we exemplify the pattern of the universe."¹⁸⁹ Moreover, we should not understand the mind-body monism of Space-Time too literally. To say that Time is the mind or soul of Space means that Time performs toward Space "the office of soul to its equivalent body."¹⁹⁰

The mind-body relation of Time and Space is discoverable, as well, in the emergents from the universe of Space-Time. "The emergent quality of a level appears . . . as the mind of this level, and the level itself as the bodily stuff from which the new form emerges." ¹⁹¹ Rudolf Metz discovers a problem with this understanding of emergence. Every emergent in the hierarchy of existents may be viewed as a union of mind and body, in an analogical sense.

There is, therefore, nothing dead in the universe, and we must view space-time itself as somehow animated and endowed with life. Alexander's doctrine, therefore, ends in a panvitalism or pampsychism <u>sic</u>, which is sharply opposed to the strictly empirical foundation on which he professed to build his metaphysics. Although this speculation too is evidently inspired by upwardlooking ideas, it is plain that it inflicts a mortal wound upon the emergence doctrine. For now the boundary between the two levels of mind and body is to a large extent obliterated and the fruitful thought of the emergent as the creatively new loses all its importance.

As G. Dawes Hicks understands the point, "mental process and neural process are . . . not two but one,"¹⁹³ and this makes questionable the degree to which the former might be called an emergent from the latter. If finite existents in Space-Time are to be understood along the lines of mind-body monism which Alexander conceives as the pattern of all existence, then to what degree can a new quality be considered creatively new, really novel, and emergent from the level to which it performs the office of mind?

Stiernotte raises a further problem with Alexander's application of the analogy of mind and body to Space-Time and all the emergents in it. Like Metz's objection, it is the problem of panpsychism.

Can we be so certain that Space-Time itself and its parts are constituted on a union of body and mind? Can we assume that this general pattern pervades the universe and all its existents? If so, how shall we interpret the following questions? What is the mind of the earth? What is the mind of the solar system, of our galaxy of some tens of billions of stars? Is the color of the star the mind of its atomic constituents? If a star has no color, such as the dark companion of Sirius, then just where is its "mind"? The danger of applying "mind" to inorganic objects leads to such a fantastic speculation as investing molecules with psychic qualities--a strange view. . . It seems that the term "mind" may be taken only in a metaphorical or analogical sense.¹⁹⁴

Professor Stiernotte has well illustrated the danger in understanding Alexander too literally, as did Metz. Stiernotte's conclusion that "'mind' may be taken only in a metaphorical or analogical sense," is precisely the point which Alexander makes. The formula for Space-Time as a mindbody union is merely functional, not literal.¹⁹⁵ It is, furthermore, inappropriate to inquire about the mind of the earth or the mind of the sclar system, for every finite may be regarded as a union of body and mind only insofar as it is an emergent from a lower level and the locus of the emergence of a higher level. To speak of the earth as a whole, for example, is not to speak of a single-level emergent, but of a composite creature, constituted of finites at several levels within the hierarchy. The earth itself, on Alexander's scheme, would have no mind. Only the basic finite existents which comprise the earth can be resolved into unions of body and mind, and this resolution remains purely analogical and metaphorical.

"'Mind' here does not mean consciousness or thought, which is the

quality characteristic of the level we call mind proper. It is 'mind' in an analogical sense, the characteristic of a new qualitative synthesis."¹⁹⁶ Both Metz and Stiernotte, who suspect Alexander of panpsychism, require us to hold rigidly to a philistime conception of mind, whereas Alexander uses the term freely and figuratively.

When we say that Time is the mind of Space, or that secondary qualities are the mind of extension, we do not mean a human mind. In fact, such a deliverance would not constitute an analogy at all. What we mean is that a secondary quality performs the office of mind to extension. The mind of extension constitutes a different quality than our human mind. Similarly, when we say that mind is a form of Time, we mean the mind is one of the evolutionary products of Time, but we are not identifying mind and Time.¹⁹⁷

In point of fact, Time as the mind of Space-Time is not at all like the 198 human mind in quality, but is "more and not less elementary than ours." New emergent qualities in Space-Time, furthermore, are more complicated than the level from which they emerge, just as mind is more complicated than life. In this sense we mean that the new quality "may be called 199 with proper caution" the mind of the lower level from which it emerged, for it performs to that level the office of mind insofar as it is an emergent from that level. We must also exercise caution when we call Time the mind of Space, for Time is not an emergent from Space. Space-Time is an indissoluble union.

We see that Alexander uses the principle of analogy as a unifying principle, ²⁰¹ for the union of matter and mind in man is one "example of a more fundamental cosmic plan which is Space with its 'mind' or 'soul,' ²⁰² Time." The pattern is applicable to all emergents in Space-Time, and Stiernotte understands its application as follows:

Mind		Time		Instant		Primary qualities
Body	as	Space	85	Point	85	Elementary motion of primordial matrix of Space-Time
					-	and the second second second

Qualities expressive of life Secondary qualities 35 as Secondary qualities Primary qualities

Quality of deity Qualities of mind 25 38 Quality of mind. Qualities of life

All existents are ultimately complexities of Space-Time, but throughout the hierarchy from the lowest to highest level, there is an aspect which performs to the level im-mediately below it the office of mind.²⁰³

D. Empiricism and the a priori

204 We have determined already that Alexander regards mind as a type of finite existence, having no greater or lesser reality than other kinds of finite existents, although it is qualitatively distinct from the levels below it out of which it emerges. Alexander considers this conclusion about the equal reality of mind and matter as fundamental to the "empirical method in metaphysics." 205 He considers his philosophical method as alwogether empirical, similar in style to the scientific method. Knowledge, as acquired in science, Alexander tells us, requires that we postulate a hierarchy of existent things according to which the world is historical, and out of which new and ever greater -- that is, more com-206 plex--existents emerge.

All of the assertions Alexander makes about the character of the world of Space-Time are, according to his system, grounded in experience. To begin, the infinitude of Space-Time is an experienced fact, derived from the "perceptual datum . . . that each finite space is part of a wider one." 207 Moreover, the notion of an infinite world is in no way contradicted by the data of experience. Indeed, the data of experience, empirically gained knowledge, require that we consider Space-Time to be infinite.

The conception of an infinite world contains nothing which does not follow the lines of experience. The nisus in the world which drives it, because of Time, to the generation of fresh empirical qualities is a verifiable fact. Its extension from mind to deity is an application of analogy, but an analogy which is no more than an extension of what can be traced as existent already. But the notion depends undoubtedly on the hypothesis which has inspired . . . our whole interpretation of things.²⁰⁸

The very way we conceive the world requires that we recognize its infinity as being a matter of experience.

Emergent qualities in Space-Time are empirical,too.²⁰⁹ They are presented to us in our intercourse with the world. Each successive level in the hierarchy has its own "characteristic empirical quality," and even the not-yet-emerged quality of deity is empirical, ²¹¹ although it is unknown.²¹² Every emergent is of greater quality than the level from which it emerged. We know this "as a matter of observed empirical fact."²¹³ All original and fundamental knowledge of things comes to us in our dealing with them, through practice,²¹⁴ through experience, that is. Knowledge of things is a matter of discovery of their reality, and is not a matter of the mind's creation of the object of knowledge.²¹⁵ Even awareness of our own minds is a matter of experienced fact, deriving from our awareness of mental processes which occur in the brain.²¹⁶

But rather than list examples of Alexander's empiricism, we prefer to understand how he employs the empirical method in philosophy. By empirical Alexander does not mean that his philosophy is sensationalistic. Indeed, the same realism which stripped mind of its pretensions to superior reality strips the senses of their unique claim on experience. Specifically, by calling his method empiricism Alexander does not mean

that an empirical philosophy is in some prerogative manner concerned with sense experience. The senses have no privilege in experience, but that they are the means by which our minds through our bodies are affected by external objects. Sensations though integral parts of experience are not the only ones. Thoughts are experienced as much as sensations, and are vital to experience. . . A philosophy which pursues an empirical method is not necessarily a sensationalistic one. It deals with the actual world, but the parts of it with which it deals empirically are nonempirical parts of that actual world. The contrast of thought and sense is from this point of view irrelevant.²¹⁷

Here Alexander makes an important distinction between empiricism, which he considers his system to be, and sensationalism, a more limited branch of empiricism which, Alexander would tell us, denies the reality of thoughts, considering them merely the products of mind and essentially incapable of being experienced. Alexander, for reasons which will become apparent later in this section and again in a later chapter, ²¹⁸ wishes to preserve the reality of unsensed data of experience.

While he considers his method scientific in that it is empirical, he does not wish to assert that his philosophy is able to make predictions about emergence from data and hypotheses with which experience presents us. There is novelty in the emerging universe, and that novelty indicates that prediction is impossible.²¹⁹ New emergent qualities cannot be predicted, but "can only be known to him who experiences them."²²⁰ While Alexander's system allows him to predict that new emergents will develop, their character and quality is unpredictable.

Thus to an observer in France in the eighteenth century it might have been plain that some revolution and reconstruction was inevitable. He might with sufficient knowledge have calculated beforehand the movements in mechanical, or even physiological, terms of all the actors. But he could not predict that these movements meant for the actors the new idea of democratic freedom

He would only predict its appearance in forms of movement or at most of life.²²¹

That is, it might be possible, on the basis of empirical knowledge, to predict new complexities or constellations of motion in Space-Time. But it is not possible to predict the new qualities which will emerge from new complexities.²²²

Brettschneider considers this limitation on predictability to be a severe problem in Alexander's metaphysics. Since we cannot predict the exact nature of new qualities which will arise out of new constellations of motion, "no necessity attaches to empirical predictions."²²³ On the basis of the empirical data he has acquired, Alexander has postulated a progressive, emerging universe. But, since predictions and what they postulate are not necessary,

it is not unreasonable that a case may be made for the regressiveness of the universe. There is no necessity to the prediction of progressiveness of the universe. From certain perspectives what seems progressive may actually turn out regressive.²²⁴

Since Alexander cannot guarantee his predictions with the certainty of the hypothesis-and-data-based expectations of the special sciences, his whole emergent formula is undermined. He has provided no rules for emergence,²²⁵ but only a description. Accordingly, the system is weakened. It fails to adhere to the empiricism upon which Alexander bases his cosmic view. The very doctrine of emergence, the heart of his system, mitigates his empiricism.

It is equally limited by Alexander's notion of the categories, the central core of his metaphysics, according to Metz.²²⁶ Philosophy is a science which deals with "certain ultimate questions about the nature of things,"²²⁷ Alexander tells us. Like the special sciences, philosophy is empirically based and is empirically oriented. But while the special sciences are concerned with "the empirical characters of various kinds of ²²⁸ existences and their empirical laws," metaphysics is concerned with considerably more, "with certain comprehensive features of experience which lie outside the purview of the special sciences." ²²⁹ It is the task of metaphysics to deal with "the fundamental or <u>a priori</u> characters of things . . . and the relations that subsist between them." ²³⁰ The method of metaphysics remains empirical like the method of the special sciences.

But the word empirical must not be too closely pressed. It is intended to mean nothing more than the method used in the special sciences. It is a description of method and not of subject-matter. . . . On the contrary, the subject-matter of philosophy is, in a special and more valuable sense of the word, non-empirical. Taking it as self-evident that whatever we know is apprehended in some form of experience, we can distinguish in experienced things . . . the variable from the pervasive characters. I shall call this the distinction of the empirical from the non-empirical or a priori or categorical. These a priori elements of things are, however, experienced just as much as the empirical ones: all alike are parts of the experienced world. Philosophy may therefore be described as the experimental or empirical study of the non-empirical or apriori and of such questions as arise out of the relation of the empirical to the a priori. It is thus itself one of the sciences delimited from the others by its special subject-matter. 231

Father Copleston understands Alexander's statement to mean that meta-232 physics is concerned with the world as a whole. Philosophy is breader in scope than the special sciences, but it too

proceeds by description and analysis, and uses, as the empirical sciences do, hypotheses, which it submits to verification. On the other hand, the subject-matter of philosophy is non-empirical; philosophy is concerned with the pervasive or categorical characters of things, as distinguished from their variable features.²³³

Philosophy uses the methods of the special sciences to discover and to understand the non-empirical nature of finite empirical existents.

Such finites have empirical qualities which we discover through our

ordinary experiences of them. But empirical existents bear both empirical characters which are variable and non-empirical or categorical characters which are pervasive. Variable characters are such as the qualities of life or consciousness, which not all finite existents possess. But all finite existents have the pervasive characters: the categories of identity, substance, diversity, magnitude and number, for example, These pervasive features of all existents are the categories. While they are not empirical, they are essential of all which exists. The categories are not dependent upon the complexity of the object, but are constitutive of that complexity, so that the qualities "are variations of them in empirical circumstance." Categories are of experience, and in that wider respect are empirical, 237 although they remain <u>a priori</u> and basically non-empirical.

They are of experience in that they are "fundamental properties or determinations of Space-Time itself, not taken as a whole, but in every portion of it,"²³⁸ and hence they belong to all empirical existents which are differentiations, complexities, or portions of Space-Time. But the categories are not thereby applicable to Space-Time. Rather, finite emergents "flow from the nature of the space-times which they occupy or which they are,"²³⁹ and are therefore subject to the categories "which are the features or determinations of the space-times themselves."²⁴⁰ As fundamental of Space-Time, the categories can neither be defined nor completely described, for there is nothing simpler or other than Space-Time in terms of which they may be expressed.²⁴¹ While "Space-Time itself . . . is beyond any categorical determination, . . . any portion of Space-Time, finite or infinite, possesses categorical characters."²⁴²

Though a priori, the categories are not products of mind, but are objective, descriptive of real space-times. Alexander's historical view of the universe requires the assertion that "nothing is real but what is given somehow in experience."²⁴³ If the categories are to be real. they must be connected to experience of the real world and may not be constructs of mind by which it understands or orders experience. Alexander, accordingly, does not consider the categories to be mental tools. They "are not imposed on empirical existents by the mind but belong intrinsically to any existent and are permanent patterns in the whirlpools of Space-Time." Experience, qua experience, is already ordered and does not need the mind to impose categories on it. "All things come into being endowed with the categories."²⁴⁶ Without the categories experience would not be experience. Without the categories experience is inconceivable. Categorical characters of things differ from qualities not in the way which Kant imagined, the former belonging strictly to mind, but in pervasiveness as opposed to variability. The ubiquitous categories are in all experience and are characteristic of all existents, whereas experienced qualities may vary with existent and experience. 247

We see how Alexander's empiricism is not extreme, but is yet a significant feature of his metaphysics. The bare data of experience are the information upon which Alexander bases his discussion of forms of existence, the emergent hierarchy of the qualities, and all characters of existence, including the non-empirical categories which we discover to be determinants of the empirical as they are essential of all experience. Alexander considers himself an empiricist in all matters of his philosophy,

both in his consideration of the actual world and in his development of the potential qualities yet to emerge. Such a potential quality is deity, such a study in theology, and it is to Alexander's theology that we now turn.

CHAPTER II

GOD AND DEITY

A. Emergence: a formula for God and deity

Alexander does not attempt to provide a direct definition of God in the theological sections of his work. Whatever God is, God is the being which possesses the quality of deity. Consistent with his metaphysical system of emergence, our author proceeds to develop the place of deity in the all-embracing cosmic matrix of Space-Time in which new emergents evolve. While Alexander bases his emergent system in primordial, undualitied Space-Time, the reality of the universe should not be understood in terms of its lowest level, but in terms of its highest level, beyond that of mind. the highest that is known to man. Space-Time is everemergent. New qualities come into existence with the passage of restless Time, each successive quality exceeding in perfection the qualities that precede it in the hierarchical ladder of existence. "The most perfect finite we know is the human mind, but the plan of emergence which we have observed in the inorganic and organic worlds is prophetic of the next higher quality, that of deity." We have no reason to believe that the process of emergence and creativity would stop with mind, for Time's nature is to be ceaseless in the creation of new finites: "Snace-Time in its intrinsic character of infinitude and continuity is not exhausted by

any of its predicates." Thus do Stiernotte and McCarthy interpret Alexander's formula for Space-Time.

Alexander specifically states that there is no reason to expect the process of emergent evolution to stop with the blossoming out of mind. His cosmic plan is centered not on man but on the total reality of the universe. It would be strange, therefore, for one with Alexander's viewpoint to regard man as the final goal of the process of emergence. The scientific objectivity to which Alexander commits himself requires that evolution continue beyond mind.

Knowledge, science that is to say, points to something in nature beyond what is already known in nature. In nature we have different grades or levels of existence. . . . Now these levels of existence grow up in the order of time, in a series or history. The world of things is through and through an historical world, for history begins not with man but with the stars and perhaps earlier. . . . Life emerges from matter, mind from life. . . . Now the point is this. Nature is historical and grows so as to produce in time a series of emergent qualities of which mind is the highest that we know from direct experience [through enjoyment, of ourselves or [contemplation] of other selves. Why should this process stop? The mere outgrowth of life from matter and mind from life . . . suggests a further quality of existence beyond mind, which is related to mind as mind to life or life to matter. That quality I call deity, and the being which possesses it is God. It seems to me, therefore, that all things point to the emergence of this quality, and that is why I said that science itself, when it takes the wider view, requires deity.

Having established a hierarchy of qualities in accordance with the observed data of the universe, having based the description of that hierarchy in strict (although not rigid) empiricism, Alexander now postulates a new emergent empirical quality, deity, which is the next logical step in the progression that scientifically established emergent evolution suggests. Deity, as a new quality, is an outgrowth of mind, but differe from mind because it represents a new complexity,⁸ a new constellation of motions. The quality of deity, then, is a novel item in the hierarchy of existents, a fresh empirical quality generated by the restlessness of Time. The quality of deity fits into the pattern of the emerging universe. Although it is "the next higher empirical quality to the highest we know,"⁹ still it is an emergent and is therefore logically like any other emergent. It stands in the same relation to the qualities that precede it as does any other emergent stand to the qualities that precede it: "At any level of existence there is a next higher empirical quality which stands towards the lower quality as deity stands towards mind."¹⁰ Deity remains but another element--albeit a higher one than mind--in the universal matrix of Space-Time, produced by the inexhaustible and infinite potentiality of Space-Time.¹¹

The relation that deity bears toward the world is peculiar when compared with the notions of standard theism or pantheism. Alexander regards the world as ever striving toward the emergence, the actualization, of the quality of deity.

Such a conception is not pantheism; according to it the world is not animated by deity as pantheists believe, for deity has not in its distinctive nature as yet emerged at this stage of the world's existence. It merely regards the world as owing such divine character as it has to its nisus or striving toward a higher form of life.12

The relationship becomes more peculiar when we realize that by virtue of its place in the evolutionary scheme, deity owes its future or potential being to the world of finite existents. "Deity, growing as it does out of mind . . . presupposes mind . . . , just as mind presupposes and grows out of life and matter and whatever may be below these."¹³ Finite existents are not mystically lost in deity, "but are the very substance which in their hierarchical order sustain the quality of deity,"¹⁴ for higher qualities in the ladder of existence are ever dependent upon the lower qualities from which they emerge. "The whole of infinite Space-Time, with all the emergent levels of existence with their appropriate empirical qualities, sustains the deity of God, just as a portion of Space-Time . . . sustains its highest quality."¹⁵ Deity relates to the world, then, as the source of its divinity (for the world strives after deity) and as the creation of the cosmic process in which the world is engaged, by which the world, Space-Time that is to say, supports or sustains the highest known empirical quality, mind, as well as the next higher potential quality, that of deity. It is, in this respect, not the soul of the world, but its outcome.

2. A. Jordan understands Alexander's conception of deity as the potential attainment of cosmic purpose through a "kind of blind impulsion rather than by a kind of creative force."¹⁶ As such, deity has no distinctive character apart from being that toward which the world strives as it grows "richer in content and more perfect in value."¹⁷ While Jordan's terminology is somewhat imprecise (in Alexander's terms the world grows more perfect with freshly emerged details rather than richer in content), still we may regard Jordan's view as substantially correct. The developing universe of Space-Time strains after the attainment of the ever-potential quality of deity; we consider that evolutionary process

as purposive only insofar as the later emergents are purposeful creatures, Deity has no actual distinctive character apart from being a potentially existent integrated greater complexity, more perfect than mind.

Edgar Sheffield Brightman also posits, as does Alexander, a notion of creative evolution striving for the attainment of increasing perfection in the actual world, but Brightman attributes self-conscious rational purpose to this evolutionary process. He describes this purpose as the will of a finite God, working "within the limitations not of its own making."¹⁸ Perhaps Brightman has done nothing more than institutionally name and ascribe personality to Alexander's nisus. But like Alexander he foresees a more perfect world: "The general purpose of life and mind and value always find new channels, new avenues of expression. It is never entirely dammed up. The elan vital rushes on."19 This elan vital is certainly more lively and more optimistic an expression than Alexander's blind nisus, but it is, at the same time, ultimately no different. It brings to birth ever more perfect qualities, striving after a great unattainable potential in the infinite future. Each potential fulfilled has beyond it another potential yet to be fulfilled. Brightman ascribes the drive of the process to the will of finite God; Alexander describes the drive as fundamental of the historical nature of Space-Time, as deriving from the restlessness of Time and the motion which Time imparts to the cosmic system.

Alexander has spoken of deity as an emergent, potential quality, one which has not yet been attained in the historical universe of Space-Time. But such a description of deity is a bit parochial: it speaks only

of what deity is to conscious man. Let us interpret the notion of deity more broadly and thereby extend it. Waxing personal, Alexander notes that

It is sometimes said that a man is a god to his dog. This may be true in the case of my wife, Jane, who deserves it, but I almost hope it is not so in my case, for if it were so he has so often brought me my boots that he must long ago have discovered that the feet which wear them are of clay. Yet there is some little foundation to this very metaphysical statement. He finds me mysterious and arbitrary, and while I provide him with good and the pleasure of exercise and company in games, I am, he must think, a creature of moods, and if I cause him pleasure I also cause him pain, and he has perforce to be content. In this respect he feels as any child may feel to a father, or as any man may feel to a person he does not understand. . . . I am, I suppose, to him a feeling animal with strange unaccountable flashes of some unintelligible and compulsive energy to which he submits. . . . I am a part of himself, or rather of the atmosphere in which he lives, and sometimes there is thunder and lightning in it.20

The attitude that Alexander's dog assumes toward his master is akin to the worshipful way in which many traditional theists relate to their God. In this sense we see how the worship-inspiring quality of God, which for now we shall call his deity, is a variable quality, one which may be ascribed to any existent higher in the emergent ladder than the specific worshipper.²¹

In Alexandrian metaphysics we call this a generalized description of deity, and it is much more profound than comes clear in the account of a dog's putative religion, although it is basic in that account. Alexander, it follows, regards deity as a variable quality.

It is clear that, while for us men deity is the next higher empirical quality to mind, the description of deity is perfectly general. For any level of existence, deity is the next higher empirical quality. It is therefore a variable quality, and as the world grows in time, deity changes with it. On each level a new quality looms ahead, awfully, which plays to it the part of deity. . . To creatures upon the level of life, deity is still the quality in front, but to us who came later this quality has been revealed as mind. For creatures who possessed only the primary qualities, --mere empirical configurations of spacetime, -- deity was what afterwards appeared as materiality. . . On each level of finite creatures deity is for them some 'unknown' (though not 'unexperienced') quality in front. . . . 22 Stiernotte sees that it follows from Alexander's position on the variability of the quality of deity that materiality, and mind is deity to

life.23

Stiernotte, complains, however, that Alexander "cannot describe the 'feeling' of matter for its deity."²⁴ Hence, "deity" is an imprecise and inexact idea. The relation of man to his deity would seem to be very different in quality and kind from the relationship of undifferentiated materiality to its deity. Yet, there is a similarity, too, for at any level on the hierarchy of existence, the finite object may always be said to be compresent with its deity. We recall that compresence does not exact contemporaneity. Man is compresent with his deity for his deity has such reality as pertains to the future.²⁵ In this respect the relationship between matter and its deity and the relationship between man and man's deity are fundamentally similar. The relationship is one of compresence.

Nevertheless, we must concur with Stiernotte who, interpreting Alexander, holds that "'deity' may be understood as a general name for the successive empirical qualities which emerge in Time,"²⁶ even though it is also the name of whatever turns out to be the next, unrealized, empirical quality. Regrettably, Alexander uses "deity" equivocally, and his tendency to do so often obscures his meaning. We are grateful, therefore, to Stiernotte who has clarified matters significantly:

. . . the deity of x is assumed to be realized. Another deity lcoms into view, the deity of the deity of x. Is this second deity also the deity of x? No, . . . when the deity of x is realized, it becomes an empirical quality in a new being, X, and since Alexander always stresses deity as "the next empirical quality," when Time has formed the being, X, its deity is "the next member of the series," and is not the deity of x but the deity of X. That is to say, as soon as this "next member of the series" is realized, it ceases to be deity, but becomes the "mind" of the highest being then in existence [italics mine], and another deity, the "next member of the series" then looms into view.2?

Deity is not only a variable quality, but it is a word with variable meaning. It stands both as a name of an unrealized empirical quality and as a general term to describe the next higher quality to any actual finite existent. Yet the deity-non-deity relationship is not transitive. My dog's deity has a deity (which with reference to man is deity proper). but my dog's deity's deity is not deity to my dog, even though what is deity to man is compresent with dogs in historical Space-Time. If this seems to be a bit obscure, it is because deity is an imprecise term. Strictly speaking, the deity of God to man is not the object of my dog's worship. God's deity is related to God's worship-inspiring quality insofar as it underwrites the mystery of the divine. Deity is just the name of the next empirical quality: what is next to man is not next to dogs. To understand deity correctly we must strip it of the religious overtones it carries. Alexander uses it almost idiosyncratically to describe an unknown empirical quality, the next higher along the hierarchical ladder of existence than the particular point of reference in historical Space-Time that an actual being assumes.

With respect to man's position in the hierarchy which qualifies actual Space-Time, deity is the next empirical quality to be realized. In Alexander's system it is a quality of God. We recall now Alexander's analogical method. Every existent is a union of body and mind or soul. Deity stands to Space-Time as mind to body.²⁸ We have seen how Time is the mind of Space, but in a larger sense deity is the mind or soul of Space-Time, insofar as it is the next empirical quality. Time as the mind of Space is the soul of the world. But deity is, in a different respect, a world-soul, as well, for deity is the next empirical quality in the hierarchy of emergents.

The world whose soul is Time is the world which precedes quality. The world for which deity is the soul is the same Space-Time but with qualitied finites evolved within it up to the level for which deity is the next quality in advance.²⁹

We may say, therefore, that deity is, in a limited sense, the soul or mind of the qualitied universe of Space-Time. Simply put, deity is the mind of Space-Time as we know it.

But deity is also the mind of God, for the body of God is the whole of Space-Time with its nisus to deity.³⁰ "Now the body of God is the whole universe."³¹ While Hartshorne and Reese understand this to mean that God is not actual because deity is not actual,³² we prefer to interpret Alexander as positing the actually existent finites of the infinite world as composing the body of God which is infinite Space-Time. Essentially, God "is of the same structure, body and mind, as we and all existents and Space-Time itself."³³ The universe of Space-Time strives after the attainment of deity;³⁴ it is God striving to attain the empirical quality next higher to the highest already actual. Stiernotte understands the body of God to be the whole of Space-Time, "primordial Space-Time plus the existents it contains up to the moment of our observation,"³⁵ for Alexander himself has stated that "there is no body outside"³⁶ God's. God contains the world but is identical with the total actual world,³⁷ in a sort of pantheistic conception.³⁸ Metaphorically, "our minds . . . and everything else in the world are 'organic sensa' of God. All we are the hunger and thirst, the heart-beats and sweat of God."³⁹ Hence, deity should not be confused with God. Deity relates to God as adjective to noun: it is the quality of God,⁴⁰ the mind of God whose body is Space-Time.

God is variable with respect to his deity, but invariable with respect to his body. Strictly understood, Space-Time does not grow. Changes are new complexities of motions that emerge within the one Space-Time, and hence God may change in quality (deity) as new actual qualities emerge, but he is forever stable bodily.

. . . God's body varies [only] in its empirical constitution and its deity. For we are not to think of the matrix, Space-Time, as something that grows bigger in extent with the lapse of Time; its Space is always full and it grows older through internal rearrangements, in which new orders of empirical finites are engendered. No matter therefore what quality the deity of God may be, his body is always the whole of Space-Time.41

As the whole of Space-Time the body of God is infinite, and by virtue of that infinity is limited beyond changeability. There can never be more Space-Time than there ever was or is, for all which is, is Space-Time, there being no reservoir of existence from which Space-Time may appropriate more of itself.

Agin, God follows the pattern of all existence, being a union of

mind and body. "Like the relation of our mind to our body, the deity of God is located in a portion of His body."⁴² God's deity is infinite but is still only a portion of Space-Time, the body of God being all of Space-Time. Infinite deity, insofar as it is a quality, is a configuration of Space-Time like other configurations,⁴³ and like other configurations cannot be the whole of Space-Time. Nevertheless, all of God's body sustains his deity.

Since his deity depends on mind, and this in turn on finites of a lower order, until ultimately we reach the simple matrix of Space-Time; there is no part of the universe that is not used up to sustain the deity of God. Everything in the world is represented (in the physiological sense of the term) in his deity. . . But all things are part of his body and belong to himself.44

Hence the deity of God is essentially connected with the body of God. Accordingly, even though God in his infinity is bodily stable, should any of the elements in God's body vary, then his body and his deity are affected--his body, for Space-Time will be constituted and constitutive of different finites, and his deity, because emergence will thereby have operated differently, yielding different results. In this respect deity is a quality of God, dependent upon the constitution of God's body which itself is made of all actual existents in Space-Time.

Deity as a potential emergent, a quality of God, is not creative, but God, insofar as he is the whole of the universe, is creative,

because Time is the moving principle that brings out that constant redistribution in the matrix which is equivalent to the birth of finite forms. Even then it is, properly speaking, Space-Time itself which is the creator and not God. The body of God includes all the finites which have hitherto been evolved in the lapse of time, and what God is creative of is not these finites but the next empirical quality of deity. It is only when we look back and identify God's body with its previous stages and ultimately with Space-Time itself that we can speak of him as creator. God himself, that is the universe as tending to deity, is creative only of deity.45

During the successive stages of the development of the universe, God is creative of that stage next to exist, that stage which is deity at the time of consideration. For example, when materiality emerged from the matrix of Space-Time, God (which is the universe in its tendency to deity) was creative of life, the next level of emergence, deity to materiality. As soon as life emerged from materiality, God ceased to be creative of it and became creative of mind which is deity to life. That is, God ceased to be creative of life in two senses. First, it had been created as a type, and logically the type could not be created again, could not emerge <u>as a novelty</u> again. Second, in a more important sense, a metaphysical sense, God could not again be creative of life, as life became then a finite empirical quality within the body of God, and God, insofar as he is creative only of deity, could not create that which is no longer deity. He became, instead creative of mind, and later still of deity, yet to emerge.

In a stricter sense, however, God is not a creator at all, but a creature. While he is creator of the beings in the universe, ⁴⁶ he is a creature of the universe with respect to the finites within his body and with respect to his quality of deity. God's deity is a part of God and God's deity is not the universe but is in the universe, like other empirical entities in Space-Time. In this regard we may say that God is, in a limited sense, in the universe and therefore "is in the strictest sense not a creator but a creature. . . . He is an infinite creature of the

universe of Space-Time."47 Alexander's conclusion requires explanation. Unqualitied, undifferentiated primordial Space-Time of its own nature is fragmented into finites, whirlpools of motion within the one matrix. The restlessness of Time is the driving force which precipitates the emergence of motion and later materiality from the primordial base. At any moment of time God's body is the whole of Space-Time, but the finite constituents of God's body, and therefore his quality, change. Nisus or Time provides the impulse of differentiation and emergence and hence it is Space-Time itself, self-caused and self-created, which gives birth to new contours in the body of God. What shall be God's constitution is, to speak metephorically, the decision of Time. At the instant before the primary emergence of motion God's body was primordial Space-Time. But an instant later it became Space-Time plus finite motion. The nature of the universe is itself the cause of motion and in this respect God is the creature of the universe. Both the details of his body and the character of his quality are determined by the progressive flow of Time.

Professor Stiernotte has summarized the fundamentals of Alexander's theology nicely:

1. The "body" of God is the whole of Space Time, whether we think of primordial Space-Time before any qualitied existents have arisen, or whether we think of the primordial matrix at any moment at which qualitied existents are present. This body always occupies the same Space, but a hierarchical order of finite existents grows within it and this order displays a variety of qualities. . . .

2. The "deity" of God, or the "mind" of God, is the empirical quality to be realized, whether we think of primordial Space-Time, or Space-Time at any moment of its historical existence. . . . 49

Various criticisms have been lodged against Alexander's theological method. Dean Inge, for example, suggests that in a universe in entropy,

according to the second law of thermodynamics, a God whose body is the whole of Space-Time is "under sentence of death,"⁵⁰ "though he may have a long time in which to realize Himself; for without the world, according to these [emergent evolutionary] thinkers [including Alexander] He is nothing,"⁵¹ for God is the world and the whole of the world sustains his deity.

Milton Konvitz proposes that the emergent deity postulated by Alexander is not in consonance with his naturalism, that "no philosopher ought to stake his reputation on the progmostication that the offspring [of the emergent process] will be deity or devil."⁵² While the argument is <u>ad hominem</u>, the point is interesting, that indeed Alexander has risked a lot with his pronouncement. But we would challenge Konvitz to collect the bet, for deity is, by nature, an unknown quality, and if it should be realized we would not be aware of it. This is a serious point, for, on the other hand, it also makes Alexander unable to collect the bet. The emergence of deity, should it ever happen, would seem to be unverifiable.⁵³

G. Dawes Hicks raises an objection within Alexander's own framework. If Space-Time has a nisus or striving, then to call the world the body of God seems arbitrary and ultimately unreasonable.

Why should God be conceived as the <u>whole</u> world possessing deity? If deity be an empirical quality, as is mind or life or colour, is there more reason why the whole world should be the body of God than it should be the body of any of these qualities? Are we . . . to suppose that the whole world is the body (say) of mind prior to mind's emergence, but that when it does emerge its body shrinks into a very insignificant portion of the world? And if so, why does the fact of emergence make so tremendous a difference? Assuming that the whole world had at one time a nisus towards the birth of mind, it is surely arbitrary to assert that it loses such nisus as soon as a certain number of mental

lives appear on the scene. So far from being infinite, the argument would rather lead to the conclusion that God's body, could it ever be formed, would be the most infinitesimal complex of movements possible--a portion (say) of a mental existent that had become complex enough to have the quality of deity, just as our mind is a portion of the organic process complex enough to have the quality of consciousness.⁵h

Hicks' objection, which we have quoted at length, illustrates a serious error in understanding Alexander. First, Hicks treats God as a quality like the quality of mind, whereas Alexander has defined God as the being whose body is Space-Time and whose mind is the quality of deity. Hicks would have Alexander speaking of a body of deity, but deity in Alexander's system is not embodied, first because it is yet to emerge, and second because as a quality it is not a body but is the mind of a body, specifically the body which is Space-Time and all the emergents within it. As such, deity (should it emerge) occupies only a portion of the body, albeit an infinite portion. Moreover, the world before the emergence of mind is not the body of mind but is the world, the body of God (just that) with its tendency to mind, then deity. In no respect is the world the body of empirical finites. But to say that the world is the body of the finites which it contains is tantamount to saying that a horse is the body of its hoof in some special sense. And to suppose that the world is, at any time, the body of deity is tantamount to supposing that that same horse is the body of its glue (alas!) or that a playwright is the body of his drama or, better, of his fame. The world is not the body of deity. It is the body of God tending to (produce) deity. The distinction _s very important and easily blurred. God's body is not identical with his deity. So far from being identical, the latter is a quality of the former and

the former only tends to (fulfill or produce, not become) the latter.

Many theists recoil in horror when they encounter Alexander's speculation about God's body or about God's evolution. But, as Stiernotte explains, Alexander is adamant about his conception of God, that it follow the pattern of Space-Time, of the universe, and be a developing union of body and mind.⁵⁵ Others, however, have questioned the wisdom of expecting God to follow the patterns of evolution or of the special sciences. Bishop Fulton J. Sheen, for example, has issued some harsh words for Alexander's theology.

The modern God of evolution is nothing but the transfer, without correction, of biological categories to the spiritual world. . . The laws and methods of one science are not indifferently transferable to another. . . If the subject-matter of one science differs from another, the formal method of study in two sciences will be different and their laws non-transferable. . . Because there are only about ninety elements in chemistry, it does not follow that there are only ninety kinds of animals. . . Because cause organisms evolve, we are not justified in concluding that God evolves. There is no more reason for applying biology to God than there is for applying music or chemistry or even mining engineering.⁵⁶

Again, Sheen is questioning Alexander's analogical method. We would tend to agree with him in principle, with one important qualification. There would be no reason to suppose the number of elements and the number of animals to be equal, unless there were some all-pervasive character about the number of elements, if, say, "ninetyness" were found to be of the basic nature of the observable existing world. Similarly, we would not suppose the laws of biological evolution-- which are more like descriptions of history than like prescriptive law--to hold for nonorganic (<u>i.e.</u>, spiritual) beings, unless there were some all-pervasive character about the nature of evolution. Alexander finds evolution allpervasive in that it is fundamental to the very nature and structure of the infinite physical universe, basic to the character of every finite existent.

Sheen's objection aside, there remains a serious problem, suggested by John Laird. Laird observes that if deity is the next empirical quality beyond mind and if mind is deity to life, then deity ought to "be succeeded (either temporally or logically) by an emergent quality still higher than deity, and so on without end,"⁵⁷ so that we must think of a sort of deity beyond deity, <u>ad infinitum</u>, or of qualities other than deity beyond deity.⁵⁸ Moreover, we have no reason to believe that the late emergence of mind on this planet is characteristic of the whole universe. If progress on earth is indicative of the stage of progress everywhere achieved, then "we should have to say, I suppose, that deity could not be co-eternal with the world, or at any rate that some high level of existence (perhaps a level much higher than mere deity) could not come first."⁵⁹ But since we do not know that our world is the exemplar of the attained level of emergence throughout Space-Time.

then divine process, or a process still higher, might very well be co-eternal with the universe. That is what many people believe who believe in God's "eternity" and also in the "redemption" of the human race. Credible or not the conception implies no inconsistency.⁶⁰

Deity remains deity, but is not necessarily the goal of the universe. On such a view as Laird suggests, deity may be but one quality, inferior to other qualities already actual in Space-Time, unknown to man in his narrow view of the universe.

B. Actuality and potentiality

One feature of Alexander's view of an emerging deity merits much further consideration: to what extent are God and deity actual and to what extent potential, and how does their actuality or potentiality affect their reality? First, we may note that the matter of potentiality is crucial to Alexander's metaphysics:

Space-Time or the universe is a growing universe and is through and through historical. If we resolve it into phases, those phases must express its real life, and must be such as the universe can be constructed from its actual reality; they must be phases which of themselves grow each into the next, or pass over into each other.⁶¹

That is, each successive phase of the universe must have had within it the seeds of the following historical phases, the potential to develop and give birth to new emergents. On the ground of experience we might say that there is no emergent quality which does not contain within itself the potential to effect a next emergent quality. As McCarthy explains the matter,

Taking the doctrine of evolution seriously we may understand the process by which the more highly developed forms of life have grown out of the lower. From Space-Time, all of the rich variety of the world as we know it has developed.⁶²

Space-Time itself contains the bare potential end, as it were, bequeaths the potential to later emergents in Space-Time. Stiernotte, on the other hand, regards all potentiality as embodied in the categories (which are themselves features of the one matrix):

Indeed, it would not be unjust to summarize Alexander's metaphysics by stating that all existents are complexities of Space-Time, constructed according to the categories which are potential plans of organization pervading these existents. . . [although] the categories and the richness of qualities, however, in no sense exhaust the infinite potentiality of Space-Time.⁶³ Whether we follow McCarthy or Stiernotte, we see how Space-Time of its own nature contains infinite potentiality for development. We might say, accordingly, that deity, from the outset, is a potential emergent. Tentatively, we will suggest that deity as a potential or future emergent is real while not actual, that the quality of deity possesses that reality which pertains to the future, ⁶⁵ reality being truly applicable to the future when we take Time seriously. Deity as a variable emergent quality⁶⁷ is both a name for the next higher level from any point of reference and the name for the next quality yet to emerge. On that basis, Laird has suggested that deity may itself be succeeded once it has appeared.

Alexander admits that there is much difficulty in conceiving of deity. First, we can neither contemplate nor enjoy it, at least not according to the epistemological system which Alexander has suggested. Moreover, with respect to God,

even the description of God as the whole universe, as possessing deity . . is full of figurative language. If we are to make our conception less abstract we must try to represent to ourselves some individual in whom deity is related to its basis in the lower levels of empirical quality as far down as the purely spatiotemporal; and a being of this kind is . . . rather an ideal of thought than something which can be realised in fact in the form of an individual.

Alexander regards actual deity as inconceivable, more an ideal than a concrete actuality.⁶⁹ Whether by deity we mean the next quality to emerge in the hierarchical series or the perfection after which the world is striving, "in either sense deity is nothing actual but is merely ideal."⁷⁰ Deity is a real potential quality, a future quality which has not yet emerged at this time during the historical existence and development of the world.⁷¹

Does infinite deity exist? The answer is that the world in its infinity tends toward infinite deity, or is pregnant with it, but that infinite deity does not exist; and we may now add that if it did, God--the actual world possessing infinite deity-would cease to be infinite God and break up into a multiplicity of finite gods, which would be merely a higher race of creatures than ourselves with a God beyond.

Infinite deity then embodies the conception of the infinite world in its striving after deity. But the attainment of deity makes deity finite. Deity is an empirical quality like life or mind. But there is no existent infinite mind, but only many finite minds. Deity is subject to the same laws as other empirical qualities, and is but the next member of the series. At first a presage, in the lapse of time the quality comes to actual existence, animates a new r ce of creatures, and is succeeded by a still higher quality. God as an actual existent is always becoming deity but never attains it. He is the ideal God in embryo. The ideal when fulfilled ceases to be God, and yet it gives shape and character to our conception of the actual God, and always tends to usurp its place in our fancy.⁷²

Each successive stage of deity that we know has been superseded by a later stage. When mind was deity to life, we might say that it was infinite deity, the mind of God. But once deity became actual as mind, it ceased to be deity and another infinite deity loomed ahead as a future emergent in Space-Time. Deity, when it is concretized in actuality, loses its infinity and its flavor of deity. It breaks up into a new race of finite emergents. Infinite deity is forever potential: to be an actual quality is to be a finite quality. Hence, we speak of the deity after which God is striving as the forever potential quality of God, a greater perfection beyond whatever perfection is actual in Space-Time. God does not actually possess deity but only is qualitied by deity potentially. Consequently, God is forever in process, for the quality of infinite deity, when deity is actualized, passes on to the next not-yet-emerged stage or level in the hierarchy.⁷³ Stiernotte suggests that Alexander spoke loosely, however, when he asserted that "the ideal when fulfilled ceases to be God." He might have been more prudent to suggest that the body of God appropriates to itself the quality of deity actualized as empirical finites and has for its mind the new quality of deity. The body of God has been rearranged, but God has not ceased to be God.⁷⁴

But deity to be deity, or infinite deity, may not be actual. We know from the course of the universe that actualized deity breaks up into finites of Space-Time, new emergent configurations of the one matrix. While arrived at by a somewhat different line of argument, we see a similar view in the world of Alvin Reines:

If the divine existence is to be infinite in duration, it can be this only as possibility. For the actually existent is always limited; nothing unlimited can be sensed or imagined, let alone conceived. To be actual is to be finite. . . The actual is finite in time because, as an actuality, it is finite in the power of endurance and destined, therefore, as an individual to annihilation. Being thus breeds nothingness. . . . Accordingly, if God is to be infinite in duration, the divine existence must forego actuality for possibility. We find therefore that God is infinite in duration but possesses only possible existence, whereas being is finite in duration but possesses actual existence. . . God overcomes nothingness by incorporating it into the divine existence and, in so doing, is emptied of actuality and must forever remain possibility.⁷⁵

We can sense some (possibly circuitous) influence from Alexander in the passage quoted from Reines. Alexander speaks of the quality of deity in much the same way as Professor Reines deals with God. Alexander would ascribe potentiality to God's mind, to the infinite quality of deity, but the body of God in Alexander's system is both infinite and actual,

and it is both because it is identical with the whole of Space-Time, which is itself both infinite and actual.

Alexander could agree with Reines only insofar as he would state that those known existents within Space-Time always share the characters of actuality and finitude, that there is no known actually existent quality in Space-Time which is not also finite, and, further, to be an actual quality in Space-Time is to be finite. But the body of God is not an empirical quality in Space-Time, but is the whole of it in its primordial and its qualitied manifestations. Deity, however, when realized, actualized or concretized, or emergent in the actual world, ceases to be infinite deity, and "there is a higher deity ahead of this emergent. Deity as such recedes into the future,"⁷⁶ and is never more than possible. Alexander's quality of deity and Reines' God are strikingly similar.

At times Alexander speaks as if God were only a possible existent.

When we ask what for us is God, we must answer that it is the whole world with this nisus towards deity. If deity were attained, there would be not infinite God but finite gods, and the world-nisus would carry the distribution of motion in turn past them.⁷⁷

The passage just quoted is somewhat later than Alexander's Gifford Lectures, <u>Space, Time and Deity</u>, and as such may represent an inconsistency or a revision of his thought. We believe it is neither, but is merely an imprecise manner of language, common in Alexander's works. Our demonstration is involved. We begin with an understanding of finite gods.

First, we recall Professor Laird's ⁷⁸ and Miss Emmet's ⁷⁹ suggestion that deity might itself when realized be succeeded by a newly potential quality of deity. Both McCarthy and Stiernotte reflect on the same possibilities:

When mind came to birth in the universe, it was found that there were many finite minds but no one infinite mind. Beyond mind, the highest existent that we know, looms the next quality--deity. The ideal toward which all striving is directed is God, viewed in his transcendent aspect [of deity]. When it has been reached, it gives way to another ideal, and so on ad infinitum. Infinite deity is the infinite world straiping after deity and the realization of deity makes deity finite.⁸⁰

McGarthy implicitly suggests that we regard deity not only as the quality of God but also as "God, viewed in his transcendent aspect." If McCarthy is correct, then Alexander equivocates on <u>God</u>, sometimes meaning the universe with its tendency to deity and sometimes meaning deity, God's transcendent aspect.

But the solution to our puzzle is still more intricate, for Alexander also refers to infinite deity becoming finite deities. For example, he regards the next level beyond mind, should it be actualized or should it emerge, as the hierarchical level of angels. He considers angels a "serious conception . . . , finite beings . . . , finite deities."⁸¹ Here again we suspect that when Alexander speaks of angels or finite gods, he is really referring to the quality of deity made concrete in finite deities. Stiernotte describes Alexander's notions of finite gods or angels as the result of a "rigid adherence . . . to deity as merely a future empirical quality,"⁸² so that Alexander's insistence that infinite deity remain forever possible and never actual leads naturally into conceptions of finite gods.

Most theologians would say that God, whatever else he may be, must at any rate be ultimate if he exists at all. According to Alexander the progressive historicity of things would be ultimate, the last word in any metaphysics, but God or deity, that is, the achievement of the next stage above "mind" in the ladder of emergence would not be ultimate at all. On the contrary, as soon as this level arose, there would be a straining after the next level, the level above mere deity. For every Jove there would be a Prometheus. That deity shall remain forever potential in Alexander's system, we are compelled to think of finite gods which would better be called finite deities. Strictly speaking, God does not become finite with respect to his body. His quality of deity becomes finite as it becomes actual, but there is yet a deity beyond finite deities, for the restlessness of Time does not cease. God remains actual God.

What I say is that God as actually possessing deity does not exist but is an ideal, is always becoming; but God as the whole Universe tending towards deity does exist. . . Deity is a quality and God a being. Actual God is the forecast and as it were the divining of ideal God.⁸⁴

Actual God is the whole of Space-Time in its movement to deity. Ideal God is God with infinite deity made actual, but we have seen how ideal God is not actualizable, for infinite deity, because of the nature of the universe and by definition remains forever potential. Ideal God, were it to become actual, would cease to be God with respect only to his deity; there would yet remain ideal God whose quality of deity is potential. and there would yet remain actual God as the whole of Space-Time with its nisus to deity.

Yet Alexander is frequently misrepresented as meaning that God is a future emergent and, having emerged, will cease to be God.

It would be easy enough to cavil at this misconception. A friend of mine jested to me of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob who is to exist a million years hence. But the jest if a misconception. For the Universe as striving towards deity is a present reality. And the Universe so conceived is God. It is only the actual existence of deity which belongs to the future.⁸⁵

God as the possessor of deity is ideal, but God as the infinite world of Space-Time striving to deity is actual, is currently real.⁸⁶ With this in mind, we recognize as a misunderstanding C.D. Broad's suggestion that

"it might indeed seem difficult to feel much enthusiasm about a God who does not yet exist, and who will cease to be divine as soon as he begins to be actual."⁸⁷ Quite the contrary, "'God,' . . . for Alexander is not the name for a not yet existing emergent quality, but stands for the whole universe as 'pregnant' with Deity."⁸⁸

Moreover, when Alexander speaks of an ideal God he is but making "a concession . . . to the habit of the religious consciousnes to embody its conception of God in an ideal shape."⁸⁹ The infinite ideal God possessing deity is neither actual nor potential: it is but an ideal conception, the referent of which is not asserted to exist. Actual God does not possess deity but strives for it⁹⁰ and actual God is actual, existing as the whole of Space-Time striving for deity, a future quality, "not realised but in the process of realisation."⁹¹

The concept which Alexander puts forward of an actual God straining after potential deity finds its parallels in other religious thinkers. Brightman, for one, speaks of a universe of "unbegun and unending duration," a "spiritual universe" which is "eternal perfectibility,"⁹² the goal of which may be attained in infinite Time because of the inexhaustible potentiality of such a world. In this world God "is a perfect ideal rather than a perfect power,"⁹³ somewhat akin to Alexander's conception of infinite deity or ideal God.

Rabbi Jacob Kohn regards God as the whole of what is real and therefore as "that source which makes existence possible and brings these possibilities into existence."⁹⁴ Such a God is very much like Alexander's concept of Space-Time as God's body which is, in a sense, creative of all

emergents, including (or especially) future emergents or deity. All possibilities are within the being of God, Kohn tells us, "even those as yet unknown to us, are within His being. They are objective facts in the overall structure of reality. . . . "⁹⁵ But where Alexander's God might be doomed to death by the second law of thermodynamics, in contradiction to Alexander's system, Kohn's conception of God is not faulty in that regard. He admits that God need not exist.

That which makes possible all existence cannot be found within existence. It is not a first cause; the causal is a form of existence. It is not a thought or idea, for both thought and mind are among the data of actuality. Nor can one say that it self-existent or necessarily existent.⁹⁰

Such a God-concept is significantly different from Alexander's. While Alexander's notion of God may well be contradicted by the second law of thermodynamics, Kohn's God is a source of possibility, like Alexander's God, but unlike Alexander's God, Kohn's is not necessary or self-caused.

The conception of a future deity yet to emerge also compares readily with the theology of Alvin Reines. Reines ascribes mysterious, untouchable divinity to the future. "The image of the future is the appropriate object of the attitude of the holy. . . . Of course, the future is divine,---it is nothing other than the unending possibilities of being stored in the infinite recesses of the Godhead."⁹⁷ Elsewhere, Reines speaks of God as "the divine possibilities that reside in the being of the present."⁹⁸ While Alexander considers those possibilities infinite, Reines would tend to limit them, and herein lies the significant difference between Alexander and Reines. Reines' disclaimer which limits possibility is in no way contradictory to the second law of thermodynamics.

But Alexander's faith in limitless potential does contradict experienced entropy, unless we accept Eddington's view of entropy which makes for greater, not lesser, potentiality.

Still, Reines' view of the future as the unfolding of present possibilities is very much like Alexander's doctrine of emergence.

For the image of the future looming over us is not an ordinary one; rather it is the image of a radical future. The radical future, unlike the ordinary kind, does not slip smoothly and unnoticed into the vacua left by the ever-retreating present; --it does not slip at all. On the contrary, it overthrows and tears down; it plucks up the present that it succeeds by the roots. The radical future finds existing institutions, economic, political, social, and religious, inadequate to contain its creative burst. Its emergent force is not able to be expressed by the beliefs, symbolism, and even morality of the age it supersedes. The radical future discovers new truths and realities, embodies them in new institutions, and enshrines them in new forms of religion.⁹⁹

While Alexander might not employ so violent a metaphor, he, too, views emergent qualities, future emergent qualities, as well, as not fully containable in the levels from which they emerge, requiring rather new forms of expression. For Alexander, such a future quality is deity. So far forth as it is possible, a vision of deity is a vision of the radical future, a vision of the potentialities yet to unfold.

Potentiality is within the body of Alexander's God and gains expression as his deity. God, therefore, is a developing God, an emerging (although not emergent) God, pregnant with deity, the whole of Space-Time with its nisus toward the infinite potentiality which deity represents. As such, God is not perfect or complete, but is a source of 100 "inexhaustible perfectibility," as Brightman states it. In some sense, God is therefore finite, although both his body and his deity are infinite. But as inexhaustible perfectibility God is finite as compared to his potential. This is the message of Brightman, and it is not substantially different from the message of Alexander.

CHAPTER III

GOD, DEITY AND NISUS

We have described in detail the manner in which Alexander regards the development of the universe.¹ Briefly, the cosmogonical formula is one of emergence. New qualities in a hierarchical scheme grow out of and are sustained by lower qualities already in existence: deity out of mind, mind out of life, life out of materiality, materiality out of motion and motion out of the primordial matrix of Space-Time. New emergents are integrated increased complexities of the levels from which they derive, equally real with the lower levels, but more perfect, too.

A. Cosmogony and metaphysics

Throughout the body of this work we have, so far, spoken of Time as the force which impels the world forward by imparting motion on the matrix of primordial Space-Time, interpreting Alexander's notion of Time, with Erich Frank "as the <u>élan vital</u> of the universe." ² We have also suggested that the categories, which might be regarded as the potentialitypatterns of Space-Time, are fundamental of the matrix.³ In any case, Alexander does not regard Time as a created entity but seems to think of it as itself creative, ⁴ for he takes Time ... "iously.

There is ample ground in Alexander's writings for us to consider Time to be the creative force in the world. Principally, "Space must . . . be regarded as generated in Time, or, if the expression be preferred, by Time. For Time is the source of movement."⁵ As McCarthy

interprets Alexander's system, Time is the cause for all emergence, for "Time sweeps out into Space ever more complex configurations of finite existences."⁶ To the extent, then, that Space "must contain in itself some principle or character which is manifested in this growth"⁷of finites in the universe, to that extent creation needs a guiding principle, a motive. We might conclude that Time serves such a function adequately. After all, it is "Time which in the first place makes motion possible, and secondly provides for the ceaseless rearrangements in Space through which groupings of motion are possible. . . . Time is the principle of motion and change."⁸ The nature of the world, taken as a created entity, requires that "Time is in truth the abiding principle of impermanence which is the real creator."⁹

Alexander takes Time seriously, for Time is fundamental of all finite existents.¹⁰ Even the infinite Space-Time is subject to the continuing creativity of Time.¹¹ Because of the emphasis which Alexander places on Time, G. Dawes Hicks interprets Time in Alexander's metaphysics to be

Time's passage is not meraly mechanical but is creative, for it implies the emergence of qualitied levels¹³ in the hierarchy of existence, that emergence which is the root of Alexander's cosmogony.

Moreover, we may observe with McCarthy that

in the Alexandrian formulation everyting is subordinate to Time, including mind and God. In fact mind and God are outcomes of

the creative process of Time. There is an element of Time in all things. It is the indispensible factor which produces movement.14

And Time continues its creative process beyond the emergence of mere conscious man, beyond the emergence of the highest known empirical quality which is mind. "It is the very nature of Time to go on ceaselessly creating new orders of finites."¹⁵ In this respect

the historical conception of things rejects of necessity a creator of the world, while accepting creators and creation within the world. The world as a whole when viewed historically is self-creative. If, indeed, we take God to mean no more than the creative impulse by which the world goes its restless way in time, in this sense there is indeed a Creator God. This is not, however, the sense which commonly attaches to the notion of a Creator God, if only because it implies that the creator is himself created along with his world. . . .

Which leads to the observation . . . that whatever God may be, he, too, is subject to the time-process and must change with the change of things. . . It is enough to remark that whether God be viewed theistically or pantheistically¹⁰ (and the conception of him must do justice to both these views), he suffers, or has the privilege of, the timeful passage of things. Pantheistic, he is at no stage of a growing universe complete; theistic, he is a projection into a single individual of the universe with its as yet unsatisfied tendency or desire.¹⁷

Even God is caught in Time's process of change,¹⁸ and in some sense is a creature of Time.¹⁹ It is Time or "Space-Time itself which is the creator and not God."²⁰ God's body, being Space-Time, is subject to the thrust of Time.²¹

Consequently, Professor Stiernotte concludes that Time in Alexander's system is a principle of growth, an enduring principle which does not cease to operate with the appearance of mind,²² but carries the world onward toward the emergence of deity and potentially beyond. But

at this point, Alexander makes a shift in his presentation, for the office of Time as the soul of Space, or the principle of growth of the whole emerging structure of existents in Space-Time, is replaced by the hitherto not mentioned principle of the "nisus of Space-Time" which bears the creatures of the primordial matrix not only to the levels so far experienced, but "will bear them forward to some higher level of existence."²³

It appears that Alexander conceives of the nisus in Space-Time as the driving force of emergence in the universe. We have now to discover what the nisus is and what is its function in Alexander's metaphysical system. The exact function of nisus and its relation to Time is not clearly expressed in Alexander's works. It appears that Alexander considered Time insufficient to provide the needed driving force and so he posited the nisus, but whether the nisus is subordinate to Time or Time subordinate to nisus is left vague and unexplained.²⁴

The uncertainty is best illustrated by citing Alexander's own words.

Now since Time is the principle of growth and Time is infinite, the internal development of the world. . . cannot be regarded as ceasing with the emergence of those finite configurations of space-time which carry the empirical quality of mind. . . . There is a misus in Space-Time which, as it has borne its creatures forward through matter and life to mind, will bear them forward to some higher level of existence.²⁵

We might conclude, on the basis of this passage, that the nisus is something which impels Time to its restlessness, or at least gives direction to temporal motion, a sort of undergirding support for the movement of Time, which motion Time imparts to the matrix of Space-Time. Hence we might think of Time as subordinate to the nisus, as an entity whose motion is caused by the nisus. Alternately, Time seems also to be a principle which gives existence to the nisus. "The nisus in the world which drives it because of Time, to the generation of fresh empirical qualities is a verifiable fact."²⁶ Here we may regard the function of the nisus as an outgrowth of Time's motion and consequently subordinate to it.

Although the relative importance of nisus and Time may be unclear, we may, on the basis of the evidence we have presented, regard the nisus as a kind of directing agent of emergence,²⁷an impulsion--possibly a blind impulsion²⁸-- which carries the universe somewhere, although where and how is not clear.²⁹ Still, the nisus appears to be a driving force which is somehow tied to the emergence of higher and higher levels of existence,³⁰ leading from pure Space-Time, to mind, the highest emergent that we know, beyond to deity.

While Alexander has led us to believe that Time is the principle of creativity and change in the universe, it is not clear that he means that quite as simply as it seems. We should not regard Time as the source of creativity and end our inquiry there.

The primodrial world which is without parts breaks up into parts held together within the stuff of the world which I must call the <u>one</u> stuff, for fear of describing the creator in the language of the creature. It germinates into the infinite variety of things in all their grades of development. This impulse of creativeness I call the nisus of the universe. . . This nisus not only leads to the formation of things and to the sustainment of them, but impels the world forward towards new creations, bringing forth the new out of the bosom of the old. . . . Yet lest it should be thought that time is the creator, we remind ourselves that time could do nothing, could not even be, except for space. . .

The nisus is no effort on the world's part to extend its bounds; such a notion is unthinkable, for the universe is boundless; but [it is] a ceaseless impulse to produce parts and alter the groupings of events into things.³¹

Generally, the view that we have given of Alexander's system has it that Time is the motive force of the universe of Space-Time, yet the passage just quoted indicates clearly and explicitly that Time alone is not the

principle of creation which we find manifest in the world. Or if Time is creative, it is only so because of its necessary association with Space, by virtue of which relation infinite Space-Time is fragmented into finite parts, whirlpools of motion within the matrix and later into empirical existents.

Nisus, however, serves as a sort of impulse to the process by which the infinite matrix breaks up into finite constellations of motion and thence into the empirical qualities. The nisus is a creative force and a sustaining force, as well, and its activity has not yet been exhausted in the course of Time. Rather, it seems to be inexhaustible, such that its creativity will, perforce, continue beyond the emergence of mind as the world strains after deity, i.e., as the world has a nisus to deity. According to McCarthy, the nisus is thus creative, and, "by a creative spurt," flings ever new finites onto the stage of the world."32 Hence, whatever it is and however it functions, we may characterize the nisus as that "which makes for advance into novelty."33 For the moment we will leave its precise definition, description and character unspecified. It is sufficient to note that whether nisus or Time be the principle of creativity in Space-Time, God remains not a creator but a creature.34 Nisus, considered with Time as the creative impulse, gives "birth in future Time to a number of existents higher than man,"35 for God, which is the universe of Space-Time, strives to attain deity.

Alexander's conception of the nisus seems very similar to Jacob Kohn's view of creation. Nisus, as an impulse which drives the universe to the fulfillment or realization of new potentiality, to new finites in the progression of Time, may be regarded, in some sense, as the cause

and foundation of finite existents, or even as a foundation of Space-Time. Kohn informs us that

creation is not a force because whatever forces there be, are within the fields of existence. It is not in time, for spacetime is the abode or field of the actual. Try as we will, we cannot call it other than that which makes possible existence in space and time. . . Creation is that which makes <u>actual</u> <u>existence possible</u> and constantly brings new possibilities into actual existence. .

Kohn's conception of creation is somewhat unclear, for it seems both to fulfill the potentialities of space and time and to create new possibilities in the universe. If Kohn means the former, that creation fulfills potentialities--and this seems to be the more important sense of creation--then nisus, as used by Alexander, appears to be a parallel conception, for nisus is also that which impels the world toward the fulfillment of new possibilities or rather makes actual those possibilities which are already present. To understand nisus in terms of Kohn's creation is to assert that nisus, while an impulsion, is not a force, that it does not act <u>in</u> Time, but perhaps <u>on</u> Time or, more rightly, on Space-Time. This is not to say that the nisus is not related to Time--nothing which is real can be unrelated to Time--for it might be regarded as fundamental of Time or as basically characteristic of Space-Time, as are the categories, which are not properly <u>in</u> Time, insofar as they are the pervasive features of Time or Space-Time.

We mean to suggest here that the nisus may be a basic property of Space-Time rather than an event in Space-Time, that it is not a complexity of Space-Time, but, frankly, a simplicity. Stiernotte explicitly recommends that we understand the nisus in just such a manner. "The nisus, . . . though not precisely defined, . . . would appear to be a fundamental character or category of Space-Time, more fundamental than the other categories."³⁷ In a later work on mysticism, Stiernotte tangentially discusses Alexander's view of the nisus in terms that are consistent with his suggestion that it is a category, calling it an "organizing emergent power" which manifests a "creative pattern of . . . emergent process"³⁸ in the world of experience.

Similarly, Bertram Brettschneider makes such a recommendation in his more complex interpretations of Alexander's view of the nisus. Brettschneider argues that the

nisus exercises a function identical to coherence taken as an ontological principle. Coherence is the organizational principle in the Alexandrian universe. The creative function in this universe is also sustained by coherence as an organizing function of pure Space-Time.

Nisus discharges the organizing or creative function in Alexander's universe. Yet we are not told the way in which it functions. In this essay, however, the hypothesis has been advanced that the empirical characters of Space-Time are subject to conditions of harmony and comprehensiveness, the criteria of coherence. It has been argued that coherence is the creative and organizing principle inherent in Time's coursing through the line of evolutionary advance. The concept of nisus commends itself, therefore, as the creative aspect of coherence, nisus entails the internal relatedness of individuals within the matrix of pure Space-Time, without which there could be no nisus. In short, no nisus without coherence.³⁹

Taken together, Kohn's view of creation, Stiernotte's interpretation of the nisus as a category and Brettschneider's suggestion that the nisus is the ontological aspect of the principle of coherence in Space-Time all seem to point to an understanding of the nisus as an organizing principle which gives direction to the restlessness or natural creativity of Time. Nisus would then relate to Time as a direction for movement, and yet it would be a characteristic fundamental of historical Space-Time, not prior to it or imposed upon it, but by its very nature coeternal with Space-Time and with the entire emergent process. "When the function of the nisus is emphasized as active throughout all Time, then the nisus becomes co-eternal with the universe."¹¹

And such a nisus which is pervasive of all Time, and therefore of all Space-Time, remains a dynamic agent, one which impels the world to change, emergent or evolutionary change. All beings are caught in the drive of the nisus toward some future emergent quality in the universe which is historical through and through. "Thus the nisus of the world is not like the turning of a squirrel in a cage, a mere repetition of itself."⁴² We discover such a view of the nisus in the philosophy of John Elof Boodin, who acknowledges his indebtedness to Alexander, when he explains his own conception of emergence in Space-Time.

It is true . . . that the future somehow is an outgrowth of the past and therefore the order of the past cannot be indifferent to the future. It appears that there is a nisus, a drift in space-time . . . that . . . is felt as future. At any rate the actuality when it comes has a quality of its own which cannot be foreseen. It involves a creative synthesis which, while conditioned by the past duration, is not a mere armithmetical sum of the characteristics of the determining conditions. Even when histories seem to repeat cycles, as when the child lives over the life cycle of its parent or when different cosmic histories repeat corresponding cycles, so that what seems future to a world like Alexander's may seem past to a world of greater range of development, it is still true, as we know, that the repetition in the concrete is a repetition with variation, the correspondence is in generic features.⁴³

The nisus, therefore, is an impulse toward fresh empirical qualities yet to emerge, an impulse which is basic or categorical of the matrix of Space-Time, the direction and thrust of restless Time which both points to and pushes to future Time while it sustains the actual finites emergent in Space-Time. This is the metaphysical conception of the nisus.

B. Cosmogony and theology: a critical understanding of the nisus

Yet we wish to consider, as well, a religious or theological conception of the nisus, how it relates not only to Alexander's theory of being, but also how it relates to his theory of God and deity. First, we note that the concept of the nisus, its thrust and direction, is a justification for religious optimism, or for meliorism, at least. As Robert Leet Patterson explains it,

many philosophical naturalists . . . would follow the lead of Alexander. The universe, they would urge, constitutes some sort of unity. There is no ground for the assumption that the process of emergent evolution which has taken place on this planet is not the manifestation of a tendency which is operative throughout the entire cosmos, nor is there any reason to suppose that in this particular case it has yet exhausted itself. There is no justification for pessimism.⁴⁴

Indeed, Alexander explicitly informs us that the impulsion of the nisus has not stopped with the emergence of mind, but has continued and shall continue into the emergence of apparently unlimited stages beyond mind, into deity and beyond, that the nisus continues to the emergence of deity, and once deity is realized, to stages in the hierarchy beyond deity.⁴⁵ That is, the nisus of the universe is toward the ever-potential infinite deity.

E. O. James regards Alexander's position as a "curious reversal of theism"⁴⁶ in which creation or emergence transcends its source--Space-Time or God--as it moves toward the actualization of continually higher empirical qualities. Nisus, therefore, is best understood as a sort of creator of deity in a world which is pregnant with deity.⁴⁷ Alternately, if we consider God and not the nisus as the creator of deity, we still find the function of the nisus to be cosmically significant:

"God is the infinite world with its nisus towards deity, or, to adapt a phrase of Leibniz, as big or in travail with deity."⁴⁸ In this respect, the nisus seems to relate to God as some sort of activity within him which leads to deity. We may tentatively accept McCarthy's interpretation of the nisus as "the desire in the universe to attain deity. . . . 49

Alexander regards deity as "the issue in Time of a tendency or nisus in the world of which our minds and everything else of the nature of mind is the proximate highest outcome -- an issue which is dependent on the nature of things lower than itself."⁵⁰ Nisus, as Alexander uses the term, appears to be definable as a tendency which itself gives birth to its "issue." It is the father, mother and midwife of the world, so that it is the nisus which is creative of new finites and of emergents yet to be realized. Still, its all pervasive activity notwithstanding, we have no sensual experience of the nisus, which, "though not present to sense, is yet present to reflection upon experience."51 The nisus, as such, is conceptually inseparable from Alexander's religious view of Space-Time. "There is an actual infinite, the whole universe, with a nisus to deity; and this is the God of the religious consciousness, though that consciousness habitually forecasts the divinity of its object as actually realised in an individual form."52 Just as a conception of Space-Time is inseparably connected to the nisus, so then is a conception of God striving to attain deity necessarily dependent upon the nisus.

Moreover, while infinite God possessing actual deity is merely an ideal, "the nisus of the universe which strains towards deity"⁵³ may be regarded as actual in a religious conception of the world. "When we

ask what for us is God, we must answer that it is the whole world with this nisus towards deity."⁵⁴ McCarthy boldly calls the nisus "a comprehensive form"⁵⁵ of God which is manifest in all emergence within the universe. The connection between God, deity and nisus seems very intimate, so intimate that we are tempted to identify the nisus as an aspect of God, or at least as a sort of metaphysical bridge between actual God and potential deity, over which bridge passes the flow of existence.

When we seek to discuss a notion of the world-soul in Alexandrian metaphysics, the connection seems to become still more intimate. Since deity is never realized as infinite deity in infinite Space-Time,

there is thus no true world-soul but only a soul of Space-Time and a nisus in the world to deity. Soul and body are distinctions within finite things. When we take Space-Time as a whole in its purely spatio-temporal character, its soul is coextensive with its body. When we take the world of things with qualities, its soul is only ideal not actual.⁵⁰

Time may be the soul of primordial Space-Time, the soul of the one unqualitied matrix, whether we refer to the matrix before any quality emerged, or whether we abstract the primordial matrix from qualitied Space-Time as we know it. Deity, on the other hand, is identifiable as the soul of Space-Time considered in a qualitied stage, and considered in its wholeness, as constituted and constitutive of finite existents. But deity, as such, is not actual, and hence there is no true world-soul at all, but only a nisus in Space-Time to deity. "Once finites emerge and we consider actual Space-Time, then there is no actual 'soul' but merely a nisus in the world to deity."⁵⁷ To the extent that the worldsoul is identified as deity it is never actual, and if deity were realized it would become finite and not a true world-soul. We suggest, therefore, that the closest approximation of world-soul for qualitied Space-Time is the nisus to deity, which is an impulse toward a world-soul and which approaches actual world-soul asymptotically. Our interpretation of the nisus seems to square with Alexander's assertion that the world owes "such divine character as it has to its nisus or striving towards a higher form of life,"⁵⁸ for "the <u>nisus</u> then is toward the attainment of the divine mind."⁵⁹

Hardly a supporter of Alexander's metaphysics, Dean Inge regards the concept of the nisus as our author's claim to theism, to Alexander's discredit, Inge would say.

If we reject the idea of "intelligible movement," which is not the contradiction of stability, we are left, it seems to me, with directionless movement, unless, indeed, with Alexander and others, we smuggle in some kind of nisus, an entirely metaphysical principle acting within nature itself, which has no place in the idea of becoming as known to inorganic science. This mysterious nisus . . . is presented to us as the begetter of Deity. Theism when expelled by the door, sometimes comes in by the window.⁶⁰

While Inge would not himself accept the nisus as a "general law of nature,"⁶¹ still he considers it Alexander's primary theistic conception, somewhat akin to deity in that respect. Alexander, on the other hand, does not conscientiously develop the nisus as a theistic affirmation. On the contrary, he seems to have neglected it as a creative power, ⁶² as Stiernotte suggests.

At the same time, deity is inadequately developed in Alexander's theological system, it appears. "Increasingly we find Alexander's deity difficult to validate in its original formulation, and the conception of a pervasive activity at all levels, such as that of the creative nisus, becomes worthy of examination."⁶³ Still, the nisus does not replace deity

in Alexander's metaphysics, and he has not intended that it should do so. Nevertheless,

Alexander admits that deity does not exist, however much he has used the conception of deity in most of his argumentation, but what does actually exist is the nisus to deity. This is another instance in which we feel Alexander should have given a hightened recognition to the work of the nisus, and not so much to the presupposition of a distant deity which is never actually attained . . . and recedes in the far distant future, so to speak.⁰⁴

While the conception of deity is gathered from speculative analogy, the nisus is factual as the observed creative impulse.⁶⁵ It might be appropriate, consequently, to suggest a greater identification of nisus with God or deity, and employ the nisus, therefore, as an aspect of God.

Apparently there is ground in Alexander's own writings to do just that, to understand the nisus not merely as a metaphysical postulation but as an element of Alexandrian theology. For the system, as we have described it, consonant with Alexander's own presentation, suggests that

God's body is not timeless but includes Time as both a continuum and succession. God's deity is not timeless but includes a part of infinite Time. But if we accentuate the successive character of Time and not its total continuity, deity is essentially a process in the general movement of Time. In calling deity a process, Alexander approaches his conception of the nisus.⁶⁰

But far more than merely approach an identification of deity and nisus, in stressing the potentiality of deity over its actuality, Alexander explicitly states that "deity is a nisus and not an accomplishment."⁶⁷ As a consequence, Professor Stiernotte classes the nisus as a subdivision of the divine.⁶⁸ Our argument seems to flow from the very description of the nisus as it appears in Space, Time and Deity.

Elsewhere, in a commentary on Spinoza, Alexander acknowledges the nisus as a heritage, borrowed from the earlier philosopher: "To find

... deity or divinity let us go back to another of Spinoza's conceptions, that of the <u>conatus</u> which according to him everything possesses of persisting or persevering in its being."⁶⁹ But Alexander prefers to call the striving in the universe "by the simpler and vague name of a nisus,"⁷⁰ an impulse which pervades Space-Time. The debt which Alexander owes Spinoza for his conception of the nisus is a further suggestion that the nisus, if it is not God, is at least <u>of</u> God and is in some sense divine, possibly as an aspect of God.

Thus does McCarthy ultimately understand the nisus as "God seen in his transcendent aspect,"⁷¹ which is deity. Winston King appears in agreement, although his description is considerably more simplified and more general. "Thus we might say ([with] Alexander) that God is a <u>nisus</u> <u>toward perfection</u>, a force that reaches out progressively toward higher attainments in the realms of consciousness, moral character, and personal qualities."⁷² As Stiernotte further clarifies the matter, deity does not exist now apart from being the nisus towards the emergence of actual deity at a later time.⁷³ "Deity--except in the sense of the nisus--does not actually exist."⁷⁴ We recall, of course, that infinite deity cannot actually exist.

We must question, therefore, what Alexander really means by the nisus, what is the religious value of the nisus, and how does it relate to God and to deity. "Is it the nisus which brings forth the best or is it the future state of being as yet unknown to us in its distinctive character to which we should give ourselves in supreme devotion and worshipful commitment?"⁷⁵ The former is actual while the latter is ideal but

but merely potential. Moreover, since deity, once it does emerge, is destined to be superseded by yet another deity, more perfect in quality, the nisus seems to be far more absolute than God, deity, mere deity or potential deity beyond deity. John Laird has reached just this conclusion. "For every Jove there would be a Prometheus. On the whole the conclusion here would seem to be that the <u>nisus</u> was more worshipful in the long run than the particular emergent stage that we call deity. . . . "⁷⁶

Again, we are tempted, therefore, to regard the nisus as an aspect of the divine or of God. While we would not agree with those critics who directly identify it with God or with deity, we shall provisionally call it God's tendency to deity, a tendency which brings about creation, sustains finite creatures and strives toward creation in the future. As a basic property of Space-Time, 77 it is also a basic property of God, which is the universe of Space-Time progressing to deity. It is, furthermore, the ground and justification for religious optimism or meliorism, the source of faith that we are not living in a decaying world, for it is a creator of deity, just as God is the creator of deity. The nisus, we have suggested, is therefore an activity of or within God which leads to the creation of deity, a "desire in the universe to attain deity." In some sense, moreover, the nisus can be understood as a provisional soul of the world until the (impossible) emergence of infinite deity, as a source of animation for the world, while deity itself does not animate the world actually. Some critics have even suggested that it is in the conception of the nisus that we find Alexander's theism, for there seems to be a close identification or at least an intimate association of God, deity and nisus. We have suggested, for example, that the nisus serves as a

bridge between God and deity. Apparently, too, the nisus inspires worship in its creative or divine function. For all these reasons we regard the nisus as the will of God.

Admittedly, our suggestion uses anthropomorphic language, and it is best understood -- in the grand Alexandrian tradition -- as a metaphorical hypothesis that we regard the nisus as the will of God. We do not necessarily mean a self-conscious will; perhaps impulse would serve our purpose better. for indeed we have described the nisus repeatedly as an impulse, if not a force, in the whole universe of Space-Time. But "impulse of God" does not seem quite adequate, for while it is a logical description of the nisus, it does not carry the theistically worship-inspiring connotations which we find in the "will of God." Still, lest we be misunderstood, we do not mean to suggest that the will of God is capricious or changeable, nor even, while possibly the object of worship, is it rightfully thought of as responsive to prayer, as the will of a being to which petitions or conversation may be directed. We call it the will of God only because it is the nisus to perfection or deity, which, if God were to have a self-conscious or capricious will, would aptly be considered idential with that will.

In sum, if we may borrow a technique of Alexander's argumentation, we shall say that nisus is the creative impulse of Space-Time. As such, it is related to deity, the mind of Space-Time, or the mind of God, but it is not identical with deity. It serves deity or God in the office of impulse, in the way which human impulse serves the mind of man. Or, it serves deity in the office of will, in the way which will serve the mind of man.

We find, in fact, that Alexander discovers a close partnership between the mind of man and the mind of God, a partnership sealed with the contract of the nisus. For example, the

religious passion is a manifestation of the nisus which the human being possesses because he is caught in the general machinery of emergent evolution] . It has therefore no specific organ though it issues in bodily movements of supplication and diffused bodily excitements. And like other emotions it leads us to the intellectual apprehension of its object. 79

That is to say, the mind of man, through his impulses, emotions and will, shares in the nisus of the universe, a nisus which creates and sustains creation, 80 akin to the traditional and anthropomorphic views of the will of God. Stiernotte interprets the nisus as the impulse of the universe which leads man to feel at one with divinity. for "all existents are caught in this nisus . . . and since we are finite existents the nisus penetrates our body and that part of our body which sustains the mind." The nisus thus evokes feelings in man. The very discovery of deity by man is an indication of the nisus of the world acting within the human mind. Deity, the quality of God, as Alexander would have it,

makes itself felt in the religious sense, which thus discovers the world it sees to be clothed with divinity. For the world is not merely what it is for intellect alone; its nisus towards what is higher enters into its constitution, and as impregnated with this tendency it affects the mind by ways other than cognition. The whole world with its real tendency to deity stirs in us from the depths of our own nature a vague endeavor or desire which shadows forth its object. Then the intellect comes into play, and discovers in detail the characters of this object, and finds at last what it truly is, the tendency of the world forwards towards a new quality.85

While the partnership between mind in man and the mind of God as felt in the nisus is not proof that nisus is, in some sense, the will of God, still, employing Alexander's analogical method we may state that the nisus is expressive of creation, emotion, or desire in God as it is expressive

of or inspiring to creativity, passion, or desire in man.

Because of their share of the cosmic nisus, "minds by their action project new combinations and are creative: they bring new things into the world."⁸⁶ McCarthy elaborates:

It is my conviction that the instinct for preservation, that of sex, the impulse for beauty, truth, and goodness are all fragments of a vast cosmic urge or nisus. The nisus which creates new species also preserves them and gives man the vital urge to assuage his impulse for truth, goodness and beauty in science, virtue and art which is the creative nisus of the universe in humanized form.⁶⁷

More explicitly, "the artistic impulse is stratified in creating a work of art, and in contemplating it the artist sees that it is good, just as God in the first chapter of Genesis created the world and then found that it was good."⁸⁸

But the similarity of the mind of man and the mind of God, which also prompts us to view the nisus as the will of God, must not be taken too seriously. Alexander limits the analogy severely when he warns against imputing to the cosmic creator (whatever that may be) a will exactly like the will of the artist.⁸⁹ We have suggested that the nisus is the will of God, largely because it is fundamental of Space-Time⁹⁰ and is coeternal with the universe,⁹¹ and may even be conceived as an object regarding which we have faith.⁹² But our affirmation, herein, of a will of God is most emphatically not a claim that God creates by his desire. Rather, it is a denial of the supposition that God is without will, however his not lacking a will may be understood.

Consequently, while we have noticed that Brightman imputes personality and self-consciousness to a will in the universe, assigning to God "a creative and rational will,"⁹³ Alexander should not be understood as doing so. We, with Alexander, could only agree with Brightman in his belief that a cosmic will is assumed because of the orderly emergence of new creations in the course of Time, that evolution "is evidence for rather than against"⁹⁴a notion of God. Alexander, should he call the creative impulse "the Eternal Spirit"⁹⁵ (which he does not), as does Brightman, would do so only to suggest that the nisus is of God, while it is not necessarily a spiritual entity at all.

If we consider some problems suggested by Boodin, we may understand more fully the value in regarding the nisus as the will of God.

Why should ensembles of space-points and time-instants have such fertility when wedded to each other and taken in perspective? And what accounts for the nisus towards more complex levels with their soul? What is to prevent time and space if left to themselves from running riot any way whatsoever, downward as well as upward? And what is to prevent us from conceiving any space-time synthesis as complete? ⁹⁵

Certainly it appears that the restlessness of Time would run chaotically were it not for the basic organizing principle which the nisus represents as a fundamental property or category of the body of God or Space-Time, a nisus which must, as a consequence, be coeternal with the emerging universe. That the nisus so operates is not a matter of chance, for it is within the essential structure of Space-Time that it shall unfold as it does, Time being successive and irreversible. Hence the nisus, of necessity, according to its nature, must impel the world forward toward the attainment of deity. Accordingly we (although not Alexander) characterize it as the will of God.

CHAPTER IV

GOD, DEITY AND RELIGION

A. Metaphysics and religion: rational religion -- its strength

We recall that Alexander's philosophical method is empirical, like the method of the special sciences. According to him, as G. Dawes Hicks interprets the Alexandrian system, "Philosophy proceeds . . . by description and analysis, and uses, as the special sciences do, hypotheses which it submits to verification."¹ But the scope of philosophy is considerably broader than the special sciences, for it is the empirical investigation of the pervasive, categorical, or non-empirical features of existence.

Within the scope of philosophy as he understands it, Alexander presents us with a rational approach to religion. The paradoxical nature of many religious problems vanishes "under the impact of his speculative genius."² Some of the traditional religious problems--the problem of evil, or the conflict of a theistic versus a pantheistic God-concept, for example--are apparently inscluble outside of his speculative theology.³

At the outset, the philosopher discovers that man does, indeed, have religion. The naturalistic philosopher is particularly interested in the phenomenon as how it relates to the very nature of man.

Religion is a fact of human nature. Naturalism seeks to understand that fact; and it may incidentally deepen the significance of religion by analysing its nature and tracing its antecedents. In no way is naturalism, any

more than any other philosophy, committed to an attempt to show that the belief of religion is illusory.4

What the philosopher discovers, in fact, is that man is motivated by a vague kind of religious sentiment "which leaves us without theoretical assurance"⁵ that the object of that sentiment, God, really exists. As a result, metaphysical inquiry or rational religion is needed to bolster the belief in divine being, acquired through some emotional response.

Alexander's primary definition of God, we find, is to describe it

as the object of the religious emotion or of worship. He is correlative to that emotion or sentiment as food is correlative to appetite. What we worship, that is God. But it is insufficient for our theoretical needs. It labours under the defect that so far as religion, however vitally rooted in human nature, however responsive to its needs, may be but an ennobling fancy, a being whom we project before us in imagination, in whom to believe may sustain and inspire us and have its own sufficient justification in its effects on our happiness, but to whom no reality corresponds which can be coordinated with familiar realities of the world.⁶

Simply stated, a belief in the existence of God, based solely on the religious response of man, may inspire, ennoble and satisfy us, but religion is wholly inadequate unless reality attaches to the object of its belief. In addition to the possibly overwhelming power of the religious sentiment, religion yet needs a rational element, so that we may be speculatively assured that the object of our desire really does exist. Consequently, rational religion provides us "with a metaphysical inquiry, [as to] what place if any the object of worship occupies in the general scheme of things."⁷

Bertram D. Brettschneider explains that "Alexander discovers God in the responses that follow from the immediate feelings in which fear, admiration, and self-abasement are prepotent."⁸ Intellectual awareness of God, however, can come only through an analytic metaphysical inquiry into the nature of existence. Such "metaphysical speculation takes us where mystical experience leaves off,"⁹ so that we are first moved to believe in God and secondarily we seek to determine whether the object of our belief possesses real existence. Hence, the religious and metaphysi-10 cal approaches to God are complementary.

Furthermore, while we acquire what appears to be an experience of God through religious emotion, "direct experience of something higher than ourselves which we call God, which is not presented through the ways of sense but through emotion,"¹¹ we still require speculative philosophy or rational religion not only to determine whether God exists, but also to discover what is the nature, the character or quality, of such a God. If we question what is the nature of the divine, then "our answer is to be a philosophical one . . [rising from an] inquiry what conception of God is required if we think of the universe as Space-Time ergendering within itself in the course of time the series of empirical qualities of which deity is the one next ahead of mind."¹² Rational religion, therefore, must seek to achieve a concept of God in a world-reality which is pregnent with deity.¹³

This is precisely what Alexander has attempted to achieve, and what we have attempted to illustrate in the earlier sections of this work. The strength, then, of rational religion is that it, by using empirical metaphysics as its tool, devises a conception of God in which divine being is real, a real referent for the yearnings of religious passion. By this method, Alexander has formulated a vast cosmic scheme in which the place

of God is vitally significant. Professor Alfred P. Stiernotte provides an original summary of the theological elements of that cosmic scheme as the subdivisions of the divine:

1. The "body" of God is the whole of Space-Time, whether we think of primordial Space-Time before any qualitied existents have arisen, or whether we think of the primordial matrix at any moment at which qualitied existents are present. This body always occupies the same Space, but a hierarchical order of finite existents grows within it and this order displays a variety of qualities. This is the immanent strain in Alexander.

2. The "deity" of God or the "mind" of God, is the empirical quality to be realized, whether we think of primordial Space-Time, or Space-Time at any moment of its historical existence. This is the transcendent strain in Alexander.

3. The "successive phases of deity," for as we have explained at length, once deity is realized in a finite existent, it becomes the highest quality of that existent, and a new deity looms ahead. This is the conception of the multiple transcendence of deity. h. Deity is a nisus, not an accomplishment.¹⁴

Rational religion serves as an approach to theology by which the object of the religious sentiment is stated to exist really. It is a technique which is secondary in practice to religious experience, but is logically prior, and therefore we have dealt with it first.

B. Religious experience and the existence of God

Furthermore, the practical approach to religion may prove emotionally satisfying or inspiring, but it needs the metaphysical approach to assert that the object of religious experience, whatever it might be, really exists.¹⁵ Through metaphysics "we are speculatively assured that the universe is pregnant with the quality of deity,"¹⁶ even though metaphysics is unable to provide an understanding of the nature of the quality, for we can neither contemplate nor enjoy it. Analogically we may picture it "as the color of the universe."¹⁷

The most significant understanding of the notion of God is derived

from practical experience, from our emotional and instinctive reactions to the world about us. True, through metaphysics we may arrive at the bare concept of a deity. Philosophical speculation permits us to postulate such a quality, but "we could never discover it to be worshipful . . . without the religious emotion."¹⁸ The plan of Space-Time is ground for belief in the existence and reality of such a quality, but such a philosophical notion hardly compels our admiration, much less does it excite us to worship, at least not as worship is generally understood. As Alexander understands religious thought,

we are assured of God's reality on the ground both of specific experience and speculative evidence, derived from experience itself. The belief reposes on this double basis; or at least when emotion assures us of God, we can look for speculative evidence of him in experience, and the direct experience and the speculative one support and supplement each other.¹⁹

Therefore, both experience and speculation are needed for a complete theological system. The one without the other is incomplete. Metaphysical analysis, for example, can postulate a God possessing the quality of deity--as does Alexander's metaphysical system--but such a being as "possesses deity need not necessarily, so far as bare metaphysical description goes, be the object of the religious sentiment."²⁰ Both experience and philosophy (which is based in experience) are required for an adequate religious theory.

Neither [the metaphysical nor the practical religious] definition [of God] is therefore for theory complete in itself. The religious description wants authentic coherence with the system of things. The metaphysical one wants the touch of feeling which brings it within the circle of human interests. Were the passion towards God already lit, no speculative contemplation or proof of the existence or attributes of a metaphysical God would make him worshipful. Even the intellectual love of God which in Spinoza's

system has the force of religion can do so, not as a mere passion for truth in its fullest form, but because it presupposes a religious passion. . . Religion leans on metaphysics for the justification of its indefensible conviction of the reality of its object; philosophy leans on religion to justify it in calling the possessor of deity by the religious name of God. The two methods of approach are therefore complementary.²¹

In this way Alexander differs significantly from William James who asserts that theological formulas would not even be possible without religious experience. But James does agree that metaphysical religious speculation is secondary in practice to religious experience.²² James exalts philosophical speculation beyond the value of religious passion:

Even if religious philosophy had to have its first hint supplied by feeling, may it not have dealt in a superior way with the matter which feeling suggested? Feeling is private and dumb and unable to give an account of itself. It allows that its results are mysterious enigmas, declines to justify them rationally, and on occasion is willing that they should even pass for paradoxical and absurd. Philosophy takes just the opposite attitude. Her aspiration is to reclaim from mystery and paradox whatever territory she touches. . . To redeem religion from unwholesome privacy, and to give public status and universal right of way to its deliverances, has been reason's task.²³

In spite of differences, we interpret Alexander as in fundamental agreement with James. Both thinkers seem to suggest that neither experience nor reason alone are enough to develop a religious system. Alexander's demand that the object of religious experience be shown to exist by philosophical analysis is similar to James' assertion that the privacy of religious experience needs to be removed by the universal publicness of rational method and discourse. James' claim that rational religious discourse could not be possible without the motivation of religious experience does not logically disallow Alexander's statement that whatever God is found to exist in metaphysical speculation is not worshipful outside of the religious experience which brings the emotions to bear upon theological postulations. Others agree with Alexander that the validity of the religious consciousness must be maintained, that a philosophical approach to religion, when asserted to be the only significant approach, makes theology into

nothing but applied philosophy, applied speculation. Such a view plainly amounts to a complete disqualification of the religious consciousness itself and of all the native resources of religion insight--philosophical speculation now being called to do what hs hitherto been done by faith.²⁴

Metaphysics is essential too weak to provide the basis of religion. Some would say that the products of metaphysics--concepts--which may be passed from one man to another, are not as significant as that which cannot be taught, the "numinous basis and background to religion, which can only be induced, incited and aroused."²⁵ Alexander's concept of deity seems to be such a device, according to Wilbur Marshall Urban.

This notion of an emergent quality of deity, mentioned by S. Alexander and others, in some way experienced as other qualities, is an attractive and fascinating one. It affords a sort of empirical and realistic way of explaining the "numinous" character of religious experience and language.²⁶

It seems to be part of the emotional or sentimental side of religion, a detail of religion which is felt or sensed in experience. "We may now lay it down as certain that in the distinctly religious sphere of experience, many persons (how many we cannot tell) possess the objects of their belief, not in the form of mere conceptions which their intellect accepts as true, but rather in the form of quasi-sensible realities directly apprehended. "²⁷

Alone, metaphysics cannot contain the whole of religion, for even the rational attributes of God are not in themselves complete, according to Rudolf Otto, because they describe, however inadequately, "a nonrational Subject of which they are the predicates."²⁸ A full understanding of deity or God "requires comprehension of a quite different kind"²⁹ from that which philosophy or speculation provides. Religion, which encompasses man's activity of worship, is much more than that which the speculations of philosophy supply.

It is idle to hope that by defining God in conceptual terms, whether as the sum of reality, or the perfect being, or the first cause, or such other device, we can establish the connection between such a being and the rest of our experience. We do but start with an abstraction and we do but end with one. Proofs of God's existence and nature there are none, if such a God is to be identified with the object of worship.30

Any religion is considerably more than its rational assertions,³¹ for the side of emotion, the quality of the numinous, is not adequately described in philosophical argumentation.

Even the traditional proofs for the existence of God are no longer convincting for Alexander.³² <u>A priori</u> considerations and techniques, by which philosophers have attempted to demonstrate God's existence, introduce into philosophical theology conceptions supplied by the mind and fail to take account of the details and facts of real experience.³³ Yet it is through experience that the important matters of the religious sentiment are derived. The traditional proofs are unscientific, and therefore they are unacceptable. Here is the essence of Alexander's treatment of the traditional proofs, a treatment which Stiernotte considers "exceedingly brief and unsatisfactory."³⁴ Whether brief or unsatisfactory, Alexander's treatment is in essential consonance with the tenor of his philosophy which demands a scientific or empirical method and approach in religious or philosophical speculation.

Only the argument from design approaches persuasiveness in such a system, as it draws from the experience of man:

The only one of the three [proofs for the existence of God] which at all persuades is the argument from design which is based on the wonderful adaptation c living forms to their surroundings and on "the hierarchy c.' ministration" amongst the forms, by which the lower serves the purposes of the higher. Because such adaptation implies in human predicates the operation of a designing mind, the conception is extended . . . by an illegitimate use of analogy, to experience as a whole. . . Subsequent knowledge has shown that the experience which has thought unintelligible without such a conception points in the opposite direction. For adaptation to the surroundings, or the internal teleology of forms, is the result of [natural] selection operating on variations.³⁵

Even the argument from design, which seems to be convincing, is not adequate to prove that the object of religion truly exists, for the "hierarchy of ministration" seems more to be the product of blind evolutionary processes which are sometimes wasteful and destructive,³⁶ than the artifice of a self-conscious designing mind such as God is asserted to be or to possess.

And before the classical proofs for the existence of God were invented, men still were aware of divine existence through the religious sentiment, a feeling of our relatedness to something much higher than mere man. Through the sentiment, through emotion, religion discovers its object in the world of experience. But in more modern societies, particularly in those after the usual proofs for the existence of God had been invented, emotion and cognition become intermixed.³⁷ Yet there are two poles in religion--emotion and cognition--and they are absolutely distinct in Alexander's system.³⁸

His religious system is the outgrowth of his entire metaphysical, philosophical framework. As John McCarthy states the point,

the theology which he presents is not a mere appending to a brilliants metaphysical analysis but is a natural outcome of his treatise of space, time and value. His treatment of deity is the crowning glory of a philosophy that wishes to take into account all of the facts of human experience, both scientific and religious. It is a naturalistic attempt that begins with statements about mathematics, physics, and biology which are honored by men of science, and concludes with observations about religion which may be scrutinized by theologians and men of practical religious faith.³⁹

Within that total philosophical framework Alexander stresses the importance of practical experience in all matters of knowledge. "All knowledge from bare sensation up to the highest truth is revealed through action."⁴⁰ Knowledge, then, does not determine our actions. "The apple is not first apprehended as food and therefore eaten; but insofar as the physical apple excites us physically through the disposition which is also bodily, to grasp and eat it we are aware of it as eatable."⁴¹ Original knowledge is always based in experience, in practical action. But "cognition, knowledge for its own sake, or theoretical or speculative knowledge"⁴² supervenes upon the primary stage of knowledge, and hence we are led to believe that speculative knowledge precedes empirical knowledge, (perhaps because it does so logically), whereas speculation is but the end-product of our experience.

So it is in matters of religion. We are first excited by the religious passion to grope for the religious object--the apple which is God--and only after our sentiments are stirred do we engage in speculation. Our actions, then, are the foundations of knowledge. We do not worship because we have speculative assurance of the existence of God possessing deity. Rather, we seek the proofs or deliverances of metaphysics and rational religion because we sense an object of our worship. In all matters of knowledge "we know in and through acting."⁴³ Problems of religious knowledge are not unique. They are solved as are problems of knowledge in all spheres of human endeavor or concern. Religion derives its value and its concepts from the nature of the religious experience, from the insights gained in and through the religious sentiment. In this regard, therefore, religion in Alexander's thought follows the pattern of all disciplines, of the special sciences, of ontology, of cosmology, of cosmogony. First come action and experience. From action and experience knowledge derives. But the religious passion always remains prior to philosophical theology. "Intellectual passion, metaphysical contemplation, no matter how satisfying, are not religion but may blaze into the religious sentiment which is more fundamental than intellectual satisfaction."^{1,14}

Neither is revelation the source of religion in Alexandrian metaphysics.⁴⁵ Rather, notions of God come to man "unreflectively and emotionally. God satisfies his religious craving,"⁴⁶ and so we discover in experience. Alexander's purpose in the development of his religious system appears "to be the enhancement of the religious sentiment <u>qua</u> feeling with the depreciation of current theological theories constructed to explain or justify this sentiment which may be difficult to validate through a rigorous metaphysical analysis."⁴⁷ The current theological conceptions of God, in fact, do not satisfy at all the religious feelings of men. But sentiment does justify belief in an infinite object for religious feelings, ⁴⁸ where metaphysics cannot. Since the religious consciousness demands a God that is infinite, God is "identified with the

infinite universe as striving after the quality of Deity."49

Hence the religious consciousness makes demands upon speculative philosophy.

If we approach the subject of religion from the side of psychology there is little concerning the way we arrive at the object of worship that may be regarded as established. ... [But] the metaphysical treatment is faced with the difficulty of understanding evil, of understanding the place of God in a world where evil is a patent reality. One thing seems clear: that no intellectual demonstration of God's nature, taken by itself, without reference to man's emotional needs, is sufficient to explain the object of religion.⁵⁰

Specifically, the greatest actual existent discerned by intellectual demonstration or speculative philosophical analysis is the whole universe of Space-Time. But that greatest, infinite actual existent cannot be conceived as the object of worship, and as such should not be identified with God too intimately. "We must seek accordingly for God, or let us say rather his divinity, elsewhere, as some character not coextensive with the reality but contained within it."⁵¹ Such a character is deity or nisus, and they--either of them--may be the objects of the religious consciousness or sentiment. Rationality alone cannot come to grips with the worshipful, and human intellect can never satisfy wholly the religious passion.

As Rabbi Jacob Kohn states, somewhat in agreement with Samuel Alexander,

 To understand the divine we need to proceed beyond the predicates which our rationality assigns to God, to the elements of emotion which we find in the religious experience. The "bias to rationalization,"⁵³as Otto calls it, may pervade much modern theology, but rationalization is not adequate or even wholly appropriate to serve the needs of practical religion as it is found among most men. "Men do not, of course, . . . employ these lofty 'rational' concepts . . . but they tend to take these concepts and their gradual 'evolution' as setting the main problem of their inquiry, and fashion ideas and notions of lower value, which they regard as paving the way for them."⁵⁴ Rationality may have a legitimate place in religion, but it is only significant to religion as a descriptive or supportive substructure to the natural religion of sentiment.

For religion discovers its object through direct experience rather than through rational conceptualizations. God "is presumed or concluded to be in its own right, and the recognition of it is religion. It belongs accordingly . . . to the order of things like apples or rocks or flowers."⁵⁵ God and his deity are not human inventions at all but are found to be objects having real (actual or potential) existence. We discover God not because of thought but because "a need for him sets us seeking him, and so we seek him because, in the famous phrase of Pascal, we have found him already."⁵⁶ We find God in the world because the human mind has the power to react to nature as it does, because "the emotional reaction which leads to the discovery of deity expresses a fundamental aspect of the structure of the human mind."⁵⁷ God is the object, then, of a human instinct, "of the religious instinct as food is the object of the body's craving for nourishment."⁵⁸ The God discovered by metaphysics is not a

fictional being, for it is confirmed to exist by the religious consciousness. "Since there is a religious emotion . . . we assume that it takes an object and that its object is real."⁵⁹ The religious sentiment, therefore, is a kind of appetite or desire, wholly comparable with the appetite of hunger or the impulse of love. "Each impulse implies its specific object which satisfies the outgoing emotion, and the task of intellectual reconstruction is secondary to the primary sentiment or impulse which expresses the outgoing of our whole personality, be it in the quest for food or drink, in the quest of a mate, or in a quest of the religious object."⁶⁰

We see, therefore, that the very sentiment of religion asserts the object of its longing to exist really. Brettschneider notes that such a conclusion is a "translocation of the Anselmian ontological argument"⁶¹ for it moves the power to prove the existence of God from the cognitive faculty to the emotional side of human nature. Religion itself "is a brute instinct or brute conation of human nature--brute not in its ordinary sense of baseness, but as given in the very structure of our constitution."⁶² And our desires, instincts and longings, as Brightman informs us, "constitute part of the evidence about the kind of universe this is."⁶³ "Knowledge" of God may come from our human constitution, but it is therefore experiential knowledge about the reality of the world. We might regard our instinctive reactions as attitudes about the world, elicited by the objects of our consciousness,

the things which we believe to exist, whether really or ideally, along with ourselves. Such objects may be present to our senses or they may be present only to our thoughts. In either case they elicit from us a reaction; and the reaction due to things

of thought is notoriously in many cases as strong as that due to sensible presences. It may even be stronger.64

The religious emotion is such a feeling, a strong feeling of our relatedness to something greater than ourselves.⁶⁵ Generally, religious feelings are much stronger than the feelings appropriate to sensible objects, and are much more convincing than the results of logic. Those who have religious emotions usually regard them as expressions of great truths, irrefutable through logic or by rational argumentation.⁶⁶

"That which we worship is God,"⁶⁷ and we find that God in our feeling of absolute dependence upon a greater being, through "what for want of a better name may be called the religious consciousness."⁶⁸ Religion, according to Alexander, is an emotional response "evoked by vague stimulus from the totality of things of which the <u>sweet influences of the</u> <u>Pleiades</u> are a symbolic and remote portion."⁶⁹ We have no particular sense organ appropriate to obtain the stimulus which provokes the religious response. Rather, our entire being responds; our whole constitution is stimulated by the influences of the universe and we react in our total being. "There is a character in the world, call it by what name you will, Mr. Otto calls it the <u>numinous</u>, I prefer to call it deity, to which we respond in this fashion, ourselves acting as a whole in response to the play upon us of this whole of which we are a part."⁷⁰ All of our being reacts to the impetus given our emotions by the world, and we attach reality in belief to the existence of things which provoke our response.

In recognizing the existence in real fact of this numinous element in the world, I . . . profess myself in this respect an Otto-man. But I do not in the least mean that there is some rare specific quality in things which we can discover, which is the numinous, which is the object of

By emphasizing his belief that the numinous is not sensed by some specific physical apparatus in the human body, Alexander rescues himself from the possible objection that not all men have the religious feeling, which should seem to be the case were the numinous physically apprehended. Awareness of deity or of the numinous may be related to the senses, but it is not derived from the senses. Belief in God comes not from explicit theological argumentations, but from a sense of reverence in man, caught up with the nisus which drives the process of the universe.⁷²

Alexander himself has stated that his system is linked closely with the religious thinking of Rudolf Otto. Otto calls the sense of the holiness of the divine existence in the world "the real innermost core [of religion] , and without it no religion would be worthy of the name."⁷³ The numinous is confirmed in all strongly felt religious emotion as a fundamental sense of the mysterious greatness⁷⁴ which Alexander might call deity. The religious sense or emotion comes basically and primarily in a "<u>stupor</u> before something 'wholly other', whether such an other be named 'spirit' or 'daemon' or 'deva' or be left without any name."⁷⁵ All of the religious consciousness testifies to the numinous in the world.

The daemonic-divine object may appear to the mind an object of horror and dread, but at the same time it is no less something that allures with a potent charm, and the creature, who trembles before it, utterly cowed and cast down, has always at the same time the impulse to turn to it, nay even to make it somehow his own. The 'mystery' is for him not merely something to be wondered at but something that entrances him; and beside that in it which bewilders and confounds, he

feels a something that captivates and transports him with a strange ravishment, rising often enough to the pitch of dizzy intoxication.⁷⁶

The feeling of numinous is closely akin to Alexander's notion of the religious sentiment, wherein man is caught up in the misus of the world.

Assurance of the reality of deity comes from the religious emotion.⁷⁷ Man finds in himself "a craving or hunger for the divine,"⁷⁸ which drives him to find its object in the real world. Man's impulse to find deity, like the impulse to seek truth, to approve of beauty, or to create art, is part of the nisus in the universe which drives it to give birth to deity.⁷⁹ "We sense deity in our feeling of going out towards the world in a quality higher than that of mind or any of the human values. Deity is not realized but prognosticated"⁸⁰ in man's emotional reaction to the universe which is higher than mind. The fear of the thunderstrom provokes man to the religious sentiment regarding God, who is not the thunderstorm but who works through it and is present in it, a "something other"⁸¹ to which we relate during the moments of terror which the phenomena of nature elicit. Men feel a divine experience, an expression of

the sense of the divine element in the world, of an object towards which man adopts the attitude of worship and feels the sentiment of religious devotion. In this feeling and through this feeling an object is made known or revealed to the person who has the feeling, and he calls it God. . . And the object itself may be revealed to the worshipper in all manner of ways: it may be an overpowering presence which compels him to his knees or terrifies him into submission; or it may be a being evoked through his desire for support in anguish, and answers his desire; or more vaguely something to lean on in his sense of dependence; or a gracious presence which responds to him mysteriously with love and excites his love. . . Always there is the awareness of a mysterious something which enforces or pleads for recognition. And in that experience itself there is no

question raised of whether the object experienced exists or not: it is for the worshipper as much a fact as a green leaf or the sun is for a dispassionate observer. The religious feeling and its object are given in one and the same experience.82

Alexander is speaking of a mystical quality of experience which is directed to God's deity and not to any particular character of God. 83 although the first provocation to such feelings may come from a need in man for a God with some specific character, be it goodness, omnipotence. love, or whatever. But the emotion expressed in the religious experience of the worship-inspiring is "seated in the subliminal strata of consciousness. It is a dim awareness of an 'outgoing' toward the universe-inprocess,"⁸⁴ a feeling which we enjoy in ourselves and thereby we "realize our affinity for the universe, and desire a sense of its otherness, vastness. and process."85 We are a part of the nisus of the universe. We feel that union of ourselves with the whole, and feeling it experience the religious sentiment.⁸⁶ The pervasiveness of the nisus assures that we shall be caught in the creative process and feel at one with the divine. 87 We are no more than configurations of Space-Time, and hence we are wholly affected by the body of Space-Time, we, striving after the object of our religious appetite which is God. 88 The religious response in man represents the penetration of the nisus, which we have called the will of God, into our being, and that response itself is, moreover, a contribution to the nisus.⁸⁹ Hence, the very nature of religion is objective if it is a response to the nisus, for the nisus is a universal tendency to deity. 90

Religion, therefore, is not the fear of the thunderstorm, but the thunderstorm is the occasion of religion, just as religion may be elicited by aesthetic strivings of men or by the drive for knowledge found in the

empirical sciences when the mind of the investigator reaches toward the unknown "so that he feels like a child gathering pebbles on the sea-shore."⁹¹ The tendency toward deity in the environment acts on the human mind, through whatever channels, and the striving of the man toward accomplishment evokes the religious response. The nisus thus provokes a reaction in men as it drives the universe onward to deity, an unknown quality which gives the world a divine flavor.⁹² Man's specific response to the nisus is a

feeling of oneness with the next higher type of quality which is to arise out of the level we or other minds have attained. ... Religious passion is a manifestation of the nisus which the human being possesses because he is caught in the general machinery.⁹³

God does not, in turn, reply to the religious response as an individual person. "The universe does not answer to our prayers by overt external actions . . , but in the strength and sustainment which in its tendency 94 Accordingly, the religious response provides its own satisfaction: it is both a reaction to the divinity of the universe and a source of contentment that that reaction is justified.

Such a religious response may be depicted as a perfectly general phenomenon, for all

material and living things are caught in the nisus, in virtue of which they sustain the level above them, and without which that level would disappear, and things would shrink back to a lower stage. And within the 'minds' of these material and living things themselves the nisus is felt as a nisus towards something unattained, and they have the analogue of what religion is for us.⁹⁵

Consequently we may best describe the religious sentiment as the reaction to the upward sweep of the nisus in the human mind, a reaction which

motivates the individual to affirm the worshipful quality of the unknown deity, expressed as a devotion to God, whatever kind of reality metaphysics might determine that God to be. Alexander agrees with William James "that it is from out of the subliminal strata of our personality that the religious emotion arises into consciousness by a kind of uprush from below."⁹⁶ Divinity is active throughout the universe and hence it moves us to worship,⁹⁷ even though the nisus of the world may be concealed from cognition.⁹⁸

Yet whatever speculative notion we accept of the universe in travail with an emerging deity, that speculation is verified by the religious sentiment, "just as the effect of the existence of jons in chemistry is a verification of their existence, or the observation of a planet through a telescope is a verification of the predicted position of this planet."⁹⁹ The religious sentiment underwrites in practice the speculations about the divine that Alexander presents in his metaphysics. We feel emotion for the objects of Alexander's theology because we are, as Boodin describes it, "part of a creative destiny, reaching backward and forward to infinity--a destiny that reveals itself, though dimly, in our striving, in our love, our thought, our appreciation."¹⁰⁰

Alexander himself best summarizes the thrust and complexity of t religious sentiment. We quote him at length to do justice to his system.

The belief that in religious experience we have direct experience of God goes entirely beyond the record. An experience we have, which is as direct as in other mental actions which we live through, in the language of Mr. Bergson, or as I am accustomed to say, enjoy. But what the religious experience is an experience of is a matter of interpretation. In the end the interpretation may be correct. But it is not direct and it is reached

only after much other experience which we have learned to trust. In itself it is a craving for something we know not what, and we search in the rest of our experience for what it may tell us of the object we seek. We may start with the actual experience of a certain 'numinous' in the world, as Mr. Otto calls it. or imagining an object to meet our need we may ask outselves whether such an object is in keeping with the rest of our experience. Our fancy, if a true philosophy leads us to believe that the fancied object is demanded by the rest of our knowledge, may give us the assurance we need. Mr. Bergson has urged lately that on this ground we may trust the visions of mystics if they are not discordant with other truths, as having a claim to be considered probably true. Some philosophers have indeed tried to deduce the existence of God by arguments which have satisfied few. At least we can see that the object of religion is not given directly to us. though when we have accepted the idea of him, he may seem to have spoken to us directly in our conscience or in other ways. But though the object of worship has not the artificiality of value, it is not experienced as part of the world with a force superior to the beliefs of science. On the contrary, it derives part of its pervasiveness from the converging indications of the rest of our knowledge.¹⁰¹

The religious sentiment as a confirmation of metaphysical postulations is, therefore, complexly utilized and needs to be consonant with a body of other experience. Consequently, it is not surprising to find many men who do not accept the validity of the sentiment, and many others who do not experience it at all, at least not in any way comparable to the manner which Alexander describes. For of necessity the religious sentiment is private and may even be idiosyncratic, it being both the response of an individual to the direction and thrust of the universe and an individual interpretation of that response which, if it is to be authentic, ought to be consistent with a great deal of additional experience, which may also be private and idiosyncratic.

There is something unsatisfying, therefore, in Alexander's attempt to disallow disconfirming lacks of experience as the results of the inadequacies of individuals to feel the divine in the universe. In spite of the all-pervasiveness of the nisus of the universe toward deity, Alexander is willing to tell us that some men lack experience of the religious sentiment because they are "deity-blind" the way some others are color blind or tone deaf.¹⁰³ Since most men are suggestible emotionally to the existence of deity, Alexander argues <u>de consensu gentium</u>, it appears, that the emotion is real, objective and in no way illusory.

C. Varieities of religion

1. Theism and pantheism. Still, whatever the consensus among men may be regarding the reality or unreality of the quality of deity, there remains room for significantly differing interpretations of the nature of that quality and of its relation to the real world of experience. The distinction between theism and pantheism is illustrative, and, as we shall find, significant to Alexandrian thought.

Theism posits a God which is a "divine individual, awfully removed from man,"¹⁰⁴ a transcendent being, external to the world of men with whom men still retain some form of relationship. As such, the theist "makes appeal to the personal or egotistic side of the religious consciousness, feeling that in the surrender the worshipper still retains his individuality and achieves it in the surrender."¹⁰⁵ Such a God is felt to be continuous with man, but is not so conceived philosophically. Frequently, God is imaged theistically as the creator of the universe who calls the world into being by the exercise of his will. When he is conceived as creator, he may create alternately <u>ex nihilo</u> or by informing a pre-existent matter.

Strictly speaking a theistic God (as Alexander depicts theism)

must be external to the material world, external, that is, even to the mind of man which is of the material world.¹⁰⁶ Should there be existents higher than man in the material world--such as finite gods or angels-the transcendent God would still have to be external to these. Nevertheless, "the transcendent God of theism is conceived predominately as possessing moral attributes and as entering into personal relations with his human creatures."¹⁰⁷ Theism, therefore, as Alexander finds it to be embodied in contemporary western religions, asserts doctrines about a transcendent God which can enter into relations with the finite existents of the actual known world, a personal God whose personality is fundamentally unlike human personality in perfection. That such a God-concept is a mass of contradictions is the weakness of theism as it is expressed in practical religion.

For the relationship of the God of theism to his creatures is 108 wholly artificial, wholly out of consonance with the nature of a transcendent God, unless we do violence to the meaning of "transcendence" and unless the theist proclaim inconsistency and self-contradiction to be the virtues of his practical religion. To overcome such difficulties, theists often multiply the confusion by positing intermediaries between the evertranscendent God and his creation, the mundane world. By ascribing an intermediary function to a god-man, for example, theists increase the confusion rather than resolve it.

The need is felt of mediators between the creatures and God which bridge the interval between him and them. God may be conceived embodied in some perfect type of manhood who is at once both human and divine. And if the relation of man with the perfect and unchanging God is artificial, still more so is the connection of God with nature. All the perplexities

which experience makes us so familiar with of the imperfect subjegation of nature to the purposes of man, arise in respect of the God of theism. The god-man is finite and dies. Even God's control over nature, though complete is arbitrary, obeys no principle and is postulated rather than explained.109

The relation of such a God to the world seems so unlike a principle of immanence amidst transcendence that it appears to be no relation at all. And if such a God is related to the world, he is but another mundane thing, although possibly the greatest of mundane things. It is, at best, very difficult to reconcile the transcendent God of philosophical theism with the immanence which theism in practical religion attributes to him.¹¹⁰

Moreover, if the God of religion is to be immanent, he must be more than a being related to the finites of mundane existence. "Immanence . . . means that God is a principle which pervades the whole of nature and has no existence outside,"¹¹¹ whether we consider such a God as identified with nature or as the animating or inspiring principle of nature. "To be immanent, God lives, and lives only in his world. This notion is the essence of pantheism."¹¹² Pantheism, as opposed to theism, has the advantage of positing the existence of a God who is in intimate relation with his world. It

has the speculative advantage that it supplies the comprehensive and unlabored connection between man, nature and God, which theism . . . fails to supply satisfactorily. But this very speculative advantage is at the same time a speculative defect in "merging individuality into the nebulous whole." This speculative defect also signifies a religious insufficiency, for the Absolute of pantheism ultimately does not permit the finite creature the real independence which is required for a free being.¹¹³

The freedom of the individual in theism and its corresponding transcendent God is, at best, replaced in pantheism by a mystical union with God, or else that freedom is altogether absent.¹¹⁴ Pantheism assigns man to an unsatisfying place also because it describes a God who is indifferent to the being of man, a God who has no need whatever for man.¹¹⁵ In such a system as pantheism, moreover, "the individual worshipper has no real existence apart from the divine, and the perpetual danger to which no pantheism hitherto has offered a sufficient resistance is that the individuality of the worshipper is lost in the divine."¹¹⁶ Where practical theism posited a lovable God (who began as awfully removed from man), the God of pantheism remains forever awful.¹¹⁷ Man may relate to a pantheistic God with intellectual passion, but never with emotional devotion,

for the pantheistic Supreme Being lacks the human note. It contains humanity and all other things indiscriminately, and it contains evil and good alike, for what from our human view is evil is not evil as in the Supreme Being.¹¹⁸

Theism and pantheism are essentially distinct and they are fundamentally at odds with one another. Alexander is intrigued, however, with the possibility that they may be reconciled.

While Judaism would, I think, be admitted to be undoubtedly theistic, Jewish philosophy has produced in the herstical Spinoza the greatest example of pantheism known to the Western world. Even Mr. Roth, who in his work on <u>Spinoza, Descartes</u> and <u>Maimonides</u> maintains the debt of Spinoza to <u>Maimonides</u> and his affinity with Maimonides, admits that God could not be equated with the World by Maimonides as he is by Spinoza, God being for Maimonides an immaterial intelligence beyond 'the order demanded by the universal claims of the thinking mind'. Maimonides, I suppose, represents the theology of the Old Testament. Spinoza's pantheism, whatever its antecedents, is unorthodox. Both, however, arise within the womb of Judaism.¹¹⁹

To Alexander, the presence of both theism and pantheism in Jewish philosophical theology represents an interesting phenomenon, particularly because theism and pantheism are so radically different from one another.

But attempts to reconcile the two systems seem to be failures. If we posit a theistic God made immanent by a quasi-divine god-man, we

have hardly at all made pantheism and theism square with one another, for an immanent God must be as immanent in unconscious or inanimate objects as he is asserted to be immanent in man.¹²⁰ Theism and pantheism remain unreconciled. for the God of theism must be transcendent, wholly separate from the finite world, while the God of pantheism is immanent, whether God is conceived as a pervading presence or whether finite things are considered fragments or modes of God. 121 A theistic God cannot be worshipped by his creatures because he is not related to them, and a pantheistic God cannot be loved or worshipped because he is not worshipful. 122 And how all finite things proceed from a pantheistic God is unexplained or incomprehensible in pantheistic theological speculations.¹²³ Also, a creator God is necessarily transcendent and out of relation with his finite creatures, while a pantheistic God is not creative. 124 The two systems -- theism and pantheism -- seem mutually exclusive and individually unsatisfying. The one is strong where the other is weak, but weak, also, where the other is strong. 125

In spite of the difficulties which Alexander finds in pantheism, we might be tempted to think of his system as pantheistic because he identifies the body of God with the whole of Space-Time in which all finites are included.¹²⁶ In any case, he specifically states that transcendence and immanence are irreconcilable,¹²⁷ so that if one must be chosen, we are inclined to believe that Alexander has selected immanence and its attendant pantheism with its speculative advantages. Specifically, however, Alexander does opt both for theism and for pantheism, both for transcendence and for immanence in God, although he assigns the two disjunctive notions to different aspects of the one God.¹²⁸ Moreover, he seems to

accept both pantheism and theism when he rejects a created world while accepting a notion of divine creation within the world.

The historical conception of things rejects of necessity a creator of the world, while accepting creators and creation within the world. The world as a whole when viewed historically is self-creative. If, indeed, we take God to mean no more than the creative impulse by which the world goes its restless way in time, in this sense there is indeed a Creator God.129

Moreover, we may say that God is the creator of the world for Space-Time, which is self-creative, is identified with the body of God as creative of the universe. Furthermore, when we think of the nisus as the will of God, we think of God as creative in yet another respect. So God may be both theistic and pantheistic. As Alexander explains the nature of the matter.

whatever God may be, he, too, is subject to the time-process and must change with the change of things. . . It is enough to remark that whether God be viewed theistically or pantheistically (and the conception of him must do justice to both these views [italics mine]), he suffers, or has the privilege of the timeful passage of things. Pantheistic, he is at no stage of a growing universe complete; theistic he is a projection into a single individual of the universe with its as yet unsatisfied tendency or desire.¹³⁰

There is some question, consequently, whether the view of theology with which Alexander has presented us is a theistic or a pantheistic one. McCarthy understands Alexander as having "solved the riddle of transcen-131 dence and immanence by combining the theistic and pantheistic viewpoints,"

and Alexander himself states:

If the question be asked, whether the speculative conception of God or deity which has been advanced here as part of the empirical treatment of Space-Time and has appeared to be verified by religious experience belongs to theism or pantheism, the answer must be that is not strictly referable to either of them, taken by itself; that in different respects it belongs to both.132 Alexander regards his unique theological formula as both theistic and pantheistic for "God is immanent in respect of his body, but transcendent in respect of his deity."¹³³ While pantheistic, God does not absorb the finites so that their individuality is lost. Rather, the finites sustain the quality of God's deity because of their place in the hierarchy.¹³⁴ Yet while not absorbed in God, the finites of mundane existence are still related to God, as pantheism declares and as practitioners of theism desire, for the body of God as the whole of Space-Time contains all finites in the world. Furthermore, theistically, God's deity as the goal toward which the finite existents in the universe strive grants greater dignity to those finites than they would have in either a theistic or a panthe-135

However, while Alexander claims that his particular theological system has the merits of both pantheism and theism, he also asserts that "if a choice must be made it is theistic,"¹³⁶ for God is theistic with respect to his deity, and it is deity which is the distinctive quality of God, the mind of God, ¹³⁷ and, we may add, the particular quality of God which provokes man to worship. Simply put, deity, if not the totality of God and if not fundamental of God, is that character or quality of God in which the religious man is most interested. Accordingly, Alexander's theology is predominately theistic. While in an otherwise scholarly work Hartshorne and Reese regard Alexander's system strictly and simply as a union of theism and pantheism, ¹³⁸ we may be assured by Alexander's own statements that his theology may be pantheistic, but God is, in its main thrust, a theistic conceptualization. While in Space, <u>Time and Deity</u> he stresses that possible union, elsewhere Alexander explicitly declares that his system is not a pantheism. "According to it the world is not animated by deity as the pantheists believe, for deity has not in its distinctive nature as yet emerged at this stage of the world's existence."¹³⁹

The world is divine not because of deity, but because of the nisus. If, however, we regard the nisus as the will of God, Alexander's theology collapses again into pantheism, for while deity does not, God then does animate the world by the activity of his will. And even if our suggestion that the nisus is identifiable as the will of God be not accepted, we still find Alexander identifying deity with nisus¹⁴⁰ and in this respect deity may, indeed, be said to animate the world, Alexander's own protestations notwithstanding. Nevertheless,

theism and pantheism, transcendence and immanence are two extremes of thought about the divine. They are rerely found in complete purity, but are combined in practical religious belief in various proportions. They represent the two essential characters which God shares with all other things and with Space-Time itself, of being both body and soul. God is immanent in respect of his body, but transcendent in respect of his deity.

But the transcendence of God's deity beyond the finite existents of the actual world must not be understood to signify that God's deity is external to the world. On the contrary, while greater in perfection than all actual existents and contained or localized in none of them, God's deity remains entirely within the world as part of the universe of Space-Time. The dependence of deity for its sustainment upon the lower levels of the hierarchy requires that we regard deity as within the world, so much so that "there is no part of the universe that is not used up to sustain the deity of God."¹⁴³ We might say, in the language of Alexander, that deity, while transcendent, is compresent with the finite existents within the one matrix of Space-Time. Temporally, at least, deity transcends finites for it belongs to the future, but to the future of that same single Space-Time of which we are parts. Moreover, God is transcendent by strict definition, because his determinative quality, that of his deity, is next higher to mind in the hierarchy of existents, and is consequently qualitatively different from all the finites in the 144universe.

Professor Stiernotte objects that such a view of transcendence is not really transcendence at all:

Alexander is emphatic that deity is within the world and in no sense does it transcend the world. God's deity transcends all the finites but is this sufficient to make of Alexander's conception, in the last resort, transcendent theism? Our answer must be in the negative, for a conception of deity as being central within the world and occupying only a part of the infinite world of Space-Time has not the character of transcendence usually associated with theism, for transcendence has meant transcendence beyond the finites of the world. . . Alexander's conception is therefore not transcendent theism, but is rather influenced by pantheism. Certainly, a God who in his character of deity occupies a portion of the infinite world, is not the transcendent God of theism, but savors of an immanent conception.¹⁴⁵

Still, Alexander does not refer to the transcendence of deity as "pure transcendence" which is irreconcilable with "pure immanence." Deity is transcendent only insofar as it transcends--perhaps in a broader sense of the term than is generally found in theism--"the inferior order of developed creations, including man." Again, God's immanence is not "pure,""but being the whole world as it tends to deity or is engaged in the production of deity, God takes in within himself the whole world and is therefore immanent in it."¹⁴⁷ In a manner peculiar to Alexander's theology, God "is transcendent, as it were, in respect of his mind (to use a human analogy) and immanent, in respect of his body,"¹⁴⁸ and in respect of his nisus is neither theistic nor pantheistic, but is "infra-pantheistic," insofar as some finite beings, such as the amoeba, seem not to participate in the nisus, for they exhibit scarcely any change at all.¹⁴⁹

Stiernotte provides us with a comprehensive interpretation of Alexandrian theology with respect to the issues of theism and pantheism. transcendence and immanence. The immanent feature of God is his body which is the all-inclusive whole of Space-Time. 150 the theistic God is to be found in his deity, the next empirical quality beyond that of mind. Deity is a quality which, unlike other empirical qualities, occupies an infinite portion of Space-Time. But deity is not merely transcendent but is multiply transcendent, for "once deity is realized by becoming the highest quality in an emergent higher than man in a future birth of Time, there is a higher deity ahead of this emergent and a realized deity ceases to be deity as such."152 Now deity, while infinite in scope, is not a pantheistic notion, for it (which is God's soul) "does not permeate the whole world, as it does in the strict pantheistic conception."¹⁵³ Alexander's God, then, shares of theism and pantheism, of transcendence and immanence. The system is a union of opposites, albeit modified forms of those opposites.

Accordingly, the God that Alexander postulates and claims verified by religious sentiment or experience has characteristics appropriate to such a unified system. It is a God that is theistic and pantheistic, as well as both rationally and emotionally discovered. But the system

remains preponderately a theism, although, as Eric S. Waterhouse interprets it, it is a reversal of standard theism, a reversal in which first comes the world of Space-Time and deity later.¹⁵⁴

Alexander is most concerned that the God postulated in his theology satisfy the demands of the religious consciousness. He believes such a God is in accordance with the practical religious needs of men.

He still asks aid from the pictorial imagination in order to be realised for our reflective weakness; but requires no pictures that depend on violent hypotheses. The numinous mystery still attaches to a world making for deity; and love given and returned is, as it seems to me, as conceivable towards a being greater than ourselves, who draws us forward to himself by the force of our own aspirations, as to one who draws backward to him the creatures which he created to love him.155

More specifically, Alexander gives us four criteria for the sufficiency to the religious sentiment of any metaphysical conception of God. They are "that he should be greater than man, a 'universal' or all-inclusive being, different in quality from man, and, finally, responsive to man, so that he offers us, in W. James' language, 'a solution of our uneasiness,' whether that uneasiness is derived from our feebleness and finitude or from the more intimate sense of our shortcomings and sin."¹⁵⁶ The last of these we shall consider in some detail later.¹⁵⁷ We may deal with the others rather briefly.

Alexander's God, in the first place, is surely greater than man. He is the whole of the universe as tending to the quality of deity. By virtue of his absolute infinitude, God is greater than man. He is also a ubiquitous all-encompassing being, with respect to this body which is the whole of Space-Time, inclusive of all the finites within the universe. All existents are within God and all actual existence is identical with

God's body. Finally, God is qualitatively different from man with respect to his deity, which is his quality, the next level in the hierarchy of empirical emergents beyond conscious mind. While deity may be considered an outgrowth of mind and sustained by mind and all the levels below it, still it represents a new configuration or complexity of Space-Time which marks a qualitative distinction from the levels which precede it in existence. While an outcropping of mind, deity is as different from mind (and man) as mind is from life, as different also as life is from insentient material configurations. It appears, therefore, that the God of Alexander's speculative theology should satisfy the needs and demands of the religious consciousness.

We may now consider some of the other characteristics of Alexander's God. First, as the whole of Space-Time God's body is not only immanent but is also omnipresent in the universe, ¹⁵⁸ much in accordance with traditional religion. But whereas the traditional God of standard theism is generally asserted to be beyond considerations of Time, Alexander cannot conceive of such a being. To be out of relation to Time, to be timeless, is not to exist, for since the all-encompassing matrix of Space-Time is composed as much of Time as it is of Space, all which exists in Space-even in all of Space--must exist in Time, as well. Alexander takes Time seriously, and hence all things are subject to Time. And to exist is to exist in Space-Time for it is infinite, there being nothing outside of it which may be called non-spatio-temporal being. Nevertheless, we may conceive of God as eternal if we understand his being eternal to mean that he exists in all Time rather than in no Time.

While Space-Time is in some sense absolute, god-like, in no sense is it worshipful, except in that it tends to deity. Bare Space-Time does not satisfy the religious consciousness which longs for a worshipful divinity in the universe. It is deity that provokes the religious response, and in speaking of God as the being that possesses the future quality of deity, Alexander approaches many of the notions of traditional, practical religion. For we exhibit a dependence "on God, which partly makes us think of him under the figure of a father."160 It is "our sense of how God gathers up for us in his person the whole infinite world to which we belong, so that in trusting ourselves to his divinity we are aware of our continuity with the whole in its divine quality." Because of his mysterious nature, God in the aspect of his deity is felt as a father, but the fatherhood of God is not expressive of a creative God who fashions the world. For the individual is sustained by God, 162 that is by the whole of Space-Time with its nisus to deity, but he is not created by God. Men worship the deity of God in the hope of help from a father figure, but this is not to say that the analogy of the father is to be pressed too closely. 163 It refers best to a trust man has in God and a freely given obedience of man to his God, a higher being whom man "regards worthy of such trust."104

Yet man relates to a God that is higher than man in much the same way a dog relates to his master,¹⁶⁵ as a qualitatively lower being that can but scarcely comprehend the higher, that can but sense it as something greater, but the nature of the superiority is unknown. Boodin seems to agree with Alexander in this respect, that the quality of the being beyond

man is largely unknown.

If there is a nisus towards God in our imperfect evolution, due to our trial and error adaptation to the divine impetus, yet we cannot presume now to share the quality of God in kind any more than a dog who shares the friendship of a Newton can hope to share the mind of Newton. . . Clearly God dwells in a light to which no man can come. In the homely language of Heraclitus: Man is a monkey compared to God. There is a difference in quality which separates us from being God in essence.

While much of Alexander's language seems full of anthropomorphism, for instance, the claim that God has a body and a mind,¹⁶⁷ the anthropomorphism is no more than the pictorial images which are given to the considerably more profound theological conceptions. The examples which we have cited serve to explain how God partakes of the general nature and structure of the whole universe. Whether such a technique is legitimate is questionable, but it is one, we note that appears repeatedly in Alexander's writings. Even the fanciful speculation that a man is as a God unto his dog is such a technique, but its intention is to show how God is not qualitatively the same with man. Alexander's purpose is not to postulate a canine theology or to make a god like a man, any more than it is to make a man like a dog.

Jacob Kohn provides us with a fairly complete rationalization and explanation of such anthropomorphizing techniques. While he does not attempt to extol anthropomorphism, Kohn does show us how it is useful in a system like Alexander's.

There can be no doubt that beyond the world symbolizing Deity itself, the designations of God are anthropomorphic. They describe the being as a whole of certain properties which man discovers within himself or within the range of his social experience. I refer to such terms as Father, King, Judge, Redeemer, Legislator and their like as they are found in the literature of religious experience and worship. Post-biblical Jewish literature is particularly rich in descriptive phrases for God, some of which have emotional overtones while others already reflect speculative thought--"He who spake and the world came into being," "Life of all worlds," "The Holy One, Blessed be He," "The Compassionate One," "The Eye of the World" (the all-seeing), "The Shekhina" (in the sense of an indwelling God), and many others. It should be noted that the tetragrammaton which, according to the interpretation of Exodus 3:14, itself bore some relation to God as Being, was not regarded as a proper noun for God. It became a cryptogram for which you could substitute any appropriate designation. This encouraged the weaving of a great variety of descriptive phrases which together reveal the Jewish God idea perhaps more truly than any of the more ambitious attempts at clarification.

Since we can only describe Supreme Being as it is relevant to the human perspective, we must expect such anthropomorphisms in the vocabulary of popular religion. Neither science nor mathematics are wholly free from them.¹⁶⁸

For science and mathematics describe entities that are not human in terms that, of necessity, are human. Anthropomorphism is a device which is useful in explaining extra-human events or objects, for without anthropomorphisms, unless we restrict ourselves to the precise equations of abstract mathematics, and only to those equations--not to their explanations--human communication would become severely limited, possibly eliminated. Speculative theology as a science benefits from anthropomorphic expressions no less than the special sciences, but it is plagued with them, tco, for the danger seems especially great that we will take seriously the anthropomorphic descriptions found in theological discourse. Such expressions serve as models by which we may gain understanding, not as rigid identifications. They are so wrongly taken only in their most pedestrian sense.

2. Monotheism and polytheism. There remains a special problem in Alexander's religious system, the problem of monotheism versus polytheism.

Frequently Alexander speaks as though he were either monotheist or polytheist or both. Stiernotte asserts that Alexander "in a daring mood extended . . . evolution to beings higher than man, his favorite finite gods."¹⁶⁹ Even before Alexander speculates philosophically as to the existence of such beings, he speaks of them in his development of epistemological compresence, supposing how actual beings higher than man--angels, that is to say--would view the relationship of compresence between a man and a material object.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, Alexander does not postulate angels or finite gods merely as a technique in his philosophical system.

This device was adopted half-playfully as a pictorial embodiment of the conception forced upon us by the fact that there is this series of levels of existence. It was used illustratively. . . But we can now see that it is a serious conception. For the angelic quality the possession of which enables such beings to contemplate minds is the next higher empirical quality of deity and our supposed angels are finite beings with this quality. We shall have to ask how such finite deities are related to the infinite God, for they themselves are finite gods.¹⁷¹

As deities, such beings are higher than man in the hierarchy, and as finites they are configurations of Space-Time, each of them having a characteristic quality.¹⁷² Still, we may yet regard the speculation about finite gods as a type of device, one which is used to gain a better understanding of the infinite God. If we transport ourselves in thought to the next level beyond that of mind, we conceive of a finite deity structured along the same lines as other existents in Space-Time, and any finite god or angel shall be, as well, a complexity of Space-Time, built of body and soul, like all other beings in the one universe.¹⁷³

The idea of finite polytheistic gods is a natural outcome of the application of Alexander's theology and metaphysics. "If deity were

attained, there would be not infinite God but finite gods, and the worldnisus would carry the distribution of motion in turn past them.¹⁷⁴ For any actual existent, as we have seen, is destined to be finite: the characters of actuality and infinity, except with reference to total Space-Time, are mutually contradictory, mutually exclusive. Should deity ever become actual in Space-Time, it would yet be replaced as deity by another beyond. A finite deity has yet another deity beyond it, which, if that latter were to become actual, has also another infinite deity beyond it. "There is always impending over him the menace which Prometheus levels against Zeus of supersession by a higher God."¹⁷⁵

Yet this is all part of Alexander's theological metaphysic, a result of his evolutionary thought, and, surprisingly, the guarantee of the theistic element in it. Stiernotte characterizes such a notion of deity ever beyond deity as "the multiple transcendence of deity." A realized deity is always to be surpassed by an infinite deity beyond it. A finite god has yet infinite deity ahead of it, that which is deity to the finite god. "There is thus, if we follow through Alexander's metaphysical assumption concerning deity as the next higher quality, a progressive Iragmentation of the quality of deity into the highest quality. the 'mind' of any number of levels of finite existents." The finites are no longer rightly called deity in such a system as Alexander's, yet we see how they may be regarded as gods to men, finite gods in a polytheistic system. "The forward movement of Time implies . . . nothing less than the fragmentation of the quality of deity into an increasing polytheism of finite existents higher than man, . . . a system of numerous angels and finite gods emerging on the levels higher than man." But

infinite deity remains forever beyond, a multiply transcendent entity which is always deity to the highest finite level in actual existence. Consequently, we may regard the theoretical polytheism which Alexander constructs as a vital portion of his work, one which underwrites the transcendent character of his theistic God. Deity at any stage may not be ultimate, as most theologians would require the quality to be,¹⁷⁹but there remains the forever ultimate notion of a multiply transcendent deity beyond any and every stage of actual deity that shall be achieved in the progressive flow of Time. While "pantheism becomes fragmented into polytheism,"¹⁸⁰ Alexander still holds fast to a God who is pantheistic with respect to his body and theistic with respect to his multiply transcendent quality of deity.

Now we cannot know whether such finite gods or angels actually do exist. Or rather (since, if they exist finitely they exist actually), we do not know whether finite deities, gods or angels exist now in Space-Time.

If Time has by now actually brought them forth, they do exist; if not, their existence belongs to the future. If they do exist . . they are not recognisable in any form of material existence known to us; and material existence they must have; though conceivably there may be such material bodies, containing life and minds as the basis of deity, in regions of the universe beyond our ken.

That is a scholastic and trivial question. 181

Yet the question which Alexander regards as "scholastic and trivial" does not seem so to a number of his critics. Frofessor Laird points out that whether the quality of deity has yet emerged is a possible question, one which deserves further consideration than our author has given it. If we accept Alexander's metaphysical emergence system, and if, therefore,

deity's emergence must somehow be based on mind, then it is fully possible that there are "plenty of angels now, and plenty of Jovian gods above angels, and plenty of Promethean gods above Jovian gods."182 We must. needs, be unaware of them all, for we can neither enjoy, still less contemplate them. for they are all higher emergents than our own human minds. In fact, it seems rather likely that in the course of the infinite Time which has elapsed, such finite empirical existents have emerged, all of which are unknown to us. Hence Alexander's system seems to require a polytheism which suggests a pantheon of gods of which man is wholly ignorant, according to Laird. But Stiernotte answers Laird by stating that such finite gods or angels must be constructed of body and mind, like all other existents in Space-Time. Since they would be so constructed and based in lower levels of existence, "we certainly would encounter them with some awareness of their material contours and biological structure and functions, though the precise nature of their 'super-mind' would remain unknown to us." Still, we could have communion with them, as a dog has communion with his master.

Professor C.D. Broad speculates that finite gods might very well 184 be in existence now, and might have as their bodies the minds of men. If such is the case, as Broad states it, either some men support such gods or all men and no animals do.

We might expect that if some men stand in a much more intimate relation to deity than others this would show itself in their lives and thoughts. With half the ingenuity that Prof. Alexander has lavished on proving that his God has many of the attributes ascribed by theologians to their God, I would undertake to work some of the most characteristic doctrines of the Christian religion into his system.185

Broad seems eager to show that Alexander's implicit rejection of Christianity, attendent to his assertion that the god-man as a principle of theistic immanence is incapable of serving the function which it is supposed to serve, ¹⁸⁶ is premature or inconsistent with his total system in which finite gods may indeed serve to bridge the gap between a transcendent deity and finite man within the world order.

Whatever else Alexander's conjectures about finite deities or finite gods may do, they do not detract from the future quality of infinite deity.¹⁸⁷ Jacob Kohn affords us some insight into the Alexandrian system when he places the speculation as to the existence of finite gods into its proper perspective within that system.

Should we . . . encounter beings qualitatively different from man, on a different plane of being, our relations to them might doubtless be like that of a dog and master. Their inner life will remain a complete secret to us. The humanization of man would then prove only one of the ends of the evolutionary process. The tides of being might have swept beyond us. Of this only can we be sure-they have never <u>paused on</u> <u>planes below us</u> and they can carry us on, if we will, to a future many times longer than that past which saw even the earliest traces of civilization.¹⁸⁸

Finite gods, should they ever emerge, would do so only as one more step in the continuing process of emergence, for "deity always exists in its infinitude beyond any realized and fragmented deity into existents of a higher order than man."¹⁸⁹ There is no reason to expect the nisus of the universe to stop with the emergence of finite gods, any more than it has stopped in the past with the actualization of any other finite quality which had previously been deity to the level below it. Alexander's polytheism does not diminish the worshipful quality of a multiply transcendent deity.

Moreover, the quality of deity, whether considered in a finite or

in an infinite phase, is not like the quality of mind.

To assume it to be of the nature of human mind would be as if a race of seaweeds were to hold that mind when it comes (the quality of deity for seaweeds) must be founded on the life of seaweeds, and minds the offspring of seaweeds. What form the finite god would assume we cannot know, and it is idle to guess. The picture has been drawn merely in order to give some idea of a higher quality of existence.¹⁹⁰

Accordingly, actual deity is not finite because minds are finite, but because actuality implies finitude. We cannot reason from our minds to the character that finite deity would possess. Its nature remains beyond our finding out.

Polytheism, now, does have a place in Alexander's system, and a useful and important place at that. While polytheism cannot contain the notion of an infinite God, it does satisfy the needs of both religion and speculation that a higher quality existent than mind be supplied.¹⁹¹ Moreover, polytheism serves to picture the manner in which God's "empire . . . is extended over the whole univarse.¹⁹² Each god in a polytheistic pantheon serves to rule some matter or concern or character of existence. They are fated to be as they are, in Greek mythology for example, to "act through allotted parts . . . --fire or storm or even minute departments like mildew or rust; they have domains allotted to them.¹⁹³ In another way, therefore, we may say that polytheism and finite gods serve as means to understanding the total universe and the relation of infinite God and infinite deity to that universe, the one matrix of Space-Time.

The finite gods or angels are but stages in the emergence of deity. Beyond them is yet another empirical quality, infinite deity, which is

the deity proper to the finite deities. 194 Infinite deity may not possess actual existence, but it "embodies the conception of the infinite world [which is the body of God] in its striving after deity." 195 Yet no infinite empirical quality -- deity, mind or life -- can actually exist, and "the picture which has been drawn of an infinite God is a concession . . . to the habit of the religious consciousness to embody its conception of God in an individual shape." Nor is God eternal, for all which exists is in Time, and the deity of God occupies but an infinite portion of Space-Time. 197 Still, we can speak of God's deity as being infinite because it represents God's infinite body. As an infinite empirical quality, God's deity is unlike other empirical qualities, actual qualities, all of which are finite. 199 We may speak of God as infinite both with respect to his deity and with respect to his body. but "God is not the only infinite." Space-Time is itself infinite, instances in Space-Time are "infinite lines in Space," 202 and infinite numbers are infinite. But the infinites which are not God are unqualitied, while God is an infinite possessing a distinctive quality, that of deity, "and we learn by experience [that] that quality is borne by finite complexities of space-time." As infinite, God and deity are monotheistic; as finite, they are polytheistic.

But monotheism has usually been understood to require the rejection of polytheism,²⁰⁵ and consequently it is difficult to see how Alexander's speculative theology can partake of both polytheism and monotheism. Historically, polytheism has generally attempted "to secure deity in finite forms, and it is not unnatural that in this imagination the divine quality

should also be construed in terms of our humanity and the gods be conceived as transcendent human beings."²⁰⁶ Taken as such, the more primitive religious imagination which characterizes polytheistic thought provides the human mind not only with finite gods to which man can easily relate but also with "the imaginative presage of what our speculation calls the ideal infinite deity."²⁰⁷

Alexander speaks of deity in two very distinct ways, and to telescope the two into one leads to a confusion that his system is equally polytheism and monotheism. His speculations about finite deities are connected with his total metaphysical scheme in which each level of existence foresees, as it were, a next level which is its deity. There are thus many finite deities actually existing now. "Materiality is deity to Space-Time, life is deity to materiality, mind is deity to life, and angels or gods are deity to mind."²⁰⁸ Finite gods do exist, we know, for levels below that of mind. But infinite deity is not yet actually existent, and were it realized there would yet be an infinite deity beyond.²⁰⁹

Still, "the finite gods were a product of Alexander's mythologizing imagination, whereas infinite God was the outcome of his speculative efforts."²¹⁰ His metaphysics postulates an infinite deity and his practical religion leads him to imagine a multiplicity of finite deities or finite gods. Moreover,

the conception of finite gods and that of infinite God are different conceptions in metaphysics. In the one we are transporting outselves in thought to the next order of finites; in the other we think of the whole world as tending towards deity or godhead. But in the inevitable blending of speculation and pictorial mythology the two conceptions

may become confused. This occurs, for instance, whenever God is conceived merely as the chief in the hierarchy of gods and not different in quality from them. For as we have seen, in speculation, either there is an infinite God, which is an ideal, and there are then no angels or finite deities; or if there are finite gods, the infinite or supreme ideal has ceased to be God.²¹¹

Here, Alexander's infinite God is comparable to Brightman's finite God which is better understood as infinite God having a finite will, ²¹² for the instances of deity in the actual universe are finite, all of them, while there yet remains the infinite ideal. The system remains monotheistic and the supposed pantheon of finite deities or gods is but the function of pictorial imagination seeking to understand the infinite in the universe. Infinite deity remains forever infinite: finite concretions of deity give way to infinite deity beyond.²¹³ But all the discussion of finite deities, while consistent with Alexandrian metaphysics, is a concession to man's habit of mythologizing the divine.

CHAPTER V

THE APPLICATION OF PRACTICAL RELIGION

A. Value and deity

Numerous religious thinkers have described a connection between religion and value. To determine Samuel Alexander's stand on the question we wish first to discuss his theory of value in very general terms. As in other sections of his metaphysics, he begins with a consideration of the human perspective and then proceeds by analogy in two directions, toward deity and toward the lower levels of emergents. Hence Alexander considers human values first and later applies his theory of value as it relates to lower forms of life and to deity. Alexander accepts in principle two propositions of Spinoza on the matter: "first that values are essentially relative to men and are in this sense human inventions; goodness and beauty do not belong to things apart from their relation to men; secondly, that while relative to men they are founded in the nature of things and are not arbitrary."² Values are related, then, to human nature and to human institutions. As John W. McCarthy interprets Alexander, values or "tertiary qualities are emergents at the human level under the compulsion of impulse."

Every tertiary quality is related to the valuing subject, the human mind, values arising when human minds enter into relations with various kinds of objects.⁵ Values are not qualities like the hierarchical qualities of life, mind or deity. The tertiary qualities of truth, goodness and beauty are not absolute descriptions or configurations of

reality.

These values are not qualities of reality in the same sense as colour, or form, or life. Reality is not true nor false; it is reality. Not even is the mental state of illusion or error true or false; it is a mental reality. Objects are illusory or unreal only in relation to the mind which has them. Facts are true only in relation to the mind which believes them. In the same way there is no goodness in a physical fact as a mere external reality; its goodness . . . lies in the relation it has to the physical mind which wills it. Things are good only in so far as we extract their goodness by using them to our purposes. That physical things are beautiful only in relation to us is . . . paradoxical and even revolting, and it . . . shall receive its justification, when it will be seen that a landscape has beauty not in and by itself, but in the same way as a poem has beauty, which is made by a man and when it has been made is also a physical thing outside the maker.6

All value on the human level is relative to the human mind which values an object: value does not reside in the object itself, but in the relationship. Simply put, according to Alexander's influence from Spinoza, "the first meaning of conatus is that the good is what we desire,"⁷ so that "the tertiary qualities . . . are subject-object determinations."⁸ The relationship creates the value, and once it has, the value is in the object, although originated in the object's relation to the subject.⁹ Still, value is not in any sense objective; it always resides in the subject-object relation.¹⁰

But while value derives from the relationship of a valuing mind to an external object, the subjectivity or relativity of value does not suggest that value is only in the mind. Both subject and object are necessary if value is to exist really. Value is yet related to nonhuman nature, as McCarthy demonstrates: "Truth is what men believe about reality. Goodness consists of the reactions of men upon their environment. Beauty is bound up with physical objects."¹² Yet values remain unlike primary or secondary qualities. The yellowness of a flower is objective, but that same flower's beauty "is a subject-object determination,"¹³ a determination which is, accordingly, superadded to the valued object, even in cases where the human mind does not select the arrangement of qualities but only perceives it, as in beautiful works of nature.¹⁴ Fertiary qualities are not discovered to be in the object but are invented by the valuing mind, for value is a quality which an object would not have except insofar as it enters into a relation with a subject.¹⁵ Like knowledge, value comes about because of the compresence of two entities, existing as biological simplicities of stimulus and response.¹⁶

The tertiary qualities are distinctive kinds of value that arise because of the social nature of man, the valuing subject. Each human ascrpiton of value involves a judgment that is necessarily social in nature, Alexander tells us. "Judging and sociability are convertible. For in judgment our objects or propositions come directly into relations of agreement or conflict with other persons,"¹⁷ and our judgments of value are thereby checked against the judgments of others.¹⁸ Hence, a judgment of value, while subjective, is not "an individual emotive cry."¹⁹ It is reasonable, consequently, that Alexander should define the good man not as an innovator or challenger of popular judgments but as one who embodies the social collectivity's expectations of the good.²⁰ For goodness, like all forms of value, has its root in instict and "grows out of purely animal sociability such as we observe in herds of buffalc or among bees."²¹ The good in human terms relates to the satisfaction of human needs "made coherent in the relations of individuals with one another in the social group.²²

Even truth as a vlue has its base in human sociability. It also has its instinctive base, deriving from our impulse of curiosity and manifesting itself in scientific enterprise, for example.²³ For one, judgments are true according to their relation to organized bodies of knowledge, not according to the correspondence rule of truth.²⁴ "The truth of a science," Stiernotte understands Alexander to mean, "consists of the system of coherent propositions involving the subject matter being those configurations of Space-Time investigated in this science."²⁵ Truth, as apprehended by valuing minds, is determined by the internal structure of reality.²⁶ The <u>coherence</u> theory or test of truth means that we find truth according to a proposition's "coherence with social minds, so that error is not primarily lack of correspondence with objective relaity, but rejection by the minds whose agreement is presumed to be a manifestation of the fact that they have the truth."²⁷

Alexander's theory of value in the human sphere extends also to the subhuman sphere.²⁸

The tertiary qualities [of truth, goodness and beauty] are not the only kind of values, though it is they which in the strict sense have the right to the name. . . Within the human region there are values we attach to such qualities as courage or good health; and there is the whole department of economic values. These transitions between the different sorts of value in man suggest that value in a more extended sense reaches lower down than man, and perhaps is a common feature of all finites. . .

In every value there are two sides, the subject of valuation and the object of value, and the value resides in the relation between the two, and does not exist apart from them.²⁹ Value, in its simpler and more extended sense, is a relation between two things that matter to one another, so that food, for example, is valuable to living beings that require nourishment.³⁰ An animal that needs to attain something may be said to desire as its good that which it needs, and we ascribe value for the animal to the desired thing,³¹ even though the desire is instinctive. It is essentially similar to human value. An animal that desires an apple values the apple, but the apple has no value until it and the animal enter into a relationship with each other.³² Animals and men partake equally of the nisus which drives them instinctively or impulsively to seek their goods and to ascribe value.³³ "Animal value is indeed exactly parallel to human psychological value, which might have been called from the beginning animal value were it not that man proclaims his values and animals only act upon them."³⁴

But human value and animal value are nearly objective, even though they owe their ascrptions to existence in a relationship. The objectivity of animal value arises from its source, from the process of natural selection as discovered by Charles Darwin. Animals which seek or display behavior which does not lead to the preservation of their species do not prevail. Their kind either ceases to exist in reality or it is altered in accordance with the distinguishing characteristics of those members whose behavior does serve to preserve the kind.³⁵ According to Darwin, variations occur in each species which variation makes the species adaptable to its environment. During many generations many different variations potentially can occur.

If such do occur, can we doubt (remembering that many more individuals are born than can possibly survive) that indi-

viduals having any advantage, however slight, over others, would have the best chance of surviving and procreating their kind? On the other hand, we may feel that any variation in the least degree injurious would be rigidly destroyed. This preservation of favourable individual differences and variations, and destruction of those which are injurious, I have called Natural Selection or the Survival of the Fittest. . .³⁶

In the process "each creature tends to become more and more improved in relation to its conditions."³⁷ Alexander understands natural selection to be the process or history "of how value makes its entry into the organic world."³⁸ The individual differences of organisms thereby become well-founded values. Value below the human level is related to a species' adaptability, so that that which sustains the type is said to be valuable. Moreover, the surviving types, by virtue of the process of natural selection, are said to be valuable themselves.³⁹

Human value, too, has this biological basis, and it is established in a process parallel to natural selection. "By the conflict and co-operation of many minds, by a process of trial and error, in short, by experiment, . . . human values are established."¹⁰ As Professor Laird explains Alexander's system, virtue is the ability of some thing to avail through its strength or ability to adjust harmoniculy and evil is weakness or inability to adjust.¹¹ But Alexander does not specify the relation among natural selection, instinct, human impulse and the misus. McCarthy claims "that the instinct for preservation, that of sex, the impulse for beauty, truth and goodness are all fragments of a vast cosmic urge or misus."¹² We have described the misus as the will of God. On such an interpretation we may then call God's striving after deity as the ultimate source of value. In human endeavor value drives out unvalue and prevails as valuable creatures prevail in the order of cosmic evolution.⁴³ While some thinkers regard Darwinism as unconcerned with value. Alexander sees it as the history of value.

Its very meaning is that values emerge through the trial of various types under certain external conditions, which trial determines whether in virtue of its gifts or constitution a type is worthy. For like our human values, value in the organism belongs not to the organism in itself, but in its relation to the conditions of life, and accordingly a type which can persist under certain conditions may be unsuited to different circumstances, much in the same way as we approve conduct which is forced upon us by the stress of circumstances, though under normal conditions we should condemn it. 44

Values are not absolutes imposed upon existent things, but rather grow out of the very conditions of existence which an entity might experience.⁴⁵ But human value arises in harmony,⁴⁶ and if it is absolutesit may

only be regarded so as long as it is understood not to be totally relative to the valuing individual. The value which will prevail is the one most fit, or, rather, the behavior valued positively is that which is in harmony with the social group and its desire for self-preservation. Value rests ultimately in adaptive survival.⁴⁷ But the process is not prescriptive. Natural selection does not cause success but only describes how successful adaptations come to be the only possible adaptations to survive. The value is not in the competition, but rather in the survival which competition achieves.

If value is so understood, then religion is not a value, according to Alexander. Nor does a sense of value necessarily lead to religion or to religious devotion. In its most primitive form religion is more closely linked to fear than to good conduct, more to a feeling of divine presence than to notions of duty.⁴⁹ Conduct may be the easiest approach and motivation to religion in the modern world, for like value religion is social or communal in nature. Yet religion and moral values are distinct: there are religious scoundrels and irreligious men who are altogether virtuous.⁵⁰ And ethical societies, good as they may be, do not grapple with religious problems.⁵¹ Man may approach God in several ways: "through the phenomena of nature, through the pursuit of truth, through art, or through morality.⁵² But value is neither the significant nor the primary approach to God.

In its primitive form it is the religious sense of awe which is felt in the presence of natural powers. No irreverence is implied in asserting that in its elementary character it is less closely allied to morality than to the uneasiness or sensitiveness which all persons feel in some degree . . . in the presence of natural mysterious occurences.⁵³

However closely the sentiment for deity may be connected with the sentiment or desire for goodness, the two are distinct aspects of human nature which may appear together in modern Western religion (particularly since the development of the social gospel in American Protestantism) but are only associated in practice, not in essence.⁵⁴ Value is a human invention but religion is an expression of a relation to a human discovery.⁵⁵

Similarly, deity is not a value. Some might interpret deity in Alexander's system to be a value because the universe has been described as striving for it. "Deity is not a value, but a quality in the order of 'perfection.'"⁵⁶ While we maintain that deity is an emergent higher in perfection than mind or any other level hierarchically below the quality of deity, deity and God are still not the highest values, nor are they values at all, "for there is no unvalue with which he [God] can be

contrasted."⁵⁷ Every value may be contrasted with its corresponding unvalue--truth with error, beauty with ugliness, good with evil. But just as there is no "unmind" neither is there "undeity" or "ungod" to which we may compare deity as a positive value.⁵⁸

Moreover, values are either subhuman adaptations, with reference to animals, or human inventions, with reference to man, tertiary qualities which arise in a relationship. But deity is deity, even if there be no entity to which it may relate. It is a quality inherent in reality and not one which is discernable only because finite beings relate to one another in the order of reality.⁵⁹ Values belong to many orders in the hierarchy of perfection, but deity belongs properly only to that level which is the next higher to the highest actually in existence.⁶⁰ We may call deity (metaphorically) the color of the universe,⁶¹ but not the value of the universe. Deity or God may attain to value as they enter into relation with men or other valuing entities, but of themselves they cannot be identified as values.⁶² God or deity are discovered, but value is invented.⁶³ And God and his deity are discovered objectively, while value is principally subjective,⁶⁴ dependent upon the fancy of a valuing mind.

As we have said, however, God and deity may be regarded as having value, if not as being value. One of the problems of speculative theology has been to explain the existence of evil in the world and "the place of God in a world where evil is a patent reality."⁶⁵ The pantheistic elements of Alexander's thought require that he view the body of God (which is the whole of infinite Space-Time) as containing evil within it. A

purely pantheistic conception cannot solve the problem of evil satisfactorily for the religious consciousness. But neither can a purely theistic conception, "so long as . . . God is regarded as separate from his world."⁶⁶ "It might be judged more irreligious," Edgar Sheffield Brightman suggests, "to hold the world as we experience it to be the best possible expression (to date) of an unlimited power,"⁶⁷ than to suppose that what power is God is limited or evil in some way. In Alexander's system, God, involved in the creative process of Time, is of finite will, for he is unable to prevent the existence of evil or even to foresee it.⁶⁸

As a consequence evil is redeemed, for whatever evil there is in the world is as much a part of God's body as is that which is good. Evil is localized in the body of God.⁶⁹ On the interpretation of Winston L. King, Alexander's system is a religious optimism because "God is a <u>nisus toward perfection</u>, a force that reaches out progressively toward higher attainments in the realm of consciousness, moral character, and personal qualities,"⁷⁰ in spite of the evil which his body contains. But since deity is representative of God's body, and since there is no evil in God's deity, we can say that evil is redeemed in the progress toward the emergence of deity, which is not a value but is in the line of value.⁷¹ Because of its place in the hierarchy, God's deity has value and redeems thereby the evil in God's body. "Though God's deity is in the line of value, it involves evil as well as good in its substructure. Evil is, therefore, redeemed as part of God's being."⁷²

The universe proceeds with its misus to deity, and evil, by natural selection, undergoes change and is redeemed as good, for it returns "into

the infinite whole [of Space-Time] out of which it sprang."⁷³ Unvalues cease to be and return to Space-Time where they may be remoulded as values,⁷⁴ as if they were a scuptor's errors, pieces of bronze to be melted and cast again in a more fitting form, or were cosmic excrement returned to the earth from which may yet emerge a thing of use and value.⁷⁵ All evil exists in the body of God, yet it shall be redeemed in God's deity.⁷⁶ Hence, deity is in the line of goodness, if it is not itself a value.⁷⁷

C. Lloyd Morgan understands Alexander to mean that value emerges from mind and deity from value.⁷⁸ While the interpretation is not strictly correct, for value is not an emergent quality like mind or deity, Morgan's gloss on Alexander is an instructive representation of what Alexander means by the claim that deity, while not a value, is in the line of value or on the side of value. As Bertram Brettschneider seas it, "the history of the universe is a quest for value,"⁷⁹ and in this respect we can understand deity to be "in the line of all value, and our values are but its proximate material."⁶⁰ Accordingly, we may regard deity as the conservation of all value in the universe, for while not a value, it grows out of the process by which value comes into the world and is the (ever potential) final outcome of evolution by which unvalues cease and values prevail.

For goodness, whether we are considering the human values or the subhuman values, is the character of the permanent as opposed to the impermanent contrasted evil. The universe works in experience so as to secure the survival of good, or rather that which survives in the longer run in the contest establishes its value thereby and is good.

Now the victory of the lower type which is good makes possible the rise of its successor on the higher level. . . If we apply to the new quality of deity what we learn from the succession of lower empirical qualities, we conclude by analogy that the process by which good overcomes evil in the reigion of mind is one of the conditions of the emergence of deity. . . Thus goodness or good will is material on which deity is built, and deity is in the line of goodness not of evil.⁰¹

Unvaluable existents perish in the course of Time and give way to those which are valuable. The line of unvalue does not continue beyond the emergence of a maladaptive type, and hence the line cannot continue to the emergence of deity. But the line of value is, as well, the line of persistence from which deity shall emerge in the onward sweep of Time.⁸² In Stiernotte's words, "Deity is in the line of value, precisely because deity implies the previous existence in Time of a hierarchical series of existents whose continual existence as a type (not necessarily as individuals) is simply their value."⁸³

Here Alexander's religious system is similar to that of Brightman. The latter regards the religious problem as it relates to natural selection as the seeming waste or purposelessness, the dysteleological nature of the evolutionary process.⁸⁴ But evolution seems to display creativity and purpose, as well, "at the growing edge of the universe, the dominant, never ultimately thwarted factor."⁸⁵ While scme species perish, "the general purpose of life and mind and value always find new channels, new avenues of expression."⁸⁶ Biological and spiritual evolution continue beyond the emergence of wasted types,⁸⁷ leading to ever newer kinds of things in an upward conservation of value.

Alexander sees struggle on the stage of the world. Even when evil

is vanquished, it remains evil. "Ormuzd may overcome Ahriman, but Ahriman is a reality."⁸⁸ With Time, however, a sorting process occurs; new levels emerge from the line of value and they are--all of them--prophetic of the next, precursors of deity. Hence, all value is conserved in deity. Yet, again, religion is not a value, nor is it faith in the conservation of values in deity. Man is moved to religion primarily by fear; value enters into the picture only as a later accretion.⁸⁹

We recall that in Alexandrian metaphysics all earlier emergents support the later qualities which emerge from them, so that deity is dependent upon the levels below it for its existence.⁹⁰ While ultimately the deity of God is dependent upon all finites,⁹¹ it grows in particular out of mind and presupposes it,⁹² and by one remove is supported by mind.⁹³ The nisus is shared by all existents in the world, and therefore each of them, as individuals and as types, strain after the higher empirical quality beyond the highest made actual; all of them strive for deity.⁹⁴

In a purely mechanical sense, therefore, man has a share in bringing about the emergence of deity. And, as deity is in the line of value, the actions of men--whether they be good or evil--affect the future actualization of the quality of deity. There seems to be progress in human values, ⁹⁵ but were there none, man would not be in the line of value and would not be the forecast of deity. Especially good men, men whom their societies recognize as good, are leaders who prepare the way for the future qualities yet to emerge, "as leaders in the human contribution to the world-endeavor"⁹⁶ in its nisus to deity. ⁹⁷ Alexander posits a kind of meliorism in which the entire cosmic process, the sweep of

emergent evolution "may depend on human purpose, for the possibility of its continuance," 98 as Jacob Kohn suggests.

Alexander makes his meliorism rather explicit when he declares emphatically that men share in the emergence of deity.

Every being has a value or unvalue as part of the whole Space-Time; it has the nisus to a higher form in so far as it contributes to the general nisus of the world. . . . We help to the creation of deity in so far as through our goodness we are qualified to share in the universal bent towards a higher quality.

Man himself makes for righteousness and thereby makes for deity.¹⁰⁰ In a respect all finites which avail are preparatory for the emergence of deity.¹⁰¹

The role of man, now, and the place of religion become more exalted than we have been led to believe in Alexander's earlier arguments. Religion is still not an outcropping of morality, but is intimately related to morality, closely tied to judgments about human conduct. Rightly understood, religion is not a series of moral imperatives, commanding us to do our duty, for whatever reason, be it the will of God or otherwise. "It is religion to do our duty with the consciousness of helping to create his deity."¹⁰² And if the nisus is the will of God, as we have suggested, then we find, furthermore, that God's will drives us to perform our duty, to work toward the emergence of deity in future time. God, however, is not to blame for the misery in the world. Man is responsible for his actions and--here is the main point--deity will be the outcome, should man choose to seek the actualization of the divine.¹⁰³ The character of human endeavor determines what or that deity shall be, even though "the process of good over evil in human minds is merely one of the 104 conditions of the emergence of deity." But deity is in the line of 105 human values, in the line of the highest human values. God cannot overcome evil, although his nisus is to deity. Man, as a finite, must overcome all the evil he can and participate, therefore, in the universal nisus. As Alvin Reines expresses the point.

Every individual decision that resolves the pain of finitude increases the possibility of pleasurable being in the future; every social decision that helps resolve the pain of injustice and poverty increases the possibility of social betterment in the future; every scientific discovery becomes a power for the future. If man wills it, God conserves all the value that is possible. . . 106

According to Alexander, as with Brightman, the will of God is finite, but God as the universe is "inexhaustible perfectibility"¹⁰⁷ and man may work to improve the universe which is the body of God.

Human morality is crucial to the development of God's divinity.¹⁰⁸ The struggle in the world is not of God's making, but the struggle is 109 and man may yet have a place in the struggle. God may be "the theatre of the contest between value and unvalue,"¹¹⁰ but man is among the actors in that theater and is thereby given a part in the redemption of evil and the emergence of deity. What men do, that deity shall be. In this respect God is responsive to the actions of man.

B. God and man in interaction

But God, "that which we worship," and man relate to one another in diverse ways, not only in and through the evolutionary process. While we can neither contemplate nor enjoy God's deity, we have speculative assurance that it is real.¹¹² Through the outgoing of ourselves to

the whole universe in its nisus to deity, we have experience of the divine in the religious sentiment.¹¹³ Whatever "direct" knowledge man may have of God, that knowledge, which operates on the emotional level, is more real and more characteristic of human needs than our speculative knowledge of God, 114 as it comes through a religious sense, as man is moved by fear, admiration, wonder and kindred feelings. Religiously. we are convinced that there is an overpowering presence in the world, one to which we can relate. It is a mysterious perception of the next empirical quality, deity, which does not exist in actuality but is forever a future emergent. For the tendency of the world affects the human mind, and therein is the religious response produced. Thus, the object of our religious sentiment is real, though not actual. It is not of our 118 own creation, but is rather a human discovery. To understand such a being we anthropomorphize it in our descriptions, but while it is not the exact quality suggested in our anthropomorphisms, yet it is real, a source of our longing.¹¹⁹ Deity is the mystery of the universe, and God strains after its resolution, yet as a mystery deity seems not quite satisfying to human needs. Yet the mystery is of a perfect infinite quality, growing out of an imperfect world.

Such a God may yet be responsive to man. Certainly, God cannot be identified with mere Space-Time, even if Space-Time is in some way responsive to the action of man. For mere Space-Time lacks the worshipinspiring character which Alexander deems necessary to the object of practical religion.

Now, no one could worship Space-Time. It may excite speculative or mathematical enthusiasm and fill our minds with intellectual admiration, but it lights no spark of religious emotion. Worship is not the response which Space-Time evokes in us, but intuition. . . A philosophy which left one portion of human experience suspended without attachment to the world of truth is gravely open to suspicion; and its failure to make the religious emotion speculatively intelligible betrays a speculative weakness. For the religious emotion is one part of our experience, and an empirical philosophy must include in one form or another the whole of experience. . . The universe, though it can be expressed without remainder in terms of Space and Time, compels us to forecast the next empirical quality or deity.¹²²

Metaphysics aside, man feels a religious need which cannot be satisfied by identifying God with mere Space-Time.¹²³ It is the quality of deity which is the object of religious worship, a quality not yet actual in Space-Time. If God were simply the matrix, he would not have his distinctive quality¹²⁴ which makes him worshipful. Moreover, Space-Time, including all the finites within it, could not be called spirit, for deity is not spirit, but beyond, nor is infinite deity the whole of infinite Space-Time.¹²⁵

Deity is the object of our worship, and if God is to be thought responsive to man, then it is with respect to deity that we should seek responsiveness. We have determined already how man has an effect on the outcome of the universal process with its nisus to deity. And we have noted how the nisus of God toward deity has its effect on man, bringing him to religious consciousness and motivating him to art and to science by providing him with impulse, a fragment of the cosmic nisus. Man is caught up in the striving of God, and he senses a certain divine flavor in the world because of it.¹²⁶

But deity is responsive to man on a very primary level, as well,

for the quality of deity is compresent with the quality of mind. As such, while God enjoys his deity¹²⁷ he contemplates his body and all the finites within it, having, therefore, knowledge of man and of man's mind, knowledge of an order which man himself cannot attain. God or God's deity contemplates all the empirical finites below itself.

But we are dealing here with an extended sense of knowledge as if it were related to God's mind exactly as knowledge is related to the human mind. Strictly speaking, God can know only through the knowing finites within his body.¹²⁸ The activity of man's mind is to know, but deity as the mind of God is not precisely parallel to the mind of man.

Other forms of theism than Alexander's may claim to be more satisfying, such as those that postulate a personal, perfect creator God. Nevertheless, according to Alexander,

it seems to be more reasonable (and helpful) to worship a being whose love draws us to him from in front, and whom we thus help into existence, rather than a being independent of our efforts, who pushes us from behind. We are creating something over which we have control rather than just obeying something we have to recognize.¹²⁹

Such a being as Alexander's deity may be approached in worship through plastic or performing arts which "have proved themselves valuable as a means of expressing religious feelings and giving vent to our awareness of God." Or science and philosophy may also serve as means of worship: as the investigator delves into the material of his study he may become aware thereby of the infinite beyond our human knowledge and gain "a sense of religious awe and mystery." In any case, we worship a being greater than man and different from man.

For in religion man senses himself in communion with a greater

and higher object than himself.¹³³ As Boodin has it, man in the religious mood of worship senses divinity, "the supreme organization of harmony, beauty, goodness and love, . . . active throughout the cosmos, stimula-13h ting the evolution of every part in the direction of divinity." Accordingly, we might sense a worshipful element in the nisus, the will of God, as well. But in any case we sense a God who is responsive to man. That he should be so "is the most vital feature of the religious consciousness." For a God which must satisfy the religious sentiment must be a being responsive to man.

Traditional theism refers to the fatherhood of God in relation to man; Alexander finds in this conception the "primeval mystery which is the root of religion; for the child the father is the mysterious something which he discovers to be like himself, a person by whom he is sustained but who issues arbitrary commands which the child must obey.u¹³⁶ However, Alexander's theism is reversed: it is man (along with all the finites in Space-Time) who sustains the deity of God, and not the other way around. God remains responsive, but not in the way described by traditional theism. Still, in agreement with standard theism, Alexander asserts that "the religious mind conceives itself as doing God's work in doing best the work of man and conceives God as speaking to man in his conscience or in his passion for truth or beauty."¹³⁷ For man's work is to partake of the nisus and strive toward the emergence of deity. Man and God cooperate for the betterment and development of the world.

The community [of God and man] is one of co-operation. The individual is sustained by trust in God but he wants and claims the help of God as a child his father's, and in turn God reciprocates the worship man pays him and the

confidence he reposes in him. There is always the double relationship of need. If man wants God and depends on him, God wants man and is so far dependent.¹³⁹

For God needs man's help to bring about the actualization of his deity, the fulfillment of his distinctive quality.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: DIRECTIONS FROM ALEXANDER'S THEOLOGY

Samuel Alexander considers his method altogether scientific, committed to the empirical method in philosophy. "Now what I want to say is that the object of religion is the completion of the one and the same world of things of which physical nature is another part, and consequently that religion has no call modestly to urge that spirit and God count for something in the world, but rather that a scientifically-minded person needs to recognize religion in order to have a satisfactory view of the world." Science and philosophy, according to Alexander, are basically similar methods of study, both supplying hypotheses about the nature of the world or some part of it. Both seek to verify these hypotheses empirically, by the nature and content of real experience.² Philosophy, as much as physics or biology, for example, is a systematic science.³

As a science, philosophy seeks to deanthropomorphize the view of the world, to place man and mind realistically where they belong in the order of finite existents.⁴ Accordingly, realistic philosophy does not seek to disparage the value of mind, but to give it its due place as another finite emergent, although it is the highest known finite quality. In short, Alexander seeks to remove mind from its unrightful place in the center of the speculative universe.

The geocentric and heliocentric views of astronomy have their counterpart in metaphysics, and the geocentric view is still omnipotent. The human mind in nearly all modern metaphysics is the centre of the universe. It is the point of reference to which all things are referred. . . Things are dependent on the mind not only for being known but for their existence. Remove the mind and they vanish into nothingness.⁵

But Alexander's work may be considered a protest against "geocentric" metaphysics, an attempt to assign mind to its proper place and, therefore, also to give due reality to other objects in the world of finite things. "As the privileged earth became, upon the new theory of the heavens, but one of the heavenly bodies amongst others, so in the Copernican metaphysics the mind is but one thing or class of things among others, physical bodies being a co-ordinate group; or rather, to speak more accurately, mind is a distinctive property of a certain group of things which are themselves physical.⁶ By analyzing the details of the act of knowing into the simple compresence of two equally real finite entities, Alexander placed mind in its proper station, denied it of its supposed greater reality, but ascribed to it its true supremacy in the world of actually existing finite qualities.

We suggest that Alexander's primary and significant basic contribution to philosophy is his Coperaican stance, his refusal to understand the nature of things as they might appear at first blush, solely from a human perspective. Using realism as a tool to achieve empirical but speculative knowledge, Alexander posited a world-view in accordance with the current discoveries of theoretical mathematics and physics. While Whitehead and others uncovered the necessary union of Space and Time from the standpoint of physics, Alexander did so and produced a nearly identical system using only metaphysics.⁷ And the details of the cosmic plan which Alexander uncovered extend beyond the discoveries of the special sciences. He maintained that science, taken in its broadest sense, required a view of the universeemergent evolution--that suggests the future unfolding of empirical qualities not yet in existence. Science points beyond what we already know about nature, to the emergence in Time of deity, the quality possessed by God, ⁸ a quality not currently actual in the universe, but a potential existent after which all actual being strains. Using the methods and discipline of empiricism, Alexander developed a rational realistic theology which has its foothold in experience but which speaks of the pervasive character of the universe, fundamentally of God whose body is the whole of Space-Time with its nisus to deity.

Whether Alexander's findings square with human experience is a crucial matter. On first inspection it appears that his metaphysics of Space-Time and the theology consequent upon it are truly descriptive of what the human being experiences. Specifically, in the religious field, Alexander's notions of the presence of God discovered through the religious response to nature and through the attendant religious sentiment, appear to be in line with what the human being does feel when confronted with the mystery and awesomeness of nature, when in the presence of the numinous. Even the postulate of an emergent quality of deity fits nicely into human experience of the numinous.

But while Alexander extrapolates from known existents and discusses the religious response in detail, uncovering its ramifications and consequences, he never examines it critically to determine whether that response and emotion might be merely an appearance or a fanciful

imagining of human nature. He denies that the sense of the divine is artificial, but he never disproves the possibility that it might be merely a projection of human longing, a delusion fomented by some peculiarity of the human psyche. For Alexander the trustworthiness of emotion is assumed once he is speculatively assured of God's reality. But the character of that God and his quality are analyzed largely on the basis of the religious response. And, regrettably, the religious response in Alexandrian metaphysics or psychology, while explained and described at length, never undergoes the kind of detailed scrutiny that our author gives to the sensible physical world. It would seem appropriate to weigh the suppositions that Alexander makes about human psychology against the findings of Sigmund Freud and his later colleagues. Whether philosophical anthropology would support or confute Alexandrian metaphysics and theology is beyond the scope of this work, but the suggestion is made to take note of a possible defect which the reader might wish to investigate.

Nevertheless with or without such a defect, Alexander's metaphysics, in general, and his speculative theology, in particular, bespeak a noble effort to account for the nature of the world and its destiny. Right or wrong--and we doubt whether Alexander's intricate system can be so simply or flippantly evaluated--the system is ingenious and intriguing. It merits our attention and our respect.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

¹John Laird, "Samuel Alexander's Theism," <u>The Hibbert Journal</u>, XL (January, 1942), 146.

CHAPTER I

John W. McCarthy, The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander (New York: Columbia University, 1948), 9.

²S [amuel] Alexander, "The Basis of Realism," <u>Proceedings of the</u> British Academy, 1913-1914, VI (London: British Academy, 1914), 279.

³S [amuel] Alexander, <u>Space</u>, <u>Time and Deity</u> (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), I, 26.

4 Ibid., II, 9.

⁵Dorothy Emmet, Preface to S [amuel] Alexander, <u>Space</u>, <u>Time and</u> <u>Deity</u> (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), I, xiii.

⁶Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," 279.

 7_{S} [amuel] Alexander, "Lessons from Spinoza," <u>Chronicon Spino-</u> <u>zanum</u>, V (1927), 15. Note that Alexander uses here his own characterization of idealism which is not necessarily accurate to the history of philosophy.

⁸<u>Ibid</u>., 15-16. ⁹Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," p. 279. ¹⁰Ibid., pp. 279-280.

¹¹Alfred P. Stiernotte, <u>God and Space-Time</u> (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), 4.

¹²Alexander, "Lessons . . . ," 16. ¹³McCarthy, 53.

¹⁴Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," 280.

¹⁵Alexander, Space . . . , II, 75.

¹⁶Rudolf Metz, <u>A Hundred Years of British Philosophy</u>, trans. J. W. Harvey, T. E. Jessop, Henry Sturt (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), 629.

¹⁷Cf., Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," 283.
 ¹⁸McCarthy, 17.
 ¹⁹Metz, 529.
 ²⁰Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," 283.
 ²¹Ibid.

²²S [amuel] Alexander, "Ptolemaic and Copernican Views of the Place of Mind in the Universe," <u>The Hibbert Journal</u>, VIII (October, 1909), 58.

²³Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," 283.

²⁴Frederick Copleston, <u>A History of Philosophy</u>, Vol. VIII: Bentham to Russell (New York: The Newman Press, 1966), 395.

²⁵R. J. Collingwood, <u>The Principles of Art</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 205.

²⁶Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, I, 12. ²⁷<u>Ibid</u>.
²⁸Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," 283.
²⁹Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, I, 13. ³⁰<u>Ibid</u>., 106.
³¹Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," 284.
³²Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, I, 13. ³³<u>Ibid</u>., II, 76.
³⁴<u>Ibid</u>., 76-77.

³⁵Arthur E. Murphy, "Alexander's Metaphysic of Space-Time," The Monist, XXXVIII (1928), 21.

36 Ibid.

³⁷G.Dawes Hicks, "Review of <u>Space</u>, <u>Time and Deity</u>," <u>The Hibbert</u> Journal, XIX (April, 1921), 579.

³⁸G. F. Stout, <u>God and Nature</u> (Cambridge: The University Press, 1952), 203.

³⁹Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," 284.

We are forced here to adopt the circumlocution, "the physical objects which it $[\underline{i.e.}, \text{ the mind}]$ contemplates," to refer to those physical objects of lesser perfection than mind, for the mind, actually a physical object, deity, potentially a physical object, and God, really so, are not in the strictest sense objects of contemplation by virtue (with respect to mind and deity) of their place in the hierarchy of existents or (with respect to God) by virtue of the total reality which it comprises. Cf. infra, "C. Cosmogony: a formula for Space-Time," and chap. ii, "God and Deity."

⁴¹ Supra, pp. 3-4. ⁴² Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," 280. 43 Ibid., 284. 44 Stiernotte, 5. 45 Metz, 629. 46 Alexander, Space . . . , I, 26. 47 Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," 285. 48 Alexander, Space . . . , I, 26. 49 Ibid., 26-27. 50 Ibid., 27. ⁵¹ Samuel Alexander, "Art and the Material," <u>Philosophical and</u> <u>Literary Pieces</u> (Hereafter, <u>PLP</u>), ed. John Laird (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1939), 223.

⁵²Stiernotte, 10. ⁵³Tbid., 12. ⁵⁴Alexander, Space . . , I, 37.

55 John Laird, Theism and Cosmology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1942), 182.

⁵⁶Ibid. ⁵⁷Stiernotte, 13. ⁵⁸Alexander, Space . . , I, 44.

⁵⁹Cf., infra, "C. Cosmogony: a Formula for Space-Time."

⁶⁰Samuel Alexander, "Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation," PLP, 272.

⁶¹S [amuel] Alexander, "The Historicity of Things," <u>Philosophy</u> and <u>History</u>, ed., Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 11.

⁶²Alexander, Space . . . , I, 46. ⁶³Ibid., 47. ⁶⁴Ibid., 48. 65 Stiernotte, 14. 66 Alexander, Space . . . , I, 48.

67 John Elof Boodin, Cosmic Evolution (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), p. 87.

⁶⁸Archibald Allan Bowman, <u>Studies in the Philosophy of Religion</u>, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1938), II, 202.

⁶⁹Metz, 634. ⁷⁰Murphy, XXXVII, 363. ⁷¹Supra, p. 12. ⁷²Bowman, II, 202. ⁷³Alexander, Space . . . , I, 59.

⁷⁴<u>infra</u>, pp. 20-39. ⁷⁵McCarthy, 23.
⁷⁶Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, I, 61. ⁷⁷Stiernotte, 200.
⁷⁸<u>Ibid</u>., 22. ⁷⁹<u>Ibid</u>. ⁸⁰Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, I, 63.
⁸¹<u>Ibid</u>. ⁸²Stiernotte, 18-19. ⁸³Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, I, 71.
⁸⁴<u>Ibid</u>. ⁸⁵Stiernotte, 43. ⁸⁶Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, I, 75.
⁸⁷Stiernotte, 21. ⁸⁸Copleston, 396.
⁸⁹Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, I, 341. ⁹⁰Atiernotte, 24.
⁹¹Metz, 637. ⁹²Alexander, "Artistic . . . ," 271.

⁹³A. S. Eddington, <u>The Nature of the Physical World</u> (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), 127.

⁹⁴Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, I, 42-42.

⁹⁵Alexander, "Ptolemaic . . . ," 61. ⁹⁶McCarthy, 85.

⁹⁷Alexander, Space . . . , I, 61. ⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Hicks, 576. ¹⁰⁰Stiernotte, 48. ¹⁰¹McCarthy, 90.

¹⁰²Erich Frank, <u>Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 81, n. 38.

¹⁰³Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, I, 66. ¹⁰⁴Stiernotte, 39.

105 Ibid., 24.

106 Samuel Alexander, "Natural Piety," PLP, 313.

¹⁰⁷Alexander, "Artistic . . . ," 257. ¹⁰⁸Stiernotte, 41.

¹⁰⁹Alexander, "Artistic . . . ," 269. ¹¹⁰Ibid.

111 Ibid., 270.

¹¹²John Laird, "Samuel Alexander's Theism," <u>The Hibbert Journal</u> XL (January, 1942), 149.

¹¹³<u>Tbid</u>. ¹¹¹<u>McCarthy</u>, 3. ¹¹⁵<u>Ibid</u>., 81.
 ¹¹⁶Alexander, "The Historicity . . . ," 15. ¹¹⁷<u>Ibid</u>., 16.
 ¹¹⁸Stiernotte, 81. ¹¹⁹McCarthy, 22.

120 Bertram D. Brettschneider, <u>The Philosophy of Samuel Alexander:</u> <u>Idealism in "Space, Time and Deity.</u>" (New York: Humanities Press, 1964), 149.

¹²¹Stiernotte, 30. ¹²²Alexander, Space . . . , II, 45.

¹²³Laird, "Samuel Alexander's . . . ," 149.

124 Alexander, "Artistic . . . ," 273.

125 Alexander, Space . . . , II, 47.

126 Alexander, "Artistic . . . ," 273.

¹²⁷Alexander, Space . . . , II, 47. ¹²⁸Ibid., 47-48.

¹²⁹Alexander, "Artistic . . . ," 273. ¹³⁰McCarthy, 89.

¹³¹<u>Ibid.</u>, 83. ¹³²Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, II, 46. ¹³³<u>Ibid.</u>, 345.

¹³⁴<u>Ibid</u>. For full treatment of the emergence, actual or potential of deity, cf. infra, chp. ii.

¹³⁵Alexander, "The Basis . . . ," 280.
¹³⁶Stiernotte, 31-32.
¹³⁷McCarthy, 19.
¹³⁸Boodin, 364.

¹³⁹S [amuel] Alexander, et al., <u>Science and Religion</u> (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), 134.

¹⁴⁰Stiernotte, 32. ¹⁴¹Laird, "Samuel Alexander's . . . ," 154.
¹⁴²<u>Ibid</u>. ¹⁴³Alexander, "Natury Piety," 302.
¹⁴⁴Stiernotte, 38-39. ¹⁴⁵Alexander, "Natural Piety," 304.
¹⁴⁶Stiernotte, 40.

147_{Robert Leet Patterson, Irrationalism and Rationalism in Religion (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1954), 10.}

¹⁴⁸Stiernotte, 55-56. ¹⁴⁹Alexander, Science and . . . , 135-136.

¹⁵⁰Jacob Kohn, <u>Evolution as Revelation</u> (New York: Philosophical Library, 1963), 117.

¹⁵¹Fulton J [ohn] Sheen, <u>God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy</u>: <u>A Critical Study in the Light of the Philosophy of Saint Thomas</u> (New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1933), 263.

¹⁵²McCarthy, 86-87. ¹⁵³Stiernotte, 264.

¹⁵⁴William Ralph Inge, <u>God and the Astronomers</u> (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1933), 113.

155 Tbid., 10.

¹⁵⁶W [illiam] R [alph] Inge, <u>Mysticism in Religion</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 48.

¹⁵⁷Inge, God . . . , 138-139. ¹⁵⁸Stiernotte, 194-195.

¹⁵⁹Fred Hoyle, <u>The Nature of the Universe</u> (2d ed. rev.; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 65-68, 123-132, <u>passim</u>.

160 Ibid., 130.

¹⁶¹ William Pepperell Montague, "A Materialistic Theory of Emergent Evolution," <u>Essays in Honor of John Dewey</u> (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929), 267.

¹⁶²<u>Ibid.</u> ¹⁶³Eddington, 74. ¹⁶⁴<u>Ibid.</u>, 77. ¹⁶⁵<u>Ibid.</u>
¹⁶⁶<u>Ibid.</u>, 83. ¹⁶⁷<u>Ibid.</u>, 78. ¹⁶⁸<u>Ibid.</u>, 91. ¹⁶⁹<u>Ibid.</u>, 92.
¹⁷⁰<u>Ibid.</u>, 91. ¹⁷¹<u>Ibid.</u>, 78. ¹⁷²Inge, <u>God...</u>, 113.
¹⁷³Stiernotte, 256. ¹⁷⁴Hoyle, 6. ¹⁷⁵McCarthy, 68.
¹⁷⁶<u>Ibid.</u>, 25. ¹⁷⁷<u>Ibid.</u>, 14. ¹⁷⁸<u>Alexander, Space...</u>, II, 367-368
¹⁷⁹<u>Alexander, "Artistic...," 268. ¹⁸⁰<u>Ibid.</u>, 258.
</u>

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 272. ¹⁸² Ibid. 183 Alexander, Space . . . , I, 44. 184 Ibid. II, 3. 185 Stiernotte, 239. 186 Alexander, Space . . . , II, 38-39. ¹⁸⁷Stiernotte, 28. ¹⁸⁸Ibid., 237. ¹⁸⁹Ibid. ¹⁹⁰Alexander, Space . . , II, 346. ¹⁹¹Metz, 646. ¹⁹²Ibid. ¹⁹³Hicks, 577. ¹⁹⁴Stiernotte, 238. 195 Ibid., 29. 196 Emmet, xv. 197 McCarthy, 15. ¹⁹⁸Alexander, "Artistic . . . ," 271. ¹⁹⁹Alexander, Space . . . , II, 68. ²⁰⁰Ibid., 39-40. ²⁰¹ McCarthy, 2. ²⁰² Stiernotte, 38. ²⁰³ Ibid. ²⁰⁴Supra, pp. 1-11. ²⁰⁵Alexander, Space . . . , I, 6. 206 Alexander, Science and . . . , 134-135. ²⁰⁷Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, I, 42. ²⁰⁸<u>Ibid</u>., II, 367-368. ²⁰⁹Copleston, 398. ²¹⁰Alexander, Space . . , II, 345. ²¹¹ Ibid., 347-348. ²¹² Ibid., 347-349. ²¹³ Ibid., 45. 214 Alexander, "Art and . . . ," 223. ²¹⁵Alexander, "Ptolemaic . . . ," 58. ²¹⁶Alexander, Space . . , II, 4. ²¹⁷Ibid., I, 4-5. 218 Cf. esp. infra, chap. iv. ²¹⁹Alexander, Space . . , II, 323. ²²⁰Ibid., 324. ²²¹Ibid., 326. ²²²Ibid., 327. ²²³Brettschneider, 148.

²²⁴<u>Tbid.</u>, 149. ²²⁵<u>Tbid.</u> ²²⁶Metz, 639.
²²⁷Samuel Alexander, "Dr. Johnson as a Philosopher," <u>PLP</u>, 116.
²²⁸Alexander, "The Easis . . . ," 282.
²²⁹Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u> , I, 4.
²³⁰Alexander, "The Easis . . . ," 282.
²³¹Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u> , I, 4.
²³²Copleston, 395.
²³³Hicks, 573. ²³⁴Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u> , I, 184-185.
²³⁵Hicks, 574. ²³⁶Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u> , I, 186.
²³⁷Metz, 640. ²³⁸Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u> , I, 189.
²³⁹<u>Ibid.</u>, 190. ²⁴⁰<u>Ibid.</u> ²⁴¹<u>Ibid.</u>, 336.
²⁴²Stiernotte, 25. ²⁴³Alexander, "The Historicity . . . ," 13.
²⁴⁵Alexander, Space . . . , I, 331. ²⁴⁷<u>Ibid.</u>, 322.

CHAPTER II

Alfred P. Stiernotte, <u>God and Space-Time</u> (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), 55.

²Ibid., 219.

³John W. McCarthy, <u>The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander</u> (New York: Columbia University, 1948), 83.

¹Stiernotte, 56. ⁵McCarthy, 81.

⁶Stiernotte, 40. Cf., S[amuel] Alexander, <u>Space, Time and Deity</u> (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), II, 346.

⁷S [amuel] Alexander, et al., Science and Religion (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1931), 134-136.

⁸Stiernotte, 32. ⁹Alexander, Space . . . , II, 345.

¹⁰<u>Ibid.</u> ¹¹<u>Ibid.</u>, 346. ¹²Alexander, <u>Science and . . .</u>, 136.
¹³Ibid., 138. ¹⁴Stiernotte, 125. ¹⁵Ibid., 63.

101d., 130. Stiernotte, 125. 101d., 03.

¹⁶Z. A. Jordan, <u>The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism</u> (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 249.

¹⁷<u>Ibid</u>. For a consideration of the relationship of deity and value, cf. <u>infra</u>, chap. v.

¹⁸Edgar Sheffield Brightman, <u>A Philosophy of Religion</u> (New York: Skeffington & Son, Ltd., [194-?]), 176.

¹⁹Ibid., 177.

²⁰Samuel Alexander, "The Mind of a Dog," <u>Philosophical and Literary</u> <u>Pieces</u> (Hereafter <u>PLF</u>), ed. John Laird (London: Macmillan and Co., 1939), 111-113. We shall find this passage especially illuminating when we deal with the religious sentiment as it relates to God. Cf. <u>infra</u>, chap. iv.

²¹Cf. Stiernotte, 67-68.
²²Alexander, Space . . . , II, 347-348.
²³Stiernotte, 57-58.
²⁴Stiernotte, 58.
²⁵Cf. supra, chap. i, pp. 1-11.
²⁶Stiernotte, 68.
²⁷Ibid., 68-69.
²⁸Ibid., 87.
²⁹Alexander, Space . . . , II, 368.
³⁰McCarthy, 14.
³¹Alexander, Space . . . , II, 357.

³²Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese (eds.), <u>Philosophers</u> <u>Speak of God</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 365.

³³Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, II, <u>h</u>25. ³⁴Stiernotte, 187.
³⁵<u>Ibid</u>., 230. ³⁶Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, II, 357.
³⁷McCarthy, 91. ³⁸Stiernotte, 230.
³⁹Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, II, 357. ⁴⁰Stiernotte, 231.
^{h1}Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, II, 366. ^{h2}McCarthy, 91.
^{h3}<u>Ibid</u>., 19. ^{hh}Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, II, 395.
⁴⁵<u>Ibid</u>., 397-398.

⁴⁶Samuel Alexander, "Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation," <u>PLP</u>,

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47 Alexander, Space . . . , II, 398.

48 Alexander, "Artistic . . . ," 269-270. 49 Stiernotte, 90.

⁵⁰William Ralph Inge, <u>God and the Astronomers</u> (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1933), 9.

⁵¹W [illiam] R [alph] Inge, <u>Mysticism in Religion</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 48.

⁵²Milton R. Konvitz, <u>On the Nature of Value: The Philosophy of</u> Samuel Alexander (New York: King's Crown Press, 1946), 13-14.

⁵³But Alexander would claim it verifiable through the religious emotion. Cf. infra, chap. iv.

⁵⁴G. Dawes Hicks, "Review of <u>Space</u>, <u>Time and Deity</u>," <u>The Hibbert</u> Journal, XIX (April, 1921), 580-581.

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⁵⁶Fulton J [ohn] Sheen, <u>God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy</u>, <u>A Critical Study in the Light of the Philosophy of Saint Thomas</u> (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1933), 261.

⁵⁷John Laird, <u>Theism and Cosmology</u> (New York: Philosophical Library, 1942), 75.

⁵⁸Dorothy Emmet, Preface to S [amuel] Alexander, <u>Space, Time and</u> <u>Deity</u> (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), xix. ⁵⁹John Laird, "Samuel Alexander's Theism," <u>The Hibbert Journal</u>, XL (January, 1942), 152.

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⁶⁴Bertram D. Brettschneider, <u>The Philosophy of Samuel Alexander:</u> <u>Idealism in "Space, Time and Deity</u>" (New York: Humanities Press, 1964), 150.

⁶⁵For a discussion of the reality of the future, cf. <u>supra</u>, B. Cosmology: the Union of Space and Time.; Cf. Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, I, 71.

⁶⁶<u>Ibid</u>., II, 347-348.
⁶⁷<u>Ibid</u>., 345-346.
⁶⁸<u>Ibid</u>., 354.
⁶⁹<u>Ibid</u>., 368.
⁷⁰Hartshorne and Reese, 365.
⁷¹Alexander, <u>Science and . . .</u>, 136.
⁷²Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 365.
⁷³McCarthy, 84.
⁷⁴Stiernotte, 69.

⁷⁵Alvin J. Reines, "God and Jewish Theology," <u>Contemporary Reform</u> Jewish Thought, ed. Bernard Martin (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), 82.

⁷⁶Stiernotte, 232.

⁷⁷S [amuel] Alexander, <u>Spinoza and Time</u> (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921), 75.

⁷⁸Laird, Theism . . . , 74-75. ⁷⁹Emmet, xix.

⁸⁰McCarthy, 89. Cf. Stiernotte, 67.

⁸¹Alexander, Space . . . , II, 346. ⁸²Stiernotte, 263.

⁸³Laird, "Samuel Alexander's . . . ," 151.

⁸⁴S [amuel] Alexander, "Some Explanations," <u>Mind</u>, XXX (October, 1921), 428.

⁸⁵Samuel Alexander, "Theism and Pantheism," <u>PLP</u>, 331.

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¹⁰⁰Brightman, <u>A Philosophy . . .</u>, 188.

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²Erich Frank, <u>Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 81 n. 38.

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⁴Alfred P. Stiernotte, <u>God and Space-Time</u> (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), 48.

⁵Alexander, I, 61.

⁶John W. McCarthy, <u>The Naturalism of Samuel Alexander</u> (New York: Columbia University, 1948), 81.

⁷Samuel Alexander, "Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation," <u>Philosophical and Literary Pieces</u> (Hereafter, <u>PLP</u>), ed. John Laird (London: Macmillan and Co., 1939), 269.

⁸Alexander, Space . . , II, 47-48. ⁹Ibid., 48.

¹⁰Stiernotte, 200. ¹¹McCarthy, 90.

¹²G. Dawes Hicks, "Review of <u>Space</u>, <u>Time and Deity</u>," <u>The Hibbert</u> Journal, XIX (April, 1921), 576.

¹³Stiernotte, 211.

¹⁴McCarthy, 23-24. But the sense of God as an outcome of Time should be understood to refer to God's deity, not to his body.

15 McCarthy, 81.

¹⁶ For more on this distinction, cf. <u>infra</u>, chap. iv.

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¹⁸McCarthy, 90.
 ¹⁹Cf. Stiernotte, 129-130.
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 ²¹<u>Ibid.</u>, 399.
 ²²Stiernotte, 56.
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 ²⁴<u>Ibid.</u>, 86.
 ²⁵Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 346.
 ²⁶<u>Ibid.</u>, 367.

²⁷John Elof Boodin, <u>Cosmic Evolution</u> (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), 88.

²⁸Z. A. Jordan, <u>The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism</u> (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 249.

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³³Dorothy Emmet, Preface to S [amuel] Alexander, <u>Space</u>, <u>Time</u> and <u>Deity</u> (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), xvii.

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³⁹Bertram D. Brettschneider, <u>The Philosophy of Samuel Alexander:</u> <u>Idealism in "Space, Time and Deity</u>" (New York: Humanities Press, 1964), 152-153.

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⁴²S [amuel] Alexander, <u>Spinoza and Time</u> (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921), 74.

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^{hu}Robert Leet Patterson, <u>Irrationalism and Rationalism in Religion</u> (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1954), 9-10.

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47 Stiernotte, <u>God . . .</u>, 57. ⁴⁸ Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 353. ⁴⁹ McCarthy, 26. ⁵⁰ Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 388.

⁵¹<u>Ibid</u>., 361. ⁵²<u>Ibid</u>., 362. ⁵³Stiernotte, <u>God</u>..., 66.

⁵⁴Alexander, <u>Spinoza</u>..., 75. ⁵⁵McCarthy, 102. ⁵⁶Alexander, <u>Space</u>..., II, 368. ⁵⁷Stiernotte, God ..., 79.

⁵⁸S [amuel] Alexander, et al., <u>Science and Religion</u> (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), 136.

⁵⁹Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese (eds.), <u>Philosophers</u> <u>Speak of God</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 365.

⁶⁰William Ralphe Inge, <u>God and the Astronomers</u> (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1933), 78-79.

⁶¹<u>Ibid.</u>, 138.
⁶²Stiernotte, <u>God...</u>, 250.
⁶³<u>Ibid.</u>, 264.
⁶⁴<u>Ibid.</u>, 165.
⁶⁵<u>Ibid.</u>, 89
⁶⁶<u>Ibid.</u>, 134.
⁶⁷Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, II, 364.
⁶⁸Stiernotte, <u>God...</u>, 90.
⁶⁹Alexander, <u>Spinoza...</u>, 70.
⁷⁰<u>Ibid.</u>, 72.
⁷¹McCarthy, 91.

⁷²Winston L. King, <u>Introduction to Religion</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), 472.

⁷³Stiernotte, <u>God</u>..., 233-234. ⁷⁴Ibid., 253.

⁷⁵Henry Nelson Wieman, Foreword to Alfred P. Stiernotte, <u>God and</u> <u>Space-Time</u> (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), xvii.

⁷⁶John Laird, "Samuel Alexander's Theism," <u>The Hibbert Journal</u>, XL (January, 1942), 151.

⁷⁷Cf. supra, pp. 78-80. ⁷⁸McCarthy, 26.

⁷⁹Alexander, <u>Spinoza</u>..., 77-78. Our discussion of religious passion or emotion here is only incidental to our consideration of the nisus. For a full discussion, cf. infra, chap. iv.

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⁸¹Stiernotte, "Some Philosophical . . . ," 176.

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⁸⁴Rees Griffiths, <u>God in Idea and Experience</u> (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1931), 130.

⁸⁵Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, II, 377. ⁸⁶<u>Ibid</u>., 326.

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CHAPTER IV

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⁹Ibid., 146. ¹⁰Ibid., 147.

¹¹Alexander, <u>Space...</u>, II, 352. ¹²<u>Ibid</u>., 352-353.

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¹⁴<u>Ibid.</u>, 90. ¹⁵<u>Ibid.</u>, 53. ¹⁶<u>Ibid.</u>, 57. ¹⁷<u>Ibid.</u> ¹⁸<u>Alexander, Space...</u>, II, 381. ¹⁹<u>Ibid.</u> ²⁰<u>Ibid.</u>, 342. ²¹<u>Ibid.</u>, 342-344.

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³⁰ Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 343. ³¹ Otto, 4.
³² McCarthy, 78. ³³ Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 343.
³⁴ Stiernotte, 55. ³⁵ Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 344.
³⁶ Stiernotte, 55. ³⁷ McCarthy, 78.
³⁸ Stiernotte, 100. ³⁹ McCarthy, 76.
⁴⁰ Samuel Alexander, "Art and the Material," <u>PLP</u>, 220.
⁴¹ <u>Ibid</u>. ⁴² <u>Ibid</u>., 223. ⁴³ <u>Ibid</u>., 220.
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¹⁵⁶Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u> , II, 382.
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CHAPTER V

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¹⁷Alexander, Space . . . , II, 304.

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³⁷Ibid., 122. ³⁸Alexander, Beauty . . . , 287.

³⁹Stiernotte, 157. ⁴⁰McCarthy, 65.

⁴¹John Laird, "Samuel Alexander's Theism," <u>The Hibbert Journal</u>, XL (January, 1942), 154.

⁴²McCarthy, 75. ⁴³Alexander, "Naturalism . . . ," 285. ⁴⁴Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 309-310. ⁴⁵McCarthy, 11. ⁴⁶Copleston, 394. ⁴⁷Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 78. ⁴⁸<u>Tbid</u>., 310. ⁴⁹McCarthy, 79. ⁵⁰<u>Tbid</u>., 80. Cf. Stiernotte, 141. ⁵¹McCarthy, 81. ⁵²Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 402. ⁵³<u>Tbid</u>. ⁵⁴<u>Tbid</u>., 405. ⁵⁵Samuel Alexander, "Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation," <u>PLP</u>,

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⁵⁶Samuel Alexander, unpublished letter to Hilda Oakeley (April, 1921), quoted in Laird, 155.

⁵⁷Alexander, <u>Space</u>..., II, 410.
 ⁵⁸<u>Ibid</u>.
 ⁵⁹McCarthy, 94.
 ⁶⁰Stiernotte, 145.
 ⁶¹<u>Ibid</u>., 188.
 ⁶²Alexander, <u>Beauty</u>..., 292.
 ⁶³<u>Ibid</u>., 293-294.

64 Stiernotte, 146.

⁶⁵S [amuel] Alexander, "Ptolemaic and Copernican Views of the Place of Mind in the Universe," <u>The Hibbert Journal</u>, VIII (October, 1909), 64.

⁶⁶Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 420.

⁶⁷Edgar Sheffield Brightman, <u>A Philosophy of Religion</u> (New York: Skeffington & Son, Ltd., [194-?]), 181.

⁶⁸NcCarthy, 100. ⁶⁹Stiernotte, 166.

⁷⁰Winston L. King, <u>Introduction to Religion</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), 472. ⁷¹Alexander, <u>Space</u>..., II, 419. ⁷²<u>Ibid</u>. ⁷³<u>Ibid</u>. ⁷⁴McCarthy, 98. ⁷⁵Stiernotte, 170.

⁷⁶Alexander, Space . . , II, 425. ⁷⁷McCarthy, 96.

⁷⁸C [onwy] Lloyd Morgan, <u>The Emergence of Novelty</u> (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1933), 74.

⁷⁹Bertram D. Brettschneider, <u>The Philosophy of Samuel Alexander</u>: <u>Idealism in "Space, Time and Deity</u>" (New York: Humanities Press, 1964), 150.

⁸⁰Konvitz, 13.
 ⁸¹Alexander, Space . . . , II, 413.
 ⁸²Stiernotte, 160.
 ⁸³Ibid., 163.
 ⁸⁴Brightman, 176.
 ⁸⁵Ibid.
 ⁸⁶Ibid., 177.

⁸⁷Edgar Sheffield Brightman, <u>The Spiritual Life</u> (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942), 159.

⁸⁸Alexander, "Ptolemaic . . . ," 65.

⁸⁹Alexander, Space . . . , II, 416-417.

⁹⁰Stiernotte, 63-65. ⁹¹Alexander, Space . . . , II, 395.

⁹²S [amuel] Alexander, et al., <u>Science and Religion</u> (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), 138.

93 Stiernotte, 124.

⁹⁴S [amuel] Alexander, <u>Spinoza and Time</u> (London: George Allen & & Unwin, Ltd., 1921), 73-74.

⁹⁵McCarthy, 66. ⁹⁶Alexander, Space . . . , II, 418.

97 Stiernotte, 165-166.

⁹⁸Jacob Kohn, <u>Evolution as Revelation</u> (New York: Philosophical Library, 1963), 118.

⁹⁹Alexander, Space . . , II, 418. ¹⁰⁰Ibid., 428.

¹⁰¹Alexander, Beauty . . . , 294. ¹⁰²Alexander, Space . . . , II, 399.

¹⁰³Ibid., 400. ¹⁰⁴Stiernotte, 158. ¹⁰⁵Ibid., 159.

106 Alvin J. Reines, "God and Jewish Theology," Contemporary Reform Jewish Thought, ed. Bernard Martin (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), 83. ¹⁰⁷Brightman, A Philosophy . . . , 188. ¹⁰⁸Alexander, Space . . . , II, 393. ¹⁰⁹Stiernotte, 135. ¹¹⁰Alexander, Space . . . , II, 421. ¹¹¹McCarthy, 77. ¹¹²Stiernotte, 57. ¹¹³Alexander, Space . . , II, 402. 114R. R. Marrett, The Threshold of Religion (London: Methuen & Co. Itd., 1914), 5. ¹¹⁵Ibid., 10. ¹¹⁶Alexander, Space . . . , II, 382. ¹¹⁷Stiernotte, 73. ¹¹⁸McCarthy, 87. ¹¹⁹Kohn, 139-140. ¹²⁰Brettschneider, 162. ¹²¹Fulton J [ohn] Sheen, <u>God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy</u>: <u>A Critical Study in the Light of the Philosophy of Saint Thomas</u> (New York: Longman's, Green and Co., 1933), 261. ¹²²Alexander, Space . . , II, 353. ¹²³Stiernotte, 60. ¹²⁴McCarthy, 84. ¹²⁵Stiernotte, 82-83. ¹²⁶McCarthy, 87. ¹²⁷ Stiernotte, 124. ¹²⁸ Ibid., 105-107. ¹²⁹Alexander, Science and . . . , 138. ¹³⁰McCarthy, 80. ¹³¹Ibid. ¹³²Alexander, Spinoza . . . , 69. ¹³³Alexander, <u>Space . . .</u>, II, 273. 134 John Elof Boodin, Cosmic Evolution (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), 123. 135 Stiernotte, 108. 136 Alexander, Space . . , II, 385. ¹³⁷Ibid. ¹³⁸McCarthy, 79. ¹³⁹Alexander, Space . . , II, 386.

CHAPTER VI

¹S [amuel] Alexander, et al., <u>Science and Religion</u>. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), 132.

²S [amuel] Alexander, Space, Time and Deity. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), I, 4.

3 Samuel Alexander, "Dr. Johnson as a Philosopher," <u>Philosophical</u> and Literary Pieces, ed. John Laird (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1939), 116.

4 S [amuel] Alexander, "The Basis of Realism," Proceedings of the British Academy, 1913-1914, VI (London: British Academy, 1914), 279.

⁵S [amuel] Alexander, "Ptolemaic and Copernican Views of the Place of Mind in the Universe," <u>The Hibbert Journal</u>, VIII (October, 1909), 47-48.

6 1bid., 53.

⁷Archibald Allan Bowman, <u>Studies in the Philosophy of Religion</u> (London: Macmillan and Co., 1938), II, 202.

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