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THE DREYFUS AFFAIR.

by

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HEBREW UNION COLLEGE.

CINCINNATI, OHIO, 1921.

TO

MY MOTHER

whose idealism inspired me to my calling

and

MY WIFE

whose devotion challenges its noblest service.

Mic. 11/79

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The Dreyfus Affair.

THE DREYFUS AFFAIR.

Introduction.

Despite the great volume of literature that has been written on the subject of this thesis, and the universal publicity that has advertised its shameful features to an astonishing world, much of the Dreyfus Affair remains a mystery, and in all likelihood, will forever continue to remain one. From November 1, 1894, when Drumont's "Libre Parole" screamed the arrest of Alfred Dreyfus in shrieking headlines through the streets of Paris, until July 21, 1906 when France made public reparation to the martyred officer for its irreparable injustice toward him and his valiant protagonists, the entire proceedings of the episode were so enshrouded in mystery, so veiled in suspicion, so obscured by innuendo and insinuation, and so amazingly interwoven with treachery, deceit, and all manner of perversion, that only the vigilant exercise of skilful discrimination enables one to follow the main avenue through the maze of fact and fiction presented, and then, to arrive at conclusions that are inconclusive, except as they establish what was already clear to everyone, save perhaps to General Mercier alone. Had not the suspicious "suicide" of Henry occurred, information which he carried with him to the grave might have thrown interesting light on the influences at work behind the scenes, and in place of the conjectures - however plausible - as to the character and magnitude of these influences, we might have had categorical proof of their real nature. With such positive information wanting, the most one can do is to set forth the known facts of the case, and allow the reader to decide whether they warrant the inferences regarding the motives of the persecutors that are herein adduced.

An intelligent appreciation of the forces at work in the "Affaire"

involves more, however, than a knowledge of the simple facts of the case. For it must be steadily borne in mind that it was not Dreyfus, but France herself that was on trial, and that the court-martial of the Jewish officer was only an incident, a pivot about which wheeled all the orders and classes of French society and culture. To Dreyfus it was everything whether he regained his freedom or became a doubly damned convict on Devil's Island; it was nothing, or very little, for France. He was something for them to fight over - an Homeric carcass around which had rallied heroes and demi-gods to hack and stab at each other. On one side were the army, the church, the aristocracy - all the forces of reaction; on the other Science, free - thought, Protestantism, Socialism - all the forces of revolution. The stake was not so much the honor of Dreyfus as the honor of France, and the prize of the struggle was not so much the body of the Jewish officer as the soul of France.

Forces, rather than men, were the actors in this great drama. Men became mere tools of their constituents and of the powers that sanctioned their authority. Only a few shining exceptions stand out in bold relief - men like Picquart, Zola, Scheurer-Kestner, Trarieux, and a few others to whose fearless valor a regenerated France has justly paid homage. But the conflict was from first to last a clash of opposing forces within the body of the nation itself, and only when viewed in this larger aspect can its profound significance be properly appreciated.

Livingston Rickett.

Cincinnati Ohio
March 1, 1921.

CHAPTER I.

The Power of the Church in the State.

At the time of the Dreyfus Affair, it is no exaggeration to say that probably the greatest power in France was the Catholic Clerical party. Despite the antagonism against them of a considerable number of Frenchmen who were incensed at their absolute disregard of law, and notwithstanding the fact that Catholic societies were legally disqualified from residing in the country, they had persisted and gained strength and influence with the passing years.

Before the Revolution, the nobility and the bourgeoisie were Voltairian, and after the crisis the return to Catholicism was by no means unanimous. In many cases it was hardly more than a sentimental affiliation or a formal avowal. Innumerable families of standing and creditable lineage, especially among the nobility and professional classes, had preserved their Gallican or Jansenist traditions, and were absolutely out of sympathy with the men who controlled the church party in those days. With the urban population the Jesuits were a bogey, as they continued to be until the end of the nineteenth century, and as for the peasantry, they feared lest the ascendancy of the clergy would mean the establishment of the loathed tithes.

And yet, by sinuous and devious paths, clerical orders obtained a footing more or less secure. During the Restoration period, from 1816 to 1830, clericalism was rife. The ultras called themselves the "Knights of the Throne and the Altar". The king himself was atoning for his flighty youth by the most rigid orthodoxy. Education was put entirely under church control. A law against sacrilege, making desecration of the host a capital offense, seemed to make the doctrine of transubstantiation a part of the French Code. France was alive with pilgrimages, processions and missions, and revival meetings, similar to those occasionally encountered in America, were daily occurrences.

This in itself would have been tolerable, perhaps, had not undue pressure been brought to bear on the population, had not the alliance of the Church with a political party been so intimate and evident. Even in those days France shuddered at the thought of a vast conspiracy to give her over to the 'men in black' - a surrender all too nearly consummated in the closing years of the century. During the Restoration there was probably some exaggeration in these fears, but the occult, half-mythical society called the "Congregation", to which Charles X belonged, was undoubtedly a power in those days. And the Jesuits, the incarnation of uncompromising theocracy, had returned under the thin disguise of "The Fathers of the Faith", in spite of the strict laws against them.

But in the period between 1830 and 1848 the growing hostility toward clericalism had reached such proportions that it found expression in overt acts of violence. In the days of Louis Philippe the church of St. Germain l'Auxerrois, the arch-bishop's palace, and many other church buildings were sacked by mobs. The former attitude of servile cowering before the garbed representatives of ecclesiastical authority had given way to a spirit of indignant insubordination. Priests dared hardly to show themselves in the streets, every appearance of a cowl or clerical vestment was the signal for a riotous demonstration, and many a mass and vesper in a convent was rudely interrupted by a menacing bombardment of stones and handy missiles. Charles X had in an earlier day compelled the Jesuits to close their seven colleges, and it is of significance that the order was signed not by a Free-thinker, but by the Bishop de Frayssinores. Now, in 1831 the Trappists were expelled, and in 1844 the French Chamber of Deputies voted the absolute expulsion of the Jesuits, whereupon the Holy See itself advised their dissolution.

Neither the active hostility of public opinion nor the official

disapproval of the state held any terrors for these obtrusive religious orders. They lent a deaf ear to all government injunctions, and in spite of the legislation that rendered illegal their presence in the country and declared invalid their titles to property-holdings, they persisted in remaining within the state and they continued to add to their fortunes. Driven by force from their convents and monasteries, they returned quietly after the excitement had calmed down, gradually to resume their accustomed activities. The thirty-nine Catholic religious orders that had been dispersed in Paris before 1845 had reassembled in even more formidable manner by 1888. From 1877 to 1900 the number of illegal nuns increased from 14,000 to 75,000 and the number of those authorized decreased from 113,750 to 54,409. In 1900 there were 1663 Catholic orders in France of which 152 were for men and 1511 were for women, with a total membership of over 190,000.

The secret of their power consisted in the fact that they had managed to lay hands on almost every agency of the national life and activity. They first contrived, by personal patronage, to get authorization for humble philanthropic work, and later, in quiet, steady fashion, they slowly penetrated into the country which, as a whole, regarded them with an attitude bordering on awe. Because of their highly centralized organization and the spirit of implicit, unquestioning obedience which each order demanded of its members, they obtained perfect coordination in carrying out their designs, and were as a result able to accomplish herculean tasks with comparative ease. The power of a superior over an ordinary member was absolute and omnipotent. The dangers to society which are inherent in such a system are only too apparent, and as a matter of history, the supreme authority vested in the higher officers of the orders was only too frequently shamefully abused. The story of the famous

Père Didon is a case in point.*

They became revivalists and dispatched their emissaries on the highways and byways of France to advertise the doctrines of their creeds in city and township. Through their intrigue and initiative, they easily put into the back-ground the more placid parish priests of the country, who were either impotent or disdainful to enter into competition with them for popularity and patronage. In open revolt of the laws of the country, they took possession of national pulpits, and opened chapels competing with churches, gradually winning over to their cause by their remarkable perspicacity and zeal the support of the aristocratic and rich. As a single illustration of the rapidity with which their influence grew, it will serve to point out that in Paris by the side of 70 parish churches they had 511 chapels and churches.†

Paradoxical though it may seem, it is none the less true that the secular interests of these clerical orders were to them of greater concern than their spiritual endeavors. They used their sacred office merely as an entering wedge to establish themselves in the country, but once they had gained a foot-hold, the fire of their religious zeal burnt merely to furnish a screen of smoke behind which they pursued their purely materialistic occupations, hatched their

* In 1872 Père Didon, without any warning or hearing, was ordered from Paris where he was most popular, to Havre, as a punishment. In 1880, at the height of his popularity, he was summoned to Rome by his superior, and there and then, without any chance to defend himself, he - one of the ablest orators in Europe - was sent in disgrace to a poor convent in Corsica. When his mother died, calling for him to the end, he was refused permission to go to her. At last the superior yielded, but it was too late - the great orator arrived three days after her death..... This same Père Didon says: "The monk is a slave indeed, and it is his last name.... the monk is less than a slave . . he is a cadaver."

- Père Raymond "Le Père Didon" p56

† Trouillot "Pour l'Idée Palque" p38.

political schemes, and labored with steady precision for the intellectual and physical conquest of the Republic.

Although the power of their organizations was felt for a long time prior to their dissolution in 1905, the Republic was considerably shocked when the real magnitude of their holdings and the enormity of their spheres of influence were revealed in a report drawn up by Waldeck-Rousseau in 1901, when antagonism against them had forced the hand of Parliament into definite action. The investigations of Waldeck-Rousseau and his committee, appointed to study the monastic question, revealed the startling facts that 5613 monastic establishments paid patents on account of industrial and commercial pursuits - 449 for the manufacture of ready-made clothing; 5 for the sale of wine at wholesale; 6 for the sale of liquor at wholesale, etc;etc. They virtually held a monopoly on the undertaking business, and received 80 per cent of the profits on burials, even when the funerals were those of Free-thinkers, and not attended with religious rites or forms of any kind. As distillers and merchants of wines and liquors they practically controlled the wine market, and such popular brands as Benedictine, Chartreuse, Redemptorine, and Trappistine, betray by their names the vats whence they were drawn. The Carthusians alone paid \$400,000 annually in excise taxes to the government. Moreover these orders were the originators in France of notorious patent medicines, and became experts in the gentle art of composing fake advertising. In less than twenty years the value of their combined property holdings had risen from \$120,000,000 to over \$200,000,000. It was definitely proved that not infrequently they skulked the payment of their taxes by deliberate lies, a case in point being that of a Benedictine convent which swore to the revenue officers that some buildings owned by them were worth only \$1,000 whereas they were discovered to be actually insured for \$110,000. (Chamber of Deputies January 22, 1901). In spite of the

fact that the laws depriving them of the right to hold property still stood on the statute books, they continued to amass holdings, either brazenly writing the deeds in their own names, or resorting to the use of dummies, fictitious societies, and similar evasions.

But their absolute disregard for law, objectionable though it was, and their commercial activities, unseemly as they were, constituted but the least of the abuses of these clerical societies. Of far more dangerous significance was their firm grip on the intellectual life of the country, their practically sovereign authority over the educational and spiritual centers of the Republic. They opened schools of all sorts, academies of arts and trades, and as by degrees they established themselves in the religious, social, and political life of the country, they gradually attracted as students to their institutions of learning the sons of the most influential men of affairs in France. They wormed their way into the great academies and colleges of the country, and many of the most desirable posts in the representative institutions of education were occupied by their candidates. They stealthily but surely laid hands on the teaching in forty-nine theological seminaries of the country. Their nominees had managed to get hold of the highest chairs in the great military schools : St. Cyr, ^{Am}Samur, Polytechnic School, the Engineering and Artillery schools at Fontainebleau - all these were predominated by the men in black, and the extent of their baneful influence in the army was fully revealed by the exposure of their detestable machinations against Alfred Dreyfus, as will appear in later chapters.

From beginning to end, their educational methods were provincial, narrow, and calculated to arouse fanaticism and prejudice. They deliberately set to work to cause Free-thinkers, Protestants, and Jews to appear as if they were traitors to the country. In their

presentation of history they took occasion in season and out of season to excite distrust and suspicion against those who differed with them. The Inquisition of Notre Dame was eulogized in glowing terms as a providential event; the massacre of St. Bartholemew's Day was lauded as an act of consecrated sanction; the Inquisition and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes were approved of in terms of highest praise.* In presenting the history of the French Revolution they always took pains to lay emphasis on its most horrible aspects. With genuine medieval instinct they revived the old unfriendliness of the Catholic church toward enlightenment, and in their curriculums they scrupulously avoided all the sciences except mathematics and astronomy, the only ones that could be taught safely. As might be expected, they viciously persecuted the protagonists of enlightened doctrines which might tend to weaken their authority, and such distinguished scholars as Guizot, Cousin, Michelet, Quinet, Challemeil-Lacour, Deschanel, Taine, Sarcey, and a host of others, were again and again made targets for the envenomed shafts of clerical abuse. They molested the non-Catholic scholar with all manner of indecent molestation, and terrorized the luke-warm Catholic professor with the prospect of disgraceful dismissal.

They succeeded in having their bishops appointed on the superior councils of Education in order that they might wield more direct influence with the Minister of Education, and thereby stifle at the source all efforts to liberalize the teachings in the public schools of France. The Catholic Catechism was the prominent book in the public schools; unauthorized Catholic institutions of learning were given the privilege of granting degrees. So effectively did the clerical orders tighten their hold on the main-springs of French education, that by the end of the nineteenth century the

* Rambaud "Jules Ferry" p 110.

warped and biased doctrines of the Catholic clerics had to a great degree poisoned the thinking of the vast majority of Frenchmen.

If we turn to an examination of their influence in the army, we are confronted with even more appalling evidences of clerical impenetration. It has already been observed that they controlled the chief military schools of the country, with the inevitable result that practically every educated professional soldier was exposed to their sinister influence. An enormous proportion of the officers belonged to reactionary families, and at the time that the Dreyfus affair opened, the Chief-of-Staff himself, General de Boisdeffre, was under the thumb of Pere du Lac, one of the most prominent Jesuits in France. He had been his tutor, and he enjoyed relations of similar intimacy and authority with a great many other military dignitaries, including General Gonse*.

The dangerous character of this clerical influence in the army cannot be too vehemently denounced. It typified the narrowest nationalism and the most militant chauvinism. Its representatives were the mystic defenders of war, and the greatest advocates of militarism. It was the originator and sponsor of the narrow racial prejudice that culminated in the martyrdom of Dreyfus. It compelled every Protestant, Jew, and Free-thinker in the army to attend the Catholic church, and to kneel before the altar at the command of ^{his} their officers, and by the exercise of that same intrigue, it secured an expensive system of Catholic chaplains for the army. So powerful was its

* This same Pere du Lac was the moving spirit behind the scenes during the stirring days of the Dreyfus trials. Although much of his personality and activity is shrouded in mystery, certain it is that he virtually held control over the army, with the hope of using it some day to seize control of the government.

- Yves Guyot "Le Bilan etc" p 101.

might, that it practically controlled all the highest military appointments, so that only by an unusually exceptional display of ability was it possible for a non-Catholic to rise to distinction.

From the foregoing it appears quite evident that clericalism in France during the period with which we are dealing, was a tremendous factor in deciding the educational and military affairs of the country. Turning for a moment to a consideration of the direct political influence wielded by these orders, we are again confronted with the same situation - the absolute predominance of clerical influence. It is no exaggeration to say that every public official, both great and small, in the whole kingdom, was either directly under their tutelage, or indirectly obligated to respect their authority, and it fared ill indeed with those who were not zealous in their cause. It was through the parish that one secured state advancement in any career, or impunity from crime at the hand of a judge. The church was in truth the stepping-stone of the religious politician to office, and once within its clutches, its proteges were well kept in line by the unrestrained use of molestation, terrorism, and refined threats of blackmail.

They placed priests as members ex officio on boards of charities; they expropriated the citizenry of Paris to build that most unpopular church, the Sacred Heart of Montmartre, they obtained the authorization of thirty-six religious orders, in the face of the constitutional provisions outlawing them. They had the Catholic budget increased from \$400,000 in 1881 to \$10,000,000 in 1890. By devious means, fair and foul, they endeavored to regain every privilege lost to them by and after the French Revolution, and with equal vigor they strove to restrict and annul the liberties of other social and communal groups within the state. The majority of the French Parliament was Catholic, and its members, egged on by the clericals,

refused steadfastly to vote religious liberty for all. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, monasticism was the great rock in the way of corporate freedom. From the Franco-Prussian war to 1900, thirty-two bills were presented to the French government having for their object the extension of civil and religious liberty, every one of which went down to defeat by the occult action of the clerical orders, which jealously refused to permit non-Catholics to enjoy the freedom that they themselves had. So sinister was their political influence and so involved had they become in the toils of national politics, that Pere Mamus of Paris was moved to recall them to their sacred functions by reminding them that "Our mission is not to cause deputies to be elected; we have to save souls and to spread the kingdom of Jesus Christ".

It was but logical that clericalism should ally itself in politics with the conservative and reactionary groups, and consequently we naturally find it entered into an implicit alliance with the Nationalist Party. Together these two factions worked untiringly for the overthrow of the Republic and the restoration of the monarchical regime. Republicanism meant liberalism if it meant anything at all. Monarchy, on the other hand, stood for the inviolability of tradition and stern authority - the only conditions under which Orthodox Catholicism could thrive. With common ends and kindred motives, Clerical and Nationalist joined forces, and seized upon every conceivable opportunity to discredit the existing government, with the scarcely concealed purpose of restoring the Monarchy.

To assist them in their designs, they seized upon the Press as their strongest weapon. The record of French journalism during the black years of clerical ascendancy in France, is one of shameful degeneracy. The disgraceful depths to which clerical unscrupulousness dragged the journals of the Republic and the foul cess-pools in which

they steeped its pages, are absolutely inconceivable to those familiar with American and English journalism. The yellowest rag in London or New York would blush to print the obscenity that filled the pages of the newspapers of Paris during the stormy years of the Dreyfus trials. Mudslinging, vituperation, muck-raking - the vilest sort of filth and the foulest manner of expression were all part of the literary equipment of the clerical journalist of the last decade of the nineteenth century in France. During the Dreyfus agitation, this campaign of villainy was at its worst, of course, and one cannot read the columns of the Catholic-Nationalist press of that period without experiencing a sensation of positive revulsion and disgust.

One finds it difficult to say a favorable word for any of the clerical orders. But certainly above all objectionable were the Assumptionists, an order which had amassed enormous wealth, and had, by the various local editions of its paper "La Croix", organized a campaign of venomous slander and abuse against Dreyfus and all who ventured to speak for him. Not even here did they stop, but went further to direct their filthy epithets and noxious insinuations against the Republic and its leaders. Especially in 1899, when the agitation over the Rennes court-martial threatened to disrupt the government, it was the Assumptionist propaganda particularly, in "La Croix", that daily incited the army to rise up and seize control, that incessantly called for a coup d'etat, that urged discharged and retired soldiers to organize for the purpose of restoring the Monarchy - that made war to the knife and drove the knife to the hilt against the loyal servants of the Republic.

Clerical Anti-Semitism.

It was against the Jews in particular, that clerical vituperation and abuse was directed in frenzied paroxysms. Balak, in his

moments of utmost hatred against the people of Israel, would have desired no more able or willing servants than the clerical orders in France in the period with which we are dealing. With impassioned frenzy and envenomed rage they threw themselves into the business of inciting hatred and violence against the Jews; with jaws foaming and spluttering they literally hurled torrent after torrent of malice and invective against the innocent Jewish population of the Republic.

Yves Guyot, in seeking an explanation for their animosity, affirms that it was "to avenge themselves for the establishment of the Republic and for the edicts of March 29, 1880, that the Jews had prepared and imported the anti-Semitism in France which had already served them in Austria and in Germany".* He goes on to state that they "wished to attack that faction of the liberal party against which they could easiest arouse all manner of suspicion, more or less justifiable." Unquestionably there were other motives for their animosity, not the least of which was the age-old hatred of the French Catholic toward the Jew, but the explanation offered by Guyot is not unworthy of serious consideration. Certain it is that the Jews in France at the time of the Dreyfus affair, numbering about 80,000 souls - 50,000 of whom lived in Paris - were far more favorably disposed toward the Republican form of government than they were toward the monarchical program advocated by the clericals. Under the former they were reasonably assured of some degree of liberal treatment leading toward ultimate equality, whereas past experiences with monarchies had taught them to be wary of putting their trust in princes. Consequently it may well have been that the desire to discredit the liberal movement by attacking its most vulnerable constituency was part of the plan of the clericals, but

* Yves Guyot - "Le Bilan etc" p. 98 et seq.

it is highly questionable whether that was their sole actuating motive.

The fact remains, however, that the clericals did persecute the Jews most abominably, and resorted to their meanest journalistic outrages to spread their campaign of hostility. They denounced them as "voleurs des Français", as the incarnation of all that is hateful and despicable and vile, as the worst enemies of the country, as exploiting traffickers in the prosperity of the nation. They published "Le Petit Catéchisme Anti-Juif" in which they damned the Jews for paralyzing industry and commerce, calling them all millionaires, and loudly clamoring for their expulsion. They called upon scholars, business-men, financiers, artisans, soldiers - upon all classes and professions to rise up in arms against the Jews and rid themselves of their competition. To the proletariat they temptingly offered "le pillage des juifs" and to proprietors they promised "part des dépouilles du juif", concluding their incendiary summons with the slogan: "Être patriote et anti-sémite, c'est la même chose!"* The insistence with which these depraved fanatics of the nineteenth century clamored for the murder of the Jews seems incredible. Thus, for instance, "La Croix", commenting upon three days of bloody rioting in Algiers, where a number of Jews were killed and considerable damage was done to their property, said "The Christ indeed, reigned in Algiers during three days." And this same journal, after the second condemnation of Dreyfus at Rennes, published an article by one Père Bailly, the Assumptionist Superior, in which he declared that "this second verdict must be ascribed to the miraculous intervention of the Virgin."[¶]

It was through the medium of the daily press, of course, that

* Yves Guyot - "Le Bilan etc" p 99

¶ Ibid p. 185

the most wide-spread attacks were made against the Jews, but the abominable vituperative campaign did not stop there. In addition to the anti-Semitic literature that was published in the newspapers and in the official clerical organs, quite a number of books against the Jews made their appearance. Of these by far the most damnable and injurious was "La France Juive", published in 1886 in Paris by the most vicious Jew-baiting specialist that ever drew breath - Henri Drumont.* It is needless to review this work in these pages - suffice it to say that it was as vile and malicious an indictment of the Jew as was ever circulated in any language. Its popularity was instantaneous, and its circulation was tremendous. Advertised by clerical propaganda, it soon ran through more than one hundred editions. Nor should it be presumed that "La France Juive" was the sole handiwork of an individual Catholic. M. Drumont, to be sure, was a sufficiently vicious anti-Semite to have been quite capable of its publication and authorship on his own account, but as a matter of fact, he was assisted from first to last by the direct cooperation of Catholic clerics. It is now positively known that one of his collaborators was Père du Lac, then a refugee at Canterbury, whose zeal in the cause of anti-Semitism we have already observed (see p.10 and note). Drumont himself acknowledged that Père du Lac had "au moins révisé les épreuves".

Such was the situation in France at the opening of the most remarkable military scandal in history. The worst fears of the peasant population at the time of the Restoration had been realized only too well - France was indeed given over body and soul to "the men in black". With their powerful grasp on the educational

* As a result of this publication, Drumont was compelled to fight duels with Charles Laurent and Arthur Meyer, the latter a born Jew, but who subsequently became one of the pillars of the Catholic Church. * Yves Guyot - "Le Bilan, etc" p.98.

military, political, and social life of the country, with the press - the sources of public information - in their hands, and with their tremendous influence in high and low places, they had completely perfected the stage setting on which they intended to enact the drama of the fall of the Republic and the reintroduction of the Monarchy.

And so it was that the Dreyfus affair occurred. Had not the blundering Esterhazy been so awkward in his treacheries, and the bordereau never been brought to light, the program of the clericals for the complete discrediting of the Jews and the government might have taken a different turn. But once it was known that there was treachery in the army, the Jesuits and their confrères eagerly seized upon the opening thus afforded them, to carry out their long cherished designs. To their bigoted imagination the opportunity must have literally appeared providential. There was a traitor in the army - that was certain - and there was a Jew on the General Staff - what seemed more plausible than the identification of the two? Once they succeeded in proving him guilty, a step which to them was a mere incident, they reasoned that the general indignation that was bound to ensue would make it impossible for a Jew to remain in the army, in politics, in business, in short - in France itself. Then, most likely, some pretext would be invented to get rid of the Protestants and Free-Masons, and the Jesuits would absolutely control the army, and who has the army, has the power. So much accomplished, it would be but a formality to overthrow the parliamentary Republic and establish a Caesarian Republic, "avec un général à qui nous donnerons sa confesseur et sa maîtresse", according to Guyot?

* Only five priests were Dreyfusards, and they were persecuted. (Guyot - "Le Bilan, etc" p. 102).

* Ibid p 101.

So must have reasoned the fomentors of the Dreyfus persecution. Everything was in readiness; never had the moment for definite action seemed more propitious. An atmosphere of suspicion had been cast around Jews in general and about Jewish officers in particular. The army and public had been persuaded in advance that the Jew is always ready to commit treason or any other crime for the furtherance of his selfish interests. The campaign of defamation and scattering suspicion had done its work and done it well. But it had gone far enough. It had become essential to justify it by facts. A victim was wanted and a victim was found.

CHAPTER II.

The Preludes to the "Affaire".

Before entering upon the subject-matter proper of the Dreyfus affair, it will perhaps not be amiss to set forth briefly at least two specific occurrences which fanned the flame of the anti-Semitism ignited by the clericals - (1) The Failure of the Union Générale Bank, and (2) The Panama Scandals; and then to present a few concrete cases of anti-Jewish demonstrations caused as a direct result of clerical propaganda.

(1) The Failure of the Union Générale Bank.

The great banking institution of the Rothschilds, a family of prominent Jewish financiers, had since the fall of the Napoleonic empire been the powerful factor, if indeed not the actual master, of the French money market. Actuated for the most part by motives of pure jealousy and hatred, a group of Catholics, under the influence of prominent clericals, and with the backing of clerical interests, founded in 1876 the Union Générale Bank. Its original capitalization was 4,000,000 francs; this amount was later increased to 25,000,000 francs. The purpose of the new concern was to wage war upon the Jewish banking house, with the avowed object of pushing it to the wall.

But unfortunately for the investors in the concern, either the thaumaturgic rites of the priests failed to function properly, or the financial wizardry of the Rothschilds proved too much for them, - at any rate, in 1885 the establishment was forced to close its doors. Thousands of Catholic investors were ruined; scores of Catholic merchants were thrown into bankruptcy; and the general financial depression was keenly felt in many quarters. But instead of putting the blame for the fiasco upon the shoulders of those who had engineered the ill-starred scheme and had guided it to destruc-

tion, those responsible for its occurrence were quick to denounce the Jews as the cause of the misfortune. That the sole motive in founding the Union Générale was the unworthy one of having it supersede Jewish finance was never mentioned, but on all sides were heard vile condemnations of the Jews as tricky financiers, as unscrupulous thieves, as parasites fattening their greed at the public expense. The sensationalism that the event created, and the impetus it gave to the anti-Semitic movement was enormous. The fanatical clericals turned the disaster into a victory for their hateful propaganda, as was clearly shown by the enormous circulation of Drumont's "La France Juive", which appeared during the following year, to crystallize anti-Semitic opinion, and serve as a handbook for Jew-baiters.

(2) The Panama Scandals.

The failure of another financial enterprise of far greater magnitude than that of the Union Générale occurred in 1888 in the collapse of the Panama Canal Company, to aggravate the prejudice against the Jews.

A stock company had been formed to promote the construction of a ship-canal across the isthmus of Panama. The project was widely and favorably advertised, and as a result, thousands of Frenchmen, among them a great number of peasants, had been attracted to the scheme and had invested their money in the bonds of the company, the chief representatives of which were Ferdinand de Lesseps, an engineer of repute, and many prominent financiers, politicians, and men of affairs in the Republic.

It appears that the company had either erred in its calculations, or was guilty of deliberate misrepresentation, for it soon became evident that their estimate of expenses had been

ridiculously low (covering, as it later developed, but one-third of the actual cost of the canal) whereas their expectation of profits had been greatly exaggerated. As the work of building the canal progressed, the stupendousness of the task loomed up greater and greater, and the funds of the company shrank smaller and smaller. The organization was soon deeply engulfed in financial difficulties. It was obliged to make loan after loan, but its situation remained precarious. In 1888 its condition was so extreme that the suggestion of Hugo Oberndoerffer, a Jewish financier who was deeply involved, to the effect that it issue lottery bonds, was accepted as a last resort. When this desperate expedient proved equally ineffectual to restore its solvency, in December of the same year, under stress of imminent collapse, the company made application to Parliament for permission to defer for three months the payments due on its stock. The request was peremptorily refused, whereupon the organization was hopelessly lost.

The facts of the disaster were, however, kept absolutely secret. No one outside the small inner circle that managed the project was made acquainted with its failure. The unscrupulous Paris press was easily bought to publish fictitious accounts of the splendid progress that was attending the venture, and everyone was deceived into believing that it was proceeding smoothly.

Meanwhile the company was secretly carrying on a strenuous campaign to induce Parliament to extend to it a loan sufficient to restore its solvency and enable it to complete its undertaking. When all honest efforts had failed, and every attempt to put it on its feet again had proved abortive, Baron Jacques de Reinach, a millionaire Jewish banker of Paris, offered for 6,000,000 francs to overcome the opposition of the Chamber of Deputies to the granting of a loan. His proposal was accepted. Reinach engaged as his

agents in carrying out this wholesale bribery, two Jews of German descent - Cornelius Herz, a naturalized American citizen residing in Paris, and a M. Aaron, alias Arton. These two men circulated quietly among the members of Parliament, and after a period of intensive lobbying extending over many months, they succeeded in bribing over one hundred deputies with amounts ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 francs.

Finally, in the fall of 1892, hints of the scandal leaked out. But the government, fearful of the notoriety that would follow disclosure, and desirous, no doubt, of casting the cloak of political protection about certain influential men who were seriously compromised, hesitated to act. Instead of ordering an immediate investigation which would have exposed the rottenness of the whole business, the government played into the hands of its opponents by trying to conceal matters. Gradually the undercurrent of rumor and uneasiness became so pronounced, that Reinach, panic-stricken, nervous, and dreading the punishment for his crime, committed suicide on November 20.

Things had thus reached a state where further concealment was impossible. Moreover, the Monarchist group in Parliament, angry at the failure of the Boulangist campaign* of 1888-89, was only too anxious to discredit the government, and accordingly took advantage of this opportunity to interpellate the Chamber on the question of the Panama Company. On November 21, 1892, the day following the suicide of Reinach, M. Delahaye of the Right, a Boulangist deputy, threw a bombshell into the Chamber by declaring that 3,000,000 francs had been given to over a hundred members of Parliament by Reinach, Arton, and Herz, acting as agents for the Panama Canal

*In 1888-89 General Boulanger, handsome, popular, unscrupulous, started a great movement in favor of the revision of the Constitution. His plan was to substitute a republic of the American type, with a strong executive elected directly by the people

Company, in an illegal attempt to purchase privileged legislation. The debate and discussion that followed was most violent. Day after day the question was argued before the House. Excitement was at fever heat; violent and abusive language was hurled from deputy to deputy, and not infrequently fistic encounters occurred. Ugly rumors were bruited about to the effect that Reinach had not committed suicide, but had been assassinated because his knowledge might prove dangerous in certain quarters. This led to another furious discussion, during the course of which President Loubet resigned, because he was unwilling to agree to the exhumation and post-mortem examination of the banker's body. Finally, Charles Floquet, the President of the Chamber of Deputies rose to his feet, and falteringly admitted that he had received 300,000 francs, but that he had devoted the money to the government's campaign against Boulanger, whereupon some Nationalist wag drily remarked that he must have had some "choice pickings" for himself.

The excitement in France during those amazing disclosures can well be imagined. The whole scandal came as a violent shock to the Republic. People were astounded at the charges of widespread corruption, and at the tendency on the part of the government to smoothe things over. Finally, in December, the cabinet decided upon direct action as the only means of satisfying the insistent clamor of the public. Indictments were accordingly drawn up against De Lesseps and four others most seriously implicated.

for the helpless parliamentary regime established by the compromise of 1875. This attracted to his party many democrats and some of the noisiest Socialists (Rochefort), whilst patriots athirst for "revenge" saw in him the future deliverer of Alsace-Lorraine."

- Albert L. Guerard "French Civilization in the XIX Cent."

These were forthwith arrested. At the same time, on the basis of the seizure of twenty-six check stubs at the bank used by Reinach, the ministry proceeded against ten prominent deputies and senators, among whom were Albert Grévy, a former governor-general of Algeria, a brother of Jules Grévy. The government seemed panic-stricken in its readiness to sacrifice, on mere suspicion, the most prominent members of its party. As for Arton and Herz, the accomplices of Reinach, they had taken to their heels at the first sign of danger, and had fled to England.

All the parliamentaries accused, were in due time exonerated. The directors of the company were eventually tried, convicted, and condemned to fines and imprisonment. On appeal, in April 1893, these condemnations were revised or annulled. One person became the scape-goat, a former minister of public works named Balhaut, who was sentenced to civil degradation, five years imprisonment, and a heavy fine. Cornelius Herz successfully fought extradition from England on the plea of illness, but Arton, the guiltier of the pair, was finally arrested in 1895 and extradited. His arrest caused a revival of talk about the Panama affair, and the newspaper "La France" threatened to publish the notorious "list of the 104 deputies". This was immediately denounced as a prima facie case of blackmail, and its instigators were summarily punished. Arton was ultimately condemned to a term of hard labor, but his trial failed to bring out the longed for revelations regarding the details of the scandal, and so the event terminated in a haze of suspicion and confusion.

With Reinach, Arton, Herz, and quite a number of other Jews involved, however, the opportunity to utilize the event as pabulum on which to feed the anti-Semitic agitation, was too good to be lost. Jews were blamed as the cause of the disaster; again the

vile epithets and nasty lies of the foul clerical press were heaped upon them. The trusting widow who had prayerfully invested her little savings in Panams shares, the toiling peasant who had put his every hard-earned franc into Company stock - the butcher, the baker, the candle-stick maker - all were informed that their certificates were not worth the paper on which they were printed, because of the knavery and rascality of those "damn Jews", who had made them, as they had made others, a prey to their greed. Pains were taken to point out that the corruption was not among Frenchmen - who were the 104 Deputies, Chinamen? - but among Jews who were posing as French citizens.

The fact is undeniable that many of those most freely accused, from Reinach and Arton up, were Jews, and it is likewise true, perhaps, that Jews were the principal go-betweens betwixt the bribers and the bribed, but nevertheless there still remains no warrant whatsoever for fixing the responsibility for the failure of the Company upon those Jews involved in the scandal, to say nothing of holding all the Jews in France accountable for it. The Company was bankrupt long before the corruption occurred. Moreover, there were infinitely more and equally as guilty Christians as there were Jews among the conspirators, so that it is quite unnecessary to point out that the distinction made between the two was only drawn for one purpose - that of anti-Semitic persecution so virulent in its passion, so blind in its fury, so frantic in its rage, that it thrusts aside all considerations of plausibility, logic, and possibility in its mad desire to destroy.

* * * *

It should be clearly borne in mind that the French anti-Semitism of this period, was not a mere "parlor" anti-Semitism, an intellectual attitude that only influenced the mind but found no

expression in concrete acts. The hostility toward the Jews, while not nearly of the proportions it was to attain during the terrible years of the Dreyfus affair, was still of dangerous magnitude. It had already outgrown the confines of literary propaganda, and taken definite form in acts of overt hostility.

During the years of the Union Générale failure, faint mutterings of the anti-Jewish sentiment were already heard in Parliament, and in the stormy sessions attending the Panama Scandals not infrequently was the anti-Semitic note sounded on the floor of the highest legislative body of the Republic. In the expression of these sentiments, the voice of the Catholic clerical group was always the loudest. Thus, for instance, in October 1891, M. Déroulède, a henchman of the Nationalist-Clerical group and the political advisor of General Zurlinden, in an address before the Chamber of Deputies, accused the French Jews of wishing to de-Christianize (sic!) France. In the subsequent debate, M. Francis Laur, a Catholic who had been adopted and reared by a Jewish family, shamefully requited their kindness, by delivering a vile denunciation of all Jews, and clamored loudly for the expulsion of the Rothschild family.

In March 1892 the "Journal d'Indre-et-Loire" managed by deputy Delahaye, who, it will be remembered, was one of the chief denouncers of the Panama Scandals, pretended that a Jew had committed ritual murder at Chatellerault. With diabolic journalistic distortion this publication published fabrication after fabrication and sensation after sensation regarding its monstrous invention, until the authorities dampened its ardour, by revealing the true facts of the case. A judicial investigation proved that this heinous ritual murder which Delahaye was capitalizing, was only a case of ordinary infanticide by a fallen woman. The genuine facts of the mat-

ter, needless to say, failed to obtain a fraction of the amount of publicity which the original libel received, and consequently thousands of people digested "the canard" of the "Journal d'Indre-et-Loire". In Catholic circles especially, was this calumny seized upon by ready ears and busy tongues, and the fires of anti-Semitism crackled all the merrier.

Ocassionally there occurred slight outbreaks of rowdiness against the Jews, but these were for the most part, sporadic and isolated. Thus, for instance, toward the end of 1892, when the daughter of Gustave de Rothschild was married in Paris, an anti-Jewish demonstration was staged. The Marquis de Mores, a French officer, rallied a band of roughs about him, and proceeded through the streets of the capital to the synagogue where the wedding was in progress. There they swarmed about the side-walks, steps, and entrances to the building, and by prolonged yells and howlings disturbed the ceremony. When the bridal party appeared, it was met with a shower of ill-smelling missiles. The bride, in particular, was pelted with lumps of assafoetida. For this chivalrous(?) performance, De Mores was loudly applauded, and for a long time thereafter he was the popular hero of anti-Semitic salons.

Meanwhile the clericals had evidently decided that their anti-Semitic campaign was too general, too broadsweeping in its nature, and that it would probably have greater effect if it were concentrated upon one particular aspect of the Jewish question. Accordingly a series of articles entitled "The Jews in the Army" began to appear in May, 1892 in Drumont's "Libre Parole", the Jesuit anti-Semitic organ, whose viciousness and depravity have already been mentioned. The signatory to these new infamies was a friend of De Mores named Lamase, an officer with intimate clerical affiliations who undoubtedly found a great number of willing collaborators among

the Catholics and editors of the "Libre Parole". The character of his articles can easily be imagined. They were as damning and as malicious a slander of the Jewish people, ^{and} but on Jewish soldiers, and officers in particular, as has ever appeared. All the old accusations and vilifications against the Jews were rehashed and served up in new style to fit the title of the articles. Jewish soldiers were slandered as cowards, as traitors, as unprincipled opportunists without the least spark of patriotism, as egocentric intriguers willing to sacrifice France to her enemies for their own personal aggrandizement.

The resentment aroused by these publications among the Jewish soldiers in the army was intense. Scarcely had the first one appeared, than Cremieu-Foa, a Jewish captain of dragoons, declared his intention of defending the honor of his co-religionists in the army, as well as his own, and forthwith sent a challenge to Drumont. In reply he received the following note:

"If the Jewish officers in the army feel themselves wounded by our articles, let them choose by lot among themselves as many champions as they like, and we will meet them with an equal number of French blades."

(Signed) Mores and his Friends.

The contents of this note received wide publicity. The distinction drawn in it between French and Jewish soldiers was too obvious to escape notice, and it was felt by many to be a dangerous provocation of civil war. M. Camille Dreyfus, a member of the Chamber of Deputies, put the question to de Freycinet, the minister of war, as to whether there were any such distinctions, i.e. French and Jewish, in the army. The minister, in a very polite and proper speech, replied that there were not, and went on to deplore the incident as a crime against the nation, a gratuitous slander, etc, etc.

It is of significance, however, that no measure was taken by the army or the state to punish the authors of the note, or to suppress the publication of the articles in the "Libre Parole".

Crémieu-Foa nevertheless, fought a duel with Drumont, and likewise with Lamase. In his encounter with Drumont, the Jewish officer was seconded by Count Walsin d'Esterhazy, who was severely reprimanded by General de Boisdeffre in a letter for acting as second to an outraged Jew. Esterhazy later claimed that this act of friendliness toward the Jews had cost him his social position and influence, and he carried Boisdeffre's letter around among the wealthy Jews of Paris and tried to get money on the strength of it. Shortly thereafter, de Mores, one of Lamase's seconds, accused Captain Mayer, one of Crémieu-Foa's seconds, of having divulged to the press, the account of the duel, which by agreement, was to have been kept secret. As a matter of fact, the disclosure had been made by a brother of Crémieu-Foa, but although Mayer was entirely free from blame, he accepted the challenge of De Mores, despite the known prowess of the latter as a swordsman. On June 23, 1892 they met. Mayer was fatally wounded, and died three days later. His death aroused considerable indignation, not only because of the sensational manner in which he came to grief at the hands of the truculent swash-buckler, but because he was a very valuable officer of Alsatian origin.

The funeral of Captain Mayer was made the occasion for a great Jewish demonstration, and as a consequence of the wide-spread excitement that followed, the "Libre Parole" discontinued the publication of its libelous series. Its purpose, however, had been achieved. Throughout the length and breadth of the land there had been strewn the leaven of suspicion, mistrust, and prejudice against Jewish officers.

CHAPTER III.

The Finding of the Bordereau and the Arrest of Alfred Dreyfus.

Of all the Jewish soldiers in the French army, probably none was more diligent, more brilliant, more loyal, than the man who became the central figure in the great military scandal with which we are concerned.

Alfred Dreyfus was born in Mulhouse, Alsace, on October 9, 1859. His father Raphael Dreyfus, was a wealthy cloth manufacturer, and had six other children beside Alfred, three boys and three girls. After the German conquest of Alsace in 1870, the entire Dreyfus family moved to Paris, with the exception of the eldest son, who had passed the age of military service, and remained behind to attend to the business concerns of the family.

Despite his father's objections to his entering the military profession, Alfred determined upon a career of soldiering, and accordingly, he entered the Polytechnic Military School in 1878 at the age of nineteen. Completing his course there in 1880, he graduated in 1882 from the École d'Application at Fontainebleau, where he attracted attention by his unusual ability. From there he was detailed to service at the garrisons of Le Mans and Paris. Because of his excellent record while on this service, (he was rated as the best lieutenant of his section in field-artillery) he was promoted to a captaincy in 1881. After spending a short time in Bourges at the School of Pyrotechnics, he decided to seek entrance into the École Supérieure de Guerre, the highest military school in the country, which subjected all candidates for admission to a most rigid examination. Dreyfus passed with credit, entering the school in 1890 sixty-seventh in rank, and graduated in 1892 ninth in his class, with the rank "very good", despite the proved fact that his

marks had been deliberately reduced by a member of the examining board who was a confessed anti-Semite. His high standing made him eligible for appointment on the General Staff, a promotion which he received on January 1, 1893, the first Jew to be so honored. The years 1893 to October 1894 were devoted to serving a sort of apprenticeship in the Staff Office, or in "going through the stage," as it is termed, in which Dreyfus acquitted himself with exceptional merit, as reports of him showed. At the same time he was attached to the 14th Artillery.

Meanwhile he had in 1890 married Lucy Hadamard, the daughter of a wealthy and respectable diamond merchant, and had established a residence in Paris. He was known to be sober and temperate in his habits, and indefatigable and earnest in his work. He was of quick and brilliant intellect and splendid memory, and above all, exceptionally well informed in matters pertaining to his profession. He had a private income of perhaps 30,000 francs from his interest in his brother's business, and lived comfortably, but never indulgently. Politically he was a Boulangist, and like most Alsatians in the army, never ceased to cherish the hope of restoring the lost provinces to the Republic. It must, however, be recorded that Dreyfus was not popular among his fellow-officers. Undoubtedly the fact that he was a Jew was a decided social disadvantage, but leaving his religion out of consideration altogether, he had many personal characteristics which repelled rather than attracted people to him. He was haughty and overbearing in his manner, inclined to shun the company of his fellow-officers; he was overconfident and mildly conceited in his demeanor, and his speech was slightly tinged with a foreign accent. Barring these, his faults were negligible, if any at all.

During the late summer or early fall of 1894, there arrived

at the Intelligence Department of the French War Office, the following anonymous letter which clearly indicated that someone in the French army was delivering military secrets to Germany:-

"Being without information as to whether you desire to see me, I send you nevertheless, monsieur, some interesting information, viz:-

1. A note concerning the hydraulic brake of the 120 and the way this gun is managed.
2. A note upon the 'troupes de couverture' (some modifications will be carried out according to the new plan).
3. A note concerning a modification in the formations of artillery.
4. A note relative to Madagascar.
5. The proposed 'manuel de tir' of field artillery (March 14, 1894).

This document is exceedingly difficult to get hold of, and I can only have it at my disposal for a very few days. The minister of war has distributed a certain number of copies among the troops, and the corps are held responsible for them.

Each officer holding a copy is required to return it after the maneuvers.

Therefore if you will glean from it whatever interests you, and let me have it again as soon as possible, I will manage to obtain possession of it. Unless you would prefer that I have it copied in extenso, and send you the copy.

I am just starting for the maneuvers".

The manner in which this letter, or bordereau, as it has become known, came into the possession of the French Secret Service has never been positively ascertained. It is known that the French had installed one of their female operatives, Mme. Bastian, as charwoman in the offices of Colonel Schwarzkoppen, the German military

attache, and that she collected all the scraps of paper and waste-material from the embassy, and delivered them at regular intervals to the French "section de statistique" where they were put together. One opinion is that it was in this manner that the bordereau came to light. The fact that it was torn but once - through the middle - tends to weaken this hypothesis, inasmuch as documents of far less significance had been discovered torn into tiny shreds. Another theory which has gained considerable credence, is that the bordereau was a deliberate "frame-up" against Dreyfus, and that it was found where it originated - in the French War Office, without ever having seen the German Embassy. In view of its identity with Esterhazy's writing, and in the light of later revelations regarding his treacheries, this theory too, is unacceptable. A third explanation, and the most plausible, is that it was taken from Schwarzkoppen's overcoat pocket. Seeing that the document arrived without any envelope, and that it was practically intact, this last hypothesis appears as the most probable.

At any rate, the date of the writing of the letter is clear, for the phrase "I am just starting for the maneuvers" places it not later than August, for the "ecoles a feu" which are referred to, took place in May and August in 1894. When it was delivered to the Intelligence Department is not accurately known, for it was first produced by Major Henry, assistant to Colonel Sandherr, the head of the department, and the extent of Henry's relations with Esterhazy has never been discovered. It is not altogether improbable that Henry was an accomplice of Esterhazy, in German pay, and that the only reason for his not destroying the document was his fear lest it had been seen by others.

On September 24 Major Henry informed Colonel Sandherr of the discovery of the letter, claiming that it had come through the

channels of Mme. Bastian. General de Boisdeffre, the head of the Staff, and General Mercier, the minister of war, were immediately notified. A council of inquiry was appointed, and the files of every bureau of the Department were thoroughly searched for a handwriting similar to that of the bordereau. When this failed to yield any result, it was suggested that inasmuch as the subject-matter of the document dealt with matters pertaining to various branches of the service, it was perhaps the work of one of the officers going through the stage, and moreover, since most of the material enumerated in the bordereau concerned the artillery, it would appear that a stage-officer specializing in this branch of the service was the culprit. At this juncture, De Morès and Du Paty du Clam came forward and at once suggested that the handwriting of the bordereau resembled that of Dreyfus. Several members of the General Staff recalled the unfavorable impression that the Jewish captain had made upon them. Papers written by Dreyfus were produced for comparison with the bordereau, and the prejudiced investigators affected to see an absolute identity of handwriting between them, whereas in truth, they were manifestly dissimilar. But the doom of the Jewish officer was sealed. He had fallen into the clutches of the most bigoted, most rabidly anti-Semitic group in France, a group that was owned body and soul by the Catholic clerical party.

The report of the council of inquiry to the effect that Dreyfus was guilty, was immediately transmitted to the chiefs of the service. Their comments upon hearing it were sufficient forecast of the quality of justice that Dreyfus might expect. Colonel Sandherr, who openly avowed that he had "a distrust of all Jews", greeted the news with the exclamation "I ought to have suspected it!" De Boisdeffre and Mercier, whose intimate relations with Père du Lac have already been noted, needed no convincing that the Jewish

officer was the traitor. The fact that he was a Jew, must have been to them sufficient proof of his guilt, else one is at a loss to account for their violent hostility, and apparent blindness to all the evidence that would have satisfied any unprejudiced person that Dreyfus was without the slightest suspicion of blame.

In the first place, the composition and wording of the note were manifestly the work of someone whose intelligence and schooling was vastly inferior to that of Dreyfus. For example, the words "s'est conduite la pièce" instead of "s'est comportée" are used in the bordereau to describe the behavior of the gun. No artillery officer would have written that, least of all Dreyfus, one of the most scientific gunners in the army. Other irregularities in grammar and expression occur. Again, the note speaks of the difficulty the author had in procuring the "manuel de tir". Now this book was freely distributed among the Staff, and Dreyfus possessed easy access to it at all times. Furthermore, in 1894 Dreyfus could not have written that he was just starting for the maneuvers, for stage officers were ordered not to attend those exercises that year. To anyone unbiased, the overwhelming evidence that the treachery was not the work of a stage officer, and above all, not that of Dreyfus, would have been instantaneous and conclusive.

The first impulse of General Mercier, the minister of war, upon hearing the findings of the council, was to act quickly and boldly. He had recently committed some much criticized ~~some much criticized~~ administrative blunders, and the present crisis appeared to him as a favorable opportunity of retrieving his reputation for efficiency, and of striking a blow for clerical anti-Semitic propaganda. His first move, which was done merely for the sake of appearances, was to lay the matter before a council consisting of Charles Dupuy, the president of the cabinet, Guérin, the keeper of

seals, and Hanotaux, the minister of foreign affairs, on October 11. These ordered him to investigate quietly, but Mercier had already determined on his plan of action. He called in Gobert, the handwriting expert of the Bank of France, and authorized him to compare the writing of the bordereau with that of Dreyfus. In spite of Mercier's unveiled hints as to the verdict he expected of Gobert, the latter, after a most careful investigation, concluded on October 13 that "the anonymous letter might be from a person other than the one suspected". Unsatisfied with this non-committal statement, Mercier submitted the matter to Alphonse Bertillon, the head of the "Service de l'Identité Judiciaire" of the police department, of whose verdict the minister of war could be certain. Bertillon did not disappoint his retainer. A most superficial examination of the documents sent to him served to convince him that Dreyfus was the author of the bordereau, and on October 14, within a few hours after he had been entrusted with the case, he so informed the minister of war.

Now that his designs had been stamped with the seal of "expert" approval, Mercier immediately ordered the arrest of Dreyfus, and conveniently charged Major Du Paty de Clam, another tool of the clericals, with the duty of taking him into custody, leaving the details of the task to his ingenuity. On the morning of October 15, Dreyfus was summoned to headquarters in civilian clothes, to

* That Mercier had fully made up his mind to persecute Dreyfus was clearly revealed in Forzinetti's evidence at the Rennes court-martial, where he testified that although Dreyfus was arrested on October 15 at 9 A.M. the order for his internment in Cherche-Midi had been signed by Mercier on October 14. This was an unheard of procedure, even in cases where the guilt of an accused person was indubitable.

stand general inspection. Little imagining the real purpose for which he was wanted, still less suspecting that he was going forth to five years of degradation, disgrace, and torture, the Jewish Captain left his home that October morning and presented himself at the War Office at the appointed time. He found himself in the presence of three officials of the Department and Du Paty, all in civil attire. The latter feigned to have a sore finger, and requested Dreyfus to write a letter for him at his dictation. Still unsuspecting, Dreyfus seated himself at a table (upon which a loaded revolver had been placed) and wrote as Du Paty dictated. The letter was in the nature of a request to someone to return the documents mentioned in the bordereau, and they were specifically enumerated. Dreyfus wrote on steadily, with Du Paty standing over him. Du Paty later testified that Dreyfus appeared to be agitated, and that his hand trembled, whereupon he sharply said, "You tremble", to which Dreyfus, surprised at the other's vehemence, replied, "My fingers are cold." As a matter of fact, the dictated letter, which was produced at the Rennes court-martial, was written with perfect alignment. Seeing that such methods were of no avail, Du Paty suddenly dropped his mask, and clapping his hand on the captain's shoulder, he thundered, "In the name of the law I arrest you; you are accused of the crime of high treason!"

Dreyfus rose to his feet, stunned, bewildered, dazed. For several moments not a sound came from his lips. It seemed as if his mind was struggling to grasp the awful meaning of the words he had just heard. Then in a passionate outburst he protested over and over again that he was innocent. Eagerly did he submit himself to their search. He offered them all the keys to his home, his private papers. When they proffered him the revolver that lay on the table, he thrust it aside with indignation. But all his remonstrances were futile. Evidently Du Paty was ignorant of the plot against

Dreyfus at the time of his arrest. One thing, however, is certain, and that is that men higher up were interested in seeing him go to his martyrdom.

CHAPTER IV.

The Trial and Degradation.

All efforts to induce the prisoner to confess proved futile. He was accordingly turned over to Major Henry, with instructions that he be safely incarcerated in the Cherche-Midi military prison. Thither he was summarily driven in a closed cab, without even being granted the privilege of communicating with his family, friends, or counsel. A cell had been prepared for him in advance of his coming, and the strictest orders regarding his custody had been lodged with Major Forzinetti, the warden, by Mercier himself. He was to hold Dreyfus in absolute isolation and secrecy. He was forbidden to mention the identity of his prisoner to a soul. No ink, paper, pen, or knife were to be allowed him; his fare was to be that of ordinary condemned prisoners - absolutely no leniency nor privilege was to be accorded him, and in every respect he was to be treated as if already proved guilty. Forzinetti was moreover warned that steps might be taken to effect the jail delivery of his prisoner, and he was admonished to be on his guard against the intrigues of the "haute juiverie", as Mercier expressed himself. The whole business was so unusual and so distasteful to the warden, who was a man of human sympathies, that he took it upon himself to disregard some of the strait-jacket injunctions of the minister. After he observed the actions of Dreyfus, who was raving like a madman, his eyes blood-shot, dashing his head against the walls of his cell, upsetting every article of furniture in the room, he became convinced that an innocent man was being outraged, and he secretly did what little he was able to mitigate the harshness of his orders. Further more, he informed General de Boisdeffre of the frantic behavior of his prisoner, and added his strong opinion of the man's absolute innocence.

From October 15 to December 5, 1894, Dreyfus was kept in strict secrecy, and was refused all communication with his wife or lawyer. Meanwhile Mercier had ordered Du Paty to conduct a quiet investigation, to discover new proofs of the prisoner's guilt. Du Paty's first move was to visit Mme. Dreyfus and inform her of what had occurred, threatening her with the direst punishment if she divulged to anyone the news of her husband's arrest. For seventeen consecutive days he visited the Dreyfus home, ransacking it from cellar to garret, and subjecting Mme. Dreyfus to the most outrageous cross-examinations, in the hope of gaining some incriminating evidence against her husband, but all to no avail.

Dreyfus too, was visited in his cell every day by Du Paty, who resorted to the most melodramatic antics in the hope of eliciting a confession from him. He would come upon him of a sudden by night, flashing a brilliant light into his face; he compelled him to write in a score of various attitudes - lying down, standing, gloved, with his left hand, but always with the same futile result. Finally, on October 29, he showed him the bordereau and made him copy it. Then only, for the first time, did the unfortunate man realize the nature of the crime imputed to him, and he broke out afresh in his asseverations of innocence, maintaining that only two of the five documents enumerated in the bordereau were known to him, and that of the other three he had absolutely not the slightest knowledge.

Meanwhile Bertillon had been busying himself with his "proofs of identity." On October 20 he turned in a report setting forth his new discoveries. This time the fraudulent graphologist had ascertained that Dreyfus had traced his own handwriting in the writing of the bordereau, varying it with inclusions of the letter 'S' of his sister-in-law Alice, and the letter 'G' of his brother Matthew.

The ludicrousness of this was so evident that even Mercier must have realized how forced a theory it was (though he later used it as the chief evidence against Dreyfus) for he secured three new experts. None of these categorically ascribed the bordereau to Dreyfus - Pelletier said emphatically that it was not in his writing; Teyssonnieres, an amateur, said it was the work of Dreyfus, but that it was written in a disguised hand, and Charavay said it bore a very close resemblance to the writing of the prisoner.* With the testimony of these experts, Du Paty concluded his inquiry. Despite the fact that he had failed to elicit a confession from the prisoner, or to secure the slightest particle of incriminating evidence against him - except insofar as the ravings of Bertillon might be termed evidence - his report brought charges against Dreyfus, and recommended that proceedings against him be instituted. (October 31, 1894).

During the course of Du Paty's inquiry, the real traitors inside the War-Office were feverishly watching the trend of events. When the final verdict of the three experts seemed too inconclusive to establish Dreyfus' guilt, and there was little likelihood of any further disclosure that would tend to fasten the crime upon the Jewish officer, Major Henry, who by this time must have known the genuine source of the bordereau, decided to precipitate matters lest further search disclose the real culprit, or less Mercier, too timorous to proceed with his flimsy evidence against Dreyfus, should quash the whole matter and rob the clericals of their victim. Accordingly, on October 28, Henry sent to Papillaud, a contributor to Drumont's "Libre Parole", a memorandum on the scandal. The following day that organ asked in its columns if an important arrest for high treason had not occurred. On October 30 the "Éclair",

* At the Rennes trial in 1899, M. Charavay publicly and with solemnity acknowledged his error.

another venomously anti-Semitic journal, answered in the affirmative. On November 1 the "Libre Parole" published a special edition, featuring an article entitled "Arrest of a Jewish Officer", in which the whole affair was laid bare, couched in the most violent language, and adding a purely imaginative confession of Dreyfus. On the same day, "Le Petit Journal" and "L'Intransigeant" opened fire on Mercier for "stifling" the news of the treachery, and from that time on until November 7, when Mercier definitely announced his intention to prosecute Dreyfus to the limit, he was subjected to the bitterest, vilest, most terrific sort of abuse.

No sooner had the facts of Dreyfus' arrest become generally known, than the press began to accuse Mercier of having "sold out" to the "haute juiverie". No alternative save instant action remained for the minister of war. Hastily summoning a council of ministers on November 3, he assured them that Dreyfus alone had access to the documents enumerated in the bordereau, whereupon it was unanimously decided to institute proceedings at once. A council of inquiry was ordered formed, with Major Bexom d'Ormescheville at its head. For four weeks this tribunal listened to the endless testimony of "fixed" witnesses, of hired perjurers, of anti-Semitic officers. Lie after lie and invention after invention regarding the character, the record, the associates, and the habits of the Jewish officer were sifted to the bottom, only to demonstrate the flimsiness of the evidence against him. And yet, d'Ormescheville's report submitted on December 3, filled as it was with illogical and tangled statements, nevertheless concluded with the summary that there were grounds for action against the prisoner.

But Mercier, however much of an anti-Semite he was, and however conscious he was of the anti-Semitic sentiment that prevailed in the country, was nevertheless hesitant about confronting a jury

with the meagre evidence of Bertillon and the results of d'Ormescheville's judicial inquiry. He realized full well the groundlessness of his case against Dreyfus, but he was too deeply involved to retract, and moreover, if he failed to secure a conviction, his political career was sealed. Accordingly, on November 28, three weeks before the actual court-martial, he pre-judged the Jewish Captain guilty by writing to the "Figaro" that he had the "most positive proofs of Dreyfus' treason, and that he had laid them before his ministerial colleagues". This step, unheard of in the annals of civilized jurisprudence, was but the least of his crimes. To make certain that his quarry would not escape him, he drew up a "secret dossier" against Dreyfus, in which he collected from the files of the Intelligence Department all records of treachery that could possibly be laid at the door of the Jewish officer. (The contents of this "dossier" will be discussed more fully later). These documents, selected with the help of de Boisdeffre and Sandherr, revised by Mercier himself, were carefully sealed in a large envelope, and laid aside until the case should be in the hands of the jury, when they were to be delivered to them unbeknown to Dreyfus, to his counsel, or to the public, while they were carrying on their deliberations behind closed doors.

Now that Mercier was absolutely certain of securing the conviction of his man, he was prepared to have the case come up for trial. No loop-hole or avenue by which Dreyfus might possibly vindicate himself had been overlooked by the Jesuit inquisitor. Public opinion had been persuaded from the very beginning that Dreyfus was guilty - all the accusations of disloyalty and all the theories of the "fatalité du type" of Drumont were brought to bear against the unfortunate officer. Lashed on by the viciousness of the clerical press, the public attitude against Dreyfus had become a sea of

roaring fury. For any jury to have exonerated him in the face of so overwhelming and so awful a hysteria, would have been deliberately to invite ignominy if not assassination. But there was not the slightest hope - or fear - of an acquittal. Mercier had taken care of that only too well. He decided "for reasons of state policy" that the trial was to take place behind closed doors, and he had the jury hand picked. Not a single one of its members was an artilleryman.

The Dreyfus family had secured as counsel Edgar Demange, a brilliant attorney, who had accepted the case only after he had convinced himself by a careful study of the available evidence, that the accusations against Dreyfus were groundless. The trial was held at Cherche Midi prison, beginning on December 19, and extended over four days. As Mercier had decreed, public attendance was barred. Not even the wife of the unfortunate prisoner was admitted. The only ones present were the jury of seven officers, the accused and his counsel, the counsel for the army, the prefect of police, and Major Picquart, an officer of the Staff, detailed to report the proceedings to headquarters.

Although the excitement and furor in the streets of Paris was at fever heat, no evidences of it were apparent in the court-room proper. The proceedings were dry and uneventful; the testimony of the witnesses was given without emotion or passion. Dreyfus, entirely ignorant of the enormous conspiracy against him, was fully confident of acquittal and complete exoneration. On the day before his trial began, he had written to his wife : "At last I am coming to the end of my sufferings, to the end of my agony. Tomorrow I shall appear before my judges, my head high, my soul tranquil. I shall return to you better than I was before . . . I am ready to appear before the soldiers as a soldier who has nothing for which to reproach himself. They will see it in my face, they will read my soul, they

will know that I am innocent . . . Devoted to my country to which I have consecrated all my strength, all my intellect, I have nothing to fear."

In the court-room he carried out his above expressed intention of holding his "head high." His demeanor was precise, his bearing stiffly military. His curt denials and prompt negations were delivered with a formal precision which unfortunately tended to alienate from him the sympathy of his judges.

M. Bertillon, in a three hours' deposition, produced a more elaborate set of proofs than any he had yet submitted. He affirmed that by his own "special" methods he had found in the bordereau the exact sum paid to Dreyfus as the price of his treason, viz. 500,000 francs. The really damaging evidence, however, was the perjured evidence given by Major Henry, to whom the weakness of Mercier's case against the prisoner was as apparent as to anyone. After his first deposition, Henry asked for the opportunity to be heard again. He went to the witness-box, and in a strong, clear voice, swore that a former Spanish military attaché, Val Carlos, had notified the Intelligence Department long before the discovery of the bordereau, that Dreyfus was selling military secrets to Germany. On December 23, after Demange had made a masterful address, in which he clearly pointed out that every accusation against the Jewish officer was unfounded and untrue, the prosecution closed its case by exhorting the jury to compare the evidences of handwriting. Then when they had retired to deliberate, Du Paty had the secret dossier conveyed to them, unbeknown to Dreyfus or Demange.

* Val Carlos had, it is true, informed the Intelligence Department on good authority in 1893 that there was a spy in the War Office, but he certainly was not aware of the identity of the malefactor, nor did he venture an opinion as to who he might be.

Inasmuch as the contents of this secret dossier were never fully produced in public, the sole information regarding them rests on the recollection of those who saw them. Captain Freystaetter, a member of the court-martial, testified at the Rennes trial in 1899, that he had voted for the conviction of Dreyfus on the strength of the following three documents:

(1) A biographical sketch of Dreyfus charging him with having committed treason while at the Pyrotechnic School at Bourges, at the Ecole de Guerre, and on the General Staff.

(2) A document known as the "Canaille de D...." document, which purported to be a memorandum of Schwarzkoppen's concerning a traitor who had surrendered the plans of the fortress at Nice.

(3) A telegram from a foreign military attaché, definitely asserting the guilt of the accused. This telegram ran, "Dreyfus arrested, emissary warned."

It need hardly be mentioned that the biographical notice was a fabrication from beginning to end. The "Canaille de D..." document was at least not spurious, but the interpretation put upon it was a gross perversion. It was not part of a memorandum dealing with intrigue, but merely an excerpt from a letter exchanged between Pannizzardi, the Italian military representative, and Schwarzkoppen, in which the words occurred: "Cette canaille de D... devient trop exigeant." The body of this letter referred chiefly to "petits soupers" at which the two attachés had clandestinely entertained the charming wife of a certain Dubois. The third document, the telegram, was a false version of a cipher message which Colonel Panizzardi had sent to Rome on November 2, when the newspapers published the first accounts of Dreyfus' arrest. His original telegram ran as follows: "If Captain Dreyfus has had no intercourse with you, let the ambassador publish an official denial to forestall press comment."

This message, in code, fell into the hands of the French War-Office. Their first effort to translate it resulted in the following misconstruction: "Dreyfus arrested; emissary warned." This error was immediately rectified, however, and the corrected copy was filed, although the first false interpretation was not destroyed. It was this false version which was placed into the secret dossier and upon which the court-martial based its verdict.

The judges were not long in their deliberations. By a unanimous vote they pronounced the prisoner guilty, and condemned him to degradation and banishment for life to a military prison. The blow came utterly unexpected to Dreyfus. As he heard the sentence of the court, he stood transfixed, dazed, as though stricken by a thunderbolt. He was turned over once more to Forzinetti, who tried to comfort him, but to no avail. Over and over again the unfortunate officer sobbed: "My only crime is that I was born a Jew".

On the same day of his conviction, he signed an appeal, drawn up by Demange, for a revision of the sentence. This was promptly denied. Du Paty came to see him again, and promised him a mitigation of his sentence provided that he make a complete confession. All that Dreyfus asked was that after he would be gone "let the search be kept up, it is the only favor that I solicit." Buoyed up by the noble heroism of his wife, who begged him not to commit violence upon himself but to continue to live for the day when his honor would be restored, he underwent the fearful ordeal of military degradation without flinching.

The ceremony took place in the courtyard of the Ecole Militaire in Paris, on the morning of January 5, 1895, in the presence of about 5,000 soldiers and a vast multitude of civilians.

The following account of the incident appeared in the "Autorite":-

"On the stroke of nine from the clock of the Ecole Militaire, General Darras draws his sword and commands, 'Shoulder arms!' The order is repeated before each company. The troops execute it. Silence follows.

Hearts cease to beat; all eyes are fixed upon the right-hand corner of the square where Dreyfus is imprisoned in a low building on the terrace.

In a moment a small group is seen. It is Alfred Dreyfus in the midst of four artillerymen, accompanied by a lieutenant of the Garde Republicaine and by the commander of the escort....

Dreyfus walks with a quiet, firm step."

The reporter continues to describe the march across the square to the point in front of the troops where the degradation is to take place. Dreyfus listens in silence while a clerk reads the sentence. General Darras then says:

"Dreyfus, you are unworthy to bear arms. In the name of the French people we degrade you."

Dreyfus is seen to raise both arms, and, head erect, he cries out in a strong voice, without the slightest tremor,

"I am innocent. I swear that I am innocent. Vive la France!"

The vast crowd outside answers with the cry,

"Death to the traitor!"

The adjutant then begins his work, first cutting from the condemned man's uniform his galloons, cuffs, buttons, all insignia of rank, ending by breaking the sword. During the ceremony Dreyfus several times raises his voice.

"On the heads of my wife and children I swear that I am innocent. I swear it. Vive la France!"

..... It is over at last, but the seconds have been as centuries. We had never before felt pangs of anguish so keen. And afresh,

clear, without any touch of emotion, is heard the voice of the condemned man in a loud tone, crying,

"You are degrading an innocent man!"

The prisoner is then obliged to pass before the line of soldiers. As he approaches the railing, the civilian crowd gets a better view of him, and yells

"Death to the traitor! Kill him!"

When he arrives before a group of reporters he pauses, and says,

"Tell the people of France that I am innocent!"

"Silence, wretch", is the reply. "Coward! Traitor! Judas!"

He passes on and comes to a group of officers of the General Staff, his late colleagues. Here he pauses, and says,

"Gentlemen, you know that I am innocent."

But they yell at him as did the reporters. He surveys them closely through his pincenez and says calmly,

"You're a set of cowards".

There is utter contempt in his voice.

At length the direful march is ended. Dreyfus enters a van and is driven to the Prison de la Sante.

CHAPTER V.

After the Verdict.

The anti-Semitic agitation that had been so rife during the stormy days preceding the condemnation of Dreyfus was by no means at an end now that the Jewish officer had been disposed of. Questions arising directly out of the affair had sprung up before the court-martial had rendered its verdict, and these continued to engross public attention. Thus, for instance, there was pending before the Chamber of Deputies a bill to provide the death penalty for crimes of high treason. A few days before the condemnation of Dreyfus, a council of war in the provinces had condemned to death a "private" soldier, convicted of raising his hand to strike an officer. The absurd disproportion between the two offences and their respective sentences could not fail to strike the public mind. Egged on by the violent denunciations of the press, and dreading the exposure of his crime as long as Dreyfus remained alive, General Mercier, on December 24, introduced a bill into the Chamber to provide the death penalty for such traitors as was Dreyfus, and asked that it be made retroactive to apply to him. Deputy Jaures, as the spokesman of the Socialist party, was delegated to oppose the passage of this bill, and similarly to demand the abolition of capital punishment in the army for any offense. In the course of his remarks he violently attacked Mercier, and accused him of having spared the life of Dreyfus because of fear lest the consequences of his execution of the Jewish captain be to bring down upon the government the opposition of Hebrew capitalism. In the excitement and hubbub that followed, the lie was passed between Jaures and Barthou, the minister of Public Works, and a duel followed.

The Jewish Question was again formally raised in the Chamber on March 11, when M. Denis, the deputy for Landes, demanded an interpellation concerning "the predominance of Jews in the French Administration." M. Ribot, the prime minister, in an able and courageous reply, with the hope of ending once for all the distasteful introduction of the anti-Semitic question into the deliberations of Parliament, said that the Chamber had "something other to do than to discuss anti-Semitic fancies on which the copious imagination of M. Drumont worked six days a week." He proceeded to ask for an adjournment of the question, which was carried by a vote of 260 against 198, the Jewish members voluntarily abstaining from voting.*

Again in May, the agitation against the Jews came to a head in the Chamber. On the 25th, M.d'Hugues raised the question of the admission of Jews into the higher ranks of the government. Upon this, M. Rouanet, a Socialist deputy from Montmatre, declared that the real question involved was not a Jewish question but a social question, and that all capitalists should be tarred with the same brush, whatever their religion might be. The debate that followed was as typically stormy as were most of the arguments of that nature that agitated the French Parliament during the Dreyfus affair. It extended over two days, in which the insult and abuse that were hurled at the Jews bade fair to out-rival the inspired compositions of Drumont. That it ended with a conciliatory speech by M. Naquet, deprecating attacks upon any body of citizens, does not alter the fact that the hostility against the Jews was so severe that the question of barring them from public office was seriously discussed in the legislative halls of the governing body of the Republic.

* The large minority vote is significant of the strength of the anti-Semitic group.

Naturally the effect of all this was reflected in the attitude of the public. The subsidized newspapers, eager to push the campaign of villainy which the conviction of Dreyfus had so well served, seized upon every opening to foment anew the hostility against the Jews. During the excitement that followed the trial, many people whose only crime was that they bore the name of "Dreyfus" were arrested or set upon by mobs. Jews all over France, but particularly in Paris, where anti-Semitism was at its height, were subjected to the harshest annoyance and insult. Jewish business establishments were boycotted; Jewish workers were severely discriminated against. All the old restrictions against the Jews seemed in danger of being revived again.

For a long time after the deportation of the unfortunate officer, not a single voice was raised in his defence. The question of his innocence seemed never to have occurred to anyone outside of his immediate family. Only gradually did the Jews in Paris begin to grow skeptical concerning the justice of the condemnation. By June 1895 however, a decided sentiment prevailed that Dreyfus was innocent. That treason had actually been committed was doubted by few, but that the Jewish captain had become the scape-goat of the Ministry to save it from defeat, was the general opinion among the Jewish people.

* As an interesting side-light on the far flung effects of this propaganda, the following news-item is of interest. It appeared in the American Israelite of March 28, 1895 :

"The talented young debutante, Miss Emma Dreyfus, of St. Louis, Mo., who has completed her musical studies, and is about to make her first appearance in public, has on the advice of influential friends changed her name to Emma Stanley."

¶ The "American Israelite" said editorially on December 27, 1894 : "It is a great pity that the death sentence was not inflicted and promptly carried out, that the whole miserable episode might soon have become a memory."

Not until February 21, 1895, did the "Israelite" question the guilt of Dreyfus.

Meanwhile Dreyfus had entered upon the most torturous period of his sufferings. After the painful ordeal of the degradation, he had been rudely hustled into a prison van, and taken to the Central prison. Here he was searched, photographed and measured, and then dragged off to the Santé prison, where he was shut up in a convict's cell. While at La Santé, his wife was permitted to visit him twice weekly in the private office of the prison director. On January 17, between ten and eleven o'clock at night, he was rudely awakened by the Minister of the Interior, accompanied by three guards, commanded to dress hurriedly, handcuffed, thrown into a prison van, and driven through the bitter cold to the Orléans Railway Station. A convict car awaited him, and he was thrown into one of its narrow cells, precautions having been taken to handcuff his wrists and shackle his ankles. The next morning he awoke with a raging fever as a result of exposure and exhaustion, and was started on his trip to the Isle de Ré, a notorious military prison. At La Rochelle, where he embarked for the Isle de Ré, the rumor of his presence spread, and he was set upon by the mob and beaten before his guards came to his rescue.

His liberties at Ré were severely circumscribed. He was permitted to walk for a time each day in an enclosed yard, after which he was always stripped and searched before being returned to his cell. He was privileged to write to his wife twice a week, and to see her on two consecutive days a week for one hour at a time. The prison director was always present at these meetings, and stood between them, while they were compelled to remain on opposite sides of the room.

Early in February General Mercier and M. Dupuy took the trouble to pass a special law to relegate Dreyfus to the Devil's Island. The island comes by its name honestly. It is one of a group situated off

the coast of French Guiana, and before the confinement of Dreyfus, it had served the French Republic as an isolated hospital for lepers. If one did not have leprosy before going to the île du Diable, he stood a good chance of getting it there, so unhealthy is its climate and environment. Thither Dreyfus was conveyed on a journey lasting from February 21 to March 15 under conditions of the utmost cruelty and torture.

For nearly four years he lived here, in a small securely guarded hut, under constant surveillance day and night. The indignities that he endured, the tortures that he suffered, read like a chapter from the Dark Ages. His food was of the poorest and was frequently inedible because of filth and vermin. The torrid darkness of the place consumed him with fever. Often he was on the verge of losing his mind. Only the cheering letters of his wife, entreating him to accept life as a duty to clear his name and that of his children, kept him from giving way. In September 1896 when a false report of his escape was spread in England, he was, by the order of M. Lebon, the Colonial Minister, chained to his couch for twenty-four nights, while the lamp that was burning over his head attracted swarms of tropical insects. He was told various tales regarding the infidelity of his wife, than whom a nobler woman it is difficult to eulogize. Once it was reported to him that she sought to forget him and desired to re-marry; at another time he was informed that ~~his~~^{she} wife had borne a child two years after he last saw her. Every imaginable torture that a fanatic diabolism was capable of inventing was spent upon this wretched man, whose only crime was, as he so truly said, that he was born a Jew.

CHAPTER VI.

Colonel Picquart.

On July 1, 1895 upon the resignation of Colonel Sandherr due to physical disability, there was promoted to the position of Chief of the Intelligence Office a man whom Destiny had chosen as its instrument to oppose the intrigues of the War Office, and to bring justice to the unfortunate prisoner of Devil's Island.

Until he assumed the direction of his new office and ran his head upon the Dreyfus "Affaire," Picquart was the most promising soldier in France. Like most of France's best men, he was an Alsatian. He had seen fighting in Algeria and Tonking, and had spent the rest of his service on the General Staff. On these two roads to distinction he had gone so far that he was major at thirty-two and lieutenant-colonel at forty, the youngest officer of his rank in the army. He knew the work of the General Staff as he knew the alphabet. He knew where every document was kept, where everybody worked, what his work was, what he was in a position to know and what he was not. He was a man for whom hate or love, anger or hope or fear, could never color what seemed true or right. His brain was like a swift and well oiled machine. He spoke and wrote English, German, Russian, Spanish, and Italian, in addition to his native tongue - an accomplishment almost unearthly in a Frenchman. He enjoyed the highest esteem of his chiefs. There was nothing in the French army to which he could not legitimately aspire, until he ruined himself by taking up the cause of Dreyfus. He spent ten months of the year before the Rennes court-martial in a secret prison. Even his vilest enemies never suggested that he had any other motive for his acts than a predilection for justice and truth.

Earlier in the year - On January fifteenth - Casimir-Perier had resigned the presidency of the Republic, sick at heart because

of the unpleasantness of the Dreyfus Affaire. Felix Faure, the new president, was a reactionary of the most stamped type, full of vanity, and naively delighted with his rise in the world from a humble position to the chief magistracy. The extent to which his judgment was warped by his temperament is shown by the later developments of the Dreyfus case. Under his administration Mercier was not re-appointed as minister of war; the post was given to General Zur-linden, who was in turn succeeded by General Billot.

Picquart had not been in charge of his new post for quite a year, when there arrived at the Intelligence Office, in March 1896, through the channels of Mme. Bastian's scrap-bag, the following note, written on a pneumatic-tube telegram blank, and reconstructed from more than fifty tiny scraps into which it had been torn:-

" Sir:

I await, before anything farther, a more detailed explanation than you gave me the other day on the question now pending. Consequently I request that you give it to me in writing, that I may judge whether I can continue my relations with the house of R or not. (Signed) C.

To M. Le Commandant Esterhazy
27 Rue de la Bienfaisance, Paris. "

The source from which this document - known as the "petit-bleu" - emanated, and the signature "C", which appeared on another document in the files of the Intelligence Department, known to have been signed by Schwarzkoppen, established at once the identity of the sender. Picquart, greatly agitated, had photographic copies made of the petit bleu, that the original might not be damaged by the manifold handling to which it was certain to be subjected, and hastened to apprise General de Boisdeffre of his discovery. De Boisdeffre in turn, communicated it to General Billot. A brief consultation between the two ensued, following which Picquart was

directed to investigate cautiously and in absolute secrecy. Not a hint of the matter was to be dropped anywhere. Those already informed regarding it were to be pledged to silence. A repetition of the Dreyfus affair was to be avoided at all hazards.

This deliberate and prudent procedure, despite the prima facie evidence afforded by the petit bleu of the guilt of Esterhazy, presents a striking contrast to the summary treatment Dreyfus received when the bordereau was discovered, which document could not even remotely be attributed to the Jewish officer. It can only be explained in two ways: either that De Boisdeffre knew that a judicial error had been committed against Dreyfus and dreaded a repetition of it, or that Dreyfus had been deliberately made the victim of an anti-Semitic plot; or perhaps both. Knowing the relations that de Boisdeffre enjoyed with Pere du Lac and the clerical party, the latter hypothesis seems quite plausible.

Picquart immediately began a systematic inquiry into the personality and character of Esterhazy. He found both to be thoroughly bad. To begin with he had not honestly come by his title of "Count", but had assumed it without any authority whatever. His father was a general during the Crimean war; he himself saw service in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, in which, because of a scarcity of officers, he rose to the rank of captain. In 1881 he was sent with his regiment against the Arabs. While in Tunis, he became intimate with the German military attache, for which he was curtly reprimanded by his chiefs. After the battle of El Arbain, when Colonel Correard, the commanding officer, recommended for bravery a captain and two lieutenants, Esterhazy surreptitiously inserted his own name into the military report, and managed later to enter it in the official records. General Guerrier long afterward deleted it, and reported the incident to the minister of war, who had the

correction verified, but Esterhazy escaped with only a reprimand.

After his return from Tunis in 1885, he remained in garrison at Marseilles for seven years. While stationed there he became notorious as a profligate and gambler. In 1886 he married for money, and having in less than two years run through his wife's fortune, she divorced him. In 1892 he succeeded in gaining a majority, and in being transferred to the garrison at Rouen. Here he immediately resumed all his loose habits. His records showed that he was continually absent from his post, neglectful of his duties, and that he was more interested in the Bourse in Paris than in the morale of his men. He was known to be a heavy speculator, and was always in financial straits.

It will be remembered that as a result of his seconding Crémieu-Foa he had received a letter of reprimand from General de Boisdeffre. He ran from one benevolent Jew to another with this letter, and on the strength of it obtained many sums ranging from twenty to one hundred francs. This begging elicited another private letter of rebuke from de Boisdeffre, whereupon Esterhazy's aristocratic relations, hearing of his actions, became violently indignant and cut him off from a legacy which he had confidently expected. This correspondence was in its turn, put to the same purpose as the former, with varying success. All this was revealed to Picquart in his investigation of the man. Finally, and what was of far greater significance than the foregoing, he learned that Esterhazy was in the habit of prying into military affairs outside his own jurisdiction; that he diligently frequented artillery tests even when his presence was not required, and that he was accustomed to borrow books and documents on military matters, and have them copied by his private secretaries.

Having ascertained the foregoing, the idea suddenly struck

Picquart, that perhaps Dreyfus was, after all, honest in his protestations of innocence, and that the bordereau upon which he had been convicted was the work of Esterhazy. Picquart, it will be recalled, was present at the court-martial which tried the Jewish officer, having been detailed there to report the proceedings for the War Office. He had been struck at that time by the flimsiness of the evidence against Dreyfus, by the failure of the court to establish a reasonable motive for the crime, by the contradictory evidence of the graphologists. Esterhazy's record, on the other hand, proved that he was an unprincipled man; that he had already been guilty of a suspicious intimacy with the German representative at Tunis, and that he was always speculating, gambling, and hard pressed for funds. All the circumstances of treason, and especially this recent discovery of the petit bleu were identified with Esterhazy. Of one thing Picquart was practically convinced - that Esterhazy was guilty of treasonable negotiations with Schwarzkoppen. The only question in his mind was whether this was a separate case of treachery, or whether Dreyfus was suffering for one of Esterhazy's crimes.

To solve this dilemma, Picquart quietly devoted himself to the task of securing copies of Esterhazy's handwriting. He procured from the colonel of Esterhazy's regiment letters he had written in the course of his service, and a single glance at them sufficed to assure him that he was looking at the handwriting of the bordereau. To convince himself that he was not mistaken, he had photographs made of the letters, concealing all references to the identity of their author, and he submitted these to Bertillon and Du Paty for examination. Bertillon, on seeing them, exclaimed immediately, "That's the handwriting of the bordereau . . . The Jews have had a year in which to train someone to the handwriting of the bordereau. They have succeeded perfectly, that's clear enough."

Du Paty's verdict was equally satisfactory, though stated differently. He declared it to be the penmanship of Matthew Dreyfus.

Satisfied that Esterhazy was the author of the bordereau, Picquart's next move was to examine the secret dossier which he knew had been given to the court in 1894, and which was still intact in the Department files, carefully guarded by Major Henry. He had been under the impression that it contained further revelations regarding treacheries ascribed to Dreyfus. Now he felt certain that its contents referred to Esterhazy. During Henry's absence, he had Gribelin, the keeper of the seals, bring the dossier to him. A careful examination of its contents satisfied him that Dreyfus had been the victim of a most astounding and contemptible plot. From that time on he was as certain that Dreyfus was as innocent of the treason for which he had been condemned, as he was that Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy was the real traitor in the French army.

Once more Picquart sought his superiors, Generals de Boisdeffre and Gonse, and laid before them the complete findings of his secret investigation. They listened with astute calmness to all he had to say, and then peremptorily advised him to separate the cases of Dreyfus and Esterhazy as being entirely unrelated matters. To Picquart, who was convinced that Esterhazy alone was responsible for all the leakage in the Department, this attitude seemed well-nigh inexplicable. He was, however, too confident of the integrity of his chiefs to ascribe their stolidity to any ulterior motives, and imagined that their instructions were founded on an honest opinion that there was no real connection between Esterhazy and the scandal of 1894. He then told Billot, the minister of war, of his suspicions, but Billot was too timorous to encounter the opposition of the heads of the army, and cautioned Picquart to govern himself according to the commands of Gonse and Boisdeffre.

Meanwhile Esterhazy had been warned, probably by Major Henry who, it appears, was his accomplice in crime, of the findings of Picquart and of his steps to secure more positive evidence against him. Esterhazy, thus put on his guard, made it impossible to apprehend him in any compromising manner. He immediately took steps to clear his desks of all suspicious correspondence and other material which did not directly concern his duties. At the same time, he confided to Drumont and others of the clerical anti-Semites that he suspected the existence of a plot to substitute him for Dreyfus. Moreover, steps were taken within the Intelligence Office to hamper Picquart in his investigations. At every turn he was furtively watched by Lauth and Gribelin, who were directly under his charge, and who not only kept Esterhazy posted of his every move, but eagerly sought occasion to discredit Picquart.

Late in October 1896, the military attache at Berlin, Foucault, returning to Paris for a brief stay, told Picquart that he had received definite information from a certain Guers, a German spy, to the effect that Dreyfus was at no time in communication with Germany, but that the German War Office had received valuable information from a French infantry major. A few days later, on September 3, an English journal published a false report of Dreyfus' escape from Devil's Island.* The Parisian press immediately took up the incident, and for days there raged a veritable Babel of condemnation of the intrigues of "Upper Jewdom", which was accused of having really set in motion a monster conspiracy to effect the escape of the interned officer. During this journalistic carnival, a

* This news was purposely circulated by Matthew Dreyfus. His object was to reawaken public interest in the affair, and to set the stage for the appearance of a pamphlet demanding the reopening of the case by Bernard Lazare, a journalist and an ardent champion of the Jews. Lazare had resolved to force the matter to public attention after Zadoc Kahn, the Chief Rabbi of France, and others, refused to involve themselves in it.

rumor had been set in motion and widely circulated, to the effect that a breach of judicial propriety had occurred in the Dreyfus trial. To refute this allegation, "L'Eclair", on September 14, began the publication of an article, under the caption "The Traitor", which stated as its purpose "to produce the proof, the irrefutable proof of the treason ... that not even a single man may hereafter in his conscience give the traitor the benefit of a doubt." Due to the intimacy of Major Henry with the editors of this vile sheet, they were told of the secret dossier which had led to the conviction of Dreyfus, and they informed the public for the first time of the "insurmountable proof that these documents contained". The entire contents of the dossier were not revealed, but the statement was given out that one document in cipher code contained the remark : "This creature Dreyfus is becoming decidedly too exacting", the phrase being a perversion of the original "Canaille de D .." document.

The publication of all this information, and especially that of the erroneous interpretation of the "Canaille de D..." document came as a thunderbolt to Picquart. He had already become fully convinced of Dreyfus' innocence; now he dreaded the humiliation of the army in the event that the vindication of the Jewish officer should be accomplished by others than those who were responsible for his conviction. On this he wrote to General Gonse as follows:

"The moment is at hand when those who are convinced that a mistake has been made with regard to them will make a desperate effort to have it rectified..... I think I have taken all the steps necessary for the initiative to come from ourselves. If we lose too much time, the initiative will be taken by outsiders, and that, apart from higher considerations, will put us in an odious light.... It will be a troublesome crisis, useless, and one

which we can avoid by doing justice in time."

Immediately upon receiving this letter, Gonse summoned Picquart, and (according to the sworn testimony of the latter at the Rennes trial in 1889) the following conversation occurred:

"What can it matter to you", said Gonse, "whether that Jew remains at Devil's Island or not?"

"But he is innocent."

"That's an affair that cannot be reopened; General Mercier and General Saussier are involved in it."

"Still, what would be our position if the family ever found out the real culprit?"

"If you say nothing, nobody will ever know it."

"What you have just said is abominable, General. I do not know yet what course I shall take, but in any case, I will not carry this secret with me to the grave."

The gauntlet had been thrown. Gonse could not but realize that he was dealing with a man whose silence was beyond his power to control, and above the price of the clericals to purchase. He would have to bide his time, and await a favorable opportunity of getting rid of so dangerous a foe. Picquart was therefore instructed, as a mere formality, to continue his investigations regarding Esterhazy, but under no circumstances was he to have him arrested. The next day, October 30, Henry and Gonse pulled apart the secret dossier.

On the day following the destruction of the dossier, Major Henry, in a state of feverish excitement, brought the following document to Gonse, claiming to have received it through Mme. Bastian's scrap-bag. Inasmuch as a great deal of its significance is lost in translation, the original is herewith given. (The italics are mine)

"Si... je dirai que jamaïs j'avais des relations avec ce juif. C'est entendu. Si on vous demande, dites comme ça, car il faut pas

que on sache jamais personne ce qui est arrive avec lui."

(Signed) Alexandrine.*

The note was written in blue pencil, and the signature and handwriting were apparently that of Panizzardi, as comparison with another document in the Intelligence Office files indicated. But despite its close resemblance to the writing of Panizzardi, the letter could never have been written with him. It was bristling with errors, that not even the most elementary student of French would commit, whereas Panizzardi was a graceful French scholar. The whole thing was one of Henry's forgeries, though not written by him, but by Lemercier-Picard, an ex-policeman, who had been expelled for crime, and who had entered the employ of Henry as a forger.†

Gonse and Boisdreffre, although they were probably aware of the spuriousness of the note, pretended to believe it genuine. Picquart entertained no such illusions, and expressed his skepticism regarding its authenticity.

On November 6, Bernard Lazare's pamphlet, on which he had been working with the assistance of the Dreyfus family, made its appearance. It presented the nature of the document upon the strength of which Dreyfus had been convicted, but did not publish the bordereau. It furthermore gave the true version of the "Canaille de D..." document. Four days later "Le Matin" published the bordereau, a facsimile of which it had procured through Teyssonnierès, one of the handwriting experts of 1894. Matters were moving entirely too rapidly

*The following is a good English translation of the poor French of the note:- "I have read that a deputy is going to ask several questions on the Dreyfus affair. If they request any new explanations at Rome, I shall say that I never had any dealings with this Jew. That is understood. If they question you, make the same reply, for nobody must ever know what has happened to him.

Alexandrine.

† Later Picard confessed to its authorship.

for the comfort of the War Office, which thought Picquart was at the bottom of all this, and accordingly, Boisdeffre and Billot decided to get rid of him immediately. On November 16, on the eve of an interpellation in the Chamber by the deputy Castelin, demanding that proceedings be instituted against the accomplices of Dreyfus, whom he named as Lazare, Hadamard, the father-in-law of Dreyfus, and others, Picquart was given five minutes notice in which to quit Paris for Tunis. The pretext for his departure was an order to organize the Intelligence Department there. He obeyed at once, hurriedly made ready, and left the country that very night. On the following day the interpellation in the Chamber into the affair by deputy Castelin, which for a long time had been the bugbear of the War Office, was begun. It failed to bring out any revelations detrimental to the army chiefs, but it accomplished one signal purpose. During the discussion, General Billot took the tribune, and after a long speech in which he solemnly declared that Dreyfus had been legally and justly convicted, he succeeded in having the affair declared a "chose jugée", a closed incident. This was the parting of the ways. The French government was committed to the crime.

The matter rested thus for about eight months. Finally, in June 1897, Picquart, who realized all along the motives that were accountable for his removal, tired of his aimless mission. He wrote a letter to Henry (who had succeeded him in command at the Intelligence Office) demanding an explanation for his continued presence in Tunis. To this Henry promptly replied that all he knew was that three charges had been lodged against him : (1) That he had opened correspondence unconnected with the service; (2) that he had planned to have the petit bleu stamped with the postmark of the post-office to prove that it had come through the mails; and (3) that he had opened the secret dossier and disclosed its contents.

Picquart's reply to this letter was to obtain a leave of absence, and hurriedly to return to Paris to seek the advice of his attorney Leblois. He confided to him the entire story, without, however, betraying the confidences of the War Office by disclosing the contents of the petit bleu or of any other official documents. Moreover, he enjoined Leblois to secrecy regarding his visit and his communication.

But Leblois, after careful consideration, decided that he was in no position to deal with the matter alone, and began to look about him for someone prominent in the affairs of the Republic who would be willing to undertake to bring Esterhazy to justice. He finally hit upon M. Scheurer-Kestner, the vice-president of the Senate, as the most likely man to handle the situation. Scheurer-Kestner had already been approached by Matthew Dreyfus in the interests of revision, and he had been greatly interested in the entire proceedings from the very beginning. Accordingly, Leblois visited him, told him of the revelations of Picquart, and in proof of his story he produced letters which Gonse had written to Picquart in Tunis, suggesting the purchase of his silence. On receiving this information, Scheurer-Kestner, who had pledged his honor to respect Leblois' confidence, went to his friend Billot and denounced Esterhazy as the traitor. Billot reassured the senator, and told him that a document recently come to light - Henry's forgery - established once for all the absolute guilt of Dreyfus. He promised, however, to investigate the possibility of a judicial error having been committed, and he made the senator promise not to do anything without first consulting him.

Shortly thereafter Billot had Esterhazy retired, having satisfied himself of the absolute unfitness of the man to hold a post in the army. But Esterhazy was by no means to be disposed of.

He began at once to write threatening letters to Billot, demanding protection as the price of his secrecy. Receiving no attention from Billot, he wrote to the president of the Republic, saying that he was in possession of the proofs of Dreyfus' guilt, and threatening to deliver them over to the German emperor. This ruse was productive of the desired results. Negotiations for the return of the document were entered into at once, and Esterhazy sent back a photographic copy of the "Canaille de D..." document, which had been furnished to him by Henry and Du Paty, but which Esterhazy later claimed had been given him by a mysterious "veiled lady", who was supposed to have gotten it from Picquart. The value of this ruse on the part of Esterhazy was that this document was the chief of the documents in the secret dossier, on the strength of which Dreyfus had been convicted. Unless Billot came to his aid, Esterhazy might say to him, "You must acquit me, for if you don't, I will expose the secret evidence illegally used by Mercier against Dreyfus." Thus Esterhazy was induced and enabled by the État major to blackmail Billot and every succeeding minister of war. He was therefore accorded the full protection of the War Office. He was informed daily by special messenger of the turn of events; each evening at a fixed rendezvous, instructions were brought to him as to how he should conduct himself on the following day. In the carrying out of this program, Henry and Du Paty played the most conspicuous part, frequently disguising themselves and carrying Esterhazy's instructions to him in person.

Esterhazy was now completely reassured. Whereas formerly he had gone to the office of Schwarzkoppen, and pleaded with him to

* On October 16, Esterhazy rushed into the office of Schwarzkoppen, revolver in hand, and threatened to blow out his brains (Esterhazy's) on the spot, if Schwarzkoppen would not go to Mme. Dreyfus and tell her that it was true that her husband had sold secrets to Germany. When Schwarzkoppen indignantly refused, Esterhazy went away. Two hours later he returned, smiling, and full

openly announce the guilt of Dreyfus, he now visited him with a more confident air, and boasted of the fact that his friends in the War Office were not abandoning him.

But the probability that Picquart might turn up at any time and upset the carefully laid plans of Henry and his accomplices in the War Office was a contingency always to be reckoned with, and one, moreover, which gave them no little concern. It was therefore decided to take bolder measures to have him put out of the way. At the end of October, when the agitation in the War Office regarding Esterhazy was at its height, General de Boisdeffre decided to send Picquart on the mission of Uriah the Hittite. He accordingly telegraphed General Le Clerc, who was in command of the French forces in Algeria, to send Picquart to the frontiers of Tripoli, where dangerous uprisings of hostile tribes were reported. General Le Clerc was astounded at receiving the order. To him it seemed tantamount to sending the man to certain death. He did not, of course, know the reasons of de Boisdeffre for the order, and he took it on his own responsibility to refuse to permit Picquart to advance beyond Gabes, which was not in the danger zone. Meanwhile he wrote to the War Office for further instructions, and pointed out that there was no emergency which would require the immediate fulfilment of the first order.

Picquart had not been at Gabes very long, when Esterhazy began to send to the War Office threats of publishing the document which he claimed to have received from a "veiled lady" (who was of apologies. He explained that he had just met two French officers at a rendezvous, who had given him a document which would enable him henceforth to defy all his enemies.

* In the Zola trial, Colonel Picquart was asked whether at the time he had been ordered to proceed to Tripoli there was any grave danger there. His reply was: "Well, Tripoli then was not one of the --- safest spots."

supposed to have purloined it from Pieuquart). Word was flashed from Paris to General Le Clerc to interrogate Pieuquart on this matter, whereupon the Colonel returned to Tunis. Meanwhile Henry had been looking through Pieuquart's private files in Paris, and had learned somewhat of the social connections of the Colonel. In order to create the impression that Pieuquart was in collusion with the Dreyfus family, Henry sent him two telegrams, through Esterhazy, both of the conspirators carefully guarding their own hand in the matter, and taking care that the messages fell under the surveillance of the authorities before they left Paris. These are the telegrams:-

"Arrest the demi-god; all is discovered; very serious affair."
(Signed) Speranza

"It has been proved that the "bleu" was forged by Georges".
(Signed) Blanche.

The receipt of these telegrams opened Pieuquart's eyes even more fully to the nature of the plot that was being hatched against him. He immediately informed General Billot of the occurrence, protesting that someone was sending him forged telegrams with the object of placing him in a compromising position. There the matter rested, for shortly thereafter Pieuquart was recalled to Paris to testify at the Esterhazy court-martial.

All this time, it will be remembered, Scheurer-Kestner was waiting for Billot to take some action against Esterhazy. Finally, on October 29, 1897, when he found that Billot and his minions in the War Office rejected his patriotic overtures with insults, he determined to take the initiative himself. Accordingly he wrote a letter to the "Matin", in which he said, among other things, "I

* Colonel Pieuquart was a favorite in the salon of Mlle. de Comminges, a lady aged fifty-five. In that charmed circle he was known as "le bon dieu" - Commandant de Lallemand, a friend of Pieuquart's, was "le demi-dieu."

† Speranza was the name of a circus girl with whom Du Paty had had an intrigue at Rouen.

am convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus, and more than ever I am resolved to secure his rehabilitation." These words, coming from the president of the Senate, and especially from a man who was known to be rich, produced a profound impression. Say what people might about his motives, they could not accuse him of having been bought by the "Syndicate of Treason".

On the day following the publication of the letter, Billot sought an interview with Scheurer-Kestner, and pleaded for a fortnight's grace in which to make a thorough investigation. The senator granted his request, and promised not to reveal anything further until the fortnight had elapsed, provided that Billot would carry out his share of the agreement. No sooner had Billot elicited this promise, than he set in motion all the anti-Semitic organs of the Parisian press in a campaign of vilification of Scheurer-Kestner. For fifteen days the old man was virtually buried beneath the torrent of muck and filth which the War Office organs loosed upon him. He held fast to his word, nevertheless, and refrained from making a single utterance regarding his knowledge of Esterhazy.

Before the fortnight was up, Bernard Lazare published his second pamphlet on "L'Affaire Dreyfus." It was a much larger work than his first, and devoted itself chiefly to setting forth the opinions of nine experts in handwriting in Europe and America. These had been supplied with facsimiles of the bordereau, together with sixteen private letters of Dreyfus. Their unanimous opinion was that the bordereau was not Dreyfus' work, and moreover, that it was written in the free-hand writing of whoever wrote it.

Simultaneously with the appearance of this work, Matthew Dreyfus had placards printed containing the "Proof of the Treason", a photographic reproduction of the bordereau. These were hawked on all the boulevards, and found a ready sale because of the tremen-

dous reawakening of interest in the affair that the new revelations had produced. One of the placards was picked up by Esterhazy's broker, M. Castro, who immediately recognized the handwriting as being that of Esterhazy. Armed with some letters of Esterhazy's which he had on his files, he sought out Matthew Dreyfus and told him his suspicions. Matthew thereupon went to Scheurer-Kestner, laid before him the revelations of Castro, and asked him point-blank whether in his opinion Esterhazy was the real traitor. The senator replied in the affirmative (November 11).

Four days later, on November 15, at the expiration of the fortnight of grace which Scheurer-Kestner had promised Billot, Matthew Dreyfus, acting on the advice of Scheurer-Kestner, caused the following letter to the minister of war to be published in the press:-

" The only ground for the accusation made in 1894 against my unfortunate brother is a "lettre missive" unsigned, undated, but proving that military documents had been betrayed to the agent of a foreign power.

I have the honor to inform you that the author of this document is M. le Comte Walsin de Esterhazy, major of infantry, withdrawn from active service owing to temporary infirmities last Spring.

The handwriting of Major Walsin Esterhazy is identical with that of this document. It will be very easy for you, M. le Ministre, to procure the writing of this officer.

I am ready, moreover, to indicate to you where you can find letters of his of incontestible authenticity, and of a date anterior to my brother's arrest.

I cannot doubt, M. le Ministre, that now you know the author of the treason for which my brother was condemned, you will promptly do justice!

The effect of the publication of this blunt accusation was like

that of a spark falling into a keg of gun-powder. All France gasped with consternation and bewilderment. Schwarzkoppen immediately packed his bags and left that very night for Berlin to return to Paris no more. It was a discreet avowal that his man was taken.

CHAPTER VII

The Farcical Trial and Acquittal of Esterhazy.

A formal indictment was made out against Esterhazy, and M.de Pellieux was ordered to conduct a preliminary hearing to ascertain whether there were sufficient grounds for action against him. Meanwhile Esterhazy was not taken into custody, but was permitted to come and go at will. When Dreyfus was accused of treason he was at once thrown into prison, shamefully maltreated, his house sacked, and his relatives severely cross-examined. Esterhazy, with a similar charge preferred against him, and with far more incriminating evidence to render plausible the indictment, was neither arrested nor inconvenienced in any manner. He was left seat-free to lounge about on the boulevards or in Drumont's editorial office, or to arrange with Henry and Du Paty the protocols of his acquittal. The Staff Office continued as before, to keep him fully posted concerning every development in the case, informed him in advance of his trial what questions would be put to him and the answers he should return to them, what to say, and what to leave unsaid.

Meanwhile, the "Figaro", (which was still a Dreyfusard newspaper) had commenced the publication of a series of letters written in 1885 by Esterhazy, to Mme. de Boulanoy, who was his mistress at that time. The scorn in which their author esteemed the army whose uniform he wore, the fiendish glee with which he gloated over the imaginary slaughter of French soldiers - this, and more, were all revealed in these letters. It will be illuminating to present a few excerpts from them :-

"Look at this precious French army! It is disgraceful. If my position were not at stake, I would be off tomorrow. I have written to Constantinople. There, if they offer me a suitable commission, I will go at once. However, I do not mean to quit before I

have played such a trick on these black-guards as I know how to play".

"If someone came to me this evening and told me that I should be killed tomorrow as captain of Uhlans while hewing down Frenchmen, I should be perfectly happy..... What a sad figure these people would make under a red blood sun over the battle-field, Paris taken by storm and given up to the pillage of a hundred thousand drunken soldiers. That is the fête that I long for."

To counteract the evil effects of these letters, the *État-Major* enlisted anew the services of the clerical anti-Semitic press. Articles and news items were written by Du Paty, Henry, and their clique, for publication in these yellow sheets. Blackmailers and "sluggers" were freely hired to injure the protagonists of Dreyfus. Lemer cier-Picard, the author of Henry's star forgery, was bought to fake another note further implicating Esterhazy. It was expected that the Dreyfusards would buy it, publish it, and then the War Office would turn around and denounce the Dreyfusards for fabricating proofs of Esterhazy's guilt. The plot failed miserably. Picard took his document to Reinach, an active Dreyfusard, who detected the forgery at once, and promptly and vigourously kicked its author out of his house into the street. To avenge himself for his ruffled dignity, Picard wrote "copié" on a corner of his note, forging Reinach's hand, and sold it to Rochefort, (the editor of the anti-Semitic "L'Intransigeant"), who beginning December 25, 1897, wrote a series of articles in which he strove to prove that all the evidence against Esterhazy was forged by the Jews. Picard's document, containing the endorsement of Reinach, was offered as a bona fide specimen. In January 1898 Reinach sued Rochefort for criminal libel. Rochefort was convicted, but he had the satisfaction of being held up as a martyr in a righteous cause by Drumont and the clerical gang, which escorted him to and from prison. Shortly afterward,

Picard was found strangled in his lodgings. The crowd at the War Office had exhausted his possibilities for service to them. Furthermore he knew too much, and they could breathe easier with him six feet under ground.

The Dreyfusards scored a point when they succeeded in forcing Billet to subpoena Colonel Picquart from Algeria to testify at the trial. Naturally the War Office would by far have preferred that Picquart be altogether excluded, but failing in that, they evened up accounts by declaring that only the civil witnesses would be heard in public, and that the military testimony would be given behind closed doors. By this stratagem the public was kept completely in the dark regarding the all-important revelations of the former chief of the Intelligence Office.

After General Billet had risen in the Chamber of Deputies on December 4, and again in the Senate on December 7, and solemnly declared "on his soul and conscience" that Dreyfus was guilty, and after the Premier Meline had added the force of his office to the opinion that "there was no Dreyfus Affaire", the War Office was ready to proceed with the trial of the traitor Esterhazy.

General de Pellieux held a preliminary inquiry; credulously listened to all of Esterhazy's prevarications and colossal inventions; applauded him when he remembered the lines given him to memorize by Du Paty and Henry; prompted him when he forgot, and officiously declared that the charge against him was dismissed as being without foundation.

In order to completely satisfy public opinion, which was still skeptical the War Office determined to perform its little trick over again, much the same as a magician, having astounded his audience by the dexterity of his art, repeats his performance to assure the spectators that he has really performed the miracle that excited their incredulity. Esterhazy was therefore ordered

to pretend that he was not fully satisfied with the results of the preliminary hearing, and that he desired "the favor of a regular judicial inquiry." His application for this "privilege" was framed with the aid of Du Paty, and the rough draft was revised by De Pellieux. General Saussier, who was as deeply involved in the plot against Dreyfus as was Mercier, was empowered to appoint the presiding officer. He not only appointed Major Ravary, but instructed him as well. Henry and his associates had the pleasure of again performing their "stunt", and Ravary's report was ready (Jan.1,1898). He declared that the petit bleu was a forgery of Picquart's, who was a disturbing element in the army; the bordereau was the work of Dreyfus, who had imitated Esterhazy's writing; and although the private life of the accused was not to be recommended as a model to the young officers, he was, however, entirely innocent of the charges against him.

But this second farcical performance was equally as unsatisfactory to the advocates of revision as was the first. Men like Reinach, Scheurer-Kestner, Jaures, Guyot, Clemenceau, and others who could not be dazzled by the glamour of the war lords, continued to express their doubts regarding the guilt of Dreyfus and the innocence of Esterhazy. Several newspapers enlisted their services in behalf of the Dreyfusards, and such sheets as "Le Siecle", "L'Aurore", "La Petite Republique", "Le Rappel", and a few others, continued in their skepticism despite the persistence of the War Office and its hirelings in proclaiming the Dreyfus "Affaire" a "chose jugee". On January 7, 1898, "Le Siecle" published the report of Major Bexon d'Ormescheville on the Dreyfus case, and that of Major Ravary on the case of Esterhazy. The vagueness and puerility of the charges against Dreyfus, as well as the white-washing of Esterhazy were easily seen, and the ranks of the skeptics were considerably

augmented. To satisfy these elements, General Saussier ordered that a regular court-martial be held, that once for all the matter might be aired, settled, and forgotten. To this Esterhazy readily agreed, as well he might have, seeing that De Pellieux and Henry's minions stood squarely behind him, and had, in fact, engineered his acquittal before the first gun for the prosecution was fired.

The court-martial took place at Cherche-Midi prison on January 10 and 11, 1898. As in the previous trials, as soon as the civil witnesses had deposed their testimony, the court, "for reasons of state", went into secret session. Again the War Office pulled the strings, and again the puppets went through their paces, which they had gotten quite in hand by this time. The handwriting experts, carefully coached beforehand, testified that the handwriting of the bordereau was indeed that of Esterhazy, but that Esterhazy had not written it. Dreyfus had, forsooth, forged the document in Esterhazy's hand, which he had learned by tracing skillfully other letters of the accused.* Esterhazy came forward at this juncture with a carefully prepared story to the effect that some years before the discovery of the bordereau, an individual who assumed the name of Captain Brault, had written to him for some information on a professional matter. He had supplied the desired information, ignorant of the real identity of his questioner, but learned subsequently that "Captain Brault" was none other than Captain Dreyfus. In this way, he pointed out, the Jewish officer had obtained specimens of his writing.

Before the court-martial began, General Luxer, who was the presiding officer, had ruled that the conviction of Dreyfus had been lawfully and justly obtained, and that therefore the court

* The absurdity of this evidence, in view of the fact that in 1894 Dreyfus had been convicted because it was proved that the bordereau was in his free handwriting, was of course, overlooked by the court-martial, which accepted it gravely as admissible.

would respect that matter as a "chose jugee". As a result of this ruling, the proceedings of the trial were naturally confused and illogical. Esterhazy's case was in reality soon disposed of, and judging by the turn taken by the court-martial, it would appear as though Picquart were on trial, rather than the traitor. The former was accused of having betrayed the secrets of the War Office, and of indiscretion in the conduct of the Intelligence Department during the time when he was at its head. Esterhazy testified that a "veiled lady", whom, by insinuation, was made to appear as Picquart's mistress - a dastardly lie! - had had several secret meetings with him, and had given him some documents whereby he could prove his innocence. It was intended to create the impression that Picquart was in collusion with the Dreyfus family to effect the substitution of Esterhazy for Dreyfus. Esterhazy produced letters purporting to come from this veiled lady, in which Picquart's alleged roguery was revealed. Picquart immediately challenged the genuineness of these letters, but his protest was lost. After the trial was over, he brought a charge of criminal forgery against Esterhazy, and it developed that the notorious

* The absurdity of this ruling is easily apparent. Here was Esterhazy on trial for writing the bordereau, and the court deciding, before hearing any evidence, that Dreyfus had written it. According to law - even French law - revision of a conviction is automatically secured if a person other than the convicted is indisputably proved guilty of the offense for which the first person has been convicted. Here was presented the spectacle of Esterhazy being denounced for the crime imputed to Dreyfus, and the court deciding, before the trial, that the verdict of Dreyfus' conviction was irrevocable.

"veiled lady" letters had been written by Count Christian Esterhazy, a cousin of the traitor's, at the request of the latter, and with the knowledge of General de Pellieux.

Finally, after two days devoted to the sort of mock jurisprudence of which the above is but an illustration, Esterhazy was unanimously acquitted. The public, prepared beforehand for the verdict by the well-feigned indignation of the anti-Semitic press, that Esterhazy had been compelled to undergo so trying an ordeal, was not greatly agitated over the outcome. Esterhazy was the recipient of loud and fervid congratulations, which were given proper publicity. The chiefs of the army wrote letters of commendation to him, advising him to institute a suit for damages against Mathew Dreyfus, for having injured his reputation. Picquart, on the other hand, was sentenced to sixty days imprisonment, pending the appointment of a council of inquiry to investigate the charges against him.

It must not be presumed that the Dreyfusards were at all satisfied with the results of this trial, or that they regarded their cause as hopeless. They realized by this time the nature of the foe they were opposed to, and they were well aware that their battle was no easy one. That Esterhazy's acquittal was a "frame up" engineered by de Pellieux, Henry, Du Paty, and the entire War Office group, they did not for one moment doubt. In July 1898, Judge Bertullus seized some letters in Esterhazy's lodgings which proved the correctness of their suspicions.

CHAPTER VIII.

Emile Zola - The Champion of Justice.

After the acquittal of Esterhazy, on January 11, 1898, the great mass of Frenchmen put down their newspapers with a sigh of relief, expressed their satisfaction that the trial was over, and hoped that the whole matter would be buried and forgotten. Truth to tell, France was sick and tired of the entire business. The average Frenchman had long ago despaired of learning the real truth about it. Investigation had followed investigation, inquiry had succeeded inquiry, only to becloud the issue still further, and lead to nowhere except to added abuse, vituperation, and recrimination. In some quarters it was vaguely felt that perhaps an error had been committed against Dreyfus; in others that perhaps Esterhazy had written the bordereau, but the general conclusion was that the country had had enough of it all and desired to hear of it no more. The opinion prevailed that weighty state reasons had influenced the military judges in both trials - the anti-Semitic clerical press had hammered away on that point for months. So argued the average Frenchman. Consequently at the end of the Esterhazy court-martial the great majority of those who took any interest at all in public affairs leaned to the view that the Dreyfus case should not be reopened.

It must not be supposed that the attitude of the country toward the "Affaire" was one of indifference or apathy. The interest with which the case was followed had been marked with a feverish excitement, due to the perverse interpretation given to it by the rabid press. For the subsidized organs of the clericals and General Staff had sought to arouse public sympathy in favor of Esterhazy by deliberately construing the agitation of the Dreyfusards

for revision as being an insulting campaign against the army, masquerading in the cloak of justice. The cause of Esterhazy had been identified all along with the "honor of the army", and as a result, a great many sincere individuals who ordinarily might have espoused the cause of strict justice, felt that the army was worth the sacrifice of one life in order not to compromise those who had committed the error - if, indeed, an error had been committed. For the army was the adored of France. France felt a sort of yearning to pamper her army as a mother might pamper an unsuccessful son. All hope of revenge for the humiliation suffered in 1870, in which France had lived for a generation, rested in the army alone. The army - as was said so often-- the army was France. Everybody had served in it; everybody depended on it. And the army being France, the honor of the army, they argued, was the honor of France. It was unseemly thus to expose the national honor to the laughing scrutiny of the world, they felt, and on all sides was expressed a nervous anxiety to hush up the scandal.

During the closing months of 1897, however, there had risen a small group of men, most of them persons of enlightenment and culture, who refused to allow themselves to be carried away on the current of popular hysteria. Being for the most part educators and professional men, theoreticians not steeped in the sordidness of petty political intrigue, and untainted by the poisonous propaganda of hostile clericalism, they saw clearly into the network of deceit and treachery that had been woven about the unfortunate Jewish officer. Especially after "Le Siècle" published the charges and findings against Dreyfus and Esterhazy, on January 7, 1898, did the judicial farce that had been enacted excite their resentment and disgust. Prior to the acquittal of Esterhazy,

most of them had remained silent, passively watching the trend of events. Now that the doors of justice were about to close finally against the helpless prisoner of Devil's island, they resolved to unseal their lips.

The opposition of these men of learning, though unorganized and disunited, came to be known as "The Movement of the Intellectuals", in contemptuous distinction to the anti-Dreyfusards, who were styled "Patriotards." These "Intellectuals" were the flies in the ointment of the War Office. They refused to permit the affair to pass into oblivion, and in class-room and lecture-hall, in newspaper and magazine, they kept up a constant fire of criticism on the administration for its stubborn persistence in refusing to administer justice.

Among the most prominent of this fearless group was the doughty Alsatian Scheurer-Kestner, who continued to appeal to the Senate in the interests of revision until in the elections of 1898 he paid the price of his temerity with defeat. Jaures, the powerful Socialist orator, was another indefatigable worker in behalf of Dreyfus. "The Dreyfus case", said Jaures, "is a question of justice. Socialism, in our minds, is synonymous with justice. Therefore every Socialist ought to consider the Dreyfus case as his own." He dared in the Chamber, of which he was a member, to interpellate the Ministry in behalf of a reopening of the case; when most of the witnesses in the Zola trial feared to testify, and absented themselves, Jaures readily appeared and spoke in admirable language in defense of the heroic author; and finally, in the elections of May 1898, he asked his constituents to return him to the chamber on the strength of his record in the cause of Dreyfus - the height of courage - and as a result went down to defeat, but without flinching. Then there were Trarieux, the former minister of

justice and a talented lawyer; Gabriel Monod, an eminent historian, a professor in one of France's highest schools - the Sorbonne - and the editor of the "Revue Historique". Duclaux, an illustrious savant and the successor of Pasteur, after reading the indictment on which Dreyfus was condemned, immediately wrote to Scheurer-Kestner a letter of encouragement and support, and prepared for publication in "Le Siècle" a series of brilliant and forceful articles. Others were Yves Guyot, a former minister and valiant journalist; Anatole France, the exquisite ironist and splendid writer; Grimaux the eminent biologist - who lost his professorship because he gave evidence for Zola. Men of letters, Protestant pastors, physicians, lawyers, and young students, circulated petitions and addressed appeals demanding revision. The Sorbonne became a hot-bed of the most uncompromising Dreyfusism. In addition to Monod, professors Seignobos of History, Seailles of Philosophy, Brunot of Philology, Langlois and Andler, all enlisted their aid in behalf of the Jewish captain. In the Collège de France there were Albert Réville, the illustrious exegete, and Havet, the famous latinist. In the Ecole Normale Supérieure almost all the teachers and students were revisionists. In the Ecole des Chartes (the school of historical criticism) there were Paul Meyer, the director, professors Giry, Viollat, and others.

Of this whole galaxy of noble-souled crusaders in the cause of revision, none was more fearless, more devoted, more outspoken, than Emile Zola, the famous novelist. He had followed the development of the case from its incipency, and his whole being was fired with righteous indignation at the shameful travesty on justice that had been staged in his beloved France. In an earlier day he had protested vehemently against Drumont's anti-Semitic monstrosities; now he threw himself again into the fray on behalf of the

victim of that same persecution whom he firmly believed to be innocent. No motives other than those of the purest loyalty to truth and love of fair-dealing actuated the author in his defense of the condemned. He refused to be made personally known to any member of the Dreyfus family. He declined to enter into communication with them, or to have them communicate with him. He was fighting for a principle in which the honor of France was engaged, and he was resolved to introduce no personal element whatever into the struggle.

On January 13, 1898, two days after Esterhazy's acquittal, and on the day that the parliamentary session opened, he caused to be published in "L'Aurore", "J'Accuse", an open letter to the president of the Republic, in which he inveighed with passionate eloquence against the perpetrators of the judicial crime. With consummate forcefulness he arraigned the ministers of war from 1894 to 1898, charging them with a crime against all humanity; he assailed Generals Gonse and de Boisdeffre, accusing them of "lèse humanité" and "lèse justice." He denounced Henry and Du Paty and De Pellieux, and others, calling them by name, of deliberately plotting against the welfare of the state, and of acting either under clerical pressure, or from that esprit de corps which aimed at making the War Office a sacred ark which was absolutely beyond the reach of attack or criticism. He bitterly stigmatized the acquittal of Esterhazy as having been fraudulently achieved, in the face of testimony which proved his guilt beyond all possibility of error; and he finished by accusing the court-martial that exonerated the traitor, of wilfully and knowingly acquitting a guilty person.

The tremendous sensation which the publication of this letter produced can be better imagined than described. Its effect was electrical - exactly as Zola had foreseen. The War Office was rudely

disillusioned from its smug contemplation of security from detection; the clericals were panic-stricken in the midst of their rejoicing over their apparent victory, and the conservatives ^{were confounded} in their congratulations that the troublesome question had been settled at last. The miracle of the resurrection had been repeated. The buried corpse of the Dreyfus "Affaire" had risen over night, and apostles were on hand to proclaim the glad tidings to all lovers of law and justice.

No sooner had the Etat Major recovered from its amazement and consternation, than it immediately set in motion once more all the organs of the clerical press with the object of discrediting this new attack on "the integrity of the Republic". Every edition of the anti-Semitic newspapers devoted great space to slandering and vilifying Zola and his ancestors. Hideous cartoons, of daring and shameful indecency, sought to render him an object of derision and ridicule. The whole band of "Intellectuals" was made a target of scorn and calumny. The old libel that the Jews had formed a syndicate to free Dreyfus, was revived, and Zola was accused of having sold himself to the masters of Jewish finance. Anti-Jewish demonstrations were staged in the streets of Paris, and not infrequently blood was shed. In Paris, Nantes, Marseilles, Chalons-sur-Saone, Bordeaux, Angoulesme, and other cities, shops belonging to Jewish merchants were looted and their lives were threatened. Professional anti-Semites harangued the mob from every street-corner, urging them to purge France of the Jews, and inciting to acts of violence and riot. Torch-light processions were formed to parade before the residences of prominent Jews; hoodlums were instigated to acts of petty vandalism. Every appearance of the uniform was the signal for a tumultuous demonstration; soldiers were carried aloft on the shoulders of the fanatic agitators, and even military characters in the

theatres were acclaimed with wild plaudits. The fever spread to Algiers, where serious rioting took place (January 23), the shops and houses of the Jews in various districts being attacked and pillaged.

All this scandal quite naturally found echo in the Chamber of Deputies. On January 22, M. Cavaignac asked leave to interpellate the ministry regarding the supposed confession of Dreyfus. The story had made the rounds to the effect that on the day of his degradation Dreyfus had confessed to Lebrun-Renault, the captain of the gendarmerie on service, saying that if he had given up any documents to Germany, it was only to get more important ones in return. This faked confession, widely advertised after the Jewish officer had been deported, had gotten the War Office into serious complications with Germany, and Lebrun-Renault was roundly taken to task by the officials of the army and by president Casimir-Perier for his fabrication. Now, in 1898, the so-called confession was being revived again, and Cavaignac called upon the minister of war to inform the Chamber regarding it. Méline declined to discuss this question inasmuch as the Chamber had previously gone on record as respecting the Dreyfus affair as a "chose jugée". Thereupon Cavaignac withdrew his motion. But Jaures, desirous of having the truth brought to Parliament, revived the debate. In a moment the Chamber was in an uproar. The air was blue with accusations and curses; the leader of the right struck Jaures; others joined in the mêlée; the galleries were ordered cleared; and the session adjourned in confusion. On January 24 the debate was resumed in a calmer spirit. Méline's ruling that the "Affaire" was a "chose jugée" finally prevailed, and the Chamber voted its confidence in the army and navy by a majority of over two hundred. This vote, however, indicated for the first time that there was a cleavage in the various political groups as a result of the disorganization

caused by the Dreyfus affair.

Meanwhile the War Office had sworn out indictments against Zola and Perreux, the publisher of "L'Aurore", charging them with defamatory libel, for having slandered the second court-martial which acquitted Esterhazy. Zola's reply to the minister of war for having him haled into court, was characteristic. He reproached him with having shrunk from a fair and open fight by resorting to legal quibbles to obtain a victory upon which he could not otherwise count. "I shall prevail", he wrote, "by the force of justice; I shall carry conviction to the conscience by the truth."

The case was tried at the Seine Assize court beginning February 7 and continuing through the 23. The opening of the trial was the signal for fresh demonstrations in the streets of Paris. Anti-Semitism sprang up afresh, venting itself upon the innocent Jewish inhabitants. The newspapers redoubled their efforts at mud-slinging, and grew even bolder in their filthy abuse of Zola and the revisionists. Street and boulevard were filled with noisy meetings under the auspices of the anti-revisionists, who were abetted by the Parisian police. Day by day there occurred scenes of the wildest disorder. The public was admitted into the court-room under extremely rigorous restrictions. Zola's carriage was followed each day by a gang of howling ruffians, mobilized and paid by the leaders of the anti-Semitic party. In the court-room proper, but little

* So sensitive had Parliament become on the matter of "the honor of the army" that for anyone to venture to criticize anything pertaining to the military, was to court political opprobrium. On January 29 M. Lockroy exposed the illegality of the manner in which the navy budget was administered, and the disgraceful waste and speculation at the Admiralty and dock-yards. For this he was howled down by the Chamber. M. Delcasse investigated conditions at the Rochefort arsenal and found evidences of scandalous administration. A report sent to him from Rochefort was intercepted, and "Le Soir", a clerical anti-Semitic paper, published a seemingly official letter abruptly inviting Delcasse to keep out of Departmental affairs and mind his own business.

but little decency prevailed. It was an offence to cry "Vive La République" in response to "Mort aux Juifs", or "A bas Zola!" By-standers were hustled and assaulted for failure to uncover when a general, or even a petty officer, passed through the crowd. It was necessary for the partisans of Dreyfus to form themselves into escorts for Zola and his witnesses, the police failing to accord them suitable protection from the violence of the mob. Most of the witnesses subpoenaed by the defense - particularly the military witnesses - declined to appear, having been intimidated by threatening letters, or fearing to expose themselves to the hostility of the anti-Semites. It was finally found necessary to resort to stringent measures in order to secure their presence.

As in the Esterhazy trial, the court ruled at the outset that the Dreyfus trial of 1894 was "chose jugée", and consequently any testimony or reference to it would not be admitted. The absurdity of this ruling has been pointed out in an earlier chapter (see p. 78) and need not be here repeated. The natural result of this dialecticism was that the testimony was confused and wide of the mark, and frequently did embrace the principal charges made against Dreyfus.

Esterhazy, one of the chief witnesses for the War Office, maintained an attitude of insufferable superciliousness throughout the entire proceedings. His testimony consisted for the most part, in violent denunciations of Picquart and Matthew Dreyfus for their

* Things had come to such a pass in France that if anybody said "Justice", he was suspected of a desire to subvert the government. M. Maurice Bouchor, poet, wrote an ode for the official celebration of the Michelet centenary. Brisson, the minister of Public Instruction objected to a stanza in which the poet invoked the shades of Michelet, Hugo, and Quinet, to recall to the minds of Frenchmen and the world that "France is the champion of right." Brisson endeavored for two hours to get Bouchor to withdraw the two stanzas, but the latter refused, and withdrew the entire poem. "I see", he said, "that I am not made to sing at official ceremonies."

■ Casimir-Perier refused to take the juror's oath when called to the stand. He frankly admitted "I cannot take the oath to tell the whole truth, because I cannot tell it."

alleged attempt to substitute him for the convicted Dreyfus. When he had concluded his voluntary remarks, he grandiloquently said that the jurors might ask him questions, "but as for those people there," pointing to Labori and Clemenceau, "I shall not answer them." Under the withering cross-fire of Zola's counsel, the dreadful record of his falsehoods, his insults to the army, his forgeries, and the whole host of his crimes were unrolled in adroit questions, but the presiding officer Delegorgue refused to permit him to reply to any of them. When Clemenceau interrogated him regarding his alleged relations with Schwarzkoppen, the German military attache, the judge again sustained him in his objection to answer. "How is it", asked Clemenceau, "that one cannot speak in a court of justice of an action performed by a French officer?"

"Because", replied Delegorgue "there is something more important than a court of justice - the honor and security of the country."

A burst of applause from the section occupied by the officers greeted this remark. Clemenceau unabashed, tartly rejoined,

"M.le President, I gather from your words that the honor of the country allows an officer to do such things, but does not allow them to be spoken of."

Piequart, of course, was the star witness for Zola. His testimony was given in a quiet, firm, impressive voice, that made everybody who was not entirely blinded to the truth realize that here was a man who knew what he was talking about. He told as much as Delegorgue would permit him, of the discovery of the petit bleu, of his knowledge of Esterhazy, and of his investigations in the case. The War Office, realizing that he was their most dangerous adversary, tried in every conceivable manner to confound him. The charge that he was influenced by the motive of substituting Ester-

hazy for Dreyfus was reiterated continually, and frequent insinuations were made to have it appear that he was in the employ of the Dreyfus family. Henry swore over and over again that he saw Pieuquart and Leblois (Pieuquart's lawyer) examining the secret dossier "in the course of October 1898, not later, in Pieuquart's room at the War Office. It was proved at the Esterhazy trial that Leblois was not in Paris that autumn until November 7, and Pieuquart mentioned that fact. Upon this Henry, who had been made lieutenant-colonel for the occasion, jumped to his feet and shouted "Colonel Pieuquart has lied!" After the trial, Pieuquart challenged Henry to a duel, which occurred March 5, with the result that Pieuquart was twice wounded. Esterhazy too, tried to force Pieuquart into a duel by insulting him, but the Colonel refused to grant him the honor of a meeting.*

The experts in handwriting summoned by Zola went to great pains to prove that the bordereau was the work of Esterhazy, but their efforts were in vain. No sooner did they succeed in identifying the document with Esterhazy's penmanship, than General de Pellieux, who represented the War Office, waved their evidence aside, claiming that their opinions were founded on the photographic copies of the bordereau, which were at variance with the original. Labori then asked that the original be produced, but Delegorgue denied his request "for reasons of state."

* On May 23, 1898 Esterhazy published an abusive challenge to Pieuquart in "Le Jour", the favorite organ of the War Office. On the 24 Colonel Pieuquart answered with a dignified note which appeared in the press, stating that Esterhazy belonged to the justice of the state. A few weeks later, Esterhazy, maddened with absinthe, rushed out of a drinking shop and attacked Pieuquart with a club from behind. Pieuquart, however, proved too quick for him, and with a few well aimed strokes of his cane, sent him sprawling into the gutter.

The generals summoned to appear as witnesses behaved as though they were attending a military reception. The elaborate unction and formality which marked their appearance in the court-room, and the manner of their bearing, were strangely out of keeping with the nature of the occasion. When in the witness box, instead of giving evidence, they harangued the jury. For example General de Boisdeffre, the Chief-of-Staff, said to the jury : "You are the jury; you are the nation. If the nation has not confidence in the chiefs of the army - in those upon whom the responsibility of the national defense depends - they are ready to hand over to others their heavy burden. You have but to say the word." Then he went on to threaten the country with a disastrous war if Zola were acquitted. It seems inconceivable, yet it is perfectly true that this kind of twaddle was accepted in absolute seriousness by Delegorgue as evidence against Zola!

The proceedings were freely interspersed with thrills and sensations, but the really startling climax came when de Pellieux, in an impassioned argument contradicting the opinion of Piquart that Dreyfus was unjustly condemned, dramatically announced that the War Office was in possession of evidence other than the bordereau, which incontestably proved the guilt of Dreyfus. He affirmed that the Intelligence Department had gotten hold of a letter written by the foreign attache "A" to another foreign attache "B", in which there appeared the words "Never mention the fact that we have had any dealings with this Jew. General Gonse instantly sprang to his feet and substantiated the statement of de Pellieux. Had a bomb-shell suddenly exploded in the room it could not have produced a more startling effect. Labori was up in an instant, and demanded that the document be produced. De Pellieux, with an air of triumph summoned an officer, and bade him go to headquarters and bring General de Boisdeffre. In a few minutes the orderly returned. A whis-

pered consultation was held among the officers, and the hearing was adjourned for the day.

The document referred to by de Pellieux was, of course, none other than Henry's masterpiece forgery, executed for him by the hapless Lemercoier-Picard. In December 1897 Count Tornielli, the Italian ambassador, had warned Hanotaux, the French minister of Foreign Affairs, that the French Etat Major had gotten hold of several forgeries, notably Henry's. Lemercoier-Picard had received money not only from Henry for this little trick, but had sold it to Schwarzkoppen as well, who promptly informed Tornielli about it, in accordance with their agreement to exchange mutually information. The Italian ambassador had furthermore given his word of honor to Hanotaux that his attache Panizzardi had at no time had any relations with Dreyfus, whereupon Hanotaux pledged that the document would not be produced as genuine evidence, and instructed Billot, de Boisdeffre, and Meline to that effect. When, on February 17 it was mentioned by de Pellieux to get a verdict against Zola, and the orderly came post-haste from the scene of the trial to procure the document, Billot and de Boisdeffre were filled with dismay. To produce the forgery in court would be to invite rebuke from, and possibly war with Italy and Germany. To refuse to substantiate the avowal of de Pellieux would be to discredit him and expose the pernicious methods of the War Office. Meanwhile, in order not to weaken the case of the War Office against Zola, it was decided to adjourn the proceedings for that day. When the case reopened on the following day, General de Boisdeffre took the stand, and contented himself

* By way of again warning the French administration not to use Henry's forgery, the Italian Foreign Under-Secretary announced in the Chamber of Deputies at Rome on January 31, 1898, that neither the Italian government nor any of its diplomatic representatives in Paris ever had any relations with Dreyfus, direct or indirect.

¶ Hanotaux later demanded in vain that because of this trickery, the prosecution of Zola be abandoned, de Boisdeffre dismissed from the Etat Major, and the Dreyfus case revised.

with officiously affirming the veracity of de Pellieux' statement of the previous day. When Piequart expressed the opinion that the document was a forgery, de Pellieux held him up to the ridicule of the jury as a "gentleman who still bore the uniform of the French army, and who dared charge three generals with a forgery." That closed the incident - Delegorgue refused to have it discussed further.

The case was then placed in the hands of the jury, which had been terrorized to condemn Zola. For days and days the military, clerical, and anti-Semitic papers had printed in glaring headlines the names and addresses of all the jurors, with threats as to what fate they might expect should they fail to uphold "the honor of France and the army." The anti-Semitic roughts of Drumont and Père du Lac were organized and prepared to wreak vengeance on them if they failed to convict the author. During the trial, one juror became ill through fright, and had to be replaced. The result, therefore, in view of these circumstances, was even more favorable than the revisionists had expected. Zola was found guilty - but by a vote of seven to five, with extenuating circumstances (sic!). He was sentenced to a year's imprisonment, and a fine of 3,000 francs. Perreux, the publisher of "L'Aurore" was sentenced to four months in prisonment and a similar fine.

The convicted author and publisher immediately lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation. This body, urged by numerous petitions, which had been freely circulated in favor of the prisoners, and by the more liberal organs of the press, annulled their sentences on the basis of a technicality, viz: that the complaint against them should have been sworn out by the court-martial that had been libeled, and not by the War Office. No sooner was this decision published than the clerical, Nationalist, and anti-Semitic press, reopened its tirade of abuse and criticism against the

administration. Intimidated by this demonstration, the minister of war reopened the case, and moreover, laid before the Chancellor of the Legion of Honor a complaint, that Zola, an officer of the Legion, had insulted the army, and had thereby forfeited his rank. His name was struck from the roster of the Legion.

On July 18 his case came up anew at the Court of Assizes at Versailles. Two days before the trial began, Zola addressed an open letter to the Premier, upbraiding him for not meeting the Dreyfus case candidly, and again reiterating most of the statements he had set forth in "J'Accuse." When his case was called on the 18, he refused to appear in court, maintaining that the tribunal which was to hear his case was no better qualified to render an impartial verdict than was the first. On the advice of his counsel, he left Paris for Switzerland, thus rendering it impossible for the judgment of the court of Versailles, which sustained the verdict of the first court, to be served on him. On August 3 he was awarded damages for libel, against the writer of an article in "Le Petit Journal" and against its editors, for an article which they had published maligning his father's reputation. On the other hand, three experts in writing sued him for slander, and he was sentenced to pay damages of 5,000 francs to each of them.

CHAPTER IX.

Henry's Confession and Revision at Last.

Flushed with success as a result of their victory against Zola, the War Office, in conjunction with the clerical and Nationalist group, vigorously pushed their campaign to ruin the cause of the Revisionists. Their first move was directed against Picquart, who had been their chief disturbing element. They succeeded in having his name struck from the army lists. Leblois, his attorney, narrowly escaped disbarment, and was fortunate to get off with a six months' suspension from his practice of law.

The abusive attacks in the press against the Jews continued with added vehemence, and their echo resounded on the floor of the Chamber, where the Jewish question was again and again made the subject of lengthy and insulting debate. Of particular note was the session at which the question of abrogating the naturalization privileges of Algerian Jews was discussed. A number of Jews residing in a remote district of Algeria had been accused of attacks upon isolated Christians and had been brought to trial at Oran. Feeling against them ran so high there that the trial was transferred to Montpellier. They were convicted and sentenced to heavy fines and imprisonment, but the Algerian populace, not content with the punishment of the prisoners, had gone off on an orgy of pillage and abuse of all Jews in the country. When on February 19, 1898, the governor-general, M. Lepine came to Paris to obtain assistance in quelling the disturbances, the Algerian question was brought before the Chamber and argued with great vehemence. The newspapers took up the matter, and the alarming extent to which the race hatred in Algiers was reflected in the minds of the French public was clearly shown by the recrudescence of the

social discrimination and mercantile boycotting directed against French Jews.

The May elections of 1898 were on the whole uninteresting. Political questions were to a great extent ignored; public attention was centered on the trials arising out of the Dreyfus affair. Esterhazy and his mistress Marguerite Pays had been convicted by magistrate Bertullus, on Picquart's complaint, of having forged the letters and telegrams that he had received at Tunis, and many interesting revelations regarding Esterhazy's relations with the War Office had been exposed in the course of the trial. These happenings crowded the political affairs of the day into the background for the time being, so that not even the usual excitement attended the elections. All parties claimed to accept the decision of 1894 with regard to Dreyfus, and made their appeals to the voters on platforms of perfervid patriotism and exaltation of the army. None of the Revisionists, or Dreyfusards, were returned, but many who had been loud in their denunciation of the Jewish captain found seats.

Meline's ministry was put in the minority at its first meeting with the new Chamber on June 17, whereupon it was forced to resign. After ten days spent by leaders of various groups of French politicians in a fruitless effort to form a conciliation cabinet, Henri Brisson undertook the leadership of a Radical cabinet. In three days he had completed his selection, and had assembled an acceptable group. Their opinion on the Dreyfus affair was not by any means unanimous. Brisson himself secretly favored revision, but he took as minister of war Godfrey Cavaignac, the mouthpiece

* In spite of all the threatening letters that had been sent to intimidate him, Bertullus sent Esterhazy to jail. Later he was freed, and Cavaignac, turning a deaf ear to all pleas on his behalf, struck his name off the army lists.

of the Nationalists, who partook of all the prejudice of his group against the reopening of the case, but who, however, was a man of sterling honesty.*

The new minister of war was determined to deal the adherents of revision so effective a blow as would kill for all time any agitation for the reopening of the case. It was with that object in mind that he accepted the cabinet post, and he began at once to put it into execution. On July 7 Castelin, who had been returned as a member of the Chamber, interpellated the new ministry on the question of "How did the government propose to give effect to the 'ordre du jour' of November 18, 1896, which enjoined respect for the 'shose juges' and for the prestige of the army?"

Cavaignac's opportunity had come. He ascended the rostrum, and in one of the most eloquent and forceful addresses that had been delivered in the Chamber during the whole course of the Dreyfus affair, he launched into a furious denunciation of the Dreyfusards, branding them as the enemies of the Republic. He scored as disgraceful the aspersion that had been cast on the integrity of the War Office and on the army, and finally he declared that there was irrefutable evidence to prove that Dreyfus was guilty, and that he had been justly and legally condemned.

"Gentlemen", he thundered, "if I were not convinced that Dreyfus is guilty, no consideration of public safety would induce me to keep an innocent man in the galleys."

* M. Cavaignac was all open and above board. At school he refused to take his prize from the son of the emperor who imprisoned his father. When every public man but a half-dozen had dirtied his fingers in the Panama Scandals, Cavaignac was the man to restore public confidence in public honesty. When Billot had succeeded Mercier, and the Dreyfus case had become worse entangled than ever, and the General Staff and War Office were suspected, who but Cavaignac could go to the ministry of war and vouch for them!

He proceeded with tremendous effectiveness to lay before the Chamber the proofs of the guilt of the Jewish captain (which, in all fairness to Cavaignac, it must be said he believed to be genuine). The first of these was the so-called confession he had made on the day of his degradation to Captain Lebrun-Renault, the authenticity of which had been vouched for by General Gonse. Then followed the documents contained in the secret dossier, including the famous Henry forgery, the use of which, it will be remembered (see p. 92) had been forbidden by Count Tornielli.^{*} These disclosures, presented for the first time to the astounded members of Parliament, created a profound sensation, and swept the entire body off its feet. By a vote of 572 to 2 the Chamber ordered Cavaignac's speech posted in every commune in France. Castelin withdrew his interpellation, and it seemed as though the whole agitation of the Dreyfusards had exploded like a pin-pricked bubble.

The triumph of Cavaignac was short lived. On July 9, two days after the Chamber had listened to the proofs of Dreyfus' guilt, Colonel Picquart addressed an open letter to Brisson, in which he reiterated his opinion of the innocence of Dreyfus, and challenged the genuineness of Cavaignac's documents. Further than that, he offered to prove before any impartial jury, that two of them in no way referred to Dreyfus, and that the so-called foreign embassy letter was a forgery.

This audacious letter infuriated the minister of war who was convinced that Picquart was persisting in his partiality towards

* When Tornielli learned that Cavaignac had used Henry's forgery as a proof of Dreyfus' guilt, his wrath knew no bounds. Without delay the Italian government, backed by Germany, gave France the choice of exposing the forgery or of having it exposed. It is difficult to state positively whether the forgery was later "discovered" by Guignet, or whether it was merely so reported to the public.

Dreyfus only because of a desire to humiliate the War Office and discredit the government. The next day in the Chamber, he rose to defend again the conviction of Dreyfus, and to denounce Picquart for having assailed the genuineness of a document that he had never seen. On the same day, he had Picquart and Leblois arrested for divulging military secrets - a charge that had already been made against them during the Zola trial, and on which they had once been tried. Three days later Demange publicly announced that none of the documents mentioned by Cavaignac in his famous speech of July 7 had ever been communicated either to Dreyfus or to himself.

Picquart's letter had however given new heart to the friends of revision. Once more they came out boldly with their opinions that the martyred officer was innocent, and they protested against the policy of the War Office in fighting logic with force and under-handed dealing. The result of all this was to shake Cavaignac's assurance. He began to grow skeptical about the integrity of the men who were responsible for the compilation of the secret dossier, and he ended by ordering Major Guignet to examine very carefully the documents which it contained. To the great dismay of Guignet, he discovered that the 1896 document - Henry's forgery - was pieced together of different finds of paper, parts of which clearly belonged to other intersepted documents on file in the War Office. He hurriedly informed Cavaignac of his discovery. The latter verified its accuracy, and swore Guignet to solemn secrecy regarding it.

Meanwhile Cavaignac hesitated to act. His famous July 7 speech was still posted throughout the whole country. He had been hailed as the deliverer of France. To acknowledge his error would be to sign his political death-warrant. But he was too honest to hush it up, so when Henry returned to Paris from a trip through the country, he summoned him to the War Office, inviting de Boisdeffre,

Gonse, and Roget, (the Chief of the Cabinet) to be present. He confronted Henry with the suspicious document, and asked for an explanation of its peculiarities. At first Henry feigned surprise that the authenticity of the letter should be called into question, and over and over again he swore that it was absolutely genuine. Cavaignac went over it with him, pointing out its fallacies, demonstrating its flaws, and demanding a more plausible explanation than the weak lies Henry had offered. Finally the forger broke down and completely confessed that he had had it invented, but for no selfish reasons. He was forthwith arrested and taken to jail, and as he left the office of the minister of war, he said: "What I did I am ready to do again; it was for the good of the country and of the army."

On the next day Henry had a long talk in his cell with an unknown officer. Immediately thereafter he was found dead - his throat cut twice across and a razor beside him. Whether he was assassinated or whether he committed suicide, it is impossible to say. Certain it is that he was in possession of more dangerous knowledge regarding all the details of the entire affair than any man in France, and had he chosen to name his accomplices and divulge the intrigues of the War Office, he could have ruined some of the most influential men of the Republic.

The news of Henry's forgery and death were immediately made public, and as can readily be imagined, produced a profound sensation. Esterhazy left the country, and after traveling around for a time, took up his residence in London. General de Boisdeffre, seeing that he was compromised beyond retrieve, resigned his post on

* Because of this, there is a very persistent theory that he was murdered when he threatened to expose his accomplices. Those who adhere to the suicide hypothesis maintain that he desired to die with his rank, to insure his widow a full pension.

the day following the sensational death of Henry, giving as his reason for quitting the service, that he had lost his influence in the army by having put implicit trust in a forger. Three days later Cavaignac handed in his resignation as minister of war. Although he was persuaded that Dreyfus was guilty, despite the revelations of Henry, and accepted the theory of the "patriotic forgery" that had been invented by the clericals to cast a mantle of charity over the dead officer, he could not induce the other members of the cabinet to see the matter in that light. In handing in his resignation on September 4, he said : "There exists between me and my colleagues a disagreement, which, if prolonged, can only paralyze the action of the government at a time when it is most in need of union. I remain as convinced as ever of the guilt of Dreyfus, and I am determined to oppose, as before, any attempt at a revision."

Because of the unwelcome notoriety that had attached itself to the War Department, it was a serious problem to get anyone to assume the position of minister of war. At the personal solicitation of Felix Faure, the President of the Republic, General Zur Linden, the governor of Paris, was persuaded to accept the office. His incumbency, however, was but of short duration, as he was a confirmed anti-revisionist, while Brisson and the others of the cabinet had finally made up their minds to secure a new trial for Dreyfus. When Mme. Dreyfus had gone through all the preliminaries necessary before the government could take action, the keeper of the seals, through whom the initiative had to come, sent to Zur Linden, as minister of war, for the official record of the Dreyfus proceedings. Zur Linden forwarded them, but enclosed a long report of his own, in which he emphatically protested against the reopening of the case. The cabinet had, however, embarked upon its course with a resolve that there should be no turning back. Discount-

ing the report of the minister of war, it proceeded to lay the matter before a judicial commission, preparatory to taking final steps for a new trial (September 17). At this Zurlinden tendered his resignation, and was immediately reinstated as governor of Paris.

But during Zurlinden's brief tenure of office he had accomplished two events of note. In the first place he investigated Esterhazy's revelations regarding Du Paty's collusion with him. Du Paty confessed not only his own share in the machinations of the War Office, but valorously took the blame for a great number of offences which might be laid at the doors of his superiors. He was found guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer, and was immediately retired. Zurlinden's second move was to have Picquart indicted on the charge of having fabricated the petit bleu. In this action Zurlinden was undoubtedly influenced, if not indeed directed, by the enemies of revision, who were aware of the fact that Picquart had been asked to aid in the preparations for the defense of Dreyfus in the event that his application for a new trial were granted.

General Chanoine, who succeeded Zurlinden as minister of war, was an anti-revisionist, but the raking cross-fire of criticism ~~of cross-fire of criticism~~ which was turned upon him from all sides shook his assurance and made him hesitant in his opinions. Accordingly, when the report of the judicial commission which Brisson had ordered to investigate, put it squarely up to him as to whether a new trial should be allowed, he refused to take the responsibility upon himself, and called a meeting of the cabinet. In a prolonged conference, the entire matter was threshed out, and finally, due to the courage of Brisson, it was decided to refer the case to the Court of Cassation, the highest tribunal in France. This meant that the cause of the revisionists had won the first

victory, and that the matter had at last gone out of the direct control of the army heads. On October 5 the procureur-general of the Court of Cassation made formal application in the registry of the court for a revision of the Dreyfus trial.

Meanwhile the most stirring scenes were taking place daily on the streets of Paris. The populace was divided into two groups, Dreyfusards* and Anti-Dreyfusards, and conflicts between the two were of regular occurrence. In these the enemies of revision had the upper hand because of the superior strength of the anti-Semitic press, which was leaving no stone unturned to discredit the growing power of the advocates of revision. The Nationalists increased their activity, and agitated day and night for the overthrow of the Republic. On September 19 the Duc d'Orleans declared that he would not allow the honor of the army to be attacked, and affirmed that he could be relied upon to aid in any movement that would guard its prestige. The discredited members of the Boulangist Party grouped themselves around M. Deroulède, and revived the old Patriotic League, which marched daily through the streets of Paris, held meetings at corners under the protection of the police, and committed petty outrages against the Jews and all who openly expressed sentiments favorable to Dreyfus.† So well organized had these contrary elements become in their hostility to the government that a coup d'état seemed imminent, and under fear of a threatened overthrow of the Ministry, the garrison in Paris was increased from 20,000 to 40,000 ostensibly on the ground of preparedness for labor disputes. All Paris was seething with tumult and disorder.

* The Free-Masons, at the annual meeting of the general body in September, voted unanimously in favor of a revision of the case.

† The Radicals threatened to withdraw their support from the Government because of the reappointment of Zurlinden as Governor of Paris, which they called an act of weakness. They accused the Cabinet of being a puppet of the army and Clerical party.

The disturbance spread to Algiers, where the most violent outbursts of disorder occurred. There were aggressive anti-Semitic demonstrations in the streets; duels arose among the higher classes; Jewish stores were pillaged, and scenes of unparalleled rioting occurred. Governor Lépine was recalled, and Laperriere, a distinguished lawyer, was persuaded to resign the vice-presidency of the Council of State to accept the post. The agitation was so serious that the Conseils Generaux were unable to ignore the question, and urged the French Government to speedily find means to end the agitation in favor of the traitor Dreyfus.

On October 25 the Chamber reopened. Brisson refused all interpellations on the subject of the Dreyfus affair, whereupon Deroulede began a vicious attack on the government, and addressed some personal remarks to the minister of war. General Chanoine at once mounted the tribune, declared that his opinion of the Dreyfus affair was the same as his predecessors', and resigned on the spot, to the amazement and horror of everyone present. On a motion to the effect that the government had not upheld the honor of the army, Brisson's cabinet, which had definitely started the movement toward revision, was overthrown. The formation of a coalition cabinet was undertaken by Dupuy. Freycinet accepted the post of minister of war. (No general could be gotten to take the position after the extraordinary conduct of General Chanoine in deserting the cabinet openly). No sooner was the personnel of the new cabinet made known to the Chamber, than an interpellation was instituted regarding its general policy. Dupuy asked for the confidence of Parliament, and was eager to show that "in politics one could shift one's gun from one shoulder to the other while marching toward a goal." This vague, shifting policy seemed satisfactory to both factions, and the new ministry received the con-

fidence it asked. To placate the Nationalist members of the Chamber, as well as the other anti-revisionists, who were in the majority, Dupuy at once instituted proceedings against Urbain Gohier for having published "The Army and the Nation", a book reflecting on the army. At the same time he had M. Francis de Pressense, the Revisionist leader, struck off the lists of the Legion of Honor. By these acts he hoped to placate the elements that were loudly clamoring for the muzzling of the impenitent Dreyfusards, as well as to stave off the virulence of the hostile press.

On October 27 the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation received the report of its members entrusted with the preliminary investigation. In a most admirable statement of the case, M. Bard showed, in brief, that the conviction of Dreyfus had been based on the bordereau, which was apparently not his work, and on a document which Colonel Henry admitted having forged. A motion to free Dreyfus at once was lost. Instead the suggestion of Bard was adopted that the court should declare the claim for revision as formally admissible, and proceed to another inquiry which would succeed in satisfying both the army and the public that the guilt of the condemned officer had not been legally and justly proved. On November 3 this course was agreed upon, and the court began its hearings, sitting as a committee of the whole, instead of delegating its powers to one or two members. Furthermore, in order to insure the impartiality of the judges, it was decided to hold the sessions behind closed doors. All the principals in the case, with the exception of Dreyfus, were summoned to testify. On November 15 the court ordered that Dreyfus be informed of the proceedings, and the following telegram was despatched to him:

"You are informed that the Criminal Branch of the Supreme Court has declared acceptable in form the application for a re-

vision of your sentence, and has ordered that you be notified of this decision and be invited to set forth your defense."

The reply of the military party to this move was not long forthcoming. Picquart, it will be recalled, was still in custody awaiting trial, on the charge of having forged the *petit bleu*. The War Office, knowing only too well the weight that his evidence would carry before an impartial court, began immediately to take steps to discredit him still further. On November 25, General Zurlinden, the Military Governor of Paris, announced that the court-martial of Picquart would take place forthwith.

No one was deceived regarding the real significance of this move. The "Intellectuals" redoubled their activities in a desperate effort to delay the proceedings until the inquiry of the Court of Cassation should have been completed. All the radical organs inveighed against the precipitancy of the War Office. Petitions were circulated and demonstrations were staged. The matter came before the Chamber on November 28, when M. Massabuan, an anti-Semitic deputy, asserted that the Dreyfusards wanted to withdraw Picquart from his proper judges, and he denounced the agitation in his favor as the influence of cosmopolitan financiers. To this allegation M. Poincaré, who was one of the members of the cabinet in 1894, made an admirable reply - all the more effective because of his part in the original conviction of Dreyfus. He declared in a voice of thunder that the whole matter had gone too far, and he demanded that Parliament take an unprejudiced attitude toward the case.

"It is necessary", he said, "to put an end at once to the scandals committed by various sections of the War Office. What passes through them is enough to goad to revolt the most peaceably inclined men.... The ministry of 1894 was only made acquainted with the arrest of Dreyfus a fortnight after the event, and

then through a newspaper article."

He went on to show that each revelation of an important fact favorable to Dreyfus, had been followed by a fresh attack on Colonel Picquart. But in spite of the logic of his speech and the eloquence of his plea, the cabinet still refused to act, and the Chamber, by a vote of 437 to 73 passed one of its empty orders of the day, declaring respect for the principle of the separation of the judiciary and legislature.

Finally, however, Dupuy was goaded into action by the increasing agitation of the liberal elements. In line with his vacillating policy of "shifting his gun from one shoulder to the other while advancing toward a goal", he struck a compromise with the military party and his conscience. He made a sonorous appeal in the Chamber in defense of liberty and of the Jews who were being persecuted by the anti-Semites, whereupon it was resolved that his address be placarded throughout the country, and he gave the Court of Cassation priority rights on the court records pertaining to the case of Picquart. The effect of this was to delay indefinitely the proceedings of the court-martial against the Colonel.

The fury of the Anti-Dreyfusards at thus being cheated of their prey knew no bounds. The rabid press excoriated the ministry in most abusive fashion, and the Clericals and Nationalists, under the leadership of Millevoye, Dérroulède, and others, organized demonstrations outside Cherche-Midi prison where Picquart was incarcerated. A little later, on December 1, the Court of Cassation struck terror anew into the War Office, by a demand for the Dreyfus secret dossier. The War Department stubbornly opposed the request for twenty-seven days - for reasons that are self-evident - but at length it was compelled to yield. It stipulated, however,

that strict guarantees be given against the publication of its contents, and that it should be returned to the War Office at the close of each day's session of the court. At the same time, the Senate quietly advanced the cause of true liberty and curtailed the authority of the army, by extending the Constans law of 1897 (which gave to all accused persons the right to be assisted by counsel) to apply to military, as well as to civil courts.

All this time the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation was slowly proceeding with its investigation, with a hesitancy and caution that easily betrayed its fears. Simultaneously there was waged in press and on street-corner, in café and salon, a perfect frenzy of abuse against the Intellectuals, the Dreyfusards, and more particularly, against all Jews. Not alone in Paris, but in other cities as well, notably in Toulouse, rioting of a serious nature took place. Encounters between the Revisionists and Anti-Revisionists were of daily occurrence. Nationalists and anti-Semites attacked the meetings of the Revisionists, stormed the residences and business establishments of the Jews, and inflicted serious bodily hurt and property damage. The disturbance spread to Algiers, where the friends of Edouard Drumont, notably Max Régis, the mayor, took a leading part in fomenting anti-Semitic demonstrations. The outrageous lengths to which this depraved maniac went in his vicious hatred of the Jews are inconceivable. By a municipal edict, the shops and patrons of Jews were photographed and exposed to public view, and by a violent campaign of terrorism and intimidation, a systematic boycott of all Jewish establishments was achieved. Despite the interference of the French minister of justice, and the reorganization of the Algerian administration, the disturbances continued until Régis was finally convicted of lèse majesté toward the prefect, and was suspended from

his office for three months, whereupon he resigned.

In the midst of this lawlessness, somehow or other a report was circulated that the verdict of the Criminal Chamber would be favorable to Dreyfus. At this the Anti-Dreyfusards redoubled their pernicious efforts to discredit the personnel of the court, charging the judges with having sold themselves to the Jewish vested interests. In this tirade of vituperation they were assisted by Quesnay de Beaurepaire, the president of the Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, who, to revenge personal slights which he had received from his associates on the bench, resigned and began an outrageous campaign against his colleagues in the "Echo de Paris." The report of M. Bard, which, it will be recalled, was favorable to Dreyfus, was tainted, he asserted, by his sympathies for Picquart. He charged the court with having conspired in advance to annul the verdict of 1894, and he asserted that the highest French judiciary was in collusion with the friends of the Dreyfus family. His evidence was only idle gossip of doubtful authenticity, statements overheard by office clerks or inferior police officers - but the fact that it was vouchered for by a former procureur-general lent credence to this ridiculous trash. At the same time, the Nationalists, Clericals, and all the heterogeneous elements that had aligned themselves against Dreyfus, were mustering their forces. The streets were abandoned to them, the police supported them, and the ministry, thoroughly cowed, capitulated. A commission of inquiry was appointed to investigate the accusations of Beaurepaire (January 14, 1899). Two weeks later their report was submitted. They upheld the capability and rectitude of the judges, but concluded (sic!) that it was requisite to withdraw from them the right of deciding alone whether Dreyfus should be granted a new trial.

Naturally it was altogether optional with the ministry either

to accept or reject the findings of the commission, but Dupuy was not the man to stand up under the withering crossfire of abuse and invective that was levelled at him from all sides. France was seething with tumult and agitation. Not since the days of the Revolution had there been such scenes in the country. On January 30 the Duc d'Orleans advanced toward the frontier and established quarters in Brussels, where he received numerous delegations of Royalist supporters and directed propaganda for the "hastening of the hour for re-constituting the French Fatherland." In Marseilles and a score other cities, disgraceful rioting occurred, accompanied by shooting and incendiaryism. In Paris conflicts between the anti-Semites and Republicans were of hourly occurrence. Algiers acclaimed Max Regis as "King" with wild enthusiasm. He was taken from his carriage and lifted on the shoulders of the anti-Semitic mob and carried in triumph to the Hotel de Ville, where from the balcony he denounced the Chamber of Deputies as the off-scourings of a sewer. For this and similar acts he was subsequently sentenced to four months in prison, which to his own surprise, he was made to undergo forthwith. He was succeeded by Henri Rochefort, one of his partisans, and the campaign of hatred continued with unabated passion.*

All these demonstrations combined successfully to force the hand of the ministry. To conciliate the Nationalists and pour oil on the troubled waters, Dupuy presented a bill to Parliament on January 30, which virtually repudiated the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation in advance of its verdict on the merits of the case of the Revisionists. He requested that the Chamber appoint a committee to inquire if there were not grounds for amending the Code of Criminal

* Rochefort, on his way from Marseilles to Algiers, was booed and pursued by an angry crowd which forced him to keep in hiding throughout his stay in France. On his arrival at Algiers, however, he received a warm reception from the mayor and municipal council, for which they were later suspended by the prefect.

Procedure in cases of revision of sentences, to the end that both branches of the Court of Cassation - the Criminal and the Civil - might sit as a body of the whole in deciding the merits of the case at hand. The announcement of this move came as a thunder-bolt to the Dreyfusards. It openly violated the recognized principle of non-retroaction in criminal enactments, and was a grave reversal of the whole system of jurisprudence. The committee however, was appointed, but it failed to indorse Dupuy's treachery. On February 6, by a vote of nine to two, it vetoed the government's proposal to interfere with the Court of Cassation, and declared that no advantage could result from the proposed bill, but that it would, if adopted, shatter the whole judicial system. The next day President Loewe, of the Criminal Chamber, announced that his body had closed its inquiry. But Dupuy was not yet ready to listen to the report of the Criminal Chamber. Either because he feared that their decision was in favor of revision, or because he quivered under the lash of the Nationalists, he placed the report of the committee on the question of uniting the two sections of the Court of Cassation before the Chamber for action, on the same day that President Loewe had informed him that the Criminal Chamber had concluded its inquiry.

On the following day, the matter of uniting the two branches of the Court of Cassation was discussed in the Parliament. Of all the Moderate, Liberal, Socialist, and Radical groups in the Chamber, that had previously been so loud in their protestations against the proposal, only two members, MM. Pelletan and Millerand had the courage to denounce it on the floor. The Minister of Justice, however, urged the members to think only of their seats, and after a short debate, the bill was accepted by a vote of 326 to 206, and passed unamended by a vote of 324 to 207.

The measure was now brought before the Senate where its fate was even more dramatic. On February 16 the committee selected to report on it, returned a vote of five in favor of its adoption to four opposed. But the debate on the committee's report, scheduled for the following day, was rudely interrupted by the sudden death of President Felix Faure who died during the night of the 16th. The consternation occasioned by this unexpected event was immediately succeeded by the wildest confusion. To avoid a crisis, Parliament immediately assembled, and on the following day, Loubet, the President of the Senate, and a man who had preserved a strictly neutral regarding the whole affair, was elected President, the Dupuy ministry continuing in office.

The new president had been the candidate of all the liberal elements in Congress, and it was therefore inevitable that his selection should arouse the antagonism of the Anti-Revisionists. On the drive from Versailles to Paris after his election, the Nationalists assailed him all along the route with cries of "Panama Loubet" - reference to his alleged hand in the Panama Scandals. Volleys of rotten eggs were hurled after his carriage. In Paris he was grossly insulted by the mob as he rode from the railway station to the ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the attitude which the prime-minister and police assumed toward him was more likely to provoke than to control the disorder. The situation was indeed precarious. The Nationalists, anti-Semites, Clericals - in fact all shades and degrees of reactionaries and conservatives, united their strength, and refused to acknowledge the election of Loubet. Francis Coppée and Paul Deroulede,

* The mysterious death of Faure gave rise to much scandalous gossip. It was variously stated that he died in the arms of a woman; that he was poisoned by a 'belle Juive' in the pay of the "Dreyfus Syndicate"; that he committed suicide to avoid terrible revelations regarding himself and his family, and many other similar tales. These rumors attained such proportions that the private secretary of the deceased publish-

leaders of the "Ligue des Patriotes", an organization opposed to parliamentary government, paraded the streets with their partizans and incited the populace to revolt. For several days Paris was in the possession of organized bodies of rioters shrieking sedition. If a Caesar had arisen in the week that intervened between the death of Faure and his interment, the history of France would have taken quite a different turn. Violence ruled in the streets; the cynics and muckrakers prevailed in the press, and the Nationalists were casting about with frenzied eagerness for someone upon whom they might lay the mantle of leadership. General Metzinger was their first selection. Wherever he appeared, he was the object of wild acclaim and deafening applause, until he chilled the enthusiasm of the Nationalists by his coolness towards their overtures. The Duc d'Orleans was summoned to Brussels, and instructed to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Paris. It was generally understood that a coup d'etat would take place on February 23, the day of Faure's funeral. In consequence of this rumor it was proposed in the Chamber that the usual formalities be dispensed with, and that only a simple ceremony be held at Notre Dame. This met with protest on the part of a majority of the delegates, and it was finally decided to go on with the regular program as though there were nothing to fear. The Ministry was solicited to keep order in the streets; the municipal council of Paris issued a manifesto calling upon the public to maintain order and peace. The League of Patriots and the League of the "Patrie Française" were denied places in the funeral procession, whereupon Deroulede redoubled his seditious activities and issued fresh instructions to his followers.

Finally the anxiously awaited day of the funeral dawned. With

ed in the "Figaro" an account of Faure's movements and actions on the day of his death. He died in his room after having been indisposed for some hours previous.

Loubet at its head, the Chamber assembled at the Elysee and marched to Notre Dame, and thence to Pere la Chaise, with perfect regularity. All the arrangements were executed in dignified fashion, and the official procession had disbanded, when suddenly Déroutede attempted his long-planned revolution. Rushing up to General Roget, who was riding at the head of his brigade, he grasped the bridle of his horse and tried to persuade him to lead his troops to the Elysee, the presidential residence, and overthrow the government. Roget vigorously shook him off and marched his men to their barracks in orderly fashion. Déroutede and Habert, still hopeful of success, followed behind the troops and entreated them impassionedly to make a pronouncement. Roget had them both arrested and thrown into jail. On the next day the Chamber accepted, without a moment's hesitation, the prime minister's proposal that they should not be allowed to plead parliamentary privilege from arrest because of their official position as delegates. This seemingly vigorous and laudable act proved to be little more than a pose, however, for when the conspirators were brought to trial a few weeks later, the more serious charges against them were abandoned, and they were accused only with attempting to decoy soldiers from their duty, and to provoke street gatherings. After a two days' hearing, they were acquitted even from this charge, and carried in triumph by the Nationalists through the streets of Paris.

* Roget was Cavaignac's Chef du Cabinet. Déroutede had expected to encounter General De Pellieux, the notorious prosecutor of Zola, who would have been more amenable to the entreaties of the Nationalists. At the last moment the Ministry, suspicious of De Pellieux, had substituted Roget for him.

‡ On February 24 the police raided a number of homes of influential Royalists in Paris and seized a great mass of evidence which demonstrated that the fears expressed concerning a coup d'état were not without foundation. On the following day the Duc d'Orléans returned from Brussels to Turin.

§ The Paris correspondent of the Neue Freie Presse of Vienna was expelled from Paris on February 24 for having written too favorably of Dreyfus in reporting these incidents to his paper.

Meanwhile the bill which provided that the united sections of the Court of Cassation judge the merits of the case for revision, was before the Senate. Especially after the noisy demonstrations incidental to the inaugural of Loubet, was the Ministry anxious to placate the Nationalists - mistaking their noise for an indication of strength. For three days the proposition was discussed with vigor, its chief opponents being Monis, Waldeck-Rousseau, and Berenger. An amendment to return it to the Chamber failed of adoption by nine votes. Finally the Senate succeeded in extracting from the government a promise to publish the evidence taken before the Criminal Chamber, and on the strength of this, it passed the bill, on March 1, 1899. Some weeks later the "Figaro" spared the Ministry the annoyance of breaking its promise, by publishing in extenso, beginning March 31, the complete testimony of all the witnesses summoned before the Criminal Chamber. Only fifty copies of this evidence had been printed, and these had been delivered to the judges with the greatest precautions and under pledges of strictest secrecy. How the "Figaro" ever obtained possession of a copy still remains a mystery. Its publishers were fined 500 francs, but they nevertheless continued for several weeks to print the full text of the official report, to the profound embarrassment of the government. These disclosures revealed coherently as a unit the entire Dreyfus Case for the first time, and as a result a great number of people were converted to the cause of revision.

As a matter of fact, by the end of March, public opinion toward the case had undergone a considerable change. The feelings of most of the sensible, law-abiding citizens had been outraged by the disgraceful irreverence exhibited by the reactionaries in connection with the funeral of Faure and the inaugural of Loubet, and altogether it was felt that the Nationalists had gone to undue extremes in

their behavior. The country was growing tired of their excesses, and the artificiality of their demonstrations was too evident to convince anyone. Besides, the "Figaro's" publication of the case against Dreyfus, had opened the eyes of a great many to the flimsiness of the evidence upon which he had been convicted, and a growing sentiment prevailed that there were grounds for doubting the justice of that conviction. This skeptical attitude showed itself in officialdom, in the press, and in society.

On March 16 Colonel Picquart was transferred by an order of the Court of Cassation from the military to the civil prison, whence a few weeks later he was definitely released. Several independent newspapers which had formerly enjoined respect for the "chose jugée" now came out openly for Dreyfus. In the literary arena, the anti-Dreyfusards, wishing to exclude from the "Société de Gens de Lettres" found themselves in the minority. On May 2, when the Chamber resumed its sessions, de Freycinet, the Minister of War, was asked to explain the suspension of a course of lectures at L'Ecole Polytechnique, which was being given by M. Duruy, who was an outspoken revisionist, and had so expressed himself in articles in the "Figaro". De Freycinet's explanation was that the students had disturbed the lectures by exhibitions of partisanship, whereupon he had cancelled M. Duruy's engagement. This ingenious evasion evoked roars of derision and sarcasm from the liberals, and de Freycinet gladly seized upon the opportunity to resign, on the pretext that the Chamber had been lacking in respect to him. He was immediately succeeded in office by Krantz, a deputy and

* His removal was a boon to the Dreyfusards, for his whole administration had been spent in absolute subjection to the military. Among other things which proved his complete subservience to the army was his introduction and passing of a law by which appointments to all high military commands were transferred from the Minister of War to a committee of generals. This abdication of the civil power was a feather in the cap of the Military Party.

Minister of Public Works.

Meanwhile the Criminal and Civil Sections of the Court of Cassation had been sitting as a body of the whole to inquire into the validity of Mme. Dreyfus' application for revision. Finally, on May 27 Ballot-Beaupré, the President of the Civil Chamber, announced that the Court had terminated its inquiry. It had gone into every phase of the affair with scrupulous exactness; its proceedings covered 1168 pages. The report of Beaupré recommended that the conviction of 1894 be set aside and that Dreyfus be given a new trial, basing its findings on the following facts:

- (1) The Henry forgery.
- (2) The date ascribed to the bordereau in 1894 was found to be false.
- (3) The contradictory testimony of the experts in the Dreyfus trial of 1894 and in the Esterhazy trial of 1898.
- (4) The identity of the paper of the bordereau with Esterhazy's stationery.
- (5) A letter of Esterhazy's stating that he had been to the maneuvers at the date indicated in the bordereau, and proof that Dreyfus did not go to the maneuvers that year.
- (6) A recent police report showing that Dreyfus did not gamble. He was accused on the charge of gambling in 1894, owing to confusion with relatives and others of the same name.
- (7) A telegram of 1894 proving that Dreyfus had no dealings with Panizzardi.
- (8) Documents proving that Dreyfus had never confessed.

Having received the report of Beaupré, the court retired for discussion and deliberation. While they were closeted in secret session, Commandant Marchand, the hero of Fashoda, arrived at Paris on June 1, and was received with tremendous enthusiasm by the Nationalists, who sought again to seize control of the government, and

to make him their "Caesar." Marchand, however, grasped the situation and quietly withdrew. On June 3 the Court of Cassation rendered its verdict. It set aside the conviction of the Paris court-martial of 1894 and ordered a new trial for Dreyfus at Rennes.

The decision infuriated the Nationalists. On the day after it was rendered President Loubet, attending the Auteuil Steeplechase races, was hit on the head with a loaded cane by a half-crazed Nationalist, Baron de Christian, while members of the Royalist society of the White Carnation stood by and uttered insulting cries. A few arrests were made, but the police, who had been warned that a demonstration was to be staged, had refused to take precautions, and deliberately closed their eyes to the situation. This negligence was promptly punished. On June 5 the Chamber passed an "ordre du jour" to make the government respected, and on June 6 the Senate passed a similar decree, the members of the Left uniting with those of the Right in both cases. Dupuy, with his political ear to the ground, saw that the public sentiment had veered in favor of Dreyfus, and immediately "shifted his gun" again. The cruiser La Sfax was ordered to return Dreyfus to France. Du Paty was indicted for having taken part in Henry's forgery. De Pellieux was charged with collusion with Esterhazy, and speedily summoned to trial, and a warrant was sworn out against Esterhazy, who was in England, for having stolen records from the War Office - a revival of the "veiled lady" affair. The ministry seemed frantic in its desire to placate the Republicans and Dreyfusards, and left no stone unturned to demonstrate its efficiency in the cause of the martyred officer. On June 11 Loubet, who had recovered from his injuries, appeared at the Longchamps races, and received a tremendous ovation. This time Dupuy had seen to it that he was properly protected - in fact the precautions taken were so exaggerated that as a result, the President was placed in

a ridiculous position. The police and military were drawn up all along the route of his journey, and in the evening they forcibly dispersed the crowds that gathered on the streets and acclaimed the Republic.

This bit of officiousness proved the undoing of the cabinet. The next day M. Vaillant, a Socialist deputy, called attention to the violence of the police against the citizens, and asked how much longer would the cries of "Vive la République!" be met with batons. Dupuy, as was his wont when hard-pressed, tried to avoid the issue, and asked for a vote of confidence. Instead of granting his request, a substitute measure was passed by a vote of 321 to 173 declaring that the Chamber would support none but a government which would maintain order by supporting Republican institutions. This was virtually a slap in the face of the cabinet, and it forthwith resigned to the intense relief of all parties. Dupuy had been the apologist for political inconsistency. His cabinet had been despised by all factions for its cajolery, deceit, and subterfuge.

With the resignation of the Dupuy ministry, the government was brought face to face with as serious a crisis as had confronted it since the inception of the "Affaire". The Nationalists, Clericals, and all the forces of reaction in Parliament and throughout the country at large, were gradually awakening to the fact that their power was on the wane. The movement that had started in favor of Dreyfus was rapidly assuming the proportions of a landslide, and the defeated reactionaries were making desperate efforts to stem its onrush. Parliament was in a state of general disorganization. Old party lines were being eradicated, and new criteria of differentiation between group and group were being formed. The university and the army were facing each other as deadly rivals, with the protagonists of either joining in the feud. The Military arrogated to itself the most haughty

airs, and officers such as General Hartschmidt, Colonel de Saxeé among others, were notorious in their astounding disregard for civil law.

Under such circumstances it was decidedly no easy matter to form a new cabinet. Poincaré was the first one delegated to attempt it, and he failed miserably. Waldeck-Rousseau ventured it next, but with no greater success. Bourgeois was hurriedly summoned from the Hague, where he was attending the sessions of the Peace Conference, and implored to try his hand at organizing a cabinet, but he, too, met with failure. Meanwhile the streets of Paris were given over to the hysteria of the Nationalists and Militarists, the confusion was daily mounting higher, and the Babel of insurgency was menacing with ugly bravado the foundations of French government. Loubet was at his wits' end. In desperation he again appealed to Waldeck-Rousseau, and impassionedly urged him to put forth his best efforts. Finally, on June 22, 1899, Rousseau succeeded in presenting an acceptable group for the approval of Parliament. The fearless and far-sighted Republican had with consummate diplomacy struck an alliance with all parties. He brought together in his cabinet such extreme opposites as General de Galliffet (War) an aristocratic soldier, famous for his share in the pitiless repression of the commune, and Millerand (Trade and Industry) who but recently had come to the fore as one of the leaders of the Socialist Party. Waldeck-Rousseau himself retained the Ministry of the Interior. His other nominees were Delcasse for Foreign Affairs, Lygues for Public Instruction, Monis for Justice, Jean Dupuy for Agriculture, de Lanessau for Marine, Decrais for Colonies, Caillaux for Finance, and Baudin for Public Works.

The new cabinet was at last one which set out with the openly expressed purpose of giving Dreyfus a just trial, and of making the

authority of government and law respected by all. Its very first acts gave gratifying assurance that it meant to stand by its guns. Generals Roget and Hartschmidt and Colonel de Saxe, the most obstreperous of the military agitators, were immediately deprived of their important commands, and assigned to routine duties in unimportant garrisons. Civil appointees to important positions were treated with similar firmness. The position of Procureur de la République at Paris and that of Procureur General, two of the most important posts in the French magistracy, were given to Bulot and Bernard, respectively, who were known to be men of fearless honesty. M. Blanc, a notorious Nationalist, was dismissed from the prefecture of the police department, and the appointment was given to M. Lepine, another trustworthy official. Similar drastic changes struck terror into the hearts of the Nationalists, and caused rejoicing among the Republicans that at last there had been formed a ministry which knew how to make the government respected.

On June 26, the cabinet met the Chamber and challenged a vote of confidence. The motion was greeted with an uproar of disapproval from the Nationalist section of the House. The Socialist delegates raved and stormed against Gallifet. Finally Brisson managed to make himself heard above the confusion, and succeeded in mounting the tribune. In an eloquent appeal he urged the Republicans to bury their animosities, and to unite in support of the Ministry. An order of the day, applauding the triumph of the government, was defeated by a vote of 271 to 248, but the vote of confidence called for by the cabinet was passed by a vote of 263 to 237 and subsequently was carried in the Senate by a vote of 185 to 25. This majority, though small, nevertheless signallized the vindication of the principles for which the cabinet stood. It meant that official France had thrown from its

* Brisson is alleged to have employed in his gestures certain signals of distress known to all Free-Masons.

eyes the scales placed on them by the military faction, and that at last Justice and Truth were coming into their own.

Waldeck-Rousseau, thus strengthened in his position, continued his campaign against the military leaders who had sent Dreyfus to his martyrdom, and whose underhand proceedings were causing such uneasiness in the Republic. General Zurlinden was removed from the Army of Paris, and Brugere was appointed in his place. General de Pellieux, now commandant of the city of Paris, was transferred to Quimper, and his place was given to General Dalstein. The boldest and most important stroke, however, of the prime minister, was the dismissal of General de Negrier, who had held an important seat at the Superior Council of War, and had been entrusted with several special missions. It was proved that he had ordered his colonels to tell their under-officers that the Superior Council of War was prepared to make the government respect the army as soon as the Dreyfus affair was finished.

And in the meantime, Alfred Dreyfus was nearing the shores of France.

CHAPTER X.

The Court-Martial at Rennes.*

On June 5, 1899, Dreyfus was informed of the annulment of his sentence and of the departure of the "Sfax" to return him to France. It was the first happiness the wretched man had known in nearly five years. His joy was "boundless, unutterable." Since the terrible moment of his degradation he had been completely cut off from all knowledge of the momentous occurrences in France, for his wife's letters had been subjected to the rigid scrutiny of the censor. Mentally he was still living in the days of '94 - of all that had happened since he was in utter ignorance. The perfidious machinations of his enemies and the heroic struggles of his protagonists were alike unknown to him. His faith in the honesty of the chiefs of the army was only equalled by his conviction that he had been the victim of a frightful error. He was convinced that it was simply this, nothing more - except, perhaps, that his religion had prejudiced the world against him.

On the 9th of June he was taken aboard the cruiser, and placed in a cabin especially prepared to receive him. Its windows were barred; an armed sentinel paced to and fro before the door. Throughout the entire voyage which occupied twenty-one days, his liberties were severely curtailed, and he was treated as an officer under arrest "de rigueur." Compared with his sufferings at Devil's Island, however, the treatment accorded him on the "Sfax" was consideration itself. So inured had he become to pain and hardship, that his stoic deportment elicited for him the admiration of the entire crew. "There is extraordinary energy in this man", was the verdict of the Captain of the "Sfax." "During twenty days he gave no sign of weakness."

* I am indebted to G.W. Steevens ("Things Seen") for much of the material in this chapter on the subject of the court-martial proper.

It was, of course, a matter of common knowledge in France that Dreyfus was returning, but the port of his arrival had been kept an absolute secret. There was a good deal of money spent by the newspapers to find out where he was to land. Boats of all descriptions had been hired and chartered to cruise about the coast in the hope of meeting the "Sfax" and getting a "scoop" of the news. Most of the journalists had concluded that Brest was the probable port of arrival, and there were gathered reporters from all over the world. No one seems to have thought of Quiberon, the actual landing place. Out of the multitude of pressmen watching all along the Breton coast and outside the naval ports, only two were at Quiberon : Emile Massard of the Nationalist-Clerical "Patrie", and Arthur Lynch, an English journalist. Massard had by some occult means gotten to know the secret, and he sold it to the correspondent of an American paper for a thousand francs. The American finally tired of waiting for the cruiser to appear, and retained Lynch to cover the story for him.

On July 1st, at half past one in the morning, in a terrific storm of wind and rain, Dreyfus was stealthily landed. The two waiting journalists were disappointed in their efforts to approach him. He was hurried to a carriage surrounded by a detachment of infantry with fixed bayonets, and driven to the railway station between two ranks of soldiers. After a journey of three hours, during which no word was addressed to him, he was again placed in a carriage and swiftly driven to the military prison at Rennes, arriving there at six o'clock in the morning.

From July 1st, the date of his return, until August 7th, the date of the opening of his trial, he was permitted to see his wife and relatives, consult with his attorneys, Demange and Labori, and familiarize himself with the momentous events that had transpired since his deportation. Thousands of messages were delivered to him

from sympathizers all over the world. Days and nights were devoted to studying the testimony of the Esterhazy and Zola trials. The strain and excitement were so intense that he succumbed to a fever which left him in an even more weakened condition. Artificial stimulants had to be administered to enable him to undergo the ordeal of the court-martial.

The trial was begun on August 7th. It was held at the Lycée, in a large room which usually served as a concert or lecture-hall. The jury consisted of seven men - six of them were artillery officers, the president, Colonel Jouaust, a little old gentleman, was an army engineer. The scene was one of animation and splendor. There were the black, red-faced uniforms of the artillery, the sombre, fur-trimmed robes of the prosecuting commissaries, generals with crimson, gold-brimmed képis, wearing ribbons and stars on their breasts, civilians in all the elaborateness of French dress, the silks and feathers of the women reporters, and sprinkled everywhere were the blue and white uniforms of the gendarmes, with sword and revolver. Along the rear of the hall twinkled the red and blue steel of a detachment of infantry with fixed bayonets. "It might have been taken for a political meeting", said an eye-witness, "for an assault at arms, or a fancy dress-ball - for anything except a trial."

The first entrance of Dreyfus into the room caused a thrill as of an apparition of one risen from the dead. Every eye was fixed upon him as he made his appearance - erect, calm, a precise martial figure in a smart uniform. He walked like an automaton. His face was like clay. His eyes were invisible behind his glasses. His white hair spoke eloquently of the inferno he had endured.

He saluted and took his seat.

Colonel Jouaust broke the tenseness of the silence.

"Accused, stand up."

Dreyfus rose and stood rigid before the president. His whole at-

titude was one of strength and determination.

"You are accused" began the president " of the crime of treason in having delivered to the agent of a foreign power documents enumerated in a document called the bordereau. The law gives you the right to say all that is useful for your defense, and I warn your defenders that they must express themselves with decency and moderation."

Jouaust read the bordereau to him and continued:

"This document has already been brought before you. Do you acknowledge it?"

The accused officer was handed the bordereau. Holding it in one hand, he raised aloft the other and said:

"It was brought before me in 1894. As for acknowledging it, I affirm that I do not. I affirm again that I am innocent, as I have already affirmed in 1894. I have borne all for five years, Colonel. I bore all for the honor of my name and my children. I am innocent, Colonel."

"Then you deny the charge?"

"Yes, Colonel", was the prompt reply. The trial had begun.

The whole appearance and demeanor of the Jewish officer during the early days of the trial was one that tended to alienate, rather than to evoke the sympathy of the audience. His voice, when he spoke, was dry and unemotional. His bearing was stiff and formal. It was said that he looked more like a German officer than a French. His denials - and he denied everything - were emphatic but without emotion. But as the days wore on and the trial progressed, as he became more at ease in his surroundings, his whole self seemed to undergo a miraculous re-creation. He found poise and assurance - he became a new Dreyfus; a man with a soul, instead of a mere mechanical body. His voice was still harsh, but it was more sonorous and vibrating. The frigidness of his early appearance thawed and disappeared - he moved with amazing elas-

ticity, leaped to his feet, and spoke promptly when called upon, and in a full voice. From a sheer protesting mechanism he became a man of logic - he balanced probabilities and weighed possibilities. He seemed at times to be the only man in the case who had the clear head to appreciate the evidence at its just value. Assuredly he proved himself no common man.

It is incredible, but it is absolutely true, that the first four days of the public trial yielded not one rag of first-hand evidence either for Dreyfus or against him. In that time eleven witnesses testified - one ex-president, four ex-ministers of war, three other ex-ministers, a diplomat, a general, the widow of Henry - and they all testified simply about themselves. Hours were spent in repeating at second and at third hand the evidence of witnesses who in a day or two were to be heard themselves. It seemed no part of Jouaust's business to guide the inquiry - if he wished for information on any point, he had to wait half a day for it, until the witness had exhausted the subject of his past life and opinions, and in the logical sequence of his narrative, had come to the subject inquired about.

Outside the court-room, party passion was at its height. Gangsters in the employ of Drumont and the Nationalists were posted about the courthouse to hoot and attack the Dreyfusards. The country itself was split into two opposing factions. On one side was a vast majority consisting of the Clericals, the Nationalists, and Jingoists, the anti-Semites, and the unreflecting mass of the population. On the other were ranged the Intellectuals, the Socialists, the Jews, and the few French Protestants. The "League of the Rights of Man" stood opposed to the "Association of the Patrie Française".

During the progress of the trial, the government was being attacked in Paris. Every day witnessed the occurrence of a riot or anti-Semitic demonstration. The police had been won over to the cause of the

Nationalists and anti-Semites, and the authorities seemed helpless in their attempts to cope with the situation. At length, after a serious conflict between the prefect and the police (August 26-27), the former realized that the opposition was organized, and he determined on a thorough investigation. He discovered that Déroulède, Buffet, Habert, and other Royalist leaders, had again conspired to seize the reins of the government. He promptly arrested Déroulède and others of the ring-leaders. Jules Guérin, one of the noisiest leaders of the anti-Semites, with fourteen companions barricaded a house in the Rue de Chabrol, and defied the authorities to capture him. The grotesque incident of the "Fort Chabrol" was among the most extraordinary episodes of this prolonged conflict between the government and the disciples of disorder. For thirty-seven days the whole Parisian police force was held at bay by this handful of noisy boasters, who insulted the authorities, and fired revolvers at all who approached them. The street "Rue de Chabrol" was subjected to a regular siege, and for several weeks remained cut off from the rest of Paris. Only after the drains had been stopped and the food supply cut off, did Guérin and his band surrender.

As usually happened, the epidemic of disorder and violence spread to Algiers. On September 21, Max Régis, with an organized band of roughs, looted the Jewish quarter and committed the most villainous

* Guérin was an adventurous journalist, once so destitute in Paris that he worked as a "deburdeur" or docker on quays, loading and unloading river barges and canal boats. Eventually, receiving some money, he founded an anti-Semitic paper, the offices of which were located in the Rue de Chabrol. These offices were the "fort".

† It is of significance that during the Rennes trial the Cardinal of Paris demanded that the authorities give in to Guérin.

‡ Déroulède and Buffet were subsequently condemned to banishment for ten years, and Guérin to imprisonment for the same term. Habert and the Count de Lur Saluces, who had taken flight, gave themselves up later, and were condemned in 1900 and 1901 respectively, amid a public indifference which was far from their liking.

outrages. Pursued by the authorities, he took refuge in his villa, patterning the example of Guerin, barricaded it, and resisted arrest. He managed to escape from it unseen, and fled to avoid a warrant that had been sworn out charging him with murder and treason.

These are but a few of the stormy incidents of that turbulent period, but they are sufficient to demonstrate the tremendous and deep-seated agitation that stirred the country. The government seemed too paralyzed to act, too panic-stricken to cope with the situation. It lived in momentary fear of a coup d'etat; each day it expected the issuance of a pronunciamiento by the army. On the ground that the flocks in the center and south of France were suffering from serious epidemics, it was decided (September 2) that autumn maneuvers would not take place. No one was deceived by the alleged reason. The government wished to avoid every opportunity of mobilizing troops, or of coming in contact with them. The Rennes trial, like the sword of Damocles, menaced the life of the entire nation. The Jewish captain had lost his personality in the maelstrom of the social conflict that thundered and seethed and threatened to overwhelm.

But to return to the court-martial.

As the days passed, and as witness after witness delivered interminable harangues - that were seriously admitted as evidence - the accusers went uncontradicted, and Dreyfus seemed hopelessly in the toils. It was not evidence; it was not first-hand; it was not new. But the judges, with this perpetual stream of accusation washing over them, coming, for the most part from their own superior officers, seemed cowed. They appeared earnest and conscientious, took notes, asked questions, and listened with fixity, but behind their masks there darted out now and then a glance that bespoke fear, rather than respect, for the uniforms that confronted them. The members of the General

Staff appeared in all their ornate trappings to interrupt the trial, and to bull-doze the court with mysterious hints of war with Germany. Day passed day, general came after general and discoursed for hours, and the mystery grew only denser and denser.

On September 3rd, a French journalist galloped into court with the screech: "Labori is shot!" and Labori was lying on the canal bank with a bullet in his back.^{*} He had been shot from behind; letters, including a threatening missive received the day before, had been taken from his pocket. It was said that his assailant had tried to wrest from him the portfolio containing his notes for the cross-examination of Mercier, scheduled to take place that morning. The culprit made good his escape. Rennes went mad. Jews wept. Newspaper sellers volleyed "Long live the army" or "Down with the tonsure", and hundreds came out on the streets to watch them do it. At every street-corner somebody was calling somebody on the other side an assassin.

Without Labori, the case was dull and grew daily duller. Esterhazy, who had been granted a safe-conduct to come to France from England, deposed a great mass of lying testimony, which was promptly declared inadmissible. It was known that he had confessed (June 2, 1899) to the "Times" and "Daily Chronicle" in London that he had written the bordereau[‡] - "by order of Colonel Sandherr", he said. Mercier's evidence was a mere dishing up of anti-Dreyfus gossip, which had convinced him of the guilt of Dreyfus. He admitted the communication of the secret dossier to the Court-martial of 1894, and asserted with bravado that he would do the same thing over again if necessary. A scene occurred between him and Dreyfus in court one day. During one of the ex-war minister's many harangues, he turned on the prisoner,

* The anti-Semitic and Nationalist papers attempted to make light of the shooting of Labori, and at length affected to believe that the attack had been an imaginary one, and that the pistol had been loaded with a bread-pellet.

‡ The story of Esterhazy's relations with Schwarzkoppen was told

looked him full in the face, and said in a measured monotone:

"If I had the least doubt that Dreyfus was guilty I should be the first to say that I was honestly mistaken."

A yell ripped the sleepy hall in twain! Dreyfus was up, eyes blazing, head thrust fiercely forward, fist flung out.

"You should say that!" were the words he screamed, but the tone in which he uttered them, the frenzied anguish of his voice, the indescribable suffering on his face - - it is futile to wrestle with description.

Picquart alone gave an absolutely clear exposition of facts. His testimony was more than mere evidence - it was a speech for the defense, and a masterly one. The judges hated him. He was younger than any of them, yet senior in rank to six out of the seven, and they showed their hostility in their glances, their yawning when he began to speak. Nevertheless after he had spoken for two hours he had more than swept away the opposition, and brought the case on the level again.

The foreign embassies had been scrupulously kept out of the case, but the German emperor William gave official announcement of his position in the matter. Two days before the Rennes verdict, he caused to be published in the most official part of the official journal "The Reichsanzeiger", a formal repetition and amplification of Herr von Bülow's statement in the Reichstag to the effect that neither directly nor indirectly had Germany had any relations with Dreyfus.

Major Carrière, the Government Commissar, concluded the case for the prosecution by a speech in which he deplored the fact that the

in a letter signed "Un Diplomate" and addressed from Berne on March 25, 1898 to "Le Siècle". It is generally believed that the real author of this letter was Panizzardi, the accredited Italian military attaché to Paris, Brussels, and Berne. It was certainly inspired by him. One of the many revelations of this document was a statement by Schwarzkoppen that up to the time he left Paris, he had received at least 162 communications from Esterhazy, for which he had paid approximately 80,000 francs.

evidence against Dreyfus had forced him, unwillingly to ask for his conviction. His address was not in any way remarkable for its brilliancy, and when he stated on "his soul, on his conscience, on his honor, that Dreyfus was guilty", the judges looked grave, but the audience only tittered.

Of Dreyfus' two attorneys, only Demange addressed the jury in the summing up, although Labori had recovered from his injury sufficiently to be present in court. Demange made an effective and eloquent plea. Then the president, Colonel Jouaust, asked the prisoner if he had anything to say.

Struggling to control his voice, Captain Dreyfus said:

"I have only one thing to say. It is very simple and absolutely certain. I declare before my country and before the army that I am innocent. My sole object is to save the honor of my name, the name my children bear. For five years I have suffered the most frightful tortures, and I am sure that I shall attain my object today, thanks to your loyalty and your justice."

"Have you finished?" demanded Colonel Jouaust.

"Yes, M. le President", was the reply.

"The trial is at an end."

At 4:40 P.M. after an hour's deliberation, the judges returned to the court-room.

"Present arms!" came an order from somewhere.

Dreyfus rose, trembling, to receive the verdict of the court.

"The judgement of the court-martial is that the prisoner, by five votes to two, is found guilty of having in 1894 conspired and combined with a foreign power, or one of its agents, with the object of inducing it to commit hostilities or to undertake war against France or of procuring it the means of doing so by delivering to it the notes and documents enumerated in the bordereau. The court-martial by a majority

finds that there are extenuating circumstances."

The sentence that was pronounced was imprisonment for ten years.

CHAPTER XI.

The Results of the Dreyfus Affair.

The verdict of the Rennes court-martial, received by a world eagerly hanging on the result of the sensational trial, provoked universal indignation and astonishment. Apparently the innocence of Dreyfus was evident to everybody except to the French Nationalists and anti-Semites. The jury's report that there were extenuating circumstances - a compromise with expediency and honor - was interpreted as an insult, a mockery, and a confession of guilty conscience. French reaction alone had triumphed; Nationalism and Clericalism, anti-Semitism and Royalism, had gained the day.

The publication of the verdict was the signal for uproarious turbulence in Paris and in other French cities. Crowds thronged the streets shouting "Vive l'Armée!" and "A bas les Juifs!"; stones were thrown at the houses of Jacques Dreyfus and prominent Jews, breaking windows and inflicting other damage to property. Other countries, however, registered quite a different reaction to the verdict. In London a mass-meeting of more than 50,000 people was held in Hyde Park on September 17 to express English sympathy for Dreyfus. In Budapest an angry mob assaulted the French consulate, and was only dispersed by the police. In Naples, Italy, troops had to be called out to protect the French Consulate after the verdict was announced. Three thousand people gathered in the Galleria Umberto in the center of the city; a band played the "Marseillaise", and the crowd yelled "Viva Dreyfus" as it marched through the principal streets to the French Embassy, where after a great demonstration, it was dispersed by the troops. A similar occurrence took place in Milan. It is of significance that the Jesuit organ in Rome, which by an amusing paradox bears the name "Voce della Verità", was the only Italian paper that did not protest against the Rennes decision.

In America the resentment was profound. Crowds stood outside newspaper offices in almost every city and town, eagerly waiting for the announcement of the result. When it appeared, it was greeted on all sides with expressions of grief and dismay. The government offices at Washington virtually suspended business to discuss the gravity of the situation and its critical implications. Mass meetings of protest were held immediately in New York and Louisville; others were set in motion all over the country. The Merchants' Exchange in St. Louis and Kansas City voted to boycott French products, and the forthcoming Paris Exhibition until the revocation of the verdict. Popular indignation spent itself in acts of unmistakable hostility* - in Indianapolis the French flag was publicly burned while thousands stood by and applauded; in a New York theatre an actor impersonating a French officer was hissed off the boards, and prolonged cheers for Dreyfus shook the house. Senators and Congressmen were besieged with thousands of telegrams, letters, and personal solicitations urging them to vote for motions that had been made in both houses of Congress to boycott the Paris International Exposition of 1900. Scores of American firms, as well as thousands of business houses in England, Belgium, Italy, Austria, Hungary, and in centers of trade all over the world gave notice of withdrawal of their intended exhibits from the Exposition, by way of demonstrating their contempt of France and their sympathy for Dreyfus. As a result, the Exposition, held the following year, was far from attaining the magnificence that had been predicted for it by its sponsors, despite the subsequent developments in the "Affaire". The

* Hundreds of Frenchmen in America were discriminated against as a result of this hysteria. Mr. D.B. Wright, a Chicago contractor, visited his employes all over the city, and discharged all the Frenchmen - six - that were in his employ. He declared that he would never again hire a Frenchman.

King of Sweden and the Shah of Persia were the only ones whom France could find willing to accept her hospitality as guests at the Exposition.

Dreyfus signed a request for a new trial the day after the sentence was passed upon him. His one hope lay in the possibility of bringing his case once more before the Court of Cassation, which had been instrumental in securing the Rennes trial for him. Three days later, on September 12, his brother Matthew visited him privately in his cell, and informed him that the Minister of War would grant him a pardon provided he withdraw his demand for revision. After considerable deliberation, he decided to accept the Minister's offer. His own weakened health - the thought of his wife and children, and the entreaties of his friends and supporters, had much to do with his decision. On September 19 he was formally released. Th very same day he issued the following statement:

"The Government of the Republic gives me back my liberty. It is nothing to me without honor. Beginning with today I shall unremittingly strive for the reparation of the frightful judicial error of which I am still the victim.

I want all France to know by a final judgment that I am innocent. My heart will never be satisfied while there is a single Frenchman who imputes to me the abominable crime which another committed."

Immediately upon his release, Dreyfus went to Carpentras and then to Geneva with his family, to escape notoriety and regain his strength. Eventually he returned to Paris where he established a residence, and continued in a quiet, undemonstrative way, to secure his vindication.

There yet remained several court actions to be settled before the state assumed normalcy. Of these the most significant was the trial of the leaders of the conspiracy against the Republic. On January 4, 1900, after forty-seven sittings, the Senate, sitting as a High Court

of Justice, sentenced Paul Deroulede (Nationalist) and Andre Buffet (Orleanist) to ten years banishment, and Jules Guérin (anti-Semite) was given ten years imprisonment. On February 23, Marcel Habert, another of the notorious agitators, was found guilty and sentenced to banishment for five years. There remained several minor suits: that of Mme. Henry against Joseph Reinach for libel; the cases of the state against Zola and against Meroier (who had been indicted before Rennes), and several others.

Before these could come up for trial, Waldeck-Rousseau determined to squash them, and end the odium and ill-feeling that continued reference to the "Affaire" was bringing to the country. Accordingly, he laid before Parliament a general amnesty bill, consisting of a single paragraph, viz, "All public actions concerning matters connected with the Dreyfus Affair are extinguished." Captain Dreyfus' most ardent defenders, Picquart, Zola, and Reinach, at once addressed protests against the bill, and requested to be heard. The opponents of redress were even more vigorous, pretending that the Government was attempting to screen Dreyfus and his friends, and was surreptitiously endeavoring to revise the sentences imposed by the Councils of War at Paris and Rennes. At length Waldeck-Rousseau mounted the tribune to repeat once more the arguments by which he had already supported the bill, and declared that the Dreyfus Affair was the "hog-wash necessary to keep Nationalism alive." Finally, after continued obstruction and extreme violence had prolonged the discussion until the early hours of the morning (December 19, 1900), the longest session of recent Parliamentary annals in France, the bill was forced through the weary Chamber at three o'clock. The amnesty as adopted included :

(1) All offences against the press, public meetings, and association laws.

- (2) All acts connected with strikes and labor disputes.
- (3) The incendiarism of the church of St. Joseph.
- (4) The deserters, and offenders against martial law.

A few days later the measure passed the Seateⁿ, and was subsequently made to apply to Algiers. About the same time the Chamber passed an "ordre du jour" prohibiting all attempts to reopen the case. At this, Dreyfus addressed a letter to the President of the Amnesty Committee in which he protested against being deprived of the right to vindicate his character.

Colonel Picquart had been exonerated even before the passage of the Amnesty Bill from the charges that had been pending against him. It will be recalled that his name had been stricken from the army lists after the Zola trial. By the provisions of the new law, however, he was reinstated, but he refused to avail himself of the privilege, and angered at the flabby policy of the government, resigned from the army. The valiant Alsatian Senator, Scheurer-Kestner, died before the last mutterings of the storm were over. As for Zola, he had returned to Paris and had reiterated his assurances of the innocence of Dreyfus. "La vérité est en marche, et rien ne l'arrêtera", was his sanguine comment after Rennes. On January 12, 1900, he was presented with a gold medal weighing four pounds as a testimonial of his services in the cause of Truth and Justice in the Dreyfus case. On September 29, 1902, he was found dead in his room in Paris. It is thought that he was suffocated by the fumes of a charcoal stove which was burning in the room. Labori became a continental celebrity, and was cordially entertained in England by the Hardwicke Society, by many distinguished members of the English Bench and Bar.

* * * *

* "Truth is afoot, nothing can stop her."

The "Dreyfus Affaire", apart from the momentous moral instruction it afforded France and the world at large, was directly responsible for at least three permanent and important changes in the social and political life of the Republic: (1) The separation of Church and State; (2) Army reforms, and (3) changes in political organization.

In the fall of 1900, Waldeck-Rousseau said at Toulouse in a public address that the self-imposed task of his cabinet was (1) the defense of Republican institutions, and (2) the passing of laws necessary for the definite organization of the Republic. He maintained that insofar as the fulfilment of that program at the time of its conception was primarily challenged by the Dreyfus case, that matter had had to receive primary attention. Now he felt that the next move should logically be directed against that power within the state that threatened to overshadow the Republican institutions, and had for years been the stumbling-block in the path of all progress - namely, the power of Clericalism. Its insidiousness had been clearly revealed in the persecution - even though officially unacknowledged - of the Jewish Captain. The next act of the Republican Government must be to repress the pretensions of all the Clerical associations, with all their branches and subsidiaries, and dependencies and ramifications.

Accordingly, early in October 1899 he decided to begin his campaign by loosening the grip of the Catholics on public affairs and public officials. To this end he introduced a bill into the Chamber recommending that all who aspired to positions of public service, be compelled to take a three year course in free State Colleges and Training Schools to be established by the Government. The proposal was at once shouted down by the Catholics, who objected to it as interfering with parental authority and liberty. The "Assumptionist Fathers" in particular - that aggregation of contemptible parasites who made capital of the superstition and ignorance in France - rebelled against

the measure, and sought to spread their propaganda in "La Croix". The reply of the Government was to prosecute them for belonging to an unauthorized community (November 3, 1899)². The arch-bishop of Aix and half a dozen other bishops who addressed letters of sympathy to the Assumptionists had their stipends promptly suspended.

The next step of the Prime Minister was to present to Parliament a bill to regulate the organization and control of religious bodies. He had conducted a painstaking and exhaustive investigation into Clerical activities, and he laid before his colleagues his astounding findings regarding their sinister influence. All the enemies of the Government rallied around the threatened orders, but to no avail. The Associations Bill passed the Chamber by a vote of 313 to 149, and the Senate by a vote of 173 to 99, and became law on June 28, 1901.

From that momentous day, it was but a natural and inevitable result that the Republic should throw off completely the yoke of the church. The activity of the Catholic leaders and of the Catholic clergy in the cause of anti-Semitism and reaction had discredited the church in the eyes of all fair-minded men. Its pernicious power in politics, in business, in education, in the army, in the press - in every aspect of the social life of the country, had gained for it universal opprobrium. The Gordian knot was cut at last, and France freed herself from "the men in black." The latent conflict with Rome came to a head in 1904, when the French ambassador to the Vatican was recalled. Finally, on July 4, 1906, after a debate lasting forty-eight days and nights, the bill providing for the disestablishment of Church

* Pope Leo XIII, more prudent than the bellicose bishops of the south, ordered the Assumptionist Fathers to cease publishing "La Croix" and devote themselves exclusively to works of charity. The editorship and ownership of the paper was therefore nominally changed, but its policy remained the same.

²The trial of the Assumptionists lasted over three days and resulted (January 24, 1900) in an extremely mild punishment: a fine of 16 francs and an order to dissolve the community. In view of the subsequent bill affecting all orders, the penalty was not carried out.

and State was passed by a vote of 341 to 233.

It is scarcely possible to overrate the advantages that accrued to the Republic as a result of this decisive stroke, directly induced by the Dreyfus Affair. One inestimable gain is the added zeal and earnestness of the French Priesthood. The mercenary elements have dropped away from the profession; newer culture and higher education has been made possible for its members. Clericalism in politics is a thing of the past. The church has lost its grip on the state - it no longer leads the state or has any official position in it, as shown by the repeated defeats of clerical candidates.

Again, with the cessation of Clerical interference in education, a great impetus was given to learning. An atmosphere of scientific enthusiasm has been created in France; chairs of higher learning have been endowed by municipalities. The Sorbonne and Collège de France have taken on new life and made new departures in curriculum and method. Education is no longer an adjunct of the Priesthood; not bishops and pastors, but educators, control education. The spirit of education, too, has changed. No longer is the mind stored with abstract formulae and traditional ideas - a continuance of the neo-monastic ideal - nor with a gloomy theory of penitential education. The newer pedagogy proceeds along the lines of the free and cheerful development of the mind, along the paths of experience, reason, and common sense. All this has come to pass at the expense of the martyrdom of the Jewish Captain, but is not the way of progress always strewn with human wreckage?

* * *

And a second direct outgrowth of the Dreyfus Affair was the reorganization of the army. Directly after the pardon of the Jewish officer, three generals (Langlois, Herve, and Giovanelli) who had been notorious in their intrigue with the Clericals, were retired. The

Superior Council of War was reorganized, and the Minister of War resumed the right - abdicated by de Freycinet(sc. note p.116) - to nominate officers for important commands. Discrimination against Jewish officers was severely discountenanced - at least officially. Several officers of the military school at Fontainebleau were punished for refusing to hold social intercourse with a Jewish officer who was appointed an instructor at the school. Changes in the magistrature of the military schools were made, and progressive Republicans took the places of reactionary Clericals. Appointments were made on the basis of merit, and it no longer was necessary to distinguish oneself in religious offices to secure promotion. The term of compulsory military service was reduced from three years to two. The army was "Republicanized", and swept clean of Clerical insidiousness. The personnel of the courts-martial was changed, and non-military judges were included in their composition, to modify their character and guard against a repetition of the collusion that caused the martyrdom of Dreyfus. The ruling that an officer must marry into a family that would provide a dowry with the daughter was abolished, and other measures were taken to break down the rigid hauteur of the military caste. From an intimate aristocratic ally of reaction, the army was converted into a democratic, loyal servant of the Republic, without the narrow, bigoted prejudices that had stamped its character during the years of Clerical supremacy.

* * *

And finally, with the discrediting of Clericalism and the forces of reaction, came the ascendancy of Republicanism and the forces of liberalism. Only for a few months after the verdict at Rennes did the Nationalists show majorities in the municipal elections. The gradual waning of the excitement that followed the stormy days of the Court-Martial, found the country rapidly convalescing from its extreme

hysteria. By degrees the magistrates that had displayed their courage and independence in the discussion of the Dreyfus affair, were elevated to important positions. The elections of January 28, 1900 were a triumph for the Government, despite the venom of the Nationalists and of the anti-Semitic press. The popularity of President Loubet grew tremendously, until it reached unprecedented magnitude.

Moreover the Dreyfus affair succeeded in effacing old party lines which had outlived their usefulness, and in facilitating a new grouping of parties. The differences between reactionaries and progressives had been sharply drawn in the course of the conflict, and it was along these lines that natural divisions arose. The conflict over the disestablishment of the church and state served to bring out into fuller relief these differences, and the increased hostility to Clericalism that came as the aftermath of the "Affaire" was generated primarily in the radical groups.

The Dreyfus case was a godsend to Socialism. Jaures had early in the struggle aligned his party on the side of the Jewish captain, and in his ultimate victory the Socialist Party had profited greatly. To the Dreyfusist coalition of Socialists, Radicals, and Moderate Republicans the term "Bloc", coined by Clemenceau (several years before in a different connection) was ultimately applied. This "Bloc", with many gradual changes, is still in power at present.

With the passing of time - and of Clericalism - the sanity of the French mind reasserted itself, and an apologetic France confessed its awful crime against the martyred Jew. On July 12, 1906 the Court of Cassation finally annulled the verdict of Rennes, proclaimed Dreyfus innocent of all the charges that had been made against him, and rehabilitated him without a new court-martial. When Dreyfus was informed of the action of the court, he was beside himself with joy. For a moment he could not speak - the swiftly changing color and expression

of his face told volumes of the inferno he was reliving in that moment. At last he found his voice .. husky .. dry .. broken ..

"The ordeal", he said, "has been long and severe. It has, above all, been long.... I am now at the end of my suffering. My honor is restored."

He was restored to the rank of Major*, and the Government was called upon to nominate him to the Legion of Honor. On July 21, in the vast court-yard of the Ecole Militaire, the scene of his degradation, Major Dreyfus was presented by General Gillain with the insignia of the Chevalier of the Legion of Honor. As the regulation double tap of the sword fell on the shoulder of the Jewish officer, and the General advanced to bestow the customary kiss of congratulation, cries of "Vive la Justice" rent the air, once filled with curses of "Death to the Traitor!" and "Kill the Jew!" The military band took up the "Marseillaise", and as the troops filed before him, who shall attempt to describe the thousand conflicting emotions that choked his throat and dimmed his eye!

On the same day that the Court of Cassation proclaimed the innocence of Dreyfus, the Senate voted to place in its gallery busts of Trarieux and of Scheurer-Kestner. Subsequently the Chamber, unwilling to be outdone in making reparation, voted to erect a bust of Zola in the Pantheon. On July 14 a law was passed reinstating Picquart in the army with the rank of Brigadier-General.[‡] A few weeks later he was made Major-General, and subsequently he served as Minister of War in Clemenceau's Cabinet.

*General Mercier made one last desperate effort in 1906 to prevent Dreyfus from clearing his name. Some of the Nationalists likewise raised a howl when the motion of July 13 to reinstate Dreyfus and Picquart was discussed in the Chamber. Pugliesi-Conti, a Nationalist, accused the Government of cowardice, whereupon M. Albert Savint, Under-Secretary of the Interior, struck him. In the duel that followed, Savint was hurt.

‡ In July 1906 Picquart doubted Gonse's word concerning a phase of the "Affaire", and a duel took place. Gonse missed - Picquart preserved his fire.

There remains but one more incident to record in the history of this eventful drama. On July 4, 1908, during the ceremony of transferring the remains of Zola from Montmartre cemetery to the Pantheon - for France had resolved to accord him that honor - Dreyfus was fired at by Louis A. Gregory, a Nationalist journalist on the staff of the "Presse Militaire" and the "Gaulois." Luckily for the Jewish officer, the shot of the would-be assassin was poorly aimed, and inflicted only a painful wrist-wound. Gregory was captured on the spot. He boasted of his feat, and declared that as the representative of the French Military Press he desired to avenge the insult inflicted on the army by the Government in obliging it to take part in a ceremony in honor of Zola, the author of "Débâcle."

His trial, on September 11 and 12, was made the occasion of an attempt to revive the Dreyfus affair. His attorney tried to confuse the Court with the dilemma : "If Gregory fired on Dreyfus believing him to be innocent, he is a madman, and you cannot hold him responsible. But if he fired on Dreyfus because he thought him guilty and unjustly acquitted, you ought to give him every facility for saying why he formed this opinion." The judge, however, declined to accept this reasoning, and held the witnesses steadily to the point. Gregory, who was a man of schooling, delivered a very skilful speech to the jury, in which he contended that he had acted for thousands of Parisians and Frenchmen in what he had done. He re-hashed much of the false testimony of the Dreyfus trials, and so cleverly appealed to the jury, that he was acquitted, and set free.

Which only goes to show that the only place where the Jew can find justice is in ----- the dictionary.

Finis.

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