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AN EXPOSTITION AND EVALUATION OF THE DIALOGUE OF MARTIN BUBER

BY

Herbert H. Rose

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Master of
Hebrew Letters Degree and Ordination.

Hebrew Union College-
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Outline of the Exposition and Evaluation of the Dialogue of Martin Buber

The purpose of this thesis is to provide an understanding of the sources of Martin Buber's philosophy, as well as a presentation and evaluation of his contribution to religous thought. The thesis commences with a short biography. An attempt is made to show how his training in both Judaism and wetsern culture enabled him to grapple with the problem of interpreting the Dialogic Relationship meaningfully to his generation. We also discover how his own fate is intimately bound up with the destiny of his people.

The four major influences reflected in Buber's philosophy are: Existentialism, Judaism, Mysticism, and those forces leading to the automatonization of man. Existentialism is chiefly responsible for his anti-intellectualism and rejection of abstract systematic thinking. It also directed him to emphasize concrete experience and history. Judaism provided him with a set of guiding principles concerning the question of the nature of man and his relationship to God. He used these criteria to distinguish his position from the Christian existentialists. By nature a mystic, he struggled to clarify his position of Encounter, from that of the traditional mystic approach of Absorption. Throughout his philosophy we note that he underlines the Personal. This is a reaction to the eliminating of this element in contemporary society.

In the next chapter is presented his theoretical justification of Dialogue. He turns to anthropology, embryology, and child psychology, in order to make his position cogent. He defends it against the attacks of Sartre, Jung, Heiddeger, and others. From the theoretical he moves to the concrete reality of Jewish History. I distinguish four periods in his treatment of his people's saga. They are: the Biblical; Pharisaic; Hasidic; and Zionistic. In each he shows how Judaism resisted the challenge to falsify or compromize the true Dialogic situation.

In the final chapter I have attempted a brief evaluation of his thought. I find that his analysis of Dialogue is crucial to modern Judaism. However, his anti-intellectualism is a very dangerous element which strikes at the very heart of our faith.

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A SECRT BIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN BUBER

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, man looked optimistically to the immanent arrival of the millenium. There were some prophets of doom such as Nietche and Dostoievsky who predicted the collapse of Western civilization, but their voices were lost beneath the chorus of those who proclaimed the age of the new technocracy which was to usher in heaven on earth. Into this atmosphere of hope Martin Buber was born in the year 1878.

His parents were not destined to play any role in his upbringing. When they were divorced in 1881, he was sent to the home of his grandparents in Lemburg. There his grandfather, Solomon Buber, who wore the twin crowns of scholarship and wealth, directed his interests along the lines of Jewish scholarship. Buber was fed a rich diet of Jewish culture and became at a young age a master of Bible and Midrash. His grandfather edited anthologies of Midrashim and Buber spoke of him as, "the last master of the old Haskalah."[1.]

In the early period of his life Buber encountered Hasidism. He was accustomed to spending the summer months at Sadagora and Czortkow, which were seats of famous Zaddikim, Hasidic teachers. He did not encounter there, however, the virile Hasidism of bygone days; rather he met a movement which was already in its decline. The people were devoted to their Zaddikim and to the memory of a once glorious doctrine.

Buber studied philosophy and history from 1896 to 1900 at the universities of Vienna, Leipzig, Berlin, and Zurich. The most prominent of his teachers were Dilthey, professor of philosophy of history at Berlin, and Simmel, professor of economics at the same university.

In 1899 Buber met Paula Winkler, a non-Jewess whom he later married. This beautiful and sensitive woman wrote in her own right under a pseudonym; she possessed some literary ability. Their marriage proved to be extremely happy as she shared with him his Zionism and spiritual idealism.

After having served as secretary of the Zionist party under Herzl, Buber broke with them 1901 over the issue of political Zionism. Herzl fought to obtain a political state by means of direct negotiation with relevant political governments. Buber, on the other hand, associated himself

with that group which placed emphasis on establishing good relations between Arabs and Jews and developing the land gradually. This latter attitude was called practical Zionism in contradistinction to political Zionism. It is of prime importance to note that for Buber Zionism was no mere political movement, but meant liberation of the inner spirit of the Jew. Buber said, "Zionism is not a political aim. Zionism is life."[2.]

In 1901 he became head of the Judischler Verlag, a publication society for Jewish books of general interest. As head of the Judischler Verlag he propunded the ideals of Hasidism. Buber retired from all public life in 1906 and devoted himself to the examination of folk literature and oriental mysticism. He came out of retirement in 1909 when a youth group called the Bar Kochba society reacted enthusiastically to his lectures. Through this experience he found that his ideas were able to stir the imagination of the youth. Between the years 1909 and 1913, Buber developed his conception of "yichud," the oneness of all experience. It first received form in his work called Ecstatic Confessions, and reached full development in his volume, Daniel.

From 1916 to 1924 he edited Der Jude, which he himself founded. Its principal purpose was the exposition and clarification of the conflict between political and cultural Zionism. Buber ended its existence because he felt that this

problem was not clearly understood by the public. But during its lifetime this publication was one of the leading organs of German-speaking Jewry.[3]

In the spring of 1925 a publisher by the name of Lambert suggested to Buber the idea of a new translation of the Bible. Buber made his acceptance contingent upon the collaboration of Franz Rosenzweig. The purpose of this translation was to elucidate the inner meaning of the Bible. This exposition was to confront the Jew with the underlying message of the Book of Books. The translation proved to be eminently successful in capturing the spirit of the original Hebrew.

Between 1923 and 1933 Buber occupied the only chair for Jewish philosophy in a German univeristy at Frankfort. By means of lectures, he was able to spread some knowledge of Judaism to many of the confused and perplexed of his day. He rallied their spirits in the face of a Fascist terror. When Hitler rose to power in 1933, Buber was forced to leave Germany and flee to Israel. In 1938 he became professor of Social Philosophy at the Hebrew University where he has continued to expand and deepen his basic conception of Dialogue. He has constantly placed before the youth of Israel the challenge of building a state with the spiritual values of Judaism at its core.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE.

1. Hans Kohn. Martin Buber, Sein Werk und Seine Zeit. Page 21.
2. Ibid.. Page 54.
3. Universal Jewish Encyclopedia. Volume II. Page 568.
4. Nachum N. Glazer. Franz Rosensweig. Page 147.

THE SOURCES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN BUBER

Martin Buber belongs to that group of influential thinkers whose philosophy reflects the intellectual currents of an epic. There are some men who are eminently sensitive to the problems of their age and who consciously and unconsciously bear witness to its struggle to dream great dreams even in the midst of calamity and catastrophe. Such a personality is Martin Buber. One can justly criticize his thought, but one can not dismiss it. One can disagree with him, but he can not be ignored. However a great person is never merely a reflection of the thought currents of an age; his talent is revealed in his creative reaction to these various influences.

Before we can understand the creative reaction of a thinker, we must first comprehend those forces which have impinged upon him and shaped his thoughts. Buber's generation was to see the rise of Zionism and the birth of a Jewish state, as well as the tragic demise of six million Jews. During his lifetime Buber was to witness the rise of the great totalitarian slave states and the dehumanization of man. Buber did not desist from meeting the entire gamut of challengers which arose out of the complexity of modern life.

It is natural then then that all of these events and intellectual trends are interwoven in Buber's thoughts. For purposes of analysis, we shall distinguish between four basic influences. They are balanced and blended by Buber into an original thought structure, but they remain discernible well springs of his thought. They are existentialism, mysticism, Judaism, and those trends in civilization leading to the automatonization of man.

The founder of existentialism and still its most influential figure is Soren Kierkegaard. He was born in Denmark in 1813 and died in his forty-second year. Although a gifted writer and thinker, he was neglected by his contemporaries, or when he was not neglected, scorned and treated with contempt. Almost his entire life was spent in Copenhagen and he was hardly known outside of his own country. Kierkegaard remained in obscurity until more than two decades after his death, when he was, so to speak, discovered by the Danish critic, Georg Brandes. Through Brandes his fame spread through Scandanavia and Germany. Kierkegaard's works were translated into German around the turn of the century and they lent impetus to the revolt against the intellectualism of Hegel.[1] But not until Karl Barth had reinterpreted him in his Epistle to the Romans, was his momentous significance felt. Kierkegaard inherited a melencholy disposition and under its influence, broke his engagement with Regina Olsen in 1840, an event which he explained as both a necessity and a tragedy.

Kierkegaard 's major contribution to the history of human thought was a consequence of his reaction to Hegelianism. The great system of Hegel contained a theory of history in which a logical dialectic proceeding from thesis to antithesis and thence to synthesis constantly worked its merry way down the centuries of human culture. In the words of F.S.C. Northrop, " Having in the final synthesis achieved the absolute, and having regarded both nature and culture as the unrollment of history, the way was made open for regarding the idea not merely as a regulative as Kant had done, but also as constitutive of the nature of things." 2. Thus Hegel arrived at his famous dictum, "the real is the rational, and the rational is the real."

Kierkegaard reacted to the unbounded intellectualism of Hegel. He states, " Most systematizers in relation to their systems fare like the man who builds a huge palace and himself lives next door to it in a barn." 3.

There has been a long tradition in philosophy extending from Parmenides to Hegel which has held this ontological position. It was left to Immanuel Kant to give the classic refutation to this argument. He pointed out that "being" is not a real predicate or concept of the thing that can be added. The word "is," is merely a copula. A hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred possible dollars. It was Kant who decisively pointed out that existence depends on experience; we must always step outside of our concept in order to attribute to it existence.

Like Kant, Kierkegaard felt that one could not derive reality from logic alone. Too many philosophers had invented "reality."[4] He believed with Kant that logic itself can not define reality; it merely predisposes reality to our knowledge without itself coming into contact with it. While for Kant both experience and reason are needed, and truth is a product of rational thought, for Kierkegaarde truth is that which can be grasped in subjectivity. Truth, he says, is "subjectivity raised to the highest intensity of which it is capable or the objectively uncertain, held fast in subjective inwardness with the highest possible degree of passionate appropriation."[5]

The anti-intellectualism of Kierkegaarde had both good and bad effects. Its positive side is contained in its interpretation of man's freedom and view of history. This is summed up in four principles developed by David Swenson:

1. Logic can not from its own resources provide for transitions from quality to another. In logic everything is and nothing comes into being. If one ignores this, then one confuses logic with history. The wonder and awe at history is forgotten.[7] Kierkegaarde pierced through the vast system of Hegel and saw that it understood history from the point of view of the past as though it had never been present or future.[8]
2. Logic can not assimilate or acknowledge the contingent aspect of the actual within its own realm of truth.

3. Kierkegaarde confirmed the incommensurability between the universal and the particular, which reveals the impotence and its attempt to define the actual. Kierkegaarde states, "For abstract thought there is no either or, no absolute disjunction; why in the world should there be, since abstract thought abstracts from existence where the absolute disjunction belongs."[9.]

4. The difference between the logical and the actual is revealed finally in the fact that logic deals with only essences or qualities.[10.] As a consequence, it is impossible to reach existence by means of a logical demonstration. One can not prove God's existence; but if he does exist, it would be the height of folly to attempt it. For Kierkegaarde then all reasoning is from existence and not towards it.

In this way Kierkegaarde curbed the over-intellectualism of Hegel. But Kierkegaarde's thought also contained a negative aspect. His anti-intellectualism did more than criticize the overbearing attitude of reason. This aspect of his philosophy ended in the crucifixion of reason. The famous phrase ascribed to the church father , Tertullian, "credo quia impossibile est," was restored to a new dignity and power.

The first along life's way is the aesthetic which discovers the significance of existence in the extraction from it of the maximum amount of pleasure. The second stage is the ethical which has as its chief characteristic the relationship of man to God through ethical obligation. The ethical life is the turning of the potential goodness in experience to actuality. The decisive category for the third stage called the religious is that of suffering. Why does one need to suffer? The only answer is that man's imperfection is at bottom guilt. The sense of guilt is not caused by the memory of any wrongful act, but it is a consciousness of a quality affecting the whole personality. Kierkegaarde distinguishes two forms of religion, the immanent and the transcendent. The former is characterized by a passive relation to the divine with the accompanying suffering and sense of guilt. The distinctive feature of transcendent religion is the transformation of the sense of guilt to the sense of sin, by which all relations between the temporal and the eternal are broken. The personality is invalidated and thus made free from the law of God because it is unable to meet his demands. As a result of this doctrine, there is no fundamental point of contact between man and God. Man's understanding and ethical values are completely different from God's. Thus we have in practically the same words used by Karl Barth the doctrine of God as the"totally other."

In Kierkegaarde we encounter return to the anti-intellectualism which does not liberate the mind from the prejudices of the intellect but enslaves it to the blind power of faith.

Faith and reason no longer walk together but they are at sword's point with each other. Kierkegaarde states, "it is not impossible that it might occur to man to imagine himself the equal of God, or to imagine God the equal of man, but not to imagine that God would make himself into the likeness of man. This would be the most stupid thought, or rather so stupid a thought would never enter his mind."[12.]

In Buber's essay, The Love of God and the Idea of Deity, the influence of Kierkegaarde is unmistakable. The purpose of this essay was to critisize the philosophy of Herman Cohen. Buber commences by referring to Pascal for whom he has a great admiration because he wrote that he worshipped the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob--not the God of the philosophers.[13.] It was Pascal who despaired of ever understanding the twin infinities, the infinitely great and the infinitely small.[14.] He declared "reason cannot help us."[15.] At the outset Buber allies himself with anti-intellectualism.

Between Buber and Cohen we have the struggle between the existentialist and the essentialist, between the antisystematic philosopher and the systematic thinker. Buber criticizes Cohen's Ethics of Pure Will, in which Cohen wrote, "God must not become the content of belief if that beleif is to mean something distinct from knowledge."[16.] Buber finds that Cohen's God is nothing but an ideal, and lacks the concrete personality which one derives from having a vital relationship to a living entity. Therefore Buber finds that

for Cohen, "God's only place is within a system of thought."[17.] Buber feels that no man can be satisfied with a mere idea of God, a product of the pure intellect, and so he demonstrates that even the system builder is not wholly consistent. He finds that Cohen changes his thought in the Berlin lectures, and gives expression to a profound feeling of love. Cohen states, "therefore shall the love of God exceed all knowledge."[18.]

Buber's anti-intellectualism manifests itself in his choice of Hasidism which he felt to be the most important expression of modern Judaism. Israel Baal Shem Tov, the founder of the movement, was born at the turn of the eighteenth century. He was not of a scholarly disposition, but rather delved more deeply into Kabbalah. The Baal Shem Tov preached a doctrine that the plain man imbued with naive faith and, able to pray fervently and whole-heartedly, was dearer and nearer to God than the learned formalist spending his whole life in the study of Talmud. The motto of the Baal Shem Tov was not to speculate in religious matters but to believe blindly and devotedly.[19.]

Buber, in his treatment of Hasidism, points out the necessity for a person to be naeve and unspoiled by reflection when he approaches God. He states, "This naivety, vitality, simplicity, and directness form the personal nucleus around which the elements of the new movement crystalize."[20.] Buber seems to feel that a person who can reflect upon his

problem is at a disadvantage in a quest for faith. "The personal existence that accomplishes such a task can only be a naive one, that is in existence directed entirely toward its object; it can not be a reflexive one that deals with its own problems."[21.]

In his essay, Religion and Philosophy, Buber reveals his anti-intellectualism in the contrast he draws in the above two disciplines. Buber feels that religion must be experienced only in the concrete immediacy of a lived situation.

"That meaning is open and accessible in the actual lived concrete, does not mean it is to be won and possessed through any type of analytical or synthetic investigation, or through any type of reflection upon the lived concrete. Meaning is to be experienced in living action and suffering itself, in the unreduced immediacy of the moment."[23.]

The melencholy Dane bestowed one other great insight upon Buber. This third insight was his critique of the mass man. As Hubben, in his work, Four Prophets of our Destiny, points out, a number of men cried out against the reduction of the free personality to that of the automaton. Included with Kierkegaarde are Max Stirner, and Fyodor Dostoievsky.[24.] The latter in The Brothers Karamazov, presents us with a figure of the grand inquisitor. This grand inquisitor symbolizes the established church. He argues with the returning

Christ that freedom is too heavy a burden for the mass man to bear. In the words of the grand inquisitor,"In the end they will lay their freedom at our feet and say to us, 'make us your slaves but feed us,' they will understand themselves at last, that freedom and bread enough for all are inconceivable together, for never, never will they be able to share between them."[25.]

In Kierkegaarde the ideal believer is of necessity solitary. Kierkegaarde fears the many and addresses himself to the single one. He is a spiritual aristocrat; he states, "If we are all Christians, the concept is annulled."[26.] In another section of his writings, he states, "To be a Christian was according to his thought precisely the definition of dissension, that of the individual with the races, with the millions, with family, with father and mother."[27.] He further states, "the human race saw that to do away with Christianity by force was not practicable, so let us do it by cunning. We are all Christians and so Christianity is eo ipso abolished."[28.]

Buber believes that it is Kierkegaarde who bequeathed us the idea that a man can have dealings with God only as a single one. Buber states, "Not before man can say 'I' in perfect reality can he in perfect reality say 'thou' -- that is to God. And even if he does it in a community, he can only do it alone."[29.] For Buber the genius of Kierkegaarde was that he established the basis of an "I and thou" relation, a relation of responsibility of each individual to his creator.

Buber remarks, "As Protagoras leads to Socrates, Stirner leads to his contemporary, Kierkegaarde."[30] For Protagoras man was the measure of all things. For Socrates "know thyself" meant a search for the essence of man which led beyond his existence to a set of values which transcended him. Stirner believed also that man was a measure of all things, but for Kierkegaarde who encountered a "thou" beyond, there stood a transcendent standard of values.

But Buber does not merely react passively to Kierkegaarde's concept of the "single one." For Kierkegaarde the relation of the single one is exclusive. "It is that relation which in virtue of its unique, essential life expels all other relations into the realm of the essential."[31] For Buber the relation with God must and should be more. He will not give up the world and his connection with his fellow man. Whereas Kierkegaarde says, "I had to remove the object in order to come to love," Buber says, "This is sublimely to misunderstand God."[32] Kierkegaarde renounced his love for Regina. Buber calls this an empty path devoid of truth. "God wants us to come to him by means of the Reginas he has created."[33]

It is enough at this point to indicate that Buber opposed Kierkegaarde's attitude towards the crowd as well as his conception of the relation of the individual to the world. The heritage of Kierkegaarde is described by H.J. Blackham, "for what he bequeathed to philosophy was his protest against pure thought and irrelevent knowledge, and his recall to the

permanent basis of human living in the ethical isolation of the existing individual."[34.]

There are some men who by nature and disposition are mystically inclined. Buber is such a type, and his interest in mysticism manifests itself in his profound concern with oriental thought, Eckart, and Hasidism.[35.] As has been pointed out before, the crucial stress in Buber's mysticism is that the "I" is never absorbed in the "thou." It is a mysticism of encounter rather than of absorption.

Buber admits that at one time he was predominately under the influence of the German mystics, Eckart, and Silensius.[36.] According to their point of view, the primal ground of being, the nameless and personal godhead, comes to birth in the human soul. He combined this trend with the view enunciated in later Kabbalah and in Hasidism, according to which man has the power to unite the God who is over the world with his Shekinah dwelling in the world. Thus Buber at one time was of the opinion that God is realized and identified with man. Man by uniting with God gives reality to the existence of the absolute.

After the World War, Buber rejected this concept of the mystical encounter. His classic work I and Thou published in 1923 gives definite expression to this new point of view. In this work he commences his struggle to prevent any kind of attenuation or falsification of the basic dialogic relationship. He begins by warning against all modern attempts to reduce the dialogue to the monologue by defining this

relation as being of only the "I" to the "self."[37] He proceeds to examine the claim of some mystics that the self is absorbed in the mystical encounter. Buber states, "I know not of a single but of two kinds of happenings in which duality is no longer experienced."[38] The first is within the subject wherby the divided soul becomes unified. Buber is careful to remind us that this occurs not between man and God, but within man. It is also claimed by many that in their experience the "I" and "thou" become one. This experience produces glorification, deification, and singleness of being. Buber rejects this doctrine, because he feels that it has been used as an escape from the world, a withdrawl from reality. He finally asks, "What does all enjoyment of God profit a man whose life is rent in two?"[39] The preservation of the dialogue preserves man's contact with reality.

Rudolph Otto's theory of the "mysterium tremendum" created a strong impression in most religious circles. He made the basis of man's realtionship with God, the feeling of absolute dependence, the "mysterium tremendum." Buber believes that this feeling is an important aspect of the mystical encounter. However he rejects the idea that feeling is the essence of man's relationship to God. Feeling, Buber maintains, is merely the accompaniment to a metaphysical relation which is realized not in the soul but between "I" and "thou."[40]

Buber had a deep appreciation and admiration of oriental mysticism, which he reveals by frequent allusions to its literature. Nonetheless, he was critical of it. He finds that Buddha, also, has interpreted his mystical encounter as being one of absorption. Although Buddha speaks and knows of a transcendent personality, he fails to teach it as he maintains, "All that has become is ultimately comprised in the breast."[41.]

Buber indicates the doctrine of absorption as being based on the illusion that spirit exists solely in man. For Buber spirit begins with man as a starting-point, but it is a relation with man and that which transcends man. By renouncing this meaning of the spirit, God and the world become functions of the soul. Buddha maintains, "I proclaim that in this, my ascetic's body, affected with sensations, there dwells in the world and in the beginning of the world and the extinction of the world, and the way that leads to the extinction of the world."[42.] Buber is quick to note that although the world can be imaged by man, this does not mean that it is within him.

He throws further light on the problem by comparing the mysticism of Buddhism with that of Hasidism. He commences by noting several similarities between the movements. Both decline to make any direct utterances concerning the transcendent matters, and both opposed to the transcendent, the concrete. Of central importance for both movements is the relationship between teacher and disciple.[43.]

In the course of its historical development, Buddhism reduced the dialogue between man and God to a monologue. Zen Buddhism became a mysticism of the human person, in which the Buddha nature dwells in all souls, and where every man is able to discover and realize it in himself. Buddhism then becomes a mysticism no longer bound to history, no longer rooted in and connected with the realm of time.

Hasidism becomes the quintessence for Buber of valid mysticism. Buber was attracted by its folk nature and its deep relation to daily living. Buber admits that Kabbalah influenced Hasidism. The Kabbalistic doctrine of emanations may have altered the idea of the relationship between God and the world; however, the idea of the relationship between God and the human soul has remained essentially the same. Although God is often called the substance of prayer, he is never defined as being merely the substance of those who prayed. In Hasidism then there has always existed the essential relationship of dialogue. God's leadership and sovereignty over his people was never equated with the existence of the people itself. The people followed a king of kings; they did not follow their own image.

Zen Buddhism is used by Buber to make clear the significance of Hasidism. Zen Buddhism means ultimately the annulment of the world. Absolute reality is accorded only to the moment, and before that moment the dimension of time disappears. Whereas this Oriental mysticism is an escape and a denial of the reality of life, Hasidism affirms the

the purpose of it.

Buber could have hardly escaped the vital influence of Judaism. The cardinal tenets of his thought are rooted in his people's tradition. In the words of Dr. Samuel Cohon, "While the'new thinking'of Rosenzweig and the'dialogical thinking' of Buber are deeply affected by the existentialism of Kierkegaarde, their religious philosophies derive from authentic Jewish sources, from Rabbinic Judaism and Hasidism."[44.]

What then are some of the significant areas wherein Buber reflects essential elements of Judaism? The first area is man's realtionship to God. Buber definately parts company with the Barthian, Brunner existentialist's emphasis on the exclusive transcendents and unapproachability of God. At the close of the epic work, I and Thou, we find a statement indicating Buber's attitude concerning the relation of God to the world: "God is near his forms, if man does not remove them from him."[45.] The way to God is not through surrendering the ethical categories of this world , and turning one's back on reality, but rather by hallowing the "here and now." He states, "One must have essential intercourse with God, says Kierkegaarde. It is impossible, says Hasidism, to have truly essential intercourse with God when there is essential relation with men."[46.]

Buber affirms that in the religious experience itself an element of the anthropomorphic is felt as though we are

confronted by something demanding reciprocity.[47] Man must want to approach God, however; although God is near, man must seek of his own aacord to draw close to him.[48] Buber in talking of prayer states that the single presupposition of devotion is the disposition of the whole man to turn to God in unreserved spontaneity.[49] All of these statements confirm God's nearness to man.

It is only fair, however, to mention another trend in Buber's philosophy. In his essay, Religion and Philosophy,[50] he develops a point of view verging very closely on that of Kierkegaard. God is the totally incomprehensible and dreadful other. This inscrutable God resembles very much the"holy other"of Kierkegaard and Barth. In one of the latest of his works called At the Turning, Buber hints at a doctrine which indicates both the unapproachability of God and his uncanniness. He states that God hides himself. Buber speaking of the European tragedy and specifically of one of the concentration camps, Osweicm, declares that this can be explained only by the fact that God hides himself.[51] It is then generally true that for Buber God is accessible, and that his demands are intelligible, but there are instances where, if we are to take him literally, we stand blindly and inadequately before the divine.

Buber rejects the doctrine of original sin, and the coruptibility of human nature. This is of course a direct consequence of the acceptance by him of the Jewish doctrine

that man was made in the image of God, that his nature was free from any taint. In Buber's work Two Types of Faith, he analyzes in clear and comprehensive from the differences between Judaism and Christianity. Contrary to those who accuse him of ignoring the divergences in doctrine between these two religions, he devotes a great deal of effort to their exposition. Buber first treats the doctrine of original sin. He notes that Jesus considered the Torah capable of being fulfilled. But Paul believed in principle that the Torah was incapable of being realized. He maintained that it was given not in order to be acted upon, but rather to call forth sin. Man could not stand before God, except through His grace. Paul also believed that God placed within man an inclination to do evil. This concept corresponds to the Old Testament's "evil imagination of the heart." Man then falls victim to his lower impulses, and he finds himself enslaved to his lusts. According to Judaism, on the contrary, the purpose of the law was to provide for the redemption of the world. Buber states that Paul's whole conception of the Torah was to set the stage for the coming of Christ who was to redeem sinful man from his terrible fate through vicarious atonement.

Paul utilized two ideas from the Old Testament to reinforce the doctrine of original sin. The first of these two concepts is derived from those instances in the Bible which mention God as hardening the heart of certain people. The Bible tells us, for example, of the hardening of the

heart of Pharoah. Pharoah constantly reversed his promises to Moses to let the Jewish people go forth from Egypt. After the seventh plague decides to harden Pharoah's heart. As Buber points out, the purpose of this act is to show that sin is not an undertaking which man can break off when the situation becomes critical. The prophet Isaiah used the phrase "fattening of the heart." (Isaiah VI, 10.) But this too occurs only after people were warned and given a chance to repent. Paul interprets the idea of the hardening of the heart in a terrible and frightening sense. God, he says, hardened the heart of all the generations of Israel from Sinai to Golgotha.

Paul supplements this argument by introducing God's statement to Moses, "I am gracious to whom I am gracious, and I shall mercy to whom I shall mercy." The statement means that grace will not be dictated merely on the basis of worth alone. But Paul does not draw this conclusion. He declares, "So he has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens." As mercy is determined upon by God alone, irrespective of the merit of man's actions, so is God's hardening of man's heart. Both God's mercy towards man and his hardening of man's heart become incomprehensible to human understanding. The modern doctrine of Christian existentialism has revived both Paulinian doctrines ie.. the doctrine of original sin, and the totally other character of God.

Buber rejects both doctrines and he refers to the prophet

Ezekial as affirming the true nature of man.[52] The doctrine of Ezekial contains the principle that man is personally responsible for his actions. Man is not born in sin, but in freedom. He does not need a vicarious redeemer because the ethical commandments do not multiply sin. God is not totally other, nor is His will blind. Rather there is a moral law at the core of the universe, intelligible to man. Buber believes in the essential freedom and goodness of man. God vouchsafed freedom to man and he does not annul it, but makes his creature responsible for all his acts.[53]

In his works on the Bible, Moses and the Prophetic Faith, Buber discovers the Jewish conception of salvation which he makes part and parcel of his own philosophy. He emphasizes in his volume, Moses, how the personality of the lawgiver tried to induce a wholeness of dedication on the part of the people to their God. This dedication was to embrace all facets of their life including their legal forms and institutions. "When the people dedicates itself to Yahveh, as its lored, as its 'Melek', only then does it become His holy people."[54] Buber reiterates this position when he states, "The entire existence of the community is to be under the rule of God."[55]

Buber further develops this idea in the Prophetic Faith. He makes clear to us that the only way we can understand the prophetic protest against ethical injustices, is to realize that implicit in it is the assumption that the state is a

theopolitical organization.[56] Yahveh had an absolute claim, recealed to His people in the desert which demanded that all state rule be under his power. This primary interest in the sanctification of this world in all of its aspects which characterized Judaism through the ages is accepted wholeheartedly by Buber.

We find the central theme of this worldly salvation repeated in his Hasidism.. The originality of Hasidism as Gershom Sholem points out is that its leaders, its mystics, turn to the people and try to influence their way of life, instead of keeping their experiences a secret.[57] The people also, needed to be led to salvation. Buber contrasts Hasidism and Christianity in respect to their attitudes towards the world. Whereas Christianity demanded that people should live as if the kingdom of God had already gone, Judaism accepted the world in its unmessianic state. The task of hallowing this world became the charge of the entire people.[58]

The fourth influence reflected in Buber's thought was produced by his reaction to those forces leading to the automatonization of man. He felt the need to preserve the specifically human and personal element in man from being destroyed by the forces of mechanization and totalitaianism. As a young man, he joined the society,"Die Nau Gemeinschaft," which developed the concept of a Utopian state. In this group he met Gustave Landauer, who was already aware of the problem of preserving man's personality and who had developed the doctrine that their were two kinds of relations struggling for the control of society. The first was a coercive

relationship in which the state freely used its power to compel man's adherence to its policies. The second was a free organic relationship in which man's personality was respected.[59] Landauer's analysis deeply affected Buber.

We find in Buber's essay, "What is Man?" an ellaboration of this theme. He declares that it is only in our time that the problem of man has reached its crisis.[60] He discovers two causes for the current plight of man. The first is primarily sociological in nature; by this he means the increasing decay of the direct life of man with his fellow. He finds that communities because of their size are too big to allow the men connected with them to come together in direct relations with one another. The structures of community life, the family, the union, the commmunity and village and town, are not providing man with a vital social tradition. Man has lost the feeling of being at home in the universe, his cosmological security, and is now beginning to lose his sociological security. The old organic forms have lost their meaning. The new structures which were intended to bring men together eg..the trade union and the party have kindled collective passions, but have not provided him with real security. His sense of solitude has been dulled and surpressed but only for a fleeting moment.

The second great cause of man's present crisis has been his lagging behind his own works. "Man is no longer able to master the world which he himself has brought about."[61]

Buber distinguishes three realms in which this lag has been experienced. The first has been in the realm of technique where machines which were designed to liberate man have enslaved to a work of drudgery. The second realm was the economic where the production was emensely increased in order to supply the needs of a great number of men, but instead has been limited to a small minority. There became wide disparities between the needs of man and those who gathered and controlled the sources of supply. The third realm was the political where as the result of two world wars, man feels himself a victim of demonic powers.

In Paths in Utopia Buber touches again on the problem of the decay of personal relationships. Speaking of Marx and Lenin, he notes their betrayal of the individual. Both Marx and Lenin give up the ideal of individual independence for centralization.[62.] He also notes that the individual in the confusion of modern life clings to the collectivity. "The personal human being ceases to be a living member of the social body and becomes a cog in the collective machine."[63.]

This growing problem of the breakdown of human relationships produced an intense reaction in Buber. He threw his weight behind those who believed in the sanctity of the individual and his personality. His major work, I and Thou may be understood as a protest againsnt the automatonization of the individual.

These four influences form significant elements in Buber's

thought. His reaction as was pointed out was not merely a passive one; rather it was a creative reaction to these stimuli. In the next chapter we turn then to Buber's own approach to the problem of the Dialogue.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO.

1. Robert Bertall. AKierkegaard Anthology. Page XVIII.
2. F.S.C. Northrop. Meeting of East and West. Page 212.
3. Marjorie Green. Dreadful Freedom. Page 26.
4. David F. Swenson. Something about Kierkegaard. Page 98.
5. Soren Kierkegaarde. Concluding Unscientific Postcript. Page 182.
6. David F. Swenson. Something about Kierkegaard. Page 106-111.
7. Soren Kierkegaarde. Philosophical Fragments. Page 66.
8. Soren Kierkegaarde. Concluding Unscientific Postcript. Page 272.
9. Ibid..Page 270-271.
10. Soren Kierkegaarde. Philosophical Fragments. Pages 29-73.
11. David Swenson. Something About Kierkegaard. Page 119-137.
12. Robert Bertall. A Kierkegarrd Anthology. Page 171.
13. Martin Buber. Israel and the Nations. Pages 53-65.
14. Ibid..Page54.
15. W. Castell. Introduction to Modern Philosophy. Page 166.
16. Martin Buber. Israel and the World. Page 53.
17. Ibid..Page 57.
18. Ibid..Page 59.
19. S.M. Dubnow. History of the Jews in Russia and Poland. Volume I. Page 203.
20. Martin Buber. Hasidism. Page 41.
21. Ibid.. Page 42.
22. Martin Buber. The Eclipse of God. Page 39-63.
23. Ibid.. Page 49.
24. William Hubben. Four Prophets of our Destiny. Page 36-37.
25. Fyodor Dostoievsky. The Brothers Karamazov. Page 262.

26. Robert Bertall. A Kierkegaard Anthology. Page 447.

27. Ibid..Page 448.

28. Ibid..Page 449.

29. Martin Buber. Between Man and Man. Pages 40-82.

30. Ibid.. Page 45.

31. Ibid.. Page 50.

32. Ibid.. Page 52.

33. Ibid.. Page 52.

34. H.J. Blackham. Six Existentialist Thinkers.. Page 22.

35. Samuel Cohon. The Existentialist Trend in Theology. The Central Conference of American Rabbi's Yearbook. Volume 63. Page 362.

36. Martin Buber. Between Man and Man. Page 184.

37. Martin Buber. I and Thou. Page 85.

38. Ibid.. Page 86.

39. Ibid.. Page 87.

40. Ibid.. Pages 80 and 81.

41. Ibid.. Page 92 and 93.

42. Ibid.. Page 93.

43. Martin Buber. Hasidism. Page 188-202.

44. Samuel Cohon. The Existentialist Trend in Theology. The Central Conference of American Rabbi's yearbook. Volume 63. Page 369.

45. Martin Buber. Iand Thou. Page 119.

46. Martin Buber. Hasidism. Page 165.

47. Martin Buber. The Eclipse of God. Page 23.

48. Ibid.. Page 130.

49. Ibid.. Page 163.

50. Ibid.. Page 50.

51. Martin Buber. At the Turning. Page 62.

52. Martin Buber. Two Types of Faith. Page 79 ff.

53. Ibid.. Page 86.

54. Martin Buber. Moses. Page 107.

55. Ibid.. Page 186.

56. Martin Buber. Prophetic Faith. Page 67.

57. Gershom Sholem. Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. Page 328.

58. Martin Buber. Hasidism. Page 59.

59. Martin Buber. Paths in Utopia. Page 47.

60. Martin Buber. Between Man and Man. Page 157.

61. Ibid.. Page 158.

62. Martin Buber. Paths in Utopia. Page 99.

63. Ibid.. Page 132.

THE DIALOGUE, ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO THE WORLD AT LARGE

When we turn to Buber's own philosophy, we are confused by the wide variety of material treated by the author. But at the core of his philosophy we find the relationship of Dialogue. Its classic definition is given in I and Thou written in 1924. But to understand the full significance of this work, one must first trace the backround in which the author came to write it. This is revealed to us by Martin Buber in his essay, What is Man? The purpose of this essay is to show that the key to the unravelling of the essence of man is not found by examining the solitary individuals or the collectivity, but only by understanding man in relation to his fellow.

In this essay Buber finds the source of his own interest in man in the analysis of Kant.[1] The field of philosophy in its universal significance, says the Prussian giant, may be marked off into the following questions: 1. What can man know? 2. What ought man to do? 3. What may man hope for? 4. What is man? Metaphysics answers the first; ethics answers the second; religion the third; and anthroplogy the fourth. But Kant is quick to add that basically all knowledge can be reduced to

anthropolgy since the above three are intrinsically related to the latter. Although Kant framed the question, he fails to answer the basic problem of man, such as his unique position in the cosmos, his connection with destiny, his relation to the world of things, and his understanding of his fellow men. These questions which Kant did not touch upon but which are basic to life became the central themes about which Buber built his creative Dialogic thinking. The full implication of this idea is expressed by Buber when he declares, "The fact that the first three question can be reduced to this question, means that the knowledge of the essence of this being will make plain to me what as such a being it can know, what as such a being it ought to do, and what as such a common being it may hope."[2.]

Buber could have approached his treatment of the essence of man in a formal and strictly analytic manner. As we have noted before in the preceeding chapter, Buber has a deep prejudice against the orthodox, systematic philosopher. Philosophy, he feels, destroys the wholeness of man. Its individual disciplines such as epistomology, ethics, aesthetics, and religion, are all abstractions from the reality of life. He states, "For in every one of these disciplines the possibility of its achieving anything in thought rests precisely on its objectification, on what may be termed, its dehumanization, and even a discipline like the philosophy of history which is so concerned with the actual man must in order to be able to comprehend man as a historical being renounce consideration of the whole man--of which the kind of man who is living outside

history in the unchanging rhythm of nature is an essential part."[3] Philosophy can help us to analyze and find answers to the first three segmented questions of Kant, but it can never answer the question of the wholeness of man. We may note in passing how close this concept of the unity of the personality is to Dilthy's. Philosophy, because it must deal in concepts, categories, and universals, can never treat merely the human species, but peoples, not merely a human soul but types of characters. Here we find another instance of how Buber, the existentialist, attracted by the concrete reality of life, revolts against systematic philosophy.

Buber negates philosophy as a method. Instead he employs the subjective personality of the philosopher as the first presupposition for a true account of man in his concrete wholeness. He states, "The philosophical anthropologist must stake nothing less than his real wholeness, his concrete self. And more, it is not enough for him to stake himself as an object of knowledge. He can know the wholeness of the person and through it the wholeness of man, only when he does not lead his subjectivity out and does not remain an untouched observer. He must enter completely and in reality into the act of self-reflection, in order to become aware of human wholeness."[4]

Buber's philosophy of man in which the philosopher involes himself subjectively in the exposition of his thought is demonstrated in his classic work, I and Thou.

Buber begins this volume by distinguishing between two primary relations or attitudes of man. These primary phrases are "I and thou" and "I and it." The first relation can only be spoken with one's whole being, while the primary phrase "I and it" can only be expressed with one's partial and segmented self.[5.] The "I and thou" relationship removes all objects, things, and boundries, while the "I and it" is characterized by the presence of the above. When a man stands opposite a "thou," his basic attitude is one of relation. The "I and it" relation, on the other hand, produces the world of experience. The "I and thou" relation produces a world of relation and is characterized by the presence of the person.

Buber affirms that there are three spheres of relation. The first is our relation to nature in which our words cling to the threshold of speech. The second is our relation to other men where we experience an open giving and accepting of speech. The third is that of man to intelligible forms which is somewhat less defined, as it does not use the technique of speech and yet produces it. We can perceive no "thou" and yet we feel that we are being spoken to, and we reply by thinking and acting. Says Buber, "We speak the primary word with our being, though we cannot utter "thou" with our lips."[6.]

The "I and thou" is a reciprocal, dynamic relation. Buber declares, "The 'thou' meets me but I step into direct relation with it. Hence relation means being chosen and choosing in one."[7.]

This relation is a direct one in which every means is interpreted as an obstacle. Whereas the "I and thou" relation exists only in the present, the "I and it" has only a past. The latter is a relation with objects in which man rests satisfied with the things he uses. Objects can only be understood in this way, as they subsist in time which has already transpired. The "I and thou" relation is only occasional and can never by its very nature be one which constantly persists as it is too fragile to endure continually. "It is our melencholy fate that every 'thou' must at some time become an 'it.'"[8.]

Buber searches and examines the past to document his analysis of the present and finds that primitive man exists primarily in the state of "I and thou." Or in his own words, "In the beginning is relation."[9.] For primitive man is not conscious of an "I," and the primary word or relation is made possible only by the recognition of the separation and independence of the "self." The "I and thou" relation did not arise then late in the consciousness of man, but it precedes all other relations. "By its very nature it (relation) precedes 'I.'"[10.]

Buber is not pessimistic over the development of self-consciousness and the dawn of the appreciation of the self. Conscious life offers us a real choice between "I" and "thou" which arises from an attitude of combination, and "I and it" which derives from that of separation. Buber is intent upon establishing that the former is the primary

and natural instinct of the human being. He turns his attention from the life of the primitive savage to that of the infant in order to throw additional light upon his thesis. Here too he finds the primary instinct of "I and thou" apparent. The child in the womb comes into being in that undivided primal world which precedes form. From this stage the child is separated and enters into his own individual life. But time is here granted to the child to exchange for his natural connection with the world, which he loses at birth, a chance for a spiritual one. The first instinct of an infant is not that he perceives an object and then puts himself into relation with it, but rather the reverse, that he puts himself into rapport first and then perceives an object, is true. Once again he returns to his primary message, "In the beginning is relation."[11] This instinct toward relation is a priori; it is the inborn "thou." The instinct toward creation is also determined by this instinctive drive towards the "thou," and this reaching out and searching for the world, man's personality matures. As he begins to appreciate a "thou," so he begins to appreciate his selfhood.

The difference between the relation of "I and Thou" and "I and it" is roughly that between the phenomenal and the noumenal. The latter is a relation which is placed within the framework of space and time while the world of the former is not set in the context of either of these. Buber believes that the underlying values of life do not lie in the phenomenal reign of space and time, of systematic order and scientific

endeavor but rather in the noumenal world of relation, in the ethical challenge.

Buber next directs his attention to an analysis of culture. He finds that culture is becoming increasingly dominated by the attitude of "I and it." The latter takes the form of experiencing the world as an object and brings to bear the analytic and synthetic capacities of the intellect in reconstituting the world. Those activities of the practical exploitation of life in order to sustain, relieve and equip humanity are governed by this attitude. According to Buber this development of the ability to experience the resources of the world comes the decrease of man's capacity to enter into relation with it. The latter, he feels, is the only power through which man can enter the life of the spirit.

Continuing with his analysis of the problem of objectivization, he defines it as taking shelter in the world of separation. Man retreats into separation along two paths, through institutions and that of feelings, and both of these reveal the divided and atomized human psyche. The world of institutions is a world of the outside in which man negotiates and undertakes business. The world of feeling, on the other hand, is a world within where the segmented man recovers from institutions. Our author states, "Here a man's liking, hate, and pleasure are indulged and his pain, if not too severe."[12] Neither of these grant man an access to real life. Institutions provide no real public life and feelings no personal and private life.

The crucial problem of community life next absorbs our author's attention. A community can be built up only on the basis of mutual relation, with individual builders as the effective centers of activity. The economist and statesman who look at men in order to exploit them, to use and make profit from their labors, are turning our civilization into an impersonal cold and heartless world. Man's will to profit and be powerful have their natural place so long as they are linked with and upheld by his desire to enter into real personal relations. Buber establishes here a principle which becomes a recurrent theme throughout his philosophy. "Economics, the abode of the will to profit, and state the abode of the will to be powerful, share in life as long as they share in the spirit. If they abjure spirit, they abjure life."[13.]

Martin Buber's emphasis on the spirit did not lead him to deny the world but rather to transform it. The basic belief is deeply rooted in his ancestral faith, Judaism, which has been a constant wrestling of Jacob to transform the world to conformity with the will of God.

Corresponding to the phenomenal world of "it" governed by causality, we have the noumenal world of "thou" characterized by freedom. But freedom is not automatically given to all men in as much as it is a task to be realized through constant dedication. Man can lose his freedom; the very basis of his moral choice, by slipping into the relation of "it." He states, "When the world of 'thou' becomes dried

up, man is overpowered. He comes to terms with a world of objects and succombs to it. Then smooth causality rises up till it is an oppressive stifling state."[14.]

Certain influences from the fields of biology and history have tended to establish the idea of an inevitable fate, of an inexorable destiny. This doctrine received impetus from Darwin's account of nature, the struggle for existence, and from the concept that man is governed by the subconscious, the"id" in psychology. The fields of sociology and the history of culture suffer also from the malaise of determinism. Buber endeavors to preserve for man a realm of freedom where he may express his creative soul. Realizing the slow, creeping, paralysis pervading our society, he declares that the only thing which enslaves us to fate is our own acceptance of it. "The only thing that can become fate for man is belief in fate; for this suppresses the movement of reversal."[15.]

Of primary importance to Buber is man's relationship to God. The essence of this attitude is expressed in the element of the personal. The mystical encounter with God, however, never results in the giving up of the "I." Man is to be rooted in the world and he is not to turn his back upon its demands. God is to be found in each temporal relation. "By means of every particular 'thou,' the primary word addresses the eternal 'thou!'"[16.]

The "I and thou" is an exclusive relation as are all real relations. This does not imply that nothing else exists, but rather that all else exists in the light of this relation. What then, we may ask, is man's relationship with God? Buber here assigns a unique character to this experience. "In the relation with God unconditional exclusiveness and unconditional inclusiveness are one."[17] If one uses the language of the objective sciences, then one is forced to come to one of two alternatives: here is the world and there is God, which represents exclusive transcendence, or else one identifies God with the world which is a definition implying his exclusive immanence. But the "I and thou" relation is one that says that there is nothing besides God and everything is in him. Reacting to the thought of Rudolph Otto, Buber states "Of course God is the holy other but he is also the holy same, the holy present. Of course he is the 'mysterium tremendum' that appears and overthrows; but he is also the mystery of the self-evident, nearer to me than my eye."[18]

Continuing his analysis of Dialogue, Buber treats of those mystics who attempted to annul this relation. As we have pointed out in the previous chapter, Otto reduces the relation to a psychological feeling and the mystics destort it through their theory of absorption. He states, "All modern attempts to interpret this primal reality of Dialogue as Monologue take their place in the abysmal history of the destruction of reality."[19]

This same question receives further elucidation in his essay, Dialogue, which he wrote in 1929. He points out that the person living the life of Monologue is one who never becomes conscious of the other as something which is not himself. Dialogue is to be defined as standing in direct relation with another person, and yet the Dialogic is not to be identified with love. For noone can go through life loving everybody. But love without this direct relation, without a real recognition of the other, is a love which betrays itself.[20] The basic movement of the life of Dialogue is the turning toward the other. But Buber finds that the chief characteristic of Monologue is not turning away from the other, but rather "reflection." Reflection is the inability of a person to enter into a mutual relation with his full being. The Dialogic relationship is not restricted to the area of the individual but also has its place in the realm of society. When direct personal relations atrophy, then we have a community breaking down into a mere collectivity. When personal existence is on the increase, then community is on its way to recovery. In 1929 he forsaw the rise of both the Communist and Fascist menaces and he wrote, "Bundled together without 'Thou' and without 'I' those of the left who want to abolish memory and those of the right who want to regulate it: hostile and separated hosts, they march into the common abyss."[21]

A fuller treatment of the Dialogic relationship as it expresses itself in the history of human thought, is given

by Buber in his essay, What is man? The Dialogue is that relation which provides man with a sense of self-realization and belonging. The basic craving of the human spirit is to have this sense of belonging, a cosmic feeling of having and being at home. Buber distinguishes in the history of the human spirit between epochs of habitation and epochs of homelessness.[22.] During the latter man feels that he is surd in the cosmos. His fate is that of the wanderer in the open field without even four pegs needed to set up a tent. In the former anthropological thought is rooted in a cosmological context. Man is not a surd element in creation, but is an integral part of the cosmos. Kant's insight into the problem of reality affected Buber immensely. The world's mystery, Kant believed, is the mystery of man's own being. For Kant the mystery of space and time of this world and the next is rooted in man's nature. Buber too has insisted that the secret to the understanding of the world is to be found through a knowledge of the nature of man. Kant does not occupy for Buber the position of one of the great system builders. Kant's contribution to the history of philosophy is not so much his intricate system as his insistance that man must know himself."[23.]

For Buber there were three great attempts on the part of philosophy to provide a home for man in the universe: The first was the cosmological system of Aristotle; the second was the theological construction of Aquinas; the third attempt was made by Hegel and can be called the ideological.

Hegel in his youth was interested in the anthropological problem i.e. the nature of man. But he ended up in his maturity no longer interested in this question. Rather does his philosophy attest to the dispossesing of the concrete man in favor of universal reason. With Kierkegaard and the whole school of existentialists Buber condemns the lological reasoning of Hegel as inadequate. According to Hegel, the meaning of history is transparently clear.[24] All insecurity, all unrest about meaning is lost because universal reason knows all. Pascal's dread and solitude is overcome while history with a methodical consistency continues to unravel itself according to the immutable laws of dialectic. Soon after Hegel promulgates this interpretation of history, the home built to house man for the next thousand years begins to crumble. The reason for its crumbling was that the home was built without recognizing the distinctive characteristic of anthropological time. Whereas security can be given in cosmological time, in the realm of nature, because all time can be present even though the future can not actually be given us, the very essence of anthropological time is freedom in which the future is unknown. The future can not be comprehended in as much as it depends in part upon the decision of man, a consciously willing creature. The only exception to this principle which can provide security in anthropological time is that conception of the universe which is grounded in faith. Buber states, "The power of faith alone can experience perfection as something assured because it is something guaranteed

to us by someone we trust, whom we trust as a guarantor also for what has not yet come into our world."[25.]

After establishing that faith is the only basis for security in our world, Buber proceeds to mention two of its great expressions, Persian and Jewish Messianism. In Persian Messianism, the future victory of light over darkness is guaranteed and the particular precise hour in which it is to occur is designated. Such mathematical definiteness is rejected by Judaism although the faith in the ultimate triumph of good over evil is firm. Judaism believes that man can help or hinder salvation for he is a cO-partner with God and his essence is freedom. Hegel secularized this Messianic concept and transfered man's security from the sphere of faith to that of evident logical conviction.

Marx commits what Buber calls the sociological reduction. An intellectual image of the universe for Marx is unneccesary because he is interested in providing his age only with an analysis of society. This analysis of society is itself distorted to fit the straight-jacket of production. Although Marx rebelled against Hegel, he shares with him the misconception of confusing cosmological and anthropological time. For him history instead of being dialectic idealism reduced itself into dialectic materialism. But the same inevitability which characterized Hegel's system is also contained in dialectic materialism. Capitalist production breeds its neccesary undoing through the inevitable rule of the proletariat. But now when man feels the weight of

his freedom so intensely, such cut and dry doctrines do not accord with the complexity of life. Life today does not exemplify pattern but rather problematic complexity.

Fuerbach and Nietzsche attempted to transform the home of man in a cosmos to that of man in a jungle devoid of any pattern. Fuerbach commits the anthropological reduction of the thought of Hegel. There is no question in Fuerbach of a relation to anything beyond man. Man should take for himself the creative freedom ascribed to God and this same creature of flesh and blood should affirm himself as the being through whom the world exists.

Nietzsche according to Buber conceives of man as the animal not yet established. Man is not a complete creature, but is always in the process of becoming. The great German philosopher rebelled against the ascetic ideal of Christianity. Man, says Nietzsche, must draw his sources of strength from life. But for Nietzsche life becomes equated with the will to power. Man is an animal with a future, an animal with great promise, but he is still solely a biological creature. For Nietzsche the only factor standing in the way of man's development is conscience. Buber rejects the opinion that guilt and conscience are obstacles to man's fullest development. Nietzsche's thought is rooted in his misconception of man and is consequently in error. Power in and of itself is not good. In criticism of Nietzsche, Buber states a principle which constantly recurs in his thought.

"So long as power is bound to a goal, to the work or to the calling, it is considered in itself neither good nor evil; it is only a suitable or unsuitable instrument. But as soon as this bond is broken or loosened, and the man ceases to think of power as the capacity to do something, but thinks of it as a possession, that is thinks of power in itself, then his power being cut off and self-satisfied, it is evil; it is power withdrawn from responsibility, power which betrays the spirit, power in itself."[26.]

The underlying criticism leveled against Nietzsche by Buber is that he misapprehends the nature of man by considering him merely an animal. Nietzsche wanted to understand man as a natural product of the animal kingdom. Consequently Nietzsche's problem was to account for a being who had moved from the unified realm of nature, free from the conflicts of conscience into that divided realm where his spiritual nature could find no place. There are two other men who attempted to reject the Dialogue position of man. They are Heidegger and Scheler. The former absolutizes the condition of the solitary man; he makes it simply impossible for man to enter into any essential relation with his fellow because he is basically alone. Scheler gives man two basic attributes------spirit and impulse. Spirit in its pure form is powerless and man needs impulse to start him on the road to creativity. Scheler then proposes a divorce between spirit and impulse. Against this duality, Buber

affirms the unitary nature of man. He states, "Human life can attain meaning not in monologue but only in the transcending of one's own nature in dialogue."[27] Man becomes an integrated personality only through his entering into mutual relations with his fellow man.

It is important to note that Buber does not reject the value of the group as does Kierkegaard. There is a corresponding, essential "we" of the group to the essential "thou" of the individual. The nameless, faceless crowd is an "one." The special character of "we" is shown in the essential relations arising between its members. Thus a community, too, can express positive, meaningful, values. Buber considers individualism and collectivism false alternatives for there is an other alternative which is a basic fact of human existence, the personal give and take between man and man and the mutual interaction between man and God.

In a recent work, The Eclipse of God, Buber renews his consideration of Fuerbach, Nietche and Heidegger and in addition analyzes the thought of Sartre and Jung.[28] In his essay Religion and Modern Thinking, Buber directs a cutting critique at Sartrian existentialism. Sartre's atheism is not a result of his materialism, but flows from his analysis of human existence. An existentialist himself, Buber is drawn into the lists to face this challenge from his

colleague. Sartre accepts the position of Nietche that God is dead. Our generation has outlived God. "He (God) is dead; he spoke to us and now is silent. All that we touch now is his corpse."[29] Sartre is concerned with God's silence and man's enduring quest to accept a faith. Sartre's answer is that man must recognize that he himself is that being through whom the world exists. For Sartre then the continued existence of the religious need to be related beyond one's own self is an illusion. There can exist no other reality than the human one, the realm of subjectivity.

Buber takes issue with this belief. The perseverance of the religious need does indicate something deeper than an illusion. Sartre, like Fuerbach, has destroyed man's home. Man stands alone in a hostile or what is worse in an indifferent cosmos. The relation between man and God can only be defined in terms ~~in terms~~ of subject and object because for Sartre the "other" is he who looks at me. For Buber God can only be reached in the mutuality of "I and thou." This "I and thou" relation is not the product of human subjectivity, but reflects the state of being, the nature of things. If man can no longer enter into relations with God, it is no mere change in human subjectivity, but in reality itself. Sartre calls upon man to recover for himself the creative freedom which he ascribed to God.

This call to freedom sounds appealing but Buber reminds us that man is not God. Man does not create being; on the contrary, he encounters it, a world not of his own creation. Human freedom does not exist in a void. We may describe man's encounter with the world according to Sartre's conception as an encounter with nothingness. For Sartre life has no meaning and man is constantly called upon to invent and create values. But this inventing of value is merely a thin veil covering up his own inner emptiness. For man cannot accept anything which is merely subjective as a set of values to govern his own existence. If man is the measure of all things, then we have anarchy; we do away with any real law. In Buber's own words,"One can believe in and accept meaning or value, one can set it as a guiding light over one's life, if one has discovered it and not if one has invented it."[30.]

Heidegger despite his acceptance of Nietzsche's dictum that God is dead is able to avoid being classified as an atheist. Heidegger binds being to the destiny and history of man. His thought is an attempt to interweave the philosophy of Parmenides and Hegel. Since being is bound up with the history and destiny of man, without being a product of subjectivity, it is also possible for God to arise from the dead. Buber carefully points out that God is not merely immanent in the lives of men, but that he is also a

transcendent being. The God of Heidegger would not be a God of religion, a transcendent being, but a God whom man could conjure up if and when he wanted him. Buber declares, "To talk of a reappearance of this conjured God of thought is inadmissable."[31.] According to Heidegger's concept of history there is no transcendent rule or divine judge; rather history itself becomes the arbiter of man's fate.

In the second part of his essay Religion and Modern Thinking, Buber enters the lists against one of the chief psychologists of our time, Jung. He accuses Jung of overstepping the limits of his field and assuming the role of the metaphysician. The issue at stake is the truth or falsity of the dialogic relationship.

As a psychologist, Jung believes, "Any statement concerning the transcendent is to be avoided, for such a statement is a ridiculous supposition of the human mind which is unconscious of its boundries."[32.] God is reduced then to being merely a state of the soul. Buber replies that when psychology stays within its own domain, it is competent. But the bounds of psychology are overstepped when in attempts to define religion as being in the words of Jung, "A living relation to psychical events which do not depend upon consciousness, but instead take place on the other side of it in the darkness of the psychical hinterland."[33.]

For Buber this kind of definition attacks the very heart of the dialogic relationship, for it reduces religion to a self-contained immanent relationship which fails to recognize an element of encounter with a transcendent being. Jung makes of God an autonomous psychic content. This means that God is conceived of not as a being or reality to which there corresponds a psychical content but merely this content itself. When Jung finally identifies himself with the school which affirms that God does not exist apart from the mind of man, he has made not a psychological but rather a metaphysical statement. Jung had said, "Metaphysical statements are expressions of the soul and consequently they are psychological." Buber counters, "However all statements, if they are considered not according to the meaning and intention of their contents, but according to their psychic origin, could be described as expressions of the soul."[34] What Jung has done is to break the boundries of psychology and to make it the only possible metaphysics. Buber points out the contradiction of a science which is empirical and metaphysical at the same time.

Jung finally confuses, according to Buber's analysis, the soul as the condition for metaphysical reality, and the reality itself. The real individual soul can never be that which is metaphysically real. Its essential life consists

of real meetings and real exchanges, and it is only through such mutual relations and encounters that man contacts reality. Otherwise the soul would have to be considered a self-contained Leibnezian monad. Jung affirms that the psychologist turns to the soul with the greatest expectations. He abhors faith and religion which is founded upon it. Thus psychology is not content to remain a science but endeavors to become a new religion. Man's relationship with deity in such a system is replaced by man seeking his own integration. Thus exposed, we find that Jung has tried to substitute self-realization for God.

Buber has presented and defended the Dialogue, its validity in the face of all opponents. He has demonstrated that the essence of man is expressed in the relation of "I and thou." In the next chapter we will attempt to show how Buber conceived this relation as finding concrete expression in the historical life of his unique people, Israel. For it is in Judaism and from its values that the Dialogue draws its direction and emphasis.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE.

1. Martin Buber. Between Man And Man. Page 119.
2. Ibid.. Page 121.
3. Ibid.. Page 122.
4. Ibid.. Page 124.
5. Martin Buber. I and Thou. Page 3.
6. Ibid.. Page 6.
7. Ibid.. Page 11.
8. Ibid.. Page 17.
9. Ibid.. Page 18.
10. Ibid.. Page 22.
11. Ibid.. Page 27.
12. Ibid.. Page 43.
13. Ibid.. Page 48.
14. Ibid.. Page 53.
15. Ibid.. Page 56.
16. Ibid.. Page 75.
17. Ibid.. Page 78.
18. Ibid.. Page 79.
19. Ibid.. Page 85.
20. Martin Buber. Between Man and Man. Page 21.
21. Ibid.. Page 32.
22. Ibid.. Page 126.

23. Ibid.. Page 137.
24. Ibid.. Page 139.
25. Ibid.. Page 141.
26. Ibid.. Page 153.
27. Ibid.. Page 167.
28. Martin Buber. The Eclipse of God. Pages 87-122.
29. Ibid.. Page 90.
30. Ibid.. Page 93.
31. Ibid.. Page 101.
32. Ibid.. Page 105.
33. Ibid.. Page 105.
34. Ibid.. Page 108.

JEWISH HISTORY AS DIALOGUE

An ideal theory when substantiated in history becomes a living reality. Disembodied idealism can never compare to the life saga of a people searching to find a path to the divine. Buber therfore turned to the historical experience of the Jew, the people of the Dialogue, who sought to realize the kingdom of heaven here on earth. He did not believe as some of his Christian contemporaries that revelation was fixed and complete. He declares, "Revelation will tolerate no perfect tense."[1.] He also states, "But it must be mentioned here for the sake of full clarity that my own belief in revelation which is not mixed up with any orthodoxy, does not mean that I believe thst finished statments about God were handed down from heaven to earth. Rather it means that the human substance is melted by the spiritual fire which visits it, and there now breaks forth from it a word, a statement, which is human in meaning and form, human conception and human speech and yet witnesses

to him who stimulated it and to his will. We are revealed to ourselves and cannot express it otherwise than as something revealed. Not only statements about God, but all statements in general are human."[2.]

Since revelation is continuous, the entire experience of the Jew falls under his purview. The Dialogue is not limited to any one epoch, but it may be encountered throuout history. In his works Buber can take a critical and progressive view of Jewish historical experience.

What then are some of the basic elements which he finds pervading the entire gamut of Jewish experience? Reflecting his antiintellectualism, he frowns upon any set of dogmatic principles. In contradistinction to the reflective relationship which he terms indispensable and unessential, (a paradox) he affirms that Israel has encountered God in the direct relationship of concrete experience.[3.] The fund-amental attitude of Judaism he calls "Yichud" or unification. "Yichud involves the continually renewed confirmation of the unity of the divine in the manifold nature of his manifestations in a practical way."[4.] This unity must be brought about in the face of the manifold contradictions of life, even in the face of the monstrous duality of good and evil. This unification requires not merely its profession intellectually but its realization actually.

This is to be achieved by translating the image of God into reality through Imitatio Dei.

In Judaism man is a true partner of God inasmuch as he is a true agent able to speak and chose as he wishes. Whereas in the Persian religion the struggle between light and darkness which is the sphere in which history unfolds is irreducible,in Judaism light and darkness are encompassed by the Creator and history takes place between man and God. Thus in principle it is only wrong choice which is responsible for evil and it is not an irreducible element. It too if given proper direction can be transformed so as to express the will of God. Passion is only evil if it remains in a directionless state, but if directed towards God then it can form part of the constructive unity of the personality. This "evil urge" is simply an elemental force which it is man's task to direct along constructive channels.

The two greatest threats to the Dialogic situation are defined as Gnosis and Magic. In the Biblical period, Israel encountered Gnosis and Magic in its two greatest neighbors, Egypt and Babylonia. Babylonian astrology claimed that it knew man's fate and consequently pierced the mystery of the future. Egyptian Magic claimed that through certain incantations death could be conquered. Both of these were attempts to destroy the mystery of the encounter

with God. The Biblical phrase, "I will be there as I shall be there," (Exodus 3:14) is interpreted by Buber as emphasizing that man can not use force to compel God's will, but must await the encounter with him.

The Talmud too is interpreted by Buber as being a defense against Magic and Gnosis. The abstract discussions of the Talmud can only be understood in the context of the late Iranian teaching that there are two forces locked in struggle with each other for control of the world. The doctrine of the Intermediary Substances represents the Gnostic element in the challenge to Judaism, whereas the Hellenistic practice of Theurgy manifests the challenge from the realm of Magic.

Unfortunately Judaism did not escape the influence of Magic and Gnosis. Both of these deleterious forces were embodied in the Kabbalah. The overcoming ofthe challenge of Kabbalah was the task of Hasidism. All intermediary substances fall before the direct relation of man to God. This relationship is neither knowable nor capable of being produced through force, but it is one of mystery unifying the personality which man must verify in every moment of his life. Hasidism does not deny man's influence on Deity, but it does place God beyond formulae and incantations, exorcises and preparation. The only way to God can be through the hallowing of the every day life. Buber states, "Gnosis

misunderstands the meaning of Dialogue; Magic offends it."[5.]

Concluding his essay on the faith of Judaism, he affirms that there is a threefold relation which is contained in it. Reminiscent of the categories found in Rosensweig's Star of Redemption, they are creation, revelation, and redemption. According to the Jewish view of creation, the world is considered not as an enemy to be overcome, but as a task to be consummated. Once again the principle of the unity of the personality is emphasized. The challenge of redemption is not addressed to the soul of man alone. Man is a unity and so is the world. Therefore both the material and spiritual aspects of the world must be redeemed by man.

Buber in his essay, The Prejudices of Youth, sums up the great contribution of Judaism to the world. He declares that Judaism is a mixture of the false and the genuine. What then does he consider the genuine message of Judaism? "The meaningfulness of history, the sovereignty of the spirit, the verifiablitity of truth, the power of decision ensuing from personal responsibility, the spontaneity between men, and finally faith as the engagement of one's entire life to the Lord of the one voice, who wishes to be recognized in each of his manifestations."[6.]

Let us examine in detail Buber's conception of Jewish life in the light of these underlying principles. For

purposes of analysis we may distinguish four epochs in Jewish history which have absorbed his interest: the Biblical; the Pharisaic; the Hasidic; and the Zionist movement.

The first and greatest period of Jewish life was the Biblical. What then may we ask was its significance? The central theme of the Bible is the encounter between a people and a God of history. This meeting is not that between a compartmentalized man and a compartmentalized God, but between a whole man and his Creator. There are two traits Buber finds which set the Bible apart from the other great books of the World's religions. The first is"that both events and words are placed in the midst of the people, of history, of the world." The second basic trait is, "That the entire course of human life is sanctified by law."[7.] The function of the Bible is to testify to the spirit's yearning for perfection and also to obey the spirit in its union with life. Using the three basic categories of creation, revelation and redemption, the Bible is a historical document of a world suspended between creation and redemption, and experiencing revelation.

In his essay, Biblical Leadership, Buber is careful to distinguish between two concepts of history. The first he calls World History. Here history is the history of success. The Bible however knows nothing of the intrinsic value of

success. Moses is plagued at every stage of his leadership by failure. The life of David is built around the two great stories of flight, the first from Saul and the second from Absolom. The history of failure culminates in the prophets. It is for them to continue the struggle but not to conquer. The Dialogue as depicted by Buber is one, "in which the people is spoken to and fails to answer, yet where the people in the midst of its failure continually rises up to answer."[8.]

The various stages of Biblical history are divided into the following periods; the Patriarchal, the Mosaic, the Judges, and the Kings, and that of the Prophets. The Patriarchal period is characterized by a group of people gathered together who placed themselves at the disposal of God. During the Mosaic period God becomes established as king. During the rule of the Judges an attempt is made to maintain God's sovereignty and to induce the people to follow him. Instead they demand a temporal flesh and blood ruler and in the era of the Kings,the people realized their wish. But the history of the Kings is the failure of those annointed, to fulfill the promise of their calling. The rise of Messianism, the belief in an annointed king who implements the rule of God is to be understood in the context of this failure.[9.] The prophets are those who are appointed to oppose not only the kings, but also the forces of history. The prophet is called upon to break his attachments with the people and become the solitary one. He must undergo the abuse and suffering of the kings and even of his own people.

From the picture of the prophet suffering we derive that concept of the suffering servant of God.

Out of this disintegration and failure is born the idea of the Messiah, who was not as in Christianity the son of God, but of mortal man. The reign he is to usher in is a this-worldly one, and not an escape from life.

In his work, Moses, Buber enlarges upon the picture of the great lawgiver. He is depicted as one immersed in the innermost parts of an alien culture. The liberation of his people could not be brought about by a slave, but neither could it be brought about by one who was not deeply related to the Jews.[10] In discussing the subject of the burning bush, Buber rejects the theory that it was merely a tree spirit. He also denies that it is mere mythology. Buber feels that this event is to be interpreted as a decree of God, whose purpose it was to commission Moses to perform his task as liberator. He rejects the Kenite hypothesis that Moses took his concept of God from Jethro. Only a God outside the pantheon of clan deities was capable of becoming the God of monotheism.[11]

Buber struggles with the problem of interpreting the Bible. He is dissatisfied with the two approaches to the Bible which are now in vogue. The first is to accept naively the Biblical account, which Buber can not follow

because he does not accept the fact that the revelation of the Bible is perfect. On the other hand he does not recognize that practice of professional scholars who treat the Bible as literature, pure and simple, and can comprehend it only through its categories. This concept he rejects because although revelation is not perfect, it is still a step on the road of his people towards a more complete experience of deity. The Bible is more to Buber than the product of the imagination of man. In Buber's own words, "The Bible is not a simple chronicle nor is it imaginative poesy, but it is a historical saga."[12.]

The historical Moses who returned to Egypt is for Buber neither a magician nor a visionary. The exodus is a real account of a historical event. He affirms that the spirit of Moses lives in the Exodus Decalogue, as well as in Deuteronomy. He allies himself with those who maintain that the ethical ten commandments are Mosaic in origin. He also believes that Moses was the author of the agrarian economy outlined in the Pentateuch, as he expected momentarily to enter the promised land.[13.]

Moses is symbolical of the principle of wholeness which is central to all Jewish thought. He strives to realize God's law in the religious, political, and theological realms because all of life is under his purview.

The Bible has often been accused of making God in the image of man. Buber feels that anthropomorphism is a necessary metaphor and that to it we owe two great concepts. The first is that of the divine love for Israel as developed by Hosea and the second that of the fatherhood of God which he ascribes to Moses. The anthropomorphic metaphor grants people a closeness to God without damaging his unity. This is precisely what the Bible has done.[14.]

The prophetic period is of great importance in any treatment of the Bible. There are two basic points of view in regard to the place of prophecy in the Biblical account. One is of the opinion that the prophets themselves are the original founders of ethical monotheism, while the other believes that they merely rekindled and reawakened the demands of the original covenant. For Buber the prophetic protest can in no sense be interpreted as an original movement, as the original founding of ethical monotheism. "The exposition of the prophets is not a basic action, but a reaction to the fact that the people and kings did not in their lives and deeds realize the goal implicit in the nature of the kingdom."[15.]

The basic problem of revelation is the setting up of criteria and standards by which to ditinguish the valid experience from that of its counterfeit. One of the chief

criticisms leveled against Buber is his lack of criteria for defining a true experience of revelation. But this does not do justice to his presentation. Buber feels that there can be no hard and fast standards except to evaluate the circumstances and the situation in which prophecy occurs. The true prophet may have his false counterpart as in the case of Jeremiah and Hananiah. Buber states, "God leaves to man the choice of opening his heart to the hard truth or of accepting the easy fraud as truth."[16.] Prophecy must be appropriate to the moment. Both Jeremiah who announces disaster and Dutero Isaiah who declares God's salvation prophecy for the sake of the covenant. Both were true to their own situations. In his essay, The False Prophets, Buber presents the problem in an expanded form. Jeremiah realized that there were some things that he didn't know; he went to listen to God's word whereas Hananiah worshipped the God of success, and parrots Isaiah's statement of God's desire to break Asshur, misapplying this prophecy to Babylon.

The true prophets proclaimed their viewpoint from a comprehensive picture of reality, whereas the false prophet is one who fosters illusions and plays upon the wishful thinking of credulous people. These false prophets are not Godless but are devoted to the God of success. Buber states, "They are in constant need of success and achieve it by promising it to the people. But they do honestly want suc-

cess for their own people. They do not deceive; they are decieved and can breathe only in the air of deceit."[17.] Prophecy does not prognosticate the future, says Buber, but rather the prophet is one who warns and guides and presents the people with a choice. He does not announce an immutable decree. "He speaks into the power of decision lying in the moment in such a way that his message of disaster just touches this power."[18.]

The challenge which the prophets direct to the people is to implement the will of God in all phases of their life here on earth. Whereas Persian and Christian doctrine accepted the need for God's intervention, and man's helplessness, Judaism called upon man to accept full responsibility. In strong words Buber clearly distinguishes the Biblical view of man from the Christian. Speaking of the latter he states, "Christianity had its origin in a deformative late phase of Jewish Messianism in which it strove no longer to conquer history but to escape from it to purer spheres."[19.] The Bible is the first link in the chain of Dialogue. Its importance lies in the fact that it fixed the character of Jewish Dialogue and left its imprint on all successive movements.

In his work, Two Types of Faith, Buber discusses the decisive differences between Pharisiac Judaism and Christ-

ianity. He begins his analysis by stating that in Judaism man finds himself in the relationship of faith, while in Christianity he is converted to it. Man in Judaism is a member of a community whose covenant embraces and incorporates him within it. In Christianity the convert comes not as part of a community but as an individual.

Buber uses as the basis of comparison the New Testament records on the one hand and the basic literature of Pharisaism, the Talmud and Midrash on the other. He attempts to show first how Paul misinterpreted the meaning of Torah. Paul juxtopposes Torah to faith. Torah to him is merely law, whereas its true definition is teaching. The core principle of Pharisaism according to Buber is the doctrine that faith gives direction to the human heart. There is no true direction except that which leads towards God. The law has merely assigned to man those actions agreeable to God, the doing of which helps give direction to man's heart.[20.]

For Buber then on the basis of his interpretation of Pharisaism, Jesus's Sermon on the Mount deals rather with the surpassing of the commandments rather than their rejection. It is only when Jesus refers to a specifically eschatological present such as, "resist not the evil," that he breaks with Pharisaism. This would indeed have been unacceptable to the Pharisees who did not live and teach in expectation of a sudden breaking in of the rule of God into

the lives of men, but rather in the continued slow process of sanctifying all of life in preparation for it. Love was indeed part and parcel of the Jewish conception of God. Buber sites a great deal of evidence in support of his position from Pharisaic doctrine.[21.]

It is Paul on the other hand who makes the absolute break with Judaism and contests the fact that the law is capable of fulfillment. Paul is an antinomian who believed that the law brings sin. He substitutes faith for good works and gradually deifies Jesus. This process of deification is climaxed in the gospel of John.

Israel's faith implies an immediate relation to God. God allows himself to be seen in the phenomena of nature and history, but always remains invisible. Buber mentions an idea which recurs in his last essay, At the Turning. This conceptis the idea of God's hiding himself. Revelation would be impossible without the latter.[22.] When one establishes an image the aim is to prevent God from hiding himself. Whereas in Pharisaism God remains imageless, in Christianity he is both imaged and imageless. He is imageless in the religious idea but image in the actual experience i.e. Jesus.

Whereas Paul could find no love in God, only justice, Pharisaic Judaism looked upon the creation of man and his

revelation to him as works of divine love. Paul constantly depreciates the nature of man who is condemned from of old by the original sin of Adam. In Judaism the mystery of creation is revealed in the free spontaneity of man made in the image of God.[23.]

According to Buber, Pharisaic Judaism had to preserve itself from two direct challenges to the immediacy of its relation to God. The first it had to protect itself from was the idea of fate, that man was destined to be born a sinner. The second doctrine which challenged the existence of this direct relationship was the concept of a mediator that man needed a divine figure to be his vicarious atonement, that he stood between him and God.[24.] Buber interprets the very famous dictum of Akiba"that everything is forseen and yet freedom is given"in this light. On the one hand everything is in the hand of God while on the other man is granted absolute freedom in almost all areas. God does not leave his creation to any kind of fate, but he at one and the same time grants it freedom and controls it.

Both justice and grace are qualities with which God created both the world and man. The unity of justice and grace, Buber asserts, stands opposed to the Pauline separation of the justice of God in this epoch, and his saving grace at the end of time. According to Buber Jewish prayer

takes place in intimacy and not in remoteness. The first word is directed to God as father and only later to God as king.[25.]

Sin in Pharisaic Judaism is the disturbing of the bond between God and man. Its restoration occurs when man turns to God and this turning is not prevented by anything. Man who was expelled from the garden of Eden is still at all times capable of directing prayer to God. As Buber states, "He sins as Adam sinned, and not because Adam sinned."[26.] According to Paul the immediacy between God and man exists only at the beginning of time and its end that is with Adam and Jesus. In between we find that inexorable fate which is broken through for the Christian only by Jesus.

Thus Pharisaic Judaism formed another link in the chain of Jewish historical experience and Dialogue. It had its own challengers to meet and overcome in order its specific Jewish character.

The most powerful impetus to the thought of Buber was provided by the Hasidic movement. Hasidism caused a revolution in his thinking. Buber points to the following elements which captured his admiration. "A community whose basis was a common reverence for divine truth; a God who can be seen in everything and can be reached through every act;

a God who can be served through joy; the high emphasis placed upon the enthusiasm and intention of an act rather than the act itself; a form of mysticism which does not require seclusion from life; and an intense concentration upon and expectation of the Messiah."[27.]

This does not mean that Buber was completely blind to the imperfections of this movement. He tells us that there were many perverted aspects of Hasidism even in its early stages. In the course of its development a wholesale decay finally undermined the entire movement. Buber points out that side by side with the fervent love for the Zadik, (a leader and teacher who helps his disciples communicate with God) we find a superstitious reverence bordering on that of the ignorant for the magician. He is regarded as a great sorcerer who may right all that is wrong and relieve the Hasidm of any responsibility to live the ethical life. As Buber states, "Sometimes dull superstition settled down side by side with the innocent fantasy of the elated spirit and made shallow of its depths, and sometimes crass fraud made its appearance and abused it."[28.]

The founder of the movement, Israel Ben Eliezer, of Mezbizh called the Baal Shem Tov, lived during the first half of the eighteenth century. He left disciples and through five generations the movement perpetuated itself in most areas of Eastern Europe. We may ask then what is the

significance of this movement in Buber's thought?

As in his interpretation of the Bible so in Hasidism the importance of the movement lies not so much in the fact that it is a novel doctrine but that it represents a mode of life.[29] The Zadik or master does not seclude himself but rather surrounds himself with his disciples. In Hasidism there is no abstract theory only the evidence of legends, stories and folk imagery. Again the existentialist determines his choice upon the concrete. The faith of a Hasid is personal but it finds true expression in community living. Arising twenty-five years after Sabbatai Zevi, a false Messiah who won tens of thousands of followers, the Hasidic movement is interpreted as being a response to this challenge. Whereas Sabbataianism focused on the end of days, the Hasidic moevement directed its energies to the sanctification of the every day daily activities of life. Buber points out that both Jacob Frank and the Baal Shem Tov begin with a post-Sabbataian inheritance of failure and despair. The Frankist movement completely breaks the yoke of the Torah and ends up in orgiastic rites of sexual licentiousness. In Hasidism however, the Torah takes on new life. Whereas Frank through the powerful magnetism of his personality leads the crowd into the abysmal depths of sexual promiscuity, the Zadik tries to bind together his disciples in love of the Torah. Buber affirms that Hasidism can only be understood in the light of these two movements

which attempted to break the desicive bond linking Israel to God and the Torah.

But Hasidism was also involved in a struggle with Rabbinism, which stressed the highly intellectual cultivation of the Talmud. It became a religion rooted in scholarship, but it also had the faults of this highly intellectual life. Often men wasted themselves in useless dialectical arguments, called "pilpul." Thus the Baal Shem Tov took his stand against the Rabbinism of his time for divorcing the Torah from real life.[30.] This divorce of the Torah from real life, the desertion of the people by its leaders prepared the way for both for Sabbataianism and Frankism. This gap which was not filled by Rabbinism had to be filled by Hasidism. It is interesting to note the parallel between Buber's own opposition to highly systematic thinking and the Baal Shem's opposition to Rabbinism.

The founder of Hasidism and his disciples prove their mettle by resisting the temptation of claiming to be the Messiah and through their dedication to the sanctification of life. Judaism needed a transfusion of vital faith, a renewal of life and not merely a new teaching. This renewal of life was to be found in Hasidism. The Zadik could then no longer be primarily a scholar, but he was compelled to be that kind of a figure who through his own dedicated

service could touch the personality vitally. This dedicated service takes its place as one of the finest expressions of religious communion with God known in history. The Hasidic movement is a deepening of the concept of Torah. Both the holy and the profane are provisional categories, for the whole of life is to be hallowed. Here again we witness the opposition between Sabbataianism and Hasidism. For one does not wait for the Messianic hour to supersede the division between holy and profane but on the contrary the Messianic hour marks the completion of the labor which is the hallowing of all life. The Torah embraces the entire life. Evil is not dissolved suddenly at the end of days but rather in the continuing processes of history.[31.]

Hasidism took over from the Kabbalah the doctrine that man has the responsibility to release the sparks of goodness from the shells of evil. The ultimate duality between good and evil can finally be resolved. In the Bible God is described as Creator of light and light and darkness. In Pharisaism even the evil inclination can be directed toward the service of God. In Hasidism the shells of evil can be pierced and the duality can be resolved.[32.] All creation becomes a task for man to direct its power in the service of God. Evil is only misdirected power. Evil and good are no longer separate qualities but are like unformed and formed matter. The Shekinah embraces both good and evil. The latter is not an independent substance but is the lowest

rung of goodness. Thus Hasidism renewed the psychological distinction between good and evil while denying its ontological basis.

Hasidism does not expect God to appear miraculously and redeem the world. Man must join hands with him. The creature waits and God waits but the impulse for redemption must first proceed from man, for grace is God's answer to this impulse.

In his essay, Spinoza, Sabbatai Zevi, and the Baal Shem, Buber throws additional light on the significance of Hasidism.[33] He asserts that the main task of Spinoza was to deprive God of the capacity for engaging in Dialogue with man. For Spinoza that which could be addressed, was not great enough to be revered. He therefore consequently rejected Judaism because he felt that its God was merely a person. But the great truth contained in Judaism is that God is also a person. The Bible speaks in the language of man but that does not mean that it reduced God to man. Consequently Judaism was able to preserve a God who could be prayed to, instead of the cold, lifeless, "Natur Naturans" of Spinoza. Although the founder of Hasidism and his disciples did not know of the threat and challenge of Spinoza to destroy the Dialogue, they answered him.

It is important before we conclude the discussion of Hasidism that we realize that the ethical and mystical strains are intimately bound together. In Kierkegaard 's religious stage there occurs a suspension of the ethical. For Hasidism and for all Judaism religion and ethics are integrally bound together. Buber states, "The mystical soul cannot become real if it is not one with the moral soul."[34.]

It was only natural that Buber should, like many of his contemporaries, identify himself with the Zionist cause. He clearly associated himself with the longing of his people for a homeland in Israel where the free spirit of the Jew might find expression. But Buber's relation to Zionism is unique in this respect. His role here is not only as an interpreter as in the Biblical, Pharisaic, and Hasidic expressions of Judaism, but he is also an active participant, a leader and formulater of ideals. His concern with Zionism was primarily with its spiritual implications for Judaism. As editor of the Zionist periodical, "Weg," Buber's attention was directed to the Jewish national renaissance in Europe. As an active professor on the faculty of the University of Jerusalem, he was deeply interested in the fate of his own society. He early allied himself with that group which looked upon Zionism as primarily a spiritual revival. Consequently he was called the "Achad Haam" of German Zionism. He broke with Herzl in 1901 over the issue of political

Zionism.

We can trace the reasons for this break in his work, Israel and Palestine, where Buber discusses this point at length. Buber treats here of the struggle between those who sought to normalize the Jew and those who struggled to preserve his uniquely religious character. For Buber Zionism is rooted in the historical saga of Judaism in which a chosen people has been wedded to a chosen land. Against this mystical relationship which defied the natural categories of history two challenges have been hurled. In the West an attempt was made to make of Judaism a purely religious denomination like any other sect. This program of denationalization threatened the very uniqueness of Judaism. The second great threat was normalization or the secularization of Judaism. Their program takes the form of making Israel like the rest of the people on the earth, a land like any other land, a nation like any other nation.

For Buber Zionism stems from out of the historic encounter between a people and its God. There can be no compromise and attenuating of this concept. The life of the Jewish people is linked inextricably to its religious encounter, to its Dialogue with God. "The idea of Zion is rooted in deeper regions of the earth and rises into loftier regions of the air, and neither its deep roots nor its lofty heights, neither its memory of the past, nor its ideal for the future, both of the selfsame texture must be repudiated.

If Israel renounces the mystery,it renounces the heart of reality itself. National forms without eternal purpose from which they have arisen signify the end of Israel's specific fruitfulness."[35.]

Buber explores the thought of the various leaders of the Zionist movement. Moses Hess, a disciple of Karl Marx, and a socialist was one of the first founders of the movement. But for Hess there was more in history than the materialistic dialectic. The freedom of man's spirit in history could not be denied. He broke with Marx and Engels and became aware of certain autonomous elements in history which they did not find. Although much of the racial theories current in his generation are reflected in Hess' writings, he came upon the basic fact in Judaism which was that religion was to be expressed in the entire domain of life.[36.] After twenty years of alienation from his people, Hess decided to devote himelf to his nation's rebirth. For Hess national rebirth was impossible without social health. This could only take place on the nation's soil. The Jews need the soil in order to realize the great historical goal of our people which is none other than the reign of God on earth. The Jew requires a land in order to realize its Messianic ideal, for it is a this-worldly one. Hess rejected merely any nationalistic restoration. He embraced the supranational mission of Israel. But this mission meant not that

religion was to divorce itself from politics, but rather that both should be intertwined. Both Achad Haam and Pinsker were also concerned with the establishment of Israel as a spiritual center. But whereas for Pinsker and Achad Haam the goal was for cultural creativity alone, for Hess it was social action.

In the thought of Rav Kook the supranational task combined with the concept of "Yichud," the process of unification of the religious life. For Rav Kook the face of the holy could not be turned away from the profane. The purpose of life is to raise the profane to the level of the holy. Israel needs the natural life of being a state which it has lost in order to attain true and natural holiness. Buber links himself with the thinking of Moses Hess and Rav Kook. He, too, wants the unification of life under the will of life in Zion.[37.]

But there is another tradition found in Zionism. This is reflected in the thought of Herzl and Pinsker. Buber feels that both lack the awareness of the suprahistorical task. They manifest the pressing demands of the moment. While Hess speaks of Israel's destiny, Herzl and Pinsker speak merely of her relations with other peoples. While Hess and Rav Kook have emphasized that positive action must take place to implement the establishment of an equitable society, Herzl and

Pinsker were more interested in reacting to antisemitism. Herzl was not aware of his people's great romance with the land of Israel as he was in favor of establishing a promised land anywhere. Pinsker, too, was willing to find a substitute for Israel. To Buber both Pinsker and Herzl were guilty of the sin of expediency in choosing Argentina and Uganda instead of Israel.

Buber has outlined some of his basic beliefs concerning nationalism. Following the first World War Buber encountered what he felt was a degenerate nationalism. He traces modern nationalism as emanating from the French Revolution. But even before this period European man's world was in a state of disolution. From out of his confusion he reached out to find a binding force in nationalism. The original feeling and force of nationalism which was the allegiance to the creative power of a people however, degenerated into a simple brute will to dominate. Buber points out that power is not an evil. Power is intrinsically guiltless but a will to power and power hysteria are definitely evil.

A people becomes a nation in as much as it grows conscious of the fact that it has a unique existence. The pathological manifestation of nationalism is that awareness which is basically the recognition of a lack, disease or ailment. In Buber's own words, "A people is a phenomenon

of life, a nation one of awareness, and nationalism one of overemphasized awareness."[38.] What may we regard as the basic manifestation of this perverted nationalism? It is the principle that a nation is an end in itself. In opposition we have the belief that a nation ahould be linked to an idea, a task greater than itself. Speaking of the positive principle of creativity found within a nation, Buber states, "In a people assertiveness is an impulse that fills itself creatively; in a nation it is an idea inextricanly joined to a task; with nationalism it becomes a program."[39.]

Buber also touches upon the question of what are the proper means to accomplish the Zionistic goal. He states that the Jew has survived because he has dared to be serious about the basic concept of God which is his unity and his undivided absolute soverignty.[40.] Over against this demand that there can be no areas of compromise in fulfilling God's will, are those who feel that the end justifies the means. Zionism cannot find fruition through every possible means but only by practising justice.

In an open letter to Gandhi written in 1939 called, The Land and its Possessors, the principle upon which the Jewish state was to be built is discussed at length by Buber. Mahatma Gandhi had in the course of an atricle compared the Jewish situation in Palestine with that of the Hindus in

South Africa and had questioned the validity of the Jewish claim. Buber alludes to the promise in the Bible. But he affirms that what is decisive is not the promise of the land, but rather the demand which is connected with the establishment of a free Jewish community in their own country. Buber admits that it would be wrong to impose the Jews on the Arabs; rather he believes in mutual aid. Both groups should develop hte land together. Each one should mutually respect and honor the claims of the other. Their difficulties can be worked out in the spirit of mutual love. T he Jew has no desire to dispossess the Arabs, but rather he wants to live together in love with his neighbors. In a recent dispatch Buber outlined his current position on the Arab-Israeli problem. "In my opinion the time is near when it will be possible to reach an agreement resulting in cooperation between Israel and the Arab states. This would involve Israel's participation is some kind of federation of Near Eastern States. I have been a propnent of such a federation for years. Naturally the federation would have to be established in such a way that the majority could not exercise undue influence over the minority, or our national existence would be endangered. That is to say the federation charter would have to be some sort of international Magna Carta.

41.

The conception of Zionism for Buber completes the chain of the Jewish Dialogue with God. His philosophy is a

testament to the fact that man must have a home in the universe. Judaism whose history parallels that of Western Civilization stands as the bearer of the Dialogue. Israel must become aware of its particular mission and priceless heritage so that it may continue to add additional links to its unique chain of being.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR.

1. Martin Buber. Between Man and Man. Page 78.
2. Martin Buber. Eclipse of God. Page 173.
3. Martin Buber. Israel and the World. Page 14.
4. Ibid.. Page 15.
5. Ibid.. Page 24.
6. Ibid.. Page 52.
7. Ibid.. Page 91.
8. Ibid.. Page 120.
9. Ibid.. Page 131.
10. Martin Buber. Moses. Page 35.
11. Ibid.. Page 45.
12. Ibid.. Page 65.
13. Ibid.. Page 176.
14. Ibid.. Page 194.
15. Martin Buber. The Prophetic Faith. Page 67.
16. Ibid.. Page 177.
17. Martin Buber. Israel and the Nations. Page117.
18. Martin Buber. The Prophetic Faith. Page 103.
19. Martin Buber. At the Turning. Page 22.
20. Martin Buber. Two Types of Faith. Page 63.
21. Ibid.. Page 73.
22. Ibid.. Page 130.

23. Ibid.. Page 136.

24. Ibid.. Page 150.

25. Ibid.. Page 157.

26. Ibid.. Page 158.

27. Martin Buber. Mein Weg Zum Chassidismus. Page 1f.

28. Martin Buber. Tales of the Hasidim. Volume 1. Page 10.

29. Martin Buber. Hasidism. Page 1.

30. Ibid.. Page 15.

31. Ibid.. Page 27.

32. Ibid.. Page 67f.

33. Ibid.. Page 95f.

34. Ibid.. Page 158.

35. Martin Buber. Israel and Palestine. Page XIII.

36. Ibid.. Page 117.

37. Ibid.. Page 150f.

38. Martin Buber. Israel and the World. Page 219.

39. Ibid.. Page 222.

40. Ibid.. Page 237.

41. Martin Buber. Every Friday. Volume XXIX. February11, 1955. Page 8.

EVALUATION OF THE

CONTRIBUTION OF MARTIN BUBER TO JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

Every philosophy is written to answer certain basic questions. What then are some of the questions Buber tries to answer? The first and crucial problem attacked by Buber is the definition of the true nature of man. Buber finds that man is a creature of relation. There is little doubt that the proofs adduced from the experience of primitive societies, embryology, and child psychology are far from making a decisive case for this definition of man's nature. This is because Buber confuses anthropology with ethics. He commits the fallacy of arguing from what exists to what ought to be. As Jacob Agus points out in his criticism of Buber's "I and thou" relation, there is a great deal of argument among anthropologists as to whether primitive life bears out Buber's thesis. In fact it appears that there is more evidence against his argument than for it. Agus states, "We have learned from Buber that the essential element of the relational attitude is the feeling of facing and conversing with another person. Does this feeling form part of

the mental content of primitive man? This question we feel can only be answered in the negative. The occult powers which the primitive man perceives all about him are so many additional inhabitants of his ordered world. There is no evidence that they are more to him than so many 'its,' which he may use, compel or persuade, as the case may be to do his bidding."[1.] Buber has thus confused ethical theory with scientific description.

At the same time Buber does discuss the nature of man in the framework of a being made in the image of God. Man, Buber recognizes, is a creature of potential. If he does not already accept the relation of "I and thou," he should accept it because through it he realizes his own essence. His criticism of the world of objectivization of the impersonal "it," of the world of exploitation, is justified not scientifically but ethically.

One must substantially agree with Buber that man cannot live alone in a world indifferent to his fate, in a world bereft of cosmos and order. The greatest tragedy in the history of the world would be the existence of man. Man in such a world would in truth encounter nothingness. His freedom would be useless. There would be no real choice to make due to the fact that no real alternatives exist. Thus Buber's "I and thou," his conception of Dialogue strikes at the heart of the problem of man's place in the world. His treatment

of Sartre and Jung are gems in the realm of analysis and in the justification of Dialogue.

Of prime importance in his concept of the nature of man are the twin ideas of man's freedom and ethical purpose as a creature of God. His mystical intuition of the encounter with God is to be understood in this framework. In any theory of intuition the problem arises of setting up criteria for its verification. There are those who say that this is where Buber is at his weakest. But he is not unaware of this problem. In his work, The Prophetic Faith, and in his essay, False Prophets, Buber comes to grips with the problem of verifying revelation. He states that true prophets penetrate to the complete historical reality of the situation; in other words, they look at all the facts, they look deep within themselves as well as comprehensively about them. In any case the mystical intuition must be verified by the categories of reason. Revelation and reason are not incompatible but they complement each other.[2.]

If reason is of vital importance to revelation or mystical intuition, then it must of necessity be respected. How then shall we understand the anti-intellectualism of Buber? As was pointed out previously, he was greatly influenced by the thought of Soren Kierkegaard. The Danish philosopher championed the anti-intellectual trend in philosophy. He established three categories of being, the aesthetic, the

ethical,and the religious. In one stage of the religious, the transcendent, all relationships are broken off between the temporal self and the eternal self. God becomes the wholly other. Thus it is that the anti-intellectualism of Kierkegaard leads ultimately to the justification of original sin and the appearance of Jesus Christ. Anti-intellectualism is ultimately a necessity in Orthodox Christianity.

In Judaism, however, the intellect has always been encouraged to explore the rational foundations of belief. There may have been some beliefs that were non-rational, that is, not rationally demonstrable, but there were no central beliefs that were irrational. It is true that the revelation of Sinai and the personality of Moses are sometimes equated with Golgotha and Jesus; but Moses was never made divine. The greatest of Jewish leaders was mortal. In Christianity there occurs a break in the history of man. One could eliminate the encounter with God on Mount Sinai and even the personality of Moses and still the basic tenets of Judaism would be valid. The same cannot be said about the place of Jesus in Orthodox Christianity

In Christianity God becomes the wholly other and with the breakdown of man's ability to understand God, we also have the possibility of the suspension of the universality of ethical law. One need only point to the story of the sacrifice of Isaac as treated by Kierkegaard as a case in point. Judaism cannot conceive of the suspension of the ethical. According to

Rabbi Eugene Mihaly who summarizes the Jewish conception of Halacha.(law) He states, "The ethical is universally applicable. It is inconceivable within Halacha, that the demands of the God relation conflict with the universally ethical."[3.]

When Buber then disparages reason and elevates feeling and emotion, he is striking at the very core of Judaism. Both reason and feeling, Rabbinism and Hasidism have their place in Judaism. Buber himself, although he rejects systematic philosophy, does not shy away from entering into analysis of systems-- for instance, his treatment of Sartre, Heidgger, Jung, Hegel, and Nietzsche.How can one justify a philosophy which looks back nostalgically on the folkways of Hasidism on the one hand and in the next breath alludes to Spinoza, Nietzsche and Scheler?

It is interesting to note the great lacunae in his treatment of the history of Judaism. He doesn't discuss the influence of systematic thought as reflected in Philo, Saadiah, Ibn Gabirol, Halevi, Ibn Ezra, Maimonides, Gersonides, or Crescas. Nor has he made any statements dealing with the development of liberal Judaism and its grappling with the problem of belief. He leaves out an overwhelmingly significant proportion of the high intellectual tradition of Judaism from consideration.

Practically speaking, he has done little to formulate a program for modern man to follow. If a way of life is indeed

the most important aspect of religion, of what relevence, we may ask, has been the thought of Buber in the concrete pattern of Jewish existence? There can be no denying that Buber has done a great deal to bring attention to the significance of Hasidism, but this movement cannot serve as a pattern for living in the twentieth century. We may be enriched by it, but we can hardly subsist on it.

It is to Buber's credit that he has reminded us that Judaism is a religion which calls upon man to unite all his life under the will of God, the ethical imperative. Contrary to some critics who have accused him of lumping together Judaismand Christianity, Buber has insistently proclaimed the uniqueness of the Mosaic faith. He has fought mightily for the centrality of the spirit in Jewish life and has left a deep imprint on the thought of an epoch.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE.

1. Jacob Agus. Modern Philosophies of Judaism. Page 261.
2. Martin Buber. Israel and the World. Page 117.
3. Eugene Mihaly. Reform Judaism and Halakah. (Central Conference of American Rabbis Yearbook). Volume 64. Page 3.

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