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The Central-Verein deutscher Staatsbuerger
juedischen Glaubens,
1922-1926:

A study of attitudes

by

Richard Rosenthal

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
the Master of Hebrew Letters
Degree and Ordination.

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Ellis Rivkin

To
My Parents
With Love

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Digest.

This thesis attempts to examine various aspects of the attitude of the Central-Verein deutscher Staatsbuerger juedischen Glaubens toward the place of the Jew in German Society.

It begins with an examination of the position of the Jew in Germany in 1922, the year this thesis begins. It also presents a short history of Germany since the war. There is also an account of the history of the CV.

The actual examination of the CV's attitude is done in six chapters. The first examines the attitude toward the German state. This shows that the members of the CV considered themselves to be patriotic middle class citizens. The next chapter deals with the attitude toward Zionism. The CV opposed Zionism because of its political platform. In regard to religion, the CV maintained that it was in large part was to be identified with ethics. It believed that there should be a great degree of unity in the German Jewish community.

The CV opposed the right wing of the Jewish community. It was also unable to act in the face of the problem presented by the Eastern European Jews in Germany. The CV considered the answer to the anti-Semitic agitation to be largely a matter of education.

This thesis attempts to show that in large measure the CV never came to grips with the real problem of the Jew in Germany. Too concerned with the petty details of answering specific anti-Semitic charges, the CV was never able to gain a large enough perspective to view the position of the German Jew in its true light. In a large part, the CV adopted the premise of the anti-Semite and descended to his level to fight him.

Preface

I cannot begin this thesis without expressing my thanks and appreciation to Dr. Ellis Rivkin for his encouragement, and for the insights that his historical approach has given me. If I have achieved any understanding of the material handled, it has been due to the fact that I have been privileged to study under him.

I would also like to call the reader's attention to the fact that I have consistently referred to the Central Verein as CV and the C. W. Zeitung as CVZ in this paper.

Chapter I

The Jews in 1922

The loss of the first World War brought revolution to Germany. The abdication of the Kaiser and the founding of soldiers and workers councils throughout the country, both point to the complete disruption of German life and to the shift of rule to the lower classes. The German government was in the hands of the proletarian classes; at least, their political parties -- Social Democrats, Independent Socialists, Spartacists, etc. -- had assumed the direction of the national administration and the administrations of the various states.

If one looks at the figures of the German elections, in the days following the war, it is clearly evident that the left parties had the confidence of the people. The war had ended with great hope for the German working classes. It was to their leaders that the General Staff had had to appeal in order to find a means by which peace could be brought to Germany. The day of the Socialist state seemed certainly close at hand. But all this is only surface evidence. Ebert, the leader of the Social Democrats, who in his person symbolized the triumph of the left, called in the General Staff to help him quell disturbances. Time and time again, it was the power of the old regime which kept the populace in check. There

was a direct phone connection from the desk of Ebert to the desk of General Groener of the High Command.

Not only did the Socialists maintain themselves with the power of the army, but they also retained in large measure the old civil service. This created the curious paradox of a republic, whose military and civil service were in principle opposed to its continuation. This fact played havoc with the life of the young republic. The existence of a strong independent army, especially, worked against the creation of a stable government. The early days of the republic were days of political assassinations; the Free Corps roamed at will through the land, challenging even the authority of the central government in Berlin.

During the struggle for political power, the economic control of the country was not at all seriously disturbed. Since the creation of the German Empire, in 1870, there had been a tendency toward centralization of industry in Germany. This was greatly accelerated during the war, when, as a result of pressure by the army, bureaucracy and big industrialists, the cartel system became the basis of German economy. After the war, there was pressure for socialization of industry. But the big industrialists were able to defend themselves. They, unlike the rest of the country, emerged stronger from the war than they had entered. They had made large profits while at the same

time they were able to keep taxes low. Thus, they were more than able to hold their own against the encroachments of the Socialist government.

After the war, the industrialists were quick to take the initiative. They used their great wealth not only for the acquisition of the organs of public information, such as the newspapers, but they acquired the middle class and rightist political parties as well. The Reichsbank, maker of German fiscal policies, was also in their hands. By 1920, they were in such an advantageous position that they could not be stopped. Men like Stinnes and Thyssen built tremendous horizontal trusts, bringing all aspects of industry and business under their control. The inflation of the early twenties firmly established them on their thrones of power as it allowed them to pay low wages, while at the same time they were able to rid themselves of their indebtedness by paying with the highly inflated mark. The Dawes Plan, which ended the inflation by stabilizing the German currency with an American loan, acted as a sort of desert for the industrialists. For now they were able to expand their production in a highly artificial economy.

Thus, industrialist, militarist and bureaucrat stood arrayed together against the struggling young republic. Brick by brick they began to build the structure that would in the end do away with the republic. Germany did

not lose the war on the battlefield, became the watchword in their circle. Germany lost the war at home. Thus, the myth of the undefeated army and the stab in the back was used as a balm for soothing the German conscience.

The intellectual state of Germany during this period mirrors, perhaps better than anything else, the confusion and lack of direction. It was the time of Anton Berg and the worshippers of discord. In literature it was the fashion to read Kafka. James Joyce was in vogue. Every irrational movement, from surrealism leftward, found a response in Germany. While in the every-day social life of the land the old order yet remained strong, the intellectual and artistic life had overthrown its traces. It had little confidence in the past and eagerly sought salvation in the new philosophies, which lead to either the political left or the political right.

What of the Jews at this time? The Jews were an intrinsic part of the German middle class. Although there were Jews who belonged to the proletariat, and, in fact, several leftist leaders were Jews, yet the majority of Jews were engaged in wholesale and retail business and the professions, and it was from this group that the Jewish leadership came. One need only glance at the list of officers of any Jewish organization, be it pro- or anti-Zionist, orthodox or liberal, to see the great number of business and professional people in positions of importance.¹

Being members of the middle class, the Jews were committed to the existing German economic and political system. They were affiliated in great part with the parties of the center, especially with the Democratic party. This was the party of economic liberalism. One of the most important leaders of this party was Walter Rathenau, the man German Jewry probably considered as its ideal representative.

German Jewry was to a large degree a homogeneous group. Belonging to the same economic class, most German Jews went through similar life experiences. Their attitudes toward the German state and toward the German social community were therefore alike in a great many respects, regardless of their affiliations in the Jewish community. Their attitudes might best be understood if we turn to the writings of Hermann Cohen, who attempted through much of his philosophical writing to arrive at a synthesis of Jewish and German thought. Said Cohen, in the midst of the first World War: "...at this fateful time for the nation, we are proud as Jews to be Germans also.... Thus we consider ourselves, as German Jews, to possess a knowledge which will unite the nations in a messianic sense...."² The German Jews drank joyfully from the fountains of German culture. We need but read the sermons, newspaper articles and other products of prominent members of the German Jewish community to find them completely

filled with quotations from Goethe, Schiller, Lessing and other classical German writers.

It must be borne in mind, however, that while Jews were of one opinion in their estimate of German culture and life, they differed greatly among themselves ideologically. There were two types of divisions, religious and political, although they tended to overlap. On the one hand there were the Liberal Jews, on the other the Orthodox. But even here there was no complete union. The orthodox had such organizations as the Agudas Jisrael, the Mizrachi, Freie Vereinigung fuer die Interessen des orthodoxen Judentums. These organizations varied in their attitude toward Zionism. The Zionists themselves were allied in different parties according to their social philosophy. Representing the anti-Zionist viewpoint in varying degrees of intensity were the CV and Reichsbund juedischer Frontsoldaten. There was a union of religious congregations, Deutsch-Israelitischer Gemeindebund. There were also various pro- and anti-Zionist organizations. Philanthropic work was done by the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden. In other words, all ranges of opinion were to be found in the community. This is a brief sketch of the situation of Germany and German Jewry in the crucial early post-war years. It will be substantiated by additional material in the following chapters.

The particular area of this study is the CV. It was founded in 1893, in response to the shifting emphasis of "German thought from religion to race, from 'Christentum' to 'Germanentum'".³ The necessity for the organization was felt throughout the Jewish community. It was felt that the Jew should take an entirely new approach to fighting anti-Semitism. Wrote one of the leading pamphleteers of the early CV: "We must help ourselves. We want to be citizens, not protected Jews (Schutzjuden)."⁴ From the start they pursued a very aggressive policy. "Protect yourselves! a call to arms to the Jews."⁴ The founders of CV envisioned it as the center of all defense measures against anti-Semites in Germany. The phrase "of the Jewish faith" in the name of the organization was designed to refer not to a religious orientation but rather it was to be "the political rubric to which the German Jewish community was oriented".⁵ The constitution declared: "The CV attempts to unite all German citizens of the Jewish faith regardless of religious or political opinion in order to strengthen them in the practical maintenance of their political and social equality as well as in the...development of a German orientation."⁵

Although they pledged themselves to work with all German Jews, the CV early antagonized the orthodox element in the community by the use of certain phrases in its literature. This split was healed by the orthodox leader

and scholar, Hirsch Hildesheimer. Thus, in its beginning the CV did truly become the center of German Jewish defense work.

The work of the CV was varied. One aspect was the strengthening of Jewish consciousness. Eugen Fuchs, one of the leaders of the organization and an important lawyer said, after the particularly successful 1895 convention of the organization: "Baptism again means loss of honor, desertion from duty."⁶ As an aside, it is very interesting to note Fuchs' language: the military imagery certainly shows him to be a child of the age of German military triumphs. The CV also busied itself in the answering of charges against the Jews. It sponsored the works of both Jewish and non-Jewish scholars in calling the lie to anti-Semitic libels, such as the attacks on the Talmud, etc.

By 1929, the CV had a membership of 60,000 who belonged to 555 local organizations. These local organizations were in turn united in 21 state federations. Various other Jewish organizations were affiliated with it. All in all, the CV represented about 300,000 Jews.

The main work of the CV was done by the Executive Committee (Hauptvorstand) which directed its activities and set its policy. There was also a yearly convention which discussed the policies of the organization. In practice, however, the policy was tightly controlled from the center.

Chapter II

Attitude toward the German State

The purpose of this chapter will be to establish by means of quotations the CV's concept of patriotism and its attitude toward the German state. What the attitude of the CV in this respect was, has already been hinted at in the first chapter.

The CV attempted to arrive at a synthesis of Jewishness and German citizenship. It did not, however, follow in the footsteps of German Jewish thinkers such as Geiger, Riesser or Hermann Cohen in attempting to prove such a synthesis possible. It simply took for granted that such a mixture was the highest of all goals. "Germany, German soil, German work, German future is holy to us."¹ Here is a quotation from the CVZ that sounds at first glance as if it came from the newspapers of the extreme right. The German Jews, or at least the leadership of the CV seems to take as metaphysical an attitude toward German citizenship as any group in the German republic. Wrote Eugen Fuchs in 1922, evaluating the program of the CV:

The kernel of...(the program of the CV) is the planting of pride in the principles of Judaism in our youth, to indoctrinate them with the knowledge that we are good Germans and also the heirs of a great...Jewish tradition in order that Jewish ethical thought take strong root and that German civilization continue to bloom and become ever stronger.²

He seems to imply by this remark that a Jew cannot be a good Jew, unless he is also a good German, and vice versa. This certainly seems to be a very odd thought at first glance. Fuchs in this quotation seems certainly to stake the future of German Jewry on German civilization. He has uncritically accepted Germany and German thought. It is a priori good. In the same light one might consider the following quote: "Our CV is the place where all German Jews, who are good Germans and good Jews, unite....We decline to allow ourselves to be examined, how many drops German and how many drops Jewish blood we have...."³

Already in these first quotations, one may perceive a very intense attitude toward the idea of German loyalty. One might almost call it an aggressive attitude. The above quotation seems to tell us by implication that there is only one good kind of German Jew, and he is the CV-type Jew. No other need apply. Certainly there must have been other elements in the German Jewish population who would not have agreed with this type of definition. But they are not mentioned except in a negative way.

One of the common arguments of the anti-Semites against the Jews was that their place in the community was an artificial one. The Jews were the pariah people, the guest people, who had no real part in the community. The Jew was the perpetual outsider. He could never be a true

patriot, for how could a stranger have really deep feeling about a country where he is only a sojourner. The German Jews thundered against this challenge of their patriotism: "We German Jews rightfully do not consider ourselves as only artificial members of the community, we German Jews have lived on German soil for many centuries and we have a sense of security which can only arise from this long association with the land."⁴

The meaning of this statement is only too clear. Considering the true position of the Jew in Germany, as mentioned in the previous chapter, we can easily see that it must certainly have been almost an impossibility for the German Jew to have had a sense of security in post-war Germany. What Brodnitz, the writer of this statement, implies is that the German Jew should have a sense of security. "Assume a virtue if thou have it not." This indeed seems to be the key to much that is said in the CVZ. An artificial situation is set up: The German Jew should by all rights be at home in Germany. He therefore is at home in Germany and he feels secure. Of course, one might indeed say that such a position leaves much to be desired. The CV recognized this. It continually found it necessary to qualify its statements.

One of the qualifications is that anti-Jewish feeling is "un-German". Certainly the anti-Semites would not

agree with such a stand. To them anti-Semitism was the height of German patriotism. Therefore the CV found it necessary to say that within the context of the German republic, anti-Semitism was un-German. It was in stark opposition to the German spirit. "The spirit of those who call themselves with pride 'Deutsche Studenten juedischen Glaubens' is not only German from the heart and with the deepest emotions, but it also, through its fight against the un-German spirit...earns the right to its Germanism."⁵

The Jew is the stoutest champion of the German tradition. Not only does he seek to preserve the German tradition by his fight to keep Germanism pure, he is one of the strongest supporters of the German tradition in those areas that have been separated from the Reich. The CV was very eager to show that "pan-German" feelings filled the hearts of those who, although they had been separated from the Reich, still remained loyal to the German tradition and longed for a reconciliation with the Reich. By this they indicated that they, as well as all other Germans, were opposed to the oppressive conditions of the Versailles Treaty. This was very important, as the opponents of the democratic republic sought to identify the Treaty with the republic and the Jews, making them responsible for the ignoble peace. "In Posen, West Prussia, Danzig, as well as in Upper Silesia, the Jews have devoted all their power to German affairs and are

today one of the strongest supporters of Germanism.... And just as in these robbed territories, so is it also in the former Austrian territories."⁶ No anti-Semitic opposition is strong enough to deter these people from their task as stout partisans of the German tradition. Even Polish persecution will not move the Jews in Posen and West Prussia from their patriotic stand.²³

The Jews in these territories were given several opportunities to show their patriotism. The plebiscite for Upper Silesia which had been held on March 20, 1921, went overwhelmingly for Germany. Yet the League of Nations decided to divide Upper Silesia. A little more than half of the province went to Germany. The most productive part of the territory, containing most of the mines, mills and furnaces, however, was turned over to Poland. This was a very critical blow to the German economy. Reviewing this situation the CV mentions the consistent patriotism of the Jews:

The Jewish citizens of Upper Silesia have remained loyal to their home (i.e. Germany) under the most trying circumstances. When, as a result of the collapse of the first proposal of the Paris Treaty, all of Upper Silesia went to the Poles, the leaders of Upper Silesian Jewry decided to undertake the difficult task of telling all civilization about the true conditions....In many places (during the plebiscite) the Jews marked their ballots for Germany -- naturally for Germany -- collectively.

The CV, however, was not satisfied with these statements alone. It publicly declared its position. Dr. Ludwig

Haas, a member of the Reichstag, declared at the convention in 1925: "We declare...that we are filled with deep sorrow at removal of territory from the nation, and we see as our highest goal, a Germany that encompasses all former German territory, as well as Austria."²⁴

The biggest opportunity for German Jews to show their patriotism came during the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. Reparations had been a continual thorn in the side of the German government since the end of the war. As a result of French pressure, the figure Germany had to pay had been set astronomically high. The Germans had at first hoped to resist paying this high figure, but the French were adamant. Finally, under the Wirth government in Germany, the decision was made to comply with the reparation demands. But the Wirth government fell, as it was indeed impossible for the German economy to bear the payments to France.

Wirth's successor was Cuno. He formed a government of experts drawn from the middle class parties. His first act was to demand a revision of the total sum by the Allies, based upon a realistic consideration of Germany's ability to pay. If they refused to do this, he told the Allies, they might do with Germany what they wanted. If they desired to occupy the Ruhr as security for Germany's reparation debt, as the French had proposed, then they

could attempt to do so. But Germany would offer resistance to this effort.

Although Cuno's position was motivated by a sincere desire to find a workable solution to the whole question of reparation, the French government decided to consider it as an out and out refusal to pay reparations. On the pretext that Germany had not delivered her complete quota of coal, the French occupied the Ruhr. The German government, however, did not sit idly by at this invasion of its territory. The German government ordered all civil servants in the area to refuse to co-operate with the French. The French retaliated by taking over the German railroads. There were daily fights between the German inhabitants of the Ruhr and the French soldiers.

If the resistance to the French were to succeed, however, it was necessary to offer economic resistance. The labor unions were willing to do this, but not the mine owners. They kept the mines open for the stated purpose of providing coal for the Ruhr itself. What really happened is described by Rosenberg:

The scene is any pit in the Ruhr district. The miners peacefully work the coal and pile it at the pit mouth. One day the French troops appear at the mine. German miners and labourers indignantly leave the spot. The French remain there, and with great difficulty and the assistance of foreign labourers whom they have brought with them they clear the coal from the pit head. This done, they move off again.

Immediately the German workers and officials reappear....The whole procedurg was known as 'national passive resistance'.⁸

The CV immediately supported the government in its campaign in the Ruhr. Collections were taken up to help alleviate the needy resistors in the Ruhr. For example, the CV called to the German Jews: "Our native land is in great need. It is necessary to help the oppressed brothers in the Ruhr. We know, that every Jewish German will assume this duty. Let the contribution come abundantly. We are calling you to your duty in order that nothing will lack."⁹ This appeal was signed by the Executive Committee of the CV. But not only did the CV fight the foe with works and money. The leaders of the CV took an active part in the resistance itself. For example, one news item informs us: "Max Blank, a member of the executive committee of our local organization in Witten, has been sentenced by a military court to imprisonment for eight days and fined one million marks because he refused to sell merchandise to the occupation authorities."¹⁰ The German Jews were constantly reminded to help maintain the boycott against the French. For example, after the French had seized the German railroads, Jewish traveling salesmen were asked not to ride on the trains operated by the French.¹¹

Thus, the German Jewish organizations showed their patriotism. But the Nationalist parties, the CV charged,

were disrupting national unity. Anti-Semitism was in this instance really giving aid and comfort to the enemy. "The French are laughing in their beards, as (they see)... how the rightist parties (Deutschvoelkischen) are working for them, destroying German unity by irresponsibly hating the Jews."¹² This side of the Ruhr struggle and the German Jews' attitude toward it, will be further discussed later.

As has been noted above, the CV was a defender of the republic. The Jews were the only element in the German population, with the exception of labor, to be absolutely committed toward the maintenance of the republic and its institutions. Therefore they found it constantly necessary to speak in behalf of the republic. For example, in February, 1924, the CV published an article by a leading politician, Hugo Preuss, a Jew, in which he defends the republic. He bases his argument on the fact that only the central democratic authority of the Berlin government can be considered as a truly "German" government. The federal system of the Empire did not provide the essential unity needed by a national state. The Weimar republic has provided a force that will make for unity. He points to recent history. "What binds all loyal Germans to the Reich, is the power of the ideas of national unity and freedom."¹³

This article has a rather peculiar tone. The idea of central authority is held out as the supreme need in

Germany. This is certainly true. But there must have been other reasons why the republic was the "best of all worlds", but Freuss does not make mention of them.

Because of their support of the republic, Jews were constantly urged to take part in the national political life. "In a parliamentary state, he who has the majority has the power."¹⁴ "Public opinion is...important today for the welfare and protection of the Fatherland, and therefore of its citizens."¹⁵ The call of the CV was "Erfuelle eure Pflicht" (Do your Duty), or "Wahlrecht... (ist) Wirklich Wahlpflicht" (The right to vote is actually the duty to vote).¹⁶ The Jews were not to be discouraged. In a democratic society, one has to learn to meet disappointment. Even if we lose an election, it is not a total loss, for we have "gained experience for the next time".¹⁷ But one thing should be remembered: "We Jewish Germans are not a political unity."¹⁸ Despite the fact that all Jews are urged to exercise their franchise, they are not asked to vote in a block. Naturally Jews can not vote for the nationalist parties with their anti-Semitic programs. But this is the only thing that limits Jews in exercising their franchise.

The CV also demands honesty and decency in politics. "We must have political parties, opposition is necessary, but attacks...by personal insults are unnecessary."²⁰ Of

course, it must be remembered that this call for less insults in politics is tied up with anti-Semitic agitation. This will be more fully discussed later in this paper.

While calling the German Jews to be loyal to the republic, the CV reminded them of the service German Jews have rendered to the ideals of Liberalism in Germany. In the midst of the Ruhr fight, an article in the CVZ recalls:

In these days, which remind us greatly of the days of the first German parliament in Frankfurt, which emphasized the need for German unity, we can point with pride (to the fact) that Gabriel Riesser, Vice-President of the Parliament of the Paul Church, was a complete Jewish German. He showed by his life and labors, that there is no opposition between German and Jew.¹⁹

Considering the attitude of the CV in regard to German society in general, it is not surprising to see its attitude toward Jewish parochial schools. Oscar Cassel gave the majority opinion when he remarked: "I am completely convinced that the separation from the public schools will have serious consequences for German Jewry."²¹ But not all the members of the CV were united with him. His article was answered by a Direktor Dr. Carlebach who declared: "The Jewish school is an absolute necessity, for only through it can the problem of a dual culture, the Jewish and universal, be overcome; only through it can the ignorance of German Jews be removed and the synthesis between Judaism and world citizenship be made a reality."²²

This then is the CV's attitude toward the German state. There is no noticeable change in attitude during the years covered by this thesis. This is understandable when we take into consideration the events of the period. The republic was under constant attack, and Jews as its supporters naturally sprang to its defense. The attack was as heavy in 1922 as it was in 1926.

One may sum up this chapter by saying that the German Jew considered himself a patriotic citizen of a democratic republic. He defended its institutions with all his might, while at the same time he fought against those who would destroy it. He felt his own hopes and aspirations to be closely tied with the democratic institutions of the state. He conceived of salvation for the state as lying in the field of utilization of political power. If all citizens exercised their prerogatives, the political life of the state would be secure.

Chapter III

Attitude toward Zionism

The CV considered itself to be solely German. Its membership was limited to those who possessed German citizenship. Therefore it is not surprising that it looked with suspicion upon the Zionists. It had no sympathy with those who desired to build a Jewish state. Political ambition of that sort was completely out of consonance with the CV's conception of Judaism.

There is no common Jewish culture, which penetrates religion, dogma and ethics as well as their application. Even the culture of the Jewish masses of the East is not Jewish in the sense...that it is created by Jewish genius or that it represents solely Jewish ideals....The 'Jewish' culture is only a hope for the future....¹

This is the CV's answer to those who hoped to create a Jewish state. It attacks the very premise of their arguments. There is no overall Jewish culture. Perhaps you might be able to create one in the future. Speaking of a proposal mentioned by the "Juedische Rundschau", the Zionist paper, to create a school where only Hebrew is spoken, the CVZ speaks out very clearly. Such a proposal is completely unrealistic. Not only that, but the proposed school might provide further ammunition for the anti-Semites.²

An article by Dr. Paul Nathan, which appeared in the CVZ in August, 1926, may perhaps be used to illustrate

several facets of the CV's attitude toward Zionism. It is true that, as was stated above, it opposed the Zionists on idealistic grounds. Nathan, however, uses an entirely different approach. The key to it is given in the title: "Practical politics or wild agitation?" The political movement that is to be measured by this title is of course the Zionist movement. He postulates two opposites: practical politics are those which have an attainable end in view, and the methods are at hand; wild agitation is working for an end that cannot be reached, for example, the tragic collapse of the ideals of the French Revolution.

The Zionists are compared to those who cannot hope to attain their goal. They hope that through the settlement of Palestine the problem of anti-Semitism would disappear from the world. "This illusion we hold as dangerous as any political illusion which is followed by disappointment."⁴ The arguments that he uses to show the impossibilities of attaining Zionist goals are: (1) Palestine is too small to provide room for all Jews; (2) Palestine is not economically able to take a large population; (3) The Arabs have a claim to Palestine; Jewish settlement causes bloodshed; (4) Palestine is an important factor in British foreign policy; Britain must maintain Arab good will at all costs. On the basis of this evidence, Zionist hopes have no chance of materialization. Why then does Zionism have such power?

It demands a great deal from its supporters, whom I...do not value lightly and further it

demands...money which flows sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker and which therefore is of questionable value for political action that depends upon time. That is all. A sober awakening...will determine that the ultimate goal of Zionism is a soap bubble, but not a realistic political program.⁴

Although Nathan presents no argument that is particularly new or original, yet the atmosphere of his article is even more damning than the ideological attack. For he seems here to reject idealism. We will give anything that seems workable a chance, he seems to be saying. We must be pragmatic in our approach to the problem. There is a dichotomy between these two objections to Zionism. In fact, there seems to be no bridge between the two at all.

The struggle between Zionist and non-Zionist also takes form in the politics of the German community. For example, in the 1925 elections held for the Prussian State Assembly of Jewish Congregations, the CV singled out the Zionists for attack. It called upon the German Jews to remember their heritage as citizens in a free land. This talk of the Zionist about a state and a Jewish race is all nonsense. "The question of the German Jews can only be solved on German soil...by German Jews in cooperation with their progressively-minded Christian fellow citizens."⁵

The CV does not support any particular party in the communal election. It only warns its members not to vote for any Zionist. "We recognize Germany as our only

fatherland."⁶ Another motivation brought forth at the same time was: "Let us show the German people that we consider ourselves as Germans, and that we reject the view which would exchange our German fatherland for Palestine, which is under British mandate."⁷

If this article were not enough to convince the voters that one should not vote for the Zionists, an article, "The Dangers of Hebraization", is even more urgent in its appeal. This article proclaims that there is great danger in Hebrew-speaking courses. It is "unhealthy". We are Germans, German is our national tongue and we have no right to teach our children Hebrew. The result will be that our children will know more Hebrew, but much less German. To teach Hebrew, we must create a ghetto, and thus our children will be cut off from all the rest of the nation. They will move only in an atmosphere that is Hebrew.

Another argument used by the CV against the Zionists was based on the theory of race. Wrote Hugo Preuss, in 1925, about the Zionist movement: "We must not deceive ourselves with a false idea of racial solidarity. We should not feel it necessary to cover up every Jewish mistake...."⁸

There is also one strange note encountered by the writer. In 1922, an article in the CVZ speaks with favor of the settling of Palestine. But it continues to

complain: "The plan to build a Jewish state...is the monopoly of the Zionist party....Now is the time...to take the Palestine-affair out of the hands of the party."⁹

This attitude seems to anticipate the plan of the original Jewish Agency. But the attitude of the CV expressed above seems to have been only a very temporary one. Most German Jews were satisfied to reaffirm again and again their German patriotism. "We want to be free Jewish Germans."¹⁰ Our lives are too intimately tied to Germany. Most people were only too willing to agree with Leopold Jessner, the manager of the Staatlichen Schauspielhaus in Berlin:

I write...with the conviction of a man who is of the Jewish faith but who considers himself completely a German, to whom the attempts at realizing the Zionist ideal seem neither practical nor opportune. Jew by race and German by politics and nation, I believe not only in this synthesis, but also in its fruitfulness, of which there is much evidence.¹¹

But the CV was not completely anti-Zionist. In fact, when anti-Semites attacked the Zionist as being un-German and having loyalty to a foreign power, the CVZ remarks how curious it is that while the Christian can show concern for and interest in the Holy Land, the Jew on the other hand is considered "as committing treason" when he "thinks of that holy soil and desires to take a part in its reconstruction."¹²

What may be considered as the epic struggle between the Zionists and the CV was over support for the Keren

Hayesod. In 1922, the CV expressed its attitude toward the Keren Hayesod in the following terms: "The philosophy of the CV forbids that as long as in our fatherland...the Jewish institutions...are in deepest need...to use money for any purpose other than the work of reconstruction in our German fatherland."¹³ The sole purpose of this article was to inform the members of the CV not to support the Keren Hayesod. The question of the Keren Hayesod seemed then to have remained dormant for several years. The writer was unable to find any references to it in 1923 and 1924. This was most probably due to the fact that all charitable work had come to a virtual standstill because of the inflation in Germany. Since most people were too impoverished to make contributions, the Keren Hayesod was a dead issue.

There is another reference to the Keren Hayesod in 1922, in addition to the one mentioned above. It provides one of the few occasions on which humor entered the pages of the CVZ. "And now the German Keren Hayesod pamphlet comes and figures out for us exactly that...Palestine will have a population of more than two million in thirty years....One should not check these facts in Baedeker, even though it may be written in Hebrew...."¹⁴ Despite these two references, which show a certain dislike of the Keren Hayesod, the CV did not begin an actual fight with the Fund until 1925. It began to disapprove the close

connection between the Keren Hayesod and the political Zionist. It said that ~~they~~^{it} had once hoped to be able to work with the Fund on a non-partisan level. But not it is impossible. After producing evidence that the Keren Hayesod is basically a nationalistic institution, the CV concludes: "Therefore it is clear that the CV cannot support the Jewish-nationalist settlement of Palestine, out of fundamental principles. We have already mentioned in these papers that the CV has great interest in every non-political, truly neutral attempt at reconstruction...."¹⁵ That this attitude did not really fulfil the requirements of a truly constructive policy toward the upbuilding of Palestine was felt by Dr. Alfred Wiener. He wrote, early in 1926, that an organization was needed in Germany which could approach the problem without "hate or love". The CV had decided that the Keren Hayesod was not qualified to do the work, but unfortunately there was no new organization to fill the need. He suggested the founding of an organization similar to the "Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Islamkunde". This German organization when founded would take a neutral attitude toward the work in Palestine, thus making it possible for all German Jews to unite under its banner. This organization would also be in a position to issue news bulletins, etc., to bring objective news of the Palestine situation.¹⁶

One seems to sense in this article of Wiener's, a sense of shame. Great things are going on in Palestine

and the CV did not want to remain on the sideline, but on the other hand it could find no way to get its foot in the door without prejudicing its German patriotic attitude. It was caught on the horns of the dilemma.

Dr. Benno Jacob takes a completely different attitude toward the problem of the Keren Hayesod. He asks the question, "Must a German rabbi make appeals for the Keren Hayesod?" and he answers it with a resounding "No!" "...in these days of the most terrible need of our collapsed fatherland and especially of the Jewish congregations (I can not square with my conscience) the collection of money for an English-Jewish colony in Asia."¹⁷ Palestine has meant a great deal to the Jewish tradition of the past. Therefore, Jews most certainly have a definite responsibility to work for the reconstruction of Palestine. It cannot, however, be done by political means. He advocates a poetic solution: "Tolstoi could not understand the Zionists. The Jews, he said, have the most beautiful fatherland one can imagine, the Bible. And our Keren Hayesod is the Sh'ma Yisroel."¹⁸

The CV continued to criticize the Keren Hayesod because of its Zionist political connection. When a Keren Hayesod handbook was published, in 1926, it referred to the contributions to the Fund as a sort of tax imposed on the Jewish people. The CV criticized this idea strongly.

If the contributions to the Keren Hayesod are demanded as taxes and we contribute money to this organization, we are giving implicit recognition to the idea that the Jews are a people (Volk). The Zionists themselves admit that this use of the Keren Hayesod is a means of educating the Jewish people in order to teach them to take an ever-increasing part in the reconstruction work in Palestine.¹⁹

At the convention of the CV in 1926, there was some opposition to the CV's stand on the question of the Keren Hayesod. A motion was introduced to permit each member to choose whether or not he wanted to support the work of the Fund. This was defeated and in its place a motion was passed confirming the stand that "the settlement of Palestine is among the primary goals of the nationalist Jewish politics;" therefore the CV could not support the organization. The motion ends with a statement of the great need in Germany which demands first attention.²⁰

This Keren Hayesod controversy points out very clearly how much the program of the CV was centered in Germany. Ideological arguments aside, the whole controversy was merely one concerning where money should be spent, in Germany or in Palestine. The CV decided for, what seemed to them, the more realistic solution of spending the money to support the institutions of German Jewry. As it was with the Keren Hayesod, so was it with the entire Zionist

program. The CV had no interest outside Germany. It could see only that the Zionist program might jeopardize its position in German society. Therefore it did everything in its power to minimize its effects.

Chapter IV

Religion

The attitude toward religion is very closely tied to the attitude toward Zionism. In fact, it is very hard to find out exactly where religion is mentioned for its own sake or when it is mentioned only as an antithesis to Zionism. For example, one might consider several references in the CVZ where religion is closely tied to opposition to Zionism. A typical statement is the following: "Judaism is religion and common origin....We know of no Jewish world politics...."¹ This statement seems to limit religion to a very narrow sphere. It has nothing to do with any national strivings. Not quite so limited in its concept of religion is an article by Dr. Felix Goldman. Arising out of the same need as the above, i.e. to answer the nationalists, it says, in part:

...for us acceptance of religion is the criterion (by which to judge) whether a person is a Jew. This is conditional for our acceptance....In all matters, that are not concerned with purely denominational affairs, we set our goal on inter-denominational co-operation....²

The placid understanding seems to be that Jews can best achieve their goal by working not with the nationalist organs of Jewry, but rather by working with all other religious bodies regardless of their denomination. This thought is also touched upon by Dr. Ludwig Haas in his address to the convention in 1925: "Materialism must be

replaced by the true Christian spirit and the true Jewish spirit, which cannot be differentiated in the social sphere, both go back to the Bible which is the book of the highest social ethic."³ This statement of Haas brings us perhaps to the underlying principle of the religious philosophy of the CV, which is an emphasis upon Jewish ethics as the center of religious belief. This can be easily understood if we remember that we are dealing with an organization whose main purpose is to provide a rationale for Jewish life in a modern state. Ethics assume the most important place in religious thought, because both Jew and Christian are heir to a more or less common ethical tradition.

It is interesting to note in this connection an article by a Christian, Pastor D. Hans Hartmann, which the CVZ published to refute the argument that the Jews are a "Dionysian people". He admits that there are irrational, emotional elements in Judaism. In fact, these are due in large part to the age-long persecution of the Jews by the Christians. But, on the other hand, he explains that Judaism is eminently rational.⁴ It is this rational, as well as the ethical, that is to be emphasized. They are the positive elements in the Jewish religion.

But the greatest need for Jewish religion is in the building of self-respect. How can the Jew fight against

his enemies from without if he does not have confidence in himself? The only place he can get that confidence and self-respect is from his religion.⁵ "The best and most successful fighters (against anti-Semitism) come from the circle of those who are inspired by Judaism...."⁶ In other words, religion serves a very utilitarian purpose. It is from religion that the Jew is to draw the inner strength to fight the anti-Semites who attack him. One can find this overtone in almost all of the religious references in the CVZ. An article by Ruth Baeck further illustrates this same point. She discusses the need of Jewish youth to have a Jewish orientation. If they do not have such an orientation, they will become "what botany calls 'incoepetae', incomplete...we will contribute most to our fatherland, if we are this type (religious) of complete people".⁷

Practical piety is what the CV hopes to achieve. It is not to be limited to any particular interpretation of Judaism. The CV does not discriminate between any of the party divisions in Judaism. As long as they are not Zionistically oriented then they are acceptable to the CV. The CV always considered itself above parties. It dealt with the totality of Judaism..

In order to achieve the goal of a religious Jewish community, the CV advocated religious education. In

speaking of religious education it of course drew the line between religious education in a Jewish school and religious education as an addition to the public school training. As has been shown above, the CV was opposed to any separatist school system. It constantly opposed the efforts of the Zionists and Orthodox partisans to found Jewish schools. The members of the CV were committed to German life and the values of German civilization; they could not permit their children to be trained in any other than the public school.

The CV did support religious education for the young. The matter of providing this type of education during the days of the depression was quite a problem. Because money was becoming increasingly more valueless, people, such as religious teachers, who were dependent on ~~insufficient~~ salaries, were always in dire need. The mark declined daily in buying power. The religious teachers constantly appealed for relief through their professional organizations. For example, the seventh assembly of the J^üdischen Lehrerverband complained bitterly: "Flourishing communities in well known middle-sized cities pay their officials only token salaries."⁸ Paul Nathan spoke at this convention on behalf of the CV. He assured the teachers: "The CV...has the greatest respect for those who are educating our children to be good German Jews and citizens. If this education suffers because of economic need, it is an

unhealthy situation....Furthermore, the teachers can count on the CV."⁹

The type of religion that the CV wanted taught its children has already been shown above. The only thing that might be added to that description is the ~~subsequent~~ comparison of the modern Jew with Philo. Philo was a great hero to the CV. It named its publishing house after him -- Philo Verlag. Philo, the CVZ explained, envisioned a union of traditional Judaism with the cultural spirit of the times.¹⁰ This is what the CV wanted their children taught in the religious school.

When the CV was faced with deeper religious problems, it seemed to have ignored them as irrelevant. Although the early twenties saw the beginning of the Rosenzweig-Buber movement in Judaism, this movement was not mentioned in the pages of CVZ, although the CV magazine, Der Morgen, did publish their articles. The CV's conception of religion seems to have been very little different from that of its fathers of previous generations. Only here and there do we catch glimpses that people are having religious doubts and that there is a new spirit entering into the religious life of the German Jewish community. For example, one writer remarks: "Out of the darkness of this brutal, thought-poor, destroyed present the Jew looks at a kingdom in which common-social action,

sympathy and intelligence rule. Is it any wonder that he more zealously than formerly...makes his way to the house of God?"¹¹ Even this is a far cry from the despair which led to the philosophy of Rosenzweig. It is not an irrational approach, the author is simply saying that because of political and economic conditions more Jews are going to the synagogue. The crisis of the age seems not to have led the CV to a complete re-examination of its religious point of view.

One item that also might be mentioned here in connection with religion although it will be discussed more thoroughly further on, is the desire of the CV to see equality granted the Jewish religion in the state. This fight went on especially in the universities where the Jews were attempting to have Jewish religious faculties created on a par with the Christian faculties. If this equality were granted it would not only underwrite Jewish equality in the community but also it would do a great deal for the prestige of rabbis and Jewish teachers. It might also attract more teachers to the Jewish religious schools. Jewish religious teachers would also receive a more thorough education.¹²

One might call the religious orientation of the CV a liberal one. Liberal, not in the sense that it favored the Liberal movement, but rather that it approached

religion in the liberal tradition of the 19th century. Religion served as an adjunct of modern society, providing it with certain moral values. It was rational, working in the field of ethics rather than metaphysics. One might almost say that the CV tended more toward supernaturalism in its view of the German state than it did in its conception of the Jewish religion.

A quotation from CVZ might perhaps be used to sum up most adequately this chapter, because it expresses all the facets of the CV's religious conception. Religion's purpose was to create "whole men, who desire to love others, who not only want to learn the commandments of humanity, ethical purity and the laws of the pure life... but also to fulfil them...."¹³ Whether or not the lives of the members of the CV bore out this philosophy is an entirely different story; it is not within the compass of this thesis. However, the CV did at least verbalize its desire for a pure ethical life.

Chapter V

Relation to Other Jewish Groups

I have already discussed the relation of the CV to Zionism and to Religion. In this chapter I would like briefly to survey the attitude toward Jewish unity in general and the relations with two groups in the Jewish community in Germany; the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden and the Eastern European Jews in Germany.

The CV believed in Jewish unity. It supported all efforts to end differences in the Jewish community. For example, when the representatives of Prussian Jewry met, in 1922, to discuss the creation of a central organization, the CV supported their move.

If Prussian Jewry does not refuse, if it understands the meaning of the moment and despite all pettiness and criticism finds the power to come to a fruitful decision, the 25 of June (date of the meeting) will become a monument in its history and in the history of German Jewry.¹

German Jewry must learn to close its ranks, for that is the best defense against anti-Semitism.² Perhaps in this lies part of the answer to the question why the CV sought German Jewish unity. If all Jewish forces were concentrated together, they believed, anti-Semitism might be countered much more easily.

The same cry for unity was also made among the youth organization. The various parties in German Jewish life

had each its own youth organization. Joseph Hirschberg, writing in the CVZ, speaks of the need for a central organization of all German Jewish youth organizations and lists the following reasons for such a move: (1) common defense against anti-Semitism; (2) representation of all Jewish organizations would provide an opportunity to compare notes; (3) a body is needed to arbitrate between the various organizations. But the main purpose of such a move would be the first, the article concludes.³

Thus both in the adult organization and in the youth organization, the primary reason for unity was the need for defense against anti-Semitism. This constant emphasis of the need to fight the enemy, etc., gives us an indication of the strong force anti-Semitism had in Jewish life. It certainly seemed to have been the prime cause for many of the actions taken by German Jewry at the time. An interesting side-light to this drive for unity among German Jews, which resulted in the creation of all sorts of Jewish organizations, is provided by a letter in the CVZ in 1923. A reader protests the founding of a German-Jewish sport organization. He asks: "Can one play football in either a Jewish or an Aryan manner?"⁴

There was, however, one group among the German Jews that did not participate in any work toward union. This was the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden. This organization,

led by Dr. Max Naumann, stated that its avowed purpose was "the affiliation of all those Germs of Jewish origin who, by the open recognition of their origin, feel so intertwined with German ideals and German civilization, that they cannot act nor think in any other manner than German...."⁵ If we consider the attitude of the CV to German culture and tradition, it would seem that it would be able to agree with this Verband. But, in reality, the organizations were mutually exclusive. The Verband called the CV "dilly-dalliers" because it allowed Jewish considerations to interfere with its attitude to things German.⁶

Naumann on many occasions attacked the CV and its leaders. For example, in 1922 he called Paul Nathan a 50% German. Nathan answered the charge by pointing to his record as a German patriot and then called Naumann a 50% Jew.⁷ There was a constant struggle between the organizations. In 1923, Naumann sued Dr. L. Hollaender of the CVZ for libel. The suit was settled and Hollaender was forced to retract his words.⁸

In most matters, the CV and the Verband were on different sides of the argument. Naumann, although his organization was supposed to be neutral in politics, constantly identified himself with the extreme right in German politics. Since all the ^{of the right} parties were anti-Semitic to some degree, the Naumann alliance with them makes a

very strange picture. Naumann wrote articles for anti-Semitic publications and supported known anti-Semitic agitators publicly. For example, when, in 1923, the CV through one of its officers, Dr. Wiener, censured General Ludendorff for his anti-Semitic speeches and actions, the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden published an advertisement in the "Muenchener Neuesten Nachrichten" declaring: "We protest against the groundless...attack of Dr. Wiener, the counsel of the CV, against General Ludendorff...."⁹ Looking back over these pronouncements with the full tide of events that engulfed German Jewry in mind, it is almost impossible to believe that such an organization existed. But exist it did, although its membership was never large.

It was, however, a very vocal organization. The anti-Semitic elements in Germany were quick to use the ammunition that the Verband provided. For example, the CV reports that an article by Naumann in which he reveals that there is an anti-German element in the Jewish community gave an opportunity for agitation by the anti-Semitic "Hochschulring deutscher Art". The article concludes: "These are the fruits of the Verband nationaldeutscher Juden!"¹⁰

Naumann's remarks alone, however, are not the only encouragement that the anti-Semitic organizations received from the Verband. The strife between the two

organizations was also used by the anti-Semites. In 1922, the CV finds it necessary to deny that it brought pressure to have an address of Naumann's canceled. The anti-Semitic press had used this instance as an occasion to point to the anti-German attitude of those Jewish organizations which opposed Naumann's point of view.¹¹

There was another element in the Jewish population in Germany that was not assimilated into the Jewish community, the Eastern European Jews. They had come to Germany for a variety of reasons. Some had come because they were drafted as laborers by the German army during its occupation of the Eastern European area during the war. Others had entered because of pogroms and economic difficulties both during and after the war. They represented perhaps one-sixth of one-seventh of the Jewish community in Germany. Most of them were poor workers engaged to a large degree in the garment industry. They were affiliated with the Socialist Zionist party or with the Mizrachi, that is to say, they were Zionists. They were a distinguishable group in the community because they were easily recognized by their speech.¹²

There was constant antagonism between the German Jews and these newcomers. They considered the Eastern European Jews to be a foreign element and refused to assimilate them into their communal structure. It is, however, very hard

to show this antagonism on the part of the CVZ. The CVZ attempted at all times to maintain a facade of impartiality. After all, it had no other choice if the sentiments it had voiced in regard to Jewish unity and the Jewish religion were to have any meaning. But, on occasion, the facade wore a little thin, and we are able to see what lies behind it.

At the 1923 convention there was a debate about the Eastern European Jewish question between two lawyers. Rechtsanwalt Geiger of Frankfurt declared that he saw in the presence of the Eastern Europeans "a great danger for Germany". Rechtsanwalt Foerder of Breslau answered the argument by pointing out the true cause of the dislike of Eastern European Jews by German Jews. It is used by the enemies of the Jews in order to divert attention. Rabbi B. Jacob remarked in regard to this argument that the Jews of Germany must be careful not to allow this division of opinion to become a matter of difference between Jews. Rechtsanwalt Lichtenberg answered Jacob by saying that there must be no concessions to the nationalist Jews, i.e. the Zionists.¹³

This argument points out the various points of view of the German Jews. There was the moderate who was able to recognize the agitation against the Eastern European Jew as the "red herring" that it was. Then there were the

opposite views of those who were quite willing to attach the anti-Semitic stereotype of the Jew to the Eastern European Jew. A third opinion held that the Eastern European Jews represented a danger because of their Zionist orientation.

The most common way the CV had of dealing with the Eastern European Jewish question was to minimize it. In a series of articles¹⁴ Paul Nathan proves that the statistic of the anti-Semites, which show that there are anywhere from one-half to one and one-half million Eastern European Jews in Europe, are exaggerated. By studying immigration figures, etc., he proves that the number is very much smaller. By this type of argument, answering the anti-Semite on his own ground, the CV reveals its basic antagonism to the Eastern European Jews. Far from discussing the question solely on the basis of whether or not the Eastern European Jews are useful members of society, he accepts the supposition of the anti-Semites that they are basically an undesirable element. The CV's approach in this matter was a very shrewd one, because it avoided coming to grips with the real problem. One can sense the basic antagonism behind these articles.

An article on Eastern European Jews in America expresses the opinion: "Only the Americans succeed (materially), not the Eastern European Jews."¹⁵ This

remark means to convey the thought that the Eastern European Jews succeed in America only after they have assimilated themselves into the general culture. One can hear a voice echoing behind this article, saying: "The same is true in Germany. If only those Eastern European Jews would become better Germans and adopt German mannerisms and German culture!"

There are several other references of the same kind. For example, the CVZ informs us: "The 'Berliner Lokalanzeiger'...(is) angry because Berlin is now being turned into an Eastern European Ghetto. A glance at the official reports (of immigration figures) will show how unfounded this opinion is...."¹⁶ It seemed as if the CV were not willing to concede a point to the Eastern European Jews. To the anti-Semitic argument that Jews were responsible for the inflation, they answer: "Foreigners in large numbers are coming to Germany to speculate in German currency. And among them one finds naturally Jews and naturally Eastern European Jews...."¹⁷ In other words, the CV admits that to a large degree the arguments of the anti-Semites are correct. Eastern European Jews are among the speculators.

Only in its attempts at finding a solution to the problem does it approach a realistic understanding of the situation. It realizes that only through economic means

can the problem of Eastern European Jews in Germany be solved. "The CV considers the solution of the problem of Eastern European Jews in the first instance as a task of German politics....The solution is: 'Away with punishment, (provide) work.'..."¹⁸ Therefore to help with this type of work the CVZ reports, in 1922, that it has joined with the B'nai Brith, the Berlin Gemeinde, the Zionist organization to form the Arbeiterfuersorgeamt der juedischen Organisationen Deutschlands and the Deutschen Zentralstelle fuer juedische Wanderamenfuersorge. The purpose of these two organizations was to provide work in Germany and technical training and advice for those who wanted to go to other countries. They realized that only "the well trained worker can hope to find work in the country of his adoption -- the western European countries, America, or Palestine -- in a reasonable time."¹⁹

But the problem itself began to lessen as the inflation began to abate in Germany. In 1924, Paul Nathan reports that Eastern European workers are leaving Germany in increasing numbers because of the German economic situation.²⁰ Of course, this did not solve the problem as there were still large numbers of Eastern European Jews in Germany and the German Jews still refused to assimilate them into their society.

Chapter VI

Causes of Anti-Semitism

It is very hard to divide the causes of anti-Semitism, the subject of this chapter, with the methods of defense against anti-Semitism which is the concern of the next chapter. I have, however, tried to make the distinction in order that I might pay closer attention to each point. It must be borne in mind that both these chapters represent one unit.

In the preceding chapters, the causes of anti-Semitism have already been touched upon slightly. By causes of anti-Semitism is meant those things which the members of the CV considered to be the causes. This conception of causation is part and parcel of the whole attitude of the CV, as it has been previously discussed in this paper.

A good introduction to this chapter might be made with the following quote from the CVZ: "Hatred of Jews grows out of envy, stupidity, and incompetence."¹ That this statement is a simplification of the problem is obvious at first glance. Yet, the writer does most certainly express the folk-belief of the Jews of the period about anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism is considered to be an artificial product of society. It is a result of various types of human abnormality. More important, the basic cause of anti-Semitism is not social, but grows out of the individual.

That is not to say that there were not people in the CV who understood the causes of anti-Semitism better than the writer of the above statement. There were. In fact, there was a certain awareness on the part of some members of the CV that the causes of anti-Semitism were much deeper than they realized. They never say so; we simply have to attempt to read between the lines in some of their statements. For example, in 1923 a writer in the CVZ, making an appeal for more money, points out: "Anti-Semitism is today a political big business."² In other words, it is recognized that anti-Semitism has become a political tool.

On occasion the insight went even deeper into the problem. It was realized that economic difficulties often drew otherwise conservative people to political extremes. "The population of central Germany has been extremely accessible to political extremes. This was proven when, in 1921, the Communists found quite a bit of support here. Therefore it is not astonishing that the right radical movement because of the continually increasing economic difficulties is growing...."³ A writer in the CVZ, in 1924, analyzes the political situation as follows:

A hatred without scruples has selected the Jews as the lightning rod for all the misfortune that has met the German people. This hate is the cover under whose protection the fight against the German Reich, the present condition of the army (and) the (administration of)

justice is carried on. This threatens the national economy, domestic peace and Germany's position in the world.⁴

Another writer says almost the same thing. "As the war was lost...the terrible consequences of the war came... inflation, and at almost the same time with currency inflation came the inflation of hatred, the hatred of the Jew. The hatred makes the Jew responsible for this misfortune."⁵ But even this appreciation of economic causation carried with it some overtones of intellectual qualification. In 1922, discussing the economic prospects and their relations to anti-Semitism, a writer warns that things will get worse with the coming winter. He calls the Jews to be on their guard and to work against the agitators in order that "reason shall remain victorious."⁶ Reason had indeed few victories in the days of the inflation. This call for the triumph of reason, almost nullifies any understanding of the economic causes of anti-Semitism that the CV might possess. Probably the CV was not in a position to see the situation any more clearly than it did. As we have seen, its members were not revolutionists, but rather good middle-class patriotic citizens. This is evident from the way the CV constantly denies the fact that Jews are Socialists: "That (socialist)... theory is a corruption of Judaism is simply not true.... Of the founders of modern socialism...only two were Jews: Marx and Lasalle."⁷

The CV attempted to show a connection between the industrialists and the rightist parties. But it was never too successful in saying what it desired to say about the industrialists, probably due to some degree to the libel laws. At any rate, the CVZ, in 1922, published an interview with Stinnes, who at that time was the most powerful man in the German economy. He controlled all facets of life in Germany, having interests in all sorts of economic ventures from newspapers to steel mills. If any man had public opinion under his control it was Stinnes. He bought and sold politicians, editors and other molders of the German mind. In the interview with the CVZ, Stinnes denies that he and his associates in the "Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie" are supporting Kunze (a vicious anti-Semitic agitator called "Blackjack" because of his fondness for this instrument) and the other anti-Semitic agitators of the working classes. But the writer is very sceptical of Stinnes' denial, pointing out that if one reads Stinnes' newspapers it is only too evident that he is anti-Semitic.⁸

The anti-Semites are a danger to the German labor movements. The CVZ speaks of the threat that the anti-Semites are holding over the entire German economy by attempting to found their own unions.⁹ Realizing the potential anti-Semitism existing in economic need, Jewish employers are told that they should not take advantage of

the weak labor movement. Rather, they should remember their duty as Jews.¹⁰

Despite this insight into the motives of the industrialists, the CV was not able to get a complete perspective of the final purpose of the industrialists, which was the creation of a German state of their liking. Therefore it rejoiced when the above-mentioned Kunze attacked Stinnes, because he would not give him financial support.¹¹ The CV also saw great hope in the fact that the industrialists might consider anti-Semitism bad for foreign relations.¹²

There was, despite the above-mentioned occasional insights into the causes of the anti-Semitism, always a feeling in the CV that anti-Semitism is not a natural thing. We have shown how that feeling existed even with some who realized that anti-Semitism was basically economic.

There were some elements in the CV who thus considered anti-Semitism the product of the evil individuals who had entered politics at the end of the war. Before 1914, one correspondent writes, there were good relations between Jew and non-Jew in Upper Silesia, but after the way "foreign elements" entered the territory and they were responsible for the creation of anti-Semitism there.¹³

These political anti-Semites are not amenable to reason, because anti-Semitism is their tool in trade.

Says Eugen Fuchs:

Even if we put on the hair shirt and walk over the Kurfuerstendam with lilies in our hands, it would not lessen the attacks one bit...the fight against us is fought on political grounds and with political weapons....Therefore we must use every permitted weapon of the political arsenal.¹⁴

The same thought was expressed concerning a certain Maurenbrecher who had circulated reports of a Jewish plot to overthrow the government of the republic. "...all Germany...must sink in the estimation of the world when low creatures like Maurenbrecher are allowed to insult the German Jews...."¹⁵ This then is the picture that the Jews paint of their enemies. Rather than look at them realistically, they only too often simply call them dirty names and think that they are doing their duty to truth. Of course, the matter is not at all so simple. By vilifying the apparent anti-Semites, they wasted away their energies, rather than using them to see who is truly responsible for the anti-Semitic propaganda.

It must be said to the CV's credit, however, that it did seriously consider Hitler's strength even when he first began to appear. The CVZ already makes mention of him in 1922, before he had really come to the attention of the German public in general. Hitler was not mentioned in any

important German newspaper until a year later, in the Frankfurter Zeitung of April 15, 1923.

Contemporary with the early Nazi attempts to gain power was the beginning of Mussolini's rule in Italy. The CV applies the title "Fascists" to the new Nazi movement. Quips the CVZ: "The German variety of Fascism is a translation of the Italian into (language of) hatred for the Jews."¹⁷ This comparison with Mussolini crops up in another article in 1922. Written by "a Bavarian politician", the article analyzes the Nazi movement. He says that "two things have lifted the morale of Hitler and his associates: Mussolini's easy victory and the hope, they... will win as easily...."¹⁸ The CV takes a very serious view of Hitler's supporters and purposes: "...money is flowing to the National Socialists from industrial circles...because the contributors...have the false impression that the Hitler movement is able to injure the free and Christian Labor movement...and to condemn strikes...."¹⁹ The CV does have a few moments of humor at Hitler's expense, when it is discovered that Hitler's economic advisor, Feder, who advocates doing away with "interest slavery" is subject to a mortgage.²⁰ But all in all, the CV's view of the Nazis is a very grim one.

The CV points out Hitler's basic antagonism to the institutions of the republic. "The National Socialists

have...oft times declared themselves as proponents of a strong central government and opponents of Federalism. But as long as 'Jewish Socialism' rules in Berlin...they take every opportunity to work against Berlin...."21 In this remark the CVZ is talking about the support Hitler was giving Bavarian separatists. The CV opposed this movement in Bavaria. Reported the CV, through its Bavarian representatives: "We feel ourselves so deeply linked with the German fate, so that no insult from the nationalist can rob us...."22 The CV also used the Ruhr incident, as an opportunity to point out Hitler's unpatriotic attitude. The CVZ reports a speech by Hitler, in which he rails against the republic, for attempting, under the guise of unity, to prevent the parties from expressing their opinions.²³ Even after the Hitler trial, however, the CV does not cease speaking of him. "The Hitler danger has been delayed, it is not finished. The poison has entered too deeply into the population, to become powerless one day to the next....If we remain proud, ready to sacrifice and to act, then the Hitler scourge will be turned against its own masters."²⁴ Although the CV did recognize the Hitler danger, and sees its source to some degree, yet it did not quite know how to deal with it. The only thing it could do was to refute Hitler's arguments. This, of course, had little to do with increasing or limiting Hitler's effectiveness.

In this chapter I have attempted to show, what the CV considered the source of anti-Semitism to be. It cannot, however, be too well illustrated here without consideration of the next chapter, which will deal with the various methods of defense used by the CV.

Chapter VII

Defense against Anti-Semitism

The purpose of this chapter is to consider the means that the CV used in fighting anti-Semitism. The CV approached the work of defense with many mottos on its lips. For example, it declared that "defense is reconstruction".¹ It emphasized the following ways to approach the problem of defense: (1) learn the answers; (2) fix ends; (3) the result will be a mere optimistic outlook.² It is easy to see that this is all in the same spirit of rationalism which has motivated almost all of the considerations of the CV that we have discussed in this paper thus far.

When approaching the question of defense, the first thing that the CV did was to consider the question: "Is there any meaning in the fight against anti-Semitism?"³ It was necessary to find an answer for this question because of Zionist pressures. Telling of the need against this Zionist opposition, CVZ says: "This must be repeated many times (the call for unity) in our serious hour, when the leading organ of the Jewish nationalists in Germany considers it right, to speak of the bankruptcy of the present defense work."⁴ The tone of the CV in countering this Zionist opposition is one of righteous indignation. It did not like to see its very serious work made light of.

In 1926, after anti-Semitism had to a certain degree been lessened in Germany, (the anti-Semitic parties decreased in strength during this period) because of the increase of prosperity due to the Dawes Plan and the resultant reviving of German economic life, the CV reviews the situation as follows:

No one will deny that anti-Semitism has somewhat abated in our day. But from the actuality, that we today more than ever suffer from the outbreaks and tortures of hate for the Jews, the enemies of the CV draw the conclusion that its goal is unattainable, its methods false....⁵

But the CV will not allow that type of opposition to stop it. It is convinced of the rightness of its cause, and none can allay it from making its appointed rounds. The trouble lies not in the CV and its methods, rather it is in an entirely different direction.

German Jewry has not yet recognized the seriousness of the situation, the work is yet meager, and the financial support is flowing slowly. But only he who strives and works may truly hope. The...right to stigmatize pessimism and resignation, has only that Jew who expresses his hope in cheerful action. That the CV is going the correct way, with the approval of Jewish teaching and Jewish history, is certain.⁶

A similar thought is expressed also in another place: "If we remain united...the hatemongers...will not be able to do us damage. This work will also help in bringing health to our unhappy German fatherland!"⁷ The CV in general terms defined its defense work as: "...to work for domestic peace, to be a calming influence, to strengthen

the power of the state and to maintain Jewish optimism."⁸ This theme of optimism runs through a great deal of the literature. One wonders what kind of an optimism the German Jews could attempt to achieve in those days if they considered their situation realistically as the CV calimed to do. Certainly the world did not look any too rosy. It is hard to imagine Jews as optimists, in a time when all of western Europe was engulfed in a flood of pessimism. But the CV stuck to its guns. Declared Rabbi Dr. Lewin of Koenigsberg: "The CV has put a Maccabean spirit into the heart of the Jews and has taught them not to bear insults continually, but also to take up the hammer and to defend themselves."⁹ Here probably lies the origin of the optimism of the CV. It is simply a call to the German Jews to lose themselves in the work against the anti-Semites. If they work hard enough and long enough the theory seems to be, they will forget all their other problems and difficulties.

There is most certainly a constant demand that all German Jews work together to stop anti-Semitism. "Many Jewish citizens have remained shy because of the Ghetto experience, they are short sighted....We will make the German Jews into fighters for their honor and existence...."¹⁰ This quote as many others reflect the use of the CVZ of a sort of romantic language, strongly reminiscent of the German university fraternities and their cult of modern

age "chivalry". The CV continually calls for aggressive action on the part of the German Jews: "Our most terrible enemy is that 'walking on tip toes' which says: 'All is quiet, no one is paying attention to us,' the fear which always asks: 'Is it time for defense?' For minorities in the life of the state the time for enlightenment is always present."¹¹ This energetic opposition against anti-Semitism was urged upon all the elements in the Jewish population. For example, Jewish parents were urged when they or their children met with anti-Semitism in the schools, "...to make a united front, which by complaints and proposals to the proper authorities, for the recognition that the Jew is human...whom one cannot attack without paying the consequences, is dawning...in the German mind."¹² Women were also urged not to ignore the work of the CV. They should not say that defense was the task of men alone. Women also can and should participate in it.¹³

Even the youth organizations were not immune from the call for workers in the fight against anti-Semitism. They were told: "...the most important task of Jewish youth is defense against anti-Semitism."¹⁴ Thus the CV proposed a sort of total mobilization of all German Jews in the fight against the anti-Semites. Everyone was to be on the alert, to know what to answer the anti-Semite. No insult was to be allowed to be passed: "We urge all our members to send us all papers...containing either open or hidded attacks

on the Jews...."¹⁵ The German Jews were to watch their opinions, their attitudes and their behavior. This was an all-out battle, and all had to psychologically prepare themselves to fight. "Our goal will be displaced, our feelings injured, if the sham praise: 'If all were like you....' is of any worth to any German Jew...."¹⁶ Further advice is given on how to adjust behavior: "Hold your tongues! A railroad trip is not for the purpose of yelling out family and business secrets. Be careful (to be honest) in business...Remember the duty of hallowing the name of God every moment."¹⁷ The CV was organized in such a manner to give the local organizations more freedom in the defense work. "The actual fighting units must be the local organizations....Through constant dealings with the authorities, the press, the school directors and others he gathers experiences, as to which place defense is best used."¹⁸

In the early twenties there was a gradual reorientation in the work of the CV. Dr. L. Hollaender expressed the change at the 1923 convention of the CV, when he said: "The old protection of rights is no longer the kernel of the work of the CV, it has been replaced by practical enlightenment through scientific sociological knowledge."¹⁹ He explains his thoughts further, in 1926, in an article entitled: "Enlightenment and ever more enlightenment." It is his thesis in this article that one can have defense

only when one is attacked, but enlightenment is possible at all times. Of course, he recognizes that not all men will learn to change their attitudes through this process of enlightenment. But they are in the majority. "The majority of our fellow citizens do not look at the Jews through the fanaticism of the sadistic nationalists,"²⁰ No, most Germans are willing to listen to reason. It is only necessary to show them that "one is dealing with a serious problem". All we have to do is to present them with books and speeches pointing out the lies of the anti-Semites. But this cannot be done haphazardly. It is now necessary to "systematize our activities". The members will become experts in various fields of enlightenment and thus make the work of the CV much more effective than it is at present.²¹

This then is to be the task of the CV: "...that it (attempt) to spread enlightenment concerning Jews and Judaism with all possible means among (our) Christian fellow citizens...."²²

The CV also makes specific recommendation to its member as to how this goal of enlightening the German people can best be achieved. For example, speaking of the publications of the CV and the Philo Verlag, the GVZ tells its readers: "The request goes to our friends, not to overlook these instruments in our work and to put their

own books at the disposal of public and labor union libraries."²³

But even more important than seeing that the literature exposing lies about the Jews is circulated, is the need for speakers to answer the charges of the anti-Semites in public meetings. It must be remembered that these early days of the republic were days of great public meetings, political debates and gatherings of a similar nature. It was this period after all that gave birth to Hitler, the prototype of the demagogue who through the power of speech misleads the crowds. It was the belief of the CV that these anti-Semitic orators had to be answered in public. The CV held public meetings at which these people were denounced.

But the number of meetings at which the Jews were denounced was a very large one, and therefore it was equally necessary to hold a large number of refutation meetings. This meant, of course, that the CV have a large staff of speakers trained and ready to answer charges at any moment. Alfred Wiener in an article in the CVZ in 1922, tells the members of the CV what they may do. A larger part of the article than is necessary is quoted here, because the rest of the quote will shed light on what has been said earlier in this chapter:

All of you must help! Learn your enemies' arguments! Join our course for orators!

Instruct yourselves from the many publications of the Philo Verlag! Pass them...to your Christian acquaintances! Pass on the read issues of the CVZ! Turn the conversation to the Jewish question at all possible opportunities and in a clever way and tell your Christian fellow citizens the truth about the German Jews. Only through this constant petty work can we win over the German nationalists.²⁴

The CV recognized that the need for this type of defense was very great.

From all parts of the Reich we hear unanimous reports that the National Socialist, German Socialist, and German Nationalist are uniting in the attempt to win the workers to their point of view....We are not always able to send out opposition speakers from the central office, and it is therefore the responsibility of the state federations...according to their ability, that opposition views are expressed in public meetings....²⁵

This attempt to provide opposition to the nationalist speakers was almost always done by calling public meetings and having representatives of the CV express their views there. Some of the titles of these lectures have been recorded and it might be interesting to note a few of them, as they in large part indicate the contents: (1) Enlightenment and Defense;²⁶ (2) The Idiot's Socialism;²⁷ (3) How Guilty are the German Jews?²⁸ The CV also sponsored talks by non-Jews. For example, in 1922, we read of a Catholic priest addressing the CV in Ingolstadt on the subject of tolerance.²⁹ Sometimes, Jews would attempt to speak at the meeting of anti-Semites.

These attempts at answering the enemy often ended in bloodshed. One such incident was reported in the CVZ, in 1922.

The well known Alfred Roth...gave one of his... (anti-Semitic) talks in Stettin. As the meeting was being closed without an opportunity for discussion, Dr. Felix Heymann, our syndic there, called it "cowardice". Immediately, he was attacked...with sticks and blackjacks....³⁰

Most of these types of incidents seemed to have occurred more during the years 1922-1924. There is much less mention of them in the later two volumes of the CVZ mentioned in this paper.

In reporting these public discussions, one often feels that the CV, despite its attempts at optimism, did feel rather pessimistic. It could at times see almost a nation-wide conspiracy against it. It seldom verbalized this thought, but yet it can be felt to permeate much that is said: "Political, economic and religious crisis have effect especially on us; we are responsible for everything."³¹

Perhaps a clearer understanding of the content of the CV pamphlets and speeches might be given if we consider the type of arguments that the CV used against the anti-Semites. First, we might ask ourselves why the necessity to answer all these charges? We have already seen in the beginning of this chapter, and in the previous chapter, the great need the CV felt to answer the charges because it believed that truth would by its very nature

overcome untruth. The following quote will make the situation clearer: "We may accept no anti-Semitic attack lightly, (consider no) attack too silly, no slander too inefficient, but all...(must) be answered with the weapons of intelligence (and) knowledge, with the call to brotherly love and morality."³² Every insult and lie must be answered. One example is the slander that was circulated about Walter Rathenau. A statement of his was falsified to read: 300 men control the wealth of Europe. The CVZ shows that what Rathenau really said was that "300 men... are economic leaders of the continent".³³ When anti-Semites said that Jewish capitalists were unusually dishonest and money-grasping, the CV shows by examples that Jewish capital works in (an) way different from Arian capital.³⁴ When the Jews were accused of being the speculators who brought the downfall of the German economy, the CVZ printed a long article on the 17th century tulip speculations in Holland, showing that many other peoples, other than Jews, are speculators.³⁵ In an analysis of the present economic situation, the CVZ shows that the Jews are not responsible for the present high prices in Germany.³⁷ When Fichte is misquoted as being an anti-Semite, the CV runs to his rescue and clears his name of all charges.³⁶

One accusation that the Jews had to answer constantly was that they were Communists. To prove the worthlessness

of this argument the CV calls on all its strength. It proves by statistics that the majority of Communists in Germany are not Jews.³⁹ When a naval chaplain, Meinhold, says that Kurt Eisner was once the president of a Jewish lodge in Warsaw, the CV goes to a great deal of trouble to show the charge false, while at the same time it dissociates itself from Eisner.³⁹ A letter is published from the banking house of M. M. Warburg of Hamburg in which it is stated: "We have given neither monetary nor any other help to (Trotzky)...."⁴⁰ One unusual argument used to show that the Jews are not Communists was showing that the Russians had appropriated all synagogue valuables.⁴¹ The argument that the Jews had too much influence in the German government was countered by the periodic publication of lists of Jewish members of federal and state government.⁴²

Some unusual arguments that the CV used might be illustrated by the following examples. The Jews were charged with taking over all of Austrian life. The CV refuted this by pointing to the fact that Austrian Jewry was rapidly losing strength.⁴³ When Mussolini, as has been shown above, was being used by the anti-Semites as their model, the CV published a statement by Mussolini in which he denied being an anti-Semite and spoke of its great danger.⁴⁴ When Dr. Lent of the National Liberal party attacked the Jews, a Dr. Gallinger retorted to his charges with: "...among the German Jews the best German

tradition is bound up with the best Jewish tradition.... (This anti-Semitic argument) is as if, they wanted to rob the Jewish youth of their joy in the German community and drive them somehow into radical waters."⁴⁵ A constant charge that the CV had to counter was that the Jews had not done their part in the World War. (Paul Nathan called this the most dangerous of the arguments.)⁴⁹ This argument was answered by pointing to statistics.⁴⁶ They published a special section to show that the German Jews had done their part.⁴⁷ When Ludendorff began to associate himself openly with the anti-Semitic parties, the CV together with the Reichsbund juedischer Frontsoldaten fought him "in the name of the 12,000 who fell in battle...."⁴⁸

As has been shown in the last chapter, anti-Semitic attacks were spoken of as being detrimental to Germany's reputation. Two examples of this might be in place here, because they represent a certain approach for answering the attackers. "What shall Europe, what shall the world think of German civilization (and) ethics when... (anti-Semitic) incidents are repeated almost daily and when people assume the leadership of German-minded youth before whom every true German shrinks...."⁵⁰ Speaking of the German nationalists' boycott of the Jews in Pomerania, the CVZ comments that when the Poles see the Germans fighting against the Jews they will say: "If the Germans...boycott their own fellow nationals, that is to say, cause them to

starve, why could we not say that the Germans are foreigners?"⁵¹

The CV made use of experts when countering the arguments of race. There is little reason to reproduce these arguments here, because the scientists who wrote the articles presented a definite, scientific point of view. Their opinions, therefore, represent the attitude of the CV on the question of race, only ^{at} second hand. At any rate, it is sufficient to say that the CV agreed with the attitudes of such men as Boaz as to race. In regard to this, it is interesting to note a correspondence in the CVZ, in 1922. A man wrote a letter to the paper arguing that since science had disproved the theory of race it was no longer necessary to counter the anti-Semitic charges on that subject. Ludwig Hollaender answered his letter by saying that what he says about the theory is true, but nevertheless, "It is winning adherents in large numbers," therefore it is necessary to answer the arguments.⁵²

The CV constantly warned Jews to be careful in order that they might not provide opportunities for anti-Semites. They are to make no show of their wealth. "...the freshly painted car of the Jewish salesman, ^{Jewish} cunning (and) Jewish superiority becomes a welcome object for demonstrations...."⁵³

Jews are also urged to stay away from summer resorts that are known to be anti-Semitic. For example, when

Bavarian anti-Semitism was at its highest, the CV remarked concerning vacationing in Bavaria: "For those Jews, who still have a sense of honor and dignity...it is important to seek another vacation spot than Bavaria...."⁵⁴

Jews are also warned of having any business or professional dealings with anti-Semites. For example, Jews are told not to hire members of the Deutschnationaler Handlungshilfenverband⁵⁵ because they have shown their anti-Jewish bias. In like fashion, the CV publishes warnings against banks,⁵⁶ professional men,⁵⁷ etc.

The CV was also quick to protest to the authorities whenever it encountered any incident which might show a certain anti-Jewish prejudice. There are many of these incidents mentioned in the CVZ. We shall only list a few representative incidents here. Many of the anti-Jewish provocations occurred in various institutions of learning. For example, in Saxony, Jewish children were not excused from school on the High Holydays.⁵⁸ In Bremerhaven, a mass meeting was called to protest against anti-Semitic school officials.⁵⁹

The CV also opposed the wearing of the swastika by government officials.⁶⁰ In Oppeln, in 1922, during a trial, the district attorney wore a swastika. Two Jewish witnesses felt themselves intimidated by this. The CV protested, and succeeded in having swastikas forbidden to

be worn in court.⁶¹ During a horse race in 1922, an owner decorated his horse and jockey with a swastika. The CV protested to the racing authorities and demanded that the swastika be banned from the tracks.⁶²

The CV was also engaged in various types of legal actions. Many of them did not succeed, but all of them have more or less the same tenor. We will list only a few of these actions that CV took, in order to avoid the charge of monotony. In 1922, the CV attempted to have court action started because of an attack upon a Jew in the Berlin streets. The authorities, however, considered the affair to be harmless.⁶³ A man who wrote a pamphlet on Jews and the white slave traffic was brought to court and convicted.⁶⁴ Max Maurenbrecher, editor of the Deutsche Zeitung, made an anti-Semitic remark. The CV complained to the authorities, who promised to take action.⁶⁵ But only too often in these incidents, the anti-Semites were allowed to go free and the CV was forced again and again to protest against the abuse of justice. The CV finds it necessary to bring charges itself because the authorities refuse to take action. "The rudest handling of Jewish citizens by anti-Semitic rowdies...is not acted against by the authorities...."⁶⁶ There does seem to be a lessening of this type of action after about 1924, although we are not able to say this for sure because the statistical evidence is not available to us at this time.

Chapter VIII

Conclusion

Es stieg aus allen Dingen
Ein Schmerz, und er ging um
Und legte sich auf mich.
--Else Lasker-Schueler

This paper has attempted to show realistically the attitude of the CV during the momentous years following the first World War. It has shown continually that the CV's approach to the problem was completely inadequate to meet the needs of the moment. For the CV thought, just as the anti-Semite thought, that there was such a thing as a "Jewish problem" in modern Germany. Actually, it can be seen that there was no such "Jewish problem". The fate of the Jew was closely tied to the fate of Germany and Germany to the rest of the world. Therefore, what happened to the Jew was much more closely related to the American stock market than to the irrational racist doctrine of the anti-Semite.

The CV could never see this clearly. It is true that it recognized economic and social causations of anti-Semitism. But this was pushed to the side. The fight against anti-Semitism was conceived as the struggle between truth and untruth; a struggle in which truth would, by its very nature, prevail.

Looking back and reading the views of the CV now that history has taken its toll, this view seems very strange. But if we turn our eyes about us, we see almost the same type of defense against anti-Semitism used in the United States. We cannot, therefore, judge these German Jews too harshly.

The CV was a product of the late 19th century and the optimistic days preceding the first World War. The world view of this period was not sufficient, as we have seen, for the post-war world. It simply could not answer the questions raised by what Ortega y Gasset calls "the revolt of the masses". The rational minority in an irrational society is lost. One cannot cure irrationality by pointing to reason, but rather the roots of irrationality must be searched out and overturned. This neither the CV nor German Jewry as a whole was able to do.

This thesis raises more problems than it answers. Thus, it is fitting to end it with a question. What can the Jew really do about anti-Semitism? I leave the solution of this problem to wiser minds. The past has shown us the ineffective attempts at solution, perhaps the future will indicate a solution that will take into consideration not only the Jew, but all mankind.

Notes

All translations were made by the writer. All references, unless otherwise noted, refer to the *CY-Zeitung*, by volume, number and page.

Chapter I

1. the population of Jews in Germany was 564,379 in 1925.
2. Cohen, H., Deutschtum und Judentum, p. 39.
3. Lowenthal, M., The Jews of Germany, p. 269.
4. Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol. 5, col. 104.
5. ibid., col. 105.
6. ibid., col. 106.
7. only figures available to me.

Chapter II

1. 1:20, p.246.
2. 1:1, p.2.
3. 1:1, p.1.
4. ibid.
5. ibid. p.10.
6. 1:3, p.41.
7. 1:81, p.97.
8. Rosenberg, History of the German Republic, p. 181 f.
9. 2:6, p.41.
10. 2:10, p.75.
11. 2:16, p.131.
12. 2:14, p.110.
13. 3:8, p.71.
14. 3:3, p.17.
15. ibid.
16. 1:2, p.30.
17. ibid.
18. 2:24, p.203.
19. 2:22, p.177.
20. 4:44, p.706.
21. 1:17, p.212.
22. 1:18, p.223.
23. 2:29/40.
24. 5:11, p.154.

Chapter III

1. 2:9, p.65.
2. ibid.
3. 5:34, p.82.
4. ibid.
5. 4:5, p.82.
6. 4:5, p.83.
7. ibid.
8. 4:27, p.476.
9. 1:17, p.217.
10. 2:26, p.210.
11. 1:3, p.37.
12. 1:18, p.228.
13. 1:1, p.5.
14. 1:21, p.269.
15. 4:52, p.807.
16. 5:2, p.17.
17. 5:3, p.29.
18. ibid. p.30.
19. 5:16, p.216.
20. 5:13, p.178.

Chapter IV

1. 1:10, p.127.
2. 5:26, p.346.
3. 5:11, p.154.
4. 5:47, p.605 f.
5. 1:14, p.174.
6. 2:34, p.276.
7. 1:3, p.43.
8. 1:7, p.90.
9. 1:6, p.77.
10. 2:29, p.236.
11. 1:22, p.275.
12. 5:4, p.40.
13. 2:36, p.296.

Chapter V

1. 1:9, p.114.
2. 1:6, p.76.
3. 1:13, p.166.

Notes (cont.)

Chapter V (cont.)

4. 2:11, p.85.
5. Quoted by R. Weiss in Juedisches Lexikon, vol. 5.
6. ibid.
7. 1:3, p.38.
8. 2:6, p.41.
9. 2:30, p.243.
10. 1:2, p.29.
11. 1:4, p.61.
12. Cf. J.R.Marcus, Rise and Destiny of the German Jews, pp. 200 f.
13. 2:23, p.150.
14. 1:1, p.5; 1:3, p.39; 1:8, pp.98 f.
15. 5:18, p.247.
16. 1:17, p.212.
17. 2:4, p.26.
18. 1:1, p.6.
19. 1:19, pp.242 f.
20. 3:11, p.110.

Chapter VI

1. 1:5, p.62.
2. 2:12, p.91.
3. 2:17, p.135.
4. 3:12, p.125.
5. 3:8, p.73.
6. 1:10, p.222.
7. 1:5, p.66.
8. 1:4, p.50.
9. 2:22, p.187.
10. 3:11, p.110.
11. 1:2, p.26.
12. 1:21, p.261.
13. 2:39/40, p.306.
14. 1:11, p.138.
15. 1:6, p.73.
16. Cf. A. Hitler, My New Order, p. 56.
17. 1:28, p.321.
18. 1:31, p.349.
19. 2:15, p.119.
20. 3:13, p.142.
21. 1:17, p.210.

22. 2:41, p.314.
23. 2:3, p.17.
24. 2:5, p.33.

Chapter VII

1. 2:20, p.158.
2. ibid.
3. 1:28, p.263.
4. 2:45/46, p.345.
5. 5:7, p.73.
6. ibid.
7. 2:45/46, p.345.
8. 2:39/40, p.305.
9. 5:14, p.191.
10. 2:19, p.149.
11. 1:1, p.3.
12. ibid., p.7.
13. ibid., pp.7 f.
14. 1:7, p.92.
15. 1:20, p.248.
16. 1:11, p.137.
17. 1:20, p.245.
18. 1:29, p.334.
19. 2:19, p.150.
20. 5:10, p.112.
21. ibid.
22. 3:6, p. 48.
23. 1:6, p.76.
24. 1:10, p.122.
25. 1:4, p.53.
26. 2:23, p.261.
27. 1:4, p.53.
28. 1:14, p.164.
29. 1:9, p.114.
30. 1:3, p.41 f.
31. 1:20, p.245.
32. 1:23, p.282.
33. 1:5, p.61.
34. 1:32, p.357.
35. 3:12, p.128.
36. 2:33, p.265.
37. 1:20, p.246.
38. 2:14, p.109.
39. 1:19, p.237.
40. 1:15, p.187.
41. 1:12, p.153.
42. 1:2, p.26.

Notes (cont.)

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| 43. 2:21, p.178. | 55. 1:4, p.53. |
| 44. 2:50, p.375. | 56. 1:5, p.64. |
| 45. 3:7, p.57. | 57. 1:8, p.99. |
| 46. 1:44, p.177. | 58. 1:19, p.236. |
| 47. See sect. on R.j.F. in | 59. 2:4, p.27. |
| vol. 3, p. 347. | 60. 1:19, p.237. |
| 48. 3:12, p.131. | 61. 1:2, p.28. |
| 49. 1:3, pp. 39 f. | 62. 1:7, pp.88 f. |
| 50. 1:2, p.26.. | 63. 1:7, p.88. |
| 51. 1:1, p.7. | 64. 1:10, p.125. |
| 52. 1:15, p.178. | 65. 1:30, p.342. |
| 53. 1:25, p.298. | 66. 1:3, p.39. |
| 54. 1:4, p.49. | |

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