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LEONE EBREO:
A PRESENTATION OF HIS PHILOSOPHY AS FOUND IN
THE DIALOGHI D'AMORE.

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TO MY PARENTS

INTRODUCTION

The concept of love mirrors in its changes and developments the forces that dominated the Medieval world, forces that came into open conflict with one another and finally led to inner breakdown which paved the way for the Renaissance. There are two terms for love that are being used in Medieval literature^{1.} that characterize and symbolize the two main opposing forces. The one is caritas, love of God, that love which the Church taught, a love that was entirely free from sensual-corporeal elements, which consisted in the chastisement of the body and abstinence.

The other is cupiditas, sensual love, the love that was praised and sung about in the ballads and songs of the traveling troubadours and minstrels.^{2.} The contrast between these two terms and the concepts for which they stood was unbridgeable and characterizes the conflict between the teachings of the Church and the popular attitude with regard to matters and life of this world.

In Dante, the concept of love as taught by the Church, finds its highest poetic expression. Love for woman is conceived of in religious terms; it is Beatrice, who at the end of his long journey, brings salvation to him.^{3.}

In Petrarca's work the conflict between sensual and rational love is clearly expressed.^{4.} "Beauty and virtue are, for Petrarca, connected with each other; but they are no longer one

and the same thing, beauty is no more only a shadow and symbol of truth and virtue, but is in itself something real. In spite of that ideal Platonic colouring of his poetry Laura never, for a moment, ceases to be a woman; she is loved and adored exactly because she is a woman and because she is beautiful."^{5.}

But Petrarca is too much yet child of the Medieval Church tradition and thus he sublimates the sensual love and equates it with caritas, simply "because he had as yet no new concept-^{6.} ion to put into the place of the old."

The third of the great Italian poets who struggled with the problem of love was Boccaccio. In him the entire problematic becomes, perhaps, the clearest.^{7.} In the "Ameto" the two types of love are side by side, without too much of a conflict between them. The "Amorosa Visione" treats the subject in a very similar manner. But what a decisive change meets us in the pages of the "Decamerone!" This is the triumph of sensual love, a veritable orgy.

But a very interesting development sets in. The older Boccaccio, driven by fear of eternal punishment, renounces his sensual love as sinful. But so far removed ^{is} he from the concept of caritas, that, in distinct contrast to both Dante and Petrarca, he becomes a misogynist and renounces love altogether.

"Thus we see, how Boccaccio, at first, takes over the concept of love of the stil nuovo ("Ameto"), how his robust

nature bursts the thinning vessel (Decamerone), how furthermore, he conceives of Amore, who for Dante leads to highest virtue, to highest knowledge, as an evil, for which he recommends, in an Ovidian manner, remedies such as walking, bird fancying, hunting, fishing, riding, games (Decamerone, Proemio); he has the evil cured by sceptical reason ("Corbaccio"), and finally, he damns and rejects love and women altogether."

The concept of caritas and of cupiditas was now rejected. A new philosophical understructure was needed on which to base a new concept of love. The rediscovery of the writings of Lucretius furnished the material for this development. Lucretius conceived of love as the creative force of nature, animating and driving the entire universe. "From this Lucretian concept of nature begins the renaissance of the idea of love in the first half of the 15th century. In the place of the vanishing figure of Amore is put that of the lovingly creative nature, fitted out with all the features of the Lucretian Venus."⁹

The discovery of Lucretius and his concept of nature led to the experimental study of nature and to the development of the Italian nature philosophy whose final traces might be found in English empiricism.¹⁰ And thus a new philosophical understructure for the concept of love has been found.

Another cornerstone in the philosophical groundwork that served as understructure for the concept of love was the study

of the writings of Plato. Aristotle had been "the philosopher" of the Medieval Church. In the first half of the 15th century however, a conflict arose in which, in theological terms, a "spiritualized neoplatonic-Platonic" theology was pitted against the "naturalistic Aristotelian-Averroistic" system. The conflict was not confined to theology, and before long had spread, and Plato became the symbol of the revolt against the Medieval Church with its dialectic deductions, a symbol of a philosophical attitude that found its highest values rather in an ecstatic metaphysical vision.

In this manner we can explain the appearance of the "accademia Platonica" of Florence, which under the patronage of Cosimo de Medici and the leadership of Marsilio Ficino comprised cultured laymen who were interested in the study of Plato. Much like the company assembled in the "Symposion" they gathered for philosophical discussion, and their friendly gathering and their discussions were blended into one. "He who, together with philosophical instruction and edification, sought for a model of the attitude of companionship, had to attribute to this dialogue (Symposium) ^{11.} a rank before all others; he who felt happiness and elevation in the consciousness of the community with friends striving for identical ends, had to put the basic theme of the "Symposion", love, into ^{12.} the center of investigation."

The activities and writings of men like Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, the mainstays of the "accademia"

established the Platonic concept of love. Lucretius and his Epicurean conception and the neoplatonic philosophy as represented in Arab and Jewish philosophers account for the other elements that can be found in the Renaissance concept of love.

Love, from its original theological contrast between caritas and cupiditas, had become an integral part of an all comprising system of philosophy, which, sketched by Ficino, found its classical expression in the writings of Leone Ebreo.^{13.}

CHAPTER I

The most important distinction which Plato makes is that between the soul and the body. The soul is immortal and immortal, and the body is mortal and mortal. The soul is the seat of reason and the body is the seat of sense. The soul is the source of all knowledge and the body is the source of all error. The soul is the true self and the body is the false self. The soul is the immortal part of man and the body is the mortal part of man. The soul is the divine part of man and the body is the earthly part of man. The soul is the immortal part of man and the body is the mortal part of man. The soul is the divine part of man and the body is the earthly part of man.

SECTION ONE

The first part of the dialogue is devoted to a discussion of the nature of the soul. Plato argues that the soul is immortal and immortal, and that it is the source of all knowledge. He also argues that the body is mortal and mortal, and that it is the source of all error. The soul is the true self and the body is the false self. The soul is the immortal part of man and the body is the mortal part of man. The soul is the divine part of man and the body is the earthly part of man. The soul is the immortal part of man and the body is the mortal part of man. The soul is the divine part of man and the body is the earthly part of man.

The second part of the dialogue is devoted to a discussion of the nature of the body. Plato argues that the body is mortal and mortal, and that it is the source of all error. He also argues that the soul is immortal and immortal, and that it is the source of all knowledge. The soul is the true self and the body is the false self. The soul is the immortal part of man and the body is the mortal part of man. The soul is the divine part of man and the body is the earthly part of man. The soul is the immortal part of man and the body is the mortal part of man. The soul is the divine part of man and the body is the earthly part of man.

CHAPTER I

The most important contribution which Leone Ebreo made to philosophy was his particular concept of Love. In all three dialogues various phases of the concept are illumined and finally a definition of love, unique to him and based on the many influences^{1.} that can be traced in his writings, is arrived at.

The dialogues open with a discussion on the difference between love and desire and it is from this discussion which is again taken up in the third dialogue that a definition is gained. There is the familiar tripartition of love^{2.} into love of the good, the profitable, and the pleasurable: "And even as there are three sorts of goods, to wit: the profitable, the pleasurable and the virtuous, so too there are three sorts of love: for one is of pleasure, another of profit, and a third of virtue."^{3.}

This tripartition is used in a negative way to prove the coexistence of desire and love. Pleasant things are both loved and desired before possession while after possession both love and desire for them dies: "On this reasoning you must needs confess that we love such things before we possess them and likewise at the same time as we desire them; and as desire dies once they have been completely possessed, so our love of them usually dies too. Hence you will allow

that love and desire can coexist."^{4.}

This argument of the coexistence of desire and love is necessary because it will later^{5.} lead to the discovery of important components in the definition of love.

Desire is distinguished from love on a metaphysical basis. The attempt is made to show that the existence or nonexistence of a thing are the basis for its being loved or desired. This argument is put into the mouth of Sophia who maintains that in the scale of values the term love stands higher than that of desire. This is an undertone that swings through the entire discussion of the difference of desire and love and is methodologically used to give the metaphysical understructure for the value judgments, for it will be because of these differences that the permanent and common features of both will be found: "Love pertains to things which exist; desire to those which do not."^{6.} But this argument is quickly demolished by showing that both love and desire presuppose knowledge of the desired object and hence the existence of that object: "So that love and desire alike presuppose the existence of their objects: existence in reality no less than in knowledge."^{7.} Because only if we know a thing as good will we love:ⁱ "Before we can love or desire, we must know the object of love or desire, that it is good. It is impossible we should know it as other than good; for in that case knowledge would produce, not love or desire of its object,

but utter loathing."^{8.}

With this we have introduced important new factors, knowledge and good which furnish the common basis for both terms: desire and love. But we have not yet reached a definition, because the question of being and nonbeing of the respective objects of love and desire, a question which from the point of view of the problem of knowledge is of paramount importance, has not yet been solved. There is an attempt to combine existence, knowledge and the judgment of value in Aristotelian terms: "And the object of desire must have three qualities in this order: first, being; second, truth; and third, goodness: these make it an object of love and desire. It could not become such an object, if it were not first judged good; ...And, before it can be judged good, it must be recognised as true; and, as it is truly present to cognition, so it must have being in reality.So that desire no less than love presupposes being."^{9.} Yet, as quite often,^{10.} an argument in Aristotelian terms is not satisfactory. In this case the objection arises that while the above statement covers the case of privation^{11.} it does not cover that of nonexistence. And therefore a new definition is being offered: "...it is enough to define desire as an affect of the will aimed at the coming to be or coming to be ours of a thing we judged good and have not; and to define love, as an affect of the will to enjoy through union the thing judged good."^{12.} This statement em-

phasizes again the distinction between being and nonbeing of the object of either love and desire. The common basis is found in the psychological element of the affect of the will; the judgment of the good, however, has already become a permanent part of the definition.

This distinction of being and nonbeing is a serious handicap for a final definition of love because of its implications for the theory of knowledge which is part of that definition. Somehow it is felt that the distinction between love and desire on that basis involves very fundamental difficulties and, therefore, any attempt to arrive at a definition in these terms is not entirely satisfactory.

In the third dialogue the question is, therefore, raised again. The definition of love and desire as affects of the will is made the starting point of the discussion. And now there is introduced a modification of the term non-being into potentially existing: "Nevertheless, we also declared that although desire is of things which are lacking, this always presupposes (and it is the same with love)^{13.} that the object has some degree of existence, for though it may be lacking to us, yet it exists in others or in itself, and if not actually, then potentially, and if not in reality,^{14.} yet it exists in the imagination and mind." This clearly removes the difficulty for the problem of knowledge. And now, by one further step, the identity of desire and love is shown and we have arrived at the final definition of

love.

Desire and love had been differentiated in terms of motion. Love had been enjoyment in union, a restive, static state; while desire was motion towards the acquisition or coming into being of the desired object. As long, therefore, as desire and love were differentiated love was necessarily the static and desire the dynamic phase of the same aspect of the affect of the will. But Leone who through the mouth of Philo speaks of love as the dynamic, life giving force, even of the whole universe, could not stop with a definition of love as a static principle. Therefore, in psychological terms, he shows how love always presupposes some lack and that though union is enjoyable, it is the fear of future lack of union or the incomplete state of union that is the true cause for love; and thus love regains its dynamic character and becomes the same as desire: "...although love is sometimes felt for an object we possess, yet it always presupposes some lack in respect of that object, which desire does also. And this is either because the lover has not yet achieved perfect union with the beloved, and therefore he loves and desires to be finally united with it, or because although he possesses and enjoys it at the present he may be deprived of its enjoyment in the future and therefore it forms the object of his desire. Thus true reasoning shows desire and love to be one and the same,...therefore, we defined love as the desire of union with the beloved, and we

showed how all desire is love and all love desire, in conformity with which I have now given you the universal definition of love, to wit, that it is the desire of something." ^{15.}

With this definition the difficulties arising from the distinction of being and nonbeing or potential being have been eliminated. It becomes now simple to reach a final definition including the terms of knowledge and the good.

As long as love had been the static enjoyment in union and thus been different from desire, knowledge and the judgment of a thing as good, which are the dynamic factors in the desire for union, had strictly speaking, nothing to do with love. This is felt quite clearly when it is said that for objects which we have taken possession of we feel no longer any desire. ^{16.} It is, therefore, only after the assertion and proof of the dynamic character, i.e., the identity of desire and love, that the knowledge and judgment of the good, which for Leone in Platonic ^{17.} style is a dynamic concept, becomes a real part of the definition of love: "For we have neither appetite nor love for an object once we have gained possession of it, yet something which is conceived to be good is ever loved and desired (sic!) : either that it may have being in reality, as it has in the mind, and exist in actuality as in potentiality; or if it already has actual existence and is lacking in us, that we may come to possess it; and if we have it in the present, that our enjoyment of it may be eternal, since future enjoyment does

not yet exist and is lacking in the present."^{18.}

With this statement love is more than a psychological drive that governs the conduct of the human being, it becomes more than a passing fancy and mere affect of the will, it enters the realm of metaphysics, it becomes permanent:^{19.} "something which is conceived to be good is ever loved", it becomes a cosmic force. It acquires that permanent status that enables it to become the undergirding, even the sole foundation for a system of philosophy, for a theory of the universe. Leone is at this moment altogether Platonist^{20.} and ends this particular discourse on the character of love with a Platonic quotation: "wherefore Plato defines love as the desire of the everlasting possession of the good, and^{21.} this everlasting implies a perpetual lack." This states clearly the metaphysical implications; love has become a metaphysical concept.

To understand fully what is meant by the definition of love as the desire for the everlasting possession of the good we shall have to treat the two concepts of knowledge and of good.

CHAPTER II

Love, of any sort, was unthinkable unless based on a knowledge of its object: "Yet without knowledge how can there be love? for you said that good must be known, before it can be loved."^{1.} But it was particularly the steadfast, the virtuous love that was conceived entirely in rational terms: "This alone is virtuous love: it is begotten of true reason, and therefore is not to be found among irrational animals."^{2.} However true these statements are and however well they fit into Leone's theory of values they bring him into methodological difficulties because he equated desire and love. For if virtuous love is based on reason what, then, forms the basis for loves and desires which range below this highly valued love?

Here we get our first glimpse of the theory of knowledge. Leone asserts that since there are three types of love,^{3.} there must be, correspondingly, three types of knowledge: "Knowledge and appetite, and consequently love, are of three sorts: natural, sensuous and rational-voluntary."^{4.}

Natural knowledge is the knowledge or the cognition of their end which is inherent in insentient bodies such as the elements, stones, metals and also in the plants. There is nothing dead or lifeless in the universe, everything

feels within it an end, a purpose to which it strives and which it desires to fulfill. The universe for Leone was an organism that was in constant motion, purposeful motion, and it was this "love", borne of the knowledge^{5.} of one purpose that animated and moved even "inorganic" bodies: "All these have natural cognition of their end and a natural inclination thereto."^{6.}

Sensuous knowledge or cognition is given to the irrational animals. It regulates their behaviour by giving them the knowledge of things pleasant and conducive to their health and safety and of things that are dangerous and harmful to them: "Sensuous cognition and appetite or love is that which we find in irrational animals (prompting them)^{7.} to pursue what advantages and shun what what harms them: as to seek food, drink, fair weather, congress, rest and the like, which must first be known and then desired or loved before they are pursued."^{8.} Leone, however, seems to feel that he is stretching the term knowledge a bit too far, or at least, that it is necessary to define this particular kind of knowledge more closely, for he hastens to add that this type of knowledge is not rational but should more correctly be called appetite: "But such knowledge does not involve reason; nor does such desire or love involve will, for there is no will divorced from reason. Rather they are produced by the sensuous faculty."^{9.} This explanation, which is given in psychological terms,

becomes necessary, because though knowledge seems to pervade the entire universe, reason furnishes a very distinct and unique kind of knowledge. The term knowledge in the above cases could easily be substituted by such words as feeling or even instinct, and seems to denote in a very wide sense the possession of certain facts, the having certain information which are not gained or given for themselves qua facts or information, but are the motors, the stimuli of conduct. And in a very real sense is content of "knowledge", "knowledge", and resulting action an inseparable unit. *Enlight*

Leone himself gives us a hint that this type of knowledge is inseparably bound up with the very essence of the "knowers". He observes the movements of elements and animals and comes to the conclusion: that they cannot but love their "proper stations" i.e. the station for which, essentially, they are meant. In the elements there is an essential relation between the heavy and the lower and the light and the higher: "And in irrational bodies there is natural love - (based, of course, on knowledge) ^{10.} - in the heavy for the lower, which they therefore seek, even as they flee the opposite, because they hate it. And the contrary applies to light bodies, which love heights and hate depths." ^{11.}

Animalic love is analogous: "The love of the elements and other lifeless bodies for their proper stations and their hatred of the opposites thereof is like the love of

animals for beneficial, and their hate of pernicious things."^{12.}

In the scale of values rational knowledge, however, is higher than the natural and sensuous ones. And man is the seat and agent of this particular type of knowledge: "Rational cognition and voluntary love are found only in men, as they spring from, and are governed by, reason, whereof men alone among generated and corruptible bodies partake."^{13.}

Reason, intellect, is proper to man, an essential in him as was the natural or sensuous cognition in elements and animals. It is man's differentia specifica, participated in by every member of the species. But since it is the specific and characteristic element in man, and since Leone is interested mainly in the practical problem of behaviour it is also the dominant factor, or at least, ought to be the dominant factor in human life: "Every man or woman has a masculine part which is perfect and active, to wit the intellect.....so that the sentient and feminine body was the obedient servant of the masculine intellect and reason. There was then no division in man, and his whole life was intellectual."^{14.} This is the description of Adam, the perfect man, as he emerged from God's creating hands.

Man, however, is no longer in his pristine perfect state and though his intellect can still, at rare moments, attain to highest perfection,^{15.} human intellect is potential: "When it attains to this state, however, it is no longer potential human intellect,.."^{16.} The introduction of this

Aristotelian^{17.} concept and term is methodologically necessary.
^{18.}

The potentiality of the human intellect, however, is not only a methodological but also a logical term. Potentiality of the human intellect means that state of the intellect which prevails at the beginning of any thought or knowledge process, that state in which the particular content of knowledge has not yet become actualized, simply because the process of intellection has not yet started, and the objects in question have not yet been united in the act of knowing, have not yet become actual: "Man is intelligent and the nature of fire is a thing which he understands. Now when man and fire are in potentiality with respect to understanding they are two separate things, and the intellection, also in potentiality, makes a third; but when the human intellect actively apprehends fire it unites with its essence and is one with the fire in the mind,...
^{19.}
and they are no longer divided."

The act of knowing is essentially one of union between the object and the subject in the process of the act. How closely this picture and terminology is linked with the actual experience and observation of love becomes evident from the fact that Leone gives the process of love as an analogy: "In the same way the potential lover is other than the potential beloved and they are two persons, while potential love makes a third which exists neither in the beloved nor

in the lover; but when the potential lover becomes actual he is made one and the same with the beloved and with love."^{20.}

Knowledge and love are not only interdependent factors in a system of philosophy, they are also essentially, in themselves, similar, even alike.

The act of knowledge was one of union, of comprehension;^{21.}

"And to gain knowledge we must comprehend;"^{22.} This comprehension is of two types due to the fact that the contents

of knowledge are essences both of corporeal and incorporeal objects. One is knowledge gained through the senses, a knowledge which is, of course, restricted to objects and their essences which are accessible to the senses: "since,

as the Philosopher^{23.} said, there can be nothing in the mind which has not passed through the senses."^{24.} "...and,

inasmuch as they are all material, it is true to say that they cannot enter the intellect save by way of the senses, which take material cognisance of them."^{25.}

The very imperfection of the human intellect, its potentiality as over against the perfection of the active intellect is borne out by the fact that it is accessible to or needs the senses for the transmission of the essences of the corporeal objects: "and man only has potential intellect in that he understands corporal essences, apprehended by the senses,"^{26.}

But the knowledge of these corporeal essences is not the highest goal of the human intellect. Their apprehension is more a concession to the imperfect nature of man and his

potential intellect rather than an essential necessity. At best the corporeal essences serve as a media^{26a.} for the comprehension of the incorporeal essences. The task of the senses is to apprehend some corporeal phenomenon such as motion and transmit it to the intellect which, in turn, interprets them as effects of spiritual causes: "But there is another way: namely the apprehension of spiritual matters through sight, or perception, of their effects: as you see the perpetual motion of the heavens, and thence conclude that they are moved by no body or physical power, but by an immaterial spirit or mind."^{27.} As clearly indicated in the above quotation the process of thinking used for the cause-effect relation is induction. This method, in another place, is attributed to Aristotle and claims that knowledge of a thing can be attained from its opposite: "Things are known by their opposites, as Aristotle says; for opposites are objects of a single science."^{28.} It is in this fashion that the senses and the corporeal essences can lead to an understanding of the incorporeal essences. These being themselves intellect are essentially akin to the human intellect and according to the tendency of "like" for "like"^{29.} much more proper to it: "...and his highest achievement, when he is sustained by true wisdom, is to attain to a knowledge of incorporeal essences through the medium of corporeal essences."^{30.} "Spiritual things are all intellect; and the light of the intellect is in our mind, fused naturally with it as being of one essence."^{31.}

But it is possible that due to our necessary dependence on the senses for information, a dependence which grows out of human imperfection, we might not be able to comprehend the intelligibility of the spiritual essences in a deserving degree: "albeit to us they may be less intelligible, since,...they are beyond the reach of our senses."^{32.}

But this cognitive relation of the intellect and the corporeal objects is restricted to their essences, while only the senses come in direct contact with the corporeal objects. For the activity of understanding deals with ideas only: "- illumining the ideas and forms of things issuing from the activity of understanding,.."^{33.} Because the higher a thing is, the more eternal and spiritual it is, the more valuable and intelligible it becomes, and is, therefore, the proper stuff for the intellect: "This science alone treats of spiritual and eternal things. The essence of these is in itself of far more worth and more intelligible than that of material and corruptible things;.." ^{34.}

The question now arises how this purely intellectual cognition is possible. Where do the ideas come from, and how are they transmitted to the intellect, or how does the intellect come in contact with them? The answer to these questions lies in the concept of the Active Intellect. Human happiness - and again the entire problem is inseparably linked with the problem of values - lies in the complete and unsullied cognition of all ideas. ^{35.} However, by itself the potential human mind is not able to attain to that happiness. Because it is only the Active Intellect

that contains within it all the forms and that comprehends them with singleness of vision.: "Whereas intellect in act, pure being and pure form, contains within itself all being and all forms and acts of the universe: - contains all in essence, in unity and pure simplicity."^{36.} And this Active

Intellect does not exist in the lower world. It is true that it is the link of the sublunar sphere with the higher ones and that it is its guiding intelligence,^{37.} but it is quite distinct from the lower world, in which the potential human mind is the highest form of rationality: "Such (active)"^{38.} an intellect does not exist in the lower world, because the inanimate compounds, plants and animals have no intellect; and man only has potential^{39.} intellect..."^{40.}

Yet it is the activity of this Active Intellect that provides the human potential mind with the material for intellection by bestowing in the act of self contemplation forms upon the matter of the lower world: "For these thinkers hold, with Plato,"^{41.} that this last intelligence, through contemplation and love of its own beauty, confers upon the lower world the forms in their various degrees and species which are found in first matter..."^{42.}

The human mind, then, is the potentiality, the capacity to grasp the forms which the Active Intellect deposits: "They say that our intellect is initially mere power of understanding: potentiality, undifferentiated in any way..."^{43.} "...whilst, on the other hand, the function of the active

intellect is to make such things intelligible, enlightening thereby our mind."^{44.}

And just as in the case of the process of intellection involving corporeal objects, so in this case also the act consists in a union, a fusion: "our mind would be wholly delivered from potentiality and made actual, changing into and becoming at one in all things with the active intellect illuminating it,.....And this is called the happy fusion of passive and active mind."^{45.} Thus the highest human happiness is achieved: human intellect in union with Active Intellect comprehends in a single vision - and a vision in its full ecstatic meaning it is^{45a} - the essence, the being of all the forms of the universe: "So that whoever could apprehend intellect thus actualized, would in a single vision and simple act of cognition, apprehend the entire being of all things in the Universe together, with an apprehension far more perfect,^{clear} and intelligible than their own nature would yield;..."^{46.}

The Active Intellect, clearly an Aristotelian element in the theory of knowledge,^{47.} plays the role of the vessel that contains all the ideas and forms and transmits them to our understanding. This process, again in Aristotelian terms, is expressed as the becoming actual of the latency or potentiality of the human understanding, which is the core of the Aristotelian epistemology: "This latent figuration is what Aristotle calls potentiality and universal preparation of the potential intellect to receive and understand all forms

and essences: for if they were not all potential and latent in it (the soul) ^{48.} it could not receive and understand them in actuality and by pre-existence." ^{49.} The entire process of knowledge then proceeds as follows. The Active Intellect, the storehouse of the ideas, impresses these on the potential human intellect, which in turn with the help of the senses who bring the representations of the forms as they exist in the objects to the potential human intellect, makes the latent essences actual: "You must know, therefore, that all the forms and ideas ¹ do not spring from bodies into our soul, because to migrate from one subject to another is impossible; but their representation by the senses makes these same forms and essences to shine forth which before were latent in our soul. This enlightenment Aristotle calls the act^s of understanding.." ^{50.} This is Leone's exposition of Aristotle's theory of knowledge.

^{51.} Side by side with this explanation we find the Platonic epistemology. But before we can enter into a description of it we shall have to define and explain three terms which Plato uses in connection with his theory of knowledge, viz., world-soul, soul and Ideas.

The World-soul, taking the place of the Active Intellect, governs the lower world and guides it to right knowledge: "Though they (the lower insentient bodies) ^{52.} have not these cognitive faculties in themselves, yet they are directed by Nature, which knows and governs all lower things: - i.e.,

by the soul of the World - to right and infallible knowledge of natural things, for the preservation of their being."⁵³ It is the repository for the forms, which are all

contained in it in order and harmony: "...of the sould of the world, and in it the hierarchy of all the forms,..."⁵⁴

"...by reason of the harmonious and concordant forms impressed upon it by the world soul."⁵⁵ These forms, which

are found in the world soul are derived ultimately from the first Intellect and the world soul has the same relation to it as have the natural forms of bodies with regard to the world soul: "And as the natural forms of bodies are derived

from an incorporeal and spiritual origin which is the soul of the World, and ultimately from the first divine intellect,..."⁵⁶ "only their ideal forms remain, pre-existing

in the first intellect and thence imparted to the soul of the world."⁵⁷ In this process of imparting the forms from

the first intellect to the world soul the forms lose in value, because the world soul is not as unified as is the first intellect: "These forms are also all contained in the sould of the world, which is its second artificer, though not with that measure of beauty which is in the first creative intellect, because in the soul they do not exist in pure union,..."⁵⁸

In the process of knowledge the link between the world soul, the container of the forms, and man, the knower and recipient of the forms, is the human soul. The human soul

emanates from the world soul: "And from the world soul emanate all the souls and natural forms in the lower world, distributed among^{59.} the various bodies,..." It is particularly the rational part of our human soul that is a copy, and image of the world soul: "Because our rational soul, as it is the image of the soul of the world,..."^{60.} And it is because of this essential likeness of our rational soul and the world soul that our understanding can grasp the forms that are laid up in the world-soul: "And therefore by the use of reason, like (that world soul), it distinguishes each one of them (forms)"^{61.} and loves and relishes its beauty."^{62.} "With the eyes of the understanding and by ordered reason we can see the beauty of the soul of the world, and in it the hierarchy of all the forms,..."^{63.} Very clearly it is the cognitive relation of the human soul to the world soul expressed in the following statement: "all abstract forms are contained spiritually in ordered union in the world soul, of which our rational is the image, because its essence is a latent figuration of all those spiritual forms impressed upon it by the world soul, its original and pattern."^{64.}

As for the human soul, this is not the place to give a detailed description of it. Suffice it here to state, as has already become evident in the above quotations, that the human soul proceeds from the world soul, is essential kin and like to it, and contains within it a rational part which

due to its essential relationship with the world soul, gains a knowledge of the forms contained therein. There is, however, one distinctly Platonic feature of the theory of knowledge involving the human soul that has to be dealt with here, and that is the theory of recollection.

66.

The world soul contains the forms. These forms are given to the lower world and, therefore, found in the objects which are accessible to the senses. The senses transmit their contents of perception to the soul in which the cognitive process functions in such fashion that these sensory data unearth, stimulate to become actual, make to shine forth the forms in which the human soul in a pre-natal state had already taken possession of. The sense data bring back to the memory of the human being all the Ideas which the human soul had once beheld, but then forgotten.

67.

And this process of recollection is the core of the process of intellection: "You must know, therefore, that all the forms and ideas do not spring from bodies into our soul, because to migrate from one subject to another is impossible; but their representation by the senses makes these same forms and essences to shine forth which before were latent in our soul. This...calls...

68.

Plato memory." The reason why the human soul forgets the ideas and contains them only in a latent form is due, and here again we see the essential connection of this theory of knowledge with the theory of values, to the soul's intimate connection with the body and hence matter: "Our soul is therefore filled with formal beauties which, in truth, are its proper essence, and if they are concealed

within it this latency is not on account of the intellect which is its essence, but by reason of the connection and union it has with the human body..."^{69.}

The third term that needs a more detailed treatment is: forms, Ideas. What are the Ideas?

The ideas are the essences, the principle of all existing things. They are, therefore, found in every object and constitute the real nature of their "incorporations": "or holding with Plato that each of the elements has a formal incorporeal principle, participation in which constitutes its own nature. Such principles he calls 'ideas',..."^{70.}

From the elements there is an extension of the theory of ideas to the virtues and vices, the plants, the generation and decay, in short the entire universe."^{71.}

To further explain the nature of the Ideas Leone uses, as does Plato,^{72.} the simile of the artificer^{73.} and the mental picture of the object which he intends to make: "...the knowledge and art preexisting in the mind of the craftsman, upon which beauty of artificial objects depends, as on their original Idea communicated to them all."^{74.}

Was the first quotation an ontological approach to the theory of Ideas, the main part of a discussion of their nature has to be from the point of view of epistemology, for they are, above all, the fundamental elements of the theory of knowledge. However, there is no real need for making a sharp distinction between the two approaches, because the

being and the knowledge of an object, as we have already seen are essentially interwoven with one another.⁷⁵ Thus applying his simile of the Craftsman to the greatest piece of art, the universe, Leone points out that in an analogous manner the Ideas are the knowledge pre-existing in the mind of God of his created universe: "The Ideas are none other than the knowledge of the created universe with all its part in the mind of the highest Craftsman and Creator of the world..."⁷⁶ And with this definition he has not only made the Ideas part of an epistemology, but has at the same time made their existence undisputable, since he links it up with the universe as the creation of God, an idea which: "...no reasonable person can deny."⁷⁷

Priority in time counts very heavily in the scales of value.⁷⁸ This factor together with the logical precedence of the picture of an object in the mind of the craftsman to its real existence, which is confirmed by experience, makes of the Ideas not knowledge as such but especially the pre-existing knowledge which, therefore, has a causal force: "the knowledge of all these things, contrived with such skill, must pre-exist in the same perfection in the mind of this Creator of the world, just as the design of artificial things must first be known in the mind of their craftsman and artificer, otherwise they would not be artificial, but only accidental. This foreknowledge of the universe and of its parts in the divine intellect is what is known as the Ideas,

that is divine foreknowledge of the things in creation."^{79.}

Following his adopted line of procedure,^{80.} Leone contrasts in important points Plato's position to that of Aristotle, and he does so in this instance also. He claims^{80a.} that Aristotle never denied the existence of the Ideas, but that he called them by a different, and as he asserts at the end of this particular discussion, a better name than^{81.} did Plato;^{82.} "For he (Aristotle) asserts that the Nomos of the universe pre-exists in the divine mind, that is the wise ordering of it, from which order the perfection and plan of the world and all its parts is derived."^{83.} "In effect, therefore, the Platonic Ideas in the mind of God are allowed by Aristotle, although he speaks of them under another name and with other figures of speech."^{84.}

In the further discussion of the difference between Plato and Aristotle with regard to the Ideas, and there is a difference,^{85.} we learn some more essential features of the Platonic concepts of the Ideas. Since the Ideas are the pre-existing knowledge in the mind of God, they are, both ontologically and from the standpoint of value, prior to the created things. Ontologically speaking that means that since reality is ascribed to the essence of an object, only the object's Idea is real, while the object itself is but a copy or shadow of the Idea: "You must know that Plato placed in the Ideas the essences and substances of all things so that everything which they engender in the corporeal world is con-

sidered as but the shadow of substance and essence rather than substance and essence itself."^{86.}

Against this view Aristotle's protest is registered. Was for Plato the relation of Idea and object that of ante^{87.} res, Aristotle's is in rebus. The object, the corporeal thing itself is the true essence and not only the idea. The idea is merely the cause of the existence of the object, and has as such the superiority that any cause has over its effect,^{88.} but essentially it is not higher: "Aristotle's opinion is less extreme: for he considers that the supreme perfection of the Craftsman must produce works of art perfect in themselves, and therefore that the corporeal work contains the true essence and substance of all its parts, and that the Ideas are not the essences and substances of things, but the procreative causes upon which their order depends."^{89.}

1 Exp.

Also in the question of the relation of the universals to the ideas there is a difference arising from this same point of divergence. Plato holds the Ideas to be the universals of the species and, of course, preceding the particular individuals of a given species, while Aristotle holds that each individual contains the essence of the species and that the universals are merely products of a process of abstraction: "Nor does he hold that the universals of these species are the Ideas,..but only intellectual concepts of our understanding taken from the substance and essence which is in

every real and particular thing."^{90.} Leone points out that while for Plato the Ideas were the only essences, Aristotle sees them merely as the divine causes of these essences: "And seeing that in the Ideas there is neither matter nor body, there is, therefore, according to Aristotle, neither essence nor substance in them, but the Ideas are the divine origin on which all essence and substance depend,..."^{91.}

Leone decides in this controversy for the version of the Ideas as given by Aristotle: "...that essences and substances produced and caused by the Ideas truly exist in the corporeal world,..."^{92.} He reaches this decision, because in his opinion, Plato had, in his understandable desire to emphasize the Ideas as against the body, gone too far in that direction: "Plato, finding that the early Greek philosophers did not hold there to be any essence, substance or beauty other than that of corporeal things, and that naught else existed save body, like a true physician was obliged to cure them with the contrary belief. Thus he showed them that the body in itself has neither essence, substance nor beauty, nor indeed anything but the shadow of the spiritual and Ideal essence and beauty of the mind of the Creator of the world."^{93.}

This concept of the Ideas is fitted into the Epistemology by the above discussed theory of the recollection. The ideas are in the potential human understanding and thence recollection, stimulated by the sense data, makes the ideas to appear. There is, again, reason from the point of view

of the theory of values to show that the human intellect should contain the Ideas only potentially, because in man they are mixed with matter and, therefore, the impression on them is less clear, less actual, potential: "...and in the potential intellect they are impressed potentially, yet not corporeally but spiritually or intellectually."⁹⁹

Thus the three concepts of the world soul, the rational human soul and the theory of the Ideas completes Plato's theory of knowledge. The Ideas are divine, are impressed on the world-soul, then imparted to the rational human soul, where they remain in latency till the sense data stimulate their becoming actual, and thus we gain knowledge.

Our investigation of the theory of knowledge was prompted by Leone's position with regard to the objects of love which had to be known first before being loved and desired. And though, from the point of view of epistemology, we might already have done justice to the theory of knowledge, in connection with the philosophy of love and its decidedly value-theoretical approach an important link is still missing.

All during our previous discussions we have found a gradation of the various types and approaches of knowledge, from the knowledge of the insentient bodies, the sensory knowledge to that of the rational human soul. And even the rational human soul has a wide range of topics and contents of knowledge, because there is a definite hierarchy

among the Ideas: "In the intellect, also, the activities are graded from the lowest to the highest according to the order of the intelligible things which are their objects, even up to the highest and final intelligible object."^{95...}

What is, then, the highest object of knowledge, that would give the highest type of knowledge? In the discussion of the theory of Ideas we have already observed that according to the hierarchy of being there is a hierarchy of Ideas. The highest Idea must correspond to the highest being, and in one place Leone draws the final conclusion and identifies "Idea" with God: "...but the Idea does not truly exist in the intellect, but is the intellect and divine mind itself."^{96.}

The entire tendency to spiritualize knowledge and the contents thereof that becomes evident from such statements as: "which wisdom, being spiritual, and so alien to matter and free from corporeal limitations, overrides the distinction of persons and bodily individuality,..."^{97.}, the Platonic concept of the Ideas as being the true essences of objects, the Aristotelian position of the Ideas as the causes of substances and essences, and Leone's own theory of values made it necessary that the highest, the first knowledge and wisdom was that of God: "This wisdom, or First Philosophy, it is, which embraces the knowledge of things divine, so far as it is possible to human intellects; and hence it is called *theologia*, which means 'study of God.'"^{98.}

Moreover, human happiness depends not on diversity, but on oneness. Here the analogy for the process of knowledge is freely borrowed from the experience and theory of love. The oneness of vision, the comprehension of the diversity of objects in one single act of intellect^{ion} is human happiness: "It (happiness)^{99.} cannot lie in knowledge of all things, each individually; but rather in the cognition of a single object, comprising in itself all the objects of the Universe. And cognition of this one object involves cognition of all others together in a single act - and a more perfect cognition than would be possible if they were cognised each separately."^{100.} And this single act of vision and single object of vision is first identified with the Active Intellect and then with God, to which identification Leone agrees: "I will only say that those who meditate most on God + affirm - and I agree - that the Active Intellect, which gives light to our power of understanding,^{101.} is God Most High;"

And still from another angle does it become necessary to posit God as the final object and the highest type of knowledge, and that is from the point of view of human desire after perfection. Leone speaks of love and its procession through the entire universe upward towards the highest beauty. And since the essential interrelation of love and knowledge has already been established, this procession is valid for knowledge as well as for love: "...love

and desire of this first matter to approximate to divine perfection,...ascending step by step through the forms^{102.} and formal perfections: firstly in the forms of the elements; secondly in those of inanimate compounds; thirdly in those of the plants; fourthly in those of animals; fifthly in potential human understanding; sixthly in the active human intellect; and seventhly in the speculative intellect united with the highest beauty through the medium of the active intellect."^{103.}

In the dynamic system of "eone, a system of such strong value-theoretical character, the first knowledge, the highest knowledge, knowledge qua knowledge is knowledge of God. There is no epistemology as an independent field of research, but knowledge itself, the basis and sine qua non of love, becomes a value-term.

Knowledge is knowledge of God, because as we have already seen, the insentient bodies receive their knowledge by the world soul which in turn receives the Ideas from God's intellect; the human intellect is in essential relation to God's intellect. And it is only due to this likeness, that the human intellect can ever grasp God intellectually, as far as that is possible:^{104.} "For the intellect is nothing but a tiny beam of the infinite splendour of God, assigned to man to make him rational, deathless and happy;"^{105.}

And, moreover, the perfect use of intellect, the per-

fect cognition, consists of the coincidence of the knower with the subject of knowledge. And this oneness, this complete unity of the act of knowledge is only possible in God: "In the Divinity, therefore, the knower is one with its knowledge,.....In this uttermost oneness and simplicity, subject to no multiplication, consists perfect cognition."^{106.}

For in God the subject, object and process of knowledge, necessarily separated in any non-godly agent of knowledge, and hence imperfect, are one: "And as in God the knower, the thing known and the act of knowing are all one and the same..."^{107.}

The human intellect, which is only a "tiny beam" of the divine, has the possibility by this very relationship to grasp God intellectually, though, strictly speaking, this grasping is no longer a process of knowledge, but one of ecstatic vision. With the exception of God's self-knowledge, there is no other way of knowing God except by this ecstatic vision of God, which again shows what extension the term knowledge experiences, and how little there is of epistemology as such: "...the human intellect is reduced to actuality and acquires wisdom, so that through the force of love and desire it can be exalted in union with this same active intellect, and behold in it, as in a medium or crystal mirror, the immense beauty of the divinity, rejoicing therein with eternal gladness as in the final end of the whole created universe."^{108.} Love and knowledge are

so inseparably merged both in language and conception, that they become synonyms. The love of God and the knowledge of God are the same intellectual-emotional process: "And as we know His perfection, though incapable of apprehending it completely, so we love and desire to enjoy Him in the most perfect union of knowledge possible to us. This great love and desire of ours ravishes us into such contemplation, as exalts our intellect, till, illuminated by special favor of God, it transcends the limits of human capacity and speculation, and attains to such union and copulation with God Most High, as proves our intellect to be, rather a part of the essence of God, than understanding of merely human form." ^{109.}

And reminiscent of our definition of love, true love is the desire for the continued union of our intellect with that of God: "Yet may love and desire well persist - not indeed for union in knowledge, which has been achieved already - but for continuance of the enjoyment of such union with God; and this is truest love." ^{110.}

Love and desire have as their goal perfect knowledge, that is knowledge of God. The Love of God and the knowledge of God are one and the same: "Thus desire and love are none other than the way of imperfect knowledge leading to perfect and unitive knowledge." ^{111.}

We can now enter into a discussion of the second term of our original definition of love, viz., that of the Good.

CHAPTER III

The definition of Good is^a rather difficult matter because Leone, throughout, is not so much interested to treat the term as an ethical value, but as a metaphysical concept. It is true that the concept of the Good cannot escape to find its place in the scale of values, but it appears there rarely as the Good, but rather interchangeably with other terms, such as the pleasurable, the desirable, and especially the beautiful. True, every now and then we find attempts to treat the concept Good in an ethical context, often reminiscent of Socratic definitions and discussions,^{1.} such as:
"for that which all men desire is truly good."^{2.} But right after that Leone hastens to affirm, that the structure and disposition of the human being is such that the common good which is desired is knowledge, and in a process similar to that observed in our discussion about love and desire a firm metaphysical basis is found for the term the Good:
"Aristotle himself gives the answer, that it is knowledge, and he begins his metaphysics with the words: "All men by nature desire to know";"^{3.}

The most frequent identification and definition used for the term Good is The Beautiful. There is an attempt made to deny the possible identification by pointing to the relativistic character of the term Beautiful: "...in fact, the beautiful and the good seem to me to be one and the

same. Therein lies your error."^{4.} "...for what seems beautiful to one does not to another..."^{5.} "...while on the other hand it is maintained that the good is a universal: "The good, on the contrary, is universal in itself, and a good thing is often esteemed as good by many people."^{6.} And this train of thought is thoroughly consistent with the above quoted opening words of Aristotle's Metaphysics. But as we have seen in our discussion of the theory and process of knowledge, knowledge embraces every phase of being, it permeates the entire universe, it is the proof for the creatorship of God. It is the common denominator for all men and its divine origin guarantees a certain uniformity of judgment. Therefore the identification of the good with the beautiful takes place in terms of knowledge: "And the true good of our soul is to rise from corporeal to spiritual beauty and to know the higher intellectual beauty through the lower and sensible."^{7.} There can be no doubt that Leone strove for this identification, because he calls for his most important authority, the Scriptures,^{8.} to prove that the good and the beautiful are one and the same: "...and the whole that it was very good, because good means beautiful;"^{9.} And the complete identification becomes evident from a quotation taken from the Diotima^{10.} story where instead of good the knowledge of the beautiful appears in the definition of love: "...love being a desire of the beautiful."^{11.}

In order, then, to understand what Leone meant by the

good, we shall first have to define and examine the term:

"beautiful". Beauty is an attribute of objects. An object^{12.} consist of matter and form. Hence, following Leone's

value-theory, beauty is resident in the form of the body, it^{13.} is formal grace. "And what is this definition (of beauty)?^{14.}

Formal grace,..."^{15.} This grace is not a term referring to a sensory process, but it influences the cognitive process:

"Beauty is grace which delights the mind which recognizes^{16.} it and moves it to love."

Motivated by his judgment of values Leone insists that beauty is, in contrast to the ugliness of matter something incorporeal, something spiritual: "And you must know that those souls which have difficulty in perceiving corporeal beauty, that is the spiritual which lies within^{17.} it, and can barely extract it from material ugliness and corporeal deformity,.."

Highest beauty is achieved in freedom from^{18.} body: "...that form is most beautiful without body..."

it rises in value as it rids itself of its corporeality:

"and are far more excellent in beauty in their spiritual^{19.} than in their corporeal being."

As a matter of fact beauty resides not only in the formal grace, but forms as such are beautiful and are the agents and causes of beauty in the objects: "I will grant you that every body has beauty^{20.} imparted to it by the form which informs its matter,..."

This same idea is graphically expressed in the simile of the craftsman who transfers beauty into the object that he

fashions by pre-existing knowledge of the form of the object: "...the knowledge and art pre-existing in the mind of the craftsman, upon which the beauty of artificial objects depends..."^{21.}

But these pre-existing forms, that are the vessels of beauty are^{no} others than the Ideas, and hence the beauty of an object lies in its Idea: "the beauty of all natural bodies is none other than the splendour of their Ideas, and therefore these are the true beauty by which all things are made beautiful."^{22.}

Following the theory of the hierarchy of the Ideas, Leone then asserts that since the highest Idea is the Divine wisdom it must, necessarily, at the same time be the highest beauty: "since first beauty, as you have said, is divine wisdom and the Idea of the universe..."^{23.}

From here the final step can be taken. The good is the beautiful; the beautiful is the divine wisdom, is God. In Aristotelian terms the identity of God, Intellect and Beauty is asserted: "According to this Peripatetic philosophy of the divine essence the solution of your difficulty is therefore made clear: for since God is His own wisdom and the first intellect and Idea of the universe, His beauty is the same as that of His wisdom and intellect, which is the Idea of all things. And this, as I have told you, is the first and true beauty..."^{24.}

In terms of the process of knowledge and human happiness

in the cognitive union with God as the highest beauty the identification of God and beauty takes this form: "The most exalted knowledge of man, however, is that of pure intellect, which, being absorbed in the science of the Divine and of things abstracted from matter, rejoices in and becomes enamoured of the highest grace and beauty which is in the Creator and Artificer of all things; and it therein attains to its ultimate happiness."²⁵

This union with the desired object had been a part of the definition of love and the following quotation will show how completely fused with each other are the terms good, beautiful, highest, intelligence and God: "The foremost seat of love, therefore, is that first and most perfect created intelligence, which by reason of its love enjoys in union the highest beauty of its Creator, upon Whom it depends."²⁶

God is the highest beauty: "...is united to the Divinity, the first cause and final end of the universe and the highest beauty universally loved and desired."²⁷ "For since the supremely beautiful is the most high Maker of the universe..."²⁸ And thus, just as perfect knowledge was knowledge of God, the knowledge of the good has become knowledge of God, because beauty and good, and beauty and God are one and the same."²⁹

But even if Leone's strongly developed theory of aesthetic values had not lead to the identification of God and good through the medium of the term beauty, there are

other passages that show clearly this identification. God is the good: "Love of God not only partakes of good, but comprises the goodness of all things and all loves; for the Godhead is at once origin, means and end, of all good deeds."^{30.}

"And because the Most High God is supreme goodness,.."^{31.}

and Plato furnishes the authority for this identification:

"Plato says that God most high (Whom he sometimes calls the highest good)..^{32.}"

Thus, when we consider the findings of the investigation of the terms knowledge and good and insert them in our original definition of love we come to the conclusion that love is the desire for the everlasting union with God, a desire caused by the knowledge of Him. Leone's concept of Love is an amor dei intellectualis.^{33.}

CHAPTER 1

SECTION TWO

CHAPTER I

The concept of love, as we had culled it from the various passages of Leone's writing, was qua love in its real and most perfect state, love of God. God had been the object of love towards Whom the intellectual faculties of the human being strained to enjoy ecstatic union with Him.

But God is not only the object of love, He is also its subject. There are two loves that proceed from Him as there eternal source. The one is the intrinsic love,^{1.} the love that God has for Himself. God, as we have seen, was the supremely beautiful^{2.} which in turn is the cause for love. And thus, following the analogy of the process of intellection that finally united the knower, the subject of knowledge and the process of knowledge in an inseparable unity in God,^{3.} the three phases of love, viz., the lover, the beloved and love are united in the Godhead as the highest actuality, leading to perfect singleness and oneness: "Just as the understanding, the object understood and the intellection are divided in potentiality and united in actuality..^{4.}" "then, when they exist in the highest and purest divine actuality, they must be one in single and absolute unity,"^{5.} God, then, is the origin and end of His self-love: "And it is impossible to conceive of the multiplication of unity if that unity is

not preserved within the product. This is why I have told you that in the Divinity the mind or wisdom, which is the lover,^{6.} eternally proceeds from beauty, which is the beloved, and the eternal love of these two is born of beauty or the beloved as the father and of wisdom or the lover as the mother."^{7.}

This intrinsic love, then, must be eternal since its parents which are aspects of God are eternal, and one with the unity of God: "...that it was born of God as both lover and beloved, none the less this love was born of God from all eternity."^{8.}

The other love that proceeds from God is called the first love. It is this love that brings God into active creative relation with the universe and makes Him more than an almost unreachable object of adoration. This love is called the first love, or the first extrinsic^{9.} love and is the cause for the creation of the universe; "The first love after this intrinsic love which is one with God was that by virtue of which the world was made or created;"^{10.} This love was born of God's desire to procreate^{11.} Himself, just as a father desires to have a son: "The Godhead, therefore, loving its own beauty, desired to bring forth a son in its own image, which desire was the first extrinsic love, that is of God for the created world, and its birth caused the first production of the first parents of the universe and of the earth itself."^{12.}

With the assertion of the existence of this extrinsic love for the created universe Leone involves himself in difficulties. Love had always presupposed a lack of the object of love in the lover. This then would imply that God has a lack which causes this extrinsic love. And, indeed, at one place Leone admits that God suffers from an imperfection, not in His essence, but in His relationship as Creator to the created: "I can grant you that God, in loving perfection, loves the perfection of His divine action, and the lack which this love presupposes in Him is not in His essence, but in the shadow of the relation of the Creator to His creatures. And since this can be sullied by a defect in them He desires that they may be made perfect, thereby desiring that His own perfection may be immaculate."^{13.}

Leone is, perhaps, forced into this admission in order to explain the presence of Evil in the world or else to avoid a situation which would remove God so far from His creation and sever the dynamic, warm, and humanly accessible bond between Him and His creatures so as to make God wholly impersonal. He, however, finds a more satisfactory solution of the conflict arising from the clash of the ideas of perfection on the one hand and God's active role as creator on the other by showing that God's love desires not his own perfection, which in spite of the above admission he maintains to be supreme, but the ultimate and complete perfection of the creatures, who by virtue of being creatures are

less perfect: ^{14.} "Such is a part of the love of the father for the son, ^{of} the master for the disciple, and of one friend for the other; and such, too, is the love of God for His creatures, the desire of their good but not of His." ^{15.}

But the first extrinsic love is not the only love that causes creation. There are two more loves whose activity combined with the first extrinsic love of God help to produce our universe: "A second love besides the divine extrinsic love was also present at this creation, ^{15a.} that of Chaos ¹⁶ for the intellect as the wife for her husband, and this was returned by the intellect as the husband returns the love of his wife, and through their love ^{17.} the world was conceived." "A third love was also necessary for the creation and existence of the world, that which all its parts bear ^{for} one another and for the whole..." ^{18.}

With the second love the "mother" and "father" ^{19.} of the universe, chaos and intellect, are introduced. These concepts are so used in the account of creation as to fit into Leone's value theory. Intellect which after the rejection of the Aristotelian identification ^{20.} is not God Himself is yet his first and most immediate emanation. ^{21.} It is this Intellect that produces from himself Chaos, the mother, and both together, then, become the procreative cause for the existence of the world: "Divine formality is its father, ^{22.} and its mother chaos, both from eternity; but the perfect

father produced from himself the single substance and imperfect
mother,^{23.} and from both are made and formed anew all the worlds,
their children, in which matter is combined with paternal for-
mality."^{24.}

With this, the rational element, which, of course, in accordance with our definition, was implied in the concept of the three loves has been stated explicitly. It is God's wisdom that fashioned the world. Leone invokes the authority of the Scriptures to prove this rationality of the creation of the universe, and, by a homily in the best Midrashic style,^{24a.} he sets out to prove his point: "The first words which Moses wrote were: 'In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.' And where we say 'in the beginning' the ancient Chaldeans^{25.} gave the interpretation, 'with wisdom God created the heaven and the earth,' because wisdom in Hebrew is called the beginning, as Solomon says, 'the beginning is wisdom,'^{26.} and for the word 'in' we can say 'with'. Thus the first words show the world to have been created by wisdom, and that wisdom was the first creative force, although it was the most high God, the creator, Who through His supreme wisdom first created beauty and made the whole universe beautiful."^{27.}

The introduction of the Intellect as the more immediate agent of creation serves not only the methodological purpose of emphasizing the rationality of the universe and its creation but also establishes clearly a difference be-

tween Plato and Aristotle. Its is a polemic against Aristotle's identification of God with Intellect. And Leone again bases himself on the authority of the Scripture to bolster his adherence to the point of view of Plato who makes Intellect do the work of creation:^{28.}

"And this intellect or true wisdom he calls the creator of the world and its Idea, containing in its simplicity and unity all the essences and forms of the universe, which Plato calls Ideas; in other words, the highest wisdom has knowledge of the universe and every part of it, by means of which all things are created..."^{29.} "And like Plato, he (Solomon)^{30.} calls wisdom a master workman..."^{31.}

In keeping with the identity of highest intellect and highest beauty we find a passage that ascribes the creation of the world to a mating of the supremely beautiful and wisdom.^{32.} for which Leone adduces the Song of Songs as his Scriptural authority: "You must know that Solomon and the followers of Moses hold that the world was begotten of the supremely beautiful, as ~~the~~ son of his father, and of supreme wisdom or true beauty as its mother. And they say that the highest wisdom, being enamoured of the supremely beautiful as a woman of her more perfect half, the man, and the supremely beautiful returning this love, she conceives and bears him a son, the beautiful universe with all its parts. And this is the meaning of the love which Solomon in his Song of Songs places between his love

and the most beautiful beloved."^{33.}

The entire relation of God's love or wisdom or beauty to the universe in the process of creation is summed up in the following passage: "You know at any rate that the world was produced by the supreme Creator through the medium of love... beholding his immense beauty and loving it, and she likewise Him as the supremely beautiful, He created and engendered in her likeness the beautiful universe; for for the end of love, as Plato says, is birth in the beautiful. The universe, therefore, having been produced by its supreme Creator in the likeness or image of His immense wisdom, His love was born towards this universe, not as of the imperfect for the perfect, but as of the supremely perfect for the lower and less perfect and as of the father for the son and the cause for its single effect."^{34.} Concerning the actual process of creation there are several conflicting theories, all of which Leone presents and from which he finally chooses the one that could best be harmonized with the Biblical account of the creation.

There are three major theories; one is the Aristotelian, the second one the Patonic and the third one the Biblical account. The main difference is that of the eternity of the world.

Aristotle claims that the world has existed from all eternity: "Many philosophers hold that it was produced from eternity by God, and is like God in that it never had a tem-

poral beginning, and amongst them, the great philosopher, Aristotle, and all the Peripatetics." ^{35.} The reason for this assumption on Aristotle's part is that an eternal cause, such as God, needs an eternal effect as counterpart; ^{35a.} and this cause-effect relationship would also, at the same time, do away with the difficulty of the identity of God and the world that arises if we posit an eternal world: "The difference between them would still be great, because God would have been the creator from eternity, and the world would have been created from eternity: the one the eternal cause, the other the eternal effect." ^{36.}

Leone devotes quite some space to an account of the Aristotelian theory of creation and lists the main reasons why the Peripatetic school insisted on the eternity of the created world. First, the Peripatetics by the method of regressus ad infinitum argue for the eternity of matter: "If, therefore, first matter had been made, it would necessarily have been made out of something else, and that would be first matter and not the former; and since this process cannot be continued to infinity, a matter which is truly primary and has never been made must be postulated. First matter, therefore, is eternal, and its generation and corruption also, for since ^{first} matter is imperfect in its essence it must always exist in the form of some substance." ^{37.}

Experience and the theory that corruption is a struggle between opposites ^{38.} prove the eternal existence of the heaven,

for heaven has no opposite elements: "Again, the heaven seem to be eternal by nature, because if it were generated it would be corruptible, and this is impossible because it has no opposite..."^{39.}

Circular motion is the third component of our universe that is eternal, because it is in the nature of a circle to be without beginning or end:" ..circular motion is without a beginning, and every part of it is both beginning and end."^{40.}

And, finally, Time is also eternal since it is nothing more than the measure of that eternal circular motion: "Again, time, which depends on first motion, since it registers numerically preceding and succeeding motions, must likewise be eternal;"^{41.}

A concluding argument for the eternity of the world in Aristotelian terms is taken from the field of value judgment rather than metaphysics. It asserts that the creation was an act of goodness and kindness on the part of the creator and there is no reason to assume that this goodness should be interrupted at any given time: "...the purpose of the Creator in the creation of the world was none other than the desire to do good; why, therefore, should He not always have done this good?"^{42.} These are the main arguments that, according to Leone, the Peripatetics ^{of} prefer to establish the eternity of the created universe.

It is against this theory that Leone quotes Plato's

account of the creation. Plato believed in the creation of the world out of chaos at the beginning of time: "Among^{43.} them is Plato, godlike in his wisdom, who, in the Timaeus, says that the world was made and begotten of God, and created out of chaos, that confused material which went into the making of all things."^{44.} Leone is very emphatic in stating that Plato believed in the creation in time, because it is on this basis that he refuses^{45.} to accept an attempt by Plotinus to reconcile Aristotle's and Plato's opinion, an attempt that in other instances^{46.} he had made, successfully, himself: "And though Plotinus, his follower, tries to reconcile him with the theory of the eternity of the world, saying that the Platonic generation and production of the world is understood to be from eternity, yet Plato's words seem to assign it\to a beginning in time."^{47.}

So far, as was particularly mentioned,^{48.} Plato had been in perfect accord with the Biblical account. But with regard to the eternity of matter Plato deviates^{48a.} from it, because he holds that matter is co-eternal with God as His eternal creation: "It is certainly true that he (Plato)^{49.} makes chaos, out of which everything is made, to be eternal, that is, eternally created by God. And this the faithful do not believe;"^{50.} But this opinion is quite distinct from the Aristot~~elian~~ian, because it is clearly asserted that matter was created by God: "for chaos is formless and imperfect, and a creative cause must be assigned to it which

shall be all-embracing form and perfection."^{51.} "This is why, Plato asserts, and not without reason, that chaos was created by God from eternity..."^{52.}

As we have already seen above,^{53.} it is not God Himself who, according to Plato, creates the world, but his intellect, the container of the Ideas which form the plan for the creation of the universe. These are the main elements of the Platonic theory of creation which Leone adduces in the course of this discussion.

The third theory of creation with which Leone deals is the Jewish one. Referring to Moses and Bible as his sources, he maintains that the world was created: "ex nihilo in the beginning of time..."^{54.} a direct contradiction to Aristotle's view. But the Jewish view, according to Leone, also disagrees^{55.} with Plato's view of the co-eternity of matter: "And indeed Moses nowhere gives any clear indication that he held matter to be co-eternal with God."^{56.}

The argument for the creation ex nihilo comes, of course, into conflict with the data of man's daily experience, which establishes not only causality by tracing material effects to material causes, but which also shows that "nothing" cannot be transformed into "something." Here Leone leaves clearly the field of purely rational argumentation and steps into the realm of faith and belief. And he asserts that the omnipotence of God is capable of producing the universe from "nothing": "We allow that in the course

of nature nothing can be made from nothing; yet we hold this possible miraculously, through divine omnipotence: not that the material consists of nothing, as statues are made out of wood, but that God can create things anew without the previous existence of any material whatsoever."^{57.} This statement not only is in distinct contrast to Aristotle's position but is also directed against the Platonic view of the co-eternity of matter, because the Platonic concept of matter as the void, the nothing, could have been used to interpret, literally, the term creatio ex nihilo in such a way as to make "nothing" the material out of which the universe was fashioned. Consequently, there could have been no objection against the Platonic position with regard to the eternity of matter, and the argument of God's omnipotence on the ground of creatio ex nihilo would, to say the least, have been considerably weakened, if not entirely impossible.

But Leone insisted on retaining the concept of the divine omnipotence and was very conscious of its force. He realized its many implications especially with regard to the problem of the free will. He, like others,^{58.} realized the limitation imposed on the divine nature by the Aristotelian concept of the eternity of the world and matter, and is very explicit in stating that God's essence is such that he acts not from necessity, but from free will: "With regard to the nature of the Creator, we believe that eternal God acts not of necessity, but of free will and omnipotence; and as He

was free to establish the universe as He pleased, the number of orbs and stars, the size of the heavenly spheres, the elements, and the number, measure and quality of all creation,^{59.} even though He could have made it eternal like Himself."

So important is this concept of divine omnipotence for Leone, apparently deeply rooted in his inner being, that basing himself on a Biblical verse he reverses the logical arrangement of the argument that he offered, viz., omnipotence for the creatio ex nihilo, and proves God's omnipotence from an assumed creatio ex nihilo:

"for the omnipotence of God and His free will is sooner recognised in having created all things from nothing than from eternity; for this latter form of creation would seem to be a necessary dependence..."^{60.} taking as his authority the verse: "'I said that the world is fashioned through the grace and mercy of God.'"^{61.}

After having presented the arguments of the three main theories of creation Leone does not hesitate to make a choice. He, a believer "in the sacred law of Moses"^{62.} himself, holds fast to the Jewish account. The world was created by God's omnipotence in time and is maintained by God's mercy and kindness henceforth: "It is temporal in having had a beginning in time, and eternal because, as many of our theologians hold, it is not to have an end."^{63.}

Leone is fully conscious that his choice of the Jewish account of the creation has brought him into sharp conflict

with the teachings of Aristotle. But in this point he not only disagrees with Aristotle, he even accuses him of lack of insight: "And more generally I would tell the Peripatetic of the supreme wisdom of God, of which we can know so little; how then should he reveal the purpose of God or the end and scope of His wisdom? So that we may with cogency conclude, as the prophet says in the name of the Lord, 'as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, ^{and} my thoughts than your thoughts.'"^{64.}

In this point where Aristotle clashes with the Bible and the Jewish traditional point of view he is clearly rejected and the authority of the Bible upheld against his.^{65.}

Yet Leone wanted to have the backing of philosophy for his views,^{66.} and is, therefore, quite ready to attempt a harmonization of Plato's theory^{66a.} with that of Jewish tradition: "I am content that you are able to reconcile Plato's opinion with that of Moses and the Cabbalists..^{67.}" And again employing the ^Midrashic method, Plato and the Bible are blended into each other: "This is also a more accurate rendering, since the text says it ^{was} ~~is~~ confused and rough, which means hidden, and it was like ^{an} ~~the~~ abyss of many dark waters over which the divine spirit breathed, like a mighty wind over the ocean, giving light to the dark, secret and hidden waters, and drawing them forth in successive waves. Thus did the spirit of God, which is synonymous with the supreme intellect filled with the Ideas;

which being communicated to gloomy chaos, created light in it, drawing out the hidden substances, and enlightening them with Ideal formality. On the second day God placed the firmament, which is the heaven, between the waters above, that is, the uppermost waters of the abyss, or chaos, representing the intellectual essences, and the waters beneath representing the essences of the lower world, subject to generation and corruption. Thus He divided chaos into three worlds, the intellectual, the heavenly, and the corruptible. He then divided the lower world into the elements of water and earth, and when He had caused the dry land to appear, He made it to bring forth grass and trees and creatures that inhabit the earth and fly above it and move in the waters. And on the sixth day, after all the other things had been made, He created man. And in this way, as I have shortly explained to you, the Hebrew sages understand the story of the Creation according to the testimony of Moses, and believe that it proves that before the Creation chaos was indeterminate and afterwards was divided into the whole universe."^{68,69.}

The Jewish view of the creation is treated as a matter of fact assumption and becomes a part of Leone's philosophical system: "You, Sophia, who are of the faithful, must believe that divine extrinsic love and worldly intrinsic love... were born when the world was created by Him ex nihilo."^{70.}

After we have treated the cause and theories of creation,

Enfi.

let us briefly speak of the purpose which God pursued in creating. Leone, it is true, in one place states that due to the vast difference between God and His creatures^{70a} we shall hardly be able to fathom the reasons and ends underlying God's creative activity, : "With regard to the end of His work, we believe that although His purpose in the Creation was to do good, and according to our reasoning eternal good is better than temporal good, yet since we cannot attain to an understanding of His peculiar wisdom, so we cannot attain to a knowledge of its true purpose in His works."^{71.} Yet in other places^{72.} he is not quite as modest and asserts that the unification of the diverse parts of the universe, which since God is perfect single-ness is nothing else but an imitatio dei, is the real purpose of the creation of the world: "this union with all diversity co-ordinated and all plurality unified being the chief end of the ^SSupreme Artificer, Almighty God, when He created the world."^{73.}

God in His relation as creator of the universe as seen from various angles which sum up elements of all the presented theories is pictured in the following passage that bears the mark of a pronouncedly ecstatic tendency and comprehension: "Thus He is alike the cause that produces them, the mind that comprehends them, the form which informs them, the end which directs them and for which they were made: from Him they proceed, and to Him they ultimately return as

to their last and true end and common happiness. He is the First Being; and all that exists, exists through participation in Him. He is pure activity; He is the Supreme Intellect,^{74.} from which all intellect, activity, form and perfection derive. To Him all things tend, as to their most perfect end; in Him they subsist without multiplication or division, in utter simplicity and unity. He is true happiness."^{75.}

Chapter II

God by His love had created the universe. Love had become diffused through the entire creation. And this effluence of love from God caused every part of the universe to love in turn the source whence it came, not only because a child loves its father, but also because the imperfect in it has the yearning to become united, by love, to the more perfect; "Hence the principal and supreme love of all is for the supreme perfection of God, Who is the source, whence flows all their being and well-being."^{1.}

Love had issued forth from God and evoked love in the created universe. For Leone, under the admitted influence of Arabian philosophy,^{2.} this process takes on the symbolic form of the circle of love and of being whose beginning is in the Godhead and runs through all stages and degrees of being to its lowest point, matter, and thence turns and ascends to its divine origin: "In this way the Arabs make the universe to be a circle, the beginning of which is God; and from Him a continuous chain of being descends to first matter, which is the most removed from the Divinity, and there the circle turns and ascends through the various degrees of being until it reaches the point of origin, to wit, divine beauty..."^{3.}

^{4.}
In a later passage Leone gives even a fuller picture of

this circle comparing it in its various phases with the corresponding circle of love: "Since the beginning and end of the circle is the most high Creator, the first half is the descent from Him to the lowest and most distant point from His supreme perfection...At this point the circle begins to turn through its second half, ascending from lesser to greater...until it reaches the supreme act of intellection, which has (as)⁵ its object the Divinity..."⁶ "Behold how the second half of the circle...reaches its end in the divine origin, and the hierarchic circle of all being is made perfect and whole."⁷ This corresponds to the circle of love: "so love originates from the primal Father of the universe, and from Him is successively imparted, like the gift of a father to his child, from the greater to the less...or more properly from the more beautiful to the less beautiful..."⁸

The circle picture of the universe gives us, then, this detailed account of the universe: "And first in order of descent comes the angelic nature with its ordered degrees from greater to less; then follows the heavenly, ranging from the the heaven of the Empyrean, which is the greatest, to that of the moon, which is the least; and finally the circle passes into our sphere, the lowest of all, to wit, first matter, the least perfect of the eternal substances and the farthest removed from the high perfection of the Creator." "ascending from lesser to greater, as I have already described, to wit, from first matter to the elements, thence to the compounds,

from these to the plants and the animals, and finally to man."^{9.}

The employment of the symbol of the circle is, methodologically seen, very fruitful. On the one hand it enables Leone to establish a hierarchy of being with which his theory of values is intimately interwoven. On the other hand the circle symbol helps him solve one of the most fundamental difficulties with which Greek philosophy had grappled, the problem of motion. The treatment which Leone gives to this problem shows that he is conscious of the fact that, in this case also, he is the heir and successor to Greek philosophy and its problematic. Aristotle and his Medieval interpreters are quoted again and again. So we find in one place the problem of motion attacked in terms of the four Aristotelian causes, of whom especially the final and efficient causes are particularly relevant: "Now there are four causes of natural things, viz: the material, the formal, and the efficient cause^{10.} (which makes or moves the thing), and the final cause, which^{11.} is the end, for the sake of which the agent moves."

Even more distinctly in line with the Aristotelian discussion of the problem of motion is the introduction of the idea of the Prime-mover. Following the same reasoning method of the regressus ad infinitum that led Aristotle to make God the creator, God is also the agent that moves the first of the spheres thus imparting motion to the entire universe: "And I have already told you, when we spoke of the universality of^{12.} love, that Aristotle (on the view of Averroes) holds that

God is the motor of the first diurnal sphere, which He moves through love of a more excellent thing, just as each of the other intelligences moves its respective spheres."^{13.}

Motion, for Leone, could only be understood in terms of love, in terms of the relation of lover and beloved. This leads to the necessary conclusion that it is God's self love^{14.} that is the cause of motion of the universe: "And since none is more excellent than God, but all inferior to Him, we must say that God moves the highest sphere through love of Himself..."^{15.}

Leone's interest in the problem of motion and his dependence from Aristotle become all the more evident from the fact that he took part in the controversy that raged between Averroes and other Arabic interpreters of Aristotle with regard to our problem. The Arabic interpreters felt that God's dignity was endangered by assigning to Him the position of mover of the first sphere.^{16.}

They, therefore, posited a First Mover who was exceeded by God and dependant from Him: "These Arab Philosophers hold that the First Mover is not God Most High. For (then)"^{17.} God would be a soul assigned to a sphere, just like the other motor intelligences; and such allocation and similarity would in no wise be seemly to God."^{18.} Against this view Leone quotes and upholds the opinion of Averroes: "Averroes and other later commentators of Aristotle hold...that God Most High is the Prime Mover."^{19.} "...the end of all the heavenly motors is an intelligence sublimer and more exalted than any of them, whom all love, desiring union therewith, as

their felicity consists in such union. And that intelligence^{20.}
is God Most High."

Leone thus asserts that God Himself is the Prime Mover who by His love makes the entire universe, and its parts, desire Him, thus uniting the parts of the universe with each other and with their Creator. The problem of motion is thus solved both by his value theory and his concept of love:

"Again, inferiors unite with superiors, the corporeal world with the spiritual, the corruptible with the eternal, and the whole universe with its Creator, through the love it bears Him and its desire to unite with Him and be blessed in His divinity."^{21.}

To gain an understanding of the division of the universe, as it had been outlined in the first half of the symbolic circle picture: "in the corruptible, the celestial, or the angelic..."^{22.} parts, We shall, in the following, give a short treatment of each.

The angelic world is the highest in the created universe. It, therefore, has received a higher share of divine beauty than any other part of the universe. Due, also, to its distance from matter its essence is least restricting, least concrete, most Godlike of all created essences: "The largest share (of divine beauty)"^{23.} fell to the angelic world...and it is less restricted, less concrete and less limited by its own essence."^{24.} Due to this proximity to the Godhead the angelic intellect has a much clearer vision of the Deity than any other

created intellect: "The second vision is that of the angelic intellect,^{25.} which perceives the immense divine beauty directly though not on equal terms, but receiving it according to its finite capacity..."^{26.}

The proximity of this angelic intellect to the Deity is so close that its desire for union with the Godhead can be fulfilled and thus its happiness attained: "The love and desire of the angels to enjoy infinite divine beauty is not, however, of something impossible and despaired of, for (as I have told you)^{27.} they hope and are able to attain to that enjoyment of it in which lies their true happiness."^{28.}

The angelic intelligences, who populate the angelic world, are the souls of heavenly bodies, are immaterial and hence, in Leone's value judgment next to God: "...the divinity of their souls, which are intelligences without matter and corporeity, pure and ever actual."^{29.}

These intelligences due to their high share of divine beauty and their clear vision of the divine intellect have a particularly strong love for God. And it is by virtue of this love that they find their place in Leone's view of the universe: "Thus by loving...they bind the ~~earth~~^{Universe} in unity."^{30.} For, love is not really proper to the corporeal world, but born in the angelic part of the universe^{31.} and descends thence through the activity^{32.} of the intelligences to the lower parts of the universe: "Albeit love finds lodging in corporeal and material things, yet it is not proper to them...it per-

tains to the spiritual and descends from the immaterial to the material."^{33.}

The second part of the universe as represented in the circle picture had been the heavenly part: "The largest share fell to the angelic world, the next to the celestial..."^{34.}

In the description of the composition of heaven Leone depends on the authority of Plato combined with that of the Scriptures, whom he employs in Midrashic style to bolster the Platonic statement that the heavens are made of water: "And there might also be a reference to the ancient and Platonic belief that the stars and planets are made of fire, on account of their brightness, and the remainder of the body of heaven -- of water, because of its diaphaneity and transparence: whence the Hebrew name for Heaven, which is 'shamayim' and is to be understood

'sh-mayim',^{35.} which in the Hebrew means 'fire and water',^{36.}

This view, clearly, assigns a matter, a substance, to the heavens and against this Aristotle, who holds that the heavens are eternal,^{37.} has to contend that matter is not present in

the upper world: "On no account would he (Aristotle)^{38.} hold that the substance of the heavens and stars is matter..."^{39.}

But, as in arguments concerning the theory of creation,^{40.} so here, too, Aristotle has to give in^{40a} to the views of Plato

who assigns matter to the heaven and the stars: "Hence he^{41.} (Plato) affirms that heaven, the sun and the stars, which are beautifully formed, are made of formless matter..."^{42.}

The heavens, therefore, need divine assistance for their eternal

existence: "Plato also holds that the heavens are dissoluble in themselves, (for everything made of matter and form would dissolve)^{43.}, but divine omnipotence makes them indissoluble, though they are dissoluble in themselves."^{44.}

Plato asserts the corruptibility of the heavens and adduces Scriptures and Cabbalistic^{44a.} views as authorities for his view: "The philosophers before Plato, of whom he was a disciple, say that the lower world is corrupted and renewed every seven thousand years."^{45.} "They say that when the lower world has been destroyed seven times, that is, in seven times seven thousand years, heaven will dissolve with all that it encompasses, and everything will revert to chaos and first matter"^{46.} "The Cabbalists say...Thus Moses commands...wherefore this seventh year is called 'shemita', which means relaxation, and signifies the loss of all characterizing qualities in the seven thousandth year..."^{47.}

Heaven itself is divided in several parts, called the spheres. Leone cites the divergence of opinion as to the number of these spheres: "The Greeks counted eight spheres, the Arabians nine, and the ancient Hebrews and some modern thinkers^{48.} ten." In the discussion of this passage Leone does not decide in favor of any of these views. But in a different passage he assumes that there are nine spheres, which might indicate that, in this matter at least, he followed the opinion of the Arabians: "The heavenly spheres which the astrologers have been able to discern, number nine."^{49.}

The division of the heavens into spheres and their numbers are derived from the heavenly bodies which, subsequently, were assigned to their respective sphere: "The seven nearest to us

are those of the seven erratic planets. Of the other two higher ones the eight is that wherein are fixed the majority of the stars we see, and the ninth and last is the diurnal sphere, which in one day and one night, i.e. in twenty-four hours, completes its entire revolution, and it that time turns with itself all the other heavenly bodies."^{50.}

The theory of the spheres had been worked out in its classical form by Pythagoras.^{50a.} And Leone in quoting him speaks of the music of the spheres^{51.} and adduces the perfect harmony which reigns between the heavenly bodies as proof of their creator: "you would see such wondrous congruity and concord of divers bodies and variform motion in one harmonious union that you would remain stupefied by the art of their contriver."^{52.} Their stars and planets, therefore, love each other due to the essential likeness of their nature:^{53.} "Such is the congruence of nature and essence between the heavens, planets and stars, that their motions and activities harmonise in such proportion, that their diversity becomes a concordant unity;"^{54.} But love, as we have seen before, is so dynamic and its very nature so dependent on sources and objects outside the lover that Leone could not conceive of a self centered love.^{55.} And thus the mutual love of the planets, also is not only for themselves, but benefits the unity and cohesion of the universe: "And I would add that all love each, not for particular or special benefits to any individual but for its benefits to the whole Universe in general..."^{56.}

The dynamic relation of the spheres to the rest of the

universe becomes particularly evident in their relation to the Intelligences.^{57.} The Intelligences are the souls of the heavenly bodies: "...of the heavenly bodies, and not in the intelligences which are their souls."^{58.} They are the agents of the motion of the spheres: "those who eternally move the celestial bodies are immaterial intelligences..."^{59.} This motion is implicit in the dynamic concepts of knowledge and love: "and the motion of the spheres is perpetual circular about their own axis, by reason of the knowledge and love which their soul bears for its intelligence and for the supreme beauty which it reflects;"^{60.} Love is an interrelation between two partners. There are, therefore, two possible ways in which the love that moves the intelligences can originate. The one is to assign two intelligences to each sphere of which one would be regarded as the efficient cause, while the other is the final cause. And this is the proposed way taken by some of the Arabian thinkers and Maimonides:^{61.} "The first Arab school, (Al-farabi, Avicenna, Al-ghazali), and our own Egyptian Rabbi Moses in his 'Moreh' say that to each sphere two intelligences are allotted, of whom one effectually moves it and is the moving intelligence of that sphere, while the other moves it finally..."^{62.}

The other possible way in which this motor love of the intelligences can originate is self contemplation. And again^{63.} Leone leans upon the Arabian school and Maimonides and develops a system of the generation of intelligences and their respective

spheres. each intelligence is born from its preceding intelligence. This birth is caused by the contemplation of its own source in which the parent-intelligence is enraptured. And each sphere and its motion are born in the self contemplation of the intelligence assigned to that sphere: "The school of Avicenna and Al-ghazali and our own Rabbi Moses and others hold that the primary cause is above all the intelligences which move the heavens (and is)⁶⁴ the beginning and end, beloved by all. And this perfect singleness and unity, by love of its infinite beauty, produces out of itself alone the first intelligence and mover of the first heaven; and this intelligence alone enjoys direct vision of the Divinity and direct union with it, for its love is turned immediately towards the Godhead as its own cause an blissful end. This intelligence has two modes of contemplation: the first of the beauty of its cause by virtue and love of which it in turn produces the second intelligence; the second is the contemplation of its own beauty, by virtue and love of which it produces the first sphere... and it is itself the perpetual mover of this sphere ...The second intelligence contemplates divine beauty, not directly, but through the medium of the first... And it also has two modes of contemplation..."⁶⁵ With this presentation the problems of the origin of the spheres and their motion is solved in terms of cognitive love.

The relation which heaven has to the lower world is comparable to that of the husband and wife or of father and

66. mother. "But lower things are engendered by heaven as by a real father; in which generation matter is the first mother..."^{67.}

The third part of the universe as presented in the circle picture had been the lower world: "and the least to the corruptible (world)"^{68.} ^{69.} This lowest part of the Universe is, according to both Aristotle and Plato,^{70.} the domain of matter:^{71.} "Because he does not make first matter common to the whole universe, but only to the lower world, subject to generation and corruption;"^{72.} "are made of formless matter, like all lower bodies."^{73.}

Thus the earth among the parts of the Universe takes the lowest place in Leone's scale of values. And yet, true to the scientific thinking of his day^{74.} the earth is the center, the geometrical center^{75.} of the Universe: "Earth, which is the centre of the Universe."^{76.} But, as if to compensate for the low rating that Earth has received in the theory of value, this central position has its beneficial consequences, because it makes Earth the focal point for all the good influences of the higher beings: "Although earth, being farthest from heaven, is in itself the grossest, coldest, lowest and least vital, nevertheless, because of its continuity and central position, it receives continuously all the influences and rays of all the stars, planets and heavenly bodies, which combine here,..."^{77.} This compensation had become necessary because matter, which is at the bottom of the scale of values, had been the dominant

feature of the earth and caused its own low rating. ¶ The concept: matter is one of the most important in Leone's philosophy. There are various definitions^{78.} of the term. One defines matter in Aristotelian terms, as potentiality: "...to distinct actuality the universal potency of Chaos."^{79.} And, as we have already seen,^{80.} this excludes matter from participation in the higher world. Plato's view is that matter is the underlying substance of all created things, all of which consist of matter and form: "Plato, seeing that the world was fashioned of one common substance, and that each of its parts was part of that common substance, informed with its own form, recognized rightly that the whole,...was composed of...a formless substance..."^{81.}

Both logic and experience posit the priority in nature and time of matter as the common substance to all formed objects: "That matter is naturally prior to form, as the subject to its attribute, is clear; but it must also be granted that matter is prior in time to any actualization or informing of itself, as Aristotle proves."^{82.}

But it would have been incompatible with Leone's theory of value to assign the same type of matter to all parts of the world. There must be a gradation of matter in accordance with the value of the various parts of the Universe: "In this way the angels would have incorporeal and incorruptible matter, and the lower beings matter subject to generation and corruption."^{83.}

This leads to the problem of the eternity of matter on which Plato and Aristotle disagree. Aristotle, consistent with his theory of creation, posits the eternity of matter: "First matter, according to Aristotle, cannot be newly made, because everything that is made must be made of something, and all are agreed that there is nothing that can be made out of nothing."^{84.}

Against this Leone attempts to harmonize Plato's position with his own, which has become evident in the discussion of the theory of creation,^{84a} and asserts that Plato believes in a matter that was created from eternity:

"But we should understand them to mean, when they make Chaos the eternal companion of God, that it was created by Him from all eternity..."^{85.} This view arises with logical necessity; for, as we have seen, matter precedes the formed things, yet, according to the theory of values, has to be less perfect than God, i.e., has to be created. And since it is created and imperfect it is moved by the same love for perfection that had been found in the other parts of the universe. Matter desires to be mastered by Form: "for matter (as the philosopher^{86.} says)^{87.} desires all those forms which it lacks."^{88.}

This desire also accounts for motion in the lower world, for so great is the desire of matter, that no one form can satisfy it, and hence it desires them all in successive generation and decay: "For a single form is (not)^{89.} adequate to sate its appetite and love...Thus first matter causes both the continual production of those forms which it lacks, and the con-

tinual destruction of those which it possesses."^{90.}

It is characteristic for Leone's strong sense of values, that even this desire, cause by the lack of the desired object, which is part of the definition of love, is degraded and almost shameful in matter, and the only excuse for the existence of this desire in matter is that through it the lower world receives its share of beauty: "Hence some call it harlot...Yet it is this adulterous love which beautifies the lower world..."^{91.} For matter is deformity and ugliness:

"mingled with deformity and ugliness, such as that of matter..."^{92.}

Thus we have reached the lowest point of the circle of the universe, both in position and value, that reaches from God through the angelic, heavenly, corruptible worlds to first matter. Hence the circle turns and the ascent begins.

The next stage after first matter had been the elements.^{93.}

There is the familiar number of four elements: "Each of the four elements, earth, water, air and fire..."^{94.} and a descrip-

tion of their qualities: "...it (earth)"^{95.} is the heaviest and grossest of the elements..." "Water too has a certain

heaviness and sluggishness:" "Air on account of its lightness and subtilty.." "Fire"^{96.} is the subtlest, lightest, and pur-

est of the elements..."^{97.} These four elements are moved by love^{98.} for each other and thus cause procreation in various

combinations: "it is the love in these four elements which is the procreative cause of all the compounds which they form."^{99.}

And, quoting Empedocles, Leone builds the elements into his

theory of value by stating that their love for one another makes for good, while their hatred is a source of evil:

"even as all evil and destruction are caused by hostility of these four elements, so all good and birth proceeds from their love and amity."^{100.}

The next step in the upward swing of the circle of the universe were the compounds.^{101.} The various combinations of the elements result in the coming into being of all corruptible objects, such as the metals: "This first^{101a.} amicable

fusion of the elements results furthermore in the forms of metals..."^{102.}

The higher the love of the elements in their fusion, the higher the resulting product: "the form of the compound is more perfect in proportion as the amity of the elements therein fused is greater..."^{103.}

And when this love attains to an even higher degree the various souls result from the fusion of the elements: "But when the amity of the four adverse elements reaches a higher degree... they not only take on the forms of compounds, but are susceptible of others more excellent, such as are the inanimate. And first of all, those of the vegetative soul..."^{103.}

"...besides these, they assume the forms of the sensitive soul..."^{103.}

"The fourth and last degree of this love and amity, when they attain the greatest possible equality of love, and the greatest possible unity of amity, enables them...to partake of a form far more remote and alien from the baseness of these generable and corruptible bodies: yea, they join with the very form of heaven-

ly and eternal bodies. This form is the soul, which is found in none of the lower bodies except the human."^{103.}

Love moving through the various stages of these compounds and reaching the stage of the various souls thus produces in its tendency towards its source the plants and animals:^{103a.}

"...the vegetative soul, which governs the germination of plants, their nutrition and growth in every direction, and their propagation of their kind, through seed and branch; for in this wise all manner of plants propagate, whereof the most imperfect^{104.} are herbs, the most perfect -- trees."^{105.}

"...the sensitive soul, endowed with perception, locomotion, imagination and appetite." And it is this degree of amity which produces all kinds of terrestrial, aquatic and winged animals. Of these, some are imperfect, being deprived of motion and of all senses save touch; but as many as are perfect have all five senses and motion. And the activities of one species are more excellent than those of another in proportion as the amity of its component elements is greater and more united and equal."^{105.}

The last step before love returned to its origin was man: "and finally to man."^{106.} To this stage the following chapter will be devoted, because it warrants a more detailed treatment.

This then is the picture of the universe. It is created by God whose love permeates the entire structure, making the whole work according to plan like a well functioning organism:^{106a.}

"You have heard from me ere now, O Sophia, that the whole Universe is one individual, (i.e. like a single person),^{107.} each one of these bodies and spirits, eternal or corruptible, being a member or part of this great individual. And all and every one of its parts was created by God with a purpose common to the whole as well as with a purpose peculiar to each part. It follows that whole and parts alike are perfect and happy in proportion as they rightly and completely discharge the functions^{108.} for which they were designed by the Supreme Artificer."^{109.}

The purpose of the Universe is the return to the source from which it originated; "for as the Universe takes its being from the Divinity, as his true, rightful issue, so its perfecting activities consist in the true return of its being to the Divinity whence it first issued."^{110.} The "true return" is expressed in terms of the amor dei intellectualis: "none the less the intellectual activity which is the direct cause of this return is that which has as its object the divine essence^{111.} and highest wisdom." because: "... through the intellect alone the whole of the universe is made worthy of union with its high beginning, and of achieving perfection and lasting happiness in enjoyment of this union with the Divinity."^{112.}

Thus God and His created world become one, the entire world can only exist because of the activity of the Divine love which evokes in it the desire and love to return to its source in blissful union: "Because the world and all in it can exist only insofar as it is wholly one, bound up with all

it contains as an individual with his members. On the other hand, any division would involve its total destruction, and, as nothing unites the Universe with its different components save love alone, it follows that love itself is the condition of the existence of the world and all in it." ^{113.}

CHAPTER III

Man had been the last stage through which love had to pass in the circle of the universe in order to return to its origin. The story of his creation is told in two different versions. One is the account^{1.} as it is told in Scriptures and Leone tells and interprets it in Platonic^{2.} terms.^{3.} The other version^{4.} is the Androgynos^{5.} legend as told by Aristophanes in the Symposium. At first sight there seems to be no connection between the two stories, until Leone asserts that Plato learned the legend from Moses: "The myth was handed down by earlier writers than the Greeks -- in the sacred writings of Moses, concerning the creation of the first human parents, Adam and Eve."^{6.}

With this rather startling^{7.} assertion Leone enters the field of Biblical criticism and shows many contradictions^{7.} in the Biblical account of the creation of man. He is of the opinion that it is best to realize that there are contradictions, but since: "...it is inconceivable that the divine Moses should contradict himself so obviously as to seem deliberately."^{8.}, we shall have to assume that these contradictions were deliberate, a fact which the ordinary commentator seems to overlook: "and in fact he wishes us to realize that he is contradicting himself, and to search for his reason in so doing." while: "The ordinary commentator wearies himself to bring harmony into the literal text..."^{9.}

The result of this attempt ^{10.} at Biblical criticism is a harmonization of the Scriptural account of the creation of man in terms of the Androgynos legend. The basis for this harmonization is the statement, for which he quotes the "Chaldean commentary" ^{11.} as his Jewish authority, that man contains both a male and a female part: "However Man...includes male and female ^{12.}..." More clearly, Leone holds that there is a contrast in every human being between his body and his spirit, which are its male and female parts: "Every man or woman has a masculine part which is perfect and active, to wit the intellect, and a feminine part which is imperfect and passive, to wit ^{13.} the body and matter."

With this statement we have left the field of literary investigation and have, again, entered the realm of Leone's value theory. His main purpose, it seems, in telling the story of the creation of man had been, aside from its purely literary interest, to establish the contrast of spirit and body within the human being and to show that ~~it~~ was the spirit, the intellect, that gave man his proper and specific essence: "Rational cognition and voluntary love are found only in men, as they spring from, and are governed by, reason, whereof men alone among generated and corruptible bodies ^{14.} partake."

This contrast between the body and the intellect is brought out even more clearly in the comparison of man as microcosm to the universe, the macrocosm: "It is indeed true that

Man is an image of the whole universe, and therefore the Greeks called him 'microcosm', which means 'little world.'^{15.}

Following the analogy of the tripartition of the universe the human being is divided into three different parts in the description of whose contents Leone shows his medical knowledge: "The human body is, like the world, divided into three parts, one above the other."^{16.} "The...highest is the head."^{17.} The head is highest not only with regard to its position in the human anatomy but also in the scale of values, because it is the abode of the intellect: "...the head, the seat of all knowledge..."^{18.}

"The next highest extends from that partition (diaphragm) to the head."^{20.} "The second part of the human body contains those spiritual organs which lie above the diaphragm tissue up to the passages of the throat, to wit: the heart and two lungs..." "The heart is the...primum mobile, which moves all things."^{21.} This motor force is also called vital power and its main function is to serve as a connecting link between the lower part of the body and the upper one, a job for which its central position qualifies it particularly well: "...the vital power of the heart which, as I have told you, is the continual custodian of life. This power holds the central position in both place and dignity amongst the powers of the human body, and binds together its upper and lower parts."^{22.}

"And starting from the bottom, the first part extends from a sheet of tissue or membrane, which divides the body into two

at the waist and is called the diaphragm, down to the feet."

"The first contains the digestive and generative organs: stomach, liver, gall, spleen, mesentery, bowels, kidneys, testes

and penis."^{23.} "as nerves, membranes sinews, muscles...such as bones, cartilage and veins...the refuse and dregs of food and the humours...such as faeces, urine, sweats, nasal mucus

and cerumen."^{24.}

This organism functions by means of the five senses, among which sight and hearing are incorporeal, and hence more highly valued than the other three:^{25.} "Sight alone gives

knowledge of all bodies."^{26.} Hearing is its helpmate; and its knowledge is not gained directly from the substances themselves, like that of the eye, but through the medium of speech, from one who has already acquired this knowledge...Thus sight is prior to hearing...The other three senses are all corporeal, created for the perception and use of those things which serve to nourish the body rather than to refresh the mind."^{27.}

The senses, however, are restricted in their scope, they cannot fulfill all the necessary functions. There is, therefore, one agent that keeps the body in motion, that connects its various parts^{28.} and shares in the upper and lower

parts of the human organism alike, the soul: "The soul is intermediate between the intellectual and corporeal world...It must therefore have a nature compounded of spiritual intelligence and corporeal mutability..."^{29.}

This compositness does not distract from its essential oneness, but enables it to share

in all activities of the body, even in its lower ones;

"The soul is in itself one and indivisible, but by distributing its powers throughout the body and permeating even its surface and extremities, it branches out for certain activities pertaining to perception, movement, and nutrition..."^{31.}

The soul is one; but, according to its various functions, it has two faces, one turned towards the body, the other towards the intellect: "Our soul has, therefore, two faces, like those of the moon" ^{32.} turned towards the sun and the earth respectively, the one being turned towards the intellect above it, and the other towards the body below." ^{33.} And the soul alternates and, in functioning, moves between these two aspects: "And so it happens that it often sets aside its intellectual nature to attend to corporeal things..." "At certain times, however, the soul withdraws within itself and returns to the its intellectual nature..." ^{34.} Leone shows clearly his dependence on Greek thinking in this instance by quoting Plato: "For this reason Plato said that the soul is composed" ^{35.} of itself and of another, of the indivisible and the divisible..." ^{36.}

No sooner has Leone stated that the soul has mainly two realms of activity, viz. the spiritual and the corporeal, when, in accordance with his theory of values, he indicates his preference: "When the soul is too much inclined toward the material and corporeal things and is entailed in their meshes, it loses all power of reasoning and intellectual enlightenment." ^{37.}

The power of reasoning is really the proper activity for the human soul, because, due to its origin from the world soul,^{38.} it contains all the forms:^{39.} "Because our rational soul, as it is the image of the soul of the world, bears the hidden impress of all the forms existing therein..."^{40.} These forms by their beauty and their value move the soul to love them:^{41.} "And this grace (of the forms) which delights the soul and moves it to love..."^{42.} And it is this love which by its twofold aspect of yearning for union with the higher and desire to beautify, and thus exalt, the lower, unifies the universe : "the soul, which is but a splendor emanating from it, becomes enamoured of this supreme intellectual beauty... The soul has yet another love, the twin of the former, and this is for the corporeal world inferior to it...which it desires to make more perfect, impressing that beauty upon it which it received from the intellect by virtue of its first love."^{43.} "And...in this way our souls realise the unity of the whole Universe according to the divine plan..."^{44.} In their obedience and love of God the souls are ready even to take upon themselves the contamination arising from their union with the body so as to be able to fulfill their God-given function: "but they coalesce with our bodies merely for love and service of the Supreme Creator of the World, taking intellectual life and knowledge and the light of God down from the upper world of eternity to the lower world of decay, that even this lowest part of the world may not be without divine

grace..."^{44a.}

But aside from these investigations into the anatomy and function of the human body Leone is mainly interested in fitting man into the scheme of his philosophy, in evaluating him according to his essence, in finding out the purpose of man. And this purpose is threefold: "For the intellect is nothing but a tiny beam of infinite splendour of God, assigned to man to make him rational, deathless and happy;"^{45.}

The implications of man's rationality for the theory of cognition and the theory of values have been treated earlier.^{46.} The following pages, therefore, will deal with the other ends of human existence: immortality and happiness.

The desire for immortality, Leone declares in a fine psychological observation, is innate in every man and born from the wish to hold onto one's possessions: "and our desire is not that we may attain to something new, but that we may cling to that which we already possess, to wit, present existence..."^{47.} This is especially true since death, which is synonymous with destruction, is loathsome: "because death is ugly and the corruption of the body is loathsome to all alike."^{48.}

Man has, therefore, always looked for means to overcome death and found one of the most efficacious remedies in the perpetuation of the species^{49.} through procreation." And they were charged with the procreation of their kind as a remedy for their mortality."^{50.}

But aside from the species, there is something in every individual that can attain to immortality, and that is man's intellect which through virtue, wisdom, knowledge and love of God can attain to a perfection that defies death: "because the desire of man to become immortal is truly possible, since man's essence (as Plato correctly holds)^{51.} is none other than his intellect which, through virtue, wisdom, knowledge and love of God, is made resplendent and immortal."^{52.} In keeping with the findings of earlier chapters^{53.} wisdom and virtue are anchored in God and thus it is especially love of God, based on knowledge of Him, that renders man immortal: "so the intellect, through the knowledge of eternal things and more especially of the Divinity, becomes immortal and eternal and attains its true happiness."^{54.}

Happiness after death could be achieved by gaining immortality. But happiness was also craved by the living. According to Leone there are two ways in which man may reach happiness by perfecting his soul. "The soul attains perfection: first through virtuous disposition, and, thence, through wisdom, which aims at knowledge of God,..."^{55.}

Following his presentation of man as copy of God's created universe Leone enumerates a set of virtues which are illustrated or derived from God's activities. Such virtues are: "loving-kindness and mercy," "liberality," "justice," "goodness," "truth," "wisdom," and "careful providence."^{56.} All these can be perceived in the created universe as proof for their ex-

istence in God: "He offers a model to be imitated by all who seek to act ^{57.} virtuously." ^{58.}

In keeping with his theory of values and the attempt to find a basis, a common denominator, for the comprehension of his world, Leone seeks for a standard by which to measure virtue. Aristotle furnishes such a standard in terms which, at first, ^{59.} must have seemed very acceptable to Leone, by equating goodness and wisdom: "for as Aristotle says, every wise man is good and every good man wise." ^{60.} Aristotle and Plato both agree that there are intellectual virtues which are entirely good: "The intellectual virtues, on the contrary, are wholly virtuous and ^{61.} latter has no part in them." Flight from matter, ^{62.} pursuit only of intellectual ^{virtues} is the condition for the happiness of the human being: "because association with corporeal things is a stumbling-block to the happiness of our soul..."

But Leone put himself in conscious opposition to this purely intellectual understructure for his ethical system, and declares in his discussion of the fall of man, that "good" and "bad" are terms which have no relation to "true" or "false:" "The tree is called the tree of knowledge of good and evil because the knowledge ^{63.} of these things concerns neither the true nor the false, which relate to eternal ^{64.} things of the intellect, but only the good and the bad, as they affect the appetite of man." ^{65.}

Leone is brought into this opposition by his insistence that the human body has definite rights and needs which contrib-

ute to human earthly happiness and which, therefore, in a system of ethics have to find their rightful place. He certainly comes in conflict^{66.} with the medieval concept of the sinfulness of the body and its desires when he demands that the intellect have due regard for the physical needs of the human being: "the inclination of masculine intellect towards it (matter)"^{67.}, with a due recognition of the needs of the body."^{68.}

The story of the creation of the world, as related in the opening chapters of Genesis, gives Leone the opportunity to develop more fully this idea of the value of the body and its place in the divine plan by showing that God Himself felt the necessity to assign certain bodily tasks to the intellect lest, rapt in contemplation of things eternal it leave the body and, therewith, condemn the human species to a certain death:^{69.} "Therefore God determined to establish some division or mean between the feminine and sensual part and the masculine and intellectual part, turning the intellect and the senses to certain corporeal desires and activities necessary for the sustenance of the individual man and for the preservation of the species."^{70.} This is a very sharp departure from the theory of values which Leone had presented so far. The intellectual phase had not only, as it may be assumed even in this present discussion, taken the highest place in the scale of values, but had done so to the exclusion of any consideration for the things pertaining to matter. The predominance of the

intellect had been so marked that the present departure,^{71.}
which was already indicated in the division of the soul into
two faces, becomes all the more interesting. Leone insists
that the definition of a human being, in clear contrast to
that of an angelic being, must include this concession^{72.}
of the intellect's inclination towards corporeal matters:

"Therefore he was divided, that is his body was made to offer
some resistance to the intellect and the latter to incline to
the necessary care of the body and its material nature, so
that the life of man might be human rather than angelic."^{73.}

This rather sharp contrast between the theory of values,
based entirely on the absolute predominance of reason, and
the necessary recognition of the body is harmonized by re-
sorting to a logical distinction. Every virtue has two
parts, one the subject matter and the other the form of prac-
tice; each virtue, thus, consists of matter and form. The
forms, following Leon's established theory of values, are
higher than the matter; as we can see from his assertion
that there are some values, wholly intellectual, which are,
therefore, only forms, entirely devoid of matter: "for they
are not directed toward corporeal activities or pleasures
which would involve association with matter, but towards in-
telligences and things eternal, separated from the body.
Therefore they are all intellectual forms devoid of matter;"^{74.}

The matter of the virtues varies as to their particular
reference. Some, as we have just seen, deal entirely with

non-material things, others deal with the needs of the body. In the latter case, where there is a distinction between the matter of virtue and its form, the form^{75.} exercises a moderating influence. The harmonization is thus achieved: the form, the intellectual part, by its moderating influence, raises the subject matter to the status of virtue, moderation becomes virtue: "Similarly in all other moral virtues which concern human activities...the matter consists in the nature of the activity and the form in the virtuous practice of moderation in that activity."^{76.} And even things which, when indulged in excessively are harmful and vicious,^{77.} become virtuous when pursued moderately:^{77a.} "nay, they are even virtuous when, as I told you, they are indulged in with such moderation as is meet to procure the nourishment of the body and the preservation of the species."^{78.}

Thus it is moderation that leads to happiness. Excess in intellectual pleasures leads to death, because of the neglect of the necessities of life,^{79.} excess in yielding to the needs of the body is detrimental to health and prevents the intellect from the pursuit of its ends.^{80.}

The other avenue to happiness had been through knowledge of God. Our human intellect is weak and impeded by its close association with matter and needs union with the Godhead to fulfill its function of aiding in virtuous living: "so our intellect, though in itself clear, is yet so hindered in wise and virtuous activities and so darkened by the coarse body

which harbours it, that it needs fresh enlightenment from the Divine Splendour."^{81.} because: "God in His mercy is the means whereby all virtuous and excellent deeds are effected."^{82.} And we need God's assistance, not only because our own intellect and love are weak, but also because the bliss that we strive for is so high and perfect: "none the less, neither our love...were ever capable of such union, nor worthy of such a high measure of bliss and perfection, were not our intellect helped and enlightened by the highest divine beauty and by the love which it has for the whole creation."^{83.}

Our love to God is limited, because it is based on knowledge of God and that knowledge, by the very nature of the knower is limited: "And since He cannot be wholly known of men; nor His wisdom by the sons of men; therefore He cannot be loved by us entirely, or in the degree befitting His nature."^{84.}

But in spite of this limitation in the human nature and the absolute perfection of God, human actions have an influence on God.^{85.} "Wherefore the ancient teachers said that the just man makes perfect the splendour of God and the wicked man sullies it."^{86.} Not only man's own happiness thus lies within the scope of his activities, but even the perfection of God and of the universe. And, as in other points of importance and emphasis, Leone takes a Scriptural text and, by a Midrashic interpretation of its contents, furnishes authority for his views: "And it is (not)"^{87.} strange that we should say that God rejoices in the perfection of His creatures, when

we read in the Holy Writ that because of the universal sinfulness of man there came the flood; and that 'God saw the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And it repented the Lord that He had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at His heart. And the Lord said: I will destroy man whom I have created from the face of the earth,' etc. If, therefore, the wickedness of men makes God to grieve in His inmost heart, how much more will their perfection and blessing give Him cause to rejoice!"^{88.}

But man in his relation to God has to fulfill one more function, and a most important function it is. It is through knowledge and love of God and through the resulting desire for union of the human intellect with the Deity that man becomes that last link that binds the yearning of the lower parts of the universe, in its own longing, to the highest source whence all love and knowledge sprang: "And it is only through the love of man for the for the divine beauty that the lower world, which is his domain, is united to the Divinity, the first cause and the final end of the universe and the highest beauty universally loved and desired."^{89.}

Man thus takes his place in the scheme of the universe. The circle of love, that surges through the universe and gives both life and purposeful motion, is closed. In man, the "little world," the "Great world" focuses its yearning for God. Man's amor dei intellectualis reaches out for God bringing the highest bliss, happiness and fulfillment to the universe

and to himself: "Finally I know that its end is the pleasure of the lover in joyful union with beauty, his beloved, and that the end of universal love is union with the highest beauty, the ultimate end, bringing lasting happiness to all creatures, which the Most High God of His mercy vouchsafe to grant us."^{90.}

CONCLUSION

Leone presents in his Dialghi d'Amore a philosophy that attempts to understand the world in terms of one basic factor; love. This love, understood in rational terms, has its origin and end in God. It is, because of its rational nature, the very essence of God. It thus becomes, following pantheistic patterns, the underlying cause for all existence and, at the same time, the determining factor of the entire universe. Essentially this entire philosophical system is a theory and system of values. Love causes not only existence and gives direction to the universe, it establishes also, due to its essential interrelation with reason, a clearly detailed scale of values. The entire world, excluding nothing, is arranged and shaped in the mold of amor intellectualis, which by inner necessity is love of God. God is the source of life, the final explanation to the mystery of existence, the end and condition of human happiness and salvation: "And therefore David says: 'In thy light shall we see light,' and the prophet: 'Turn us unto Thee, O Lord, and we shall be turned'; and another says: 'Turn thou me, and I shall be turned; for thou art the Lord my God.' For if God were to abandon us we could never return to Him of our own accord."^{91.} This is mysticism in all its beauty and its strength, its rationality and unity of life.

This then is the legacy of the man who had seen life in all its heights and depths,^{91a.} this is the value and the message of his work: "He is true happiness."^{92.}

Introduction:

- 1) cf. Heinz Pflaum: Die Idee der Liebe Leone Ebreo; Tuebingen 1926. p. 1.
- 2) cf. Pflaum, op. cit., p. 1.
- 3) Dante, Alighieri: The Divine Comedy. The Carlyle Wicksteed translation; New York. Inferno Canto XXIII.
- 4) Pflaum, op. cit., p. 5 quoted from Gaspari: Geschichte der Italienischen Literatur, Strassburg 1885.
- 5) Pflaum, op. cit., p. 5.
- 6) Pflaum, op. cit., p. 8.
- 7) Pflaum, op.cit., p. 9ff.
- 8) Pflaum, op. cit., p. 11.
- 9) Pflaum, op. cit., p. 17.
- 10) Pflaum, op. cit., p. 22.
- 11) author's addition.
- 12) Pflaum, op. cit., p. 25.
- 13) Pflaum, op. cit., p. 55.

Section I, ch. 1.

- 1) cf. below.
- 2) Nikomachian Ethics, book VIII (cf. Pflaum op. cit., p. 89, and Zimmels, Bernhard: Leo Hebraeus ein juedischer Philosoph der Renaissance; sein Leben, seine Werke und sein Lehren. Leipzig 1886, p. 82. and Gebhardt, Carl. Leone Ebreo, Heidelberg 1929, p. 38.)
and Isaac Abrabanel פירוש על חמורא , Deut. 6.5;
לפי האמת כמו שלכר חמורא בספר חמורא ואמר שמי' פון שלמי'
ח'א אלס ח'י'ס ח'ס'ר פ'ס'ר ... ואס'ר ח'ס'ר ... ואס'ר ח'ס'ר ...
- 3) The Philosophy of Love (Dialoghi d'Amore) by Leone Ebreo
Translated into English by F. Friedeberg-Seeley and Jean
H. Barnes. London, 1937. p. 4.
ויכוח על האמת חמורא בן יחורא בן יחורא אבונגאל ו'ל'
Lyck, 1871., p. a'א , adds ו'ל' גאור ו'ס'ר ח'ס'ר , good
and virtuous per se.
- 4) Leone Ebreo, op. cit., p. 5.
- 5) cf. p. 4, bottom; coexistence leads to identity.
- 6) Leone Ebreo, op. cit., p. 6.
- 7) L. E., op. cit., p. 7.
- 8) L. E. op. cit., p. 7. Hebrew text has p. b 'א , כ'י ל'א
ו'ל'א for "for in that case knowledge would pro-
duce, not love or desire of its object, but utter loath-
ing."
- 9) L. E., op. cit., p. 9. The first ellipsis in this quota-

tion is also missing in the Hebrew text p. a 'a .

- 10) Cf. the discussion of the problem of Creation and its many implications.
- 11) because we may desire things that are not only ours, but which do not exist at all:" Yet I see that we desire many things, which, not only are not ours but, are not absolutely:" Leone Ebreo, op. cit., p. 9.
- 12) L. E., op. cit., p. 12.
- 13) translator's brackets.
- 14) L. E., op. cit., p. 241-2.
- 15) L. E., op. cit., p. 242. It is interesting to note that the difference between desire and love is dismissed as a manner of speaking: "It is a manner of speaking,..." L. E., op. cit., p. 242. and: "These theologians are also deceived by the existence of two separate words," L. E., op. cit., p. 244.
- 16) "and, once obtained, are only loved without desire." L. E., op. cit., p. 11.
- 17) cf. Republic, book 1, where justice is defined as doing good, and not as a state. Cf. also Gorgias, Protagoras.
- 18) L. E., op. cit., p. 247.
- 19) L. E., op. cit., p. 247.; Love corresponds to the circle of beings: "It gives me no little pleasure to understand the whole circle of the love of the universe corresponding to that of the various degrees of being,..." L. E., op. cit., p. 453.

- 20) while in other phases of his philosophical activity he is rather eclectic at times.
- 21) L. E., op. cit., p. 247.

Section I, ch. 2.

- 1) L. E., op. cit., p. 34.
- 2) L. E., op. cit., p. 73.
- 3) cf. above.
- 4) L. E., op. cit., p. 74.
- 5) The question as to how this knowledge was imparted to these insentient bodies will be treated later, suffice it to say at this moment that their knowledge is given them through the activity of the World soul.
- 6) L. E., op. cit., p. 74.
- 7) translator's brackets.
- 8) L. E., op. cit., p. 74. "drink, fair weather," missing in Hebrew text, p. b. 3¹
- 9) L. E., op. cit., p. 74.
- 10) author's addition.
- 11) L. E., op. cit., p. 76.
- 12) L. E., op. cit., p. 77.
- 13) L. E., op. cit., p. 74. "whereof men alone among generated and corruptible bodies partake.", missing in Hebrew text, p. b 3¹
- 14) L. E., op. cit., p. 354-5.
- 15) "Have you not shown me that the human intellect sometimes attains to such perfection, and that it can rise to union with the divine or angelic intellect,..." L. E., op. cit., p. 324.

- 16) L. E., op. cit., p. 324.
- 17) "according to the philosopher" L. E., op. cit., p. 324-5.
- 18) It forms the contrast to the concept of the Active Intellect, of which more later.
- 19) L. E., op. cit., p. 303. How closely this conception of the process of knowledge is linked up with the theories of knowledge of both Plato and Aristotle respectively, we shall attempt to show later on. (Hebrew text is misprinted p. a כ'ו, ought to read: *שורא*)
- 20) L. E., op. cit., p. 303.
- 21) Zusammenfassung, Erfassung, comprehendere,
- 22) L. E., op. cit., p. 34.
- 23) The term "philosopher" is in Medieval literature used to denote Aristotle, cf. Zimmels, op. cit., p. 66. But Gebhardt, op. cit., p. 98, claims that Leone uses the term also for Plato. This author could not find any such instances.
- 24) L. E., op. cit., p. 40.
- 25) L. E., op. cit., p. 41; cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 207.
- 26) L. E., op. cit., p. 323.
- 26a) "for corporeal things give knowledge of incorporeal things..." L. E., op. cit., p. 208.
- 27) L. E., op. cit., p. 41.
- 28) L. E., op. cit., p. 75.

- 29) This theory was first worked out by Empedocles. Cf. discussion of epistemology of Empedocles in Erdman, Johann, Eduard: Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Zuerich 1930, p. 28.
- 30) L. E., op. cit., p. 323.
- 31) L. E., op. cit., p. 41.
- 32) L. E., op. cit., p. 43.
- 33) L. E., op. cit., p. 32. (Hebrew text is misprinted. It ought to read: פ'א'ל "אחנה").
- 34) L. E., op. cit., p. 43.
- 35) "Thus does our power of intellection become pure actuality: and in this union lies supreme perfection and true blessedness." L. E., op. cit., p. 39.
- 36) L. E., op. cit., p. 41.
- 37) cf. L. E., op. cit., p. 334.
- 38) author's addition.
- 39) In keeping with his theory of values Leone connects potentiality with corporeality: "in that he understands corporeal essences, apprehended by the senses,..." L. E., op. cit., p. 323.
- 40) L. E., op. cit., p. 323.
- 41) cf. Phaedo, and Laws, book X.
- 42) L. E., op. cit., p. 334.
- 43) L. E., op. cit., p. 38.
- 44) L. E., op. cit., p. 39.
- 45) L. E., op. cit., p. 39.

- 45a) cf. below note 109.
- 46) L. E., op. cit., p. 44.
- 47) Active Intellect is an Aristotelian term, especially enlarged upon by Averroes. cf. Windelband, W., A History of Philosophy. London, 1931. p. 150. and More Nebukhim, I, 68 , cf. also, Chronicon Spinozanum, tomus primus, The Hague, 1921. p. 202.
- 48) author's addition.
- 49) L. E., op. cit., p. 391.
- 50) L. E., op. cit., p. 391-2.
- 51) other instances of harmonization between Aristotle and Plato cf. Theory of Ideas; Creation; Theory of Recollection; Theory of Vision. Cf. Gebhardt, op. cit., p. 98. Zimmels, op. cit., p. 69-73.
- 52) author's addition.
- 53) L. E., op. cit., p. 76.
- 54) L. E., Op. cit., p. 389.
- 55) L. E., op. cit., 390.
- 56) L. E., op. cit., p. 386.
- 57) L. E., op. cit., p. 386.
- 58) L. E., op. cit., p. 387.
- 59) L. E., op. cit., p. 388.
- 60) L. E., op. cit., p. 389.
- 61) translator's addition.
- 62) author's addition.
- 63) L. E., op. cit., p. 389.

- 64) L. E., op. cit., p. 389.
- 65) L. E., op. cit., p. 391.
- 66) cf. above.
- 67) cf. Menon.
- 68) L. E., op. cit., p. 391.
- 69) L. E., op. cit., p. 392.
- 70) L. E., op. cit., p. 118.
- 71) cf. "and considers that the Idea of fire is the true fire, as its formal essence, and that elemental fire is fire in virtue of its partaking of the Ideas; and so with other things." L. E., op. cit., p. 118.
- 72) cf. Timaeus.
- 73) the relation of "form" to "beauty" is best shown in the following quotations: "In the lower world all beauty is of form,..." L. E., op. cit., p. 383. "and yet it is always beauty which follows on form." L. E., op. cit., p. 383-4. "The beauties of knowledge and understanding and of the human intellect clearly take precedence of every corporeal beauty because they are truly formal and spiritual and bring order and unity to the many and various sensitive and rational concepts of the soul;" L. E., op. cit., p. 385. "I understand well how all natural beauty in the corporeal world derives from the form or forms impressed upon its material substance; L. E., op. cit., p. 385.
- 74) L. E., op. cit., p. 399.

- 75) cf. above pg. 3.
- 76) L. E., op. cit., p. 400.
- 77) L. E., op. cit., p. 400.
- 78) God the highest value is eternal. Cf. the discussion of Creation.
- 79) L. E., op. cit., p. 401.
- 80) for example: Creation, theory of Ideas.
- 80a) Cf. Averroes' treatment of Aristotle, where he speaks freely of the Ideas as coming from God. L. E., op. cit., p. 336 f.
- 81) Plato, though superior to Aristotle, does not invalidate Aristotle's opinion. Cf. Gebhardt, op. cit., p. 98.
- 82) author's opinion.
- 83) L. E., op. cit., p. 401.
- 84) L. E., op. cit., p. 401.
- 85) cf. below.
- 86) L. E., op. cit., p. 402.
- 87) these terms are taken from the Realism-Nominalism controversy, and are coined by Abelard. cf. Windelband, op. cit., p. 299. Leone refers to the issues of this controversy by the statement: "since it is sufficient that faith should not conflict with reason,..." L. E., op. cit., p. 282.
- 88) L. E., op. cit., p. 405/6.
- 89) L. E., op. cit., p. 402.
- 90) L. E., op. cit., p. 402

- 91) L. E., op. cit., p. 403.
- 92) L. E., op. cit., p. 404.
- 93) L. E., op. cit., p. 403/4
- 94) L. E., op. cit., p. 337.
- 95) L. E., op. cit., p. 448.
- 96) L. E., op. cit., p. 411.
- 97) L. E., op. cit., p. 31 For: "and free from corporeal limitations..." Hebrew Text has p. a :
- 98) L. E., op. cit., p. 43.
- 99) author's addition.
- 100) L. E., op. cit., p. 44.
- 101) L. E., op. cit., p. 45.
- 102) This is also an epistemological term showing the close interrelation.
- 103) L. E., op. cit., p. 335.
- 104) God's position is so far removed from the human sphere that even our words about him are only symbols: "you must know that everything which is ascribed to us, when predicated of God, is no less different in form and significance than His exalted state is far removed from our lowly position." L. E., op. cit., p. 250
"yet since we cannot attain to an understanding of His peculiar wisdom..." L. E., op. cit., 281.
- 105) L. E., op. cit., p. 32.
- 106) L. E., op. cit., p. 413/4.
- 107) L. E., op. cit. p. 299.

108) L. E., op. cit., p. 334.



109) L. E., op. cit., p. 49.

110) L. E., op. cit., p. 50. The words "- not indeed for union or knowledge, which has been achieved already -" are missing in the Hebrew text, p. a .¹

111) L. E., op. cit., p. 447.

Section I ch. 3.

- 1) cf. e.g., Gorgias.
- 2) L. E., op. cit., p. 431.
- 3) L. E., op. cit., p. 431.
- 4) L. E., op. cit., p. 262.
- 5) L. E., op. cit., p. 256.
- 6) L. E., op. cit., p. 256 because good, just like sweet and bitter is recognized by everyone, and universally accepted.
- 7) L. E., op. cit., p. 398.
- 8) Scriptures are authoritative: "and we who shall believe in the sacred law of Moses..." L. E., op. cit., p. 280. "And more generally I would tell the Peripatetic of the supreme wisdom of God, of which he can know so little; how then should he reveal the purpose of God or the end and scope of His wisdom? So that we may with cogency conclude, as the prophet says in the name of the Lord, 'as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thought.'" L. E., op. cit., p. 282. "Plato, however, made first matter eternal in order that the Mosaic account of the Creation might be upheld by the reason of Philosophy;" L. E., op. cit., p. 282.
- 9) L. E., op. cit., p. 423.
- 10) Symposium, Socrates' speech.

- 11) L. E., op. cit., p. 368.
- 12) cf. L. E., op. cit., p. 284, cf., also note 81 , Section II, ch. 2.
- 13) an attempt to reduce grace to proportion is rejected.
- 14) author's addition.
- 15) L. E., op. cit., p. 386.
- 16) L. E., op. cit., p. 264.
- 17) L. E., op. cit., p. 393.
- 18) L. E., op. cit., p. 387.
- 19) L. E., op. cit., p. 388.
- 20) L. E., op. cit., p. 382 (Hebrew text misprinted ought to read:  , p. b 
- 21) L. E., op. cit., p. 399.
- 22) L. E. op. cit., p. 399.
- 23) L. E., op. cit., p.412.
- 24) L. E., op. cit., p. 414 Cf. Solomon's objection against this identification L. E., op. cit., p. 421. God is supremely beautiful, but not supreme beauty, L. E., op. cit. p. 423.
- 25) L. E., op. cit., p. 267.
- 26) L. E., op. cit., p. 313.
- 27) L. E., op. cit., p. 313.
- 28) L. E., op. cit., p. 375.
- 29) The terms good and beauty are practically synonymous as shown in the two definitions of love, both of which are given in Plato's name. cf., note 21, Section I, ch. 1,

and L. E., op. cit., p. 255.

30) L. E., op. cit., p. 31.

31) L. E., op. cit., p. 32.

32) L. E., op. cit., p. 415.

33) "and such is the love not only of the mind..." L. E.,
op. cit., p. 373, p. b'v א'לען אאאא . cf.

Gebhardt op. cit., III 99a (amore intellettuale).

For the influence of this concept on Spinoza cf. Pflaum,
op. cit., p. 40; Zimmels, op. cit., p. 75-78. Carl Geb-
hardt, op. cit., p. 216ff. Chronicon Spinozanum, p. 196ff,
p. 218f, p. 222f.

Section II, ch. 1.

- 1) Hebrew text translates it p. a "ו' 'ה'ת' 'א"
- 2) cf., p. 37.
- 3) Cf., ~~E. E.~~, op. cit., p. 31, note 107.
- 4) L. E., op. cit., p. 301.
- 5) L. E., op. cit., p. 301.
- 6) love is a cognitive process.
- 7) L. E., op. cit., p. 302.
- 8) L. E., op. cit., p. 304.
- 9) Hebrew text translates it p. a "ו' 'ה'ת' 'א"
- 10) L. E., op. cit., p. 304. "which is one with God", missing in Hebrew text.
- 11) God cannot help but be creator. His love is so dynamic, that it cannot be contained. Cf. Zimmels, op. cit., p. 84 who states that this dynamic conception of God's creative love is in consonance with an Aristotelian idea from the Nikomachian Ethics, book VIII.
- 12) L. E., op. cit., p. 304/5.
- 13) L. E., op. cit., p. 261.
- 14) cf. L. E., op. cit., p. 314.
- 15) L. E., op. cit., p. 255. "Such is a part of the love of the father for the son, of the master for the disciple, and of one friend for another;" this is missing in Hebrew text p. a "ו'
"For he desires that all things produced by Him, may come to perfection..." L. E., op. cit., p. 250.

16) This presupposes the existence of chaos before the creation, of which more later.

17) L. E., op. cit., p. 305.

18) L. E., op. cit., p. 305.

19) "by intellect, as father, and matter, as mother (as Anaxagoras says)." L. E., op. cit., p. 139.

"Plants, grasses and trees so love earth, their mother and nurse, that they will not be parted from her but wither away; and with their roots as with arms they cling to her lovingly, as children cling to their mother's breast. While earth, like to a female mother, not only brings them forth with great affection and love, but is ever careful to nourish them with her own liquors, drawn from her entrails to the surface as the milk of a mother suckling her children is drawn to her breasts." L. E., op. cit., p. 82/3.

20) cf. above.

21) cf. L. E., op. cit., p. 46, and Zimmels op. cit., p. 91.

22) cf. below.

23) cf. L. E., op. cit., p. 305.

24) L. E., op. cit., p. 285.

24a) cf. Hebrew text p. a'9

25) Targum Yerushalmi and Mendelsohn ויקא ad loc.

26) Proverbs 4.7.

27) L. E., op. cit., p. 419.

28) cf. Plato's demiourgos

- 29) L. E., op. cit., p. 415.
- 30) author's addition. Proverbs 8.30.
- 31) L. E., op. cit., p. 422, cf. note 28 of this section.
This is a typical Renaissance idea. Chronicon Spinoza-
num, p. 198.
- 32) This seems in contrast to the account that gives to matter
the place here given to beauty.
Wisdom and beauty in the course of this discussion are
identical: "he signified as ideal wisdom the highest beau-
ty," L. E., op. cit., p. 423, so that the mating is self
love (of God). And this, and not the extrinsic love,
seems to be the really creative love.
- 33) L. E., op. cit., p. 424.
- 34) L. E., op. cit., p. 440.
- 35) L. E., op. cit., p. 277.
- 35a) L. E., op. cit., p. 280. "They affirm that God, the Crea-
tor, being eternal and immutable, His work, which is the
world, must have been made in a given form from eternity,
because the thing which is made must correspond to the
nature of him who makes it."
- 36) L. E., op. cit., p. 277.
- 37) L. E., op. cit., p. 279.
- 38) cf. Empedocles' theory of love and hatred as the fifth and
sixth components of the universe. Cf. Windelband op. cit.,
p. 40; Zimmels, op. cit., p. 76.
- 39) L. E., op. cit., p. 279.

- 40) L. E., op. cit., p. 279, missing in Hebrew text p. a
- 41) L. E., op. cit., p. 280.
- 42) L. E., op. cit., p. 280.
- 43) Timaeus, discourse about the creation of the universe, using both Pythagorean and Empedoclean elements. Cf. Taylor, A. E. Plato, The Man and His Work. New York, 1936, p. 444. Jowett, B. The Works of Plato. New York, p. 363.
- 44) L. E., op. cit., p. 277.
- 45) L. E., op. cit., p. 185. "Averroes says that to posit more intelligences than the force of philosophical reasoning demands is unworthy of a philosopher, since we can discern only what reason proves to us." "This doctrine seems to me more discreet than the former:"
- The refusal seems to be based on Leone's desire to adhere to the traditional Jewish interpretation, (cf. also Zimmels, op. cit., p. 67) and may, at the same time be considered as directed against Maimonides, who made his peace with Aristotle in this point. But there are also instances when Leone either openly or impliedly criticizes Maimonides. Cf L. E., op. cit., p. 185, which is said in refutation of Maimonides' teaching. Cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 415, where he is openly called "imperfect" follower of Plato. Yet in the discussion of prophecy Leone seems to follow rather the ideas of prophecy as expounded in the "Moreh".

- 46) cf. treatment of theory of Ideas! In this case also Plato is made to agree with Aristotle. L. E., op. cit., p. 297 bottom.
- 47) L. E., op. cit., p. 277/8.
- 48) L. E., op. cit., p. 277. "But the faithful and all those who believe in the sacred law of Moses hold that the world was not created from eternity, but ex nihilo in the beginning of time, and certain philosophers also seem to believe this. Amongst them is Plato,..."
- 49) author's addition.
- 50) L. E., op. cit., p. 278. "And this the faithful do not believe;" is rendered in Hebrew text p. b.4) א'ענכ
פ'ינגא נח, which refers back to the Jewish statement of the theory of creation and has, therefore, the same meaning as has the English text.
- 51) L. E., op. cit., p. 284/5.
- 52) L. E., op. cit., p. 285.
- 53) p. 41.
- 54) L. E., op. cit., p. 277.
- 55) cf. later harmonization attempts.
- 56) L. E., op. cit., p. 278.
- 57) L. E., op. cit., p. 281. "as statues are made out of wood" Hebrew reads p. a1') אכסא פניא
- 58) Crescas (אבן עזרא) ויק Gebhardt traces also the idea of the love of God to Crescas. op. cit., p. 74.
- 59) L. E., op. cit., p. 281.

- 60) L. E., op. cit., p. 281.
- 61) L. E., op. cit., p. 282 Psalm 89.3.
- 62) L. E., op. cit., p. 227.
- 63) L. E., op. cit., p. 383 cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 210 and L. E., op. cit., pp. 143-145 where interpretations of Biblical accounts are given and harmonization with Greek mythological material is attempted.
- 64) L. E., op. cit., p. 282. Jes. 55.9.
- 65) One cannot help but feeling that this also is an implied criticism of Maimonides, cf also note 45 of this chapter.
- 66) cf. L. E., op. cit., p. 282 bottom, and L. E., op. cit., p. 292, " and it is enough to believe steadfastly, that which is not disproved by reason."
- 66a) Plato, as a disciple of the Jews, was not only better than Aristotle, but also very acceptable. L. E., op. cit., p. 418. Yet there is no slavish dependance. L. E., op. cit., p. 322 states clearly that Leone's treatment of the love is wider than the Symposium's.
- 67) L. E., op. cit., p. 296, cf. also p. 292, where the genealogy of the Cabbala is given.
- 68) This, as will be shown later, is another important point of divergence between Aristotle and Plato, where Leone sides clearly with Plato on the basis of Biblical authority.
- 69) L. E., op. cit., p. 295-6. Not in verbal congruence with the Hebrew text p. a
- 70) L. E., op. cit., p. 306, also L. E., op. cit., p. 315, 319.

- 70a) L. E., op. cit., p. 34, and L. E., op. cit., p. 315.
- 71) L. E., op. cit., p. 281.
- 72) cf. also the Peripatetic account, L. E., op. cit.,
p. 280.
- 73) L. E., op. cit., p. 281.
- 74) This is an instance that shows clearly the difficulties
which the Dialoghi present to one who seeks to bring
them into a system. Here, e.g., the identity of God
and First Intellect is still assumed, while later un-
der the influence of Platonic reasoning it is entirely
discarded. The discussion of the term "matter" shows
similar difficulties.
- 75) L. E., op. cit., p. 46 "the mind that comprehends them"
missing in Hebrew text p. a'6

Section II, ch. 2.

- 1) L. E., op. cit., p. 179.
- 2) Averroes, Avicenna, and Al-ghazali are quoted again and again.
- 3) L. E., op. cit., p. 355.
- 4) He does not mention the Arabs here, he has taken their idea over completely.
- 5) Mistake in English text; author's addition.
- 6) L. E., op. cit., p. 450.
- 7) L. E., op. cit., p. 450-1 (Hebrew text misprinted ought to read: p. ב'3 מרוב)
- 8) L. E., op. cit., p. 451.
- 9) L. E., op. cit., p. 450.
- 10) translator's brackets.
- 11) L. E., op. cit., p. 182.
- 12) Leone's brackets.
- 13) L. E., op. cit., p. 271.
- 14) Which can, according to Leone's concept of love as a cognitive process be compared to Aristotle's self thinking thought.
- 15) L. E., op. cit., p. 271.
- 16) cf. Husik, Isaac, A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy New York, 1930. p. XXII, account of Mutakallimum's opposition to Aristotle.
- 17) translator's brackets.

- 18) L. E., op. cit., p. 184, cf. also Section II, ch. 1.
note 45.
- 19) L. E., op. cit., p. 184.
- 20) L. E., op. cit., p. 186, where Leone gives his own opinion
after having been questioned by Sophia.
- 21) L. E., op. cit., p. 191.
- 22) L. E., op. cit., p. 307, cf. also L. E., op. cit., p.
318.
- 23) author's addition.
- 24) L. E., op. cit., p. 318.
- 25) In the evaluation of the Intellects given p. 328 the an-
gelic intellect is the second, Divine self contemplation
is the highest, human intellect the weakest. It is the
"active disembodiment intellect" L. E., op. cit., p. 324.
There seems to be no difference between this concept of
the angelic intellect and the angelic intelligences
whose job is to think L. E., op. cit., p. 187: "...The
proper and essential activity of an immaterial intelli-
gence is to understand itself and in itself all things
contained."
- 26) L. E., op. cit., p. 328.
- 27) Leone's brackets.
- 28) L. E., op. cit., p. 329-30. Their proximity and posi-
tion warrants even the birth of love in the angelic
world, L. E., op. cit., p. 307.
- 29) L. E., op. cit., p. 118, cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 328.

- 30) L. E., op. cit., p. 189.
- 31) cf. note 28 of this chapter.
- 32) This activity, as will be shown later, is to turn the spheres by arousing love in them.
- 33) L. E., op. cit., p. 179.
- 34) L. E., op. cit., p. 318.
- 35) cf. Rashi to Gen., 1.1.
- 36) L. E., op. cit., p. 126 "which in Hebrew means fire and water" not in Hebrew text p. א'ו
- 37) cf. L. E., op. cit., p. 279, cf. also the discussion of Creation; cf. also Section II, ch. 1. note 39.
- 38) author's addition.
- 39) L. E., op. cit., p. 286.
- 40) cf. L. E., p. 47-8.
- 40a) L. E., op. cit., p. 293, cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 296.
- 41) author's addition.
- 42) L. E., op. cit., p. 286.
- 43) translator's brackets.
- 44) L. E., op. cit., p. 287. Hebrew text has 'סח p. b ') , instead of "Plato".
- 45) L. E., op. cit., p. 288.
- 46) L. E., op. cit., p. 289. This gives him also a chance to state the date of the writing of his book as 1502-3. p. 289.
and Tel. Babil Synhedrin 97a; R.H. 31a
- 47) L. E., op. cit., p. 294, cf. also L. E. op. cit., p. 290.
It is interesting to note that Leone still knew Ibn Gabirol as "our teacher", referring, undoubtedly, to the fact

that he was a Jew.

- 48) L. E., op. cit., p.334.
- 49) L. E., op. cit., p. 166.
- 50) L. E., op. cit., p. 166.
- 50a) Pythagorean geography of the sky and Aristotle's view of it L. E., op. cit., p. 96-98.
- 51) L. E., op. cit., p. 107-8. "Pythagoras declared that, as they move, the heavenly bodies emit exquisite sounds, conforming one to the other in harmonious concordance; and he asserted that this heavenly music accounts for the maintenance of the weight, number and dimensions of the world. He assigned to each sphere and planet its own peculiar sound and tone, and set forth the harmony composed by all."
- 52) L. E., op. cit., p. 107.
- 53) which is taken from human love, L. E., op. cit., p. 109.
"The chief cause of love between the heavenly bodies is congruence of nature, as in men congruence of dispositions."
- 54) L. E., op. cit., p. 109.
- 55) i.e., a love that is entirely restricted or restrictive.
- 56) L. E., op. cit., p. 109-10.
- 57) cf. above.
- 58) L. E., op. cit., p. 287.
- 59) L. E., op. cit., p. 182.
- 60) L. E., op. cit., p. 334.

- 61) translator's brackets.
- 62) L. E., op. cit., p. 183/4, clearly rejected in preference for Averroes' position, L. E., op. cit., p. 185. "our own Egyptian" left out in Hebrew text, p. 6 / '5 .
- 63) though this is a definite modification of the "two intelligences" position, this opinion, though contrasted with Averroes', who also insists on the immediate derivation of each intelligence from God, is upheld as equal to Averroes, L. E., op. cit., p. 388.
- 64) translator's brackets.
- 65) L. E., op. cit., p. 333.
- 66) The entire discussion of this point is in symbolic language which takes its language pictures from the human body and the relationship between the sexes.
cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 89. "moves with its continental gyratory motion over the whole globe of first matter," "even as the female under the burden and motion of the male, conceive her young." This shows how seriously the analogy of "mother" and "father" is taken.
- 67) L. E., op. cit., p. 89.
- 68) author's addition.
- 69) L. E., op. cit., p. 318.
- 70) cf. their arguments as to matter in heavenly world...
- 71) about which more later.
- 72) Aristotelian quotation L. E., op. cit., p. 286.
- 73) Platonic quotation L. E., op. cit., p. 286.

- 74) Galileo was born 62 years after the writing of this book.
- 75) in contrast to the above value judgment.
- 76) L. E., op. cit., p. 127.
- 77) L. E., op. cit., p. 81.
- 78) cf. L. e., op. cit., p. 321; p. 90; p. 279; p. 124.
- 79) L. E., op. cit., p. 124.
- 80) p. 63.
- 81) L. E., op. cit., p. 283/4; cf. also the Ether theory as agreeing with this view. L. E., op. cit., p. 132/3.
- 82) L. E., op. cit., p. 285/6.
- 83) L. E., op. cit., p. 287.
- 84) L. E., op. cit., p. 278/9. Ovid is adduced as holding a similar view L. E., op. cit., p. 123: "Chaos, which is, as Ovid explains, the indeterminate matter of all things promiscuously commingled, which the ancients held coeternal with God."
- Against this vide the view that matter is composed of elements L. E., op. cit., p. 90.
- 84a) namely, that matter was created by God.
- 85) L. E., op. cit., p. 124.
- 86) Aristotle? Zimmels, op. cit., p. 66, seems to identify "Philosopher" at all times with Aristotle.
- 87) Leone's brackets.
- 88) L. E., op. cit., p. 128 cf. Zimmels op. cit., p. 92 reference to Ibn Gabirol.

- 89) author's addition. Otherwise the text does not give the right sense, cf. p. a 5'6. Hebrew text has: א'ב'א
ר'ע'ס נ'ס'ס
- 90) L. E., op. cit., p. 84 also cf. preceding note.
- 91) L. E., op. cit., p. 84/5.
- 92) L. E., op. cit., p. 426.
- 93) cf. p. 57.
- 94) L. E., op. cit., p. 78. This birth is told in the Demogorgos legend, L. E., op. cit., p. 126 ff. Hebrew text has the following order p. a 1'6: א'ב'א, ר'ע'ס, נ'ס'ס, א'ב'א
- 95) author's addition.
- 96) It is the one closest to heaven L. E., op. cit., p. 80 and hence present as lifegiving warmth in the other elements as well.
- 97) L. E., op. cit., p. 78/9.
- 98) This is an Empedoclean feature, cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 88. Cf. Windelband, op. cit., p. 40; Zimmels, op. cit., p. 76.
- 99) L. E., op. cit., p. 85.
- 100) L. E., op. cit., p. 88.
- 101) cf. p. 57.
- 101a) "3", as a symbolic number represents this first fusion, L. E., op. cit., p. 301. (Is this perhaps a Christological feature?)
- 102) L. E., op. cit., p. 86.
- 103) L. E., op. cit., p. 86/7.

- 103a) For observations about animal life cf. L. E., op. cit., p. 69/70.
- 104) even here, Leone sets up a scale of values!
- 105) L. E., op. cit., p. 86/7.
- 106) L. E., op. cit., p. 450.
- 106a) cf. L. E., op. cit., p. 97. "And he avers that the whole body of Heaven forms an animal,"
- 107) translator's brackets. It is missing in Hebrew text p. b 56 This idea is again taken up by Spinoza, Chronicon Spinozanum, L. E., op. cit., p. 201.
- 108) This is very reminiscent of early Socratic dialogues of Plato, where the functioning of a thing determines its value.
- 109) L. E., op. cit., p. 188.
- 110) L. E., op. cit., p. 444.
- 111) L. E., op. cit., p. 445/6.
- 112) L. E., op. cit., p. 447.
- 113) L. E., op. cit., p. 190/1.

Section II, ch. 3.

- 1) L. E., op. cit., pp. 355-362.
- 2) cf., e. g., Division of man in active, -intellectual, and passive-corporeal parts ! L. E., op. cit., p. 354/5, cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 363 and p. 365.
- 3) already earlier, in such statements about woman as on L. E., op. cit., p. 133 shows that the Jewish account was taken for granted.
- 4) L. E., op. cit., pp. 343/5.
- 5) cf. Jowett, op. cit., p. 314 ff.
- 6) L. E., op. cit., p. 345.
- 7) L. E., op. cit., p. 347/8.
- 8) L. E., op. cit., p. 348 "divine" is missing in Hebrew text, p. b'Y
- 9) L. E., op. cit., p. 348.
- 10) L. E., op. cit., pp. 362-364.
- 11) L. E., op. cit., p. 349, based on Rashi to Gen. 1.27, taken from Talmud Babli Erub. 18a.
- 12) L. E., op. cit., p. 95, he is a physician ! cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 96: "Hence not only in the Latin 'Man' (homo-) denotes both male and female, but in the Hebrew tongue, which is the mother and source of all languages (sic!), אָדָם, which means man, connotes both male and female,"
- 13) L. E., op. cit., p. 384/5, cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 145: "to make an animal with them, in whom spirit might mingle with body, the divine with the earthly, and

the eternal with the corruptible in one wondrous compound.

- 14) L. E., op. cit., p. 74/5 cf. Section I, ch. 2., note 13.
- 15) L. E., op. cit., p. 95.
- 16) L. E., op. cit., p. 102.
- 17) L. E., op. cit., p. 102.
- 18) L. E., op. cit., p. 204, cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 105: "The head of Man, which forms the upper part of his body, is an image of the spiritual world."
- 19) author's addition.
- 20) L. E., op. cit., p. 102.
- 21) L. E., op. cit., p. 103.
- 22) L. E., op. cit., p. 204.
- 23) L. E., op. cit., p. 102, "mesentery, bowels,..." missing in Hebrew text p. a'ḏ
- 24) L. E., op. cit., p. 103. Although this is the lowest part, especially the generative organs were considered highly. They are compared to the cognitive ones. L. E., op. cit., p. 94/5 "cartilage" missing in Hebrew text p. a'ḏ
- 25) yet it is interesting to note that taste and touch are called indispensable L. E., op. cit., p. 53: "The reason for this is that the latter three (viz., sight, hearing, and smell) are not indispensable to the existence of the individual,..."
- 26) cf. above p. 13.

- 27) L. e., op. cit., p. 208.
- 28) cf. L. E., op. cit., p. 390.
- 29) much like the above mentioned vital power.
- 30) L. E., op. cit., p. 206.
- 31) L. E., op. cit., p. 204.
- 32) Leone frequently gives astronomical analogies.
- 33) L. E., op. cit., p. 394/5.
- 34) L.E., op. cit., p. 206.
- 35) Leone, L. E., op. cit., p. 206/7, insists that it is only an internal relationship not detracting from the posited oneness of the soul.
- 36) L. E., op. cit., p. 206 "indivisible and the divisible..", Hebrew text has instead p. אכח אכח אכח אכח
- 37) L. E., op. cit., p. 224. This induces Leone to mention the theory of the transmigration of the soul, as related by Pythagoras p. 225.
- 38) cf. Section I, ch. 2.
- 39) the significance of this factor for the theory of cognition has been dealt with before. p. 21.
- 40) L. E., op. cit., p.389.
- 41) author's addition.
- 42) L. E., op. cit., p.267.
- 43) L. E., op. cit., p.227.
- 44) L. E., op. cit., p.190.
- 44a) L. E., op. cit., p.189/90.
- 45) L. E., op. cit., p.32.

- 46) p. 15f.
- 47) L. E., op. cit., p. 330.
- 48) L. E., op. cit., p. 330.
- 49) The individual has no immortality, only the species can attain to it, according to Aristotle, L. E., op. cit., p. 374.
- 50) L. E., op. cit., p. 353, so Leone interprets the story of the paradise.
- 51) Leone's brackets.
- 52) L. E., op. cit., p. 330-1, cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 388.
- 53) p. 37.
- 54) L. E., op. cit., p. 355.
- 55) L. E., op. cit., p. 34.
- 56) L. E., op. cit., p. 33.
- 57) deeds are virtuous L. E., op. cit., p. 120: "But we recognize the rank of a man's soul by his acts;"
- 58) L. E., op. cit., p. 33; cf. also a corresponding list of vices, L. E., op. cit., p. 395.
- 59) cf. modification below.
- 60) L. E., op. cit., p. 342.
- 61) L. E., op. cit., p. 439.
- 62) L. E., op. cit., p. 396.
- 63) cf. an earlier statement about knowledge, as the possession of a fact, p. 10.
- 64) With this statement this part of ethics, at least, is removed from an absolute basis and seems relativistic.

- 65) L. E., op. cit., p. 355 (Hebrew text has ¹³⁸ p.a.ג'ח)
- 66) This opposition is all the more indicated due to the fact he leans on Scripture as his authority, L. E., op. cit., p. 354.
- 67) author's addition.
- 68) L. E., op. cit., p. 357.
- 69) L. E., op. cit., p. 356.
- 70) L. E., op. cit., p. 356.
- 71) It may be a Renaissance revolt, going back to the Greek love of the body (cf. Introduction), or a Jewish recognition of the body's place, cf. Cohon, Samuel, S., Theology Lectures, Cincinnati, 1940. p. 94.
- 72) cf. wording L. E., op. cit., p. 356: "and should draw it somewhat (!)"
- 73) L. E., op. cit., p. 363.
- 74) L. E., op. cit., p. 439.
- 75) As in everything else the forms are the predominant and real factor.
- 76) L. E., op. cit., p. 439.
- 77) Eating, carnal pleasures L. E., op. cit., p. 54 (He is a physician!) cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 358, the Serpent story.
- 78) L. E., op. cit., p. 437, cf. vices of immoderation, L. E., op. cit., p. 438 and p. 71. (In the Hebrew edition the passage of Sophia preceding this passage is left out by

mistake. p. b

- 77a) L. E., op. cit., p. 365, hence we have three types of love: "the intellectual, which are absolutely virtuous,...the corporeal, which are requisite and restrained, the moderation of which places them among the virtuous desires of the body,...and finally, corporeal desires, which are unbridled, superfluous and inordinate,..."
- 79) L. E., op. cit., p. 205.
- 80) L. E., op. cit., p. 356: "for as eternal truths of God make the intellect divine, true, and eternal as they are, so sensuous, corporeal and corruptible things make it material and corruptible like themselves."
- 81) L. E., op. cit., p. 32, cf. also L. E., op. cit., p. 34.
- 83) L. E., op. cit., p. 460.
- 84) L. E., op. cit., p. 34 (Hebrew text does not have the words "...entirely, or..." p. a³)
- 85) This seems in distinct contrast to any "grace" idea that the church may have taught.
- 86) L. E., op. cit., p. 261, cf. also Pes. Rab Kahana ed. Buber XXVI p. 166 a f cf. Zimmels, op. cit., p. 59.
- 87) translator's brackets.
- 88) L. E., op. cit., p. 457, Gen. 6.5 though--of course the fault lies with the creature L. E., op. cit., p. 457.
- 89) L. E., op. cit., p. 313.
- 90) L. E., op. cit., p. 462.
- 91) L. E., op. cit., p. 460.
- 91a) cf. L. E.' poetry in Gebhardt, op. cit.;

- 92) L. E., op. cit., p. 46 for the religious background of the entire Renaissance philosophy cf. Introduction and cf. Lewkowitz, Albert, Das Judentum und die geistigen Stimmungen der Neuzeit. In "Bericht des jüdisch-theologischen Seminars Franckelscher Stiftung, für das Jahr 1928, Breslau 1929. p. 9f.

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