

HEBREW UNION COLLEGE - JEWISH INSTITUTE OF RELIGION
California School

in co-operation with

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
School of Social Work
School of Public Administration

M O V I N G R I G H T , W H A T ' S L E F T ? :

CHANGING TRENDS IN JEWISH LIBERALISM,
1960's - 1980's AND BEYOND

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ABSTRACT

Jewish "neo-conservatives" argue that Jews are becoming and ought to be more conservative. Others, such as sociologist Steven Cohen, contend that Jews remain substantially liberal. By using two national surveys of college students conducted almost twenty years apart (1969 and 1984), this question is examined in the context of the campus. Jewish students in the 1980's are compared with non-Jewish students and with Jewish students in the 1960's to determine: 1) whether Jewish students in 1984 are more conservative than their 1960's counterparts and 2) whether Jewish students in 1984 still remain more liberal than non-Jewish students.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The liberalism of American Jews is a given in American society. Non-Jews see Jews as predominantly liberal on social, political and economic issues and Jews have agreed with this assessment.

Jews voted, next to blacks, the most heavily in favor of Democratic candidate Walter Mondale in the last presidential election. There has been much documentation (Keniston, 1968; Glazer, 1969; Rothman, 1982; Cohen, M. 1986) regarding the disproportionate percentage of Jews involved in "liberal" organizations and supportive of the Left's political and ideological positions relative to their actual numbers in the general population.

At the same time, however, a variety of issues have arisen which tend to estrange Jews from the liberal camp. These include: The liberals' support of quotas in Affirmative Action cases, the prominence of Jesse Jackson in the Democratic Party (vis a vis his relationship with the black anti-Semite Louis Farrakhan) and the anti-Israel stance often adopted by liberal groups. Most recently, for example, Amnesty International has been accused by AIPAC of having an anti-Israel bias.

In recent years, Jewish neo-conservatives have argued that

the liberal agenda and the Democratic Party no longer represent Jewish interests. They identify (and encourage) a shift toward the right among American Jews. They contend that Jews ought to be more aligned with conservatives. Other social scientists disagree, stating that Jews indeed remain more liberal than other Americans.

Review of the Literature

The Eastern European immigrant generation of American Jews was not only liberal, but heavily socialist. The Jewish socialists of the 1930's and 1940's, for example, established the American Labor Party and later the Liberal Party.

Nathan Glazer notes the extent to which socialism was an accepted aspect of American Jewish culture:

A powerful strain in the Jewish ethnic culture, rivaling in its appeal and significance for Jews, the Jewish religion itself, was Jewish socialism, in a score of variants....If one's family was not Socialist, then there was likely to be an uncle Moe, with his copy of Frieheit (the Yiddish Communist daily) sticking out of his pocket (Glazer, 1969, 113).

The Daily Forward, a leading Yiddish newspaper, was avowedly socialist in its editorial stance. Another example is the Yiddish radio station, WEVD, whose call letters were named after noted socialist Eugene V. Debbs.

If the individual Eastern European Jew was not actually a socialist, s/he was sympathetic or at least tolerant of socialist ideologies in a period of American history which was openly

hostile to it.

Glazer argues that contemporary Jewish liberalism emerges from the unique cultural milieu of the Jewish community in five ways. First, the emphasis on education exposes the child to cosmopolitan ideas and leftist literature. Second, in the intellectual atmosphere of the home, books and magazines abound and discussion is encouraged. The third factor is the impact of working class grandparents on the intellectualized and academic suburban parents and their children. A fourth element is the tendency toward intolerance of authority, especially authority that does not explain itself to the rational mind. Thus, the general makeup of the American Jewish family which emphasizes empathy, democracy and mutuality uniquely shapes and stimulates liberal thinking.

This understanding of the role that the family plays in shaping the child has been used by Glazer and others to explain student radicalism in the 1960's and the prevalent role Jews played in it. Keniston, in his book Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth, and Richard Braungart in his book Family Status, Socialization and Student Politics advance this argument a step further.

Braungart describes the general characteristics of the family and social environment that tend to support and nurture liberal thinking: families which are more democratic and egalitarian, that encourage interpersonal relations among family

members and are more permissive (Braungart, 1979, 77). He then states that Jewish families predominantly exhibit these characteristics.

Keniston describes the "red-diaper baby" hypothesis which states that the sons and daughters of the socialists and leftists became the student activists and radicals of the 1960's. These activists grew up in an environment that socialized them into a leftist orientation that carried them into the civil rights and student movements of the 1960's.

Keniston states that rather than the children of the socialists turning against their parents (ideologically speaking), the children admired their parents and thought they had not gone far enough. In this regard, the commonly held belief in the "war between the generations" was muted when parents were liberal and humanitarian with strong ethical and moral values.

In the 1970's, a variety of issues arose which alienated Jews from other liberals. The first was the Black Power Movement or black separatism which was critical of white (read Jewish) involvement in black causes and also was sharply critical of Israel. At the same time, "Black is Beautiful" encouraged other groups, including Jews, to assert their own identity and pursue their own agendas. Jewish Studies followed Black Studies to the college campus and flourished to a remarkable degree.

Affirmative Action was another issue on which Jews were no longer "liberal." Jews support the concept but not the

programmatic reality, i.e. quotas. For the black community and other racial and ethnic groups, quotas can be the entre into better paying and professional jobs. For Jews, quotas represent the way that employers and the corporate world have kept Jews out.

Jews found themselves increasingly at odds with the Left also as the Left became more supportive of Third World issues. When various ethnic and racial minority groups began to identify with Third World struggles, they focused in upon the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO became the vanguard of "national liberation" while Israel was portrayed as the aggressor.

Seymour Martin Lipset recognized this crisis for Jewish liberalism as early as 1972. Writing for the American Jewish Committee's Task Force Report on Group Life In America, he states that "liberalism is in a state of crisis" (Lipset, 1972, 46). He explains that university students as well as other segments of the Jewish community were "pessimistic about the ability of liberal government to solve 'problems' through public action" (Lipset, 1972, 46). Unemployment, inflation, the ballooning welfare state, crime and urban problems were core concerns of the community. The Jewish community was taking issue with the way that liberal government had been dealing with these problems.

Lipset concludes that Jews were "torn between traditional liberal loyalties and Jewish concerns. American Jewry has been heavily liberal in its ideology and organizational strategies"

(Lipset, 1972, 55) yet was dismayed "over the inefficacy of applying traditional universalist and integrationist principles to the condition of the blacks [which now] challenges the norms and institutions which Jews have long regarded [as] essential to their own security" (Lipset, 1972, 47).

Contemporary Jewish Liberalism

There are two basic schools of thought regarding the current political thought and behavior of American Jews. One group is typified by such neo-conservatives as Norman Podhoretz and Milton Himmelfarb. They suggest that on such issues as Israel, the economy and certain domestic social programs, Jews have moved to the right. They see this as a positive and inevitable step that will lead Jews to a more complete integration into mainstream America. These same neo-conservatives, centered around Commentary magazine, have also argued since the late 1970's that the Republican Party and the conservative agenda are now closer to, and would better serve, Jewish interests. On the other side are writers and researchers such as Lawrence Fuchs, Steven M. Cohen and Stanley Rothman who argue that, although there may be some cracks in what appeared to be an all encompassing liberal ideology, Jews remain among the most liberal groups in America.

When one looks at important Jewish leaders and spokespersons today, there is a sense that they espouse more of a conservative cause. Some have assumed that because the leaders are conservative, then the rank-and-file in the Jewish community must

also be turning to the right in larger numbers and with more intensity.

Steven M. Cohen, himself a liberal, has found in his extensive studies that the Jewish public has remained strongly liberal. In his "1984 National Survey of American Jews," he states that "some observers have either predicted or advocated a rightward shift in Jewish political thinking. Jews, however, continue to confound logic" and "still report disproportionate Jewish support for liberal candidates and issues. The national political center has moved right over the last fifteen years, and Jews have moved accordingly, but the center of the Jewish political spectrum remains left of the national center" (Cohen, S., 1984, 3).

In an article for Moment magazine, Deborah Lipstadt, Charles Pruitt and Jonathan Woocher suggest a "liberalism with exceptions" (Lipstadt, et al., 1984, 2). They state that though the socio-economic level currently occupied by a large segment of American Jewry would normally be associated with support for the Republican platform, Jews remain tied to the Democratic party and their old patterns of support. But this support is not uncritical.

Jews are still liberal on a broad range of social and economic issues, but perhaps not as unswervingly as in the past. They still oppose nuclear power plants, tuition tax credits, increased spending on national defense and amendments prohibiting abortion. They support the nuclear freeze, increased spending on

education and on environmental issues.

Exceptions to the traditional liberal stance include: rejecting job quotas as a way of implementing equal opportunity, wanting more government spending to combat crime, too much government regulation of business and some agreement to continue U.S. aid to anti-communists in Central America.

This description of the historic trend of American Jewish liberalism has put into context the elements that have created the unique relationship between Jewish tradition and American culture. The intersection of social, religious, ethnic and political factors has led to a discussion of the current relationship of American Jews and liberalism.

College Students

College students can be seen as a barometer of the future. Though they are apt to be more extreme in their views, their attitudes and trends are a microcosm of the larger community. For example, neo-conservatives and their supporters point to the decreasing involvement of Jewish college students in liberal political and social issues and organizations over the past two decades as evidence of a positive political shift to the right among the entire Jewish community.

While liberals may acknowledge a slight shift to the right among Jews, they point out that this corresponds to the general shift to the right over the last twenty years by the larger American society. But these writers stress that Jews still

remain to left relative to the rest of the population.

Studies of Jewish college students in the 1960's started with the assumption that they were more radical than non-Jewish students and sought to understand why. Keniston's and Glazer's studies of Jewish radicals and activists revealed that within the leftist student movements of the early to mid-1960's, a disproportionate percentage of the leaders and followers were Jews. The students accepted the Jewish self identification and seemed to "make nothing of it. Indeed, they [were] scarcely conscious of it, and [were] not aware of it at all in connection with their political activities" (Glazer, 1969, 112). Studies conducted in the 1960's found a large number of Jews involved in liberal causes either through actual membership in liberal organizations or by exhibiting their solidarity through demonstrations, arrests or attitudinal support.

In a 1969 article, "The Jewish Role in Student Activism" by Nathan Glazer, he quotes statistics on the number of college students and the percentage of activists who were Jewish. He stated that there were an estimated 325,000 Jews among 6,700,000 college students. Seymour Lipset estimated that the number of student members of the New Left was 30,000, with a very small percentage of those being "committed, identifiable radicals on the most active campuses" (Glazer, 1969, 112). Glazer states that probably one-third to one-half of these committed activists were Jews. Though this works out to be a small percentage of the total Jewish student population, it represents a higher

percentage of committed student radicals than in other religious subgroups; thus, Jews were over-represented.

Stanley Rothman and Robert S. Lichter in their book, Roots of Radicalism; Jews, Christians and the New Left, discuss the change that occurred in the student movement in the 1960's and how that affected Jewish participation. They write that in the early to mid 1960's, the white civil rights activists in the Free Speech Movement (FSM), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other groups were essentially non-violent idealists. These students came from well-educated Jewish and Protestant families and they majored primarily in the social sciences and humanities.

In the late 1960's, the style and orientation of the student protest movement became more violent and militant. At this same time, the demographics of the movement's participants and supporters also changed. More members were coming from politically conservative, non-Jewish and non-intellectual families. It became more of a mass movement. Some researchers believe that this radicalism was a rebellion against the students' parents. Though the majority of the members were still supportive of the philosophy of the early 1960's, the newer participants were heading in another direction. This is especially true of such organizations as SDS and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

A recent study conducted by UCLA professor Alexander W. Astin and others reveals that current college students remain as liberal on broad social and political issues (relative to other

students) as their 1960's counterparts. One general impression is that today's college students are primarily concerned with their own individual well-being and not interested in the betterment of society. But Astin remarked that "materialism in the job market may have been mistaken for conservatism in the political arena" (Los Angeles Times, 1986).

In this thesis, college students are used as a barometer of changing political and social attitudes in order to ascertain the extent of the rightward shift among Jews and non-Jews in the United States.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Two comparable studies conducted 15 years apart (1969 and 1984) make it possible to chart the proposed rightward drift of American Jewish college students. In 1969, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education sponsored a survey of undergraduate students at universities and colleges across the United States. In 1984, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching sponsored a similar survey, in part designed to identify any new trends or movement which had occurred since previous research. The first study consists of a random subset of an original survey of higher education: undergraduate subsample, conducted in the winter of 1969-1970. The second study consists of the data provided by a similar study conducted in 1984.

The total number of respondents in each study are 13,000 respondents and 10,000 respondents, respectively. While the number of cases available for study is large, all cases were included in the research so as to maintain the percentage relationship of Jews to non-Jews that is natural within the larger community.

The cases were divided according to the respondents' religion as indicated on the survey. Religion is defined as the respondents religious preference at the time of the survey. If the respondent did not provide a current religious preference at

the time of the survey, the respondents' religion in which s/he was raised was the criteria used to determine into which category each respondent should be placed. Religion categories include Jewish, Protestant, Catholic and other non-Jews. In addition, because the black community is more liberal than other Protestants, they were removed from the sample.

Testing the Hypothesis of Rightward Drift

In this study, we will pursue the question of Jewish liberalism by examining the emergent political constituency: college students. In order to test the "Hypothesis of Rightward Drift" (i.e. the Jewish political arena is moving to the right), three possible models were developed:

- 1) STABLE LIBERALISM MODEL:
Jews remain as liberal in 1984 as they were in 1969.
- 2) PARALLEL DRIFT MODEL:
Both Jews and non-Jews are moving toward the political right.
- 3) CONVERGENCE MODEL:
Jews have moved more rapidly to the right than have non-Jews and thus may converge with them.

Weighting

Due to an over-sampling of private colleges and universities in 1969, the original study was weighted by the Carnegie Foundation in order to obtain a more accurate impression of the distribution of public and private universities across the country.

Liberalism Defined

Liberalism can be defined in terms of its political, social and philosophical dimensions. Michael Walzer in his article, "Liberalism and the Jews," defines liberal politics as a commitment "to individual freedom, civil liberty, a pluralist society" and the welfare state (Walzer, 1986, 15).

Lawrence Fuchs states in "Sources of Jewish Internationalism and Liberalism" that American liberalism consists of a constellation of attitudes about race prejudice, civil rights protection and the spread of militarism (Sklare, 1958, 598).

On a broader level, liberalism reflects a commitment to the democratic ideal of social justice, equality, tolerance and mutual aid and responsibility.

Nathan Glazer and Kenneth Keniston explain the predominance of liberalism in the American Jewish psyche as an historic and intrinsic outgrowth of Jewish culture and religion.

Method of Analysis

Ideally, the two studies should be identical. However, because times have changed and the university campus has become more quiet, the focus on campus activism so prevalent in the 1969 study was absent from the 1984 instrument. Also, a variety of questions, while similar in substance, were re-worded for the 1984 study. Thus, the analysis is divided into two parts. The first takes those questions which were identically worded in each study and makes three comparisons:

- 1) Jews in 1969 with Jews in 1984.
- 2) Jews with non-Jews in 1969.
- 3) Jews with non-Jews in 1984.

Noting that only a limited number of questions exactly matched from survey to survey, it was necessary to develop another method of question analysis. The second part uses comparably worded questions and makes two comparisons:

- 1) Jews with non-Jews in 1969.
- 2) Jews with non-Jews in 1984.

The questions from each survey were divided into three categories: 1) current issues; 2) campus environment; and 3) philosophy of life. Category one included questions concerning foreign policy, U.S. domestic problems, national defense and the military. The second category, campus environment, includes all of those questions asked on either survey which pertain to various aspects of campus life, including: a) policy issues; b) faculty issues; and c) general campus impressions. Category three studies "philosophy of life" issues. Included in this section are respondents attitudes toward such issues as the existence of a god and future desires. These questions remained consistent from one study to the next.

CHAPTER III

EXACTLY MATCHED QUESTIONS

Approximately thirty questions matched exactly from 1969 to 1984. Twenty questions deemed most appropriate for comparison were chosen for analysis. The responses to these questions were compared in three phases. First, Jewish responses in 1969 were compared to Jewish responses in 1984. This enabled us to ascertain any significant shift in Jewish political attitudes from 1969 to 1984. Second, non-Jewish responses in 1969 were compared to non-Jewish responses in 1984 in order to determine any similar movement in the non-Jewish population. Finally, the non-Jewish responses were compared to the Jewish responses in 1969 and then again in 1984. This enabled us to compare the degree of change in Jewish responses to the degree of change in non-Jewish responses.

Generally speaking, Jewish students were more liberal than non-Jewish students in 1969. This was not the case in 1984, however. On many issues in 1984, some groups of non-Jewish respondents were more liberal than Jewish respondents. In addition, while Jewish respondents generally became more conservative on many of the issues surveyed from 1969 to 1984, non-Jewish respondents oftentimes became more liberal.

There follows now results of the twenty questions which were analyzed according to the method described above. In most cases, the liberal response is obvious. In other cases, the liberal

response is that which is the most non-traditional, "humanistic" or humanitarian.

Individual vs. Communal Responsibility

The questions in this category asked respondents their opinions on various personal and communal responsibilities. Those respondents who placed greater importance on communal responsibility rather than on their own personal well-being, were defined as more liberal.

Two important points are evident from the results of these questions. First, there has been a general trend among all groups toward increased optimism regarding the potential impact of an individual on society. Juxtaposed to this is a marked decrease since 1969 with concern for communal/social involvement (Tables #1 and #4).

Along the same lines, concern for personal well-being nearly tripled among all groups from the 1969 study to the 1984 study. For example, on a question regarding financial well-being, none of the groups expressed much concern with the issue in 1969. In 1984 both Jews and non-Jews were more than twice as concerned with personal financial matters as they were in 1969 (Tables #2 and #3).

TABLE #1

"REALISTICALLY, AN INDIVIDUAL PERSON CAN DO LITTLE TO BRING
ABOUT CHANGES IN OUR SOCIETY."

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Strongly Agree	10.7	13.2	10.8	14.6	11.3	11.3	25.8	11.9
Agree With Reservations	37.9	37.6	47.4	37.8	30.3	32.7	24.1	30.5
Disagree With Reservations	39.9	36.3	29.5	29.6	36.8	39.2	40.1	38.0
Strongly Disagree	11.6	12.9	12.3	17.9	21.6	16.8	10.1	19.6

TABLE #2

"RAISING A FAMILY IS IMPORTANT TO ME."

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Strongly Agree	38.1	39.7	39.6	22.2	52.0	52.4	52.2	33.2
Agree With Reservations	38.5	35.4	36.2	29.0	27.0	28.9	38.8	35.8
Disagree With Reservations	17.2	17.5	17.0	32.9	11.6	10.4	6.7	18.7
Strongly Disagree	6.2	7.4	7.2	15.9	9.3	8.4	2.3	12.3

TABLE #3

"BECOMING WELL-OFF FINANCIALLY IS IMPORTANT TO ME."

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Strongly Agree	8.6	8.4	5.6	9.6	25.5	35.8	28.4	32.6
Agree With Reservations	29.6	28.0	31.8	22.3	49.3	46.4	25.5	35.7
Disagree With Reservations	43.9	46.2	42.2	44.1	17.9	14.5	43.9	28.5
Strongly Disagree	17.8	17.4	20.4	24.0	7.3	3.3	2.2	3.3

TABLE #4

"THESE DAYS YOU HEAR TOO MUCH ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AND NOT ENOUGH ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF THE MAJORITY."

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Strongly Agree	20.6	18.4	4.8	15.4	25.5	19.6	42.3	15.1
Agree With Reservations	41.2	39.0	20.7	28.1	37.0	35.1	19.8	37.7
Disagree With Reservations	27.4	31.6	46.2	31.2	27.4	31.6	27.2	32.8
Strongly Disagree	10.8	11.0	28.3	25.3	10.1	13.6	10.7	14.5

Constitutional Issues

The following questions deal with certain rights or responsibilities which are provided by the U.S. Constitution. These include freedom of speech, the military draft and capital

punishment.

While college students continue to support freedom of speech, in general, they have become much more conservative on other constitutional issues. For example, on the issue of military draft (Table #7), Jews and 'others' were the most liberal in 1969 (i.e. they supported a volunteer versus a conscripted military service). By 1984 however, all groups became much more conservative. In some cases Jews became more conservative than their non-Jewish counterparts. For example, Jews were more in favor of the death penalty than non-Jews but less willing to ban persons with extreme views from the campus.

TABLE #5

"CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (THE DEATH PENALTY) SHOULD BE ABOLISHED."

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Strongly Agree	31.2	39.4	42.4	54.8	10.9	13.1	6.0	9.5
Agree With Reservations	25.4	23.8	30.9	15.3	7.6	9.4	10.0	13.8
Disagree With Reservations	25.8	21.5	18.2	18.6	26.4	29.9	38.4	34.6
Strongly Disagree	17.6	15.4	8.6	11.3	55.1	47.5	45.6	42.1

TABLE #6

"COLLEGE OFFICIALS HAVE THE RIGHT TO BAN PERSONS WITH EXTREME VIEWS FROM SPEAKING ON CAMPUS."

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Strongly Agree	10.9	8.7	1.1	7.4	8.3	7.8	5.7	2.6
Agree With Reservations	18.9	18.5	8.4	3.6	16.6	18.4	6.7	23.7
Disagree With Reservations	32.1	34.1	26.6	20.7	30.4	32.7	41.3	38.5
Strongly Disagree	36.6	35.7	62.5	61.9	44.7	41.1	46.3	35.2

TABLE #7

"ONLY VOLUNTEERS SHOULD SERVE IN THE ARMED FORCES."

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Strongly Agree	24.4	22.8	41.4	48.0	15.9	16.8	28.5	20.8
Agree With Reservations	33.0	37.6	34.9	31.7	29.3	30.6	43.6	31.5
Disagree With Reservations	33.4	27.2	19.2	17.2	34.9	35.3	20.2	23.8
Strongly Disagree	9.3	12.4	4.4	3.0	19.9	17.4	7.7	23.9

Student Power on Campus

The following questions deal with the amount of control which respondents feel undergraduate students should have in decisions regarding certain aspects of college life. In both studies respondents were asked: "WHAT ROLE DO YOU BELIEVE

UNDERGRADUATES SHOULD PLAY IN DECISIONS ON...?"

The greater the role which respondents felt students should play, the more liberal the response.

The results indicate two important trends. First, Jews were significantly more liberal in their attitudes about student power in 1969 than they were in 1984. Second, Jews tended to be slightly more liberal than their non-Jewish counterparts in 1969, but somewhat more conservative than non-Jews in 1984 (Tables #8a-#8f), indicating a strong rightward drift. For example, Jewish respondents saw little or no role for students in faculty promotions, admissions or degree requirements as opposed to 1969 when they were the most in favor of control over these areas.

"WHAT ROLE DO YOU BELIEVE UNDERGRADUATES SHOULD PLAY IN DECISIONS ON THE FOLLOWING?"

TABLE #8A

"FACULTY APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION"

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Control	.5	.3	1.0	2.5	1.7	3.5	1.9	3.5
Voting Power	15.6	17.9	26.2	27.8	16.1	21.2	15.6	20.0
Formal Consultant	22.2	20.0	36.8	23.5	19.7	23.2	13.0	27.5
Informal Consultant	29.4	32.4	23.4	24.4	32.5	26.6	14.3	24.7
Little or No Role	29.8	26.6	11.3	19.3	30.0	25.5	55.1	24.3

TABLE #8B

"UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS POLICY"

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Control	.7	1.5	1.1	15.0	1.2	3.7	.3	2.2
Voting Power	18.8	19.1	26.8	24.1	15.1	16.9	12.6	24.1
Formal Consultant	27.1	25.2	32.6	28.1	23.8	27.5	12.7	22.6
Informal Consultant	25.1	27.4	20.3	27.7	27.3	19.7	16.6	21.0
Little or No Role	25.2	23.7	17.9	2.2	32.6	32.3	57.8	30.1

TABLE #8C

"BACHELOR'S DEGREE REQUIREMENTS"

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Control	1.2	1.2	2.1	2.8	1.6	4.3	1.0	3.4
Voting Power	20.1	27.0	37.4	30.9	14.4	14.6	13.5	14.6
Formal Consultant	31.6	34.4	35.9	33.9	25.2	34.6	22.8	28.1
Informal Consultant	25.1	20.9	12.9	18.4	28.6	23.1	13.5	35.9
Little or No Role	19.2	13.0	10.3	11.2	30.1	23.4	49.1	18.1

TABLE #8D

"PROVISION AND CONTENT OF COURSES"

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Control	3.3	3.1	5.8	7.8	2.7	5.8	1.8	5.3
Voting Power	31.7	32.2	54.6	41.5	17.9	19.9	18.7	24.8
Formal Consultant	36.2	39.5	27.3	29.9	33.1	31.1	21.6	29.4
Informal Consultant	19.8	15.8	9.9	14.1	32.1	26.3	48.3	24.8
Little or No Role	6.3	6.2	.7	4.0	14.2	16.9	9.6	15.8

TABLE #8E

"RESIDENCE HALL REGULATIONS"

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Control	22.4	26.6	49.8	44.5	12.2	15.6	6.4	13.0
Voting Power	47.9	46.5	33.5	35.3	43.6	38.7	34.6	41.1
Formal Consultant	17.2	14.3	10.1	9.2	22.7	23.7	34.6	18.6
Informal Consultant	7.4	6.3	2.5	4.8	13.9	11.1	22.2	14.1
Little or No Role	2.2	2.4	.5	3.4	7.6	10.9	2.2	13.1

TABLE #8F
"STUDENT DISCIPLINE"

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Control	18.2	21.7	34.5	40.7	9.4	14.0	9.0	13.7
Voting Power	47.3	46.5	47.9	38.5	38.8	33.2	25.5	33.4
Formal Consultant	22.0	18.7	11.4	10.8	25.3	22.7	33.5	24.7
Informal Consultant	6.7	6.7	2.3	4.7	16.6	17.6	8.9	12.2
Little or No Role	3.1	3.1	2.6	2.6	9.9	12.5	23.1	16.0

Purposes of Higher Education

These questions examine students' perceptions of the traditional responsibilities of the university and to what extent these are valid. The general trend in 1969 was toward non-traditional methods of education (Tables #9 and #10) and in an orientation toward developing interpersonal skills and future life goals (Tables #11-#13). By 1984, these trends had reversed themselves; students were no longer concerned with issues outside of the strict academic setting and were instead inclined toward a more limited vision of a skills oriented education.

TABLE #9

"UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION IN AMERICA WOULD BE IMPROVED IF GRADES WERE ABOLISHED."

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Strongly Agree	18.1	22.0	29.2	26.5	3.6	5.2	2.9	4.6
Agree With Reservations	33.5	32.8	39.8	38.7	11.3	9.7	17.1	17.7
Disagree With Reservations	27.7	26.5	21.9	23.9	30.9	31.9	32.5	23.0
Strongly Disagree	19.4	16.7	8.8	9.7	54.2	53.2	47.5	54.7

TABLE #10

"UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION IN AMERICA WOULD BE IMPROVED IF STUDENTS WERE REQUIRED TO SPEND A YEAR IN COMMUNITY SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES."

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Strongly Agree	13.9	14.6	19.8	17.4	7.2	6.6	3.6	8.4
Agree With Reservations	35.3	33.8	32.2	29.3	26.2	19.3	9.3	24.8
Disagree With Reservations	29.5	29.9	30.4	27.9	26.6	28.0	16.5	25.3
Strongly Disagree	19.1	18.5	16.5	23.3	40.0	46.2	70.7	41.5

"INDICATE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS FOR YOU TO GET THE FOLLOWING FROM COLLEGE:"

TABLE #11

"FORMULATING THE VALUES AND GOALS OF MY LIFE"

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Essential	69.6	70.0	67.3	71.8	57.1	62.2	31.8	52.9
Fairly Important	27.2	26.9	29.7	23.1	34.9	32.3	44.6	34.9
Not Important	3.1	3.1	3.0	5.1	8.0	5.5	23.6	12.1

TABLE #12

"A WELL ROUNDED GENERAL EDUCATION"

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Essential	52.0	60.4	61.1	53.5	55.1	60.9	79.3	49.8
Fairly Important	45.9	37.6	36.5	42.1	42.6	38.1	19.3	47.1
Not Important	2.1	2.0	2.3	4.4	2.3	1.0	1.4	3.2

TABLE #13

"LEARNING TO GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE"

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Essential	77.7	77.0	78.9	69.8	57.4	55.4	39.4	52.1
Fairly Important	20.9	19.9	18.8	26.6	34.7	38.3	38.6	37.6
Not Important	1.4	3.1	2.3	3.6	7.9	6.3	21.9	10.3

Religion

The two questions in this section asked students about their belief in God and their degree of religiosity. The results changed slightly over time. Generally, Jews were the most self identified "non-religious" group among both surveys and maintained less of a belief in God as well (Tables #14 and #15).

TABLE #14

"I BELIEVE THERE IS A GOD WHO JUDGES PEOPLE."

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Strongly Agree	59.9	70.1	17.5	21.1	53.9	54.8	24.7	34.6
Agree With Reservations	25.9	22.7	32.1	15.5	22.3	24.1	17.6	34.7
Disagree With Reservations	9.2	4.9	25.9	19.7	10.7	9.8	20.8	14.5
Strongly Disagree	5.1	2.3	24.5	43.6	13.1	11.3	36.9	16.2

TABLE #15

"I CONSIDER MYSELF RELIGIOUS."

	1969				1984			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTH.
Strongly Agree	23.1	20.4	6.5	10.7	20.8	10.8	2.8	8.1
Agree With Reservations	47.8	50.6	27.4	17.4	56.5	71.3	54.0	49.1
Disagree With Reservations	22.3	21.1	38.3	27.0	20.0	15.6	39.1	35.8
Strongly Disagree	6.9	7.9	27.9	44.9	2.8	2.2	4.1	7.0

CHAPTER IV

QUESTION CATEGORIES

Issues and attitudes within the United States changed significantly between the 1960's and the 1980's. As a result of these shifts the focus of questions from the 1969 survey to the 1984 survey also changed. A second method of analysis was developed to study those questions which could be grouped into similar categories for cross survey analysis.

Of the three main categories (current issues, campus environment and philosophy of life) the category of current issues was further divided into four groups: 1) foreign policy; 2) women's issues; 3) national defense and military; and 4) current U.S. domestic issues. After organizing questions into these groups, the numerical scores of all of the responses to each question within a group were totaled. The mean and standard deviation for each group and for the entire population were then computed. The placement of each group relative to the entire population was calculated by subtracting the mean of the entire population from the mean of the group and then dividing that sum by the standard deviation of the entire population. This number would then reveal how far above or below the mean of the entire population each religion was located for each group of questions. Using standard deviations based on the entire population, where a group stood in relation to the other groups was thus expressed as a fraction of a population standard deviation.

The responses to each question were coded in order to give a uniform value to each answer that would then illustrate a "most liberal" response to the "most conservative" response. The most liberal response to each question was then given a code of 4; a less liberal response was coded as a 3; a conservative response was given a 2; and the most conservative response was coded as a 1.

From the calculations of relative placement, those groups that appeared more liberal than the mean of the entire population would have a positive number. Conversely, those groups that were more conservative received a negative number; thereby being below the mean of the entire population.

Group 1: Foreign Policy

A comparison of the 1969 foreign policy questions with those from the 1984 survey reveals both consistency and change in perspective. First, there continued to be a concern for U.S. intervention in the affairs of foreign countries (although the area in question changed from Vietnam in 1969 to Central America in 1984). Second, whereas the 1969 survey reflects a strong concern with Communism, the 1984 study does not mention Communism at all. Instead, the central issue for determining foreign policy by 1984 was human rights.

QUESTIONS:

1969

- 1) Communist China should be recognized immediately by the United States.
- 2) Some form of Communist regime is probably necessary for progress in underdeveloped countries.
- 3) The U.S. should withdraw from Vietnam immediately.

1984

- 1) The current unrest in Central America is caused primarily by internal poverty and injustice rather than political intervention.
- 2) Foreign policy decisions should be based on a strong commitment to human rights.
- 3) More effort should be made to improve relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- 4) Third world countries are being neglected by the foreign policy of this nation.

TABLE #16
FOREIGN POLICY

	<u>1969</u>		<u>1984</u>	
	<u>MEAN SCORE</u>	<u>RELATIVE PLACEMENT</u>	<u>MEAN SCORE</u>	<u>RELATIVE PLACEMENT</u>
PROTESTANT	6.91	-.260	8.92	-.141
CATHOLIC	7.35	-.055	8.50	+.096
JEWISH	8.50	+.484	8.63	+.020
OTHER	8.30	+.390	8.58	+.047
TOTAL*	7.47	-----	8.67	-----

*Entire Population score

Jewish respondents were the most liberal in 1969. They are located well above the population mean. In 1984, Jews are still above the mean but are less than one fourth as liberal as

they were in 1969. In addition, they are no longer the most liberal group. They are now third behind Catholics and 'other' non-Jews.

In 1969, Protestants and Catholics are below the mean for the population. By 1984, both groups have become more liberal on foreign policy issues. Catholics have become more liberal than Jews.

Group 2: Women's Issues

Between 1969 and 1984 a significant revolution occurred in women's rights. This is evident in the shift in focus of questions from the 1969 survey to the 1984 survey.

In 1969, questions focus on two issues: whether or not the government should have the power to regulate abortions and women's equal status with men. By 1984, abortion had been legalized (but that right is threatened), and women are now regarded as more equal with men. The focus of the questions shifted to maintaining or increasing women's rights.

QUESTIONS:

1969

- 1) Under some conditions, abortions should be legalized.
- 2) Women are at least the intellectual equals of men.

1984

- 1) A woman should have freedom to choose whether or not to have an abortion.
- 2) Women should be given preference for jobs if they have the same qualifications and abilities as male applicants.

TABLE #17
WOMEN'S ISSUES

	<u>1969</u>		<u>1984</u>	
	<u>MEAN SCORE</u>	<u>RELATIVE PLACEMENT</u>	<u>MEAN SCORE</u>	<u>RELATIVE PLACEMENT</u>
PROTESTANT	6.58	-.035	4.65	-.081
CATHOLIC	6.25	-.288	4.60	-.050
JEWISH	7.14	+.401	4.13	+.249
OTHER	7.04	+.328	4.25	+.171
TOTAL* -	6.62	-----	4.52	-----

*Entire population score

Jews were the most liberal in 1969 and were still the most liberal in 1984. By 1984 however, Jews had decreased by almost half. Catholics and Protestants fell below the mean in 1969, while 'other' non-Jews were above the mean. In 1984, 'other' non-Jews remained above the mean yet became more conservative. Protestants also became more conservative. In contrast, Catholics were the only group to become more liberal.

Group 3: National Defense and Military Issues

The focus of questions regarding military issues changed significantly from 1969 to 1984. In 1969 the concern lay in the role of colleges and universities in national defense while in 1984 questions developed a broader scope, focusing on nuclear disarmament and military spending.

QUESTIONS:

1969

- 1) Classified weapons research is a legitimate activity on college and university campuses.
- 2) American colleges and universities must sever all ties with the military-industrial complex.

1984

- 1) The United States is spending too much money for national defense and military purposes.
- 2) Our nation's leaders are doing all they can to prevent a nuclear war.
- 3) Nuclear disarmament should be given high priority by our national government.

TABLE #18
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY

	<u>1969</u>		<u>1984</u>	
	<u>MEAN SCORE</u>	<u>RELATIVE PLACEMENT</u>	<u>MEAN SCORE</u>	<u>RELATIVE PLACEMENT</u>
PROTESTANT	4.81	-.151	7.15	-.182
CATHOLIC	4.90	-.096	6.55	+.085
JEWISH	5.60	+.341	5.06	+.749
OTHER	5.56	+.317	6.55	+.089
TOTAL*	5.05	-----	6.75	-----

*Entire population score

This category is the most interesting in terms of Jewish responses. It is the only area in which Jews show an increase in liberalism from 1969 to 1984. In 1969, Jews were the most liberal of the respondents. 'Other' non-Jews were slightly less liberal than Jews, but still remained far above the mean. Protestants and Catholics were both located below the mean, or more conservative. In 1984, the Jewish position more than doubled, placing Jewish respondents almost one point above the

mean. Protestants became more conservative on the issue; Catholics became more liberal, placing them above the mean rather than below; and 'other' non-Jews, while remaining above the mean, decreased by almost four times.

Group 4: Current U.S. Domestic Issues

Very few changes occurred in domestic issues from 1969 to 1984. The focus of almost all questions on both surveys is on who is responsible for poverty within the country, the government or the individual.

QUESTIONS:

1969

- 1) Most people who live in poverty could do something about their situation if they really wanted to.
- 2) However acute our domestic problems, we cannot afford to suspend our space effort.
- 3) Urban problems cannot be solved without huge investments of federal money.

1984

- 1) Real poverty could be eliminated in this country within ten years if it were given a high national priority.
- 2) Private corporations are too concerned with profits and not enough with public responsibility.
- 3) In general, older citizens in this country do not have the basic services they need.
- 4) If people are unable to find jobs, it is their own fault.

TABLE #19
U.S. DOMESTIC ISSUES

	<u>1969</u>		<u>1984</u>	
	<u>MEAN SCORE</u>	<u>RELATIVE PLACEMENT</u>	<u>MEAN SCORE</u>	<u>RELATIVE PLACEMENT</u>
PROTESTANT	7.37	-.214	.090	-.048
CATHOLIC	7.66	-.054	.026	+.123
JEWISH	8.75	+.547	.055	+.045
OTHER	8.28	+.292	.159	-.234
TOTAL* -	7.76	-----	.072	-----

*Entire population score

In 1969, Jews were the most liberal group, twice as liberal as the 'other' group and almost four times as liberal as the Protestants and Catholics. Protestants and Catholics were located below the mean, while 'other' non-Jews were located above the mean.

In 1984, while still located above the mean, Jewish liberalism had decreased almost five times. 'Other' non-Jews shifted almost as far below the mean in 1984 as they were above the mean in 1969. Protestants and Catholics became more liberal. Protestants came very close to the mean, but remained slightly below, while Catholics moved above the mean and became more liberal than Jewish respondents.

With the exception of military and defense, it is clear that Jews have moved closer to the right in the political arena. In addition, it appears as if many non-Jewish groups are becoming slightly more liberal than they have been in the past.

CHAPTER V

AREAS OF DISCREPANCY

We identified six variables which could potentially account for any differences among the respondents within a given survey or across the years. These are: 1) respondent's college-public or private; 2) respondent's parents income; 3) respondents parent's political leaning; 4) respondent's high school grade point average; 5) respondent's secondary school type; and 6) respondent's political leaning.

These variables were crosstabulated by 'group' in order to determine any significant variable other than religion which might account for the differences in political attitudes. If, for example, most of the Jewish respondents went to private high schools and private colleges, while most of the non-Jewish respondents went primarily to public high schools and universities, this would be an important difference to note. Perhaps private schools embody and teach a different set of values than do public schools. This might account for the differences in political attitudes.

In general, all of the respondents were compatible in these five areas. There were no significant differences among groups. Respondent's School Type. After weighting, the number of respondent's from public universities was over seventy-five percent for all groups in 1969. In 1984, this number increased slightly.

TABLE #20
RESPONDENT'S SCHOOL TYPE

	<u>1969</u>				<u>1984</u>			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER
Public	77.9	66.9	62.4	76.7	86.8	89.0	86.3	92.8
Private	21.8	32.9	37.5	23.2	13.2	11.0	13.7	7.2

Respondent's Parents Income. Parental incomes of Jewish respondents tended to be slightly higher than the rest of the population in 1969. In 1984, almost half of the Jewish respondents were unable to answer the question. Of those who did, parental income was generally higher than in the non-Jewish population.

TABLE #21
RESPONDENT'S PARENTS INCOME

	<u>1969</u>				<u>1984</u>			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER
No Response	10.8	8.2	10.7	6.1	25.4	29.0	41.0	20.5
Below \$4000	5.2	4.5	3.9	5.0	6.6	4.0	2.8	18.9
\$4000-5999	10.5	10.9	6.1	6.4	2.5	9.2	4.8	15.1
\$6000-7999	13.6	15.1	6.2	11.5	4.2	7.2	1.8	13.6
\$8000-9999	15.7	20.5	9.5	17.3	6.1	6.0	1.1	5.6
\$10000-14999	25.6	23.4	26.3	30.7	28.0	28.8	68.4	18.6
\$15000-19999	10.8	8.5	14.0	10.0	30.2	16.5	7.2	15.3
\$20000-24999	3.3	5.0	6.1	4.7	22.5	28.3	13.9	12.9
\$25000-29999	1.6	2.3	5.2	2.3	8.4	14.7	4.4	16.8
\$30000 Or More	3.1	1.6	12.0	6.0	64.6	51.6	53.3	62.5

Respondent's Parents Political Leaning. Jewish respondents characterized their parents as slightly more liberal than their non-Jewish counterparts in 1969. One third of the Jewish respondents characterized their parents as middle of the road while almost one half of all non-Jewish respondents characterized their parents as moderately conservative.

In 1984, Jewish respondents classified their parents as middle of the road by almost fifty percent. Non-Jewish respondents still classified their parents as moderately conservative, but slightly less than in 1969.

TABLE #22
RESPONDENT'S PARENTS POLITICAL LEANING

	<u>1969</u>				<u>1984</u>			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER
Left	.1	.1	.2	2.2	.3	1.6	1.4	.4
Liberal	6.8	9.4	26.9	12.4	9.3	6.6	32.9	16.3
Middle of the Road	26.0	27.1	36.5	26.7	28.5	36.4	41.7	34.2
Moderately Conserv.	48.3	46.0	27.6	42.3	46.3	42.2	18.6	40.6
Strongly Conserv.	14.5	11.6	5.1	12.5	15.6	13.2	5.4	8.5

Respondent's Secondary School Grade Point Average. In 1969, all of the respondents were clustered around the B+ to B range, with a small percentage of each group in the A+ to A-range. In 1984, G.P.A.'s improved across the board. Jews were, however, slightly

higher in the A+ to A- range than were non-Jews.

TABLE #23
RESPONDENT'S SECONDARY SCHOOL G.P.A.

	<u>1969</u>				<u>1984</u>			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER
A or A+	5.4	4.9	9.1	5.0	16.5	10.7	7.8	26.6
A-	9.9	8.0	15.2	8.7	19.1	13.1	34.7	10.5
B+	17.9	16.6	23.0	16.4	20.0	27.2	19.6	25.6
B	24.7	27.9	23.6	19.1	17.4	18.0	7.9	24.1
B-	13.2	15.1	13.6	22.4	7.1	10.3	3.0	3.4
C+	15.5	16.1	11.5	16.2	11.0	11.0	2.0	6.5
C	12.8	9.9	3.2	11.4	3.8	8.6	24.3	1.5
C- or less	.2	.4	.5	.5	5.2	1.1	.7	1.7

Respondent's Secondary School Type. The predominant school type across the board in 1969 was public. The only exception here was in the Catholic group in which approximately half of the respondents attended private schools. In 1984, the same trend obtained, although Catholic private school attendance was much lower -- less than one fourth of all respondents.

TABLE #24
RESPONDENT'S SECONDARY SCHOOL TYPE

	<u>1969</u>				<u>1984</u>			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER
Public	94.1	57.4	90.2	87.6	92.9	73.6	90.8	91.1
Parochial	1.8	38.7	2.5	7.6	1.7	18.9	1.8	4.2
Other Pvt.	2.1	.8	5.8	3.0	5.4	7.5	7.4	4.7

Respondent's Political Leaning. A sixth variable, respondent's political leaning was also analyzed to determine any significant differences among groups or across the years. In 1969, Jews identified themselves as much more liberal than most non-Jews. Half of all Jews identified themselves as liberal in 1969 compared with only one third of non-Jews. In 1984, less than twenty-five percent of Jewish Protestant and Catholic respondents identified themselves as liberal. This indicates a decrease by half of Jewish respondents.

TABLE #25
RESPONDENT'S POLITICAL LEANING

	<u>1969</u>				<u>1984</u>			
	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER	PROT.	CATH.	JEW.	OTHER
Left	.9	1.9	7.3	12.0	2.5	1.3	3.3	2.2
Liberal	28.9	36.4	50.6	48.1	20.2	23.7	21.9	30.9
Middle of the Road	42.1	39.6	27.6	22.9	36.0	40.4	42.0	38.9
Moderately Conserv.	21.9	15.9	8.7	11.9	34.4	31.3	32.8	23.7
Strongly Conserv.	2.0	2.1	1.2	1.0	6.9	3.3	---	4.3

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Within the framework of the original "Rightward Drift" Hypothesis, we found that evidence strongly supports the CONVERGENCE MODEL. This model considers the movement of Jews and non-Jews relative to each other from 1969 to 1984.

The findings reveal three facts. First, that Jewish students have moved toward the political right along with non-Jewish students. This is evidenced by most of the data presented especially on such issues as the volunteer military draft, the importance of becoming financially well off and learning to get along with others. There are exceptions to this movement such as in the area of national defense where Jews became much more liberal and Protestants, more conservative. But overall, the trend is toward a more conservative attitude on most issues, especially by Jewish students.

Second, Jewish students are moving toward the right at a much faster rate than non-Jewish students, thereby, converging or "catching up" with non-Jews. Examples of this are Jewish student attitudes toward capital punishment, the rights of the minority vs. the majority and the importance of community service and formulating values and goals. On all of these issues, the changes in the Jewish student responses were greater than their non-Jewish counterparts.

Finally, all the groups were moving toward one another on

the political spectrum. Examples of this include the groups' positions on the right to ban persons from campus, on foreign policy questions and on U.S. domestic issues. On foreign policy, all groups moved closer to the mean of the entire population. However, on the issues surrounding national defense, Protestants became more conservative and Jews more liberal. From this evidence, it is possible to conclude that in the future the center of the Jewish political spectrum will no longer be located very far to the left of the general political spectrum. Rather, the two may converge.

The PARALLEL DRIFT MODEL identified any shift in placement of Jews or non-Jews relative to their own group between 1969 and 1984. Jews became more conservative from 1969 to 1984 on most issues. Catholics became more liberal on most issues including foreign policy, women's issues, national defense, U.S. domestic issues, minority/majority rights and the right to ban persons from speaking on campus. Protestants became more liberal on foreign policy, U.S. domestic issues and the right to ban persons from speaking on campus. Protestants became more conservative on national defense, women's issues and minority/majority rights. 'Other' non-Jews consistently became more conservative except on the issues of minority/majority rights. On the questions regarding the importance of raising a family, becoming financially well off, learning values and goals while in college, capital punishment and working in community service, all groups became more conservative from 1969 to 1984.

In reviewing the STABLE LIBERALISM MODEL which analyzed the relative placement (liberal to conservative) of Jews to other groups within each study year we found that Jews were generally more liberal than non-Jews on almost all issues in the 1969 study and on most issues in the 1984 study.

In such areas as foreign policy, women issues, national defense and U.S. domestic policy, Jews were consistently the most liberal group in 1969. While on such issues as the importance of raising a family, becoming financially well off and serving in the armed forces, Jews were not the most liberal group in 1969.

In 1984, Jews remained more liberal than non-Jews on most issues. The exceptions included; opinions of minority/majority rights, issues of undergraduate education and foreign policy.

Implications for the Organized Jewish Community

If Jews have become more selective in their support of liberal issues and attitudes, we must examine where the greatest changes have taken place in order to understand implications for the future.

On issues of national defense, the Jewish respondents became more than twice as liberal, while on foreign policy and U.S. domestic issues, they became much more conservative and very close to the mean of the entire population. Jews were very concerned with nuclear war and national defense while simultaneously becoming more skeptical about supporting Third World countries, the necessity of improving relations with the

Soviet Union and having a strong commitment to human rights. This has left the organized Jewish community with a dilemma. They have traditionally supported a strong commitment to human rights, and the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. The organized Jewish community can no longer assume that fellow Jews will be "knee-jerk" liberals on most issues.

Implications for the Field of Jewish Communal Service

Within the context of the study results, there are important implications for the field of Jewish communal service. Jewish respondents increasingly agreed that it was important to be financially well-off. At the same time, there was a marked decrease in support of the idea of the importance of community service. This may affect the numbers of future Jewish professionals willing to work within the Jewish community for two main reasons. First, individuals may lack the identification with, and commitment to, community service. Second, work within the Jewish community may be challenging but it is not often financially rewarding. The field may be unable to attract even those individuals who do see the importance of community service.

In addition to a decrease in the number of Jewish professionals, there are other elements within the Jewish communal sector which may be affected; namely, voluntarism, lay leadership and potential financial contributors. From where will we recruit the sorely needed lay leadership and volunteers within a community which is more concerned with personal financial

matters than with community service and social action? This group may be solicited for financial contributions, but the approach of the Jewish community and the justification given to contributors may have to change. The organized Jewish community can no longer rely on "Jewish guilt" and the fear of anti-Semitism as motivations to give to Jewish causes. Rather, the emerging contributors may need more positive reasons to become involved in, and responsive to, the community.

A Look to the Future

This study has revealed how the political and social attitudes of the Jewish student population has changed over the last twenty years. The group has moved from being among those possessing the most liberal attitudes on all aspects of governmental and social issues to becoming among the most conservative on many of these issues.

In looking at the mean of the entire population in both the 1969 and the 1984 surveys, Jews have moved consistently closer to the center on the political spectrum. It appears then, that the groups are becoming more alike overtime; that is, in fact, conservative.

We can extrapolate from the Jewish student population to the larger Jewish community. Though they usually hold more extreme views, (i.e. see issues in concrete, black and white terms), the trends of the students often become the trends of the future (Rothman, 1982, 330). Today's students are critical of the

traditional liberal stance on the variety of issues discussed here. These changes should not be attributed merely to young age and thereby disregarded. This would be a mistake that the organized Jewish community can ill afford.

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