

Statement by Referee of Master's Thesis

The M.H.L. dissertation entitled:

"The Doctrine of Immortality in Reform Judaism"

written by Jack Stern, Jr.
(name of student)

1) may (with revisions) be considered for
publication ()

cannot be considered for publication (X)

2) may, on request, be loaned by the Library (X)

may not be loaned by the Library ()

Samuel S. Cohon
(signature of referee)

Samuel S. Cohon
(referee)

February 17 '52
(date)

Thesis Digest

--

THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY IN REFORM JUDAISM

by

Jack Stern, Jr.

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
the Master of Hebrew Letters
Degree and Ordination.

Hebrew Union College-
Jewish Institute of Religion
Cincinnati, Ohio
January, 1952

Referee:
Professor Samuel S. Cohon

Reform Judaism is the response of a group of Jews to the stimulus of the modern age. Its beginnings marked the bold attempt of a few men to free their religion from the customs and beliefs which belonged to a bygone period of history. One of these beliefs was the doctrine of immortality.

The modernization of the immortality idea has been attributed to Moses Mendelssohn who, though himself a Deist, may be called the forerunner of Reform Judaism. By the use of reason, he deduced the doctrine of spiritual immortality and thereby tacitly rejected a multitude of irrational concepts which had accumulated through the centuries.

Reform Judaism adopted Mendelssohn's rational approach, combined it with the element of faith, and produced an immortality doctrine of its own. Despite individuality of approach, certain conclusions came to be accepted with some degree of unanimity. Resurrection and transmigration were rejected. The soul's future existence was conceived as a self-conscious existence. Retribution no longer suggested the physical abodes of heaven and hell but rather states of spiritual blessedness and spiritual misery. Exactly how these states were to come about was a subject of considerable difference of opinion.

As rationalists, the theologians of Reform Judaism offered a series of rational arguments as the basis of immortality. Most of these arguments, however, lose all validity unless founded upon religious faith, upon the belief in a personal God.

Jewish tradition is regarded, not as a source of authority, but rather as corroborative evidence that the immortality doctrine, in some form or other, has always been a theological

principle of Judaism. Special attention is given the Bible as the spiritual foundation of Reform Judaism, as the cradle of Jewish theology.

[But even though a Reform immortality doctrine has been evolved, it has not yet attained full maturity. It means little in the lives of Reform Jews; it has no relevance to their daily lives. To transform the belief in the soul's eternality into a stimulus of righteous living is the task which remains for Reform Judaism.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY IN REFORM JUDAISM

by

Jack Stern, Jr.

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
the Master of Hebrew Letters
Degree and Ordination.

Hebrew Union College-
Jewish Institute of Religion
Cincinnati, Ohio
January, 1952

Referee:
Professor Samuel S. Cohon

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	p a g e
Introduction	1
Chapter I - Moses Mendelssohn and <u>Phaedon</u> ...	1
Chapter II - The Approach of Reform	15
Chapter III - Resurrection and Retribution ..	23
Chapter IV - The Assertion of Immortality ...	56
Chapter V - The Reasons for Immortality	77
Chapter VI - Jewish Tradition	88
Chapter VII - The Doctrine of Reform Judaism.	99
Footnotes	102
Bibliography	115

INTRODUCTION

Anthropological studies testify that the belief in immortality, in some shape or form, has been the possession of all peoples in all ages and may therefore be classified as a "universal." The Bible, as the record of Jewish experience, provides testimony that the Jewish people was no exception. Although the belief in the continued existence of the soul had not yet acquired the philosophical and ethical refinements of modern day theology, the belief was nonetheless extant.

As the centuries passed, the concept of immortality underwent successive changes and modifications, many of which may be traced to the influence of current philosophies outside the fold of Judaism. Thus, the concept of heaven and hell which pervades rabbinic literature evidences a marked Persian tinge. Likewise, the rabbinic belief in metempsychosis may be traced to Platonic influence.

This is not to imply that there was no original thinking upon the part of Jewish philosophers or theologians. But whatever thinking there was largely complied with or reacted against the prevailing ideas in the non-Jewish world. Thus, a Saadia opposes the rabbinic and Platonic concept of transmigration.

With the dawn of the modern period, philosophy emerged from the stagnant state in which it had been immersed during the Middle Ages. Descartes, Leibnitz and a multitude of others renewed the search which had been halted for many centuries. But the Jews were not on hand to participate in the new quest.

Cultural as well as social interaction with the non-Jewish world had been blocked by the walls of the ghetto. Jewish minds still looked to the medieval rabbis and philosophers for authoritarian answers about life and death. Any new ideas, such as the mystic concepts of the Chasidim, drew their inspiration and motivation from within the Jewish group itself.

The nineteenth century witnessed a revolutionary change in the status of the western Jew. The ghetto walls were torn down, and he was face to face with a new world -- very promising but very strange. Its life was not his life. Its ideas were not his ideas. Its philosophy was not his philosophy.

The Reform movement, in part, signifies the attempt of the Jew to accomodate himself to this new world and, at the same time, to retain his identification with Judaism. Consequently, his religious practices and concepts were made subject to drastic change to meet the demands of the new age.

One of these concepts was the idea of immortality. How did Reform Judaism adapt its own belief to nineteenth and twentieth century thought? Did it react favorably or unfavorably to the beliefs of the day? How much of traditional content was retained? To provide answers to such questions is the purpose of this thesis.

CHAPTER I

MOSES MENDELSSOHN AND PHAEDON

Reform Judaism, as a religious movement, did not begin to emerge until the first quarter of the nineteenth century. But the forces of emancipation which motivated the rise of Reform had already taken embryonic hold in the century preceding. There was at least one man who, by the force of his own personality, had achieved a type of self-emancipation from the confines of the ghetto. As the first modern Jew to concern himself with the adjustment of Jews in modern life, Moses Mendelssohn was the forerunner of Reform Judaism. It is logical, therefore, that we begin our treatment of immortality in Reform Judaism with Mendelssohn's Phaedon.

The eighteenth century was the Age of Enlightenment, when freedom of inquiry evoked bitter reaction against traditional authority and reason was elevated to the supreme position. Both trends spelled doom for revealed religion. Rationalists maintained that nature and human history were in themselves sufficient to instruct man about God and His relationship to the universe. Revelation was no longer considered a reliable source of authority, religion generally fell into disrepute, and atheism became the vogue in western Europe.

The vindication of religion was undertaken by Mendelssohn, himself a rationalist. He distinguished between truths which were immutable (unveränderlich) and truths which were casual (zufällig). The immutable truths are

necessary in themselves, are conditioned by their own nature so that their opposite would be impossible and involve a contradiction. Casual truths are only contingent, depending upon conformity to certain laws which God has thought best to give to certain phenomena. Immutable truths are derived from God's reason, and therefore can be understood by man's rational faculties, while casual truths are derived from God's will and must be revealed to man. The former cannot be set aside, but the latter may be superseded at His pleasure when a higher purpose is served thereby. These truths which are only casual, which can be set aside by God at His own will, and which man learns only from experience rather than by logical deduction are not competent as criteria to judge the truth or falsity of the teachings of religion. Only reason is a sure guide to religious tenets. Through reason, Mendelssohn evolves a religion of three articles: God, Providence, and Immortality. The last of these is discussed in the Phaedon.

Dialogue I.

In the Phaedon proper, Mendelssohn defines death as the separation of the soul from the body. This death is a natural change in the human state of being. The first question to be answered, therefore, is: What is change? "A thing has changed when of two opposite determinations which belong to it, one has ceased, and the other has actually begun to be."¹ The phenomenon of change may therefore be defined as the "successive existence of the opposite determinations which are possible to one thing."² Nature herself provides intermediate stages as a passageway between these op-

posite states of existence so that every change is a gradual change. What at this moment seems to be a product of nature is in reality the object upon which the powers of nature have been working for a long time -- but only now do the results of their operation become visible. Three things, then, are required for every natural change: the foregoing state of the things which is to be changed; the opposite state; and the intermediate stage, lying between both, which leads nature the way from the one to the other. This intermediate stage is never in a static position but is always changing, continually undergoing a rapid succession of new forms -- even though invisible to the human eye. Each of these lesser changes keeps equal pace with time. It is characteristic of the phenomenon of time that the smallest portion of time may always be subdivided into smaller portions which still preserve the same properties of time so that no two units of time are so near to each other that it is impossible to imagine a third unit which intervenes between the two. Since, then, the succession of changes corresponds to the passage of time, there can be no two states of existence so near that we cannot conceive of a third state between them. Thus, annihilation in nature is impossible inasmuch as it would involve a change from existence to non-existence, a change which would not permit a third form to intervene. The very abruptness of the change is contrary to the natural laws of change. We may conclude, therefore, that nature cannot destroy.

Specifically, then, death is a natural change which involves three stages: the state of life, its opposite --

the state of death, and the intermediate stage of dying. This change applies to the soul as well as to the body, since the two have the most intimate connection with each other. With the aid of our senses, we can observe what happens to the body as it changes from life to death. But since our senses do not permit us to view a similar change in the soul, we must conjecture by reason from the analogy of the body. In every animal body, continuations and separations continually take place which contribute partly to the preservation and partly to the destruction of the animal machine. When this machine falls, the component particles do not cease to act because, as we have proved before, nature cannot destroy. Rather the separate parts continue to exist, act, suffer, unite and separate until they become the parts of another composition. Thus, the birth, life and death of the body, though they appear to the senses as disparate states, are in reality no more than members of a continued series of uninterrupted changes.

When we say that the soul dies, we must assume one of the following two alternatives: Either all of the operations cease, or, like the body, it sustains gradual and imperceptible changes which proceed in a continual series until it reaches a stage when it is no longer a human soul but becomes something else -- as the body dissolves into dust. The kind of death described in the first alternative, though possible in itself, cannot be produced by nature, since -- as we concluded above -- nature is incapable of producing complete annihilation. Perhaps, then, the annihilation may be caused, if not by a

natural force, then by a supernatural power-by God. Perhaps God causes the complete death of the soul by rendering inoperative its functioning powers. Such a possibility, Mendelssohn maintains, would be contrary to the nature of God who represents complete goodness -- and destruction is far from an act of goodness.

Now we consider the second alternative -- that, like the body, the soul undergoes gradual change until it ceases its functions and dissolves into something else. Perceptibly, the death of the soul does involve a cessation of function. As long as the general motions of the body tend to the preservation of its whole, the senses are operative and the soul possesses its full power; it feels, thinks, loves, abhors, conceives and wills. When the body becomes sick and its general motions go their separate ways, the soul apparently also grows weak and feels disordered, thinks falsely, and is made to act versus its own will. When the body dies and dissolves, the soul likewise seems to cease its functions. But, says Mendelssohn, such a cessation does not necessarily point to the death of the soul. Perhaps the soul only seems to cease its operations inasmuch as it no longer has any form susceptible of animation, has no body in which to express itself. Indeed, were we to infer that all the soul's sensations, thoughts and inclinations disappear at the death of the body, then our inference would contradict the natural law of non-destruction. For, even though the decline of the soul might be a gradual process, still that last step from existence to non-existence is a leap contrary to nature's law. Therefore, we cannot con-

clude the death of the soul from its apparent cessation of function. We are forced to the opposite conclusion -- that the soul continues to live and cannot die. And if it exists, it must continue to operate -- even though the outlet for expression, the body, no longer exists. She must continue to act and to suffer, and, consequently must feel, think, and will. After death -- the soul, as an active being, must have conceptions.

But what is the nature of conception? Do not ideas take their beginning from the impressions on the senses received from external objects? Apparently so. But only apparently. For this we conclude only from our experience in this life, and nature's power is greater than our own experience. We do not have the right to deny the possibility of our soul thinking without a body in our next life. "Our soul triumphs over earth and corruption, and leaves the body behind to fulfil, in a thousand various ways, the views of the Almighty, while she rises above the dust, according to other natural, though superterrestrial laws, to contemplate the works of the Creator, and to form ideas of the virtue and power of an infinite being."³

Dialogue II.

The continuance of the soul as a thinking and conceiving being rests upon two assumptions, viz., 1) that the soul is an independent substance, and 2) that this independent substance is simple.

1) Were the soul not independent, were the power of thinking merely a function of the body, then this thinking

power must cease when the body, as a unified whole, ceases to function -- at death. If the power to think and feel has no independent existence but depends upon the composition, we must assume one of two alternatives. Either the power of thinking must originate with one or more of the constituent parts of the composition, or this power must arise from the manner of composition, even as symmetry and harmony, although not characteristic of any constituent part, are derived from the manner in which these single parts are combined.

The second alternative is impossible. The faculty of thinking cannot be equated to symmetry and harmony since these are impossible unless there is a thinking being to discover them. "Order, symmetry, harmony, regularity and, in general, all proportional objects which require their various parts to be contrasted and compared together, are the effects of the operations of the faculty of thinking."⁴ Axiomatically, no power can arise from its own operations. Thus: "As every whole, which consists of parts that exist independent of each other, presupposes the combination and comparison of those parts, this combination and comparison must be the operation of a conceiving power; therefore I cannot place the origin of this conceiving power in the whole that consists of those separately existing parts, without making a thing derive its existence from its own operation."⁵ Therefore, we cannot search for our power of feeling and thinking in the situation, structure, harmony, or order of the parts of our material frame.

The first alternative -- that the power of thinking derives from the constituent parts -- is likewise impossible.

For the power of thought, which unifies the various parts, which views them as a composite whole, must necessarily transcend the single power of any single part. For though we have an infinite number of ideas, inclinations and passions which incessantly affect us, there is a single one which unites all the ideas of the constituent parts.

Having negated both assumptions, we are forced to negate the proposition. The power of thinking cannot be dependent upon the composition. It must have its own existence, independent of the composition.

2) Mendelssohn maintains that the soul is a single substance. If it were composed of parts, "we again suppose a composition and connection by which a whole is formed from parts and return to the point from whence we set out."⁶ If simple, the soul must also be unextended, since extent would be divisible and therefore complex.

The philosopher concludes: "There is, at least, then, in our bodies a single substance which is neither extended or compounded, but is simple, has a power of conception and unites all ideas, desires and inclinations in itself."⁷ This is the soul.

More than one such substance is illogical. If there were several reasoning spirits, not all would be perfect since such multiplicity would be superfluous. Therefore one such substance must be most perfect, and this is my soul.

Summarily, since the soul cannot -- according to the laws of nature -- cease its functions, it must continue to live. And since the soul is a simple and therefore indissoluble

substance, it must continue to live as a soul -- a thinking, feeling, and conceiving being.

Dialogue III

Now the rationalist becomes the theologian. "In the first two dialogues, he thinks with his head, in the third, with his heart."⁸ Man is unique in his progress toward perfection. As a substance, he is served by all nature in this striving toward perfection. One object of nature sharpens his senses and imagination. Another cultivates his understanding, judgment and reason. The beauties of nature form his taste. The sublime in nature raises his admiration; order and symmetry serve his rational amusement and dispose the powers of his mind to that proper harmony which is conducive to their perfection. As a member of society, he acquires new perfection. The sense of right and duties which elevate him into the class of moral beings provides him with ideas of justice and honor. His affections, at first limited to his own family, now expand into patriotism and philanthropy. As a rational creature, he attains true ideas about God and His attributes. He learns that virtue alone leads to happiness and that he cannot please the Creator otherwise than by striving after his own real happiness.

This man, this purpose of all creation, has but one purpose of his own -- to make himself and others more perfect. But in this life he never attains to complete perfection, because the way to further progress is always open.

If, then, man strives toward perfection, and if his goal is unattainable in this life, then -- "That these things are to

be stopped, in the midst of their course, not only stopped but all at once thrown back with the whole fruit of their efforts, into the abyss of annihilation, cannot be the design of the Creator."⁹

The belief or denial in immortality reflects itself in moral behavior. A denial of immortality plunges man into despair. This life loses its lofty purpose if annihilation is the inevitable end. Then this life, and the satisfactions derived therefrom, become all important. Sacrifice for humanity becomes nonsense. Heroism becomes an emotional rather than a rational mode of behavior. Without immortality, this life ceases to be a means toward happiness and perfection and becomes an end in itself. If this life is everything, then every moral being has the absolute right to contrive the destruction of the whole world to prolong his own existence. If he is subjected to suffering, he questions the providence of God who allows such suffering.

But the acceptance of immortality leads man to an entirely different philosophy of this life. He says, "Behold, you are sent here to make yourself more perfect by the furtherance of good; you may, therefore promote good, even at the expense of your life, if it cannot otherwise be effected."¹⁰ Though there is apparent injustice in the world, he reassures himself: "It may, it must, be of greater moment to our future happiness, that we struggle here with misfortune and submit to the will of God, than if we forget ourselves in prosperity and affluence."¹¹

Immortality, says Mendelssohn, is not the exclusive possession of the righteous. All men, wicked as well as righteous, have innate qualities which unfold themselves and become more perfect by exercise. Even though the wicked consciously contends vs. his goodness, he will be overcome by his original bent for righteousness.

The Phaedon concludes with a list of questions which we cannot attempt to answer. Where is the future life? What will they do there? What is the reward for the righteous? Will the vicious be enlightened and reclaimed? These are matters beyond the scope of human speculation, and we are not entitled even to ask them.

* * *

Since we have labeled Mendelssohn as the forerunner of Reform Judaism, we are obligated to ask a question the answer to which bears significant import for the further consideration of our subject. Did Mendelssohn's view, as expressed in the Phaedon, represent the view of traditional Judaism? Or was the philosopher indifferent to the teachings of his religious tradition?

Our answer is forthcoming from a statement by Kohler in which he expressed the obvious purpose of the Phaedon: "This fine dialogue, written in 1767, after the model of Plato, to prove, by modern arguments, borrowed from the Wolfian philosophy, the soul's immortality and the inviolable holiness of human life was everywhere welcomed as a soothing balm upon the bleeding wounds of the age. It attempted to stem the growing tide of French atheism; which declaring man to be a mere

machine, showed its damaging effects by many suicides then occurring in all circles and worked like an epidemic upon many a noble youth."¹²

Here, then, was a philosopher, grappling with the most pressing problem of his day -- not a Jewish problem, but a general problem, a problem of all society. The specifically Jewish problem of reconciliation between traditional Judaism and modern thought had no place in the Phaedon. Enelow maintains that the philosopher paid no attention to Judaism whatsoever until the Lavater -- which was written after the Phaedon.¹³ Felix Levy suggests that Jewish thought per se played no role whatsoever in Mendelssohn's work: "His aim was primarily accomodation -- not the accomodation of Jewish thought or religion to the dominant currents of speculation of his own day -- but accomodation of the Jews to the new state or the theory of state found in the political doctrines of Rousseau and his school."¹⁴

If the question which Mendelssohn was seeking to answer had no relevance to Judaism, we could hardly expect the answer itself to reveal Jewish content. Epstein assumes falsely when he says, "He is alone among Jewish religious philosophers to substitute philosophy for faith and to make reason the mistress and handmaid of religion."¹⁵ For Mendelssohn is not a Jewish religious philosopher at all. In the Phaedon, he is an eighteenth century rationalist and not even secondarily a Jew. He is an Enlightenment philosopher of a strongly marked bourgeois hue.¹⁶ That he subscribes to Albo's three Ikkarim is only incidental, for these Ikkarim were likewise the tenets of

eighteenth century Deism, to which Mendelssohn was a loyal adherent. His answers to the question of immortality are the answers of the rational psychology of his own day.^{16a} Drawing considerably upon the arguments of Wolf and Leibnitz,¹⁷ he concurs in the emphasis, current in his time, upon "Erkenne dich selbst" -- self recognition. For him, the primary purpose of immortality is to develop this self-recognition, this ego.¹⁸ Margolis castigates the philosopher for his complete indifference to the teachings of his religion: "An admirer of the shallow deism of a few English philosophers, a believer in the demonstrability of the fundamental truths of religion, natural religion, afraid of the ban of an ignorant rabbinate which might interdict his favorite pursuits along the lines of philosophical speculation, he had no understanding of that which is truly elemental in religious faith, nor of that which alone establishes the cohesiveness of a religious body, a creed."¹⁹ Only one commentator attempts to apologize for the philosopher. "Mendelssohn's philosophy, which started with the idea of individual and social perfection and happiness and culminated in the immortality of the soul, was in no way antagonistic to Judaism."²⁰

Mendelssohn's purposeful rejection of Jewish tradition and concentration upon eighteenth century philosophy do not disqualify him as the pioneer Reform thinker upon the subject of immortality. On the contrary, it is probable that he set the pattern for the Reformers who succeeded him. "It is still a question whether Mendelssohn's ideas of immortality are strictly Jewish, yet his doctrine may be said to have influenced

Reform Judaism, as the theology of the Union Prayer Book testifies. The additional paragraph inserted in our Kaddish, the references to the soul's imperishability and its future bliss, the excision of all allusions to resurrection, the doctrine of reward and punishment may be said to have been inherited from the Phaedo." ²¹

CHAPTER II

THE APPROACH OF REFORM

Before launching upon our consideration of immortality within the Reform movement proper, a word about our modus operandi. Originally, this thesis was to be entitled, "The Development of the Immortality Idea within Reform Judaism." However, after consideration of the material, the author concluded that, with few exceptions, there was nothing of real development or of drastic change in the formulation of the immortality idea within the Reform movement proper. The same arguments for and the same concept of immortality are easily discoverable in an early nineteenth century as well as a mid-twentieth treatment of the subject. Therefore, in our own consideration, we shall proceed topically rather than chronologically.

The Reform Movement is primarily a movement of adjustment--adjustment of the Jewish people to modern life and, consequently, adjustment of Jewish thought to modern thought. Reform Judaism then, may legitimately be termed "modernized Judaism." Thus Geiger, a pioneer of the movement, insists upon the abandonment of all law and dogma which are "not in accord with the conviction of the modern Jews."²²

The idea of immortality, along with all of the other cardinal doctrines of Judaism, had to be set into the crucible of modern thought, for "if immortality cannot stand the test of modern thought then it will die among select thinkers and their multitudes."²³ The test of modern thought became synonymous with the test of rationalism as expressed in the

findings of science and philosophy. Consequently: "Just because all fundamental doctrines are undergoing a mighty change in the crucible of modern research, it must be of the utmost interest to us to know whether this great hope of man (viz. immortality) must be given up as incompatible with science and reason, or whether it does not conflict with either our thinking or knowledge of things and should therefore be claimed and reclaimed by religion as the staff of comfort in the midst of trial, and a fount of inspiration in the discharge of life's solemn duties."²⁴ Wise presented a series of Friday night lectures in which he considered the idea of immortality as a tenet of Judaism in the light of scientific and philosophical principles. In the first lecture, he indicated his modus operandi: "...in discussing this important question, he would not depart, at any time, from strictly philosophic methods of establishing evidence, independent of all religious beliefs concerning immortality, future reward and punishment, heaven, hell, purgatory, Gehinnom and Gan Eden, Hades, Orkus or Walhalla; nor would he, at any time, leave out of the account the well-established facts of science, which he thinks could not be ignored in any philosophical speculation claiming to establish facts upon the valid foundation of conviction."²⁵

Wise assumes the role of rationalist in two important respects: first, in his rational approach and method in treating the subject of immortality;²⁶ and, secondly, in his turning for support to the important philosophers of the modern era to establish the validity of the doctrine. Reason, he asserts, in its highest state of development is actualized in the history

of philosophy. All philosophers, with few exceptions, advanced some theory regarding the immortality of the soul.²⁷ Specifically the teachings of modern philosophy, beginning with Descartes and Spinoza, and reaching down to Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Ueberweg, and Czolbe, bear witness to the existence and eternity of the soul as acknowledged and promulgated by Moses and the Prophets.²⁸ In his own generation, Mendelssohn, Terchmüller and Schuetz are the champions of the doctrine. Even of those who do not emphatically attest to immortality -- Carlyle, Mill, Spencer, Tyndall, Darwin, Huxley, Haeckell -- none would be satisfied with the argument of complete annihilation,²⁹ Even the pessimist Schopenhauer is quoted for support: "Everybody feels that he is something besides a nothing once enlivened by another. This gives him the confidence that death may make an end to his life, but not to his existence."³⁰ Similarly, Kohler maintains that the espousal by Lessing and Goethe of belief in the hereafter should hold some weight against "the flat denial of shallow thinkers."³¹

Science was not as co-operative as philosophy. While, on the one hand, the scientific theory of the indestructibility of matter³² lent itself well to the proof of immortality, the new scientific theories of evolutionary development which would deny man (and consequently his soul) any unique place in the universe posed a problem for theologians. If man, by his nature, differed from the animal species only in his degree of development, why should his soul, and not the animal's, bear the seed of immortality? For some Reform thinkers, the answer lies in the nature of evolution itself. When this evolving

creature assumed human form and was endowed with human capacities, he became a Divine creation, and his soul acquired an immortal existence. Kohler states: "Just as organisms can no longer be constrained by laws ruling chemical elements, because they have risen above them, so does man, though of animal structure, belong to a higher category of life than the brute, and his claim on immortality cannot be invalidated by science."³³ Montefiore concurs: "We can only reply that in man, in spite of his physical relationship and descent, a difference so enormous appears to have arisen as to justify the hope of different treatment after death. His moral, intellectual and spiritual life constitute something new. His conception of truth, beauty and righteousness is new. His worship of God is new. His thought, his reason, his consciousness are new."³⁴ In his two lectures concerned with evolution, Wise considers the theories of Darwin, Baumgartner, Wigand and von Hartmann to show that none of these theories is sufficient to explain all of existence and therefore involve no contradiction to human immortality.³⁵

The materialistic conception of the soul which science had formerly advanced, and which had placed a thorn in the side of religionists who espoused the immortality idea, was no longer viewed as a stumbling block. "It is now admitted that cerebral investigation puts no veto on the conception of our existence after death. The cruder materialism of a past age is exploded. It is no longer affirmed that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes

bile."³⁶

But science and reason alone cannot lead us to a belief in immortality. Even Mendelssohn, the rationalist, turned to faith as his guide in the third Dialogue of the Phaedon.³⁷ Philipson resolves the difficulty thus: "Every science, every department of thought, requires faith in certain fundamentals which cannot be explained.... Therefore no intelligent man will impugn any article of thought because he cannot conceive it. He will rather attribute it to the weakness of his mind than positively state it cannot be thus because he cannot understand."³⁸

Other Reform theologians, while never negating the importance of science or of reason, insist that rationalistic findings and conclusions are irrelevant to the tenets of religion -- including immortality -- which transcend the realm of reason. Cohon suggests that the scientist is unable to answer questions about immortality because his tools were designed for material and visible objects rather than for a spiritual substance like the soul. Not with the methods and instruments of the scientist, but with the thought of the philosopher and the inspiration of the poet and the faith of the believer can the religious affirm immortality.³⁹ Others go still farther and rule out even rational thought as a tool for discovering immortality. Even as science has no means of working with immortality, so philosophy itself admits that it is incapable of lifting the veil of mystery from the future.⁴⁰

Not science or reason, but only religion assumes an attitude of knowledge and authority regarding immortality. For

religion governs the province of faith, and the belief in man's continued existence is a matter of faith -- as expressed in the following quotations:

"Not philosophy, nor metaphysics, nor science has been able to give definite reply or demonstration. But where the mind is silent, the heart speaks, and where science halts, faith marches on."⁴¹

"It passes beyond all demonstration or logic, and becomes one of the great certainties of all who have filled their souls with the real consciousness of God."⁴²

"Where can we find an answer to this problem but in faith; where can we learn the solution of our perplexity but in the yearning for immortality planted within the human soul! Science fails us, research can give no reply, philosophy is lost in its own mists and faith alone remains triumphant, telling us that even as there was a change though not apparent to the eye or human senses, so there must be two natures, the one mortal, the other immortal. The lure of faith alone leads us out of the depths of misery and brings us triumphant to our daily tasks."⁴³

"It is faith alone that helps. Walking at twilight on the bank of our great river, and looking across to the hills on the other side, shrouded in mist and strewn with faint lights, I have often seen sights more sweet and tender than any the eye of flesh could behold. To the spirit's eye more of the vista on the other side of life's stream is granted than to reason and senses. Faith, this is what taught the Jew the belief in immortality: faith in a good and righteous God, in the Divine nature of the soul, in the unquenchable character of this light of God within us."⁴⁴

Immortality, then, is but a mere matter of faith. We instinctively feel that it is a fact whose verification does not depend upon the process of induction or deduction or upon demonstration. It springs from a conviction deeper than that which is engendered by science or philosophy. It springs rather from human desires and hopes and fears -- which we confidently know to be real.

Faith, however, does not imply blind belief. Rather it

denotes acceptance of truths which are not demonstrable by reason or science. "The deepest truths elude demonstrations. They are the axioms, mathematical or mystic, on which all other truths are based and yet are themselves unproven and unprovable. For they are self-evident; truths of which we are conscious, which the inner sense sees at it were face to face, but of which there can be no evidence, for they are elemental and basic."⁴⁵

It is this inner sense which brings us to the realization of immortality. "The eye of the intellect is not our only organ of perception. There are things unseen of it which are revealed to a subtler sense within us. Deeply rooted in our common nature are instincts -- call them what you will -- which certify us of truths, disclose to us realms of being and experience forever veiled from the lower gaze. We cannot explain those instincts -- we can scarcely describe them, but they are real none the less, and one of their messages is immortality."⁴⁶

Were Reform theologians consistent in following faith as the sole guide to the belief in immortality, a mere creedal statement of the idea would suffice. But they are not consistent. They feel bound to prove the belief, and for their proof, they turn to reason and to science.⁴⁷ In many cases, we find a single man (e.g. Joseph) who, on the one hand, urges a belief in immortality through faith, immediately turns to science and philosophy to support his belief. Resurrection is rejected solely upon rational grounds. Significantly, the exaltations of faith may be found almost exclusively in sermons rather than in theological treatises. We are forced to the

conclusion that Reform Judaism deals with the belief in immortality both as a matter of faith and of reason, or, better, as a doctrine of faith fortified by reason.

CHAPTER III

RESURRECTION AND RETRIBUTION

In the earliest catechism of the Reform movement,⁴⁸ Edward Kley, one of the preachers in the Hamburg Temple, calls himself a rationalist.⁴⁹ He offers nine reasons to validate the doctrine of immortality. At the same time, however, he leaves untouched the rabbinic doctrines of resurrection and retribution, which later Reformers excise as being contrary to reason. It is within these two areas of belief that we may look for a developmental change in the treatment of the immortality doctrine within Reform Judaism.

Resurrection

Although Kley seems to place the greater emphasis upon the doctrine of spiritual immortality, he does not discard resurrection. In the ninth section, dealing with "Remuneration in the Eternal Life," he includes the following statement:

16. "WHAT IS RESURRECTION?"

The reunion of the souls of the dead with their bodies in a perfect condition. Progress towards perfection is also the design of that world to which the body belongs; rejuvenescence awaits even the corruptible sheath. Is. 26.19. 'Thy dead men shall live; together with my dead body shall they arise.' 50-51

The earliest Reform prayer book⁵² seems to have concurred with the attitude of its preacher toward resurrection. It retains the Orthodox form of the second benediction in the

Amidah.

[illegible]

The first Reform congregation in the United States also subscribed to the doctrine of resurrection with emphasis, however, upon spiritual immortality. The Amidah, which consists only of the Gevurah in English, provides no real evidence in either direction: "Thou, O Lord! art mighty forever. It is Thou who revivest the dead; Thou art mighty to save; Thou who sustainest the living with beneficence, and with great mercy quickenest the dead. Who supportest the fallen and healest the sick; who delivereth those that are in bonds, and wilt accomplish Thy faithfulness unto those who sleep in the dust. Who is like unto Thee, O Lord! Or who can be compared unto Thee, who are the King that destroyest and restorest to life, and causest salvation to spring forth."⁵³ The Prayer for the Dying, however, is suggestive of resurrection: ".... Thou who breathest into man an immortal spirit canst redeem his soul....and re-unite it to an immortal form."⁵⁴ Similarly in the Burial Service: "May he raise him at the end of days."^{54-a}

The subject of resurrection seems to become an issue for the first time at the Frankfurt Rabbinical Conference of 1845. It was raised in connection with a discussion of the Messiah concept. The Commission had reported "The Messiah concept should in the future find high recognition in the prayers, but with the rejection of all political rational conceptions."⁵⁵ The minutes of the Conference record remarks by various participants. David Einhorn: "I vote

for rejection of all blood sacrifices and political restoration, but instead I wish that the Messiah prayer be formed in this manner -- that it express hope in spiritual resurrection and the unification of all human beings in belief and in love."⁵⁶ A. Adler: "He (Adler) believes implicitly in the belief of the ideal resurrection of the nations and with it asserts unqualifiedly the immortality (unsterblichkeit) of the individual."⁵⁷

It becomes evident that the original opposition to resurrection did not spring from any rational objection to an irrational doctrine. In rabbinic tradition, bodily resurrection was closely connected with the Messianic return of the Jewish people to Palestine, where the resurrection would take place. But the whole program of emancipation which motivated the beginnings of Reform militated against any such Messianic aspirations. The modern Jew cherished no hope of an ultimate return to his ancestral home, but, instead, hoped to strike permanent roots in his Western home -- be it Germany or England or America. Moreover, the traditional Messianic doctrine was particularistic, applicable only to the Jewish people, while Reform Judaism laid great stress upon the universalistic theme of human brotherhood. The resurrection of the Jewish people in Palestine violated the theme of brotherhood. In view of these principles, the objection by Reform Judaism becomes understandable.

Geiger's statement of the principles of Reform bears witness to our conclusion: "Hence, it is implied that at least a great part of the law which is not in accord with the

conviction of the modern Jews must go, as its retention is only a burden which retards the revitalizing of the real religious spirit of Judaism. It also follows that such dogmas, as the coming of a personal Messiah, the restoration of Zion, the bodily resurrection of the dead, as well as many laws which aim at the separation of the Jews from other nations must go."⁵⁸ Waxman comments that Geiger contended against all dogma of resurrection "probably not because of its supernaturalness but on account of its rational import."⁵⁹

But Geiger is not consistent. In his prayerbook which was published in 1854, the Amidah is retained in its traditional form -- thus implying bodily resurrection. The German rendition of the passage is equivocal: "Ja, deine Allmacht erfuehlt den Todten die Verbeissung, dass im ewigen Leben ihr Heil erspriesse!"⁶⁰ Philipson comments: "This rendering is dubious and does not clearly indicate a belief in the bodily resurrection as it is so strongly stated in the original Hebrew."⁶¹

In his essay on his prayerbook, Geiger is equally indecisive: "The belief in immortality must find expression not alone in the doctrine of the bodily resurrection but also in that of spiritual immortality."⁶² He takes the same middle-of-the-road position in the Leipzig conference of 1869 when he states that the belief in immortality "must not be expressed in the one sided idea of bodily resurrection."⁶³

David Einhorn is guilty of no such vacillation. Unqualifiedly he repudiates any belief in bodily resurrection. We have already noted his remarks in the Frankfurt conference

of 1845.⁶⁴ In an article which appeared in his magazine, the Sinai, he describes the distinguishing qualities of his new prayer book thus: "Dogmatically, this prayer book is differentiated from the traditional order by the omission of prayers for the restoration of the sacrificial cult and the return to Palestine, i.e., the reinstitution of the Jewish kingdom, as well as the change of the doctrine of bodily resurrection into the idea of a purely spiritual immortality."⁶⁵

Einhorn's attitude is embodied in the Gevurah of his Olath Tamid. He changes the פ'תח פ'נח פ'חנ ד'חנ to read פ'תח פ'נח ל'תח ע'תח ד'תח and translates thus: "...with infinite kindness Thou redeemest the souls of Thy servants from death spiritual"⁶⁶

Similarly, he changes פ'חנ ח'חנ ד'חנ נ'חנ ל'חנ to פ'חנ ד'חנ נ'חנ ל'חנ ח'חנ and translates: "Thou art faithful in all Thy works. Be praised, O God, dispenser of life eternal."⁶⁷

and translates: "Thou art faithful in all Thy works. Be praised, O God, dispenser of life eternal."⁶⁷

Leo Merzbacher, rabbi of Temple Emanuel in New York, published two editions of his prayer book in 1855 and 1863 respectively. In the first edition, the Hebrew rendering of the Gevurah retains the traditional phraseology -- implying a belief in bodily resurrection. The evening Amidah reads: ל'תח פ'חנ ד'חנ and is translated: "He reviveth the dead at his command."⁶⁸ The morning (note underlined words for comparison with 1863 version) Amidah reads: ל'תח פ'חנ ד'חנ נ'חנ ל'חנ ח'חנ

וְיַחְיֶה כָּל־בְּרִיָּה בְּפִקְדוֹן מִלְּפָנָיו
 וְיַחְיֶה כָּל־בְּרִיָּה בְּפִקְדוֹן מִלְּפָנָיו
 69 וְיַחְיֶה כָּל־בְּרִיָּה בְּפִקְדוֹן מִלְּפָנָיו

The 1863 edition omits specific words suggestive of re-
 surrection and substitutes more general terms. In the even-
 ing Amidah, וְיַחְיֶה replaces וְיַחְיֶה and is translated: "He
 reviveth all things at His command."⁷⁰ The morning Amidah
 reads: וְיַחְיֶה כָּל־בְּרִיָּה בְּפִקְדוֹן מִלְּפָנָיו

71 וְיַחְיֶה כָּל־בְּרִיָּה בְּפִקְדוֹן מִלְּפָנָיו

Three possible explanations for the changes suggest them-
 selves. Merzbacher may have modified his own theological
 belief during the five years intervening between the two
 editions.⁷² Secondly, he may have rejected resurrection from
 the beginning and wished to remove the Hebrew incongruities
 present in the first edition. Or finally, his co-editor,
 Adler, who collaborates on the 1863 version, may have been
 responsible for the modifications. There is no certainty in
 the matter.

He died
 in 1856

Isaac Mayer Wise seems to be indifferent to the problem
 of bodily resurrection. In an editorial which appeared in
 the Israelite, he expresses his preference not to enter into
 a discussion of whether or not resurrection is a doctrine of
 Judaism. "The subject is too abstract to be discussed in a
 newspaper and too void of practical consequences to arrest
 the attention of any large number of readers."⁷³ However, by
 implication, he accepts Einhorn's point of view. In his
 catechism, The Essence of Judaism, he speaks of the immortality

of the soul only.⁷⁴ In an Israelite article, he maintains that Maimonides was a firm believer in the afterexistence of the soul only, as stated in his Sefer Hamada, Moreh Nebuchim and Shemoneh Perokim. Wise explains away the Maamar by saying that Maimonides changed his mind or that the work was a forgery. As a rational thinker Maimonides was interested in bringing Jewish philosophy up to the philosophy of his age and therefore could not possibly subscribe to resurrection which was contrary to the philosophy of his age. Maimonides was not the type of man who would recant to Orthodoxy.⁷⁵ From such an analysis, with all of its inuendoes, we may infer that Wise himself repudiated bodily resurrection.

In his prayer book, the Minhag America, we find inconsistencies. In the 1857 edition of the daily prayer book and the 1866 edition of the holiday book, the Gevurah reads:

אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ
יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ
יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ
יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ
יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ
יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ
יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ
יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ
יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ
יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ

Though the Hebrew rendition would seem to retain the traditional belief in resurrection, the English counterpart (of the underlined phrases) speaks only of spiritual immortality:

replied that Judaism does have specific dogmas even though there is no compulsion to accept them. Moreover he denied that the term *olam ha-hai* implies spiritual immortality and insisted that it still signifies corporeal resurrection. Such a belief, moreover, is of Persian origin and therefore incompatible with pure Judaism. Consequently, the belief must be dogmatically negated. Kohler stated that no conclusive proof supports Persian origin but that he, personally, does not hold to the doctrine. Felsenthal recalled two Biblical passages referring to corporeal resurrection -- Isaiah 26 and Daniel 12 (Ezekiel 37 is figurative for the revival of the nation). Daniel was certainly written under Persian influences, and Isaiah, of early origin, may likewise show traces of Persian ideas. Chronik proposed to amend Article 6 as follows: "The belief in corporeal resurrection must be completely discarded."⁸⁰ This proposed amendment was not carried. Gutheim proposed another amendment: "The belief in corporeal resurrection is incompatible with the wholly spiritual Jewish faith."⁸¹ This likewise was voted down. Felsenthal amended to strike out the phrase "No Jewish basis," and the amendment was carried. Einhorn amended to substitute "no religious basis," which was also passed. The article was then accepted as amended, and read as follows: "Article 6: The belief in corporeal resurrection has no religious basis and the doctrine of immortality must be taken exclusively in the spiritual sense."⁸²

Wise obviously abided by the decision of the Conference and effected the necessary changes in his prayer book. But

the discussion in Philadelphia is of far greater significance than its influence upon Wise. In the first place, this was the first official definitive statement in connection with immortality and resurrection. But even more important is the tenor of the statement and the discussion which preceded it. Heretofore, the doctrine of resurrection had been rejected because of a social need -- the need to adjust to the larger culture and the consequent need to repudiate all particularistic doctrines, including that of a personal Messiah and the resurrection of the bodies of the Jewish people.⁸³ In the Philadelphia discussion, we hear nothing of the controversy between particularism and universalism in connection with the resurrection question. The frame of reference has changed entirely. It has become solely theological and academic. The origin of the resurrection belief and its compatibility with "pure Judaism" have become the prime matters for consideration.

Significantly these academic criteria did not come to the fore until the rejection of resurrection had become almost a fait accompli, as evidenced by the various Reform liturgies which we have cited. Are we not justified, then, in assuming that the academic considerations proposed in the Philadelphia convention were but a mere rationalization for a development which had already transpired and which had been originally motivated solely by the need for adjustment?

Reform theologians took up the cue from the Philadelphia Conference and repudiated bodily resurrection on academic and theological grounds. Kohler disqualifies the doctrine on

on grounds of its origin outside of Judaism. The idea he maintains, was originally evolved by tribes in Asia and Africa who derived it from the world of nature. It was the traditional belief of the Chaldeans who transmitted it to the Persians and Jews. The rabbis in the Talmud declared resurrection a Jewish doctrine, but when the Platonic idea of immortality was popularized, many Jews (e.g. Saducees) abandoned the more naive conception because of its irrational content. E. Deutsch, in a paper entitled "Eschatology of the Jews until the Close of the Talmud," cites Daniel 12.2 as the only indication that a belief in bodily resurrection was extant in the Biblical period. The belief entered the Jewish fold partly through the Babylonian exile but more forcefully after the Macedonian conquest of Asia, when the spiritual treasures of various nations were exchanged. The resurrection doctrine in the Persian Avesta -- in which a Savior is destined to appear to exterminate all evil, renew the world, annihilate the wicked and raise the dead -- impresses us with its similarity to the Daniel passage: "Many of those who sleep in the dust shall arise."⁸⁴

But the most violent objection to the resurrection doctrine voiced by the later Reformers (after 1870) was due neither to its particularistic tinge nor to its historic origin, but rather to its violation of the principles of science and rationalism. "Resurrection of the body was the belief of former ages," says Kohler, but "immortality of the soul is the hope of the enlightened."⁸⁵ The enlightened are offend-

ed by a doctrine which conceives God as breaking into nature. "Whoever, therefore, still sees God's greatness, as they did, revealed through miracles, that is, through interruptions of the natural order of life, may cling to the traditional belief in resurrection, so comforting in ancient times. On the other hand, he who recognizes the unchangeable will of an all-wise, all-ruling God in the immutable laws of nature must find it impossible to praise God according to the traditional formula as the 'Reviver of the dead' but will avail himself instead of the expression used in the Union Prayer Book after the pattern of Einhorn, 'He who has implanted within us immortal life.'⁸⁶ The doctrine of resurrection, as a violation of the natural law, is thus placed in the same category as the miracles of the Bible which Reformers attempted to explain away.

Similarly, the doctrine of resurrection finds no place in the scientific frame of reference in which modern man operates. Kohler states explicitly the attitude of science: "Science has defeated resurrection. The laws of anatomy have proven its impossibility. The works and laws of nature take care only of the race not of the individual. As in the ocean, wave follows wave, beats but once upon the shore, and then is lost, so, in life, we find all forms come but once to the surface, then to be dropped forever."⁸⁷ Scientific findings have shown the inability of man to withstand the forces of physical dissolution which operate in nature. On the contrary, it is necessary for man to die that the race may con-

tinue. Thus, what is scientifically impossible is at the same time a necessity for racial survival.⁸⁸

By the Pittsburgh Conference of 1885, the rejection of the resurrection doctrine is already accepted as an established fact. It is reasserted in the Conference Platform: "We reassert the doctrine of Judaism, that the soul of man is immortal, grounding this belief on the divine nature of the human spirit, which forever, finds bliss in righteousness and misery in wickedness. We reject as ideas not rooted in Judaism the belief both in bodily resurrection and in Gehenna and Eden as abodes for everlasting punishment and reward." The discussion which followed revolved around the retribution doctrine, implying a unanimous acceptance of the official attitude toward resurrection.

We should logically expect to find this official attitude as stated in the rabbinical conference embodied in the Reform prayer books published after the statements were made. We are surprised, therefore, when we turn to the Jastrow Prayer Book, published in 1885 for the Rodeph Sholom Congregation in Philadelphia, and find traditional references to bodily resurrection retained in the Amidah in the phrases $\text{נְשִׁימָה נְשִׁימָה}$ and $\text{נְשִׁימָה נְשִׁימָה}$.⁸⁹ The English translation, however, is equivocal: "We faithfully believe that Thou wilt restore us from death unto life. Praised be Thou, O Lord, who restorest the dead to life." With such phraseology, we cannot be certain whether or not Jastrow accepted or rejected the official Reform attitude.

There is no such uncertainty, however, when we examine

only of spiritual immortality: "Thou wilt, of a surety, fulfill Thy promise of immortal life unto those who sleep in the dust. Who is like unto Thee, Almighty, author of life and death, source of salvation, Praise be to Thee, O God, who hast implanted within us immortal life."⁹⁴ With only slight modifications in style, this translation was included in all subsequent editions of the Union Prayer Book. In a further application, the closing verse of the Yigdal in the Union Prayer Book is changed from $\text{יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֶחָד}$ to $\text{יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יְהוָה אֶחָד}$.⁹⁵

In connection with our prayer book analysis, it might be in order to lay aside for a moment our chronological consideration and turn to the prayer book of the Liberal Jewish Synagogue in London. In no other prayer book is the liturgical treatment of immortality given such explicit statement. In the introduction, Mattuck states: "When traditional prayers are used, the Hebrew of the original is most often printed with an English paraphrase, which is sometimes like a translation, deviating from literalness only for the sake of ease in reading; at other times however, the English paraphrases alter the meaning of the original, interpreting it so as to accord with our beliefs. In other words we have here and there read a new meaning into an old prayer, one, however, not unrelated to its original meaning. For some reasons, this procedure is unsatisfactory; it is open to misunderstanding; but it has been adopted only with the prayers which are so old that they could not be excluded from Jewish services. The best example is the prayer on page nine and elsewhere, beginning "Thou, O Lord, art mighty to save." This is a very

ancient prayer, dating back in its present form nearly twenty-one centuries. It contains a reference to the belief in the bodily resurrection of the dead, which was for a long time a teaching of Judaism; it still is an official dogma of Orthodox Judaism. For liberal Judaism, however, the belief in the resurrection of the body has lost its significance, its teaching about life after death is contained in the hope for immortality issuing from the belief in eternal life. Though, therefore, this prayer has been retained in its ancient Hebrew form the paraphrase shows what meaning it holds in this Prayer Book."⁹⁶

In the Gevurah proper, we find the traditional Hebrew, but the following translation is appended: "Thou are mighty, O Lord; Thine is the power to save. In Thy lovingkindness Thou sustainest the living, upholdest the falling and settest the captive free. Thou hast endowed man with eternal life, to exalt his life on earth and to overcome death; so that he rejoices in the hope of immortality. Who is like unto Thee, Creator of life and death, author of salvation? Praise be to Thee, O God, source of eternal life."⁹⁷

During the last fifty years, the resurrection doctrine has received but little attention in the Reform movement. There are a few exceptions. Kohler, in his Jewish Theology, includes a chapter entitled "Resurrection, a National Hope." He traces the doctrine historically to show its original nationalistic motivation and its irrational content, both of which render the doctrine unacceptable to the modern Reform Jew. Mattuck, in his analysis in the Union Tract,

is more sympathetic when he states: "Liberal Jewish teaching has, however, shifted all emphasis on to the hope of immortality. But that change does not deny the spiritual significance that lay originally in the belief in the resurrection. It expressed confidence in the value of individual goodness in the sight of God, and faith in the justice of the divine ordering of the universe. It was the justification of God in the life of the individual and a justification of the individual who serves God in the life of eternity."⁹⁸ The same stress upon the element of individuality is given by Margolis when he analyzes the doctrine historically.⁹⁹ In the creed which follows, however, there is no mention of resurrection, and its rejection is implicit. Cohon, in his lectures, Man and His Destiny, likewise considers the doctrine historically and refutes it on religious grounds. Since man's pre-eminence over other beings lies in his reflective reason, his ethical and spiritual idealism and his creative will, and since these powers reside in the universal self, the soul, "the hope of immortality is, therefore, associated with the inward self rather than with the corporeal being. For us, only the immortality of the spirit has sanctifying power and moral value."¹⁰⁰

But aside from these instances which are, in the main, academic and historical, only passing mention is given to the problem of resurrection. For example, Stolz remarks: "Not that the grave will open and the wasted bodies resurrect and come together from the four ends of the earth to welcome the Messiah."^{100a} Schulman accounts for the abandonment of the doctrine

thus: "The belief died because its vitality has been corroded by the air of our scientific mentality."¹⁰¹ The committee of the Central Conference who presented "The Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism" in 1937 did not see fit even to reject resurrection but only to re-affirm spiritual immortality: "Judaism affirms that man is created in the Divine image. His spirit is immortal."^{101a} The doctrine of resurrection was no longer even to be considered. It was already dead.

Retribution

In contrast with the resurrection doctrine, no progressive or clear-cut development can be traced in the doctrine of retribution. In the earliest prayer book of Reform Judaism, bliss and joy are asked for the departed in "that ineffable good which God has laid up for those who fear Him."¹⁰² In the Revised Holyday Edition of the Union Prayer Book, compiled more than a hundred years later, we read an almost identical statement: "To the departed whom we now remember, may peace and bliss be granted in life eternal.May their souls rejoice in that ineffable good which God has laid up for those who fear Him...."¹⁰³

If retribution was to be retained within the theological framework of Reform Judaism it had to be stripped of its traditional accoutrements which violated the principles of reason and modern thought. The medieval rabbis had assigned the dispensation of reward and punishment to specific geographical locations. Eden was the paradise where the righteous would indulge themselves in manifold physical pleasures,

while Gehenna was the hell where the wicked would endure excruciating torture in payment for their sinful lives upon earth.

In an essay, "The Divine Comedy in the Light of Modern Thought," Kohler seeks to discredit the traditional doctrine of retribution: "unless we purposely shut our eyes and ears to the revelations of the modern era since Copernicus, and Newton, Kant and Darwin....Dante's world view is as remote from ours as is the child age from that of manhood."¹⁰⁴ In the first place, the modern conception of the universe militates against any such naive world-view. "Our universe, with its infinitudes of space and time, in which orbs of light without number swing in endless aeons through distance far beyond the grasp of the human mind around some unknown center, has no upper nor lower sphere, no celestial or infernal region to localize either the Deity or its counterpart, the devil, with their hosts. In order to find God, while upward looking in our prayer and aspiration, we must needs look within, as neither space nor time can encompass Him. And as God has thus become for us both transcendent and immanent, the hosts of angels as well as the demons have ceased to be material entities. Heaven and hell have at best merely symbolic significance, lacking all reality. Geography and history compel us to see in the story of Paradise a beautiful parable rather than an actual occurrence, as, in fact, the medieval Jewish philosophers felt it to be." Secondly, physiology and anthropology forbid us from separating the soul from the body as to believe that the disem-

bodied spirit of man is, after this life, to take on the shape of body again in order to endure corporeal suffering and to enjoy sensuous delights.¹⁰⁵ Thirdly, our modern ethical view militates against the doctrine of eternal damnation. The principle of Divine justice is violated if the sins of man committed during his brief stay upon earth should condemn him to eternal suffering. Moreover, penalty should not be inflicted for revenge but should aim at the improvement of man -- "or else it would be cruel and unworthy of God." Similarly endless joy, as a reward for the good, is unbearable, unless it have an ennobling and salutary effect. The promise of heavenly reward and the threat of infernal punishment merely constitute threats and bribes which are, at best, "pedagogic methods for children, not for men. True morality must do away with all selfish motives....Genuine religion fears not hell, but wrongdoing and falsehood, and longs not for heaven, but for goodness and righteousness." Kohler concludes: "We need a new inspiration, a new interpretation of the ancient truths, a powerful vision which points not to a realm beyond the grave, but beckons us, as did the prophets of yore, forward to a life of duty...."¹⁰⁶

Kohler claims no originality in his concept of retribution; he speaks as the representative of Jewish thought as it developed throughout the ages. "In the same degree, however, as experience contradicted this doctrine (viz. retribution in this life), and as examples multiplied of wicked persons revelling in prosperity and innocent ones laboring under adversity and woe, it became necessary to defer the Divine retribution more and more to the future--at first to

a future on earth and later to one in the world to come, until finally it developed into a pure spiritual conception in full accord with a higher ethical view of life." He traces the concept from the primitive idea where the clan was held responsible for the sins of its members through the Deuteronomic and Ezekiel idea of individual responsibility, then to the deferment of retribution to another world as found in Job, then to the apocalyptic and rabbinic concept of eternal bliss and heavenly torment as borrowed from Persian and Egyptian thought. He completes his development with Maimonides, who describes hell and paradise as mere metaphors for the agony of sin and the happiness of virtue.¹⁰⁷ Note that Kohler finds in Maimonides a concept of retribution similar to his own; the reasons which Kohler provides, however, derive almost exclusively from Kohler's own modern theological system.

Kohler has "spiritualized" the doctrine of retribution. He has designated heaven and hell as states of the soul, induced by man's own actions. These states do not begin after earth but here, in this life, and merely continue in the world beyond.

Other Reformers subscribe to a similar view. Preceding Kohler, I. M. Wise denies hell, the devil and brimstone and refers, not only to Maimonides, but to Moses Mendelssohn for support. Both philosophers had maintained that the Biblical verse, "That soul shall be surely cut off," is not to be taken literally but means that it would be deprived of spiritual gifts.¹⁰⁸ Wise himself states: "So we can only

know that the soul is an immortal spirit as revelation teaches and reason affirms, but we cannot know what and how the soul is in the body or outside thereof: in time or in eternity. It is self-evident, therefore, that we cannot understand the nature of the reward or punishment to be ministered to the disembodied soul; hence all presentations of a hell, hell-fire, torments, brimstone, large devil and small devils, from the standpoint of reason and the Sinaiic revelation, are radically false and purely fictitious."¹⁰⁹ He explains away physical retribution as found in Jewish teaching by stating: "...no human intelligence can understand a state of existence purely spiritual, hence none could approximately define the nature of spiritual reward or punishment, or of a place where the souls of the departed abide."¹¹⁰

In spite of his previous confession of ignorance about the future retribution of the soul, he ventures a description of spiritual joys which he derives from Maimonides. Whereas, in this life, man derives enjoyment from the company of sympathizing and congenial minds, in the after life congenial and sympathizing souls will meet to part no more. The remembrance of noble actions is a joy of this life; the remembrance of an entire lifetime is the parallel joy in the world to come. In this life man rejoices in perceiving perfection in nature, science and art. In the next life, the soul perceives God, who is the all-perfect. In this life, man seeks pleasure in knowledge, but his pursuit of knowledge is restricted by his bodily frame. But in the next life: "When this frame is left, and the soul soars on high, comprehending the laws of

the universe, now perceiving for the first-time, listening for the first time to the harmony of the spheres, to the praise resounding from the myriads of suns moving in eternal glory around the throne of glory--there is another idea of future reward." The opposite of all of these rewards constitute the punishment which the wicked soul must endure. Wise concludes his description thus: "It must be confessed that this heaven and this hell is more consonant to common sense, more comprehensible to the mind, than any other doctrine of a future state of existence." Although the nature of the doctrine is extremely profound and requires much reflection, "still none can say justly and with certainty that it is not true."¹¹¹

A summary of Wise's view, as stated in his catechism, suggests that he may have supplied the model for Kohler. "In life eternal, being the continuation of this life, the perfection attained in wisdom and righteousness, must be the main source of true happiness to the pure soul; as the consciousness of guilt and criminal self-neglect must be the main source of remorse."¹¹² Philipson likewise borrowed from Wise: "Heaven and hell are states of the soul, not abodes of bliss and torture, virtue the efficient cause of the establishment of the one, vice and wickedness of the other.... With this hope, we think not sadly of the departed, but trustingly, their brief earthly existence over, the eternal life of the spirit but begun."¹¹³

Johlson, in his catechism, subscribes only partially to the view of Philipson, Kohler and Wise. Although he espouses

a spiritualized retribution, it is a retribution which begins only after death and not in this life: "...those who have led a godly course of life, and who have sedulously endeavored to act conformably to the will of Heaven, will be rewarded by the God of mercy and eternal Father with an inexpressibly great happiness, when they have finished their earthly existence; but that the wicked who died in their obduracy, without repentance, will be punished. So that only in a future life the real reward and punishment will take place, and there will be meted out to every man the just recompense of his deeds."¹¹⁴

Within the framework of spiritual retribution, what becomes of the wicked? A variety of answers is forthcoming from Reform theologians. In some cases, the wicked are ignored. We have noted previously¹¹⁵ that the Hamburg Prayer Book and the Revised Holiday Prayer Book assure heavenly reward only to the righteous, and the wicked are not even mentioned. In the memorial service of Geiger's Gebetbuch we read: "...and that they might share in the blessings that you have promised the righteous and pious as their reward for all their earthly suffering."¹¹⁶ Similarly, we read in the 1918 edition of the Sabbath and Daily Union Prayer Book. "...that it is our duty to walk in Thy ways, to do what is good in Thy sight, and to keep our souls pure from sin, so that when Thou callest us hence, we may enjoy the reward which Thou hast prepared for those who have earnestly striven to live in accordance with Thy will."¹¹⁷ Wise likewise refers only to the righteous: "...The memory of the righteous is a blessing on earth and

'the spirit returns to God who has given it' to receive the rewards of his doings. The righteous and the pious ones live in the presence of the Almighty in the realm of happiness...."118

Enelow, though uncertain of what lies beyond the grave, assures us that the spirit lives on and that the good spirit will be rewarded. The category of righteous, in some instances, specifically includes all righteous people--thus bringing the doctrine into accord with the universal motif of Reform Judaism. Jastrow uses the Mishnaic phrase $\int \kappa \gamma e' \int$ $\cdot \kappa \gamma \gamma$ $\rho \int$ $\iota \gamma \int$ $\gamma \int$ n $\rho \gamma \int$ e' and translates:

"Every believer in God, whose unity it is the mission of Israel to proclaim will partake of the everlasting life of futurity."119

Schulman attacks this one-sided view of retribution:

"One cannot help feel the shallowness of much of the rationalism and optimism of those of our time who, when they talk of immortality for the human soul, always talk only of bliss and throw altogether into oblivion the thought of the pain that might await man in the future. But to speak of 'heaven' in the usual sense without something as its contrast is certainly a piece of cheap sentimentalism..."120

But there are many Reformers who are not guilty of the evasion, who clearly define retribution as the punishing of the wicked as well as the rewarding of the righteous. After describing the spiritual rewards of the righteous in the hereafter, Johnson states: "...and in the same way we believe the punishment to consist in a state full of shame and compunction of the soul, which must be to it the most painful and afflicting state imaginable."121 Einhorn affirms the punitive

justice of God: "....and they who walk here below before Thy countenance, and sow the seed in its time -- though with tears -- go home laden with sheaves, when the harvest comes, and joyfully re-enter the paternal house. He who sows but wind may tremble at the whirlwind he has to reap...."¹²² In a Neilah sermon, Rabbi Jacob Klein states: "....and that for every sin of which we have not atoned by repentance and amend-meng, God will bring us into judgment."¹²³

As we have previously noted,¹²⁴ Kohler specified the punishment for sin as the consciousness of sin, while, according to Wise, the wicked will be deprived of the spiritual rewards prepared for the righteous in the hereafter. Margolis, in his Theological Aspect of Reformed Judaism cites Maimonides: "The pious who in this life obey God's Law and do His will with a perfect heart and those who truly repent shall, when freed from their bodies, as immortal souls enjoy the spiritual vision of God in His own world. To be debarred from this bliss means eternal damnation."¹²⁵

This doctrine of eternal damnation, even in the spiritual sense, did not set well with some theologians. Friedlander takes issue with Margolis's point of view.¹²⁶ The most serious objections to this creed are, first, it implicitly denies any redemption to the unrepentant sinner." While Margolis has borrowed his doctrine of retribution from Maimonides, he has paid no need to Joseph Karo who commented on Maimonides by saying: "whoever reads this passage must be dreadfully disheartened." Friedlander concludes: "The spirit of Judaism, and especially modern Judaism, decidedly repudiates a verdict of eternal doom."¹²⁷ Morris Joseph rejects eternal damnation

on the grounds that such a concept does not represent the doctrine of any "rational religion." In its stead, he proposes a doctrine of redemption, whereby the soul can work out its own atonement, finally free itself from pangs of remorse and guilt and attain to communion with God in company with the righteous.¹²⁸ Although Montefiore subscribes to the "law of justice and equal retribution,"¹²⁹ still the aim of punishment is purification rather than revenge: ".... upon the good and the bad alike will He always exercise His purifying righteousness and His redeeming love."¹³⁰ N. S. Joseph likewise looks to the mercy of God for the redemption of the soul laden with sin: "Just as, in our present state of existence, we feel inward satisfaction after a virtuous act demanding self-sacrifice, and, on the otherhand, inward remorse after a lapse of duty or an act of careless neglect--both feelings being natural sequences of our conduct--so the released soul may carry with it into futurity also as necessary sequences, its own accumulated treasures of natural reward or its own accumulated burden of natural punishment, till the Divine Hand, 'whose mercy is over all His works,' removes that burden, cleansing the soul from all worldly stains."¹³¹

Enelow is unwilling to accept redemption as part of the retribution concept. "Though rabbinic teaching sometimes ascribes to death the power of atonement, it is hard for us to believe that the mere incident of dying transforms miraculously the imperfect human being into a completely saved soul.... The belief in immortality implies that death

will reveal the better way of life which will mean joy to the righteous but will be hard for those who have shunned it here."¹³²

In its official formulation, the dogma of Reform Judaism adhered closely to the view of Wise, Kohler, and Philipson. The seventh article of the Pittsburgh Platform reads thus: "We reassert the doctrine of Judaism, that the soul of man is immortal, grounding this belief on the divine nature of the human spirit, which forever finds bliss in righteousness and misery in wickedness. We reject as ideas not rooted in Judaism the belief both in bodily resurrection and in Gehenna and Eden (hell and paradise), as abodes for everlasting punishment and reward."¹³³

The discussion which followed reveals a multitude of varying opinions. Dr. Hahn raised the objection that the formulation was too dogmatical and savored too much of Saduceeism. Dr. Falk wished to have Reward and Punishment accentuated as an indispensable Jewish dogma. Dr. Wise referred to Maimonides's Yad Hachasaka, Hilchoth Teshuba, as the best authority corroborating the spiritual conception of Retribution expressed in the platform. Dr. Samuel Hirsch stated that resurrection was already rejected by the Philadelphia Conference, but eternal punishment and Paradise pleasure must also be discarded. "Let our modern Kaddish Jews be reminded that the twelve months burning in Gehenna is probably of parsee origin. We cannot urge too strongly that righteousness is its own reward, and wrong-doing carries with it its own punishment, and that work is the aim of life." Dr. Kohler concluded the

the discussion: "The word 'Forever' implies eternal readjustment of man's doings throughout all epochs or evolution of the life of the soul, the soul's ascending from stage to stage with its bliss or its woe. We need no actual or localized rewards and punishments. This is no Seduceeism. It is the view of Antigonus of Socho in the Mishnah: 'Be not like servants who work for their master only for the sake of wages.'" ¹³⁴

The seventh article was carried by the delegates of the Conference. But the discussion which we have quoted belies any suggestion of unanimity of opinion upon the subject of retribution.

The dogma of retribution, as formulated by the Pittsburgh Conference, was embodied in the liturgy of the Union Prayer Book. As we may observe in the following passages, however, more stress is placed upon spiritual retribution as exacted by God than upon bliss and misery as the logical effect of man's own actions.

(a) "It is our duty to walk in Thy ways...so that when Thou callest us hence, we may enjoy the reward which Thou hast prepared for those who have earnestly striven to live in accordance with Thy will." ¹³⁵

(b) "Surely there will be compensation for those who suffer innocently, reward for virtue thwarted, and punishment for wickedness which triumphs for but a day." ¹³⁶

(c) "But why should man murmur at his lot? Though he be called to trial and to trouble, his faithfulness shall not fail of reward." ¹³⁷

(d) "For all things stand revealed at last, and all men will be called to render account for their doings. Then truth will be made manifest, and deception will be ended forever. He who worketh righteousness and showeth mercy will find everlasting peace. His reward surpasses all earthly trea-

asures and honors. A good name is his here below, and the crown of life eternal beyond. For him the day of death is better than the day of birth."¹³⁸

(e) "But call to mind affliction's weight and dread the judgment day;"¹³⁹

(f) "Treasures of wickedness profit nothing: the Lord will not suffer the soul of the righteous to famish."¹⁴⁰

(g) "May we be enabled, by Thy favor, so to order our whole life that at its eventide we shall look back with a tranquil mind upon the world we leave, and find in the world we enter that perfect rest which Thou hast prepared for the righteous among the children of men."¹⁴¹

(h) "And they who walk here in the light of Thy countenance and sow good seed, though in weeping, go home to Thee laden with sheaves. They who sow but wind may tremble at the whirlwind which they must reap. He who toils but for vain things and boasts of his might, must dread the grave."¹⁴²

(i) "O, that we might die the death of the righteous and our end be like theirs. Suffer us not to pass away in our sins, O Judge of life and death."¹⁴³

(j) "for Thou renderest to every creature its due."¹⁴⁴

(k) "May their souls rejoice in that ineffable good which God has laid up for those who fear Him..."¹⁴⁵

These passages describing spiritual retribution to take place after death were not received with universal favor. In his essay, "The Theology of the Union Prayer Book," S. S. Cohon expresses special disapproval. Reform Judaism, he maintains, has generally accepted a higher scale of religious values. It is therefore strange to find so many expressions of both worldly and other worldly compensations as incentives to goodness.¹⁴⁶ In passage (a), man is summoned to goodness, not for its own sake, but for the subsequent reward beyond the grave. In passage (b), the worshiper is taught that retribution begins after death rather than here and now. In

passage (c), retribution is offered as a source of comfort -- "oblivious of the difficulties involved." On the basis of the statement, "Thou renderest every creature its due" (passage (1)), "an artificial argument for immortality is advanced which promotes skepticism rather than greater faith."¹⁴⁷ Passage (k), as we have noted previously,¹⁴⁸ implies a bad lot for the wicked but is not specifically mentioned.

The confused view of retribution, as embodied in these passages of the prayer book, Cohon states, "directly leads to otherworldliness."¹⁴⁹ At the same time, a saner, more accepted view may be found in other passages contained in the prayer book: "and when at last the time shall come in which Thou wilt take us hence to be with Thee, may our life not have been in vain; may we leave the world better and richer for our service and our toil, and may we close our earthly career with cheerful trust in Thine eternal love and wisdom."¹⁵⁰ As to the settlement of moral accounts, we should turn to the old piyyut: "Thy way, O God, is patience and compassion, alike to the wicked and the good; this is Thy glory. Instil Thy healing balm into sorrowing hearts; have pity on those who are but dust and ashes."¹⁵¹ Cohon concludes: "This, too, we believe, is the more truly religious view of life with God."¹⁵²

Samuel Hirsch likewise looks askance at a doctrine whereby reward in the next life would lead man to goodness in this life. He who looks upon the future life as a reward for this life errs because he has not yet tasted the true bliss of this life. Virtue is its own reward. He who lives

and works, who trusts in God and labors, he knows that God's love is his guide, and that this love, which leads him into the grave, will not desert him there.¹⁵³

The belief in immortality does not suffer when we strip it of the hope for reward and the fear of punishment. ".... the doctrine itself is independent of such a hope, and in nobler minds, and in an increasing number of persons, the reasons for believing in it and clinging to it are quite independent of, and other than, the desire for personal recompense. As we shall see, so far as the doctrine speaks of bliss and happiness at all, it views them far less as reward than as evidence of divine justice...."¹⁵⁴

Although no mention of retribution is forthcoming in the Columbus Platform of 1937, the Newly Revised Daily and Sabbath Prayer Book (1940) and the Newly Revised Holyday Prayer Book (1948), show significant changes in certain prayers which are more in accord with the attitude of Cohon. Passage (a) is replaced by an entirely new prayer¹⁵⁵ with no reference to retribution. Passage (b) has been substantially altered¹⁵⁶ to omit all reference to reward and punishment. Passages (c) and (d) remain exactly the same in the new edition¹⁵⁷ as in the old. Passage (e) in the 1948 version¹⁵⁸ omits the stanza about "judgment day." Passages (f) and (g) are omitted in the later edition. Passage (h) is omitted but (i) is retained in the 1948 version of the prayer.¹⁵⁹ The phrase, "Thou renderest every creature its due" (passage (j)) is not to be found in the later edition. In the Kaddish of both newly revised editions, passage (k) is

omitted.¹⁶⁰

In the newly revised editions of both liturgies, we are thus made aware of glaring contradictions and obvious inconsistencies. The revisers have not followed through in their excision of passages which make retribution in the next life an inducement to righteousness in this life. If they are convinced of their stand, let them be consistent. There are still changes to be made.

CHAPTER IV

THE ASSERTION OF IMMORTALITY

With the unanimous rejection of bodily resurrection and with the denial of other worldly retribution by some, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul has become a dogma of Reform Judaism.

"Dogma" is an unpopular word among Reform Jews. Its unpopularity derives from two trends discernible within the movement itself: first, from a pseudo-liberal attitude which discourages positive adherence to any formulated religious principle, and; secondly, from the strong reaction against Halacha, which, in medieval times, de-emphasized the spiritual message of Judaism in favor of legal minutia.¹⁶¹ This negative attitude toward creed was strongly stated by Mendelssohn in his insistence that Judaism was not a revealed religion but only a revealed legislation and consequently has no formal creed of belief which binds members of the group.¹⁶² This conclusion of Mendelssohn became the hypothesis of early Reform Judaism.

Just as Mendelssohn was mistaken in his analysis of traditional Judaism, similarly his conclusion did not prove a valid hypothesis for Reform. Reform Judaism did adopt dogma, not as a formula for salvation nor as an authoritative creed which demanded adherence, but as a set of religious principles as formulated in the various media for expression of Reform Judaism: in the rabbinical conferences, in the catechisms, in the theologies, and in the prayer books.

Rabbinical Conferences

In reviewing the resolutions of the early rabbinical conferences,¹⁶³ the author is unable to find any mention of immortality as a theological principle of Reform Judaism until the Leipzig Conference of 1867.¹⁶⁴ Here Geiger resolved that "the belief in immortality must not be expressed in the one sided idea of bodily resurrection."¹⁶⁵ Subsequently, at the Philadelphia Conference of 1869, the following principle was adopted: "The belief in bodily resurrection has no religious foundation, and the doctrine of immortality refers to the after-existence of the soul only."¹⁶⁶ The Pittsburgh Conference of 1885 included the following in its Declaration of Principles: "Seventh, we reassert the doctrine of Judaism that the soul of man is immortal, grounding this belief on the divine nature of the human spirit, which forever finds bliss in righteousness and misery in wickedness...."¹⁶⁷ In its "Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism" formulated at Columbus in 1937, the Central Conference of American Rabbis stated: "Judaism affirms that man is immortal."¹⁶⁸

Aside from this formal declaration, the proceedings of the Central Conference include various statements of and allusions to immortality as a doctrine of Reform Judaism. In his Funeral Agenda,¹⁶⁹ Joseph Stolz lists several concepts "held by Reform Jews without dissent." One such concept is: "Death is not the end of man....Somewhere, somehow, the spirit lives on."¹⁷⁰ In his Theological Aspects of Reform Judaism, Margolis includes the following as a creedal article of Reform: "I believe that the pious who obey God's law and

do His will with a perfect heart and those who truly repent, share, as immortal souls, in the everlasting life of God."¹⁷¹

During the 1908 session of the Conference, the Committee on the Elaboration of a Systematic Theology suggested that the theological anarchy in Reform Judaism is exaggerated and that there is unanimity in the acceptance of fundamental principles. Consequently, although it be contrary to the genius of creed in Judaism to manufacture creeds in conferences, still it would be helpful to clear thinking, and to an effective presentation of Judaism, if a volume of essays could be published by the Conference on the essential ideas of Judaism." One of the proposed titles was: "The Jewish Attitudes of Life After Death."¹⁷²

Objections were raised against the formulation of a creed or dogma within the Conference. The committee which reported on Margolis's paper gave one reason: "At the same time your committee is of the opinion that any attempt at formulating a creed for one section of Judaism, with the exclusion of the rest, is a dangerous procedure which should by all means be discouraged, as it tends to create a schism in antagonism to the spirit and tradition of Judaism." With specific reference to immortality, Adolph Guttmacher voiced an objection on philosophical grounds: "All scientific truth, if it be truth, is absolute; it is verifiable and must hold good at all times and places. All religious truth is relative truth. That man has a soul of which his body is the temple; that the soul survives the dissolution of the body; that there is reward and punishment here or in a future existence; that there

is a personal God -- these are relative truths. They are hopes, faiths, beliefs, aspirations; they are true to some men and not to others....Religious truths are, therefore, relative truths and any attempt to make them fixed and absolute must end in failure."¹⁷³

The authors of the Columbus Platform took a compromising and ambiguous position as to the classification of its principles--including immortality. Although each of the principles seems to be presented in doctrinal and creedal form, the introduction to the document reads: "....It presents them not as a fixed creed but as a guide for the progressive elements of Jewry."¹⁷⁴ The difference between "guide" and "creed" is difficult to discern.

Catechisms

Whereas the pronouncements of the rabbinical conferences represent more or less the official attitudes of Reform Judaism, the statements found in the catechisms are the expressions of individual theologians. Every catechism which the author has examined contains the assertion of immortality -- as illustrated by the following examples:

(a) As we have already noted,¹⁷⁵ the first catechism in the Reform movement was Katechismus der Mosaischen Religionslehre by Eduard Kley of the Hamburg temple. His assertion of immortality falls in the ninth section: entitled "Remuneration in the Eternal Life."

2. "WHAT IS THEREFORE NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITH THE BELIEF IN REMUNERATION?

The belief in the immortality of the soul, or eternal existence of our spirit.

3. HOW DO YOU EXPRESS THIS BELIEF?

I believe faithfully and surely, that God, the the Lord, has created the soul which is in me immortal that He will in that life reward or punish me according to my actions on earth...."176

(b) The fifth article of the Charleston creed reads:

"I believe with a perfect faith that the soul of man is breathed into him by God and is therefore immortal."177

(c) As one of the fundamental articles of the Mosaic religion which can be deduced by reason, Johlson lists:

"Our soul is immortal, -- her existence, therefore does in no wise terminate at the death of the body."178

(d) In Die Lehre des Judenthums, David Einhorn asserts that the human spirit, because it originates from God, is necessarily immortal.178 a

(e) Isaac Mayer Wise includes man's immortality as one of the cardinal doctrines of Judaism: "He is gifted by kind providence with the capacity to become happy here and hereafter, and imbued with the desire to reach perfection; in this way to fulfil his destiny on earth and acquire eternal bliss."179

(f) In the Systematische Katechismus by Samuel Hirsch, the assertion of the immortality doctrine is found in the Confession by Confirmand: "Into the hand of this Eternal Father who has guided me from my youth, who has educated and led me, who has shown me his fatherly love in all that has happened to me, into His hand I trustingly place my future in this life and past the grave. God, who has led me here, will not desert me there. He, the Eternal, has made me in His image and educates me on earth to be like unto Him, and

therefore, I constantly strive to become as God's image so that in God's hand I will overcome death and the grave, and will go into a higher eternal life, into a nearer relationship with God, my Creator, my Master, my Father. Amen."¹⁸⁰

(g) In his Manual of Religious Instruction, Kohler sets forth the doctrine of spiritual immortality in clear and succinct terminology: "Man's body shares the fate of all animal life. It falls into decay and dies. But his soul shares in the nature of God who lives forever."¹⁸¹

Theologies and Sermons

To turn to various theological and homiletical works for the mere assertion of immortality would involve unnecessary and useless repetition. We have already made our point; immortality is generally accepted within the theological framework of Reform Judaism. A much more significant question remains to be answered, viz., what is the exact nature of the immortality doctrine as conceived by Reform theologians? The answer is not a simple one, for there is no single answer. Indeed, the theme has many variations.

One of the variations may be labeled "social immortality," which denotes the survival of a man's influence upon the society from which he now departs. The good deeds he has done, the kind words he has spoken, the happiness he has brought to others -- these constitute his claim to immortality insofar as they affect the lives and deeds of his survivors. This concept is stressed primarily in memorial sermons:

"As we gratefully call to mind and memory our loved ones who have already answered the divine summons, it is that which was timeless in them which we cherish most. The timely aspects of their beings were but the shells which encased the priceless kernels of love and and truth....They live for us again in every kindly act we perform, in every lofty ideal we pursue, in every evidence of self-sacrifice and true devotion we manifest in our lives. By our conduct we assure their immortality.

They are not dead who live
In hearts they leave behind.
In those whom they have blessed
They live a life again,
And will live through the years
Eternal life, and grow
Each day more beautiful,
As time declares their good,
Forgets the rest, and proves
Their immortality."182

"It is out of a spiritual interpretation of life that death receives its significant translation into terms of deeds and ideals that reveal the realm of deathlessness, not as time beyond the grave, but as an insight into life's purposes that make every moment a link in an endless chain of being, that endows every fleeting hour with an immortal purpose and aim."183

"Weep not nor fret. Your departed ones are not lost forever. Only the wicked perish and are no more. The righteous live in the Immortality of Good Deeds or in the Immortality of Love. They live in memory, in the annals of history, in the hearts of their fellow men. To live in hearts we leave behind is not to die."184

"Is not this--the embodiment of our thoughts and sentiments--the profoundest form of immortality?"185

"All individuals, who so lived as to enrich the maximum consciousness, may live on in their individual identity within it, as live the component personalities in a multiple personality."186

"Men and women who strive to realize these ideals (love, beauty, justice) in their temporal lives are as immortal as these qualities to which they have connected their being. They may pass from the changing scene of earthly endeavor. But the qualities they enshrine do not perish with them."187

"....The builder of monuments of the human spirit need not fear death nor the dissolution of death. Nothing can kill a man; except the forgetfulness of those who have nothing by which to remember him. Nothing can give immortality: except a life that has been devoted to immortal living...."188

A different type of social immortality verging on Traduceanism, is represented in the assertion of E. Cohon: "It is the rain and the dew that fall on the ground and cease to be that make for life. Without it we perish. Even so, it is with the life of the spirit.... We have absorbed into our personalities the spilt water of their (our forefathers') lives, just as we, in turn, will be absorbed in the lives of our children and our children's children.... It is precisely in this absorption that we realize ourselves and achieve immortality."189

Still another version of social immortality depends not so much upon the influence we leave behind as upon our membership in the human race, which itself is eternal, or upon our membership in the eternal brotherhood of Israel. "Each one of us can live through membership in and service to the undying folk."190

Closely connected with the doctrines of social immortality, as we may observe in some of the quotations just cited, is the concept of "immortality by memory." Our dead survive in the memories of their beloved: "Wherein lies their immortality but that we remember them and their works?"191

Social immortality and immortality by memory cannot rightly be called immortality in the usual sense of the term. The survival of man through good works, through membership in the group or through memory is completely irrelevant to

the continued existence of man's soul after death. Moreover, social immortality is a contradiction in terms. "While the reassurance that their individual beings will be preserved in the larger life of their people has afforded ground for hope to vast numbers of people, it can hardly be taken for the real hope of religion. Families and even nations have run their course and have been lost without a trace in the maelstrom of history."¹⁹² Social immortality is no immortality at all.

But we are not entitled to conclude that the rabbis who speak of immortality in society and memory necessarily deny spiritual immortality. The two are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they can be mutually enriching. Some of the rabbis quoted (e.g. Lefkowitz) allude to both types, while those who speak only of social immortality (e.g. Gordon) may be directing their particular approach to the mourners who are assembled for the memorial service. In a single sermon, one cannot cover the entire scope of a theological idea.

The Hegelian idea of non-personal immortality has found but meager support within the ranks of Reform Judaism. Hegel's monistic system, similar to Spinoza's, admits of God as the only reality, and man is but a manifestation of God with no individual personal existence of his own. When man dies, therefore, his spirit cannot endure as a personal entity, but is absorbed back into pure universality which is God.¹⁹³

Evidences of Hegelian influence are possibly evident in such phrases as: "They have all entered the spacious halls

of eternity and are now mixed with God and nature."¹⁹⁴ S. S. Cohon, although he leans heavily to the side of personal immortality, admits the possibility of the Hegelian approach: "In the mystic union with God the soul attains its highest reward, whether it retains consciousness of individuality or not. The drop has joined the ocean. The spark has merged into the radiant light."¹⁹⁵

The immortality doctrine of Samuel Schulman reveals strong traces of Hegelian influence. In Hegel's philosophy, the ideas of God and immortality are necessarily related, for man knows himself in God and thereby knows his imperishable life in God. Immortality, then, becomes a present possession of the spirit to which belong freedom and universality; by its very nature, the spirit is lifted above time and mortality. As we have stated previously such monistic approach precludes the possibility of immortality in any personal sense, but the spirit must return to universality. As we turn to the words of Schulman, we notice striking resemblances: "Judaism does ascribe eternal value to personality as it is expressed in the soul's freedom, in its conscious realization of the moral purposes of life, insofar as it partakes of a divinity which is revealed in a measure through human experience. But Judaism does not necessarily postulate infinite extension in time of the existence of personality. The only personality that is absolute, for Judaism, is God....There is an eternal significance to human life. There is a timelessness to it, in the same sense that there is a timeliness to truth, and to goodness, and to beauty. We feel that there is something

absolute in them irrespective of time.... When man accepts the Divine will, he shares in the eternity of God, His truth, His goodness, and the beauty of His holiness. This is a different thing from the everlasting perduring of human personality."¹⁹⁶

In the theological thinking of most Reform Jews, the absorption theory finds unwelcome reception. Cohon rightly calls the absorption theory a kind of pantheism and attributes to it the difficulties posed by pantheistic thought, which obliterates the distinction between God and the universe. "The part is identified with the whole, and personality is deprived not only of immortality but also of self-realization, of responsibility and freedom, and is logically reduced to illusion.... Ethical monotheism supplies what pantheism misses. Believing that we live in a world, the final ground of which is a supreme moral and spiritual Being, personal immortality becomes a reasonable belief."¹⁹⁷

According to I. M. Wise, man, since he is a personage, cannot be absorbed back into the universe -- as are all the other creatures in the world. His very personality demands personal immortality. "As an idea of the substance and a fact of existence, he is both self-conscious and personal, while all other ideas manifesting in the cosmos are also present forever in the self-conscious substance, but not as persons which they never were. Man alone is a person, hence he alone can be personally immortal."¹⁹⁸ Hence, Wise is a modified pantheist, for man is excluded from his pantheistic scheme.

Thus we arrive at the concept of immortality most generally accepted and most frequently expressed in the theological statements of Reform Judaism. In modified form, it was enunciated by Plato centuries ago. It was borrowed by the medieval rabbis who added some ingredients of their own. It was reasserted by Leibnitz along with his pluralistic conception of the universe. Mendelssohn copied it from Leibnitz, and Reform Judaism adopted it from Mendelssohn. We may formulate it thus: Immortality denotes the continued existence of the soul, as an independent self-conscious principle, after the body has dissolved at death. Some Reformers call this principle "the mind," some call it "substance," some call it "consciousness," but, with few exceptions, all agree upon its independence and its self-conscious state after death:

"Immortality in our orientation does not mean the existence of a soul-substance without a body substance, as there is no substance at all. Immortality means a continuation of consciousness within the never ceasing interaction of the two kinds of processes....Does the individual realize his identity after death? From a strictly philosophic point of view there may be no such postulate. From a religious point of view there seems to be such a postulate."¹⁹⁹

"I do not continue to live, if my self-consciousness does not only continue to live as a general self-consciousness but as my very own, as the consciousness of my own self."²⁰⁰

"The real individuality that will survive will constitute the soul proper, the true Ego, enhanced and emphasized by the withdrawal of the evanescent. The wealth of truth and goodness, the store of wise and happy memories, and all the other goods of the soul will remain to represent its abiding individuality in the spirit world."²⁰¹

"When we enter the future life our reason leads us to think that we are, at first, morally and spiritually (dare one add, even intellectually?) the same as we were before we embarked upon the adventure of death."²⁰²

"We concern ourselves only with the belief in the soul, or that which makes human personality, its self-consciousness, its sense of its own identity, its moral and religious experience, its memory that stretches over the past, and its aspiration which has limitless scope."²⁰³

"There is a larger self, a larger life--a self I try to realize, a life I try to live, in my best moments--and that self I shall wholly realize, that life I shall fully live, in the great beyond."²⁰⁴

In the philosophy of Plato, the proposition of the continued existence of the soul, carries with it the corollary of the soul's pre-existence. Of all the theologians referred to for this thesis, not one mentions the pre-existence of the soul as a part of the immortality idea. We can only conjecture the reason. Perhaps the doctrine represents one of the rabbinic ideas of immortality which is implicitly rejected because of its discord with modern thought. Or perhaps the doctrine, although philosophically tenable, finds no place in a system which is primarily religious.

Another corollary of the Platonic view of the soul is transmigration. This, too, receives only indifference in Reform Judaism. Of all the theologians, Wise alone suggests possible acceptance of metempsychosis: "...when the human body is dissolved, the immaterial principle, by which it is animated, continues to think and to act, either in a state of separation from all body or in some material vehicle to which it is intimately united, and which goes off with it at death, or else, that it is preserved by the Father of spirits, for the purpose of animating a body in some future state."²⁰⁵

But Wise admits the possibility of pre-existence, as of resurrection, only to make his central assertion, immortality, stronger. The rest of his theology is indifferent to either of the two possibilities--as are all other Reformers. For, similar to pre-existence, the belief in metempsychosis belongs to the mystic school of ibn Gabirol and the Kabbalists and, therefore, has no place in modern rational thought. Likewise, the doctrine has no religious import and thus becomes irrelevant for religious thinkers.

Another corollary of the soul's immortality is the hope of reunion in the hereafter. For if my soul continues as a self conscious reality, and if your soul continues as a self-conscious reality, is it not probable that the two of us, though stripped of our physical form, should someday, somewhere, behold each other with clear recognition? A few rabbis validate such a hope, e.g.: "Despair we must not, for the memory of them urges us to strive to reach the day when together with our loved ones we shall enjoy the fruit of their and our activity...."²⁰⁶

E. G. Hirsch takes violent issue with such a doctrine. He calls it no more than a mystic hope which gives no real consolation but provides an opiate for the mourners.²⁰⁷ Though he stands alone in his explicit denial, the expectation of reunion has merited but little attention in Reform theology. It appears primarily in memorial sermons and services, where it is offered as a source of consolation. It is practically ignored in theological discussions, probably because of its lack of ethical content which supplies the

primary motif of our theology.

Liturgies

In the previous chapter we noted that the changing attitude toward resurrection found expression in the Amidoth of various prayer books. In our examination of the retribution doctrine, we discovered that liturgical statements were often inconsistent with the pronouncements of official rabbinical bodies. Now we return our attention to the prayer books as we look for "the assertion of immortality." That such an assertion is universal we may conclude from the previous chapter where we cited the Gevuroth of various liturgies.

Before we continue our examination, however, preliminary observation is in order. Aside from the doctrine of resurrection and perhaps the concept of retribution, there is nothing in the attitude toward immortality that can legitimately be called "change" or "development." Mendelssohn, in the eighteenth century--before the Reform movement had even begun, supplied a theory of immortality which became the point of departure in Reform Judaism. His theory finds expression in almost every Reform liturgy--the earliest as well as the latest. We look in vain, therefore, for any substantial change in the formulation of successive prayer books.

In the second place, the liturgical assertion of immortality is primarily motivated by the need for consolation. Consequently, we shall look primarily to passages connected with the Mourner's Kaddish and the Memorial Service.

In most cases, we shall find an emotional rather than a philosophical treatment. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, some prayer books include the reasons for immortality even within passages of consolation.

Ordnung der Andacht des Neuen-Tempel Verein in Hamburg.

The Yizkor service anticipates reunion with loved ones and the blessed future of the soul: "Also we, when our time has come, will be reunited with our dear ones. Through death, a purer, better life begins for us. In the blessed abode of peace, no human frame restricts the purer spirit. There it will appear to us in light clarity which we could not understand on earth."²⁰⁸

Charleston Prayer Book.

The first Reform prayer book in America makes clear assertion of immortality with, as we have noted, overtones of resurrection: "May it be consistent with the will of God, that the portion and tranquil abode of the soul of our deceased brother may be found in the goodly heritage of the future state....May the King of kings, through his infinite mercy, hide him under the shadow of his wings, and in the secret place of his tabernacle, to behold the beauty of the Lord, and to inquire in his temple. May He raise him at the end of days, and cause him to drink at the brook of his pleasure...." ^{208a}

Geiger's Gebetbuch.

A clear assertion of the soul's continued existence in a purely spiritual realm is made in the Memorial Service:

"Man's domain is the earth. And when in your wisdom you find it good, you call him, and his body returns to the earth, it dies not. The soul returns to you and lives purely in your Holy of Holies."²⁰⁹

Geiger holds to a firm belief in reunion: "Many a bond down here is loosened, but up there in your kingdom, we will all be reunited."²¹⁰ Understandably, then, the departed retain their self-conscious personalities along with the memory of those whom they have left behind: "You, my dear ones, look out of your heaven down upon me in friendliness and in love."²¹¹

Gebetbuch für Jüdische Reformgemeinden.

A similar stress is placed upon the hope for reunion: "....for I know that not forever do you part me from my loved ones."²¹²

Merzbacher's Seder Tefillah.

Merzbacher places the major emphasis upon the spiritual bliss of the future world: "May the Lord God of the spirits of all flesh remember thy soul; may he grant it the bliss of eternal life, and let shine the light of his countenance upon thy purified spirit, for everlasting happiness."²¹³ In the description of the future world as contained in the El Molay Rachamim, he inserts the phrase: "where there is atonement of faults, where misdeeds are removed, where salvation is near at hand...."

Einhorn's Olath Tamid.

In the morning service for the weekday, Einhorn rendered

an English translation of the "Elohi Meshamah" which became almost standard for subsequent Reform liturgy: "O Lord, the soul which Thou hast given us is pure. Thou wilt take it from us, and continue its life in another world.... Be praised, O God, who hast given us an immortal soul."²¹⁴ Although the major emphasis is placed upon the spiritual bliss that awaits the righteous in the future world, Einhorn also alludes to social immortality: "....not the epitaph is his record, but his life, the sphere in which he was a messenger of God, the shining inscription which he has left in the heart of man."²¹⁵ We recognize the immortality of memory when we read:

"Mem'ry is death's conqueror.
Bridging separation's chasm,
Citing all that are no more."²¹⁶

I. M. Wise's Minhag America.

Spiritual as well as social immortality is expressed in the "Address to the Mourners before the last Kaddish": "....The righteous and the pious ones live in the presence of the Almighty in the realm of happiness; they live in the hearts of their children and their friends...."²¹⁷ The hope of reunion is expressed in the "Prayers for the Dead": "Yes--I shall see thee again, in a land where there is neither death nor separation."²¹⁸ But by far the most central theme is the soul's reward in heaven as illustrated by the entire memorial service,²¹⁹ which became the model for the Union Prayer Book.

Jastrow's Avodath Yisrael.

Jastrow borrowed considerably from his predecessors and seems to offer no original expressions of the immortality doctrine. His memorial service is essentially that of Wise.

Union Prayer Book.

The dogma of spiritual immortality, as promulgated by the Central Conference of American Rabbis is embodied in the Union Prayer Book. In the preceding chapter, we have noted inconsistent attitude toward retribution. But with the assertion of immortality, there is no vacillation. The continuation of the soul's existence is a constantly recurring theme in the introductions to the Kaddish and the Memorial Service on Yom Kippur. Many phrases have been borrowed directly from Einhorn and Wise, and many have been created anew. There are changes between the earlier and later editions of the Union liturgy, but these are primarily stylistic rather than doctrinal. A few quotations from the prayer book itself will suffice as evidence for the assertion of immortality:

"May the splendor of Thy glory and the bliss radiating from Thine infinite grace encompass the souls of our beloved departed."²²⁰

"Though vanished from bodily sight, they have not ceased to be; they abide in the shadow of the most High."²²¹

"For only the dust returns to the dust; the spirit which Thou has breathed into us returns to Thee, its ever living source."²²²

We are aware of only one slight change of emphasis which distinguishes the last edition of the Union Prayer Book from the earlier editions and from other prayer books compiled by Wise, Einhorn etc. This difference becomes evident

as we examine parallel versions of the same passage. In the earlier editions, we read: "The spirit lives on forever in the land of undisturbed peace and perfect happiness."²²³ The same paragraph in the 1940 edition reads: "The spirit lives in the shelter of God's love and mercy."²²⁴ The former version posits a description of the soul's future existence, while the latter expresses complete resignation to the mercy of God in an exalted testimony of faith. It becomes presumptuous for man to attempt description of the future world in human terms. Faith in God, rather than a rosy picture of the hereafter, should be sufficient to dispel the fear of death.

Social immortality and immortality of memory are not ignored: "Our loved ones continue, also, in the remembrance of those to whom they were precious. Their deeds of loving-kindness, the true and beautiful words they spoke are treasured up as incentives to conduct by which the living honor the dead."²²⁵ Such an assertion does not substitute for, but only enriches the hope of real immortality.

Liberal Jewish Prayer Book of London.

The compilers of the London Prayer Book were likewise reluctant to attempt any description of the future world in their assertion of immortality. But the assertion is nonetheless positive: "God who is all spirit has given of his spirit unto man; so that our life is exalted by the hope of immortality, and death loses its darkness before the light of eternal life. He will swallow up death for ever...."²²⁶

The second departure of Reform from traditional usage of the Kaddish is the omission of every Kaddish except the Kaddish Yathom. Although the Hamburg prayer book, Geiger, Wise and Jastrow utilize the Hatzi Kaddish and the Kaddish Shalem as doxologies throughout the service, Merzbacher and Einhorn omit them altogether, as does the Union Prayer Book.

The relegation of the Kaddish to the Mourners' Service exclusively and the references to death and immortality contained therein were the object of attack by S. S. Cohon in his paper, "The Theology of the Union Prayer Book." The Kaddish, he said, is found only in a funereal setting and no longer constitutes a doxology. Moreover, the insertion borrowed from the Hamburg prayer book implies a concept of retribution inconsistent with the theology of Reform Judaism.²³³ Rabbi Tarshish, commenting upon the paper, took issue with Cohon: "....I object to the criticism that has been made to the present conception about the Kaddish. I think the greatest achievement forward that has been made religiously by the Jewish people of our day has been the connection of the Kaddish with the sense of immortality and the conception of the dead. My opinion is from my experience with my own people, that the one thing they do like about the Union Prayer Book is the Kaddish and the rest they don't."²³⁴

The newly Revised version of the Union Prayer Book reveals a partial concession to Cohon's view. Although the Kaddish Yathom alone is included, the paragraph beginning

שְׁמֵי שָׁמַיָּהּ is revised to omit the passage about retribution and reads thus: אֵלֵינוּ שְׁמֵי שָׁמַיָּהּ שָׁמַיָּהּ

וס-סח מן זאזסלר מן שטמא פ'ו
 כדיוהם זכספאל יבא לבין שטמא דקלא
 וחא וחא - ח'ו - ח'ו נרא ענ'א
 ואזעא . ואזכו אמן .
234a

CHAPTER V

THE REASONS FOR IMMORTALITY

In the chapter entitled "The Approach of Reform," we suggested that the theologians of Reform Judaism based their belief in immortality upon faith fortified by reason. A mere assertion of immortality would satisfy only the former requirement and would ignore the latter. The assertion has to be rationally justified. Consequently, with almost every mention of immortality--even in some prayerbooks--, we find one or more accompanying reasons which attempt to validate the belief and give it rational justification.

But every list of rational arguments in Reform Judaism involves certain assumptions which are founded upon faith. These assumptions all center around the belief in God: God exists, He is good, He created man. It is these very assumptions which qualify the arguments as religious arguments. Without these assumptions, the theologian would be no theologian at all. He would be a mere philosopher.

A word about procedure. Since the arguments of the later Reformers show no marked difference from those of their predecessors, a chronological consideration would be of little avail. And secondly, since even contemporaries utilize the same reasons for immortality, a consideration of individual theologians would only burden us with unnecessary repetition. Thus, we shall proceed topically by presenting, in turn, the various arguments for the belief in immortality as proposed in Reform Judaism.

The Theological Argument

Man is created in the image of God--this is a teaching of Scriptures which we accept as valid. This Divine image is represented, not in the human body, but in the soul of man. This soul, which is our real self, is the link between man and God. Assuming that God is eternal, the Divine soul of man must likewise live eternally. "....indeed we know that the soul is not an illusion, an accidental combination, a product of material conditions, but that it is literally a part of the Eternal, with the inferences that plainly follow as to its destiny from its divine and imperishable character and origin."²³⁵

The Moral Argument

The moral argument for immortality is proposed both philosophically and theologically. In its philosophical form, Kant becomes the spokesman. The argument is based upon the incomplete nature of man's spiritual life and the discrepancy between his vision of the ideal and the ability to realize that ideal. Since man conceives of the happiness which comes from perfection, of the summum bonum in which he might find everything in the whole of his existence ordered in conformity with his wish and will, that perfection must be logically attainable. But in this life, it is unattainable--as experience testifies. Consequently, "....this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of the endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being. The summum bonum, then, practically, is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of

the soul; consequently, this immortality, being inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason."²³⁶

In its theological formulation, the argument resolves around God. God has inspired man with the desire for supreme happiness. But--"all our passions here below may easily be gratified; love, ambition, anger, have their full portion of enjoyment--the desire of happiness is the only one that cannot be satisfied, and that fails even of an object, as we know not what the felicity is which we long for. It must be admitted, that if everything is matter, nature has made a strange mistake in creating a desire without any object."²³⁷

But nature has not created the desire; God has created it. And God has provided the object of the desire as well. He has created supreme happiness which comes only from the attainment of perfection. He has inspired man to seek this perfection. He has inspired man to seek truth, wisdom, knowledge, virtue, beauty in their most sublime form. But man completes his day upon earth, and he has only begun his journey toward perfection. He has only begun to acquire the knowledge he seeks, to attain a thorough-going grasp of goodness, to experience all the varied manifestations of beauty. Were he destined to cease his striving at death, the goodness of God would lie open to question, for a good God would not implant within the soul of man the desire for perfection only to frustrate that desire. Our initial efforts toward perfection would be in vain, "would be useless and absolutely burdensome to us, were we to die away for everlasting and

irrevocably in the midst of our endeavors, when our wishes are not yet satisfied, even in a slight degree; since, with all our toiling, we can only view the surface of truth and wisdom."²³⁸

Confident of the goodness of a God who would not frustrate His children, we cling to the conviction that our earthly life and labor are but a first step toward the glorious future which lies ahead. We find support not only in man's unsatisfied desires but in his special capacities, still largely untapped, which would indicate the possibility and probability of fulfilling those desires. "The pre-eminent mental endowments, wherewith man is so peculiarly gifted, as also his reason, freedom of will, conscience, and the ever active impulse which spurs him on to reach higher perfections and greater happiness, clearly prove to us, though even there were no other indications of the fact, that he is destined to advance continuously in perfection, wisdom and virtue."²³⁹

The Ethical Argument

This argument, dominant in Platonic as well as rabbinic thought, originates from the moral anomalies and inconsistencies which pervade our world. The good often suffer, and the wicked often prosper. Such seeming injustice violates our concept of a moral universe and does not comply with the demands of our moral consciousness. It suggests a God of whom justice is not an attribute.

But we assume that God is just. And we conclude that since complete justice is not exercised in this earthly

realm, there must be another realm in which good and evil receive their just recompense. Only Divine retribution to be exacted after death, can bring moral harmony into an otherwise unharmonious universe. If such retribution is to be a reality, the soul must live to see it. Ethical justice demands the immortality of man.²⁴⁰

The ethical argument, though logical in its development, is based upon a premise which had been rejected officially in the Pittsburgh Platform and individually by Wise, Kohler and others. Retribution, they said, refers only to states of the soul. The consciousness of having performed a righteous act brings bliss to the soul, while the sense of guilt wrought by evil deeds brings misery to the soul. According to this definition, the suffering of good people is not contradictory to just and equal retribution, for their souls cannot be deprived of the satisfaction which goodness brings. Nor can the prosperity of the wicked violate our sense of justice, for the wicked man suffers from the consciousness of his guilt, regardless of his material prosperity. We need no future world to settle the accounts for there are no accounts unsettled. Consequently, the ethical argument loses all validity.

Montefiore speaks double talk when he tries to retain the new concept of retribution along with the old ethical argument. Even though goodness is its own reward, he says, we cannot associate goodness with defeat. "The fullest well being which we can conceive is not a combination of universal virtue and outward misery."²⁴¹ We are not convinced.

The Psychological Argument

From historical and anthropological investigation, Wise concludes and others agree,²⁴² that the belief in immortality is universal among all men. The ancient Egyptians, Persians, Phoenicians, Scythians, Celts, Druids, Assyrians, Greeks, Romans, etc.--all embraced the idea that death is not the destruction of the rational soul, but only its introduction to a new and unknown state of existence.²⁴³ Similarly, the primitive nations of his own day--the natives of the Society Isles, the chiefs of the Friendly Islands, the New Zealanders, the tribes of Africa, etc.--each had its own special belief about the future life.

From the universal prevalence of the belief, Wise concludes that it is innate, "for whatever all men at all times did think is evidently part of human nature; it is a fact based on universal testimony, and reasoning against fact is unreasonable."²⁴⁴ Using different terminology, Grossman calls the universal belief an "instinct,"²⁴⁵ while Montefiore describes it as an "intuitive perception."²⁴⁶ Cohon is more specific when he traces the universal instinct to "the inability of consciousness to negate itself." Man, as a self-conscious personality cherishes his personality and is unwilling to conceive of its annihilation.²⁴⁷ The awareness of existence cannot conceive of its own non-existence.²⁴⁸

But the mere belief in immortality, even though it be universal, is no guarantee of its reality. As a mere psychological phenomenon, the belief is seen to stem not from logical deduction but only from the yearning and hope of man. Not until we introduce God into the discussion does the argu-

ment gain cogency. Only when we say that the instinct or intuition has come from God, and that God would not deceive us, does the psychological consideration become a psychological argument. Only then must the hope have its counterpart in reality. "No; not to deceive me did God implant in my bosom this eager desire for everlasting existence, this desire for unending bliss. I may, therefore, relying on the faithfulness of his word and his kindness confidently expect a happier and eternal life."²⁴⁹

The Scientific Argument

Reform Judaism adopted, with some modifications, the Mendelssohnian argument of the soul's indestructibility. No instance of annihilation is discoverable in the world of nature. Only changes, not destruction, take place. Soil which "dies" is absorbed by plants and animals, which, having spent their span of life, are transformed into dust, liquid and gas. These, in turn, feed whole new generations of plants and animals. Similarly, the energies of nature--light, heat, etc.--never disappear, but are only transmuted into another form. The things of nature have no end; they are eternal.

At this point in the argument, Reform theologians depart from Mendelssohn. He had attempted to establish the soul as a simple substance, like all other simple substances in the natural world. As such the soul must not only live on, but must live as a soul--since its simplicity precludes the possibility of decomposition. But most Reformers²⁵⁰ deduce the soul's immortality, not from its place in nature, but from its superiority to nature. The soul exerts control over nature;

it thinks; it actuates our will; it gives purpose to our deeds; it distinguishes between good and evil; it impels us onward toward constant improvement; it gives rise to justice, courage, pity and honor.²⁵¹ If, then, natural phenomena never die,

711/1 *SP* this soul, which is superior to nature, should live eternally. "Is it consistent with the common dictates of reason to admit that matter shall have a longer duration than mind, which gives motion and beauty to every material scene?"²⁵² "Shall this wonderful spirit, whose enlivening breath moulds and changes all according to the will of its possessor, be less than the smallest of inanimate things below? As far as we with our limited comprehension can understand, not one iota in the vast creation is lost, what effrontery then for any one of the children of men to take it upon himself to assert the destructibility, the utter annihilation of the soul after death?"²⁵³

The scientific argument alone does not rest upon the intercession of God on behalf of the soul; nature herself is the guarantor of immortality. Only by the Divine interruption of nature, only by Divine interference in the progress of nature would the soul be denied its eternality. But such interference would be contrary to the goodness and wisdom of God and is therefore improbable. "How can we assume that the most merciful should annihilate the human soul the master piece of his creation, after having gifted it with so many noble endowments, which all tend to point out its being destined for the enjoyment of the highest felicity?"²⁵⁴

Miscellaneous Arguments

The various arguments we have cited thus far are held

generally by Reform theologians. But there are other arguments held individually by various Reformers. These likewise must be included in our consideration.

1) Johlson in one of his arguments bases the soul's immortality upon the omnipotence of God. If the death of man means his complete annihilation, then man, by voluntary death, could escape the power of God. Divine omnipotence thus demands immortality.²⁵⁵

2) As man advances in years, his physical energies decline, but his mental and physical qualities continue to increase. This spiritual progress would seem to deny the death of the soul with the body.²⁵⁶

3) The death of the martyr is a proof of immortality. "Can we think that God impels those who love him by the best principle in their nature, to encounter death in its most dreadful forms, and then abandons them to final extinction, at the very moment when they must be to him most worthy of his love? No! No! 'The Lord redeemeth the souls of his servants, and none shall be desolate who trust in him.'"²⁵⁷

4) Schulman turns to the hope for reunion as an argument for immortality. A loved one dies. The bereaved wishes to see him again. Therefore he will.²⁵⁸ It merely explains the belief in immortality and not the reality.

5) In a series of four lectures delivered in 1876, Isaac Mayer Wise attempts to prove the immortality of the soul by arguments which are exclusively philosophical. To the universal acceptance of immortality he establishes the follow-

ing proposition: "If the human mind is not immortal, it certainly ought to be; i.e., human reason demands and human feeling desires immortality; therefore, the mind ought to be immortal."²⁵⁹ But the fact that man thinks, feels and wills to be immortal could be made the postulate of a legitimate evidence for the soul's immortality only in a deductive argument. An inductive argument can be based on this fundamental fact only after we prove that immortality is the effect of this knowledge, feeling and volition, and contained therein. Wise establishes such a conclusion by proving the following propositions:

- a) Mind is the substance of the universe. Therefore, each mind is substantial.
- b) Nothing can escape outside the universe because there is no outside. Nothing can perish within the universe.
- c) The substance is capable of infinite self-division, and each division is an idea which is actualized, whether materialized or not. Therefore, every mind is an idea of the substance and a fact of existence, and, therefore, imperishable.
- d) Ideas are in the consciousness only. As they divide, they the self consciousness of the first idea, i.e., the mind.
- d) Every mind is an idea of the substance and, therefore, must be consciously immortal in the substance precisely as conscious and self-conscious as it has become by self-division.²⁶⁰

Without attempting to refute the exclusively philosophical arguments for immortality, we may repeat our original assumption which, we think, has been validated by the presentation of the various arguments, viz., philosophy alone is unable to prove the immortality of the soul. "All of us would like to justify the ways of God to man. All of us would like to prove that there is immortality or at least a probability of it,.....But I believe that we ought to draw a very careful distinction between our desires and the realities. It would be a total error in my opinion to think that modern thought has as yet come to the point at which it affords any theoretical basis for Jewish theology as such."²⁶¹ Without the traditional belief in God and the soul which He has given to man, there can be no immortality.

CHAPTER VI

JEWISH TRADITION

Reform Judaism insisted upon a "modern" concept of immortality. Thus it turned to Mendelssohn's Phaedon. Thus it rejected the concepts of earlier periods in Judaism, concepts of bodily resurrection, of physical retribution, of pre-existence and of metempsychosis.

But the repudiation of antiquated ideas did not imply the unqualified, complete repudiation of traditional Judaism. Indeed, certain Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages were considered as true forerunners of modern rationalism. The Bible, in the early days of Reform, was considered of Divine origin, and, consequently, as binding authority. Even the Talmud, though its authority was no longer binding, was not to be cast aside completely. Holdheim, himself a radical reformer, stated: "Even though the Talmud is not authoritative for us, we do not wish to disregard the intellectual activity of two thousand years. We merely say this: anything which upon unbiased, careful criticism contradicts the religious consciousness of the present age has no authority for us."²⁶²

Thus, the teachings of traditional Judaism have a positive function in the Reform treatment of immortality. They serve, not as the authoritative foundation of the doctrine, but as testimony that immortality is a doctrine of "historic Judaism," that, in some form or other, it has had its place in the Jewish theology of every age. "The fact is that in all the long history of Israel, and in the great variety and voluminousness

of his literature, there is not the record of a single man or book that denies the immortality of the soul....From the first page of the Bible, which teaches the duality of man and asserts that though the body is dust returning to dust, the soul is a divine force, deathless as God, down to the Union Prayer Book, and the Pittsburgh Conference in 1885....-- the testimony of Hebrew literature and history is unanimous that the Jews always believed that the human being is made up of a perishable body of clay and an imperishable spiritual personality."²⁶³ Thus we, as Reform Jews, take our place in the continuum. Though we have effected changes in the formulation of the doctrine, we still hold to essentially the same fundamental principle which has been cherished by our people from its very birth.

The Philosophers.

The teachings of many medieval Jewish philosophers could be whole-heartedly accepted by Reform theologians. Thus Kohler can maintain that the first clear idea of the nature of the soul came with "the philosophically trained thinkers," who were dependent either upon Plato, or upon Aristotle, who ascribes immortality only to the creative spirit of God, the Supreme Intelligence, as a cosmic power, and who denies the Platonic concept of pre-existence.²⁶⁴ Kohler and Wise both turn to Maimonides with his denial of physical resurrection and his assertion of spiritual retribution.²⁶⁵ Similarly, Maimonides becomes the model for Margolis in his formulation of the immortality idea.²⁶⁶ Reichert compares modern thinkers to Maimonides in their contention that immortality must be

acquired by the quest for truth.²⁶⁷ Kohler cites Halevi as the first to emphasize the indivisibility, incorporeality, independence, and individuality of the soul.²⁶⁸ Wise cites Crescas as the first to maintain that the soul is a self-existing individual substance with immortality as one of its properties. Crescas thus becomes the model for Leibnitz and his theory of monads.²⁶⁹ If Mendelssohn borrowed from Leibnitz and, in turn, lent to Reform Judaism, then the Reform doctrine of immortality can be traced directly to its own philosopher of the Middle Ages.

The Rabbis.

Having defined the Talmud as the product of the social, intellectual and religious atmosphere of an earlier day, the Reformers could discard, with complete impunity, any rabbinic concepts of immortality which were out of accord with modern thought. But the rabbinic period was nonetheless a link in the chain of historic Judaism. Consequently, it gained importance as a promulgator of the immortality doctrine--regardless of the special interpretations it may have given that doctrine. Even David Einhorn, the radical Reformer stated: "The Talmud is for us by no means divine, but a treasure house full of divine truth, developed from out of the ancient kernel. Such a precious possession is, for instance, the belief in immortality."²⁷⁰

But even in the rabbinic period, weighed down though it was by ~~irrational~~ ^{non} theology, the Reform theologians were able to find instances of their own concept of immortality. Thus Kohler states: "....at this same epoch we find the higher idea

expressed that the soul is an invisible, god-like essence, pervading the body as a spiritual force and differing from it in nature in much the same way as God is differentiated from the world."²⁷¹ Isaac Meyer Wise finds in Hillel's view his own attitude toward immortality. It is the duty of man to develop the capacities of his soul to permanent qualities, to a self-conscious personality, to an imperishable individuality. "This development of self is man's work, and by this he merits the reward of immortality and the place of happiness under the throne of God."²⁷² To find support for their concept of retribution which frowned upon external rewards and punishments, Reform rabbis quote Antigonus of Socho: "Be not like servants who serve their master for the sake of reward."²⁷³ Thus, even Rabbinic Judaism becomes a handmaid to Reform in its treatment of immortality.

The Bible.

The Bible posed two problems for Reform Judaism in its consideration of immortality. First--a theological problem. The spiritual teachings of the Bible were regarded as the foundation of Reform Judaism. Since immortality was a major tenet of Reform theology, the corresponding doctrine had to be discovered in Scriptures. And the task was not easy.

Secondly, and far more significant, was the apologetic problem. Christian theologians asserted that the immortality idea was original with Christianity. Consequently, Reform Jewish theologians felt themselves duty-bound to refute the Christian claim and, therefore, had to discover the immortality idea in Jewish Scriptures or else give good reasons for its

absence. Moreover, since the Christian concept of immortality was closely allied to the resurrection idea, Reform theologians attempted likewise to find resurrection in the Old Testament. This presented a curious phenomenon. Reform theologians, though they themselves excluded resurrection from their own framework of belief, were eager to prove that resurrection was a cherished belief of their Biblical ancestors.

As the only clear evidence of the immortality doctrine in the Bible, A. Neuman cites Daniel 12.2,3 ("and many of them that sleep in the dust shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to reproaches and everlasting punishment, etc.") and Isaiah 26.19 ("Thy dead shall live, thy dead bodies shall arise, etc.") Even though no earlier passages indicate a clear and unequivocal belief in immortality, the silence upon the subject cannot be construed as either negation or confusion. In the Pentateuch, "the revelation of the nature of God is primary. Man's self revelation is secondary to the transcendence of God. It was infinitely more important to reveal the might and holiness of God than the composition of the human soul." In prophetic times, the accounts of virtue and reward, evil and punishment were balanced in this world--without the moral reserve of another world. The despair which depressed the people after 586 motivated the prophets to reinvigorate the heart of the people with the promise of the Messianic Age--on earth. Not until the prosperity of Hellenized Jews were the Biblical writers prompted to reconcile the justice of God with the glaring injustices in this world. Another life to succeed this one would provide the setting for justice and equal retribution. This

other life is envisaged in Daniel 12.2,3 and Isaiah 26.19.^{273a}

Isaac Mayer Wise offers a far greater variety of passages which to him are suggestive of the immortality concept in Scriptures. Assuming that the Israelites, along with all other ancient peoples, possessed a concept of immortality, he turns to the Bible for testimony. Genesis 1.26-7 and 5.1,3 tell us that man was created in the image of God. Genesis 35.18 represents dying as the departure of the soul from the body. Numbers 16.22 and Isaiah 42.5 assert the clear distinction between body and soul. Deuteronomy 32.39 contains the words "I kill and I make alive." I Samuel 25.29 expresses the confidence of Abigail that "the soul of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life with the Lord thy God." The witch of Endor is asked to conjure up the spirit of Samuel in I Samuel 28. In I Kings 17.21, Elijah, as the messenger of God, revives the widow's dead son. Isaiah 25.8 visualizes God as swallowing up earth forever. Psalms 16.10 and 17.15 express man's hope to behold God after death. The Isaiah and Daniel passages quoted by Neuman are also cited as evidence.

But even Wise would not dare to assert that the Biblical verses, except in a very few instances, indicate any positive belief in immortality. References to the soul, to Sheol, to the spirits of the dead--these were no more than possible allusions to or vague suggestions of the continued existence of the soul after death. The Pentateuch, especially, was conspicuous with its absence of the immortality idea.

Wise appointed himself as the lawyer for the defense. Merely because the Pentateuch contains no special mention of immortality, he maintained, is no grounds for inferring that

the doctrine was absent in the mind of Moses or in the collective mind of the people. On the contrary--"the image of God cannot die; this always was a self-evident truth to the Jewish mind. Therefore, it needed no special revelation by Moses or the prophets."²⁷⁴ It was thus unnecessary to repeat over and over again "what he could well expect to be universally known as being the cornerstone of his whole structure."²⁷⁵ Secondly, Moses did not speak of immortality because he spoke to a people and about a people, and immortality is a personal rather than a social matter.²⁷⁶ Thirdly, Moses was not a metaphysical deductive reasoner. He reasoned from facts inductively and by analogy, as the lawgiver and the founder of a culture must do. Therefore, he spoke of immortality only insofar as he had facts to present; beyond that, he would not go.²⁷⁷ Fourthly, history and anthropology testify that immortality is a universal belief of mankind. It is highly improbable, therefore that the Jews alone, of all peoples in antiquity, should have been without the belief in immortality. On the contrary, Moses and the Israelites especially should have been aware of the doctrine since they came from among the Egyptians, who were the first to teach that the soul of man was immortal.²⁷⁸

Even though Moses and the people held to the immortality doctrine, it was not made the basis of ethics and Divine worship, for what was a belief and hope only could not become the foundation of a way of life. Secondly, a system based upon personal immortality would be a system of selfishness. "What we see now from history, he must have seen also then, that the

selfishness which is the very foundation of this hope and belief overwhelms and even extinguishes that other principle of religion which is the main pillar of human society, viz: to advance the well being of our fellow man and fellow beings...."²⁷⁹ And finally, were the center of gravity moved from this world to another, the Jews would have no objection to slavery. Consequently, concludes Wise, even though Moses and his people believed in a future world, they didn't talk about it.²⁸⁰

Wise compromised his position in an article entitled "On the Silence of the Pentateuch Respecting the Doctrine of Immortality."²⁸¹ Instead of attempted to prove that the immortality doctrine is implicitly expressed or understood in the Pentateuch, he seeks rather to indicate how the immortality doctrine was the logical sequence of other theological doctrines in the Torah -- which made way for a belief in immortality and retribution. Thus, the doctrine of God and the concept of this wordly retribution became the foundation-stones of man's immortality and retribution which arose later in Jewish religious experience. We may expect, then, different arguments for the silence in the Pentateuch than those presented in his other articles. Granted, he does posit the pre-supposition of immortality by the Mosaic people, but the emphasis is relatively minor. He rather stresses the idea that, in the minds of the people, life and death begin already here. There nothing new is begun, and therefore, no special mention of "there" is necessary.²⁸² (Note how he projects his own personal idea of immortality into the minds of his ancient ancestors.)

Other Reform theologians offer additional explanations for the silence of the Pentateuch regarding personal immortality. N. S. Joseph suggests that the Biblical writers were practical men, and, therefore, were concerned with conduct rather than doctrine. Secondly, the historical period in which the Bible was composed finds the Jewish people busy with subsistence and defense, with little time left over for speculation about the future life. Thirdly, a theological doctrine like immortality has no place in a historical and legislative opus. But even the prophets are not specific about the hereafter because "they probably had little to tell that they themselves knew or that human words could express, or that mental comprehension could compass."²⁸³

Baeck suggests that the silence of the Bible is a tacit protest against the images and idols of neighboring religions. "...It is probably not fortuitous that the thought of the Beyond began to find expression only when idol-worship had definitively vanished from the national life."²⁸⁴ Kohler similarly states that the Biblical writers "deliberately avoided giving any definite expression to the common belief in a future life after death, especially as the Canaanitish magicians and necromancers used this popular belief to carry on their superstitious practices, so dangerous to all moral progress. The great task which prophetic Judaism set itself was to place the entire life of men and nations in the service of the God of justice and holiness; there was thus no motive to extend the dominion of Jhuh, the god of life, to the underworld, the playground of the forces of fear and superstition."²⁸⁵

Einhorn attributes the silence of Moses about the next world and its retribution to his interest in the primacy of this life rather than the life to come. If man is to improve himself, to restore his soul to its original purity in this world, then retribution, as the purifying process, must take place in this world. Divine justice could not be postponed. ²⁸⁶

It becomes evident that there is ^{neither} unanimity nor consistency in the Reform treatment of immortality in the Bible. Many hypotheses are presented, but corroborative evidence is sorely lacking. The cause of the difficulty is this: that Reform theologians are not content with the mere Biblical concept of a vague consciousness of immortality but seek rather the more refined development of the idea--to correspond, as much as possible, with their own ideas of immortality. Thus, they impute to Moses all kinds of ideas which very likely never entered Moses's mind. Only a few of our theologians, gifted with a historical perspective, are able to recognize in the Bible a more primitive notion of the immortality idea. Only a few are willing to recognize that retribution played no role in the hereafter until the need arose (with the Hellenists) and until Persian influence introduced the concept into Judaism.

The apologetic problem by itself, however, was not difficult to solve. Aside from the Bible, irrefutable evidence was available to negate Christianity's claim that Jesus and his disciples originated their doctrine of immortality, retribution, and resurrection. Reform theologians thus point to the Wisdom of Solomon, where life eternal and future reward and punishment are made the rock and center of ethics and the final

cause of this mundane life.²⁸⁷ They cite II Maccabees, where Hannah and her seven sons die with firm conviction and faith in immortality and future reward.²⁸⁸ Josephus' clearly describes the Pharisaic concept of otherworldly retribution and resurrection.²⁸⁹ Thus it becomes obvious where Jesus derived his own concept. Thus Wise states the apology in a form which is almost polemical: "Jesus and the New Testament have not advanced one single truth that was not well known before his advent."²⁹⁰

CHAPTER VII

THE DOCTRINE OF REFORM JUDAISM

The theology of Reform Judaism represents the union between modern rational thought and traditional Jewish thought. Neither one of the partners is in itself a single consistent unity, for each one constitutes a polygot of different theories and attitudes. Matched together, the diversity increases many times over.

It is understandable, then, that our consideration of the immortality doctrine has produced no one single point of view. We are unable to say: "This, specifically, and no other, is the attitude of Reform Judaism toward immortality." Some describe the future life in one way some, in another. The exact nature of retribution has received a multiplicity of definitions. The number and character of the reasons for immortality vary with each theologian. The individualism of thought and expression which characterizes Reform Judaism becomes apparent in its consideration of the immortality idea.

But there is a common denominator which gives unity to diversity. It was succinctly stated in the Columbus platform: "Judaism affirms that man is created in the Divine image. His spirit is immortal." Even from all the multiplicity of opinions and variety of emphases, we can extract this fundamental principle which has received universal acceptance. Having rejected the irrational and antiquated beliefs in resurrection and heaven and hell, Reform Judaism has asserted the immortality of the soul and has founded the doctrine upon

the belief in God.

As a cardinal principle of Jewish theology, the doctrine of the soul's immortality has taken its place in the theologies, catechisms, sermons and prayer books of Reform Judaism. But it has failed to take its place in the minds and hearts of Reform Jews. In a survey of 675 young people in twenty Reform congregations, a question about the concept of life after death produced the following answers: I live on only in the memory of those who remember me -- 43.8 percent; I do not know what lies ahead -- 21.0 percent; all or part of me returns to God and lives on with him -- 10.3 percent; all or part of me journeys to heaven or hell -- 8.8 percent; all or part of me returns to earth in some form -- 8.8 percent; death is the end of me -- 7.3 percent.²⁹² Thus, the largest percentage subscribed to a definition of immortality which is not the definition of Reform Judaism, a kind of immortality which is no immortality at all. Only one tenth expressed the immortality doctrine of Reform Judaism as their own personal belief.

The leaders and teachers of Reform Judaism have failed to instill the Reform concept of immortality into the minds of their congregants and students. Their failure may be traced partly to the intellectual atmosphere of the age. Reason has become the sole criterion for the acceptance of any belief. Immortality cannot stand the severe test of cold reason and has been denied acceptance.

But the failure lies ultimately with the religious leaders themselves. They have failed to dislodge reason from her seat of supremacy. They have failed to show the inadequacy of

reason in discovering the basic truths of life. Reason is indeed helpful but it is not enough. By itself, it cannot lead man to a belief in God, and, consequently, to a belief in real immortality.

Our leaders have failed to impress the populace with the relevance of theology, in general, and immortality, in particular, to the daily life of man. If any thing, the immortality belief has been de-emphasized because it lures man away from the issues of this life to speculation about the hereafter. "Judaism," they say, "is a religion of this world. Concern yourselves with the evils of society, and let the future bring what it will."

Such advice springs from a narrow perspective of immortality. A line is drawn between this life and this next; when one ends the other begins. A fuller, more mature, perspective, however, erases the imaginary line. It sees an intimate connection between the Here and the Beyond. It sees one as the continuation of the other.

With such a perspective, the immortality doctrine gains significant relevance for the life of man. If our souls are immortal, then we should cultivate them for immortality. Every day of our lives we should direct our souls along paths of righteousness, not to ward off the evil decree, but to prepare ourselves for eternity. Every deed of goodness in this life becomes a deed of purification for life eternal. "One who builds for eternity must build deep and strong."²⁹²

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. Mendelssohn, M., Phaedon (translated by Cullen), p. 51.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 84.
4. Ibid., p. 126f.
5. Ibid., p. 128f.
6. Ibid., p. 138.
7. Ibid.
8. Walter, H., Moses Mendelssohn, Critic and Philosopher, p. 88.
9. Mendelssohn, M., op. cit., p. 179f.
10. Ibid., p. 184f.
11. Ibid.
12. Kohler, K., "Moses Mendelssohn and Modern Judaism," Kohler Studies, Addresses and Personal Papers, p. 370.
13. Enelow, H. G., "Moses Mendelssohn," Selected Works, V. 2, p. 396.
14. Levy, F., "Moses Mendelssohn's Ideals of Religion and Their Relation to Reform Judaism," CCAR Yearbook, V. 39, p. 352.
15. Epstein, I., Judaism of Tradition.
16. Walter, H., op. cit., p. 85.
- 16a. Rothman, W., "The Life and Work of Moses Mendelssohn," CCAR Yearbook, V. 39, p. 342.
17. Wise, I. M., "Moses Mendelssohn's Arguments on the Immortality of the Soul," Israelite, Nov. 19, 1875. p. 4.
18. Wolf, Platonischen und Mendelssohnischen Phaedon, p. 4.
19. Margolis, M., "The Theological Aspect of Reformed Judaism," CCAR Yearbook, V. 13, p. 106.
20. Ravidowicz, S., "Moses Mendelssohn, the German and Jewish Philosopher," Occident and Orient, p. 480.

21. Levy, F., op. cit., p. 364.

Chapter II

22. Geiger, A., quoted in Waxman, History of Jewish Literature, V. 3, p. 363.
23. Wise, I. M., "Immortality," Israelite, Jan. 21, 1876, p. 4.
24. Kohler, K., "Immortality," Lecture at Temple Beth-El, April 25, 1888, p. 2.
25. Wise, I. M., "Immortality," Israelite, Jan. 28, 1876, p. 4.
26. Infra, Ch. 5.
27. Wise, I. M., op. cit., p. 4.
28. Wise, I. M., "Individuation and Individuals," Israelite, Feb. 11, 1876, p. 4.
29. Wise, I. M., "Immortality," Israelite, Jan. 28, 1876, p. 4.
30. Ibid.
31. Kohler, K., op. cit., p. 4.
32. Infra, Ch. 5.
33. Kohler, K., op. cit., p. 7.
34. Montefiore, C. G., "Immortality," Judaism and the War, p. 18f.
35. Wise, I. M., "Darwinism, Evolution, a Spirit," Israelite, Dec. 17, 1875, p. 4.
36. Montefiore, C. G., op. cit., quote from J. E. Carpenter, p. 36.
37. Supra, p. 9.
38. Philipson, D., Immortality, March 29, 1889, p. 6.
39. Cohon, S. S., "The Secret of the Tomb," CCAR Sermons 1924, p. 26.
40. Silber, M., "The Mission and Message of the Memorial Service," CCAR Sermons, 1915, p. 38.
41. Calisch, E. N., "Journey's End," CCAR Sermons, 1938, p. 34.
42. Levy, C. H., "Life Everlasting," CCAR Sermons, 1926, p. 33.
43. Zielonka, M., "The Lure of Faith," CCAR Sermons, 1911, p. 20.

44. Enelow, H. G., "The Death of the Righteous," p. 7.
45. Harrison, L., "Wordsworth's Ode on the Intimations of Immortality," CCAR Sermons, 1920, p. 33.
46. Joseph, M., "The Soul and its Destiny," The Message of Judaism, p. 137f.
47. Infra, Ch. 5.

Chapter III

48. Kley, E., Catechism of the Mosaic Doctrine (translated by Lutomirski).
49. Kley, E., op. cit., p. 13.
- 50-51. Ibid., p. 136.
52. Ordnung des Neuen Tempel Verein in Hamburg.
53. Charleston, The Sabbath Service and Miscellaneous Prayers (Reformed Society of Israelites), p. 12.
54. Charleston, op. cit., p. 33.
- 54a. Ibid., p. 41.
55. Frankfurt, Protokolle und Aktenstücke der Zweiten Rabbiner Versammlung abgehalten zu Frankfurt am Main, p. 74.
Translated by courtesy of Albert Friedlander.
56. Ibid., p. 75.
57. Ibid.
58. Geiger, op. cit., p. 363f.
59. Ibid., p. 366.
60. Geiger, Gebetbuch, p. 38.
61. Philipson, D., "The Reform Prayer Book," Journal of Jewish Lore and Philosophy, Jan., 1919, p. 218.
62. Ibid.
63. "Resolutions of Past Conferences," CCAR Yearbook, V. 1, p. 109.
64. Supra, p. 24f.
65. Philipson, op. cit., p. 212.

et.?

66. Einhorn, Ohath Tamid, p. 5.
67. Ibid.
68. Merzbacher, Seder Tefillah 1855, p. 12.
69. Ibid., p. 64.
70. Merzbacher, Seder Tefillah, 1863, p. 10.
71. Ibid., p. 64.
72. The 1855 Translation translates with such phrases as "who revivest the dead," "quickenest the dead." These may or may not imply resurrection.
73. Wise, Editorial, Israelite, Oct. 12, 1879, p. 4.
74. Wise, Essence of Judaism, p. 22.
75. Wise, I. M., "That Ma'amar of Maimonides," Israelite, Aug. 29, 1879, p. 4.
76. Wise, I. M., Minhag America, Yom Kippur, 1866, p. 49.
77. Ibid.
78. Check underlined phrases with 1866 version, supra p. 29.
79. Wise, I. M., Minhag America, Daily, 1872, p. 94.
80. Protokolle der Rabbiner Conferenz Abgehalten zu Philadelphia, 1869, from translation by Miss Erna Diesendruck.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Supra, p. 25.
84. Deutsch, E., "Eschatology of the Jews until the Close of the Talmud," CCAR Yearbook, Vo. 4, p. 104.
85. Kohler, K., Manual of Religious Instruction, p. 13.
86. Kohler, K., Jewish Theology, p. 296f.
87. Kohler, K., "Immortality" (Sermon), April 29, 1881.
88. Kohler, K., "Immortality" (Sermon), March 25, 1888, p. 5.
89. Jastrow, M., Avodath Yisrael, V. 1, p. 28.

90. Union Prayer Book, 1895, p. 24.
91. Union Prayer Book, 1903. Cf. Einhorn, Supra, p. 27.
92. I. E., all editions through Newly Revised II, 1948.
93. Union Prayer Book, 1904, p. 25.
94. Ibid., p. 24.
95. Union Prayer Book II, 1948, p. 165.
96. Liberal Jewish Prayer Book, London, p. 1f.
97. Ibid., p. 10.
98. Mattuck, Immortality in Judaism, p. 9.
99. Margolis, M., op. cit., p. 99.
100. Cohon, S. S., Man and His Destiny, p. 228.
- 100a. Stolz, Jr., "Funderal Agenda," CCAR Yearbook, V. 7, p. 32.
101. Schulman, S., Judaism and the Destiny of the Individual, p. 24.
- 101a. CCAR Yearbook, V. 47, p. 97.
102. Hamburg, op. cit., p. 24.
103. Union Prayer Book Revised, p. 60. The Newly Revised omits the phrase, "May their souls, etc."
104. Kohler, K., Heaven and Hell, p. 149.
105. Ibid., p. 150f.
106. Ibid., pp. 152ff. Cf. also Jewish Theology, pp. 308ff.
107. Kohler, K., Jewish Theology, pp. 298ff.
108. Wise, I. M., "Future Reward and Punishment," Occident, V. 7, p. 86.
109. Wise, I. M., Judaism and Christianity, p. 88.
110. Ibid., p. 86.
111. Wise, I. M. "Future Reward and Punishment," Israelite, Jan. 12, 1855, p. 212.
112. Wise, I. M., "Judaism, its Doctrines and its Duties", p. 30.
113. Philipson, D., "Immortality," (Sermon), March 29, 1889, p. 11f.

114. Johlson, Instruction in the Mosaic Religion (translated by Leaser), p. 42.
115. Supra, p. 40.
116. Geiger, Gebetbuch, p. 461.
117. Union Prayer Book, 1918, p. 291.
118. Wise, I. M. Minhag America, Daily, p. 203.
119. Jastrow, M., op. cit., p. 39.
120. Schulman, S., op. cit., p. 23f.
121. Johlson, op. cit., p. 45.
122. Einhorn, D., op. cit., Yom Kippur, p. 269.
123. Klein, J., "Prepare Yourself," UAHC Sermons No. 6, p. 43.
124. Supra, p. 42.
125. Margolis, M., op. cit., p. 69.
126. Supra.
127. Friedlander, M., "Discussion of Theological Aspect of Reformed Judaism."
128. Joseph, M., Judaism as Creed and Life, pp. 107ff.
129. Montefiore, C. G. op. cit., p. 24.
130. Montefiore, C. G., Liberal Judaism, p. 57.
131. Joseph, N. S., "Immortality," Prayers for Jewish People No. 5, p. 18f.
132. Enelow, H. G. "The Death of the Righteous."
133. Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Rabbinical Conference, p. 25.
134. Ibid.
135. Union Prayer Book Revised, V. 1, p. 309.
136. Ibid., V. 2, p. 329.
137. Ibid., p. 180.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid., p. 331.
140. Ibid., V. 1, p. 23.
141. Ibid., p. 25.

142. Ibid., V. 2, p. 326.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid., p. 329.
145. Ibid., p. 338.
146. Cohon, S. S., "The Theology of the Union Prayer Book," CCAR Yearbook, V. 38, p. 259.
147. Ibid., p. 260.
148. Supra, p. 46.
149. Cohon, S.S., op. cit., p. 261.
150. U. P. B. Revised, V. 1, p. 237.
151. Ibid., V. 2, p. 264-5.
152. Cohon, S. S., op. cit., p. 26.
153. Hirsch, S., "Religion of Humanity," Reform Jewish Advocate, January 1, 1916, p. 648.
154. Montefiore, C. G., "Immortality," Judaism and the War, p. 20.
155. Union Prayer Book, Newly Revised, V. 1, p. 307.
156. Ibid., V. 2, p. 314.
157. Ibid., p. 211.
158. Ibid., p. 213.
159. Ibid., p. 310f.
160. Ibid., V. 1, p. 76; V. 2, p. 32.

Chapter IV

161. Cohon, S. S., Class notes of Theology 2.
162. Ibid.
163. CCAR, "Resolutions of Past Conferences," CCAR Yearbook, V. 1.
164. Immortality was only incidentally discussed at the Frankfurt Conference of 1845. See Supra, p. 24.
165. Supra, note 62.

166. Supra, note 80.
167. Supra, note 133.
168. Supra, note 101-a.
169. Stolz, J., op. cit.
170. Ibid., p. 32.
171. Margolis, M., op. cit., p. 117.
172. CCAR Yearbook, V. 18, p. 106. Each year the committee reported "progress" until 1917 when the following report was made: "The committee feels that the Conference by adopting the report in 1908, having given up the idea of formulating a Jewish theology, and the practical needs for the present of those who belong to the Reform wing of Israel having been met (by Kohler's Theology), the enterprise of publishing a Volume of Theological Essays, as recommended in 1908, should be discontinued." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 27.)
173. Guttmacher, A., "Modern Thought Tendencies in Judaism," CCAR Yearbook, V. 8, p. 194.
174. CCAR Yearbook, V. 47, p. 97.
175. Supra, p. 23.
176. Kley, op. cit., p. 132.
177. Charleston, op. cit., p. 7.
178. Johlson, op. cit., p. 17.
- 178a. Einhorn, Die Lehre des Judenthums, p. 38.
179. Wise, The Essence of Judaism, p. 22.
180. Hirsch, S., Systematische Katechismus, p. 214.
181. Kohler, K., Manual of Religious Instruction, p. 13.
182. Mark, J., "Man-Known and Unknown," CCAR Sermons 1937, p. 31.
183. Singer, J., "Living Immortality," CCAR Sermons 1935, p. 41.
184. Silverman, J., "A Meditation on Death and Immortality," CCAR Sermons 1929, p. 34.
185. Gordon, J., "Life Beyond Death and God Beyond Life," CCAR Sermons 1930, p. 38.
186. Neumark, D., "Systematic Relations of Judaism to Kant," CCAR Yearbook, V. 34, p. 221.

187. Reichert, V., "What I Believe About Immortality," p. 5.
188. Rudin, J., "Why?" CCAR Sermons 1946, p. 28.
189. Cohon, B. D., "Water Spilt on the Ground," CCAR Sermons 1943, p. 45.
190. Neuman, L., "Fear Not the Sentence of Death," CCAR Sermons 1932.
191. Lefkowitz, S., "Hallowed Memories," CCAR Sermons 1944, p. 24.
192. Cohon, S. S. Man and His Destiny, p. 225.
193. Galloway, The Idea of Immortality.
194. Gordon, J., op. cit., p. 39.
195. Cohon, S. S., What We Jews Believe, p. 182.
196. Schulman, S., op. cit., p. 6f.
197. Cohon, S. S., Man and His Destiny, p. 230.
198. Wise, I. M., "Personal Immortality," Israelite, March 3, 1876.
199. Neumark, D., "Historical and Systematic Relations of Judaism to Kant," CCAR Yearbook, V. 31, p. 220f.
200. Hirsch, S., Religion of Humanity, Reform Advocate, Dec. 25, 1915.
201. Joseph, N. S., "Immortality," p. 5.
202. Lazarus, O., Liberal Judaism and Its Standpoint, p. 101.
203. Schulman, S., op. cit., p. 24f.
204. Joseph, M. "The Soul and its Destiny," p. 138.
205. Wise, I. M., "On the Absurdity of Supposing that the Thinking Principle in Man Will Ever be Annihilated," Israelite, V. 5, March 25, 1859, p. 300.
206. Freund, C. J., "A Message of Hope," CCAR Sermons 1912, p. 21f.
207. Hirsch, E. G., My Religion, p. 110.
208. Hamburg, op. cit., p. 279. Translated by courtesy of A. Friedlander.
- 208a. Charleston, op. cit., p. 41.
209. Geiger, op. cit., p. 462. Translated by courtesy of A. Friedlander.
210. Ibid.

211. Ibid., p. 464.
212. Berlin, Gebetbuch für Jüdische Reformgemeinden, p. 59.
Translated by courtesy of A. Friedlander.
213. Merzbacher, op. cit., p. 347.
214. Einhorn, Olath Tamid, p. 15.
215. Ibid., 1872, p. 270.
216. Ibid., V. 2, 1896, p. 224.
217. I. M. Wise, Minhag America, Daily, 1866, p. 203.
218. Ibid., p. 39.
219. Ibid., Yom Kippur, p. 64.
220. Union Prayer Book I, Revised, p. 333.
221. Ibid., I, Newly Revised, p. 151.
222. Ibid. II, Newly Revised, p. 311.
223. Ibid. I, 1914, p. 49.
224. Ibid. I. 1940, p. 72.
225. Ibid., all editions.
226. London, Liberal Jewish Prayer Book III, 1926, p. 96.
227. Hamburg, op. cit., p. 24.
228. Merzbacher, op. cit., p. 42.
229. Einhorn, op. cit., 1896, p. 12.
230. Wise, op. cit., 1866, p. 88.
231. Union Prayer Book I Revised, p. 60.
232. Jastrow, op. cit., p. 40.
233. Cohon, S. S., "The Theology of the Union Prayer Book,"
p. 260f.
234. Ibid., p. 289.
- 234a. Union Prayer Book I, Newly Revised, p. 77.

Chapter V

235. Harrison, L. Op. cit., p. 31. This argument is presented by almost every Reform theologian.

236. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Abbt, p. 218f.
237. Wise, "A Few Remarks against Materialism and Atheism," Israelite, Sep. 2, 1864, p. 74.
238. Johlson, op. cit., p. 39f.
239. Ibid., p. 6.
240. This argument is presented by the majority of theologians: M. Joseph, Johlson, Cohon et al.
241. Montefiore, "Immortality," Judaism and War.
242. Johlson, M. Lefkovitz, R. Grossman, S. S. Cohon.
243. Wise, "On the Universal Belief, which the Doctrine of Immortality has Obtained in All Ages," Israelite, April 8, 1859, p. 324f.
244. Wise, "Origin and Development of the Immortality Idea," Israelite, May 21, 1891, p. 4.
245. Grossman, R., "The Hope of Immortality," Sermons by American Rabbis, p. 308.
246. Montefiore, C. G., Outlines of Liberal Judaism for Parents and Teachers, p. 154.
247. Cohon, Man and His Destiny, p. 230.
248. Mattuck, op. cit., p. 18.
249. Johlson, op. cit., p. 39. The same sentiment is expressed by Philipson, Lefkovitz, Wise, Montefiore.
250. L. Harrison retains the older idea and describes the soul as a simple force which is undestructible, op. cit.
251. Joseph, N. S., op. cit., p. 4.
252. Wise, "On the Absurdity, etc," Israelite, March 25, 1859, p. 4.
253. Philipson, "Immortality," p. 8. Also N. S. Joseph, S. Hirsch, M. Silber, R. Grossman, J. Levy, Calisch, Kley, Geiger, Hamburg Prayer Book.
254. Johlson, op. cit., p. 39. Cf. Mendelssohn, Supra, p. 5.
255. Johlson, op. cit., p. 40.
256. Wise, Essence of Judaism, p. 28f. and Philipson, "Immortality," p. 9.
257. Gutheim, J. K., "The Immortality of the Soul," The American Jewish Pulpit, p. 111.

- 258. Schulman, op. cit., p. 19.
- 259. Wise, "Immortality," Israelite, Jan. 28, 1876.
- 260. Wise, Lectures on Immortality, Israelite, Jan. 28, 1876; February 4, 1876; February 11, 1876; February 18, 1876.
- 261. Heller, J. G., Answer to F. Levy's paper, "The Nature and Scope of Jewish Theology," CCAR Yearbook, p. 359.

Chapter VI

- 262. CCAR, p. 494.
- 263. Stolz, op. cit., p. 28f.
- 264. Kohler, Jewish Theology, p. 290.
- 265. Supra, p. 29 & p. 42f. Also Joseph, M., Judaism as Creed and Life, p. 111.
- 266. Margolis, M., op. cit., pp. 253ff.
- 267. Reichert, V., op. cit., p. 6.
- 268. Kohler, op. cit., p. 290.
- 269. Wise, Editorial, Israelite, March 9, 1878, p. 4.
- 270. Kohler, K., "David Einhorn, the Uncompromising Champion of Reform Judaism," CCAR Yearbook, V. 19, p. 243.
- 271. Kohler, Jewish Theology, p. 289.
- 272. Wise, "Two Doctrines in One Haggadah," Israelite, Nov. 19, 1896, p. 4.
- 273. Aboth 3.1.
- 273a. Neuman, A., "The Immortality of Man," pp. 13ff.
- 274. Wise, "The Doctrine of Immortality and the 'Christian Review,'" Israelite, March 27, 1857, p. 298f.
- 275. Wise, "The Doctrine of Immortality is a Mosaic Dogma of Judaism," Israelite, Oct. 3, 1895, p. 4. Also N. S. Joseph, Kley, Joseph M., Einhorn.
- 276. Wise, "The Doctrine of Immortality and the 'Christian Review,'" Israelite, March 27, 1857, p. 298f.
- 277. Wise, "The Doctrine of Immortality is a Mosaic Dogma of Judaism," Israelite, Oct. 3, 1895, p. 4.

278. Wise, "The Doctrine of Immortality and the 'Christian Review,'" Israelite, March 27, 1857, p. 298f.
279. Wise, Editorial, Israelite, May 16, 1889, p. 4.
280. Wise, Judaism and Christianity, p. 73.
281. Israelite, September 7, 1866, p. 4f.
282. Ibid.
283. Joseph, N. S., op.cit., pp. 11ff.
284. Baeck, L., "Religion of the Hebrews," article in Olemen, Religions of the World, p. 286.
285. Kohler, Jewish Theology, p. 280. Also Philipson and Einhorn.
286. Einhorn, Sinai, V. 6, p. 302.
287. Wise, Judaism and Christianity, p. 73, also Cohon.
288. Ibid.
289. Ibid.
290. Wise, "Doctrine of Immortality and the 'Christian Review,'" March 27, 1857, p. 298.

Chapter VII

291. Survey by B. Erickner.
292. Harrison, op. cit.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baeck, L. "Religion of the Hebrews" (Clemen, Religions of the of the World). N. Y., Harcourt, Brace, 1931.
- Berlin, Gebetbuch für Jüdische Reformgemeinden. Berlin, 1851-2.
- Calisch, E. N. "Journey's End." (CCAR.Sermons). Cincinnati, 1938.
- CCAR. "Formula for the Reception of Proselytes." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 7). 1896-7.
- CCAR. "Guiding Principles of Reform Judaism." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 47). 1937.
- CCAR. Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Rabbinical Conference. Richmond, Va., Old Dominion Press, 1923.
- CCAR. "Report of the Committee on the Elaboration of a Systematic Theology." (CCAR Yearbooks, V. 18-27, inc.). 1908-17 inc.
- CCAR. "Report of Committee on Margolis's Paper" (CCAR Yearbook, V. 15). 1905.
- CCAR. "Resolutions of Past Conferences." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 1). 1890-1.
- CCAR. Union Prayer Book. (all editions).
- Charleston, S. C. The Sabbath Service and Miscellaneous Prayers. (Reformed Society of Israelites, 1825). Reprinted, New York, Bloch, 1916.
- Cohon, B. D. "Water Spilt on the Ground." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1942.
- Cohon, S. S. Man and His Destiny. Cincinnati, HUC Placement Bureau, 1940.
- Cohon, S. S. "The Religious Ideas of a Union Prayer Book." (CCAR, V. 40). 1930.
- Cohon, S. S. "The Secret of the Tomb." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1924.
- Cohon, S. S. "The Theology of the Union Prayer Book." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 38). 1928.
- Cohon, S. S. What We Jews Believe. Cincinnati, UAHC, 1931.
- Currick, M. C. "Children of Two Worlds." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1927.

- Deutsch, G. "Eschatology of the Jews until the Close of the Talmud." (CCAR, Vol. 4). 1894.
- Einhorn, D. Book of Prayers. N. Y., Thalmessinger, 1872.
- Einhorn, D. Book of Prayers. (Translated by E. G. Hirsch). J. Einhorn, 1896.
- Einhorn, D. Die Lehre des Judenthums. Philadelphia, Stein and Jones, 1866.
- Einhorn, D. Das Princip des Mosaismus. Leipzig, Fritzsche, 1854.
- Einhorn, D. "Unterscheidungslehre zwischen Judentum und Christendom." (Sinai, V. 6-7). Philadelphia, Stein and Jones, 1861-2.
- Enelow, H. G. "The Comforting Quality of Religion." (The Effects of Religion). N. Y., Temple Emanu-El, 1917.
- Enelow, H. G. The Death of the Righteous. New York, 1914.
- Enelow, H. G. The Faith of Israel. Cincinnati, UAHC, 1917.
- Enelow, H. G. "Moses Mendelssohn." (Selected Works, V. 2), Kingsport, 1935.
- Enelow, H. G. "The Spiritual Worth of the Modern Kaddish." (Selected Works, V. 2). Kingsport, Tenn., 1935.
- Enelow, H. G. "What Do Jews Believe." (Union Tract No. 1). Cincinnati, 1908.
- Epstein, I. Judaism of Tradition. London, Goldston, 1931.
- Fineshriber, W. H. "The Decay of Theology in Popular Religion," (CCAR Yearbook, V. 30). 1920.
- Frankfurt, Protokolle und Aktenstücke der zweiten Rabbiner Versammlung abgehalten zu Frankfurt am Main. Ullman, 1845.
- Freund, C. J. "A Message of Hope." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1912.
- Friedlander, M. Discussion of "Theological Aspects of Reformed Judaism." Oakland, Calif., 1905.
- Galloway, G. The Idea of Immortality. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1919.
- Geiger, A. Gebetbuch. Breslau, 1854.

- Gordon, J. "Life Beyond Death and God Beyond Life." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1930.
- Grossman, R. "The Hope of Immortality." (Sermons by American Rabbis). Chicago, CCAR, 1896.
- Gup, S. "Life in Death." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1934.
- Gutheim, J. K. "The Immortality of the Soul." (The American Jewish Pulpit). Cincinnati, 1881.
- Gutheim, J. "The Spirit of God in Man." (The Temple Pulpit). Jewish Times, N. Y., 1872.
- Guttmacher, A. "Modern Thought Tendencies in Judaism." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 8). 1899.
- Hamburg. Ordnung der Andacht des Neuen-Tempel Verein in Hamburg. 1819.
- Harrison, L. "Wordsworth's Odes on the Intimations of Immortality." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1920.
- Hirsch, E. G. My Religion. New York, Macmillan Co., 1925.
- Hirsch, E. G. "The Philosophy of the Reform Movement." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 5). 1896.
- Hirsch, Samuel. "Religion of Humanity." (Reform Advocate, May 29, 1915-Jan. 1, 1916 inc.). Chicago.
- Hirsch, Samuel. Systematische Katechismus. Philadelphia, Hirsch and Larzelere, 1877.
- Hirschberg, A. "In Memory's Shrine." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1914.
- Jastrow, M. Avodath Yisroel. Philadelphia, 1885.
- Johlsen, J. Instruction in the Mosaic Religion, (translated by I. Leeser). Philadelphia, Jones and Thacher, 1830.
- Joseph, M. Judaism as Creed and Life. London, Macmillan, 1903.
- Joseph, M. "The Soul and its Destiny." (The Message of Judaism). London, G. Routledge and Sons, 1907.
- Joseph, N. S. Immortality. (Prayers for Jewish People No. 5). London, Jewish Religious Union.
- Kaufman, M. "Immortality Within the Framework of Modern Science." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 58). 1948.

- Kayserling, M. Moses Mendelssohn. Leipzig, H. Mendelssohn, 1862.
- Klein, J. "Prepare Yourself." (CCAR Sermons, V. 6). Cincinnati, 1904.
- Kley, E. Catechism of the Mosaic Doctrine (translated from 3rd edition by Lutomirski). Oxford, 1842.
- Kohler, K. "David Einhorn, the Uncompromising Champion of Reform Judaism." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 19). 1909.
- Kohler, K. Heaven and Hell in Comparative Religion. New York, Macmillan Co., 1923.
- Kohler, K. "Immortality," Lecture at Temple Beth-El. (American Hebrew). New York, April 29, 1881.
- Kohler, K. Immortality, Lecture at Temple Beth-El. New York, April 25, 1888.
- Kohler, K. "Immortality." (Jewish Encyclopedia). New York and London, 1904.
- Kohler, K. "Jewish Eschatology." (Jewish Encyclopedia). London, 1902.
- Kohler, K. Jewish Theology. New York, Macmillan Co., 1918.
- Kohler, K. Manual of Religious Instruction. New York, P. Cowen, 1887.
- Kohler, K. "Moses Mendelssohn and Modern Judaism." (Addresses and Personal Papers). Cincinnati, 1931.
- Kohler, K. "Resurrection." (Jewish Encyclopedia). New York, and London, 1904.
- Kohler, K. "The Spiritual Forces of Judaism." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 4). 1894.
- Kornfeld, J. S. "The Blessed Assurance." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1909.
- Lazarus, O. Liberal Judaism and Its Standpoint. London, Macmillan Co., 1937.
- Lefkowitz, M. "We Are Immortal." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1918.
- Lefkowitz, D. "Light at Eventide." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1945.
- Lefkowitz, S. M. "Hallowed Memories." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1944.

- Levy, C. H. "Life Everlasting." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1926.
- Levy, F. "Moses Mendelssohn's Ideals of Religion and their Relation to Reform Judaism." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 39), 1929.
- Levy, F. "The Nature and Scope of Jewish Theology and its Bearing on Modern Thought." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 41). 1931.
- Liberal Jewish Synagogue (London). Liberal Jewish Prayer Book. (1923-V.1,2,3; 1926-V.1,2,3). London.
- Margolis, M. "The Theological Aspect of Reformed Judaism." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 13), 1903.
- Mark, J. "Man-Known and Unknown." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1937.
- Mann, L. "What is Certain in the Uncertainty of Life?" (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1928.
- Mattuck, I. The Essentials of Liberal Judaism. London, G. Routledge, 1947.
- Mattuck, I. "Immortality in Judaism" (Union Tract No. 21). Cincinnati, O.
- Mendelssohn, M. Phaedon. (translated by C. Cullen). London, J. Cooper, 1789.
- Merzbacher, L. Seder Tefillah, Yom Kippur. New York, 1855. Revised by Adler, 1863.
- Merzbacher, L. Seder Tefillah. Daily and Holydays. New York, 1855. Revised by Adler, 1860.
- Montefiore, C. G. "Immortality." (Judaism and the War). London, Jewish Religious Union, 1917.
- Montefiore, C. G. "Jewish Conceptions of Immortality." (In Spirit and in Truth, edited by G. Yates). London, Hoddler & Stoughton, 1934.
- Montefiore, C. G. Liberal Judaism. London, Macmillan and Co., 1903.
- Montefiore, C. G. Outlines of Liberal Judaism for Parents and Teachers. London, Macmillan and Co., 1912.
- Montefiore, C. G. Truth in Religion and Other Sermons. London, Macmillan & Co., 1906.

- Moses, A. "Hell and Heaven." (Yahwism). Louisville, 1903.
- Moses, I. S. "Hope and Consolation." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1922.
- Neuman, A. "Immortality of Man." _____
- Neumark, D. "Historical and Systematic Relations of Judaism to Kant." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 34). 1924.
- Newman, L. I. "Fear Not the Sentence of Death." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1932.
- Philipson, D. Immortality. Cincinnati, March 29, 1889.
- Philipson, D. The Reform Movement in Judaism. New York, Macmillan, 1931.
- Philipson, D. "The Reform Prayer Book." (Journal of Jewish Lore and Philosophy. V. 1. No. 1). Cincinnati, January 1919.
- Raisin, J. S. "The Reform Movement before Geiger." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 20). 1910.
- Rauch, J. "The Hamburg Prayer Book." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 28). 1918.
- Rawidowicz, S. "Moses Mendelssohn, the German and Jewish Philosopher," (Occident and Orient). London, 1936.
- Reichert, V. "What I Believe about Immortality." (CBS Church of the Air). April 4, 1937.
- Rothman, W. "The Life and Work of Moses Mendelssohn." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 39). 1929.
- Rudin, J. "Why?" (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1946.
- Schanfarber, T. "A Call to Man." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1910.
- Schlesinger, M. "Cremation from the Jewish Standpoint." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 2). 1892.
- Schulman, S. "The Heart of Wisdom." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1909.
- Schulman, S. Judaism and the Destiny of the Individual. London, World Union for Progressive Judaism, 1934.
- Silber, M. "The Mission and Message of the Memorial Service." (CCAR). Cincinnati, 1915.

- Silver, A. H. "A Three-Fold Benison." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1925.
- Silverman, J. "A Meditation on Death and Immortality." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1929.
- Singer, J. "Living Immortality." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1935.
- Starrels, S. E. "Death and the Spirit's Unbroken Crust." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1931.
- Stern, Nathan. "Love's Resurrection." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1923.
- Stolz, J. "Funeral Agenda." (CCAR Yearbook, V. 7). 1897-8.
- Walter, H. Moses Mendelssohn, Critic and Philosopher. New York, Bloch, 1930.
- Waxman, M. "Movements in Judaism." (History of Jewish Literature, V. 3, Ch. 9). New York, Bloch, 1936.
- Weiss, H. "Memory and Hope." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1910.
- Wise, I. M. "On the Absurdity of Supposing that the Thinking Principle in Man Will Ever be Annihilated." (Israelite, V. 5, p. 300). Cincinnati, March 25, 1859. (authorship in doubt.)
- Wise, I. M. "The Argument of Dr. Schuetz in Favor of Personal Immortality." (Israelite, V. 25, No. 23, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1875.
- Wise, I. M. Daily Prayers. (all editions - 1857-1886). Cincinnati, Bloch.
- Wise, I. M. "Darwinism, Evolution and Spirit." (Israelite, V. 25, No. 24, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1875.
- Wise, I. M. A Defense of Judaism versus Proselytizing Christianity. Cincinnati, Bloch, 1899.
- Wise, I. M. "Dr. John Thomas's Views on Immortality." (Israelite, V. 6, p. 228). Cincinnati, Jan. 20, 1860.
- Wise, I. M. "The Doctrine of Immortality, and the 'Christian Review.'" (Israelite, V. 3, pp. 298-9). Cincinnati, March 27, 1857.
- Wise, I. M. "The Doctrine of Immortality is a Mosaic Dogma of Judaism." (Israelite, V. 42, No. 14, p. 4). Cincinnati, Oct. 3, 1895.

- Wise, I. M. Editorial. (Israelite, V. 19, No. 3, p. 8). Cincinnati, July 19, 1872.
- Wise, I. M. Editorial. (Israelite, V. 29, No. 26, p. 4). Cincinnati, Dec. 28, 1877.
- Wise, I. M. Editorial. (Israelite). Cincinnati, March 9, 1878.
- Wise, I. M. Editorial. (Israelite, V. 34, No. 16, p. 4). Cincinnati, Oct. 14, 1887.
- Wise, I. M. Editorial on Maimonides (Israelite, V. 33, No. 11, p. 4). Cincinnati, Sept. 12, 1879.
- Wise, I. M. Editorial on the Origin of the Immortality and Resurrection Doctrines. (Israelite, V. 41, No. 45, p. 4). Cincinnati, May 9, 1895.
- Wise, I. M. Editorials Showing Superiority of Judaism. (Israelite, V. 35, No. 46). Cincinnati, May 16, 1889.
- Wise, I. M. "The Effect of Biblical Theology." (Occident, V. 8, pp. 217-231). Philadelphia, 1850.
- Wise, I. M. "The Effect of Biblical Theology." (Occident, Vol. 8). Philadelphia, August 1850.
- Wise, I. M. The Essence of Judaism for Teachers and Pupils. Cincinnati, Bloch and Co., 1868.
- Wise, I. M. Festival Prayers. (all editions, 1866-1900). Cincinnati, Bloch and Co.
- Wise, I. M. "A Few Remarks against Materialism and Atheism." (Israelite, V. 11, p. 74). Cincinnati, September 2, 1864.
- Wise, I. M. "The Fourth Theory on the Origin of Species." (Israelite, V. 25, No. 25, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1875.
- Wise, I. M. "Future Reward and Punishment." (Israelite, V. 1, p. 212). Cincinnati, Jan. 12, 1855.
- Wise, I. M. "Future Reward and Punishment." (Occident, V. 7, pp. 86-89). Philadelphia, 1849.
- Wise, I. M. "Hope." (Israelite, V. 31, No. 7, p. 4 and V. 31, No. 8, p. 4). Cincinnati, August 16, 1878 and August 23, 1878 resp.
- Wise, I. M. "Immortality." (Israelite, V. 26, No. 3, p. 4 and No. 4, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1876.
- Wise, I. M. "Individuation and Individuals." (Israelite, V. 26, No. 6, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1870.

- Wise, I. M. Judaism and Christianity. Cincinnati, Bloch and Co., 1883.
- Wise, I. M. "Life Eternal." (Israelite, V. 27, No. 15, p. 116-7 and No. 16, p. 124). Cincinnati, Oct. 8 and Oct. 15, 1880, resp.
- Wise, I. M. "The Means and Degrees of Immortality." (Israelite, V. 26, No. 13, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1876.
- Wise, I. M. "The Moral Aspect of Memory." (Israelite, V. 34, No. 15, p. 4). Cincinnati, Oct. 7, 1887.
- Wise, I. M. "Moses Mendelssohn's Arguments on the Immortality of the Soul." (Israelite, V. 25, No. 19, p. 4 and No. 20, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1875.
- Wise, I. M. "Objections and Probabilities in Regard to Personal Immortality." (Israelite, V. 26, No. 11, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1875.
- Wise, I. M. "Origin and Development of the Immortality Idea." (Israelite, V. 37, No. 46, p. 4). Cincinnati, May 21, 1891.
- Wise, I. M. "Personal Immortality." (Israelite, V. 26, No. 9, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1875.
- Wise, I. M. "Points on Which Judaism and Christianity Differ: The Immortality Doctrine of the Hebrews." (Israelite, V. 43, No. 41, p. 4 and No. 43, p. 4). Cincinnati, April 8 and April 22, 1897, resp.
- Wise, I. M. "The Substantiality and Eternity of Mind." (Israelite, V. 26, No. 5, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1876.
- Wise, I. M. "Reply to Veritas of Edinburgh." (Israelite, Vol. 3, p. 275). Cincinnati, March 6, 1857.
- Wise, I. M. Review of "The Soul of Man is Not Immortal," a pamphlet by O. H. Harris (Israelite, V. 34, No. 52, p. 4). Cincinnati, June 22, 1888.
- Wise, I. M. "A Response." (Israelite, V. 6, p. 70). Cincinnati, Sept. 2, 1859.
- Wise, I. M. "Sensation and Intelligence." (Israelite, V. 25, No. 21, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1875.
- Wise, I. M. "On the Silence of the Pentateuch Respecting the Doctrine of Immortality." (Israelite, V. 13, No. 8, pp. 4-5; V. 13, No. 10, pp. 4-5). Cincinnati, August 24, 1866 and Sept. 7, 1866, resp.

- Wise, I. M. "On the Silence of the Pentateuch Respecting the Doctrine of Immortality." (Israelite, V. 13, No. 8, pp. 4-5; V. 13, No. 10, pp. 4-5). Cincinnati, Aug. 24, 1866 and Sept. 7, 1866 resp.
- Wise, I. M. "That Ma'amar of Maimonides." (Israelite, V. 33, No. 9, p. 4). Cincinnati, Aug. 29, 1879.
- Wise, I. M. "Two Doctrines in One Hagadah." (Israelite, V. 43, No. 21, p. 4). Cincinnati, Nov. 19, 1896.
- Wise, I. M. "Unconscious, Conscious and Self-conscious." (Israelite, V. 26, No. 7, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1875.
- Wise, I. M. "On the Universal Belief, which the Doctrine of Immortality has Obtained in All Ages." (Is. v. 5, p. 314 and V. 5, pp. 324-5). Cincinnati, April 8 and 15, 1859.
- Wise, I. M. "A Voice Crieth." (CCAR Sermons-delivered in 1891). Cincinnati, 1919.
- Wise, I. M. "Will and Passion." (Israelite, V. 25, No. 22, p. 4). Cincinnati, 1875.
- Wise, S. "The Adventure of Life and Death." (Free Synagogue Pulpit). New York, 1920.
- Wise, S. "The Awakened Soul." (Free Synagogue Pulpit). New York, 1920.
- Wise, S. "The Blessing of Grief." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1899.
- Witt, L. "Remembrance that Redeems from Death." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1939.
- Wolf, J. Platonischen und Mendelssohnschen Phaeton. Wien, 1880.
- Zielonka, M. "The Lure of Faith." (CCAR Sermons). Cincinnati, 1911.