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HENRI BERGSON
IN THE LIGHT OF
JEWISH PHILOSOPHY.

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FOREWORD.

A dissertation that has for its subject "Henri Bergson in the Light of Jewish Philosophy" presupposes a continuity of Jewish thought that reaches the present day. This presupposition is justified only on the consideration of an extensive influence of ancient and medieval technical Jewish philosophy. If the term 'philosophy' be broadly interpreted it may truly be said that the Jew has philosophized quite as much during the last five centuries as he did during the five preceding centuries which witnessed the production of formal philosophic works, but for the most part Jewish thinking has eluded systematic formalation since the days of Hasdai Crescas who died in the year 1410. Religion and ethics were of prime importance to the Jew prior to the age of philosophy, and even with the philosophers medieval rationalism was but the handmaid of Biblical doctrine. In like manner philosophy during the Modern Period was subordinated to Judaism, that is, to a practical code of religious customs and ethics. The Jewish philosophers, properly so called, continued in authority after their day and are still the masters of whatever is distinctive in Jewish thought. While, therefore, Jewish philosophy is correctly a product of the Medieval Period, it may be considered modern in the sense that its influence has been continuous.

The essay herewith undertaken assumes with sufficient reason the vitality of the major principles for which the medieval Jewish philosophers contended in their day, with the assistance of the current thought in large part but in some important respects against the dominant beliefs. Whereas the deliberate intention of those men of an earlier time was to harmonize a faith, founded upon the Bible and tradition, with an alien philosophy, it is in no wise the thesis of this study to bring into agreement the Jewish line of thought with Bergsonism. The writer has in mind that Bergson is of Jewish

Origin, but it is not his intention to allow that fact to enter into his considerations; rather has it been a motivating influence in undertaking the study. The chief purpose is to compare and contrast some of the fundamental ideas and beliefs of historic Judaism with a modern philosophy which, though it makes no claim to being Jewish, has been widely reported to be of unusual assistance both in clarifying the tenets of the ancient faith and in pointing out the direction which its philosophic development must take if it is to be brought into accord with modern scientific research. In so far as this treatise draws parallels it will resemble in method and purpose the philosophic writings of mediæval Jews who sought to bring their traditions into agreement with the current thought of their day.

The doctrine of evolution so revolutionized the world's philosophy that it is scarcely possible to span the centuries that separate us from medieval times with any vital bonds of thought. Liberal allowance must be made for the interval of time if the 'Principle of Becoming' which is part of the theory of emanation, is to be compared to the Bergsonian 'Principle of Becoming.' The difference between the two is the cardinal difference between ancient and modern thought. The one is regressive, the other progressive; the one sets forth from perfection and arrives eventually at a humble degradation of itself, the other is advancing through ever improving forms to a radically new order continuously recreating itself.

Though the points of view be very different, similarities may be discovered and suggestions of modern ideas be discerned in the old. Change as an important factor in consciousness and the world of matter was no less noticeable then than now, and in the view of the Greeks as well as in the ultra-modern philosophy of Henri

Bergson change was a fundamental characteristic of reality. Again, universal thought has passed around the circle to the ancient conception of the derivation of matter from spirit. Certain demands of the human spirit for unity, freedom and the supremacy of the spiritual have given much the same formulation to philosophic problems since the beginning of self-conscious metaphysical speculation.

The subject of this thesis was found, upon investigation and in pursuit of treatment, to be too broad for adequate discussion within the limits of the ordinary thesis of this kind, and it has been restricted, therefore, to the central theme of any philosophy: The Absolute. For the purposes of theology, such consideration is most important. In the conceptions of the Absolute the widest differences will be seen between Bergson and the Jewish philosophers, and for this reason limitation to that question is the better justified. The intention originally was to consider also the two problems of Creation and Free Will because the unique solutions which Bergson offers have important bearing upon the Jewish position relative to them. Intimations of the ideas on these subjects are given in the course of this study of the Absolute. Bergson identifies Creation with evolution, a process going on continually, not a final act intime. Freedom is the foremost characteristic of creative evolution; the difficulty that surrounded the idea of Free Will in the past resolves itself away when the Absolute is conceived of as a progressively developing reality, but it must remain to torment the mind if the postulate of an Omnipotent and Omniscient Being is laid down.

I.

THE ABSOLUTE

Considered from the Point of View of Henri Bergson.

THE ABSOLUTE.

As generally understood in philosophic usage the term Absolute represents the last analyzable element of a logical process beyond which reason cannot lead because of the nature of its powers; in this sense the Absolute is the Ultimate. More than that, the Absolute is then conceived to be the inner meaning of all things within experience, the definition of Reality. In the word itself, as well as in the use to which it has been put by the philosphers, there is somethigg that suggests the stable, the unchanging, which makes it meaningless for the philosophy of Henri Bergson to whom reality is nothing static but is ceaseless change. That the term may be acceptable to him as a label for what is ultimate, the Absolute cannot be associated with thoughts of finality or self-sufficiency, for it is simple becoming, continual change in time, pure duration. And, further, a knowledge of the Absolute, in the Bergsonian sense, is not attained to by the aid of the reason - certainly not by the reason alone. With these qualifications it may be said that Bergson's philosphy contains the idea of an Absolute: it is Time, "the very stuff of reality,"- not time that is completed or measured, but Time flowing. It remains to consider more fully these two qualifications: the source of knowledge, other then reason, of the Absolute, and the incompleteness of the Absolute, i.e. of duration as distinguished from an uncritical conception of time.

It is important to note that Bergson does not construct a system upon the foundation of his absolute. His philosophy is"Not an account of the ultimate nature of the universe, which claims to be a complete representation in knowledge of all reality, and which appeals to us for acceptance on the ground of its consistency and harmony.... One of its most important conclusions is

that the universe is not a completed system of reality, of which it is only our knowledge that is imperfect, but that the universe is itself becoming. Consequently the value of the philosophy... will be seen to depend ultimately not on the irrefutability of its logic, but on the reality and significance of the simple facts of consciousness to which it directs our attention." (1)

In a preface to his criticism of the evolutionism of Spencer, Bergson accounts for the new method in philosophy which he himself introduced. "The advent of the moral sciences, the progress of psychology, the growth in importance of embryology among the biological sciences—all this was bound to suggest the idea of a reality which endures inwardly, which is duration itself. The thought of the nineteenth century called for a philosophy of this kind. It felt that philosophy ought to establish itself in what we call concrete duration."(2) Bergson sought to purge experience and appeal to experience anew. He set himself the purpose to release experience from the molds that intellect has formed in the degree and proportion of the progress of action on things. Pure time had become corrupted as the result of confusion with the idea of space, and spatialized time has taken its place. Experience seeks "beyond the spatialized time in which we believe we see continual rearrangements between the parts, that concrete duration in which a radical recasting of the whole is always going on. It follows the real in all its sinuosities."(3)

Bergson's center of force is the intuition of duration. It is clear upon an examination of experience that we are aware of facts ranged in a double series. First we observe the tendency of facts to present themselves to us in juxtaposition to other facts. For all practical purposes such facts are repeated, and they tend to distinct multipicity and spatiality. Much as we try to keep the

facts distinct, we note at the same time another tendency on their part to assume the form of reciprocal interpenetration. This second tendency may be slight when the facts are viewed as extended in space, but the moment we become aware of experience being influenced by the past, that is, experience in time, we find this tendency much stronger. With this observation we have arrived at Bergson's point of departure upon a philosophical inquiry that distinguishes his philosophy from all the systems ancient and modern that have preceded it. "The whole of Prof. Bergson's philosophy centers round his conception of real, concrete duration and the specific feeling of duration which our consciousness has when it does away with convention and habit and gets back to its natural attitude."(4) By arguments and efforts of the imagination, Bergson seeks to arrive at a "sympathetic insight" into the fundamental, psychical life of the self. It is his method to subject to a searching critical analysis well-defined philosophical concepts which have been formulated by the traditional philosophy, and we see the concepts lose themselves in a "fugitive and fluent" reality.

Reality is seen by Bergson to have degrees; experience is said to partake at times of a superficial degree of reality, at other times of a more fundamental degree. The truth is, all of experience is real; parts imply all other parts; we are "Immersed in realities." The ever-present act, and need for action, is the reason for introducing distinctions. It is essential for the practical life that all of existence except that which is immediately useful shall be excluded from attention. Effort at any one time to which attention is given means a reaching out into the future - a grasping at something. The experience, however, that lends itself to action is found to be spatial, admitting

of measurement and tending to repetition. But in so far as anything has duration, such an experience of it is superficial, for in duration there is no repetition; it cannot be represented spatially or be measured. In our consciousness we are within a reality into which we can push deeper and deeper as we more fully experience its duration. The standard of the deepest reality here is that which is most internal to us and most really ourselves. As our duration - the consciousness of our own becoming - is most real in our experience, in the same way the duration of any other change must be its fundamental reality. If we seek to get at the things in our experience as they are in themselves, the individuality of the objects our needs cut out around us would be absorbed in universal interaction. Change is the most substantial thing there is; in mobility and duration lies the deepest life of all. In the degree that the internal nature of motion, change and duration is grasped, reality itself is so far grasped.

Duration, the "stuff" of reality, of which we are aware in ourselves, is at the basis of all things. Our knowledge of reality would be only relative if the nature of life and consciousness were altered by being those of a certain personality, and if they thus became of a different essence from the life and consciousness of all things. "Positive science," Bergson says, "may pride itself on the uniform value attributed to its affirmations in the whole field of experience. But, if they are all placed on the same footing, they are all tainted with the same relativity....The understanding is at home in the domain of unorganized matter. On this matter human action is naturally exercised; and action cannot be set in motion in the unreal....If science is to extend our action on things, and if it can act only with inert matter for instrument, science can and must treat the living as it has treated the inert.

But, in so doing, the further it penetrates the depths of life, the more relative to the contingencies of action the knowledge it supplies to us becomes..Combined, all our knowledge, both scientific and metaphysical, is heightened. In the absolute we live and move and have our being. The knowledge we possess of it is incomplete, no doubt, but not external or relative. It is reality itself, in the profoundest meaning of the word."(5)

The quotation just given raises the question of a distinction in the use of the word 'real'. The deepest life of all things is duration; this can be reached only ~~through~~ by a philosophy ~~which~~ employing the faculty of intuition which reaches all depths of reality. But life is also unmaking and scattering itself; and we have matter whose order and complication can be traced more and more clearly by the intellect. Science closely reached the absolute nature of its object, matter, which, though it be still vibrating with life, is all but dormant and atrophied. Science reaches reality, but that reality only which is the suppression of the positive reality, duration. From the point of view of the intellect a distinction must be made between what is real and what is simply apparent. What is understood by the intellect as having immediate practical significance is marked off from all else in experience for the sake of simplified action, and, as a result of this method of the knowing process, is rendered symbolic of the true flowing reality; in other words, it is less real, or merely apparemt.

Now, what is duration itself, that to which is assigned absolute existence?(6) Upon examination of one's own consciousness the most apparent fact to be noticed is the simple transition from one state to another. Consciousness appears to be ceaseless change. "No feeling, no idea, no volition is there which is not undergoing change every moment: if a mental state ceased to vary, its duration

would cease to flow."(7) "My memory is there, which conveys something of the past into the present. My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates: it goes on increasing - rolling upon itself, as a snowball on the snow."(8) "The truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself is nothing but change."(9)

There appears to be , however, discontinuity in psychical experience. Incidents arise which seem to be cut off from those which precede them, and to be disconnected from those which follow. Our attention is fixed upon them because they interest us more, but "each of them is borne by the fluid mass of our whole psychical existence."(10) If, instead of watching individual incidents and analyzing consciousness into particular states, we make an effort to reach our true selves, our living acting selves, the result is different. States, no longer distinct, fuse and interpenetrate till there is simply a continuity. It would have been impossible to have reconstructed the self from the materials furnished by the analysis. The fact is, no single state of consciousness can be considered apart from all others that have gone before. No sensation, no feeling can repeat itself; and, what is more, the present is unforeseeable and new, given its distinctive character by the sum total of past experiences. One state differs from all others in quality, not in quantity. The multiple states of consciousness bear down upon succeeding states only to affect their quality: the intensity, that is, of the sensation, the feeling, the volition or the idea. It is said, therefore, that there is qualitative heterogeneity and incommensurability between past and present. Such is duration.

"As the past grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation. Memory is not a faculty of putting

away recollections in a drawer, or of inscribing them in a register....In reality, the past is preserved by itself, automatically... The cerebral mechanism is arranged just so as to drive back into the unconscious almost the whole of the past, and to admit beyond the threshold only that which can cast light on the present situation....Even though we may have no distinct idea of it, we feel vaguely that our past remains present to us. What are we, in fact, what is our character, if not the condensation of the history that we have lived from our birth - nay, even before our birth, since we bring with us prenatal dispositions? Doubtless we think with only a small part of our past, but it is with our entire past, including the original bent of our soul, that we desire, will and act."(11) In this position there is the suggestion of both freedom and creation.We are the artisans of the moments of our life; each of them, in being new and unforeseeable, is a kind of creation.

Even in the material world succession is an undeniable fact. Bergson attaches much meaning to the necessity of waiting for sugar to melt, if a mixture of sugar and water is wanted. The mixing is then not something thought, but something lived. "It is no longer a relation, it is an absolute. What else can ~~can~~ this mean than that the glass of water, the sugar, and the process of the sugar's melting in the water are abstractions, and that the Whole, within which they have been cut out by my senses and understanding, progresses, it may be in the manner of a consciousness?(12)

"The universe endures." In it "two opposite movements are to be distinguished, 'descent' and 'ascent'. The first only unwinds a roll ready prepared....But the ascending movement, which corresponds to an inner work of ripening or creating, endures essentially and imposes its rhythm on the first, which is inseparable from it.

There is no reason, therefore, why a duration, and so an existence like our own, should not be attributed to the systems that science isolates, provided such systems are reintegrated into the Whole.... The individuality of the body is reabsorbed in the universal interaction which, without doubt, is reality itself."(13)

Duration has been said to be reality, and duration is time. But there is pure time and time that is spurious; this is the concept which Bergson, in the very first of his extended studies, submits to analysis. The negative result reached is that time is not a conception which can stand alone. It is fundamentally identical with space, and though it is differentiated from space, that differentiation is capable of explanation. The positive outcome of the discussion is that something psychical, which Bergson calls duration, is substituted for time as it is represented in the concept under investigation.

The time which is found in mathematics and the mechanical sciences is conceived as infinite, homogeneous, of one dimension, continuous and irreversible. Bergson lays particular stress upon its homogeneity and its continuity. It is an empty, qualityless or indifferent, homogeneous medium in which points are distinguished as "now" and "not-now", as successive, or as first, second, third, etc., and this homogeneous medium is distinguished from space, another qualityless, infinite, and infinitely divisible medium, homogeneous in all its parts, in which points are distinguished as "here" and "not-here", as simultaneous, or as co-existing in one moment of time.

Bergson thinks that time, so conceived, does not differ essentially from the conception of homogeneous space. The idea of number serves as a clue to his proof. The idea of number, even of abstract number, "implies the simple intuition of a

multiplicity of parts or units, which are absolutely alike. These must all, at first, be grasped, ranged side by side, and then, by a synthesizing act of the mind, added together. It is in space that this juxtaposition takes place and not in pure duration. Counting material objects means thinking all these objects together, thereby leaving them in space."(14) If the possibility of counting rests upon an intuition of spce, either time, as represented in mathematics and the mathematical sciences, is fundamentally identical with space, or it must be admitted that there are two forms of homogeneous medium which can be distinguished from each other - one medium in which the numerable contents are regarded as co-existing, and a second, in which the contents are regarded as following one another. "We cannot admit two forms of the homogeneous, time and space, without first seeking whether one of them cannot be reduced to the other. Now, externality is the distinguishing mark of things which occupy space, while states of consciousness are not essentially external to one another and become so only by being spread out in time regarded as a homogeneous medium. If, then, one of these two supposed forms of the homogeneous is derived from the other, we can surmise a priori that the idea of space is the fundamental datum."(15) An a pirori surmise being scarcely sufficient guarantee of the certainty of a question so vital, other evidence is brought to show that time, conceived under the form of an unbounded and homogeneous medium, "is nothing but the ghost of space haunting the reflective consciousness."(16)

The subsequent line of thought is of the utmost importance for the understanding of Bergson's philosophy. His argument involves the supposition that the only valid conceptions are quantitive. Since time, quantitatively conceived, is identical

with the conception of space, no peculiar conception of time is possible. That is to say, intelligence is capable, fundamentally, only of quantitative or mechanical conceptions; and if a non-mechanical reality is to be apprehended, that can be accomplished only by a faculty other than intelligence. This is the key to Bergson's philosophy.

If pure time is to be perceived, all that is quantitative, or that is determined by relation to the conception of space, must be ruled out. Pure duration is nothing but a "succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another."(17) When, with our eyes shut - so runs an example supplied by Bergson - we pass our hands along a surface, the rubbing of our fingers against the surface, and especially the varied play of our joints, provide a series of sensations, which differ only by their qualities.(18) The distinction is clearly revealed in the illuminating figure of the pendulum. In saying that a minute has elapsed I mean by this "that a pendulum, beating the seconds, has completed sixty oscillations. If I picture to myself these sixty oscillations all at once by a single mental perception, I exclude by hypothesis the idea of a succession. I do not think of sixty strokes which succeed one another, but of sixty points on a fixed line, each one of which symbolizes, so to speak, an oscillation of the pendulum. If, on the other hand, I wish to picture these sixty oscillations in succession but without altering the way they are produced in space, I shall be compelled to think of each oscillation to the exclusion of the preceding one, for space has preserved no trace of it; but by doing so I shall condemn myself to remain forever in the present; I shall give up the attempt to think a succession or a duration. Now if, finally, I retain the recollection of the preceding oscillation together with the image of the present oscillation ... either I

shall set ~~the set~~ the two images side by side, and we then fall back on the first hypothesis, or I shall perceive one in the other, each permeating the other and organizing themselves like the notes of a tune, so as to form what we shall call a continuous or qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number. I shall thus get the image of pure duration; but I shall have entirely got rid of the idea of a homogeneous medium or a measurable quantity."(19) Pure duration, that which consciousness perceives, must be reckoned among the so-called intensive magnitudes, if intensities can be called magnitudes: strictly speaking, however, it is not a quantity, and as soon as we try to measure it, we unwittingly replace it by space.

An apt quotation, which will both summarize the latter part of the discussion thus far, and clarify the distinction made between time and space, is the following. "There is a real space, without duration, in which phenomena appear and disappear simultaneously with our states of consciousness. There is a real duration, the heterogeneous moments of which permeate one another; ... The comparison of these two realities gives rise to a symbolical representation of duration, derived from space. Duration thus assumes the illusory form of a homogeneous medium, and the connecting link between these two terms, space and duration, is simultaneity, which might be defined as the intersection of time and space."(20)

Time, then, as pure duration, is identical with spiritual growth. The "stuff" of life is spirit. Pure spirit reveals itself in immediate knowledge as non-spatial, as entirely disparate from a reality to which number is applicable, and as devoid of all homogeneity. In the fundamental psychical life there is a constant accumulation of the past conserved in memory; the volume of the

self grows, and we have a feeling sui generis, the feeling of the greater weight, so to speak, which memory carries. For this spiritual reality, identical with growth which is a continuous elaboration of something not partially, but entirely, new, the future is wholly imprevisible. The possibility of prediction lies in the actual persistence in time of identical elements, in the fact of homogeneity. The law of causation, for example, has a practcal value in that it enables us to predict the future only when certain conditions recur. This possibility is realized in the material world, for the existence of matter, in so far as it is spatial, means here an ever renewed creation of the present; hence the future is essentially previsible. But in pure spirit there is an entire absence of homogeneity. Consequently, to entertain the possibility of foreseeing here is to contemplate the possibility of living before we live.

The analysis which Bergson has made of human consciousness applies to all life and to the whole universe. "Like the universe as a whole, like each conscious being taken separately, the organism which lives is a thing that endures."(21) The organized world is represented as a harmonious whole. This harmony is not so perfect as not to admit discord, because each species, each individual even, retains only a certain impulse from the universal vital impulsion and tends to use this energy in its own interest. The original impetus that works through all things with a tremendous internal push is a common impetus.(22) One of the objects of Bergson's famous work, Creative Evolution, is to show that the universe in its entirety is of the same nature as the personal mind, that in it two movements, similar to those which are found in human minds, reveal themselves - the one towards growth, creation, continuous elaboration of something new; the other in the

direction of homogeneity and repetition. "As soon as we are confronted with true duration we see that if that which is being unmade endures, it can only be because it is inseparably bound to what is making itself. Thus will appear the necessity of a continual growth of the universe, I should say of a life of the real."(25) The universe is a great individual akin to ourselves. It endures as we do. Just as our self is made up of a number of interpenetrating tendencies, so the universal self is composed of systems which, in their turn, contain organisms of various kinds. There may be a tendency in this great cosmic self for the systems to fall apart or to isolate themselves. Science seizes upon and emphasises this tendency. But an underlying Élan, like the will in us, directs them to unity, keeps them in a continual state of greater of less interpenetration, and, in the course of its free activity, incessantly creates new worlds. This power is God. He is that creative activity which is the fundamental basis of all life, and which is not exhausted in the finite impetus which constitutes the life in our solar system. "God is unceasing life, action, freedom."(26)

We are not the vital current itself, says Bergson, but it is possible for us by a supreme effort to become part of it. "We are this current already loaded with matter, that is, with congealed parts of its own substance which it carries along its course."(27) When we put back our being into our will, and our will itself into the impulsion it prolongs, we understand, we feel, that reality is a perpetual growth, a creation pursued without end. "Coinciding with matter, adopting the same movement and the same rhythm, might not consciousness, by two efforts of opposite direction, raising and lowering itself by turns, become able to grasp from within, and no longer perceive from without, the two forms of

reality, body and mind? Would this twofold effort make us, as far as that is possible, relive tha absolute? In the course of this operation we should see the intellect cut itself out in the whole of the mind; intellectual knowledge would then appear as it is, limited."(26) This participation of the individual will in the Divine Will is secured by means of an intuitive understanding.

In this brief way the outlines of Bergson's view of the Absolute have been sketched. Pure time, in the sense of pure duration, is that reality. A distinction if first made between time in its purity and time as it is ordinarily confused with space. The Absolute is continuous becoming, never completion. Of the 'inwardness' of duration only fleeting glimpses are ever attained. The practical character of experience gives rise to the antinomies of reason, and to mixed ideas. Finally, there is seen to be unity to consciousness which is universal. More will be siad further on about the method of perceiving this reality.

II.

THE PLATONIC AND ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY

COMPARED WITH BERGSON

With special reference to

The Absolute.

THE PLATONIC AND ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHIES.

Compared with Bergson.

The background of medieval Jewish philosophy, as of the philosophy in general of the middle ages, was Greek thought in the formulation given it by Plato, Aristotle and their followers. Bergson has himself drawn contrasts between his own and these ancient views.

Sense-perception, Plato argues, does not reveal the true reality of things, but gives us mere appearance. Opinion may be true or false; as mere opinion it has no value whatever; it is not knowledge, but rests on persuasion of feeling; it does not know whether it is true or false, it cannot justify itself. Genuine knowledge is knowledge based on reasons. The necessary advance from sense-perception and opinion to genuine knowledge is made under the guidance of a desire or love of truth: we pass from the contemplation of beauty to the contemplation of truth. The love of truth impels us to dialectics, a method that consists, first, in the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea, and second, in the division of the idea into species, that is, in the process of generalization and classification. For clear and consistent thinking we pass from concept to concept, and judgment expresses the relation of concepts to one another.

But the concept or idea does not have its origin in experience. There is nothing in experience, in the world of sense, exactly corresponding to the notions, for example, of truth, beauty or goodness. Plato must resort to a metaphysical answer to the question, What guarantee have we of the truth of conceptual knowledge? There must be, he says, pure absolute realities corresponding to our universal ideas. The world perceived by our senses is not the true world; it is a changing and fleeting world, therefore mere

appearance and illusion. True being is something permanent, unchanging, eternal. Hence, in order to have genuine knowledge, we must know the permanent and unchangeable essence of things. Thought alone, conceptual thought, can grasp eternal and changeless being; it knows that which is, that which persists, that which remains one and the same in all change and diversity, the essential forms of things.

The particular objects which we perceive are imperfect copies or reflections of eternal patterns; there are many objects or copies, but there is always one idea of a class of things. These ideas or archetypes, though numberless, constitute a well-ordered world, or rational cosmos. The universe is conceived by Plato as a logical system of ideas: it forms an organic spiritual unity, governed by a universal purpose, the idea of the Good, and is, therefore, a rational moral whole. Its meaning cannot be grasped by the senses, which perceive only its imperfect and fleeting reflections and never rise to a vision of the perfect and abiding whole. It is the business of philosophy to understand its inner order and connection, to conceive its essence by logical thought.

In sensation and opinion the soul is dependent on the body; in so far as it beholds the pure world of ideas, it is pure reason. The copies of the pure ideas, as they exist in the phenomenal world, merely invite the rational soul to think; sensation provokes ideas, it does not produce them. Hence, the soul must somehow possess ideas prior to its contact with the world of experience. Plato teaches that the soul has viewed such ideas before, but has forgotten them; the imperfect copies of ideas in the world of sense bring back its past, remind it, as it were, of what it has been befoer: all knowledge is reminiscence and all learning reawakening.

Now, there is much in all this that is quite at variance with

Bergsonian views. "In a certain sense," says Bergson,"we are all born Platonists." (27) "Our reason, incorrigibly presumptuous, imagines itself possessed, by right of birth or by right of conquest, innate or acquired, of all the essential elements of the knowledge of truth. Even when it confesses that it does not know the object presented to it, it believes that its ignorance consists only in not knowing which one of its time-honored categories suits the new object...Plato was the first to set up the theory that to know the real consists in finding its Idea, that is to say, in forcing it into a pre-existing frame already at our disposal - as if we implicitly possessed universal knowledge."(28)

Elsewhere Bergson protests that human intelligence, as he represents it, "is not at all what Plato taught in the allegory of the cave. Its function is not ~~at all~~ to look at passing shadows nor yet to turn itself round and contemplate the glaring sun. It has something else to do.... To act and to know that we are acting, to come into touch with reality and even to live it, but only in the measure in which it concerns the work that is being accomplished, such is the function of human intelligence."(29) Ancient philosophy proceeds as the intellect does. "It installs itself in the immutable, it posits only Ideas."(30) "Plato, like Plotinus, erected mathematical essences into absolute realities. Above all, ancient philosophy suffered itself to be deceived by the purely superficial analogy of duration with extension," that is, with the inversion of original Being, matter carved out in space.(31) It treated the one as it treated the other, "regarding change as a degradation of immutability, the sensible as a fall from the intelligible"(32) "Yet becoming exists:it is a fact. How, then, having posited immutability alone, shall we make change come from it? Not by the addition of anything to it, for, by hypothesis,

there exists nothing positive outside Ideas. It must therefore be by a diminution. So at the base of ancient philosophy lies necessarily this postulate: that there is more in the motionless than in the moving, and that we pass from the immutable to becoming by way of diminution or attenuation."(33)

Now degrade the immutable Ideas and you obtain, by that alone, the perpetual flux of things. Hence, though the process be negative and void of reality, there is, throughout the whole philosophy of Ideas, a certain conception of duration, as also of the relation of time to eternity. The intellect, accustomed as it is to think the moving by means of the unmovable, generally refuses to install us within duration; the Forms, which the mind isolates and stores up in concepts, are then only snapshots of the changing reality. "They are moments gathered along the course of time; and just because we have cut the thread that binds them to time, they no longer endure."(34) They enter into eternity, it may be; but what is eternal in them is just what is unreal. On the contrary, if Forms are treated as constitutive elements of change, they represent all that is positive in Becoming. "Eternity no longer hovers over time, as an abstraction; it underlies time, as a reality. The philosophy of Forms or Ideas establishes between eternity and time the same relation as between a piece of gold and small change - change so small that payment goes on for ever without the debt being paid off. The debt could be paid at once with the piece of gold. It is this that Plato expresses when he says that God, unable to make the world eternal, gave it Time, 'a moving image of eternity.'"(35)

From the Bergsonian point of view, a mind placed alongside of becoming, and adopting its movement, sees each successive state, each quality, each form, as a mere cut made by thought in the universal becoming. It will be found that form is essentially extended, inseparable from the extensity of the becoming which

has materialized it in the course of its flow. Every form thus occupies space, as it occupies time. "But the philosophy of Ideas follows the inverse order. It starts from the Form; it sees in the Form the very essence of reality. It does not take Form as a snapshot of becoming; it posits Forms in the eternal... Form thus posited is a concept. And, as reality of the conceptual order occupies no more extension than it does of duration, the Forms must be stationed outside space as well as above time.... Move an imaginary pendulum, a mere mathematical point, from its position of equilibrium: a perpetual oscillation is started, along which points are placed next to points, and moments succeed moments. The space and time which thus arise have no more "Positivity" than the movement itself. They represent the remoteness of the position artificially given to the pendulum from its normal position, what it lacks in order to regain its natural stability. Bring it back to its normal position: space, time and motion shrink to a mathematical point....The sensible forms are ever before us, ever about to recover their ideality, ever prevented by the matter they bear in them, that is to say, by their inner void, by the interval between what they are and what they aught to be....The alteration of generation and decay, the evolutions ever beginning over and over again, the infinite repetition of the cycles of celestial spheres - this all represents merely a fundamental deficit, in which materiality consists. Fill up this deficit: at once you suppress space and time, that is to say, the endlessly renewed oscillations around a stable equilibrium always aimed at, never reached. Things reenter into each other. What was extended in space is contracted into pure Form. And past, present, and future shrink into a single moment, which is eternity."(36)

From this point of view science is not a human construction.

It is prior to our intellect, independent of it, veritably the generator of things. Physics is but logic spoiled, nothing else but the fall of the logical into space and time. The intellect of the philosopher ascends from the percept to the concept, and sees condensed into the logical all the positive reality that the physical possesses; in doing away with the materiality that lessens being, it grasps being itself in the immutable system of Ideas. Forms become, then, not simply snapshots taken by the mind of the continuity of becoming, relative to the mind that thinks them, but independently existing things. Ancient philosophy could not escape the conclusion that Ideas must exist by themselves. Plato formulated it, and in vain did Aristotle strive to avoid it.(37)

Accepting the idealistic and teleological presuppositions of his teacher, Aristotle rejected the transcendency of the changeless, eternal forms. He strove to bring them down from heaven to earth, so to speak. Forms are not <u>apart from</u> things, but in them; not transcendent but immanent. Matter is not non-being, as Plato would have it, but is dymamic; form and matter are not separate, but eternally together: matter realizes the form or idea of the thing, moves and changes, grows, or evolves formward. The world of sense, the phenomenal order, is not a mere shadow of the real world; it <u>is</u> the real world, form and matter in one, and the true object of Science. The universe is an ideal world, an interrelated, organic whole, although, to be sure, a system of eternal and unchangeable ideas or forms. The object of philosophy is the study of these ultimate essences and first causes of things. The different sciences are concerned with being, too, but with being in so far as it has matter and motion.

The highest part of the soul is reason or 'nous', and the basic notions and principles of metaphysics are direct intuitions

of reason. Human reason has the power of abstracting from the particular its form, or that in which it agrees with other particulars of the same name. Such forms constitute the essences of things; they are real. They are not only the principles or essences of things, but also principles of reason; experience is necessary to bring them to consciousness. They are implicit in the mind and made explicit or actual by experience. Fundamental to the philosophy of Aristotle is the idea that thought and being coincide; truth is the agreement of both. Universal concepts are first principles, being first in nature, although they are the last things reached in our thinking which proceeds from particular facts to these universals.

Aristotle enumerates ten most general forms of predication. The most universal predicate which we can affirm of anything may be subsumed under one of the categories: substance, quality, quantity, relation, space, time, position, state, activity, passivity. These are so many stabilities; permanent essences; predicates of reality itself. They are aspects of reality. That which is affected by these relations is a certain substratum never experienced in its purity, called pure matter, which is forever in a state of potentiality and is forever being brought to actuality by eternal motion. We may here employ for the sake of clarity Bergson's figure of the swinging pendulum which for all time hovers in the unreal round and about a point representing reality as given in its entirety in eternity, or more truly, in its equivalent, a single moment.

The change that is the noted in the universe is the actualization of the potential. The material substratum undergoes changes of Form, now seed, now sapling, now tree, now fruit. Since potentiality and actuality are contradictory states, that which is potential cannot make itself actual, and there must be, therefore, an external agent,

itself actual, to actualize the potential. The change which is motion in place is of the same principle as the change which is the realization of the potential. That an infinite number of things all here and now should be in motion, which would be necessary on the hypothesis that a thing cannot move itself, implies a contradiction in terms, according to Aristotle. If anything is to move at all, there must be at the end of a finite chain of movements an unmoved mover. The movement thus initiated cannot be like the movement of bodies which, themselves in motion, act upon other bodies, but this first cause, since it is unmoved, must be form without matter, pure form, absolute spirit, for where there is matter there is mation and change.

It must be that the first cause is pure spirit because, if it were allied with matter, imperfection would be set at the very heart of perfection. Matter is not merely possibility, but offers positive resistance to the form principle, and is thereby the cause of the introduction of plurality and diversity, of incompletion and deformity, into this world of matter and form. The unmoved mover is spirit and not body, because no body can move another without being in motion itself, and because in no body which is finite can there inhere an infinite power; and being neither body nor matter, which is the same thing, the unmoved mover is not subject to change. The being so endowed with power is God.

God is the highest purpose or highest good. He acts on the world as the thought of good and the beautiful acts upon the soul, or as the feeling of love influences action. All things in the world, plants, animals, men, desire the realization of their essence; the existence of God, the highest good, is, of itself alone, the cause of their desire. Hence God is the unifying principle of the world, the center

toward which all things strive, the principle which accounts for all order, beauty, and life in the universe. He is all actuality; every possibility is realized in him. God's activity consists in thought. His thinking is intuitive, quite in the Bergsonian sense if foreknowledge be not included: he sees all things at once and sees them whole. God is pure intelligence: he has no impressions, no sensations, no appetites, no will in the sense of desire, no feelings in the sense of passions. Any division in the content of God's thinking would mean that he changed in some manner. He is, then, eternally thinking the same thought, and that thought, being of necessity only the highest, is himself. God is therefore pure thought thinking pure thought.

So far in the outline of Aristotle's philosophy it has been clear that a frank dualism runs through the whole of the metaphysical scheme. Although matter is never found apart from form, it is viewed as a separable entity. The forms or principles of things are entities quite as well. The separateness is based on ontological grounds. Professor Neumark lays stress upon the distinction on this point between Aristotle's metaphysics and his physics.(28) There is in all matter, he points out in his analysis of Aristotle's physics, a minimum of form out of which other forms develop in an enduring line of progression. The monism of the physic rests upon the one kind of energy resident in all things. The principle of steresis acts as a balance between opposites such as sweet and bitter, hot and cold. The differences between them is due to matter, says Aristotle. Professor Neumark suggests that the difference may be due to the form principle, and hence the difficulty of the monist's ~~conception~~ position. According to the metaphysics, on the other hand, there may be real differences because at every stage of becoming there is a special, prepared steresis to allow for differ-

entiation and individuation. Bergson would say that the necessity of practical action compels the intellect to cut out these differences, but that the resulting disjunction of parts within the whole is merely an illusion produced by the logical process.

But the monism discernable in Aristotle's physics is important for the later development of philosophy through Philo, Plotinus and the Jewish philosophers, some of whom were more under the influence of the metaphysics to a greater extent, and some were influenced more by the physics.

Aristotle's physics is characterized by its opposition to the mechanical-atomistic views of the Greek schools. He refuses to explain all changes in the corporeal world as changes in the local relation of atoms. Empty, infinite space is likewise denied; whatever is not bounded by another body is not in space, and since the world is finite, there is no infinite space.

For Aristotle nature cannot be explained mechically; it is dynamic and teleological. The Universal energy works through changes in substance, quantity, quality and place toward the realization of the possible. The earth is in the center of the eternal universe, and it occupies that place because it is the heaviest of the celestial spheres. In the degree of their weight the other elements surround the earth in concentric layers, water, air and fire. Whenever change disturbs this order, natural law tends to restore the elements to their spheres. The spheres of the elements are bounded by celestial spheres which are composed of ether and some of which carry the planets, the sun, and the moon; then the fixed stars. God encompasses the outermost sphere of the fixed stars and causes it to move; by the motion of this sphere the movements of the other spheres are influenced. In the sublunar world there is a continual process of generation and decay; the elements constantly take on

new combinations. No individual thing in the world is permanent, yet there is no annihilation nor destruction of elements in the process of becoming.

Wherever there is life there is soul. No soul can be without a body, and no soul without a specific body. The organic world forms an ascending scale of bodies, and a graduated series of souls, from the plant soul to the human soul. Man, the microcosm and final goal of nature, is distinguished from all other living beings by the possession of reason. The human soul possesses, besides perception of sensible objects, the faculty of thinking the universal and necessary essences of things. Conceptual thought is actualized reason. There is active or creative reason and passive reason. Creative reason is pure actuality: thought and the object of thought are one. In passive reason concepts are potential; they are made real or actual by creative reason. Creative reason existed before body and soul; it is immaterial and immortal, and is not bound to a body as are perception, imagination and memory, the other functions of soul.

Differences between Bergson's point of view and that of the ancients given in this outline are apparent. "The error of the ancient philosophers," as our modern thinker sees it, "consisted in their being always dominated by the belief, so natural to the human mind, that a variation can only be the expression and development of what is unvariable."(39)"The whole of the philosophy which begins with Plato and culminates in Plotinus is the development of a principle which may be formulated thus: 'There is more in the immutable than in the moving, and we pass from the stable to the unstable by a mere diminution.' Now this is contrary to the truth." (40) Plato and Aristotle, and the Jewish philosophers who followed them, considered concepts immutable entities, but Bergson

protests that no state of mind, however simple, is not a 'state' of continuous change. In the one case, psychology gives rise to a metaphysics at the heart of which is stability and wholly-given reality; in the other, reality is continually completing itself, and change occupies the center of the universal order of things. Man is indeed the microcosm; the duration that characterizes his inner life is identical with the inner meaning of the world. "Inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present, the present either containing within it in a distinct form the ceaselessly growing image of the past, or, more probably, showing by its continual change of quality the heavier and still heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older."(41) The intuition of this reality escaped the ancients because of their emphasis upon reason which in accordance with its nature tends to picture a system as they have drawn it.

Now, what Bergson objects to most in the Aristotelian philosophy, and would object to in Jewish philosophy, is the tendency to becloud the fact of the survival of the past into the present without which there would be no duration, but only instantaneity. When being is understood as a logical or mathematical essence, and therefore non-temporal, a static conception of the real is forced on us; everything appears given once for all, in eternity. Aristotle set above the physical world a God who is a Form that is found to be the Form of Forms, the Idea of Ideas, or, in his own words, the Thought of Thought - necessarily immutable and apart from what is happening in the world. "If only we imagine the God of Aristotle in a sort of refraction of himself, or simply inclining toward the world, at once the Platonic Ideas are seen to pour themselves out of him, as if they were involved in the unity of his essence: so rays stream out from the sun, which nevertheless did not contain them. It is probab-

ly this outpouring of Platonic Ideas from the Aristotelian God that is meant, in the philosophy of Aristotle, by the active intellect,- that is, by what is essential and yet unconscious in human intelligence. The 'nous poietikos' is Science entire, posited all at once, which the conscious, discursive intellect is condemned to reconstruct with difficulty, bit by bit."(42)

If one follows to the end the natural movement of the intellect he reaches a particular conception of causality immanent in the philosophy of Ideas. "Sometimes the ancient philosophers speak of an attraction, sometimes of an impulsion exercised by the prime mover on the whole of the world. Both views are found in Aristotle....But these two conceptions of the divine causality can only be identified together if we bring them, both the one and the other, back to a third, which we hold to be fundamental, and which alone will enable us to understand, not only why, in what sense, things move in space and time, but also why there is space and time, why there is movement, why there are things. This conception, which more and more shows through the reasonings of the Greek philosophers from Plato to Plotinus, we may formulate thus: The affirmation of a reality (e.g. the number 10) implies the simultaneous affirmation of all the degrees of reality intermediate between it and nothing (i.e. the whole interval between 10 and zero)....Let us then posit the God of Aristotle, thought of thought - that is, thought making a circle;... it follows that all the descending degrees of beigg, from the divine perfection down to the 'absolute nothing,' are realized automatically.... By degrees we see the perfection decrease more and more from the slightest diminuation of the first principle which will be sufficient to precipitate Being into space and time, down to our sublunary world, in which the cycle of birth, growth and decay imitates

and mars the original circle for the last time. So understood, the causal relation between God and the world is seen as an attraction when regarded from below, as an impulsion or a contact when regarded from above, since the first heaven, with its circular movement, is an imitationof God and all imitation is the reception of a form....The true relation is that which is found between the two members of an equation, when the first member is a single term and the second a sum of an endless number of terms....Only thus can we understand why Aristotle has demonstrated the necessity of a first motionless mover, not by founding it on the assertion that the movement of things must have had a beginning, but, on the contrary, by affirming that this movement could not have begun and can never come to an end....A perpetuity of mobility is possible only if it is backed by an eternity of immutability, which it unwinds in a chain without beginning or end."(42)

Such was the point of view of ancient philosophy, partially presented, in regard to change and duration, and the ground of difference between Bergson and those early thinkers who profoundly affected Jewish philosophy is established. At least the later Jewish philosophers, Abraham Ibn Daud, Maimonides, Gersonides and Hasdai Crescas, were fully conversant withthe Aristotelian works and ideas; the same familiarity is not so evident in the writings of the earlier men who gained a knowledge of Aristotle indirectly through other schools, Greek as well as Arabian. Even the former group, although their information was more accurate, read Arabic translations and interpretations of Aristotle rather than the original. Though this be true, the fact that Aristotelian ideas and principles, terminology also, were widely current among the Jews and gave the impulse to their philosophy, is not altered. Aristotelianism held sway over the minds of Jewish philosophers,

mingled with the Kalam, or Arabic philosophy, to a greater or less degree until the time of Ibn Daud. In Maimonides the Greek master received fullest recognition, and the Kalam its most thoroughgoing critism. Crescas finally attacked the Aristotelian influence and endeavored to limit its pervasive effect upon Jewish thought. /2

III.

THE JEWISH CONCEPTION OF THE ABSOLUTE

The Problem of Unity.

The Jewish Conception of the Absolute.

The Problem of Unity.

The harshness with which the term 'Absolute', as applied to God, reacts upon the Jewish consciousness indicates to some extent the difficulty of comparing with the absolute reality of Bergson's or any other philosophy the Being who is worshipped reverently by the Jew. Subjected to the formal treatment of logic, the idea of God seems not only to be desecrated but to be rendered more confused by the conflicting notions and analyses set forth in explanation by the numerous schools of philosophy. The Jewish conception, it must be said, however hallowed it has become as the result of ages of reverence, is yet immersed in Aristotelianism, the type of thought which is reversed by Henri Bergson who admits that ~~the~~ it ~~other~~ is more natural to the human mind. At utter variance with the older and more accustomed philosophy, the new may be discovered to be but a different approach, in the light of increased knowledge, to intuitions that remain the same. The religious mind might not analyze and compare the structures of the eye of the mollusc and that of the vertebrate, but given the results of the examination its admiration of the evolutionary process which produced the two organs on opposite lines of development might conceivably be enhanced. The intuition of unity in respect to the absolute is identical, be it Bergsonian or Aristotelian; the method, to be sure, differs widely in each case. The reverential regard, the quality of the intuition, so to speak, may or may not be alike in both.

Bergson offers an illuminating exposition of the concept of unity. In the field of numbers each is a unit, since it is brought before the mind by a simple intuition and is given a name; but the unity which attaches to it is that of a sum; it covers a multipli-

city of parts which can be considered separately. But when we speak of the units which go to form number, we no longer think of these units as sums, but as pure, simple, irreducible units, intended to yield the natural series of numbers by an indefinitely continued process of accumulation."It seems, then, that there are two kinds of units, the one ultimate, out of which a number is formed by a process of addition, and the other provisional, the number so formed, which is multiple in itself, and owes its unity to the simplicity of the act by which the mind perceives it. When we picture the units which make up number, we believe that we are thinking of indivisible components....Nevertheless, by looking more closely into the matter, we see that all unity is the unity of a simple act of the mind, and that, as this is an act of unification, there must be some multiplicity for it to unify. No doubt, at the moment at which I think each of these units separately, I look upon it as indivisible, since I am determined to think of its unity alone.... The numbers are provisional units, which themselves can be subdivided without limit, and each of them is the sum of fractional quantities."(43) The point that Bergson is here making is that we could not split up a unit into fractions whilst affirming its unity, if we did not regard it implicitly as an extended object, one in intuition but multiple in space. What we are interested in for our purpose is the conclusion to which Bergson comes, that there are two very different kinds of multiplicity: that of material objects, and the multiplicity of states of consciousness. To the first the conception of number is immediately applicable, to the second not without the help of some symbolical representation, in which a necessary element is space. This idea carried through and applied to the Absolute gives a definition of duration as a qualitative multiplicity, with no likeness to number: "an

organic evolution which is yet not an increasing quantity; a pure heterogeneity within which there are no distinct qualities. In a word, the moments of inner duration are not external to one another. (44) Qualitative differences are applicable only to magnitudes, that is, in the last resort, to space; intensity in itself is purely qualitative. The qualitative multiplicity of unfolding conscious states constitutes duration, which is an interpenetration of elements so heterogeneous that former states can never recur.

Let us consider the Jewish Absolute, or God, in the light of the foregoing analysis. The problem of unity presented itself to the Jews, as it did to the Muctazila, because of the necessity of interpreting properly the anthropomorphic passages in the Bible and the Koran, and of explaining the doctrine of divine attributes. When God is spoken of as seeing, does it mean he has eyes, or does the mention of hearing, walking and feeling mean that God is possessed of ears, feet and the physical sensations of anger, love, and remorse? If all of these references can be explained away on the ground that they are to be understood metaphorically, as was done at length by Philo, how is the conception of unity to tbe preserved in its purity if God is said to possess the attributes of life, power and knowledge? The answer invariably is that the essence of God is oneness, and that distinctions in the form of attributes ascribed to his essence are simply verbal and do not either multiply Being or render it composite. But before we enter upon a comparison or contrast between the position taken by Bergson and the Jewish philosophers, we should see the problem of unity a little more fully in its historical setting and development.

The Muctazilites, or Mutakallimun, the oldest sect of the Arabic philosophers whose works with their Neo-Platonic elements exerted a far-reaching influence upon the earlier group of Jewish

philosophers, were known chiefly for their doctrines of the unity of God and his justice, and for that reason received the name of "Men of Unity and Justice." Arabic treatises were divided into sections under these headings and the Jewish works followed the form which they set. The discussion of unity aimed to show that dualism or pluralism is incompatible with omnipotence and perfection. Unity was inferred from the proof of God's spirituality.

Al Mukammas is a Muchtazilite, and proceeded in the manner of the Mohammedan rationalists. God is one, he says, not in the sense that genus, species, number or an individual person is said to be one, but one like which there is no other - a simple unity without distinction or composition. The essence of this simple unity is revealed in part in his Book from which we may learn that God is the first and the last, although without beginning or end; he lives, but his life has no outside source; he is wise, but not in the sense that his wisdom is derived or acquired. The life of God is eternal like himself and is identical with his being. So of the other attributes: they are identical with his being. Expressing attributes positively excludes the possibility of their opposites; but one may more safely speak of God in negative terms, for one takes less risk thereby of endowing him with a form and a resemblance to other things.(45)

Saadia arrives at the conception of God's unity by way of proving his incorporeality. All body is caused, and God, the cause of all body, may not himself be body. And being incorporeal, he is not subject to the accidents of body, since bodily accidents involve body. (46)

Among the corporeal attributes are quantity and number, and hence God cannot be more than one. (47)

Saadia makes the interesting comment that the universe is one, the

parts of which cannot be separated.(48) אולי לא יהיו נפרדים לעולם הקשה על הנראק.
From this observation he derives the proof for a unitary cause, on the ground that a unified effect indicates a single cause.

The three cardinal attributes, Life, Omnipotence, and Omniscience, are three concepts which the limitations of language force our reason to distinguish in one act of thought, for they are all involved in the concept, Maker. Saadia does not see why the Christians should limit the divisions of the Godhead to three; they might with equal reason ascribe to God hands, eyes, mercy, anger, and so forth, if they quote scripture in support of the other three component parts. (49)

The discussion of this problem by both Mukammas and Saadia shows clearly the origin of the doctrine of attributes as well as its motive. "Both they and the later Jewish philosophers owed their interest in this problem primarily to the Mohammedan schools in which it played an important role. But there is no doubt that the problem originated in the Christian schools in the Orient, who made use of it to rationalize the dogma of the Trinity."(50) The problem was quite as important for Judaism as it was for Islam, for the reason that both were monotheistic faiths and it was necessary to answer the Trinitarians by showing that the multiplicity of divine attributes could not deny nor affect the unity of God.

An extended discussion of the unity of God is to be found in the Hovoth ha-Levovoth of Bahya ibn Pakuda, and greater care than anyone before him had taken is therein to guard against the identification of God's unity with any of the unities in our experience. Like Saadia, Bachya traces effects back to a single cause, and infinity of individuals to a finite number of categories, and thence to the cause of causes, the will of God. The evidence of a plan in the correlation of parts in the universe points to a unitary principle.

On the authority of Euclid's definition of unity as that in virtue of which we call a thing one, Bahya establishes the hypothesis that unity prededes the unit by nature, and as a matter of course preceded plurality, the sum of ones. The ultimate unity, which sets aside all possible plurality of gods, is the unity of the one God. An enlargement of this idea is found in Ibn Zaddik, who asserts that God is to the world as unity is to number. Unity is at the basis of the idea of number; the whole system of numbers is built up around and involves unity. There is the suggestion here of Bergson's definition of unity, as that which is grasped by a simple act of the mind. In accordance with the Aristotelian type of thought, unity would naturally be posited as an eternal entity, an Idea or a Form. Qualities such as existence, unity and goodness are singled out and become the possessors of what reality objects in the sensible world hold. In other words, sublimated essences are the everlasting realities. The error involved, as Bergson sees it, is the confusion of two kinds of multiplicity. The absolute is multiple, the multiplicity of interpenetrating qualitative states of consciousness, not the multiplicity of discrete numbers, each one of which might be viewed as a unit. It seems that the Jewish philosophers struggled with just this conception, attempting to preserve multiplicity in a unity, while they sought to avoid the plurality of number. When qualities are given independent existence, they may be ranged in an ideal space and so may be counted as so many objects in a numerable series. God does not occupy space, they said, but they did not succeed in eliminating the idea of space from their conception of God. The hypostasis of distinct qualities gave rise to the whole problem of attributes, or, as Bergson would say, the confusion that was allowed space to enter into the concept or intuition of pure duration was responsible for the difficulties.

For the same reason that all change is the degradation of stability, unity must be more real than multiplicity. Individuals belong to a class, a species or a genus, and are themselves divisible into parts. In virtue of this composition they are subject to genesis and decay, union and separation, motion and change. Mere appearance and similarity induce us to call a class or an individual one which in reality is many. There is something that neither changes nor multiplies which is itself the cause of change and multiplicity. The real one, the true unity, is one in all reppects, undergoes no change, has no beginning and no end, resembles nothing. If it were otherwise it would be like matter, associated with accidents, and hence multiple. In short, it is a purely negative term in its application. This unity is the unity of God who is the one cause of the universal manifold; he is the unconditioned one, the indivisible sum of essences and attributes, the changeless one. These are the principle proofs which Bahya offers for the unity of God. which He holds to be required a reasoned understanding of unity in order that the unity of God may be acknowledged with a full heart.(51)

Since reference is made to individuals and genera throughou the Jewish philosophic speculation on the question of unity, it may be well to introduce here something of what Bergson has to say in the matter. The problem for the ancients was how order is imposed on disorder, form on matter. His analysis of disorder, which we will not enter upon fully in this place, is seen by him as an analysis of nothing at all; the problems that have been raised around it vanish.

He begins by distinguishing, even by opposing one to the other, two kinds of order which are generally confused. Reality is ordered

exactly to the degree in which it satisfies our thought. Order is "the mind finding itself again in things."(52) But the mind can go in two opposite directions. Sometimes it follows its natural way:there is then progress in the form of tension, continuous creation, free activity.Sometimes it inverts itself, and this inversion, pushed to the end, leads to extension. The order of the second kind may be defined as geometry, which is its extreme limit; "it is that kind of order which is concerned whenever a relation of necessary determination is found between causes and effects. It evokes ideas of inertia, of passivity, of automatism. As to the first kind of order, it oscillates around finality; and yet we cannot define it as finality, for it is sometimes above, sometimes below..Life in its entirety, regarded as a creative evolution, transcends finality, if we understand by finality the realization of an idea conceived or conceivable in advance....We may say that this first kind of order is that of the vital or of the willed, in opposition to the second, which is that of the inert and the automatic....We say of astronomical phenomena that they manifest an admirable order, meaning by this that they can be foreseen mathematically. And we find an order no less admirable in a symphony of Beethoven, which is genius, originality, and therefore unforeseeability itself. Ordinarily we have every interest in confusing features of the first kind with those of the opposite order."(53)

We try to express the difference between the physical and the vital order by saying that the former makes the same combination of causes give the same combined effect, that the latter secures the constancy of the effect even when there is some wavering in the causes. The first impulse of the mind is to see a skilled foreman, the 'vital principle', watching over the concurrence in the world of the infinity of infinitesmal elements and of infinitesmal causes.

These elements and causes are not a little army of workers, and there is no foremen to direct them. "Vital phenomena, or facts of organic creation, open up to us, when we analyze them, the perspective of an analysis passing away to infinity: whence it may be inferred that the manifold causes and elements are here only views of the mind, attempting an ever closer and closer imitation of the operation of nature, while the operation imitated is an indivisible act. The likeness between individuals of the same species has thus an entirely different meaning, an entirely different origin, to that of the likeness between complex effects obtained by the same composition of the same causes. But in the one case as in the other, there is <u>likeness</u>, and consequently possible generalization. And as that is all that interests us in practice, since our daily life is and must be an expectation of the same things and the same situations, it is natural that this common character, essential from the point of view of our action, should bring the two orders together"(54).

"The ancients," and this may be understood to include our Jewish philosophers, "did not ask why nature submits to laws, but why it is ordered according to genera. The idea of genus corresponds more especially to an objective reality in the domain of life, where it expresses an unquestionable fact, heredity. Indeed, there can only be genera where there are individual objects; while the organized being is cut out fromthe general mass of matter by his very organization, it is our perception, in the interest of action, which cuts inert matter into distinct bodies. Genera and individuals determine one another by a semi-artificial operation entirely relative to our future action on things. Nevertheless the ancients did not hesttate to put all genera in the same rank, to attribute the same absolute existence to them all...The stone, in Aristotle's view,...in falling back into its natural place, aims at completing

itself, like a living being that grows, thus realizing fully the essence of the genus stone....All bodies would have the same individuality as living bodies, if this conception of the physical law were exact, and the laws of the physical universe would express relations of real kinship between real genera....The ancients, who believed in a science that embraced the totality of the real at and at one with the absolute, were confined to a more or less clumsy interpretation of the physical in terms of the vital."(55) "The vital order, which is essentially creation, is manifested to us less in its essence than in some of its accidents, those which imitate the physical and geometrical order; like it, they present to us repetitions that make generalizations possible, and in that we have all that interests us....Life as a whole is an evolution, an unceasing transformation, but it can progress only by means of the living, which are its depositaries. Innumerable living beings, almost alike, have to repeat each other in time and in space for the novelty they are working out to grow and mature....Heredity does not only transmit characters; it transmits also the impetus in virtue of which the characters are modified, and this impetus is vitality itself."(56) Clarity on this point of the distinction between the order that is 'willed' and the order that is 'automatic' dissipates the ambiguity the idea that underlies the idea of disorder. On this latter subject more must be said shortly; it was in connection with the analysis of the idea of disorder that Bergson introduces his criticism of the ancient conception of genus and genera, a criticism that seems to be in place here.

If there be an effort to bring Bergson's and Jewish thought in agreement, it may be pointed out that to the Jewish philosphers, too, the world presented the aspect of a 'willed' order. This is especially true of the Neo-Platonists among them. To be sure, the

distinction between a willed and an automatic order can scarcely be said to be found in Gabirol, Bahya, Ibn Zaddik and the Ibn Ezras, yet the imposition of form upon matter at the will of God - a continuous process - does indeed suggest resemblances to the Bergsonian conception. A kind of reflection of God himself, but not to be distinguished from his essence, so to destroy his unity, God's Will pervades everything as a soul does the body it animates. Though any union of matter and form tends to a classification under one of the Aristotelian categories, it may be assumed that the freedom of God's Will, or as it is variously called, his Wisdom or Word, has power to transcend the customary limitations, described by the categories. An infinity of individuals gains unity from a regression through effects to causes, and thence to the ultimate cause; unity will, again, appear in the single plan or purpose which all creation presents. The vital will of God, as it receives elaboration in Gabirol's writings, moves through all things, an immanent voluntary activity which is neither necessary nor impersonal. Genus and species are then not absolute forms, but are simply convenient expressions for the similarities which are noted in the effects of the cosmic process. The agreement between Bergson and the Neo-Platonic Jewish philosophers ends here, however, for Gabirol maintains the doctrine of transcendentalism by the side of immanence, in order that no change may be ascribed to God. A theory of emanation attempts to bridge the gap between the two conceptions of deity. The immobile, self-sufficient essence of God thinks, speaks, wills, or reflects himself as from a mirror, and by the instrument of his delegated Wisdom, Word, Will or Reflection, which may not at all be distinguished from his essence, the world comes to be. Matter, that which is created by God or emanates from his essence, is itself ultimately identified with God, and is therefore as much a part of

the 'willed' order as are living beings.(57) The difficulties of this conception of Gabirol's are due chiefly to the ambiguous nature of the Divine Will; in Bergson, God or the Creative Will is frankly immanent, and in no sense transcendent. The idea persists throughout ancient and medieval philosophy that only the permanent can belong to God, and to that extent he transcends all knowledge of particulars which are constantly changing. Hence Abraham ibn Ezra claims that God does not know the particular as such, but only as involved in the general and permanent.(58)

Returning now to the philosophic arguments for unity, we find in Abraham ibn Daud much the same habit of thought that characterized his predecessors. The unity of God is like no other known unity, not the unity, surely, of a dollective, not the unity of an individual, which consists of parts, not the unity of any object for an object is composed of matter and form, not the unity of mathematical entities which, though not corporeal, are divisible and hence potentially multiple. The being that may be termed truly one is that which is both unique and incorporeal. Again, its unity may not be an accident, as is the case when an ordinary object is designated one. God's unity is his essence.(59) אחדות האל ית' אינה מקרית אחר שהמקרים לא ישיגוהו ית'.... אחדותו היא עצמותו.

A similar mode of reasoning is carried into the discussion of attributes. The truest of them are the negative ones, such as that God is not body, is not subject to change or motion. The nearest approach to affirmation of unity, existence, incorporeality is a denial of their opposites. Maimonides employed this method of Ibn Daud's, making it the predominant factor in the construction of his philosophic system. He lays the greatest stress on the "homonymous"description of Sriptural terms. A homonym is a word, borrowed from Aristotle, which has more than one meaning; "a word which

denotes several things having nothing in common....For example, the word 'merciful', one of the attributes of God named in the Bible, is a homonym. That is, we denote by the same word a quality which is characteristic of human beings, but which, when applied to God, has nothing in common with it."(60) There is nothing, in fact, in God corresponding to the word merciful. In this way Maimonides aims to establish a true conception of God; God so defined by the use of attributes which are not attributes at all will be absolutely incorporeal and purely spiritual. A glance at his greatest philosophic treatise,Guide for the Perplexed, shows that more than half of the first part, a total of seventy-six chapters, is devoted to an exposition of the homonymity of the Divine attributes. The expressions which are discussed are nouns and verbs used in reference to God, attributes of the Deity, and names commonly given to God. The several arguments advanced by Maimonides against the employment of attributes are intended to show that those who assume the real existence of Divine attributes may possibly utter with their lips the creed of the Unity and Incorporeality of God, but they cannot truly believe it. Faith consists in thought, not in mere utterance; in conviction, not in mere profession. He discusses then the impropriety of assigning attributes to God.

The attributists admit that God is the Primal Cause, One, incorporeal, free from emotion and privation, and that he is not comparable to any of his creatures. Any attributes which, directly or indirectly, are in contradiction to this creed, should not be applied to God. By this rule he rejects four classes of attributes: those which include a definition, a partial definition, a quality, or a relation.

"The definition of a thing includes its efficient cause; and

since God is the Primal Cause, He cannot be defined, or described by a partial definition. A quality, whether psychical, physical, or emotional, or quantitative, is always regarded as something distinct from its substratum; a thing which possesses any quality, consists, therefore, of that quality and a substratum, and should not be called one. All relations of time and space imply corporeality; all relations between two objects are, to a certain degree, a comparison between these two objects. To employ any of these attributes in reference to God would be as much as to declare that God is not the Primal Cause, that He is not One, that He is corporeal, or that He is comparable to His creatures."(61)

The one class of attributes to which Maimonides makes no objection is such as describe actions, and to this class belong all the Divine attributes which occur in the Scriptures. The "Thirteen Attributes"(Ex.xxxiv.6,7)are illustrations. They were communicated to Moses when he wished to know the way in which God governs the universe, in order that he himself in ruling the nation might follow it. Scriptures ascribe to God Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom, Unity, Eternity, and Will. Maimonides points out three ways of interpreting these attributes so as to reconcile them with the belief in the Unity and the Incorporeality of God:- "1. They may be regarded as descriptive of the works of God, and as declaring that these possess such properties as, in works of man, would appear to be the result of the will, the power, and the wisdom of a living being. 2. The terms 'existing,' 'one,' 'wise,' etc., are applied to God and to His creatures homonymously; as attributes of God they coincide with His Essence; as attributes of anything beside God they are distinct from the essence of the thing. 3. These terms do nor describe a positive quality, but express a negation of its opposite. The author observes that the knowledge of the incomprehensible Being is solely of a negative character, and he shows

that an approximate knowledge of a thing can be attained by mere negations, that such knowledge increases with the number of these negations, and that an error in positive assertions is more injurious than an error in negative assertions."(62)

Without extending further this outline of Jewish thought upon the nature and possible knowledge of God, let us turn to that phase of Maimonides' philosophy which bears more particularly upon the central theme of Bergson's works, the subject of motion and change.

In Part Two, Chapter Four, Maimonides gives the Aristotelian explanation for motion. תנועתו המקומית מורה על היות בו התחלה,
בה יתנועע, וההתחלה ההיא היא נפש בלא ספק ··· אין הנפש
אשר בה תהיה התנועה, ולא השכל אשר בו יצייר הדבר מספיקים
בהתחדש כמו זאת התנועה, עד שתתחבר אליהם תשוקה לענין
ההוא המצוייר, ויתחייב א"כ מזה שיהיה לגלגל תשוקה למה שציירהו,
והוא הדבר האהוב, והוא האל ית' שמו. "The locomotion of the sphere leads us to assume some inherent principle by which it moves; and this principle is certainly a soul....Neither the soul, which is the principle of motion, nor the intellect, which by which that thing is perceived is the source of ideas, perceived would produce motion without the existence of a desire for the object ~~of~~ which was perceived ~~an idea has been formed~~. It follows that the heavenly sphere must have a desire for the ideal which it has comprehended, and that ideal, for which it has a desire, is God, exalted be His name!" When we say that God moves the spheres, we mean that the spheres have a desire to become similar to the ideal comprehended by them.

We see motion in the sublunar world; it is the motion involved in the processes of genesis and destruction, and ultimately derived from the motion of the celestial sphere. Maimonides draws an illustration to make clear the dependence of earthly movement upon the motion of the sphere. A stone is set in motion by a stick, the stick

by a man's hand, the hand by the sinews, the sinews by the muscles, the muscles by the nerves, the nerves by the natural heat of the body, and the heat of the body by its form. This is the immediate motive cause, and is part of a certain design, the design being in this case to prevent a draught from coming through a crevice. The motion of the air that causes the draught is the effect of the motion of the celestial sphere. The motion of the sphere must likewise have been effected by an agent. That agent, it is seen, must be one of four possibilities: a corporeal object within the sphere; an incorporeal object separate from it; a force spread throughout the whole of the sphere; or an indivisible force within the sphere. Maimonides sets aside all but the second of these, and comes to the conclusion that the sphere cannot move 'ad infinitum' of its own accord; that the Prime Mover is not corporeal, nor a force residing within a body; that the Prime Mover is One, unchangeable, and in its existence independent of time. (63)

This exposition of the Jewish point of view in respect to God, or the Absolute, brief and incomplete as it is, suffices to show rather clearly the differences between Bergson's modern way of thinking and that of ancient and medieval men. The main line of Jewish thought reached its culmination in extreme transcendentalism that verged upon agnosticism. Neo-Platonism allows a degree of immanence to be introduced into a conception of Deity, but the reversion to Aristotle for guidance removed the possibility of perpetuating the doctrine of an indwelling God. At best, the difficulties attendant upon an association of immanence with transcendency would have been practically insuperable, in addition to the fact that it would have been foreign to the traditional attitude of the Jewish mind.

The refinement and purification of the idea of unity that went

to extremes in the philosophy of Maimonides scarcely avoided the implication of unity which Bergson points out, namely that there must be some multiplicity to be unified. The fact of the matter is, the essence of God is multiple, although the philosophers were at pains to show that it was a multiplicity without distinctions. Such, indeed, is Bergson's absolute, pure duration, and the differentiation which he makes between the multiplicity of material objects and the multiplicity of conscious states may be seen to be of real service in solving the problems which troubled Jewish thinkers most. Maimonides distictly says that God is possessed of no qualities, having in mind the qualities of matter, such as hard, bright, smooth, etc., but Bergson would have his absolute nothing but qualitative. To the former, quality must be dissociated from God because it was understood as an accident of matter; to the latter qualities are viewed subjectively, and are therefore not so much properties of matter as graded perceptions of consciousness. The entire first part of Time and Free Will is devoted to the elucidation of this thesis. Far from endangering the conception of God's incorporeality and unity, the concept of a heterogeneous, interpenetrating, and qualitative duration saves both of the fundamental tenets of Jewish thought from materiality and quantity, for in this direction Bergson and the Jewish philosophers are at one.

In spite of the fact that Maimonides, like Saadia, conceived of the whole existing world as one organic body: כל הנמצא כגוף אחד (64) the factor of vitalism was either confused or misunderstood. Whereas Bergson, monist that he is, lays emphasis upon the vital or willed order as distinguished from its inversion, the geometric, Jewish philosophy fails to make any distinction at all and considers the whole 'organic' process from the standpoint of what is to Bergson the geometric order. Thus from

a physics which gave reality to the immobile and lesser reality to departures from the fixed or 'natural' place, there arose the system of thought that exalted transcendental unity to a position of supreme and unapproachable dignity. The great difference between the ancient and modern philosophies which we are examining is to be accounted for on the grounds of their opposite conceptions of the physical universe. The Jewish and Bergsonian Absolutes are irreconcilable; perfection and completion are the identifying marks of the one, growth and change the essential characteristics of the other. In order that the medieval thought may become modernized, the static become mobile, stability give place to evolution, it seems to be necessary to introduce change into God, and to admit that His plan grows continually even as the visible universe grows.

The strongest objection to the Bergsonian substitute for the Jewish God is based upon the idea that complete immanence disallows a cardinal belief of Judaism, the conception of a personal God. (65) An understanding of what personality means to Bergson may be gained from his works, although he does not treat the question specifically

Our experience begins by being impersonal, but from an indistinct whole we gradually detach ourselves and become a distinct part. The body is found to remain relatively invariable in relation to the changing objects around it on which it acts and toward which its effort is directed; it becomes the center of action and the source of effort. The affections establish the body through experience as the physical basis of personality. In the growth of self-consciousness experience distinguishes an I, a personality, from all other beings and objects. "The existence of which we are most assured is unquestionably our own, for we perceive ourselves internally, deeply."(66) Self-consciousness is a progressive thing, starting almost passively with a mere insinuation of itself into matter

and a reaction to environment. Consciousness, as it goes to the formation of a personality, becomes increasingly aware of itself as an agent. Memory plays a part. Our past is indissolubly united with the present. Every experience enters into the composition of the self.

For the needs of a practical life only a bit of our past is actually brought to consciousness, and our experience of the self is necessarily a superficial one. Life in homogeneous time, which is space, described by language, presents to us a view of personality as divided into distinct states, and a substance of some kind is posited to provide a mysterious unification. But there is no rigid immovable substratum, nob are there in reality any distinct states. There is simply the continuous "melody" of our inner life. This indivisible flux is our personality, and a perception of it is seized by an effort of intuition, a kind of sympathy with ourselves. There are degrees of personality present in action to the greater or less extent that our true self acts.

Personality, besides being a growth, is a continuous unfolding. Everything living is a tendency, and the very essence of a tendency is the development in different directions of an initial impulse. The human race as a whole has lost much of what the original life-impulse contained in it. Each individual inherits less, although many incompatible tendencies leave their traces in him. As life is lived and personality develops, the individual abandons much and character results from the choice and selection. The character of a personality is thus the condensation of a history which begins with inherited dispositions and tendencies and which subsequent experience enriches by the exercise of choice and emphasis. Freedom is here self-creation, and the degree of freedom one attains depends, in the first instance, on the extent to which automatism

has been allowed to creep over freedom, and depends, secondly, upon how much of the self is cast into any act, how far, that is, the self is capable of breaking through the inevitably acquired habits, when matters of deepest concern to itself areaat stake. Perfect freedom of self-creation can never belong to the individual; that can only be found in coincidence with the principle of all life. The more fully we coincide with the spiritual force which is in us, the more are we creative personalities. "The passage of consciousness through matter is destined to bring to precision, in the form of distinct personalities which were at first mingled, and also to test their force, while at the same time increasing it by an effort of self-creation."(67)

Each human personality is, in its most real self, its inmost core, part of the principle of life. In the union with the principle of life, however partial it may be, we are placed in sympathetic communication with all living beings, more particularly with those nearest ourselves, our fellow-men. All individuals are closely allied tendencies because they are identified with one life-force.

The vital impulse is, as Bergson says, "a principle of change rather than of conservation;" it is a principle, not merely flux.(68) Our solar system and all other systems manifest each but a part of the creative principle which is the source of all things. God must be pictured, according to Bergson, as a continual springing forth, the free center of the birth of all worlds. The individual is by his actions continually creating himself, choosing among the potentialities of his person. He is, of course, limited in a sense to the potentialities of his personality, of the life-principle which is his in part, and which gave the impulse of his life. But no individual life is cut off from its source.

So of the larger system of the universe: the life-principle of each world cannot be dissociated from its source, and in so far as it can attain awareness of its nature, that is, as it once more becomes conscious of itself in each world system, it should be reinforced through coincidence with the other manifestations of the life-principle. There is thus a unity to the principle of life. The relation of the supraconsciousness to the different world systems and to the individuals of each world may perhaps be compared to the relation of the single consciousness to its mental states. In a sense, then, God may be said to be both "immanent in and yet transcendent to all worlds."(69) The deeper the experience of an individual, the more completely does he establish himself by the method of intuition within the vital impulse which is the principle of life in the world and beyond.

The vital "impetus is finite, and it has been given once for all. It cannot overcome all obstacles. The movement it starts is sometimes turned aside, sometimes divided, always appowed; and the evolution of the organized world is the unrolling of this conflict." (70) If the vital impulse is to be understood as the Divine force, in these terms of struggle must it be interpreteted. "Life is essentially a current sent through matter, drawing from it what it can. There has not, therefore, properly speaking, been any project or plan....We struggle like the other species, we have struggled against other species....It would be wrong to regard humanity as prefigured in the evolutionary movement....Man continues the vital movement indefinitely....It is as if a vague and formless being, whom we may call as we will, man or superman, sought to realize himself."(71)

The final consideration of this section which has had as its principle theme the conception of unity in Jewish philosophy, with

some side-lights thrown upon the problem by Bergson, will be one more reference to the unity of the absolute found in Creative Evolution. "Life, though compared to an impetus, is, in reality, of the psychological order, and it is of the essence of the psychical to enfold a confused plurality of interpenetrating terms. In space, and in space only, is distinct multiplicity possible: a point is absolutely external to another point. But pure and empty unity, also, is met with only in space; it is that of a mathematical point. Abstract unity and abstract multilicity are determinations of space or categories of the understanding, whichever we will, spatiality and intellectuality being molded on each other. But what is of psychical nature cannot correspond with space, nor enter perfectly into the categories of the understanding. Is my own person, at a given moment, one or manifold? If I declare it one, inner voices arise and protest - those of the sensations, feelings, ideas, among which my individuality is distributed. But, if I make it distinctly manifold, my consciousness rebels quite as strongly; it affirms that my sensations, my feelings, my thoughts are abstractions which I effect on myself, and that each of my states implies all the others. I am then a unity that is multiple and a multiplicty that is one; but unity and multiplicity are only views of my personality taken by an understanding that directs its categories at me; I enter neither into one nor into the other nor into both at once, although both, united, may give a fair imitation of the mutual interpenetration and continuity that I find at the base of my own self. Such is my inner life, and such also is life in general."(72)

With due allowance for new definitions of old terms in the light of increased knowledge, especillay in the direction of evolutionary conceptions, Bergson's philosophy may be said to afford support for Jewish ideas of God's unity, existence, and incorpor-

eality. If Jewish philosophy, in its progressive development, can surrender the ancient illusion that we can think the moving by means of the immobile, it is quite possible that it may be brought into agreement with Bergson's thought. Bergson introduces us into the spiritual life. It shows us in the intuition of our own personal life the true duration in which memory and will form one free acting present. By sympathetic insight we realize that our duration is one with the whole reality of the universe, vast as we conceive it to be. "We see that if the universe is real it can only mean that it lives as a consciousness which endures and becomes unceasingly. T That for this universal life as for every individual life, matter is the momentary point without duration that exists only where the m movement is creating."(73) The life-principle is finite, Bergson says, and the idea of eternity means little that is really significant to him. Furthermore, the God of Bergson's philosophy is an immanent God; indeed He is Creative Evolution. Is He a personal God? On the analogy of human personality, He is a transcendental person inclusive of the individual personalities. Jewish philosophy was persistently averse, however, to identifying God with any of his powers. The Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages taught that God is both immanent and transcendent. This is true not only of those philosophers who based their thought on Aristotle's Metaphysics, such as Gabirol, Halevi and Gersonides; but is also true of those whose systems were based on Aristotle's Physics, such as Saadia, Maimonides and Crescas. Whereas the tendency in Bergson is always toward pantheism, Jewish philosophy tends to an abstraction homonymous with human characteristics. If psychology is to be our guide, personality may apply to the large metaphysical principle of life which develops progressively quite as well as to the individual consciousness which evolves constantly toward more complete personality.

IV.

INTUITION AND RATIONALITY

As Methods of Perceiving
The Absolute.

Intuition and Rationality.

A bringing together of the two terms, Intuition and Rationality, looks like a revival of the dualism of medieval thought . If in the earlier days the two sources of truth were revelation and reason, religion and philosophy, faith and knowledge, in these modern times the first of the terms in the series have been reduced to the level of the mental or psychical, even to the level of the second terms. Intuition and Rationalism do not present a problem like the one that gave so much concern to thinkers of the Middle Ages because they will not be set in contrast or opposition to each other but will be seen to be aspects of one process serving a mutual amplification.

Both Bergson and the medieval philosophers discovered a principle which transcended mere ratiocination. To the former it is the intuitive method of perceiving reality; the intellect is useful for the practial life, but is quite unable to grasp the significance of real movement, real becoming, real duration. To the philosophers of the remote age, reason could not of itself reveal the whole truth, but it nevertheless was a sure test of truth. The direct word of God contained in Biblical tradition and the oral law was reasonable, and adaptable to logical inference. Revelation and authority on one side, and independent thinking upon the testimony of the senses on the other, reason, introduced harmony. Not reason but the psychological equivalent of revelation and authority is the ultimate guide for Bergson. Some among the Jewish philosophers laid less emphasis upon the guidance of reason, Halevi in particular To them something approaching the intuition of Bergson, which they called prophecy, represented psychological receptivity to a perception of reality.

The foundation of Bergson's philosophy is his method of intuition. He repeatedly draws attention to the fact that his philosophy is not a definitely formulated system, but is essentially a method. The metaphysic which he has in view is "a positive metaphysic, susceptible of a rectilinear and indefinite progress; a science empirical in its method, progressive, and restricted, like the other positive sciences, in that it gives us only provisionally the last results to which it has been led by an attentive study of the real. (74) "By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places himself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible."(75) To philosophize is to feel the palpitations of the heart of reality, and it is the duty of philosophy to disengage itself from the forms and habits of intelligence, for intelligence is characterized by a native inability to comprehend life which is always going, ever becoming. The work of intelligence is to reconstitute ready-made conceptions; what is new in each moment of history escapes it, and still more the process itself from moment to moment is beyond its grasp. If the intelligence were capable of knowing reality in its fulness, the assumption would necessarily be that reality is given, in its completeness, from all eternity. This conception of reality is fundamentally opposed to Bergson's view of life and mind; consequently he insists on the limitations of intelligence as a faculty of knowledge.

By an almost superhuman effort the philosopher may transcend the point of view of intelligence, and by a stroke of sympathetic insight perceive or feel the impulsion at the heart of reality. Experience is not confined within the bounds of rational experience; thought is wider than reasoned thought. Intelligence is supplemented by intuition: intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect

goes in the inverse direction, and thus finds itself naturally in accordance with the movement of matter. A complete and perfect humanity would be that in which these two forms of conscious activity should attain their full development. In the humanity of which we are a part, intuition is, in fact, almost completely sacrificed to intellect. It seems that to conquer matter, and to reconquer itself, consciousness has had to exhaust the best part of its power. Intuition "is a lamp almost extinguished, which only glimmers now and then, for a few moments at most. But it glimmers wherever a vital interest is at stake. On our personality, on our liberty, on the place we occupy in the whole of nature, on our origin and perhaps also on our destiny, it throws a light feeble and vacillating, but which none the less pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us."(76)

Intelligence finds its proper shere of activity within the positive sciences. In the mathematical sciences it is perfectly at home. "De jure, physics grasps the absolute....I am of the opinion that it is reality in itself, absolute reality, which the mathematical and physical sciences reveal to us."(77) Intelligence succeeds in the sciences because they have ultimately a practical aim, amd intelligence is the instrument of action. Parallel to modern scientific knowledge there ought to be constituted a second kind of knowledge which would retain what physics allows to escape. One must transport one'svself by an effort of sympathy to the interior of that which becomes, and attempt to follow the flux to the real. Philosophy thus introduces us into spiritual life, its true domain.

But science treats the living in the same way as the inert; the object of philosophy is to speculate, and its attitude should not be that of science, which aims only at action, and which, being

able to act only by means of inert matter, envisages the rest of reality under this single aspect. The faculty of speculation is intuition. A philosophy which employs only intelligence alone, capable as it is of apprehending only the inert, the spatial and the mechanical, will erect into an absolute the factitious unity of science; knowledge within the realm of life and consciousness, where there is process and growth, will be merely relative and symbolic. The task of philosophy is to build a progressive knowledge of these realities which shall be no longer symbolic. By flashes of inspiration, by successive efforts of intuition the philosopher will follow the windings of life and consciousness in all the movements of their qualitative processes.

"The intelligence is not made to think evolution, is incapable of presenting the true nature of life, the full meaning of the evolutionary movement."(78) It cannot grasp it, for life overflows intelligence which is the materialization of the psychical force at the heart of the universe. "Created by life, in definite circumstances, to act on definite things, how can it embrace life, of which it is only an emanation or an aspect? Deposited by the evolutionary movement in the course of its way, how can it be applied to the evolutionary movement itself? As well contend that the part is equal to the whole, that the effect can reabsorb its cause, or that the pebble left on the beach displays the form of the wave that brought it there."(78) Spirit has developed in two divergent directions. At the end of one of these stands man, the intelligent creature 'par excellence'; at the end of the other are the insects, which are most perfectly possessed of instinct.

The main lines of the doctrine that was developed by the Greeks indicate the vision that a systematic intellect obtains of the universal becoming when regarding it by means of snapshots, taken

at intervals, of its flowing. 'Forms' are the constitutive elements of change; they represent what is positive in becoming; they dwell in inexorable steadfastness, free from limits of time and place. Mobility is accounted for on the postulate of an immutable center, more real than the mobile, namely, 'Thought of Thoughts'. The conclusion which Bergson draws from Greek systems is that intellect is dominated by the principle of identity. Similarly, an investigation of the conquests of modern science reveals the inherent inability of intelligence to grasp the nature of anything other than the mechanical and static. Modern science considers only "moments, virtual stoppages - in short, immobilities." It takes account, at best, of abstract time, time that is nothing more than a fourth dimention of space. "When positive science speaks of time, what it refers to is the movement of a certain mobile T on its trajectory... Of the flux itself of time, still less of its effect on consciousness, there is here no question; for there enter into the calculation only the points taken on the flux, never the flux itself."(79) The requirements of action necessitates the isolation of differences in order that similarities in other situations may be noted and prediction made. Out of such needs the intelligence has acquired its present inherent nature which is the domination of the principle of identity.

From the bottom to the top of the organized world we find one great effort; but most often this effort turns short, sometimes paralyzed by contrary forces, sometimes diverted from what it should do by what it does. Even in its most perfect works, though it seems to have triumphed over external resistances and also over its own, it is at the mercy of the materiality which it has had to assume. The result has been divergent lines of evolutionary development. So Bergson says, "The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has

vitiated most of the philosophies of nature, is to see in vegetative instinctive and rational life, three successive degrees of the development of one and the same tendency, whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity that has split up as it grew. As vegetable and animal life are shown by Bergson to be at once mutually complementary and mutually antagonistic, so he shows that intelligence and instinct also are opposite and complementary.

Because intelligence and instinct have originally been interpenetrating, they retain something of their common origin. Neither is ever found in a pure state. There is no intelligence in which some traces of instinct are not to be discovered, more especially no instinct that is not surrounded with a fringe of intelligence. They accompany each other only because they are complementary, and they are complementary only because they are different. The life manifested by an organism is a certain effort to obtain certain things from the material world. Instinct and intelligence are two different methods of action on inert matter; instinct perfected is a faculty of using and even of constructing organized instruments; intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using unorganized instruments. Another difference between them is that while instinct and intelligence both involve knowledge, this knowledge is rather acted and unconscious in the case of instinct, and thought and conscious in the case of intelligence. And, again, in their application to Greek philosophy, intelligence, in so far as it is innate, is the knowledge of a form; instinct implies the knowledge of a matter. The essential function of the intellect is to see the way out of a difficulty in any circumstance whatever; what is innate in intellect is the tendency to establish relations. There are things that intelligence alone is able to seek, but which by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could find; but it

will never seek them.

Intelligence takes its nature from its function, which is the exercise of fabrication on inert matter. Fabrication deals with the solid; the rest escapes by its very flyidity. To hold the view of the ancients relative to the rise and function of the intellect is to lead to error. They saw in the intellect a faculty intended principally for pure speculation. The understanding must have fallen from heaven with its form, as each of us is born with a face. It will be said then that the function of the intellect is essentially to introduce a certain unity into the diversity of phenomena. But, aside from the fact that 'unification' is a vague term, it might be asked if the function of the intellect is not to divide even more than to unity. And if the intellect proceeds as it does because it wishes to unite, the whole of our knowledge becomes relative to the requirements of the mind. Having placed the understanding too high, by making it a kind of absolute, we end by puting too low the knowledge it gives us. If we regard the human intellect as relative to the needs of action, knowledge ceases to be a product of the intellect and becomes, in a certain sense, part and parcel of reality.

Of the discontinuous alone, of immobility, does the intellec form a clear idea; it is characterized by the unlimited power of decomposing according to any law and of recomposing into any system. An intelligence which reflects is one that originally had a surplus of energy to spend, over and above practically useful efforts. But intellect, even so, behaves as if it wree fascinated by the contemplation of inert matter, and adopts the ways of unorgaized nature; it cannot, without reversing its natural direction and twisting about on itself, think true continuity, real mobility, reciprocal penetration - in a word, that creative evolu-

tion which is life.

Instinct, on the contrary, is molded on the very form of life. While intelligence treats everything mechanically, instinct proceeds, so to speak, organically. In the instinct of the animal and in the vital properties of the cell, all goes on as if the cell knew, of all the other cells, what concerns itself; as if the animal knew, of the other animals, what it can utilize - all else remaining in the shade. Is it not plain that life goes to work here exactly like consciousness, exactly like memory? We trail behind us, unawares, the whole of our past; but our memory pours into the present only the odd recollection or two that in some way complete our present situation. Thus the instinctive knowledge which one species possesses of another on a certain particular point has its root in the very unity of life.

Though instinct is not within the domain of intelligence, it is not situated beyond the limits of the mind. In the phenomena of feeling, in unreflecting sympathy and antipathy, we experience in ourselves something of what must happen in the consciousness of an insect acting by instinct. Whatever be the force that is at work in the genesis of the nervous system of the caterpillar, for example, we get only the whole outer effect of it; but at least it discerns it from within, quite otherwise than by a process of knowledge - by an intuition (lived rather than represented), which is probably like what we call divining sympathy.

Instinct is sympathy. If this sympathy could extend its object and also reflect upon itself, it would give us the key to vital operations - just as intelligence, developed and disciplined, guides us into matter. Intelligence goes all round life, taking from the outside the greatest number of views possible. But it is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us - by intuition is

meant instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely.

The existence in man of an aesthetic faculty along with normal perception proves that an effort of this kind is not impossible. The intention of life, the simple movement that runs through the lines of all its features, that binds them together, is just the intention that the artist tries to reagin, in placing himself within the object of his study by a kind of symapthy, in breaking down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier that space puts up between him and his model. We can imagine an inquiry turned in the smae direction as art, which would take life in general for its object. In default of knowledge comparable to that which science has of its object, and reserved to pure intelligence, intuition may enable us to grasp wht it is that intelligence fails to give us, and indicate the means of supplementing it. Intuition may bring the intellect to recognize that life does not quite go into the category of the many nor yet into that of the one. Then, by the sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us into life's own domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation.

Bergson has no desire to oppose intelligence to intuition with a view to the disparagement of the former faculty. He has no desire to encourage intellectual scepticism, yet he would disagree with the tendency of Jewish philosophy to stress the perfect reliability of reason and intelligence for an understanding of reality. Intuition and intelligence are complementary the one of the other in their mutually inverse movement; intelligence may be trusted so long as it is content to confine itself to following the movement towards materiality. But it is just this that Jewish philosophy

has in the main not been entirely willing to do. Bergson's chief objections~~is based~~ to intellectuality as a metaphysical method are two in number. First, it gives an "absolute that is synonymous with perfection,"(80) and secondly, it proceeds by analysis, which "is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, to elements common both to it and other objects. All analysis is a translation into symbols, a representation taken from successive points of view. In its eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object around which it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies without end the number ~~the number~~ of its points of view in order to complete its always incomplete representation. It goes on, therefore, to infinity. But intuition, if intuition is possible, is a simple act."(81) Any number of sketches and descriptions of the city of Paris, for example, will fail to "get back to an intuition that one has never had, and to give oneself an impression of what Paris is like if one has never seen it."(82)

It appears at once that Jewish philosophy presents a conception of a perfect absolute, and intelligence represents the absolute as an infinite because an analysis of that concept is found never to be completely satisfying. Attributes of Deity are enumerated in an endless series by relation to human qualities, and eventually philosophic agnosticism concludes that God cannot be known as He really is; He may be described in terms of abstractions, and they are but homonyms. The Jewish philosophers may be said to have attempted ~~merely~~ the intellectual representation of an intuition, that intuition being the existence of a spiritual Unity, or the spiritual unity of Existence. But, according to Bergson, rationalism is powerless to reach the inner self, the self which is Being. It considers mind and matter infinitely divisible into absolute fragments capable of being recreated into a unity. It sees this

unity steal away indefinitely like a phantom in the continually renewed effort to clasp it. In the search for unity that puts down all the qualities and determinations that it finds by analysis, rationalism has nothing left for unity but something negative, the absence of all determination. The unity of the 'ego' or of 'personality' can never be more than a form without content. It will be absolutely indeterminate and absolutely void. "Is it astonishing," Bergson asks, "that the philosophers who have isolated this 'form' of personality should find it insufficient to characterize a definite person, and that they should be gradually led to make this empty ego a kind of bottomless receptacle, which belongs no more to Peter than to Paul, and in which there is room, according to our preference, for entire humanity, for God, or for existence in general?"(83) The difference between the two points of view we are here considering may be summed up in the statement of Bergson's that "from intuition one can pass to analysis, but not from analysis to intuition."(84) And, once more, the unique contribution of Bergson to philosophy contrasted with the dominant characteristic of ancient and medieval thought: "What is relative is the symbolic knowledge by pre-existing concepts, which prodeeds from the fixed to the moving, and not the intuitive knowledge which installs itself in that which is moving and adopts the very life of things. This intuition attains the absolute."(85)

Medieval Jewish rationalism took its direction from Aristotle and the Arabic Aristotelians, and based its systems upon their conceptions of physics and metaphysics. Under their influence Intelligence was endowed with metaphysical reality, of a transcendental nature. To man was attributed by Aristotle an intellect of a twofold order, active and passive, and to the universe ten

Intelligences which were the sources of heavenly spheral motion. The Neo-Platonic development of Aristotelianism provided a scheme of emanation by which the ten Intelligences emanated in succession from God. The Active Intellect controlled the motions of the sub-lunar world composed of the four elements; it was itself the emanation from the Intelligence of the lunar shere. Man is born equipped with a material intellect which is spiritualized with the aid of the Active Intellect. Man thus attains to his immortal state upon the development of this Acquired Intellect, which, at death is re-absorbed into the Active Intellect.(86)

The Active Intellect is God's instrument of revelation to man. Those who, by reason of fitting innate and acquired powers, and of moral excellence, are deemed worthy, become the recipients of God's favor. Aristotle's psychology was authority for the Arabs to give such an explanation of prophecy and the Jewish philosophers, with some exceptions, followed their lead. Maimonides gave it its final form in Jewish rationalistic philosophy, and Gersonides but adapts further his formulation.

The earliest of the Jewish philosophers, Isaac Israeli, is Neo-Platonic in his habit of thought. The rational soul of man, highest of his three souls, is nearest to the Intelligence from which it is derived; the animal and vegetative souls issue in turn from the rational by a process of degradation. Transcendental Intelligence contains all ideas and principles in a completed and changeless state; it has but turn upon itself and spontaneously produce of its stock without thought or reflection. God creates by thinking Himself; such is his conception as it was that of Plotinus before him. Israeli suggests what Bergson means by intuition when he says that a skilful artisan creates similarly, by looking within himself, that is, for the idea that impels him to

create. But it is not without intelligence, in the Bergsonian sense, that he creates, for the soul of the artisan is divided and he must search his thought and discriminate before he can realize his desire or his impulse.(87)

That man who was least susceptible to the benumbing effects of animalic and vegetative control was chosen by God to receive His law. Not to any one could God reveal His will and impart His wisdom; only to him who yields to the influences of the rational soul which is illumined by the Intelligence. The animal soul prompts to confused, bold and unchaste action; the vegetable soul persuades man to succumb to the appetites. The prophet of God, messenger to mankind, must be as spiritual in his nature as it is possible for man to become. As a means of communication, dreams are closely related to the highly developed rational faculty. The Intelligence transmits the spiritual forms which it receives from God to the receptive soul, and it employs either the direct method or the indirect. If a man's thinking powers are of the proper prophetic order, he will be able to interpret the spiritual message which he has received in a dream. Such is Israeli's initial attempt at an explanation of human intellect and its function.

The interesting thing about these observations is that they distinguish between forms of psychic activity. There is the strictly analytical process and the more direct, or immediate, grasp of truth. In other words, revelation is a kind of intuition: an inwardness of perception. Reasoning, turned outward upon the facts presented to consciousness, may or may not be able to explain the data of experience satisfactorily, according as animal and vegetative interests - the material and habitual - raise obstacles to true understanding. Intuition of reality is rare; other concerns of life interfere with the frequent operation of the purely rational soul.

Saadia states thatit is the aim of his book to remove doubt and error from men's opinions and beliefs. A study of his work will offer a substitute for belief through tradition in the form of belief through knowledge. Doubt is liable to castnits shadow over the mind as long as life's experiences remain unanalyzed. His method will be the rationalist's method of simplifying the complex by a process of analysis. It takes time to resolve doubts.

The position taken by Saadia is sufficiently characteristic of those who succeed him that a brief outline of his conception of the nature and function of reason will serve to illustrate the direction of medieval Jewish thought.

Knowledge is derived from three principal sources: the senses, judgments (similar to innate ideas), and logical inference.
הראשון ידיעת הנראה. והשני מדע השכל. והשלישי ידיעת מה שההכרח מביא אליו (88)
To these he adds a fourth source of truth which is specifically applicable to Jews, and that is, authentic tradition. ונחבר אליהם שרש רביעי הודענו אותו בשלש ראיות ושב לנו שרש והוא ההגדה הנאמנת כי היא בנויה על מדע החוש ומדע השכל (89).

From this it appears that tradition itself was authentic only to the extent that it conformed clearly to the requirements of normal sense perception and to the demands of reason. Saadia claims that a Jew is not forbidden to philosophize about the truths of religion. On the contrary, speculation upon philosophic questions provides a guide for the better understanding of traditional belief and customs, and sets aside doubt. Saadia enumerates seven logical tests of truth and argues that they may with propriety be applied to the commandments of the Bible and the utterances of the prophets.
וכאשר יבחן (כל) במבחן וישקל במאזנים, אמת יהי"ד לכל מקובל, ואף נשתמש בהם, בעניני ההגדה הנאמנת רוצה לומר ספרי הנביאים.
(90)

If the truths of religion may be attained by reason without revelation, the question arises, why was it necessary that divine truth should have been revealed directly? Saadia answers that not every individual is able to follow the lengthy and difficult processes of reason, and were he given no immediate revelation to satisfy his religious queries and perplexities, he would be forever doubting and uncertain. The conclusions of reason are therefore given complete to begin with, and in a form that the senses may apprehend. מי שיהיה מן הנשים או הנערים ומי שלא ידע לעיין תהיה דתו שלמה לו ומגיע אליה כי כל בני אדם שוים בהרגשם החושים ישתתפו החכם והנבער. (91)

Saadia makes the same distinction between what is traditional and what is rational when he comes to treat the subject of ethics. And the same relation between tradition and reason is maintained: reason authenticates tradition. Miracles attest to the genuine character of prophets and their messages, but neither Moses or any other prophet would be accorded credence if he performed miracles and at the smae time commanded the practice of murder and adultery. In all of this philosophy there is the recognition of the ability of at least some men to go to the heart of a matter as though by intuition. May it not be said of Bergson's intuitionist that he is like the prophet whose heightened powers of perception enable him to witness or receive a revelation? The supreme Intelligence, however, which vouchsafes knowledge is perfect and complete; it is a reservoir replete with the knowledge that flows without diminution into such minds as are suited to receive of its abundance. Gabirol understands Intelligence to be the cause of all things in having immediate knowledge of all things. Reason is given priority over everything, both for the individual and for the universe of which man is but the miniature replica. This is especially true of Joseph Al-Basir who tressed this feature of

Saadia's philosophy and all who followed him to the time of Halevi assigned to reason a similar role.

Judah Halevi relied less fully upon reason as the ultimate and convincing guarantor of beliefs. The religion of the Jews in all its traditional aspects held the supreme position in his mind. The opinion that induced this attitude was based upon his observation that pure speculation might result in the proof of ideas contrary to each other. He does not discredit reason, but holds that reason itself needs the proper guide. Tradition furnishes this guide to a philosopher. "Heaven forbid," he puts into the mouth of his spokesman, The Rabbi, in Al Khazari, "that there should be anything in the Bible to contradict that which is manifest or proved!"(92)

Aristotle exerted his reasoning powers, but he had no tradition from any reliable source at his pisposal. His abstract speculations made for eternity of the world. Had he lived among a people with well authenticated and generally acknowledged traditions, he would have applied his deductions and arguments to establish the theory of creation, however difficult, instead of eternity, which is even more difficult to accept. "The theory of creation derives weight from the prophetic tradition of Adam, Noah, and Moses, which is more deserving of credence than mere speculation."(93)

In his introduction to a trahslation of Halevi's Kitab Al Khazari, Hirschfeld says that the doctrines of the work may be summed up in one sentence, "a philosophic scepticism in favor of a priori belief." This introduction comments further on the position of Halevi by saying that it was close to the Jewish feeling toward philosophic pursuits and metaphysical speculation in particular. Halevi's religious nature is responsible for the

two pivots on which the dialogue of the Cusari turns: 1/ Direct revelation of God to the patriarchs, Moses and the prophets; 2. Uninterrupted tradition of the divine guidance of the people, handed down by Moses to the prophets, and from them to later generations, this tradition embracing both the history of the Israelitish people and the law.

Halevi's dissatisfaction with a 'rational' religion established by speculation and argument and full of doubt, led him to substitute for rationalism a study of actual experience, - not only the actual experience of his own life but of the whole historical life of his people. God revealed His truths to Israel, through chosen individuals. The avenue of revelation is not closed entirely at any time, but yet it is open only to those who by birth andtradition belong to the family of the prophets,who had a personal knowledge of God, and who knew the land of Palestine where God revealed himself.

Without insisting too much on a possible similarity here to Bergson's thought, it may be pointed out that clearly Halevi was aware of the content of the past being a telling force in any present experience. Memory had treasured up for this ardent lover of his people and its history the traditions which served to meet his speculative problems and questionings. Little allowance was made for growth of this mass of traditions; the past rather than the future held the attention of the author's mind. Restitution of the Jewish national life would probably mean to Halevi more of a return to conditions and thoughts of the past than a continuation of the past undergoing changes ever new. At the same time, in this comparisonof Bergson and Jewish philosophy, the tendency of the latter to emphasize the importance of tradition is a point of contact with Bergson's analysis of cumulative psy-

chic growth.

In Halevi's discussion of the significance of the names of God he comes as near the distinction which Bergson himself makes between intellect and intuition as we come in the whole range of Jewish philosophy. The name 'Elohim', although it was used by gentile idolators to denote a collection of individual forces or separate deities, is in truth a collective form which comprises all causes equally. A more exact and more lofty name is to be found in the form known as the Tetragrammaton. That is the special name of God, the proper name, as Reuben and Simeon are names which indicate personalities. Only prophetic vision is able to designate the Being of God an individual. Demonstration leads astray, resulting in the assumption of two eternal causes in one case, and in another it taught a materialism which held that the sphere is eternal and its own primary cause. Immediate cognizance of the existence of God is gained by understanding and perceiving His words and acts. The first man would not have known Him if He had not addressed , rewarded and punished him, and had not created Eve from one of his ribs. This gave him the conviction that this was the Creator of the owrld, whom he designated by words and attributes, and styled 'Lord.' Cain and Abel were made acquainted with the nature of His being by the communications of their father as well as by prophetic intuition(בראיה הנבואית). So Noah, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Moses and the prophets called Him intuitively 'Lord', as also did the people, having been taught by tradition that His influence and guidance were with men—— —— —— ——

—— 'Holy' expresses the notion that God is high above any attribute of created beings, although many of these are applied to Him metaphorically. 'Holy' is a description of the spiritual, which never assumes a corporeal form, and which nothing concrete can

possibly resemble. Not everyone who wishes is permitted to say, 'My God and Holy One!' except in a metaphorical and traditional way. In reality only a prophet or a pious person with whom the Divine Influence is connected may say so. How can we indicate God? real designation of Him is impossible. We can point to things created by Him, and which form His immediate tools. In reality we can only point to a thing enclosed by a space. The royal side of a king is the intellectual and rational one, but this is essence, not limited to space and not to be pointed to, although one does so and says that he is the king. Now, if he is dead you see the body, but you conclude that this is not the king. The senses (which report to the intellect) have not the faculty of perceiving the essence of things. They only have the specific power of perceiving the accidental peculiarities belonging to them. Everything which ~~shares the active intellect~~ is an intellect in actuality (or intuition), like the angels, grasps the subjects in their true essence without requiring the medium of accessories (the testimony of the senses). But our intellect which is potential, being sunk in matter (לפיכך נשקע בהיולי.), cannot penetrate to the true knowledge of things, except by the ~~grace of God, by~~ special faculties God bestowed upon him and which He has placed in the senses, and which ~~resemble~~ correspond to these perceptible accessories, ~~but are~~ always found with the whole species. Professor Neumark has made some comments upon this passage. With reference to the last phrase (דבקים תמיד בכל המין.) 94) he explains that the entire race has a specific energy which is the subjective feeling of the human family. A perfect intellect (שכל בפעל) is to be taken to mean an "intuitive understanding" without material frame, able to attain to a perception of reality. (95) Of this entire section Prof. Neumark says that portions anticipate critical elements in Kant, and that Kant has some of it almost word for word.

Halevi thus notices a twofold function of intellect: it is directed to the perception of physical stimulus, and also to the refined and exalted intuition of essence. Bergson's criticism of this would be, of course, intellect and intuition are not a unilinear development, but ends of two divergent lines of the evolutionary process. However, that Halevi has this criticism of ancient psychology is important. Surely the following quotation presents the distinction clearly: (the assistance which a man with weak eyes is able to give to one of clear vision who is in search of something dimly seen by the other is shown to be analogous to the relation that prevails between senses and imagination on one side, and reason on the other) כאשר שם הבורא בחכמתו הערך הדק בין החוש הנראה והמוחש הגשמי, כן שם בחכמה ערך בין החוש הנסתר והענין שאינו גשמי. (96)

The Creator was as wise in arranging this relation between the exterior senses and the things perceived, as He was in fixing the relation between the abstract sense and the incorporeal substratum. To the chosen among His creatures He has given an inner eye which sees things as they really are, without any alteration. Common men are possessed of senses, imagination(represented sensations) and intellect; the Prophet is gifted with an intellect of a slightly different order which is intermediate to something higher.

The philosopher - and Halevi ~~always~~ mostly uses the term in a slightly derogatory sense - follows the natural bent of the mind, even as Bergson says, and consequently unable to grasp all metaphyical problems with the abstract intellect alone, without the support of anything that can be conceived or seen, such as words, writing or any visible or imaginary forms. This is Bergson's idea of the

intellect turned in the direction of matter. The prophet's image of God is a multiplicity, too, but one that is perceived in a single sudden flash: His greatness, power, loving-kindness, omniscience, life, eternity, government, and independence, the dependence of everything on Him, His unity and holiness; and in the same moment stands revealed a grand and majestic figure in all its splendor, known characteristics, and with the instruments that typify power, etc., the outstretched arm, unsheathed sword, fire, wind, thunder, the word which goes forth to warn, to announce what has happened, and to predict. Angels stand humbly before Him. He raises the lowly, humbles the mighty, and welcomes the repentant. He is wroth with the wicked, deposes and appoints. Such are the visions of the prophet. Fear and love come to him naturally, and remain in his heart for the whole of his life. He even yearns and longs to behold the vision again and again.(97)

As the intellect lets slip away from it the true reality when it seeks to analyze concrete duration, so in the philosophy of Halevi, the speculation of the philosopher fails altogether to obtain a worthy image of God. The philosopher only seeks Him that he may be able to describe Him accurately in detail, as he would describe the earth. Ignorance of God would be no more injurious than would ignorance concerning the earth be injurious to those who consider it flat. The real benefit is thought to be found in cognizance of the true nature of things, inorder to resemble the Active Intellect. We cannot blame the philosophers for arriving at conclusions that hold the world to be eternal, and God to be Creator and Maker only metaphorically in place of cause and prime mover, since this knowledge was derived from speculation. And Al Khazari summarizes the differences the Rabbi has drawn between Elohim and Adonoi; between the God of Abraham and that of Aristotle. Man yearns for 'Adonoi' as

a matter of love, taste, and conviction; whilst attachment to 'Elohim' is the result of speculation. A feeling of the former kind invites its votaries to give their life for His sake, and to prefer death to His absence. Speculation, however, makes veneration only a necessity as long as it entails no harm, but bears no pain for its sake.(98)

Halevi differs from the conception of prophecy which was later adopted by Abraham ibn Daud, Maimonides and Gersonides. They had the philosophical view of prophecy, and Halevi felt that is was quite impossible for the speculative mind to gain the insight of the prophet who is under the direct influence of God. Prophecy is a supernatural power, and those who were endowed with special divine qualities constituted a species of mankind different from any other; and in addition, prophecy is the special prerogative of Israel and the land of Palestine. To Halevi prophecy means the peculiar ability to perceive 'by a simple act of consciousness' Jhvh, the personal God who performs miracles and reveals himself to mankind through the prophet. To the philosophers, Aristotelians, that is, God meant nothing more than Elohim, the concept of cause and power. The human intellect was nothing but an individualized reflection of the one universal intellect, which is not God -Halevi says the real Intelligence is God alone - but a wholly immaterial intellectual substance, some nine or ten degrees removed from the Godhead. It is called the Active Intellect, and its business is to govern the sublunar world of generation and decay. As pure thought the Active Intellect embraces in essence the entire sublunar world. It bestows 'forms' upon the things of this world, acting as the Principle of Becoming but timeless in operation. The Active Intellect is the cause and source of conceptual knowledge in its human individualizations which are again reabsorbed in the whole when

the individual dies. Some men share more, some less, in the Active Intellect. It is in the power of everyone, within certain limits, to increase and purify his participation in the influence of the Active Intellect by study and rigorous moral discipline. The prophet differs from the ordinary man and the philosopher in degree only, not in kind. His knowledge comes from the Active Intellect as does the knowledge of the philosopher. The difference is that in the prophet's case the imagination plays an important role and presents concrete images instead of universal propositions and his identification with the Active Intellect is much closer.(99)

All such schemes as this which are based on ideas of emanation seem to Halevi to be fanciful and mythological, pure conjecture without support of proof. He criticizes other conceptions of the philosophers on similar grounds. Some of the conclusions of the philosophers may contain elements worthy of consideration because of their scientific value. Of this sort is the psychology of Avicenna which Halevi borrows verbally. In this account several points stand out as suggestive of Bergson's thought. In its lowest form the rational soul is hylic or material intellect which is shaped by the intelligible forms of matter, i.e., thoughts, ideas, concepts When it controls animal functions, the rational soul is called 'practical intellect', and at its highest stage of development the rational soul is concerned with pure knowledge, and is called the 'speculative' or 'theoretical intellect'. What is at all parallel to Bergson's intuition is, like it, of an entirely different order, the Divine Influence (השפע האלהי), the special gift to the prophets. It is similar to, but not quite identical with, the Shekinah. It is the Shekinah revealed and visible to the prophet. The invisible and spiritual Shekinah is with every born Israelite of pure heart. Palestine is especially distinguished by the Lord of Israel; referring th the שכינה: (100)

CONCLUSION.

The study herewith concluded of the Absolute as it is understood by Bergson and orthodox Jewish philosophy discloses differences which can hardly be harmonized. Bergson's God is not the God which has received the worship of the Jews throughout the ages. The God of the philosophers is more like the Aristotelian God, a Being who suffers no change. Certain of these Jewish philosophers, notably Halevi, were closer to the religious feeling in their speculations than was Maimonides, for example, and this feeling adapts itself to changes in philosophic ideas. Halevi differs from his associates in just the way that allows for the introduction of new ideas, such as Bergson's criticism necessitates, with the least disturbance to the foundations of Judaism. The Cusari was read after the furor aroused by Maimonides had subsided. It may safely be said that Maimonides forfeited too much to the demands of current Aristotelianism. Something of the flow of consciousness was caught by Halevi in his understanding of Jewish tradition and historic continuity. He relied less on the misdirection which the unaided reason ~~alone~~ permitted thought to take. His conception of prophecy, rather than that of the other Jewish philosophers approached Bergson's guide to intellect.

Bergson vindicates the Jewish instinctive feeling for unity, for a source of knowledge that complements the reason, for the supremacy of spirit, for the love of the God of life:

זכרנו לחיים · מלך חפץ בחיים · וכתבנו
בספר החיים · למענך אלהים חיים ·

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