THE FIRST SECTION OF ALBO'S "IKKARIM"

A TRANSLATION

and

INTERPRETATION

A study in Albo's theologic system

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Rabbi, Hebrew Union College.

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TO THE MEMORY

of

A BELOVED TEACHER

DAVID NEUMARK

REVERENTLY DEDICATED

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*Taenzer seems to be very important, but I could not procure his book.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

B. M.,- - - BEATAE MEMORIAE	עליה השלום [ע] לזכרה
D. A.,- - - DEUS AVERTAT	תלוה, תהא נשמתו
D. G.,- - - DEI GRATIA	צרורה בצרור החיים
D. J.,- - - DEO JUVANTE	צדקת תגן עליו
R. I. P.- - REQUIESCAT IN PACE	ותנוח בשלום על משכבו
b. - - - - Blessed be He	

List of Abbreviations Used in Notes

Ed. Edition

N. Note (s)

A. Albo

S. Soncino Edition

V.* Venice Edition

W. Warsaw Edition

Lip. Lipshuetz, "Ez Shathul"

Sch(l). Schlessinger

Neum. Neumark

Neum. ms. Neumark Manuscript

* V. is usually like S., so that it is mentioned only where important differences occur.

All parentheses in the text are the translator's.

The biography of the author, his views on important subjects, and other men's views of him, appear in their proper place in the notes.

Since human happiness is dependent on reflection and action, as the philosopher in his Book on the Soul expounded, and true opinions and praiseworthy deeds cannot be attained properly by way of the human intellect, since the mind of man wearies in comprehending things thoroughly, as will appear, it necessarily follows that a thing should exist which is superior to the human intellect, through which praiseworthy deeds might be defined and true opinions be grasped in a way that there should not be any doubt ~~any~~ in them whatsoever. This can only be through a divine guidance; and it is therefore fitting for, and obligatory on every man to recognize revealed religion that guides to, this, unlike the other religions. This cannot be discerned except by a knowledge of the dogmas without which revealed religion could not possibly exist. And this is the purpose of this book, to expound the dogmas that are essential for revealed religion, and how many they are. And therefore was it called "Sefer Ha-Ikkarim". It is divided into an Introduction and four Sections.

The Introduction is to expound, in a general way, the necessity that led to compose the book, and the investigations which properly fall in it. And there is explained in it the great value of the research that appears in this book; and there will be explained in it the verse "Vihi noam" (Ps. 90:17).

The first Section examines the dogmas of the religions, how many they are, and what they are, and the difference that ex-

ists between revealed and civil religions, and which are the dogmas of revealed religion and which are the dogmas of civil religion. It will show that religions have universal fundamentals and particular fundamentals, and that the universal fundamentals for revealed religions are three, viz., the Existence of God, Revelation, and Reward and Punishment. It will show that there are subsumed under these fundamentals, others dependent on them and branching out from them. It will expound wherewith revealed religion may be recognized from the false that pretends divineness.

The second Section deals with the exposition of the first fundamental, viz., the Existence of God, and the fundamentals that depend on it and that branch off from it.

The third Section deals with the exposition of the second fundamental, viz., Revelation, and the fundamentals that depend on it and branch off from it.

The fourth Section deals with the exposition of the third fundamental, viz., Reward and Punishment, and the fundamentals that branch off from it and the things that depend on it.

The first Section investigates the dogmas of the religions, how many they are; it is divided into twenty-six chapters:

Chapter One discusses the difficulty of investigating religious dogmas. It explains that there are universal and particular dogmas for every religion; it objects to Maimonides, b. m., because he listed the coming of the Messiah among the dogmas of the Mosaic Torah. It likewise objects to those who say that creatio ex nihilo is a dogma of the Mosaic Torah. (15)

Chapter Two explains who it is that denies anything of the dogmas, so that he be called "Kofer", and who it is that denies them and is yet not called "Kofer". And it shows that the coming of the Messiah and creatio ex nihilo should not be counted as dogmas of the Mosaic Torah, as many held. (19)

Chapter Three expounds to what the term "Ikkar" refers; it examines the thirteen dogmas which Maimonides, b. m., laid down, whether or not that number is exact. It also examines other dogmas which were laid down for revealed religion, and it shows that none of their number is exact. (24)

Chapter Four shows that the universal dogmas for revealed religion are three, which are as matrices. And they are the Existence of God, Revelation, and Reward and Punishment; and subsumed under these are other principles that branch out from them and depend on them. It maintains that for this reason the Benedictions for Rosh Ha-Shannah are three, viz., "Malkioth", "Zikronoth", and "Shofaroth", corresponding to these three dogmas. It

maintains that all the dogmas which Maimonides, b. m., enumerated branch out from these three matrices. (30)

Chapter Five shows the necessity of the existence of natural religion for the maintenance of the human species; it shows that it alone is not sufficient for the maintenance of the political group without the existence of another religion. It shows the necessity of the existence of a judge or a king in a state. (36)

Chapter Six proves that it is proper that a Divine Torah should exist to guide men to human happiness. (39)

Chapter Seven shows that religions are either natural or civil 10
or revealed; the purpose of each one of them and its goal is described, and how each one of them can be recognized from the other.(43)

Chapter Eight shows some of the deficiencies of civil religion as compared with divine; it shows that some of them were alluded to in the verse: "The Law of the Lord is perfect", (Ps. 19:8) and the ensuing verses. (45)

Chapter Nine shows that the principles of civil religion in general are Freedom and Purpose; it explains why Freedom is mentioned in the Mosaic Torah, though it is not a principle to it in so far as it is divine. (55) 20

Chapter Ten shows that the principles of revealed religion in general are three, viz., the Existence of God, Reward and Punishment, and Revelation, and they were therefore counted as the universal dogmas for revealed religion. It maintains that these are the three which the Rabbis, b. m., counted in the Mishnah, Chapter Helek. (58)

Chapter Eleven shows that it is right that proof for the things essential for a Divine Torah should be taken from the Mosaic

Torah, since all agree that it is divine; and that there is proof there that these three are principles for revealed religion, since they were laid down at its beginning in"Bereshith", just as the principles of every science are laid down in its beginning. And it maintains that the real beginning of the Torah is, "This is the book of the generations of Adam", (Gn. 5:1). It expounds the interpretation of, "Let us make man in our image", (Gn. 1:26). (61)

Chapter Twelve explains the reason why Maimonides, b. m., did not count creatio ex nihilo among the dogmas, although he believed that it is a fundamental matter in the Mosaic Torah, as he wrote in the "Moreh", II, Ch. 27. (74)

Chapter Thirteen shows that not every religion that confesses those three dogmas which we discussed is revealed in all events, unless it also confess all the principles that branch out from them,and then it may be revealed. It maintains that he who denies one of the principles is as if he were a "Kofer ba-Ikkar". (77)

Chapter Fourteen explains that none of the commandments of the Torah should be counted among the dogmas or the principles; and it says that this is the reason why Tradition was not counted as a principle, even though it is essential for the maintenance of the religion. And it gives the reason why Unity was counted a principle despite its being a particular commandment. It explains why all the dogmas were not said explicitly in the Ten Commandments; it maintains that the Commandment "Anoki" is not a dogma, as Maimonides, b. m., wrote, but a commandment. (80)

Chapter Fifteen expounds the principles that are respectively dependent on each of the three dogmas. It explains why we counted them in this way, dogmas and principles, which are the

matrices and their derivatives, and not all of them dogmas. (85)

Chapter Sixteen begins with a consideration essential for revealed religion; it shows that there was an ancient authority who held that knowledge of any unknown thing is impossible for man. It interprets the verse, "Mi shath batuhoth hakmah", (Job, 38:36), and the Benediction, "Atah honen", and "Im ein da'ath ein binah". And this chapter is introductory to the following one. (91)

Chapter Seventeen shows that every science has premises, and it discusses what are, in a general way, the premises of the sciences. All this is for the purpose of expounding where the Torah takes its premises. And it interprets the verse, "Rosh d'bar'ka emeth", (Ps.,119:160), and part of the Psalm (#78), "Haazinah 'ami torathi". (96)

Chapter Eighteen expounds the difference between the truly revealed religion and the false one that pretends divineness. It expounds the difference between the Prophet who is not a Messenger and the Prophet who is a Messenger for a Torah to be given through him. It expounds the signs which are essential for prophecy and for the mission of the Messenger; it maintains that those that make use of the "Names" without being Prophets are punished. (102)

Chapter Nineteen discusses the definition of "Faith", and explains the things in which there could be faith, and in which thing there could be a stronger faith. (112)

Chapter Twenty explains why the Torah was not given to Abraham or to Isaac or to Jacob. It explains what the Rabbis, b. m., said in Maseketh "Abodah Zarah", (p. 2 b.), that in the Messia-

nic Future, God will bring a Scroll of the Torah and place it in His lap and say: All who have dealt with the Torah should come and take the reward. It explains why the "Umoth" do not receive reward for observing their Torah which they received by tradition, just as Israel receives a reward for their tradition. (115)

Chapter Twenty-one shows that Faith brings man to eternal happiness more than Philosophy. It maintains that experience proved this thing. (119)

Chapter Twenty-two explains the thing, belief in which brings to happiness; it maintains that belief in the impossible does not bring to happiness. It shows that the impossible is of two kinds. It explains how there can be known the thing in which belief enters. (123)

Chapter Twenty-three maintains that besides the belief in the Torah and in the commandments and in all the miracles that generally come in the Torah, it is necessary to believe six particular doctrines which are at all times essential for the maintenance of the Torah. It maintains that he who denies one of them is called "Min". (126)

Chapter Twenty-four examines whether the religionist is in duty bound or is permitted to investigate the dogmas of his religion and his faith and the principles that branch out from them, or whether he is obliged to rely on his tradition. (131)

Chapter Twenty-five examines whether it is possible that there should exist more than one Divine Torah at one time for different nations or in different countries. (137)

Chapter Twenty-six mentions the number of dogmas and principles, as a summary of the whole Section, which are essential for re-

vealed religion, as learned reflection necessitates and as the Mosaic Torah decrees. (140)

Thus are finished the notations of the Chapters of the first Section, D. J.

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This is the gate of the Lord; the righteous may enter into it. (Ps. 118:20).

Let not the foot of pride overtake me, and let not the hand of the wicked drive me away. (Ps. 36:12).

In God - I will praise His word -

In the Lord - I will praise His word. (Ps. 56:11)

THE INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOK.

The knowledge of the fundamentals and the understanding of the premises on which the foundations of religions in general hinge, are easy from one standpoint and difficult from another. It is easy, because all the people that are at present known of in the world are religionists, and it is inconceivable that a person should be an adherent of a religion or that he should ascribe himself to it unless he know the fundamentals of that religion or conceive them as an imaginative opinion, so that he believe in them; just as he will not be called physician who does not know the principles of medicine, nor a geometer he who does not know the principles of geometry with a true knowledge or at least as an imaginative opinion. And it is therefore evident that every religionist should know the fundamentals of the religion to which he ascribes himself, with a thorough knowledge as the nature of the subject demands, or that he should understand them as an imaginative opinion that comes at the beginning of reflection. And it is difficult, because we do not find the mass of scholars discussing the fundamentals of religions in a satisfactory manner, nor are they agreed as to the dogmas or as to their number, but they differ concerning them with a great divergence. And in particular as regards the dogmas of the Mosaic Torah; for although all agree that it is divine, they differ as to the number of its dogmas with a not inconsiderable difference. For one has put them as thirteen dogmas, and there is one who put them as twenty-six dogmas, and there is one who put them as only

six dogmas; and there was not one of them who set his heart to expound the dogmas of revealed religion in general, without which a Divine Torah would be unthinkable, and whether revealed religion should be one or many; and if they are many, whether or not each should have ~~particular~~ peculiar fundamentals in so far as it is revealed and particular. What there is no doubt about whatsoever is, that revealed religion should have universal fundamentals in so far as it is revealed in general, that, should one of which be eliminated, its being divine would be inconceivable; and particular, individual fundamentals, that, should one of which be eliminated, the revealed religion would fall in toto.

And because I, the insignificant Joseph Albo who lives here in the city of Soria, the Prime Mover having moved me here, saw the great worth of this investigation and its highly prized value, and the great mix-up and confusion which reigns among those that philosophize about it, and that all of them sank in mighty waters and they did not bring up in their hands anything that is worthy to turn the heart to; for they have expounded the fundamentals by the judgement that comes to the mind at the beginning of thought, without turning to what should be examined, so that the interpretation should be explained truthfully, - I have set my heart to examine, with a sufficing examination, the universal fundamentals of revealed religion. And I composed this book and called it "Sefer Ha-Ikkarim", because it investigates the fundamentals of religions in general, and in particular the fundamentals of revealed religion; and whether revealed religion should be one or many, and if many in what would they differ one from another. Then it examines the fundamentals of the Mosaic Torah,

concerning which all are agreed that it is revealed; it shows that it has universal fundamentals in so far as it is divine, and particular fundamentals in so far as it is individual. It will also show that the universal fundamentals have other, particular fundamentals which are called principles, because they are subsumed under the universal ones and branch out from them, and with the elimination of the universal ones the particular ones are eliminated. It will further show that the universal dogmas for a Divine Torah are three, viz., the Existence of God, Revelation, and Reward and Punishment. And we have therefore divided this book into four Sections; the first to examine the dogmas in general, how many they are and what they are; and the second to examine the first dogma, viz., the Existence of God, and the principles that depend on it; and the third to examine the second dogma, viz., Revelation, and the things that depend on it; and the fourth to examine the third dogma which is Reward and Punishment, and the principles that branch out from it and the things that depend on it.

And since it is evident that in proportion to the worth of the thing whose attainment is sought, ought to be the labor and endeavor of man to attain it; for when the investigation is of great value it is right that man should strive with a strong endeavor to attain it, and when it is not of great value it is not proper that he should strive to attain it with a strong endeavor, but with an endeavor proportionate to the thing to be attained; for he who makes instruments worth a talent of silver in order to make one iron needle is not as praiseworthy as he who makes instruments worth ten-thousand talents of silver in order

to make an endless number of needles one after another; and this investigation which is for the knowledge of the dogmas of religions is a thing of extremely great value, because the entire perfection of people who are religionists, and all people are religionists even though they are adherents of different religions, it is evident that we should strive to investigate this with all our strength, in proportion to possibility and ability, and as the nature of the subject will suffer.

And since this investigation is of great value and very precious, it is right for us to beg God who favors man with knowledge and discernment that he should favor us with knowledge, discernment, and comprehension in a way that there should be in this our work some of the divine sweetness which attaches to all divine works. As Moses our Master, r.i.p., said in his prayer, "And let the pleasantness of the Lord our God be upon us: and establish Thou the work of our hands upon us; yea, the work of our hands, establish Thou it", (Ps. 90:17); and its interpretation is that in every act there may be pleasantness in two ways: either by way of the act~~ive~~ itself, in that it is perfect with complete perfection, as the nature of its material demands; or by way of the maker, i.e., that there may be in that work a pleasantness and a perfection only because of its relation to the maker and because that act is the work of that maker. In divine acts pleasantness and perfection enter in both these ways; both on account of the acts themselves, i.e., their being perfect as completely as they can in proportion to what the nature of their material demands; and there also comes in them another pleasantness and glory which is not in the nature of their material, i.e., be-

cause they are the work of God, b. As for example, although it is not in the nature of the bee, according to the make-up of its elements, that it should have the understanding to build the hives of wax in which the honey is lodged in the hexagonal form, yet because the Maker is the best of workers, He gave it the understanding to build them in this form, since it is like a circle which is the natural form and it has an advantage over it, for in the hexagonal figure the proximate forms touch and are near each other, thus filling all the space and area, not leaving any unfilled and empty distance between them; this is not so with a circle, for if they would make the hives round in the form of a column, close one to another, there would be left much space between them from which they would receive no benefit. Therefore do they build them in the hexagonal form and do not make them circular; they also do not build them square, for even though in the adjacency of square forms one to another all the space and area which is between the approximate ones is filled, yet since the square form looks less like the circle which is the natural form, than the hexagon, they do not build in it. And all this is true of the bee because it is the work of God, b.; it is right that there should be an advantage in it on that account over what the nature of its material demands; and this is the pleasantness which comes because of the Worker - which is found in divine works.

And therefore did Moses pray to God after he said, "Let Thy work be made manifest unto Thy servants, and Thy majesty upon their children"(ib.16), that there should be in our work the two kinds of pleasantness which come with divine work; he said, "Let the pleasantness of the Lord our God be upon us"; ~~And~~ to allude

to the pleasantness and the splendor which comes on account of the Maker, he said, "And establish Thou the work of our hands upon us"; that is, in conjunction with us. And to allude to the pleasantness which comes on account of the work itself, he said, "The work of our hands establish Thou it". And therefore do I pray to God who is perfectly omnipotent and who is the perfect Truth that He should give me strength and power to complete my purpose and that He should lead me in the true path and teach me the ways of righteousness; for in Him do I trust and to Him do I hope, as the Psalmist sings, "Guide my in Thy truth, and teach me; for Thou are the God of my salvation; for Thee do I wait all the day". (Ps.25:5).

And thus I begin with the aid of the Almighty.

The first Section examines the religions in general, how many they are; it shows that there are three kinds, natural, civil, and revealed. It presents their differences and examines the dogmas of every one of them, so that the dogmas of revealed religion be made clear. It then explains the method of the test by which the revealed religion may be recognized from the false one that pretends divineness; and whether there could be more than one Divine Torah at one time.

CHAPTER ONE

The examination of dogmas is a very dangerous undertaking, because even though the religions are agreed as to the general matters, e. g., the existence of God, Reward and Punishment, and the like; they differ as to particular matters. And it thus necessarily follows that religions have particular fundamentals by which the revealed religion may be distinguished from the others. And there is a grave danger in the investigation of particular matters, because he who denies one of the particular dogmas of the religion excludes himself as an adherent of that religion. For he who denies the Prophecy of Moses and his Mission is undoubtedly a denier of the Mosaic Torah, even though it is not a universal dogma for a Divine Torah. And likewise the coming of the Messiah which Maimonides, b.m., counted as one of the dogmas of the Mosaic Torah, in his opinion he who denies it will also be among those that deny one of the dogmas of the Torah of Moses, who excluded themselves from the communion of the religion, who have no share in the world to come. And he, b.m., thus reckons such a one - in "Sefer Ha-Madda", Hilkoth T'shubah, ch. 3 - among the unbelievers. And this is a very strange thing, for we find - in the Gemara Synhedrin, in Chapter Helek, (98 b.) - Rabbi Hillel who was one of the sages of Israel that are mentioned in the Talmud, saying that there is no Messiah for Israel, for they have already "consumed" him in the days of Hezekiah, King of Judah. And according to the opinion of Maimonides, that sage would be among the unbelievers and of those who have no portion in the world to come. One may ask then, why is he mentioned in the Gemara - since he excluded himself from the communion of Israel, not believing in the

dogmas of their religion. Should one say that he is quoted in order to be refuted, then he should not have been mentioned with the title "Rabbi", nor should any law have been quoted in his name anywhere. Some answer this by claiming that R. Hillel did not deny the principle of the Messiah, D. A., but he meant to say that a Messiah for Israel cannot be derived from Scripture, for all the passages that occur in"Isaiah" concerning the Messiah, such as, "And there shall come forth a shoot from the stock of Jesse", (11:1), and the like, referred only to Hezekiah,King of Judah, and those prophecies were fulfilled in his days. As for what the verse said, "The root of Jesse, that standeth for an ensign of the peoples, unto him shall the nations seek", (11:10), this was said concerning Merodach - baladan ben Baladan, (ib. Ch. 39;II K20:12), King of Babylon, who had sent letters and a gift to Hezekiah. And as for the verse, (Isaiah, 11:10b), "And his resting place shall be glorious", this also was said about him, for it is customary for the hero or the king to go forth in a war to fight with his enemies, to save his people, and to endanger his life for them; but when he sits at rest in quiet, in the corners of the Tabernacle, it is a disgrace big enough for him to prefer death rather than suffer that shame. For likewise did Saul do, even though he knew that he would die in battle as Samuel had told him, "Tomorrow you and your children will be with me", (I S 28:19), yet he did not refrain from going out to war so as to escape this disgrace. Hezekiah was reviled by all for having closed himself in in Jerusalem and did not go out to battle; but when they saw the great miracle that was done for him by the death of Senacherib and his armies, it became apparent that the reason he did not go out to war was that he trusted in

God to fight his battles, and therefore that resting was a big honor for him, for all the world knew that he was perfectly righteous and beloved by God and that therefore He granted him his heart's desires and fought for him; it being otherwise with other kings, for whom rest is not an honor. And because this great miracle became public, all the Israelites who had been exiled to Assyria or who had fled to Ethiopia, the deserts, and Pathros, or to other countries returned to Eretz Israel. And this is what is meant by the verse, "And there shall be a highway for the remnant of His people", etc. (Is. 11:16). And this is the manner the entire rest of the Chapter (#11) is to be interpreted; and so have R. Moses Ha-Kohen and ben Balaam and other "Peshat" exegetes explained it.

It would accordingly appear that R. Hillel held that from the verses in Isaiah and the (other) Prophets there is no apodictic proof for the coming of the Messiah, but he believed in the coming of the Redeemer only on account of tradition; and that he therefore did not exclude himself from the communion of Israel nor was he counted among the rebellious. But this is not the implication, for when the Rabbis refuted him in the Gemara, they said, "May the Lord absolve R. Hillel", i.e., may the Holy One, blessed be He, forgive him. It is thus implied that they considered him a sinner for his opinion, and they would not have considered him a sinner for denying proof from Scripture, - had he so believed through the tradition, as will be explained in Section four (Ch. 42). But R. Hillel undoubtedly did not believe in the coming of the Messiah at all, and he was not counted among the unbelievers despite that; because the coming of the Messiah is not a dogma of

the Mosaic Torah, as Maimonides, b.m., would have; for its existence is quite conceivable without it. It is however a particular dogma for the religion of the Christians, whose existence is inconceivable without it. And it is a belief which every Jewish religionist ought to believe; just as creatio ex nihilo is a belief which every adherent of the revealed religion should believe, even though it is not a dogma for revealed religion. For he who believes that there is a primordial hylic substance from which all beings were created by the will of the Maker, - even though he is not a "Kofer ba-Ikkar", in the opinion of Maimonides, b.m., who did not count it among the dogmas, - he is none the less a sinner. And likewise was R. Hillel a sinner, because he did not believe in the coming of the Redeemer, but he was not a "Kofer ba-Ikkar". And this is the opinion of the later authorities who did not count the coming of the Messiah or belief in "ex nihilo" as dogmas. The great anxiety that exists in an examination of the dogmas is thus made clear, for one endangers oneself lest one come to deny a thing which is one of the dogmas of the Torah; for in the opinion of him who counted "ex nihilo" one of the dogmas of the Torah, Maimonides, b.m., would be an unbeliever of one of the dogmas of the Torah, D.A.; so too, he who did not count the coming of the Messiah as a dogma would be an unbeliever of one of the dogmas of the Mosaic Torah in the opinion of Maimonides who did count it as a dogma. One may similarly dispute the other things which he, b.m., counted as dogmas which are not dogmas, as will appear (Ch. 3). And because of this did we say that there is a great danger in an investigation of dogmas, for how can one know which are the things which, when one disbelieves them and says that they are not a dogma, he would be a "Kofer ba-Ikkar".

CHAPTER TWO

In justification of the sages of Israel who discuss this and similar matters, we may say that every Israelite is in duty bound to believe that everything that is in the Torah is perfect truth, and he who disbelieves anything that is found in the Torah - though he knows that it is the view of the Torah - is called a "Kofer"; as the Rabbis, b.m., said, in Chapter Helek (Synh. 99a), that he who says that the entire Torah is of divine origin except that one verse was said by Moses himself, - concerning him it is said, "He has despised the word of the Lord" (Nu. 15:31), and he is among those who say that there is no revelation. He, however, who ad- 10 heres to the Mosaic Torah and believes in its dogmas, but when he comes to investigate the matter with the intellect and inference of verses, reflection leads him to say that one of the dogmas means something different from what it is thought to be at the beginning of the investigation; or if reflection leads him to deny that dogma because he holds that it is not a clear opinion which the Torah demands to believe; or if he considers that which is a dogma not to be a dogma but believes it only as (he does) the other beliefs which are found in the Torah, which are not dogmas; or if he believes a certain (divergent) belief concerning one of 20 the miracles of the Torah because he thinks that he is not denying thereby any one of the beliefs which he is in duty bound to believe on account of the Torah, - such a one is not a "Kofer"; but he is among the sages and pious of Israel even though he goes astray in his thinking and he sins erringly and needs forgiveness. And this is the viewpoint of some of the earlier sages of Israel, (Gn. R. 8/3), who say that the time order was pre-existent, as if

to say that the Torah does not require to believe that time was created. And likewise R. Eliezer Ha-Gadol, when he says in his Chapters (Ch. 3), "The heavens, whence were they created, and the earth, whence was it created", etc., even if his words should be taken literally and as they appear at first glance that his opinion is that the world was not created "ex nihilo", but "ex substantione", viz., from a primordial hylic substance, he cannot be taken to task for it for his meaning is that the Torah does not require to believe in "creatio ex nihilo", not that he had in mind to deny anything that is in the Torah, D. A. So too did the author of the "Moreh" b.m., write, in Chapter twenty-five of the second Part, that he believed in "creatio ex nihilo" not because of the demand of Scriptural verses. For the verses may be interpreted (otherwise); but he believed in "creatio ex nihilo" because it is an intrinsically true view, and the verses should therefore be interpreted in a manner that they should concur with it. The "Rav", b.m., has here shown as it were that that which contradicts the verses should not be believed in at all; provided however that what is found in Scripture should not be a false view whose existence is inconceivable to the intellect; for the Torah does not require belief in that which is a false view, for the Torah does not necessitate to believe in a thing which is against the innate ideas, or in any fictitious opinion, the existence of which is inconceivable in nature, such as the ressurection of the dead; but all the miracles that come in the Torah it is right and obligatory to believe them; a false opinion however whose existence is inconceivable to the intellect, even it though it appears explicitly in the Torah, as e.g., "Cir-

cumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart, (Dt. 10:16), it is not right to believe literally, and such verses must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with the truth. And this is the method of Onkelos the Proselyte and of Jonothan b. Uziel and the other sages of Israel who interpreted all the verses in the Pentateuch and the Prophets that point to corporeality in a way that is compatible with the truth, and they took them out of their literal meanings since they were false opinions. And the Rabbis said, "The Torah speaks as men do so as to assist the ear." And this method which we are describing is the selfsame method of some of the later exegetes who interpreted the opening of the mouth of the ass in a way different from the view of the Rabbis, b.m.; their meaning being that the methods of the Torah do not demand belief in that miracle except in the way that they understood it. We will accordingly say likewise that he whose reflection has not attained the stage of belief in the verses in a way compatible with the truth, but believes them literally, with the result that he hold a false view because he thinks that that is the view of the Torah, - he does not leave, through this, the communion of the adherents of the Torah, D. A., and one is not permitted to tell of his shame or call him "Megalleh phanim batorah", or "Kofer", or to count him among the heretics, D. A. A still greater thing did R. Abraham b. David, b.m., write that even he who understands one of the dogmas of the Torah incorrectly because he errs in his thinking should not be called a heretic; for thus did he write in the book of "Strictures" on what Maimonides, b.m., wrote ("Sefer Hamadda", Hilkoth T'shubah, ch. 3) that he who says that God is a body is a heretic, and R. Abraham b. David, b.m., writes on this,

"Said Abraham: 'Even though the fundamental of the religion is so, yet he who believes Him to be corporeal because he comprehends the expression of Scripture and the Midrashim literally is not properly called a heretic'".

This method appears to be correct and well established in what the Rabbis, b.m., say (Hagiga, 15a) concerning Elisha b. Abuiah, "Return ye rebellious sons", - except Elisha Aher since he does know his Creator yet purposes to revolt against Him. They have thus explicitly shown that he who knows the truth and purposes to deny it is of the company of the wicked, whom it is unfit to receive in repentance; but he who purposes neither to rebel nor to turn from the true road nor to disbelieve what is in the Torah nor to deny the tradition, but to interpret Scripture according to his understanding, even though he interprets them incorrectly, he is neither a heretic nor a "Kofer", D. A. And because of this he who believes concerning the ressurection of the dead that the people who will be ressurected will not exist forever in body and soul, but will return to dust, as is the view of Maimonides, b.m., in the "Epistle on the Ressurection of the Dead", even though this is a perversion of the truth according to Nahmanides, b.m., such a one is not a denier of the dogma of ressurection, D.A.; and likewise he who believes that the chief reward in the world to come is for body and soul together and that the soul by itself has no reward besides the body, as is the view of Nahmanides, b.m., and some Cabbalists, even though this is a perversion of the truth in the opinion of Maimonides, b.m., such a one is not a denier of spiritual reward and punishment, D. A.

I found it necessary to write all this because I saw some

insignificant people, wise in their own eyes, mock and impudent towards great men, without knowledge and without understand.[mf] And thus it is permitted for every person of wise heart to examine the dogmas of the religion and to interpret Scripture in a way compatible with the truth as he sees it; and even though he should believe that some things are not dogmas which the early authorities considered dogmas, such as the coming of the Messiah and "ex nihilo", and the like, but that they are true beliefs which the believer in the Torah is obliged to believe, as he believes that the opening of the earth in the rebellion of Korah and the descent of fire from heaven and such similar miracles or promises that are mentioned in the Torah, - that they are true although they are not dogmas for the Torah, such a one is not, D. A., a denier of the Torah or its dogmas. For were such a one an unbeliever, then the number of dogmas in the Mosaic Torah would amount to the number of miracles and promises that appear in the Torah; and such a viewpoint never occured to any man.

CHAPTER THREE

The term "Ikkar" denotes a thing on which is dependent the existence and maintenance of another thing, and without which it has no maintenance, just as the root is a thing on which is dependent the maintenance of a tree; and the existence of a tree and its maintenance are inconceivable without it. The Rabbis, b.m., used this expression very frequently; as they said, "A thing which has an Ikkar in Scripture or which has not". On this account does this term apply to principles and bases on which is dependent the existence and maintenance of the religion; such as the Existence of God, from whose nature it is clear that it is a dogma belief in which is imperative for a Divine Torah, for the existence of a Divine Torah is inconceivable without it. It is accordingly incumbent upon us to examine which are the matters which should be dogmas in a revealed religion. Maimonides, b.m., has reduced them as thirteen dogmas, viz., (1) The Existence of God, (2) Unity, (3) His Incorporeality, (4) His Eternity, (5) His Exclusive Worship, (6) Prophecy, (7) (The superior quality of) The Prophecy of Moses, our Master, v.i.p., (8) That the Torah is from Heaven, (9) The Immutability of the Torah, (10) God's Omniscience, (11) Reward and Punishment, (12) Messiah, and (13) Ressurection of the Dead. These are the dogmas which the "Rav", b.m., enumerated in Chapter Helek in his Commentary on the Mishnah, (Synh. Ch. 11).

Our first objection to those dogmas which Maimonides, b.m., laid down is, why did he put them in that number, saying that they are thirteen; i.e., if they were laid down in that number according to the connotation of the term "Ikkar", how good and how pleasing it would be that there be laid down as

dogmas the Existence of God, Prophecy, the Divine Origin of the Torah, God's Omniscience and, Providence to mete out Reward and punishment! For these are essential dogmas for a Divine Torah, its existence being inconceivable without any one of these. And according to this method, it is not out of the way to lay down as dogmas also the Prophecy of Moses and the Eternity of the Torah, since they are particular dogmas essential for the Mosaic Torah, its existence being inconceivable without them. For would the existence of a Prophet greater than Moses be conceivable, then it would be quite possible for the Mosaic Torah to be abolished; 10 for the words of the Prophet who is greater in rank than another should be believed more than those of that other who is of a lower rank of prophecy than he, as will appear, (III, 17). Also, should we not believe in the eternity of the Torah, the abolishment of the Mosaic Torah would be readily conceivable, since Israel is exiled from its land. None the less, the difficulty still remains, why does he list Unity and Incorporeality among the dogmas, for even though they are true beliefs which every adherent of the Mosaic Torah should believe, yet it may be contended that they should not be reckoned among the dogmas for the Divine Torah in its entirety would not fall were one to believe contrariwise. And still more difficult is that the "Rav", b.m., considered His exclusive worship as a dogma. For even though it is one of the Commandments of the Torah as it is written, "Thou shalt have no other gods before Me..., Thou shalt not bow down unto them nor serve them", yet it is not a dogma on which is dependent the Torah in its entirety; for he who believes that God is real and that his Torah is true, only that he brings in a mediator between himself and God, such a

one transgresses the prohibition, "Thou shalt have no," etc., but it is not a dogma without which the Torah would fall in toto. Why then does the "Rav", b.m., consider it a dogma? And likewise if one does believe in Reward and Punishment, but he believes that the reward is only for the souls and in the world to come, and that there is no physical ressurection after death, why need the Torah in toto fall so that he is compelled to count the ressurection of the dead as one of the dogmas of the Divine Torah, like the Existence of God?

Should we say that the "Rav", b.m., did not list the 10 dogmas in accordance with the connotation of the term "Ikkar", but enumerated as dogmas the true beliefs which every adherent of the Mosaic Torah should believe, why then did he not count as a dogma that the "Sh'kinah" rests in Israel by means of the Torah, as it is said (I, K 6:13), "I will dwell among the children of Israel". And why did he not count "ex nihilo" which is a belief which every adherent of a revealed religion should believe, as he himself has shown in Chapter twenty-five of the second Part of the book "Moreh" , and as he counted the belief in the Eternity of God. And why did he not list that one should believe 20 in all the miracles in the Torah literally, and other particular beliefs which every adherent of the Mosaic Torah should believe, as he counted the belief in the coming of the Messiah? And should we say that he listed only fundamentals and not true beliefs, why does he not count Tradition - that one must needs follow the tradition of the fathers - which is a universal fundamental for all revealed religions, their existence being inconceivable without it? And why did he not count Freedom, for although it is a true doctrine, it is

also a fundamental; for it is clear from its nature that the existence of any religion is inconceivable without it. And furthermore, he himself, b.m., has written in "Sefer Hamadda", Hilkoth T'shubah, chapter five, "The option is given to every man; if he wants to turn to the good way and to be righteous, he may do so", etc., and further on he wrote, "And this ~~fundamental is a big fundamental~~ is an essential dogma and is a pillar of the Torah and the commandments, as it is written, (Dt. 30:15), "See, I have set before thee this day life and good", etc., and he expatiated in that chapter in explanation of this fundamental. It is therefore very strange why he did not count it among the fundamentals in his Commentary on the Mishnah in Chapter Helek, as he counted the thirteen fundamentals.

From all of which follows that the number which the "Rav", b.m., laid down as regards the dogmas is very strongly questionable. I saw one author claim that the "Rav", b.m., ~~shows~~ chose this number because it corresponds to the number thirteen of the Divine Attributes, and also to the thirteen hermeneutic principles by which the Torah is developed. How irrational is this notion that the "Rav", b.m., omitted to enumerate Freedom which is a fundamental, as he, b.m., himself wrote, so that the number thirteen should not be exceeded! And he further does not help, i.e., why should he count among the thirteen those which he did count which are not essential fundamentals, as we have written? Another author says that there are ~~26~~ twenty-six dogmas, enumerating among them anything that flitted through his mind, such as Eternity, Wisdom, Vitality, Omnipotence, Will, and other attributes which are ascribable to God, b.; he also listed Paradise as one dogma, and Gehenna another dogma, and other things full of nonsense; for this man did not set his heart to understand the word "Ikkar",

and to what this term may refer.

One of the later authorities was very precise with the word "Ikkar", and he added to and subtracted from the dogmas of Maimonides, b.m.; saying, that the dogmas for revealed religion are six, viz., (1) Omniscience, (2) Providence, (3) Omnipotence, (4) Prophecy, (5)Freedom, and (6) Purpose, besides the three for which the "Rav", b.m., brought a rational proof, viz., the Existence of God, His Unity, that He is neither a body nor an energy in a body. He maintains that it is clear from the very nature of these six that they are essential for revealed religion, its existence being inconceivable without them; and with the three others for which proof was presented, there are completed the dogmas of revealed religion. One may object to this that even if these are universal dogmas for revealed religion, its existence being inconceivable without them, he should have counted with them also other, particular dogmas, as Maimonides, b.m., counted matters which are particular dogmas for the Mosaic Torah. Or he should(at least)have listed some universal dogma by which the true, revealed religion might be distinguished from the false one that pretends divineness. For all the religions that exist at the present time in the world profess these six dogmas; and they would all, accordingly, be divine. One may still further object to this number which he compiled, that even if there could be no Divine Torah without them, it does not necessarily follow that when they exist the Divine Torah will exist; he should have added to them one dogma, viz., Revelation. For this is just as one would say that with the existence of a being that needs food and has sensations, man exists, because with the existence of man

there exists a being that needs food and has sensations; this is doubtlessly untrue, for even if man cannot exist without them and they are essential for the existence of man, it does not necessarily follow that when they exist man exists, unless one should add to this "the rational faculty", and say, that with the existence of a body that needs food, has sensations, and has reason, there exists man. Likewise here should he have counted together with them Revelation; for with the existence of God's Omniscience and Providence and Omnipotence and Prophecy and Freedom and Purpose, there does not necessarily follow that there exists a Torah of divine origin, even though it cannot exist without them. And likewise as to what he counted Freedom and Purpose among the dogmas of revealed religion, - it is not so, for these, even though they are essential to it, are not dogmas nor premises for a revealed religion in so far as it is revealed, for they are premises also for civil religion, as will appear (Ch. 9); and the General Purpose also is not a premise for revealed religion, only Special Purpose.

In fine, the ascertaining of the dogmas essential for revealed religion is very difficult. A still greater difficulty (lies in the fact) that the Rabbis, b.m., give no clear statement on this subject; they might have discussed the fundamentals which are the principles and bases for a Divine Torah, since the essence of human happiness and the reward of the soul are dependent on them; just as they had discussed other human accidents and civil laws which concern only the behavior of the body and on which is dependent the order of the social (political) group.

CHAPTER FOUR

The proper manner for counting the dogmas which are the principles and bases for a Divine Torah, it appears to me, is that the universal and essential dogmas for revealed religion are three, viz., the Existence of God, Providence for Reward and Punishment, and Revelation. These three are the ~~matrices~~ of all the fundamentals of the revealed religions, such as the Adamic Torah, the Noaic Torah, the Abrahamic Torah, and the Mosaic Torah, and such similar Divine Torahs, if it is possible that there should be more than one at a time or one after the other. And under each one of these dogmas, principles and tenets shoot off and branch out from each respective dogma. Under the "Existence of God" there is the principle that He is beginningless and endless, et al. In "Revelation" there are included God's Omniscience, Prophecy, et al. And in "Providence" there are included Reward and Punishment in this world for the body and in the world to come for the soul. And from these three universal dogmas there shoot off tenets and doctrines for the Divine Torahs or for those that pretend divineness in this manner. For under the dogma of the Existence of God is Incorporeality which is a particular dogma of the Mosaic Torah, and Unity. And under "Revelation" there is the principle of the Prophecy of Moses and his Mission. Under "Providence" and "Reward and Punishment" there is the coming of the Messiah, which is a particular dogma of the Mosaic Torah in the opinion of Maimonides, b.m.; but in our opinion the coming of the Messiah is not a dogma; if it is a dogma it is not peculiar to the Mosaic Torah, for also the Christians make it a dogma to annul the Mosaic Torah, and this is a ~~particular~~ distinctive dogma to them, the existence

of their religion being inconceivable without it. And these and the like which are dogmas for the respective religions are all included in the three dogmas which we had posited. Whether it is possible, however, for more than one Divine Torah to exist at one time or at different times, will be discussed yet infra,

D. J.

And that which shows that these three dogmas are the root and basis of the Faith through which man attains his true happiness is the fact that the Men of the Great Assembly ~~or-~~ with-
~~dained~~ ordained for us in the Additional Service of Rosh ha-Shannah the three Benedictions, "Malkioth", "Zikronoth", and "Shofaroth", corresponding to these three dogmas, to arouse the heart of man (to the fact) that through the proper belief in these dogmas together with their tenets and principles man will be found righteous in Divine judgement. For the Benediction of "Malkioth" corresponds to the dogma of the Existence of God, and the formula of the Benediction points to it: "We therefore hope in Thee, O Lord our God, that we may speedily behold the glory of Thy might, when Thou wilt remove the abominations from the earth and the idols will be utterly cut off, when the world will be perfected under the Kingdom of the Almighty.... Let all the inhabitants of the world perceive and know that unto Thee every knee must bow, every tongue must swear.... Let them all accept the yoke of Thy Kingdom". The Benediction of "Zikronoth" likewise, points to "Providence" and "Reward and Punishment"; and so does the formula of the Benediction indicate: "Thou rememberest what was wrought from Eternity and art mindful of all that hath been formed from of old; before Thee all secrets are revealed",

etc., The Benediction of "Shofaroth" alludes to the third dogma, viz., Revelation; it therefore opens with "Thou didst reveal Thyself in a cloud of glory unto Thy holy people in order to speak with them. Out of Heaven Thou didst make them hear Thy voice". And because the giving of the Torah was ~~in~~ the ~~midst~~ of a very strong voice of a shofar, the like of which there never was in the world, it is called "Shofaroth", for the thunderings and the lightnings which were there had already occured in the world, either like them or their kind, but the sound of the shofar without a shofar never had taken place in the world and such will not be till the time of the Redemption - the hour when the true Torah will be made widely known before all the world. And concerning that hour it is said, in the view of some sages, "And the Lord God will sound the Shofar". (Zech. 9:14). I have indeed seen some authors write that the "Shofaroth" are an allusion to the Sacrifice of Isaac, but it is not so, for were the Benediction of "Shofaroth" an allusion to the"'Akedah", the Sacrifice of Isaac should have been mentioned here and not in "Zikronoth", where it is mentioned. They were however brought to this by what they found in the Rabbis, b.m., that the blowing of the horn of a ram is a remembrance of the ram of Isaac. (R. H. 16a). But this proves nothing, for they only said that the blowing of a shofar of a ram is a remembrance of the Ram of Isaac, but not blowing in general nor the Benediction of the "Shofaroth".

To indicate that these three dogmas are the cause of happiness, Isaiah included them in one verse; saying, "For the Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our Lawgiver, the Lord is our King;

He will save us!" (Is. 33:22). He said, "The Lord is our Judge," to allude to the dogma of Providence, in the sense of: "He that justifieth me is near; who will contend with me? Let us stand up together," etc., (Ib. 50:8), i.e.,on this account we should be found righteous in Divine judgement. And he said, "The Lord is our Lawgiver (M'hokek)", to allude to "Revelation", which is the second dogma; for"M'hokek" refers to the giver of the Torah, as e.g., there "For the portion of the'M'hokek'was reserved", (Dt. 33:21), which is said of Moses because the Torah was given through him.

He said this in the sense of: "Harken unto me, ye that know righteousness, the people in whose heart is my law; fear ye etc., not the taunt of men", (Is. 51:7), viz., even if we should not be found righteous in Divine judgement because He is our Judge, for the judge may not trespass the law laid down by another; yet in so far as He is the Giver of the Torah and is the One who lays down the laws, it is right that we should be found righteous in Divine judgement. He further said, "The Lord is our King", to allude to the third dogma, viz., the Existence of God, for He is the King of all the world and is called especially the King of Israel and its Redeemer, and also to intimate that even if in so far as He is a Lawgiver, He may be unwilling to trespass the Law, none the less in so far as He is our King it is right that He should help us; for the king has the power to transgress the law and to do as he pleases, so as to help his people. And therefore did he conclude, "He will save us", that is, that since we have an advantage over the rest of the world in these three dogmas, on belief in which is dependent the essential happiness of man, we deserve that He help us, especially, more than them.

It is possible that the view of Maimonides in counting the dogmas is along the method which we have described, only that he counted the three, which we had said were the matrices, together with the ~~principles~~ beliefs that branch out from them, calling them all dogmas. And therefore did he count the "Existence of God", which is a matrix, as the first dogma, and counted with it, as dogmas, four other principles that branch out from it, namely, (1) Unity, (2) Incorporeality, (3) His Eternity, and (4) His Exclusive Worship; and he counted "Revelation", which is a matrix, together with the three other principles among the dogmas, because they shoot off from it, and they are "Prophecy", and "The Prophecy of Moses", and "The Immutability of the Law"; he also counted "The Omniscience of God and the Providence for Reward and Punishment", - a matrix, - together with three other fundamentals which are included in it or that branch out from it, viz., "Reward for the Soul", "The Messiah", and "The Resurection of the Dead". There would accordingly be no difficulty as to why he did not list "ex nihilo"; he did not count it because it is not subsumed under any one of those three which we have mentioned. And he did not count "Freedom" and "Purpose", even though they are essential for a Divine Torah, because they are not essential for it in so far as it is Divine, as will appear, D. J., (infra, I, Ch. 9). But it is still a problem, according to this method, why he did not count "Life" and "Omnipotence" and other attributes under the dogma of the Existence of God, as he counted "Eternity" and the other attributes. Similarly may one take exception to all that he deduced from the other dogmas. All this will be explained in our discussion,

infra, D. J. And we now return carefully to examine the dogmas in accordance with our method, by which we maintain that there are three matrices; we will first explain the dogmas of the civil religions, and then we shall discuss the dogmas of the revealed religion, with the help of God, blessed be He.

CHAPTER FIVE

All animate beings live and subsist in either of three ways. (1) Of them some cannot live or subsist together as the beasts of prey for whom collecting together and association is bad and harmful; for should many of them gather together into one place they would kill one another over the prey. (2) And of them are some of an opposite nature; they are those animate beings for whom it is impossible to live and subsist without community and group, and for whom association is essential in preserving their existence; as for example, man who due to his delicacy and the fine balance of his constitution is affected by cold, heat, and every other change; he therefore needs clothes to shelter him from heat and cold, and well prepared food which should be suitable for his constitution. This cannot be accomplished without the collecting together and association of many people who will assist one another; one sews, one weaves, one makes needles, and so every trade; so that each person may obtain what he needs for his living and subsistence in food and clothing. (3) There are still other species of animate beings, so to speak, intermediary between these two extremes; for group and association are not harmful to them in their existence as it is for the beasts of prey and the carniverous birds, nor is it essential for them as it is for man. It appears however that collecting together and association are advantageous for them, such as many herbiverous animals and non-carniverous birds which flock together in many groups for the sake of company and companionship which is their only benefit, since this is not essential to them for their existence and subsistence as it is

for man.

Since group and association are necessary for man for his very life and subsistence, it is rightly that the sages said that man is social (political) by nature, by which they mean, that it is necessary almost from his very nature for man to dwell in a state with a large aggregate of people so that he be able to obtain that which he needs for his life and sustenance. And because of this fact it is clear that it is important that there should be for the whole group in the state or for the entire group in one district or of one climate or for all the people of the world some Order by which they should conduct themselves to maintain righteousness in general and to remove perverseness, so that people should not wrangle when they associate together in the business and trade relations that exist among them. This Order will include protection against murder, theft, robbery, and the like, and in general anything which will preserve the social group and direct it to the end that its people live in a pleasant state. This Order thesages called by the name of natural Law, which means that it is ~~essential~~ for man from his very nature; whether it is ordered by a sage or ~~by a~~ sage or by a prophet. But such a Law is not yet sufficient to arrange for the needs of men, their life and subsistence one with another, unless there be added to it some Order or Convention which includes the affairs of men one with another in all their relations and the business dealings that exist among them; such as, the Laws of the Roman Caesars and the customs of the states, and the statutes which the people of a district or a kingdom legislate among themselves to preserve the Conventional

Justice. Such an Order is called "Nomos", or Civil Law. Such Order or Law cannot subsist unless there be one man, governing or judging or ruling over that respective group or state, who would compel the people to remove perverseness and to maintain the Law, so that the establishment of that group be perfected. And therefore will the matter of establishing a king or leader or judge be essential, in a sense, for the preservation of man - since man is social (political) by nature, as we have shown.

CHAPTER SIX

When we examine the formation of animate beings and the perfection of all their limbs, we find that the Creator took care with a remarkable Providence to arrange all their affairs and all the details of their needs in a remarkable arrangement, not only in regard to that which is essential for them, in the preservation of the species or the individual, but also in regard to what is not essential either for the preservation of the species or of the individual, only that it is found advantageous for them; as for example, the duality of the sense organs that is found in the animal so that its affairs might be ordered in a more suitable and more perfect way, even though it is not essential for it in the arrangement of its life. And when we find such a Providence among the lesser animals, it is so much the more right that He should provide for the most worthy kind of them, so as to arrange its interests according to the perfectibility of its kind in a way that all its affairs be ordered in a manner appropriate for the attainment of its perfection. And he who will consider this matter well will find that the existence of a divine influence by which means are arranged the affairs that are necessary for the preparation of man for the attainment of his perfection and goal, is more essential than many things that are found in the make-up of animals, which things are found only as a beneficial matter, but without which they could (very readily) continue their existence. And although this divine influence will be found only in one individual, it will lead the way of perfection to mankind. That is, even though the species which are subsumed under the genera are not all of them going the path

of perfection end to end, viz., that even though there be found among the species one particular species which is more perfect than all the others, and still that species alone is not the perfection and goal of that genus, nor does it lead that genus to the goal of its perfection, for every species by itself has a goal and a perfection peculiar to that particular species; still in every species even though there are found in it varying classes of which one is more weighty than the other; as if for example the class"rulers" is closer to human perfection than the class "farmers", and the class "sages" is more perfect than than the class "rulers"; similarly in this wise there will be in every class an individual or individuals more perfect than the rest of that class and that individual or individuals or class alone is not the goal of the existence of that species, but that species or those individuals or that class are the cause of the attainment of the goal of that species in that theygoithe path of perfection for the whole species, by which I mean that they are as an instrument by which to bring the species to its goal and its perfection - which is common for the entire species, even though there are varying ranks from end to end. That is, that just as every individual has many different limbs, all necessary for the maintenance of the animate being, and still one is more perfect than the other and that other than the third, so that there finally is one limb which is the root of the existence of the animal; and still that one goes the path of perfection for the animal, that is, that it is an instrument by which to bring the perfection of life to the entire animal, as when one says that the heart is the basis of the animal's exis-

tence, since it is the instrument with which life is brought to all the limbs in toto and to the brain in particular; so that through the life that comes to the brain from the heart there originate from the brain sense and movement to all the limbs; thus is the existence of the living thing perfected by what reaches them from the heart either directly or by means of a medium. Likewise men, although they are all alike in their common humanity, yet human perfection comes to some of them only by the mediation of others; for just as all the limbs are necessary for the ~~existence~~ of the individual, and yet some of them have ranks superior to others and life reaches some of them by some intermediation, so, in a similar manner, does the class "sages" have ranks superior to the rest, and there originates in the sage an Order for people which arranges their affairs in a way that would attain human perfection, which Order is called "Nomos". And according to what we said that it is fitting that Divine Providence should supervise the attainments of this usefulness for the human species, as we find that it provides in matters of small importance in the animal; it thus necessarily follows that the Divine influence should be emanated on some individual of the human species, which is more prepared for this, so that he be a means to bring people to the perfection of their goal, either through himself while alive or through an intermediary after his death, that is, through the sages that follow after him to guide people by what they received from him or by what they inferred from his sayings that are found in his books at all times and everywhere. For it is not fit that the Divine Power fall short in granting this benefit which is essential for the human

species in perfecting it always and everywhere, just as it does not fall short in the perfecting of the benefit that is necessary for the lesser animals everywhere and always. And the guidance that comes to people through this individual is called "Divine Law", and its ranks as compared with the other Laws and Mores correspond to the ranks of the chief work as compared to the other tasks that are subordinate to it.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The term "Dath" applies to any guidance or regulation which is laid down for a large group of people, whether it includes many laws as, "All those that knew the law and judgement", (Esth. 1:13), or one law as, "And a decree was given out in Shushan", (Ib. 9:14), or whether it is revealed as, "At his right hand was a fiery Law unto them", (Dt. 33:2), or civil as, "The law of the Medes and the Persians", (Dn. 6:9). There are three kinds of "Dath": natural, civil, revealed. The natural is a like for all people at all times and everywhere. The civil is that which is arranged by a sage or sages according to the place and time and according to the nature of those that are guided by it, like the laws and statutes which are arranged in some states of old, worshipers of idols and worshipers of God, by way of the rational Order which the human mind necessitates without divine inspiration. And the revealed is that which is ordered by God through a Prophet as Adam or Noah, and like the guidance and law which Abraham used to teach and accustom people to serve God and circumcise them at the command of God; or that which is ordered by God through a Messenger sent by Him for a Law to be given through Him, as the Mosaic Torah. The aim of natural religion is to remove evil and establish justice so that people should keep away from theft, robbery, and murder, so that the society among men should exist and continue, and each one should be rescued from the palm of the wrong-doer and the violent man. The aim of civil religion is to remove the reprehensible and institute the becoming, so that people keep away from that which is indecent according to the accepted standard. In this respect it

is superior to the natural, for the civil also corrects the conducts of people and arranges their affairs in a way suited to establish the political group, even as the natural. The aim of the revealed (religion) is to guide people to the attainment of true happiness which is the happiness of the soul and immortality; it shows them the ways they should follow in order to attain it; it teaches them the real good so that they should strive to achieve it, and it also teaches them the real evil, so that they should guard against it. It accustoms them to the forsaking of the (merely) apparent successes, so that they should not be afflicted or pained because of their absence. It also lays down the ways of righteousness, so that the civil (political) group be established in a fitting and perfect way, so that any bad arrangement of their group should not ~~weary~~ them while attaining the true happiness, or trouble them in their striving to attain the final happiness and goal of the human species, which is the aim of revealed religion; and in this it is superior to the civil.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Civil religion falls short of the revealed in many respects:

1) The first is that which we already mentioned, that the civil arranges the acts of man in a way that the political group be well established, but it does not suffice to give perfection in views, as we will explain infra, so that the soul should remain after death, and by this (i.e., civil religion) it could not return to dwell in the land of the living from which it was taken, because it is authoritative as to the proper and the improper alone. Revealed religion (however) is sufficient for that, because it includes the two parts on which human perfection depends, namely, Ethic and Doctrine; for it is authoritative in regard to the proper and the improper, and it differentiates between the true and the false in regard to Doctrine. This is why David describes it as complete; when he says, "The Law of the Lord is perfect restoring the soul", (Ps. 19:8), i.e., civil religion is not complete because it is not authoritative as to true doctrines, but revealed religion is perfect because it includes the perfection of Ethic and the perfection of Doctrine, which are the two parts on which the perfection of the soul is dependent; it thus "restores the soul" to God who has given it, to the place of its original habitation.

2) Civil religion is inferior to revealed in yet another respect, in that it cannot distinguish the proper from the improper in all things, for a thing may be proper or improper with us and yet not be proper or improper intrinsically; for just as it is impossible that man be born perfect, through his nature,

in all the practical trades, even though he may be predisposed by nature to some of them, so is it impossible for man to be born perfect in all the qualities and perfections and not have any defects or deficiencies, but he may indeed be prepared towards some quality or some perfection more than others; but that he should be predisposed for all the qualities is impossible. It is thus clear that it is impossible for any human arranger of Custom not to turn - through his nature - to the side of some defect and to judge the proper to be improper and the improper to be proper, and therefore his testimony on the proper and the improper would not be true. We find, as a fact, that Plato went very much astray in this and called the improper proper; for he said that it is proper that the women in a state should be held in common by the members of one class, as for example, the wives of the officials are to be held in common by all the officials, and the wives of the merchants by all the merchants, and likewise the wives of the artisans of one craft are to be held in common by all the artisans of that craft. This thing, of course, the Torah prohibited; and even the Torah of the Noahides, for it was said to Abimelek (Gn. 20:3), "Behold thou shalt die because of the woman whom thou hast taken; for she is a man's wife", and he justified himself in that he did not know that she was a married woman. Aristotle has indeed censured the opinion of Plato in this matter; this is a proof that the mind of no man is sufficient to differentiate the truly proper from the improper, and therefore will his testimony on the proper and the improper not be trustworthy; and certainly in the matter of Doctrine is it impossible that his testimony be trustworthy, - in profound speculations,

such as whether the world is created (ex nihilo) or eternal. For the human mind is not sufficient to know this in a clear way; but, "The testimony of the Lord is trustworthy, making wise the simple", (Ps. 19:8), for it testifies concerning the world, whether it is created or eternal, and concerning the other weighty speculations, and as to the proper and the improper, in truth.

3) In yet another matter is civil religion inferior to revealed. It cannot rejoice the heart of those who conduct themselves according to it, because he who is in doubt whether the thing he performs is sufficient to bring him to the desired goal, does not rejoice in his work; and he who conducts himself according to the "Mores" will - because he is in doubt whether the justice which is described by it is really justice or is justice only in appearance - not be happy in his work. But he who conducts himself according to revealed religion, is - because he knows that that justice which is described by it is justice in reality - happy in his action; thus, "The precepts of the Lord are right rejoicing the heart". (Ib. v. 9).

4) In yet another respect does civil religion fall short of revealed, in that it cannot prescribe the details of acts which should be performed in any situation. For it lays down only general principles; just as definitions are only applicable for general things; for the individual, cannot be defined, so can civil religion not prescribe specific acts. This is why Aristotle in his book on Ethics frequently mentions all the virtues which should be practiced in a proper way at the proper time and at the proper place, but he does not make clear what the

proper time is or what the proper place. This (power of) estimating is undoubtedly not given to any man. We find him saying in many places in the book on Ethics that the specific acts must be estimated, but he does not explain the estimate in them; it seems that his view is that this estimation is beyond him. There is no doubt that if it were in the constitution of man in so far as he is man to know this estimating, Aristotle would undoubtedly have discussed it. But because it is is not in the nature of man to arrive at this by himself, he left it for another, viz., Divine Apportioning. And therefore do we find him talking on virtues in a general way, as for example, when he says that the fearing of sin is the mean virtue between the pleasure of eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse, and the other pleasures, and that of extreme abstinence. The human teachers of morals say that one should cohabit in the proper way and with the proper person and at the proper time, but they cannot explain it further; revealed religion however does explain that cohabitation is proper in so far as it is for the purpose of rearing children, for the preservation of the race, and as for the proper person - the particular woman; it further prohibits certain women who are not fit for such relations; and that the proper time is when the woman is ritually clean, and not at the time of her period or near it. Likewise does revealed religion forbid certain foods and permit others; it prohibits the drinking of wine when one comes to perform the divine duties or to pray; It sets forth that extreme abstention is not good, as the Rabbis, b.m., interpreted the verse: "And he shall make atonement for him, for that he had sinned against the soul", (Nu. 6:11), against which

soul did he sin? - but that he denied himself wine. (Nazir 19a). Similarly the human teachers of morals praise fortitude, but they say that a person should not expose himself to danger except when death is preferred by him to life. They cannot however determine that occasion ; the Divine Torah explains that that occasion is when God's Name is to be sanctified through one, as in the case of Hananiah, Mishael, and 'Azariah, or of warring with idolators to destroy them and to erase their name from under the heavens. Similarly as regards mercy and cruelty, can human custom not determine who is worthy (of mercy) and who is unworthy; but revealed religion sets forth that cruelty should be shown to unbelievers, heretics, and transgressors of the Law, whom it is proper to chastise with stripes or death, each case in accordance with what the Torah determined to be the degree of guilt; and that mercy should be shown to believers, the poor, and the lowly, in various ways, for some are worthy to be given a gift gratis, and to some is it right to give by way of a loan. And to show that it is not right to apply one method alone, the Psalmist says, "Well is it with the man that dealeth graciously and lendeth, that ordereth his affairs righteously," (Ps. 112:5); he uses the expression "dealeth graciously" ("Honen") in reference to the charity to the poor who receives a gift gratis ("Hinam"), and "lendeth" in reference to him who would not take except by way of a loan; he who does both these, he continues, "ordereth his affairs righteously"; he further says concerning him, "that he shall never be moved, the righteous shall be had in everlasting remembrance", (Ib. v. 6), because he benefits all people, either by way of graciousness and gift or by way of loan.

It is not,however, within the power of civil religion to estimate anything of particular acts, such as these; and therefore will he who conducts himself according to it be walking in the darkness, and will not know which are the detailed acts which he should by right perform, and neither will he know which way to walk. But "the commandment of the Lord is pure" as the sun and "enlightening the eyes" (Ps. 19:9), to light to those that live according to it - the way in which they should walk and the deeds which they should do.

5) In yet another respect the civil religion falls short of the revealed: because its orderer is a human being it is impossible for him to mete out the proper and the improper for all times; for it is possible that the custom will change sometimes, and that proper will become improper and the improper proper. As we find in the case of Cain and Abel and the early generations, that the marriage to sisters was not considered improper by them; and even in the days of Abraham, as when he said to Abimelek in justifying himself to him, "And moreover she is indeed my sister, the daughter of my father, but not the daughter of my mother" (Gn. 20:12), and then it became improper. It is therefore impossible that the fear that is acquired for the improper as it appears in the civil religion should be eternal, for it changes with the changing of the times. But the revealed religion, because it is measured out by Divine Wisdom, defines the proper and the improper for all times; there will thus not enter into the fear that is acquired for the improper as it appears in it any change or deficiency, since it is pure from any dross and deterioration. On this account is it possible that it should

exist forever, like silver that is pure of any dross; as in the phrase of the Psalmist, "The words of the Lord are pure words: as silver tried in a crucible on the earth, refined seven times", (Ps.12:7); and its meaning is that the counterfeit silver which is made by the science of alchemy, some of it, when melted once, its badness will not be revealed, but if it is melted again its badness will be revealed. Some endure two meltings, and some endure three or four or five, but in the end its badness will be revealed. And the badness of some will not be revealed when it is melted in a crucible, but when it is melted in the density of the earth its badness will be revealed; and the silver that is tried in the thick of the earth, that is purified many times, is pure from any adulteration, dross, or deterioration, for it is impossible that it should change after that, even it be melted many times. Therefore does he describe the words of the Lord as pure like pure silver that is tested in a furnace of earth which is in an open space in the thick of the ground, "purified seven times", for there is no suspicion of any adulteration concerning it. And likewise the fear that is acquired for the improper as it appears in the Torah is "clean, enduring for ever" (ib. v. 10), for there does not fall into it the change and deficiency that falls into civil religion.

6) Again, civil religion cannot mete out to each man according to his ways in exact degree, or estimate the punishments by exact measure and weight, so that one should receive stripes, and one be stoned, and one choked, and that one should pay double, and one should pay four or five times the amount, so that the punishments that are meted out to the sinner should be ap-

propriate to the measure of sin. But revealed religion gives recompense to every one according to his evil,no less nor more; and even though it appears that a righteous (person) perishes in his righteousness and a wicked (one) lives long in his wickedness, this is only when the punishments are tested with the test of the goods of this world alone, but when the good things of this world that come to the wicked would be considered together with the evils and punishments that come to him in the world to come and, likewise, the evils that come to the righteous in this world with the goods that come to him in the world to come, we will find the two recompenses just,together, even though each one of them separate by itself is not just. This is the meaning of the Psalmist, "The ordinances of the Lord are true, they are righteous altogether", (ib. v. 10); he said "true" in reference to the measure of punishments, and he said, "They are righteous altogether" in reference to the punishment of this world together with the goods in the world to come, or vice versa. I saw some one who interpreted (this verse) that because there is found in the Torah that one and the same thing is (both) prohibited and permitted, as,e.g., a brother's wife (who has a child from him) is prohibited, and the "yebama" is permitted, and the fat of the (domesticated) cattle is prohibited where the fat of the (wild) animal is permitted, and meat with milk is prohibited where the udder is permitted, and such similar things which would lead a person to think that it is impossible that the two contrary things both be right; and therefore did he say that "The ordinances of the Lord are true, they are righteous altogether", viz., the permission and the prohibition. But the term "true" does not

fit in to this interpretation, for the term"true"is not applicable to the laying down of laws, only terms like "proper", or "appropriate", or "righteous laws", but the term "true" is applicable to recompenses. Scripture says, "Execute true judgement" (Zech. 7:9), for the essence of the recompense is always called by the term "judgement";(and again) "The Lord hath made Himself known, He hath executed judgement, the wicked is snared in the work of his own hand", (Ps. 9:17); (and again) "Only to do justly", (Micah 6:8); and likewise the word "altogether" is not well explained according to this interpretation.

These then are the deficiencies of civil religion, and many more like these can be added to them; among them are that civil religion can lay down punishments only for the overt, but not for the covert, for man looks only at appearances, where the Divine Torah lays down punishments also for the hidden, for God sees into the heart. One may interpret "The ordinances of the Lord are true, they are righteous altogether " in this way, in reference to the revealed and the hidden. I need not expatiate on this; only that I desire to list those six which the Psalmist counted in the Psalm: "The Heavens declare the glory of God" (#19), when he says, "The Law of the Lord is perfect,... the Testimony of the Lord is sure,... the Precepts of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart, the Commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes, the fear of the Lord is clean, enduring forever, the Ordinances of the Lord are true, they are righteous altogether", (ib. vv.8-10). And after the Psalmist explains these six advantages which revealed religion has over the civil, he goes on to show that not only does revealed religion make for

perfection of doctrine, i.e., the true and the false, and as regards the proper and the improper which are the perfection of Ethic, as we have written, but it also makes for perfection in all that appears to be perfection, and that which appears to be perfection besides the perfection of conduct and doctrine, i.e., the useful and the pleasant; he said in ~~the metaphors of song~~ Voltri language that in the words of the Torah there will be found the useful and the pleasant, saying, "More to be desired are they than gold, yea, than much fine gold", (Ps. 19:11), to allude to the useful, and, "Sweeter than honey and the honey comb" (ibid.) to allude to to the pleasant; viz., that the reward that is attainable by means of the commandments is a great reward, more useful than gold or much fine gold, and more pleasant than honey comb; this happens when man is diligent in their performance; he therefore concludes, "Moreover, of them is Thy servant careful, in keeping of them there is great reward", (ib. v. 12).

CHAPTER NINE

The premises and principles of civil religion are Freedom, and Purpose. This is evident and clear: why should the lawgiver lay down the punishments for those that transgress the dictates of the "Nomos" if he who transgresses is not in his own control to do as he wills; likewise, how could the king or the potentate of the state force people to perform the good acts if the people were not in their own control to do evil or good. And even those that deny spiritual reward and punishment will admit that freedom is absolute in man's power, and that he has no one to press him to it, and by which he can choose what he wants and center his deeds towards some purpose. And therefore do they (sc. the deniers) say that it is a necessity that a "Nomos" be arranged by a sage or sages to prescribe the proper and the improper and the perverse and the just among the people of the state, and which places on them a ruler, officer, or governor, to compel the people to the continuation of the right among men and the removal of perverseness, so that the social (political) group be perfected through it in a fitting way. It is thus evident that he who puts Freedom and Purpose as principles for revealed religion did not aim correctly; for although Freedom necessarily proceeds it, it is not a presupposition to it in so far as it is revealed; it is a principle to it though, in the sense that it is a principle for all human actions and conventions and civil customs by which the political settlement is arranged, without which it is impossible. And just as we would not say that the (innate ideas) are a premise for revealed religion, even though they necessarily proceed it, since they are prior to all learning and

teaching and to any knowledge, similarly Freedom - although necessarily a principle for revealed religion - is not a premise to it in so far forth as it is revealed. That is why Maimonides, b.m., did not list it among the dogmas, although,he says, that it is an essential fundamental for a Divine Torah, as we have written in Chapter Three , because only those are counted as dogmas which are basic for revealed religion in so far as it is revealed. Similarly is General Purpose not a premise for revealed religion in so far forth as it is revealed, but it is a premise for all those human actions that are done by (free) will; and from this aspect is it a premise for civil religion; for just as any one who does something from his own free will certainly does it because he intends towards some purpose, whether that purpose actually is good or is a thing that appears to him to be good; so does he who lays down the civil norm intend with the commands and prohibitions which he lays down for people to reach with their actions some purpose, viz., the guidance of the people and their well-being, in a way that the political group be perfected. It is thus clear that Purpose is also a premise for civil religion, but not for revealed religion in so far as it is revealed. Since however the Purpose which comes through the Torah, viz., life in the world to come, is different from the end that comes by civil religion and from all other ends, Maimonides, b.m., counted it among the dogmas even though he did not include Freedom. If one were to object that since Freedom and Purpose are not premises for revealed religion in so far as it is revealed, what is meant by the Scriptural verse: "See,I have set before thee this day life... therefore choose life" (Dt. 30:15,19)? - to allude to Freedom and Purpose, i. e.,

Eternal Life? We have already said that even though Freedom and Purpose are not premises for revealed religion in so far as it is revealed, yet they necessarily precede it, just as the innate ideas precede revealed religion even though they are not premises to it in so far as it is revealed; and because no one denies that the innate ideas are existent in man, but there are those who deny that Freedom exists in man - as is the opinion of some astrologers -, and there are also some who deny Purpose in all acts, like Epicurus and his School, who hold that the world came into being by chance, and that there is no Purpose in any action whatsoever, but that everything is by pure chance; and even those who assume a Purpose for all human actions will not agree to such a weighty Purpose as this, viz., the Permanence of the Soul in Eternal Life; therefore was revealed religion necessitated to write this in order to refute those opinions because they are untenable of themselves, since they would destroy all human action and human purpose, besides the destruction of all religions.

CHAPTER TEN

The premises of revealed religion in general are three: the first - the Existence of God, second - Revelation, and third - Reward and Punishment. These three must not be doubted, for they are premises essential for revealed religion in so far as it is revealed; for should we imagine ~~that~~ the removal of one of them, the religion as a whole will fall. And this is evident from their nature: for if we do not believe in the Existence of God who commands the religion, there is no revealed religion; and even if we believe in the Existence of God, if there is no ~~Revealed Torah,~~ latter there is no revealed religion; and if there is no Reward and Punishment corporeal in this world and spiritual in the world to come, why then should a revealed religion be ordered; if its purpose is to arrange the order and conduct of people and their affairs so that the settlement of the political group be perfected, civil religion would be sufficient for that. But it is patent without doubt that the purpose of the existence of revealed religion is to bring people to a perfection which the power of the human "Nomos" falls short of holding out to him; and this is the human perfection that is dependent on the perfection of the soul, as will appear below. It is therefore evident that spiritual Reward and Punishment is a dogma and basic principle of the Divine Torah, without doubt; and the corporeal reward that comes from God, b., in this world to the righteous (person) for fulfilling the commandments is just as a proof of the other; and therefore is Reward and Punishment considered an essential premise of revealed religion.

And because these three are universal dogmas for revealed

religion, the Rabbis, b. m., listed them in Chapter Helek in the Mishnah, when they said that he who disbelieves one of them is not included among the religionists and that such a one has no portion in the world to come; they said (Synh. ch.11, p.90a), "All Israel have a portion in the world to come, as it is said (Is. 40:21), 'and thy people shall be all righteous; they shall inherit the land forever'; and the following have no portion in the world to come: he who said that ressurection of the dead is not (deducible) from the Torah,", viz., that he who denies the Divine Reward and Punishment which is alluded to in the ressurection of the dead, which is a divine act, whether spiritual or corporeal, to include all sorts of reward; and that is why we find the Rabbis using guarded words there on this subject, for the ressurection of the dead is a term used for (both) a generality and a particularity, either for the ressurection of the dead in particular or for the punishment of the souls in the world to come and the Day of Judgement in general. There they also have explained the matter of the Messiah, that it is a bodily reward to hint at all sorts of reward. And then they listed him who says that there is no Revealed Torah, and this is the other dogma; then they listed the Epicurean; in accordance with what we find among the early (thinkers), a man by the name of Epicurus, who held that the world came into being by chance, and denied the Existence of God as Creator; the followers of his doctrine were called Epicureans. Here they have thus counted these three dogmas, and they said that he who disbelieves them has no portion in the world to come, for he withdraws from the communion of religionists. And even though there inthe Chapter Helek it is said that an Epicurean is he who abuses scholars, this, they said,

because not every person has sufficient ability to understand the existence of God by himself; and we know (it) indeed (only) either by way of tradition or by way of proof from the sages; and he who abuses scholars, who expound the Existence of God to all men, does not leave for himself a way by which he might know Him, and he is as if he had denied the Existence of God; therefore, he is called an Epicurean. And since they listed in the Mishnah, Chapter Helek, only those unbelievers who have no portion in the world to come, it is seen that these three are the universal dogmas of a Divine Torah, in which every one who is attached to a revealed religion is bound to believe; and even though they listed there in the Gemara others who have no portion in the world to come, they enumerated them only since they branch out from these three dogmas, not that they are dogmas in themselves.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

"And this is the law which Moses set before the children of Israel", (Dt. 4:44); since all are agreed concerning it that it is revealed, it is proper that we set it as the basis and criterion for revealed religions, and it is proper that a proof for them be taken from it; viz., that just as from the one individual a proof will be taken for all the individuals of that species in the knowledge of the things that are essential and necessary for its existence and its maintenance, so too is it proper that a proof be taken from the words that come in the Mosaic Torah that are essential for its existence and its maintenance, for the things that should be in a Divine Torah which would make for its existence and sustain it also. And since we find that the Mosaic Torah laiddown in its beginning the three premises which we have mentioned, viz., the Existence of God, a Revealed Torah, and Reward and Punishment, it is evident that they are premises essential for a Divine Torah. And therefore it set them down in Bereshith to allude to the fact that these are the premises for Divine Torah. This is that just as in every science there are laid down in the beginning the things and the premises on which the science rests, and they are the root ideas by which to prove all the things that may come in it, so likewise were there written in the Section Bereshith three matters different one from another, in every one of which there is one of those dogmas, to indicate that these are the principles and bases for a Divine Torah on which it and all its matters ~~rest~~ hinge.

For from "In the beginning" (Gn.1:1) to "These are the generations of the Heaven" (ib. 2:3) is one matter, written to indicate the first dogma, viz., the Existence of God, who creates,

of (His own free) will all the existing things, in order to contradict the opinion of the School of Epicurus who held that the world came into being by chance and that it has no Creative Cause. On this dogma, then, does the whole story from "In the beginning" to "These are the generations of the Heavens" hinge. For the order of creatures which is found in the Section Bereshith in the rank of their being, one above the other, their arrangement and the creation of the forms like the plant, the animal, and man in different times, all this points to the existence of a Creator (endowed) with Free-will, as will be expounded in Section Two, D. G.,(Ch. 4). It is explained in this division that man is the choice of all the sub-lunar creatures, and that he alone is the chief purpose of the creation in the sub-lunar world; because he alone goes the path of the form and perfection for the other forms, like the plant and the animal. Just as the actions preceding a certain work are like preparations and matter for it, and it is as a form for them, likewise all the forms that precede the human form are as preparations and material for it, and it is as a form for them. For this reason was his creation delayed and was attributed to God more than any creation of the other animals; to indicate that the intention of the Creator in the forming of the earlier forms, of plant and of animal, was the bringing into existence of the human forms alone. For man alone, from among the other sub-lunar creatures, recognizes the existence of the Creator; and when man came into being, Creation was completed, and then was it said: "And the Heaven and the earth were finished and all the host of them", (Gn. 2:1), for the purpose of anything is the end of the act; and therefore was man the end of the creations, just as the chief work is at the end of all

the works, and all of them precede it and exist because of it. This entire Section was written only to the first dogma, viz., the Existence of the Creator of all the creatures, and therefore is in this entire Section from "In the beginning" to "These are the generations of the heavens" only the name Elohim used, which name signifies: He who has the power to create all, to show that the only intention in all that was mentioned in this Section was to point to the existence of the Maker of all the creatures. And this is the first dogma.

And from "These are the generations of the heavens" to "And the man knew Eve his wife" (ib. 4:1) is a different subject, and was written to allude to the second dogma, viz., the Reality of Prophecy and the Divine Origin of the Torah. You will therefore find all that story hinging on "the Revealed Torah". For the beginning of the conversation which God, b., spoke to Adam was "And the Lord God commanded to man, saying," etc. (ib. 2:16); and he wrote ~~before~~ after that the reason why man was commanded a divine command rather than all animals. When it says, "And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field and every fowl of the air, and brought (them) unto the man to see what he would call them", etc., (ib. v. 19), it, so to speak, comes to explain that since man understands and knows the characteristics of animals more than all of them, all the sub-lunar creatures are subservient to him, and all of them exist for man; and the purpose of man is to observe the commandments of his Creator. He was for this reason placed in this world which is pictured in the Garden of Eden so that he might eat from the Tree of Life which was in the Garden, which is a hint to the Torah, for it is written con-

cerning it, "It is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon it", (Prov. 3:18); and when he transgressed the commandment of his creator he was driven from the Garden of Eden. Because of this was that entire story that happened to Adam with the Serpent and Eve written, so that he should have a hint on what will happen to him in this world; for the Serpent which is called in the language of our Rabbis, b. m., Samael is the Evil Inclination that hinders man, by the medium of woman, from attaining his perfection, and this is the cause for his being expelled from the Garden of Eden. And for this reason was "Jahweh Elohim" used in this entire story to show that the belief in the existence of the Creator is in itself not enough for the attainment of human perfection, which belief can be comprehended by way of conceiving a Creator who creates the natural things and which is indicated in the word "Elohim"; but (also) is needed belief in Prophecy and the Divine Origin of the Torah; for this conception is superior to the conception of a Maker who is the cause of the natural things; and on this account that the command came from Jahweh Elohim was it possible that man would eat of the tree of life, "and eat and live forever" (ib. 3:22), not because of the first knowledge and understanding which is the existence of the Maker alone, but because of the conception of Prophecy and the Divine Torah which commands to do the things that are acceptable before God, b., even though reasoning would not demand them; for this is a supernatural matter. And in order that there should not appear any duality through this, D. A., it is said at the giving of the Torah: "And Elohim spoke all these things, saying" (Ex. 20:1), and He opened with, "I am Yahweh, thy Elohim" (ib. v. 2), to make clear that the Giver of the Torah, who is the Honored Name,

He Himself is the Creator of all the creatures, Who is called Elohim in the Section Bereshith. And for this reason did Moses explain in Deuteronomy, "These words did Yahweh speak unto all your assembly" (5:19), to show that although it is said that the giving of the Torah, "And Elohim spoke all these things", it was the Honored Name, b., who was the Speaker. This is why Yahweh Elohim is used in this entire story from "These are the generations of the heavens" to "And Adam knew Eve his wife" (Gn. 2:3-4:1) to point to this dogma, viz., the Reality of Prophecy and the Divine Origin of the Torah; and all the punishments that are mentioned there included the entire human species, not only Adam and Eve alone.

And from "And Adam knew Eve his wife" to "This is the book of the generations of Adam" (ib. 4:1-5:1) is a different subject; it was written to allude to the third dogma, viz., the Reality of Individual Reward and Punishment and Providence over the particulars that arise in the world from quarrels and words of strifes between man and his fellow; as it happened to Cain and Abel; and this is a different kind of punishment from the punishment that is mentioned in the previous chapters on Adam and Eve. For there Adam was punished for transgressing the commandment of God, to point to the entire race that the basis for punishment is transgression of the commandment of God, but it was not written on account of the particular matter in itself that happened to Adam and Eve. For this reason did all the punishments that were mentioned concerning Adam and Eve include the entire race. But in this Section, Providence in matters particular for every person is set forth, and that is how God paid attention to Cain to punish him because his intention was not acceptable in the offering

of the sacrifice and for the violence that he perpetrated on Abel, not alone because he transgressed the commandment of God. This is to show that God, b., observes the perpetrators of evil to punish them for their evil thought and for the violence which is in their hand. And although He is long suffering for them, as He was for Cain, yet in the end He does punish them, just as He punished Cain: with the measure that he used, did He mete it out to him, for just as he killed Abel thus causing all his posterity to cease, likewise was Cain killed and all his descendents were erased in the Deluge and there was not left of them a remainder or a fugitive; even though there were among the descendants of Cain great, wise, and intelligent people, who invented the trades and the sciences, as it is written, "The forger of every cutting instrument of brass and iron" (Gn, 4:22), "The father of such as dwell in tents and have cattle" (ib. v. 20), "The father of all such as handle the harp and pipe" (ib. v. 21), yet God did not spare them. And this was the intention of all this third Section; therefore, also, was the name "Yahweh" alone used in it, to indicate that individual Providence which is in all things that are done in this world, to give to each man according to his ways and the fruit of his deeds, is not from the fact of the existence of a Maker who brings the natural things into being, nor from the fact of the Divine Origin of the Torah, but is due to the perfection of God and His Excellence in taking care of the sub-lunar creatures and the impotent ones, to rescue them from the power of their oppressors. In allusion to this the prophet (sc. Isaiah) said, "I dwell in the high and holy place, with him (also) that is of a contrite and humble spirit" (57:15), i.e., that it is in the nature of His Excellency

and His Majesty to take care of the lowly, to show them the power of His strength, to quicken the heart of the oppressed. It is set forth in this story of Cain and Abel that His Providence is with the quality of mercy to open to the wicked the ways of repentance, as He opened for Cain and said to him, "If thou doest well, shall it not be lifted up?", etc.,(Gn. 4:7); and this is not of the quality of justice, therefore was the name Elohim not mentioned in this story at all.

And when it was through with the exposition of these three dogmas which are the premises for revealed religion, it (sc. Scripture) returned to begin the story and the order of the generation as in the beginning, saying, "This is the book of the generations of Adam" (ib. 5:1); saying as it were, that here is the beginning of the book, for all that was written till here was only a series of the premises of the book, which are not part of the book (however); but just as every one who begins a book says in its introduction: 'this book discusses such and such, likewise here it says: this book, which is the Book Bereshith, discusses the history of Adam and how the world followed after him; it comes to explain that what was written till here is not of the book, but premises to the book, just as in every science - the principles are laid down in the beginning; and from "This is the book of the generations of Adam" (ib. 5:1) is the beginning of the Book of the Torah, and that the Book Bereshith is the story of the generations of Adam.

It (sc. Scripture) begins by saying: "In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made He him; male and female created He them,"etc. (Gn. 5:1b-2); even though for the story

of the generations it would have been enough to say "In the day that God created man, male and female created He them", etc. But it expatiated here: "In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made He him" to allude to a great matter which is essential for the existence of the Torah, viz., that Individual Reward and Punishment, which we have mentioned as one of the premises of the Torah, may indeed reach man by way of the thinking soul which is in him, which is in the likeness of God; for by this way may individual existence reach man, and on this account is he fit to receive individual reward and punishment, not on account of the existence of the species which he shares with the other animals. Therefore did it write in this verse, which is the beginning of the Torah, the two kinds of existences which man has; saying "In the likeness of God made He him" to hint that he has an individual existence as the super-lunar beings, because he is in the likeness of God, (super-lunar beings) i.e., the angels who exist as individuals; saying "male and female created He them" to hint at the species-existence which he (man) has as the sub-lunar beings. And to this the Rabbis, b. m., allude in Genesis Rabbah (Ch. 8) when they said on the verse: "Let us make man in our image", etc. (Gn. 1:26), whom did God consult? Said Rabbi Joshua ben Levi: he consulted the creation of heaven and earth, meaning that because till the sixth day before Adam was created there were in the world two different creations, the super-lunar who exist as individuals and the sub-lunar, which exist as species and not as individuals; God consulted the super-lunar and the sub-lunar and said: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness", i.e., that the two powers be combined together, existence as individual

and existence in the species; existence as an individual as the super-lunar beings by way of the intellectual power which is in him (man), and existence in the species as the sub-lunar beings, by way of the material power which is in him. And therefore is it said, "And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He <u>him</u>" (Gn. 1:27), in the singular, to hint at the individual existence which He gave him in superiority to the other animate beings; then it says, "Male and female created He <u>them</u>" (ib. 5:2), in the plural number, to hint at the species-existence which is by way of the male and female together.

An objection may indeed be raised against this from what we find there in Genesis Rabbah: "When God told Moses, 'let us make man', he said to Him: 'Lord of the universe, why dost Thou give an opening to heretics to err?'. Said the Holy One, blessed be He, to him: 'write, and he who wants to err, let him err.'" It is clear that the thing whose existence is good should exist, and the thing whose existence is bad should not exist; and that whose existence is mixed of the good and the bad: if the good is the greater, it should exist, and if the bad is the greater, it should not exist. The expression which they (sc. the Rabbis) said that God told Moses: "write, and he who wants to err, let him err", appears like one who was willing to suffer a small damage for the sake of a great advantage that comes from this expression; would that I knew what is that great good which comes from the expression, "Let us make man". If it is to teach the superior that he should take advice from an inferior, just as He, b., consulted the creation of heaven and earth, which are His creations, even though He did not have to, this benefit is not so big that

He should suffer because of it the damage which comes from His giving to heretics an opening to err. And even were we to say that the benefit resulting from this is what we have said in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi, so that we should know that man has intellectual power as the super-lunar beings, and material power like the sub-lunar ones, that this intellectual power gives him existence as an individual, viz., immortality of the individual human soul, and this is an essential fact for the Torah, as we have said; then although this is undoubtedly a great advantage for which sake it is fit to suffer the damage of the erring of the heretics, one still may ask what was the compulsion which led to write "let us make" in the plural, it should have said: and God said to the super-lunar beings and to the sub-lunar ones, 'I am going to make man in your image', and the mentioned benefits would have thus been attained without leaving room for the heretics to err. It seems to me, however, that even though this benefit would accrue from the expression: "I am going to make man " (yet) it wrote: "Let us make", so that there should be understood from it also another matter more profound and essential, viz., that because the existence of the super-lunar beings who exist as individuals indicates that they were created by an Existent who has the power and the might to give immortality to the individuals just as these exist eternally as individuals; and the existence of the sub-lunar beings indicates that they were created by an Existent who has the power to ~~so~~ preserve the species alone and not the individuals; and this is what brings (man) to err and to think that there are two Powers, as Elisha Aher thought, as it is mentioned in the Tractate Hagigah (Ch. 2, pp.15a-b); therefore did He say: "Let us make

man in our image"; the two Powers, as it were,which created the various creatures, viz., the super and the sub-lunar beings, were saying: "Let us make man", i.e., that they agreed to make one creature, namely man, in which should be combined both powers, the general power that gives existence in the species, and the particular power that gives existence in the individual; and from this, other creatures; it will be understood that all the creatures, the super and the sub-lunary ones, originate from One Existent Who is the Possessor of all the Powers; therefore does it say: "And God said, let us make man", i.e., God Who is the Possessor of all 10 the Powers, and by which is meant the general and the particular, agreed with both of them to make man, that there be combined in him both aspects, general existence and individual existence, general by way of the body, and individual by way of the soul. And this points to One Existent in Whom all the powers unite in a perfect unity, and that the Creator of the things that exist as individuals and that exist as a species is One. It is also understood from this that the knowledge of God includes (both) individual matters and general matters. And as a proof for this you will find that when God revealed Himself to the righteous, He mentioned their 20 names twice, "Abraham, Abraham", "Jacob, Jacob","Moses, Moses", "Samuel, Samuel", to indicate that He knows the individuals by their individuality. Similarly, did God say to the Noahides,"Who so sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made He man" (Gn. 9:6) to indicate that there is individual knowledge of man. For if there were only a general knowledge of him, as of other animate beings, to preserve the species, why should the murderer be killed because in the image of God made He

man, does then he who kills one man kill the entire race? But because man was made in the image of God, he therefore exists as an individual, and he who kills him deserves the punishment, since there is the Divine individual knowledge of him by way of the intellectual power which he has like the super-lunar beings who exist as individuals, and there is particular knowledge of them by way of the intellectual power that is in them; and therefore was man fit for the individual Reward and Punishment which is designated in the Torah. Since further these two things are essential for the existence of the Torah, first by way of God the Creator: to teach that there are no two Powers, as the heretics were saying that the God of the heavens is not the God of the earth, but all is one, for this is the belief in Unity which Abraham was proclaiming in the world, as when he said, "And I will make thee swear by the Lord, the God of heaven and the God of the earth"(Gn. 24:3); and the second by way of man: to teach that the knowledge of God, the general as well as the particular, are combined together in the creation of man, and therefore is he fit for reward and punishment, because God knows him with an individual knowledge, since he is in the image of God; and that also is what Abraham was proclaiming, saying, "The Lord, the God of heaven, Who took me from my father's house, and from the land of my nativity," (ib. v. 7), i.e., that though He is the God of heaven, He knew me with an individual knowledge, and spoke to me and swore to me. For this reason, then, is it written, "Let us make man", and the Rabbis, b. m., said that God said to Moses, "Write, and he who wants to err, let him err", i. e., that the benefit that accrues from this expression is great and essential for the Torah

to show that He who created the individual super-lunar beings and who knows them is the same One as He who created the general sub-lunar beings and who knows them, and that there are no two Powers, nor two different Knowledges, but He knows all with one knowledge. And to this did Rabbi Ami allude;when it issaid in Genesis Rabbah (ibid), "'Let us make man', whom did He consult? said Rabbi Ami,'He consulted His knowledge'", i. e., that He did not consult any one else, D. A.,but He consulted His knowledge, the general as well as the particular, to create one existent through whom it should be clear that it is all one knowledge; and that is, when the two knowledges, the general as well as the particular, will be combined in him, and that is - Man. For by the fact that he is in the image of God like the super-lunar beings, he shows that there is individual knowledge of him; and by the fact that he is male and female, he shows that there is also species knowledge of him; and this points to the perfect Unity and to the fact that man is fit for individual reward and punishment since he is in the likeness of God. And to point to this is the reason why there is written in this verse which is the beginning of the Torah, as we have maintained, "In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made He him."

CHAPTER TWELVE

The doctrine of "creatio ex nihilo" - even though it is a belief which every religionist must needs believe, just as the believer in the Mosaic Torah has to believe that the earth opened its mouth and swallowed up Korah and his assembly because they revolted against Moses, - is yet not one of the dogmas of the Divine Torah without which the existence of the Divine Torah would be inconceivable. The Torah did not begin with the Section Bereshith to point to "creatio ex nihilo" and to make it a dogma for the Torah, as many of the sages have thought. Because even though the believer in the eternity of matter in the way that Aristotle believed it will not conceive God as having the power to lengthen the wing of a fly or to create an ant with only four legs, much more than that such a believer would deny all the miracles of the Torah, for he does not believe that God has the power to turn a rod into a serpent in the twinkling of an eye or water into blood or dust into lice, and not that alone but he will have to deny even the existence of Moses and of the Messiah, because the individual who exists only because of the existence of an infinity of individuals before him, can never exist, for the infinite will never end, and the Torah would thus fall in its entirety, without a doubt. Nevertheless, he who believes that there is a primordial eternal matter from which the world was brought into being and created at the time when God wanted and in the way that He wanted, - this viewpoint will not deny the miracles of the Torah and its wonders; for none of the miracles and wonders which are mentioned in the Torah as a change of the nature and law of the world were a creation "ex nihilo", but "ex substantione", as the turning

of a rod into a serpent, or when the water acquired in no time, despite ~~their~~ being simple, the form of blood, even though the simple cannot turn into blood, for that is the reason that water cannot feed animate beings; and despite all this did God - through Moses His prophet - bestow upon part of the water the form of fire, and to another part the form of air, and to another part the form of dust, and He mixed them together, thus compounding them and turning them to blood, as a change in the essence, in no time; and not to appearances alone for were it only to appearances, the fish would not have died and the Nile would not have stunk. Similarly was there not in any of the miracles of the Torah and the Prophets which took place in the essences, any creation "ex nihilo", only "ex substantione"; so much less than in what happened only in the "accidents", as when the hand of Moses became leprous like snow.

Therefore, then, even though the one who believes in the eternity of matter in the way that Aristotle believed it is a disbeliever of the Torah and of all its miracles, yet he who believes it in this way does not disbelieve in the Torah or in its wonders; for belief in creation or formation "ex nihilo" is not an essential of belief in the Torah; we therefore said in the previous Chapter that the main interest of the first part of the Section Bereshith is only to point to the existence of the Maker, which is the first dogma that is essential for the existence of the Divine Torah, without which the existence of the Divine Torah is inconceivable. But belief in "creatio ex nihilo" - even though it is a doctrine which every adherent of the Torah should believe, as he has to believe that Moses cleaved the rock and the waters flowed forth, and that he brought on the quail and brought down the manna, - none the less

it is not one of the dogmas of the Divine Torah; and therefore did Maimonides, b.m., not list it with the dogmas of the Torah; even though he wrote in"Sefer Hamadda", Chapter Three, of Hilkoth T'Shubah, that there are five sorts of heretics, and one of them is he who says that He is not first alone and Creator of all. It is thus clear that he who says that there is a primordial eternal"hyle" is as if he said that He is not alone first, for the primordial "hyle" is (as) first as He, in his opinion ~~(sc. Maimonides)~~. And despite all this - that he (sc. Maim.) called heretic him who does not believe in "creatio ex nihilo", (yet) he did not count it among the dogmas, because it is not a dogma without which a Divine Torah would be inconceivable. Therefore the subject with which the Torah begins in the Section Bereshith is indicative of the Existence of a Maker, which is the first dogma and essential to a Divine Torah, as we have explained.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Not every religion that holds those three dogmas which we have mentioned, viz., the Existence of God, Reward and Punishment, and Revelation, which are the universal dogmas for revealed religion, as we have said, is by that very fact necessarily revealed, also that he who believes in it would be called a believer in a Divine Torah, and would have a portion in the world to come; the situation is not so. But the principle of the matter is that these three dogmas are universal dogmas for revealed religion, that he who denies one of them withdraws from the communion of the professors of revealed religion and he has no portion in the world to come, since he does not confess to a Divine Torah in the proper way. He who does profess them, none the less, still has not a portion in the world to come until he profess them as well as the principles that depend on them and that branch out from them. He who denies indeed, one of the principles is as if he denies the respective dogma from which that principle branches out; for he who believes in the first dogma, viz., the existence of God, also has to believe that He is One, that He is not a body, nor an energy in a body, and such similar things that are principles which originate in this dogma or depend on it. And likewise he who believes in the Divine Origin of the Torah, which is the second dogma, has to believe in the Reality of Prophecy and the Mission of the Messenger; and he who believes in the third dogma, viz., Reward and Punishment, must needs believe in the Omniscience of God and His Providence, and that there is reward whether spiritual or corporeal. Any one who denies any one of those principles that branch out from the dogmas or that depend on them is as if he

deny the dogma itself; for just as he who denies the Reality of Prophecy, which is a principle of "Revelation", or "The Mission of the Messenger", which was given through him, is as if he deny the dogma of Revelation; similarly, he who believes that God, b., is a body denies the dogma of the Existence of God; because belief in the Existence of God means that one believe that there is an Existent Whose Existence is a necessity, Who is the Cause of all existents and all are sustained from Him and need Him, but He needs nothing outside Himself; and if the Necessarily Existent One were a body, He would need another, because every body is composite, as the author of the "Moreh" in premise twenty-two (II,22) shows, and every compound needs another composer and creator who would necessitate the compounding of its parts; He will not, then, be a necessarily Existent One because of Himself, but because of another, and He would not be sufficient unto Himself but would need another outside Himself; and that other would accordingly be greater than He and His creator; and He would thus not be necessarily existent through Himself but through another, and he whose existence is dependent on another is (only) potentially existent; it thus necessarily follows, he who says that God is a body or an energy in a body is as if he deny the dogma of the Existence of God, as will be fully expounded in Section Two, D. G., (Ch. 7). And likewise he who denies Providence or God's Omniscience, or who says that all things are by Fate, which is called in Arabic "al-קצא" and "al-קדר", denies the dogma of Reward and Punishment, or ascribes perverseness and wickedness to God, Who punishes the sinner when he has done no violence, since he has it not in his power to do the opposite of what he did; far be wickedness from

God and perverseness from the Almighty. Likewise with all the principles that originate in the dogmas: he who denies one of them is as if he deny the respective dogma. Understand this well, for this is the method of criticism with which all the principles that originate in the dogmas should be tested with a real test, in which there is no confusion or error. The believer will profess them in total confession; and then will he be called believer in and professor of the three dogmas which we have mentioned.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

It is appropriate that we now explain the method of knowing the principles that branch out from those three dogmas, so that there be known the"Kofer Ba-Ikkar" or he who professes it. And we will first posit that it is not appropriate that there be counted either as dogma or as principle any commandment of the Torah, for he who transgresses a commandment of the Torah is among the transgressors in Israel, and is fit for the punishment that is prescribed in the Torah in regards to that commandment, but he does not withdraw from the communion of the adherents of the Torah, that he should be reckoned among the deniers of the Torah who have no portion in the world to come; unless he transgresses a commandment because he doubts it, whether it is a commandment of God or whether it was given to Moses on Sinai, for such a one is among those who say that there is no Torah from God, as the Rabbis, b. m., expounded in Chapter Helek (Synh. Ch. 11, 99a), and all the commandments of the Torah are alike in this, even the "sending away of the nest" (Dt. 22:6-7). And should one count a commandment among the dogmas, there will on this account be accordingly as many dogmas as the number of the commandments of the Torah; (should one say) that the commandments that are called dogmas or principles are the 20 commandments that depend on the three dogmas which we have mentioned, then there would be in the list of the dogmas all the commandments that appear in the Laws of Idolatry and in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, all of which are dependent on the first dogma - the Existence of God. But the truth is that no particular commandment of the Torah should be counted either as dogma or as principle. Therefore is it wrong to count among either the principles or the

dogmas that we should worship Him and no one else, as Maimonides, b.m., wrote, because it is a commandment by itself, namely, "Thou shalt have no other gods before Me; thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, nor any manner of likeness... thou shalt not bow down unto them, nor serve them", etc. (Ex. 20:3-5; Dt. 5:7-9), and he who transgresses it is not a denier of all the Torah or of any of its dogmas, even though it is such a grievous transgression that as the Rabbis, b. m.,said as to it, that whosoever professes idolatry is as if he deny the entire Torah ("Sifre" Section "Sh'lah"); 'as if he deny', they said, but not 'he denies'; for Ahab was a worshipper of idols, yet he did not deny the dogmas, for he believed Elijah and knew that the rain was withheld because of him (sc. Elijah) by his oath, as he said to him: "Is it thou, thou troubler of Israel?" (I K 18:17); and yet he erred with idolatry, either by introducing an intermediary between him and God, b., or in that he thought that God, b., paid attention to the good and to those that are attached to Him, as Elijah, and other righteous ones; but the other people, he held, were delivered over to the accident of arrangement, and he would therefore make icons and would worship idols (so as) to receive the influence of the arrangement by their mediation. There is no doubt that the punishment of the denier of a principle or a dogma is not the same as that of the transgressor of one of the commandments of the Torah. For when the Cuthites (II K 17:24-33) did not know the Torah and undoubtedly denied it - the lions were destroying them; but when they were taught the Torah, even though they did worship idols, as Scripture testifies, they were rescued from the lions. One may say, then, concerning the punishments in the world to come, that

God has balance and scales of judgement to give each one a punishment according to his crime; the punishments of this world are an indication for all the punishments in the world to come, as will appear infra. One may deduce this from the fact that the Rabbis, b. m., listed the bearers of false tales, and those that separate from the ways of the community, and him who puts to shame his fellow in public, among those that have no portion in the world to come, even as the heretics and Epicureans and unbelievers; there is no doubt that the punishment of him who puts to shame is not the same as the punishment of him who denies the Torah, and likewise is the punishment of him who transgresses a commandment not the same as of him who denies a principle. It is thus clear that one should not count, either as a principle or as a dogma, any of the particular commandments of the Torah; therefore, Tradition was not counted as a dogma or as a principle for "Revelation", that is, that it is proper that man should follow the tradition of his fathers and the sages of the Law,-even though it (sc. Tradition) is essential for a Divine Torah, - because it is a particular commandment. One should not count also, for the same reason, either as a principle or a dogma, that the Torah will not be amended or changed, - if it were a particular commandment, as Maimonides, b.m., wrote; only that the truth is that it is not a commandment, but an opinion which follows from the principle of the Mission of the Messenger, as will be explained in Section Three, D. J., (Chs. 19 & 26). The reason why Unity was counted as a principle, even though it is a particular commandment, is that in the belief of Unity there are subsumed two phases: either we believe that God, b., is Unique, and there is no second equal or like him, or we believe that the

Necessarily Existent One - although He is One (i.e., Simple), without any plurality or manifoldness whatsoever, He is none the less our God, that is, the Cause of all the existing plurality. From the ~~first~~ point of view it is a principle branching out from the dogma of the Existence of God; from the ~~second~~ point of view, it is a particular commandment concerning which we were commanded in, "Hear O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One", (Dt. Ch. 6). It is strange why according to the method of Maimonides, b. m., - who counts the Commandments as dogmas, and he counted: "I am the Lord thy God," (Dt. Ch. 5; Ex. Ch. 20) as a commandment to believe that there is a Necessarily Existent One, - why were the other dogmas not listed in the Ten Commandments. But according to our method there is no difficulty here, for no particular commandment was counted among the dogmas, at all, and the Commandment "I" (sc. the First Commandment) is a particular commandment and not a dogma, and that is, to believe that God who brought us out from Egypt, from the house of bondage is the One who gave us a Torah on Mount Sinai; or, the Commandment "I" may be considered to be as a sort of introduction to what follows; namely, to "There shall be unto thee no other gods before Me", meaning that since I took care of thee, and brought thee out of the land of Egypt, from the house of bondage, there shall be unto thee no other gods before me, that is, it is not right that you should neglect my worship for the service of another. And this is also the view of many sages, that "I" is not among the Ten Commandments, but is an introduction to the two following Commandments, which are: "Thou shalt not have", and "Thou shalt not make". For "Thou shalt not bow down to them nor serve them" is

only an explanation of these two; and they said that the Command-
ment "I" was written at the beginning of the Commandments in order
to strengthen the heart of the believers in the confession of the
Providence that originates with Him, b., that is, that it comes
forth by way of Grace, even though the receiver may not be fit
for it; just as He took care of Israel when they were in Egypt,
worshipping idols and He brought them out from the house of bond-
age for the merit of the fathers. And this is why he concludes:
"And showing grace unto the thousandth generation of them that love
Me and keep My commandments" (Ex. 20:6). The rule will therefore 10
be as regards all the principles, - that no particular commandment
whatsoever, may be counted among them.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

The principles that depend on the three dogmas which we have mentioned and which branch out from them are eight. From the first dogma, viz., the Existence of God, there branch out four principles that include all the things that depend on the Existence of God who is a Necessary Existent; and they are (1) Unity, in the way that we have described, (2) that He is not a body nor an energy in a body, (3) that He is independent of time, and (4) that He, b., is free from imperfections. And it is clear from the nature of every one of these four principles that they are necessary for the dogma of the Existence of God; for if He, b., were not One (sc. Simple), without any compositeness, He would not be necessarily existent; and likewise, if He were a body or an energy in a body; and similarly if He were dependent on time, that is, that He would exist at a specific time, then there would be time before Him or after Him, as will appear (Section Two, Chs. 4,5 & 18), and He would accordingly then not be either beginningless or endless. For this reason did we count this principle that He is independent of time, but we did not count beginninglessness as did Maimonides, b.m., so that there should be included in this principle both beginninglessness and endlessness; and according to him who listed beginninglessness as a principle by itself, he should have listed also endlessness as a principle by itself. And likewise when they counted as one principle that He, b., is free from defects; that was to show that there does not fall on the Necessarily Existent One any sleep, or forgetfulness, or weariness, and the like; and to include with this that all the attributes which are necessarily found in Him, such as Omnipotence, Freewill, and other such attributes, - that if

they were not present in Him, He would be defective; they are, as a fact, ascribed to Him, b., in a way that there should not occur any defect in His nature, because of this; by which way, however, these and other attributes may be ascribed to Him, this we will explain in Section Two (Chs. 8, 21, 22), D.J.

The principles that depend on the second dogma,which is the"Divine Origin of the Torah", and which branch out from it, are three, namely, God's Omniscience, and Prophecy, and the Mission of the Messenger. And from the nature of these also is it clear that they are essential for the dogma, the "Divine Origin of the Torah";10 and this is that if God does not know the sub-lunar occurences, there would be no Prophecy from Him nor any Torah from Heaven; and even if He should know the sub-lunar occurences, it does not necessarily follow that a Torah come from Heaven, if there should be no Prophecy or Knowledge coming from God to man; and even though there should be Prophecy to inform as to the future events, or to command man particular commandments which he and his children and his household after him should do, just as He commanded Abraham the'Mitzvah'of circumcision , people would not be compelled to hearken to Him (sc. the prophet) unless he is proved to be a mes- 20 senger of God to command people divine commandments. And for this reason was the verification of the Mission of the Messenger a universal dogma for all revealed religions; for when the Mission of the Messenger is verified, whether the Messenger be of a very exceedingly great degree, or whether He is not in that rank, it would be possible that there begiven through him a Divine Order which would include and be sufficient to bring people to eternal happiness; this is the matter of Torah from Heaven. For this reason

did we not count the Prophecy of Moses among either the dogmas or the principles, as Maimonides, b.m., did, for only that should be counted as a dogma without which a Divine Torah is unimaginable, and a principle only that which necessarily follows a dogma; and this does not necessarily follow from "The Mission of the Messenger", it is only a doctrine which originates in it; and if it should have been counted, it is as a particular fundamental for the Mosaic Torah; but because the verification of the Mission of the Messenger who is especially appointed for every faith, is a particular fundamental for it, and according to the strength of the verification of the Mission of the Messenger will be the strength of the belief in that faith, we did not think it necessary to count the prophecy of Moses as a particular fundamental for the Mosaic Torah, for after his mission is verified, there is no need to verify the rank of his prophecy. How the verification of the Mission of the Messenger should take place so that there should not fall in it any doubt, this will be explained in what follows, D.J., (infra Ch. 18 & Section Three, Chs. 19 and 26); but why we counted "Revelation" as a dogma and "Prophecy" as a principle originating in it, will be explained in Section Three (Ch. 12) D. J.

The principle that precedes and is essential to the third dogma which is "Reward and Punishment" is "Providence". That is, that although the principle of Omniscience is already posited for us, and that God knows the deeds of the children of men, and arranges their affairs in "Revelation" in a manner that their community may exist and their being be bettered, it was quite possible, that because man is small and despised in the eyes of God, the individual should be deserted and forsaken and not rewarded for his par-

ticular deeds as between him and his Creator, only because he is part of the group, not by reason of the particular - himself. The reason why they counted"Providence" as a principle preceding"Reward and Punishment" is to show that Divine Providence is for every individual, to give him Reward and Punishment, even for the things that are between him and God, just as He did not pay attention to Cain and his offering, and certainly for the things which are between man and his fellow, as the Prophet (Jeremiah) says, "Great in counsel, and mighty in work; whose eyes are open upon all the ways of the sons of men, to give every one according to his ways, and according to the fruit of his doings", (32:19.) Reward and Punishment are of two kinds, either material or spiritual, and the dogma of Reward and Punishment includes both of them. But we did not think it necessary to count the physical as a principle by itself and the spiritual as a principle by itself, because the physical should not be counted as a principle by itself, in my opinion, for some of our Rabbis, b. m., said: "There is no reward for (obeying) a commandment in this world", (Kiddushin, Ch. 1, p.39b). We have therefore placed Reward and Punishment as one dogma in general, to include the two kinds of reward, either the spiritual, according to those that hold that the main reward is for the soul and not for the body, and according to those that say that there is a spiritual and physical, it will include both of them. The number of the dogmas and principles for Revealed Religion in general will accordingly be eleven: (1) The Existence of God, and the four principles that originate in it, namely (2) Unity, (3) that He is neither a body nor an energy in a body, (4) that He is independent of time, and (5) that He is free from defects; and similarly (6) the

Divine Origin of the Torah, and the three principles that depend on it, namely, (7) God's Omniscience, (8) Prophecy, and (9) the Mission of the Messenger; and (10) Reward and Punishment, and the principle that depends on it, namely (11) Providence. And if we will count Omniscience and Providence as one dogma, as Maimonides, b. m., included them in one dogma, the number of dogmas and principles will then be no more than ten.

It is evident that not all of them should be called dogmas, because they are not equally necessary for a Divine Torah. As for example, if one were to believe in dualism or that He is a body, or an energy in a body, or that He is dependent on time, the Divine Torah would not fall in its entirety because of this, only because of the fact that they are dependent on the dogma of the Existence of God, and he who denies one of them is as if he deny the dogma (itself), since he does not believe the dogma as he should. And we have therefore not placed them all alike as dogmas as Maimonides, b. m., placed them. We did not list the "Prophecy of Moses" nor that "the Torah will not be amended" either as dogmas or as principles, because these are neither dogmas nor principles which are absolutely necessary for Revealed Religion, but they are doctrines and beliefs which originate in "the Mission of the Messenger", and should they be considered either as dogmas or as principles, they would be particular fundamentals for the Mosaic Torah, but not for revealed religion in general; just as the coming of the Messiah and the ressurection of the dead are fundamentals particular for the religion of the Christians, and they are particular fundamentals for the religion of the Christians without which its existence would be inconceivable; the Mosaic Torah, however, existence of the

is quite conceivable without the"Prophecy of Moses" or that "the Torah will not be amended";and for this reason it is the more fitting that we should say that they are doctrines and beliefs originating in the "Mission of the Messenger", not dogmas in themselves; just as the ressurection of the dead and the coming of the Messiah are doctrines branching out from "Reward and Punishment", neither dogmas nor principles in themselves, neither universal for a Divine Torah nor particular for the Mosaic Torah. We have also not counted "His Exclusive Worship"; because it is a particular commandment, and it should not be counted either among the dogmas or among the principles, from the reason that we have written in the preceding chapter. We did enumerate"Omniscience"and "Providence" as two distinct principles, because they are different matters, as Maimonides, b.m., wrote in his book "Moreh" (III, 21), and as all the later authorities, b.m., agreed, even though he included them as one dogma. We did not count"Freedom" and "General Purpose" among either the dogmas or the principles, even though they are essential for a Divine Torah, its existence being inconceivable without them, because since they are not essential to it in so far as it is revealed, as has been said (supra Chapter 9), they should not be counted as principles to it. Special Providence, however, for a Divine Torah, which is spiritual reward and punishment, was already counted among the dogmas, since it is of essential necessity for a Divine Torah. But"Freedom", since it is not necessary for it in so far as it is revealed, was not counted either among the dogmas or the principles; nevertheless, since it is essential for a Divine Torah and necessarily precedes it, we will explain it in Section Four, D. J. This is what we wanted to explain, concerning the number of dogmas and principles; Blessed be He who helps and decrees. Amen va-Amen.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Some early writers have denied knowledge, saying that it is impossible for man to comprehend anything in its reality. And this because of two reasons: (1) either because there can be no knowledge except it be through a previous knowledge, and that previous knowledge also had been discussed and established through a knowledge that preceded it, and likewise that preceding one had already been discussed and is established only through a knowledge that precedes it, the matter is(thus) concatenated ad infinitum; and knowledge cannot circumscribe the infinite. Or (two) that the thing that is known by a proof will not escape the dilemma that: either it was known before and therefore there is no need for proof, or, if it was not known, how did the person know that he will find it out by a syllogism. And because of these two reasons they denied knowledge and held that it is impossible that knowledge concerning any unknown thing should come to man. But the truth seeking philosophers have refuted their arguments; in that they showed that the first (argument) is not apodictic for the matter does not concatenate ad infinitum as they held, because not always does every knowledge originate in a knowledge that was (already) discovered, for it is quite possible that it be known from a knowledge that is not discovered and not attained by a syllogism, but by knowledge that man has in the bases of the mind, that is, that it is in the nature of the mind that there be in it some knowledge which did not originate in another knowledge; and they called that knowledge which is at the basis of the mind '~~innate~~ ideas', that is, that they are ~~innate~~ in that they did not originate from another knowledge, but were created with it in nature. And those ideas are

the bases for wisdom, for from them does knowledge ~~concatenate~~ Evolve.
And as for the second argument, they said that it also is untenable, namely that what was not known will never be known. For it can be known by means of a syllogism, only that before the syllogism the thing was known potentially by its premises, and by means of the syllogism it became known in actuality; and reason decrees that the attainment of knowledge in this way is a perfect attainment and knowledge. And these two ways by which knowledge is attained and is perfected existed in the human mind from the moment of birth without him feeling or knowing how they came to him.

It appears that this was the actual way in which we find God, b., reprimanding Job when he complained of the injustice of God's ways, and accused God that he did not arrange creation properly in his opinion, as when he says (Job 3:20), "Wherefore is light given to him that is in misery, and life unto the bitter in soul", and the like; and God, b., answered him concerning this, saying to him, how did he dare to take exception to the work of God and His knowledge, as if he knew more than Him, and therefore was he temerous enough to say that the order would be better in a different manner, whereas the natural things which are with him and in his body, he cannot assign their causes, and how much the less does he know to discuss the higher matters; for man does not know how and whence that power which is in him by which he attains knowledge came to him, how then could he know the knowledge of God and the manner of His conduct. And this is what God told him in His first answer, "Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts ("batuhoth")? Or who hath given understanding to the mind ("sekvi")?" (ib. 38:36). It seems to me that the 'beth' of 'batuhoth' is a radical, as, "And they that provoke

God are secure ('batuhoth')" (ib. 12:6); and 'sekvi' is derived from the same root as 'veist'ke', which is the Aramaic for 'and he looked'; the human intellect is called 'sekvi', and so do the great exegetes interpret it. He called the innate ideas which are the bases of wisdom 'batuhoth'hakmah', because by means of them, man is certain ('batuah') that he may attain knowledge, and without them it would be impossible of attainment. And he calls the human intellect which creates the method of truth to deduce the conclusion from the premises 'sekvi', which is called in our language inference ('binah'), as they (sc. the Rabbis) said, 'Nabon' 10 is he who deduces one thing from another. The explanation of the matter is that God, b., takes Job to task, when He, b., tells him that even the innate ideas which are the assurances for wisdom, in which knowledge originates, - we do not know how they come to man, and whence he has them, and how they arrived, only that we find them in man so by the Divine Will; as David said, "Behold, Thou desirest truth in the inward parts ('batuhoth')", (Ps. 51:8); and this is what He meant when He said, "Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts ('batuhoth')", that is, who put them in man originally, or which nature necessitated that they exist in man rather 20 than in all the animate beings. And likewise did He take him to task that even after the innate ideas already are in man, he does not know who gave to the 'sekvi', that is, the human intellect, the power of deduction to understand that the conclusion that is deduced from the premises is knowledge; for this is in man only by the Divine Will. And this is what David said as an allusion to both, "Behold, Thou desirest truth in the inward parts; make me, therefore, to know wisdom in mine inmost heart" (ib. Ps. v. 8a-b).

He said: 'Thou desirest... in the inward parts ('batuhoth';i.e., according to Albo, assurances)' to allude to the innate ideas which are in man by the Divine Will; and he said, 'make me to know wisdom in mine inmost heart' to allude to the fact that knowledge that comes of an unknown thing ('sathum') is also by the will of God. As Solomon said, "For the Lord giveth wisdom, out of His mouth cometh knowledge and discernment" (Prov. 2:6); he said that wisdom comes from God, b., because from His mouth, that is, by His will, knowledge - which is the innate ideas -, and understanding - which is the knowledge of deducing the conclusion from the premises, - that these two exist in man, and we do not know how they came to him, and whence they came to him; but we recognize that by way of wisdom and love are they existing in man, so that through them knowledge and understanding may come to man. And therefore was the Benediction: "Thou favorest man with knowledge, and teachest mortals understanding" ordained, for the innate ideas are called 'knowledge' in general; it says, 'Thou favorest man with knowledge,' for this knowledge is alike in all people ('Adam') without any learning but by way of wisdom; and then it reads, 'and teachest mortals('Enosh') understanding', for the knowledge of deducing the conclusion from the premises,which is called understanding; and this depends on natural learning and it is ascribed to "Enosh", for not every man ('Adam') makes use of understanding, only the "Enosh"; therefore the conclusion was, "Gracious Giver of knowledge", for the love which includes the entire race in the form of the innate ideas, not for individual love; but the prayer should be more than for knowledge and understanding, namely, for discernment; for discernment is of things divine, as it is said, "that

He discerneth and knoweth Me" (Jer. 9:23); because of this does the prayer include all:"(And) favor us with knowledge, understanding, and discernment", that is, that the innate ideas are beneficial in reaching by them understanding and discernment; as they (the Rabbis) said, "If there is no knowledge, there is no understanding" (Aboth, Ch. 3), that is, that if man did not have knowledge - which is the innate ideas, then there would be no understanding, which is (the power of) deduction of the conclusion from the premises; and"if there is no understanding, there is no knowledge", that is, and if man does make use of understanding, to deduce one 10 thing from another, so that knowledge may come to man, (then) the innate ideas which are knowledge were given to him in vain. And similarly did Solomon say, "For wisdom shall enter into thy heart, and knowledge shall be pleasant unto thy soul; discretion shall watch over thee... to deliver thee from the way of evil" (Prov. Ch. 2:10-12), which means, that when wisdom comes into thy heart established on true premises, then knowledge will be pleasant to thy soul, that is, that if you use properly the innate ideas, then discretion shall watch over thee, and discernment shall guard thee so that you should not be misled by false opinions. And this is 20 why he said'to deliver thee from the way of evil, from the men that speak froward things, who leave the paths of righteousness' (ib. vv.12-13), for the understanding which if man uses properly based on true principles, will lead man in a righteous may in which he will not stumble.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

There is no doubt that every science has premises and postulates which are not verifiable of themselves, but are received as true from another science in which these premises are established; and on these premises are built all the proofs of that science. Just as the geometer accepts the concept of the line and the point from the physicist; and the arithmetician accept the notion of unity, and the physicist the concept of substances and accidents from the early philosophers, and the early philosopher accepts from the physicist the concept of a First Mover; and likewise in every reflective science it is essential that there be accepted, at the beginning of its study, premises and postulates which are proved in another science as it is explained in the book of Proof; and all the proofs of that science are built on those premises or on the innate ideas. And therefore it is not appropriate for us to ask, saying: whence does the Divine Torah take its premises? For this question appertains indeed to the Divine Torah more than to others of the Nomistic Religions. For the premises of civil religion which are Freedom and Purpose, as we have explained (supra Chapter Nine), are expounded by the Philosopher (sc. Aristotle) in his Political Philosophy; but the Divine Torah, whence does it take its premises? For even though the Existence of God, b., is proved by the Philosopher, from the premises that concatenate from the innate ideas, (yet) the Philosopher will not believe, however, in Prophecy and Providence, which also are premises and bases for the Divine Torah; and how can their reality be proved; for these premises are not provable of themselves; nor can they be proved from premises taken

from the innate ideas; for the Philosopher will not believe in Prophecy and Providence just as the adherent of revealed religion would believe them. It is therefore incumbent upon us to explain whence the Torah takes its premises.

We find that there are four things which are known and for the veracity of which there is no need for proof: namely, (1) the axioms (~~the innate ideas~~), such as our knowledge that the whole is greater than the part, and that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, and that the affirmative and the negative are not simultaneously true concerning one thing in its essence from one viewpoint; and (2) sense perception, such as our knowledge that fire warms, and snow chills, and likewise, that opium cools and pepper warms, for this is a thing which is perceived by a sense, for as soon as we eat the pepper we feel warmth, and the opium we feel coldness, and we thus judge that the pepper warms because the fire molecules are preponderent in it, and that opium cools because the cold elements are preponderent in it; and (3) experimental facts, such as the attraction of iron by magnet, and the cathartic effects of scammony on the bowels, and the like, for these things we find to be so not because of the nature of the elements from which they are compounded, but because of their nature as compounds; and (4) historical facts, such as our knowledge that Rome and Jerusalem and Babylon existed in the world as large, populous states, even though they are not so now, and even though we do not comprehend this and the like by a sense, we judge them true as if we had comprehended them (so), because of the many stories that continue from many people, with which we find no one disagreeing to this day.

And there is no doubt that every one of these four kinds of premises may be set as a premise and basis of proof; for just as the proofs of geometry, which are all built on the axioms, and the proofs of physics, which are built on sense perception, are true without the least doubt, since their cause is known and well established, likewise may one not doubt the proofs which are built on experimental facts, even though their cause is unknown, since the senses testify to their reality. For just as it will never be shown that the angles of a triangle are not equal to two right angles, and that pepper does not warm, because their cause is known and understood, likewise will it never be shown that the magnet will not attract iron, even though its cause is hidden and (not) understood, for the opposite of the thing concerning which experience testifies can never be proved. And since not all of the dogmas and premises of the Torah are comprehensible by way of the innate ideas, and are not sensed at all times, as the warmth of pepper and the coolness of opium, but their cause is unknown, therefore did God, be, contrive to verify the principles of the Torah by experience, so that doubt should not be passed on them; for it is impossible that doubt should be cast on that which has been verified by experience, as the attraction of iron to the magnet, even though its cause is hidden, just as doubt does not fall on physical things that are comprehended by the sense whose cause is known.

This we always find in all revealed religions; for by the Torah which Adam was commanded, there were verified for him the Existence of God, in that He spoke to him, and Prophecy and Torah from Heaven, and Reward and Punishment. And this is why God revealed Himself to him and spoke with him, and commanded him as to the Torah,

as it is said, "And (the Lord) God commanded the man, saying,"etc. (Gn. 2:16); which the Rabbis, b. m., interpreted (Synh. Ch. 7, p.56b) that in this verse were alluded all the commandments which Adam was commanded, and there was verified also to him, by experience, Reward and Punishment, for performing the commandments, in that he was punished for having transgressed the commandment of God, and his being led astray by the serpent through Eva; and we have already said that the punishments of this world are an indication for the punishments of the world to come. And likewise to Noah were there verified "Prophecy" and the "Existence of God" in that He spoke with him, and Reward and Punishment in that he and his children were saved in the deluge and the others were punished; he therefore received the permission of eating flesh, forbidden to Adam. Likewise, when Abraham was commanded on the Covenant of Circumcision, there were verified to him the Existence of God in that He spoke with him, and Prophecy, and Torah from Heaven, in that order which He commanded him. Similarly, at the giving of the Torah were there verified to Israel the universal premises, since they had comprehended by Prophecy, God speaking with them and commanding them a Torah; and in the exodus from Egypt there had been proved to them Providence and Reward and Punishment. From which follows that the premises of the Torah were verified by experience with unimpeachable proof. And therefore the Torah is true and eternal without a doubt, just as the proposition which is deduced in a syllogism whose premises are true, that is, the conclusion, is true, without a doubt, and is eternally unchangeable, for the truth never changes. This is implied in the verse, "The beginning of Thy word is truth; and all Thy righteous ordinance

endureth forever" (Ps. 119:160), that is, just as the beginnings of Thy word, viz., the premises which are posited at the beginning, so as to deduce from them the conclusion which is the desired proposition, are true, therefore is the judgement that is deduced from them true, and it will accordingly be eternal, for the truth is eternally immutable, and this is meant by, "Thy righteous ordinance endureth forever". And therefore the Torah whose premises were proved by the senses is true and eternal; and the Tradition that follows from it is true, which one may not doubt in the least.

But in order that it should not appear that the premises of the Torah are all known to us by Tradition alone, Asaph explained in the Psalm "Give ear, O my people, to my teaching" (Ps. 78) that some of them may be understood by reflection, and some of them of historic data, and these are disputed by nane, and some of them are merely traditional; and therefore did he say: "Give ear, O my people, to my teaching, incline your ears to the words of my mouth...I will utter dark sayings concerning days of old, that which we have heard and known, and our fathers have told us." (ib. vv.1-3). By "that which we have heard" he wishes to allude to the dogma, Torah from Heaven, which is one of the historic events to which all the nations testify, which no one ever disputed, like the information that Egypt and Babylonia had existed in the world - which it is impossible to deny, even though we, ourselves, have not seen it. He first alluded to the dogma, Torah from Heaven, because he was admonishing concerning hearkening to the Torah in general, as he said, "Give ear, O my people, to my Law". Then he says, "that which we have known" to allude to the dogma of the Existence of God, and the principles that branch out from it, which are comprehensible

by philosophy, which is based on sense perception and on the innate ideas. He further said, 'our fathers told us' to point to the dogma of Spiritual Reward and Punishment, for that is known to us by way of Tradition alone. And in order to expound the proof of the premise of this dogma, he adduced the miracles and the wonders and the special providential acts which were performed for our fathers which they received from them as a sign for the reward in the world to come, as we have shown in Chapter Twenty-one of this Section. He further showed that this Tradition is ever to be handed down from father to son, and therefore did he say, "We will not hide from their children", etc. (ib. v. 4); and he showed that the principle of the Tradition and these premises were comprehended by Israel by sense perception, and thenceforth did the Tradition come continuous to us; and this is what is meant by the verse, "For He established a testimony in Jacob," etc. (ib. v. 5) viz., by the fact that they comprehended by the testimony of the sense organs, He gave the Torah to Israel, as it is ever continued by Tradition.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Since we find many religions calling themselves revealed, and Tradition is carried on in every one of them to their respective adherents, it is meet to ask, how can the distinction between the true, revealed religion, and the false one which pretends divineness, claiming to be revealed but not really revealed, be known. I maintain that the proof for the divineness of a Torah is twofold, both through the religion of itself and through the messenger: (1) through the religion itself on the one hand, that is, that the three dogmas which we have discussed, together with the principles that branch out from them will probe it, as we have described above (Ch. 15); and if it does not oppose any one of the dogmas or principles that originate from them, or that depend on them, it is revealed, and if not, it is false, pretending divineness; (2) and, on the other hand, through the messenger, that is, when the receiving of prophecy by the prophet, and that he is a messenger for a religion to be given through him will be verified by an essential proof. This is because the proof of a thing is in either of two ways, either by an essential verification, or by a non-essential one; the essential verification means that the thing is verified either through its causes or through its essential properties; the non-essential proof means that the essential thing be verified by an accidental (sc. external), as opposed to essential) proof, neither by its causes nor through its essential properties. For an illustration of this: two druggists who were brought before medical scientists so as to prepare the great theriac drug; one said that he will compound the theriac well in a way that it will be an antidote to all fatal drugs, hot or cold, and to all sorts

of poisons, by an exhibit in which he will show them the flesh of the viper and all the chemicals that must enter into the theriac, and that he will test the properties of all the simple chemicals and their powers, one by one, in their presence. And he did so, in that he tested all the drugs before them, and they were all acknowledged to be above any suspicion of falsification; there is no doubt then that there is no suspicion of falsification in the theriac which was made in this way, since that druggist gave it an essential verification. Or should he likewise say that the theriac which he will make is good by the proof that it heals all the patients from all the sorts of the ailments and fatal poisons which are curable by the theriac; and he did so; there is no doubt also that this test is good, since he proved that the theriac is true through its essential properties; and even though this proof is not as strong as the first, which tested the thing by its causes, yet both of them are an essential proof to the theriac, it being impossible that there should be any falsification in it. The second druggist, however, said that he will make a theriac which would be an antidote to all poisonous drugs by a proof that he will walk in fire and not be burned, or that he will walk on the waters and will not drown; even though he should do this before the peoples and the princes and before all the sages, this is not an essential proof that the theriac which he made or which he will make is good. For it is quite possible that even if he did go through fire and was not burned, that the theriac which he will make will not have the properties of the theriac necessary to heal from all deadly drugs; because this proof which he made for the theriac is a non-essential proof, and it is possible that there should really

be in it a suspicion of falsifying. The test of the prophecy of the prophet or the messenger is exactly similar; for the prophet who gives a sign of his being a prophet by the exhibit that he walks on the face of the waters or that he cleaves the river to pass through it, of that he walks through fire and is not burned, or that he cures the sick and the leprous, this is only a sign that he is a man worthy of having miracles, signs, and wonders performed through him, but this is not an essential verification for prophecy, much less is it not a sign that a Torah be given through him. For as a matter of fact, there are found signs and wonders performed by sorcery and witchcraft or performed by the righteous who are not prophets; as it is mentioned in Baba Mezia (Ch. 4, p. 59b), in the matter of the dispute of R. Eliezer that a carob-tree was torn out from its place and a pool of water reversed its course, et all, and despite this, they did not establish the law in accordance with his opinion because he was not known as a prophet.

Therefore you will find that all the signs and wonders which Moses performed before the giving of the Torah were signs that he is worthy that only signs and wonders be performed through him, not to receive a Torah through him; and for this thing alone was Israel's belief in him, and therefore did they conduct themselves according to his word, since they believed that God hears his prayer and fulfills his word, as Moses did in Marah, "And God showed him a tree" (Ex. 15:25), and likewise in the battle with Amalek (ib. 17:11-13), and he brought down the manna with his prayer, and divided the sea with his supplication, as Scripture said, "Why dost thou cry unto me" (ib. 14:15). And on this account and

the like, is it said at the splitting of the Red Sea (ib. 14:31), "And they believed in God and Moses His servant", which means that they believed that he was the servant of God, that God will perform through him signs and wonders, all just as he wants;'he will decree a thing and it will be established for him' (paraphrase of Job, 22: 28). Just as we find this with the righteous that God performs signs and wonders through them, even though they are not prophets; as R. Phineas b. Jair, who divided the river three times, as it is told of him (Hullin, p.7a), and like R. Hanina b. Dosa (Taanith, p. 24b), and Honi Ha-M'aggel (ib. 23a), and like Nakdimon b. Jor- 10 ion for whom the sun rose again (ib. 20a), and like Hananiah, Mishael, and 'Azariah, who were rescued from the furnace of fire. But since the signs and wonders which were performed by Moses our Master, even though many, and extremely miraculous in the chang- ing of the nature of the world, were not an essential proof of prophecy, therefore Israel were yet doubting the reality of pro- phecy; as a proof therefor we may adduce the fact that after the giving of the Torah they said to Moses, "This day have we seen that God may speak with man and he may live" (Dt. 5:21), from which it appears that till that scene they were doubtful as to the reality 20 of prophecy, even though they did believe in Moses that he was a servant of the Lord through whom signs and wonders may be performed, as Scripture says: "And they believed in God and Moses His servant", (Ex. 14:31). You will therefore find that God said to Moses at the time of the giving of the Torah, "Lo, I come unto thee, in a thick cloud, that the people may hear when I speak with thee, and may also believe thee forever", (ib. 19:9), viz., I want to prove to them the reality of prophecy itself by an essential proof, and

also to prove to them that you are sent by Me to give the Torah through you; and this will be when they themselves will attain the rank of prophecy, and by this the reality of prophecy itself will be verified to them; also that they will hear me talk with you when I want to give a Torah through you. And this is an essential proof to Prophecy and to the Mission of the Messenger, and it is therefore impossible that there remain after this glorious scene any doubt or any suspicion of falsification, since the two things which are essential to prove the existence of a Torah from Heaven were verified at that scene: the one is the reality of Prophecy, because all 10 of them were prophets at that time, hearing the voice of the Lord, God, speaking to them the Ten Commandments; and the second is that they heard the Voice say to Moses: "Go say to them, return ye to your tents. But as for thee, stand thou here by Me, and I will speak unto thee all the commandment, and the statutes, and the ordinances, which thou shalt teach them, that they may do them in the land," etc. (Dt. 5:27-28). And by this was there verified to them - by an essential proof - that Moses was the Messenger through whom there was given a Torah eternal for the generations.

This is the difference between the Prophet and the Mes- 20 senger. As for the Prophet, - his prophecy is verified either by predicting the future in that not one of his words should fall to the ground, or by the performance of signs and wonders. And it is a particular commandment of the Torah to hearken to the prophet whose prophecy is verified in this way, to all that he says, and even to transgress the words of the Torah - excepting idolatry -, as a temporary legislation, as for example, Elijah on Mount Carmel. For after he has been tested many times, and all his words were found

true, whether by the performance of signs and wonders, or by prognosticating the future, and none of his words fell to the ground, behold,he has the status of a prophet and it is a commandment to hearken to him. As Scripture says, "And (the Lord) did het none of his (Samuel's) words fall to the ground. And all Israel from Dan even to Beer-sheba knew that Samuel was established to be a prophet of the Lord," (I S 3:19-20); this is similar to him who made the theriac three times, and they proved it to be true, - this druggist has the status of a true person until he is proved another kind and found false. And likewise the prophet who fore- 10
tells the future, or who performs a sign or a wonder for his prophecy, is it a commandment to hearken to him, as long as there is not found any falsehood in his words; as Scripture says,"When a prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken" (Dt. 18:22), for it is quite possible that the prophet should be a true prophet and should lie at any time of his own will and not through prophecy, for "God is not a man that He should lie" (Nu. 23:19); as it happened to Hananiah b. 'Azzur, who was a true prophet - as the Rabbis, b.m., said in Tractate Synhedrin (pp. 89a, 20 90a) - but he erred and lied when he broke the pole from the neck of Jeremiah, and he was therefore punished, as Jeremiah said to him, "The Lord hath not sent thee; but thou mamest this people to trust in a lie", (Jer. 28:15), and it is written, "This year shalt thou die, because thou hast spoken perversion against the Lord" (ib. v.16); and it is written, "So Hananiah the prophet died the same year in the seventh month" (ib. v. 17).

But the messenger, and that is that he is a messenger

through whom a Torah is to be given, - he cannot lie in any wise. For he will not be called a messenger unless his mission is verified by an essential test, and this may be either by the verification of the reality of prophecy to all the recipients, as it was verified to all Israel at the time of the giving of the Torah, or by the verification of the mission of the messenger, as the mission of Moses our Master was verified: it was not verified by prognosticating the future or by the performance of signs and wonders, for the foretelling of the future is a non-essential proof to the mission of the messenger through whom to give a Torah, and it is possible that he lieth some time, as it happened to Hananiah b. 'Azzur, as we have said; and likewise is there a doubt concerning the performance of signs and wonders for it is possible that their like may be performed by some art or natural cunning; but when his mission is verified in the way that the mission of Moses was verified, a lie cannot enter into it in any wise, neither by his own will nor by any other; neither by his own will, for God would not have entrusted the mission to him thus if he were going to lie; and not by any other, for since his mission was verified by an essential proof, there was removed from him any kind of doubt. And this is what Maimonides, b.m., wrote in "Sefer Hamadda", Chapter Eight of the "Hilkoth J'sode ha-Torah": "Israel did not believe Moses our Master, r.i.p., because of the signs which he performed, for those that believe according to signs have a mental reservation, for it is possible that the sign be performed by sorcery, witchcraft, etc. But through what did they believe in him? through the scene at Mount Sinai, 'which our eyes have beheld and not another's, and our ears have heard and not another's' (paraphrase of Job 19:27)

the fire and the thunderings and the lightnings, when Moses approached the thick darkness, and the Voice was speaking to him and we heard: Moses, "Go say to them, return ye to your tents; but as for thee, stand thou here by Me, and I will speak unto thee all the command-ment, and the statutes, and the ordinances, which thou shalt teach them", (Dt. 5:27-28). And how do we know that it is the scene at Mount Sinai alone that is the proof of his prophecy in which there is no misgiving? because it is written; "Lo, I come unto thee in a thick cloud, that the people may hear when I speak with thee, and may also believe thee forever" (Ex. 19:9); from which it fol- 10
lows that before this they did not believe with an ever enduring belief, but with a belief with an arriere-pensee. By this is meant that it is quite possible that the sign which the prophets performed, like the dead person whom Elisha revived, or like the healing of the leprosy of Naaman, or like Hananiah, Mishael, and 'Azariah, who were not burnt in the furnace of fire, or Daniel who was rescued from the lions, or Jonah who was rescued from the bowels of the fish, and likewise all the signs which were performed through every prophet or the prognostication of the future, through astrologers, or through a necromancer, and likewise the performance 20
of signs, - should be performed, part of them by the righteous or the pious, even though they are not prophets, as R. Hanina b. Dosa, and R. Phineas b. Jair and his confreres, or through some natural art, as the Rabbis, b.m., said concerning Hezekiah, King of Judah, that his father Ahaz passed him through fire, but he was rescued because his mother aanointed him with salamander-fat (Synh. Ch. 7, p.63b); or it is possible that they be accomplished by sorcery or witchcraft, as did the Egyptian magicians, or through one of the

Holy Names, for the Names are - as it were - the work-tools of God, for He placed in their power that there be done through them signs and wonders, and he who makes use of them with the consent of God, like the prophets, or for the glory of God, like the pious, such a one is loved in Heaven and liked on Earth, and he does not die in his middle age, and does not fall into the power of his enemies; as God said to Jeremiah, r.i.p., "And they shall fight against thee; but they shall not prevail against thee; for I am with thee... to deliver thee" (Jer. 1:19). But he who uses them for his own sake and not for the glory of God, such a one is exterminated in his middle age, and falls into the power of his enemies, and he will finally end up in bad, as the Rabbis, b.m., said, "And he who makes a(worldly)use of the crown of the Torah shall waste away" (Aboth Ch. 1); such a one is like him who stole the ring or the utensils or the seal of a king, and uses them - who has thus incurred the guilt of death; and even Isaiah, who is a true prophet, (but) because he mentioned one of the Names for his own benefit, as the Rabbis, b.m., tell, in the Tractate Jebamoth (p. 49b): "He pronounced a Name and was swallowed up by a cedar", he was punished and fell into the power of his enemies, and they killed him, as it is mentioned there. Understand this well, for by this thing is he who makes use of the Names without the will of God tested, when he dies an unnatural death, or is cut off in his middle age. Many are confused in this matter, and they do not understand how it is possible that the wanton make use of the Names, and the act is successful in their hands, since the prophets use them, as we find it among the ancients; and it is alluded to in the Verses: 'Vajisa.... Vajabo.... Vajet....' (Ex.14:vv.1

19, 20, 21). The rule in this is that all depends on the conclusion.

Because of this it is patent that a sign is not a true proof for prophecy, and much less for the Mission of the Messenger; and therefore were the signs which were performed by Moses before the giving of the Torah, not essential to prophecy, and much less that the Torah be given through him, - until the scene at Mount Sinai. And this is what we wanted to expound in this Chapter.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

Belief in a thing is the picturing of the thing in the mind with such a strong impression that the mind could in no wise conceive its denial; even the method of its proof be unknown; just as the mind will not conceive the innate ideas, and the things over which the imagination of man has mastered, or those that are in man from his nature, and he does not know how they came to him; or just as the mind could not imagine the denial of what was comprehended by the sense perception, or what experience verified, even though it does not know the cause of the proof thereof. And (the term) faith may apply to anything which was not attained by the believer, by way of sense, but was attained by some trustworthy and acceptable man;or by many people of great renown was that thing comprehended, or the like, at a certain time, by sense perception; and the Tradition was handed down to the believer from that man or those men, a Tradition continuous from father to son. This certainly is worthy of almost as much belief as that which sense perception attests to that believer, even though the intellect does not verify it; just as it was verified by experience that God bestows prophecy upon any human being whom He wants, without him previously having the natural preparations which the Rabbis, b.m., enumerated as being essential in the make-up of a prophet so that prophecy may rest on him; as they said in Nedarim, in Chapter "Ein bein Hamudar"(p.31b & Sabbath, Ch. 10, p. 92b): Prophecy rests only upon him who is wise, strong, rich, tall, and handsome, etc.; and nevertheless was there verified by experience,at the time of the giving of the Torah, that all Israel, their wise men and their stupid ones, the short ones and the tall

ones, the cowards and the brave, the rich and the poor, all of them attained the rank of prophecy and heard the voice of the living God speaking from the midst of the fire as Scripture testifies, saying, "These words the Lord spoke unto all your assembly in the mount, out of the midst of the fire, of the cloud, and of the thick darkness, with a great voice, and it went no more", etc. (Dt. 5:19); and Moses said, to testify to this miracle: "Did ever a people hear the voice of God speaking out of the midst of the fire, as thou hast heard?" (ib. 4:33); and even though the intellect rejects this, yet it is perfect truth, which it is impossible to deny, since experience testified to it, and Tradition about this comes continuous from father to son. Because it is self-evident that there is no one in the world who loves a person more than his father; and therefore the Tradition which continues from father to son should be impressed in the heart of the son with a strong impression, the removal of which being unimaginable, as if he had attained this by sense perception himself, since it is evident that the father does not want to bequeath falsehood to his sons. As the Psalmist sings: "O God, we have heard with our ears, our fathers have told us; ... Thou with Thy hand didst drive out the nations, and didst plant them in;... for not by their own sword did they get the land in possession.... Thou art my King, O God; command the salvation of Jacob" (Ps. 44:2-5); that is, since we have thus received this thing that the victory of Israel over the nations in past time was not a natural thing for, "Not by their own sword did they get the land in possession, neither did their own arms save them"; and this Tradition our fathers told us, and it is impossible to doubt it or to suspect them

that they bequeathed falsehood to us; and therefore since Thou wast the Cause of the beginning of their happiness, now also 'command the salvation of Jacob', since 'Thou art my King, O God', that Thou hast the power for this. It appears from all this that the Tradition that is continuous from father to son should be accepted. And because it is impossible for revealed religion to maintain itself without it, Scripture commanded concerning it, saying, "Ask thy father, and he will declare unto thee, thine elders, and they will tell thee" (Dt. 32:7); and it prescribed death for him who transgresses the words of the Tradition of the sages, saying: "Thou shalt not turn aside from the sentence which they shall declare unto thee, to the right hand, nor to the left. And the man that doeth presumptuously, in not hearkening... that man shall die" (ib. 17:11-12); it also admonished concerning the honoring of parents, and commanded to punish the rebellious son, because the Tradition from the father is almost as that which was attained by sense perception, belief in which is compulsory, even though the intellect rejects it. And in this way does "Faith" apply at all times, to the things which were not then comprehended by sense perception, nor by intellectual verification, but by the continuous Tradition.

CHAPTER TWENTY

The belief in anything that is perceived through the senses by some man who is so much more acceptable and agreeable than others that there are none who would contradict him; or that has been perceived by men more perfect of comprehension than others, or by people of a greater number than others; - will be the more acceptable and the more pleasing to the mind; and there will be accorded to it a very strong belief. And because of this did God, b., want that the Torah be given through Moses with great publicity and a crowd larger than sixty myriads, which number according to the view of the Cabbalists, include all the physiognomies, and 10 there could not be a greater publicity than this (therefore), even though its number should be greater; andin the view of the Rabbis, b.m., that publicity was for all the world, as they said: "'The Lord came from Sinai, and rose from Seir unto them; he shined forth from mount Paran' (Dt. 33:2), what does He do in Seir, and what does He do in Paran? but it teaches that God went about with the Torah all over the world, and they did not accept it, until Israel came, and accepted it", etc. (Abodah Zarah, p.2b). The meaning of this is, that since there were in the world Seventy nations, and only Seir and Paran are mentioned of them, it doubtlessly does 20 not intend to point to mount Seir and the wilderness of Paran, but to allude to the whole world; that is, because God saw that there will arise in the world founders of religions in Seir, which is the nation of Edom (sc. Christianity) and its dependencies, and in Paran which is the nation of Ishmael (sc. Islam) and its dependencies, for these are the two nations that include all the world, and they are from the seed of Abraham, who was the first of believers;

therefore did He announce to them the giving of the Torah to Israel to show that the revealed religion has to be announced - at its promulgation - with a great publicity, and any religion whose promulgation is not announced with as great a publicity as this, is not revealed. This is because the thing that is commanded to a prophet privately by God, - there is a suspicion or a doubt, to another, concerning that tradition, and even to those that live in that generation, certainly to those that come after them; for Israel did not believe the prophecy of Moses our Master with a perfect faith till the day of the giving of the Torah when they heard 10 the Voice speaking to him, as we have written (supra, Chapter Eighteen); and because of this was the Torah not given in toto to Abraham, or to Isaac, or to Jacob, that he should command it to his children and his household after him that they should keep the way of God; for even if the tradition from them would be continuous from fathers to sons, it is still quite possible that a suspicion or doubt enter into the heart of those that come after them in the future generations, because the recipients were individuals. Such is not the case with the matter that is clarified through the sense organs to people of a very large number, among whom there 20 were wise and discerning men, of many varying opinions. For this reason then was the Torah given through Moses with such a great publicity, as we have said, so that there should not be left any anxiety or doubt whatsoever, in the heart of the recipients and of those that are dependent on them, or in the heart of those that come after them, and that tradition should be well established and true to the greatest possible extent.

This is what the Rabbis, b.m., meant in saying in the

Tractate Abodah Zarah (Ch. 1, p.2a); "In the Messianic future, God will take a scroll of the Torah and place it in His lap and say, 'All who have engaged in this, should come and take their reward'; immediately all the nations will gather together and enter before Him in confusion, as it is said, 'All the nations are gathered together, and the peoples are assembled; who among them can declare this ("Zoth")?' (Isaiah, 43:9), and 'Zoth' means, of course, the Torah", etc.; by which they meant that in the Messianic future, God will bring all the nations to judgement because they have not kept the Divine Torah, and this is what is implied in their saying, that God will say to them, 'in what have you engaged?', and they will say that they were engaged in the matters which are for the social welfare, as it is mentioned in the Agadah, at length; and finally, the Holy One, b., answers them, that all that they did, they did not do because of the social welfare, but for their own purposes: indeed, 'who among you can declare this?' etc., that is, is there among you any one who could say that he fulfilled the Divine Torah, and they will answer and say before him, that just as Israel should receive reward for the fulfillment of their Torah which they fulfilled because of their Tradition, so should they receive reward for the fulfillment of their Torah which they fulfilled because of their Tradition. And God will answer them: 'Who among you can declare this ("Zoth"), and announce to us former things? let them bring their witnesses, that they may be justified', that is, that the nations who say that they relied on their Tradition, let them announce to us former things, that is, they should inform us the premises of their religion which they received and on which they relied, how they were proved, whether they were per-

ceived by the senses and with great publicity, just as the premises of the Mosaic Torah were expounded; 'let them bring their witnesses, that they may be justified', and let the recipients hear and say,'it is truth';just as the recipients of the Mosaic Torah will bring their witnesses that the premises of their religion were announced to sixty myriads that received the Torah. And that is why Scripture concludes: "Ye are My witnesses, saith the Lord" (ib. v. 10), that is, all Israel are witnesses to the giving of theTorah from Heaven, and that they heard the voice of the Lord, God speak to them the Ten Commandments; "And My servant whom I have chosen" (ibid.) is an allusion to Moses who was called the servant of the Lord; and all of you are witnesses that the Torah is from the Lord, from Heaven.

This is a remarkable interpretation of all these verses in the way that the Rabbis, b.m., understood it: that it speaks concerning the reward of the Torah in general, and it agrees with the truth; for since the premises of the Torah were expounded with a great publicity, it is impossible that a doubt should fall as to its truth. It is therefore proper that the belief in the Mosaic Torah be with the utmost strength, and especially since its premises were expounded in an undoubtable way; as we have shown in Chapters Seventeen and Eighteen of this Section.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

Faith in God, blessed be He, and in His Torah, is that which brings man to eternal happiness, and to the union of the soul, to the Spiritual; and this thing was verified by experience, as continuous Tradition about it verifies. For we never find any one of the philosophers or any investigator attain the rank of prophecy, that is, the union of the Divine Spirit with the human intellect, as we find it among the Masters of the Torah, whose intellect is united with God by a strong attachment, so that, as a result of this, their attachment, the nature of things may be changed, to carry out their desire and will, and they may create in the world very many signs and wonders against the nature of things. For we find the prophets 'decreeing a thing, and God establishes it for them' (paraphrase, Job 22:28), all that goes forth from their mouth; you will find Elijah, who brought fire downward - contrary to its nature; when he said, "If I be a man of God, let fire come down from heaven" (II K 1:10), and so it was; and he cleaved the waters of the Jordan; Elisha healed the leprosy of Naaman, and revived the dead in his lifetime, and even after his death, and many such things with him and with the other prophets. It is also established among the believers that the pious, even though they are not prophets, may change nature with their prayer, or it may change for their sake; for Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, were thrown into the fire and were not burnt; and R. Hanina b. Dosa and R. Phineas b. Jair made things in the world changing the nature and law of the world. And this is an indication that the believer in God and in His Torah is above nature, and is not subjected to the nature of things, but

the nature of things is subordinate and subjected to him, and he can change it according to his desire and will.

And this is a proof and a demonstration that the Torah is from God, from Heaven, since He, b., is a shelter, a refuge, and a shield for those that trust in Him, and for this that keep His covenant and His commandments. This is what David meant, when saying: "The word of the Lord is tried; He is a shield unto all them that take refuge in Him" (Ps. 18:31), viz., that the proof that the Torah of God is tried and pure from any dross and from any defect and from all sorts of suspicion, is that the Exalted One is a shield unto them that take refuge in Him, and He does the will of those that fear Him, and He hearkens to their cry, and He fulfills the word of His servant, and carries out the council of His messengers.

This is also a proof of the union of the soul, after death, with the Spiritual Beings, for the union during life is a sign of a union after death. And to this did Moses allude when he said, "And ye that did cleave unto the Lord your God are alive, every one of you, this day" (Dt. 4:4), by which he meant that the philosopher believes in the union of the one perfect man with the Spiritual Beings, but not the entire people; 'and ye that do cleave unto the Lord ~~your God~~, every one of you,': though the philosopher may believe that this will be after death alone in the spiritual life, you attain this union today, while you are in this corporeal life, and, as a matter of course, you will attain it after death. And he brought a proof that this union is attainable in life, from the acceptance of prayer, - for God accepts the prayer of those that pray before Him to change the na-

ture and the law of the creation, - when immediately after this he says, "For what great nation is there, that hath God so nigh unto them, as the Lord our God is whensoever we call upon Him?" (ib. v. 7). And all this is a proof that belief in God and in His Torah is that which gives perfection to the soul and union with the Higher Beings, so that nature is subjected to him to do his bidding; because his soul is exalted through faith to a rank which is above the natural things, and therefore he rules over them. And because of this was Abraham our patriarch, r.i.p., praised for faith; as Scripture says, "And he believed in the Lord; and He counted it to him for righteousness" (Gn. 15:6); and Moses and Aaron were punished because they did not believe, as Scripture says, "Because ye believed not in Me, to sanctify Me", etc. (Nu. 20:12), "Therefore ye shall not bring...."; it is further said, in Chronicles, "Believe His prophets, so shall ye prosper" (II Chron. 20:20), which shows that faith is the cause of happiness, and likewise is it the cause of eternal life, as Habakkuk said: "But the righteous shall live by his faith" (Ch. 2, v.4); he does not mean the corporeal life by this, for the righteous does not live in them more than the wicked, but he alluded with this to the eternal life, that is, the life of the soul which the righteous live, and which they trust in God, to attain. Scripture says, "But the righteous, even when he is brought to death, hath hope" (Prov. 14:32), that is, that the righteous trusts that he will attain that good in his death; but when a wicked man dies, his expectation perishes, as Scripture says, "When a wicked man dieth, his expectation shall perish (ib.11:7), for the wicked will not attain that life after death, and the their

lifetime they do not attain any attachment whatsoever. Therefore are they always considered as dead, as the Rabbis, b.m., said; the righteous even in their death are called alive, whereas the wicked even in their life are called dead (Berakoth,18a & b). You will therefore find the signs and wonders performed by those that have faith,not by those that are masters of speculative knowledge (sc. philosophy), to show that faith is superior to philosophy and to natural things; and therefore is the true union attained through it during life, and after death, as we have written, and that this thing is above natural things.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Not belief in everything brings to happiness, for belief in the impossible is not that which would make a man happy. This thing no man will doubt, that the belief which would make a man happy is the belief in the true thing which is pure truth; not the belief in what does not exist that it does exist, or in that which does exist that it does not exist. It is therefore proper for the inquirer to ask, saying, how may he know if the thing in which he has belief, is true by itself, so that we should believe in it with a perfect faith, or that it is not true, so that we should reject belief in it; and if we say that this is grasped by the reflection of the mind, then philosophy would be superior to faith, and this is contrary to what was posited above (in the previous Chapter). This is a difficult problem, deserving that we should endeavor to solve it.

We say that there are two kinds of impossibles: either the impossible is intrinsic, so that God cannot be conceived as having the power to change them, as for example, that the whole is greater than the part, or that the diagonal of a square is greater than its side, for God cannot be conceived with the power to make the part to be equal to the whole or the diagonal of the square to be equal to its side, or the angles of a triangle to be greater than two right angles, or that the two opposites should be grouped together in one subject, at one time, or that the affirmative and the negative should be both right in the same thing from the same phase, and such similar impossibles in whose existence it is impossible for Tradition to come to believe, nor in what is of their kind, and it is impossible for the senses ever to testify that

this or the like exists, since it is impossible for the mind to picture their existence. Therefore is it not right that belief should enter on this or on the like; just as it is impossible that Tradition should come to believe that God be conceived as being able to create another, similar to Him, in every way, for the one will necessarily be the cause, and the other the effect, and he will therefore not be like Him, in every way. There is another kind of impossibles, their opposite being conceivably within God's power, and these are the impossibles for nature alone; for these and the like, even though they are impossible for nature, are not impossible in the constitution of the Creator, such as the ressurection of the dead, and the occurence of a man sitting for forty days and forty nights without food or drink and similar such miracles that are impossible with nature. And in this second kind of impossibles, is it possible that belief should enter; since it is possible for the mind to picture its existence. Therefore do we say that all whose existence can possibly be conceived by the mind, even though it may be impossible with nature, it is possible that belief that this thing has already occurred in the past, or that it exists now, or that it will occur in the future, should enter. All the more readily will belief enter if experience testifies to it, even though the mind would deny the veracity of its existence, because it does not know its cause; such as the attraction of iron by the magnatic stone, the cause of which existence cannot be given by the mind, but would deny it, but after experience testify to it, and it is a thing whose existence is conceivable to the mind, even though the mind does not know how to verify the cause of its existence, it is true without

a doubt. And so too, what the senses testify to, as the various miracles, such as ressurection of the dead through Elisha in his lifetime and in his death, and like the endurance of a human, born of woman, for forty days and forty nights, without food and drink, as Moses, and Elijah, or like the coming down of fire from heaven, or the resting of the Sh'kinah on Israel, and such similar miracles, towhich the senses testified that they occured at a certain time; and the mind can conceive their existence, even though it cannot prove their existence. It is possible that Faith should enter all this and the like, and that it falls within the power of the Infinite.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

The doctrines which every adherent of the Mosaic Torah should believe, which originate in the three dogmas which we have posited, even though they are not principles to them, are six.

1) The first of them is the Creation of the World "ex nihilo", and that it is a general doctrine for a Divine Torah in general, and for the Mosaic Torah in particular, it is clear from its nature, amen though it is neither a principle nor a dogma to them, for a Divine Torah in general and the Mosaic Torah in particular, are quite conceivable without the concept of "creatio ex nihilo", as we have shown in Chapter Twelve of this Section. But it is a doctrine branching out from the first dogma, - the Existence of God; and this is that since we have expounded that He, b., is free from defects, if He were not able to create "ex nihilo", this would be a defect in His nature; for it cannot be said that to create "ex nihilo" does not fall within Omnipotence, but only "ex substantione", for since its reality is conceivable to the mind, it is quite possible that belief should come on it, andit should fall within the Omnipotence of the Infinite; for even the believers in the eternity of matter, concede that though God, bs, is an uncompounded (simple) Intellect, He is the Cause of all, and thus matter is'effected' from Him, by the mediacy of a Separate Intellect, which is an effect from Him, and how can the Separate Intellect be a Cause of the existence of matter, if "ex nihilo" is impossible; there is no greater "ex nihilo" (process) than this. And should one say that it is inconceivable that He should create or make at a specific time, and they therefore say that it is apodictic that the world is eternal; one may reply that this objection

holds only for him who makes by necessity, but not for Him Who makes of (His own free) will, for this is a necessity in the nature of the will, that it should make at a specific time, as the author of the "Moreh" in Chapter Eighteen, Section Two, has shown. And since God, b., - being the best of makers - should make of(His own) will, and not by necessity, as will be shown in the Second Section, (Chapter Three), it follows therefore, that He should create the world at a specific time, for this is a thing which is necessitated by, and following from, the nature of the will.

2) And the second ~~doctrine~~ is that the rank of the prophecy of Moses our Master, r.i.p., is superior to the rank of all the prophets who have been and who will be. And although this is not essential for a Divine Torah in general, or for the Mosaic Torah in particular, nevertheless, since it is mentioned explicitly in the Torah, "And there hath not arisen a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses" (Dt. 34:10), viz., that there has not arisen nor will there arise (any one) to show the excellence of the Torah which was given through him, as we will explain in Section Three (Chapter Twenty), D. J.,it is then proper that every adherent of the Mosaic Torah should believe it. It is a doctrine which branches out from "the Divine Origin of the Torah".

3) And the third is the belief that the Mosaic Torah will not be amended,or changed,or exchanged for another by any prophet whatsoever. And although this belief is not essential for a Divine Torah in general, or for the Mosaic Torah in particular, as we have shown (supra Ch. 15), yet it is a doctrine branching out from "the Mission of the Messenger", and every adherent of the Mosaic Torah should therefore believe it, in the way that we will

show in Section Three (Chs. 19 & 20), D. J.

4) And the fourth is the belief that human perfection is attainable by (the observance of) one commandment of the Mosaic Torah; for if this were not so, then the Mosaic Torah would be keeping man away from the attainment of human perfection, which our Rabbis, b.m., named 'the life in the world to come'. That is so since by the Torah of the Noahides, people were attaining some rank in the world to come, as they (the Rabbis) b.m., said: the pious among the nations of the world have a portion in the world to come, meaning - that those who fulfill the seven laws of the Noahides have a portion in the world to come; and if every adherent of the Mosaic Torah would have needed the entire increase of commandments which appear in it, in order to bestow upon him one of the ranks of the life in the world to come, then the Mosaic Torah would be keeping man away from acquiring perfection, more than it would bring him near; and this is the opposite of what was intended by it, as they (the Rabbis) b.m., said:"The Holy One, blessed be He, was pleased to make Israel worthy; therefore He gave them a copious Torah and many commandments" (Makkoth, Ch. 2, p.23b). And this is why it appears that this belief is a particular principle for the Mosaic Torah, as we shall show in Chapter Twenty-nine of Section Three, D. J.

5) And the fifth is the belief in the ressurection of the dead. As to this ressurection, there are some of our Rabbis who hold that it is only for the perfectly righteous; and since it is not a rank of reward which is designated for all men, for it is impossible for all men to be perfectly righteous, the one who denies this will be like him who denies one of the great miracles

that are performed for the righteous, which are within Omnipotence; it will then be a doctrine branching out from the first dogma. And if ressurection is general, as is the view of some of the sages, then he who denies it will be a disbeliever in that part of the Reward and Punishment that is designated for all men or for the whole nation; and it will be a doctrine that branches out from the third dogma. But it is neither a dogma nor a principle, neither for a Divine Torah in general nor for the Mosaic Torah in particular, because their existence is quite conceivable without it. For since the believer will admit Reward and Punishment in general, whether corporeal and in this world, or spiritual and in the world to come, he who denies it does not deny any principle or dogma of the Mosaic Torah. It is however, a belief accepted by the nation, which every adherent of the Mosaic Torah is bound to believe, as will be shown in the Fourth Section (Chs. 29, 30, 31) D.J.

6) And likewise is the belief in the coming of the Messiah in the same category, for it is a doctrine branching out from the third dogma, which is, "Reward", and it is a belief accepted by the nation which is proper for every adherent of the Mosaic Torah to believe, as will be shown in the Fourth Section, D. J. But it is not a principle or a dogma for the Mosaic Torah, for the Mosaic Torah, with its dogmas and principles, is quite conceivable without it.

We did not enumerate among these doctrines, the beliefs that depend on particular commandments, such as Repentance, Prayer, et al, or to say that it is right to believe that God hearkens to the prayer of those who cry to Him, and also that He accepts in repentance those that return to Him, and like beliefs that depend

on particular commandments; because it is not proper to enumerate any one commandment as a doctrine, rather than another. We have also not counted as a doctrine, that the Sh'kinah rested on Israel, and that fire descended from Heaven on the altar of the burnt offerings, and that the priest was answered by the Urim ve-Thumim, et al, because these are included, in general, in the belief in miracles and wonders which appear in the Torah, and it is not proper to count these rather than other miracles, such as the belief in the splitting of the Red Sea, or the opening of the earth, and the swallowing up of Korah and his congregation, and that they entered Sheol alive, and to show the extraordinariness of the miracle - that the earth closed its mouth over them, as Scripture says: "And the earth covered over them" (Nu. 16:33), not in the usual way of the cleaving which is made by an earthquake, which always remains thus split; for all this and the like are included in the belief in the Torah and in all the miracles that are related in it. But the six doctrines which we have mentioned, we enumerated because they are beliefs accepted by the nation, especially designated for the fulfillment of the dogmas of the Torah and its principles, always; and the fulfillment of the Torah at all times depends on them, even though they are not principles to it, for its existence is quite conceivable without them, as we have shown; and he who denies them is called a heretic, even though he is not a denier of the Torah who would thus have no portion in the world to come.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

We are here warranted to call attention to one doubt, which may be entertained concerning the belief that appertains to religions, namely: whether a religionist, as such, is permitted or in duty bound to investigate the dogmas of his religion and faith, whether or not they are true, and conform to what we have posited as the dogmas of revealed religion; and if he is permitted to investigate, whether or not the liberty is granted him to choose that religion which appears to him truer than others.

There are powerful objections to both contradictory views. First, if we will say that the religionist is in duty bound to examine the dogmas of his religion, or is permitted to compare the dogmas of his religion with the dogmas of another religion, it will follow that no religionist would be firm in his faith, and he would, as a result, not be worthy of receiving reward for faith if he is not firm in it, and not in the least doubtful about it; since only that can be called faith, the opposite of which, the mind cannot imagine, as we have shown (supra Chapter Nineteen); and if he does investigate, he thus shows that he is doubtful about it. Furthermore, if we posit that he has the liberty of investigation, then when he has examined and compared the dogmas of his religion with the dogmas of another religion, and he finds the dogmas of the other religion truer, is he then permitted to exchange his religion for another; and if he is permitted, it will follow that no religionist will be happy or saved by his faith. This would be so, for when he will compare the dogmas of his religion with the dogmas of another religion and find the lat-

ter's truer than the dogmas of his religion, and he will exchange his religion for the other religion, it will still be impossible for him to be firm in the belief of that other religion which he has chosen to appropriate for himself. For it is possible, that when he will examine and compare that second religion with a third religion, that he will find its dogmas truer, and he will have to exchange the second for the third; and so, in this wise, the third for the fourth, and the fourth for the fifth, and so endlessly; no religionist will accordingly be firm in his faith, until his investigation of all the religions in the world shall have been completed, so that then he may choose one of them over all. And perhaps there may be another religion, at the ends of the world, which is unknown to him, and it may be the truest of them all. No religionist will then, accordingly be saved by his faith, since he cannot believe with perfect faith, until he shall have examined all the religions, and it is impossible for him to examine them all, as we have said; thus it follows that no religionist should be permitted to investigate the principles of his religion and his faith, so that he should believe with an undoubting faith. And should we say that the religionist should not be permitted to investigate the dogmas of his religion and his faith, there will follow from this either of two things: either all the religions lead to human happiness, and no one of them has any superiority over the other, as regards reward and punishment, since no religionist may investigate the dogmas of his religion, or exchange it for another; this is very absurd that the religions which oppose each other as to the truth and falsehood like the affirmative does the negative, in regards to Trinity and Unity, should alike lead to

happiness. And if we say that only one of them leads to happiness, and not both, a profound falsehood would follow, viz., that God perverts justice, in punishing the adherents of the false religion that pretends divineness, despite the fact that the believer has no liberty to budge from it, nor to exchange it for another, or to doubt it in the least. Far be God from wickedness, and the Almighty from perverseness! And this is the doubt which may be entertained about all the religions that call themselves revealed, and it lies upon us to endeavor to solve it.

We say that if all the known religions in the world would differ one with another, so that each should claim that the other is not revealed, then this doubt would be very strong, difficult of removal; but since all the religions are agreed concerning one of them, that it is revealed, only that they differ with it, in that they say, that it was temporary and its time has already passed; we will then say that every religionist ought to investigate the dogmas of his religion and faith, and this because: as regards the religions that differ from the revealed religion, it is very clear concerning them, that it is not right for any man to be persuaded to believe a thing against the religion which it is agreed is revealed, only after he has investigated that second or third religion and its dogmas, in the way that we have expounded in Chapter Eleven of this Section;and as regards the revealed religion, it is also proper for the adherent of that religion, to examine it, whether it is temporary or eternal, and if it will be shown that it is not eternal, in which matter it may be changed. On this account did Maimonides, b. m., write in Chapter Forty of Part Two of the "Moreh" that every religionist ought

to investigate his religion. He said there, further, that this investigation is of a twofold nature: either from the standpoint of the religion itself, and that is when he will reflect on its commandments and prohibitions, if they are interested only to remove perverseness and violence and to order the affairs of the state, then he should know that that religion is civil and not revealed; but if - added to the fact that it aims for the removal of perverseness and violence from among the people of the state - that religion will be found to be interested also in inculcating true opinions concerning God and the angels, and that it endeavors to enlighten men and to show them the entire creation from a true viewpoint, this would be a sign that it is revealed. Or from the standpoint of the founder of the religion, viz., in that that prophet or that messenger, who prides himself that the Torah came from God through him, is tested whether it was so, or whether they are merely sayings which he appropriated from another; and the method of testing him is a choice of ~~the~~ perfection by that man and an investigation into his qualities and deeds, and the biggest test is the abstention of bodily pleasures and the despising of them, and especially the sense of touch, which is a disgrace for us, as Aristotle had said. This is the essence of his (Maimonides') remarks in that chapter. He laid down that the test of the Torah from its own standpoint is that it should aim to give true opinions about God, b., etc., to allude to the religion that ascribes Corporeality and Trinity to God, b.; and he also laid down the test of the qualities of the founder of the religion in that way, to allude to the man who prides himself with prophecy to the Arabs, who was passionately addiced to bodily pleasures, and

to sexual intercourse, according to the stories as written among the Arabs about him. But this is not enough to test a religion that is laid down by the sage who lays down true principles, such as are fit for a revealed religion, and he himself is of good conduct; how will it be known that that religion is truly revealed, or (merely) human and pretends divineness. Therefore do I say that the testing of that religion is in the two phases which the "Rav", b.m., wrote, in the way that I will explain, viz., that the dogmas of that religion be first tested whether they are in accord with the dogmas for revealed religion which we have set down, and the principles that branch out from them should be tested in the way that we have shown in Chapter Fifteen of this Section. And if that religion be found to be in accord with or not differing from the dogmas and the principles, and it will also endeavor to remove perversion from among the people of the state, and to set them on right opinions, free from the fancies that are found in women and the common people, and calls their attention to human perfection, this is a sign that it is revealed.

In a similar wise did our Rabbis, b.m., say in the Sifra (Ch. 14), "'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself' (Lev.19:18) R. Akiba says, this is a great principle of the Torah; Ben Azai says; 'this is the book of the generations of Adam' (Gn. 5:1), this is a greater principle of the Torah than that". They have shown by this that the Divine Torah should include these two matters, both the removal of perverseness and violence from among the people of the state, which is alluded to in 'Thou shalt love thyy neighbor as thyself'; and the calling attention of people to human perfection, which is alluded to in the verse 'This is the book

of the generations of Adam', in which (verse) it is written, 'on the day that God created man, in the image of God created He him', which means that there is in man a human form which is in the likeness of God, and it is therefore proper to be careful not to disgrade it either in oneself or in one's fellow man, and that one should endeavor that it should remain (eternally) and unite with the Higher Beings, in the place from which it was hewn. And the Divine Torah should include this matter. But it is still possible, that it may be laid down by a sage or sages, unless it be tested by the second phase, viz.,when it be tested would the method of proof by which the Mission of the Messenger through whom the Torah be given is verified, if it is verified by an essential proof, as was explained in Chapter Eighteen of this Section, then it is revealed, and if not, it is false, ~~depending~~ depending divineness; even if it professes all the dogmas and principles, and certainly if it differs from them or from any one of them.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

What we should now examine is whether revealed religion must be one for all men or may be many. And we say that it is evident that it is essential that it be one, both on account of the Giver, and on account of the recipient. On account of the Giver: in that since the Cosmoplast, viz., God, b., is One in every respect, it follows that the order that preceads from Him should be one in every respect, for He, b., has not a relation to some people different than to others. And on account of the recipient: in that mankind is one in its human nature, then the arrangement which directs it to the attainment of its human perfection should be one; it appears from this that revealed religion should be, and necessarily is, one for all people. Upon proper consideration of this matter, however, we find that even though we may admit, that it is necessary on account of the Giver, it is not necessary on account of the recipient. Because it is known that the dispositions of men differ one from another, due to a difference in the temperaments of the parents, or to other causes, so that it is impossible that two people should have the same temperament and constitution, as Avicenna wrote in the First Section of the first book of the"Canon", so that there results from their differentiation that they should be almost opposite in their qualities; so that there may be a person cruel in the extreme - to the extent that he should, as a result of his cruelty, kill his youngest son, and there may be another man, tender hearted in the extreme, so that he take pity over the killing of a rat or an ant. And people will be different in this also due

to the differences in their dwelling places; for the natures of the countries differ with the varying air and mountains and waters, and the like, so that there may be a land whose fruits are gross and hard in their nature, and this because the air in which they grow is not pure and clean; and there may be another land whose fruits are not sweet or unwholesome because the waters at which they grow are not good, and the animate beings that feed on such fruits - their temperament is necessarily like to the food on which they feed. And the fruit of another land may be found to be of an opposite nature, and the constitution of the animate beings that feed on them, will be the opposite of the people of the other land. And on this account there are people in one city or in one district who are keener and wiser than the people of another land, and there follows from this that the kinds of conventions will differ between those two lands, in accordance with the differences of the dispositions of their inhabitants, and every one of them will need a "Nomos" different from the "Nomos" of the other at the very same time. But since this difference obtains on account of the recipient and not on account of the Giver, it is right that the difference should be in those things that pertain to the recipients, viz., in the details of the agreements and conventions which exist among the people according to the variations of the lands, as to the proper and the improper, for that which is proper among some will be improper among others. But in the universal dogmas and the principles that branch out from them, all of which are of those things that depend on the Giver, it is impossible that any change be conceived. Therefore will you find that the Torah of the Noahides and the Mosaic Torah, although they differ in par-

ticular matters, as will appear (Section Three, Chapter Thirteen), yet they agree in the general matters, which pertain the Giver, and both of them exist at the same time, for even when the Mosaic Torah was possessed by Israel, the Torah of the Noahides existed for all the nations, and they differed in proportion as the lands differed, that is, Palestine as contrasted to the Diaspora, and also in proportion to the difference of the nations, one from another, due to ancestry. There is no doubt that the nations were attaining human happiness through the Noaitic Torah, since it was revealed, although it was not in the same rank of happiness that is attainable by Israel through the Torah; as our Rabbis, b.m., said, the pious among the nations of the world have a portion in the world to come. And this is what shows that it is possible that there should exist two Divine Torahs at the same time for different nations, and each one of them will lead those that live by it to human happiness, even though they differ in the rank of the happiness that is attained through the two Torahs. This difference in the Torahs cannot exist in the dogmas or in the principles that branch out from them; and therefore will the intrinsic test of the Torah always remain in the same method. But it is possible that a change should occur in the test from the standpoint of the Messenger; and nevertheless it is necessary that the verification be an essential verification, even though the verification of one religion will be different from that of another religion. But whether the religion itself, even though it is revealed, can be changed for one and the same people, and in one land, in its essence, this is what we shall investigate in Section Three (Ch. 13), with the aid of God, blessed be He.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

The summary of what we have said in this Section is: that the number of dogmas of a revealed religion are three, viz., the Existence of God, Torah from Heaven, and Reward and Punishment; that a Divine Torah is inconceivable without these three; that under these three, other principles branch out from them, which are - in regard to these three dogmas, as the rank of the species that are subsumed under the genera - for with the removal of one of the principles, the dogma is not eliminated, but with the elimination of the dogma, the principles are eliminated, as we have shown. And the principles which are under the dogma of the Existence of God, b., as reflection demands it, and as the Mosaic Torah decrees, are Unity, Incorporeality, and that He, b., has no relation to time, and that He is free from defects. And below "Torah from Heaven" are Prophecy and the Mission of the Messenger. And under "Reward and Punishment" are God's Omniscience and Providence for Reward and Punishment, either in this world or in the world to come, whether it be spiritual or physical. And there is no necessity for the Mosaic Torah to posit any dogma or other principle that would branch out from these, besides these: for "His Exclusive Worship", we have already shown to be a commandment, and that one should not enumerate any commandment as a principle or a dogma; and "that the Torah will not be amended", and "the Prophecy of Moses" are subsumed under the verification for the "Mission of the Messenger", as will be shown in Section Three (Ch. 20) D. J. And the coming of the Messiah and the ressurection of the dead are all subsumed under the belief in Reward and Punishment in the way that every adherent of the Mosaic Torah should believe. And so too

is the view of my teacher R. Hisdai Crescas, that all these and also "ex nihilo" are true beliefs which every adherent of the Mosaic Torah should believe, but they are neither principles nor dogmas to it, neither universal nor particular. But the particular dogma for it is that(the fulfillment of)only one commandment in it is sufficient to bestow perfection and some one of the ranks of the world to come, as we have shown in Chapter Twenty-three of this Section. But the other religions which call themselves revealed posit indeed under these dogmas other principles, with the elimination of one of which their Torah falls, for the Christians postulate,under the 10 "Existence of God",Trinity and Corporeality; and it is evident that this contradicts the principles that branch out from the dogma of the Existence of God. And under "Reward and Punishment" they postulate the coming of the Messiah and the ressurection of the dead, and it is evident from these that the existence of their religion is inconceivable without them. And likewise the Moslemin postulate Predetermination and Omnipotence, called in Arabic 'Al-قضاء' and 'Al-قدر' under Providence; and it is clear that if this is so, then Freedom would be eliminated thereby and there would be no place accordingly, whatsoever, for "Reward and Punishment". And the rea- 20 son why we did not list Freedom among the dogmas of a revealed religion, even though it is essential to it, is because it is not a dogma to it in so far as it is revealed, but only in so far as it necessarily precedes all guidance and Law - human or divine.

The number of dogmas and principles will then, accordingly, be eleven: (1) The Existence of God, and (2) Unity, and (3) Incorporeality, and (4)that God, b., is independent of time, and (5) that He, b., is free from defects, and (6) the Reality of Prophecy, and

(7) the Veracity of the Mission of the Messenger, and (8) Torah from Heaven, and (9) God's Omniscience, and (10) Providence, and (11) Reward and Punishment. If we should consider God's Omniscience and Providence as one fundamental, as Maimonides, b.m., did, the number of fundamentals would then be only ten. Iffowe should count Freedom among the fundamentals of revealed religion, since it necessarily precedes it, even though it is not essential to it in so far as it is revealed, the number will then be twelve or eleven. We do not count General Purpose as a fundamental for revealed religion, even though it is prior to all Order and Law, - human or divine, like Freedom, since the reward that is designated for a revealed religion is the purpose specified for it, which has already been counted with the fundamentals.

And thus do we conclude the First Section, which examines the number of the dogmas and the principles that branch out from them and the things inclusive of revealed religions. Praise be to God, Who has helped us till here. Our intention, - to explain the matter of the dogmas and the fundamentals that branch out from them has here been attained, in this volume. But at the request of my friends and acquaintances among the believers and thinkers who asked of me to expound to them the inference of these dogmas and their principles and the things that branch out from them and that pertain to them, in a proper way, and approaching the viewpoint of the Torah, I have increased and added the three other Sections that follow this; and I have therefore designated, at the beginning of the book, to expound them. And help is in God alone, may He be blessed and exalted over all benediction and praise. Amen.

APPENDIX

Notes

p.1. S. gives no title to the Preface

1.2 The philosophy in his Book on the Soul. Aristotle, "De Anima". The reference is an error; the Eudaimonia which is a result of good action based on reflective thought, is discussed in Ethic. Nicom. I,5. Schl. 618. Perhaps De Anima, III, Ch. 3. Neum. ms.

1.4 Mind... wearies.... This of course is in line with Albo's anti-intellectualistic trend. It may be interpreted as indicative of the status of philosophy in his day.

1.11 A. recognizes revealed religion as contrasted to civil and natural rel. cf. infra.

1.16 A discussion of A.'s terminology will be found at the proper place.

p.2 1.3 Fundamentals, Universal. Particular. v. N. to p.1, 1.16

1.5 Revelation. The expression"Torah min ha-Shamaim" is variously translated as 'Revelation', 'Divine Origin of the Torah', 'Torah from Heaven'. 'Revelation' invariably denotes this dogma, in our translation.

1.7 There is a difference between these branches and the particular fundamentals of 1.3, as will appear below.

1.11 And the fundamentals S.r. Ikkarim, W.r. Sharashim. The first is the preferred reading; Shoresh has not yet been used, and Ikkar has not yet assumed its technical meaning; compare supr. 1.7, 'others'.

p.3 A.'s Table of Contents. S. continues directly from the Preface, without any title. The later eds. have placed the Table of Contents at the head of the book.

1.6 Maimonides. (1.7.Messiah.1.11.Kofer, et al.). A dis-

cussion of the points touched on by A. in his Table of Contents will appear in their proper place.

1.6 b.m. beatae memoriae. We preserve the time honored usage of Z.L. when referring to a dead person. Aside from its intrinsic, quaint interest, an important inference is drawn from our author's omission of the expression on one occasion, cf. Back, pp.9 f. cf. also infr.

1.12 And it shows. W. omits this last sentence.

1.24 The Benedictions. A's homiletic predilections are here evident.

p.4 1.8 Divine Torah. Practically synonymous with "revealed rel."

1.11 Its goal. S has the sing. fem. suffix, W - the plu. masc. Described. S r. ולתכליתה, W - ולתכליתם

1.26 Chapter Helek. Ch.11 of Mishn.Synhedrin

p.5 1.6 W adds between Adam and It expounds ויקהל כל העדה which phrase S omits

1.11 A usually refers to the Moreh Nebukim as (Sefer) Ha-Moreh

1.24 Commandment Anoki. Viz.,the First Commandment.

p.6 1.2 Consideration S- ועיון W- ועיין

1.10 What are S- מה הוא ועל מה W- מה הוא ועל מה.

1.13 No comment is necessary on A's calling a Ps. by its opening phrase

1.21 "Names". The supernatural power that exists in God's 72 Names.

p.7 1.3 Umoth. Non-Jewish nations. W reads עמים

1.10 Proved. S- מוכח W- מוכח

p.8 1.4 Then follows the table of the contents of the other three Sections; and A begins the book proper with some appropriate

verses from the Ps. in the dignified Medieval manner.

p.9 1.1 W, following Lip's Ed. has here הקדמת המאמר as contrasted to the commentator's Introduction. S reads הקדמת הספר

1.2 The desire to begin a book with an acrostic of some of the names of God usually led to awkward expression; as note here יסדרת בסימנים ליחלת התחלות שתוכם ענינו וכו׳

1.4 Easy... difficult. In imitation of Aristotle's Introduction in Bk.II, Metaph.,on the knowledge of truth. Sch. 618.

1.6 He who denies the dogmas is excluded from the religious communion, as A himself says, ch.10. What therefore has led him to analyze them, at the risk of losing all that he holds holy, he here explains, 'it is inconceivable';

cf.Back,32.

l.8 Imaginative opinion. The distinction between real knowledge and imaginative opinion is drawn from Plato & the Stoics

1.23 All agree. A makes much of the fact that both Christianity and Islam accept the Jewish Bible

1.25 Thirteen dogmas. Maimonides.

1.26 Twenty-six dogmas. Perhaps Ibn Billa,cf. Karpeles,183.

v.N. to p.27,1.23.

p.10 1.1 Six dogmas. A's teacher,Crescas.

1.2 Without which. S reads ההכרחיים .The Ohel Jacob,as quoted by Lip.,ad.loc., corrects to ההכרחיים .

The basic idea running through A שאין לנו מושג אמיתי בעצמות with its many variations of בלתי מושגות, בלתי מושכלות, וזולתם וכו׳, is taken from Crescas (Or Adonai,III, beginning). cf. Joel,p.76.

1.4 Each should have. S reads שיהיה לכל אחד W incorrectly reads שיהיו

1.11 Fall in toto. S reads כולה הדא הלכתא דכולה Lip. has found the reading הדא הלכתא דכולה אלא אשכח גרסא which he prefers because the word 'bik'lalah' fits in better. cf. ad loc. 'Sharashim'.

1.13 Here in the city. S r. בהדא קרתא W omits בהדא .-

A's ancestry is utterly unknown; we encounter the name Albo only once more in Jewish literature. (Seder Ha-Doroth gives a R. Jacob Albo of Florence as author of a book Tol'doth Jacob,1609.) The year of A's birth is determined by Graetz as 1380; of his death, as determined by Sch. is 1444. Neither the contemporary records nor the later writers tell us much of our author's life. We are not even certain of his birthplace. In the Tortosa Disputations he was the representative of the Jewish community of Monreal (in Aragon), which leads to the conjecture that that was his native city (Back); Sch. however thinks that since he was a student of Crescas, he probably studied at Saragossa, which was also probably his birthplace (Introd. XIV). Graetz, quoting כל קיצין מלה מעיק הסלעי (p.168 fn.) deduces from it that because of fear and persecution on the part of the Church after the Disputations, A was led to leave his birthplace. Bernfeld (479 fn.) justifiably calls attention to the inconclusiveness of this deduction. He composed the book, at least its First Section, in the fortified city of Soria in Castille, as he here informs us. Hirsch (JE,art.Albo) says that the First Section was written before the death of Crescas (which took place 1410), referring to Taenzer. Back, writing almost thirty years before, proves

it conclusively, pp.9-10. Cf.Sch. Introd.,JE art.Albo, Back,7 et al, Bernfeld,477 ff.

p.10 l.5 v.N. infr. to p.22,l.28. Ikkar in its non-technical sense is here translated 'fundamental'.

p.11 l.2 Universal fundamentals. Particular fundamentals. With Crescas, A draws a distinction between the principles universal for all religions and the principles peculiar (m'yuhadim) to any particular religion. To those universal principles belong also other principles (Sharashim), which define the universal ones, giving them their content. (l.4.). Ikkar is thus the general name for a dogma, Shoresh - the particular branch (principle) of the respective dogma. Ikkar is the stump, from which the Sharashim- the roots - branch out. cf.'the stump of its roots', Ikkar sharshohi (Dan.4:12,20). These Sharashim (principles) are related to the Ikkarim (dogmas) as the species to the genus. (cf.ch.26. כמפרקים פרטיים...שהם כללים). The Sharashim are therefore called the Ikkarim P'ratiim of the Ikkarim Kollelim. The Ikkarim M'yuhadim, or the fundamentals that are peculiar to a particular religion are not necessarily therefore the Ikkarim P'ratiim, - the M'yuhadim may or may not be P'ratiim, and vice versa. cf. Back pp.18 ff. Back also calls attention to the twofold implication of Kollelim; "es bedeutet nicht nur: die alle Religionen umfassenden, sondern auch die Einzelgrundsätze zusammenfassenden" (p.21.fn.). Kollelim as contrasted with M'yuhadim, means universal; as contrasted with P'ratiim means general.

p.11 l.9 Three. A takes his number three from Duran. cf.infr.

1.14 The second dogma. W omits this, reading ודעשוו יתקור מן דיאקו דעשוו

This is clearly a printer's error.

1.27 One. S reads אחת ,fem.

p.12 1.4 People who are religionists. S r. לפוסבל שאחת הנשוים שהם

זעלו פחות ומהם הנשוים לעלי בית הולפולו שהם יעלי פחות

מחשבה הזאת מלוכלר שיהיו שלשתם

Lip. ad loc. substitutes the more likely reading of the Salonica,1521, ed., thus לפני שהם שאחת הנשוים שהם ל"ב הולפו

שהם דעלי בחור מחשבות לילך בדרכי בדעם הזה ואלו כן ראוי שישתקע

W agrees with Salonica, but puts the first שהם דעלי פחות in parentheses.

1.9 Of great value. S correctly r. יקרות מאוד W יקרות מאד. Marc.

1.14 His prayer. Ps.90: T'fillah L'Mosheh

p.13 1.6 The circle was considered the perfect geometrical figure, from which all others are deflections.

1.8 Touch. S r. פלל אא W r. פלילא

1.11 Column. Sch. translates 'Istvana', 'runder Fensterscheiben', p.6.

1.17 S r. אחאלא מאוכלא- W אחאלא מאוכל

1.19 Build in it. S- אנא בנאוה אנא W - בנאלא אנא

p.14 1.14 Natural. Bernfeld points out that by natural religion A does not mean the religion that is based on the religious feeling of man, which modern thinkers call 'Naturreligion'. P.482 fn.

1.15 Civil. Nimosith. Neum. ms. transl. it 'legislative'. Sch. transl. it by 'buergerliche', p.8. Derived from Nomos, Greek for law, order. A means the religion established by

the state, the main purpose of which is the maintenance of law and order in the community through religious sanctions.

p.15 l.1 Since the Neum.ms. is not published, we are giving here two passages as an example of that translation, the beginnings of chs. 1 and 3. "The investigation into the principles is a very dangerous query. For the religions, much as they do agree about the common principles, such as... and the like, they certainly differ in particular questions; which necessitates that there be to the different religions particular principles by which one religion would be distinguished from any other. Now, in the investigation about the particular principles there is grave danger. For whosoever denies one of the particular principles of a certain religion ceases to be an adherent of that particular religion. So is one who denies the prophecy of Moses and his message undoubtedly a denier of the Torah of Moses although this is not a principle common to every divine Torah. Likewise the coming of the Messiah, which Maimuni counted as one of the principles of the Torah of Moses. According to his opinion, then, also one who denies this belongs to those who, denying the principles of the Torah of Moses, place themselves outside the religious community and have no share in the world to come. Book of Madda, Laws of Repentance, ch.III...."

1.4 Particular. פרטיים is used synonymously with P'ratiim. cf. Back pp. 21-22.

1.6 The revealed rel. S reads ראיה W - ראיה

1.15 S r. אחרת ויקרי מאמינים אחרת ויקרי

1.20 This of course is not Hillel the Elder.

1.22 Consumed. Neum. ms. explains: enjoyed.

1.26 For him. S r. 'lo', which W omits.

1.28 The reason. S r. מיפי שלא, W inserts 'lo' between these two words.

p.16 1.4 Some answer. Jaulus thinks that perhaps A had Duran in mind; 'hekrah ha-p'sukim' is a phrase also used by Duran. P.458 fn.

p.17 1.7 The deserts. S r. 'u-l'midbarim'; V and W - 'u-l'mizraim'.

1.28 Messiah is not a dogma. Hirsch (JE art. Albo) points out that A corrects Maimuni where the latter fell under Christian influence. Maimuni himself warred against Christianity and Islam, e.g., when he stressed God's incorporeality and the future coming of the Messiah. But then this was pushed forward by the apostates and gave the later Jews trouble. A, says Sch. (Introduction XIII) takes out the props from his opponents who look for the weak points in the ancient faith. The personal Messiah - the Achilles' heel of all later Judaism, always proved detrimental to it. The idea of the personal Messiah, claims Sch., hinders the spiritualization of the faith, binds it with earthly supports, demoralizes the religion. It gave Christianity a starting point as dethroner of Judaism; it gave the Clergy material for endless persecution. It even now, when the coming of the Messiah is deliteralized, in this modern day, gives an excuse for persecution; and while persecution and exclusion are certainly no grounds for giving up a true religious

principle, yet we may clear the way of unnecessary stones, to give the Christians and Mohammedans one excuse less for prosecution. A gives us the example; he did not consider the Messiah a principle, he freed Judaism and at the same time cut off an opponent's arguments. Anton Hulsius actually reproaches A for having cut out the future Messiah on this account (Sch.XIII-XIV). This was one of the strongest indirect polemics against Christianity and against Geronimo de Santa Fe - his apostate opponent. Also Brann (p. 207) lauds A for setting down the Messiah as only a time honored tradition. This then is one of the great merits of the "Ikkarim", - as a book of polemics. We distinctly note here the negative influence of Christianity on Albo. (Karpeles, 184).

Abrabanel - who claimed David descent - fulminates against Crescas and A, in defense of Maimuni's view of the Messiah. (in Joel, p.81). He represents Maimuni as calling out to him:

שתק על כרחם... שני הנשיק מדרוש בפיוט ... שאמרו הוא"ו נלכד
אותו מהדרין תוספות ובשלוב הנשלוב ממנו מדרשת משה וגוש הנלחם...
וכסף ישמע כי פ טעמי בלי מלחמו ומר ומאמרו וחלמי יהודי שם
בלשון... ומה הוא הנשיק בקרוב לשון שנוי וכו'

p.18 l.3 Christians. S - 'Noz'rim'.W - 'Aherim'. In W, 'Christians' is invariably substituted by 'Aherim', - due to the censor.

l.14 The later authorities. R. Asher in "B'samim Rosh" points out that in Judea's heyday - in Solomon's time - there certainly was no hope for 'redemption'. Crescas considers the Messiah and ex nihilo as true beliefs, but not as essential dogmas (Or Adonai III, K'lal I & 8). cf. Sch. 618.

p.19 l.3 This is Albo's basic maxim: All that appears in the Torah must be believed as perfect truth; only he is an unbeliever who consciously denies anything of the Torah. cf. Back pp.34-35. Jaulus quotes Duran, Magen Aboth, ch.9, to show the parallelism between him and A. כי העיקר הגדול ביסוד

הזה להיותו אמת שלמה ואותו הוא כל יסודות אלו ואי שבזה

ראוי שלמה ואותו הוא שיהיה הדעת ולפי שאין התורה

הזה כופר

Adds Jaulus in a fn: "The expression 'bo ba-Torah'... is borrowed in preference from Crescas". He whose interpretation of the Torah differs from the orthodox one is not a denier however, if he is sincere. (p.458). Jaulus quotes other passages of this chapter and other chapters to bolster up his argument of plagiarism. cf. also Guttmann, Monat. (LII) p.653 et al.

l.26 If time is Platonically real, rather than a catagory of thought, one may believe that time existed 'before the world came into being'. Maimuni in the Moreh II,30, shows that R. Judah b. Simon's error originated in the Genesis story of Creation. Kronos who devoured his own children, is a time concept. cf. Sch. 618.

p.20 l.5 At first glance. Duran has almost the same expression. cf. Jaulus ib.

l.17 "Rav". Maimonides is frequently referred to by A. as the "Master" par excellence.

l.24 Inconceivable in nature. S r. מושג מהותו כמהות המציאות

This is clearly a printer's error; in ch. 23 of this Section A counts resurrection as one of the six doctrines

which each Jew must believe. (cf. p.128 of this transl. ll. 23 ff.) V. agrees with S. but a reader corrected as follows: W corrects the text in accordance with the view expressed in ch. 22 of this Section, (cf.p.124 of this transl. ll.7 ff.12.17 ff.) as follows:

1.25 But. With the corrected reading, we would transl. here "and".

p.21 1.9 This well known Rabbinic saying aims, in part, to account for the earlier Biblical anthropomorphisms as being figures of speech.

1.11 Later exegetes. Ibn Ezra makes the speaking of the ass one of his favorite "mysteries". cf. Sch. 618.

1.15 Whose reflection has not attained the stage. Jaulus, quoting A, p.459, reads: rather than

1.21 M'galleh panim ba-Torah shelo ka-halakah, - he who makes the Torah bear a meaning other than the right. cf. Aboth ch.3.

1.23 Both A and Duran quote the Rabad of Possequiers in a similar connection. Jaulus p.459. Joseph Caro in 'Kesef Mishnah' corrects a reading in the Rabad (H. T'shub. III,7) from A's quotation here. This seems to be a conscious change by A, however. cf. Kaufmann, Ges. d. Attributenlehre, 488, fn. 171.

p.22 ll.5 ff. Quoted in Back 33-34, as giving the kernel of A's thought.

1.10 Whom. S r. 'otham', W - 'otho'.

1.23 The world to come. i.e., the time after the resurrection; frequently called by the Rabbis 'Olam ha-ba'. Sch. 619.

1.28 I found it necessary.fo: Graetz deduces from this sentence that A's main purpose in writing this book was to defend Maim. and philosophy against their common enemies (168 fn.) Back correctly calls attention to the fact that A. was dissatisfied with Maimuni's and Cres.'s systems, v. supr.p.10, 11.15 ff. and that this sentence refers only to what was said immediately above (cf.Back pp.15-16 fn.)

p.10

p.23 1.1 Insignificant people. Shem Tob et al. cf. Graetz ib.

1.2 Great men. Maim. et al.

p.24 1.1 The term Ikkar. It gradually assumed its technical meaning of a dogma for a religion. The Tanaim used it as such already, but it had not yet received its special technical meaning. Kafar ba-Ikkar means to deny God; Ikkaro shel Olam does not refer to a speculative view but to God himself. Saadia does not use Ikkar exclusively in its technical sense; nor does Bachia. Ibn Ezra in 'Yesod Mora' uses it in its almost technical sense, but only as genera for the respective commandments; but a speculative view he calls 'emunath ha-leb'. Halevi also uses אעתקאד (Arabic for Ikkar) in many senses, and also in Ibn Ezra's use; but he begins to technicalize it. Ibn Tibbon however continues to transl. אעתקאד with Shoresh as previously. Ibn Daud in 'Ha-Emmunah Ha-Ramah' apparently used אעתקאד as technically as the Arabs used it, and his is the first book where the translator uses Ikkar in its technical sense. The translator was not the first so to use it however; he was preceded by Maim. in Chapter Helek, and especially at the end of the Intr. to the thirteen dogmas; אעתקאד is translated tech-

nically; the dogmas themselves are called עיקרי דאמונה
and transl. 'yesod'. Maim. further defines the Talmud-
ic expression in a technical sense. וע"ז תמצא על פרוש, שיש
שיש עיקר יותר מעיקר, אומרו כלומר תורשה -ולפיכך ראוי,
שיקראו בשרשים שעליהן תלויות. וכן יסודות פ"ח וכו"ו.

and other places. The translator in the Moreh uses Ikkar
in its Talmudic sense. Even after Maim. infused a re-
ligious meaning to Ikkar the other words still were
used: yesod, pinah, shoresh. Cres. uses all the terms
and even rejects almost Ikkar as a technical term,
calling the essential dogmas pinoth, the secondary
de-oth, and the tertiary s'baroth. The use of Ikkar
as a religious term became strong from the days of A.
And even though A. himself divides the Ikkarim into
Ikkarim and Sharashim, yet the thirteen yesodoth ha-
Torah of Maim. became the thirteen Ikkarim with him.
Abrabanel in 'Rosh Amanah' uses Ikkar in its technical
sense as we use it today, even though he also uses
pinah, shoresh, yesod. Abrabanel in defending Maim.
against A. tries to draw a distinction between Ikkar
and yesod. Neum. points out that Abrabanel misunder-
stands Maim.; though he is certainly right in maintain-
ing that Ikkar means two things: a basic belief, and
an important belief. Though every basic belief is im-
portant, yet not every important belief is basic in
the sense that other fundamentals or that the practical
law is dependent on it. Neum. Tol'doth ha-Ikkarim, v.1,
pp.1-5. cf. also Neum. Principles, pp.44-45.

We are here giving the transl. of the beginning of ch.3 as it is found in the Neum.ms.:

"Ikkar is a (Heb.) noun applied (metaphorically) to something on which the perpetuation of something else and (even) its being depends, and without which it has no being; just as the root (the prime meaning of the word Ikkar) is that thing on which the being of the tree depends and without which the (continued) existence of the tree, nay its very being, cannot be conceived of. And our sages of blessed memory used this expression very often as when they say: 'Something that has a root in (a command of) the Torah (the written law) or that has not (such) a root.' Under this aspect this noun applies also to roots, and fundamental principles on which the subsistence of religion and its tenability, depends; such as the belief in the existence of God, from whose very concept it is evident that it is a principle the belief in which is indispensable to a divine Torah, it being impossible to conceive of a divine Torah without it."

That Ikkar is the stump of the root and not the root,

cf. Back p.19 and fn.36.

p.24 l.16 Incorporeality. Literally: negation of corporeality. So Neum. ms. cf. also for the 13 principles, Eisler, p.191.

l.17 The prophecy of Moses. Always means, as here our parentheses indicate, the superiority of the prophecy of Moses to that of all other prophets.

1.20 It is easily noted that Maim.'s 13 dogmas are mainly a polemic against Christianity. The second against the doctrine of Trinity, the 3d. Incarnation, the 4th. the death of Jesus, 5th. worship of Jesus, the Virgin, and the saints, 7th. the belief that Jesus was a superman, 8th. antinomianism, 9th. the new dispensation superceding the old, 12th. the <u>future</u> coming of the Messiah as vs. the belief that he had already come.

p.25 1.1 A. here suggests the elimination of all the specifically anti-Christian doctrines. v.N. immediately above.

1.9 Prophet greater than Moses. A. too recognizes the importance of this anti-Christian doctrine. Sch. calls attention to the fact however, that the Messiah is to be not only greater than Abraham and Moses, but also than the archangels. (Jalkut Shim. to Is.52:13); also Cres. exalts Elijah, the forerunner of the Messiah, as not having died, as the resurrector of the dead, as the one through whom all future miracles will take place. (Or Adnn., III,8,1). cf.Sch.619.

1.13 Should we not believe in the Eternity of the Torah. With the coming of the Messiah a new dispensation would be given (cf.Jalk.Shim. to Is.26). These midrashim are strongly tinged with Christian elements. Maim. of course, has no use for any extravagant millenianism. cf. Sch.ib.

1.21 Would not fall. A. maintains (I,13,II,6) that Unity and Incorporeality are Sharashim of the first dogma, i.e., they define it and form its content. cf. Back 29-30 on the relation of the Sharashim to the Ikkarim. There is

a difference of course between the person who accepts Manicheism with its dualism, and the one who practices Judaism but has a vague notion of dualism. The Divine Torah cannot stand with dualism; cf. Sch. pp.619-20.

p.26 1.5 And in the world to come. W. omits the 'Waw'.

1.15 I K 6:13. Lip. correctly remarks that the quotation is from Kings where the subject is obedience to the Law, as a result of which, the Sh'kinah, etc., and not from Ex.29, where the Sh'kinah rests because of the Tabernacle. v.'Sharashim' ad loc. and Lip.'s Introduction.

1.25 Tradition. Tradition in general, A. himself does not consider a fundamental; by this he means the verification of the founder of the religion, as tradition relates it. In I,18,he clearly identifies the two: Kabalah and Hith-amtuth sh'lihuth ha-shaliah. cf.Back p.23,fn.46.

1.28 Freedom. That man has a free will.

p.27 1.3 b.m. S. reads ʃ'ʒ W r.ɔ"ʃ

1.13 From all of which. A.'s criticism of Maim. then is that he does not use the term Ikkar strictly enough. This also is Cres.'s criticism; but A.'s is far sharper and more consequential. cf. Back 16-17, 13-14. Maim.'s number is either too big or too small. A.'s criticism of Maim. as to Creation, Freedom, and the number thirteen, is said by Guttmann to have been plagiarized from Duran's Introd. Monat. (LIII),1909,p.58.

1.15 I saw one author. Maim.'s number thirteen has been a subject of many speculations. Sch. thinks that the nature of the subject required that number; p.620. Abra-

banel also rejects the suggestions here thrown out by A. (Rosh Amanah, ch.10), cf. Sch.ib. It seems true however that the number thirteen is actually based on the thirteen attributes (Ex.34:6-7); if I remember correctly, this is also Dr. Neum.'s view.

1.18 Developed. S r. מלשון תפיסה W. r. מלשון מתנה

1.22 Which he did count. Shemanah. Lip. brings an interpretation which explains the word as a number, Sh'monah, because A. really holds that the prophecy of Moses and the Eternity of the Torah are not fundamentals, thus making 8 non-fundamental. He disagrees with it. Sch. also considers it a verb, p.17.

1.23 Twenty-six. Sch.621, does not know who it is. Karpeles suggests Ibn Billa, p.183.

1.27 Another. S r. מלשון חלק W r. מלשון חלק

p.28 1.2 One of the later authorities. Cres. gave the number of dogmas as 6; it is him that A. here discusses; he calls him his teacher in I,26. Joel adduces this as showing A's pettiness of character that where he polemizes vs. his teacher, he does not call him by name, but refers to him as מלמדו של בעל הכוזרי or מלמדו של בעל המאמר. Joel p.77.

1.5 Six. The number six is popular among the Karaites, who used either six, ten, or thirteen. cf. Sch. pp.621-22. pp.640 ff.Sch. gives a full discussion of Karaite dogma.

1.16 With them also other. Here A. appears to wish to add more dogmas. Back feels that it is A.'s intention to show the untenableness of Cres.'s system and then to build up his own. He wants 'the verification of the Mes-

senger' to be included among the Ikkarim Kollelim, as below I,18 (Back 17-18,fn.32).

1.26 Revelation. Here A. is very mystifying. He argues sharply for Torah from Heaven as a fundamental, overlooking that Cres. Tractate III, begin. in his polemic against Maim. notes וכנגד ששה סדרים כלולה ומסודרת משנה תורה של רבינו משה בן מימון ונראה מפי כשנאמרה קדם מפיהו וכו' ולא נזכר שמים בג"כ כללה התורה הקדושה ונלמדה מן השמים by which Cres. means that aside from the six he had discussed in the previous Tractate, there are these other two - the existence of God and Torah from Heaven - which he had no occasion to discuss, thus really making for eight dogmas. cf. Joel 77. Back,great admirer of A. as he was, could not refrain from hinting at the situation: "Ueberhaupt ist diese Kritik die dunkelste Stelle des ganzen Buches", etc. (p.17,fn.32).

p.29 1.10 Does not necessarily follow. A. here accuses Cres. of the fallacy of Undistributed Middle.

1.13 It is not so. This criticism of A's, Back feels, is unjust, since he himself, I,26, is not sure whether or not to count Freedom as a religious dogma. cf.Back p.18 fn.32. cf. however Neum. Tol'doth.v.2,p.177.

1.21 The Rabbis... might have discussed. They have; only that they had to deal with later Zoroastrianism and with early undeveloped Christianity, while A. had to deal with the tremendously big and profound structure Christianity which it took Augustine and Aquinas and centuries of thought to build. cf.also Sch.622.

1.25 Discussed. S r. שנית W r. לפרקו

1.27 Social (political). A. uses מדיני in the double sense of the Greek πολιτικός

p.30 1.3 Three. A. has been charged with plagiarism, heterodoxy, ungratefulness, and arrogance, by mediaval writers as well as by modern scholars. A review of what has been said about A. seems in place here, since this is the usual starting point of his critics, namely, that the very number three is not original with him. His courage in defending Judaism cannot be questioned. In the disputations at Tortosa (February, 1413 to November, 1414) he showed a remarkable faith and fortitude. Reading the records of the disputations (Sch. Introd., Shebet Jehuda, pp.68,ff. Back 3 fn., Poznansky, REJ, vols. 75 & 76) we find as follows: that though he did not take a great part in them, because he was evidently a young man (Graetz, 168 fn.) of thirty, yet the little that he did say proved his character. At the third session (Feb.9,1413) he said to the Pope: "Posito Messiam mihi probari jam venisse non putarem deterior esse Judaeus" (Even it should be proved that the Messiah has already come, I do not intend, on that account, to stop being a Jew). Poznansky, REJ,1923 (vol.75),p.75. At the 14th session (10 Feb.) he made a short observation; at the 48th session (Jan. 8,1414) he made a declaration (ib. p.199). At the 64th session (July 7) he with R. Ferrer remained steadfast in their defense of the Talmud; and on the 67th session (Nov.10) they did not cede

this point (vol.76,1923,pp.37 ff.,43,45).

And yet he was attacked even in his lifetime; he defended himself in his Preface to the second Section of his book, published about 15 years after Section One had been prepared.

The printers of the Soncino Edition (1485) look upon the book as a great polemic against Christianity as well as a fine theologic work.

Abrabanel attacks A. (v.supr. on the question of the Messiah); he also claims that A. plagiarized. (Joel,pp.80 ff.) Jacob Ibn Habib in the En Jacob to Megillah ch.1 (p.112), in commenting on the fact that A. mentions Cres. in I,26, has this to say about our author

Fanatics called the"Ikkarim", "Sefer Ha-Ok'rim". We find similar criticism in "N'veh Shalom" by Abraham Salom, cf. Joel 78.

Messer David Leon has this to say on A. (Schechter, 'Notes sur Messer David Leon', REJ,24,1892,p.125):

Zacuti, however, in his Sefer Yuhasin Ha-Shalem considers A. a pious preacher; on the day of the circumcision of

R. Abraham, brother of Don Vidal, A. gave the sermon;
p.226: .... תסוד אדרל דרש מלין ר' יצל הל ערל

Among the moderns, Sch. (1844) (Introd. p.xxxx) feels that one cannot say that with A. a new epoch in Jewish religious philosophy began; it was not a time of purely philosophic questions, but a time of defending the specifically Jewish religion, and this A. did with courage and manliness, at the disputations and elsewhere (xi-xiv). Munk feels that A. is not important philosophically but is of supreme importance theologically (p.507).

Graetz accuses A. of superficiality, plagiarism, lack of originality, that he wanted to Christianize Judaism,(Mess.) pp.168 ff.

Joel (pp.76 ff.) claims that A. is almost completely dependent upon Cres., that whenever he criticizes Maim. he follows Cres. (e.g., on the immutability of the Torah I, 26,& III,16 end.) Not only as to the basic thought ירל

ערוך מ רי מלה ערבר, (Or Ad.III,beginning) does he copy Cres. without acknowledging his authority, but also the interpretations and the very citations from the Bible (v.infr.ch.8) and the Aggada in A. are taken from Cres. A.'s criticism of Aristotle's definition of space (II,17) and discussion on time (II,18) are taken from Or Ad. (I,1, 1, and I,2,11 respectively). Where A. differs from Cresc. in philosophic matters, Joel claims (p.77) it is due to his nature to level out difficulties, as e.g., his treatment of Freedom (Ikk.IV,5) as compared with the deep method of Cres. cf. also supr. I,3. Cresc.made

an end to the glorification of knowledge at a cost of a religious life. Even in this anti-intellectualism A. is ungrateful; he attempts a poor correction of Cres.'s definition of soul (IV,29).

Back is the greatest admirer of A. He considers him a fighter for liberty, the first to have the daring to co-ordinate and even identify, in principle, philosophy and religion. Philosophically A. is a dwarf, standing on the shoulders of the two giants, Maim. and Cres., he is of utmost importance however in his method, where he determines the value of a religious doctrine by philosophic principles, making philosophy an indispensable complementary to religion. The earlier Jewish philosophers assumed that the content of theology is given a priori, and that it is for them to systematize and harmonize it. Philosophy was then merely an arabesque for the structure Theology; once a cleavage is made between the two however, religion falls. A. starts out by identifying the principles of religion and philosophy, recognizing that it is only by beginning their identification at the premises and not merely at the results that any progress could be attained in religious thinking. The aim of the other philosophers, till him, was a philosophically reformed Judaism, A. wanted a philosophical Judaism. His method is therefore synthetic; A. holds that philosophy gives theology its content; philosophy is thus the material out of which the structure of theology is built. A's criticism of Maim. is far deeper than Cres.'s. A. is

the Descartes of Jewish Theology. (Back pp.3 ff. 30, et al.) And so throughout the book Back emphasizes the fact that Jewish Theology was given a new turn because of A's new method in his classification of religions, doctrines, etc.

Jaulus (pp.456 ff.).Duran was dissatisfied with Maim.'s dogmas and laid down the three; A. follows him in laying down the number and the content of the dogmas. When one compares the two, one concludes, says Jaulus,... "dass die Uebereinstimmung Albo's mit dem 23 Jahre frueher schreibenden Duran (1405-1428) keineswegs rein zufaelliger Natur ist, sondern in der ungezwungensten Benützung der Duran'schen Schrift ihren Grund hat". "Albo borrows from Duran, not only the thoughts but frequently, with slight changes, also the expression, indeed in many cases he gives entire discussions... only once naming his rich flowing source." His theory of dogmas, at least in the beginning, he borrows not from Cres. but from Duran.(fn.p.457). Then Jaulus compares the two; we insert in the notes at the proper place some of the passages which he adduces. The basic thought - the criterion of heterodoxy (cf. ch.2 of the Ikkarim), is expressed by both in almost the same way (v.supr.); both mention the the Rabad, Jonathan b. Uziel, Onkelos Ha-Ger. The concept of dogma is defined by both in the same way, v.infr. NN.to ch.14. They agree in their definition of an Epicurean, differing from the Rabbis (cf.infr.ch.10). Both draw from Cres. in maintaining that ex nihilo is not a.

fundamental (cf.moreover Moreh III,17). "More striking than in the theory of dogmas does A's dependence on Duran show itself in regard to the doctrine of Providence", where he slavishly follows him (cf. Duran, chs. 2-4 & 13-16 with A. IV,7-16) (Jaulus pp.456-461).

Bruell shows that A. plagiarized from Lorki (v.infr.NN. to ch.24); also from R. Nissim without acknowledging his debt (Ikk.III,32 & 33,on the question of reverence, and interpretation of some vv. in Job & Ps. & other matters of those 2 chapters, are taken from the "Twelve Derashoth" of the 'RaN'. (Bruell, p.52).

Schechter (JQR,1889,p.120,reprinted in Studies,1896,pp. 171-172) agrees with Graetz that A. was not original; he calls the division between Ikkarim and Sharashim unreal. He gives our author credit however for his view that fulfilling one commandment alone is sufficient,etc., v.infr.

Bloch gives a favorable view of A. Where A. argues independently, his proof is inductive; his metaphysical speculations, Bloch admits, are weak and eclectic; yet his argumentation is not shallow or superficial, it always has searching thoughts;it is always fresh and clear. He frequently contradicts accepted interpretations of the Bible and the Talmud; he has happy illustrations. "Albo ist jedenfals in Bereich der juedischen Religionsphilosophie der letzte originale Denker von Bedeutung". (Bloch,p.790).

Brann. The times made for a polemic literature. "Die

kuehne und originelle Aufstellung verschaffte ihm (Albo) jedoch nur arge Widersacher bei den eigenen Glaubensgenossen," etc. (Brann, pp.207 f.)

Dalman (Realencyclopaedie,art. Albo) considers our philosopher the last important Jewish thinker.

Hirsch (JE art. Albo) holds that Albo does have much of Crescas, but only as a disciple from his preceptor. He disagrees with Graetz that A. wanted to Christianize Judaism; the opposite is true: he wanted to deprive Christian disputants of their favorite weapon,- the Messiah. His terminology is original with him, though it is not consistent throughout the work. "His canon for distinguishing heterodoxy from orthodoxy is the recognition of the truth of the Torah. But a remarkable latitude of interpretation is allowed." The book is a contribution to Jewish apologetics. (JE art. Albo).

Karpeles. "Ihm (Albo) war es vorbehalten, ein Werk zu schaffen, welches aus einen dringenden Zeitbeduerfnis hervorgegangen, nicht nur fuer jene, sondern auch fuer die Folgezeit eine wichtige Schoepfung der juedischen Theologie, zugleich aber ein Volksbuch geworden ist. Je seltener die Vereinigung so heterogener Bedingungen in der Literatur anzutreffen sein mag, desto hoeher ist das Verdienst Albo's anzuschlagen." A. presents a complete system of philosophy; Karpeles takes the bull by the horns, admitting that Albo accepts the three dogmas of Duran, but which were really first established by Abba Mari ben Moses, the well known opponent of Maim.

and in parts uses the same expressions as Simon Duran; "Nichtsdestoweniger ist aber sein Werk doch verdienstvoll, indem es den Kern des juedischen Religionsprinzips fasslich darlegt und dieses, selbst treffend zu schildern versteht." Due to its homiletic qualities, the book is accessible to all, but it loses thereby in depth. "Der Kernpunkt seines systems liegt in der religioesen Dogmatic. Die goettliche Religion hat nach ihm Erfahrungssaetze wie die Wissenschaft, und die Offenbarungen Gottes sind eine historische Tatsache, deren Ursachen wir ebensowenig erkennen, wie etwa die des Magnetismus, die aber doch eben so wahr wie dieser seien." The proofs for revealed rel. are (1) that it does not contradict the Ikkarim and Sharashim as laid down by Albo, and (2) the verification of the Messenger. What A. then has to say about freedom of research and thought in Judaism, over the Mission, and on the question of many religions, follows then logically, clear, and well developed. "His system is important and noteworthy where he, out of the necessity of the polemic, is forced to formulate new theories for the truth of the Jewish religion, and for the impossibility of abolishing the Sinaitic revelation through a new one." We find positive Christian influence on him and Cres., when they accept as the goal of man - the happiness of the soul. To sum up then, philosophically, his work, says Karpeles, is unimportant; theologically, it is of the greatest importance, besides having historic interest in its polemics. Thus it was justifiedly held


in high esteem; as e.g., when Luther uses his arguments against particular Christian dogmas and vs. the exegesis of the Church Fathers. (Karpeles, pp.182-ff.)

Guttmann claims that A. builds the basis of his book with the evident content of Duran's Introd. (Oheb Mishpat). He points this out throughout his article; he also points out that A. quotes the Or Ad. without naming the author (v.supr.I,2) (Monat.52,1908,p.649). He quotes A. on Maim. as to Creation and Freedom and the number 13, showing the parallelism with Duran (ib.53,1909,p.158); on the question of "Zadik v'ra lo, rasha v'tob lo": Duran discusses it both ways, A. - basing himself on Duran's conclusion - maintains that the latter is more difficult. Ikkarim IV,7. (ib.p.67)

Husik agrees, that he is of little importance, with some of the earlier scholars. As a philosopher, he re-hashes the problems of Maim., Gersonides, and Cres. The philosophic discussions in the last three Sections are the eclectic compilations of a moderate conservative. While Maim. and Aquinas and Gersonides were interested in philosophy as such, as vs. the scientific attacks on religion in general, not only against Christianity or Islam; not so A., in whose day there was no purely philosophic interest, rather religious disputations. After the first Section A. is aware that he has nothing to add. He follows the beaten tracks, reviews the classic views of Maim., takes advantage of the corrections of Gersonides and Cres., and settles problems sometimes one way,

sometimes the other, without ever suggesting anything new. (Husik pp.406,407,419).

We finally quote Neumark's view which recognizes all the previous criticisms and yet finds something valuable in Albo, (Tol'doth vol.2,pp.176-7), with which view we are in agreement:



p.30 l.3 Three. Sch. 622 Abba Mari Moses b. Jos. ha-Yarhi Don Astroc, in his book Minhath Kenaoth, gives the number 3. Neum. "Principles", p.45; A., in reducing Maim.'s 13 to 3 has overlooked the fact that this"had been done by Maimuni himself in his "Ma'amar ha-Yihud"", cf. also Back 18 & Eisler,pp.192 ff. cf. also Munk,p.507.

l.6 Revealed religions. S r. כתי דמשא W r. כתי דמשא

l.8 If it is possible. S r. 'Ee efshar'. A reader corrects

it to 'Im'. V & W r. 'Im'.

1.9 And under each. Back p.19

1.20 The principle. W omits Shoresh

1.26 Christians. W r. Ha-Aherim.

p.31 1.5 Infr. I,25,III,13.

p.32 1.3 People. S & V read "Har" instead of "'Am".

1.15 Some authors. The Hebrew text r. 'Mi she-kathab', but further on, line 19, A. uses the plural. He is thus inconsistent frequently.

1.17 Akedah. W r. 'La'akedath Yizhak'.

p.33 1.10 Ye that know righteousness. A. quotes here from memory. He begins the quotation with Isa. 46:12 שמעו אלי אבירי לב and continues it with ib. 51:7 ... יודעי צדק עם תורתי. W corrects it and we transl. accordingly.

1.23 The King has the power. Neum.ms. fn.: cf. Arist. Politica, III,ii (16). Jerush. R.H.57a. Horvitz, Monats. 1914,p.261

p.34 1.12 Immutability of the Law. Neum.ms.fn.: Maim. considers the Torah from Heaven as a subordinate dogmatical principle, counting Prophecy in general as the main principle. cf. Neum. Tol'doth vol.II,ch.Maimuni.

1.16 Reward for the soul. Neum.ms.fn. This interpretation is not correct; the 10th. principle refers to retribution in this world, the eschatalogical retribution being covered entirely by the 11th. principle.

p.36 1.9 Man.., fine balance. cf. III,1.

1.12 Him. W omits "'Alav".

1.15 One weaves. W omits "V'ehad ye-erog". S & V & all other editions, including the Pressburg, 1853, and the Lemberg, 1861, retain it.

1.24 Herbiverous animals. W r. כל הבעלי חיים, in parentheses. S omits כל הבעלי חיים

p.37 1.4 Man is social. "It is therefore clear... that man is a social (political) animal". Arist. Polit. I,c.2. cf. Sch. 622. ἄνθρωπος πολιτικὸν ζῷον.

1.17 Preserve the social group. Lip. interprets: anything which the social group will keep so that through that the people may live, etc.

1.22 Men. S r. 'ha-anâshim'. W incorrectly - 'ha-ishim'.

1.28 Conventional. Social justice is of course a matter of social agreement, whether in the sense of Hobbes and Rousseau, or in the way modern socialogists explain it.

p.38 1.2 Law. S r. 'ha-nimos'. W incorrectly - 'ha-nimosith'.

p.39 1.4 Remarkable arrangement. On the adaptation of animals cf. Arist. De partibus animalium. Bahya, Hoboth, IV, ch.3. Kusari III,11; V,8. Also A. IV,11. cf. Guttmann Monats. 1909 (53),p.72.

1.9 Duality of the senses. Galen considers even the taste as a double sense: the snake has a cleaved tongue. Gerson b. Solomon gives as the reason for two eyes, the possibility of accident. A. here claims that the doubling is not necessary, but is a special gift from Heaven. cf. Kaufmann, Die Sinne, pp.50 & 139. On the superiority of hearing over seeing v. Albo,III,2, Kaufm. ib. p.143; that the senses of taste and of touch, though a help to perfection, are not related to spiritual perfection, v.A. II,21 and Kaufm.ib.171.

1.20 Necessary. S r. 'Ha-mitstarfim'. V and the later eds. correct to 'Ha-mitstarkim'.

p.40 1.1 End to end. S & V- ארץ W - בארץ

1.9 The class, rulers. Counsellors, commanders, agricultural class. An allusion to the 3 classes in Plato's Republic. Neum.ms. fn.

1.13 And the individual. S r. וגוף היחוד כלל הכוונות כלל מה שהם בפועל בלתי מתנועת המשל במין המחולק וכללם במין המחולק כלל הכוונות כלל מה שהם המין כלל מה שהם,,,

V r. וגוף היחוד כלל הכוונות כלל מה שהם המין כלל מה שהם,,,

This is corrected by a reader to r. like S. W r. וגוף היחוד בלתי מתנועת המשל במין המחולק וכללם המחולק המין כלל הכוונות כלל מה שהם המין כלל מה שהם,,,

Neum.ms.fn.: This rather involved sentence explains the difference between the relation of the various kinds to their genus and between the relation of the different individuals to their kind. The kind is more of a real unity than the genus. The kinds have their aims in themselves, thus they do not tend to the perfection of the genus, the individuals have their aim in the kind, thus they do tend to the perfection of the kind. And even the classes among men, though resembling the kinds in the genus, are different from the latter in that the higher classes tend toward the perfection of the lower classes.

p.41 1.27 The perfection of life. S r. לתקון של מדות המושלמות כפי הכללי

W r. לתקון המדות כלל בקלקול הכללי

p.42 1.6 Correspond. W 'Be-madregoth'. S omits the "Beth".

p.43 1.1 Dath. A. understands Dath to be equivalent to the Latin

'religio', "bond", anything that binds, "guides", "regulates" people; it therefore usually means"religion", sometimes "law", "custom", "mores".

1.8 Natural. cf. N. to p.14,l.14.

Civil. cf. N. to p.14,l.15.

p.44 l.3 Establish. S - שימוק W - שינוק

1.5 True happiness. Christian influence can here be noted, that the aim of life is bliss after death. This is pointed out by the various writers on the subject.

p.45 l.11 The two parts... Ethic and Doctrine. Remarks Bernfeld (pp.483-4). cf. Mendelssohn, Philosophic Works, part I, p.451, and Bernfeld ib. p.575.

1.13 Improper. W adds

1.27 Through his nature. Lip. ad loc. also gives another interpretation,- at the beginning of his existence. Sch. seems to prefer the latter. p.28

p.46 l.4 He may indeed be prepared. Plato's idea of the unity of vocation: there is some definite disposition in every man prevailing in his makeup, qualifying him to a certain kind of work; while all individuals of an animal species have the same disposition. Neum.ms.fn.

1.7 Humann arranger of custom. "M'sader nimos enoshi". Sch. transl. "Anordner eines buergerlichen Gesetzes". p.29. It seems to me that Sch. misplaces the emphasis.

1.13 Women... in common... one class/ Plato. De republica, V.9.10.VIII.1. Sch.623. Neum.ms.fn.: This interpretation

of Plato is not correct; cf.Neum.Geschichte d. jud.Phil. II,1,p.256. My recollection of Dr. Neum's interpretation of Plato in this respect is that only the women of the philosophers' guild should be held in common.

1.23 Aristotle... censured. Polit.II,1-4. He relates (ch.3) that he heard from travellers,that in Upper Libya there are certain tribes, who have communism as regards women, and the children are recognized according to the physiognomies of the fathers. cf. Sch.p.623.

p.47 1.26 Aristotle... Ethics. Ethica Magna; so Raphall,p.9. Sch.quotes from Eth.Nicom.II,9: "It is very tiresome to find the exact mean in everything",etc. On the mean between the extremes, v.ib.ch.6. Schl.623.

p.48 1.2 To any man. "L'kal adam". Lip.ad loc. corrects to the more explicit "L'shum adam".

1.6 If it were in the constitution of man... Aristotle. A. was a typical scholastic in his adoration of Arist.

1.14 The human teachers of morals. רמז' כינוסים מקילים

Sch. again transl.:"Die Anordner buergerlicher Gesetze". p.30.

1.15 Cohabit. S.r. "she-yif'al". The other eds. correctly, "she-yib'al".

p.49 1.8 Idolators. S r. ע"ז 13/6 W - "!Amalekim". The latter reading is quite probable; the phrase "lehashmidam velimhok", etc., is usually associated with Israel's first enemies. It appears however,that the latter reading is a censor's substitution.

As an illustration of the freeness of the transl. in Raphall, we will quote a sentence of it here; the parentheses and

italics (here underlined) are Raphall's: "The Divine laws, however, explicitly declare that case to be <u>whenever it tends to glorify the name of God</u>, and that then only,(as in the case of Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah,) or in combating the enemies of God and their evil deeds, (as in the case of Samson,) death is more desirable than life". pp.9-10.

1.11 Cruelty... to unbelievers. We cannot take A to task for this. It was the spirit of the time; the Jew could think only of persecution to the unbeliever, when his fellow Christian thought of nothing else for him. cf.also Sch.623.

1.15 Guilt. S - ...

p.50 1.6 As the sun. A again quotes from memory. This phrase is not in that verse.

1.15 Cain and Abel... sisters. A refers here of course to the midrash that together with these two, their sisters and future spouses, were born.

p.51 1.23 Again civil religion. W inserts the usual...

p.52 1.12 This is the meaning of the Psalmist. Joel gives, as illustration that A even took verse - proofs and Scriptural interpretations from Cres.,the following quotation from Or Ad.III,4,14, as paralleling our passage here in A:...

Joel p.77. cf.also Sch.p.624.

p.54 1.1 And as regards. S r. ... - W ...

p.55 1.1 Freedom. A's view of Freedom,IV,5. cf.Arist.Eth.Nic.III, 1-7,Or Ad.II,1, chs.2 & 3,cf.Sch.624.

1.16 Right. S r. "ha-yosher". W r. "ha-yishub".

1.25 It is impossible. W inserts "la-'amod".

p.56 1.3 Maimonides. A agrees with Maim. vs. Cres. not to count Freedom and General Purpose as dogmas;cf. Bernfeld,484.

1.4 Among. S r. "bi-klal". W "mi-klal".

1.17 Well being. S r. [illegible] W r. [illegible]

p.57 1.8 Epicurus. He of course believed in pure chance, denying both General and Particular Purpose. cf.Sch.ib.

p.58 1.5 Removal. S r. "hiluk ahath". W - "siluk ehod". The criterion of the indispensibility of dogma for religion, A formulates much more sharply and keenly than Cres. Herein also he differs most markedly from Maim. and Cres. in counting as 'Anafim, some beliefs which those two considered essential dogmas.cf. Back,25 ff.also Eisler,192.

1.25 Essential. W omits [illegible]

p.59 1.2 Disbeliever... not included. cf.Back,p.31.

1.24 Epicureans. A gives here the correct interpretation of the word. Maim. (Introd. to Chapter Helek) derives it from the Aramaic "Pakar", to set free. V also Sch.624-5. Jaulus adduces a quotation from Duran,ch.10,which is parallel to our passage here (Monat.p.460): [illegible]

p.62 1.5 Creatures. S r. "lan'biim". The later eds. correctly "lanibraim".

1.11 Sub-lunar. The distinction between the sub-lunar world and beings and those above the 'luna' is quite classical.

1.14 Form. In the Aristotelian sense.

1.22 Human. S - הדולשות W - הדולשים

1.27 Therefore. S r. ומצה W - ולכן

1.28 Creations. S r. מיצורות W - הנשמות

p.63 1.17 After. S r. קלקף W correctly - ולתר. Verse 19.

p.64 1.7 Samael. On Satan's relation with women, v. Gn.Rab.,98. cf.Sch.625.

p.66 1.13 The forger. A quotes from memory: "Abi kal horesh". The correct quotation is, "Lotesh kal horesh".

1.15 Handle. Under Aramaic influence S r. "tofes" with a 'samek'. W reads correctly.

p.67 1.7 Quality of justice. In Rabbinic literature Elohim usually stands for justice, Yahweh for mercy. Philo, it is interesting to note, gave these Names the opposite interpretations.

p.68 11.15,18 As the super-lunar,as the sub-lunar. S r."Beth". W - "Kaf". So also p.70,1.5.

p.69 1.24 Which comes. S - "vehamagia". Lip. ad loc.corrects (and so also W) to "hamagia".

From. S r."milashon". W -"b'lashon".

p.70 1.27 Elisha Aher. Ben Abuiah. He was an unbeliever, not necessarily a dualist. cf.Sch.625.

p.71 1.6 From. S "umizeh". W "ubazeh".

1.7 Other. S "ha-aher". W - "ha-ehod".

Understood. W inserts שכל שלא

1.8 Ones. W inserts "kulam"

1.11 And by which is meant. W omits "ulazeh" before "r.l.".

1.21 Twice. Abraham: Gn.22:11.Moses:Ex.33:4. Samuel:I S 3:1. This interpretation is original with A. Rashi explains the doubling of the name as an indication of a special love. For Ibn Ezra's and Kimhi's interpretations, v. Sch.625.

1.26 For if there. S r. שאינם הוה הראשון ופשוט

W r. שלא היתה הוה ופשוט

1.28 Because in the image of God made He man. W omits this entire phrase.

p.72 1.17 General. Particular. S r. "hak'lalith ve-hap'ratith". W r."M" for "Tau".

p.73 1.5 Said in Gn.Rab. W omits the phrase (שהוא) דרך הפשט אינו

and r. simply (שהוא) דרך הנמשל

p.74 1.9 Many of the sages. Maim. (M.N.II,27.30).Saadia (Emmun. ch.1). Halevi (Kuzari,I,67,V,18). cf.Sch.pp.625-6.

1.11 Believed it. S - "sheyaaminah". W - "sheyaamin".

1.17 Deny...Moses...Messiah, because....Neum.ms.fn.: This passage which afforded so much difficulty to the commentators, goes back to Saadia's fourth proof for creatio ex nihilo, Emunoth,I,1: The existence of any individual descending from preceding individuals is a proof against eternity, in as much as such an individual presupposes an infinite number of predecessors, having been traversed in order to reach it. Neum.ad loc. takes this sentence as a parenthesis, in which A incidentally argues against Jews and Christians, holding Arist's idea of the eternity of the world, with this rather sarcastic argument. The

Messiah is most likely to include Jesus: According to this view, neither Moses nor Christ could have existed, as indeed no individual at all.

1.22 Primordial eternal matter. This view of an eternal primary matter which the Demiurge endows with Form is Plato's (Timaeus). cf.also Lip.ad loc. and Sch.626. This is not the place for a criticism of the respective theories of the two Greek philosophers.

p.75 1.14 Accidents. In the philosophic sense, of course, of non-essential.

p.76 1.3 Sefer. All the eds. incorrectly read "perek".

1.9 Heretic him who does not believe in... ex nihilo. Neum. ms.fn. A follows here the interpretation of the Rabad. The real view of Maim.however, is that one who does not believe in God as a principle of being and becoming is a heretic which includes only one who believes in primary matter, but by no means one who believes the eternity of the world, this being compatible with God as a principle of being and becoming.

p.77 1.15 He who denies. S "vekal". W- "ki kal". Here A discusses the dogmas objectively: To deny Unity is to deny God. He however, who thinks that he believes in God - as the Torah prescribes it - when he believes in dualism, is not a denier of God. Note "is as if", because if he is sincere, he really does not, as A clearly shows in Ch.2. cf.also Sch.627,Karpeles,183.

p.78 1.2 Fate. Predetermination. Moreh,III,17.23. Arabic-Kadr. This doctrine,"as advocated by the Ashariyah, repudiates chance or accident in any realm of existence, so that

the fall of a leaf is as preordained as the death of a human being; it repudiates also the freedom of will and the existence of possibilities; makes the divine precepts useless and divine actions without a final cause, and places the will of God above justice and injustice." Efros, p.18. One sect in Islam (the Dshemihtes) even subject God to Fate. Sch.627. Maim. and A combat these views.

p.80 1.3 Professes it. He who denies the root (dogma), and he who accepts it.

1.5 Any commandment. The view that no commandment may be considered a dogma or principle is set forth by Nahmanides in his Glosses on Maim. Cres. developes it (Introd. to Or Ad.). Later opponents of A, like Abrabanel, concede this point. cf. Sch.627. Jaulus finds here another parallelism between A and Duran, ib.ch.10. (Monat.p.460):

כי יוצאין כולן מאותו אחד הנזכר שהאחד הזה הוא שלימה דקיו אשמה
דוגמתן אלא שהאחד הזה הוא השורש והשלימה כולם הם

1.6 Transgressors in Israel. "Posh'e Yisrael". The term is technical in Talmudic literature for sinners of a certain description. But aside from the fact that the description varies with the different traditions, the term is also used generally to designate Jewish sinners of any kind. Neum.ms.fn.

1.17 A commandment. S r. ס אסון W - אסון

1.19 (Should one say). W inserts אי אפשר, which is lacking in S.

1.23 Law of Idolatry. Foundations. In allusion to Maim.'s great work. p.81

p.81 1.8 That whosoever. W omits "shekal".

1.10 As if he deny. Moreh, III, 29, end, brings this quotation

from the Sifre.cf.Megillah,15: He who denies idolatry,is called 'Jew'. Kiddushin,p.49a: Idolatry is so important, that he who denies it, is as if he had acknowledged the entire Torah. cf.Sch.pp.627-8.

1.12 And knew. S retains the participial construction,"veyodea", W r.,"veyada".

1.19 Arrangement. World order; natural law; arrangement of the stars.

1.21 Their. S correctly uses the plural suffix, W - the sing. fem.

1.27 One may say then. S ܐܡܪ ܐ W - ܐܡܪ

p.82 1.26 Unity... two phases. The two senses of Unity here are traceable to Cres. Cres. gives up the attempt of proving Unity as excluding Dualism, as incapable of logical proof; he therefore falls back on the Scriptural "Sh'ma". Cres. does however, prove the other sense of Unity (Simplicity); A therefore calls it a derivative principle. cf.Husik, p.414; also ib.p.392.

p.83 1.4 From the one,i.e.,the second point of view.

1.5 From the other,i.e.,the first point of view.

1.10 I am the Lord. Ontheothe various views whether or not this is the first commandment,v.Sch.628.

p.84 1.8 This is why S ܗܘ ܐ W - ܐܡܪ

p.85 1.1 The principles. cf.Back,p.23.

1.18 Beginninglessness as did Maimonides. "Kadmon" means originally the earliest, or at most, 'eternal in the past', while 'nitzhi' means originally lasting, 'eternal in the future'. But the two terms have come to mean 'Eternal' in an absolute sense and A's stricture upon Maim. is

hardly justified. Neum. ms. fn. cf. on criticism of Maimon. Back, 17.

p. 86 l. 8 Omniscience. Usually counted under third dogma. cf. Back, p. 24.

l. 9 From the nature of these. W inserts "hash'loshah".

l. 22 Verification of the Mission. cf. Back, 18.

p. 87 l. 21 The principle. cf. supr. N. to p. 86, l. 8, also Sch. 628.

p. 88 l. 11 Reward. On the various views on reward, v. IV, 30. Sch. 628.

p. 89 l. 8 It is evident. cf. Back, p. 29.

l. 17 Prophecy of Moses. Neum. ms. fn. The commentators found this passage to be in contradiction with what was said in ch. 3 or even above in this ch. and suggested rather inacceptable harmonizations. They failed however, to see that this passage treats of the <u>prophecy</u> of Moses, while the preceding passages treat of the <u>superiority</u> of the prophecy of Moses. The superiority of the Messenger of the Torah is a particular principle to it, while the Torah as such could well exist if God had chosen any individual other than Moses b. Amram, whether or the same or of any other name, as His messenger to convey this Torah.

p. 90 l. 12 Omniscience and Providence. Cres. considers them as two fundamentals. Or Ad. II, 1, 2. Sch. 629.

p. 91 l. 1 Some early writers. Pyreneans and Sceptics. cf. Sch. ib.

p. 92 l. 26 Who. YḤR. H. 26a. cf. Sch. ib.

p. 94 l. 6 Love. S r. "hafsed". Corrected by a reader and in the other eds! to "ha-hesed".

p. 96 l. 15 Not appropriate. S and V r. [illegible]. W r. [illegible]

p.98 1.12 (Not). S r. ואולם W inserts ואולי מה

p.100 1.3 Which is the desired. W r. מתקרב ,with an unnecessary מ.

p.102 1.1 Since we find. The whole ch. is a discussion of the Mission of the Messenger. cf. Back, 18 & 23.

1.5 Theriac. cf. Sch. p. 630. Also Jastrow, Talmudic Dictionary.

p.103 1.20 And not be burned. W merely adds וכוותיהו יקדם. S & V continue וילך על פני המים ולא ניזוק. An allusion to some of the miracles of Jesus, and therefore evidently censored in the later eds.

p.104 1.4 Walks on the face of the waters. S & V r. ולך על פני המים
ולא שזקקו ליסדלר ול ולא שלך דמו ולש ולא
דשבה יכולה ולא שורפול המלכים ולא המעלכדים
W r. ולך דמו ולש ולרוחו הוכוותיהו כן

p.108 1.22 Eight. W r. חל S r. חל

p.109 1.2 Heard. W adds — ולא תקבל ואמר ל

1.19 Future. S & V continue ע"י תלדנו שתוך ולדתה ולא נתן רשות
המלאת כדרך אפשר שיראו קשה
W r. הרשעות כדרך אפשר שיראה ע"י תלדנו שתוך ולדתה ולא
נתן רשות המלאת כדרך אפשר שיראה קשה

1.24 Art. W has the plural.

p.110 1.11 In his middle age. W omits this.

1.23 When he dies... middle age. W omits.

1.28 Vayisa.... Each of these verses has 72 letters; for the Cabbalistic indications, v. Sch. 630.

p.112 1.1 Belief. On the various opinions on belief, v. Sch. 630-32.

1.4 Will not conceive the innate ideas. W properly corrects S & V by inserting here, "S'thirath".

1.19 Upon any human being. A thus opposes Maim. Mor. II, 32. cf. Sch. 632.

p.113 l.10 Rejects. S r. "Yemaen". W r. "Lo yaamin".

p.115 l.9 Sixty myriads. For the Cabbalistic implications v.Sch. 632-3.

l.23 Founders...dependencies. Crossed out by censor. iñnS & V. W omits שמנה אלופים, ושבעה ואחד. Lemberg ed. leaves spaces here.

l.26 Two. W omits "sh'the".

p.116 l.3 And any religion...not revealed. Crossed out by censor in S.

p.117 ll.4&9 Nations. Censor crossed out in V. W adds לא

l.22 And God will answer. S r."Veha-Shem yashib". W r. "Vehasheb yashib".

l.25 Nations. W r. עכו"ם S & V r. גוים

p.119 Chs. 21 & 22. Sch.discusses the how of good deeds and reward, pp.632-4.

p.124 l.2 Their. S r.plur. W r.fem.sing.

ll.6&7 Other. Another. S r. "Aher". W r."Ehod".

p.125 l.2 Elisha. W adds "Ha-nabi".

p.126 l.1 The doctrines. These are the 'Anafim which are not essential but important. cf.Bloch,790,Back,24,Eisler,197.

l.4 Ex nihilo. Sch.lists the views of the various thinkers on Creation. pp.634-5. Back points out that A contradicts himself on this doctrine. Here he classes it with the first dogma and in ch.15 he does not class it with any of the dogmas. cf.Back,p.24,fn.50.

l.6 Its. S has fem.sing.suffix. W masc.plur.

l.21 Mediacy of a Separate Intellect. Neum.ms.fn.:This refers to the theory of spheres of the Arabic Peripatetics.... According to this theory the world is the result of

divine emanation as an eternal process: God emanates the first intellect which in turn emanates another intellect and the highest,the 9th sphere (according to the Ptolmeic world picture). This second cosmic intellect emanates a third and the 8th sphere which hold the fixed stars. The fourth intellect again emanates a fifth intellect and the sphere of the planet Saturn, and so on to... the moon, each one of the intellects having the function of the moving energy in this sphere. The ninth intellect produces a tenth intellect called "the active intellect", who governs the sub-lunar matter which is the last product of emanation. This intellect produces matter out of nothing, since none of the spirits contains matter in his essence. A then,claims that we might just as well conceive matter as produced directly by God.

p.127 l.1 By necessity. In this argument A draws from Maim. and Cres. cf.Husik,416.

p.128 l.2 The trans. in Raphall,p.56,of this paragraph is illustrative of its freeness.

l.8 The pious among the nations. ~~Quoted also in~~ Maim. Hilk.. T'shub.III. cf.Sch.635.

p.129 l.25 Repentance. Prayer.p.130,l.3. Sh'kinah. l.5. Urim Ve-Thumim. A here opposes his teacher Cres. Or Ad.II,7:2, 1:2. Sch.635. On Cres's view of the Urim Ve-Thumim,cf. Neum.,Cresças and Spinoza,end.

p.130 l.25 Who would thus. The trans. in Raphall, p.57,misunderstands the entire thought,by translating: "He who denies them is called **min**, 'heretic,' and has no share in the life to come."


p.131 In this chapter A lays down the fine principle of not only liberty, but necessity, of free thought and research. Sch!s(635 ff.) strictures may well be answered that A lays no claim to being a philosopher. He is a theologian, and a Jewish theologian; as such, all his argumentation necessarily will lead to the proof that Judaism is the true religion. Call it petitio principii, if you will (as indeed Hirsch, JE, art.Albo,does); but herein lies the difference between the two disciplines. Theology starts out with a particular religion in mind, to find proof for it; philosophy works backwards. Backwards: for after all man's foremost speculative interest is in first rationally, establishing the truth of his own viewpoint and system. It is only as one has established the truth of his religious views, philosophically, that one may - if one has the leisure and the inclination - then test his individual methods by general philosophic methods. This is Maimonides' work. In A's day however, there was no leisure for such reconstruction. He, together with the other Jewish thinkers, were hard pressed by their only too practical enemies, to have the leisure for further theoretic, philosophic speculations. Furthermore, "Wie es Christelt sich," etc., and Christian scholasticism was in the last throes of death, in the middle of the fifteenth century; and so was Jewish scholasticism. A's prime purpose was the defense of Judaism, not of religion in general, (although he bases his system on the broad classification of three kinds of religion,and subdivides

the premises of religion accordingly); we cannot therefore take a man to task for not having chosen a different purpose, under the circumstances; our only test of A is, has he succeeded in accomplishing his task? our answer is an admiring yes. His courage, his lucidity, his straightforwardness, are unimpeachable. He does apparently quote from other sources without acknowledging them by name; perhaps he thought they would be known anyhow; perhaps, as preacher, he was not interested in scientific footnotes; the fear of plagiarism certainly was not as strongly developed in his day as it is in our own. He may be excused for that, if he fulfill the purpose he set himself, which is certainly original in its main part; by his division of religions, by his criterion for recognizing the false from the true, by its wide latitude, by differentiating between essential principles and unessential ones, by his insistence that by the performance of one Mitzvah conscientiously, one may attain man's supreme purpose, by all this, despite minor deficiencies, Albo - as a theologian - towers among the mighty.

p.131 l.3 Whether a religionist.... As one of the proofs that the author of the famous epistle to Paulus Burgensis was not the same Joshua Lorki who later as Geronimo de Santa Fe, apostate, contended with Albo in Tortosa, Bruell (p.52) brings this passage from Albo to show that he reproduced, with some omissions and changes, the last part of Lorki's epistle, and although Albo

does not mention Lorki by name, he would hardly have made use of his writing if Geronimo - against whom he personally defended the teachings of Judaism - had been its author. (So Bruell; it seems to me however, that the fact that the "Ikkarim" as a whole was not published before 1425 - Zurita, or 1428 - Zakuto, v.Back 8, yet our Section seems to have been ready before 1410 - as v. supr. - and that the disputations did not take place before 1413 to 1414, should be taken into account.)

Lorki's letter is printed in "Dibre Hakamim", pp.41-46; Bruell's quotation is from the end of the letter, pp. 45-46, as follows:



p.132 l.8 Trinity. So S & V "Kashilush". Censored. Pressburg ed. and W "Bashniyuth" - due to the fear of the censor.

p.133 l.10 Known. S - "hanodaoth", W "hano'adoth".

p.134 l.3 Will reflect. S - "k'she-n'ayen", W - "k'she-y'ayen".

l.6 That that religion. S W

l.9 That religion. W omits "ha-hi".

l.17 The choice. S "b'hirath", W "b'hinath".

l.21 Aristotle. Eth.Nic., III,13. Maim. quotes Arist., Moreh, II, 36 & 40. The latter is quoted by A. here. cf.Kaufmann,

Die Sinne,188.

1.25 Trinity. S & V "vehashilush". Censored. W substitutes-

p.135 1.23 Greater... than that. W omits "mizeh".

1.24 By this. S בזאת W בזה

p.136 1.14 It is false pretending. Censored in S.

p.138 1.7 On such. S [illegible] W [illegible]

p.139 1.26 In its essence. S - "b'einah", W - "b'einam".

p.140 1.7 Species... genera. For the relation of the Sharashim to the Ikkarim, cf.supr. also Back,19.

1.15 Omniscience. In ch.15 (supr.), A classifies this principle under the second dogma. v.ib.

p.141 1.1 Crescas. cf.Joel,76, Back,4,9-10; Sch.638 ff. gives an outline of Cres's book and system.

1.10 Christians... Corporeality. [illegible]

S & V censored. W as usual, r. [illegible]

p.142 1.6 Freedom. Here A is uncertain whether or not to count Freedom as a principle, and in ch.3 he criticises Cres. severely for counting it as such. v.supr.ib.also Back,17-18. cf.however Neum.Tol'doth,II,177.

1.14 And thus do we conclude the first Section. We append here a short resume of Albo's system as it is developed in the first Section. The prevailing religious systems are unsatisfactory; they do not sound the depths of religious thought profoundly enough; it therefore devolves on our author to do so himself. (Introduction). Investigation into dogmas is very dangerous, because though all are agreed as to the general principles, there is great divergence of opinion as to particular

matters; and any one denying the principles peculiar to a particular religion, excludes himself from that religion. Thus, Maim. considers the Messiah as an essential principle, and though R. Hillel did not believe in it, he was yet not considered excommunicated. The truth of course is that the Messiah is not an essential dogma. According to Maimonides however, to deny the Messiah is to deny Judaism. (Chapter One). The criterion for testing a person's attitude is: that as long as he professes belief in the Mosaic Torah he is a good Jew. If his studying has led him to give a different interpretation to the Mosaic Torah, he still remains a good Jew if he is sincere. The Torah does not require belief in anything which the human mind rejects; this of course does not exclude miracles in the nature of things. This is said in defense of philosophy against its virulent opponents. (Chapter Two). Ikkar is that on which the being and existence of a thing is completely dependent. Maim. counts thirteen Ikkarim for Judaism; his number thirteen is untenable, because it is either too much or too little. Crescas gives the number six; that too is unsatisfactory: they are necessary but not enough for a revealed religion. (Chapter Three). Therefore Albo lays down his own number: three, from which branch out other principles, some of which are common to all religions, such as God's Eternity; others are particular for certain religions: the Prophecy of Moses, e.g., is essential only for Judaism. (Chapter Four). Albo recognizes other forms of control besides that of revealed

religion, namely, natural and civil religion or law. These also have their fundamentals, just as every science has its premises on which it builds. The two principles for civil religion are Freedom and Purpose. For unless man has Freedom he cannot be expected to do or to refrain from doing, at will; also the lawgiver must have a purpose in mind when he lays down the religion: the establishment of law and order in the community. (Chapter Nine). The premises of revealed religion are three, the Existence of God, Revelation (Torah from Heaven)is used by Albo in this sense), and Reward and Punishment. They are absolutely essential: without a Deity or without Revelation there could be no revealed religion; and without Reward and Punishment, physical in this world, and spiritual in the world to come, why a revealed religion? a civil would do quite sufficiently. But the purpose of revealed religion is clearly more than merely that of establishing law and order among people, namely, the perfection of the human soul and its eternal bliss (Chapter Ten). Creatio ex nihilo is not an essential dogma for Judaism; because he who believes, with Plato, in a primal hyle which God gave a Form, can believe all that the Torah requires belief in. (Chapter Twelve). Merely to believe in the three dogmas alone however, is not enough; because they have their respective principles which explain them and give them their content; to believe in the corporeality of God, e.g., is to deny God. (Chapter Thirteen). But we must first posit that no single commandment of the

Torah may be considered an essential principle, for to transgress a commandment of the Torah is not to leave Judaism, whereas one does leave Judaism when one denies a principle. (Chapter Fourteen). The principles of the first dogma - the Existence of God, are: Unity, Incorporeality, Independence of Time, Perfection. The principles of the second dogma - Revelation, are: Prophecy, the Mission of the Messenger. (cf.NN. to Chs.15 & 26 on Omniscience). The principles of the third dogma - Reward and Punishment, are: Omniscience and Providence. Freedom and Purpose are not principles to revealed religion in so far as it is revealed; since they are also principles to civil religion. (Chapter Fifteen). Now, these are the dogmas and principles for any religion that would be divine. However, a religion can have these and yet not be revealed, unless people actually heard God proclaiming it or saying that that particular person is His messenger. This was the case with the Torah of Moses; 600,000 people <u>experienced</u> revelation, and heard God say to Moses that he should be His messenger. No religion can take its place therefore, unless it too would be proclaimed in the presence of 600,000 people under the same circumstances as the Sinaitic Revelation. (Chapters Seventeen to Twenty-two). Having thus established the truth of the Mosaic Torah, Albo gives the six 'Anafim (doctrines) which - though not essential for the Mosaic Torah - should be accepted by its every adherent; namely, Creatio ex nihilo, the superiority of the Prophecy of Moses to that of all

other prophets, the Immutability of the Mosaic Torah, that human perfection is attainable through the conscientious observance of one Mitzvah of the Mosaic Torah, Resurrection, the Messiah, six in all. (Chapter Twenty-three). Freedom of research and thought is granted to and required of every religionist. (But of course, Judaism has already been proved; since all agree that it is true, since it has been known empirically.) (Chapter Twenty-four). It is possible however, that there should be more than one Torah at the same time, since people differ with different climes and countries. (Chapter Twenty-five). This is the substance of Albo's system; for criticisms of individual points, v.NN.supr.

p.142 l.16 Praise. cf.Back,p.8.

l.21 Who asked of me. S & V r. "bikshu mimeni", W r. "shebikshu mimenu".

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